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title : The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics SUNY
Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy
author : Bodéüs, Richard.
publisher : State University of New York Press
isbn10 | asin : 0791416100
print isbn13 : 9780791416105
ebook isbn13 : 9780585086866
language : English
subject Aristotle--Contributions in political science, Aristotle.--
Nicomachean ethics, Ethics, Ancient.
publication date : 1993
lcc : JC71.A41B63 1993eb
ddc : 320/.01/1
subject : Aristotle--Contributions in political science, Aristotle.--
Nicomachean ethics, Ethics, Ancient.
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The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics

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SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy
Anthony Preus, Editor

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The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics

by
Richard Bodéüs

translated by
Jan Edward Garrett

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

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The book was originally published under the title of Le Philosophe et la cité by Publications de la Faculté de
Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bodéüs, Richard.
[Philosophe et la cité. English]
The political dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics / by Richard Bodéüs
; translated by Jan Edward Garrett.
p. cm. (SUNY series in ancient Greek philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7914-1609-7 (cloth : alk. paper). ISBN 0-7914-1610-0
(pbk.: alk. paper)
1. AristotleContributions in political science. 2. Aristotle.
Nicomachean ethics. 3. Ethics, Ancient. I. Title. II. Series.
JC71.A41B63 1993
320'.01dc20 92-34024
CIP

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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Contents

Author's Preface to the English Edition ix

Translator's Preface xi

Abbreviations xiii

Introduction 1

Chapter 1 In Search of Aristotle's Project

9
I. Difficulties peculiar to the interpretation of Aristotle

10
II. 1. The Corpus in the catalog of Andronicus of Rhodes

11
2. Conceptions inherent in the principles of division

13
3. The supposed foundations of the systematizing interpretation

16
III. 1. The first set of interpretive categories

18
2. A second set of interpretive categories

20
3. A third set of interpretive categories

22
4. Provisional balance sheet

22
IV. 1. The common plan of the Ethics and the Politics: Ancient testimonies

24
2. Modern exegesis

27
V. 1. A key-concept:

30
2. Prudential knowledge

36
3. Conclusions

38
VI. The meaning of Aristotle's project

Chapter 2 The Justification for a Political Teaching

1. On the insufficiency of discourse for forming the good person 54 2. 47 I. A privileged document 48 2. 1. A reflection in the Socratic-Platonic tradition 49 3. The limits of discourse in education 51 II. On the need for laws 57 3. On the formation of the lawgiver < previous page page_v next page > .

1. A basic aspect of the discourse: The methodological statements Chapter 5 The Audience of the Political Discourses 97 I. The purpose of the lectures contained in the Ethics and the Politics 63 2. Aristotle and the development of philosophy Chapter 4 The Public Character of Aristotle's Discourses 83 I. 1. Philosophy to the aid of the lawgiver Chapter 3 The Development of Aristotle's Philosophy and Aristotle's Position in the Development of Philosophy 69 I. The concerns of the "speaker" 100 II.< previous page page_vi next page > Page vi 59 III. The traces of didactic precaution 95 3. Oral communications 88 3. An opening of the school to the city? 92 5. Affinities with the Protrepticus 77 III. Differences with Plato 93 II. Lectures of a more or less private nature 89 4. Obscure material circumstances 94 2. The complex nature of the documents 85 2. The problem 71 II. Affinities with Politics vii-viii 73 2. 1. Prerequisites for the discourse . Introduction 84 1. The intellectual nature of legislative activity 66 IV.

Education and critical aptitude 106 1. The faculty of "comprehension" 105 III. 100 1. In drawing < previous page page_vi next page > . The experience required of the listener 103 3. The limits of language as instrument of knowledge 102 2. In music 108 2.

New preliminaries for the discourse 119 2. The deficiencies of the traditional interpretation 112 3. In medicine 109 4. The practical relevance of education 118 1. Results of to be avoided 115 4.< previous page page_vii next page > Page vii 108 3. The unity of the concept "educated" 111 2. The need to be educated 110 1. General education and politics 118 V. Conclusion 110 IV. Ethics and Politics 123 Notes 127 Bibliography 199 Index of Passages from Plato and Aristotle 225 Index of Ancient and Medieval Names 237 Index of More Important Greek Terms 239 Subject Index 241 < previous page page_vii next page > . "Good moral habits" and practical education Conclusion Education.

108-11. Patzig (Göttingen. 1990). ed. 1987). Lord and D." in Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science. "Savoir politique et savoir philosophique. < previous page page_ix next page > . "Deux propositions sur le droit naturel chez les continentaux d'Amérique.< previous page page_ix next page > Page ix Author's Preface to the English Edition This book first appeared in Paris in 1982. "Qu'est-ce que parler adéquatement des choses humaines? La réponse d'Aristote. O'Connor (University of California Press. 1991). by G." in Aristoteles' 'Politik'. These include: "Law and the Regime. It is now translated into English without any major revisions. "L'homme d'Aristote et son avenir. Since 1982." Dialogue 29 (1990): 21-49." Revue Philosophique de Louvain 85 (1987): 143- 70. Minor corrections have been made and at various points a more appropriate presentation has been adopted. 329-55. by C. But the content is basically the same as in the original version. ed. 234-50. Vrin. An up-to-date version of most of these complementary publications can be found in my book Politique et philosophie chez Aristote (Namur. Belgium: Société des Études Classiques. 1991). 101-23. I have published several complementary pieces in scholarly journals and anthologies. and partly in response to recent literature on related topics.'' Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 94 (1989): 369-89." in L'Avenir (Paris: J. "L'imagination au pouvoir.

has worked closely with the translator. and Christine Lynch. Pierre Pellegrin. SUNY Press's Series Editor in Ancient Philosophy. whose English is quite excellent. who had been invited by the institute's organizers to address the participants on Aristotle's biology. (Any errors of translation or English-language style that remain in the final product. of Western Kentucky University. One suggestion Bodéüs and I have adopted from Fred Miller is to reduce the prominence of Greek terms relative to their frequency of occurrence in the original work. < previous page page_xi next page > . Anthony Preus. We have tried to make at least the main text of the book accessible to readers who know little or no Greek. I quickly became convinced that not only was his emphatic recommendation justified. Biology and Ethics. Those due thanks for working through the complete text and providing helpful criticisms regarding unclarities and awkward sentence structure include Richard Weigel and Alan B. In June 1992 he came to Western Kentucky University to work with me in order to resolve numerous points of difficulty that remained. but also that this was a book that should be made available to a wider audience of scholars whose limited knowledge of French might impede their reading the original. we have translated the first occurrence of a Greek term and then used that translation consistently.< previous page page_xi next page > Page xi Translator's Preface This translation of Richard Bodéüs' Le philosophe et la cité: Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans la pensée d'Aristote is indirectly the product of a National Endowment for the Humanities Institute on Aristotle's Metaphysics. in which I participated in 1988. From the early stages of this project. SUNY Press's Production Editor. a work of which most of us were then entirely unaware. Anderson of the Departments of History and of Philosophy and Religion. checking the translation for accuracy and taking the opportunity to make minor revisions and corrections. During one of these meetings Pellegrin made it clear to those who knew some French that we just had to read Richard Bodéüs' book. The author. and Fred Miller Jr. Taking Pellegrin's advice to heart. of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center of Bowling Green State University in Ohio. Generally. Special thanks are due William Eastman. Director at SUNY Press. Several other scholars have read the translation at various stages of refinement. however.) I want to acknowledge also the encouragement I have received in this project from colleagues in the 1988 Politics discussion group and other scholars working in the interpretation of Aristotle. joined in the discussions of a special interest group on the Politics which some of us had formed. are the responsibility of the translator. the support and cooperation of State University of New York Press have been essential. respectively.

In doing so. there has been no attempt to translate the French edition's untranslated Greek.< previous page page_xii next page > Page xii while eliminating the Greek term. Italian. but have not normally provided the basis for my renderings. 1934). Spanish and Dutch) have been translated. Bodéüs' commentary on these citations is often closely tied to the French translations he was citing in his original book. 1985). in the following passages. the reader is typically given the Greek and a translation. Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. though for the Nicomachean Ethics I have also consulted translations by T. Where longer quotes are at issue. and by H. for the most part those found in Barnes 1984. however. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett. German. With respect to the notes. by M. Mass. 1962). I have frequently checked the result against widely used English translations.: Harvard University Press [Loeb Classical Library]. A word about my strategy for handling citations from Aristotle is in order. But citations from modern European languages (French. These translations may have inspired a word choice here or there. Because Prof. JAN EDWARD GARRETT WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY < previous page page_xii next page > . my primary approach has been to retranslate the French into English. Rackham (Cambridge.

Teubner. Cited from Aristoteles' Politik. Teubner. Cited from Aristotle on Coming to Be and Passing Away. by O. edited by W. Ph = Physics. Joachim. M = Metaphysica. < previous page page_xiii next page > . A Post. 1912. H. edited by L. Minio-Paluelo. 1965. D. [1894] 1962). Me = Meteorologica. DA = De anima. 1956. unless otherwise noted. Les Belles Lettres. text established and translated by P. Of the NE there is no truly satisfactory critical edition. Bywater (Oxford Classical Texts. The two works are cited in accord with Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics. = Analytica Posteriora. A. 1970. Louis. PA = Les parties des animaux. however. Cambridge. Moraux. Mass. followed the text of W. 1957). Ross. edited by F. Ross. = Analytica Priora. D. Leipzig. with introduction and commentary by W. EE = Ethica Eudemia. Susemihl [Leipzig. edited by W. Paris. Paris. 1922. M. Teubner. Oxford Classical Texts. 1919. edited by F. text established and translated by P.< previous page page_xiii next page > Page xiii Abbreviations After the interpretation of the abbreviations. Dreizehnter. A revised text with introduction and commentary by W. Munich. 1883. 1884]. 1907. Teubner. edited by F. D. Fobes. D. GC = De la génération et de la corruption. text established and translated by P. GA = De la génération des animaux. 1949. Amsterdam. NE = Ethica Nicomachea. 1949. I have sometimes. HA = Historia animalium. introduced. Apelt. Oxford Classical Texts. Hakkert. Les Belles Lettres. Susemihl. A Revised Text with introduction and commentary by H. 3rd ed. edited by F. Sometimes I have preferred the text of I. Leipzig. Les Belles Lettres. Oxford Classical Texts. 1936. DC = Du ciel. Leipzig.. 1967. I indicate the edition whose text I have followed. A revised text. edited by L. 1957. 1961. C = Categoria (et liber de interpretatione). edited and indexed by A. P = Politics. Susemihl. Jaeger. Louis. Oxford. H. MM = Magna Moralia. Oxford. Oxford. A Pr. Ross. Paris. Ross (Oxford Classical Texts. Dittmeyer.

edited by R. These two final works are cited from their common edition by W. D. Florence. 21-65). < previous page page_xiv next page > . Kassel. Oxford Classical Texts. Prot. Les Belles Lettres. R = Rhétorique. 2 vols. Düring. Göteborg. Paris. pp. because this collection includes longer passages of text. 1932-1938. [1934] 1963. 1958). SR = Sophistical Refutations. I have sometimes referred to the fragments according to the enumeration of R.. 1961. 1965.< previous page page_xiv next page > Page xiv Po = De arte poetica. Dufour. by I. = Protrepticus. Ross (Oxford Classical Texts. Walzer (Aristotelis dialogorum fragmenta in usum scholarum. T = Topica. An Attempt at Reconstruction. text established and translated by M.

the master left his imprint forever upon the mind of the disciple. This is so true that the attentive reader of Aristotle can often receive the impression that he finds in Aristotle's works. tries to analyze philosophical problems only for the purpose of determining the relative chronology of the writings in which they are stated. in the first. doubtlessly one of the most fertile in the entire history of philosophical thought. to a clear break with Platonism in order to adopt a more empirical orientation. in almost constant interaction. to adherence to the strictest Platonism and. an obsession which. the obsession with fixing ever more precisely the stages of Aristotle's career. A sound approach subordinates inquiries concerning relative or absolute dating of texts to understanding their intellectual content. Anyone who has visited the Room of the Signature in the Vatican and stood before Raphael's School of Athens will remember the meaningful image offered by the figures of Plato and Aristotle in the center of the composition. It is the concise representation of a dialogue conducted over a period of twenty years by the master of the Academy and his disciple from Stagira.6 The bulk of the studies undertaken to verify or correct this hypothesis has only very rarely (alas!) attained the high level of the views expressed by the one who inspired them. in short. The "genetic" obsession is.3 However. willingly reverses the order required by a sound exegesis. This problem had appeared to be brilliantly solved when interpreters recognized the results obtained by W. until the death of Plato in May 347. as T. In fact.C.2 They were associates. Gomperz said. after all. testifying. 1 The first encounter between the two men probably took place in the year 366/5 B. the "Platonist" and the "Asclepiad" confronting each other on all the great questions of philosophy. who applied the method of Entwicklungsgeschichte to Aristotle's works.4 Without doubt the most formidable problem confronted by interpreters of the Corpus Aristotelicum is the difficulty of reconciling positions maintained by Aristotle as heir of the Academy with those he maintained as champion of a new philosophy.< previous page page_1 next page > Page 1 Introduction I 1. likely to lead to an error which one has the right to denounce a priori: "in the absence of exter- < previous page page_1 next page > . in the second.5 Many were then persuaded that the philosopher's writings belonged in fact to two successive phases of Aristotelian research. Jaeger.7 They are often committed to a method which neglects the essential task the interpreter must accept. at Athens.

for they think themselves called upon to attempt a hypothetical reconstruction of the lost works rather than to illuminate."16 Aristotle. that they noticeably modify certain earlier positions. 2. our author thought.'' and so on. all things considered. According to Düring. Ingemar Düring's Aristoteles."14 The picture of Aristotle which one tends to receive from this interpretation is that of the inquirer.< previous page page_2 next page > Page 2 nal criteria.12 the most complete and ambitious work devoted to the philosopher since Jaeger." an "Urpolitik. Düring not only rejects. the idea of Aristotle's work as a rigid system of doctrines. according to a movement "which leads to increasingly refined structures of thought and to increasingly subtle understanding. the effort to attain and identify an "Urmetaphysik. I refer to the claim that the writings of Aristotle's first period testify to an adherence to the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. but the way in which he affirms it and poses the questions. very hard to sustain. by means of their preserved fragments. challenged the thesis of Entwicklung on a point of decisive significance. Düring writes. But Düring's interpretation invites conclusions which are hard to accept. like the attempt of Homeric philology in the nineteenth century to reconstruct a primitive Iliad. the most interesting thing with him is not generally what he affirms (results).15 Speaking of Aristotle's procedure. of course." 8 Moreover. but also takes for granted that Aristotle himself was a "problematic" philosopher. the "genetic" current of interpretation contributes to nostalgia for studies bearing on essential content.17 In other words. excels in discussion of disputed questions. the major texts of the philosopher which have been recognized as authentic. published in 1966. as Jaeger did.9 Even Jaeger's worthy effort to take into account fragments of lost Aristotelian works for the genetic interpretation of the Corpus10 seems to have turned his imitators away from their basic task. has mutatis mutandis the effect of shifting emphasis from the synthesis to early drafts or works which prepare for it. but the stages of this progress are the stages of a continuous organic development. a chronological method which is based upon the incompatibility of texts and whose fecundity thus thrives upon failures of comprehension runs the risk at every moment of preferring pretexts of not understanding to reasons for understanding. "the strength of his accounts always resides in the discussion of problems.13 The results acquired by the philosopher progressively over more than thirty years' uninterrupted reflection are sometimes such. his weakness in the search for definitions. < previous page page_2 next page > .11 In this respect and in many others. who is prompt to review his own opinions and those of others by means of constantly renewed inquiries. It tends to present the development of Aristotelian philosophy over time as evidence for a philosophy which is aporematic in its very principle. the hypothesis of a dramatic crisis in Aristotle's career and of a spectacular about-face at the end of this crisis appears.

with its collective sense. the individuals to whom political communities entrust the ultimate task of defining coercive norms relating to the good and who potentially include all the adult citizens in the city which corresponds "to the wishes" of the philosopher. Rather. the rules of what < previous page page_3 next page > .1095b5-6). the part of Aristotle's teaching traditionally associated with human philosophy sought somehow to be useful. On this point it is necessary to challenge a very long tradition of misunderstandings. like the French word législateur. I have taken the approach of historical inquiries whose ambition is to rediscover the essential features of a way of thinking which time has obscured. this desire to contribute concretely to the perfection of human becoming? This is the question which has guided my research from the beginning. as the first historical expression of the individualistic spirit which asserts itself against politics. therefore. that my exegesis takes seriously the philosopher's own statements in the NE's introduction. How can one make sense of this aim historically. which would perhaps yield a bit too easily to current tastes.< previous page page_3 next page > Page 3 II 1. for the sake of "the one who wants to listen to a discourse on political questions" (i 2. the most famous of them.20 One will notice at once. This issue is not sufficiently clarified if one limits oneself to saying that the two series of texts are written from the same theoretical perspective. This chapter also brings to light support for the belief that the works of Aristotle with which we are concerned were the object of a political teaching which the philosopher aimed primarily at the "lawgiver" . for he explicitly describes his inquiry as "a political inquiry" (i 1. 2. the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) as the expression of a strictly independent science. To make this clear is my task in the first chapter. But this is not to say that it intends to ignore the historical distance between Aristotle and ourselves and to confront his texts as if they were contemporary texts with which one might conduct a philosophical dialogue. When he later clarifies.1094b 1). however. and that the one series describes rules of an ethical code for individuals. especially.C. The study which I publish here is not committed to this approach.. It has led me to scrutinize the unity of purpose which clearly governs the elaboration of the two Ethics and of the Politics. 3. This interpretation will perhaps surprise those who have been accustomed to regard Aristotle's two works called Ethics and. 18 Nor does it aim to continue "genetic" studies in some way. Conceived at first for the sake of the citizens of the Greek city of the fourth century B. a perspective appropriate for explaining human affairs. Aristotle designates by this term not the well- known magistrate of Athenian institutions19 but. the other series principles for the organization of communities. designed to teach each individual the ends of his moral action and.

the reasons why Aristotle's position which can be reconstructed from this famous textand in close connection with the NE prologue of which I spoke abovedoes not represent an "archaic" stage of his thinking left behind by his later views. the political community tries to make its members adopt.1095a2-3) because he lacks experience and has not yet completed his education. in other words. is also dedicated to certain details of the NE's prologue. the teaching of Aristotle himself (including that reflected in the ethical studies) are addressed primarily to the lawgiver. I shall try. where Aristotle considers the role of discourse in the apprenticeship of virtue. It will try to shed light upon the prior qualities which Aristotle requires of listeners to his lessons on politics and. in the fourth chapter. in the following chapter. He was thus persuaded that moral education. according to Aristotle. particularly. in the strict sense of the term.< previous page page_4 next page > Page 4 P. the ends of action lie beyond any discursive search by the understanding. the correctness of practical ends is assured by moral virtue. This is why philosophical discourse and. Ricoeur has so aptly called "the very discipline of reasoning. In continuing this study I shall try. on the indispensable "education" which he demands that they have. correct determination of the ends of action is not an operation of practical intelligence. may be linked to a form of oral communication addressed to a public broader than that of his school. according to whom a function of this intellectual virtue is the study and definition of the ends of action. "is an inappropriate listener to politics'' (i 1. to lift a corer of the veil which masks the identity of the listener to whom the prologue of the NE alludes. especially those of the NE. 4. it depends upon habitual conduct that society and. especially. to determine summarily to what extent Aristotle's texts. Scholars have been too little concerned. finally." he says. As for virtue. was primarily a political task for which the compulsion of the laws turns out to be indispensable. However. as one may imagine the one which has perhaps made interpreters hesitate most to draw this conclusion from the NE prologue is the interpretation of proposed by certain Aristotle commentators. as I hope to show later. as the unprejudiced mind can confirm. Among other obstaclesfor they are numerous. The arguments to which one can appeal in support of this thesis are clearly stated in the final pages of the NE (x 10). My last chapter. They will be the object of my second chapter. therefore. they suffice to suggest that Aristotle does not intend his ethical researches to contribute basically or directly to the moral education of those whom he addresses and whom he supposes already to be essentially virtuous. already in themselves. in my opinion. < previous page page_4 next page > . I shall try to indicate. This will provide occasion to clarify how the philosopher conceived his contribution to the lawgiver's knowledge.22 In fact." 21 Aristotle resolutely excludes all young people from his audience"the young person. with examining the real implications of these statements.

does not rest upon their author's philosophical evolution.24 From this difference between the two Ethics. such a hypothesis continues to imply that one of the two Ethics followed the other in time. or preserve. may eventually provide a better way to solve this problem.< previous page page_5 next page > Page 5 5. This study. between the EE and the NE. against the authenticity of the EE. like.): "[the young man] who is inclined to follow his passions listens in vain and without benefit. for brevity and convenience. which nobody any longer seriously contemplates calling into question. Kenny has devoted himself. risks a misinterpretation on the part of the exegete who would only retain its final. perhaps with an interval of several years. The form in which these texts appear seems to convey. least obscure. especially. it is because he addresses precisely persons of proven morality and political experience. they would have no other wish than to perfect their own moral conduct.26 upon different aims or circumstances of composition. Without these detours. as the reader will see. on hearing his discourse.]. The fact that my study so often focuses upon the texts of the NE has a precise reason. we shall see that in fact. as some have suggested. which does not appear to imply any doctrinal inconsistency between them. by means of stylometry. since the goal is not knowledge but action. 2. That said. When at the end of this study I shall again have occasion to take up the examination of these few lines. the political perspective of Aristotelian teaching. the majority of the differences.1095a4ff. It is this type of analysis to which A. this is i 1-3-tr. as those must be whom he wishes to prepare for the role of lawgiver. NE i 1 [in some versions of the NE.27 And it is not impossible that some of the conclusions which he has reached will ulti- < previous page page_5 next page > . this claimambiguous in any case 23would easily lead one to think either that the philosopher intends only that his discourse incline. or that. more clearly than that of the Eudemian Ethics (EE). moreover. rather it would seem to rest.what I shall call. III 1.25 I have therefore left open here. this text can really be clarified only for those willing to take several long detours. moreover. My reservation on the subject is dictated by the opinion that the difference just mentioned. without deciding. Formal analysis. the question posed by "developmental" studies. the text is a formidable enigma and. the orientation of his listeners' actions towards the good. whose importance I indicated at the start." In fact. I refuse to extract any argument for relative chronology or the possibility of Aristotle's philosophical evolutionor. if Aristotle believes that he can help certain people in their actions. But it seems to me that the temporal priority of the one to the other cannot be securely established with the help of arguments which postulate a scheme of evolution in Aristotle's thinking. lines (i 1. is designed always to draw attention back to the same text. Indeed. in my view minor.

a Socrates who no longer busies himself actively with politics but continues to place the laws of his city higher than the judgments of those who dispense justice (Crito < previous page page_6 next page > . was written first. a reason which could decisively settle the question of which of the two. seems to have in mind the texts of the EE rather than those of the NE does not prove that the former were written before the latter. it would have been useful to explore in detail the conceptions of politics prior to Aristotle. I have not taken. J. when it refers to "ethical discourses" (1261a30. these presumptions provide additional reason for disbelieving in the existence of the theoretical differences between the two Ethics which some have audaciously wished to affirm. This approach is in keeping with my view that the two Ethics are distinguished less by their content than by the different circumstances of their composition. like that which one finds in the Politics. does not aim to establish that the NE texts with which I am concerned form. Reversing the perspective to which interpretation had practically unanimously subscribed up to C. For this reason I have not felt obliged to abstain from using in my study the account of from the second common book. I incline to support the thesis that the contested books actually belong to the EE. for my purpose. And. even if this were the case. IV 1.31 My study. on the other hand. the NE's reflections on politics would not lose their significance because the texts of the Politics had been composed earlier. the NE or the EE. depends on a comprehensive vision or perspective oriented towards politics. even more sharply. 1295a36. to clarify Aristotle's thinking contained in the NE. I do not see. 1280a18. For my part. and not without interest. there are serious presumptions in favor of the idea that these three books in their present form make up a fraction of the EE and not of the NE. The fact that the Politics. 28 Kenny's works argue for the temporal priority of the NE relative to the EE and. as well as the confrontation of the politics taught by Protagoras (Plato. Rowe. as scholars have often believed up till now. along with those of the Politics. or other passages proper to the EE. in my view. Prot.29 And. the solution of this problem does not seem to me to have major significance. In particular. It would have been possible. Evidence drawn from comparative study of the methodological statements of the Ethics seems to argue in this direction.< previous page page_6 next page > Page 6 mately be firmly established thanks to other studies of the same type. I only hope to show that the thinking expressed in the NE (and implicitly contained in the EE). 318e-319a) with the notion of virtue as science defended by the Socrates of the earlier dialogues.30 Now. for economy's sake. to extend my study along several paths which. 1332a8 and 22). a continuous sequence in which the NE texts were written first. for the attribution of the "common books" (NE v-vii) to the EE. And. 1282b20. however.

it is obvious that Aristotle's thought. the role of advisor of princes assumed by the members of the Academy. However. moreover. But it did not seem to me necessary to examine further whether our philosopher had wished somehow to promote the happiness of cities by indirectly influencing the policy of princes. 2.< previous page page_7 next page > Page 7 50aff. It would. It suffices here for me to see to what extent what has been called his ethical thought is inextricably connected with the politics of princes and cities. being silent as much about the Socratic idea of virtue- science as about the sophistical conception of politics. takes its place in the history of all these notions with the conception of . of which I shall speak. more particularly.). have been profitable perhaps to scrutinize the historical traditions which highlight the connections of the philosophers with the city-states and. < previous page page_7 next page > .

'' is doubled by a difficulty probably unique in its kind: the impossibility of always being able to determine exactly the sort of things the writings of the authentic Aristotelian Corpus are. sometimes very opaque."' The difficulty of piercing the screen. Düring has written.3 For we suspect that scholars often have to deal with texts whose definitive form owes something to the work of Aristotle's disciples. on the other hand. driven by its own logic. We remain." This observation by G. masks it." Such a claim will perhaps seem today the unavoidable result of Jaeger's explicit < previous page page_9 next page > . But among the philosophers of great intellectual vision whose original message historical exegesis strives to recover. More seriously yet: it becomes autonomous and generates a superimposed tradition which. The project of expounding a genuine system is in fact. Voss2 recently noted. At least I can state very generally that the organization of the Corpus Aristotelicum. powerless to determine always with precision the extent to which the products of their work continue to conform to the master's thinking or proceed. as I. F. Now. distorts it and makes it disappear. from a new idea. this is the one intention that we may hardly attribute to our philosopher. obliterates the work from which it has issued. Duvernoy 1 concerning Machiavelli could be applied almost without qualification to the work of Aristotle. on the contrary. First. the West has been enveloped in an almost uninterrupted dialogue with the man whom the scholastics called 'the philosopher. because of the preeminent role that he plays in the intellectual adventure of the West. which is the Aristotelianism of so many centuries. based substantially on the thinking of a thousand and one more or less faithful "disciples. depends for them on the firmer and firmer conviction that Aristotle elaborated a philosophical system whose constituent parts are reflected in the arrangement of the different preserved treatises. such as scholars after Andronicus of Rhodes have understood it. Aristotle is a strange caseand for two reasons at least.4 "typically Hellenistic but very un-Aristotelian.< previous page page_9 next page > Page 9 1 In Search of Aristotle's Project I Difficulties Peculiar to the Interpretation of Aristotle "It is without doubt the fate of great persons who have put their mark on the ages: commentary very soon comes between their work and posterity. As J. as if their author had effectively "programmed" them from the perspective of systematic expression. "for about twenty-three centuries. It does not hesitate to goat least quantitativelybeyond the works upon which it is commentary.

The Corpus in the Catalog of Andronicus of Rhodes We know that Aristotle's death in 322 B. itself conceived as a philosophical summa.4 The historian who desires to measure the originality of Andronicus' contribution is forced to study the early lists of Aristotle's works preserved by Diogenes Laërtius and the anonymous author of the Vita Menagiana. K.2 the very nature of the texts (joined to the difficulty of the message which they contain) was perhaps the principal cause of what one must call the decadence of the Peripatos during the Hellenistic period. independently of Jaeger. of which Andronicus drew up a new catalog." 5 which regarded the work of the "master of those who know" as a genuine "summa.7 Moreoverand this is a prime consideration whose significance I shall examine at great lengththe originality of Aristotle's project risks being masked by the interpretation or the importance given since antiquity to certain interpretive categories (human philosophy. left in the hands of his immediate disciples an impressive series of texts unedited and without determinate classification. who obtained a first-rate edition of the principal so-called "acroamatic" texts [writings thought to have served as the basis for oral presentations] of Aristotle. Wehrli has suggested. Praechter. The danger will appear considerable especially as these categories make reference to Aristotelian vocabulary. II 1. Without hiding from ourselves either the difficulty of the undertaking or the limits beyond which everything is no more than a tissue of gratuitous hypotheses. This indeterminateness is obviously quite irksome for the interpreter who asks about the occasion for the project of Aristotle to which the texts catalogued under the titles Ethics and Politics correspond. and who finds himself dealing with a Corpus established by people who indeed thought that they could abolish such indeterminateness by recourse to the hypothesis that the philosopher conceived his project as formally expounding a genuine system.1 As F. Still the fact remains that the rebirth of Aristotelianism in the first century before our era coincides with the labors of Andronicus of Rhodes.) in accounting for the approach of a series of texts integrated in the Corpus." firmly articulated. To restore to the philosopher that which properly belongs to him is thus an extremely perilous task. which permit us to ascertain the condition of the Corpus a good century at least before the cata- < previous page page_10 next page > .3 Its arrangement supposes an organizing principle about which we should inquire. it is important to state in the clearest way the particulars of the problem. ethics.C. practical science. etc. assures us that "a secure division of the philosophical disciplines according to a determinate principle does not occur in Aristotle"!6 And it is obvious that Aristotle was not as concerned as his disciples were to propose a rigid system of sciences and to organize his writings systematically according to it. for example. But.< previous page page_10 next page > Page 10 attempt to combat "scholastic idolatry.

Düring liked to put it. everything supports the belief that from the time of Theophrastus' leadership of Aristotle's school.14 In any case. For no Greek text has preserved the latter for us. perhaps we have here a reflection of the order followed by Andronicus in his edition of the Corpus Aristotelicum. before the work of Andronicus.9 they then penetrated the Arab world and it is there that we can make our acquaintance with them in the parallel editions of Ibn al Qifti (twelfth-thirteenth centuries) and Ibn Abi Usaibia (thirteenth century). stylometric indications. that it distributes Aristotle's works according to certain well-defined categories. at first translated into Syriac. it indexes the principal titles of the modern Corpus as it is edited. Conceptions Inherent in the Principles of Division But what will especially bear looking at in the section of the Andronican catalog transmitted by the Arabs is the fact that the list of different "treatises" bears witness to a desire for classification. 5 But the comparison of these earlier materials with the catalogs of Andronicus is not without difficulties. that Andronicus was largely influenced in this regard by prior efforts. if one believes the tradition. the eight books of the Politics have never formed anything except a whole. collections into "treatises" had already been for the most part performed.3 Be that as it may. the above- mentioned catalogwhich.< previous page page_11 next page > Page 11 logs of Andronicus were drawn up. after all.10 A section of the lists which these authors offer us has every chance of reproducing the work of Andronicus. included in our Corpus in accordance with a principle of division. the titles of the Andronican Corpus provoked many questions. Moraux noted. As P. for the most part. 2.1 that is.8 Thanks to Ptolemy.11 It is a section which has no parallels in the earlier lists and thus constitutes an exceptional document.7 these catalogs." since it offered information other than the mere titles of the works (incipit [first words or lines of the text].4 was a "catalogue raisonné. Seen against this background.13 To take just one example which concerns us especially.15 "the Rhodian did not have to deal with a pile of orderless notes which he would have been the first to sort and classify systematically. if not from the time of Aristotle himself. there existed much more than a mosaic of independent . Moreover. by I. for example. Bekker. as I. But I do not need to dwell here on the problems raised by the formation of Aristotle's "works" before the Christian era. notes on the question of authenticity)5tries to divide up the various titles still. were integrated (in an abridged form?) into a general work on Aristotle's life and writings composed by a certain Ptolemy. Andronicus thus had the very clear sense that the group of the (two) Ethics and the Politics < previous page page_11 next page > .2 an edition which we know served as Porphyry's model for his edition of Plotinus' works.12 It seems. Perfectly known in Plutarch's time6 and probably still used by Porphyry and the Neoplatonists." In short.

1 (book)]. Andronicus may thus have wanted only to group Aristotle's principal "treatises" according to the type of questions which they address. 2 (books)]. One can hardly doubt that this division bears traces of Stoic influence. Andronicus." "ethics.16 Therefore < previous page page_12 next page > . like the majority of later Greek interpreters14 and unlike the Stoics. etc. etc. in a rationally organized system of writings. the distinction "logical-ethical-physical" already appears in the Topics10 as a principle of classification of propositions and problems . So.9 Obviously. in itself alone. just as Diogenes Laërtius' summary of Aristotle's doctrines according to the three categories "logic. One might think. however. solidly articulated by teleological principle. 8 (books)]. ethics and physics make up the three parts of philosophy for the Stoa.15 Andronicus held that logic was not a part of philosophy at all and was only its instrument . For the catalog's author. for logic. a question of this type clearly expresses the conviction that Aristotle's principal writings. in fact. The Tripartite Division A clear-enough tripartite division appears in the section of the catalog corresponding to the Corpus:8 1 [Categories. a. that such a division of the writings likewise reflects Andronicus' view that Aristotle divided philosophy in this way. and that one should approach them as a program of study.. are. also recommends beginning the study of Aristotle with logic .12 Besides. was Andronicus the first to pose the question which became classical for the neo-Platonic commentators of Ammonius' school. The Bipartite Division But a qualification should be made here.< previous page page_12 next page > Page 12 (arranged alongside the Poetics and the Rhetoric) 6 conveyed the same kind of philosophical preoccupation and that this part of philosophical inquiry could be located along with other parts (to which there would usually correspond one or more collections of Aristotelian texts). imply that the Rhodian attributed to Aristotle a tripartite conception of philosophy. the point was mainly to divide up the philosopher's writings in the most convenient manner. who includes the "logical" writings in the first division of writings in the Corpus. "where should one begin the study of Aristotle?"7 Now. For. collected for this reason in a Corpus. Andronicus' classification of the Aristotelian works does not necessarily. Now. The internal organization of the system suggested by Andronicus' classification of the works he listed may be guessed without difficulty. 2 [Great Ethics. each in its place. and so forth.13 this fact clearly demonstrates that for him the "treatises" contained systematized knowledge and were coordinated with one another. b. the component parts of a systematic enterprise." and ''physics"11 probably reflects Diogenes' view that Aristotle subdivided philosophy in this way. 3 [Lectures on Physics..

the basic idea is therefore that Aristotle's written work is distributed by content into two divisions of a philosophical system. the practical and the theoretical. It alludes to two notions which."19 But what falsifies Aristotle's thought or.21 And. on the other hand. considered separately. The Supposed Foundations of the Systematizing Interpretation Let us first note the reasons which convinced the ancients that there were correspondences between the division of the written works and the division of the sciences. that the two series of writings which he put after the logical writings were the expression of this twofold philosophy. one had recourse to the seemingly more adequate categories "practical" and ''theoretical" to describe the two approaches of philosophy as such. thought . This was already done in the doxographical document preserved by Diogenes Laërtius: "There are two types of philosophical discourse. We are in the presence of a remarkable phenomenon. is the use of the terms "practical" and "theoretical" to distinguish two types of philosophical discourse.< previous page page_13 next page > Page 13 restricting philosophy properly so-called to a twofold scheme. at least." 17 This document deserves our attention. One discovers here the traces of an attitude which grows more and more pronounced among the ancient Aristotle commentators and whose most notable trait seems to be the effort to state strict correspondences between a division of Aristotle's written works in a Corpus solidly constructed and a division of the sciences according to Aristotle in a perfectly organized philosophical system. Now. Andronicus himself understood. and invited his successors to understand. < previous page page_13 next page > .20 are used by the doxographers to distinguish two series of philosophical discourses . can pass without much difficulty as authentically Aristotelian (in the sense that they find a direct echo in Aristotle's texts): the contrast of the categories "practical" and "theoretical" 18 and the idea of a "philosophical discourse. then. the categories "practical" and "theoretical. violates the most constant rules of the language which expresses it. On the one hand. 3. the categories "logical. or scientific disposition . if the categories "ethical" and "physical" seemed appropriate for cataloguing these works (as the category "logical" was for designating the works which contain philosophy's instrument)." "ethical" and "physical. It will be important to consider exactly to what extent exegesis prompted by this attitude distorts or conceals the philosopher's real purposes." which Aristotle uses to classify different types of problems." which Aristotle uses to distinguish two types of reason . on the other hand.22 are adopted by the commentators to designate three scientific disciplines as well.

scientific treatises instructing the souls of his disciples in conformity with each subject-matter. And the correspon- < previous page page_14 next page > . "that philosophy wishes to cultivate and perfect. To convince ourselves of this it suffices to consider the quarrel which. which he calls respectively "living" and "contemplative" . set Theophrastus and Dicearchus at odds on the question whether one should opt for a life of the intellect or a life engaged in the polis.4 then. it suggests that anthropological or psychological doctrine has a basic importance for the bipartite division of philosophy. he suggests at several points that very close relations obtain not only between the different parts of the soul (animal." he writes. in his Commentary on the Categories."6 Psychological theory can certainly influence how one distinguishes forms of activity and the ways they are improved. human and divine) and the three types of life (apolaustical [devoted to enjoyment]. and philosophical or theoretical)11 but also between different forms of discursive intelligence theoretical. declares straight out:2 "Given that philosophy is divided into two parts. as F. It is split in two. Philoponus explains that the two corresponding parts of philosophy." to adopt Stephanus' expression3is attributed to Aristotle. sometimes not. Aspasius tries to establish that practical philosophy. for example.5 These are the faculties.8 this philosopher challenged Aristotle's theory of the separable mind .< previous page page_14 next page > Page 14 1. including "the inquiry concerning character traits" and "politics" . in the first generation of the Peripatetic school. He also published. Aristotle is engaged in both. political or practical. the other by knowledge of beings. is made necessary by our possession of a soul and a body: 1 "if we did not have a body. in his Commentary on the Meteorologica. should be correlated with the two "faculties" of the soul. distinguishes between Aristotle's "practical" and "theoretical" writings. theoretical and practical. John Philoponus. the one by virtue." Once this philosophical care for soulsthis wish to teach a "practical happiness" and a "theoretical happiness. champion of the practical life .'' This interpretation still prevails in the Byzantine epoch and Eustratius. The fact that the Neoplatonists understood the matter in this way is well known.7 defended a view strictly in accord with his account of mind. practical and productiveand the three types of scientific disposition of the same name. practical and theoretical philosophy. Philoponus tells us. First. "our nature would have no task other than contemplation. in the two domains.12 But this does not imply either that these dispositions form a (systematic) whole or that they are expressed equally in three series of discourses. because the human being or the human soul can sometimes be regarded as pure intelligence. Dicearchus. At the beginning of his Commentary on the NE.9 Theophrastus' adherence to this theory explains his stand in favor of the contemplative life. there is a certain anthropological or philosophical duality. seeing that. Wehrli has rightly stated. that is. For example.10 As for Aristotle.

which is based on the dual nature of knowable reality. derives less from its relation to Aristotle's view than from its connections with the other definition of philosophy put forth in the same context. Ammonius can henceforth align the definition from the Theaetetus. must be understood by the indirect route of yet another distinction. Marietan 13 gives for defending the view. from the most famous thinkers. We read: "Philosophy is the knowledge of things divine and human" . in the words of Ammonius himself. In confronting them with each other. they are borrowings. one is able to reach only "human" subject-matter. Now.17 As one sees. I shall come back to this issue. As an example here. So the reasons which. but if one should refer to the "practical" end. the one borrowed from Plato's Theaetetus:21 "philosophy is assimilation to God so far as humanly possible'' . consider Ammonius' testimony in the introduction to his Commentary on the Isagoge (of Porphyry) where he wishes to respond to the question "What is philosophy?"16 For the most part the definitions which Ammonius considers in response to this question are not of his invention. that such a classification reflects the distinction between the practical and theoretical intellects made by the treatise On the Soul14 and corresponds to the two types of life praised by the NE's tenth book)15 seem entirely superficial. however. all of whose parts are perfectly arranged and expressed in the Corpus. "taken from the end" .24 Thus justifying the twofold division of philosophy by appealing to a psychological principle now familiar to us.23 themselves expressions of the human soul's dual capacitytheoretical and practical. Ammonius tells us. Aristotle and Plato. Ammonius tries to establish the unity of all these conceptions. 2. The attempt by the ancients to confer on philosophy in general and Aristotelian philosophy in particular the allure of a formal system. with the definition "taken from the subject- matter" : if one should refer to the "theoretical" end. is eternal (labeled "divine") or subject to generation and corruption (labeled "human").20 My interest in Ammonius' definition. and this fact seems to legitimate also the division of his philosophy using these categories. J.22 Ammonius actually explains that the assimilation to God must be understood as two specific activities. according as the object to be known. although a unity. philosophy is able to reach only "divine" subject-matter. if not lame.25 The double assimila- < previous page page_15 next page > . is drawn from the object to be known . for example. such a division supposes that philosophy. or. the account brings to light two primary definitions. either from the tradition.< previous page page_15 next page > Page 15 dences between parts of the Corpus and scientific dispositions or forms of intelligence always seem quite rough. The first. similar to that of the Neoplatonists. in an explicit way. is divided into two parts. that Aristotle makes a twofold classification of the sciences (namely.18 Now the old pair of antithesesthe divine and the humanwhich dominates the Platonic reality picture19 leaves several traces in Aristotle.

namely. that the Corpus Aristotelicum. the fragility of both syncretistic and systematizing interpretations of Aristotle. the ancients were often inspired by his texts. corresponding. Considered collectively. as I said. Each pair bears witness to a twofold conception of philosophy. three < previous page page_16 next page > . which is itself based ultimately on the twofold nature of the mental faculties. to be respectively "a knowledge of beings as beings" the phrase plagiarizes a passage from Aristotle's Metaphysics 26and "an apprenticeship with death" the phrase is drawn from Plato's Phaedo. directly or indirectly. Let us begin by examining the categories "logical. I must therefore give them credit for having brought to light the principal Aristotelian categories without the comprehension of which we cannot claim to describe correctly our philosopher's project. Knowing the privileged charm which posterity casts over such categories and recognizing. Recovering the genuine meaning and significance of his terminology is a sure means to clarify his philosophical project. we are now ready to question Aristotle himself. III 1. in Ammonius' resolutely syncretistic mind.< previous page page_16 next page > Page 16 tion to God in which philosophy consists therefore appears. contains two basic groups of treatises. to two levels of knowable reality: "ethical" science"physical" science "practical'' science"theoretical" science knowledge about human affairsknowledge about divine things A more or less clear conviction accompanies this view. However.1 There is no question here of three philosophical disciplines or sciences but. the reflections of the ancient Aristotle commentators therefore produced the following result: three pairs of categories were superimposed upon each other." In the Topics. The First Set of Interpretive Categories 1." "ethical" and "physical. I have suggested the distance which separates Aristotle's concerns from the concerns which his commentators tend to attribute to him or which they themselves proclaim while taking him as an authority. they serve to distinguish summarily different species of propositions or of problems.27 3. respectively. which pursue truth in two realms of knowledge and whose totality makes up a philosophical system that should be studied in a precise order if the student is adequately to progress towards philosophy's ultimate goal. simply. moreover. reflecting the twofold division of philosophy.

they exhibit the perspective of "logical" study. The fact that the physical investigator's viewpoint is narrower than the dialectician's does not imply that the physical perspective is scientific. after having established the difference between having an opinion and knowing . thus a perspective which. if not verbal. The fact that the Stoics happened to divide philosophy systematically into three parts described as "logical." Aristotle." "ethical'' and "physical"4 might suggest that such a system of sciences was previously drawn up by Aristotle himself.7 Nor does the fact that Aristotle makes an even narrower contrast between the viewpoint that studies "ethical problems" and that which studies "physical problems"8 imply that he wishes to correlate the former with a special science. But the texts do not really authorize our being so affirmative. To the extent that references in the texts of the Corpus to certain "ethical" or "physical discourses" 9 allude to the works of Aristotle which we call by the titles Ethics or Physics. so to speak.3 As for the Analytics. for Aristotle. Therefore it does not have as much weight for the interpreter as would a categorical declaration regarding the organization of a philosophical system. these references would seem to restrict to those works the application of the two viewpoints of which I am speaking.< previous page page_17 next page > Page 17 points of view permitting classification. has no true scientific significance. perspective for discussing problems. Do these viewpoints correspond to "sciences" in the sense of formal objects recognized and distinguished elsewhere in Aristotle? One is tempted to grant this in light of a passage of the Posterior Analytics where. can describe as only a very general. Still it is important to observe that (1) the physical study of which the Posterior Analytics speaks obviously stands for the viewpoint exhibited by the physical science < previous page page_17 next page > . In the first place. 3. in contrast to dialectic. purely formal. For. always supposes a particular object. the passage from the Posterior Analytics does not imply that for Aristotle "'logical' study" exists on the same level as "physical study" and "ethical study. who reproaches the Platonists for their argumentation . 2. But the only conclusion that one can draw from this is that the works for which we today reserve these labels certainly and more obviously exemplify the respective viewpoints to which their traditional descriptions correspond. according to him. others to ethical study" . the classification proposed by the philosopher in the Topics is not at all rigorous. So it clearly follows that the distinction of viewpoints of which I am speaking does not correspond to a distinction between sciences in the strict sense. it is presented as approximate .6 that is. 2 he writes: "As for how the rest should be distributed among discursive thought and intellect and science and art and prudence and wisdomsome of these questions belong rather to physical study. of all types of propositions and problems.5 Besides. their dialectical method. science.

L. Newman1 has rightly observed. In Plato it becomes a philosophical contrast of the greatest importance. But it is precisely this antithesis that interests me. for whom. the phrase (ethical problems) by which Aristotle names or describes the concerns of the same Socrates. duplicate. As W.< previous page page_18 next page > Page 18 which Aristotle elsewhere assigns to the "theoretical sciences" 10 and whose results he expounds in some of his discourses. as we shall see. In any case. 4." essentially used by Aristotle for purposes of classification of problems.6 Beyond the terms < previous page page_18 next page > . then with Socrates. With him. The distinction between ethical and physical perspectives of which I have just spoken does not seem alien to another distinction. Finally. used to name a field of philosophical investigation. The terms used here to express the peculiar nature of Socratic inquiries in the context of the movements of contemporary thought. this is what Xenophon's Memorabilia seem to indicate:2 "conversation (with Socrates). In this respect.. indicated by the contrary terms "divine" and "human" . in contrast with Aristotle." which have status only in relation to the gods.5 the adjective receives in the NE). the human conditionmortal possesses a certain depreciative tone (a tone that. does not coincide with studies expounded in a discourse.4 "who believes in the reality of human things without believing in the reality of human beings?" ." but what he calls a "practical science" . probably derives from a Socratic usage. the phrase or . one may recall that the terms "physical" and "ethical." we read. ''did not turn on the nature of things as a whole .11 refer to the two basic concerns of philosophy which successively occupied the center of attention in the history of Greek thought. at least insofar as it is opposed to the "divine" condition. Plato usually opposes "divine things. according to R. virtue was science!12 2. A Second Set of Interpretive Categories 1.3 At the beginning. but (2) the ethical study of which the same passage of the Posterior Analytics speaks and which probably stands for the viewpoint assigned to the accounts of the Ethics cannot be considered as implying any science recognized in express terms by Aristotle. conversation was always about human affairs" . as was the case with most of the others. For to those things which can be defined only in relation to the human being.. For not only does he nowhere explicitly recognize an "ethical science. therefore. Gauthier. first with the early natural philosophers.." asks Socrates in the Apology. "Is there anyone. A. the expression vaguely refers to a totality of phenomena defined only by their relation to human beings considered as something specific. so to speak.

2. although fleetingly. in the NE. one can draw attention. we must understand that the order of the eternal and immutable makes possible the order of "becoming where we dwell" 7 and that Socrates' interlocutor.15 they are beyond the range of philosophyAristotle.16 to two phrases appearing. in Aristotle's texts: 17 ("philosophy" concerning human affairs) and 18 (''philosophy" concerning divine things). not in contrast to what he elsewhere."20 Supposing that this latter expression applies to a part of the doctrines expounded by Aristotlea supposition which has not been proven-it would thus seem to refer. they were henceforth objects of scientific study. Of course. as the context makes clear. according to him. as the Academicians did. There is no doubt. unlike divine things. 3. we should conclude. This circumstance should make interpreters cautious. when he mentioned a "philosophy" bearing on divine beings.8 feared that a guardian. if Plato could not consider the latter as objects of any scientific proceedingafter all. seduced by contemplation. The contrast between the "divine" and "human" in Aristotle's texts still indicates the antithesis between the order of the incorruptible (eternal) and the order of the corruptible (mortal). that we find in Aristotle's terminology an echo of a usage in vogue in Academic milieux. In fact. consequently. he undoubtedly meant an inquiry devoted to the totality of incorruptible celestial realities. which likewise suffer corruption.11states the above point in the same terms. we know.19 he meant this in contrast to an inquiry into corruptible beings where chance and accident occur (in a word. in the treatise On the Parts of Animals. And if Aristotle employs such an expression. tried to give them their due. the [living nature]).9 The Seventh Letter of the Corpus Platonicum. it therefore applies less to a part of speculative inquiry undertaken < previous page page_19 next page > . since philosophy no longer has for Aristotle the unity which it had for Plato. Moreover. because he still believes that it can express this "concern for human affairs" which the author of the Republic made a duty for human beings "in search of wisdom". that philosophy was divided into two parts. this phrase cannot refer to a study tightly linked to other philosophical studies similar to the study of human things required of philosophers by Plato.< previous page page_19 next page > Page 19 employed.12 The NE notes13 that. as some have done. Thus Plato described in a handy way the respective domains of true wisdom and the political art. calls "philosophy concerning human affairs. would no longer devote any care to the latter .10 like the Epinomis. "nothing human can be continuously in act" But we know that for Aristotle incorruptible things are contrasted not only with human phenomena but also with some natural things. it is most probably. in the Republic. but. not to one of two but to one of three types of philosophical study.14 Now. governed by perfect necessity. Kinship of vocabulary masks profound differences here. But the existence of these phrases does not permit us to suppose that Aristotle thought.

Aristotle. belongs to the category quality. as a firm disposition . corresponding to it in the category of substance is discursive understanding . "to the production of something" . A Third Set of Interpretive Categories 1." Examination of a third set of interpretive categories used in the division of the sciences will allow us to understand this point.4 The distinction established here does not refer directly to things scientifically known even if it presupposes a basic difference at the level of the known or knowable. For when it concerns "human things. does not deal "with a genus of being" . productive or practical is explained by the view that every intellectual excellence is oriented "to the contemplation of something" . but it would at least be premature to think that the latter. but with realities which can be otherwise than they are and whose ori- < previous page page_20 next page > . the term "science" does not refer to an organic whole of known or knowable objects but to a perfection of the knowing subject. unlike theoretical understanding or science. the expression "philosophy concerning human affairs. but like productive understanding or science. or "to the determination of some action" ." which he describes respectively with the help of the terms "theoretical."1 This distinction is famous. this division of the genus "science" never alludes to any list of scientific doctrines and still less to a program of inquiries which Aristotle would have wished to carry out. This fact implies that nontheoretical science has a special status.< previous page page_20 next page > Page 20 by Aristotle himself than to a study analogous to the study which human becoming. as Aristotle conceives it. we know. where it appears. That being said." included in the NE's final chapter in a context which introduces a type of inquiry such as that expounded by the Politics. In Aristotle's language." "philosophy" is no more a matter of mere contemplation than ''science" is when called "practical. distinguished three types of "science. for practical understanding or science. 3. contains the sum of two sets of studies expounded by him. requires of all those who aspire to know. 21 One can henceforth suspect that Aristotle's teaching contained in the discourses collected under the title Ethics and his teaching contained in the discourses collected under the title Politics are both related to what he calls "philosophy concerning human affairs".2 Now. It limits itself to distinguishing different kinds of intellectual disposition in terms of the activities which are performed by each of them. too much so perhaps insofar as it has traditionally licensed the classification of Aristotle's texts into three groups of doctrines. Thus Aristotle's view that every science is theoretical.3 science." "practical" and "productive. with realities which possess in themselves their origin of movement and rest and which cannot be otherwise than they are. according to Plato. cannot avoid posing grave problems for interpreters.

8 More precisely.12 It is not thereby excluded that the two-way contrast (on the one hand. occasionally. who condemns the Platonists' method of division by two.< previous page page_21 next page > Page 21 gin is in the knowing subject. Aristotle is led naturally to neglect the human being's "productive science. Let us note. not to study action scientifically.13 Thus. in the one who acts or produces . appears historically to be the result of a subdivision performed on one of the terms of a dichotomy which was established earlier and is still used in other texts: that which contrasts purely "theoretical (or knowing) science. as Plato. given that they can be decided. it seems difficult to assimilate practical science. that the division of the "sciences" into three species. "realizable in and through action" ( : EE 1218b5). action to come .6 not another person's action. when he considers the improvement of the human being. 3.7 "Practical science" thus appears to be a cognitive quality of persons immersed in action and deciding to act. but action to be done . productive and practical ) continues to be used subsequently to mark the distinction between purely speculative science and the science of subjects engaged in an activity other than speculation (leaving aside the different forms which this activity may take).'' on the other hand. The fact. while he also undertook and expounded a scientific inquiry into the human good. as he does in the ethical writings. As a result. that Aristotle understood "practical science" in this way. for example. not action past and done. Aristotle. has action as its object. But this would suppose that for him the cognitive qualities of the acting subject as acting could be acquired or at least reinforced by teaching by means of discourses ." especially. the < previous page page_21 next page > ." that is. implies that he meant to present his study (primarily) to help others acquire practical science. without other precautions.5 "Practical science.9 or. Is this the case? It will be important to examine this question. 4. on the other hand.11 probably substituted a tripartition for the dichotomy rather than subdivided a member of the latter. the "practical sciences. from whom the dichotomy derives (Statesman 258e-260e). As the Topics attests. for this would make it the expression of a speculative operation which could be performed by someone outside every particular situation which requires his action and. to a group of scientific or philosophical reflections (of practical interest) consigned to a set of discourses used for teaching."10 Indeed. the three-way division of science could have been fixed relatively early in his career. theoretical . that is. as some of Aristotle's texts state it. on issues which either were already decided thanks to practical science or which. will call for practical science. one may say. It would not necessarily follow from this that these texts remain faithful in spirit to a dichotomy of the Platonic type. moreover. it is an habitual disposition to act scientifically. but action which is to be performed by the knowing subject." on the one hand. says more frequently. with "productive sciences.

whether I am entitled to assume that they both ultimately express a single plan. The Common Plan Of The Ethics And The Politics: Ancient Testimonies It is especially significant that. Moreover. which are not presented as ends in themselves. Moreover. which mentions three forms of discursive thought 14 and rigorously distinguishes practical disposition and productive disposition 15. Before formulating any hypothesis in this connection. IV 1. and so the NE's sixth book. as we have seen. must turn all those who aspire to know away from pure contemplation and lead them to take the destiny of cities into their hands. Aristotle's description of "practical science" as the quality of human understanding which performs action suggests that such a "science. Here too I touch on a delicate issue.< previous page page_22 next page > Page 22 intellectual virtue related to making things. that is. according to Plato. the concern for human becoming which. conceived as a means to help those addressed by the philosopher to acquire "practical science"? Does the philosopher expect in that way to play his part in the improvement of human becoming. Provisional Balance Sheet My analyses so far let me draw conclusions only with extreme caution. on the assumption that it requires the aid of those who know? None of these questions is easy to resolve. One could not apply this label to a study on the Socratic model which took "human things" as its object. tends in spite of everything to reduce to two virtueswisdom and prudence the intellectual virtues of the rational soul. cannot be assimilated to any speculative study which is expressed in a discourse. A study of this type which would take character as its viewpoint as did the inquiries of Socrates (who dealt with ethical problems )1escapes the division of the genus ''science" into the species "theoretical" and "practical". Aristotle never gives it the label of science . were these studies. All this helps to make more uncertain than ever the exact epistemological status of Aristotle's studies the results of which constitute the discourses of the Ethics and Politics of the Corpus." in his eyes. commentators and doxographers have always grouped the Ethics (in the singular) (or both Ethics) < previous page page_22 next page > . from very ancient times." but. I must examine how far I am justified in taking into consideration the Ethics and the Politics jointly. it is probably not this type of Socratic inquiry to which Aristotle was directly referring when he used the expression "philosophy concerning human affairs.16 4.

turned the minds of their initiates from civic preoccupations to the pursuit of an ideal of self-sufficient wisdom.9 But all that does not exclude the hypothesis that the ancient doxographers or commentators wished to respect the purpose of Aristotle himself who. in the same section. and even if in a general way the exact nature of the connections which they recognized between the two "works" ultimately escapes us. on completing an inquiry about happiness. which depends upon sources from the time before Andronicus. explicitly recommends an inquiry about constitutions.< previous page page_23 next page > Page 23 together with the Politics in the same set of works as so many contributions to a single and unique general plan. preserved by Stobaeus.13 Trustingtoo much perhapsin the letter of the prologue.6 This order of classification is natural. the other radically. pleasure and the principal virtues. Moreover. in the NE. the ethical and the political . which announces "an approach which is < previous page page_23 next page > . The secondary place which the Politics thus occupies in this list could also be explained by historical factors. the doxographer probably meant only to suggest that the essay on problems concerning household management contained in Politics i was of less importance than other materials treated in the Politics.2 "practical philosophical discourse" of which I have already spoken. one notes that the Compendium of Arius Didymus. wisdom independent of political contingencies. 1 According to the testimony preserved by Diogenes Laërtius. according to the same source. for we lack information about the interpretation of the Politics in antiquity. dwells infinitely less on the doctrines contained in Aristotle's Politics than on doctrines borrowed from various ethical discourses attributed to him. would sketch two types of reflection.11 This gap cannot be remedied by the mere incidental notes of commentators who classify this "work'' as part of Aristotle's written works or within a division of philosophy.12 But at least we know that they did not dissociate the Ethics from the Politics in principle. as products of their times.3 Inclusion of the apocryphal Economics4 in the Corpus will later lead interpreters to list for Aristotle not two but three "practical sciences. that is. reconstructed with the help of Arabic documents. and this latter part. would be subdivided into two parts. followed by the Politics. especially as Andronicus here describes in detail the "ethical" category of writings in the Corpus. the ever diminishing general interest in that work during the Hellenistic era. the one relatively.7 Moreover."5 For its part Andronicus' catalog. namely.8 As valuable evidence for this. when the city-state was no more than a shadow of the of classical Greece.10 To verify this hypothesis among the ancients is a difficult business. they are always mentioned in the same order. the other to the household. the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies. we must regard as conveying the prevailing interpretation the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodisias for whom the NEdespite its prestigewas but a preliminary to the Politics. classifies the two Ethics. the one pertaining to the city. By listing the parts of the second subdivision in this order.

Ritter5 has done. it is indisputably interrupted in the post-Hegelian era. Wolff." we must refrain from overstressing this distinction of subject-matters at the expense of the unity of intention which governed the two groups of investigations. in these conditions. in Aristotle. Modern Exegesis 1. the < previous page page_24 next page > . The hypothesis that this unity was defended by Aristotle himself must obviously be considered. the notion of "practical science". contemporary interpreters. Unable to find a rigorous correspondence between the "works" of the Corpus and the Aristotelian notions of "philosophy of human things. the (logically prior) inquiry concerning character traits and the (logically posterior) inquiry concerning constitutions formed a unity. 14 and considering that the subject-matter of the NE's ten books (i. even in its most "classical" form.e.2 consequently. And one can understand how." "practical science.4 The tradition which made use of it surely defended the real unity of ethics (and of economics) and of politics. 2. neither misinterpreting nor of course denying the significance possessed by the mere material existence of two separate "writings. as long as the nature of this generic unity of "human philosophy" does not seem clear.< previous page page_24 next page > Page 24 political in some way" . tends to avoid." in a way which one thinks more in accord with Aristotelian vocabulary. however problematic it should appear to us. if not to reject. Thus interpretation of the Ethics and the Politics was often attempted by different specialists who rarely occupied themselves with the details of the Politics concerning the Ethics and vice versa. human character traits ) would make up in fact "the primary parts of the City" . the notion seems very difficult to define. as answering to a single philosophical discipline.1 Besides.. For to say that each of the two treatises could be considered as parts of a whole which explain Aristotle's "human philosophy" does not tend to draw any tighter connection between the two. As for the expression "practical philosophy"for which one searches in vain in the Corpus3some have thought that Aristotle avoided it because he deemed it self-contradictory. it makes no difference if one baptizes this ensemble "practical philosophy" or "practical science. but if one can trace this living tradition up to C. for the most part.16 For.15 Whatever one thinks of the summary arguments which Alexander uses to support his interpretation. as J. modern epistemology. let us note in passing.'' and so on (which I examined above). it doubtlessly has the merit of not concealing that. This is an essential basis for understanding the attitude of modern interpretation. have had to be satisfied with the convenient unity represented by each "treatise" of the Corpus. in the ancients' view. even to understand. Alexander intended to vindicate the received sequence of the two treatises.

that of the philosopher who reflects upon politics and about whom the NE states. Susemihl criticized such a viewpoint from the start. science)" ( )." Yet the expression "practical science. which science.15 is not fundamentally knowledge of something but a disposition to act in some way . M.< previous page page_25 next page > Page 25 exegete might neglect the profound meaning which the categories I examined above possessed for Aristotle and make up his mind to rely upon the significance assumed by the autonomy of the so-called Aristotelian "treatises.7 F. A sound method recommends rather adopting the inverse attitude and forgetting for a moment the prestige of the "works" of the Corpus.11 worked up by Aristotle himself.14 to a science "immersed" in action. the ethical discourses and the political discourses 17 consist ultimately pursue a useful end.16 "there is practical truth when judgments involved in the formation of the 'choice' leading to action are all true. on the other side." a knowledge of how to act. politics is applied ethics (die angewandte Ethik). It is therefore in our interest to acknowledge two distinct levels: the level of practical knowledge (knowledge of the acting subject). as H. asserting "that. each existing as a whole. in the political art. in other words. This is the attitude which J. does not conclude with the utterance of a proposition. but in action. according to the Topics. and the level of speculative or philosophical knowledge (knowledge of the subject studying issues related to action or to politics). Burnet was more faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the philosopher when he defended the idea of a "practical science" also called "politics. In his commentary on the NE."8 But one cannot grasp the thinking of Aristotle. who governs in the sphere of action." 2. for example. they < previous page page_25 next page > . E. J. but the practical truth is not the truth of those judgments. as I have observed. and. any more than the expression "political (art. expressed in a philosophical discourse. at work.12 For one cannot overstress that the idea of "science" which Aristotle conceives under the expression "practical science" "apprehended in terms of competencies of the knowing subject"13 refers. for example. Burnet maintained that the philosopher's terms "practical science'' and "politics" both correspond adequately to the single science with which both the NE and the Politics deal. in order to rely more on the notions." which are likely to reveal more exactly Aristotle's concerns. Anscombe has written. It is a "savoir-faire. H. that he must study pleasure. J."9 by subordinating politics to such a science. Its operation. whatever it might be. in accord with truth. Joachim noted." as we have seen. on the one side. does not seem to refer to a body of speculative theory. Burnet adopted 6 at the beginning of the century. clearly there are two roles here. defined in the "works. capacity or science." Now although all those arguments of which. As G. who does not speak of "ethical science. for Aristotle. Indeed. that of the political leader . capacity.10 which may be a synonymous expression. for example.

In spite of everything. 3. the interpreter is naturally led to describe in different terms what Aristotle calls a "practical science" (in contrast to "theoretical science") and what I shall call. This is an hypothesis which will be advanced by some scholars. in the practice of affairs. an extremely thorny problem remains. Bien. it could be that Aristotle did not intend or know how to make such a distinction and clung to the idea that one and the same cognitive excellence is exercised both in action and in speculative inquiry into action. examined in the second book of the Politics. As Joseph Owens has noted. they often furnish advice useful in the exercise of virtue. the idea preserved by the ancient commenta- < previous page page_26 next page > ." to once again follow G. And if the occasion requiresbut only if it doessuch writings involve what G. For although the two levels of knowledge just mentioned might be de facto clearly distinct for the contemporary interpreter. Besides. Bien liked to say. Aristotle himself studies it as a reality whose present existence and contingent occurrence do not depend upon him. Moreover. That is. it had its origin in the understanding of this lawgiver." as G. but their immediate purpose can only be knowledge. etc.23 was the object of the "practical science" of the Spartan lawgiver. There is. for him. independent of his action. Otherwise. the objects of the "practical writings. they are expressions of nothing but speculative knowledge. otherwise and in another person.24 5. Can we draw this conclusion? To get to the bottom of this issue I must now open up a special inquiry." 4. For example. Bien calls20 "an instrumental aspect" [ein technologisches Moment] with respect to their ultimate purpose. Here we see the vast difference that separates knowledge realized in the study expounded in what may be called Aristotle's own "practical" writings from what he really means by "practical science" or (according to Burnet) "politics. for convenience. in the first place.19 their ultimate purpose also is action. the constitution of Sparta. Let us first keep as provisional what in the preceding remarks seems able to secure a sort of unity to the discourses collected in the Ethics and Politics. this "prudence" simultaneously involves an intelligent inquiry into the particular good to be realized hic et nunc and a speculative inquiry about action or the good (like that set forth by the Ethics and the Politics). 18 the first and immediate purpose of "practical science" is action (not contemplation) which has its origin in the knowing subject. are objects of such savoir-faire. upon objects which. As for the writings called "practical. but in another sense.< previous page page_26 next page > Page 26 express a person's reflection. who regard Aristotle's discussion of I shall translate this term by "prudence"in the sixth book of the NE as supporting the view that.21 are "human affairs" (pertaining to the city and not to the cosmos) which of course (as future objects 22 for "practical science") do not have their origin in the subject who analyses them or clarifies their rationality once they have occurred. the "practical writings" of the philosopher (in contrast to the "theoretical writings'').

Aubenque has noted. Thus it follows that for him "ethical" problems. 1 originated in the works of a disciple of K. far from representing the inquiry of an independent science. knowledge which provides no illuminating intuition of first principles.1366a22).1282b23) and of which he says that it raises questions about equality. he concluded that the philosopher's ethics was basically empiricist and rejected the claim by other scholars that Aristotle's "practical intelligence" had anticipated Kant's "practical reason. it is reduced to knowledge of the means of moral action. to the philosophical study which Aristotle describes as "political.e. without the aid of reason. A. belong. wherever Aristotle mentions it. he nevertheless < previous page page_27 next page > . the "political philosophy" which studies. rather than the former. by synderesis. in the course of a critique nearly 600 pages in length. Fischer. to desire)." like the problems which are specifically called "political."4 Although E. that the human affairs discussed in the ethical discourses form the "primary parts of the city. for example. like Thomistic prudence. in the third edition of his Philosophie der Griechen. on the contrary. in the last analysis.5 does not assume Walter's essentially polemical conclusions. that (2) the inquiry to which the NE prologue is an introduction is ''a sort of political inquiry" (1094b11) and that (3) the study "of the philosopher who reflects upon politics" (NE 1152b1-2) must also deal with pleasure. V 1. These statements. questions concerning equality turns out to be clearly distinguished from "the political capacity" which represents the most sovereign of the "sciences" (or "arts") that have the good as their end (P 1282b14-16). While refuting an anti-Kantian essay on Aristotle's practical reason (an essay published in 1855 by F.. was given over to virtue (i.e. moreover." because they bear on the laws and constitutions (R i8. the grounds of which are not obvious. Trendelenburg2 and supported by his pupil G." An examination of the concept of "prudence" ( ) should shed some light on this point. which corresponds to the notion of "practical science.3 Since Walter held that for Aristotle the determination of ends (i. Walter tried to establish.. From the fact that. J. as P. Zeller. of values)." To this vague idea must be added the statements of Aristotle himself that (1) "the concern about character can justifiably be called political" (R 1356a26). Teichmüller). A Key Concept:The Irritating Quarrel Of The Interpreters Scholarly discussion of the topic of .< previous page page_27 next page > Page 27 tors. nevertheless suffice to connect the studies set forth in the Ethics with a reflection which Aristotle elsewhere calls "political philosophy" ( : P iii 12. that since the Aristotelian prudence of the NE's sixth book is not assisted. one may ask whether it is not the latter.

we should distinguish. The fact is that the texts of the NE (even the most explicit. p. Very lucky in that it introduced an historical criterion of interpretation two years before W. Wittmann's suggestion nevertheless runs exactly counter to the view of Jaeger himself. at least implicitly. Gadamer13 criticizes Jaeger's hypotheses concerning in the writings which Jaeger takes to be prior to the NE. But this view was to be attacked vehemently and influentially by D. and. Allan in a series of studies whose arguments appeared in his general work on Aristotle's philosophy published in 1952. sometimes the properly Aristotelian virtue of the same name. according to Allan. This is also the position defended by F." (English translation. for whom in the NE regains its ordinary pre-Platonic meaning:12 "a practical faculty concerned both with the choice of the ethically desirable and with the prudent perception of one's own advantage." To argue for this position. in the final chapter of book six)10 can easily give rise to controversy and M. in the NE itself.8 includes many issues which go beyond the scope of my work and whose significance depends on the opposition between two philosophical schools at the end of the nineteenth century.7 This quarrel.< previous page page_28 next page > Page 28 accepts the view that Aristotelian prudence is understanding of the means of moral action only and not of the end. or. 1928.9 they are not yet definitively finished today. Gauthier thinks or rather desires." between intelligent inquiry into the means of action (corresponding to the minor premise of the practical syllogism) and intelligent inquiry into the ends of action (corresponding to the major premise of the practical syllogism). in any case.15 Allan defines for us as ''practical wisdom.22 whose most explicit is a < previous page page_28 next page > . Jaeger's Aristotle." and involves "skill in applying such rules intuitively to given situations. Teichmüller 6 replied and his viewpoint would be supported in 1903 by R. Wagner14 in the same year. can be understood in Jaeger's manner and is not set aside for discursive investigation of general norms of action."17 as an intellectual virtue which can be "produced by teaching. despite what R. A. M."18 Therefore." which sometimes designates the instrumental wisdom of the Greek tradition. Kress. But in the same year. And Allan tells us precisely concerning the "practically wise person" 20 that he possesses "a philosophical view of man's place in the universe" and "can best define the end for which all human society exists. within conceived as "practical wisdom. but seems to admit."16 whose task is "the discipline of the emotions according to a rule or purpose formulated by reason. 83) H. that. Wittmann11 formulated the quite seductive hypothesis that the word in these texts constitutes "an ambiguous term. G.19 According to Allan. could coincide with the course taken by Aristotle himself in the Ethics and the Politics. G.21 Allan refers to a number of passages from the NE. But the debates about the concept connoted by the Greek term which fed this quarrel were to recur in the course of the twentieth century. whose vicissitudes have been recounted by E. J." concerns "[general] rules. this interpretation coincides. Loening's original study.

R. the level of formal causality. it is not the task of the prudent person as such to seek knowledge of it. Before this. Walsh. J.25 This interpretationhardly a natural onepermits him to reduce the knowledge of prudence to the order of means. Gauthier tells us that to understand Aristotle's thought concerning we must carefully distinguishas Aristotle does implicitlybetween two levels: first. several scholarsE. therefore. which virtue alone permits us to glimpse correctly. that his own philosophical inquiries. "Perhaps. Hardie. F.35 to name a fewhave sanctioned D. R.30 if this claim is correct. Gauthier. Ando. translates the above passage as if the antecedent of the relative pronoun were not (the end) but (what is effective in promoting the end). 23 Aristotle would thus proclaim straight out that knowledge of the ultimate ends of action devolves on the "prudent" person . i. Like T. Michelakis. the level of efficient causality (where . In this respect. as knowledge penetrated by desire. a study of the avatars of Aristotelian (''the scholastic origins of the modern notion of 'prudence"')32 which I shall have occasion to evaluate shortly. Tricot. determines action at the end of the deliberation. who fixes the norms of virtue and. Allan's interpretation of .33 J.< previous page page_29 next page > Page 29 definition of excellence in deliberation .27 whose study of practical knowledge in Aristotle was written during the Second World War but published only in 1958. second. in a new introductory volume. As for the absolute end of action.31 When the second edition of his commentary on the NE appeared in 1970. it would justify Gauthier's use of the term "wisdom" to translate Aristotle's Greek term. depend on "prudence. performed with this goal. A. thought that he could corroborate the analyses of the professor from Glasgow.28 In short. P. the level on which (as pure knowledge) has the role of determining universal laws of action. from which it can be inferred that is not only intelligent inquiry into the means of action but also "true apperception of the end" .e.36 "the ultimate justification for looking upon the NE as an exercise of moral knowledge lies in the perfect coincidence of its < previous page page_29 next page > . along with what it implies about the knowledge put to work in an inquiry like that testified to by the NE. who defends in every possible way the assimilation of Aristotelian prudence to Thomistic prudentia. Allan's interpretation found other partisans. M. in his commentary on the NE.29 would thus seem to be the total virtue of the practical realm.34 W. Monan clearly expresses the view of those who hold that the study carried on by Aristotle himself is a function of . at the end of an inquiry into means) and. D. J. But D. J. Aubenque26 has exploited the manuscript tradition's alternative in the passage under consideration in order to support the claim that prudence has the task of knowing a particular goal . which appeared in the same year. and in the same direction. From his side." he writes. Gauthier included."24 J.. J.

in acting. but. the true practical principles. Listening to a philosopher's words is one thing. a teacher ." But does Aristotle really think in this manner? Let me clarify what is at stake here. The impossibility of teaching principles by means of rational speech holds especially when it is a matter of practical principles. for example. Now such a teaching does not put the person taught in possession of principles which suffice for his being a prudent person. like those which Aristotle himself offers us in his writings. prudence needs assistance from another person. a counselor. Therefore. But is that right? 2. that to commence and develop. Philosophical lessons in due form. A source of difficulty for the interpreter of Aristotle resides in the fact that no text of the philosopher explicitly distinguishes between the knowledge < previous page page_30 next page > . what does this mean precisely for prudence? It means. acquisition of practical principles from them is another. they will be able only to utter general rules. cannot truly teach them to us. seeing that reason and discursive understanding. it is not possible that prudence is an intellectual capacity for rationally determining these principles. Indeed.. on the nature of happiness. Aristotle himself assures us 1 that like other "intellectual excellences. then that would mean that this virtue is acquired just when one becomes a philosopher and also that the philosopher's teaching produces this intellectual virtue. this does not at all imply that the discourse or the oral lessons of a philosopher are the true means of acquiring prudence. would ipso facto be Aristotle's contribution to the arrival of the intellectual virtue of prudence in those who listen to him. is gaining experience. by themselves. the philosophical lessons expounded in.3 suggests rather that we should conceive the teacher as a guide. If Aristotelian prudence were the excellence activated by the philosopher who argues (theoretically). cannot of course lack interest on occasion. for the person who. In these conditions. is exactly the task which Aristotle assigns to phronesis. Aristotle seems to be very explicit about this:4 principles are not taught by discursive reasoning . Prudential Knowledge 1. that is." prudence proceeds "for the most part from teaching" . even if it is admitted that the prudent person knows the end of action. Now. who emphasizes in this regard the imperative need for experience.. The function of discerning those precise values . like any discourse. One point seems immediately to indicate the opposite. the value or values one should realize in conduct.< previous page page_30 next page > Page 30 avowed purpose with the function which Aristotle explicitly ascribed to phronesis. 2. The whole work is quite simply devoted to determining the end of human action. for example. the NE.2 Aristotle. but in contrast to what "teaching" connotes for us. universal and theoretical laws of conduct. at the very least.

primacy returns to the knowledge which directly presides over action. This is the interpretation of R. But if. prudence from the higher forms of knowledge < previous page page_31 next page > ." for the precise reason that it lies. as Gauthier says. "Moral 'science"'"which draws conclusions of universal significance from first principles using reason alone.11 They are: 1. And. Thomas dismembers Aristotle's . in this domain. "at the bottom of the ladder"? Let us not forget that we are in the practical domain. "at the bottom of the ladder. 2. however important scientific or synderetic knowledge of principles may be. as is clearly the case. that prudence is the exact opposite of a "modest virtue. "St. God. that is.'' 4. Gauthier displays with perfect clarity the different superimposed orders of knowledge recognized by St. 3. is that a reason to see in it. not as sciences"Gilby tr. as a result. Gauthier commits here. A. considering the "small and humble place"12 reserved by St. which preserves nothing of what made Aristotle's a [form of] wisdom. with some discomfort." Consequently.7 If Aristotle does not explicitly mention such a distinction. it seems to me. prudential knowledge for St. Thomas.]. for example. "Synderesis"which (naturally) knows universal first principles."10 In order to show us the distance between the two philosophers. a singular error of judgment when he disregards an essential fact pertaining to practical matters: the implication of the higher in the lower. . "Prudence"which. . or rather thinks he can dissociate. Thus we distinguish between moral science (moral or ethical philosophy) and morality (the domain of prudential knowledge)."13 The reason. wants to justify the inclusion of oeconomica and politica as partes subjectivae [subordinate parts] of prudence. Gauthier for whom. Thomas in the practical domain.8 one may be tempted to believe that in his eyes. he takes care to state:6 "oeconomica et politica non accipiuntur hic secundum quod sunt scientiae. scientia and prudentia are based on one and the same capacity. For he dissociates. Thomas is limited to a search for particular means on the basis of general principles established in advance. "Faith with the gift of wisdom and the contemplation which arises from it"which knows the supreme end of man.< previous page page_31 next page > Page 31 which the scholastics will call prudential and the knowledge which they will call scientific. according to Gauthier. quite to the contrary. sed secundum quod sunt prudentiae quaedam" ["domestic management and politics are here taken as kinds of prudence. 5 When St.9 complete virtue of the practical realm: . is that Aristotle extended the realm of to include both the determination of the human being's ultimate end and the inquiry into principlesfirst or second principlesof all moral action. [applies] to concrete cases [the] rules which come from higher up. Thomas for prudence. a "modest virtue"? Is it not. Gauthier holds that it amounts to a "modest virtue .

3. considered in itself. A. the latter "are naturally known" (naturaliter nota). one must indeed admit that the positions of St. Gauthier claims.26 But. I have in mind Aristotle's definition of prudence as a permanent disposition which directly presides over action . on this point. according to the theological perspective. indeed. Thomas includes among the partes integrales of prudence. Gauthier's conclusions. A conceptual distinction in terms of the objects known and in terms of the modes of acquisition of knowledge is possible.22 as does Thomistic prudentia. which occupies a preponderant place in the act of the prudent person. Albert's) synderesis21 contributes to Aquinas' teaching.30 "is of the intellectual order and not an operation < previous page page_32 next page > . is not a purely intellectual virtue. whatever (Christian) faith and above all (St. the general principles of action: it is wisdom in the practical realm.29 And. one must recognize that prudence constitutes the whole virtue of the practical realm. is limited to an inquiry into the means. not even deliberation . by itself. and so its virtue. instruction by a teacher (docilitas). nevertheless. One must dare to say so and." he wrote. begins with the knowledge bound up with faith. according to both the NE27 and the treatise On the Soul. Thomas and Aristotle. it knows. in some ways. moves nothing. because its specific task is to govern action. But can they be separated in reality? One cannot ignore the nature of the prudential act whose exercise presupposes knowledge of principles and endsknowledge which. Allan was right. for example. The connections will be tightened even more when one has noted the essential feature of Aristotelian prudence. A.23 The NE. 14 "Prudence. that is. from synderesis. from science or experience. Thomas.28 understanding.18 And it comes to the same thing for "the universal posterior principles'' (principia universalia posteriora) which one discovers "by way of experience" (per viam experimenti) "or by teaching" (vel per disciplinam):19 they are included in the science of the prudent person.17 that is. it seems obvious: nothing derived from pure knowledge would make of prudence a practical disposition . are infinitely less distant than R. concerning prudentia and respectively.20 If one takes account of these successive implications. states that prudence is "prescriptive" and not only critical (like "comprehension" )24 and that prudence is not merely "a rational disposition based in habit" .25 Understanding effectively commands action by discovery of the "final term" which figures in the minor premise of the practical syllogism. in a way." writes St. From this point of view. by synderesis. Thus practical understanding is understanding penetrated by desire . We can pinpoint two passages fundamental in this connection. precisely reverses R. "includes (includit)15 knowledge of universal principles" although "it does not consist principally (principaliter consistit non)16 of the knowledge of these universal principles".< previous page page_32 next page > Page 32 just enumerated. this point. in its own operations. This is why St. the end of the moral virtues and. prudence. Although prudence. "Deliberation.

M. as a point of contrast with the ethical virtues. D. "the eye of the soul"38 glimpses the good (which serves as end) only if correctly oriented by virtue. conceiving it to be an act of the speculativa ratio." he writes. Aristotelian prudence represents essentially the intellectual virtue whose operation consists both in determining rationally (by deliberation) and in commanding effectively (through its connection with desire) the precise means which allows attainment of a good end. the former the actions with respect to the end." The error here. adopting a Platonic metaphor.< previous page page_33 next page > Page 33 distinctive of practical reason.34 as G. consists in taking the definition of the genus for a definition of the species. with an eye focused on the good. has the function of inquiry into (particular) means and not that of theoretical inquiry about the (general) end. In summary. Allan41 wants to introduce when he claims that Aristotle "is careful not to say that < previous page page_33 next page > ." Saint Thomas thought so too. Of course. there is consequently no doubt that Aristotelian prudence. if I may say so. Deliberate choice will be correct neither without prudence nor without virtue. The idea that the rightness of the goal is assured by virtue rests on the also expressed conviction that "wickedness disorients us and deludes us about practical principles. E. like Thomistic prudentia. 4. in this respect. J. for the latter produces the end. And.35 Since each particular action may be regarded as a means with respect to the good which is the end of action. after all. Monan's view:32 "that the work distinctive of phronesis is truth. there is no room to object to it. But such an operation obviously presupposes that the prudent person possesses some sort of knowledge of the good end in terms of which he deliberates and commands. simply on the grounds that it is an intellectual virtue. 31 But one cannot subscribe to J. that is.40 I find it difficult to understand the qualification which D. the only difference which separates the prudent person from the clever person : the former acts for a noble goal . Anscombe has written. "is a matter of evidence for Aristotle. for virtue produces the rightness of the end and prudence the means with respect to it.33 What gives the operation of prudence its specific difference is the discovery of a "practical truth" ("in agreement with right desire"). the texts of the final chapter of NE vi are explicit:36 The operation (of the human being) is fulfilled in accordance with prudence and moral virtue.39 Such is."37 In short. But to affirm what is true is not a ''work distinctive of phronesis" within the genus of the intellectual virtues. as Aristotle says.

in keeping [the virtuous person] turned in the proper direction.44 "it is moral virtue which. in a passage of NE vii of which Allan 42 is perfectly aware: "virtue.45 like D. however. to note the same obvious point: "without doubt." This claim is contradicted. the conclusion of scientific (or philosophical) demonstration. teaches a correct opinion concerning the principle.] to see the true end. almost word for word. Gauthier uses all his efforts.43 "whether natural or the fruit of habit.. cannot by itself judge! One would be truly surprised at the contrary. Gauthier. A. like all those more specific ideas which motivate his actions. as Gauthier himself has to admit. not being an intellectual disposition. R. J.'' he writes. since the also knows the end. prudence can be assimilated to a true apperception of the end. an idea of the end which his actions should pursue.49 Hence it seems that. R. which abstracts from its specific operation (deliberation which governs action). this idea proceeds. St." we read. permits wisdom [i. But the conclusion goes beyond the premises.e. Thomas paraphrases Aristotle's passage when he writes that deliberative excellence constitutes a "rectitudo consilii in ordine ad illum finem circa quem veram aestimationem habet prudentia simpliciter dicta et hic est finis communis totius humanae vitae" ["rectitude of deliberation in respect to that end which so-called absolute prudence truly evaluates.52 For one easily agrees with Aristotle that in order to decide "what types of thing one must do to live well generally" .50 But what should we understand by this? 5. in other words. thanks to his virtuous dispositions. is not. in this connection. from the direction which the prudent person receives from his virtues. but the point remains that it is [wisdom] which sees it."]51 This explanation in no way distorts Aristotle's thought. therefore. It is quite simply an issue of true opinion which." Indeed.47 Aristotle tells us that the premise of deliberate choice is "a rational representation of the end for which we act" . It is not the conclusion of an intellectual or theoret- < previous page page_34 next page > .< previous page page_34 next page > Page 34 moral virtue can furnish us with a true judgement about the good or end which ought to be pursued.B. Allan must have meant only to maintain that virtue.53 the prudent person must possess a conception of living well generally. This is in effect what we are taught by the famous definition of deliberative excellence of which we have already spoken.48 and that temperance preserves prudence by preserving the apperception of "the final cause of our acts" or of the "principles of our acts" . For the fact that the . as such. This is the common end of the whole of life." Backed by this observation. in its most exact form. but the starting point for the working of prudence as such. R. in the context. A. But. In his commentary on the NE. possesses a vision of the good to be pursued does not imply that is also an intellectual capacity for rational determination or philosophical investigation of this goal. Allan46 can thus maintain that is not limited to the choice of means.

the existence of natural virtue. far from having to find. It will later be exploited by the scholastics. On the other hand.58 It is a form of intuitive knowledge.< previous page page_35 next page > Page 35 ical study undertaken independently. endorsing the belief that prudence is an intellectual operation assigned to the discursive search for principles of action. One will look in vain in Aristotle for a single passage. they can be theoretically determined by natural reason. the accomplishment of acts conforming to right reason. Thomas asserts. one does not find that reason naturally determines (praestituit) the end towards which the moral virtues aim. of course. that the rational imperative could be known and still not be accepted without virtue.67 and that. in some circumstances.63 who will introduce here the concept of synderesis.69 it does not imply any knowledge of these principles. nor right opinion about first principles of action. For the characteristic capacities of the prudent personlike those of the clever person are those which make him achieve acts tending towards the goal posed in advance . and even that. as St. He admits. is ever said to be a result of natural reason. moreover. in other words. On the other hand." Let us understand clearly: what this proposition claims is true.61 This analogy. a single allusion.55 The statements that a virtuous disposition determines a correct opinion of principles56 and that temperance guarantees a true apperception of the end57 imply that.68 He admits therefore that native dispositions of character could favor.59 which makes as little pretense to be (total) virtue of practical understanding as (the intuition of the first principles of science)60 makes to be total virtue of theoretical understanding. understanding. which Aristotle does not make explicit.62 asserts that apperception of the end is integrated into prudence as intellectual intuition is integrated into wisdom . it is said and demonstrated that the supreme end of action does not appear 54 to the person who is not virtuous. is content to grasp it and affirm it. But in itself. knowledge of practical < previous page page_35 next page > . but he did not maintain that the practical principles which are grasped by prudence are determined as the conclusion of theoretical inquiry by natural reason. preserved in its orientation towards the real good. and far from having to establish this good rationally. in certain people. natural virtue is blind. what the good actually is. such virtue might facilitate the development of a correct opinion concerning first principles of action. but what it presupposes is not: namely. This rather leads one to think that the prudent person receives from his virtues the possibility of acknowledging the (supreme) good.65 In Aristotle. natural practical reason. which is guaranteed by temperance. It is therefore a peculiarly Thomistic idea which Gauthier paradoxically defends66 when he writes that Aristotelian virtue "is ready to accept the rational imperative which will be the major premise of the syllogism of virtuous action.64 But in Aristotle neither true apperception of the end. by means of discursive inquiry. which is made possible by natural or habitually acquired virtue. Aristotle was perhaps close to seeing that the first principles of action are naturally known by each person.

as Aristotle understands it. no discourse teaches the principles of "practical science. combines. both prudential or practical knowledge and a speculative knowledge of a philosophical sort bearing on the ends of human action.e. Distinct from cleverness only because its operations rest on a true conception of the good. ) or because he obeys the injunctions of another. courage. prudence therefore represents right reason. according to a right reason which he did not possess. And the prudent person constitutes for another what other prudent persons had been earlier for him. are transformed into true virtue sustained by personal choice. on the condition that these injunctions also conform to right reason (cf. one cannot attribute to the philosopher the intention of supplying in his own arguments < previous page page_36 next page > . Virtuous dispositions. such knowledge is not taught by means of discourses any more than a properly prudential capacity is taught by such means. Even if Aristotelian prudence infallibly contains a knowledge of the end. this in no way coincides with the knowledge obtained by a theoretical or discursive study like that whose results may be contained in Aristotle's texts. The answer is no. Aubenque72 has clearly seen. and Aristotle can affirm that it is the prudent person who furnishes or rather constitutes in himself the norm of the moral virtues. in the same intellectual excellence. in other words. a person can at last conceive for himself what this right reason is. And his skillfulness at finding and realizing operations permitting the attainment of just any goal is transformed into prudence.. For by his acts of justice. liberality.71 But. scientific or philosophical) capacities.73 the norm of justice.< previous page page_36 next page > Page 36 principleswhich one cannot teachpresupposes virtue. precariously sustained up to this point by nature or as a result of another person's instructions. either naturally or under the authority of his masters. 70 And this discovery implies ipso facto two fundamental changes. a norm in the flesh. whether it be natural or the result of habits. ). On the other hand.. namely. as the NE1 essentially asserts. the norm of every practical good which should govern those who do not themselves possess right reason or do not possess it yet. as we have just seen. etc.. 3. liberality. Because he naturally acts in accord with right reason (cf." Therefore. the principles which govern his action. a model to be imitated. etc. a skillfulness at finding and realizing only the operations which conform to the good now known. Indeed. he establishes. he possesses the knowledge of principles because his character dispositions have permitted him to apprehend themdispositions themselves acquired by having acted over a long time. magnanimity. as P. magnanimity. Conclusions At the end of this inquiry it is therefore possible to answer categorically the question whether . courage. in the society where he lives. the prudent person owes this true conception neither to his natural reason nor to his intellectual (i. what are. in short.

and tries to determine what he must do in order to respond practically to the correct intuition which he has of happiness. as such. These two rea- < previous page page_37 next page > . thanks to virtuous action which prepares his understanding to grasp and acknowledge the truth of the principles which prompt his action. expresses a desire for general knowledge (what is human happiness?) and whose answer does not have to determine what he himself will do. It compares rather to the activity of this person when he exercises his properly prudential excellence in deliberating about the means to be employed in order to attain the good end which imposes itself upon him. to function as principles for practical science. cannot be an answer to the practical question which is posed for each subject in his own situation. any more than it must determine his later development. by the same token. because knowing what in general one should do does not give me in turn the means of doing what I ought to do. in his turn. in the same way. it is beyond the range of the contingencies into which every action necessarily enters. The true principles by which the action of the prudent person must be prompted. so. the philosopher who wants to know theoretically what happiness is. seeks then to determine the account which best corresponds to the idea of happiness that imposes itself upon him as the end of all action. in contrast with the practical question of the acting subject. but how to be happy (the means)." And. just as the prudent person. Thus the answer to the theoretical question is not and. to a theoretical question. From this perspective. for example. in each person. does not ask whether one should be happy (the end). And the theoretical question of the philosopher." but does not contribute directly to practical science by supplying its conclusions. For the latter tries to respond to a practical question (how am I going to be happy?) which he poses to himself and whose answer will determine his action. in order that it be good action. because what I must personally do is not necessarily what in general one should do 2 and. while the philosopher responds. for Aristotle. Indeed.< previous page page_37 next page > Page 37 a teaching of the sort that would aid the acquisition of prudence in those who are listening to him. turns out not to be conditioned by the earlier development of the person who poses it. firstly. one must understand that the theoretical inquiry to which the philosopher devotes his energies not only is not the expression of any "practical science. secondly. but empirically. As for the intellectual activity of the philosopher who tries to fix speculatively the ends of all action. are not fixed rationally thanks to a theoretical operation of the philosophical sort. By definition. But the philosopher's question is not that of the prudent person. which. one sees better how and why the disposition which Aristotle calls also exhibits the pattern of every "practical science. as such. it in no way compares with the intuitive process that each virtuous person activates in order to grasp and acknowledge the good to be pursued as an end.

above all. they promote good or bad habits. its decrees and its customs tends to define compellingly (with physical force. its customs or its constitution. it is society. that the conditions under which each person can reach knowledge of practical principles are rigorously connected to the acquisition of a virtuous disposition which is not yet prudence but only a permanent disposition to act in conformity with right reason. more precisely. or right reason. in the broad sense of the term. as being practical principles . which through its laws. the standards expressed in its laws. whether educators intervene a little or a lot. We must thus suppose that the persons with whom an individual regularly interacts and especially the society to which he belongs play a dominant role in the process whereby he is called upon to recognize this right reason. for this reason. in the vicious. the obligatory and effective principles which his listeners would have to pursue in their action. We have just seen. thus stating the norms respect for which will assure in all people subject to them the possession of true (or good) practical principles governing their actions. Now to whom. 1 Each person receives his standards of conduct from society and more immediately from those who educate him. Ultimately. they involve an element of relativity.< previous page page_38 next page > Page 38 sons were such as to remove from Aristotle the intention of supplying. This inference calls for another. practical principles are actually determined for everyone by the society in which they liveand. with the conclusions of his theoretical studies on happiness. whether they support and cultivate a natural inclination to follow the law or use their authority to correct a contrary inclination. in fact. opposing what the law prescribes). in the virtuous. therefore. The reason I have taken up discussion of Aristotle's concept of prudence is that an adequate grasp of this concept clarifies the plan pursued in the studies expounded in the Ethics and the Politics. it is primarily his responsibility to establish laws that accord with right reason. which determine the acquisition of true or false practical principles (true principles. Two observations should be made here. as I < previous page page_38 next page > . In short. VI The Meaning of Aristotle's Project 1. if need be) in each of its members the dispositions which will enable him or her to acknowledge. For one still needs a guarantee of correctness for the educational regime actually promoted or organized by each city and for the dominant values prescribed by it or sustained infallibly by it in the conduct of its members. This is equivalent to emphasizing the importance of "political science" for everything that concerns the acquisition of happiness. Indeed. agreeing with the prescriptions of the law. does the task of furnishing this guarantee befall if not the politician or. the lawgiver? Indeed.2 false principles. Thus we are referred to this famous science of the politician to which.

that is. The first condition for verifying the hypothesis which I just formulated is of course to guarantee the political nature of the enterprise which unites the discourses of the Ethics and the Politics and. the conduct of every person is evaluated.. it is indispensable to know the goal (human happiness) sought by every regime (or way of life in a political community). turns out to be defined and determined in Aristotle's view by the society of which they are part (i. the principles of the ethical good are in fact taught. it appears. he will do so indirectly. if not indispensable. which constitutes. as the task of every prudence is to discover and propose the best actions in a given situation. who therefore can and must desire a general knowledge of the human good.. the conformity of human conduct to the good).e. that Aristotle is concerned precisely with politics as an architectonic science4 and offers his discourses as a contribution to the knowledge needed by such a science. a basic element of knowledge useful. of virtues. etc. habits. by helping the lawgiver gain possession of a general knowledge of this type. especially. Now. etc. Besides. describes his inquiry concerning character traits as political . In other words. on the other hand. there is.e. if the philosopher himself hopes to serve morality effectively through his lessons. 2. Thus. along with the knowledge of the best political or constitutional rules. the lawgiver.e. to present arguments to show that. This is why Aristotle describes as "architectonic" the legislative prudence 3 whose task is to discover or establish the best laws in a given society. This is not all. Aristotle does not acknowledge "ethical science" as such nor does he recognize ethical inquiry which is not political. if the principles of the "practical science" of the prudent person are adequately defined by the science of the politician-lawgiver who furnishes (by means of his laws. to legislative science (i.) the general norms by reference to which.5 Hence the hypothesis. no superior science to determine the principles of legislative science. That is the reason why Aristotle. decrees. according to the NE prologue. Aristotle may have wished to contribute by means of the group of inquiries to which the discourses of the Ethics and Politics bear witness. architectonic politics). orto put it more preciselyinculcated by the lawgiver. < previous page page_39 next page > . as we have seen.. that the philosopher's works which we are readingnot only the Politics (which is obvious) but also the Ethicsaim essentially to instruct the politician and above all the politician par excellence. by politics). for in order to legislate adequately. because it contributes to the knowledge required for the adequate exercise of political art . what we call the "morality" of people (i. in the last analysis. For. in spite of the existence of the so-called ethical discourses .< previous page page_39 next page > Page 39 suggested hypothetically above. which it will be necessary for us to examine. in a given society. who requires general knowledge concerning both constitutional regimes and the human good in order to make laws in particular circumstances.

that Aristotle conceived of something with the status of "ethical science" ( ).18 Those committed to the philosophical tradition which has seen the NE as the first monument to "ethical science"19 may perhaps claim that an ethical teaching. a fact "of primary importance. insisted on the fact that the expression is found in no text of Aristotle. on the words "ethical study" .13 the reason is that these discourses argue from a specifically human perspective (which is neither "logical" nor "physical"). Everyone who wishes to subscribe to this opinion is free to do so. J. 6 As for the phrase . as I have noted. that the expression "ethical study" . Can one admit. by itself. Now.9 Gauthier does not hesitate to conclude: "thus it seems that one could consider Aristotle the creator of the expression and the concept 'ethical science. like the expression "the inquiry about character traits" . moreover. Burnet. even if its author did not describe it as such. seeing that the < previous page page_40 next page > . Let us indeed admit what is probable. A.14 "discourse about things to be done" . we know how difficult it is to equate the notion of "practical science" worked out by him with the theories set forth in a "discourse on actions. but our problems are in no way resolved by such a move. what R. it is certain that the occurrence of this phrase is not. Gauthier judges it to be." There is even less reason to infer."'10 This is as if one were to argue from the existence of the expressions 11 and 12 ("'exoteric' discourses'' and "'more exoteric' investigation") to the conclusion that Aristotle was the founder of "exoteric science"! If the adjective "ethical" describes a type of discourses ."8 Picking up. There are other expressions by which the philosopher clearly designates his own writings or writings similar to them: "discourses about actions" . for this reason.< previous page page_40 next page > Page 40 To speak of "ethical science" in describing the doctrines contained in the Ethics is obviously to betray the letter of Aristotle's writings. especially when the latter phrase does not exist in any text.15 "discourses about character traits and actions" . Burnet said in short that it refers to discourses characterized by the use of ethical propositions .7 In any case. refers to a study such as that expounded in the texts now entitled Ethics. that Aristotle conceived this study as an autonomous science. mostly concerning human character traits . which constitutes the birth of ethics as a science. from the occurrence of the expression "ethical discourses" . But.17 and so forth. Aristotle does not grant that the study that corresponds to such arguments has the status of a science .16 "discourses about issues relating to passions and actions" . is really found in Aristotle. an ethics as we understand the term. for all that. although the expression "practical science" is used by Aristotle.

However." Modern exegesis tends to reserve the term "political" or "political science" for the teachings (about the constitution. McKeon. and.e. Christi's apt observations. after being described as a political inquiry. of the label "ethical inquiry" which. which the philosopher could not resolve to abandon in words!22 This is a fine example of an ad hoc hypothesis. the teachings of the Politics) and a "politics" in the broad sense (i." And that is why some interpreters have conceived a "politics'' in the narrow sense (i. this influence was natural. I think that the inquiry also rightly bears the name. F. according to R."' And Hardie refers to the introduction of the Magna Moralia (MM). as it seems. nobody denies that the discourses of the NE deal essentially with material which is properly called ethical. in its totality. as Hardie saw clearly. Schwan. then." The position defended by Aristotle himself leaves no room for doubt: the writings supplied to us by the Ethics and the Politics belong to a single study described as "politics. not ethical. but political. Indeed. Bien28 and W.26 A. left behind in deeds. that the NE.< previous page page_41 next page > Page 41 Rhetoric proposes to describe as "political" the inquiry about character traits with which it deals 20 and that the NE is presented as an approach which is in some way political ?21 It has been claimed that the NE's use of such an expression is the trace of an earlier conception.33 influenced Aristotle's editors in the Hellenistic era.) contained in the Aristotelian work of the same name.25 but Aristotle himself is far from thus restricting the meaning of the term "political (inquiry).23 To claim.. R. moreover. But nothing proves the incompatibility of this fact with the second fact that the same discourses present the results of an inquiry described by Aristotle himself as "political. is transformed quickly and definitively into a strictly ethical inquiry24 gets us nowhere.. . Hardie. etc. which to him seems to state Aristotle's view correctly. the teachings of the Politics and the Ethics). One finds this distinction in R. a part as well as a starting point of politics." < previous page page_41 next page > . inasmuch as the Stoics at this time were preaching a human philosophy under the name of "ethics.27 G. this distinction is much more artificial than real:30 "Aristotle does not seem to suggest that there are different senses of 'political science. There is not the least ambiguity to the rejection here.e.29 for example. conceived by those who unhappily see that his terminology impugns their own interpretation! This spare hypothesis should be considered only when all interpretations which could do justice to Aristotle's vocabulary have been invalidated. by the author of the MM.31 Here is the conclusion of this passage:32 The inquiry about dispositions of character is.

Aristotle understood the need for securing the excellence of the human being independently of any political system by working out an ethical theory for individuals.< previous page page_42 next page > Page 42 Such a position does not require us to minimize the distinction between an inquiry about character traits and an inquiry about the constitution nor the credit which Aristotle deserves for making this distinction more clearly than Plato. in contrast to Plato. Apparently quite seductive. beyond the accidents of politics. Betbeder wrote. For at the end of the classical age which knew the grandeur of the city-state and of its "political humanism. commits exactly the same error and assures us. this judgment nevertheless rests on a capital error of interpretation which calls it into question. Voegelin did. which have tried to describe an evolution in Aristotle's thought."36 Such a judgment can hardly be sustained when one knows that human excellence. as G. more than a way of distinguishing two kinds of problem for homo politicus himself. that ethics cannot have such independence before Aristotle "because the individual does not [yet] have an autonomous end. the majority of the moral virtues analyzed by Aristotlenot only justice and friendship40presuppose a common life organized in accord with established rules. P. having been a single study up till then.39 a conception which prohibits the philosopher from proposing an ideal form of life which would abstract from the actual (political) conditions in which each person is located. that. The error is to regard Aristotle's Ethics as an attempt to contribute to "the moral formation of the individual" considered in isolation from society. 34 But such a division within "political" study does not involve. Aristotle innovates.35 The historian of philosophy does not have to judge prematurely.41 "Genetic" approaches. that is. when we keep in mind Aristotle's conception of the human being as "political animal'' 38 noted by so many interpreters. for example. Nor do we have to say that "the Nicomachean Ethics is the great testimony in which the authority of the spoudaios asserts itself through the ages. in Aristotle's mind. in Aristotle's eyes. have often been led to overemphasize his differences with Plato on this point. Plato's Republic is succeeded by the Ethics and the Politics: we are present in a way at the origin of a separation. above all. inaugurates in its autonomy a new field of study. who also pleads in favor of the strict autonomy of "ethical science" in Aristotle. he creates a new cycle of teaching. as E."44 How can such judgments be supported? And. One can say that with Aristotle reflection on the human being divides in two. Bien has noted. above all. is effectively realized only under the aegis of correct compulsive norms." Aristotle establishes a new balance between the problem of organization of the city and that of moral formation of the individual.43 Gauthier. for example:42 when he teaches the courses which will become the Eudemian Ethics and then the Nicomachean Ethics. where can one find in Aristotle the notion of an "individual" whose good < previous page page_42 next page > . Moreover. of just laws37 and.

49 When he asserts elsewhere the identity of happiness (or type of life) defined for each person taken separately and happiness defined for cities in their totality . has ensnared his interpreters." it becomes immediately obvious that it is in each individual's interest that he offer his cooperation to the support and prosperity of the city. The reason is that. are only deformed human beings. of the city's common good must be preserved or secured." human beings still remain decisively dependent on favorable conditions provided for them by the city. it is perhaps Aristotle's realistic perspective which. the importance of individuals (i. the most elementary good: life. or even the existence. paradoxically.55 But.< previous page page_43 next page > Page 43 should be promoted without consideration for the society to which he belongs? 45 One knows that. can indeed tempt one to infer prematurely that. there can be no contradiction in principle between what is required for the good of the city and what is presupposed for the happiness of human beings (particular.57 The part. who were neglected by Plato so that he could focus on an idea of the state.46 Indeed. is the explanation of the claim that the city is prior to each of its members: . concrete human beings) is not equivalent to falling into individualism! It is true that the organization of the city does not seem to be an end in itself for Aristotle. as A. when devoting themselves to "contemplation. from Aristotle's perspective. according to Aristotle.50 he did not of course mean to say that each individual could be happy living separately.52 This having been said. indeed.56 And this. if necessary.e. if they exist. in the philosopher's eyes. The attention devoted by the philosopher to concrete human beings. consequently. if the city is that by which human beings secure their "living-well. but are distinguished only as whole and part . P. concrete beings.. Aristotle's city exists only for the individual.54 Recognizing. does not exist without the whole and. laid down in the third book of the < previous page page_43 next page > . M. A final argument to support the autonomy of a supposed Aristotelian "ethics" might be found in the distinction."48 Aristotle thus reproaches idealism with sacrificing the actual components of the state (its members) to an abstraction of the state. integral parts of the city). Schwan has correctly noted. including. Lerner seems to reach this conclusion. Really isolated human beings .53 But it is a conclusion of a false realism. And if the interest. then the particular good must be subject to sacrifice.51 Even when they are least political. the real human being does not exist without the city. as Aristotle does. so the city is not an idea but a reality to which one must assimilate the good of each and every member. moreover. the city and the particular person are not opposed. just as the human being is not an abstraction. that is.47 Hence the objection addressed to the Socrates of the Republic: "it is impossible that the city as a whole should be happy without all its parts or the majority or at least some among them possessing happiness. from the perspective of the final cause. even if this should be at the expense of his own immediate advantage.

61 But. Aristotle. On this last point. prudence above all an excellence of political life and the good man a leading citizen. the subordinate is also a citizen. even under this favorable hypothesis. to the exact extent to which the excellence of the good man is identified with the excellence of the prudent person operating in a political role.68 Courage. while the excellence of the good man cannot. Consequently.69 is a virtue of the citizen-soldier and particularly of the military leader (who is < previous page page_44 next page > . because the excellence of the citizen depends upon the type of constitution in which he participates .64 To sum up. Aristotle. but that is for very definite reasons. strictly speaking . that is.< previous page page_44 next page > Page 44 Politics. in fact. between the excellence of the good citizen and the excellence of the good man. even without considering justice and friendship.66 One will object that there are other kinds of prudence which relate not to the political arena but to domestic life and even to strictly personal life. the excellence of every citizen is not yet the excellence of the good man. 58 In reality. it is only in one type of city that the two coincide . .62Let us think of the paradigm of the prudent person. one must observe that the principal moral virtues analyzed by the philosopher. it can vary. is it possible to conceive a truly good man.63Now. but perhaps personal happiness does not exist without political life. however. as a result. . Aristotle is explicit: "The excellence of a man is necessarily the same as the excellence of the citizen of the best city.'' he tells us. either among the governed or in a nonpolitical activity? Obviously not. Above all. correctly interpreted. the philosopher's statements on this point. Aristotle thus concludes that only "the politician who is sovereign or can be sovereign in the care of common affairs (either by himself. are essentially virtues of the public man."65 Let us therefore pose the question: outside the conditions created by the best constitutional regime.60 therefore. "that the person who knows his personal interests and occupies himself with them is a prudent person. displayed in the dangers of war. the excellence of the good citizen differs from the excellence of the good man because the qualities of a good citizen do not necessarily imply the qualities of a good man. asserts59 that. categorically nullify the hypothesis that he meant to promote an ethics which was not political. or along with others)" is a good man. the excellence of the good citizen coincides with the excellence of the good man under the two conditions that he exercises a commanding role and that he exercises this role in the best type of city. They furnish the evidence for our counter-interpretation. it can only be identified with the excellence of the leader ." One must resign oneself to what cannot be avoided: Aristotle's man is above all a political man. Of course. recognizes the objection and refutes it:67 "one thinks. and it might be the case that a good citizen in a given constitutional regime would not be a good man absolutely. Pericles. For the latter presupposes prudence and. After all. while the politicians are those engaged in intrigue .

did not dream in any way of proposing an individual happiness apart from the city. which are virtues of the citizen who exercises a magistracy . If.74 Their intention. we are justified in supposing that the collection of discourses which make up the Ethics and the Politics are not addressed (directly or primarily) to just any person whatever but preferentially to the lawgiver. and so did not undertake ethical studies outside of a larger inquiry called "politics." and. after all that. particularly if it is true that Aristotle did not recognize ethics as an autonomous "science" in any sense. who must know both what constitutes the happiness of human beings belonging to the city. the educator par excellence. < previous page page_45 next page > . consequently. But one will note henceforth that it does not do violence to any of the philosopher's assertions concerning the nature of his teaching. Temperance and mildnessas well as other minor virtues "concerned with conversations and interactions in common life"72 (truthfulness. humor and friendliness)are no more virtues of the private person than the other virtues are. as has been said. are also the subject of two virtues (magnanimity and an anonymous virtue. that they are united by a close connection with the discourses grouped under the name of Politics and that the two types of inquiry express ultimately the same basic concern. moreover. the affairs of state are discussed and negotiated. the just mean between ambition and the lack of ambition). thus. then one can say. they attach to the citizen either in his life of leisure (let us think of the symposia!) or in the meetings or assemblies where. without prejudging the content of his discourses known under the name of Ethics. Liberality and magnificence engage the noble citizen respectively in the domain of small expenses vis-à-vis his fellow citizens or his friends and in the domain of great expenses for the benefit of the entire state. If my analyses up to this point are correct.< previous page page_45 next page > Page 45 a prudent person). directly or indirectly. and correct if need be the interpretation which I am proposing.71 They are thus the virtues to which only the politician can aspire. one takes account of the conclusions to which the study of Aristotle's concept of prudence leads us and. it seems to me.73 To think. I shall have to verify. if one admits that teaching by discourse has no part in the acquisition of the principles of action which truly orient the prudent person towards the good. render precise. in the practical domain. 70 Honors . in the practice of the liturgies ["public services" only the wealthy could afford]. would be above all to instruct the lawgiver. that Aristotle was engaged not only in describing but also in actively recommending an ethics foreign to every political system is. large or small. for example. and what are the best arrangements which the city can make to promote this happiness. to misconstrue all the philosopher's explicit statements and to risk an hypothesis which cannot be sustained historically.

which here adopts a new point of departure. The reflections of Socrates and his successors may thus be understood as being prompted by the wish to supply politicians and lawgivers with the insights of which they were manifestly deficient. My inquiry. to the lawgiver. especially. Perhaps politics and. particularly. lawgiving seemed to fail at their most basic tasks.< previous page page_46 next page > Page 46 I said above that Aristotle's concerns are part of a tradition inaugurated by Socrates. had developed in such a way that a curious or simply attentive mind was led to inquire simultaneously into the nature of the human good and the means which political authorities could employ to secure it. will allow us to see to what extent Aristotle's enterprise implies an historical context like that to which I am alluding. < previous page page_46 next page > . But it will permit us above all to understand the philosopher's theoretical reasons for addressing his teaching to the politician and. What was the source of the latter's desire to clarify "human affairs"? Perhaps the Greek city. at his time.

into constitutions. as its general content suggests and its appendix which lays out a program of studies "concerning lawgiving . the < previous page page_47 next page > . there is no doubt that this chapter was meant to introduce.C.< previous page page_47 next page > Page 47 2 The Justification for a Political Teaching I 1.6 This project should not be understood as a mere contribution to knowledge. The most brilliant among them. given the depth of thought expressed and the importance of themes addressed. Given its location at the end of the NE's tenth and final book.. will train the young Aristotle over a period of almost twenty years. the present final chapter of the NE.5 His death. on the whole. It vividly displays the concerns which prompted the philosopher's investigations. The anxiety and confusion of those responsible for the upbringing of children shows up in Plato's portraits of Callias in the Apology. not necessarily the Politics as we have it. in an Athens which left the task of training its citizens to the discretion of the heads of families. and. the Ethics and the Politics. Thus Aristotle's enterprise comes to maturity within an Athenian tradition born a good century earlier when the men of wisdom. They are forthcoming.. to be only a transitional passage.4 Socrates attracts to him youth in search of instruction. A Privileged Document The figure of the helpless Strepsiades who resorts to Socrates' "thinkery" in the hope of finding there a guide for his son's education proves to be symbolic for us. 1 As the city's alarmed conscience.3 People seek new insights. in 399. who had been till then natural philosophers. more generally.7 The works which we read today. gives life to an ineradicable message in the minds of his disciples. Perhaps also philosophers have too readily abandoned to the philologists what would seem. its readers and commentators often come to it already a bit winded. Two thousand years of scholarship have not exhausted this chapter's richness. the constitution"8 confirms. in general. bear witness to an effort to solve problems raised by human life on Greek soil in the fourth century B. Like Protagoras and his imitators. Plato. Aristophanic comedy2 is the echo of an actual historical drama: that of education at a time when the poets ceased to be the teachers of virtue. were summoned into controversies concerning the education of citizens. A privileged text. Lysimachus and Milesias in the Laches. Indeed. allows us to glimpse Aristotle's intentions in this respect. Nevertheless. and Crito in the Euthydemus. but an investigation into laws and.

the NE's final chapter raises a particular but important difficulty about the connections between habit and knowledge in the acquisition of virtue. Different conditions. Within the general problem of education. one of these conditions is that habituation precedes knowledge.5 And. does not distinguish between the good man and the statesman so far as virtue is concerned.11 Plato's Republic had already noted the inadequacy and radical imperfection of those who attain a sort of virtue "through habit without philosophy" . who understood the law in this way from the time of his Protrepticus. I distinguish three sections in this chapter. It presumes. moreover. And Aristotle elsewhere exposes this confusion. aside from the appendix.15 Hence the importance reserved in the dialogue (book ii) for education defined as the primary acquisition of virtue in children. apparently sees in it the ideal instrument of education. the Platonic heritage as a whole and.9 As in his predecessor Plato.16 Plato < previous page page_48 next page > .10 We are thus referred back to the historical situation that was the fifth century origin of philosophical reflections about human beings. therefore.6 the influence of the Laws appears basic.14 must be combined in order to produce a good human being . as F. Aristotle. In the Laws.12 The myth of metempsychosis. the Laws. he tells us in effect. In essence: "How does one become a good human being?" and "How does one become a lawgiver?" The debate on both issues seems to be inspired by the Meno. 9 It essentially involves the entire enterprise of Aristotle about which we are inquiring. the most definitive lessons drawn from attempts beginning with Socrates to solve human problems. Plato bases on this conception the need for education from infancy on . Plato gives us his final word on the question. we find in Aristotle a concise confirmation of the defects displayed by the majority of Greek cities and of the futility of attempts to remedy them.8 education which requires the aid of the laws as rational norms.2 This dialogue. rational and irrational. or nearly so. published after Plato's death by Philip of Opus. He has succeeded.< previous page page_48 next page > Page 48 NE's final chapter is just the opposite of an artificial transition. beginning with the first part. presented in the Phaedo. Dirlmeier has noted.4 On the other hand.13 illustrates this idea. seems to have been a profound source of inspiration for Aristotle: the central part of the chapter directly refers to it. however. Plato expressly states his conviction that at the earliest age the totality of character is basically determined by habit .1 The first and the third pose analogous questions. A Reflection In The Socratic-Platonic Tradition For the sake of convenience. 2. which is dominated by a conception of human beings divided between two tendencies.7 Like Aristotle. in distinguishing the elements of a synthesis which will be clearly formulated by Aristotle.3 But the influence of the arguments of the Meno on Aristotle's thought is rather superficial.

23 Nothing shows better Aristotle's debt to his master on this thorny question than a remark in the fifth book of the Laws.4 who ignores here the dialogue's solution (which was provisional. 3. Plato stated: "education consists in drawing and leading children to the norm which has been pronounced right by the law and which has been proven truly right in the unanimous experience of the best and oldest. Were pre- Platonic < previous page page_49 next page > . nobody will ever be able to if he be evil. that virtue is the result of chance .1 As is shown from other Aristotelian texts which echo it. seeing that it opposes prudence and prevents knowledge of the good.< previous page page_49 next page > Page 49 started from the idea that those still incapable of reason must be trained to rule their appetites and their aversions by rational norms whose rationality they will later acknowledge. Like his master. he too will appreciate the importance of the laws in this respect.6 Although he examines elsewhere7 the hypothesis.22 Nevertheless.21 Perhaps he does not consider the discord between that which pleasure pursues and that which rational opinion prescribes to be the greatest possible ignorance . 17 Aristotle will retain the lesson. Aristotle recalls the Meno."18 For Plato. as Plato did."19 Aristotle decisively adopts the same perspective regarding both the nature of primary education20 and the importance of the laws. Aristotle.2 this dialogue stated the question concerning virtue in a form which had become classical.3 Can virtue be taught or learned ? Can it be obtained by practice ? Does it pertain to us by nature or in another way? Such are the hypotheses preserved by Aristotle. He sees in this agreement the whole of virtue . The Limits of Discourse in Education In attacking the problem of teaching in the first part of the NE's final chapter. from which the Theognis citation at 1179b5 is borrowed.8 Aristotle ignores it here. intemperance remains a sort of ignorance in his eyes. for other passages in the NE (and the EE) deal with divine dispensation . A conviction of this sort leaves little room for the claims of those who think they are able to teach virtue by means of discourses. Plato asks: who can really appreciate this measure which we have just proposed? He answers: "according to the ancient proverb. in any case) that virtue was to be a divine gift.24 The deep conviction that virtuous habits are required for knowledge of the good is at the root of Aristotle's statements in the NE's final chapter. but whoever has become experienced and good from habit will" . set aside by the Meno. who refers to it.5 The silence is deliberate. sets aside Plato's response to the question in order to return to the way in which it was posed on the threshold of the dialogue: Plato was asking. all education should seek that "the child's soul should not be accustomed to react to pleasure and pain in ways contrary to the law and to those who have been persuaded by the law.

they are essential. emphasized the irreplaceable importance of natural gifts. differing from rhetoric in that the latter can be acquired rapidly. Plato impugns the natural virtues by noting that they can be harmful in certain circumstances. and. the Sophists' claims that they taught by discourses were open to criticism. To suppose that the virtues are purely and simply natural is to mortgage all education or rather to condemn it as a futile undertaking. though they did not necessarily completely deny the importance of natural qualities.10 This will also be the case with Isocrates a generation later. like Gorgias.21 But the Socratic tradition did not understand the issue this way. When. among them probably Critias20 and surely Iamblichus' anonymous Sophist. like Antiphon.13 while certain Socratics like Antisthenes denied instruction any role in the acquisition of virtue. 9 who stressed education. whose epistemological (and didactic) skepticism was notorious. secondly. obviously assumed that this mortgage has been removed. The philosopher falls in with the majority of his predecessors in stating that human beings are not naturally virtuous. apprenticeship does not ipso facto involve teaching . challenging the pretensions of the so- called masters of virtue who complained of the injustice of their pupils. for "one must first be born with human nature and not that of another animal. which they likened to a sort of repetitive practice . So did certain Sophists.14 Believing in spite of everything that the virtues are sciences. as I indicated. as Aristotle frequently notes. in the Meno. as well as with a certain quality of body and of soul. preparing the way for Plato's description of philosophyinsofar as it is "concerned with teaching" and "concerned with educating" as genuine sophistic. the insufficiency of natural qualities did not always imply an unconditional need for repetitive practice in order to acquire virtue worthy of the name.19 But that would take us far from our purpose.16 The elements of this old controversy become with Aristotle the elements of a familiar synthesis.15 Socrates was able to adopt the claim of the Sophists to teach virtue. beginning with Protagoras.12 insisted on apprenticeship in the acquisition of the qualities of the good human being and claimed to be teachers of virtue. in their ambition to teach rhetoric. the majority. did not claim at all to teach virtue."18 There would be much to say in this vein concerning Aristotle's idea of inborn excellence . Others. he is agreeing with Socratic claims that what is wrong with the < previous page page_50 next page > . Now.17 It is not that natural factors play no role in his view. On the contrary. for whom virtue is the result of numerous actions. Those.11 But without minimizing natural gifts. and. Socrates undertook this criticism in a radical way. Antisthenes thought that it did. But two points must be made here: first. for the philosopher holds that the same nature which distinguishes man from woman also distinguishes the free man from the slave. In the view of thinkers prior to Aristotle.< previous page page_50 next page > Page 50 thinkers primarily divided according to the three hypotheses here recorded by Aristotle ? This is not impossible.

the moral virtues allow one to know the human good and this knowledge belongs to the prudent person. up to that point it is strictly useless or almost so. once acquired.e. on the contrary. after what has just been said in outline about happiness and the virtues. about friendship and pleasure. proceeds from habit. on the very likely hypothesis that the philosopher could only count on prudent persons who were a powerless minority in the polis where he taught. Conclusion: teaching does not create (moral) virtue in people but it permits prudent people to exercise better the virtue they already have. II 1. Thus the final difficulties of Platonism are dissolved. However.< previous page page_51 next page > Page 51 natural virtues is a lack of understanding. Socrates was not wrongnor was Plato insofar as he held that the emergence of prudence raises a virtuous disposition to the rank of true virtue. but at that point it becomes possible because the prudent person is open to effective persuasion. which perfects or corrects nature. 22 Hence Aristotle attributes to Socrates the belief that all virtues are kinds of knowledge. which has no parallel in the EE or in the MM.. one cannot assume that Aristotle's project constituted by the Ethics aims to supply principles permitting everyone to become a good person..23 Plato. begins with a question full of interest for us. Consequently.26 In a sense the Socratic thesis is inverted: knowledge is no longer the condition of virtue but virtue is the condition of knowledge (i. given that it could not operate at the early stage of education? Did he abandon to circumstances the whole of basic training in virtuous habits? All these questions are addressed by the last chapter of the NE. At the most.24 Two main corrections allow Aristotle to perfect this synthesis: he distinguishes between two main types of virtue and affirms a radical difference in kind between prudence and wisdom. if "intellectual virtue. we < previous page page_51 next page > . owes its birth and growth to teaching . For. moral virtue. for the most part. the acquisition of the moral virtues owes little to teaching as we understand it: it rests upon habit. It concerns whether. who uses it for the premises of his deliberation. through the knowledge or awareness which they would acquire of their virtue.28 As for instruction by means of discourses. chapter 10). for his part. brings off a preliminary synthesis: he emphasizes the importance of habit alongside nature and the necessity of (philosophical) knowing in addition to habituation."25 Strictly speaking.27 In another sense. On the Insufficiency of Discourse for Forming the Good Person The present final chapter of the NE (book ten.. according to Aristotle. what echo could he expect from his teaching. knowledge of the human good). But did such a plan require the lengthy analyses offered us by the Ethics? And. it would help those who are materially virtuous to become so formally.

that is. 1 The question is posed both for the teacher (the author of the preceding discourses) and for the person taught (the listener to these same discourses). more affirmatively. Of course. But the hypothesis of a doublet. and so forth. they do not obey what these discourses enjoin. About the effectiveness of discourses.14 Correl- < previous page page_52 next page > . do not have decisive influence on most people.7 chose to see there two successive versions. in spite of its intrinsic insufficiency. the two passages agree in affirming that many people listen in vain and without benefit to discourses (which appeal to reason). for which no interpretive difficulty calls. that "in practical matters the goal is not to gain the ability to study or know all good things but rather to realize them in action. Arguments. The question which Aristotle formulates at the start is explained by a dual conviction (general and particular) which he expresses elsewhere ( ).2 that is. first. the conditions under which teaching. Such is the starting point of a long reflection which examines both the meaning and the role of the philosophical "discourses" which we read today in the Ethics and the Politics. by contributing to the effective virtue of those who are listening to it. second. is the virtuous praxis of the learner. and it is admitted right away that this praxis is distinct from knowledge acquired by teaching by means of discourses."3 and. that "on the subject of virtue. the same doctrine undergirds both expositions. Aristotle says in short.13 These remarks apply to people who live at the mercy of their passions. Rassow. The whole problem is whether acquisition of knowledge in this way necessarily implies that the learner's praxis is virtuous. The possible exception made for generous. Thus the philosopher implicitly answers the initial question in the negative: no. the virtues. is misleading because the influence of discourse on such persons is entirely dependent on their being already oriented towards the good.6 followed by R. well-born characters.12 knowledge supplied them by teaching remains of no interest to them. Aristotle insists on what we can call the preliminaries (cf.< previous page page_52 next page > Page 52 can consider that we have attained the goal which had been established. Indeed. the goal sought has not necessarily been reached after what has been said about happiness. The text apparently offers two parallel passages on the topic. in themselves. whether it is the sufficient condition for such a praxis. that is. who are truly enamored of the good."4 The end envisioned by Aristotle at first. knowledge does not suffice but one must try to possess [virtue] and practice it. Gauthier. have the power to make a person good. therefore. A. Aristotle sets forth several considerations which join those of the second passage.5 and H. could attain the goal sought. is not required.8 The first passage puts observed phenomena 9 in opposition to the view that arguments in discourse form might. the latter passage states. 10 / 11) of teaching by means of discourses. I shall note the strict correspondence which exists between these claims and certain claims in the NE's prologue.

)24 is compared to traditional counsels and exhortations. 15 In the same line of thought. The love of the good and the hatred of evil here mentioned as indispensable prerequisites for instruction obviously can only be the result of a good education: that point was already an implication of the prologue."17 The same view. reason and passion . In short. < previous page page_53 next page > . while the prologue limited itself to indicating the considerable importance of knowledge on the subject. Aristotle's intent is to show that the sanctions used to secure the masses' respect for the good are of the same type as those needed to guarantee the virtuous action of the youth. For Aristotle.25 Indeed. he states the conditions under which instruction received has force: "the soul of the listener must first have been shaped for a long time by habits so that it will rightly exercise its likes and dislikes".16 "the character therefore must have a predisposition for virtue. Hence this statement that "generally.< previous page page_53 next page > Page 53 atively. our passage. Let us see for ourselves. Given this.19 The idea is as follows: whoever does not ordinarily act in conformity with the rational rule which he possesses in himself cannot conform any better to the rules prescribed for him by arguments in another person's speech. that human conduct is motivated by two antagonistic principles. without specifying that certain discourses can contribute to the virtuous praxis of the well-disposed listener.20 The NE's prologue expresses the point precisely. the category of the people most frequently in rebellion against reason because they are carried away by the passions. unlike the prologue. our present passage. Aristotle holds that the dominion of the passions operates at reason's expense.23 Thus. the knowing acquired through teaching by discourses amounts to an external regulator. nevertheless yield to the external forms of virtue involving compulsion. Aristotle states specifically that knowledge of issues with which his political discourses deal "would be of great benefit to those who govern their appetites and their actions in accord with reason" .21 The relationship between the two passages is not merely one of parallelism but of complementarity. useful only for the learner whose actions obey reason. The disciple's understanding of the teacher's discourse presupposes analogous conditions. therefore. on the other hand. Here Aristotle focuses on the fundamental problem of education. loving what is good and not tolerating what is evil. an internal regulator.22 Besides. a rational discourse capable of shaping virtuous praxis by the indirect route of persuasion (cf.18 a claim which seems almost a truism to us because of the ambiguity of the word . which describes the listener as an educated person . In the prologue. both passages agree also in positing an ideal listener in whom teaching will produce results. lies behind Aristotle's claims in these two parallel passages. insists on the basis of observation that the many. passion does not seem to yield to reason" . who cannot be reached by arguments and thus by teaching. alludes directly to protreptic discourses.

10 As Lacordaire wrote. In other words.11 "If we ask why the human being is a being which is taught. appealing to observations regarding human development beginning in early childhood. as W. dependence on others characterizes primarily and especially the first phases of human existence. subsist through a social nexus. on the other hand. during their whole existence) implies the very principle of education. naturally appear only at a later age." The essential dependence of human beings on each other (which begins with conception. as it were." he says. Politics vii fully presupposes this distinction when it asks.7 Still following Plato."9 Given the temporal priority of desire to understanding . The psychological notions of (reason) and (character) are irreplaceable elements of this view. inhere in the human soul from birth. To be sure. the fact that the human being is a possible object of education correlates with the fact that the human being is by nature a political animal . we shall answer that the human being is a social being like all the beings which. Thus. just as it is biological necessity which explains the need for education generally and education at the earliest age especially. which pertain to character . "reasoning and understanding. Aristotle's assertion presupposes a conception of the human being as (educable). for Aristotle.12 is to express in unambiguous terms the permanent insufficiency of human beings in the absence of a social framework. the philosopher insisted that education is a necessary condition for fruitful reception of lessons on politics. < previous page page_54 next page > . it is biological necessity which requires us to educate at first by habituation.8 he observes that if the inclinations of appetite. as I said. the second by habits .6 but from a different viewpoint.5 Like Plato.he insists again on the same prerequisite by stating that in the absence of external regulation neither the many nor the young can undergo the habituation needed2 to acquire a taste for the good. to state that human beings need laws throughout their lives. ''for.3 "the majority of people obey necessity rather than reason and chastisements rather than desire for the good.< previous page page_54 next page > Page 54 2. Jaeger4 examined it). "must human beings be educated first by reasoning or by habituation?" . On the Need for Laws Already in the prologue. that is. continues after birth and lasts. when reason is absent in the child. each in their own manner. Noting now 1 the need to acquire virtuous habits beginning in childhood . as Aristotle does in the last chapter of the NE. Reason and character are taught in two fundamentally different ways: the first by means of arguments ." Because education here is (in the broadest sense of the term. the years during which appetite and the passions are all and understanding is nothing or very little. Aristotle decides in favor of the second solution. The regulation Aristotle has in mind would be accomplished by laws governing the education of the children and arranging the entirety of adult life in the same spirit.

whether good or badand we should also say: by its presence or absencethe law and whatever has legal force shapes education more effectively than the most persuasive speech. Aristotle observes there that the human good by which he means human happiness or excellenceis the end of that science "which establishes by means of legislation the action which people should perform and those actions from which they should refrain" . legislation assumes a function with respect to virtue and thus seems to be the privileged instrument of education. One cannot deny that. Of course.14 he conceives of the law. therefore. to mitigate. the weaknesses they would express if left to themselves. on which the philosopher touches here. that education is not a matter of discourse.18 This is to acknowledge.. the philosopher's thought is also rooted in factual evidence. ultimately. As the philosopher stated at the outset. In fact. that by its positive regulations legislation actually shapes the excellence of the persons subject to it. not only in principle but in fact. In its very essence. if it is true that. and able. but requires. most existing bodies of law show little concern for education. a minimal form of compulsion. for the good reason.17 Undeniably. supplied with coercive power. For the needs inherent in primary education and those rather similar ones felt by more mature people who wish to lead just lives imply that they require in their social environment what Aristotle calls "a certain understanding and right disposition.15 The underlying ideawhich Aristotle will formulate a little later. which "possesses a compulsive power" . The complexity of the phenomenon and. The assumption < previous page page_55 next page > . tend to be posed in political terms. 13 I take this phrase to mean: a rule defined by understanding. towards what the lawgiver takes human happiness to be. one can deny that existing legislation promotes the actual good of the citizens it governs: that is another issue. that is. However. to the famous passage about the architectonic (i. possessing force" . therefore. One thus can observe that in this sense the laws orient us.e. Once more we are referred to the NE's prologue. as also being "a normative expression which proceeds from a certain prudence and understanding" . in principle. for these reasons. in the vast majority of cases.< previous page page_55 next page > Page 55 Such considerations show. in other words. that is. that "it is thanks to the laws that we can become good human beings"16might seem to be weakened by attention to certain facts. for it is the ultimate norm (hence its architectonic character) to which all forms of praxis are referred. the difficulty of the problem which Aristotle raises in the last chapter of the NE is obviously connected to the distinction between public and private domains. on his own admission. laws exist so that the human good may be attained or preserved. that the problem of education and the more special issue of early childrearing . willy-nilly. by guiding the development of human beings. as we have seen. political) science.

" Aristotle means the capacity to establish the rational norms which effectively govern human development. That is. on which their happiness directly or indirectly depends. but especially in the earlier years.21 Aristotle thinks that to solve this problem we can rely on paternal authority (in virtue of certain natural advantages which compensate for its relative weakness. such precepts must indicate what the laws should be. he also recommends that they acquire a legislative capacity.22 He places much less trust in paternal wisdom if one judges by his statement that each head of household has a duty to acquire the capacities of the lawgiver.20 Such a situation turns out to be worrisome insofar as it removes the education of children from the influence of all law and leaves it to chance. the heads of household will have to know the purpose of the laws and will have to be able. leaves to the discretion of the familial authority the education of the children who thus. Aristotle's view is that the ultimate end of the laws coincides with the ultimate end of every educational undertaking and that the law of the city is the law of young children from birth on. permanently inscribed in human nature. precepts not formulated in legislation now in force must either be drawn somehow from the existing laws or. implies a need for laws.26 In this detour of the argument. without reference to existing laws. Aristotle's injunction upon the heads of household should be understood primarily as providing a way to align children's education. that is to say: for ultimate coercive rules. Thus is removed the possible discontinuity between the household regime and the political regime in which children indirectly participate and in which.23 Obviously. the concept of "legislative science" put forth by the philosopher takes on special importance. via paternal authority. sanctioned in most cities. they are invited to flourish. everyone who is furnished with a similar science and is thus prepared to formulate for other people precepts possessing force of law.24 But. escape the law. In every case. By "legislative science. on the assumption that there are gaps in the laws. in a sense. But Aristotle knows that autonomy of the private domain. with the principles of the laws which determine the development of the political community to which the children belong. There is no choice in it for them. leg- < previous page page_56 next page > . But Aristotle recommends not only that heads of household know the existing laws. such a duty would have no meaning if the existence of the suprafamilial community was never to be of any interest to the young child.< previous page page_56 next page > Page 56 of a state educationof the Spartan type 19would get rid of the trouble. if one compares this authority to the authority of the laws).27 The philosopher's reasoning can be summarized as follows: The need for rational and effective external regulation. the same lawgiver who regulates the whole of political life also regulates education from one end to the other. by analogy. when they have become adults. to establish rules which are appropriate for each child.25 They subsist on this law. a faculty which characterizes not only the lawgiver charged with a mission in the city. as we have seen. but also.

This question. strangely resembles the question posed at the beginning of the chapter: "How does one become a good person?" The semblance is striking. the question returns: "from what source or in what way can one acquire the qualities characteristic of the lawgiver?" 1 This question is crucial. advanced by the Sophists. for here it is equivalent to asking how some individuals develop the capacity to secure the conditions of happiness for people generally. "among other things. I say. as we recall.29 3. we are tempted to think that he sees no difference between the two cases. )." because the interrogative . . the prologue affirms the importance of knowledge about political matters and thus of teaching. From what source or in what way ? The two terms are not equivalent. understood as the knowledge of what is appropriate for human beings generally. In short. that there might exist persons competent to give instruction to would-be lawgivers. implies that the qualities sought may be the result of the individual's acting in a certain way. provided that certain conditions are given.< previous page page_57 next page > Page 57 islative knowledge. And in the following passage2 Aristotle provides part of the answer to this question by referring to the need to acquire experience through involvement in public affairs. (from what source?). On the Formation of the Lawgiver Consequently.7 Moreover. This is the sense of the interrogative .8 Regarding the formation of good persons. we have seen how far Aristotle restricts the role of instruction by means of discourses. the two < previous page page_57 next page > . among other things.4 The question concerning teaching must therefore be posed for the lawgiver as it was for the good person. In fact. Is the situation the same for the formation of the lawgiver? Because Aristotle borrows the arguments of the Meno. The question is important also because it occurs at the point where the philosopher has just shown that the lawgiver must really possess a kind of knowledge. which suggests. Aristotle doubts that one could acquire the capacities of a lawgiver from this source 6 because experience is required for judging the quality of the laws.5 that one might become a lawgiver merely by studying existing collections of laws. could also refer to a suggestion. let us note. Aristotle tells us that human happiness depends on the capacity which some possess to formulate for others compulsive laws based on genuine knowledge (cf. if ever one was. inasmuch as the attempts in both places to provide an answer not only echo the Meno3 but reconnect at certain points with ideas from the NE's prologue about an appropriate listener to political discourses. In the course of arguments developed on this subject we find yet another echo of the warnings issued in the NE's prologue. 28 should govern every educational undertaking.

< previous page page_58 next page > Page 58 problems are not identical but only analogous. if the politicians make no pretension in this respect. one who must have attained general knowledge. Aristotle does not in any way conceive that one could become a lawgiver as a result of teaching alone.20 or that he can look forbut from whom?the help of instruction.12 even less does he wish to deny the importance of political practice (experience). which cannot possess in the two cases either the same nature or the same degree of necessity. Of course. neither of the two possibilities necessarily excludes the other.15 the same cannot be said for the Sophists. But the Sophists.10 who. Of course. Aristotle notes in passing. Now. an essential partAristotle goes to some length to discard two possible sources from which it would be futile to expect teaching. in this connection nothing replaces experience. with a change of ending. Experience is for the politician and especially for the lawgiver what virtuous habits are for the good person: a necessary condition for teaching.14 To transmit to another. the philosopher remarks. they could formulate general principles of their art in discourses and thus easily transmit them to others. of whatever kind.11 If such is the philosopher's argumentand how could one interpret him otherwise?we must believe that in his view politicians [politikoi] do not possess the general knowledge for which the name. takes the place of science and who cannot communicate to others general precepts which they themselves do not know. by way of writings or lectures. politicians themselves.17 They do not even know what politics is.13 his sole concern is to show why politicians are unable to teach. First. One cannot consult people for whom mere social custom. with which. and if they did know. in any case. But he speaks of the true lawgiver as a person competent in the art and as one who has studied it . Aristotle does not mean to pronounce on the value of political action in his time. in proclaiming this deficiency. Aristotle infers from this that their actions display a certain natural capacity and experience rather than understanding. Aristotle thinks either that every experienced person must pull himself up by his bootstraps to the level of art . "they would not have equated it to rhetoric. Contrary to what one might think at first. have never written or spoken on the subject. who brag that they can teach the political art 16 are in fact a long way from doing so. if they but had it.19 This attests to the insufficiency of experience ."18 In vain would one seek instruction from the Sophists. this discussion does not imply the impossibility of instruction in the legislative art. is the same [politike]. the rules of political art can be done only by one who knows. The philosopher does not pronounce explicitly on this issue and sticks to a prior question: are there teachers in political or legislative matters?21 But the negative responses which he gives to that question (first in relation to the active politicians and then in relation to the Sophists) < previous page page_58 next page > . Starting from the view that the legislative art is a part of politics 9indeed. Consequently.

But such knowledge cannot be communicated by the politicians (who themselves do not get beyond the level of experience). experience of the topics to be discussed. Nevertheless. III 1. one may object that the persuasive and informative aspects of the teaching process cannot be completely dissociated. claiming that discourses could have a persuasive (or dissuasive) effect on well-disposed people. Let us note especially this little sentence: "for those who pursue knowledge about politics. they would write and speak of it. it would seem that experience must be added" . for the two questions posed by Aristotle(l) How does one become a good person? and (2) How does one develop the ability to formulate laws?seem to provide focus for the Ethics and the Politics respectively. they enter into Aristotle's reflections about the lawgiver. Aristotle stands his ground. The Purpose of the Lectures Contained in the Ethics and the Politics The topic of teaching1 is treated twice in the NE's last chapter: first. considered from this angle. quite explicitly. therefore. But it remains the case that virtue seems primarily to call for persuasive discourse and legislation primarily for informative discourse. we believe that art is closer to science than is experience. Each time the philosopher hastens to note the prior conditions without which the person taught would get nothing from instruction: virtuous habits in the first case. they are also the vehicle of a kind of knowledge and. he says. "Generally. and. there is but one step from this to thinking that the Ethics is the philosopher's teaching addressed to persons who wish to be virtuous and the Politics a teaching which Aristotle < previous page page_59 next page > ." he observes elsewhere. at the level of effectiveness (or efficiency).23 The knowledge about politics which Aristotle there seems to promise those who are going to hear him requires. Of course. Of course. "the mark which distinguishes the knower from the one who does not know is the capacity to teach.< previous page page_59 next page > Page 59 indicate the elements of his thought. then."24 Now. more implicitly. 22 This warning is also given by the NE's prologue. does Aristotle himself intend to impart the knowledge required by the politician or lawgiver who would be a ? We shall see how far it is possible to give an affirmative answer to this question. experience in the second. One must insist on this. as if discourses constituted only an instrument of persuasion relating to action. with regard to virtue. so to speak. neither when they concern virtue (because some information turns out to be useful for practicing virtue and becoming conscious of one's virtue) nor when they concern lawgiving (because the point is not only to formulate laws but to apply them). In fact. as a means of securing knowledge for the lawgiver. If they really possessed art or knowledge. as a means of realizing virtue.

I am aware. Should we say that this work is essentially a vehicle for Aristotle's teaching addressed to the lawgiver? Does it supply knowledge which is directly useful to the persons of whom the philosopher demands real knowledge in the subject-matter? Without any doubt.. But can we say that the lawgiver will find a sufficient teaching there? Given that the philosopher requires of the lawgiver that he be able to decide what is appropriate for all the people or for such and such a category among them and to formulate the rational rules which should govern the development of his peers or assure the virtuous conduct of his own household. we must take into account the NE's prologue. Let us look at the Politics. the discourses of the Ethics too are addressed to the person charged with defining the laws. ." Aristotle tells us. Burnet4 who adopts a view of H. of course.6 But this hypothesis. could he be satisfied to know only the discussions contained in the Politics? In other words. This is at least an error of perspective. to speak in a general way. Contrary to what may at first seem to be the case. hardly suffices for < previous page page_60 next page > . if not throughoutan hypothesis which could not be sustainedat least in some parts. For could the Ethics be assimilated without qualification to those arguments "which it would be necessary to produce. to the politician. that is. . secondly. is to be retained only by those who. could he dispense with analyses of the issues tackled by the Ethics? That is much less sure. Therefore.< previous page page_60 next page > Page 60 aimed at persons who wish to be lawgiversa step all the more quickly taken because our chapter supplies a handy transition between the two works.3 the philosopher insists especially upon their having experience. Therefore.. where. beginning with J. needed practical advice or an exhortation to persevere in their activity rather than the help of such an extended inquiry? That he considered that such an inquiry could be useful to people of this sort is not debatable... already naturally enamored of the good or habituated to virtuous actions. did Aristotle really conceive his scientific project as primarily benefiting people who. But. by itself alone. Aristotle is not really discussing the Ethics when he alludes to teaching in the first part of our chapter. But we should see there above all a collection of analyses directed at intellectual clarification. Consequently. One can recognize in the Ethics an element of exhortation. in my view. the lectures of the Ethics seem to offer a teaching insufficient to guarantee virtuous praxis on the part of listeners who do not already have virtuous habits and if. find troublesome the terminology employed at the beginning of the Ethics. first of all. ). once more. Diels5interpreters now and then have allowed themselves to treat the vocabulary of the prologue as a traditional vocabulary which we need not take too literally. for one or another reason. as I said. "if arguments were enough to make people virtuous"? 2 This is doubtful. in introducing his listeners to political lessons (cf. the Politics seems to contain a teaching which. that. I am not in this situation. if.

The development of ideas in the NE's last chapter lets us understand it. This conclusion calls for some qualifications. and given that legislative art is the most important part of politics. household management . this is not his intent. require people capable of instituting them. And thus. as usual. in turn. "on which of the sciences or faculties does it depend?"12 And Aristotle answers: "it seems to be the most eminent and. The NE's prologue. arts and sciences pursues its own end. Now. he only wishes to specify. the form upon which the realization of the supreme good ultimately depends. here virtuous praxis which leads to happinessthe ultimate term on the level of realization and the starting point of reflection.< previous page page_61 next page > Page 61 the moral instruction of the lawgiver as Aristotle understands him. It does not imply that the lessons about happiness and about virtue in the Ethics are otherwise of no interest to those who meet the prior conditions of morality with which we are familiar.10 There follow the familiar accounts of the arts subordinate to the architectonic arts. to which corresponds the notion of the intermediate end. among the forms of nontheoretical activity governed by human understanding. 7 the term "political" is reserved for the teaching announced by the prologue of the NE. generalship . and so forth.9 The examples cited (medicine . he comes to prove the importance of instruction in the legislative art (this instruction being first from the practical point of view)."13 An ''unexpected and deceptive" answer. asserts P.8 Then the philosopher delves further and further into the order of means: virtuous praxis (happiness) requires virtuous habits. which itself demands the idea of a supreme end. virtuous habits. that is. each in its place). which constitutes the supreme end. addressed to the person who listens to lectures on politics. can we not conclude that the Ethics and the Politics were conceived as forming together the teaching intended from the beginning for the person who must preside over the fate of the city. But in Aristotle's enterprise they are likely to have a more fundamental aim. Nowand it is at this point that the teaching of the philosopher proper enters without real interruption of continuity into the actualization of human happinessthe capacity of some individuals as lawgivers to institute rational norms requires a type of knowledge to which Aristotle intends to contribute through his own lessons (the Ethics and the Politics. to the highest degree.14 As we have seen. by degrees. compulsive rules. that is. require compulsive rules. etc. expounds an analogous idea. Aubenque.) clearly show that the philosopher is not referring to diverse activities of the same individual but rather to diverse activities of the social whole. who obviously thinks that here Aristotle means that political philosophy crowns a finished system of the sciences. considers first of all the end. it will be asked. in most cases. There Aristotle states that each of the many actions . Of this good. Aristotle. the lawgiver? For this reason. architectonic. shipbuilding . among other things:11 . an end which is means to another end. despite a condensation of thought which < previous page page_61 next page > . and such science is obviously politics.

the philosopher states: ''presumably it is necessary to define the voluntary and involuntary when one undertakes a study of virtue. in NE vii.18 But never mind. Desiring. at some point. Besides. at least we have some explicit indications that the philosopher's teaching presented in the NE's main texts was addressed to the politicians (primarily to the lawgivers) and thus pursued a plan similar to the one I have been bringing to light. for he intends to make his fellow citizens good persons. with minimum revision. and quite precious inasmuch as a great part of the NE is devoted to the study of the virtues.e. our inquiry will clearly conform to our initial project. concerning virtue ) answers to politics. the philosopher's idea. For to assert that the human good is the end of politics amounts to saying that happiness (not for a single individual only but for the whole city) depends on the capacities of the politicians. Aristotle is addressing himself to the lawgiver. do we have any assurance that Aristotle is responsible for the arrangement of texts within the NE as we read it today? It should be confessed that we do not. Now if this study (i. who obey the laws. in the prologue of the NE too. Although they let us glimpse how solidly grounded Aristotle's project is. the philosopher was able to regroup.< previous page page_62 next page > Page 62 should not be abused. he observes just as he broaches the study of virtue. 15 We are familiar with what follows in the prologue: the announcement of an inquiry labeled "political" and reserved for "the hearer of [or listener to] politics" who would have to listen to the discourses which make up the promised inquiry. Thus. Besides there are numerous occasions when Aristotle presents the politicians as those who ensure for themselves and others the virtues and qualities of good persons. we read: "it is obvious that the politician must possess a certain knowledge of psychological matters. we find this important consideration: "Taking up a study of pleasure and pain is the duty of the person < previous page page_62 next page > . at the start of NE iii. the close connections between the NE's prologue and last chapter do not license any prejudgment regarding the texts assembled within the NE. the philosopher's answer completes a line of reasoning analogous to a more explicit one developed in the NE's final chapter."21 Moreover. is that the politician pursues the happiness of his fellow citizens primarily by means of good legislation . several earlier studies which he had not initially composed with the idea that they would become part of such a comprehensive whole.16 Now.."19 This passage is very convincing.20 A little farther on. This study contains numerous references to the lawgivers.17 It is therefore probable that. the arrangement of which he had perhaps not yet frozen. "it seems that the true politician should be concerned with virtue above all."22 Finally. and it is likewise useful for lawgivers for purposes of honors and punishments. which is what the NE'sfinal chapter tends to demonstrate. never called into question. We have an example in the Cretan and Lacedaemonian lawgivers and possibly in some others of the same type. to construct a coherent whole made up of lessons which were political in the sense defined a moment ago. when Aristotle introduces some remarks about the human soul.

similar in this respect to the slaves who are their master's instrument.). 2. carpenters. is subordinated to the supreme architectonic art. all the other arts (cf. for he is the architect of the end with respect to which we call each thing good or bad unconditionally. The Intellectual Nature of Legislative Activity Already in Plato.. along with other arts. Zeller had recourse in order to reconstruct what he called Aristotle's hierarchy of the practical sciences. capacity).6 to which E.1 The master craftsman decides. science. The need for study and thus the possibility of teaching addressed to the politician is affirmed quite clearly here. serves also to indicate the relations which exist between arts . is subordinated to the architectonic art of the horseman .5 Hence the NE prologue's notion of architectonic (art. and "nomothetic'' [legislative art].< previous page page_63 next page > Page 63 who philosophizes about politics.10 politics is itself subdivided. respectively. following a distinction already exploited in the Laws:3 the latter cares for the patient while deferring to the judgment and correct decision of the former. some of which use other arts for their own ends. must be informed by a study for example. the situation of the politician whose task it is to secure the happiness of his fellow citizens naturally calls for such a study. Within it we may distinguish "dicastic" [judicial art]. the study of pleasureif he wants to act as a philosopher. masons. which people will later describe as immanent and transitive activities. which governs the preceding two.4 But the figure of the master craftsman. Here Aristotle deliberately ignores the distinction between acting and making. I shall make a new step in my interpretation by examining the notion of an "architectonic" art often introduced by the philosopher. who uses the work of his laborers.7 The art of bridle-making . so to speak. the relation between master craftsman and manual laborers provides a particular illustration of the general relation between a chief and subordinates. thus constituting the supreme architectonic art. along with other arts. the laborers execute. etc. the vocabulary used has no moral coloration even with regard to politics: the capacity which Aristotle attributes to the politician < previous page page_63 next page > . which. who uses. in order to actualize such and such a building. "bouleutic" [the art of deliberating in the assembly].24 Aristotle now says that the politician. in this task. So what I have said about how Aristotle's teaching fits into the realization of human happiness receives solid confirmation.2 Aristotle speaks metaphorically of an "architectonic" doctor and of a "workman" doctor. that of the politician .9 However.8 which along with still other arts is subordinated to the architectonic art of the general .25 Apparently. as it appears from other passages." 23 The idea that the politician operates like an architect in determining the end of human becoming finds an echo in the prologue. excavators.11 In addition. etc.

12 The moral coloration does not always disappear in this way. or. despite its autonomy.15 the point would seem to be that economic and political life shape even the person who would like to escape it. In fact. or. as a type of prudence. Because Aristotle takes legislative prudence to be a disposition of the public person (strictly distinct from similar dispositions which pertain to the private domain). more likely. and because every household. C above) as absolutely sovereign . in NE vi the label "architectonic" seems always to be reserved for the legislative art. among which is the prudence which governs actions concerning only the self and to which people give the common name:13 Prudence in the generic sense A. which lists the different specific forms which can be taken by prudence (the generic term for all the virtues of practical understanding). is part of a city. concerning the interests of the individual I must make a parenthetical remark here.< previous page page_64 next page > Page 64 is indifferently good or evil. Political art in the narrow sense a) Deliberative art b) Judicial art B. it belongs to the practical realm. Consequently. But this apparently rigorous distinction is toned down considerably in concrete reality because every individual. more precisely. which is always good or always evil. B. Aristotle's text enables us to construct in his name the following table. despite his autonomy. he suggests that alongside politics (the architectonic science referred to in the NE's first chapter). Therefore. Aristotle sorts out the implications of such a state of affairs by observing that "personal happiness of course does not exist without economic or political life". that is. Prudence in the specific sense. but this art is understood there as a permanent disposition. Indeed. for all these reasons together. we should acknowledge the autonomy of household management and prudence (in the narrow sense of the term). Legislative art/architectonic science 2. not to the productive. again.14 This means that the authority which the individual ultimately possesses over actions which concern only himself and the authority of the household manager over actions which concern only domestic life are equivalent in rank to the authority which the politician possesses in the city. or that it offers the means without which one cannot be happy. Political art in the broad sense 1. or. Household management C. escaping its sovereignty. that we have to participate in it in order to attain happiness. unlike a permanent disposition . is a member of a household and a city. the legislative facultyand legislative < previous page page_64 next page > . a passage in the EE depicts each of these three dispositions (see A.

and subordinate laborers. they perform. we should acknowledge that on one principal point architectonic prudence is resolutely distinct from every species of prudence understood as a permanent practical disposition . the actualization of health will require the collaboration of two types of doctors. emphasizes that legislative activity. Their art does not qualify them to accomplish a particular action but only to formulate laws (which are general by definition)." As for the lawgivers. who." he goes on. since they only establish general rules as master craftsmen do. as architects do. For he tells us of the latter that it is reduced (this is the word) to a practical disposition: 16 "thus. the politicians in the narrow sense of the term. one to formulate principles of the art. ). Indeed..19 their "architectonic" thinking discovers general ruleslaws (rational expressions of a sort of wisdom)which form the premises of the deliberations of the politician.18 Those especially and in the strict sense act.< previous page page_65 next page > Page 65 prudence toois far more important than household management and prudence in the specific sense of the term. this dichotomy and the metaphor which accompa- < previous page page_65 next page > . And one may say that laws are to politics as medical doctors' handbooks are to medicine. Aristotle notes this point explicitly when he compares architectonic prudence to political prudence in the narrow sense (i. is practical activity par excellence. an important passage of the Statesman21 contrasted the master craftsman and the worker .e. still one cannot say that their thinking decides upon an action which they perform themselves. the lawgiver. by their thoughts. notwithstanding the remarks just made. As the EE attests. I must cite an important passage from Politics vii which. no practical activity at all. the other to apply them. The point was to illustrate the idea that politics ( or ) belongs to knowledge rather than to manual dexterity or action . That being said. and this is a rather intellectual operation. the actualization of the good in the city requires the cooperation of a master craftsman. by distinguishing the knowledge characteristic of the first from the manual labor characteristic of the second. In an entirely similar way. direct the actions of others.20 Wherever Aristotle discusses the view which we have just extricated from his texts. he is guided by a Platonic distinction.17 "it is said that those people who deliberate are only the instruments of politics. in a sense. If from such a perspective lawgivers seem to be men of action par excellence. since they are limited to acting as manual laborers do. Regarding this point. Aristotle himself noted this analogy. we say. Whatever philosophical arguments they may support in Plato. in another sense.

the essentially educational nature of legislative work in Aristotle's view is confirmed by the sketch of the ideal constitution offered us by Politics vii-viii. like the deliberation of any prudent person. share in legislative work within the city. which pronounce about absolutely everything.< previous page page_66 next page > Page 66 nies it are adopted by Aristotle to make a distinction within politics itself. as I said. even if lawgiving is not only thinking but giving a rule. in the Statesman. is backed by true general principles. but also. it seems. assigns "politics" to knowledge rather than to action. that the lawgiver's constructive work (or. who must set up for others and make them respect the same rules of conduct which are expressed in the laws. Plato already. the need on the part of the lawgiver. given that this sketch tends to be reduced to a sketch of an educational system. Hence. In intellectually guiding the actions of others.2 It is also confirmed by the conception of general justice offered us by the NE (v 3). and what Aristotle calls "legislative prudence" therefore turns out to be a more purely intellectual excellence. Such a distinction within politicswhich from a certain angle is a unity just as the building of a house is a unity."3 Aristotle. Now the laws. . the operation of architectonic prudence) is eminently intellectual work. besides.5 Since the deliberation of the prudent lawgiver. in the < previous page page_66 next page > . by analogy. who also remarks that the laws prescribe acts conforming to all the principal virtues. 1 After all. incidentally. to all the educators. to possess knowledge of ethical issues. The adequate exercise of his function thus does not depend upon moral dispositions in the same way as do practical activities in general. we must infer. between legislative and deliberative activity. This is the reason why. as conceived by Aristotle. . pursue the common interest .4 thereby indicates the essentially educational function of the legislative art. such as heads of household. so much so that in a sense we call just whatever produces and preserves happiness and its constituent parts for the benefit of the political community. although the architect's (intellectual) work differs essentially from the laborers' (manual) laborbrings out the specific nature of legislative work in the actualization of the good: a rather intellectual activity which determines all human becoming. Let us recall first that the description of lawgiverthe notion towards which all the elements of Aristotle's account converge and which must be understood in a quite broad senseapplies not only to those who. by acknowledged right. Aristotle speaks quite clearly in this respect: "that which has been defined by legislative science possesses legal force and we say that each of its precepts is just. IV Philosophy to the Aid of the Lawgiver We must now draw the most immediate corollaries from the analysis to which the NE's final chapter lends itself. We have just seen. if one wishes. the lawgiver as such performs no action in the ordinary sense of the term.

Now this is indeed a principal preoccupation of the prologue of the NE. 6 a text which. the prologue of the NE thus turns out to be evidence par excellence for our knowledge of the aims of this discourse. At the same time that it displays the philosopher's concerns about the qualities required by his listeners and. And in this connection the analysis of the final chapter of the NE confirms the importance of its first chapter. < previous page page_67 next page > . Consequently. cannot ultimately prompt any legislative work worthy of the name if it does not address people sufficiently experienced both to understand the cogency of the propositions it contains and to express these propositions adequately in social reality (in the form of laws or precepts). in the continuation of this study. more generally. But contrary to what occurs in the realm of action properly speaking. since they have not yet internalized the practical principles. according to him. can only rely on the persuasive force of discourse. the law can determine each person's action. especially to the extent that it would be normative and although it did not possess any coercive force. with respect to the lawgiver in power. I have already revealed a similar analogy between virtue's relation to the good man and experience's relation to the good lawgiver. connects at many points with the final chapter of book ten. that. the law as coercive force becomes practically useless for them). For without being understood and by its coercive force alone. which.< previous page page_67 next page > Page 67 light of the preceding analyses. We shall see. people who submit to the law and are habituated to virtuous actions do not necessarily have to succeed in grasping the true principles which it expresses in general terms (and if they succeed on their own. Did Aristotle consequently think that a teaching such as his. as the prudent person concerned with his own happiness owes his principles to virtue (be it natural or the result of habit). a role analogous to that which the laws play with respect to the person who is becoming good? It would appear in any case that the philosopher who had the desire could guide legislative activity (without himself legislating in any given situation) as the lawgiver guides the action of others (without himself. The philosopher must therefore obtain safeguards from his listener. that he owes his principles to experience. as I have stated. the statements they contain will acquire ever greater importance and will increasingly display their significance as the inquiry advances. the philosopher's message. for. acting hic et nunc). the analogy thus developed has limits which should be noted. on its side. Nevertheless. we are invariably brought back to those fundamental lines which open the NE. there are neither superior rules nor superior force able to guide a lawgiver who may be still too inexperienced to possess unerring principles of good legislation. as lawgiver. But. by whatever end we grasp the problem which I have chosen for my exegesis of Aristotle. in order to act according to the good. which I have emphasized from the introduction on. about the methodological rules demanded by his discourse. where the law rules from without the conduct of persons who feel their way towards right decision. could play.

which is called into question by other passages or provably characteristic of a stage which the philosopher left behind in his later thinking. < previous page page_68 next page > . before proceeding. which in spite of everything is but one document among others for the exegete's use. to examine whether the delicate problem of Aristotle's evolution does not require us somehow to say that my interpretive hypothesis corresponds to an "early phase" of the philosopher's thought. requires me to consider the possibility that the passages in question express for Aristotle only a provisional opinion. the fact that I have concentrated my attention on certain passages of the NE. it is important. to speak precisely.< previous page page_68 next page > Page 68 But. For this reason.

The NE's final chapter. that it is the task of politics to effectively ensure the morality and happiness of human beings. in its turn. more precisely. Is this conception challenged by the EE? A precise text proves that. given that the individual. I must thus again take up the argument within the limits of my project. for instance. corresponds to a more mature stage of Aristotle's thought than the NE? It seems to me that the differences between the two Ethics are related to something other than a development in Aristotle's doctrines. has no parallel in the EE. the reason is. to test whether the texts which I have used to defend my interpretation do not convey ideas corrected by the philosopher in particular texts of later date. The context shows that in the case of a disharmony we are dealing with a conflict between the good and pleasure. precisely at the point where it seems to refer to the individual rather than the citizen. that characterizes most people left to their own devices. with the condition. does not explicitly present itself as a political inquiry or one aimed at the politician. dependent on his own subjectivity as he may be.2 Aristotle here rigorously distinguishes between "the absolute good" and "the good relative to oneself" . he tells us. I have assumed in accord with the NE's final chapter. which.< previous page page_69 next page > Page 69 3 The Development of Aristotle's Philosophy and Aristotle's Position in the Development of Philosophy I The Problem Those who hold that Aristotle's thought sanctions the emergence of individual ethics at the expense of political ethics will perhaps be tempted to think that the traces of genuine political concern preserved in the NE are evidence for a position which he was later obliged to abandon. which. on the contrary. is most often unable to reach the objective good. by himself. but the essential doctrinal unity of the NE and the EE is far from having been proven to complete satisfaction. this is exactly the view which it supports. especially prior to < previous page page_69 next page > . Therefore I now need to consider the hypothesis of a doctrinal evolution in the philosopher's career and. If for Aristotle the teaching of ethics is addressed to the politician (lawgiver). 1 Could this not be evidence that the EE. that is. of which I have spoken at length. morality requires "to be in harmony with one another" .

either generally. it is difficult. that the fact that one is able to assign an early date to a given text does not necessarily imply that the ideas contained in it ever "lapsed. devoted to contemplative happiness. expressed at the beginning of NE x 10. we cannot conclude that they were later given up because the philosopher changed his mind. < previous page page_70 next page > .7 In other words. 3 This perfect identity of opinion between the EE and the NE. to declare incoherence.8 that knowing is not the end. implies that the author of the EE had the same reasons as the author of the NE for addressing a discourse on ethical questions to the lawgiver. if one has to do with virtue. that is what the EE says next: "politics exists precisely to give birth [to this virtue or this harmony] in those in whom it is still lacking" . when reason is blinded by the power of the passions. Thus virtue. do not call it implicitly or explicitly into question. of the law)." an account which has every chance of representing Aristotle's final position on this intellectual virtue.5 And stylometrical studies. it could go back to an early date. Besides. will be what produces this harmony ." Well. it were securely demonstrated that its concluding chapter expresses an early set of ideas. it is probably the case for chapters 6-9. if one has to do with actions. faithfully echoes." at least if other texts. for instance.e. Let us observe first in this connection that the contentions of NE x 10like those which seem to underlie the prologue of the NEcan be reconciled without major difficulties with the account of prudence (including legislative prudence) in the "common books. one will note that the view. as a whole. whose results were communicated by C.< previous page page_70 next page > Page 70 maturity. chronologically later. and.4 And so I shall no longer entertain the possibility that Aristotle's thinking on this subject evolved. if we do not otherwise find facts which clearly cast suspicion upon them. between the account of the NE's final chapter and the passages which contain Aristotle's definitive thinking on a notion as important as prudence..6 tend to show that this tenth book is homogeneous enough and that. that would only signify that Aristotle fixed relatively early the positions which I have been trying to elucidate. or particularly. Thus. Rutten. Let us first of all state the obvious. but only the possibility that the interpretation of the "ethics" proposed up till nowthat it is part of a teaching addressed to the lawgivercorresponds to a view defended by Aristotle early in his career and abandoned in subsequent philosophical reflection. which agree in acknowledging the subordination of individual morality to the intervention of politics (i. either from the NE to the EE or from the EE to the NE. described in the terms used here by the EE. if not impossible. An account which agrees with the teaching of the NE's final chapter would be obliged to entrust politics with attending to this "production. one can assume without great risk of error that the NE's tenth book contains numerous passages written at a relatively early point in Aristotle's career. therefore. If. within the ethical works.

II 1.2 so < previous page page_71 next page > . Affinities With Politics VII-VIII A major challenge to my interpretation derives from the close affinities between the NE's final chapter and Politics vii and viii. So it is very dangerous to seek in them traces of doctrinal disharmony on important questions.< previous page page_71 next page > Page 71 respectively. ultimately. Aristotle was content to borrow from the dialogue the traditional arguments of a controversy which had already become classical.15 a text to which scholars since Jaeger tend to assign an early date. In this connection. everything looks as if the philosopher intended to compose his discourse in light of such a final cause. Aristotle's claim that general knowledge is needed and his distinction between experience and art 14 should be compared with ideas set forth in Metaphysics A. without referring to strictly Platonic solutions of the problem." As I said. on the basis of its relations with some claim or other defended by Plato.18 But such a reference need not have chronological significance.10 Now these are key passages for the NE. The fact that this final cause reappears in the concluding chapter displays another type of coherence in the discourses gathered to form the NE and suggests that they are indeed guided by the same perspective. such affinities are naturally explained.12 although considerable at certain points. in spite of the similarities which can be established between the two texts. is related to agreement between Aristotle and Plato about the importance of legislation for education .13 for the NE's final chapter relies on a conception of the legislative art which no longer has anything specifically Platonic about it. Can we even take reconciliation between the texts as an indication of relative chronology? One cannot be completely sure.1 But again.17 probably because Metaphysics A contains an explicit reference to the "ethical discourses" . at least on a general level. Even if Plato's Meno directly influenced the composition of this text.16 F. however. It would also be dangerous to attribute an "archaic" character to the doctrines contained in a text like NE x 10. I am now going to discuss them. the general claim of the prologue ("the end is not knowing but action") 9 and the particular claim which introduces the study of virtue ("we do not inquire in order to know what virtue is but in order to become good"). it is impossible to specify which text influenced which. And. by the clearly shared purpose of the texts. For to establish that point one would have to show that NE x 10 is also in agreement with the mode of thought of other early texts which also allow reconciliation.11 For its part. which are generally held to be early. it would not follow that the text is "early. Dirlmeier hesitates to regard it. as a source of inspiration for our passage and even inclines to adopt the hypothesis that the influence operated in the reverse direction. For as the teaching of Plato's Laws reappears in detail in the NE's final chapter because both texts tackle the problem of education and the role of lawgiving in education. the influence of the Laws.

while still conforming to the Laws. the affinities between these books and our NE chapter are essentially determined by two particular points. And there the philosopher advocates "public attention to education" . on the other hand. is that the NE. which.6 Seeing that this triad conforms with the teaching of Plato's Laws. EE i 1). Another point of coincidence is the role of the lawgiver in education. so to speak. The first is the role of the triad nature . Now.. while doing this.13 Without in the least renouncing his view that public care is the best . mentions the same deficiency and. perhaps it only indicates the early existence of a (lasting) view which is stated there. in the great majority of cases). considers also the solution of last resort. and. on the contrary.4 In terms of content. it is a basic duty of the lawgiver to busy himself with the education of young people. contrary to the Politics (which restricts itself to an ideal proposal).7 we might think that it expresses an early opinion that Aristotle would have expanded later by considering other possibilities. lay out a broad range of possibilities.10 Up to that point we notice no difference between the two texts. the triad. strictly speaking. it is a bit hasty of R.5 and which. But perhaps. let's be on our guard here: this is an exact application of the principle expressed in Politics iv (generally considered by commentators to be a late work) that "it is < previous page page_72 next page > . According to Politics viii. A.9 The NE's last chapter. habit . above all. after all. However. but as something to fall back on. it does not follow from this that. does not exist. Aristotle proposes a lesser evilnot. is the answer to inquiries formulated by other texts which take their point of departure from the options considered by the Meno.''12 What is true. Politics vii 13 and NE x 10 see in the last analysis only three factors which shape human goodness: nature. contrary to other passages which consider how a person can attain the supreme good. The fact that NE x 10 coincides on this point with Politics vii 13 does not necessarily prove the "archaic" nature of the former. when Aristotle composed the text of the NE's final chapter. identified with happiness (NE i 10. with the exception of Lacedaemonia. Gauthier11 to claim that in the NE Aristotle admits the "collapse" of the educational system which he recommended at an earlier date in the Politics: one does not find a trace of a disavowal or a retraction concerning the ideal of "public attention to education. in any city-state. it acknowledges the same ideal. as a substitute.8 This answer reduces the several possible causes that might be entertained hypothetically to three basic ones. discourse in the acquisition of human goodness. which one must adopt where the organization of an ideal educational system is neither applicable nor in force (i. he planned to offer his listener only the sketch of an ideal constitution like that which he tries to present in the final two books of the Politics. Indeed. habit and discourse (or teaching ). he says.< previous page page_72 next page > Page 72 also the normative teaching of Politics vii and viiithemselves influenced throughout by the Laws 3seems evident in this chapter.e. and for the same reasons. let it be said parenthetically. it must be insisted.

< previous page page_73 next page > Page 73 necessary to examine not only the best political organization but also that which is possible. He finds this already to be the case for the description of law at 1180a21-22. of the central books of the Politics? That claim would be audacious. it already leaves room for the type of consideration which will lead the philosopher. the same observation of the insufficiency of experience . this conclusion runs contrary to my previous claims that the attitude of NE x 10 vis-à-vis public attention to education presupposes the principle enunciated in Politics iv 1 (which. if that is the case.4 It is a polemic which obviously concerns our inquiry if it is likely that. the affinities with the famous Walzer fragment 13 are more or less constant starting from 1180b12:7 the same analogy with medicine and gymnastics. Jaeger's "Urpolitik"). Immisch2 even tried to identify in 1181a16-17 an almost literal citation from an Isocratic speech. Taking up the question in detail in his turn. according to W. Aristotle was defending positions of his Protrepticus. O. the best realizable in a given situation and not only the best absolutely. to recommend carefully taking into account historical contingencies which often make impossible the realization of an ideal. Stark argued in a 1954 study which supported the claim that these passages (except for the appendix of 1181b15-23.6 In his view. in this connection. the same condemnation of pseudo-lawgivers who base their proposals on existing laws which have a good reputation. The same points hold with respect to education. This is the way R.15 Does that imply that we must push back the date of the NE's final chapter to the time. 2. In that respect. L.5 In itself. Jaeger. whatever be its date of composition. From the same description of law in the two < previous page page_73 next page > . in criticizing the Antidosis in the last chapter of the NE. But it is important at least to say that. probably much later. and.8 the same effort to state the requirements for the education of the lawgiver. it already expresses Aristotle's "definitive" opinion. at the final stage of his thinking about constitutions. Spengel1 already noticed the correspondence of this section with Isocrates' Antidosis. Affinities with the Protrepticus Before deciding the issue definitively. even if the chapter at issue is early. Stark points to a series of borrowings (some of them "almost literal") by NE x 10 from the Protrepticus." 14 That is. still very close to Platonism.10 But these comparisons are not always conclusive. the tendency would be to push back the date of the chapter to a quite early period. But that does not eliminate our need to inquire further. the same assertion of the lawgiver's need to avail himself of study (to be )9 and. it still remains to raise some difficulties posed by an important section of this chapter (1181a12-b12). introduces empirical politics). finally. which is a later composition) were originally meant as an introduction to Politics vii and viii (W.3 And scholars agree today in recognizing in this section a piece of Aristotle's polemic.

B 49-50 Düring: The laws of the philosopher. It is true that fragment 13 of the Protrepticus addresses the theme of the good lawgiver.15 It is such knowledgedescribed in Metaphysics A16which causes the head of household to resemble a lawgiver. If these two texts express the same basic intuition.12 it seems to be downright superficial.14 display common featuresup to the point of using the same analogical argumentseven at what might be an interval of several years. And Aristotle concludes. 11 no inferences can be drawn about chronology. the knowledge which he demands of the lawgiver is knowledge of the universal . Together and consistently. Gauthier has rightly seen. nevertheless one may not ignore the differences between them which they also reveal."17 In short. are durable and his actions correct and beautiful. may the knowledge of the universal. R. But it is not surprising that two texts written by the same author. either many or a few. the Protrepticus and the NE declare that the empirical "know-how" which reigns in the political arena does not suffice to make a person a good lawgiver. the NE recommends that he receive knowledge of a general sort . Protr. Stark is willingly silent about the differences between the two texts. for it is said that this is the object of the sciences.< previous page page_74 next page > Page 74 texts. devoted to the same subjects and probably directed against the same type of adversary. by his efforts. must strive to acquire the capacities of a lawgiver. to make people better. Indeed. which in the NE is characteristic of the person competent in an art . raise himself to the universal and also know this universal as far as possible.13 as does the NE's last chapter. really be assimilated without qualification to < previous page page_74 next page > . A. "Perhaps the person who wishes. But the actual recommendations formulated in the two texts do not exactly coincide. In specifying the conditions for the best realization of the particular education required by the head of household. for he is the only one to really live with his gaze fixed on nature and on what is divine. Quick to emphasize similarities. it would seem. if it is through the laws that we may become good. alone among the artisans. as R.18 Stark19 tries to reconcile the NE passage in which this idea is expressed with a passage from the Protrepticus: NE x 10.1180b20-23: He who intends in any case to become a man of art and knowledge must. As for the parallelism with fragment 13 of the Protrepticus (whose interpretation remains problematic).

as such. And Aristotle explains: This science is theoretical but it enables us to determine all our practical conduct in accordance with its teaching. distinct from the person concerned with his own personal happiness or. of the prudent person in Aristotle's current use of the term). purely speculative. thanks to it. deprived of sight. as far as this chapter is concerned. however. In its context. as we have seen. but only of the lawgiver. moreover. studious of his own good. the NE passage at issue really refers only to the lawgiver. Just as sight neither produces nor accomplishes anything (since its sole function is to distinguish and to reveal each of its visible objects). much more basic. for legislative science is.e. but it enables us to act thanks to its existence and offers us great assistance in our actions (for. the comparison of this chapter to the Protrepticus requires two remarks. Basing itself on the Protrepti- < previous page page_75 next page > . there can be no doubt. The entirety of Walzer fragment 13 is devoted. we follow its teaching in many of our actions. Secondly. the unreservedly Platonizing manner in which the author of the Protrepticus21 expresses himself no longer appears to be present in the NE. according to us. such language does not conform to the description of the prudent person offered us by NE vi. nevertheless. and that alone. wisdom. to proving the usefulness of "theoretical" knowledge for human life in all its aspects. Therefore. is the excellence of the lawgiver. we avoid others. so it is clear that. without themselves acting. corresponds well enough to what we are taught in the passage from Politics vii23 discussed earlier24 concerning the "architects" (those persons who.22 By subordinating the practical good of human beings to their acquisition of a "theoretical science" . we undertake some actions. it refers to both without making any distinction. regarding the nature of the knowledge characteristic of the : it is general knowledge arrived at by induction from experience of similar particulars. But what the NE describes in this way. and generally. In other words. we are almost immobile). although this science is theoretical. who is concerned with the good of other people and who is.< previous page page_75 next page > Page 75 the knowledge of natural and divine patterns about which the Protrepticus preaches? 20 In any case. As for the Protrepticus. nevertheless direct the actions of others by practicing an intellectual activity). as we have said. But there is another. of a theoretical science or knowledge useful in the practical order finds an echo in the idea of an architectonic prudence. difference. This is so even if we assume that the knowledge of nature and the divine to which the Protrepticus refers is not equated to supreme. we know that such a theoretical capacity is not required of the ethically active person as such (i. the idea. The idea. First. The NE'sfinal chapter conveys the same idea when it presents the lawgiver as competent in an art and as having availed himself of study . more precisely. we acquire all good things. on the other hand. the only speculative faculty in the practical order. expressed in the Protrepticus..

in a sense. seems to express. the approach which consists in choosing the best laws from among the most renowned than in determining the conditions in which such choice is possible. at least of presenting. This basic distinction does not appear in fragment 13 of the Protrepticus. who always kept himself aloof from public affairs. if not of conceiving. as such.31 but when they claim that such a job is ''easy" . was the very model of the inexperienced person. Even if we abstract from the Platonic coloration of the thinking. so perhaps someone who legislates or acts by observing and imitating other human actions or constitutionsLacedaemonian or Cretan or others of the same typeis not a good lawgiver or a good person. Perhaps in this insistence. in itself. sharply distinguished from legislative knowledge. Stark. a considerable evolution in his way. On the other hand. prudence. but knowledge of universal principles of action. and if such principles are. Here the condemnation of the "imitative" method is radical.32 And the philosopher emphasizes how much experience is needed for adequate evaluation of the laws.27 For the imitation of a model which is not well-made cannot be well-made itself. the NE. which it is summoned to acknowledge in action as being the good). proof that Aristotle has arrived there at a clear conception of practical science.< previous page page_76 next page > Page 76 cus' analogy with vision. We read:26 As he is not a good builder who does not use a ruler or other similar instrument. we can see also the trace of an ad hominem argument. on the contrary. nor can an imitation of a model which is not divine and durable be immortal and durable by nature.29 In fact. in relation to the Protrepticus. since Isocrates. The same chapter differs from the Protrepticus by another perceptible difference missed by R. far from indicating an early phase of the philosopher's thinking. it underlies the entire final chapter of the NE. Fragment 13 distances itself from all those pseudo-lawgivers who claim to legislate by imitating the best existing constitutions. That is why. rightly interpreted. but works on the model of other buildings.28 it is possible to show the distance which separates this view from the view of the NE. the approach adopted by Aristotle in the NE denotes a noticeable change on the < previous page page_76 next page > . But. this finding may support the view that the NE'sfinal chapter. tackling the same adversaries. they are apprehended in virtue of the content of experience proper to the practical order: the exercise of virtuous actions (which confer on character a stable disposition able to preserve understanding with respect to the good. the NE elsewhere explains the case of the prudent person: 25 his knowledge is not the science of universals which belongs to the speculative order. There. which his teaching is supposed to serve. does not fundamentally challenge the stand taken by the "Sophists"30 when they recommend the collection of existing laws in order to select the best among them. inferred from multiple empirical cognitions. Aristotle shows less interest in denouncing.

in its language alone.< previous page page_77 next page > Page 77 issue of whether some advantage might be drawn from existing bodies of law or constitutions. the basic text to which I have appealed in sorting out the reasons which.4 but this is the place to take it up in detail along with other problems raised by the sentence to which R. once saw. Stark suggests. By appealing to this sentence R. that one may even doubt the argument that appears to give it most support: that there is a parallelism between it and a lecture course ''on divine things" mentioned in the treatise On the Parts of Animals. 33 The outcome of all this is that. They will also enable us to understand better his notion of "the philosophy of human affairs.2 I shall say. For if we examine carefully the several lines which bring the NE to a close (1181b12ff. at the end of its final chapter. fairly enigmatic sentence which includes the famous phrase . < previous page page_77 next page > . Rodier. they will show us that the precise intent of Aristotle's investigations was to contribute to the perfection of the critical faculty which he deemed a prior condition for the use of collections of the laws. the lecture course thesis turns out to receive only very feeble confirmation. G. lawgivers may make use of collections of existing laws. at the same time. called for his teaching the politician. justifies its content. not only does not reveal an "archaic" doctrine which may have been revised later. according to Aristotle. in certain ways.6 who summarized earlier exegeses. a "syllabus" of studies concerning constitutions. whatever be its precise date. III Aristotle and the Development of Philosophy We ought to dwell at greater length on this last point. which would unite his principal ethical discourses with the lessons contained in Politics vii and viii. What interests me here is the statement by which Aristotle introduces this "syllabus" and. that early in his career Aristotle had conceived the idea of a "lecture course" [Vorlesungszyklus] concerning human affairs. under certain conditions. Düring already noted in a 1956 review of Stark's work. Stark appeals.) and which I have not mentioned until now.1 As I. Here is its Greek text:5 The authenticity of this sentence was long doubted by the experts. for my part. but still testifies.3 The question has already been touched on earlier. by way of concluding the interpretation examined in the preceding pages. the NE sets out." As we know. The point at issue is a small. to ideas which can be recognized as expressing the philosopher's definitive view: the plan for a "back-up" education for those cases in which the city is deficient in its duties and even the possibility that.

14 There Aristotle insists on the opportunity of adding a study of meteorological phenomena to his previous studies of physical phenomena so as to fill out the vast inquiry which he had proposed for himself. in other words. did not appear to be attributable to Aristotle. whose works are regarded as almost worthless. is accepted without comment by the exegetes. (b) this study and the study concerning the constitution will complete. 7 but which occurs only once in Aristotle. Indeed. which seems unaware of Plato's Republic and Laws. the locution itself. "the philosophy of human affairs. with some surprise. from an error of interpretation? For we notice.15 But these parallels are less real than apparent. in order to omit nothing in his study of living things. the expression turns out to be guaranteed by an ''excellent" parallel13 in the treatise On the Parts of Animals: ! But we ought to ask if such a quarrel is not a bit fruitless.< previous page page_78 next page > Page 78 two if not three pieces of evidence against authenticity: first of all the term . which belongs to Platonic vocabulary. Now. that an examination of legislation and the constitution. if more evidence be needed. Jaeger himself supposed12an Aristotle dazzled by the discovery of empirical politics who disavows all earlier studies on the subject. < previous page page_78 next page > ." of which we have just finished the first part devoted to questions of ethics. that idea (b). All the formal obstacles disappear at the same time. the sentence reproduced above seems to contain two ideas which one can restate as follows: (a) given that our predecessors have not studied the problem of legislation.10 Today. In the same vein. would be the second part of the two-part human philosophy of Aristotle. then. Spengel had insisted.9 But it is above all the intellectual content which seemed problematic. in interpreting our passage. the tendency is no longer to invalidate the sentence. and finally. finally. including Plato's and his own to the extent that they were conducted more Platonico. One will say that a rare expression does not as such furnish any decisive proof against the passage's authenticity. It urged a verdict of inauthenticity. such an idea is well conceived only on the assumption that Aristotle was really intent here on constructing a system of doctrines through his inquiries. it is our task to do so. of which this is the only occurrence in the whole Corpus.8 on whose rarity L. for the "genetic" perspective has enabled us to get around the difficulty. as W. however. the formula . Of course this hypothesis seems to find a solid confirmation in the famous chapter which opens the Meteorology. one could also cite a passage from the treatise On the Parts of Animals where Aristotle calls for an examination of corruptible beings alongside an earlier examination of incorruptible realities. For it is first necessary. Idea (a). as far as possible. coming after the study of ethical questions. We only need to imagine either a young Aristotle who considers himself still a Platonist and as such passes judgment on defects in inquiry prior to Plato11 ormore probably. that the word must be understood as a point of irony against Plato. Does it not arise.

recently or in the < previous page page_79 next page > . philosophy relating to human affairs may be completed. it seems to conform completely to the teleological perspective dear to him. Aristotle conceives his own inquiry as a relay in the effort of earlier generations to realize a perfect constitutional life. where the desire expressed by Aristotle to complete. In other words. the NE passage reveals at least two notable peculiarities when compared to the passages of the Meteorology and the treatise On the Parts of Animals.22 of those who strove to invent new procedures for the defense of cities. not his own philosophical inquiry. it remains for him to examine some other subject. The term used in this context should not mislead the interpreter at all." but. so far as possible. moreover. and thus. Now. or even especially. in the past this problem of legislation17 has been left aside without having been made the object of study. the project of completing as far as possible the philosophy of human affairs must be related to Aristotle's expressed conviction that there is an important gap in the work of his predecessors.23 of those who studied musical education24 and of those who. therefore. For in these passages. The idea that each successive generation of researchers passes the "torch" to the next18 and thus brings the various arts gradually to their flourishing stage is an idea expressed elsewhere by Aristotle. it is perhaps better to examine it further oneself. as indicated at the beginning of Politics ii20 (which. much more fundamentally. to correct weaknesses or suppress gaps in political theories stated in the past by those whom we call "philosophers. For Aristotle the point is not only. And the context indicates that it is his own project which Aristotle intends to bring to completion in this way.21 In other words. to remedy finally the imperfections of legislative contrivances and actual political organizations. Aristotle mentions that after his having himself spoken about such and such a topic. I shall translate as follows: Since. Aristotle does not distinguish for his purposes here between the great lawgivers and those thinkers prior to him whom we call "philosophers.19 Although its application here has unique features. but philosophy. He does not actually see any discontinuity in development from the "lucky insights'' which permitted the first forms of social organization up to the most recent proposals on the topic." Who were the former? Aristotle speaks of the Spartan lawgiver who contrived felicitous arrangements for securing moderation in eating. proposes to subject to the same critical evaluation both constitutions in effect in cities renowned for their good legislation and proposals of certain "theoreticians"). the general problem of the constitution. also. There is nothing like this in the NE. for example). so that. but in studies undertaken by others in the past. in this respect. alleged to be parallels to the NE passage at issue.< previous page page_79 next page > Page 79 to take into account the close connections between ideas (a) and (b). 16 may also be understood as an intention to remedy gaps not in his own studies in a given area. utopian or not (those of Plato.

to choose. Now this is precisely the point in the last chapter of the NE. for what neglect could Aristotle reproach his predecessorsincluding Platoif not failure to contribute to the critical formation of the lawgiver. the politics of his time suffered not from a lack of inventive minds able to contrive institutional noveltiesfor this field of possibilities seemed to him to have been exhaustedbut rather an intellectual incapacity. everything is cleared up. those which. the enigmatic sentence whose analysis I have undertaken comes shortly after Aristotle has noted that "the collections of laws and constitutions can be quite useful for those who are able to examine them and judge what is good or not in them and what measures are appropriate for what classes of people."27 This is a basic claim. in Aristotle's critique of Plato's Republic. could suit the particular community of their own city. But he hints that this implies great powers of discernment on the lawgiver's part. indeed. have worked out. or are working out. at the end of the NE. have enabled or may enable human progress (whether or not their discoveries have found a universal application).26 He himself seems to be faithful to this principle when. that shortcoming which he discovered in past work? What deficiency was to be made good? We can perhaps glimpse it when. For Aristotle. in themselves and in their foundations. on the part of the politicians. although known. while conforming as much as possible to the final cause of every political community. they are inventors who. in short. that in his view. It thus seems. Consequently. with respect to institutions. etc. so to speak."28 Aristotle. have been made but some have not been collected while others.< previous page page_80 next page > Page 80 most distant past (Sesostris in Egypt. constitutional rules. Minos in Crete. Aristotle could only regard it as infinitely more urgent to assemble the discoveries already made at various places in the world of the Greek city-state and to evaluate them. we should know that Aristotle elsewhere formulated a rule which should govern the development of politics as legislative science: "one must use sufficiently secure discoveries and try to find what has been neglected" . In fact. he declares." After all. In virtue of that conclusion. I said. Indeed. it seems that the time of essential discoveries in institutional matters is past or nearly so. that "all the discoveries. by their thought. 25 All these people are called "philosophers. he announces his own study by saying: And what was that omission. does not deny that there is much advantage to be drawn from knowledge of others' accomplishments. preferring instead to try to add further to the number of legislative inventions? For Aris- < previous page page_80 next page > . in order to help in applying them. That being said. Thus he finds it presumptuous of Plato that he still used all his wits to try to propose new modes of political organization.). from among the legal or constitutional arrangements already conceived or even in effect in certain cities. are not in use.

the problems which are posed for legislative work after all the discoveries have been made. to substitute himself for the lawgiver by proposing a system of laws in his own name. And. then. and it is in the formation of such minds that he wishes to collaborate by his teaching. And so he does not wish. and other thinkers working in the same direction have. < previous page page_81 next page > . that Aristotle produced a number of studies for the benefit of politicians entrusted with defining the lawsome related to ethical questions (which politicians must resolve. that is. because of the educational aspect of their mission) and others concerned with a critical study of constitutional "inventions" (so that the enterprise inherited from past lawgivers might advance and. as Plato did. what is henceforth needed are minds capable of collecting with care and profit the fruits of this mass of inventions. but rather to enlighten the lawgiver by examining.< previous page page_81 next page > Page 81 totle was right when he remarked elsewhere 29 that "the vast majority of the Laws happens to be laws" and thus does not answer to the needs of contemporary cities at all. gradually discovered. be completed). for his benefit. on the other hand. It will especially permit us to perceive the distinctive character of the "discourses" of the NE. authors of constitutions. what concerns legislation . thanks to this studyan essentially critical one. then. more precisely. to bring to completion the effort thus begun. Thus the question obviously is: how did the philosopher make his teaching public? What sort of hearing could Aristotle's message have? Or. all that could be found out on the issue. they cannot expect practical results. whose peculiarity in relation to the "discourses" of the EE I have already noted. if possible. what sort of audience can we suppose for the "discourses" of which his Ethics and Politics were probably the basis? Such is the question I shall now tackle. For he holds that if lawgivers. Now. if studies of this kind are not made public. we may surmiseAristotle wishes to complete the enterprise of all those who have striven to give intellectual guidance to human development . if not applied. so to speak. We are justified in thinking.

For. noting that he had carried out his project.< previous page page_83 next page > Page 83 4 The Public Character of Aristotle's Discourses I Introduction Among the passages in which Aristotle refers to the idea that the arts are progressively worked out over time and which. on the contrary. "It is necessary. has still to observe the peculiar character of the subjects with which he has just dealt. We read: "On the subject of rhetoric there exist numerous early accounts. but nevertheless much more useful than the development which derives from them later. that. upon examination. we had absolutely nothing earlier to cite. in comparison with other studies developed by tradition. at the end of which. among discoveries. are original discoveries usually denoting at first only a small advance. express his sense that his inquiries occupied an important place in the organic development of various sciences. there are some which have been received from others. Aristotle. not to hide from ourselves. is to provide instruction about requirements for being a "listener. partly worked out in advance. nothing more will remain for all of you who have listened to me than to forgive the gaps in the inquiry and give many thanks for the discoveries achieved. we could only devote long hours of labor to the study ourselves. however. This distinction enables the philosopher to emphasize the merits of the undertaking which he has just completed. For the Sophistical Refutations are brought to a close by a recapitulation of what has been sought and achieved. But on the subject of arguments."4 Beyond their interest for the appreciation of Aristotle's historical sense. the inquiry is satisfactory. for the most part. like the appendix of the NE. these statements have the advantage of counting among the rare and privileged passages where the philosopher focuses on his own listeners ("all of you who have listened to me" ). They should be compared with the first chapter of the NE whose purpose. others."3 Aristotle then addresses his listeners: "if it seems to you.2 what has happened in regard to this study. and which have made partial progress thanks to those who have taken them on later." < previous page page_83 next page > ." he says. 1 I must cite the famous last page of the Sophistical Refutations. in light of the conditions from which we started.

Dirlmeier calls "orality and textuality [Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit]"5 and the distinction between "esoteric'' and "exoteric. not only the methodological requirements demanded by such presentations . Jaeger had drawn attention to the importance of this passage for his interpretation of Aristotelian pragmateiai. in short. of course.3 Jaeger's interpretation was based upon a negatively formulated claim: "The doctrinal writings [Lehrschriften]are generally not literature. The Complex Nature of the Documents As the brief summary of lines 1095a11-13 indicates. It is not my intention to solve here the problems posed by the nature of the texts of the Corpus.4 the discourses of the Corpus Aristotelicum were as a rule only so many texts to be read or expounded before a limited circle of disciples. or nearly all of it.1 Discovering this fact. resist the temptation to leave conveniently in the dark the peculiar circumstances under which these addresses were held. But < previous page page_84 next page > . of which the clearest. the prologue of the NE. in addition. in pursuing this connection. his dialogues. They became a sort of common property.< previous page page_84 next page > Page 84 1. at the beginning of the NE.2 The fact that Aristotle orally addressed an audience is confirmed for us by several passages in the Corpus. poorly illuminated because of insufficient documentary evidence. the texts which had served as its basis remained within the school. whether he wishes to or not. The communication itself. which differ from his literary output. This account assumes two partly overlapping distinctions within Platonic and Aristotelian activity: the distinction between what F. and. is the passage quoted above from the Sophistical Refutations. which would demand a long and laborious study. but like Plato's discourses on the Good. Although. shared by the disciples. material for Aristotle's various oral teachings. the interpreter for his part is directly referred to the concrete historical situation from which Aristotle's texts issued: that of an oral teaching whose specific character must not be neglected. Already in 1912 W. but once it had been performed. for instance. because it uses the second person pronoun . but also the preconditions which must be fulfilled by the person who listens to them . to acknowledge a perceptible parallelism and continuity between Plato and Aristotle on this point." By "literature" Jaeger meant the works which were composed and intended by the philosopher for publication. he inferred from it that the entire Corpus. almost impenetrable. which consists of its first chapter. comprises a system of ." Jaeger's account tends. from which they could take apographa and to which they could make their own contributions. to depict their ideal recipient. Unlike literary texts written for a wide audience. seeks to clarify not only the nature of the project to which subsequent presentations correspond ("what we propose" ). he ventures onto terrain which is extremely muddy. the exegete must. that is. like those of Plato. given that their author has taken care. would constitute a minimal form of publication.

The difficulty of explaining their oral character in comparison with other literary texts. "oral presentation on political questions" . Robin generally backed up this view. The need to address these questions is affirmed. if we abstract from the specific character of Aristotelian exegesis.6 But the same year.5 which had received an enthusiastic reception from J. The difficulty of explaining the similarity between an Aristotelian "work" thus conceived and a Platonic "work. One fact cannot be doubted: the philosopher's very clear references to the "listener" . L. nevertheless provide a handy approach to the issues involved. but it was able to evoke abundant commentary. moreover. Susemihl expressed reservations. for instance. the expression "listener to politics" 1 is the source of the very early title given to the Politics in the first catalogs. in a review of Burnet's work. 3. who wrote in his Aristoteles und Athen that Aristotle's ''acroamatic works" were "spoken discourses" rendered into writing before being. Oral Communications The first difficulty does not seem very great. Perhaps. Gilson has rightly noted: "in a philosophical work. is more recent. a kind of echo. at the beginning of the NE.3 Jaeger's interpretation summarized above. The difficulty of explaining the connections between their oral character and their esoteric character. an oral presentation of which the texts of the Corpus are. The difficulty of explaining their esoteric character in comparison with other texts of an exoteric nature. even the literary form of expression should be interpreted in function of the philosophical needs which it is supposed to answer. was sustained by the authority of Wilamowitz. 2. although in a sense deceptive (for the difficulties are all inextricably related). supposes an audience and. F. 2.2 The better-known label given to the Physics. the difficulties in appreciation of the texts of the Corpus Aristotelicum can be ranged under four primary headings: 1." 6 In accord with what has just now been said. Burnet as early as 1900. although it appears in the NE.4 He happened to have the Politics especially in mind. consequently.< previous page page_85 next page > Page 85 we cannot ignore the terms in which these problems are expressed if we wish to evaluate correctly Aristotle's project.7 Susemihl thought that < previous page page_85 next page > . on issues connected with the oral presentations ." These distinctions. for us. read aloud. however. and in order to be. As E. "oral presentation on physical questions" . 4. the year he published his commentary on the NE.

< previous page page_86 next page > Page 86 Aristotle's texts were not mere oral lessons but ratheras E. Weil. But in the latter case. a rather considerable expansion of the text. Their purpose was probably to allow his listeners to 'correct their notes' and also to 'preserve the official record of the teaching in the library of the Lyceum. there is no evidence at all that ancient writers held that the Corpus Aristotelicum was a collection of students' notes. does not avoid an odd view of this issue.9 But in adopting Jaeger's arguments in principle. simply to maintain that the listeners were taking notes is already a poorly justified claim which seems inspired by a relatively modern conception of teaching. A listener could not express the thought with such rigorous exactness. performed by Aristotle himself or entrusted to certain disciples . Zeller. codified the texts which we read.'"11 With an account like this. a particular feature of present-day teaching."10 It is not useful. Newman had already observed. in any case. Besides. if not correction. the disciples had to work on the text of the oral presentation. R. and only by Aristotle. Dufour did not understand this possibility when he wrote: "what strikes us more than any other fact about the style of the treatises is the equality of tone due to the perfect adequateness of the word to the object. . for instance. But the very conception of the oral presentation is in error here. of the sentence to the idea. thus Aristotle would not have committed them to writing before orally presenting and discussing them. and not Aristotle. only be 'memoranda. for example) that the texts of the Corpus are "course notes" taken by Aristotle's pupils.' written after the course had been delivered. There is room for hypothesizing. who highly values Dufour's impressions. . M. it developed into a claim still defended in our day (by M. could have been revised after the oral presentation and as a result of the discussion which followed the reading. to reinforce this impressionparts of which. such an unqualified claim needs modification.C. can . had demonstratedexpansions of such lessons into books for the school. the oral presentation. in the case of the schools of the Christian era. one can hardly avoid emphasizing the importance of discussions following the oral presentation for the definitive composition of the texts preserved within the school. one must admit that it is possible (though not necessary) that Aristotle's texts. Besides. Prélot 8 concerning the Politics. This is perhaps to project anachronistically into the fourth century B. L. For one cannot demonstrate for that early era. of the form to the subject-matter. . he said. at this stage. This is an important point. ." he writes. Supported by the often distressing discovery that the preserved texts display numerous repetitions and contradictions (frequently imputed by the exegetes). The idea that the lessons were committed to writing after the oral presentation had a continued life. that the disciples codified the master's thought solely on the basis of notes taken in the course of oral expositions. "and particularly our Politics. in my view. as W. as one could. could be challengedagainst the idea that a listener. . let us note. which were written up in a concise form before. and for the purpose of. The term does not refer to a < previous page page_86 next page > . "Our treatises.

in a very significant way.22 Let us recall that Plato's dialogues (the Phaedo. R. divisions.) are cited by Aristotle with locutions which use the verb "write" . this fact. etc. Corrections. if need be.24 which < previous page page_87 next page > . besides. Gauthier.23 for the same reason: these texts belong to literature. in certain respects. the anatomical plates. after all. Dirlmeier21 on this point leave no doubt. in the preserved texts.20 which proves its strictly "literary" character. the oral presentation seems. the Republic. Aristotle refers to it. notes. instructions. to which Aristotle sometimes alludes. it belongs to the same category.15 is perfectly right in thinking that most of the works of our Corpus are basically texts which Aristotle "fixed in writing himself with a view to16 his courses and for the use of his disciples. but because their text. Jaeger hereA. were meant to be recopied many times and distributed to a broad cultivated publicthe process called the situation is obviously very different. On the other hand. refutations. The first is that the oral presentation is a reading which presupposes a prior text. The History of Animals. definitions. amplifications. the phenomenon of oral presentation defines and structures Aristotle's philosophical exposition as genuine "discourse" (of the demonstrative type).17 With his specifically literary works which. like the collections of 158 Constitutions. It refers. with the texts comprising most of the works of the Corpus. when he says "has been written" 19 or uses the formula "consider from" . Mansion. to be placed on the same level as the diagrams ( or ).< previous page page_87 next page > Page 87 "course" in the modern sense of the term. given their nature as collections. after discussion and thus having become common property) could be taken up again by Aristotle with a view to later oral presentations.14 followed by R. to a "hearing" by informed collaborators charged with testing 12 the thinking of one of them (a sort of primus inter pares). puzzles. Weil omits two important circumstances. the Timaeus. theses. the Gorgias. A formula like "as Plato says" . substitutions could occur. was conceived from the start with a view to publication. were never meant for oral delivery. Much better inspiredby W. Aristotle never explicitly retracts anything is that he made the most of such a possibility. Because their "public character" was initially quite restricted.)18 and which. propositions.13 Besides. as a rule at least. was never anything but a written text. The arguments of F. Aristotle's texts were not "laid down'' in definitive form. quite like Plato's dialogues. And perhaps the reason that. fixed in a more definitive way." Weil also neglected the very probable fact that the material of the oral presentations (revised. This was so not because Aristotle's dialogues could not have been the object of a prior reading. problems. to be an end. gives most of the texts of the Corpus their distinct character in comparison with many texts of which we have often lost track (epitomes. Although the History of Animals is perfectly integrated into our Corpus. the Laws. In another sense. etc. for instance. A. a course attended by pupils anxious to note down their teacher's thought in order to prepare themselves for God knows what later study.

what lessons should be drawn from the "esoteric-exoteric" contrast in the Aristotelian work? This is the second difficulty. Socrates says .< previous page page_88 next page > Page 88 might be mentioned as an objection. metaphysics in comparison to ethics or politics. when they are addressed to specialists. Lectures Of A More Or Less Private Nature Let me first forestall any misunderstanding. . even hermetical. it turns out that Aristotle refers to fictional speeches contained in his teacher's works. 3. which only appears in the second century of our era. for example. either because. Finally. Besides. imagine a philosopher dealing with esoteric matters with an esoteric method and an esoteric style for the sake of certain initiates. Plutarch.3 Methods are esoteric when. 25 or again (in an allusion to the Symposium). discourses are esoteric when they renounce all rhetorical embellishment in favor of an extreme sobriety able to render thought obscure. to the common run of mortals4hence the idea of secret doctrines . as certain ancient writers have already proposed (Aulus Gellius. etc. . .26 This being said. ." . the other the many . Aristophanes says . Neither the word "esoteric" . Indeed. in the method of dealing with it. Boas. they appeal to an unusual form of inference or argumentation. . in themselves or naturally.6 Let us note that a given philosophical account is not necessarily esoteric in all three senses at once. one of them the disciples . in this sense.2 At bottom." . By contrast I can speak of exoteric texts without prejudging in any way what Aristotle himself actually meant by "'exoteric' discourses" another thorny question if ever there was one. they are difficult to attack or. "we know that. mentioned by Clement of Alexandria5 and studied in our century by G. . Subjects are esoteric.1 nor the concept which it expresses in the ancient or modern tradition is Aristotelian. for instance. This could hardly be clearer when we read. of course. still more simply. Syrianus. One can. the issue for us is to distinguish two possible groups of writings on the basis of their respective intended audiences. because they are of no interest to the massesfor instance.). in the discourses about love. to approach an eso- < previous page page_88 next page > . "in Plato's Republic . But it is possible. is clearly of no significance. this natural distinction can fix a difference simultaneously in the subject being dealt with. The use which I am making here of the word refers therefore to its etymological sense and aims at describing in a handy way the nature of some of Aristotle's texts in terms of an idea retrospectively conceived for them by usthe idea that these texts express the philosopher's concerns "inside" the restricted circle of his disciples. and even in the mode of expression of the discourse itself.

the Neoplatonic writers. Diels < previous page page_89 next page > . H. Whether the subject under discussion is esoteric or not. etc. that all the oral presentations were delivered before the same audience of specialists. It remains to be determined whether all of Aristotle's writings which we suspect to have been connected to an oral presentation possess the same esoteric nature sharply distinct from the nature of other writings which we know to have been published by their author in good and proper form (for instance. for example. where the main consideration is not the intended audience and the decisive factor seems to be the subject being addressed.1 There would be much to say and resay about this. at the end of an already long tradition. etc. Elsewhere. of course. the importance of the intended audience appears at first sight to be decisive. justifies his division in the following way: "the exoteric works are so called because they have been written for the sake of people who have a superficial understanding. on the contrary. 4. where the philosopher wished to provide arguments and no longer only to collect factual material. But perhaps it rests on certain unreliable assumptions. were conceived for a broad public) is a seductive one. except."2 Such an interpretation is not to be taken literally. among others. systematically contrasted two classes of "compositions" in Aristotle: the works designated "for oral presentation" (works corresponding to occasions when the author himself is speaking . But it is not very important. In 1883. The acroamatic works. the hypothesis that the principal texts of our Corpus possess an esoteric character in this sense (and are distinguished from other Aristotelian texts which. that is. in this respect. An Opening of the School to the City? The problem we are addressing has been partly solved by ancient commentators. based on widespread opinions. Perhaps it arose historically from the discovery of a genuine difference between two types of writings.) and the works called "exoteric" (those in dialogue form . on the other hand. seeks a broad audience. As we know. one might think a priori that the philosopher would be inclined to opt for or against an esoteric method or language according to whether he addresses a group of his disciples or.). 7 Thus we arrive at the third difficulty. Everyone would admit it. Ammonius. like the dialogues. with respect to collections of political and other data. seems always to be the intended audience. In fact. and so the philosopher labors to produce a clear style and forms of reasoning which are not demonstrative but persuasive. the dialogues). almost necessarily assume a devoted listener who is really sincere in his love of philosophy. But it rests on an intuition which one cannot entirely challenge.< previous page page_89 next page > Page 89 teric subject with a nonesoteric method and vice versa. The decisive factor. I must make an incursion here into the history of modern interpretations regarding the "'exoteric' discourses" .

the Rumanian C. in this case) would have been discussed by Aristotle. In 1965. more mathematical cast than the texts of the NE. in part at least. contained passages in a popular style.12 in a vast study.< previous page page_90 next page > Page 90 maintained that by this phrase Aristotle meant discourses in which strict scientific method was not used and one was content with probable reasoning. he thought that he was able to establish that the EE and the NE (with the exception of the common books) were two concomitant and complementary aspects of a single systematic enterprise.14 namely. he would speak in his own name to an audience of philosophers (inside the school). in the EE. has been noted by D. just as in Metaphysics A and Metaphysics M respectively. H.10 And Flashar drew the following lesson: "Thus the NE is one grade more exoteric than the EE. that on the whole the texts of the EE have a more scientific. J. Vicol Ionescu nevertheless reached analogous conclusions in 1973.4 a passage whose importance must obviously be considered. One knows the interpretation which led J. using Platonic vocabulary and contrasting clearly with rigorously scientific accounts. Flashar9 concludes that the basic difference between the two passages tends to prove that the NE was addressed to a larger public than the EE. Vicoi bases himself on an easily verifiable point which. at the end of a minute comparison between the NE's and the EE's critical accounts of the theory of Ideas. Allan. at another before a much expanded public. to formulate principles of action for people in general.7 Let us note again that the exoteric character of certain texts also explained their Platonic tinge.15 The NE."11 Radically hostile to the arguments of Dirlmeier. in the NE.13 C. In the NE. though its partisans have not invoked Diels' authority. who did not imagine that the occurrence of Platonic terminology in a text could vouch for its belonging to an early period in Aristotle's career. indeed. for whom a more rigorous mode of argumentation was appropriate. Five years later.8 I have tarried a bit on this point since this view. Burnet to adopt this view of things. resolutely abandoned since Jaeger. 3 This was suggested by a passage of the EE which contrasted "'exoteric' discourses" with "discourses in accord with philosophy" . for instance. like the Protrepticus. at one time before his own disciples. Whatever one thinks of his work otherwise. Aristotle would speak in the name of philosophers to an audience including nonspecialists as well. Diels5 observed that certain texts. according to Diels. according < previous page page_90 next page > . from a practical point of view. moreover. while. the other (NE) intended.6 Not only the language but also the thought content in these passages seem not to express rigorous philosophy. to a public of nonspecialists. and unaware of Flashar and Diels. has recently regained favor. who required certain concessions in terms of traditional (or Platonic) language and ideas. the one (EE) intended to found a moral theory for philosophers. Diels saw in such a fact evidence that the NE was midway between a truly philosophical work and an exoteric work (in a sense claimed by him to be Aristotle's) and that it was addressed. Hence the hypothesis that the same subject-matter (ethical questions.

would require a more detailed exami- < previous page page_91 next page > . distinguished between a philosophical teaching reserved for an elite within the school and a political teaching aimed at the mass of citizens outside the school. compared with the NE. these subjects were the very ones which most directly and most naturally interested possible listeners from outside the school. as much by their purpose as by the way in which this purpose is carried out.17 it seems. it suffices to compare the Platonic works and the first twenty-four titles of Aristotle listed in the catalog preserved by Diogenes Laërtius.19 The reflections on the "politically active life" .21 the EE's difference from the NE has less to do with chronology than it does with the public for which Aristotle conceived it: an audience versed in special questions debated at the Academy. would tend often to appropriate the style and methods characteristic of published works which sought a large audience. for many ancient writers. which seems to bring the EE25 under a perspective other than that of the NE. To persuade oneself of this. in his view. This difference."20 Bien then encounters the problem of the EE. While Plato. which are conducted from the practical perspective. In his judgment. he says. 16 It would thus. one must recognize the truth that the majority of the works published by Aristotle and destined for a broad public (among others. identical to that of the NE. were held before an enlarged audience. As for the EE. at first sight. A very interesting study by G. Bien. ethics and politics constituted. After all. But the discourses to which the EE testifies appear to be an exception. for instance. not without reason. were therefore addressed to the citizens ''who come from the city into the school in order to be enlightened there about their ethical and political existence. clearly explains the situation in which we find ourselves. might have nothing esoteric about it. Aristotle. the dialogues) touched on ethico-political questions. Because of its more esoteric character (in the sense of esoteric defined by us). quite the contrary of an esoteric subject. the dialogues. Bien examines the relations between the "school" and the "city" from Plato on.24 Whether one endorses them in detail or not. insofar as they tackled practical problems. Bien's arguments have at least the merit of stating the fact that some of the philosopher's oral presentations. as did most dialogues of Plato. the EE does not contain a protreptical eulogy regarding the "theoretical life" similar to that of NE x 6-9. a rather different criticism of the Platonic ideas23 and it shows less concern with happiness. Is this not indeed a peculiar situation? For I have taken care to note above that. although its object. Along with the rhetoric. the EE is at first sight an exception. in order to clarify the "theory- praxis" problem. conduce to a hearing which goes beyond the narrow context of the disciples: they are oral presentations touching on the human problem (from the angle of praxis). Thus.22 it presents. it would be an esoteric work (in the sense I have defined). it does not formulate a "political" ethics while the NE does.< previous page page_91 next page > Page 91 to this comparison.18 wanted to make the Academy a school for citizenship. be normal enough that all of Aristotle's oral presentations.

they possess very close relations to the philosopher's written and published works (his exoteric teaching). which work out." politics is restored to "the city. which is the object of an oral teaching. absent from the dialogues.'' according to a sui generis procedure. between what we call metaphysics and politics. alongside the dialogues and undergirding the intellectual content of the dialogueswhere we find "the protreptic. were in fact rather inaccessible to the great majority. For the disciple has broken the unity. in one respect. which was defended by the master. problematic and aporetic Plato"3we should suppose a fixed.5 Krämer believes himself justified in speaking of this sort of "esoteric" teaching for two reasons: first. J. Differences with Plato The most important studies mentioned above and which converge remarkably enough (those of Dirlmeier. Solmsen. Cherniss attest2is a highly debated question.7 Conceivable for Plato. at least. but.< previous page page_92 next page > Page 92 nation if we were to try to decide whether the principal texts assembled in it are merely Aristotle's notes consigned to writing for his personal use and eventually left for consultation by his collaborators or disciples. political < previous page page_92 next page > . following Krämer's suggestions. As Krämer has rightly noted. such relations are no longer conceivable for Aristotle. 1 The nature of an "esoteric Plato"and even his existence. principles assumed by the dialogues." Henceforth. the very question which is the object of Plato's discourses on the Good has disappeared from Aristotle's horizon. as is implied by Aristotle's doctrine of the autonomy of the various sciences. by H. According to Krämer.8 That is why the esoteric-exoteric contrast as we have glimpsed it in Aristotle does not continue the verbally similar contrast which.4 Prompted by remarks of F. even if Plato had not wished to keep them secret. I can try to clarify the hypothesis formulated above in light of historical facts concerning Plato. given by Aristotle in the context of opening the school to the city. for the great majority. Kramer's work on Plato's unwritten doctrine. the principles' "axiological significance. In the esoteric teaching Plato explained the ontological foundations or. Flashar and Bien) are backed. because at issue are doctrines completely original in comparison to the content of the dialoguesat least in one basic respect (Prinzipienlehre [the theory of principles])and. if you will. as writings of H. the metaphysical principles of the Good. we might reconstruct in Plato. secondly. while the texts of the NE would be the basis for various oral presentations. Freed from a metaphysics which is in itself of interest to the "school. I am unable to perform such a study within the limits of the present work. which Krämer's daring but seductive synthesis has undeniably renewed in depth.6 However. fully worked out ontological doctrine. because such doctrines. 5. The only thing that interests me here is the meaning of the term "esoteric" as applied to Plato's doctrines.

3 refers to the "auditorium" of Plato where Aristotle was the "intellect" ( ). may allude to the fact that Aristotle assured the "public reading" of certain texts before a circle of disciples. II 1."7 But the job of reconstruction. Obscure Material Circumstances Without doubt it is very difficult to picture concretely for oneself the oral presentations to which the works of the Corpus bear witness. the oral presentations which deal with such issues would naturally seek a hearing outside the usual circle of disciples. through the parodies of the comic authors. since H. This anecdote. correctly interpreted. From another angle. outside of a little passage from Aristoxenus.2 An anecdote. 9 On the best hypothesis. Düring sketches a portrait of Aristotle "as a scholar.1 which. For it seems clear that. for. Certain traditions assure us that Aristotle taught rhetoric while he was still a disciple of Plato.5 But all this is quite meager and imprecise. Obviously. One is reduced. But we possess at least one significant general certainty. no indirect information survives to enlighten the exegete. To the extent to which. We are going to see that it was. whoever Aristotle's intended audiences were in particular cases. in spite of these partial successes. in spite of their codification and although they prepared in some way for the emergence of a new literary genre (the scientific monologue) at a more or less distant date. in the last analysis. Usener8 and E.< previous page page_93 next page > Page 93 topics are considered essentially exoteric. It is in this way that H. to educate. Jackson reconstructs the philosopher's "lecture room" at the Academy6 and I.4 Aristotle may have been described by his master as a ''reader" . remains at the mercy of preconceived ideas which have done so much damage. Therefore. finally. which are known to us only indirectly. they correspond to an intention to instruct or. According to another anecdote. relates to a very particular point. moreover. the oral presentation appears as an extremely original phenomenon.10 The little that we know on the subject forbids building up a system < previous page page_93 next page > . recounted in the Vita Marciana. deserving of further consideration. better still. Howald. This could have been the case. aspects of this complex reality are masked for us by the fact that Aristotle's discourses were all combined so as to construct the works of the Corpus as we find them today. Their new "literary" status forms a screen difficult to penetrate. all these discourses express a thought the disclosure of which he did not entrust to literature. at least on one or another occasion. the philosopher's message thus was intended by its author only for a relatively restricted hearing. to exploit the texts of the Corpus themselves to obtain an idea of Aristotle's teaching.10 Aristotle's texts remain linked to a form of oral expression.9 to similar efforts attempting to reconstruct the activities of the Platonic Academy.

As for the habits of Aristotle himself as a teacher. : 1095a12). : 995b5). for the sake of the audience . Baptized "prologues. :1217a18). 1 Aristoxenus informs us that the philosopher "announced in advance for those who were going to listen what topics his study would deal with and what the nature of the study would be. Brunschwig has recently noted the importance of this testimony. as the mark distinguishing ''acroamatic" from "hypomnematic" works. it might be plausible to give special weight to the four texts of the Corpus portrayed by their author as so many "prefaces" : NE i 1 (cf. they escape us completely. following the testimony of Aristoxenus. and Metaphysics A 1-2 (cf. specifying both the nature of the < previous page page_94 next page > . which has no bearing on my study."2 J. as Aristotle used to do according to Aristoxenus.4 Obviously. the matter and form of the study. by the ancient commentators. reports that the treatise On Interpretation was considered "hypomnematic" up to the time when Ammonius discovered a prologue (and an epilogue) for it. one cannot deny that the prologue of the NE (i 1) is a model of the genre." these introductions were regarded. not precisely to describe. with the exception of one very definite habit noted carefully by Aristoxenus of Tarentum. we can posit for ourselves habitual declarations by Aristotle before embarking upon a lecture. It is not a question of invoking here all the (more or less elaborate) introductions to each of the "treatises" which make up the works of our Corpus. He sets out his project for them (cf. leaving aside the case of the Metaphysics. thus enabling scholars to classify it among the "acroamatic" works."5 Let me remove all ambiguity in this respect. By contrast. Politics vii 1-3 (cf. and the Neoplatonist Elias.3 But certain texts of the Corpus bear the trace of an oral teaching of Aristotle like that known and described by his Tarentine disciple.< previous page page_94 next page > Page 94 of hypotheses about it and does not permit the exegete to conceive positively either the identity or the attitude of the audience of the oral presentations in general or of any one such oral presentation in particular.6 for instance. There the philosopher addresses himself directly to his listeners. The Traces Of Didactic Precaution Himself a hearer and acquaintance of Aristotle. In Politics vii 1-3. the six long chapters beginning the EE were conceived in order to introduce the multiple difficulties of a given problematic. EE i 1-6 (cf. But. the philosopher's remarks uniquely aim at establishing some preliminaries (of an ethical order) indispensable for the enterprise he faces at that point. : 1323b37 and : 1325b33). with reference to the same testimony. these are the "prologues.7 As O. On the other hand. 2. "what we propose" ). not all these "prologues" or "preambles" answer equally to the idea that. Gigon8 has rightly seen.

. stipulates the qualities required of the listener himself (cf. (1094b22ff. . . For it seems to bear witness to a precaution which Aristotle adopted at the moment of orally communicating to a particular audience his reflections on questions pertaining to that aspect of human development whose direction is the task of the politician. He describes how each of his remarks should be received and. 9 brevity is desired for the prologue of discourses. Indeed. the object of our discourse is . . finally. as a last resort. and good things").< previous page page_95 next page > Page 95 inquiry ("the approach . a peculiarity of the NE prologue. to prevent the listener's adopting an unacceptably critical attitude towards the account about to follow. ." as he says in the chapter's summary. (1094b11-14) Minor premise: Now. our discourse will be . ).2 Now we know. (1094b14-19) Conclusion: Therefore. . . In other words. which reinforces certain methodological considerations (among the most famous in Aristotle). thanks to Aristoxenus' testi- < previous page page_95 next page > . . which is in some way political") and its subject-matter ("noble and just . he does so in order to show his listeners "how it should be received. . (1094b19-22) Corollary: And so the listener must . it is the presence of an audience on whom one must be able to rely which explains here the usefulness of Aristotle's methodological remarks. In rejecting the ideal of precision . according to Aristotle's Rhetoric. erected into an absolute methodological principle by the Academy. The prologue of the NE also recommends itself because of another virtue: brevity.). 3. The philosopher's concern is to respect the requirements imposed by the object of his discourse. A Basic Aspect of the Discourse: The Methodological Statements In fact. This point is clearly demonstrated by the structure of the passage: Major premise: Every discourse must be appropriate to its object. . If the philosopher is trying here to provide an advance justification of the method of his account. So one cannot dwell too much on the importance of this text. is that it formulates such considerations in order.1 Aristotle emphasizes that the specific subjects with which his discourse deals at best tolerate only a good approximation.

if not all. Can one not conceive. then. On this ground. In any case. it also points to Aristotle's desire not to disappoint the expectation of people who might come to listen to him discuss a similar subject. 3 that Aristotle liked also to recall the annoyance of Plato's listeners who came to hear the master speak about the Good but left disappointed because he discussed mathematics.< previous page page_96 next page > Page 96 mony. it seems. while fighting against unacceptable demands of possible listeners influenced by Platonism. the beginning of the NE bears the trace of oratorical precautions which the philosopher had to use in communication before a broad public. of the texts assembled in the NE were the basis of communications of this type? The question deserves at least to be raised. < previous page page_96 next page > . So one can seriously ask whether the words of the NE prologue. they display the wish to meet better the concern of politicians with respect to the good. The anecdote says a lot about Aristotle's wish not to subject his own addresses to Plato's setback before an unprepared public. do not express the intention of regaining an audience disappointed by the discourses of the Academy. that most.

If need be. just as the orator. That is why the author of the NE. "His arguments.< previous page page_97 next page > Page 97 5 The Audience of the Political Discourses Obviously. infinitely more. but where there is no exact knowledge and opinions are. Thus a part of the prologue of the NE is. on the contrary. there can be a "listener" only where there are "discourses" . In any case. in this regard.5 Accordingly. to the philosopher's address what the captatio is to the orator's. for he was regarded as an extraordinarily temperate human being. the EE fully reassures us of this fact when it states that "one must try to seek persuasion with the help of arguments.'' also turns out generally to be mindful of his discourse as a discourse. would wish to dispose his audience favorably towards what he had to say. it seems that the question of how (and under what conditions) one might hope to benefit other people by means of discourses is a crucial question about which the author of the NE is very worried. by introducing what seems to be the case as evidence and examples" < previous page page_97 next page > . it would be a mistake to think that Aristotle could neglect at any moment or under any circumstance what seems a natural requirement of every discourse: to seek the "persuasion" or "conviction" of persons addressed. I The Concerns of the "Speaker" We are essentially dealing with what the Rhetoric calls a "scientific discourse" . so Aristotle took heed to describe in advance the ideal attitude of his listener."3 This remark may be put together with one from the Rhetoric: "We generally believe good people more often and quickly than others. 1 which corresponds to teaching and primarily relies on reasoning to reach the listener. than the author of the EE. divided. Aristotle did not neglect in his own case the importance of a factor which he says was decisive in that of Eudoxus: the personality of the speaker. on the whole."4 In short. whoever he might be. this belief is absolute.6 Of course.2 But one guesses that. "were believed more because of his moral excellence than because of their intrinsic value. who is very solicitous about his "listener. the relatively tiny interest in the listener shown by the latter work could be partly the result of its lack of attention to problems raised by the use of discourses in teaching. mutatis mutandis." Aristotle says in connection with Eudoxus.

" 14 And the philosopher draws the consequences that we expect: "one must therefore examine our foregoing statements by comparing them to actual facts and to life and. Anaxagoras). the practical consequences of these discoveries. So we are not at all surprised to see the philosopher.13 Here is remarkable evidence for Aristotle's sense of the relative persuasive weakness of his own discourses (as such) in comparison with the reality which the listener could otherwise observe. But truth in practical matters is judged by reference to real facts and to life. the important statement that "discourses bearing on subjects which involve the passions and actions are less credible than the facts" . unreservedly affirmative. therefore. which he does not hesitate to use as evidence. in case of disagreement.16 we easily grasp that he also demands from the listener. this was a preoccupation for the author of the NE. Aristotle notes several times the persuasive force of opinions. that reinforces the belief in truth" . for such an explanation promotes persuasion . Aristotle concludes: "Such reflections therefore possess a certain conviction.11 And Aristotle then explains "why bodily pleasures seem more choiceworthy. for himself and his teaching. ).9 Besides."12 Nevertheless. but. One will perhaps ask whether this sense went so far as to make the philosopher draw. in the prologue of the NE. The answer."15 If. 7 In his desire to persuade. when we have an apparently reasonable explanation of why a false view appears true. above all universally held opinions. is given by NE x itself. in the case of agreement with the facts. describing the needed characteristics of his listener as those of the < previous page page_98 next page > . One finds. in return. for instance. For there is where the supreme criterion resides. For once his thoughts about supreme happiness are confirmed by the opinions of the sages (Solon.10 And the same concern is expressed in the well-known observation of NE vii (a "common" book) where we read: "we must not only state the true view but also the cause of the error. Aristotle ultimately demands that his listener test the value of the words directed to him by confronting them with lived reality. On the other hand.< previous page page_98 next page > Page 98 . accept them. the philosopher here proposes to add certain essentially rhetorical proofs8 to the logical argumentation appropriate to scientific discourse. one does not find either in the EE or in the "common" books the least secure evidence for the view that the philosopher was really worried about the extent or form of persuasion which could be produced by his own discourses as discourses. one should take them as mere words. a sufficient familiarity with the facts of life to empower his judgment (cf. at the beginning of the study concerning pleasure of NE x.

Such is the view expressed by the philosopher at the beginning of the NE. one may suspect.'' In this connection. the preconditions which must be met by his listeners if they are to "obey" the discourse's (implicit or explicit) injunctions are of the same sort as the conditions which must be met if they are really to "comprehend" the discourse. In short. suggests that in this case the "protreptic" effectiveness of discourse is not produced by the discourse itself (as it is in rhetoric) but. and thus finally concluding: "this is why the young person is not a good listener to politics. it is dependent on a characteristic of the listeners which Aristotle calls "comprehension" . they can effectively "hear reason. It is also an undisguised warning directed to the listeners of the discourses which he is introducing.18 This statement. Aristotle is impressed by the fact that discourse is not only a vehicle of information. Besides. the listeners' appetites and passions must have been disciplined by habituation so that. on the contrary. In the same context of book ten where he introduces the listener to a study concerning pleasure. as the earth which is to nourish the seed." 17 Given that. if true. are not powerful over everyone. we might say. for he does not have experience of the actions which characterize life. the philosopher incidentally formulates the following idea: It thus seems that discourses. if they are in accord with the facts. Aristotle knows that his teaching cannot persuade persons who have not acquired from experience the means of confirming his words. For he who lives as passion directs will not hear a discourse < previous page page_99 next page > .< previous page page_99 next page > Page 99 "good judge" . a passage from the final chapter of the NE should be noted: Discourse and teaching. But our discourses rely on and deal with such experience.19 In reality. in his eyes. to action. are most useful not only for knowledge but also for life. the truest discourses remain less convincing than observed reality. however. it offers a means of persuasion leading not only to knowledge but also. but the listener's soul must have first been cultivated by means of habits so that it tastes appropriate pleasures and feels appropriate aversions. For. they bring conviction with them and consequently they encourage those who comprehend them to live in conformity with their teaching. as we shall see. because of knowledge.

Drechsler has rightly seen. that something intelligible exists. that is. elementary reflection on language often supplied arguments to experts in disputation. there is but one step. 1.5 As M. whether it can be explained to another person. Reflecting that the "hearer" must be able both to "hear" his message. The Limits of Language as an Instrument of Knowledge In the fifth century B. but also by actions conforming to its injunctionsa possibility excluded for those whose ordinary conduct has but one source. nor comprehend it if he does. Now. to utter a solemn warning: "those who are inclined to obey their passions. that is.C. pertaining to the listener himself. were shaken by them. which he thought improbable. passion. as we know.< previous page page_100 next page > Page 100 that dissuades. the philosopher is thus equally compelled. Brochard has written. to ''comprehend" it. This is the view defended by Gorgias on the assumption. "from eristic to scepticism. Aristotle's undertaking as a kind of teaching .22 II Prerequisites for the Discourse The listener to whom the NE prologue refers may be understood as a learner . to describe the prerequisites the listener must meet.21 Because he knows the limits as well as the possibilities of discourse.. at the beginning of the NE. since the end is not knowledge but action" . Gorgias' stand was the direct or < previous page page_100 next page > . entirely peculiar to the NE. and how could one persuade a person of this sort to change? 20 The persuasion which Aristotle has in mind here must be expressed. in the NE prologue. "obey" it . This prefatory concern of Aristotle. Ever bearing in mind the practical purpose of his teaching. "will listen in vain and without profit. without which there could be neither conviction (cf. as V. Aristotle strives.2 But we can no longer ignore it completely. the philosopher proceeds to specify the conditions." he says. and the discourses mentioned there as discourses for teaching ."4 Thus arose doubt whether it is possible to utter anything which is the case and.3 And the very foundations of teaching. We do not have to dwell at length here on Aristotle's notion of teachingas given or received 1a notion which implicates his entire theory of knowledge. in the listeners. not only by a total intellectual assent to the truths of the discourse. which uses language. as J. Untersteiner noted. and to "harken" to the message. ) of the cogency of his message nor persuasion to act in accord with its injunctions. if it is possible. should be examined in detail.

Whatever may be the case for Plato's Meno. Plato tries to describe the conditions under which virtue could be taught. whether or not consciously intended by him as such. which contradicts common sense. a passage of the Hypotyposes. that is. or be convinced. Sextus claims essentially that only those will perceive the object signified by a discourse who know in advance the convention linking the signifiers to what is signified. but he seems to have recognized the correctness of the basic intuition underlying all these debates. For the dialogue accepts the point. therefore. of the truth of statements which touch on the core of the problem and supply premises for reasoning about it.e. Aristotle states unambiguously that they require time and experience. The philosopher observes elsewhere: "those who have begun to learn connect the formulae."16 A bit < previous page page_101 next page > . as we have seen. Aristotle. Thus discourse seems to be an instrument of recollection for those who know. the dialogue in which. which for the most part arise and develop through teaching. not only in Gorgias. made by thinkers prior to its composition. for it must become an integral part of the learners' nature.15 First a word on the negative implications of such a statement. by itself or in itself. what is signified is already otherwise known. for his part. for example. and for whom. avoided the sceptical denial of the possibility of teaching..13 I have already noted the importance of this requirement for the NE. that the one who is to comprehend a discourse needs prior knowledge of its object.14 Now. this is something which requires time. The upshot is that nothing can really be taught by language. the only type which seeks to produce knowledge of the object. science) regarding the object described by the discourse. We find them roughly sketched. The theory of recollection sketched in the Meno11 may indicate the elements of a solution devised for it by Plato. Aristotle says that learners must have conviction . but also in the Meno. while the nature of the arguments given contributes in no small way to winning listeners' approval.7 which shed light on positions contradicted by Aristotle and whose arguments he seems to refute by way of anticipation.10 Given that signifiers have only conventional meaning. Now. but they do not yet know their meaning. that learning from a discoursea conventional substitute for realitydoes not. 6 There are even several texts of this sort. Plato was certainly aware of this problem. not a means of knowledge for the ignorant.< previous page page_101 next page > Page 101 indirect source of Sextus Empiricus' much later reasoning on the same subject. produce knowledge (i. The reason for this apparent foresight is that the system of proofs worked out by Sextus borrowed quite a few arguments from the period prior to Aristotle's reflections.8 Here we are interested in the consequences derived from the hypothesis that language has only conventional meaninga theory mentioned at the beginning of the Cratylus9 and presupposed by the treatise On Interpretation.12 Where the discourse is of the didactic type. Speaking of the intellectual virtues. the fundamental conditions of conviction (which implies the intelligibility of the discourse) are really inherent in the dispositions of listeners themselves.

" he prudently suggests. Now. Here he uses an illuminating analogy: that of the drunk man who recites the verses of Empedocles. with the memorization of a sequence of words. that discourse alone can supply to persons who have no prior acquaintance with a subject at all the knowledge of the reality of which they are ignorant). in this domain. Moreover. the philosopher does not in any way infer the radical impossibility of teaching. Actualization of such knowing is brought about by direct acquaintance with what is signified. mathematical knowledge does not consist in the ability to recite a demonstration. which. from this discovery. The Experience Required of the Listener But. it suffices to return to the famous passage of NE vi. he understands nothing of the Agrigentine philosopher's meaning. enables what is signified to become part of the knower. that is. if it is true that one cannot comprehend a discourse without having advance familiarity with its object. where Aristotle tries to explain why genuine mathematical science but not philosophical science is accessible to learners from childhood on. in the philosopher's eyes. in this extreme case. It is clear. as actors. But this is obviously not appropriate for the teaching through which one aspires to help the learner gain knowledge of what is signified. To adopt terminology used by the philosopher in the context. 17 Aristotle also distinguishes between possession of science and the ability to speak its language .19 verbal knowledge is equivalent to a potential knowledge.18 whose knowledge. that when the drunk man performs his recitation. like a young child who could be taught to memorize the same discourse."3 Presumably. we should declare illusory the belief that one can teach by means of discourse (that is to say. And Aristotle himself refers to the example of actors in a theater. "is that the objects of the one [science] are accessible by abstraction but the principles [of the other] result from experience. as the actor < previous page page_102 next page > . at this point. To convince ourselves of this. as we have just seen." if the signs composing the discourse were themselves considered to be the essential object of knowledge. 2. "The reason. and this potential knowledge is farther from being actual.2 Now. and. he strives constructively to describe the optimal conditions of teaching. Learning by means of discourse in this way could pass for the acquisition of a kind of "science. when repeated. He knows only the words. Aristotle willingly concedes that the acquisition of scientific language is far from implying scientific knowledge of its object. these conditions vary according to the object of knowledge.< previous page page_102 next page > Page 102 further on and in the same context. the conditions which must be fulfilled by listeners if they are to comprehend the discourse and so to advance into knowledge.1 On the contrary. coincides. so to speak. the less known the referents of the words are. young people have no conviction but only words while the essence of mathematical realities is immediately obvious.

It is therefore true that if disciples are to be taught. far from rendering useless the discourse of the teacher. "we often actually say that learning is comprehending" . know in advance that of which the master speaks. furnishes the principles of the science at issue). from which it is easy to abstract an essence. progress towards genuine knowledge become easier. the listener will at most learn a language. For. in a sense. Of course. the discourse of a person who knows has real meaning only for persons able to relate the words to the referents made known by experience. comprehension of the discourse and. the greater the amount of experience. the experience of the disciple is a condition without which the discourse given by the master cannot be meaningful and. mathematical knowledge depends upon a small amount of experience. In short. verbally acquired. they must.5 It is still necessary to say that the best-prepared listeners who begin to pick up the words of their teacher do not acquire a scientific training at a single blow.used here to express the act of < previous page page_103 next page > . But only in a sense. in which general concepts. Lacking such experience. if one prefers. it is possible to conceive the definition of the triangle. with it. between the comprehension of the discourse and the assimilation of the knowledge expressed in the discourse (up to the point at which listeners themselves can be said to possess science) there is sometimes a considerable distance. But is not the comprehension or. But assimilationand thus deep convictiondemands time. expressed by means of words. And.< previous page page_103 next page > Page 103 in a theater recites his lines or the drunk man a poem of Empedocles. moreover. who possess only verbal knowledge. if the remarks about the listener in the NE prologue gain meaning from the perspective informed by the problems discussed above. as indicating deficient experience. one must admit that their aim is limited to describing the indispensable conditions for comprehension alone. In these matters. that is. a lack of familiarity with the concrete and peculiar reality of the subject-matter (which. 4 To take an extreme case: from a single concrete representation of a triangle." The verb "to comprehend" . physics. cannot provide access to general knowledge (in which the transmission of science consists). The Faculty of "Comprehension" Let us take a moment to focus more precisely upon the idea of "comprehension. far from destroying the claims of teaching. the understanding of the discourse precisely the measure of a true learning as a result of hearing a teacher's words? As Aristotle observed. are grasped only in connection with many concrete impressions. in such a field. the experience of the listeners constitutes the prior condition for the intelligibility of the discourse. Presumably. Thus Aristotle describes the condition of youthful "persons of wisdom" or "natural scientists" .6 3. consequently. for instance. other things being equal. Now. But there are other fields.

" so another form of comprehension vouches for the adoption or rejection of legal formulae proposed in a given situation.7 We may infer that. the philosopher meant to rely on an attribute of his listenerscomprehensionwhich.3 It is therefore easy to conceive a secondary sense of comprehension. was quite concerned to inform his listeners about the prerequisites for being taught. 1 refers to the notion of "comprehension" . applicable to a given city. as we have seen. And we find in NE vi. Aristotle. For experience of the referents of the discourse. the NE prologue. demanding a < previous page page_104 next page > . therefore. persons of experience in each field judge correctly what is accomplished in it" . in its own right. his analysis of a minor intellectual excellence called comprehension. clearly requires of the listener that he be a good judge: "and every person judges well the subjects which he learns to know" . And here Aristotle establishes a necessary connection between being a good judge and experience : ''Indeed.2 But the analysis performed on it by Aristotle has the advantage of bringing to light the constituent elements inherent in the general notion of "comprehension. comprehension figures in the NE's final chapter4 as a capacity permitting the correct selection of laws. by rendering them able to test the discourse by reference to reality. operating on the practical level. ensures their possession of the means of really being persuaded and. if not an idiosyncratic use. without oneself being able to legislate. consequently. arms them against acquiring a merely verbal knowledge. which stands to architectonic prudence as the comprehension of NE vi stands to prudence and consists in the capacity to judge proposed laws for what they are worth. Probably the use of the word here is. at the very least a technical refinement of the concept normally expressed by it. permits one knowingly to approve or disapprove of a statement claiming "this should be done.5 Now." In NE vi comprehension is presented as an exclusively critical capacity : it pertains to those subjects which are governed by prudence. from among those furnished by a collection of laws. which here deserves our attention. Indeed. And it is equally possible to imagine the corresponding capacity of a type of "good judge. is a condition without which the listener learns only words.6 and it also requires of listeners that they possess substantial experience (up to the point of rejecting young people as listeners inasmuch as a youth is "inexperienced in the actions that make up life" ).< previous page page_104 next page > Page 104 comprehending a discourse. alongside Aristotle's analysis of prudence ( ). There is nothing gratuitous about such suppositions." who is able to judge statements which purport to provide general instruction to the lawgiver. though such a person is unable to teach the legislative art. and it consists in the capacity to judge correctly what is said by another . since. As the primary form of comprehension. it belongs to persons who need not possess science. beyond any doubt. in all probability.

the idea of a good judge formed by experience is linked to the concept of the "educated person"for. 8 In other words. to my knowledge. they comprehend by what means or in what manner their perfection is attained and what types of product are proper for what clientele.1 In this passage the manner in which correct judgment (which." which is itself security that listeners will actually be able to "learn" .9 III Education and Critical Aptitude To grasp Aristotle's thinking on this question. not to the (general) objects of science but to the concrete and singular realities with which experience alone can acquaint us. these are educational topics studied in the Politics. as we have seen. just as one sees in the case of musical works. the formula "subjects which he learns to know" refers. more general requirement which probably subsumes it: the requirement for a kind of education . is explained to us by reference to what happens in matters of music and drawing. on the basis of laws alone. as in the matter of drawing. or rather because. one can be content when it does not escape them completely whether the product has been well or badly executed. let me emphasize. on the contrary. With people lacking experience. people of experience in each type of thing judge products correctly . Indeed. says Aristotle. Now the laws are in a sense the product of politics. Indeed. acquire a legislative capacity or judge [which laws are] the best? Indeed. [The Sophists. the requirement for comprehension remains implicit in the section of the NE prologue (1094b27-1095a4) which touches on the problem studied above. pretend] that it is possible to choose the best [laws] as if the choice were not the result of comprehension and correct judgment not the greatest quality. this characteristic is attributable to the "educated person" of whom Aristotle is thinking when he says: "Each person judges well the subjects which he learns to know and it is of these subjects that he is a good judge. in the same terms as comprehension. one must first note a point which has occurred to no other exegete. implies comprehension) is necessarily connected to a kind of personal experience. Let us in fact note the statements of the final chapter of the NE which teach the dependence of correct judgment on experience in legislative affairs. < previous page page_105 next page > . that education (as a quality that results from the process called by the same name) is analyzed. How therefore could one. so to speak. Now. namely." . people do not seem to acquire a medical capacity by studying medical doctors' handbooks. it yields its place to another. As it appears from the immediate context.< previous page page_105 next page > Page 105 "critical capacity" is equivalent to stating the need for the power of "comprehension. although. The interpreter must reach this conclusion on his own.

it would seem. First." we read. And. answer yes. it is not Zeus himself who sings or plays the cithera. such amateurs will always be inferior to professional musicians. our interpretation should take a clue from the sharp contrast between the technical training of the professional musician (described as a "mechanic" ) and the training of the free or liberal person."9 And the philosopher concludes several lines later: "Since. when young. which. on the contrary."8 As the first and third reasons suggest. devote < previous page page_106 next page > . In Music For a start. As for the second reason. We see in this way that there is a resemblance between the concepts of education and comprehension. asks Aristotle. the educated person par excellence in such matters is recognizable by the aptitude for correctly judging the works of other people." says Aristotle. his first concern is to challenge this view: "It is difficult. it is necessary to actively participate. in order to be able to judge .4 why. it indicates the importance of another criterion: the formation of correct judgment. it did not take us long to discover that the essential question for him is whether musical instruction which abstains from teaching the practice of singing and playing musical instruments could train the judgment of the individuals being instructed. we call people of that sort mechanics."7 Third reason: "In the opinion of the poets. in Aristotle's eyes. "it is inevitable that those who make of music itself a vocation and an art perform better than those who concern themselves with it only long enough to learn. 1.< previous page page_106 next page > Page 106 And there Aristotle tries to show that the free person's training in music or drawing requires personal practice of the appropriate art. "Indeed. if not impossible. But."6 Second reason: "From what people say. is important to us here. Regardless of whether one supposes that its purpose is to supply amusement in adulthood 2 or to improve moral dispositions3 or to provide something to occupy a life of leisure. and practice is not for people who would not be drunk or involved in playing silly games. let us consider the discussion of a particular issue touching on musical training. in fact. Let us take a closer look at it. one should. in fact. This criterion lies at the center of Aristotle's concerns. "to become good judges without being initiated into performance. Therefore. without having learned [music]. when in Politics viii 6 Aristotle definitively solves the aporia. are able nevertheless to judge correctly between good melodies and those which are not. [the Lacedaemonians]. by itself. precisely because this training seeks to form correct judgment. Those who cite the case of the Lacedaemonians. should children have to learn the practice of music themselves?5 Would they not have sufficient knowledge if they could appreciate it when it is performed by others? And the philosopher sets forth various possible reasons for raising this question.

when one has become more mature."11 Concretely. Its outcome is that its practitioners become mechanics. therefore. He states elsewhere that there are two types of spectator and."14 The claim that the pleasure of listeners at musical competitions is base may seem surprising. it may be objected. In short.< previous page page_107 next page > Page 107 oneself to practice..15 The notion of being educated. listeners: (1) "the one free and educated" and (2) "the other a vulgar crowd composed of mechanics and laborers and the like" . one should give it up. For. in this education.13 preferring instruments capable of cultivating good listeners. for Aristotle. Aristotle rules out the kind of training which leads to professional competitions . the educated person (equivalent to the really free individual) is thus not an expert . education in the preeminent sense (i. Aristotle disapproves of professional education : "We call professional the sort of education that prepares for competitions.12 preferring a training which cultivates taste. practitioners do not perform with a view to their own personal excellence but for the pleasure of their listeners." 10 Such is the attitude which corresponds best to the central concern of all liberal education. as applying to most people. what types of melodies and rhythms should be practiced and what kinds of instruments should be used to fulfill their study. he possesses the capacity to judge correctly the product of the expert.16 We also find that.18 < previous page page_107 next page > . Thus is illustrated the philosopher's view that every kind of good judge requires a (minimal) sort of experience. So let us deem this activity as appropriate not for free human beings but for hirelings. the cithera (a kind of lute) and any other type of instrument restricted to professionals . "free or noble education" )17 in a given subject does not extend to professional training in the subject. In the philosopher's mind. The person "educated" in musical matters could be none other than the person whose good taste has been successfully cultivated. He excludes the use of the aulos (a kind of flute). here wonderfully condenses the philosopher's thinking in the several passages I have just cited. Aristotle understands it. but. is this approach not exposed to the risk of turning young people into "mechanics"? Aristotle quickly refutes the objection: "It is not difficult to resolve the problem if one inquires to what extent those being educated in political excellence should take part in musical activities. retaining the ability to judge and take the proper pleasure in fine things because of the study made of them in one's youth. But. in fact. but. naturally associated with the notion of being free .e. which is a base pleasure. For if he himself is restricted to practicing certain types of musical worksthose which in no way undermine his condition as a free human beingit is precisely in order to be able to render an authoritative judgment . because he has undergone the necessary minimum of personal experience.

" he tells us.15 < previous page page_108 next page > .8 And. And the philosopher adds: "there are. only an apocryphal passage from the (Pseudo-Platonic) Rivals9 (which W. however.7 seems at first sight to break away from the Socratic-Platonic position. of whom I spoke earlier. so far as I know. and we attribute judgmental ability quite as much to the educated as to the experts."6 In this respect. artistic or scientific) specialization and aims only at the formation of correct judgment. so to speak.< previous page page_108 next page > Page 108 2." which appears elsewhere in Aristotle's works in specific contexts.12 it expresses a concern of Socrates. although it was attacked by certain Sophists. In the course of a famous passage in book iii. it nevertheless resembles the ideal of Protagoras. "It also seems. for Plato. The philosopher assigns a general significance to his assertion when he says: "It is difficult if not impossible to become good judges without being initiated into the practice. who. described as ''the person who is educated in the art" . without some practice in the art whose works must be judged at their real value. In Medicine This conception of liberal education helps us understand the meaning of the term "educated. Isocrates pursued the same ideal. different kinds of doctors.4 There are.14 And there is at least one piece of evidence that it was not alien even to Plato.5 but there is also a third kind. including earlier in the Politics. the stand of Aristotle. in both areas. liberal education thus pursues an explicit end: forming correctness of judgment. If one is to believe Xenophon. In Drawing Aristotle's remarks do not deal only with music. 1 And in the same passage. But as Newman already noted. denied the capacity for judging to every person who was not an out and out expert. incidentally. Now. Newman seems to have been the first to point out)10 aligns itself with the view defended by Aristotle.13 and. As for the label "educated" (to describe the person of good judgment who is not an expert). "that the study of drawing is useful for best judgment of the works of artists" . L. appears to do justice to the claims of Isocrates. personal training in drawing is recommended "because it renders us able to contemplate the beauty of bodies" .11 the principle of such education (understood as the contrary of "technical education") cannot be attributed only to Aristotle. for instance. the philosopher asserts that the only doctor who can "judge [is] one who has correctly practiced medicine" . according to Aristotle.2 In drawing as in music. the "workman" and the "architectonic" doctors. it clearly refers to the conception of liberal education which rejects the demands of (technical. the ideal sought seems impossible to attain. professional."3 3. similar people in all the arts. in connection with medicine. like Socrates. in the "Platonic" works.

< previous page page_109 next page > Page 109 Whatever the case may be for others. a medical operation)." but in any case he has an experience other than the healer's. The educated person could thus have less experience than the "healer. for medicine) the educated person and the person of good judgment are the same. as incompatible with the life of leisure as the condition of the paid worker. But on this point. for instance. This is why Aristotle not only disapproves. as the latter can judge the melodies or songs performed by a third. liberal education. 16 but he also adds other reservations: "Even with respect to the liberal sciences. a necessary condition for being educated. education must refrain from trying to educate experts at whatever the cost. Personal experience. some remarks are in order. Many scholars. ''to apply oneself to them up to a certain point is not contrary to the status of a free human being. Hence his acknowledgment that for every subject (for example. seeing that. in medicine) there are people who stand to the complete artist or expert in the same relation as the free individual who has received a musical education stands to the professional musician: persons able to judge correctly the acts or products of another (for example. the educated person is ranked with the expert. in any field. nevertheless remains an insufficient condition for correct judgment. to focus on their minutiae. In his eyes. this is also a purpose of education in the areas of music and drawing. must remain within those limits beyond which the person being educated will be inducted into a type of servitude." Finally."17 In short. art or instruction which in itself runs counter to the life of leisure. 4. it is important to distinguish two things within this power of judgment: (1) the ability to judge whether a given medical operation should or could be < previous page page_109 next page > . in many contexts. does not suffice to empower such a person to exercise an art himself. medicine. although Aristotle nowhere says so explicitly. experience. but to devote oneself too assiduously to them. as the "workman" does. Aristotle defends a very clear position. in Politics iii. According to him. in every field." he says. have stressed this Aristotelian view and have tried to determine its consequences. in fact. not the experienced person.18 But the essential thing to note is that. although a necessary condition. Aristotle holds that liberal education is able to shape minds just as capable of correct judgment as the minds of experts. as we have seen.19 Moreover. Conclusion This view thus also assumes a kind of personal experience on the part of those involved. as lowering the free person to the base rank of "mechanic." of every activity . exposes a person to the harmful effects already mentioned. since it gives him an authority to judge which has not necessarily been acquired by the "healer. within the limits in which he intends to defend it. This is tantamount to saying that in each domain of art or science (for example.

This is the place to reinforce this point by gathering the most important facts for the interpretation. Metaphysics a (Alexander of Aphrodisias). both powers of judgment are normally possessed by the educated person.1 Rhetoric i (an anonymous commentator)2 and the treatise On the Parts of Animals (Michael of Ephesus).< previous page page_110 next page > Page 110 applied to a given subject and (2) the ability to judge. in spite of all the evidence. There is therefore reason to think that being educated in a given subject and lacking personal experience in the same subject are mutually exclusive characteristics. ) or vulgar ."4 But perhaps this has the effect. uncultivated. like the NE prologue. that is.6 But the fact that the educated person must possess experience in no way implies that he is equivalent to the experienced person. The Unity of the Concept "Educated" As we have seen. proceeds to distinguish sharply between the use of the terms "education" and "educated" in such contexts and the "unreflective use of the concept 'education"' which appears elsewhere and possesses ''no specific Aristotelian coloration. for instance. bestows a technical meaning on the term "educated.5 Accordingly. convey the same essential idea. IV The Need to be Educated The remarks on this subject found in the NE received attention already from the ancient commentators. for every field. We have noticed this distinction in a passage from the Politics concerning medicine: quite incapable of practicing an art after the fashion of the empiric. in all cases. in the first case. being educated in the preeminent sense turns out to be associated usually with being free and. who referred to it for explanation of parallel passages in. Kullmann. And this is an aptitude that he owes for the most part to having devoted a certain period of time himself to the type of work of which he is a good judge. This is the reason that Aristotle describes the newly rich as suffering from a lack of education in riches . the educated person has the advantage over < previous page page_110 next page > . once it has been recognized that a particular operation has to be performed. for instance. The reader will recognize. the ideal education is contrary both to deficient and to excessive instruction. the capacity for comprehension described earlier. 1. of masking the unity of intention behind Aristotle's uses of the term . W. therefore. uses which." And. 20 However.3 Each of these passages. in the strict sense of the term. from the most technical to the most ordinary. whether this operation was adequately executed. it is contrasted with whatever may be servile (cf. therefore. Of the aptitudes possessed by the expert . the educated person has only the aptitude for judging a task performed by others.

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the experienced person of being able to judge how the works of that art should be performed. In short, he is a
person of good taste; we agree to recognize his excellence of judgment, but no more than that. And therefore,
lack of education , wherever it may be found, is nothing other than a lack of discernment. In
the field of ordinary decorum, for instance, the "uneducated person" will not see that people
should refrain from speaking pompously on a subject of which they have no experience. 7
In the field of literary aesthetics, for instance, the uneducated person will not see that poetic style is
inappropriate for a prose discourse.8 Finally, in the field of scienceand here Aristotle's idea is especially
importantthe uneducated person will not see that certain propositions, that is, principles (especially the
principle of contradiction), do not require demonstration in the strict sense of the term .9 In
light of this evidence, I conclude that the same idea is always indicated by the expression "educated," the
idea of correct evaluation of the manner of speaking or of reasoning or (generally) of conducting oneself.
Moreover, this holds regardless of the subject-matter. Forand this too is worth notingwhen Aristotle speaks
of "éducation'' or of "homme cultivé" (which is how J. Tricot and R. A. Gauthier render the idea in their
translations of the NE),10 he always understands: relative to a particular field. Education, in this sense, is
always "a form of initiation into something."

2. The Deficiencies of the Traditional Interpretation

We must bear in mind all the observations made up to this point in order to grasp the inconsistency of the
commonly accepted interpretation of the NE prologue. This interpretation goes back to the nineteenth
century and, particularly, to J. A. Stewart,1 who made it his business to produce a synthesis of all the facts
regarding the problem. Avowing his debts to A. Grant and G. L. Michelet,2 Stewart tried to establish the
proposition, which R. A. Gauthier regards as secure even today,3 that the educated person is primarily a
logician. At the beginning of the NE, indeed, the educated person appears to be an "arbitrator of method."
Now, a passage from the treatise On the Parts of Animals, which can be invoked as a parallel, precisely
distinguishes between the characteristic disposition of the scientist and the characteristic disposition of the
educated person, in that the former is knowledge of "the object" and the latter is
"capacity to judge wisely what is expressed well or not well by the speaker"
.4 The
cultivated person, Aristotle says, "will approve the way in which things are set out for him, leaving aside the
question of what the truth is"
.5 Of course, to
move from this view to the belief, as Gauthier puts it, that "the basis of his being cultivated is knowledge of
logic,"6 is but one step; more quickly taken inasmuch as, among the passages concerning lack of education

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(which, for their part, as we have seen, expose faulty ways of operating in discourse or reasoning), we find a passage of the Metaphysics
mentioning a "lack of education concerning things related to analysis" . 7 Misinterpreted by J. Burnet8 and
after him by W. F. R. Hardie,9 this expression (which actually refers to a special case of lacking education, as does the expression "lack of
education in riches"10) might suggest that to become educated one must have received some training as a logician. But a straightforward reading
of the NE prologue refutes this interpretation. For there Aristotle does not defend the idea that the educated person must be able to verify
a systematic argument according to rules of logic (which do not vary with the subjects on which reasoning bears). He merely affirms the capacity
of the educated person, whom he would like to make his listener, to judge the agreement of a mode of expression (or reasoning) with the nature
of the object discussed in the discourse. "It is characteristic of a cultivated person," says Aristotle, "to seek rigor in each type of thing only to
the extent that the nature of the object admits"
.11
And this faculty of discernment obviously owes nothing to training as a logician, but only requires enough familiarity with the object of
discourse that one can recognize the appropriate way to speak about it.12

3. Results Of To Be Avoided

Having seen the facts of the problem assembled up to this point, one may expect that the lack of discernment chastised by Aristotle under the term
"lack of education" ( ) involves, at some level, a form of troublesome (unconscious and involuntary) confusion. And, in fact, the
Rhetoric describes lack of education as one of the human causesalong with "boasting" , which is, incidentally, conscious and
voluntaryof some thinkers' assigning to rhetoric the position which properly belongs to politics, thus disregarding the difference between the two
activities.1 Now, this improper equation which, when asserted in good faith, indicates a regrettable confusion in the minds of its authors, is
attributed to the Sophists by the NE's final chapter.2 And on this occasion Aristotle notices the "ignorance" (cf. ) of the Sophists
about the kind of activity appropriate for politicians and the kind of subject with which they are properly concerned. If
inexperience (attributed to these Sophists, as we have seen, in the passage being discussed) is inseparable from such ignorance, this is just because
a lack of familiarity with the object of politics prevents recognition of the specific nature of this object and, as a result, of the specific kind of
discourse and attitude needed by such an object. Aristotle thus hints that his teaching requires education (itself dependent on personal experience
of political affairs) because education alone permits us to judge the distance that separates a genuine polit-

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ical teaching from the rhetorical teaching of the Sophists, in spite of the claims of the latter. This education
lets us also escape the trap set by people other than the Sophists. And in EE i 6 we read the following: 3

There are people who, thinking that it is for the philosopher to say nothing by conjecture but
everything with rational support, put forward without realizing it arguments alien to the subject and
empty. They do so sometimes from ignorance, sometimes from braggadocio; and it happens that
even people of experience who are capable of acting [rightly] let themselves fall under the
influence of those who neither have nor can have architectonic or practical understanding. They
submit to this control because of a lack of education. For it is lack of education in each thing which
is unable to judge which arguments are appropriate to it and which are alien to it.

This important passage deserves our attention in several respects. First, it clearly shows that the defect called
"lack of education" and, correspondingly, the characteristic of being educated may pertain to the speaker as
well as to the hearer of a discourse. Of course, in connection with the speaker, it is not expressly an issue of
lack of education but of ignorance . However, the passages from the Rhetoric and the NE to which
I alluded above4 confirm that Aristotle is thinking of the ignorance of an uneducated person, which results in
the very incapacity for judgment displayed by some listeners. Moreover, it appears that possession of
experience in political affairs, even if paired with practical training, does not necessarily suffice for being an
educated person. In other words, and this confirms the analysis I made earlier of a passage from the
Politics,5 experience can train anyone quite well to perform (political) action and yet fail (1) to enable him to
judge whether the way of thinking of those who might speak to him about politics is adequate and (2) to
warn him against accepting illusory philosophical demands maintained by other uneducated persons who
expound to him arguments which are actually "alien to the subject and empty." Indeed, as it emerges in the
context, education in political subjects enables us to see that these subjects are entirely unable to tolerate a
discourse which proceeds exclusively by giving reasons . (In all likelihood, Aristotle directs
this point against the Platonists.6) So, just as education prepares us to deal correctly with those who think
they can reduce the teaching of politics to a rhetorical discourse, it also enables us to expose the illusion of
those who, because they lack education, demand a rational justification for everything

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which one may utter about political issues. It thus seems to prevent our yielding either to the tendency of the
Sophists or to the tendency of those who preach the universal ideal of mathematical demonstrations, that is,
the Academicians.

A passage from book a of the Metaphysics clearly describes the two tendencies which customarily
accompany two radically different types of listeners and which are characterized respectively by an excessive
predilection and an excessive distaste for precision : "the one group does not respect what you
say if you do not reason mathematically, and the other group if you do not reason with the help of examples;
still others deem it necessary to produce the testimony of a poet. Some people require that everything be
rigorous, while some others have a distaste for rigor." 7 This is exactly the kind of intransigent attitude
castigated by the NE prologue for ignoring the specific nature of the subject-matter with which the discourse
deals: "It comes to the same thing, so to speak, [that is, it is equally inappropriate] to allow a mathematician
to state probable arguments and to require genuine demonstrations of a rhetorician."8 Again according to the
NE, education protects us against this kind of inappropriateness, by letting us see the degree of precision
tolerated by each subject-matter.9

The same conclusion is found in Metaphysics α: "This is why one should have been educated regarding the
way in which one should receive each type of argument"
.10 And the philosopher justifies his claim by
distinguishing between the study of a science properly speaking and the study of the "way" or
"spirit" is the term used at NE i 1.1094b22in which the exposition of the science should proceed.11
Thus, discovering the "right way," that is, the way appropriate to the subject under study, seems to be the
task of education. How is this accomplished? The introduction to the treatise On the Parts of Animals, which
addresses this question, suggests that the discovery of the appropriate way to explain or reason about a
subject coincides with, or rather depends on, the discovery of "a certain kind of rule''
.12 Indeed, Aristotle notes the manifest existence of rules "by reference to
which a hearer shall be able to criticize the method of a professed exposition"
.13

The consistent thrust of Aristotle's ideas in the passages examined up to this point suggests that these
ruleswhich actually operate as methodological principlesare drawn from experience. But, as we have seen,
experience, whether of political or other matters, is not synonymous with education. We now understand
why. It is that extended practice of political affairs could actually reinforce a person's practical disposition
for dealing with such issues, without the person's grasping, for all that, the peculiar character of politics as an
object of discursive teaching and without his possessing the meansthe rulesfor discerning the best way to
speak about it. On the other hand, a small amount of experience which familiarizes a person with the object
of the

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discourse could supply these means. It is a necessary and sufficient condition for this that the understanding
should be forewarned about the peculiar nature of the subject to be treated and thus that it realize the
methodological conditions required or rejected by this subject. To be educated in relation to instruction
therefore implies only that one's understanding is familiarized with the subject-matter of the discourse, its
problematic, as we would say today. In this sense, education, for Aristotle, protects us against every method
of scientific inquiry or exposition which has been conceived a priorior, what amounts to the same thing under
the circumstances, every method which is supposed to be universally valid. In positive terms, the very idea of
the educated person implies that every subject-matter itself teaches us the procedure
required for the discourse which deals with that subject-matter. Such was the philosopher's view, however
unfamiliar it may be to us.

4. General Education and Politics

Some qualifications are still indispensable. I saidand the analysis presented above confirms this claimthat
education and the lack thereof had to be understood "relative to a particular field." 1 To teach about a
particular kind of issue requires an educated person initiated in these issues; teaching about another kind
requires an educated person different from the first, the experience needed in the one case having nothing in
common with that needed in the other. It therefore seems obvious at first glance that political matters and
experience relative to these matters call for a particular kind of educated person. These persons would be
able to evaluate the procedure of a discourse on politics, and this judging will differ from judging appropriate
to the procedure of a treatise, for instance, on nature in the animal world. But it behooves us to inquire
further and to cast a glance at a distinction made by both the NE prologue and the introduction to On the
Paris of Animals. The two passages seem to present us with the picture of an educated person limited to a
precise domain but taking as a model the person who is "cultivated" in the general sense of the term, as the
following diagram shows:2
NE On the Parts of Animals
1. 1.

2. 2.

1. The person educated (in each field judges 1. (The person educated) about a
his) particular subject-matter (well) definite subject (is able to judge things
that concern it)

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2. The person educated in everything
(judges well) generally 2. The generally educated person is said to be
able to judge concerning everything

This distinction requires thorough understanding. 3 The primary issue is what Aristotle means by a person
educated in everything or in general, a person capable of judging everything, as it were, or of judging well as
such. If we grant that education and judgment in such a case bear on the totality of particular matters in
which training can be proposed, we can rigorously construct the notion of an initiation (by definition, a
summary one) to all the disciplines, sciences, arts, and techniques, similar to what is involved in well-
rounded education , conceived already by the Sophists, whose purpose was the
formation of individuals adept in all fields.4 But an education which would thus be nothing but the sum of
many particular "educations" is strangely lacking in unity, for the same reason that the mere sum of all
sciences and arts is. Pressing the various "educations" into a more unified conception of general education
seems impossible, on the other hand, since for Aristotle there exists no universal science worthy of the name
into which one could be initiated, as one can be initiated into a particular science. Incidentally, this is one of
the reasons which led P. Aubenque to equate the educated person with the dialectician.5 But W. Kullmann
has shown the inconsistency of this interpretation.6 Obviously, as Kullmann has correctly stated, one can get
oneself out of it by saying that the concept of the person educated "generally" or "in everything"
here captures the current concept of the ''generally well-informed person" [allgemein
Gebildeter].7 This is not false. But, as a result, we are pointed back to the idea of liberal education (a major
concern of the Politics),8 that is, to the education of the citizen, who does not need to be instructed in a
particular science or art, but to be instructed and educated as such. Indeed, the hypothesis cannot be excluded
that the person who emerges from education (and who cannot be equated to the person educated in a
particular field, whatever it may be) tends to correspond ideally to the notion of the person educated in
everything. Neither the training nor the experience of the citizen presupposes one specific domain. I shall
speak, in this connection, of experience, in an absolute and global sense of the term (that supplied by life and
described in the NE with the expression "[of] actions that make up life"
9 and of education in the same sense (that which helps one to live well:
eruditio vitae est peritia [education is the experience of life], as G. Ramsauer puts it).10

Now, if things are as I have said, Aristotle's political discourse requires that the listener be educated, not in
each field, but generally; for the very simple reason that the education of the citizen, in the philosopher's
mind, is equivalent to the formation of the whole person (not reduced to the warrior, the financier, etc.)11
and it trains him to judge every subject-matter, since in virtue of its architectonic position, politics, in a
sense, governs the entire

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which is just that of experience. Werner. having said this. and F. in a discourse on political issues. one cannot doubt that the methodological rules here under discussion and the criteria of truth actually do proceed. some interpreters of this treatise (including J.. he requires that his listeners adopt the same attitude < previous page page_117 next page > . [and] do not represent the primary propositions on which the science is based.. 1. from the single matrix of experience. Kühnert13). but.17 And in concrete reality. And we have already acknowledged this capacity as a form of comprehension indispensable for being taught. The judgment of the person educated with respect to the discourse. 12 Nevertheless. that to be educated is to be able to do as was just said" . has already discovered. anything other than a schematic outline of the truth and acknowledges that he must be content with conclusions valid only for the most part. M. a capacity for judgment relative to the matter of the discourse. Kullmann rightly objects that "the rules ."16 It is true. having acquired the wherewithal to evaluate the adequateness of the form of a discourse on politics"we believe . if not to include. b) 1094b22-27: Consequently. To sum up. W.14 hesitated to reduce the characteristic capacity of the educated person to judgment about the formal aspect of scientific discourse and tried to prove that knowledge of the principles or primary elements of the particular science must be attributed to the educated person. in Aristotle's words18may have also discovered and. a) 1094b11-22: In virtue of a principle (1094b11-14) whose application in each case rests on the education of the person who attempts an exposition.. at least some factual reference points which will empower him to check the propositions about politics which relate to his experience.< previous page page_117 next page > Page 117 human domain. is most applicable when the time comes to evaluate whether the form of an exposition is adequate for the subject treated: "leaving aside the question of truth" . as the treatise On the Parts of Animals puts it. it goes without saying that the educated person. Yet he possesses the ability to pass intelligent judgment on discourse which claims to teach politics. In this quality.15 which form the content of education in a particular field. linking up with the commentary of Michael of Ephesus. at least to link up with.. Aristotle confesses his inability to offer. have nothing in common with apodictic principles . although independently. That is why education tends. usually. This leads us to another consideration. which expresses Aristotle's primary concerns regarding his listener. Le Blond. we have shown. however. let us now try a brief rereading of the important section of the NE prologue (1094b11-1095a4). the educated citizen differs fundamentally from the true politician (just as every person educated in a particular field differs from the expert or the scientist in that field).

although conceptually different. the philosopher's intention is not so much to justify his own procedure as to indicate to his listeners the special way in which the reasoning will develop. guarantees that he can obey the < previous page page_118 next page > . Nevertheless. especially insofar as it remains close to the commonly shared notion of the educated person to which Aristotle alludes elsewhere (in saying. that they too should be guided by education. the idea of the educated person cannot be reduced to this aspect alone. and positively preoccupied with what favors. Aristotle is negatively preoccupied with what handicaps. seen from this angle. justifying this exclusion on the ground of their lack of experience. whose character is already formed. 1 And the qualities that it embodies. apparently offers safeguards only of an intellectual sort."2 Now. This conclusion takes into account defects arising from the fact that young people have lived but little (and thus have but little familiarity with the subject-matter of political discourse). The ideal of education. for instance. Following Plato. a) 1094b27-1095a2: Aristotle then follows up with an observation about the primary characteristic of the educated person (both with respect to a particular field and in general). why it is inappropriate to use the same form of argument everywhere and always (1094b25-27). the (correctly) educated person. as a result. which seems to sum up the philosopher's requirements in this respect.< previous page page_118 next page > Page 118 (1094b22-23). Aristotle understands by this term the condition "of somehow having been led since youth to receive pleasure and pain appropriately. V The Practical Relevance of Education 1. In saying this. cannot really be dissociated from other dispositions conferred by correct education . a capacity for judgment. that in aristocracies the distribution of education determines who has access to power). The statement that education is required of his listeners entails the need to accept this peculiar feature of the discourse. Education will let them see how to adapt the requirements of the exposition to its object (1094b23-25) and. whom he takes as an authority. New Preliminaries for the Discourse In everything said up to the present point. which accompanies education). supplies the guarantees of a person with disciplined passions. defects affecting possibilities both for evaluating the "form" of the discourse (an ability proper to the generally educated person) and for judging its connections to reality (proper to comprehension. b) 1095a2-4: And he directly infers that young people are incapable of following a political discourse. 2. only the understanding which the listener may have of the discourse. that is.

2 For Aristotle. He thus presents the ideal conditions for responding. Aristotle relies a great deal on the presence of such listeners and warns against the illusion that listeners will "benefit" from his discourses if. the discussion of incontinent conduct in NE vii sheds considerable light on this phenomenon. according to Aristotle. 2. to clarify the indispensable moral qualities which must be possessed by listeners who wish to benefit from this aspect of his teaching.< previous page page_119 next page > Page 119 commands of reason. that is. placed before a concrete singular of the class. the author of an incontinent act knows in general that a given class of things is pleasant but should be avoided as evil. a discourse can contribute directly to the virtuous action of the persons to whom it is addressed. it stresses the instrumental aspect of the discourse and of the knowledge contained in it ("without benefit" : 1095a5. "of great benefit" :all). as the NE prologue essentially affirms. it is to be feared that. genuine knowledge of the good (to be pursued) or the evil (to be avoided) disappears. "useless" : a9. cf. with an appropriate act. Moreover. on the contrary. of the lawgiver?4 Before answering this question. Aristotle compares such listeners to incontinent people . To help us understand this phenomenon. in fact. or rather no longer exists in act. we should consider just how. Would Aristotle therefore be disposed to leave room in his discourse for certain facts or problems directly involving the action of virtuous listeners alongside facts and problems required for the instruction of the "architectonic'' politician. after having described the conditions under which listeners would be able intellectually to follow his discourse and in order to parry the charge that an attempt to provide only (theoretical) instruction in these matters risks uselessness. his practical understanding. nevertheless. the knowledge expressed in the discourse remains useless . for the majority of people (who live at the mercy of their passions). to the injunctions of a discourse which tries to reason about acting well.1 Indeed. "Good Moral Habits" and Practical Education The possibilities offered by the discourse in this respect also depend upon the listener. which is dominated by an irascible or concupiscible inclination. they are enslaved by their passions .3 This warning. the philosopher wished to display his intention also to fulfill the desire some might have to hear a discourse directly useful in action and. an aspect which went unmentioned before this point and for which Aristotle invokes a final cause ("the end is not knowledge but action" : a4-5). And. from the practi- < previous page page_119 next page > . In the NE prologue. sees only the pleasure and fails to grasp the evil at the very moment which decides the act. let us note. a state of affairs which. occurs as an afterthought ( : 1095a4) to remarks which exclude young people from the audience.3 In that precise instant. It is as if. at the same time.

so to speak. A chart can clarify these analogies: 1. since understanding sees the evil to be avoided. action is suspended) and from the following instants (where.< previous page page_120 next page > Page 120 cal point of view. the subject is seized with remorse). The idea is that knowledge acquired by people dominated by their passions will remain ignorance on the practical level. This insistence reflects a specific doctrine regarding education. For although from the theoretical or cognitive point of view alone. because ineffective for conduct. whose passions overwhelm their practical understanding. Those who live in Those who live in The child/ accord with reason/ accord with passion/ the animal the well (/rightly) young people educated (in general) 2. this aberration would condemn their general knowledge to remain useless. In young people. the person "who lives in accord with passion" could be grouped alongside the person "who lives in accord with reason" (as the incontinent person can be grouped alongside the prudent person ). can be extended. the philosopher therefore insists that they must already live in such a way that their appetitive tendencies are subordinated to a rational rule. permanent situation of those who live at the mercy of their passions. from the practical point of view. by analogy. is equivalent to ignorance. This moment of aberration 4 (responsible for the incontinent act) which stands out from the preceding instants (where. < previous page page_120 next page > . this moment. I say. As we know. the person who lives in accord with passion is hardly distinguished from the animal (as the act of the incontinent person no longer differs from the act of the intemperate person ). since understanding sees the evil which should have been avoided. Aristotle requires of education that it remedy the weaknesses of nature. if not constantly at least frequently. on the other hand. that it concern itself first of all with the appetitive tendencies of human beings: for children. to the. The prudent person The incontinent person The intemperate/ the bad/the ignorant Seeking to provide his listeners with knowledge from which they can benefit.

And the proof of this fact is that the requirement of character formation by means of habituation. because he relies on them to establish. on the theoretical or cognitive level.7 The implication of all this seems indeed to be that only the politician. not only offers a safeguard on the practical level but also provides. I have taken great pains up to now to distinguish conceptually between legislative prudence (or architectonic understanding) and prudence as habitual disposition for action (or practical understanding). Aristotle addresses his discourses. to politics. in reality. something that illuminates their conduct. in real life. In a word. that listeners will be able to actually derive some benefit from the discourse by obeying the injunctions implicitly or explicitly contained in it. acquired by habituation. after having said that "we must take our starting points from what is familiar to us" . to whom. Usually the two go together. should have been rightly directed by habituation" . will be able to find." he says. to act in accord with the law (= ) and not in accord with the caprices of one's own passions. in Aristotle's view. Aristotle himself remarks that they are. the task is to bring conduct into line with the rational norm expressed in the law. we can hardly separate. will be able to derive from them some benefit for his own conduct. the necessary condition for the listener's ability to judge the starting points chosen for the discourse. it is the acquisition of an "excellence resulting from habituation" . That being so. the habituation of conduct in accord with right reason (required of the listener if he is to benefit from the discourse in his actions) and experience of actions characteristic of life (needed by the listener if he is to comprehend the discourse and pass judgment on its "form").< previous page page_121 next page > Page 121 whose understanding is small or nonexistent. 5 The first quality obtained through educationthe first quality of the educated personwill thus be the capacity. in the eyes of most people. the lot of one and the same individual: "the reason. they usually have to go together. such an excellence presupposes a substantial number of virtuous actions or. an experience of virtue practiced.8 We can now observe and comprehend that. in my opinion. will also be the ones who. from another perspective. in other words. "why we believe that Pericles and people like him are prudent9 is that they can see what things are good for themselves and what things are good for other people" . if one prefers.6 Now. the just and in general. Possessing this experience also guarantees that the discourse will be intelligible. in this teaching. the genuine norms of the good for the city.10 < previous page page_121 next page > . in NE i 2. then. Aristotle adds: "This is why those who wish to listen satisfactorily to a discourse on matters relating to the noble. Indeed. The very people for whom the philosopher intends his teaching. as laws.

could only note once and for all the additional interest which this teaching has for praxis. does not refer to a kind of action alien to legislative work itself. 11 prepares for both prudence as a practical disposition and legislative prudence. because he must decide to derive a law from the good. who fails to carry out the good which he knows. not only because he must know the good to be prescribed in the law. the personal conduct of those to whom it entrusts the task of defining the laws. but. to all intents and purposes. already virtuous will possess the disposition needed to understand what is required by the good and to obey the imperatives. which owes nothing to teaching by means of discourse. as it does according to Aristotle. But the former can also derive some benefit from the same type of teaching. < previous page page_122 next page > . that is. but for better understanding of the actions which accord with the good. which are contained in a discourse whose subject-matter is this good. whose teaching is presented as a contribution to the formation of the judgment of the politician-lawgiver. For only the prudent person or the person who is. Aristotle. or to the defects of the youth. who obey their passions rather than the demands of reason which they do not understand. For this work includes. Because the operations of the latter are more purely theoretical. Therefore. training in virtue under the aegis and constraint of laws or other coercive powers which conform to the good. there is a risk at the point of decision that the lawgiver fall prey to the defects of the incontinent person . the lawgiver requires a moral education. as such. above all to the extent that it takes place in the arena of political life.< previous page page_122 next page > Page 122 Indeed. not for the acquisition of principles of conduct. it has to draw more on teaching of a philosophical type. Now such a decision requires that the person who knows the good possess the moral virtue which commits him to legislate in accord with what he knows the good to be. Therefore. it is important to add that this properly ethical instruction. and this is an action in the strictly moral sense of the word. Thus. explicit and implicit.12 Finally. which Aristotle addresses to the politician in the hope that it will be of use to him in his action. an ethical dimension. given that the lawgiver is not primarily the one who knows what the norm of the good should be but the one who decides to derive from this norm a law for others and for himself. also and especially.

Indeed. 1. Indeed. which. the essential body of learning with which the lawgiver must fortify himself when legislating. legislation is the tool required for the realization of the ends pursued by life in the city." 1 Aristotle insists elsewhere2 that one should always legislate with reference to the constitutional regime in effect in the city. in many respects. for the character type appropriate to each constitution usually preserves the constitution. He should train the future citizens required by the political regime to which he belongs. Conversely. Put into perspective in this way. appears to be a treatise on education. as if they were lawgivers. And.3 Before indicating how the lawgiver should operate in order to educate. Ethics and Politics The preceding investigations have shown that Aristotle's discussion of ethical problems corresponded to his most important concern. Experience bequeathed by the tumultuous history of political regimes here guides the philosopher's position and dictates to him a demand which he addresses to those responsible for the laws. grave risks of injury to the constitution. not only political life but life in general as lived in the framework constituted by political organization. one might say that the main body of political issues discussed by the philosopher also presents learning which is to provide direction for heads of household. on the contrary. in a restricted context. as for Plato.< previous page page_123 next page > Page 123 Conclusion: Education. at the very least. the instruction of the lawgiver. education should accord with each regime. opens with these words: "Nobody will challenge the statement that the lawgiver must above all concern himself with the education of young people. whose last important work is the Laws. The fact that the legislator must be < previous page page_123 next page > . such considerations point out that he must accomplish it to avoid injuries or. that is. cities in which nothing of the sort occurs injure their political regimes. given that each regime necessarily implies a particular type of citizen. This requirement applies also to arrangements made by the lawgiver in the field of education. who are often responsible for the education of children and thus need to act. presents. One may puzzle over the nature of this requirement when one compares passages of Politics viii with those of NE x. moreover. If this is the case. far from describing an individual ethics alien to politics. The eighth book of the Politics. for Aristotle. The first of these problems is that of education itself. one cannot conclude without bringing to light the three problems which seem to have led Aristotle to defend the unity of ethics with politics. Aristotelian ethics. This concern will not seem peculiar if one remembers that the thinking of our philosopher places itself in the tradition of Plato.

he says. Therefore. in the sense that it is incompatible with belief in an immutable and absolute good which is applicable everywhere. he will have to set up an entirely new political regime.9 shows clearly enough his distrust of revolutions which brutally interrupt the continuity of the order of things which is indispensable for training in virtuous habits. . Besides.5 Aristotle presumably understands that this situation could not lead to the promotion of virtues radically different from those imposed by the particular character of the political regime under consideration. "politics < previous page page_124 next page > . second. he does not impose on the lawgiver the task of applying everywhere and always the rules of education which are described by Politics viii as conforming to the ideal.< previous page page_124 next page > Page 124 involved with education does not necessarily imply that the law must set up a system of public education governed by civic officials. given its kind.6 in short. that education can be left in the hands of private persons. Aristotle thinks it necessary that such private persons take into account the implicit premises provided for them by the nature of the political regime under which they have to exist. in admitting. The second problem which Aristotle seems to have had to face is that posed by the existence of several correct political regimes. but because of the need to know. If therefore. as it already is in most cities. must provide (the type of excellence appropriate to the human beings who compose it). and which can fit all cities in general. This attitude implies a somewhat relativistic position. in NE x 10. he required that lawgivers also understand that which is possible. But it does surely imply that the lawgiver is required to put the principles of education into the law. that which every kind of regime must try to produce (the excellence which is essential to happiness) and. the requirement that the lawgiver study constitutions and thus come to possess knowledge is imposed not only because of the possibility that."8 And the value that Aristotle attributes to the preservation of political constitutions. or as he says. that which each regime. In the absence of such explicit principles. to realize or generally accessible. "the reform of an existing regime is not a smaller task than the establishment of a new one. which is most adequately adapted to situations as they already exist. as the NE states. without the latter being destroyed as a result. For these regimes justify differences at the level of principles of education and even require such differences. even if private persons are in charge of that education. 4 constitutional regime. even imperfect ones. The consideration of existing realities and historical contingencies led Aristotle to the view that "good lawgivers" and "genuine politicians" themselves should consider which constitution best fits each type of population.7 Not that it was his view that they should endorse every state of affairs as a good one. first. It is the lawgiver's universal task to "see the best laws and those which accord with each type of constitution"11 precisely in order to reform and preserve the regime which he will recognize as preferable in the situation where he must legislate.10 From this perspective. in an exceptional situation. even easy. but. 2.

practicioners of political activity in its higher aspect. without contradiction. This ideal is the goal borne in mind by rightly oriented lawgivers." 12 this can only occur in the precise limits set by the existing constitution. to avoid surrendering to radical relativism. the first in his list of virtues. It is the problem posed by the belief in absolute principles governing the good. 3. in the last analysis. Here one should mention a single remarkable example. < previous page page_125 next page > . But nothing of the sort is being proposed. But this does not imply that the moral reforms which Aristotle expects from the lawgiver must refrain from modifying the principles of certain regimes. rather than to the lawgiver. but most importantly philosophy . For the lawgiver to whom the Aristotelian ethics is addressed and upon whom it above all enjoins the care for moral excellence is thus urged. the "philosophy" and "speculative" excellence which Aristotle as a moralist locates above the level of action16 would appear to be an ideal which the human being must reach apart from the city and apart from every form of political life. as it is expressly put in what follows. at the end of the NE. If it had been addressed to the particular individual. for instance) distance themselves from the principles which should ground a good regime. This means of securing moral virtue (and. not to ignore the fact that the conduct whose rules he prescribes serves. But a final problem preoccupies the philosopher and leads him. In the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. temperance and justice (which are needed everywhere). thereby. a goal other than itself. happiness) of individuals is not at all directed towards conduct which is alien to the political order or subversive of this political order. For the good constitution pursues a final cause diametrically opposed to war and thus promotes "virtues which contribute to leisure" . when they seem in some way badly constructed. According to what has just been shown. which shows this clearly and which lets us grasp the more general scope of Aristotle's ethics. one could reasonably think that the requirement imposed upon lawgivers for instruction on ethical questions aims at furnishing them the means to correct the imperfections or mitigate the defects of a system of laws which is insufficient to guarantee that the education of future citizens harmonizes with the political regime.13 Aristotle takes considerable pains to define courage and examine the problems posed by this moral virtue.< previous page page_125 next page > Page 125 has for its most important mission to produce a certain human quality and to render the citizens good and capable of fine actions. Yet he demonstrates in the Politics how far constitutions which try to promote courage by military education (Sparta's. principles with which the lawgiver must come to terms when determining which differences between political regimes are legitimate.15 These statements permit us to establish exactly the purpose of the Aristotelian ethics.14 that is.

Even among the most faithful partisans of "Entwicklung. in the spring of this year. Berti 1975. often from different periods. translated from Italian by tr. Aubenque 1962. A reproduction of this panel is found in Grenet 1962. 3. the latter.34-53. with respect to Aristotle. depicted an analogous encounter between Aristotle and the master of the Academy. 5. I use the term "synthesis" here. Cf. 9. I refer here to R. 32.12. chapters VI and VII. Jaeger 1923.< previous page page_127 next page > Page 127 Notes Introduction 1. seems to me to be a result of the accession to power of Demosthenes' anti-Macedonian party. 7. Luca della Robbia. to describe the project of unifying. Cf. rather than the effect of a crisis in Aristotle's relations with the Academy (or even with Plato. see Düring 1966. For a similar view. almost a century earlier. one intermediate between the anthropological dualism of the philosopher's origins and the hylomorphism of his full maturity. For the elements of chronology.) 8. 4. Cf. in a coherent whole. on the hypothesis that Plato was still alive). 6. 2. Nuyens 1948. F. 11-12: "Not having understood this intent (of Jaeger) and being stuck on the problem of the succession of the different phases of Aristotelian reflection. 166-85) remains to this day very suggestive for understanding the tensions inherent in Aristotelian thought itself. invites us to raise our gaze towards heaven. Robinson's English translation of this work (Jaeger 1948). in spite of the objections with which an obstinate disciple seems to resist him. 435-41). E. Nuyens thought he could identify a third phase in Aristotle's development. In a 1939 thesis (entitled Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles). Aristotle's departure for Atarneus. Frank's excellent article (1940. Jaeger brought to this translation additions and corrections which were incorporated into the second German edition of his work (Jaeger 1955. Lefèvre 1972. Gomperz 1910. 249ff. or even of the chronological stratification of single treatises by Aristotle. different studies. its result has been that many studies marked by historico-genetic method in the wake of Jaeger have made no contribution to understanding the philosophical value of Aristotle's work and finished on the contrary by distracting philosophers from the problems of interpreting the Stagirite's thought. 10." (Bodéüs' emphasis. < previous page page_127 next page > . see Düring 1957. On one of the panels in bas-relief which decorates the base of the cathedral of Florence." this thesis is seriously questioned. as on Raphael's fresco.

13. by the continuous dispute conducted by the philosopher against his colleagues of the Academy on controverted questions. 18. for Plato.). in this connection. and for the most part small. Cf.23. Brémond 1933 (a work to which he explicitly refers). cf.< previous page page_128 next page > Page 128 which concern the same type of questions: the major works of the Corpus testify to this project. II and III. and Kullmann 1965. in this vein: Aubenque 1962. which neglects philosophical issues). chap. Düring 1966. 29). see Bignone 1936. On the problems posed by the axiomatic method. Düring (1966. Still it is necessary to exaggerate neither the number nor the significance of these contradictions. Düring himself writes (1966. according to Düring. Cf. Paisse 1969. Düring 1966. rather than Loria 1914 (an obsolete work." Among the examples of purely apparent contradictions to which he refers (24n137). Dumoulin's recent work (1981). passim. 24): "The numerous. Barnes 1980. "Although they are not mentioned by Aristotle in the Constitution of Athens. 16. of the fragments of On Philosophy and of the Protrepticus (this being primarily known to us through Iamblichus' work of the same name). Berti 1975.. on this subject. Concerning more particularly the method followed by Aristotle in the Ethics. and likewise Aubenque 1961. holds that Aristotle was not ultimately able to overcome the dilemma which Plato posed for him: cf. I am thinking.v. even if they do not always realize it adequately.. Lavedan. < previous page page_128 next page > . 10. See. Reidemeister 1949. see Eucken 1870 and. Düring 1966." (P. Mignucci 1965. 13. more generally. 12. s.45-46. Düring mentions the different accounts of the soul and. Bodéüs 1981. 15. Cf. see Berka 1963. Düring 1966. 29. For a good attempt at synthesis from an original perspective. Cf. contradictions in his writings are explained by the principle that in different writings he discusses the same questions from different angles. 17. Demosthenes. 1968. 19. 14. for his part. iii 10. 11. Olynth. The most subtle contradictions between certain texts of Aristotle are explained. particularly. One will understand the different concerns which motivate their authors if one compares Chroust 1964 and Düring 1961. 24. Dictionnaire illustré de la mythologie et des antiquités grecques et romaines. their existence is not in doubt. finally. Nuyens' mechanical application of the criterion to determine the periods of Aristotle's career. Cf. as well as Untersteiner 1963 and Wilpert 1957. he later criticizes F.

cf." in CIRPHO [Cercle International de Recherches Philosophiques par Ordinateur] (1976) and Kenny 1978. defended especially by Gauthier in his commentary on the NE. The authenticity of the MM remains very unreliable. 11. F.1102a23-27. But see (contra): Guthrie 1981. according to the prologue. Aristotle criticizes a bad way of posing the problem of friendship. at ix 2. most often. See.346-47. 9.1101b34-1102a1.1164b27-30. ii 2. he sets forth considerations which he has already maintained at several points in books i-iv ( . 24. Hardie 1968. 1108a1-4. however. Gohlke 1944.1172a34-b8. .. Cooper 1973.'' on the other hand. C. This interpretation. 31.) 27. 10. Cf.1178a22-23. 21. 12. is to recall the need to be content with an "outline" and to give up the demand for "precision. (which refers to the prologue and to the introduction to the account of virtue.) In the "common books. (Cf. . discourses on action are useful. his concern. my chapter 4. b7-10. Dirlmeier 1958. Kenny. EE i 6. we read at 1165a12). has been severely criticized by M. 438ff.1127a14-17). 26. D. De Corte in his penetrating article "L' Éthique à Nicomaque': introduction à la politique. 11). A. 28. there is no question < previous page page_129 next page > . he recalls the conditions under which. The prologue of the NE (i 1094b19ff.) actually describes principles of method which recall-indeed clarify- several other passages belonging to the same Ethics: i 2. J. followed by Düring 1966. iv 13. 7. 23. 13. 22.1101a24-28.1216b36-39 (according to Richards' correction: b37). which does not correspond to the subject-matter of "ethics" as the prologue has described it.1095a30-b13.1098a20-b8. 328. Vicol Ionescu. . of the Eudemian Ethics in relation to the Nicomachean Ethics" (Decarie in Decarie 1978. for example.< previous page page_129 next page > Page 129 20. on this subject. Ricoeur 1974. . Vicol Ionescu 1973.. 8. . 1109a23-24. b14-16." See De Corte 1977. 29." Books viii through x show an analogous concern: in viii 1-2.1179a33ff. ). 7. Allan. Accounts contained in the first four books thus preserve a trace of Aristotle's concern about the "listener" whom he tries to instruct about the prerequisites for the studies which he is communicating to him.1179a16-22. "Rather today's discussions bear on the question of the temporal priority or posteriority . 8. Bien. G. as at 1165a12-14.1103b26-1104a11 (cf.1107a28-33. and at x 1. This is the well-known position held by Gauthier. Rowe 1971. 25. . Therefore we cannot here consider the testimony of this text as being on the same level as that of the NE and the EE (despite the arguments of von Arnim 1927. "A Stylometric Study of the Aristotelian Corpus.1098b9-12.

1214b28-1215a7. a passage at EE vii 2. 4. provides a number of arguments to confirm the conclusion that the disputed books belong with the Eudemian rather than the Nicomachean Ethics." The author. which the EE conspicuously uses from the introduction on (i 4.).< previous page page_130 next page > Page 130 of any of this: at v 1. Given the respective methodological profiles of the NE and the EE. as the following comparisons illustrate: (1) NE i 2. In trying to show Aristotle's alleged evolution from the EE to the NE. All this tends to group the "common books" with the EE. Aristotle asks us to follow a method applied earlier. Kenny 1978. and (3) NE i 4. which. Moreover.1095a30-b13 and EE i 6.1217b16-20. 482. he believed. one discovers common traits.1215a20ff. More especially as.).1129a5-6. which seems indeed to be that which is sanctioned at EE i 6. 3. he describes the rules of aporematic method (applied also in the study of pleasure: chapter 12 et seq.79. generally.. Chapter 1. 1146a22-27).1096b30-31 and EE i 8. unlike the NE. < previous page page_130 next page > . see my chapter 4. however. Voss 1974. and at vii 1.1095a28-30 and EE i 3. 31. In Search of Aristotle's Project Section I 1. set forth in a book which one considers to belong to the EE. does not draw any positive conclusion regarding relative chronology from his analysis of and limits himself to refuting Jaeger's argument. In this connection.1235b13-18 corresponds perfectly to the description of the rules of NE vii ("a common book") of which I have spoken. On this subject. gives a preponderant place to the aporematic method. But the EE. the methodological concerns of the latter stand out rather clearly from those which preoccupy the author of the NE. Düring 1957. belonged to the NE. Jaeger based his argument essentially on the account of expressed in the second common book.1216b36ff. he recalls a principle which only EE i 6.1216b32-33 explicitly invokes. unlike the NE.422.1216b26ff. Can one today reasonably try to prove that this same account. 189: "Aristotle's teaching on wisdom . (2) NE i 2. the EE. Duveroy 1974. nowhere addresses a "listener" in order to acquaint him with the requirements for a discourse on action.1138b25-26. at vi 1. whose temporal priority one thus verifies? Cf. 30. 2. Of course. 3. he claimed that this account was incompatible with the view of the books proper to the EE but in accord with the view of the books proper to the NE.. conforms more to the view of the books proper to EE than to the view of the books proper to the NE. there is therefore no doubt that the "common books'' correspond to the latter rather than to the former. given its subject-matter. rejects the demand for precision and asks rather for a description which has the form of an "outline. which. For a contrary view.." This difference is significant.1145b2-7 (cf. see Vander Waerdt 1985.

8.2-3.414 [74 b]): . see Pucelle 1948. 10. "It was actually Andronicus' edition which laid the basis for the view that Aristotle was striving for a closed philosophical system.414 [75 g]).67-69) and Vita Menagiana = Vita Hesychii. 18-22) by a reconstruction of Ptolemy's Greek . 242. 26ff. 1469 (cf. see: Diehle 1957. 2. 29-56 in Düring 1957." (Düring 1966. Ar.-R.. A. Müller 1875.. Cf. 486-87. A Latin translation by M. Diogenes Laërtius v 22-27 (cf. 34-35.< previous page page_131 next page > Page 131 5. Cf. H. On this individual. . a similar attempt working from Ibn Abï Usaibi'a is found in Düring 1957. Wehrli 1959. cf. 6. 7. 289ff. Moraux notes (1973.208-210. 83-89. the hypothesis that the lists go back to Andronicus himself (V. Steinschneider is found in Aristotelis Opera Omnia. and Littig 1890. 3. Cf. Rose. 22-23. 221-31. 7. Diels. 11. Praechter 1926. 186. Even if Aristotle's thought is coherently organized in accord with definite principles and thus reflects an effort at systematization. Düring 1966. no. 35ff. Probabilities established in Lippert 1894. On this distinction. Cf. and Diels 1882. published in Düring 1957. Littig 1890. F. col. 4. As P. see my remarks in Bodéüs 1975. 224-26 (cf. 5. With this scholar. Jaeger 1948.41-51. Life of Sulla 26 (Düring 1957. Moraux 1973. t. 34ff. and less recently: Baumstark 1898. On this subject. 96. 61-70. 60n5). the Arabic text is preceded (pp. and Düring 1957. 60n6 (with discussion and bibliography). 9. Life of Plotinus 24 (Düring 1957. 58-94.314-25. J. the exposition of theories in his texts does not possess the form of a system. 6. These are nos. Section II 1 1. < previous page page_131 next page > . ) is today explicitly contradicted by what we know about the Rhodian. 2). Plezia 1946. V (Berlin. Schwyzer 1951. 244-45: commentary). . Düring 1957. Moraux 1973. 1870). Bernays. .42). frag. 368. Moraux 1951. H. Porphyry. 256 and 263. nevertheless. Littig 1890. Plutarch. 373. Cf. 38- 42. Rose. Gerke.

In any case. probable but of little significance (for it concerns minor details only). 224-25). 13." 3. 8ff. to whom the Arabs refer. as Düring supposes (ad loc. This problem arises from the comparison between (a) the titles listed in the catalog of Andronicus and (b) the titles enumerated in the earlier lists preserved by Diogenes Laërtius and the anonymous author of the Vita Menagiana. It remains a fact that "Ptolemy followed Andronicus very closely" (Düring 1957. no."). As is attested by entry no. Moraux 1973. 69) are part of the same Cursus Politicorum. 2. (on the origin of the catalog: cf.e. 14. The construction of each of Aristotle's "treatises. Moraux 1973." 5. the order of the works promoted by Andronicus. cf. Düring 1957. Nos. by the end of the third century B. in its essentials. no. i. suspicor. 75) and of the anonymous author of the Vita Menagiana (no. 4. HΘ. Kenny 1978. It is hardly likely that the two books of listed earlier (Diogenes L. 64ff.453-54." as we can understand it with the aid of this comparison. here and there. Cf.< previous page page_132 next page > Page 132 12. appears to involve grouping by species. Moraux 1973. that Ptolemy. 242-44. 6. 45. Rather one will be able to assume that the perspectives which were decisive in the structuring of the edition also made themselves felt in the pinax. 35-39 (Düring 1957. 4n2). on this subject. . Cf. more generally. see the critical discussion of various hypotheses in Moraux 1951. and. Düring 1950. note 7 in the preceding section and Bodéüs 1973.461-67. < previous page page_132 next page > . corrected.: "Eundem esse atque librum . and Lord 1986.244). 74. See. Lord 1986. The same author.. see: Moraux 1973. author of Vita Menagiana. 15. 70) already mention "eight books of a " (Düring 1957. 85). 230): . and. 12ff. Pol. 104ff. Cf. and Bodéüs 1973. The parallel lists of Diogenes Laërtius (no. C. 2 1.95-96. I leave aside here the fact. more recently. 157 and 159. depend closely upon one another. For the way in which Diogenes Laërtius presents the work under discussion . referring particularly to the section which interests us. 97 in Ptolemy's catalog (Düring 1957. the Politics of our Corpus was constituted.64: "it is obvious that pinax and edition . . Moraux 1951. adds (245): "This excellent Index generalis of Andronicus' Edition has been unduly neglected by the edition of the Corpus Aristotelicum. I:62. On this subject.C. One cannot rightly imagine that his pains at classification and regrouping of the treatises would have left no traces in his catalog.

. followed by H. op. passages cited in note 7). Diogenes Laërtius at first (v 28) proposes that Aristotle followed a different division of philosophy. VIII: pp. Simplicius. Topics (T) i 14. Moraux 1973.1: p. Diogenes Laërtius v 28. Ar.< previous page page_133 next page > Page 133 7. cit. Apollodorus.4: pp.. Chrysippus. . Usener 1892. in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (CIAG). In Cat. "From this information it follows that [Andronicus] had posed the question [i. in CIAG.. p. 532. 589 and Moraux 1973. 18-25 and p. Ammonius. above. No evidence guarantees this explicitly. op. 11.. IV.78. 117. Olympiodorus. Ammonius. 5. in CIAG. 7). "we see him abandon this scheme without regret . 27-36 and Elias. < previous page page_133 next page > . above. Cf. 15. Olympiodorus and Elias. In Cat. 15-34. 31-6. but one can hardly doubt that this view. 5. 8. The last two works cited state (p. 117. in CIAG. in accord with terminology which in effect makes the same classification. Diogenes Laërtius vii (in connection with Zeno. Philoponus. Simplicius. 50-56). 15-119. 5. In Cat.1: pp. and that the vast majority of the later tradition . . cit. 8. but. echoed by the Neoplatonist commentators.4. These are respectively nos. but the categories "ethical. See already: C. 8. cit. in CIAG. In Cat. 9-13. 12. for his account of Aristotle's doctrines. 15-17). Ar. 3-6. Cf. 7. 26-28. op. von Arnim. at least implicitly] . 29-34. Cf. prefer to distribute Aristotle's acroamatic writings into . 24. pp. 35-39 and 40-56 in Düring 1957. 17. and Elias. Ar. cit. and . respectively) that their predecessor Andronicus of Rhodes recommended beginning the study of Aristotle's philosophical disciplines with logic. 4.105b19-30. goes back to the earliest days of Aristotelianism (and was shared by Andronicus). 22-24. XIII. 9. II (1903). 117. answered this question following Andronicus" (Moraux 1973. as well as Philoponus. In Cat. 15. . 13. Eudromus. cit. Prantl [1855] 1957. 4. 5.. 14.. 10. XVIII. Philoponus. note 7. Diogenes Laërtius v 28-34 (Düring 1957. Syllus.79).1: pp. XII.e. 23." "physical" and "logical'' reappeared in their writings in the general introduction to philosophy which they located at the beginning of their Commentary on the Categories (cf. 5. fragment 35-44 (pp. Ar. op. 4. . 30-5. v. p. p. Diogenes of Babylon and Posidonius). 16. to recur to the well-known Stoic division" (Moraux 1949. ed. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (SVF). Ar. J.77. op. 29-9. Olympiodorus. p. 224-26. Simplicius.

1324a27-28 and 3.1139a29. fr. p.1094b17ff. but also to distinguish kinds of life (NE i 3. ii 3. 50. i 3. appendix. in CIAG.1217a7.24-25).1333a25. 22. x 7-8).415a11-12). P vii 14. p. 14-16. In Eth. see Isnardi 1956. EE i4. K 7.401-33.433a14-18 (cf.1217b23.1325b17-18.< previous page page_134 next page > Page 134 18.1139a27. In Rhet. Ibid. 3 1. De Anima (DA) iii 10. This explanation is obviously suggested by the reflections of NE x 7-9 on the (divine) contemplative life. 6.. op. see Regenbogen 1940. 1. 10. p. Eustratius..145a13-18.1097b33-1098a18 (cf. In speaking of : M a 1. 20. It is to two categories of Aristotle's "acroamatic" writings.993b19-23. 1. P vii 2. 5. T vi 6. XIV.. These categories are used by Aristotle not only to distinguish types of understanding. which surpasses the bounds of the human "composite" . XIII. P vii 3.1095b14-1096a5. 270. in CIAG. 1. Wehrli 1944. 8 and 27). 7. in CIAG. In Eth. thought and science (cf.430a17ff.1333a24-36. p. Nic. XX: p.1025b5ff. Cf. In speaking of : EE i 6. In Meteor. On this subject. . cit. note 10. above. col. reason. on this subject.1.7-8. Jaeger 1948. Dicearchus. Nic. 6.407a23: ).2.5-6.1215a26-1215b14. In speaking of : P vii 14. viii 1. that the Neoplatonist commentators apply the labels and .1025b6. 25 Wehrli (cf. in CIAG. Stephanus. Metaphysics (M) E 1. The opposition of these ideals flows from a situation peculiar to Plato's Academy. Aspasius. Cf. 4-6.1325b16). XXI. XIX: p. NE i 3. 1398.36. note 20). 1. 1497.. While explaining: (Philoponus. 3-6. 21. 2. 4. NE vi 2. fr. DA iii 10.433a18-19 (cf. Philoponus. 11. below. E 1. In speaking of : NE vi 2. 3. 8. DA iii 5. < previous page page_134 next page > .157a8- 11. 4.1064a10ff. 19. 9. in CIAG. For example: EE i 8. as we shall see.

In Porphyrii Isagogen in CIAG. T i 14. op. above. 3. p. 2. p. 1. Phaedrus 259d. Ibid. x 886e.2.. p. Republic vii 517d. Sophist 266a. 25..). 6-25). s. Plato. op. respectively. 18. 3.. 8-9: . op.1064a10ff. Apology 20d. p. Des Places 1964. cit.< previous page page_135 next page > Page 135 12. Ibid. 3 (1-2 and 6). IV.3. 26. p.1025b3-4 (cf. Section III 1 1. Cf. 17. 19. no. K 7.. 4. 16. 23. as the Neoplatonic commentators always did. Plato. 14. to "necessary" and to "contingent" phenomena. Mariétan 1901. NE x 7-8 (1177a12-1178b32). p. viii 836a. < previous page page_135 next page > . Ammonius. 5. 111. 5. sect.89b7-9. 6-15. p. Laws v 732e. Cf. 11. ME 1. Symposium 186b. or. 24. cit. i 33. Theaetetus 176a-b. . 21. cit. on the propaedeutic character of logic..105b19-30. p. 22. ME 1..2-3. Ibid. p. Ammonius. but the way in which Mariétan understands the concept of is itself subject to question. Critias 107d. The author is also concerned especially (19-25) to meet Zeller's objection (that this division mistakenly made no room for logic) and insists. Ammonius.v. Ammonius. 15. 268d. as the scholastics will say. 246-48. Ibid. The adjectives and are metaphorically applied to incorruptible (eternal) and corruptible realities. Ibid. sections IV. Cf. DA iii 4-5 (429a10-430a25). Parmenides 134e. 13. 1 and 5.4-5: .8-9. 15-18. E. 2ff. Phaedo 64a. A Post.. p.. 29-30).1025b5-7 (cf. 16-19. 27. Cf. see chapter 5. 67e (cf. 28ff. 3. On this topic. Plato. 20. 6. Crito 46e.

1235a4ff. see M A 6. NE ii 7. . and the NE (ibid. 37). (vi 3. all these belated witnesses show clear traces of Stoic influence.427b26). math.1217b21. Apuleius. In this connection. 315b12-16 and 835b9-15 . Deman 1942.1107a28.987b1-2 (cf. 102. ME 1. Cf.1155b8-13 (cf. 9. 186. xi 2. s. 19. Adv.. DA i 1. Sextus Empiricus. discusses anger in yet another language than the "physicist" (cf. etc. Ross [Oxford.-I could make analogous remarks concerning and (studied especially in DA iii 3. 1956]. evang. On the other hand. Cf. Diogenes L. M 4. 3. 7. vii 16. see Hadot 1979. for example. Diogenes Laërtius iii 56. NE vi 6) or . In fact. E. EE vii 1. who is essentially concerned with determining how is distinguished from dispositions such as . edited by W. Prep. Bonitz. 10. These two categories were already used during the Hellenistic period to classify the works (written in dialogue form) of the Peripatetic Heraclides Ponticus (cf. cf. or. 7. the issue is one of "science" and the perspective employed is that of the physicist. i 5. who examines there a type of "assumption" . The different parts of philosophy indeed receive from philosophers the titles of "places.1141a9- 20).1108a4-6). but each part in turn is subdivided into two or more "sciences'' . 26: "History of phi- < previous page page_136 next page > . EE i 8. cf. Post. NE ii 4. . The origin of this distinction can be sought for within the Academy. Aristoteles De Anima. 8. (in connection with Xenocrates). . as Cicero asserts (Acad. p. D. "logic" into "rhetoric" and "dialectic.1078b19-20 and Physics (Ph)ii 194a20. The "ethicist. 32) refers us to the accounts devoted to this subject . either in Plato's teaching.< previous page page_136 next page > Page 136 3. ." "forms" or "kinds". 17. according to Aristotle. and (studied especially in NE vi 4. 206-7. fragment 22 Wehrli). Mariétan 1901." in his turn. Howald 1927. more probably. 7. Virieux-Reymond 1949.1139b18ff. in the perspective adopted by ethical inquiry. Socrates introduced into the history of philosophy.). 12.1025b18-26.427b11-16. in the immediate wake of Plato (Xenocrates?): cf.748a8.433a17-20. cf. iv 11ff. ). T. Nevertheless. 10. in the DA (cf. 5. Augustine. Atticus apud Eusebius. 11. (Cf. 5." Cf. b27. De Platone i 3. there is no opportunity to linger for the examination of the principles of scientific method or the study of the demonstrative qualities of science. Cf. it interests the author of the NE.403a29 and the following discussion.v. De la géneration des animaux (GA)ii 8. Alas. 181 and 132. Concerning the rupture which. 4. Contra Academ.). 14 and n2. NE viii 2. 73).1105b22. cf. 4-7. 6. But the specific nature of this assumption does not interest the author of the DA: (iii 3.

4. 1:303 and II.1112a21-23 enumerates the possible objects of knowledge in a list which one can diagram as follows: < previous page page_137 next page > . Cf. 18. NE iii 5. 11. cf. 9 (and n30). 37. Memorabilia i 1. Plato. 3. The synonymy between the terms and is perhaps not complete. M A 6. Cf. chap.987b1-2. Newman 1887-1902. VIII. etc. 24. cf. 7. For the permanence of the same conception of the necessary in the Platonic tradition. Düring 1966. Plato. 2. in practice. Gauthier II. 13. PA i 2. philosophical activity was oriented in two primary directions. see Chevalier 1915. the points of similarity outweigh the points of difference and the latter need not concern us here. Which we must distinguish from unqualified becoming. 533. 5.644b22-31. Mansion 1946. 8.1072b12. ME 5. 208ff. Xenophon.641b18-20. the one ascending . 6. Plato. Letters vii 322e. 2:718.1:2 and n1. Epinomis 974b. 11. 12.1175a4-5. The distinction corresponds to the two methods of dialectic. Republic vii 517d. the two seem to have been regarded as virtual equivalents. Pépin 1971. which. for Plato. 9. the other descending . 2 1. NE x 4.") In Aristotle's view. A 7. 10. Apology 26 b. 5.< previous page page_137 next page > Page 137 losophy may begin the ethical period of ancient philosophy with Socrates (d. although. there was no doubt that from the beginning of the fourth century. is not an object of science. Plato. Bodéüs 1975a. 399). 16-31. 14. and A.

p. 3 1.. Goedeckemeyer 1922. in CIAG.1. 19. Gauthier II. XIII. NE vi 2. IV. but it probably also designates an inquiry about the divine stars. 20.1181 b 15.645a4. 3. in CIAG." "physical" and "logical" had been borrowed by Aristotle from the Academy. Ibid. rather than a "theological" inquiry about immovable and separate beings. Ar. In Cat. IV. p. 4. Ar.. III.1025b3-28. sect. 3. like Bywater. 2:912. Here. T vi 6. PA i 5. 16-17 and Ammonius.145a13-18. Cf. For the meaning of the expression. 15. listed in accord with their (material or formal) objects. Tricot 1953. the expression no longer has with Aristotle exactly the same meaning which it presumably had with the Academicians: not only does it not refer to a study conforming to Plato's dialectic. 17. like the one mentioned by the Metaphysics: cf. is found in A. chap. Sensible becoming physical problems (not the object of science)] b. 18. [a. Divine things logical problems. particularly.< previous page page_138 next page > Page 138 Such a systematic classification of the sciences. 28-29. 18. Léonard 1948. Cf. Hamelin 1920. Kb and Mb in preference to the reading of Lb .4. Similarly. like the one expounded in the treatise On the Heavens. viii 1. 144n4. 328n1): < previous page page_138 next page > . Mansion 1946. Already with the ancients (see particularly: Philoponus. NE x 10. Natali 1974. In Cat. 21. 15-44. K 7. 16. I follow the reading of mss. sect.157a8-11. reproduced by J. cf. 3. 86-88. Human things ethical problems B. 645a4-6: .1139a27-28.1063b36-1064b14. one could perhaps reconstruct a "division" (in the Platonic style) as follows: A. M E 1. 2. the most common opinion among modern scholars (an opinion prompted by O. cf. 40-42) tends to make out the classification of Aristotelian sciences according to the following schema. see chap. If one puts this fact together with the hypothesis that the categories "ethical.

Seeing that (i. Cf.204): "One need not . on this subject. to "science" ( .61-83. there is no doubt that "practical science. This is the expression of T vi 6." for Aristotle as for Plato. to which the genetic perspective assigns an early date (near that of the Prot. Besides. As is shown clearly by ME 1. < previous page page_139 next page > . 1046b2). Du ciel (DC) iii 7. or to something (some action) which one can do." 3. . Schaerer 1930 and Caramella 1925. which lists the three types of science. 9.1139b31-32: ) and to "discursive thought" ( . PA i 1. XXI.1074b38-1075a3 (cf. NE vi 3. 8. in the same context.e.640a3: .982b11-21 (cf. 699ff. was always understood. 11. in part. EE i 5. 4. 5. or to something which can be produced.1025b23-24).1221b5-7.< previous page page_139 next page > Page 139 Hadot writes on this subject (1979. understood as a : cf. 315)..1147a28: ). M A 2. with the help of the model presented by the (whose study had been so decisive for Socratic reasoning: cf. where "science" is given as an example of "relation" . either to something which can be contemplated. ) (M E 1.1025b18-28 and by NE vi 4. From another perspective. 6. understood as exercise of the intellectual faculty). Λ 9.). Gauthier II.1040a1-2. 13 Walzer. 13-18). ii 3. 2:458 and Greenwood 1909. NE vii 5. leave the specific nature of in the background. introduction (particularly.1216b10-19. Joachim 1951. read the classification presented in book E as a program of study which Aristotle defined once and for all in order to organize his teaching and establish the basic plan of his work.1227b28-30 (cf. All these passages. Burnet 1900. as if the notion of "poetic" intelligence covers every type of noncontemplative noetic activity (cf. De Vogel 1955. Cf. in fine = B 51 Düring). see: Bartels 1965.306a16-17). The famous first chapter of M E. The distinction under discussion shows therefore that science is relative. 182. . 7. in fact states (1025b25-26): . which only recognizes the distinction : fr. 275-87 and Ortega 1965.145a17-18. the distinction is applied indifferently.

In Cat. Olympiodorus. 1-5. p. in CIAG.1139b1: [i.1140a3-5: . . PA i 2.987b1-2. Section IV 1 1. note 1 of this section. P i 3.. Ammonius. VIII. 9-10. The contrast . in CIAG. 14.1. pp. Elias. we find here too the basic dual approach that Aristotle seems to assign elsewhere to philosophy. 34-8.1140b25-26. Cat. Cf. ] ). 4. Cf. 4. Discourses. This is obviously a privileged distinction in the view of ancient commentators (Alexander. 5.. An. 7. 2. This does not necessarily imply that at that time Aristotle had not yet conceived the distinction between the immanent activity called and the transitive activity called (a distinction which NE vi 4.. pp. II. p. P. The basic passage on this subject is M α 1. 115.e. Cf. 2. M A 6.50-51. 16. seeing that it refers to the in this connection). 18. in fact.993b20-21. in CIAG. In Cat. Epitome. 3. 6.3. 14. which neglects science which is specifically productive. 3. XIII. 11.1.. ] ) and 12. warrants the authentic Aristotelian character of this distinction. 4 1.< previous page page_140 next page > Page 140 10. Ibid. 12. in CIAG.1140a2-3 tends to portray as quite widespread. p. Cf. confirmed by various pieces of evidence (cited in note 18 of section 11.642b5ff. 2. nor the way in which is distinguished from .1139a15-16 ( [i. op. In Cat. . 11. NE vi 2. p. Albinus. . 26-28. Julian. Comm. XII. Düring 1957. Cf.6-7.1253b1-3ff. in CIAG. in connection with . < previous page page_140 next page > . 19-116. 5. pp. Paris. in Ar. In short. which is. in Ar. IV. XVIII. Simplicius. subordinated to it (NE vi 2. 13. .2). Comm. cit. Louis.1143b14-17 ( ).1. 1945]. [ed. Ibid. 1.6. 190 A). Diogenes Laërtius v 28: . 15. De Pater 1965.1139a26-29. and .1. in CIAG.e. pp. Philoponus. 18-19. III. 1.

< previous page page_141 next page >
Page 141

4. On this subject see B. A. Van Groningen's attempts at dating the different books in the introduction to Van
Groningen 1968, xii-xiii, xix-xxi.

5. Cf. Piat 1912, 287.

6. Nos. 35-39 in Düring 1957,224-25. The Economics is not mentioned in this list, nor in the parallel lists of
Diogenes Laërtius and the anonymous author of the Vita Menagiana-which, however, record a book entitled
(respectively, no. 23 and no. 17: Düring 1957,42 and 83), a work which, later, Olympiodorus
(in CIAG, XII.1, p. 7, 36) and Elias in CIAG, XVIII.1, p. 116,23) will insist upon distinguishing from the
treatise of our Corpus-but, unlike the Greek catalogs, the list transmitted by the Arabs also omits the NE!
Perhaps the difference merely reflects an accident in the transmission (cf. Baumstark 1898, 76). As I have
pointed out elsewhere (Bodéüs 1973, 455n13), memory of the NE is perhaps preserved in al Nadim; for a
contrary view, see Kenny 1978, 18. This is the place to add that the work of Ptolemy (known by the Arabs)
reproduces the list of Andronicus in a form probably corrected as a result of studies by Adrastus of
Aphrodisias (first half of the second century) concerning the arrangement of the treatises of the Corpus (cf.
Moraux 1970, 24); it is impossible to determine the share which each of these intermediaries had in the
classification which shows up as the end result of the transmission.

7. There is of course room to exercise caution concerning the immediate influence of Alexander's conquests
in this domain, but it is undebatable that the questions addressed in the Politics gradually disappeared as a
philosophical preoccupation (the lack of interest in these issues on the part of Aristotle's first disciples is
already evidence for this) under the effect of a new historical situation: "they were not reading the Politics,
perhaps because it reflected an historical situation forever vanished and, therefore, it no longer interested
anyone." (Moraux 1970, 32).

8. For the Stoics, see the summary but nuanced accounts of Rodis-Lewis 1970, 55-58 ("Morale personnelle
et morale sociale"), and 119-22 ("Détachement et engagement"). As for Epicurus, his recommendation in the
first book of the (cited by Diogenes Laërtius x 119) is as explicit as one can make it: "The wise person
will have nothing to do with politics."

9. Arius Didymus apud Stobaeus, Eclogae II, pp. 116, 19-147, 25; pp. 148, 5-149,24; pp. 150, 1-152,25. On
this subject, see: Moraux 1973,418-34, particularly 423ff. and 419n319 (bibliography). Besides, nothing in
the summary of Aristotelian theories reproduced by Diogenes Laërtius has to do with the Politics.

10. NE x 1181b12-23. Cf. above, chap. 3, sect. V.

11. As I have said, this is not the result of an accident in the transmission, which has deprived us of works
relating to the Politics; such works were not undertaken. Arius Didymus, in the time of Augustus, was no
longer using Aristotle's text: "He owed his information rather to a late Hellenistic manual in which
'Aristotelian' poli-

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tics was presented not only according to the writings of the Stagirite but also as reconciled with later
thinking about political theory" (Moraux 1973, 419). A manuscript of the fifteenth or sixteenth century
(Berolinensis 397, formerly known as Hamiltonianus 41) has preserved for us some notes prompted by
the commentary of Michael of Ephesus (eleventh century): cf. Immisch 1929, xvi-xx, 294-329.

12. Cf. above, note 1.

13. Alexander, Comm. in Ar. An. Pr. in CIAG, II.1, pp. 8, 30-9, 2.

14. NE i 1.1094b11.

15. Probably, Alexander, whose careless expression here is obvious, refers to the simple fact that human
beings are, for Aristotle, the primary parts of the city: cf. P iii 1274b38-41. If Aristotle precedes his account
of constitutions with an account in ten books devoted to ethical problems, the reason, as Alexander tells us
(loc. cit.), is that "in his mind, it is necessary first to speak of human character traits and to say of what sort
the character traits of the people who are going to stock the city should be."

16. Abstracting from any other consideration, I can say that Alexander's opinion has the merit of being
faithful to one of the most constant principles of Aristotelian thought, seeing that he does not consider human
beings at all independently of the issue of their moral development. I shall have occasion to insist upon this
point (chapter 1, sections V-VI, especially VI.2).

2

1. Höffe 1971, 15: "Practical philosophy means thinking which studies praxis or human conduct starting
from, and in reference to, praxis." This definition, according to its author, does not apply to the procedure of
the NE in all its aspects: "It is Aristotle . . who in the introductory chapter of his Nicomachean Ethics has
posed both problemsi.e., first: how is ethics as practical philosophy possible? and, second: how is practical
philosophy as science possible?For him ethics is a kind of practical philosophy." (ibid.)

2. The radical opinion of Van Steenberghen (1947, 256) reflects an extreme position: "the distinction
between speculative philosophy and practical philosophy is deprived of foundation and scientific interest;
every science is speculative, even if it has 'practice,' i.e., human activity, for its subject-matter." See the more
subtle opinion of M. M. Labourdette 1948, 143ff. and, for the status of the problem now, Noulas 1977, 18ff.

3. Although the expression (used in M E 1.1026a28-29) might suggest
the existence of the expression . One might reason similarly starting from M α
1.993b19-23. That which G. Bien calls Aristotle's "practical philosophy" is "politics" in the broad sense, that
is, the part of the "encyclopedic system" which includes the "ethics" and the ''politics" in the narrow

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sense (Bien [1973], 1980, 195-96); this terminology does not exactly conform to Aristotle's usage, but it expresses an interpretation which has
the advantage of uniting (under the label of "politics") the teaching of both the Politics and the Ethics. Cf. chap. 1, sect. VI and Ritter's studies
cited below, note 5.

4. Allan 1952, 163: "Aristotle does not speak, as do some later members of his school, of a practical branch of philosophy, and would regard
this expression [i.e., "practical philosophy," used to denote the inquiry set out in the Ethics and the Politics] as self-contradictory."

5. Ritter 1960, 179-80. Cf. likewise Ritter 1966-1967, 235-53.

6. Burnet 1900, xx ff.

7. "The subject of both works is equally 'Politics.' . . . It is quite true that Aristotle himself . . . refers to this first part of his course of Politics as
and the like . . .; but it is none the less a part of Aristotle's system of Politics. . . . The whole forms one or ,
and there is no word anywhere of as a separate branch of study." Burnet 1900, xxvi-xxvii.

8. Susemihl 1900,1512.

9. Burnet 1900, xxvi: "There is not a single word . . . which could be interpreted as setting up any such science as in distinction to
"; and note 1: "The word as a substantive does not occur once in Aristotle."

10. See, for example: NE i 1.1094a27; b15; 1095a2; 2.1095a16; 10.1099b29; 13.1102a12, 25; ii 2.1105a12; v 5.1130b28; vi 7.1141a20,
29; 8.1141b23, 32; 13.1145a10; vii 12.1152b1; x 7.1177b15; 10.1180b31; 1181a10-11,23.

11. Cf. Höffe 1971, 15 (which distinguishes "moral knowledge," "ethical knowledge," and "metaethical knowledge").

12. NE vii 12.1152b1-2. Cf. Rhétorique (R) i 2.1356a26-27:
. Aristotle's terms refer clearly to a "study" of character
traits, virtues and passions, as it appears from the immediate context (a23-25):
.
The expression should be compared to the passage from M A 6.987b1-2 , where the subject is Socrates.

13. Cf. Barreau 1972, 65.

14. Joachim 1951,14.

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15. T vi 6.145a18 (loc. cit.). Science as such has as its aim only the action which the knowing subject
proposes to perform.

16. Anscombe 1965, 157. Cf. NE vi 2.1139a26ff.

17. R i 8.1366a22.

18. Owens 1964,206.

19. Bien 1968-69,275.

20. Bien 1968-69,275-80.

21. Bien 1968-69,281-84. The issue, for Bien, is one of essential difference (cf. Burnet 1900,20). To study
"human things" as a philosopher is equivalent, according to Aristotle (who is situated in the tradition of
Socrates), to trying to bring to light the rationality immanent in human conduct.

22. PA i 1.640a3.

23. P ii 9.1269a29-1271b19.

24. Cf. Gauthier II, 2:463-69 (general introduction to the study of ). For the precise question
which concerns us one will find useful: Lottin 1955, 343-64; Cathrein 1931,75-83; Jackson 1942, 343-60,
and Despotopoulos 1963, 63-91.

Section V

1

1. Aubenque 1963, 28n3.

2. Trendelenburg 1855, 377-78,381; Teichmüller 1879, 210ff.

3. Walter 1874 (and Walter Diss. 1873, 259-76,305-35).

4. Walter 1874, 275: "One can only say that Aristotle's ethical principles are insufficient; and they are so to
the same extent as the principles of his philosophy . . . Only Kant's philosophy completely grasps Aristotle's
basic idea, the concept of practical reason, and makes of this concept what ultimately can be made out of it,
an independent and therefore truly practical reason." Cf. the evaluation of Höffe 1971, 20n21.

5. Zeller 1879, 648ff., especially 653n3.

6. Teichmüller 1879, 210ff.

7. Loening 1903, 16ff., 27ff., 40ff.

8. Kress 1921.

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9. Gauthier II, 2: 563-78.

10. NE vi 13.1143b18-1145a11; cf. 5.1140a24-b30; 7 (starting from 1141a20); 8-9 (1141b8-1142a30) and
10.1142b31-33.

11. Wittmann 1921, 57ff.

12. Jaeger 1948, 82-83 (cf. 236).

13. Gadamer 1928, 147-50.

14. Wagner 1928, 90-97.

15. Allan 1952; French trans. from 1957 reprint by Ch. Lefèvre = Allan 1962. The Italian translation by F. C.
Caizzi (Allan 1973) makes no changes in the part with which I am concerned; cf. the review by H. J. Padron
(1975).

16. Allan 1952, 163: "practical wisdom (phronesis) and politics (politike)it does not matter which term we
use, since it is held that they are identicalare to be seen embodied not in the university lecturer but in the wise
man or moral agent."

17. Allan 1952, 168; Allan 1962, 177.

18. Allan 1952, 168.

19. Allan 1952, 178: "[T]he man of practical wisdom . . . is equally competent in formulating general rules of
action and in applying them to the swiftly changing situations of life." Allan 1962, 184. Cf. Allan 1955, 325-
40; Akrill 1973, 28-30.

20. Allan 1952, 178; Allan 1962, 184.

21. Allan furnishes us with a detailed argument on this subject in Allan 1953, 120-27, especially 125 and n6.

22. NE vi 2.1139a21ff.; 5.1140b11ff.; vii 9.1151a15.

23. NE vi 10.1142b32-33. The reading , warranted only by manuscript Kb, is also that of the author
of the Antiqua Traductio published in Paris in 1497; cf. Gauthier II, 2:518; like Bywater and Burnet 1900, I
prefer it to the prevailing reading (which bears witness, in my opinion, to an ancient
reinterpretation on this point).

24. Cf. Gauthier 1973, 100: "It is the task of wisdom (i.e., phronesis) to know the end, as Aristotle supposes
everywhere and says explicitly on occasion (E.N., VI 10.1142 b 32-33)."

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25. "Good deliberation is a correctness with respect to what is useful for the realization of an end, usefulness
whose true conception is prudence itself" (English trans. of J. Tricot's French trans.: Tricot 1967, 301); for a
similar understanding of the relative pronoun, see Rackham 1982, 356.

26. Aubenque 1965a, 40-51.

27. Ando 1958, 284ff. and 295ff.

28. The updated version of the commentary in the second ed. of 1970 includes almost no basic changes of
interpretation with respect to NE vi or any other book of the NE; therefore, when citing R. A. Gauthier, I
shall continue, here as elsewhere, to refer to the second ed. of his commentary, whose main arguments were
acquired before 1958.

29. Gauthier II, 2:567-68.

30. Gauthier , 1:279.

31. Gauthier II, 2:463: "the meaning of the word prudence in our language has undergone a change so drastic
and its meaning has become so narrowly restricted that it no longer corresponds to the full meaning of the
Greek phronesis. . . . Since Aristotlelian phronesis is wisdom that directs the whole of life, to call it prudence
is to deny oneself any understanding of it."

32. Gauthier I, 1:275-79.

33. Michelakis 1961, 23, 28-31, 34-46. This work (undertaken during the author's study with W. Jaeger at
Harvard) focuses especially on interpretation of . However, Michelakis admits (61) an
important difference between properly speaking and : the latter is given the job
of discovering first principles which the former then grasps for purposes of reasoning. Cf. 13 in connection
with NE vi 9.1142a23-24: . .

34. Walsh 1963, 128-50. Pages 135-44, however, reintroduce the distinction between the formal perspective
and the efficient perspective attributed to Aristotle by Gauthier.

35. Hardie 1968, 212ff. But the author concedes only that is not alien to knowledge of the end
(226): "the truth which it is the job of practical reason to find includes true conceptions of what ends are
good." This is an important nuance, to say the least.

36. Monan 1968, 93. The work reproduces, virtually unchanged, a doctoral thesis defended ten years earlier
at the Catholic University of Louvain. Father Gauthier

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Gauthier I. Allan 1952. Stelzenberger 1960. above. . 2.. . for example. on the one hand. Which turns out to be assigned. the theological virtues. EE ii 10. IIa-IIae. unicus) ad 2. sect.. 14. Druet its deficient documentation (Revue Philosophique de Louvain 73 [1975]: 193-94). St. however. 15. 5. that given by a teacher in horsemanship (Plato. 16-17): . NE (loc. 3.. qu. through faith. 4. Summa Theologiae (ST). 10. to the study and discovery of means relating to this end. 1. 1:280. 7 (conclusio): "Of its nature faith is first of all the virtues. Cf. must first be present in the mind before it is present in the will. IV. NE ii 1. 276: [Saint Thomas] "developed a notion of 'prudence' which is the negation of Aristotle's phronesis").1: 328) and P. Gauthier I. The verb is also used when the topic is strictly practical instruction. to the philosophical study and discovery of the end of action and. . 168. in all matters of action. surfaces in the occurrence of the terms and (i. 1:277-79. IIa-IIae.1103a15-16. ST. This difficulty is not brought to light in the otherwise excellent study of Pfeiffer 1943. Janssens 1920. Burnet). :278n105. the end has primacy. The end itself. vi 13. Thomas. The reason: because . Thomas. art." (English < previous page page_147 next page > . present to the mind . .e. ).< previous page page_147 next page > Page 147 has criticized its superficial character (I. 12. having the final end as object. 5. therefore. IV. 11. Cf. Gauthier I. the ultimate end is .. 7. St. 6. chap. are necessarily prior to other virtues. .1227b23-36). . NE vii 9. cit. Hare 1963. on the other hand. Meno 94b: ). Gauthier I. . Section V 2 1. 13. 9. 48 (art. qu. 4. sect.1144a29-b1.1227a8-9. The distinction. 11. it necessarily follows that faith is absolutely the first of the virtues.1151a17-18 (cf. chap. 1. 1:279 (cf. iii and Höffe 1971. in turn. 8. Cf.2 (in connection with the interpretation of J. Since. 1-2. Cf.

qu. Thomas. St. art. 3 (conclusio): "The prudent character must needs know both the general moral principles of reason and the individual situation in which human actions take place. b2-3. NE vi 5. 233.1143a28-29. whose reverse is moral excellence. 47. That implies that any (true) judgment produced by the understanding of the automatically corresponds to a correct tendency of his appetite (cf.) 16. 47. Demos 1961-62. art. art.1140b5-6 . (ad 1): "natural reason determines beforehand (praestituit) the ends of moral virtue by what is called synderesis. art. Cf. v. NE vi 5. vii 11. 15 (conclusio). qu. cf. Hardie 1968. St. art. 3 and qu. < previous page page_148 next page > . 23. is on a par with moral virtue (cf. 24. 13. 15. Thomas. St. 49. even in the theoretical sciences (iii 5. 36. 24. Deliberation obviously also exists outside the framework of moral conduct. Blackfriars. 15 (conclusio). Thomas. Ia-IIae. . 22. 4.1139a29-31) and is therefore an order that a particular action be performed. 1974]. 16 (ad 3). St. See the bibliography on the topic in Gauthier I. 2. 36. ST. ibid. 26. Cf. NE vi 11. NE vi 2. 20. 28." (ET. IIa-IIIae. 18.1140b28. Cf. 13.1139a35-36. Aubenque 1963. 108. St. St. Cf. IIa-IIae. qu. 3. it is the intellectual obverse of the characteristic quality of the good person. 31). 153-54. ST. . ST [Blackfriars. 1:277n104. art. 156-57. 20-21 .1140a3-4 . 1974]. 29. art. Thomas. 21. IIa-IIae. NE vi 12. qu. IIa-IIae. 27. not by prudence. Cf." (ET.433a15-20. DA iii 10.1143a6-10. Summa Theologiae [Blackfriars. v.1144a36-b1). In other words.1140a25-28. ST. 6 (conclusio) and art. NE vi 5. qu. ST. . 25.1152a8-9: . 15 (conclusio). cf. 4. Thomas.) 19. ST. ST. IIa-IIIae. art. 47. Thomas. v. qu. 17.1112a34-b9). 47.< previous page page_148 next page > Page 148 translation.

8 (conclusio). 40.1151a15-16. Allan 1962. < previous page page_149 next page > . 37. ST [Blackfriars. cf. moreover. Of course. Thomas. Anscombe 1965. inquiry in order to discover]. 2. a21-22.< previous page page_149 next page > Page 149 30. praecipere [commanding. 39. On this distinction. 328. Cf. iudicare de inventis [forming a judgment on what has been discovered]. art.1144a2-3.1140b11-20 and vii 9. . 36. 31.1139a29-31 (passage also cited by Monan at the same place). 70): "But because of the peculiarity of its object and of its manner of reaching that object. Monan 1968. 187. 36. 47. and explanation of Thomas' three terms based on ET. Allan 1952. 38. v." 34. Of the three successive acts which make up the activity of the prudent person (1. Monan corrects himself immediately (p. Besides.. 35. Republic vii 518c and 533d. 182. Ibid. who do not exist separately (NE vi 13.1129a11-15. (Trans. in contrast with . 125. qu. 143-58. we conceptually distinguish affirmation of the good and the pursuit of the good. 41. a23-29. Allan 1962.1144b31-32: ). NE vi 13.1139a23-25 and 13. 42. 33.1144a29-34. 2.. consilari [taking counsel. 1974]. 124 and 139. Allan 1953. NE vi 2. 3. and the (virtuosus). which is always oriented towards the same goal (the good according to the circumstances) and constitutes a genuine . is a mere . Aubenque 1963. but in reality the two operations are strictly indissociable. see NE v 1. ST. cf. Cf. bringing into execution what has been thought out]) only the last displays practica ratio. it is truth of a special type. Ibid. "Cleverness" is independent of the goodness or badness of the end pursued and. Cf. Plato.) 32.1144a6-9 and 1145a4-6. NE vi 13. IIa-IIae.70. like the . St. . a34-36: . vi 5.

Allan 1952." He also supposes that the phronimos "is able to justify his insight. 51. 53. NE vi 5. This is my understanding in view of expressions such as (NE vi 5.1139a32-35. 1:565.568. 13-14: ). 47. Aristotle says. 335. 44.1140b17-18)and (i. "from the fact that he is so constituted that he pursues [bodily pleasures]" (ibid. between deliberative capacity and "a rational grasp of the end as a result of epagoge.1151a18-19. 187. can only regard this evil as good (NE vii 9. 1145a2) do not say that practical wisdom has no other function than the choice of means". 58. English translation: St. 57.. who acts (Ibid. Gauthier II. 54. NE vii 9. 45. b9. oriented towards evil. NE vi 10. Ibid. 12) to refer to that < previous page page_150 next page > . Thomas Aquinas 1964.e. Gauthier I.e. 2:519. NE vi 5.. 50. 52. The conviction of the vicious person.1142b32-33. NE vii 9.1151a17-18. NE vi 2. 46. vi.11:584. Thomas 1949. the supreme end) (NE vi 13.1140b10-16. in the phronimos. Just as the vicious person's understanding. actually comes.1150b36: ). Gauthier I. 55. Nevertheless. Allan 1962." 48." but admits that "that level is neglected by Aristotle in NE. 181: "the words quoted (i. 223-24) distinguishes. it remains that the is essentially the one who knows how to deliberate well (a30-31: ). St. 59.1140b11-20.1144a34). NE vi 5.. Engberg-Pedersen (1983. a24-25. 49. It is also suggested by the noun used at this location by Aristotle (ibid...1140a25-28. NE vi 13.< previous page page_150 next page > Page 150 43. 56. 1:557.1144a34. 1151a7).

Cf. IIa-IIae. which is the end. Hardie 1968. established as a result of repeated bad actions. Whence Aristotle's comparison (NE vi 13." 66. 1247ff.1143b15) uniting simultaneously (inductive) knowledge of principles and (deductive) knowing which works from these principles: (NE vi 7. implies the existence. The virtue constituted by (cf. 70. And to the extent that such liberty turns out to be guaranteed by an understanding able to distinguish good action (to be performed) from bad action (to be avoided). 229): "it seems doubtful to me that Aristotle makes such a strong contrast between the intuitive grasp of first principles of conduct and their rational determination by discursive intelligence. Cf. Cf. Cf. St.1142b33). 15. a claim similar to this.1141a19). vii 9. 67. NE vi 6. so with respect to matters of conduct the end is not taught by reason. Thomas 1949. Although it corresponds to another context." 60. Finally. 87: "Vice is the perversion of understanding. arrives at correct belief about the principle of what can be done. vice. 69. Thomas 1949. Likewise. Voelke mistakenly writes (1985. of to a true "assumption" regarding the principle of conduct ( : NE vi 5.< previous page page_151 next page > Page 151 by which the can attain knowledge of the good. 62. 6 (ad 3).1140b31-1141a8. Thomas. ST. Gauthier II. qu. Baumrin 1968. no.1114a19-21: . might be evidence for such a view: . NE iii 7. Cf. 65. A. But the human being. 63.1151a18. But the subject." < previous page page_151 next page > . 227-28. at the outset. Gauthier 1973.1216b30-31. NE vi 12. this interpretation is hinted at by the reduction. because of a disposition of virtue either natural or acquired by practice. in certain cases. of an error of understanding. understanding which errs regarding principles of action cannot always be blamed: the error has its source in the immorality of the acting subject. Cf. 197-198. found at EE i 6. Cf.1144b3. nevertheless. St. 10. Against this view.1144b10-12): . NE vi 13. 61. art. 47. 2:553. 383: "Just as in mathematics principles are not taught by reason. 64. J. 1-17 and Boutroux 1899- 1900. St.1140b12-13. 68. is responsible for his immorality: cf.

1129b4-6. NE x 10. for only the model which is expressed by a perfect society can claim to incarnate the good absolutely. Burnet 1900.40-51. V. escaped P. 7. Aubenque when he sought to penetrate the meaning of the expression just cited and concluded by saying (1963. 4. The importance of the political community in the eyes of a philosopher who regards the (or the ) as a ''rule" or a "measure" (NE iii 6. i 33.). above.1179b7ff. Aristotle is tempted to substitute a new absolutism. 9.1180a21-22.1094a23-b2. 8. 6. < previous page page_152 next page > .1113a33: ). 3. it seems to me. A Post. 3 1.2. 2. Cf. 1094b10-11. The urgent need for educators reveals the inability of the great majority to follow naturally the instructions of right reason. 47): "For the humanist relativism of Protagoras as well as for the Platonic absolutism of the Good. B 13 Düring.1141b25. n. P vii 17. 1:1.1144b12-17. Aubenque 1963. Cf. xxvi.. 10. 5. NE i 1. In this respect natural factors are of less importance than the help received from others (Cf.1337a1-3: and Prot.< previous page page_152 next page > Page 152 71.. 1:2. Gauthier II. 73. 4 to sect." In fact. Cf. which to us today appears quite relative: that which takes as criterion the physical superiority of the 'healthy' man and the social superiority of the 'free' man. Aristotle's apparent relativism is equivalent to stating the importance of the perfection of the political community. 2. NE v 3.89b9. NE x 10. About all this. xxviin1. Burnet 1900. Cf. fr. see NE vi 13. 72. Section VI 1. Gauthier II. NE vi 8. Ibid.

include ethical inquiry in an account rightly called "political. However. P iii 6. 14.1140a3. 24. 2984 A-2985 A.1102a12.1165a12-13.217b30-31. the remarks of Venturi-Ferriolo 1976. vii 1. Voegelin 1957. The impression is correct only to the extent that the content of the NE is not identified with the object of a political inquiry conceived as "Staatslehre" (science of government). < previous page page_153 next page > .1104a1.1356a26-27.1172a34-35. there is the question of the autonomy of the so-called "ethical" study whose results are expounded in the .303. Voegelin 1957. O. NE x 1. P i 5. EE i 8.1155b9-10.1254a33-34. which is the issue here. vi 4. 12.1102a26-27. M M 1. NE viii 2. NE i 1. See. 18. Abstracts 30 (1970).1094b11. according to the abstract in Diss. 15.1107a29-30. Cashdollar's thesis on this subject ("An Inquiry into Aristotle's Ethics and Politics: Is there an Autonomous Science of Morals?" Diss. University of Illinois. Ph iv 10. 1:3 and 9. NE ii 2. Cf. NE ix 2. 65-87 and 145-67. E. 19.1217b22-23. 25. on this subject. Gauthier I. 23. 17. Beyond terminology. but the author neglects several relevant facts of which his documentation leaves him unaware. 13.< previous page page_153 next page > Page 153 11. A summary account of the question is found in Vancourt 1977.1218b33-34. Gigon 1973. 20. Cf. at least that he could not. 294. S. NE i 13. NE ii 7. Cf." And this seems to me indemonstrable. ii 1. Cf. 13..281-90. from his perspective. 296 (who goes so far as ask why Aristotle restricted politics to the subjects of the Politics!). 22. his conclusions furnish a categorically negative response to the question formulated in the title. if not that Aristotle believed it inadequate. 21. To demonstrate that this vocabulary inherited from Plato is no longer appropriate for describing Aristotle's enterprise would require proving.1323a22-23. 1969) was not accessible to me. 16.1278b31-32. 8-42. Cf. R i 2.1076a27-29.

< previous page page_154 next page > . While for Schwan politics in the broad sense constitutes the consummation of practical philosophy.) 33. 195-96. Hardie 1968. within politics. . 313.1218b13-14) and NE (vi 8. IX. Schwan 1963.1181b25-1182a1. who wish to remove the individual from the vicissitudes of the city (precisely what Aristotle did not wish to do: cf.1094b11 by "political science in one sense of that term")." 28. a study of these books conducted in ignorance of the rest of the NE would give a superficial and truncated idea of Aristotle's thought. n1 (in connection with MM i 1. in contrast with the economic part of politics).266. but are dialectically distinct approaches to common problems. 31. 77-78.277n30. the notion of moral duty will be posed in different terms for the Stoics. it is true. adds: "Aristotle was as much the founder of ethics as of a general theory of (good) human conduct. into English. 32. 38-49. Burnet 1900. Bien 1968-69. The author took care to note earlier (264): "Ethics and politics are not separate sciences treating of independent subject matters. Do we know. 387. who translates NE i 1. politics in the narrow sense is located "alongside and behind ethics.28 (against Ross. which is political in a narrower sense.< previous page page_154 next page > Page 154 26. But in addition. Hardie 1968." Cf. Radermacher 1973." EE (i 1. The Works of Aristotle trans. Cf. Cristi 1969-70. as Dirlmeier noted (1964. any positive warrant. There is no sharp or fixed boundary. for his part. which really does set up an independent ethical science. Bien 1980." 27. not as a type of study . for instance.1181a24: . or how. 29. I would be tempted to see here a stand taken by a strict follower of Aristotle against Stoicism. the so-called 'political part' (books iii-vi especially). 28: "It would be unprofitable to discuss how far Aristotle moved towards separating ethics from politics." 35. McKeon 1941. within the latter. 30. if for Aristotle the separation between inquiry and inquiry was much more pronounced than the separation. MM i 1. deals with the problem of the arrangement of political-public life as a constitutional question ( . the province of 'Ethical discourses' is demarcated.1141b31-33) show that Aristotle distinguished a broad and a narrow sense of the word . 508). between the inquiry and the inquiry ? The hypothesis that NE viii-ix may have at one point constituted an independent unit does not have. 34. and in each approach the effect of the other must be taken into account. but understood as a form of . who. xxvii. who also distinguishes a third conception of politics: "within the 'Politics' (as a whole). Bien 1968-69. .

And it appeared that this originality had to always be protected against threats posed by different types of collectivism sustained by egalitarian myth. VI. and Habermas 1963.1262b7-8). 14. Schwan 1963.1159b26-27: . according to whether the ethics under consideration relates to the individual alone or to human society. it tries to determine the principal stages which led to the divorce (allegedly consummated at the end of Aristotle's evolution) between the studies of the Ethics and those of the Politics. 45.1253a7-8. respectively. 37. 382-83. comparable in some ways to all concrete beings. in its concrete totality"). 453. the individual. 435: "Today we distinguish between personal and social ethics. P i 2.1129b26-27) and (P ii 4. sect. 1:2. NE i 5. we may acknowledge that study of the Politics by itself offers an impoverished and truncated idea to anyone who is unaware of the Ethics. chap. 38. ix 9. Modern thinkers prefer to stress the irreducible originality which attaches to every individual person (cf. Cf. above. Gauthier II. see the end of this section. This article apparently summarizes a thesis defended at the Facultés du Saulchoir.< previous page page_155 next page > Page 155 similarly. remains absolutely original in its own existence. Cf.1162a17-18.1169b18. Betbeder 1970. But such a badly conceived aim helps to establish an opposition between the human individual and society and to maintain the idyllic and illusory idea of individuals' attaining happiness in and through the most complete indifference to their society. its race.1097b11. 303. its time and family. Cristi 1969-70. but I have not found any trace of its publication. Moreover. and in more ways to beings of its species. 1. its nation. for the historical contingencies which compelled Aristotle to select certain ethical virtues as primary subjects for analysis. 44. . Which are. 42. Aristotle's project is throughly at odds with such an extreme position. 80. 192. Voegelin 1957.1. Düring 1966. . 8: " . Cf. because they cannot be exercised by a human being who is alien to all social interaction. EE vii 10. more simply. 40. Cf. 452 and Ritter 1960. and vice versa. Ritter 1969.1242a22-23. viii 14. this structure of unique synthesis. 41. 43. 39. Using a genetic perspective. 35-37. But for Aristotle the goal for the individual and for society < previous page page_155 next page > . 36. (NE v 3. Paulhan 1909. NE viii 11. Dufour 1928. Either because their respective "matters" do not exist without society or.

even in the exercise of his highest faculties (those of the contemplative kind). 53. Allan (Allan 1965) pushes too hard. . Aristotle's recognition that the city is established primarily for the sake of human "living well. Abstracts 30 (1970): 2985 A.1177b12-15). In particular.1253a26-29). He has in view a double inquiry. . according to Aristotle the human being is not only part of a whole. 47. Thus P (i 3. His ethics is therefore a social ethics. Robin 1931. for example. If we start by considering what is the best life for the individual. Cf. 337-60. Lerner 1969. but the realization of his very being.1253b1ff. 50. remains dependent on the favorable conditions which the city procures for him. Hence.1264b17-19 (against Plato. J. P vii 1. it will be found that the only measure is the well-being of individual men. 48. . 5-11. . Cf. Republic iv 419a-420e. . If we ask which mode of organization is the best. 1952. to the following conclusions drawn by the author (Allan. In his otherwise nuanced study. in the direction of individualistic theories. who ends up sacrificing the happiness of the guardians while claiming to secure the happiness of the entire city). 166-67): "It was Aristotle who gave the name ethics to that part of [practical inquiry] which is specially concerned with the happiness of the individual. then it distinguishes the (cf. a mere makeshift . His reason is that a science which deals with the good of the individual alone would be incomplete. Cf. 52. Allan's hesitations (1952. 2. It is significant that the only objection foreseen by Aristotle to his use of the name Politics for the science of human good is the objection that the good of the individual is the same as that of the state. acc. 83-113. NE x 7. Burnet 1900. 147. 54.) first clarifies . Cf. 183): < previous page page_156 next page > . to Dissert. P ii 5.472-75 (which expounds the metaphysician's point of view). Simon 1976.1333a33-39 (cf. xxv- xxvi: A modern writer who wished to draw a distinction between Ethics and Politics would probably rest his case on the view that the good of the individual is something different from the good of the state. wherein either part must involve the other." 46. P vii 14. 49. we shall in turn be obliged to take notice of his need for permanent association with others.< previous page page_156 next page > Page 156 is identical. ." Besides. D. It will be seen from this that it is quite wrong to say that the Ethics studies the good for man from the point of view of the individual. xxv-xxxi.1323b40-41. Cashdollar 1969. M. Werner 1931. on the other hand. 51. Cf. . a philosophy of the common human life. P i 2. . Defourny 1935." One cannot subscribe.1253a4-5.

1140b7-10 and Aubenque 1963.1278a40-b3.1107a33-1108b10 and the table at EE ii 3.262-63). NE vi 9. Schwan 1963. 71-79. P iii 4. 4. 58.1288a38-39. < previous page page_157 next page > . 67." (Bien 1980. In this I agree with Aubonnet. 57.. Ibid.1253a25-26 (cf. Cf. See also the virtues which Plotinus (Enneads i 2. 64. For lines 15-16 I prefer the reading of the mss.1278b3-5:6 . de Moerbecke to the correction by Congreve adopted by Ross. along with the remarks of Nolet de Brauwere 1953. P i 3. 35-52. Burnet 1900. xxviii. 63.1277a13-23. 62. and Develin 1973. See the list at NE ii 7.. P iii 18. 5..1142a1-10. to which expositors have failed to do justice. 68. Cf. at least as stated in the Ethics.1220b38-1221a12.1276b16-1277b32. 24ff.< previous page page_157 next page > Page 157 "A 'public' education does not necessarily mean training the young to regard themselves as mere ciphers and to prefer the general welfare to their own: Aristotle believes this to be psychologically impossible. Dreizehnter and Immisch. Ibid." 55. NE vi 5. "Aristotle never regards virtue as a matter of private morality and for him it is so far from being something outside or prior to politics that he says of it that it reaches its perfection precisely in the exercise of the leading office in the state. P iii 5. 61. a20-22: ). Braun 1965. 60. 85... 66. and I think there is an element of uncompromising individualism in his system. 59. Braun 1961.51. see Kahlenberg 1934. 56. 65. On this question. Ibid. 3) calls "political" and to which Macrobius (In Somnium Scipionis i 8) systematically connects all the virtues labeled "moral virtues" in Aristotle. Ibid. 1277a12-13. attested by the translation of G. 1276b30-35.

probably explain the choice and relative importance of the different moral virtues analyzed here by the philosopher. Cf. Clouds. Plato.1115a29-31. NE iv 9. 88ff. 73. not "what is desirable for each person" . NE ii 7. Ehrenberg 1965. v. Hippias Major 282b-d (in connection with Hippias. Indeed. The Justification For A Political Teaching Section I 1 1. 74. particularly.1125b8. 71. Ehrenberg 1951. for having failed in their mission as educators of the city. the sui generis character of Greek society and the Greek city-state. Aristophanes. Certain historical contingencies. Meletus made himself the spokesman for the hatred of the poets.< previous page page_158 next page > Page 158 69. Anytus for that of the political men and Lycon for that of the orators. or that of an alien who has broken every link to it?'' This inquiry is not the task of political reflection. as he has just said explicitly (1324a14-17).1122a18-25. 72. 2. 70. The Apology (23e) indicates that of Socrates' accusers. NE iii 9. even when he is studying perfect happiness (NE x 6-9). Euthydemus 272b. For the question of "what is desirable for each person" is not the question posed by Aristotle in his Ethics. NE iv 4.1324a19-21 Aristotle writes that "the task of political thought and study" is to ask what is the best regime. one can say that all of them had been exposed to Socrates' reproaches. Apology 20a (cf. This is a complete mistake.1108a11. Plato. Laches 179a . At P vii 2. In fact. 3. Cf. as if these different categories of people had a bone to pick with the accused.1125a34-10. because it is already solved for the politician who inquires about the best type of life (regime) for those who have already chosen to live in a city. Gorgias. 112-14. Prodicus and Protagoras). namely. Chapter 2. 33d-34a: lists of young Athenians entrusted to Socrates by their fathers). which would then be the task of ethics. that which associates us with fellow citizens and makes us members of the political community. it is the question which each person poses by asking: "What type of life is the most desirable. Some commentators have believed that this statement excluded from the scope of political reflection the consideration of individual happiness. 360-73. < previous page page_158 next page > . 4.

Meno 70a: . answers to our need to know. 10). 8. seems to indicate that. But it is not through science that they can directly obtain it. And such a project must be located at the opposite pole from. ). < previous page page_159 next page > . the ideal of science in human affairs (Lévy-Bruhl 1902.1214a32-33: . v). . 2 1." retorted Lévy-Bruhl. NE i 1099b9-11. NE x 10. Cf. ) and three types of life (NE i 3. It seems likely that the Meno'sarguments had become by that time obligatory usage in all discussion about the origins of virtue." regarding which Cantecor uneasily asked if it answered to our practical needs: "Clearly not. The content of NE x. From another perspective.'' (Lévy-Bruhl 1902. . seems to us an appendix.1276b16ff. EE i 1. Any science. and (3) concerning education and politics (chap. .1214a14ff. Doent 1967. "it does not answer to them. and (c) 1180b28-1181b12. 32ff. These are (a) 1179a33-b31. But. (2) concerning contemplative happiness (chap. 7-9). it does not have to. 7. in my view. EE i 1. The Hippias Major (281 c) notes that the sages of the archaic period (Pittacus. Brun 1963.< previous page page_159 next page > Page 159 5. Lévy-Bruhl is therefore wrong to regard Socrates. (b) 1179b31-1180b28. Calabri 1977a. III. Laws iv 722a ff. which is quite different. was the very root of Aristotle's reflections: cf. Lévy-Bruhl's "science des moeurs. This question. Cf. 5. Compare lines 1180a5 and 1180a12 with Plato. by composing it. applied to happiness. 4. especially as it forms its conclusion. L. Thales and even Anaxagoras) refrained from all political activity. 3. . Cf. at least by their method. its author meant to respond to a need for synthesis.. say. As for our 'practical needs. Bias. 6. chapter 10 seems a piece required for the synthesis. Moreover. . Plato and Aristotle indistinctly as having proclaimed. therefore. respectively. deals with three sharply distinct problems: (1) concerning pleasure (chap. NE x. 291-92).1181b13-14. if it is truly science. Plato.' presumably they ought to find satisfaction.. 2. 93-102. and ix 854e ff. 1-6). P iii 4. which. especially in comparison with the EE (and the MM). 9. It is difficult not to note the connection between the choice of such topics and the recognition elsewhere of three basic goods (cf. We are going to have a new indication of it here.1095b17-19: .

14. The reference to the opposition between and (1179b26-29) expresses the same idea as Plato at Laws i 644d (that the human being is like a puppet on two strings which pull in opposite directions). i 643c-d). (Plato. 19. 8. however. 7. see Biehl 1877. Plato uses virtually the same verb ( : 791d. Ibid.1103b24. 9. < previous page page_160 next page > . is also at the source of Plato's reflection. This discovery of deficiency (1180a24ff. Plato. Laws i 643b. Ibid. B 38 Düring (cf. 11. Laws ii 659d.1104b11- 13: . ii 1. 15. ii 653a-c. which. which portray for us the distress of the Athenian heads of household who appeal to Socrates. Prot.. NE x 10. the dialogue excludes from rewards connected to supreme happiness those who have acquired . Plato. 47ff. 17. Laws vi 770d ff.1095b4 and Plato. In fact. Republic x 619c. Phaedo 82b). To describe the "work" which thus needs to be performed upon the soul or the character of small children.. Ibid. On this subject. Dirlmeier 1964. (which presents a translation of NE x 10 and NE vi under the heading "Logos as Paideia's second field of activity").1180a21-22). It is the object of the first part (1179a33-b31). that is.< previous page page_160 next page > Page 160 6. 14-15 (which concerns the final chapter of the NE) and Braun 1974. from the time of the first dialogues. ii 653b: (in the sense of "the characteristic quality of the educated person") (cf. vii 792e. 792b) as Aristotle does in our chapter ( : 1179b24).). 18.600. 13. Cf. 12. 10. NE ii 2. Plato. Plato. makes an exception of Lacedaemonia.. i 2. Laws ii 653b. 16.

at the moment of taking leave of each other: it is necessary to know the nature of virtue in order to decide whether or not it can be taught. This virtue. 22. Plato. To the "illogicality" of this solution. note 2 to sect. NE i 10. seeing that this conclusion is proposed with the reservation that it may be altered when we know what virtue as such is. vi 5.< previous page page_161 next page > Page 161 20.1151a17-20. Plato's statement here applies both to individual human beings and to cities. As the interlocutors of the Protagoras already affirmed (361c- e). so that he now recognizes the real virtues of Pericles and those like him. does not imply understanding on the part of the person affected . Theognis.1179b34-35. Laws iii 689a. 24. This is not Plato's last word on the question.1332a38-b11. 1180a14-22. Aristides. etc. on the other hand. Laws v 741d. 1179b20-21. in the politician a result of divine dispensation. as some think. the meaning of the conclusion still remains to be determined: the which actually explains the moral quality of these politicians falls to them as an entirely irrational divine dispensation. Plato. P vii 13. The Gorgias (515e ff. cannot be transmitted by teaching (for only science is the object of teaching). If the qualities of renowned political men (Themistocles. therefore. the Meno seems less severe and if. 21. 5.. Plato.1334b6ff.. Meno 95e). Cf.1247a28 about the idea that a divine favor could explain the success of madmen: . < previous page page_161 next page > . sparing only Aristides in its judgment of Athenian politicians. 4.1214a14ff. the copyist of manuscript Kb has therefore cut out ! 2.) has stated the contrary. Section I 3 1.1140b12-20. it marks an improvement in Plato's evaluation of the facts. Elegies i 434: (= Plato. nothing demonstrates that Plato actually regarded the qualities of these politicians as perfect virtues. annoyed by the break which this extra word causes in the pentameter rhythm. The manuscript tradition of the NE seems to have added an interlinear gloss: (between and ). NE x 10. NE vii 9. P vii 15. Pericles. 23. 1. in the name of Plato himself.2. If.) effectively depend on and. it is perhaps fitting to invoke.1099b9ff. EE i 1. Meno 99e-100a. the judgment made by EE viii 2. 3. Thucydides.

Plato. Gorgias 519c. 11.1260a7ff.1103a15-17. Protagoras 318d ff. Cf.1246b37-1248b7. 15. 19.1214a23-24 . Cf. 1.1144b19. 11-14. 22. Plato. 9. B 3 and 10 Diels-Kranz. NE vi 13. 139ff. See on this subject: Dumont 1969. Plato. 27. 17. (cf. NE i 1. NE vi 13. EE i 1. Mathieu 1966 [1925]. EE i 5. fr. sect.. chap. Plato. fr. < previous page page_162 next page > . 323c.1103a23ff. Meno 87e ff. and Kucharski 1970.1144b4-16. 16. and Raeder 1905. 21. Joos 1955. P vii 13. preceding note and EE viii 2. NE vi 13.. Plato. B 60 Diels-Kranz. 28. Cf. Cf.1144b12-25. 7. NE i 10.77-181.< previous page page_162 next page > Page 162 6.1216b3ff. vi 13. 18. 195ff. Sophist 231 b. 470-74. (cf. 13. Laws ii 655d. 24. Loc.1144a34ff. Levi 1940. fr. 23. Plato. P i 13. Antiphon. 24. 59ff. Cf.1144b28-30. NE ii 1. and Kube 1969 (passim). NE ii 1.1099b10. 8. Levi 1932. Meno 99a. 55ff. Cf.1151a17-20. NE vi 13. 18. Critias. NE vii 9.1216b6-8. 12. Protagoras. 225. 25. cit. Bignone 1974. EE i 5. 20.. 10. 14.1332a40-42. 26. B 10 Diels-Kranz. Cf. V).1094b16-18). Gorgias 449c and Levi 1966. Plato.

These are lines 1179b4-20 and 1179b20-21. i 1. Rassow 1888. that the emphasis now is placed. i 1. Buchner 1963-64. The account up to 1179b31 actually corresponds exactly to what we should expect given the three questions posed in the introduction to the chapter: (1) (1179a33-35). The only argument is based on the impression left by the evidence I mentioned in note 5. with this exception. < previous page page_163 next page > . in their main lines. Humbert 1960. 5. . 160. My translation tries to respect the inceptive aspect indicated in the two aorist infinitives. 594-96. 1179b7. not on intention. (cf.1094a2). . 2.< previous page page_163 next page > Page 163 Section II 1 1. Gauthier II. 1179b2-3: . 12. 2:900.1216b3-25). 13. . 11.1095a5: ). whose order is vouched for by x 6. . To the question posed at the beginning: .1103b26-30 (cf. 4. Cf.1214a9-14. (1179b3-4). 1179a33-35. 1179a35-b2: . 8. Aristotle first resolves the choice posed by the first two questions (1179b4-20).1095a9: . The word at a35 has the same meaning as it does in the sentence which opens the NE (i 1. the passage introduced by (1179b20ff. 3. . to the content of the NE.) seems to be a response. (2) (1179a35-b3). This view of things makes the passage situated in between (1179b4-20) seem like a piece added after the fact. NE ii 2. 10. 1179b30.1176a30-31. (1179b3-4). The "project" at issue here amounts to a series of expositions which correspond. (3) . then he examines the possibility mentioned in the third question (1179b20-31). 1179b24. in contrast to the use of the present infinitive which follows: cf. 7. 9. 1179b26-27: . 6. EE i 1. 5. but on the concrete proceedings which express it.

25. In other words. 1179b7: . i 1. 6. 22. 1179b13-16 . (1179b27-28) 21. 1179b31ff. 15. 16. 20. 1178b28-29.1334b8-9.1095a10-11. passages cited above in note 25 of sect.. P vii 15. (1179b28-29). Plato. 17. where the goal is between the inclinations deriving from character and the objectives of reason. 3. by a discipline of the passions in favor of reason.1095a2.1. 1180a4-5: Cf. On this subject. 2 1. i 1. 19. 2. 24. (1179b11-13). Laws ii 653e ff. 4.1095a1.< previous page page_164 next page > Page 164 14. see the important passage in P i 2. i 1.b17-18 . < previous page page_164 next page > . II. 5. i 1. 1179b28.1253a9-18. cf. 1179b29-31. 1179b24-26. 23. Jaeger 1964.1095a4 . 18. a8 . Aristotle expresses himself similarly here (1334b9-10): .29.

114-15). Plato. Cf. 18. Laws vii 791b-792e. cf. 11. This principle is minimized in Clark 1975. 1180a26-27: . 14. Cf. 15. Odyssey ix. 1180a1- 4: 13. 8.1337a24- 26: . Kullmann 1980. ii 9. the Spartan regime represents an ideal in his eyes insofar as it responds to the need for a genuine education. In spite of everything. 1180b25. 17. it derives from observation of human conduct.1324b5-9. 16. This acknowledgment is not the result of a speculation on the essence of human beings (cf. that is. the need for and for . 10.1334a40-b5. 1180a18. 15. 2. < previous page page_165 next page > . and appetite with respect to understanding. Joja 1968). 19. It is the mere fact that the Lacedaemonian lawgiver had such a concern which earns Aristotle's praise. 20. is expressed at PA ii 1. P vii 15. Lacordaire 1893. The principle of the final cause.646a30ff. P viii 1. NE i 1. 25-26.1271a41-b7).< previous page page_165 next page > Page 165 7. The laws of Sparta are cited (1180a25) as rare examples of public concern for matters of and . 1180a21-22. corporeal existence with respect to mental life.1333b1 1-35. 1180a27-29: (Homer. That is. To acknowledge the political nature of human beings is to acknowledge that they require others for their development. 9. which governs the union of parents with respect to the birth of children.1094b5-7.1334b24-25. for he nevertheless regards the particular direction which this lawgiver gave education as deserving of severe criticism (P vii 14. at the beginning of the second part of our chapter (1179b31-32). .1337a31. The same point is made at P viii 1. 12.

i. as Aristotle states elsewhere (P viii 1. .. 1180a32-34: . and Laws vii 793ff. 27. as is clearly noted by P viii 1. who possesses a general knowledge of the human good. 1180b29.1337a27-29. Let us understand this well: the point. 1180b14. requires on the contrary that education should always conform to the type of political regime: . 22. < previous page page_166 next page > . in contradiction with the ends of the constitutional regime in force. who loathes situations of conflict. (P v 9. for the situation already becomes critical from the moment when education begins to follow principles other than those whose application is recommended by the political regime actually in power. is to remedy the deficiencies of the lawgiver and not to enact rules of conduct allegedly better than the norms implicitly recommended by the laws. Aristotle hints at this distinction at 1180b24. when he describes it as the lawgiver's wish to make others better. 460b.1310a12-14). Cf.e. The (analogical) reasoning of section 1180b13-28 establishes that the capacity to provide a good moral training to others is not within the range of just anyone.1337a14): . 26. v 457c-d. 23. the prologue of the NE (i 1. 25. cf. This is the extreme case.1094a27-b7). 28. but only of the person who knows . 29. Which is absolutely not the case. It is to be noted that in Aristotle's mind the instruments of private education do not differ from the instruments of public education either in their purpose (to promote the acquisition of good habits) or in their source (rational rules). in this context. 1181a11-12. 24. Plato.< previous page page_166 next page > Page 166 21. Aristotle. 3 1. These advantages include the fact that father and son already possess connections of kinship and mutual benefit and the fact that paternal education allows the best possibility for adaptation to particular individuals.. The justification for this recommendation will be given later (1180b13-25). Republic vii 522e ff. 1180b5-13. 2. .

1180b30-31: . note 4. Tricot. This reasoning is borrowed from Plato's Meno (91a. 17. cf. 13. as J. Aristides. above. Which cross-checks quite accurately with the famous doctrine stated in M A 1. 529n2). Meno 89d ff. political subjects lack a corresponding class of specialists (Laches 184d-187b). 15. (1181a12-13). (1181a5-6). cf. Gorgias 515e). A suggestion reproduced and criticized by Aristotle at 1181a12ff. The observation has less historical significance inasmuch as it virtually reproduces Plato's judgment of Themistocles. 5. And the following passage demonstrates the contrary (1181a10ff. Pericles. 1181a19-23. 1180b35.< previous page page_167 next page > Page 167 3. had already emphasized that. thinks (Tricot 1967.1094b27-1095a4. 1180b30-1181a9. It is possible. 16. Cf. 1180b20-21 . Plato.981a5ff. Protagoras. 8.). 99b-e). < previous page page_167 next page > . 11. 4. 10. 6. 14. that these words make reference to NE vi 8. here he cites word for word a passage from Isocrates' Antidosis (60). 12. for example. and Thucydides (Meno 93c-94c. 1181b1. 19. 20. 18. As I shall have occasion to repeat (chapter 3). he refers mainly to Isocrates. 1181a14-15.1141b24. for his part. Cf. 7. NE i 1. unlike other subjects. NE i 1.1095a10-1. 319b ff. 9. Plato.

7. The reason for this approach. Burnet 1900. clearly corresponds to a scarcely hidden desire to turn their hopes for a genuine teaching towards himself. By "teaching" here. the city represents the superior moral authority. 2.< previous page page_168 next page > Page 168 21. the absolute priority of the problem can be explained in the same way. is linked to Aristotle's wish (in this respect shared by Plato) to spare his listeners the futile search for help from "teachers" who do not know what they claim to teach. M A 1. within the Ethics. But if this were Aristotle's aim in describing to us the hierarchy of the arts and sciences crowned by politics. 24. < previous page page_168 next page > . 4. The relations between means and end are examined in detail in Ganter 1974 (see particularly chapters 1 and 2). NE i 1. could he.1094a6-9. For an example of this view. 3. see Gauthier II. so that this happiness may exist.1094b11 (cf. The discrediting of pseudo. 9. 1179b6-7. 1180b30-31. that they have been chosen by analogy (because they are easier to grasp) to show the order of subordination of individual activities to a supreme end. at the same time. NE i 1. NE i 1. I understand the instruction of other persons by means of discourse. Diels 1888. 1181a11-12. 5. 23. 6. 1181a23 . 10. 3 and 8. 22. 15). Let it be said in passing that the priority of the Ethics to the Politics and. modeled on the aporematic discussion of the Meno. Cf. on individuals. the greatest and most complete task would seem to be to attain and preserve that of the city"? (1094b6-7) In Aristotle's view. and even sacrifices.1).981b7-9." adding: "although this [good] is identical for a single being and for a city. 8. Section III 1 1. confer on politics the task of realizing "the human good. xviii-xix (and notes to I.1094b27-1095a4. for it secures the happiness of all or of the majority and imposes conditions. One might be tempted to say that the examples cited in this passage do not prove much. 1095a2-3.

. EE i 5. furnishes to the same question.1099b29-32: . J. 12. < previous page page_169 next page > . 15. 1094a26-28. 13.1177b12-14: . 16. v 14. 1:63-89. 266.. Cf. Cf. NE i 13.< previous page page_169 next page > Page 169 11. Cf. Gauthier II.1102a7-13." 13. Aubenque 1962.1113b21-26. viii 1.1155a28-29. These are remarks which enable Aristotle to provide his listener with evidence for general legislative concerns or particular legislation which attests to the importance or the cogency of arguments which he himself wants to introduce. 14.1102a7-10. The justification for Aristotle's statements must therefore be sought in a demonstrable need on the part of the politician. that the sciences whose classification is at issue are really techniques. 1094b10-11. iii 7. in that it considers the view just expressed to be different from Aristotle's.e. .1142a2. 19.1112b11-14: (cf. 1:9: "Let us not forget that we are always here in the framework supplied by Plato's Statesman. NE i 13. x 7. a26. NE ii 1. Euthydemus 291c in connection with the royal art).1128a30-31 (cf.982b4). See the hypotheses on this topic in Gauthier I. 11. one almost certainly suggests that the word "science" ought to be understood as "theoretical science" and one then risks seeing a contradiction between the answer supplied here and the answer which the Metaphysics (A 2. which barely connects with the personal views of Aristotle.1160a12-14. Aubenque concludes ultimately that we are in the presence of a traditional response.1140b7-11. In light of similar reflections found in Plato (for example. NE iii 5. Tricot is quite aware of this point (34n6): "Reconciliation between the two ideas is difficult. except." This interpretation is correct. obviously. 20.1137b28). 9. i. 18.1103b2-6. 21. working from a different perspective. NE i 10. If one translates this ''Of which of the sciences or capacities is it the object" (Gauthier) or even "to which particular science or potentiality does it correspond" (Tricot).1216b18). vi 5. 17. iv 14. theoretical sciences are not under discussion and it is to raise a false problem to ask if Aristotle here wished to place politics above metaphysics. 1095a1-2.1102a18-19. Ibid.

However. 3.1331a16. Laws i 644d. Gorgias 455b. 4. in order to determine the rules for distribution of rewards and punishments (according to a need also noted in x 10. Zeller 1879. But the distinction is already present at NE i 1. his reason is that.1109b32-35.1094b4.1253b38-1254a1. 2 1. 2. viii 7. ) another to execute his plans. Cf.1329a41. 180-81.1180a1-4). < previous page page_170 next page > . It does not imply anything like "philosopher-king" in the Platonic sense. 24. it is absolutely necessary not to misapprehend the significance of the term in our passage.1198a34-b2 and P i 13.1094a4-6 and 16-18. NE i 1.1282a3-14. Plato.1297b40 and the passage cited in note 13. P iv 14. Statesman 259e.1013a10-14. 25. it is important to have a precise knowledge of the boundaries between the voluntary and the involuntary. 6. P iii 11. 8. Aristotle thus reveals his sense that his addresses could contribute to the training of those responsible for penal law.1152b1-3.1094a14ff. it merely suggests the importance of study for the in his role as . for this reason. When Aristotle claims that the analyses to which he is introducing the lawgiver will be useful to him. It appears from what follows (260b-c) that the notion of the is essentially connected to the idea of the person who orders (cf.< previous page page_170 next page > Page 170 22. The horseman. just as the pilot is a better judge of the quality of a rudder than the carpenter who built it.1341b28.1260a5-24. 23. 11. These are considered to be "principles" by M ∆ 1. For other similar uses of the word. 11. NE i 1. NE vii 12. he is better able to evaluate the quality of the product than the one who made it. MM i 34. The comparison is found in P i 4. Plato. of course. Cf. NE iii 1. 5. 33. 9. 7. NE i 1. see: P vii 10. 10.1094a27ff. is the user of the product of the bridlemaker and.

the most common in the world of Greek city-states during his time).1142a9-10: . respectively. b28-29). the terms "lawgiver" and ''head of household" are little short of being coextensive and apply to the same individuals. P vii 3. NE vi 8. 19.1325b21-23. 14. which is clearly attributed more to those who direct than those who execute. 16. Besides. There is of course a pejorative note in this comparison.< previous page page_171 next page > Page 171 12.1141b23ff. In these circumstances. the activity which occurs when the enunciation of a particular decree is required as an application of a general law. as for the status of legislative activity.e. NE v 1.1217a6-7. 21.1141b26-28). therefore. considered as public and private persons. Concretely. 13. Statesman 259b- 60e. (ibid. that in the political regimes of the democratic type which Aristotle primarily had in mind (because they were. along with oligarchical regimes. This passage mentions. But only the NE passage mentioned in the previous note deals with this distinction. EE i 8. Cf. it is correspondingly enhanced. as is. (NE vi 8. ). MA 1. while distinguishing. NE vi 9.1218b12-14. Plato.1181b1-3. Let us remember. 2. 17..98 b31-33. This passage does not explicitly refer to the lawgiver. EE i 6. 20. This passage saves for later ( : b16) the explanation of the way in which these three differ from each other. but it cannot be doubted that Aristotle has him in mind. is presented in two parts. The term here seems to be synonymous with and Plato's Statesman (259c-d) uses the two words without distinction to designate an activity of mere execution. Cf. indeed.. The first part aims to state the necessary preconditions for the establishment of an ideal regime: number < previous page page_171 next page > . the same passage reinterprets the notion of practical activity. the term "lawgiver" describes all the citizens to the extent that they have access to the Assembly. Section IV 1. 15. a and a (i. 18. NE x 10.1129a13ff. the account of inquiries (after preliminary considerations: P vii 1-3). however.

Ibid. these two final words might be the corruption of . NE v 3. the reservations which he makes refer to those who are naturally inclined to seek the objective good. in i 6. Cf. 4. where the philosopher describes his method. Here. 4. which tackles only the issues really internal to the subject (cf. 8. 11. Moraux (1957. The Development of Aristotle's Philosophy Section I 1.1331b23-24: ). II. as in the NE. the EE does not think that "the actions which derive from virtue" could be those of isolated individuals or restricted to the private domain. EE vii 2. 3. the passage would mean: "the politician must not think superfluous the sort of studies which (etc. On this subject. (vii 4-12). Statesman 260a-b. perhaps. 5. finally. 5. it turns essentially on the organization of .1216a24-26). chap. 1129b19- 23: . 6. Kenny 1978. While also agreeing with P. 5. Except. Chapter 3.< previous page page_172 next page > Page 172 of the population." We would then have. which he says is one adapted "to the political domain" . as. This is section 1094b22-1095a11. an invaluable parallel with the NE. 6.. According to an ancient conjecture by Victorinus. < previous page page_172 next page > . above. which cannot be ruled out. geographical situation. it links them to the political man and describes the true politician thus: (i 5. say. 1237a2-3. Plato. chap.1236b39-1237a3. in the EE proper. these discussions constitute the core of the inquiry. 482n3) would have us believe. vii 13. we must acknowledge nevertheless that this conception remains basic at the time of NE v. Ibid.. 2. when it conceives "action" as the preferred terrain for the realization of the self. etc. As for the second part. chap. sect. Rutten 1981. I) that this conception of general justice reflects the content of a dialogue composed early in Aristotle's career. see. 3.1129b12-19.). Tricot (1962. J. In this case.1216b37. Besides. Far from being something extra.3. which devolves upon the lawgiver (vii 13 to viii 7).

respectively. 13.603.259-92).1179a35-b3. The early date of the two books which come last in the traditional order of the Politics was demonstrated definitively by Jaeger (1948.1180b13-23.1095a5-6. 15. 161ff. Jaeger 1948. .: cf. above. Moreover. is an ultimate outcome of Aristotle's reflections. The introduction shows that the NE did not yet exist. he holds that it was inserted in the original text when the text was revised by Aristotle himself. 18. 260-61. 8. 17.1 and 11. Laws i 644d and iv 714a) or an allusion to the life of the Cyclops (1180a27-29: cf.981a1-12. which often loses itself in details. of Plato's thinking in the Laws.< previous page page_173 next page > Page 173 7. (1180a6ff. This conclusion applies both to the first and the last part of NE x 10. Düring 1966. sections 1.). according to Gauthier (II. the fact that NE x 10 and NE vi rest on the same account is acknowledged by E. sections II. this account. 1 1.1103b27-28. 10. the text of the prologue (i 1) to which I refer constitutes. Lastly. Dirlmeier 1964. Düring expresses the opinion which is now most widely held on this issue when he writes (1966. In his edition of the Metaphysics. . Laws iv 718c-723b). 682a). 2:12-18). see chapter 2. M A 1.2-3. Cf. Jaeger placed this reference (981b25) between two double brackets.3. Braun (1974. a definition of law (1180a21-22: cf. Plato. 68-72 (for the introductory pages of book A) and 171-76 (for the criticism of Plato's doctrine of Ideas). Without doubt the introduction to book vii represents an earlier stage of his thinking on this question. Cf. chapter 2. 11. NE x 10. Whether one adopts Jaeger's viewpoint (1948. 228-58) or Kenny's (1978. 47ff. Which must be recognized in certain explicit allusions or references. < previous page page_173 next page > . 16. 474-75): It seems to me not to be excluded that this text derives from Aristotle's time at the Academy: in favor of this are the close connections to the Protrepticus and to the EE and the discussion. Laws iii 680b. Cf. NE i 1. In the NE the close relationship between ethics and political philosophy is self- evident from the beginning and is strongly emphasized in the final part. in fact. . For example. 9. 14. NE x 10.).1216b9ff. Aristotle's final "version" on the subject. EE i 5. NE ii 2. 12.

is more than an introduction to Politics vii and viii. here and there. chap. 2:907 (where one will find a very just criticism of Defourny 1932.390-92. 3. above.1214a15- 25: . Aristotle continues to acknowledge without reservation that ( 1180a29- 30). P viii 1. even if the context contains the implicit admission that there are difficulties in realizing this ideal everywhere and always. note 21 to sect. a passage about which we know that it agrees with the basic stand of the Protrepticus. Cf. 192-95). 3. like Politics vii. it is the central problem of the Laws which Aristotle addresses here: Hentschke 1971.1180a24ff. Stark (cf. Plato. 9. sect. 3. Meno 70a. EE i 1. Politics vii (1-3) affirms the superiority of the contemplative life with the same vigor as NE x (7-9).1099b9- 11: . The allusions to the Laws which one finds in this passage are innumerable.2). chapter 2. 5. as is attested by the appendix (1181b12-23). 2.2. NE x is perhaps relatively early. above. remains faithful to a doctrine expounded in a youthful work is especially significant for the permanence of certain beliefs held by the philosopher. 12. 111.1332a38-40: . in the last two passages. but the ideas which it develops concerning contemplative happiness were not disavowed later. The nuance is not negligible. 4. chapter 2. NE i 10. NE x 10. 7.1337a12-32. This chapter. NE x 10. P vii 13. The fact that Aristotle. 10. 6. which I shall analyze later (chap. < previous page page_174 next page > .2. in other words. Cf. IV). 11. sect. and contrary to the opinion of R. above. Gauthier II. Ultimately. In any case it is false to claim that here Aristotle sets out the ideological justification for a private education which he would recommend as superior to an education by the state.1179b20-21: . 8. section 1.< previous page page_174 next page > Page 174 Besides. Aristotle expresses himself positively while in the two preceding passages he sets outs the terms of an aporia. One will notice that. 1. 99e-100a.

Prot. Aristotle occasionally uses the adjective instead of (cf. pp. B 46-51 Düring. 54.1288b22- 23: and ibid. however.605 and Gauthier II. 13 Walzer (= B 46-51 Düring) makes it a duty of the lawgiver (who < previous page page_175 next page > . but as entertaining an alternate supposition.1288b37-38. 4.56-58. 11. 8. Stark 1969. 1181a15-b12: cf. we can observe here a considerable expansion of Aristotle's concerns. Immisch 1935. cf. Protrepticus 10. (cf. appeals to the examples of the doctor and the master of gymnastics to emphasize the need for general knowledge. 1180b16-22.. Aristotle does not say "since the public powers neglect it" but "when the public powers neglect it. 10. 12 Pistelli) corresponds to fr. The author otherwise defends the unity of Aristotle's ethical and political writings: cf. Prot. Fr. B 49-50. Prot. In the same direction: Dirlmeier 1964. only to emphasize the requirement of a certain . 6. Isocrates. Prot. 2 1. The NE. 5. 15-16. an expansion which expresses his intention to deal with the needs of states situated in conditions which prevent the functioning of a perfect regime. it is the very adjective which NE x 10. Now. Bignone 1936. fr. 2:905. Following von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1893. Gauthier II. 15. P iv 1. B 46-47. 2. 3." 14. I:98. the Prot.< previous page page_175 next page > Page 175 13. 9. 7. Antidosis 56-58 and 60. 10-56.. b25- 26: ). 13 Walzer (= Iamblichus.1260b28-29: = iv 1.) should not be understood as recording the failure of an ideal proclaimed earlier. P ii 1. B 46. cf. The assertion (1180a30ff.360. B 38 Düring: ). 1180b14: cf. In order to describe the perfect constitutional regime. fr. 2:903. In relation to the aims of P vii-viii. Stark 1954. 12. Prot.1180a29 uses to describe the existence of a .

1325b21-23. 111. frag. 1180b21. 13. M A 1. the only models really worthy of being imitated. 20. for we discover that Aristotle casts his thought in the moulds offered him by Plato's vocabulary of transcendence. Ar.). 14. fr. 24. < previous page page_176 next page > . That is. b20-21: ). in fact. 16. the "pseudo-wise. fr." Aristotle alludes to their most illustrious representative still alive (Isocrates) and the NE calls them (1181a12). 22. Prot. above.. I do not dare to say "thinks". 22 (passages cited by Walzer. See also the notes which Düring devotes to this subject in Düring 1960. 15. I prefer to say "expresses himself".1222b7. EE ii 5. 1180b23-25: .981a5ff. 21. 46 and 49 Düring. 25.1144b8- 13: .241. 23. 61 and Pépin 1971. 2. 19. 1180b14-15 (cf. viii 3. P vii 3. Stark 1972. B 34. 18. fr. dial.< previous page page_176 next page > Page 176 aspires to teach happiness) to be a "philosopher" and to derive from "nature itself" the unchanging standards of the good. B 49. But we cannot be sure that he subscribes to the philosophical implications which such vocabulary had for Plato. Cf.1249a21. Prot. chap. NE vi 13.1241b35. 17. Prot. The latter text suggests. On this subject and for a comparison with M ∆ 7-9. an operation of the metaphysical sort. 18. B 51. see Verdenius 1960.2 (end). sect. 26. In particular: fr. Cf. 55n3 ad loc. Cf. vii 9. 19. b17. Nature in this sense appears to be the immanent or efficient aspect of God. when it comes to apprehending the supreme model.

According to Rodier.v. Cratylus 421d (cf. < previous page page_177 next page > .< previous page page_177 next page > Page 177 27. The Platonic character of this text is expressed not only by the idea of a but also by the very sharp contrast between the divine (model) and the human (which should be a copy of it). Ramsauer 1878. 1497). Plato. which itself was written as a rejoinder to Aristotle's Protrepticus. Section III 1. The imitative approach is therefore not essentially condemned.645a4. Rodier 1897. cf. 10. 8. chap. II.1181b12-15. Goldschmidt 1947. 76ff. With the exception of the Traductio antiqua (Paris. sect. 7. Spengel 1843. 1.. 30. 68-69). 32. Let us note that here the and the are yet another time given the same treatment. 1181a16. 2. NE x 10. 9. Stark denies this view (1972. 33. 5. Cf. 728n14. Ramsauer.149. Cf. 31.). 1854). Ast 1908. Düring 1956. 6. who thinks he discovers here an argument by Aristotle against the usefulness of collecting existing laws. But the object to be imitated must be chosen as the end result of thorough critical evaluation. 4. F. 174ff. Stark (1972. deems that the endeavors of the Peripatetics to construct such collections must be credited to Theophrastus. Isocrates. Cf. 78). 14) and strives to confirm the opinion of Von der Mühll (1940-1941) that NE x 10 is a direct rejoinder to the Antidosis of Isocrates. 148ff. above. s. 29. 170. Stark 1972. 81-82. 28. Hippias Major 298c. who is not cited by name in this context but turns out to be the primary object of the allusion. 3. the is preserved only in manuscript Lb (Paris. is treated here as the most recent of the great Sophists. PA i 5. Stewart and even Susumihl (in Susemihl-Hicks 1894.

14. PA i 5. Phaleas of Chalcedon and Hippodamus of Miletus. Aristotle examines the constitutions of Sparta. "in order to complete . . Hatch). 2). von Fritz-Kapp 1950. "onze wijsgerige beschouwing over de menselijke dingen [our philosophical view of human affairs]'' (L. 2:912 (who defends the interpretation summarized above).1266a31-32: . P ii 8. erroneous: "de façon à parachever dans la mesure du possible notre philosophie des choses humaines [in order to complete so far as possible our philosophy of human affairs]" (Tricot). McKeon 1947.< previous page page_178 next page > Page 178 11.1268b35-36. W. 22. to my mind.183b16ff.98. C 52.1272a22ff.338a20-339a10 (a chapter which the partisans of inauthenticity were able to regard as a model for the forger of the appendix of the NE): . and relative to the second. The expression is found in Gauthier II. Besides the passage cited in the preceding note. Relative to the first category. our philosophy of human nature" (Ross). Sophistical Refutations (SR) 34.645a 4- 7: . The following translations thus involve an interpretation which is. 19.. < previous page page_178 next page > . Cf. 17. Cf. Jaeger 1948. 12. "so that our survey of social philosophy may be brought to a due completion" (W. Calabri 1977b. M α 1. R. 1969). 18. M. B 55 Düring (cf.993b11-19. 13. 169-200. "Aristotle understands his philosophizing from the outset as a (decisive) stage in the progress of philosophical knowledge generally" (O. Dodds 19742. P ii 7.264- 65. Edelstein 1967.228a28-29. 118-30. 16. P ii 10. Cf. Meteorology (Me) i 1. 20. Crete and Carthage. Thuijs). The figure of speech is one used by Aristotle himself: Ph v 4. 43. 21. .69-70.1260b33-36. the theories of Plato. P ii 1. Gigon 114 in Düring ed. 15. see: Prot. 15ff. This "problem of legislation" of which Aristotle speaks is the one which is mentioned in the passage immediately preceding and which I have discussed in chapter 2.

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23. P vii 11.1331a16ff.

24. P viii 7.1341b28ff.

25. P vii 10.1329a40ff.

26. P vii 10.1329b33-35. This claim happens to express a corollary of the belief that "everything is old" in political
affairs; a belief which is itself supported by an historical observation:
(31-33).

27. P ii 5.1264a3-5: .

28. 1181b7-9.

29. P ii 6.1265a1-2.

Chapter 4. The Public Character of Aristotle's Discourses

1. Cf. Jaeger 1948,4.

2. SR 34.183b16-22.

3. SR 34.184a9-b2.

4. SR 34.184b2-8.

Section I

1

1. NE i 1.1095a12-13.

2. A collection of the most important studies devoted to the subject by various authors (Wilamowitz, Jackson, Jaeger, Wehrli, Düring, Lynch
and Gottschalk) has been published under the editorship of C. Natali as Wilamowitz-Moellendorff et al. 1981.

3. Jaeger 1912, 131-63 (which I summarize in what follows).

4. Cf. section 1.5 of this chapter.

5. Dirlmeier 1962, 12. Cf. also Dirlmeier 1969b, 55.

6. E. Gilson, Preface to Owens 1951, vi.

Section I.2

1. NE i 1.1095a2.

2. No. 75 (Diogenes Laërtius) and no. 70 (Hesychius) in Düring 1957,45 and 85.

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3. No. 148 (Hesychius) in Düring 1957, 87 and 91 (commentary); cf. Moraux 1951, ad loc.

4. Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1893, I:355 (cf. 66n37).

5. Robin 1944, 42. Cf. Manquat 1932,13.

6. Burnet 1900, xviii.

7. Susemihl 1900, col. 1508-9.

8. Prélot 1950, xxv ff.

9. Newman 1887-1902, II, xxxv-xxxviii.

10. Dufour 1932, 17.

11. Weil 1960,55.

12. NE i,moreover, suggests that the appropriate attitude of the involves being a (1094b27ff.).

13. Even if the exposition is sometimes addressed to a wider audience or to incipientes [beginners]. Cf. Jaeger 1912, 131-63, n2.

14. A. Mansion 1927,308-10.

15. Gauthier I, 1:67-70.

16. The emphasis is mine.

17. "The Aristotelian school-literature represents, if I am allowed to express myself paradoxically, an oral tradition in written form.
Aristotle and his fellow scholars were continually working with this material. Their contributions take the form of additions or
amplifications. Theophrastus and Eudemus may use the same wording as Aristotle, because all of them, as a matter of course, draw from
the same source: the common school literature. This fact explains the fundamental problems in the history of the Aristotelian text. . . .
Aristotle's are thus to be regarded as a special kind of school literature, written entirely without literary ambitions,
which . . . does not at all mean that they from our point of view lack literary quality. Unlike Plato's or Aristotle's own dialogues they
were not protected by any literary proprietorship." (Düring 1950, 58 and 59).

18. , etc.
See: nos. 29, 33, 34, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 51, 55a, 57, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 86, 118, 119, 121, 124 (Diogenes

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Laërtius); 31, 33, 42, 44, 48, 61,65, 66, 67, 68, 69,78, 106, 107, 112, 116, 143, 144, 145, 147
(Hesychius) in Düring 1957, 43-49 and 82-87.

19. De Respiratione 12.477a5. Cf. Bonitz 103a45ff.

20. Cf. Bonitz 96b54ff. and Louis 1964, ix-x.

21. Dirlmeier 1962,12-13.

22. : NE ii 7.1107a33; Historia animalium (HA) i 17.497a32; iv 1.525a9; EE iii 1.1228a28; T i
14.105b13. : EE ii 3.1220b37; De interpretatione (DI) 13.22a22; Me i 8.346a32; ii 6.363a26; HA
iii 1.510a30; PA iii 5.668a17. For , see: De somn. 3.456b2; De respir. 8.474b9; 16.478b1; HA iii
1.509b21; 11.511a13; vi 10.565a12; PA ii 3.650a31; iii 4.666a9; 5.668b29; 14.674b16; iv 5.680a1; 8.684b4;
10.689a18; 13.696b14; GA i 11.719a10; ii 4.740a23; cf. no. 103-4 (Diogenes Laërtius); 93-94 (Hesychius).
Nos. 77, 82, 89 (Diogenes Laërtius) and 71, 74 (Hesychius) mention the other than the
collections of the Constitutions; for the latter see: Weil 1960, 97-116. Cf. Dirlmeier 1964, 312-13. On the
notion of "history" and its implication for "research" in Aristotle, see Louis 1955 and Gastaldi 1973.

23. References in Bonitz, 598a23-599a17.

24. For example, NE ii 2.1104b12 (which probably refers us back to Plato, Laws ii 653a-c).

25. P ii 1.1261a6-7 (i.e., Plato, Republic v 457a-466d; cf. iv 423e).

26. P ii 4.1262b1 1-12 (i.e., Plato, Symposium 191a-b).

3

1. I refer to the word as used to describe secret doctrines in Lucian, Vitarum auctio, 26 (=Düring 1957,430-
31 [T 76 e]).

2. On this subject, see Dirlmeier 1969b (who defends what is, in this respect, the least suspect interpretation
today).

3. Aulus Gellius, The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius (Cambridge, 1967), xx 5; Plutarchus, "Alexander," in his
Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans (New York, 1962), 805-6; Syrianus, Schol. in Hermogenem, IV, 297
(Walz).

4. Cf. Philoponus, Comm. in Ar. Cat., in CIAG, XIII.1, p. 6,18
, 22 .

5. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata v 9, p. 58, 3.

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6. Boas 1953,79-62.

7. One should probably challenge also the too simplistic view that all the Aristotelian dialogues are works of
popularization in the modern sense of the term.

4

1. See, in particular: Philoponus, Comm. in Ar. Cat., in CIAG, XIII.1, p. 3, 14-16 and Simplicius, Comm. in
Ar. Cat., in CIAG, VIII, p. 4, 10ff. In relation to this distinction, Aulus Gellius (The Attic Nights, xx 5) states
that at the Lyceum Aristotle gave lectures strictly reserved for initiates in the morning and lectures described
as "exoteric" vulgo juvenibus sine dilectu [in the popular fashion for youths without special qualification] in
the evening. J. P. Lynch takes this evidence seriously (Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff et al. 1981, 123).

2. Ammonius, Comm. in Ar. Cat., in CIAG, IV.4, p. 4, 21-27. This interpretation was directed against the
view some had expressed that Aristotle did not state his own views in the dialogues or exoteric writings
(Ibid., p. 4, 19-22).

3. H. Diels 1883, 477. This idea, in fact, was not new, seeing that, as I just said in the preceding note, it had
already been attacked by Ammonius.

4. EE i 8.1217b22-23.

5. Diels 1888,492-97.

6. Such would be the case, according to Diels, for NE i, beginning from 1094a22, for "The Ethics begins
with a strictly logical demonstration" (Diels 1888, 495).

7. Burnet 1900, xviii, xxiv-xxv (concerning the beginning of the NE). Burnet's primary idea, that the NE
addresses ethical problems with an unqualifiedly dialectical approach conforming to the practices sanctioned
by the Topics, is a view decisively abandoned today.

8. Diels 1888, 497: "But it should be clear by now that it is dangerous to try to infer the developmental stages
of Aristotelian philosophy from terminological distinctions in the treatises, to say nothing of the dialogues."

9. H. Flashar 1965. Flashar relies as much on the choice of different arguments as on the different ways in
which these arguments are set forth in the two texts: NE i 4.1096a9-1097a14 and EE i 8.1217b1-1218a32.

10. Jaeger (1948, 171ff.) thought that the peculiar differences between the criticism of the Ideas in M A 9 and
the criticism of the Ideas developed by M M 4-5 indicated that the first was temporally prior to the second.

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11. Flashar 1965, 240. Following Dirlmeier, Flashar also holds that close relations between an Aristotelian
text and the dialogues of Plato cannot always automatically constitute, in themselves, genuine evidence for
purposes of dating.

12. Vicol Ionescu 1973,1:131-267 (EE), 271-399 (NE).

13. Instead of attempting, as might have been wished, to develop a dialectical synthesis of studies about the
three Ethics of the Corpus, C. Vicol Ionescu willingly makes a blank slate of everything written on the
subject since Jaeger, and devotes himself, at the length of more than a thousand pages, to the exposition of an
allegedly new global solution of all the problems of "Entwicklung," using for this end weak, if not deceptive,
arguments, such as the one furnished by chronological interpretation of Aristotle's references to himself. He
thinks, moreover, that the "common books" (NE v-vii = EE iv-vi) and the MM (!) belong to the final stage of
Aristotle's evolution and are in harmony with the later theory of the soul (hylomorphism) stated in the DA.

14. Allan 1961.

15. The corollary would be, according to C. Vicol Ionescu, that, in order really to locate the philosopher's
thought, the interpreter must simultanteously take into consideration both accounts of ethics: "only by
considering together the two writings can one obtain the genuine treatise on ethics belonging to Aristotle's
systematic philosophy" (1973, 1:388).

16. Nos. 1-19 refer to the works (dialogues or not) made public by Aristotle and distributed to the public in
the Hellenistic era; concerning nos. 20-24, "Here we recognize Aristotle's synopsis of Plato's dialogues and
oral teaching" (Düring 1957, 68).

17. Bien 1968-69,264-314.

18. Bien 1968-69,290.

19. A convincing example, according to Bien, is provided by Aristotle's criticism of Plato's views. In P ii,
which tackles practical questions, Aristotle is not at all concerned with what falls under the jurisdiction of
philosophy in the strict sense, namely, the cogency of Plato's equation of theoretical excellence and practical
excellence in the mind of the philosopher-king; for "such an assertion is not for him (Aristotle) a specifically
political problem or issue."

20. Bien 1968-69, 298.

21. Bien 1968-69, 304.

22. In the sense understood by the prologue of the NE.

23. Cf. Flashar 1965.

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24. EE i, for example, can seem focused upon the concept of less completely than the first book
of the NE.

25. However, from this way of regarding the EE, there is a danger of treating it as a perfectly homogeneous
whole. Its prologue (i 1-6), especially, seems to have another style, more carefully wrought, more "literary"
than that of the texts to which it is an introduction (cf. Gigon 1971, 133 and Dirlmeier 1969a, note on
passage under discussion); it opens, after all, with citation of a Delphic maxim (EE i 1.1214a5-6: cf. NE i
9.1099a27-28; Plato, Gorgias 451e; Meno 87e; Euthydemus 279a; Philebus 48d; Gigon 1971, 95), following
a procedure used in written work intended for publication (cf. Sur la philosophie, fr. 1 Walzer, which refers
to the maxim ). As for the fragments which make up book viii, they have suffered too much in
transmission for scholars to be able to compare them validly, from the point of view of form, with the
remainder of the texts which belong to the EE.

5

1. Krämer 1967. On the subject that concerns us here, cf. Marten 1977.

2. Cherniss 1944 and Cherniss 1962. See Krämer's criticisms with respect to these works (1967, 380ff.).

3. Krämer 1967,479.

4. Whose "axiological meaning" is developed by the dialogues (Krämer 1967, 454).

5. Solmsen 1929,92-135.

6. Krämer 1967,380-454.

7. Krämer 1967,454-86.

8. Krämer 1967,480.

9. In the ordinary sense of the term, i.e., according to the rules of an established literary genre (in a
publication for common use).

10. On this subject cf. Aubenque 1967, 17.

Section II

1

1. Cf. above, chap. 4, sect. II.2.

2. Diogenes Laërtius v 3. Cf. other testimonies in Düring 1957, 299-314 (especially: Quintilian, Inst. Or. iii
1, who teaches us that Aristotle gave lectures in the afternoon). These testimonies obviously involve a good
deal of imagination: cf. Chroust 1973, : 105ff.

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292 Kock (cf. P vii 1." as a rule. 8 = Düring 1957. 6: . Philemon ii. Aristoxenus. 737 Kock. Düring (1966.< previous page page_185 next page > Page 185 3. Philoponus. in CIAG.191-200. a "prologue. De Aeternitate Mundi vi 27. 303 Kock). Jackson 1920. in Ar. 3. 98 and 108-9 (commentary). 6. Cf. Capelle 1930. 5-37. But the two terms are. Lynch's study (1972) was not accessible when this chapter was written. 1ff. 496 Kock. 5. Düring 1954. Cf. 1 and 2 Wehrli II:9.1323a14-21. 237 Kock and Philippides iii. XVIII. I do not feel that I am obliged to modify its text after consulting Lynch's work. Contrary to what Brunschwig states (1971. 114. He refers us to the evidence of T i 14. Cat. Vita Marciana. 10. but without bringing the reader any real discoveries. and Herter 1946.1414b19-20). pp. 1981) take precedence over positive ones. 8. Vita Marciana. be surprised that this professorial 'tic' of the Stagirite left no direct traces in the Corpus. Elias. Gaiser 1980. 4. 6. in practice. 7. 209): "One may . 27 in von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff et al. 108) thinks that Aristotle did not have the (servile) status of an and that this nickname was given to him because of his propensity to read much. 353 Kock. 34ff. Amphis ii. 4. 9-11. Natali. ..105b12: . p. Comm. 1921. Elementa Harm. Brunschwig 1971. See: Theopompus i. 209. In this area negative conclusions ("the ancient philosophical schools had no direct similarity with our university"C. Usener 1884. 2 1. Lynch takes the bearings of our information on the subject and compares the two "brotherhoods" which the Lyceum and the Academy were." 5. 386. 7 in Düring 1957. 29ff. . is to the prose discourse of orators what a "prelude" is to poetic compositions: an introduction to the subject (R iii 14. Fr.61-77. Cratinus ii. Alexis ii. equivalent and interchangeable. 9. Howald. According to Aristotle. cf. 7. < previous page page_185 next page > . ii 30-31. 2.

For this reason. From the fact that one is often obliged to restrict oneself to giving an "outline." (cf.1107a30-31. Aristotle lists three kinds of which he describes as formed (cf. 18. NE i 11. by recourse to a principle drawn from somewhere else. a scientific proof which one might claim to adduce in addition. Cf.< previous page page_186 next page > Page 186 8.1356a2-4).1355a26.1328a17-21.. is allied very closely to that used by Aristotle himself at the beginning of the NE. 7. The topic is the hedonist theory defended by the philosopher from Cnidos. P vii 7. M α 3. In the same work. For the ideal of . 9.e. R i 1. proclaimed a priori for every kind of knowledge.994b32ff. described as consideration for the irreducible peculiarities involved in the facts of each given science (cf.1094a ff. that he judges that we not only can. the philosopher never infers that the inquirer remains at most within the bounds of the probable. < previous page page_186 next page > .1104a7-9. The Audience of the Political Discourses Section I 1.1415a23-26. stated in NE x 2. ix 9. 20-23.1172b15-16. content ourselves with it. This famous inventory. 3. i.1172b9ff. Elementa Harmonica ii 1. illusory. but must. 2. therefore. Eudoxus' reasoning. 7.1169b27-30. relative to the supreme good (i 1. iii 5. Chapter 5. R i 1. Gigon 1971. 391-414 and Heyde 1941). 3 1.1358a37-b1).1112a34-b9. who cannot ever be suspected of wishing to rationalize a personal lack of control with respect to pleasure. Kurz 1970. set up for discourse which cannot be assimilated to scientific exposition. Cf. is not without some relevance to the latter. 4.39-51 and passim. Aristoxenus. 9. a little later (i 2. This derives from R iii 14.). iv 11. von Blumenthal 1928. would be inappropriate and.1356a6- 8: . Aristotle substitutes the ideal of (adequateness). and Buchheit 1960.1126a31-35.1109b14- 16. it is precisely because Aristotle is convinced that an approximate description of the phenomena truly reveals the reality. 2. ii 2. 3.b2-4.1098a26-29. short of truth.1101a24-28.). 132. On the contrary. NE x 2. 88ff. 3.

In this connection. 12. NE vii.1356b5. 10. on the other hand.1095a2-4. 13.1172b3-7. Speaking. to determine whether the term . 14. NE i 1. then. 16. in particular. and ) and above all the . i 2. can be distinguished from the (mentioned at EE i 6. 11. 7. NE x 1. The (or : cf. 1154a25-26. The use and justification of this procedure appear in the EE (ii 1. The translation closely follows T. refers to discourses properly so called or the reasoning expressed in them. above.1179a17-20. 15. Cf..< previous page page_187 next page > Page 187 5. note 29 of Introduction. this "lack of attention" on the part of the EE's author needs to be explained.1172a34-35.1152b23) with equivalent meaning.Tr.1375b26-1376a32. 1357b1ff.-It is difficult. NE x 1.1154a22-25. NE x 9. 19. 8. Irwin (1985).1216b26-28. < previous page page_187 next page > .1393a28. The idea derives from the participle (line 6). The difference between the NE here and the EE (passage cited in note 7) seems to be that the NE passage conveys a greater distrust of . 17.1145b3) and (12. NE vii 15. 15. 6. 18. cf. Aristotle adds (a35-b1): . I favor the hypothesis that he felt that he did not have to emphasize such problems for the readers of a study-aid not intended for . Verhaeghe 1965.1219a40-b1) and in the NE (i 8. are carefully considered from this perspective in the Rhetoric.1216b28. at first and most prominently in connection with happiness. If this is correct. 9. uses (1. See. in our passage. EE i 6. cited above. ii 20. for instance. 30ff. The (observable facts). mentioned by the philosopher in the passage reproduced above. 1179a20-22. of the partisans of hedonism. which belong to the arsenal of the employed by the orator.1098b9-12) in connection with the same topics. note 7) insofar as the latter can be assimilated to opinions regarding facts.

Laches 182dff. 14. I know Jackson 1973 only through the brief summary found in Diss. Sections II. Abstracts 34 (1974): 4325 A.< previous page page_188 next page > Page 188 20. Protagoras 320b. 11. Cf. Gorgias 979a12-13. 245b. 98d-99e. Meno 80d-e and 70a (cf. A modified version of the Ross-Urmson translation (Barnes 1984) has been used.71a1-2. Ion 533d. 205. Cf. see especially T viii 11. 204-6. Drechsler 1935. SR 2. see Salman 1955.141a30. NE ii 1. Plato. Gorgias 454e-455a. i 1. 89d. 21. 7. 9ff. Melissus. T vi 4. 3. The two words are often used together by Aristotle: cf. 462c. Xenophanes. Plato. Cratylus 383a.1147a21-22: . 269d. 521e. Meno 81 a ff. 12.1095a4-6. Cf. I of this chapter. sect. Sextus Emp. 12ff. Protagoras 323c). Gaudron 1947. Euthydemus 274c. 273n105. De Interpretatione (DI)2.. L.1 1. Untersteiner 1967. 2.161a25ff.1179b23-28.Tr. Levi 1966. For a general summary of Aristotle's argument. NE i 1. Cf. II. etc. 1. Contra Dog. NE x 10. 13. above.86 and n3. Cf. < previous page page_188 next page > . Levi 1966. Brochard 1923. Pseudo-Aristotle. (in response to the question how one can find a thing of which one knows nothing). Contra Log. 10. Méridier 1964. Aubenque 1967.165b3. 5. Plato. 15. Plato. On this subject. Phaedrus 244a. NE vii 5. 22. 6. and Buchheit 1960. 16. 9.16b29. Cf. 4. 6..7-13.1103a15-17. A Post. 8. 1. Cf.16a19 and 4. 254). Hypotyposes iii 267-268 (cf.

Aristotle posits. which. see Snell 1924. NE vii 1147a11-13.1139b26). for instance. Tricot 1967. 19. NE vii 1147a24. 2." For the origin of the word. 3. Gauthier II. does not seek to formulate any prescriptive rule (law) for the organization of cities or the conduct of human beings. the other having also an "epitactic" function. as such.71a1-11. This kind of distinction seems to go back to a famous passage of Plato's Statesman (260a-b). Cf. alongside the science of the lawgiver . cf.1143a17-18.1179b27. Cf. i 1. 2 1. Particularly at NE x 10. M K 1 (in its entirety). 5. because of the complexity of those observed facts. 147-50. 2:519ff. which tries to justify. Aristotle bases himself here on the obvious point that it is easier to picture mathematical objects for oneself than to infer the first principles of a science from the observed facts which those principles explain. SR 34 (which criticizes the Sophists' approach to the subject). the translation of the word by ''conscience. but consists in the ability to evaluate correctly formulations of such rules. 3.141a28-30 and M A 9. the one having only a "critical" function. NE vi 11. T vi 4. 45ff.. it is the latter which Plato identifies with "architectonic" science. 4. 2. NE x 10. M A 1.1142b34-1143a18. Cf. Cf. 4. NE vi 11. which divides "gnostic" science into two species.1142a18- 20: . 3 1. 1147a18-19 (the passage discussing the drunkard's recitation of Empedocles). 331n1. Cf.< previous page page_189 next page > Page 189 17. 18. The terminology of this passage is fully explained in Mansion 1946. In a similar fashion.981b7-10. in the context. < previous page page_189 next page > . which refers to passages (probably A Post. NE vi 9. an exclusively "critical" form of knowing. Cf.1181a17-18.992b24-33).. 6. NE vii 1147b11-12. The idea that every type of intellectual apprenticeship derives from prior knowledge is formulated in the NE (vi 3.

NE x 10.1 1. 9.1339a36-38. P viii 5. A hypothesis considered at P viii 5. 9. The expression .< previous page page_190 next page > Page 190 5.1341a10-11. 8."' 7." could perhaps also mean "as they (the Lacedaemonians) claim. 49. A hypothesis considered in P viii 5. 3.1094b27-28. 4. P viii 5. etc. in ordinary language. The verb used here is one of those redoubled presents whose primitive meaning (preserved here by Aristotle) is revealed by Chantraine 1964. P viii 6.1339b4-5: .1339b5-6.1181a17-b3.1339b2-4. by the way the word is used. The neuter plural seems to me indeed to designate concrete realities rather than the general formulae of the discourse which refers to them. 7. P viii 6.1340b41-1341a3. In this connection. 8. NE x 10.1340b24-25.1340b35-39. Sections III. 5. 6. A hypothesis considered at P viii 5. 10.1339b7-10. although both are involved in the context. Aristotle refers here to evidence supplied by the notions inherent in mythopoetic images of Zeus.1339a41-42: . the argument presented would obviously lose its force. NE i 1. 12.1181a19.1339a31- 33: . III. P viii 5. this evidence is confirmed. 2. P viii 6.1094b27-28. P viii 6. < previous page page_190 next page > . NE i 1. 6. 17. 11." But.1095a3. which I translate "as people say. NE i 1. 224: "it seems to express an action that one repeats in order to succeed: 'learn to know bit by bit. see Anderson 1966. in this case. P viii 5.

1282a3-4. Rivals 135c- d. 3. This consideration is equally valid on the practical and theoretical levels. For its relevance to moral judgment. 7. 16. We should understand here as practice of the art. Pseudo-Plato.1338a32.1338b1- 2. 15. though one word has been changed. The B. P viii 6. 6. Isocrates.1338a32 (where Aristotle sets forth the positive ideal of an ). P viii 3. note 8 to sections III. 2. P viii 7. Newman 1887- 1902. Cf. Cf. first subsection. P viii 3. 10.1281b40. belonging to the sphere of understanding. III.1338a17- 19. 3.1. above.1342a19-21. 8. See particularly Plato.Tr. P iii 11. viii 3. 11. 4 1. P viii 3. Cf. VI. 5.1282a4- 5.1341b9-14. . 18. Cf. I:365n2. see P viii 5. belonging to the sphere of musical production.< previous page page_191 next page > Page 191 13. P iii 11. 4. chap. sect. not an empirical knowledge of things.1341a18- 19. Jowett translation (Barnes 1984) has been used here.1340a14-18: 2. Antidosis 264. P iii 11. 14. :354n3. 17. P viii 6. I. Newman 1887-1902. 9. Charmides 171 b-c and Protagoras 319c.

< previous page page_191 next page > . 7. Xenophon. Memorabilia i 4.12.

1338b32-36. 16. 168. 100n16 (for the earlier bibliographical references) and 107ff. 7. Kullmann 1974. PA i 1. p. 20. who seem. Kullmann 1974. 1. 14. 222-333 and my review of this study in Bodéüs 1975b. XXII. vii 17. finally. I. relates to the fact that their judgment actually varies with the subject-matters considered. on this subject. Cf. 13. 5.2. hesitant to express their opinions.3. < previous page page_192 next page > .2. III. 4. On this subject. 11. Cf. According to Plato. Newman 1887-1902. Michael in CIAG. note I to section 111.1 1. 5. 18.639a4ff.1395a2-5. 16. Cf. 13-20. above.1335b5-8). P viii 2.2. :354n4. chap. IV.1391a17. sect. Laws vii 810b. at first glance.< previous page page_192 next page > Page 192 13.1356a29ff. constitutes an ideal often emphasized by Aristotle in connection with physical exercise or the games of early childhood: P viii 4. P viii 2. The second case is the only one which a "person of experience" in the field is competent to evaluate. 2.1-3. M α 3. 19.1337b15- 17: . Anonymous in CIAG. some of them deserving in-depth discussion. See. R ii 21. others not. Avoidance of the extremes. see Tracy 1969. the passages from the Politics cited in chap. 17.994b32ff. he judges not the appropriateness of the act relative to the situation but the quality of the performance. Protagoras 318e-319a. 15.1337b8-11. 6. p. Alexander in CIAG. 3. The difficulty of interpreting all these passages and reconstructing the definitive thought of their authors. sects. R i 2. R ii 17. and preservation of the proper middle point. 5. on the R passage under discussion. 107-8.. Sections IV.1336a28-30 (cf. Plato. XXI.

M α 3. PA i 1. 10. M Γ 4. Burnet 1900. I:34-37. NE i 1. R i 2. Cf. 5. 9.< previous page page_193 next page > Page 193 8. Cf.1356a27-30. 3 1. notes 1 and 2. 12. 4. 2. 2:3.31. Gauthier I. 237n3. R iii 1. Stewart 1892. 12. and Michelet 1848.1005b35ff. 127ff. Tricot 1967. Grant 1885.1216b40-1217a10. I:8ff.1404a24-29. 1:15. Cf. above.1094b25. passage cited in note 6 of sections IV.22-23.995a6-8. EE i 6. xxxiii.1. Le Blond 1945.2 of this chapter. < previous page page_193 next page > . and Flashar 1965. 2. Cf. 2 1. sect. 130n4 and Torraca 1961. 7. 1:15. 3. 11. 223ff. 3. 6.639a3-6. 5.1005b2ff. Gauthier II. Hardie 1968. PA i 1. Dirlmeier 1969a. NE x 10. 10. 111. 9. 38. Gauthier II. IV. and 1006a5-7. 4.1181a11ff. Düring 1943. 6. 7. Cf. M Γ 3. 8.639a13-14.

639a4-12. M α 3. 10. Whose capacities are useful only in a single domain (cf. Cf. Cf.1338b34-35: ). De Vogel 1955.2. sect. Le Blond 1945. 130. here should be understood in the broad sense. Kühnert 1961. 42ff.639a8-11 and 13-14.995a12-13.282-86.639a13. 9. 5. Balme 1970. Ogle in Barnes 1984. Aubenque 1962. 5. Cf. IV. Cf. 13. 307-23. 12. but judging its suitability. since. the end of sect. 9. 11. but this view cannot be sustained. see. NE i 1.XXII. 12.1094b19ff.995a13-15. Souilhé (Souilhé and Cruchon 1930. 10. PA i 1.1094b25-27. III of chap. 1 of chap. 4 1. 1. Kuhnert 1961. being a is precisely contrasted to being or man of science. Michael of Ephesus. 12-21. 8.8 (note on NE i 1. Kullmann 1974. on this subject. English tr. NE i 1.1095a3). The activity of the is not testing the validity of the reasoning. < previous page page_194 next page > . by W. 13. 2. 127. PA i 1. 7. 14ff. 96-97.639a13-14.1094b28-1095a2 and PA i 1. 8) thought he recognized there the contrast between the generally educated person and the specialist. p. 11. P viii 4.1095a3. M α3. Werner 1912. NE i 1. 14. above. Ramsauer 1878. 13. Kullmann 1974. in CIAG.. 3.109-11.< previous page page_194 next page > Page 194 8. 5. in every field. 6. 4. NE i 1. PA i 1.

< previous page page_195 next page > Page 195 15. NE ii 2. 10. NE x 9. The author has in mind the sense which the term has in PA i 1. NE i 1. iii 16. and architectonic understanding. Section V 1 1. vi 2.1095b2. for similar reasons. 4. Cf. P vii 14. with the younger persons constituting the .1299b25. 7. I agree with Bywater that the reading is preferable to the reading followed by Aspasius .1214b8.639a5 and 11. 8. Cf.1147a25-35. 17. NE vi 8. in the strict sense of the term. 2 1. Cf. P iv 15. It is to be noted that. NE i 2.1095a9.1104b11-12: . Plato.. 2. NE vi 5. 2.1095a4ff. and EE i 2. Cf. NE x 10.1179a18-19: . Kullmann 1974.1332b41-1333a16 also reserves to mature persons the exercise of power in the state. PA i 1.639a7-8. Laws ii 653a. NE vii 5. see particularly Grant 1956.1140b7-10. Cf. Ritchie 1897. NE vii 5.98. 4-6. 5.1151a18-19. 3. 6.1317b39. and Robinson 1955. insofar as it describes a characteristic with implications for both practical understanding. 9. Kenny 1966.1287b25-26. NE i 1. 16. EE i 6. < previous page page_195 next page > . 163-64.1147b5-6.1141b24ff.1179b31-32. On this subject. 3. 18.1217a6-7. 4. NE vii 9. The adjective in this passage seems to me to defy translation. Cf.

"experience of the actions characteristic of life. 6.1288b37-39. Finally. P iv 1. in concluding. P iii 11. Kullmann 1974. or more precisely.1288b23. cf.1310a12ff.1275b4-5: (cf. P iii 1. 13. and this requirement.1283b42ff. 4. vii 4.1337a11-15. P iv 2. although it recognizes in principle the distinction between an inquiry for theoretical purposes and an inquiry for practical purposes and although it criticizes Socratic intellectualism (because it neglects the most important question concerning how virtue is produced: EE i 5. P iv 1. But the notion appears there only as part of a refutation of the requirement that every type of proposition receive a reasoned justification. Besides. it is well aware of the ill consequences of (EE i 6. P iv 1.). 12.1332a29. although the EE does not explicitly draw the positive implications of this fact for the . Let us note.1337a21-26 wished.1288b24.1216b3-25). 8. For Aristotle the "practical life" is synonymous with the "political life": NE i 3.1325b36.< previous page page_196 next page > Page 196 11. It is not used to support the recommendation to restrict the discourse to approximate (or nonrigorous) demonstration or to accept conclusions valid only for the most part-points which seem essential to the NE. 117-22). 2. the EE totally ignores the prior requirement of an without which knowledge acquired from the discourse remains useless. And no longer necessarily entrusted to the city.1282b10-11. found only in the NE. cf. 35.1289b14-16. iv 1. Without a doubt. < previous page page_196 next page > . 8." is required for comprehending the discourse and for judging its conformity to reality.1289a3-4. 28. how much Aristotle's concern with the listener in the NE (particularly in the prologue) contrasts with what we find in the EE. excludes young people from the class of possible listeners..1215b3. 5.1289a13-15: . 13. EE i 4. Are these differences evidence that the EE is not composed of texts which were conceived for the purpose of ? It is not impossible. 3. v 9. Conclusion 1.1308b20-24. as P viii 1. the EE never alludes to the fact that an . 1.1095b22-23. 7. P viii 1.: .1216b40ff.

so that frequent transformation of existing laws into new laws weakens the power of the law. 10.1269a19-24: "Change in a technique and change in the law are not the same thing. 148-51 and Contogiorgis 1978. cf. 14. Blasucci 1977. 16.1099b30-32. MM i 20. For law has no persuasive force apart from habit.1334a22-25.< previous page page_197 next page > Page 197 9. 15. P vii 15. P iv 1.1334a14.1289a12-13. A superficial reading of the texts leads easily to the charge that Aristotle is a "machiavel" (cf. which does not emerge without a considerable length of time. NE i 10. NE x 7-9. It is the aim of P v (where the causes of political revolution are studied in order to find ways to ward off revolutions wherever and whenever they might be possible). < previous page page_197 next page > . NE iii 9-12. 250. 130). 13. one can get beyond this impression just as easily by bearing in mind Aristotle's recognition that laws (constitutional and otherwise) must endure if the power of law itself is not to be destroyed. which refers to P ii 8. P vii 15. cf. EE iii 1. Mulgan 1977. 12." 11.

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this index lists. 138n1 viii 11. 188n1 i 1. (Bekker location) 16a9.< previous page page_225 next page > Page 225 Index of Passages from Plato and Aristotle Data for most references are given in the endnotes. 20.105b13. 188n1 vi 6. 188n10 4. 102. 102. the note number occurs in the main text on page 101.71a1-11.105b19-30.71a1-2. 139n4 vi 6. 181n22 i 14. 185n5 i 14. 135n2 i 33. 100. 87. 20.22a22.141a28-30. 101.145a18. 25. Aristotle De interpretatione 2.165b3. the first Aristotle passage listed below.141a30. 102. 101. 17.. the page in the main text on which the note number occurs and the page on which the corresponding endnote occurs.105b12. together with the note number itself. De interpretatione chapter 2. 40.16b29. Thus. is referenced in note 10 on page 188. 101. 93. 135n1 vi 4.157a8-11.89b9. 189n1 . For the reader's convenience.145a17-18. 16. 189n2 i 33. 138n1 vi 6. 188n12 Sophistical Refutations 2. 188n13 34. 87.16a9.161a25ff. 134n20. 181n22 Analytica Posteriora i 1. 188n10 13. 152n9 Topica i 14.89b7-9. 144n15 viii 1.145a13-18. 100. 134n20. 13. 101. 13. 189n2 vi 4. 20. for every such reference.

139n9 Meteorologica i 1.34..184a9-b2. 17.228a28-29. 136n12 iv 10. 181n22 De anima 90. 83. 136n3 iii 4-5.427b26. 138n20 iii 7. 153n11 v 4. 21. 15. 178n19 34. 17. 40.415a11-12. 136n7 i 3.194a20. 134n20 iii 3. 179n2 34. 181n22 ii 6.403a29.407a23.338a20-339a10. 87. 17. 183n13 i 1. 18. 135n14 < previous page page_225 next page > .427b11-16. 83. 83. 179n3 34. 178n14 i 8. 178n18 De coelo 19. 136n3 iii 4-7. 136n3 iii 3. 87. 13.184b2-8.346a32. 79. 78.306a16-17.183b16-22.217b30-31. 179n4 Physica ii 2.183b16ff. 17. 79. 13. 134n20 ii 3.363a26.

87. 14. 194n12 i 1. 87. 114.639a4ff.433a18-19.510a30. 117. 181n22 iii 1. 181n22 Partes animalium i 1. 87.456b2. 195n15 i 1. 87.639a5.474b9.433a17-20.525a9. 13. 181n19 16.640a3. 13. 21. 194n2 i 1. 193n4 i 1. 87. 134n20 iii 10. 139n6. 111.477a5.639a13. 181n22 vi 10.. 87.478b1. 148n28 iii 10. 110.430a17ff.497a32. 87. 134n9 iii 10. 114. 181n22 iv 1. 117. 117. 87. 195n18 i 1. 26. 181n22 iii 1. 115. 195n15 i 1. 192n3 i 1.< previous page page_226 next page > Page 226 iii 5.639a4-12.509b21. 117. 181n22 iii 1. 117. 194n13.639a11.639a3-6.433a15-20. 87. 87. 144n22 . 111.433a14-18. 17.639a8-11.565a12. 194n12 i 1.639a13-14. 136n3 iii 10. 134n20 De somniis 3. 181n22 Historia animalium i 17.. 181n22 De respiratione 8. 193n5. 32.511a13. 194n12 i 1.639a7-8. 181n22 12.

181n22 iv 8. 87. 181n22 iii 4.981b7-9.981a1-12. 181n22 iv 5. 71. 71. 165n7 ii 3.646a30ff.981b7-10. Xenophanes.680a1.645a4-6.. 181n22 ii 8. 19.i 2. 181n22 iii 5.689a18.981a5ff.645a4-7. 173n16 i 1-2. 167n20. 181n22 iii 5. 74. 19. 173n18 . 137n14 i 5. 77. 78.642b5ff. 181n22 Generatio animalium i 11. 59. 181n22 iv 10.696b14. 181n22 iv 13.641b18-20. 19. 138n19 i 5.668b29. 87.666a9. 189n5 i 1.748a8. 87.644b22-31. 138n18. 19. 100. Gorgias 979a12-13. 87. 87. 136n6 Melissus. 71. 173n15 i 1. 138n20 i (A).684b4. 94 i 1.668a17. 87. 17.674b16. 21.645a4. 181n22 iii 14. 87. 87. 137n14 i 2. 178n15 i 5. 181n22 ii 4. 87. 168n24 i 1. 54. 176n16 i 1.719a10. 177n3 ii 1. 188n5 Metaphysics 19. 140n11 i 5.650a31.740a23. 103.. 87.981b25.. 87. 58.

136n12. 112.1013a10-14.995b5. 178n19 ii 1. 194n11 iii (B) 1. 135n26 < previous page page_226 next page > . 61. 21. 182n10 i 9. 139n9 i 6. 134n20. 111. 114.994b32ff.993b20-21. 65. 140n1. 143n12 i 9. 110. 192n1 ii 3. 114.982b4.i 1. 193n7 ii 3. 75. 24. 95..995a12-13..995a6-8. 142n3 ii 1. 189n2 ii (α) 1.993b11-19.1006a5-7. 63. 13. 25. 193n9 iv 4. 193n7 iv 4. 137n3. 18.987b1-2. 21. 176n20 vi (E) 1. 94 iv (Γ) 3. 22. 169n12 i 2. 171n17 i 2. 79. 193n7 v (∆) 1. 90.993b19-23. 102. 186n2.1005b2ff. 194n10 ii 3. 112..982b11-21.1005b35ff. 140n10 ii 1.995a13-15.1025b3-4. 170n5 v 7-9. 114. 16.981b31-33.992b24-33.

103. 14. 138n1 xi 7.1064a10ff. 136n10 vi 1. 52. 137n14 ix (Θ) 2.1072b12. 153n11 xiii 4-5. 91.1094a2.1094a1ff. 20. 163n1 i 1. 5. 136n12 Nicomachean Ethics i-iv. 189n4 xi 7.1076a27-29.1094a14ff. 142n3 vi 5. 182n10 xiii 4. 139n3 vi 1.. 90. 134n20. 18. 70. 139n9 xi (K) 1.1046b2.1025b6.1026a28-29.1025b5-7. 91. 21.1025b18-28. 20. 173n7.1094a6-9. 170n6 i 1. 183n22 i 1.1025b18-26.1063b36-1064b14.1074b38-1075a3. 24.1094a16-18. 18. 139n9 xiii (M) 1. 134n20 vi 1.. 63. 94.1094a4-6. 139n5 vi 1.. 13. 19. 61. 138n1 vi 1. 135n12 vi 1. 13. 168n9 i 1. 14. 13. 139n7 vi 1. 135n12 xii (Λ) 7.1025b5ff.1025b25-26. 19. 21. 40. 134n20 vi 1. 6. 186n3 i . 184n24 i 1.1025b3-28.1025b23-24. 170n11 i 1. 20. 21.1078b19-20. 63. 21. 97. 137n14 xii 9.. 129n29 i. 63. 170n11 .< previous page page_227 next page > Page 227 vi 1.

1094b23-25. 182n6 i 1. 117 i 1. 95 i 1. 3. 114. 39. 172n6 i 1.1094b11. 134n18 i 1. 61. 168n23 i 1.1094a27-b7.i 1. 61. 27.1094b11-14.1094b6-7. 117 i 1. 112. 165n18 i 1. 129n29. 39. 60.1094b22ff. 152n5. 180n12 i 1. 142n14.1094a22ff.1094b27-1095a2. 41. 168n3 i 1.. 154n30.1094b15.. 118.1094b16-18. 25. 95 i 1. 169n11 i 1. 152n4 i 1.. 87. 170n9 i 1. 143n10.1094b22-1095a11. 193n11 i 1. 166n25 i 1. 143n10 i 1. 63.1094a27. 117 i 1.. 118 i 1. 13. 168n3 i 1.1094b22. 118 . 55.1094b22-27. 59. 162n22 i 1. 56.1094b27ff. 95. 63.. 95 i 1. 41. 57. 105. 153n21. 51.1094b11-22.1094a26.1094a23-b2. 60.1094b10-11. 194n9 i 1. 25. 168n10 i 1.1094b25-27.1094b19ff. 90.1094b22-23.1094b27-1095a4. 117 i 1.1094b25. 114 i 1.1094b14-19.1094b19-22. 169n16 i 1.1094b17ff. 194n8 i 1. 170n24 i 1. 67.1094b4.1094b5-7. 6.1094a27ff. 24. 114. 167n4. 62. 118 i 1..1094b11-1095a4.

1095b17-19. 6.1095a11. 84. 143n10 i 2.1094b28-1095a2. 53. 164n21. 57.1095a4ff. 134n11 i 3. 105. 187n17 i 1. 195n1 i 1.1095a5. 129-130n29 i 2. 48. 118. 62.1095b14-1096a5. 163n12 i 1. 48. 52. 190n7.1095a5-6. 121.1095a16. 3 i 3. 119.1095b2.1095a12-13.1095a2-4. 94 i 1. 163n13. 99.1095a10-11. 14. 52. 164n14 i 1.1095a28-30. 179n1 i 1. 119 i 1.1095a12.1095a1-2. 25. 115. 25. 173n9 i 1. 53. 179n1 i 2.1095a9. 104.1094b27-28. 6. 85. 119. 119.1095a4. 104. 119 i 1.1095a1. 160n8 i 2.1095a3. 190n8 i 1. 164n14 i 1.1095a2. 119.1095a30-b13. 195n3 i 1. 116..i 1.1095b5-6.1095a4-5. 100.1095a4-6. 164n22 i 1. 52. 194n9 i 1. 5. 52. 169n16 i 1. 164n15. 143n10.1095b4. 4. 60. 188n21 i 1. 130n29 i 2.1095a2-3. 195n7 i 2. 71. 168n3 i 1. 190n6. 53. 167n8 i 1.1095a8. 194n2 i 1. 159n9 < previous page page_227 next page > .

1099b29-32. 42.1103a23ff..< previous page page_228 next page > Page 228 i 3. 143n10 i 10.1102a18-19. 143n10 i 13. 6.1102a7-10. 129n29. 125.1099b30-32. 62. 25. 62.1103a15-16. 153n11 ii 1.1099b9ff. 162n17 . 169n21 i 13. 197n12 i 11. 147n3 ii 1.1103a15-17. 129n29 i 7. 90. 30. 184n25 i 10.1096b30-31. 169n15 i 13. 186n2 i 12. 162nn6-7 i 10. 6. 48.1099b11-14.1095b22-23.1098a26-29.1103a16-17. 186n2 i 8.1098b9-12. 129n29 i 13. 95. 182n9 i 4.1099b9-11. 162nn6-7 i 10.1099a27-28. 161n2 i 10.1096a9-1097a14. 143n10.1099b29. 6.1102a7-13. 134n11 i 7. 196n11 i 4. 129n29 i 13. 174n5 i 10. 50. 49. 6. 130n29 i 5. 30. 187n10 i 9.1099b0.1101a24-28. 95.1102a25. 41. 62. 25.1102a12. 98. 62. 169n19 i 13. 40..1097b33-1098a18. 91. 188n15 ii 1. 49. 51.1097b11. 153n21 i 13. 162n25.1098a20-b8. 25. 6. 72.1101b34-1102a1. 159n2. 122. 129n29. 6.1102a26-27. 101. 49. 169n15 i 10. 155n38 i 6. 14. 147n1 ii 1.1102a23-27.

129n29 ii 7. 62.1108a4-6. 52. 19. 195n2 ii 2. 170n22 iii 5.1104b1-13.1108a1-4.1113a33.1107a33-1108b10. 87. 48.1109b14-16. 40. 48.1104a7-9. 158n72 ii 7.1104b12. 129n29 ii 7. 136n6 ii 7. 95. 169n17 iii 6. 153n14 ii 7. 36. 17. 186n2 iii 5.1108a11.1103b2-6.1103b26-30. 136n7 ii 7. 71.1107b14-16. 17.1103b27-28. 186n2 ii 7.1109b32-35.1107a28.1104b11-12. 152n73 . 137n14 iii 5.1109a23-24.1107a33. 148n29.1105b22. 6.1112a34-b9.1107a28-33. 160n8 ii 2. 181n24 ii 2. 129n29 ii 9. 129n29 ii 7. 17. 186n2 ii 9. 143n10 ii 4.1107a30-31.1112a21-23.1105a12. 45. 95. 169n20 ii 1. 118. 136n7 ii 7.1103b26-1104a11. 6. 95.1109b20-23. 129n29 ii 2. 181n22 ii 7. 87.1112b 1-14. 62. 95. 186n2 iii 1. 6.1104a1. 32. 129n29 ii 9.1108b7-10. 157n68 ii 7. 163n2 ii 2.1103b24. 25.ii 1. 160n8 ii 2. 6. 173n10 ii 2. 95. 6. 44. 153n15 ii 2. 6. 186n2 ii 2. 62.1107a29-30. 40.

1138b25-26. 171n12 v 3. 186n2 iv 13. 25. 197n13 iii 9. 169n20 v-vii (= EE iv-vi). 186n2 iv 11. 35. 160n11. 66. 151n65 iii 9-12. 169n20 vi. 6. 28. 172n3 v 3. 140n16 vi 2. 172n4 v 3. 66.1122a18-25. 48. 42.. 169n20 iii 7. 158n71 iv 11. 33. 44.1115a29-31.1139a21-22. 33..1129b4-6. 34. 152n2 v 3.1129a11-15. 29.1114a19-21. 146n28. 1145n22 vi 2.1129a5-6. 25. 62. 173n7 vi 1.1127a14-17. 22.1125b8. 62. 155n40 v 5.1130b28. 158n70 iv 9. 66. 95.1129b26-27.1139a21ff.1139a15-16. 6.1139a26ff. 129n29 iv 14. 150n47.1129b12-19. 149n36 vi 2.1129b19-23. 144n16 vi 2.1113b21-26.iii 7.. 90. 45. 149n40 v 1. 22. 143n10 v 14. 158n69 iv 4. 149n34 vi 2.1128a30-31. 183n13 v. 129n29.1126b2-4.1125a34-10. 130n29 vi 2. 130n29 v 1.1126a31-35. 64. 62. 37.1137b28. 70.1129a13ff.1139a23-25. 95. 140n14 < previous page page_228 next page > .1139a26-29. 33. 6. 125. 45. 6. 172n3 v 1.

32. 32. 13.1140a3.1139b1. 189n2 vi 3. 136n3 vi 3.1139a29. 136n3 vi 4.1140a30-31. 139n3 vi 3. 148n22 vi 4. 140n13 vi 3.1140a1-2. 40. 20. 17. 17. 150n49 .1140b11-20. 32.1140a3-4. 17. 195n10 vi 5. 134n20 vi 2. 134n20 vi 2. 150n57 vi 5.1139a32-35. 136n3 vi 4. 145n22 vi 5. 22.1140b7-10. 148n24. 62.1140a24-b30. 34. 32. 34.1140a3-5.1140b11ff. 148n22 vi 5. 138n1 vi 2. 150n53 vi 5.1139a27.1139a29-31. 44. 28. 34.1139a27-28.1140a2-3. 13. 21. 169n15 vi 5. 32.< previous page page_229 next page > Page 229 vi 2. 34. 140n13 vi 4..1140a25-28. 102.1139b26. 149n34 vi 2. 139n5 vi 4. 134n20 vi 2. 140n15 vi 4..1139a36. 153n11 vi 5. 145n10 vi 5. 20. 149n37. 17. 136n3 vi 3. 157n63.1139b18ff.1140b7-11. 148n27 vi 2. 33. 21. 148n29. 21.1139b32.1139b27.1140b10-16. 136n3 vi 5.1140b5-6. 121. 35.1139a35-36. 17. 28. 150n48 vi 2. 13.1139b31-32. 150n53 vi 5. 33.

a29. 136n3 vi 6. 35.1141a19. 151n59 vi 11. 35. 148n25 vi 6.1141a20ff.1141b28-29. 25. 35. 151n59 vi 5.1142a9-10.1140b28. 171n16 vi 8.1141a20.1142a1-10. 29. 189n3 vi 9. 146n33 vi 10.1140b12-13. 49. 44. 65. 65. 171n13 vi 8.1141b25. 150n50 vi 10. 58. 152n3 vi 8. 35. 25.1142a2. 64. 35. 151n61 vi 7. 28.1142b34-1143a18. 29. 171n15 vi 9.1140b25-26.1141b8-9. 32. 171n17 vi 8. 104.1142a30.1142b32-33.1140b17-18.1140b31-1141a8.1141b24. 121. 28. 28. 154n29 vi 8. 17.1141b24ff.1141a9-20. 39. 143n10 vi 8. 17.1142b31-33. 161n23 vi 5. 145n10 vi 10. 157n67 vi 9. 148n22 vi 5. 151n60 vi 7.1141b23.vi 5. 62. 150n59 vi 5.1141b26-28.1140b12-20. 22.1141b32.1142b33. 102. 34. 143n10 vi 9.1140b20-21.. 32. 189n3 . 41. 167n9 vi 8..1142a23-24. 195n8 vi 8. 145n10 vi 7. 25. 145n10 vi 8..1141b31-33. 145nn23-24. 140n16 vi 5. 169n15 vi 9.1142a18-20. 64.1141b23ff. 143n10 vi 8. 136n3 vi 7.

1144a24-25. 32. 152n71 vi 13. 149n36 vi 13. 148n26 vi 12.1144b12. 50.1144b0-12. 51.1143b2-3. 148n25 vi 13. 35.1143b18-1145a1. 150n59 vi 13. 150n59 vi 13.1143b14-17.11443. 32. 149n36 vi 13.1144a29-34.1144a36-b1. 150nn54. 103.1144b12-17.1144a23-29. 145n10 vi 13.1143a28-29. 162n17 vi 13. 35.1144b9. 33. 35. 33. 51. 176n25 vi 13. 36. 35. 140n16 vi 12. 162n28 vi 13. 149n37 vi 13. 35. 22. 150n55 vi 13. 33.1144b12-25.1144a6-9. 32.1144b8-13.1144b19. 51. 76. 151n69 vi 13.1144a34.1144a34ff. 35. 151n61 vi 13.1144a34-36.1143a6-10. 30. 35. 148n26 vi 12.. 162n23 < previous page page_229 next page > .1144b4-16. 33. 59 vi 13. 28.1144b15. 147n4 vi 13. 149n39 vi 13. 162n26 vi 13.1143a17-18. 151n68 vi 13. 35.1144a29-b1.1144a2-3.vi 11. 149n40 vi 13. 33.1143b11. 151n68 vi 13. 189n6 vi 12. 148n24 vi 11. 32.

150n56. 25. 35. 170n23 . 6. 50. 195n4 vii 5. 98. 34. 30. 102.1146a22-27. 33. 28. 35. 162n27 vii 9. 130n29 vii 12. 6. 195n6 vii 9.1151a17-18. 188n16 vii 5. 34. 35. 149n36 vi 13. 147n4. 32.1147b5-6. 145n22 vii 9.1151a15.1147a24.1151a18-19.1152b1-3.1147a21-22.1150b36.1151a13-14.1145b2-7.1144b28-30.1145a2. 49. 130n29 vii 5.1145a4-6. 187n13 vii 5. 21. 150n58 vii 9. 162n15 vi 13. 161n23. 101.1152a8-9. 149n35 vi 13.1151a15-16. 151n68 vii 11. 63. 120.1145a10. 189n17 vii 5.1151a17-20.1151a18. 130n29 vii 1. 150n43 vii 9.1147b11-12. 150n58 vii 9. 33. 195n3 vii 5.< previous page page_230 next page > Page 230 vi 13. 102. 119.1144b31-32. 150n46 vi 13. 150n58 vii 9. 35. 148n24 vii 12ff. 189n18 vii 5.1147a28.1147a11-13. 121.1147a18-19.1147a25-35..1151a7.1145b3. 6. 149n37 vii 9. 102. 130n29 vii 1. 143n10 vii. 189n19 vii 5. 6. 189n17 vii 9. 33. 139n9 vii 5. 35. 102. 51.

143n10 vii 12. 153n17. 25.1172a34-b8.1152b1-2.1155a28-29. 153n13 viii 11. 187n12 viii-ix. 169n20 viii 14. 186n3 x 4.1172b15-16. 48. 187n18 x 1.1169b27-30. 95.1165a12-14.1169b18.1164b27-30.1172b9ff.1165a12-13. 15. 98.1152b1.1176a30-31.1155b8-13. 158n74 x 6. 42. 6. 169n20 viii 2.vii 12.1172a34-35. 99..1172b6. 40. 17. 98. 6. 153n16 ix 9. 42. 174n1.1154a25-26. 155n38 ix 9.1178b32. 129n29 ix 2. 154n35 viii 1-2. 125. 97. 135n15 . 42.1160a12-14. 134n11. 186n3 x 2. 159n9. 62. 98. 91. 6.1152b23. 143n12. 48. 187n19 x 2. 187n13 vii 15. 98. 163n1 x 7-9. 155n40 viii 11. 187n1 vii 15. 27 vii 12. 129n29 x 1. 137n13 x 6-9. 19. 186n2 x 1-6. 99. 40. 129n29 viii 1.1177a12-8. 25.1154a22-25. 42. 136n8 viii 2. 62. 40.1172a35-b1.1172b3-7. 71. 187n13 x 1. 129n29 ix 2.1162a17-18. 98. 45. 159n9 x 1. 155n38 ix 2.1155b9-10. 97. 14. 187n13 x 1. 52.1175a4-5.1159b26-27. 6. 197n16 x 7.

98. 164n23 x 10...1179b20ff.. 8 x 10.1179a16-22. 52. 164n14 x 10. 52. 168n2 x 10.1179b4-20. 77.1179a35.1179b3-4. 156n52 x 7. 169n15 x 7. 52. 52. 6. 53. 70. 48. 177n33 x 10. 71. 4.1179b17-18.1179b13-16. 52. 163nn1. 187n15 x 10. 163n4 x 10.1179a35-b3. 159n1.1179a33ff. 152n1 x 10.1179b11-13. 43. 187n14 x 9.1179a20-22. 163n9.1177b12-15. 173n8 x 10. 6. 164n14 x 10. 129n29 x 10. 52. 60. 159n9. 163nn5.1179b7ff. 6. 8 x 10.1177b15. 70. 163n1 x 10. 53. 98. 163n3 x 10. 129n29 x 9.1179a35-b2.1179a33-b31. 163nn5. 48.1179a18-19. 52. 38.x 7. 173n7. 195n17 x 9.1179b7. 67. 163n5 x 10. 173n11. 160n11. 143n10 x 8. 163n8 < previous page page_230 next page > .1178a22-23.1179b2-3. 25.1179a33-35. 129n29 x 9.1179a17-20. 117. 62.1177b12-14. 52. 52. 163n8. 160n1 x 10.1179b6-7.1179b20-31. 164n25 x 10. 52. 8 x 10. 52. 52.

52. 164n25 x 10. 53. 173n12 x 10. 56.1179b29-31. 55.1179b30. 49. 165n17 x 10. 159n1 x 10. 174n10 x 10. 161n21 x 10.. 163n12 x 10. 53.1179b23-28.1179b24. 104.1179b27-28. 163n8 x 10. 163n10 x 10. 164n16 x 10.1179b28. 53. 62. 49. 52. 160n9.1180a25. 173n12 x 10. 189n1 x 10.1180a1-4. 100. 165n19 x 10. 164n24 x 10. 52.1179b34-35. 160n10. 53.1180a18. 164n17 x 10. 170n22 x 10. 152n2. 164n3 x 10.. 72.1180a27-29. 55.1179b31. 71.1179b26-29. 55. 159n5 x 10. 48. 161n4. 54. 188n20 x 10. 52. 48.1180a6ff.1179b20-21. 121. 164n1 x 10.1179b24-26. 174n6 x 10. 49.1180a4-5. 73. 173n12 .1180a24ff. 52. 53.1179b31ff.1179b27.1179b28-29.< previous page page_231 next page > Page 231 x 10. 163n5. 54. 71.1180a21-22. 54. 71. 165n14. 195n5 x 10. 48.1180a14-22. 48. 55. 165n12. 48. 165n15. 165n20. 56. 48. 160n15. 38. 72.1179b26-27.1180a26-27. 163n11 x 10.1179b31-1180b28. 160n7 x 10. 164n20 x 10.1179b31-32.1180a12.1180a5. 48.. 165n13 x 10. 161n21 x 10. 159n5 x 10.

x 10. 57.1181a11ff.1180b30-31.1181a12-b12. 73. 176n15 x 10. 74. 25. 57. 58. 176n17 x 10. 58..1180b20-23. 72.1180a29-30.1180b31. 57. 173n14 x 10.1180b13-23.1181a5-6.1180b24. 143n10 x 10. 58.1180a29. 56.1181a12ff. 167n13 x 10. 193n2 x 10. 168n7 x 10.1180b35. 58. 73. 61.1180b12. 175n9 x 10.. 166n1 x 10. 166n23 x 10.1181a10-11..1180a30ff. 166n29. 71.1180b5-13. 175n8 x 10. 57. 25. 176n18 x 10. 58. 55. 166n28 x 10.1180b13-28.1180b30-1181a9. 143n10 x 10. 56.1180b14-15. 74.1180b13-25. 167n16 x 10. 48. 74 x 10. 167n10 x 10.1180b23-25.1180a32-34. 73. 74. 166n23 x 10.1180b14. 57. 176n15 x 10. 58.1181a11-12. 168n22 x 10. 175n13 x 10. 167n19. 56. 112. 175n15 x 10. 159n1 x 10. 167n15 x 10. 59.1180b25. 166n2. 73 . 174n12 x 10. 166n27 x 10.1180b16-22. 165n16 x 10.1180b20-21. 167n9.1180b29. 73 x 10. 166n22 x 10. 74. 72. 167n5 x 10.1180b21..1180b28-1181b12.1181a10ff. 56.

1181b12-23. 167n17 x 10. 159n8 x 10. 72. 154n31 i 1. 104.1181a19-23. 197n13 i 34. 171n20 x 10. 154n32 i 20. 65. 168n7 x 10. 177n32 x 10. 57. 80. 167n6 x 10. 175n10 x 10. 179n28 x 10. 76. 189n4 x 10. 61. 41. 174n4 x 10.1181b1.1181a14-15. 73. 58.1181a17-18.1181a17-b3. 143n10.1181b1-3. 167n18 x 10.1181b15. 41. 183n13 i 1. 105.1181b7-9. 190n1 x 10.1181a23. 141n1. 104.1181a15-b12. 73 x 10. 57. 25. 176n14 x 10. 170n2 < previous page page_231 next page > . 23.1181a12-13. 167n4 x 10.1181a16. 63.1181b15-23.1181a24.1181a19. 47.1198a34-b2.1181b13-14.1181a12. 74. 159n9. 90.1181b25-1182a1. 58. 138n17 Magna moralia 48. 73 x 10. 125. 19. 190n5 x 10.x 10.1181a16-17.

172n4 i 1. 139n9 i 5. 173n10 i 5. 52.1216b10-19. 48. 50.1216b32-33. 71. 159n2.. 91. 6.1216b9ff.1215b3.1215a20ff. 62. 21.1216b36ff.1214a32-33.1216a24-26. 118. 6.. 129n24 .1214a9-14. 162n23 i 5. 162n15 i 5. 49.1215a26-b14. 187n7 i 6. 159n9 i 2.1216b36-39. 6.1216b26-28.. 35.1214a23-24. 130n29 i 4. 49.1214b28-1215a7.1216b30-31. 48. 174n5 i 1. 51. 70.1216b26ff.1216b6-8. 162nn6-7 i 1. 98. 163n2 i 1.< previous page page_232 next page > Page 232 Ethica Eudemia 71. 169n17 i 6. 6. 195n1 i 3. 130n29 i 6. 184n25 i 1. 14.1214a5-6.. 90. 122. 161n2 i 1.. 6.1214a15-25. 172n4 i 5. 122. 130n29 i 4.1214a24-26. 151n67 i 6. 130n29 i 6. 184n24 i 1-6.1216b18. 72. 173n1 i.. 163n2. 91. 184n25 i 1. 130n29 i 6.1216b3-25. 52.1216b3ff. 196n12 i 5.1214b8.1214a14ff. 196n11 i 5. 70. 5. 134n11 i 4.

21. 64. 13. 171n19. 134n19 i 8. 98. 172n1 i 6. 136n8 vii 2.1217a18. 171n14 i 8. 75.1217b23. 153n11 ii 1.1217b22-23. 181n22 vii 1. 139n9 ii 5. 157n68 ii 3. 122. 125.1218b12-14.1216b40-1217a10.1217b21. 65.1218b13-14.1220b37. 17.1218b33-34. 147n4 ii 11. 30.1227b28-30. 90. 139n9 iii 1. 193n3 i 6. 176n21 ii 10. 41. 182n4 i 8.1217a7. 17. 153n11. 75. 87. 176n21 vii 10.1236b39-1237a3. 30. 121.1237a2-3.1217b16-20. 69. 196n12 i 6.1216b37.1235a4ff. 154n29 i 8.1217a6-7.1216b40ff. 40. 195n8 i 6.1227b23-36. 5. 21. 182n9 i 8. 197n13 iii 1. 147n4 ii 11.i 6..1218b16. 13.1222b7. 130n29 i 8.1217b1-1218a32. 171n14 ii 1. 130n29 vii 2. 64. 94 i 8. 70. 42.1235b13-18. 44. 187n10 ii 3. 172n3 vii 9.1221b5-7.1241b35.1242a22-23. 129n24.1219a40-b1. 172n2 vii 2. 40. 87. 69. 6.1228a28. 6..1220b38-1221a12. 136n6 i 8. 155n38 . 134n20 i 7. 112. 181n22 ii 3. 90.1227a8-9.

1269a19-24. 26.1249b17. 156n51 i 2. 162n7 viii 2. 181n26 ii 5. 178n19 ii 8. 91. 179n27 ii 5. 75. 157n57 i 3. 91.1262b11-12. 197n10 ii 9.1264a3-5.1254a33-34.1264b17-19. 183n19 ii 1. 42. 176n21 viii 3. 80. 88. 63.1253b1-3. 165n19 .1253a4-5.1249a21. 181n25 ii 2.1253a9-18. 184n25 viii 2. b19.1262b7-8. 75.1253a7-8. 43. 42. 155n40 ii 4.1261a30.1271a41-b7.1260b28-29. 63.1261a6-7. 49. 161n5 viii 3.1265a1-2. 43. a25-26.. 56. 170n2 i 5. 79. 156n48 ii 6. 43. 178n21 ii 8. 164n19 i 3. 79. 156n47 i 3. 79. 50.viii. 73.1268b35-36.1260a7ff.1253a20-22. 144n23 ii 9. 140n3. 88.1269a29-1271b19.1266a31-32. 162n19 ii. 176n21 Politica i 2.1253b38-1254a1. 43.1246b37-1248b7.1253a26-29. 179n29 ii 7. 23. b22. 6 ii 4. 40. 178n20 ii 1. 53. 43. 170n2 i 13. 156n47 i 4. 124.1260b33-36. 49. 155n38 i 2.1260a5-24. 175n15 ii 1. 153n12 i 13.1247a28. 81.

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1281b40. 79. 6 iii 12. 157n61 iii 5.1282b23. 157n64 iii 6.1276b16ff. 44. 178n22 iii-vi. 44. 123.1282a4-5.. 108.1276b30-35. 157n65 iv 1. 6 iii 11. 118.1278a40-b3. 157n58 iii 4. b35. 124. 153n11 iii 9.1282a3-4. 123.1282b14-16. 175n15 iv 1.1278b3-5. 124.1288b25-26. 196n2 iii 12.1275b4-5. 142n15 iii 1. 123.. b28. 196n3 iii 16. 27 iii 12. 44. 191n4 iii 11.1288b23. 196n4 iv 1. 195n1 iii 18.1287b25-26. 191n5 iii 11. 44.. 196n3 iii 4. 154n28 iii 1.1272a22ff. 73. 191n6 iii 11. 108.1274b38-41.1282b10-11.< previous page page_233 next page > Page 233 ii 10. 24.1282b20. 170n4 iii 11. 175n15 .1288b22-23. 108. 73. 41. 44. 196n6 iv 1.1280a18. 157n62 iii 4. 48. 157n62 iii 5.1288a38-39. 44. 157n59 iii 4.1278b31-32.1282a3-14.1276b16-1277b32. 159n3 iii 4.1277a12-13. 27 iii 13.1283b42ff.1277a13-23. 63. 44.1277a15-16.1288b24. 44. 40. 157n60 iii 4.

124. 56. 66. 158n74 vii 2. 196n2 iv 2.1288b37-39. 195n1 v. 118. 196n7 iv 1. 197n11 iv 1. 166n26 vi 2. 6 iv 14. 176n23 vii 4-12.iv 1. 94.1288b37-38.1324a27-28. 165n19 vii 3.1325b21-23. 123. 134n18 vii 3. 124. 195n1 vii-viii. 196n1 v 9.1289a3-4. 124. 13. 73. 174n1 vii 1. 95. 124. 196n4 vii 7.1324a19-21. 94 vii 1.1310a12ff. 73.1323a22-23. 65. 171n2.1297b40.1308b20-24. 45. 175n14 iv 1. 175n14 vii 1-3. 174n4.1310a12-14. 185n7 vii 1. 71.1299b25. 40.1325b33. 43.1325b16. 124.1323b40-41.1323b37. 123.1328a17-21. 172n2 vii 4. 134n20 vii 3. 56. 45. 170n10 iv 15. 94 vii 4. 196n6 iv 11. 66.1289a13-15. 13.1325b17-18. 124. 13. 156n50 vii 2. 153n11 vii 1.1323a14-21..1289a12-13. 134n18 vii 2. 75.1324a14-17.1289b14-16. 123. 197n9 v 8. 196n1 v 9.1324b5-9. 171n18. 118. 72. 63. 196n8 iv 1.1317b39.1325b36.1295a36. 186n2 . 158n74 vii 2.

1332a38-b11.1331a16. 172n2 vii 13. 164n6 vii 15.1337a12-32. 72. 79. 109. 152n1 viii 1.1333a25. 197n15 vii 15. 80. 179n26 vii 11.1334a14.. 195n4 vii 14.1331a16ff. 196n4 vii 13. 63. 125. 166n21 . 66.1334b6ff.1331b23-24.1332a29. 161n2 vii 13. 170n25 vii 10. 56. 125.1333a33-39. 170n25 vii 13-viii 7.1336a28-30. 56..vii 10.1334b24-25. 179n25 vii 10. 134n20 vii 14. 172n2 vii 13. 165n19 vii 15. 6 vii 13. 134n11 vii 14. 164n5 vii 15.1329a41.1332a40-42.1333b11-35. 63. 179n23 vii 11. 174n9 viii 1. 14.1337a1-3. 54.1334a40-b5. 80.1337a14. 165n19 vii 15.1332b41-1333a16.1332a8.1335b5-8. 56. 49.1334b9-10.1332a3840.1329a40ff. 197n14 vii 15. 49.1334b8-9. 54.1333a24-36.1332a22. 119. 156n52 vii 14.1337a11-15. 124. 161n20 vii 15. 109. 162n18 vii 14. 72. 192n17 vii 17. 38. 50. 196n1 viii 1.1329b31-35.1334a22-25. 6 vii 13. 174n6 vii 13. 66. 43. 54. 123. 13. 192n17 vii 17. 165n9 vii 16..

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124. 190n11 viii 6.1338a17-19. 108.< previous page page_234 next page > Page 234 viii 1.1341b28ff. 192n17 viii 3. 166n24 viii 1.1340b24-25. b33. 107.1341b28. 106. 56. 190n12 viii 6. 190n5 viii 5.1338b1-2. 56. 191n15 Rhetoric . 116.1337a24-26. 165n19 viii 2. 170n25 viii 7. 191n1 viii 3. 190n10 viii 6.1338a32. 191nn14. 107..1341a10-11.1339a36-38.1339b2-4. 109.1340a14-18. 109. 190n2 viii 5. 165n20 viii 1.1341b9-14.1339b5-6.1337b8-11.1341a18-19. 196n5 viii 1. 107. 106. 190n4 viii 5.1342a19-21. 190n6 viii 5. 106. 107.1339b7-10. 79. 106. 56. 191n2 viii 4.1338b34-35. 108. 107. 107. 191n18 viii 6. 190n9 viii 6. 191n13 viii 6. 106. 106. 106.1339a41-42. 109. 107.1339a31-33. 179n24 viii 7. 194n11 viii 5. 17 viii 3. 107. 192n17 viii 4.1339b4-5.1337a31.1340b35-39. 192n16 viii 2. 63.1338b32-36. 190n3 viii 5.1340b41-1341a3. 190n7 viii 5.1337a21-26. 191n14 viii 7. 106.1337a27-29.1337b15-17. 190n8 viii 5.

1375b26-1376a32.1356a26-27. B 13 Düring.1355a26. 74.1404a24-29.1356a29ff.1356b5. 74.1356a2-4. 176n26 . 21.1414b19-20.1393a28. 25. 175n7 B 46-47. 176n13 B 49-50. 186n2 i 2. 95. 187n8 i 2. 176n13. 73. 192n2 i 2. 74.1395a2-5. 193n8 iii 14. 73..1356a27-30. 139n9. 97. 193n10 ii 20. 112. 187n8 i 3. 175n9 B 46. 186n9 De philosophia fr. 41. 97. 94. 73. 175n10 B 49. 73. 186n4 i 2. 38. 175n12 B 34.1366a22. 160n9.1358a37-b1.1415a23-26. 111. 74. 143n12. 176n17 B 38. 98. 185n5 iii 14. 76. 98. 74. 74.1356a23-25. 192n6.i 1. 175n10.1357b1ff.1356a26. 152n1. 98. 110.1356a6-8. 27 i 2. 73. 186n2 i 8. 186n1 i 2. 184n25 Protrepticus 71. 110. 173n1 fr.1391a17. 111. 1 Walzer. 143n12 i 2. 27. 48. 193n1 i 2. 97. 175n6 B 46-51. 112. 97. 144n17 i 15.. 153n20 i 2. 192n7 iii 1. 175n8. 25. 25. 91. 73. 175n7. 73. 187n8 ii 21. 98. 187n8 ii 17.

18. 191n8 Cratylus 383a. 75. 2. 79. 101. 158n3 Charmides 171b-c. 108. 158n3 26b. 15.B 51. 79. 15. 177n7 Critias 107d. 178n19 C 52. 78. 135n19 23e. 47. 135n19 < previous page page_234 next page > . 158n3 20d. 137n4 33d-34a. 176n22 B 55. 47. 188n9 421d. 178n19 Plato Apology 20a. 47.

. 58. 162n10 451e. 47. 135n19 50a ff. 167n12 519c. 47. 159n6 282b-d. 101. 6-7 Epinomis 974b. 188n5 515e ff. 188n5 455b.< previous page page_235 next page > Page 235 Crito 46e. 177n7 Ion 533d. 170n1 462c. 50. 15.. 188n5 Hippias Major 281c. 49. 47. 100. 47. 50. 188n8 Laches 179a. 158n4 298c. 161n5 515e. 101. 100. 162n13 521e. 91.. 169n14 Gorgias 449c. 188n8 . 101. 100. 91. 63. 137n11 Euthydemus 272b. 158n3 274c. 158n3 182d ff. 184n25 454e-455a. 19. 188n8 279a. 78. 184n25 291c. 61.

. 173n12 iii 689a. 160n14 vii 791b-792e. 173n1. 682a. 15. 71. 19... 164n6 ii 655d. 166n26 vii 810b. 51. 160n15 vii 792b. 48. 71. 160n16. 48.184d-187b. 48. 56. 160n8 i 643c-d. 49.. 54. 160n17 ii 653e ff. 160n8. 49. 160n19 iii 680b. 174n3 i 643b. 48. 159n5 x 886e. e. 161n22 iv 714a. 162n24 ii 659d. 63. 48. 71. 173n12 ii 653a-c. 49. 173n12 iv 718c-723b. 87. 160n7. 173n12 iv 722a ff. 161n24 vi 770d ff. 118. 72. 160n8. 159n5 v 732e. 48. 48. 108. 135n19 ix 854e ff. 135n19 v 741d. 160n16 i 644d. 58. 71.. 48. 135n19 Letters vii 322e. 15. 48. 49. 48. 181n24 ii 653a. 137n10 Meno . 170n3. 165n8 vii 791d. 54. 49. 192n15 viii 836a. 15. 160n15 vii 793 ff. 167n14 Laws 71. 195n2 ii 653b.

168n21 70a.. 49. 188n8 91a. 147n2 95e. 51. 57. 167n12 94b. 101. 101. 159n4.. 174n8 < previous page page_235 next page > . 184n25 89d ff. 72. 58. 188n8 99a. 101. 162n22 87e.48. 159n2. 188n8 81a ff. 161n1 98d-99e. 161n5. 30. 72. 48. 58.. 101. 58. 162n8 99b-e. 167n11 93c-94c. 188n8 80d-e. 167n11 99e-100a. 58. 101. 49. 49. 174n8. 167n3 89d. 188n11 87e ff. 91.

< previous page page_236 next page > Page 236 Parmenides 134e. 108. 188n8 Philebus 48d. 49. 149n38 . 192n14 319bff. 108. 15. 167n11 319c. 19. 50. 50. 156n48 iv 423e. 135n19 Phaedo 64a. 101. 33. 56. 88. 6. 91.. 162n12.. 161n5 Republic iv 419a-420e. 135n19 269d. 16. 135n27 82b. 181n25 v 457a-466d. 101. 160n13 Phaedrus 244a. 188n8 361c-e. 184n25 Protagoras 318dff. 162n12 318e-319a. 135n27 67e. 16. 15. 137n8 vii 518c. 101. 43. 15. 56. 58. 188n8 323c. 191n8 320b. 181n25 v 457c-d. 188n8 245b. 135n19. 166n26 vii 517d. 188n8 259d. 48. 101. 88. 101. 166n26 v 460b.

160n12 Rivals 135c-d. 170n1 260a-b. 15. 135n19 191a-b.. 104. 181n26 Theaetetus 176a-b. 63. 15.vii 522e ff. 171n16 259e. 108. 135n21 < previous page page_236 next page > . 189n3 260b-c. 50. 15. 48. 66. 149n38 x 619c. 166n26 vii 533d. 135n19 Statesman 61. 162n16 266a. 135n19 268d. 170n1 Symposium 186b. 63. 191n9 Sophist 231b. 56. 88. 171n21 259c-d. 33. 15. 172n5. 65. 65. 169n14 259b-260e.

< previous page page_237 next page > Page 237 Index of Ancient and Medieval Names A Adrastus of Aphrodisias. 136n5 Augustine. 142nn15. 136n5 Aulus Gellius. 141n6 Albertus Magnus. 132nn12. 14. 10. 182nn2. 132nn12. 4. 110. 133nn7. 140n10. 185n10 Anaxagoras. 23. 159n6 C . 50 Anonymous author. 50 Antisthenes. 1. 9-13. 16 Alexis. 23. 23-24. 16. 5. Vita Menagiana. 141n11 Aspasius. 159n6 Andronicus of Rhodes. 50 Apollodorus. 89. 195n7 Atticus. 12. 140n10 Alexander of Aphrodisias. 185n10 Ammonius. 136n5: Aristophanes. 32 Albinus. 94. 98. 141n6 Anonymous of Iamblichus. 3 Amphis. 138n2. 182n1 B Bias. 140n10. 93-95 Arius Didymus. 15-16. 14. 131nn4. 88. 47 Aristoxenus. 141n6 Antiphon the Sophist. 133n9 Apuleius.

76. 180n17 Eudoxus. 167n5. 88 Commentator (anonymous) on Aristotle's Rhetoric. 108. 97. 91. 9.Chrysippus. 11 Isocrates. 100-101. 12-13. 23. 165n20 I Ibn Abi Usaibia. 158n4 H Heraclides of Pontus. 136n5 Clement of Alexandria. 133n9 Eusebius. 50 D Dicearchus. 132nn12. 181n22 Hippias. 133n12. 14 Diogenes of Babylon. 141n8 Eudemus. 14 G Gorgias. 94. 158n4 Hippodamus. 141nn6. 178n21 Homer. 133n9 Cicero. 133n9 Diogenes Laërtius. 14. 11 Ibn al-Qifti. 50. 10. 136n11 Hesychius. 186n3 Eudromus. 136n5 Eustratius. 176n14. 141n6 Epicurus. 192n2 Cratinus. 185n10 Critias. 177n33 . 133n12. 181n22 E Elias.

140n10 L Lucian.J Julian. 185n10 < previous page page_237 next page > . 181n1 M Macrobius. 133n12. 157n68 Michael of Ephesus. 142n11 O Olympiodorus. 110. 185n10 Philip of Opus. 141n6 P Phaleas of Chalcedon. 48 Philippides. 178n21 Philemon.

196n12 Stephanus. 159n6 Plotinus. 158n4 Protagoras. 136-37n12. 147n13. 131n10. 184n2 S Sextus Empiricus. 136n11 . 149n31. 31-35. 138n2. 93 X Xenocrates. 108. 22. 50. 152n73. 14. 177n31. 11. 11 Posidonius of Apameia. 158n4 Ptolemy. 160n10. 46-48. 141n6 Q Quintilian. 132n1. 108. 133n9 Prodicus.< previous page page_238 next page > Page 238 Philoponus. 18. 157n68 Plutarch. 158n3. 14 Syllus. 88 T Thales. 11. 101 Simplicius. 49 Theophrastus. 185n10 Thomas Aquinas. 47. 185n3 Pittacus. 11. 133n9 Syrianus. 180n17 Theopompus. 159n6 Theognis. 151n70 V Vita Marciana. 139n9. 14. 88 Porphyry. 11. 50-51. 133n12 Socrates. 6.

Xenophon. 108 Z Zeno of Citium. 133n9 < previous page page_238 next page > . 18.

34. 138n17. . 196n12 . 152n73. 177n27 . 26. 25. 180n12. 110-15. 36 . 121. 119-20. 135nn18. 132n14. 38 . 49. 18. 70. 18-19. 84-88. 30. 137n9. 88 . 60. 114. 84-88. . 55 . 112 . 62. 122 . 196n12 . 138nn14. 95. 36. 97.< previous page page_239 next page > Page 239 Index of More Important Greek Terms A . 36. 44. 18 . 120 . 17 . 22. 43 . 186n2 . . See . See . 95.

191n6. 72. 149n40 . 196n12 . 13 . 91 . 97. 65 ∆ . 175n8. 181n22 . 139n3. 159n9. 189n3 B . See . 49. 159n9. 32 . 20. 190n8 . See and . 35 . 91. 189n2 . 36. 104 . 104. 22. 30. . 64-65 Γ . 63-64. 48-50. 87. . 108. 108-9 . 65 . 13-14. 171n19. 106-7. 136n3. 140n10 . 71. 33. 100. 14. 49. 58-59. 64 E . 73-74. . 63. 54. 134n20.

151n61. 25. 122 . 40. . 75. 139nn2. 180n18 . 16. 13. 22. 49 . See . 18. 32 . 22 . 9 . 17. 139nn2. 135nn18. 19 . 102. 140n13 . 153n18 . 32. See . . See and Θ . 48. 3. 34 . 20. 88 . 20-21. 180n18 . 62 H . 14. 50 . 71. 23. 137n9. 61. 136nn3. 40 . 20-22. 134n20. 86. 22. 25. 4. 180n18 . 64-65. 20. 17-18. 143n7. 22. 54. 40 . 29. . 39-40. 88-89. 18. 65 .

75. 180n12 . 140n10. 58. 99. See . See < previous page page_239 next page > . 105-10. 154n29 K . . 104. 73.

3. . 13. 100. 34. 160n7. 27. 120-21. 97. See . 146n33. 151n61. 21. 164n6. 39. 14 O . . 60. . 49 . 54-55. 177n27 . . 97. 17 . 187nn13. 13. 72. 16. . . 30. 43 N . 23. 60. 150n59. 64 .< previous page page_240 next page > Page 240 Λ . 50. 64. 140n10. . 41. 57. 53-54. 134n20. 90. 24. 12 . See and M . 66 . 134n20.

70. 25. 170n25. 53. 34. 117. . 180n18 Π . 140n10. 27. 54 . 9 . 186n2 . 180n18 . 40. 42. 20-21. 16. 64. 107 . 39. . 139n2. 118. . See and . 14. 58 . 154n35. 12 . 44 . 98. 53. 21. 20-22. 105-18. 171nn16. . 14. 191n14. 24. See . 53- 54. 120. 116. 25. 110. 154n29. 100-102. 114. 18. See . 40 . 160n7. 19. 139nn2. 194nn3. 39-40. 71-72. See . 6 . 143n12. 165n10. 32. 65. See .

26-38. See . . 35. . See . 34-35. 23 . 19 Y . 16-17. 104. 6-7. 55. 35. 148nn24-25. 32. 77-81. 40. 22. 136n3 . See and . 48. 64. 138n20. 150nn46-47. . 13. 149nn35. 44. 151n61 . 99. 136n3. 165nn10. 164n6. 180n18 Φ . 12. 125 T . . 29. 159n9. 78. 12 Σ . 181n22 . 87. 4. 180n18 . 117. 58-59. . 53. See and . 146nn33. 154n29. 49. 151n59. 15. 120. 104. 74-75 . 152n73. 136n3. 19. 22. 39 . 125. 19.

85. 171nn16. 19 < previous page page_240 next page > . . See and X . 17 . 75. 72. 65. .

117. and didactic precaution. 34- 35. Practice acroamatic writings: and catalog of Andronicus. 34-35. and prudence. and rule of law. 29. 120-21 appropriate method. 93. vs. Problematic perspective apperception (hupolepsis) of the end: and practical principles. and educated person. literature. 34. 26. philosophical study insufficient for. and Neoplatonist commentators. 134n21 adequateness (appropriateness) of discursive form: and educated persons. 53. precision.< previous page page_241 next page > Page 241 Subject Index A action (conduct): end for writings and science. 113-15 . vs. See Discursive teaching. See Eudemian Ethics. 148n24. 150-51n59 appetite (s): and prudence. 37. preserved by temperance. and reason-passion antagonism. 10. 186n2 aporematic. 94-95.

See Listener. on resolution of moral development problems. 92 C . 95. Plato and Platonists. 92 B becoming good. criticisms of arts. 49 brevity. as ''principles. 159n6 architectonic art (science. 51. and human good. as legislative prudence. lawgivers. See Laws of Plato. and revealing reality. and hierarchy of sciences. virtue of prologues. 48- 49. 186n2 archaic sages. 98. capacity): form of prudence. 4. and esoteric doctrine. 1. and practical understanding.approximation. Youth autonomy of sciences. as refraining from politics. 45-46. chapters 4-5." 170n5 audience (of NE lectures). and didactic precaution. 67. and facts of life. 61. 39. on law and habit in childrearing. and NE prologue. 63. the question how. 121-22 Aristotle and Plato: ongoing dialogue. 64- 66.

4- 6. 166n27. 175n14. 62. and proper mean. 133n12. determined by habit at earliest age (Plato). 10-11 categories (divisions). 49 character (ethos. 16 chance (tuche). 91. See Inquiry. 13. a political issue. 14. 118. rearing of. 127n9. 55 citizens: as audience for political reflections. 158n74. 54. and habituation. 18-23. 139nn4.catalogs (lists. 9. training of. 10-11. 140nn10. 168n10 classification. 192n17. 54. 116-17 city-state (city. 132nn12. as superior moral authority. Virtue children: education of. imperfect conditions. 11-16. 135n25. membership in. 56. 1-2. character traits [ethel]): and correct education. and general education. polis): happiness of. improvement as aim of lawgiver. assumed by political inquiry. and good legislation. pinakes) of Aristotle's writings. as indirect participants in regime. and acroamatic writings. 48. and need for laws. interpretive. 137-38n14. See Categories . 138-39n2. 131nn5. 48.

87 < previous page page_241 next page > .cleverness (deinotes). 35-36. 149n40 collections. 33. in general.

See Neoplatonist commentators common books. 149n31 commentators. 104-5. vs. 105. 43. 32-33. 9- 10. 32. 80-81 command (prescription). and formation of lawgiver. 77. 117. and systematizing perspective. 23- 24. Nicomachean Ethics. See Eudemian Ethics.< previous page page_242 next page > Page 242 collections of laws (and constitutions): advocated by Sophists. 32. early: and political nature of NE. 99. 117. Aristotle defends use of. 66 common opinions. 80- 81. 117. and discursive teaching. 99. 103 compulsive rules (norms): . and use by lawgiver. use requires discernment. 104. science. 57. 76. and comprehension. and educated person. and persuasion. final chapter common interest (public good). compared with prudence. and discipline of passions. 187n10 comprehension (sunesis): a critical faculty.

197n9. 14. catalogs of. 123-124. 87 contemplative (theoretical) life (bios theoretikos): and defense of separable mind. Inquiry. 55- 57. politeiai): and education. 93. 26. reforms of. 124-25. and lawgiver's practical science. and developmental perspective. See Law concrete action: philosophical study insufficient for. vs. 1-5. 11-16. 124- 25. critical evaluation of. 37. Ideal regime. See Education. . 3. 10- 13. and revolutions. 25-26 constitutions (constitutional regimes. and lawgiver. and practical science. practical life. 101 Corpus Aristotelicum: acquired literary status of texts. and problem of relativism. only a "written" work. division of writings. Sparta Constitutions. 124. 79. 91 conventional meaning. 61. and childrearing.

24 correctness: of education. 37. See Judge. 148n29 deliberative art (science. 2. 89. See Dialogues D decorum. 32. good cultivated person. 78 courage. 63-66. two aspects. incorruptible) things. capacity). of judgment. 111 deliberation (bouleusis): inquiry into means. 109- 110. term "practical philosophy" not in. needed by audience of discourses. 4 corruptible (vs. and moral virtue. 66. and philosophical speculation. 4. and systematizing perspective. 44 critical faculty: and comprehension. scope of. 87. 110 cultivated public. of ends. of prudent lawgiver. 104- 5. 53. 131nn7. 2. and comprehension. 150n47 deliberative excellence (euboulia): . 19. 29. 117. and problematic perspective.

91. 42. 1- 5. and prudence. difficulties of. and individualist interpretation of NE. as published works. temporal priority to understanding. 2. 150n53. 89. 34 demonstrative science. as popularizations. See Discursive teaching didactic precaution: . in Thomas Aquinas' view. 54 developmental perspective: challenged by problematic perspective. a simplistic view. 54. 111 desire (orexis): and need for laws. 1 dialectical skill. and prudential commanding. and tensions in Aristotle's thought. 32. and practical understanding. 116 dialogues (of Aristotle): conceived for broad public. 89. and interpretation of Corpus. 84. 182n7 didactic discourse. 127nn6- 7. 33. 34. and true apperception.

and acroamatic works, 94-
95;

minimized in EE, 97,
196n12;

and false teachers, 168n21;

< previous page page_242 next page >

< previous page page_243 next page >
Page 243

and methodological rules, 114-15;

summary of argument, 117-
18;

and unacceptable demands, 95-96

disciples
(hetairoi):

as audience for Aristotle's works, 84,
88;

as audience for oral presentations,
89;

and elaboration of Aristotle's texts, 86

discourses
(logoi):

and conventional meaning,
101;

as esoteric,
88;

as means of recollection,
101;

protreptic, 53

discursive teaching, 49-53, 100-102;

and acquisition of virtue,
50;

and formation of lawgiver, 57-
58;

insufficient for good action,
52;

and internal regulation by reason,
53;

and knowledge production,
101;

lacks coercive force,
67;

and practical principles,
30;

and practical science,
21;

problems of,
97;

prudence necessary for reception of,
51;

and well-born characters, 52.

disposition
(hexis).

See Practical disposition

divine
dispensation:

and acquisition of virtue,
49;

and renowned politicians, 161n5

divine things (theia) vs. human things:

division, 15-16, 18-20, 135n25, 137n9, 137-38n14

divisions.

See Categories

dramatic actor, 102-3

E

educated citizen, 116-17

educated person
(pepaideumenos):

and appropriate method, 105-
15;

armed against illusory demands, 113-14;

and comprehension, 105,
117;

and cultivated person,
110;

vs. experienced person, 109-
10;

as free person, 107, 109-
10;

as good judge, 105-11, 118,
194n6;

vs. logician,
194n6;

vs. "mechanic," 107,
109;

modern exegesis of notion, 111-
12;

vs. professional, 106-
9;

vs. uneducated person, 110-14

education
(paideia):

and action obedient to law,
121;

and compulsion,
55;

by heads of household,
66;

and human nature,
54;

and the lawgiver, 55, 66;

more important than nature, 152n1;

and natural weaknesses,
120;

and need for laws, 48, 54-
57;

public and private, 72-
73;

relative to constitution, 38-39, 123-24, 165nn21, 26,
166n26;

and Socrates, 158n3,
160n10;

and Spartan regime, 165n19

ends of
action:

and moral virtue,
4;

not taught by reason,
151n70;

and prudence, 4, 30, 32-
38;

and practical principles, 30

Entwicklungsgeschichte.

See Developmental perspective

eristic, and skepticism, 100

"esoteric" philosophy, senses of,
88.

See Exoteric

ethical discourses (ethikoi logoi), 23, 71;

Aristotle's descriptions of,
40;

and character,
40;

and ethical problems,
17;

and ethical propositions,
40;

and "ethical science," 39-
40;

and the EE,
6;

pursue practical end,
25;

and reflection outside action, 25-26

"ethical science," 18, 39-
40;

and modern exegesis, 143nn7, 9

ethical
study:

and "ethical science," 18;

in Socrates, 22

Eudemian Ethics
(EE):

aims of composition,
5;

and aporematic method,
130n29;

and common books, 6, 130nn29-
30;

compared with NE, 5-6, 91, 129-
30n29;

and maturity of Aristotle's thought,
69;

minimizes didactic precaution, 97,
196n12;

not a homogeneous whole,
184n24;

and oral presentation,
196n12;

and political ethics, 70, 172nn1,
4;

its "scientific cast," 90;

and temporal priority, 5-6

exhortative discourse, 60

exoteric:

vs. esoteric, 88-
93;

vs. esoteric, difficulties,
85;

subjects, 88, 92-
93;

works, vs. acroamatic works,

< previous page page_243 next page >

as practice of art. 58. necessary for comprehension. insufficient for judgment. 102- 3. 113- 14. insufficient for being educated. and modern exegesis. 30. necessary for prudence. necessary for science. 191n16. 89-91 experience (empeiria): and critical evaluation of laws. 98. vs. 57. 104 F facts of life. and formation of lawgiver. 98 false teachers. 117. and general education. works.< previous page page_244 next page > Page 244 exoteric (continued) 89. 57. 117. 105- 10. and being educated. 168n21 . 113. necessary for expert lawgiver. merely verbal knowledge. needed by Aristotle's listeners. and methodological rules. insufficient for legislative science. 60. 102- 4. 59.

149n35. 150n58 . 107. 115. 115- 17. vs. dialectical skill. See Liberal education general knowledge: absent in politicians. and lawgiver. 165n7 free person: and educated person. 74. 66 genetic perspective. and good moral training. specific education. and vice. needed by head of household.final cause. 116. 58. vs. as unified concept. human: affirmation of and pursuit of. 37 general principles. end of politics (and architectonic science). and Socrates' reflections. 62. 3. 50 G general education: vs. 55. slave. 166n28. 109- 10. 46. See Developmental perspective good. and study of happiness.

36. 44 H habituation: and acquisition of virtue. human human nature: . prudence seeks means to. See Moral development human good. and the law. requires general knowledge. 55. 56. 121. Critical faculty. head of: and lawgiver. 57. 37. 49. 61 household. 45. insufficiency of habituated virtue (Plato). 123. 160n13 happiness: and lawgivers' knowledge. virtuous habits necessary for. priority within Ethics. good legislation. See Good. 171n1. and prudence.good judge. 55. 168n8. 3. 66. 74 household management (oikonomia). 121. See Judge. 49- 52. necessary for Aristotle's listener. 62 good man (aner spoudaios) and good citizen. 64 human becoming. good. and the laws.

and pure contemplation. 50. 24. and good man. and leisure. 112-13 . and modern exegesis. 18 humor. 44. of Sophists. 18- 19. 165n10 human philosophy: called "ethics" by Stoics. mature citizens rule in. necessary for acquisition of virtue. 54. 15-16. 125. and educational regime. citizen of. 171- 72n2. 18-20. 195n4. and lack of education. 41. 124 ignorance: and incontinence. 135n25. 3. 137n9. in Socrates. and lawgiver. observational knowledge of. 119- 20. in Plato. 137- 38n14. 20 human things vs. 66. divine things: division. and education. 45 I ideal regime (ideal constitution): citizen of. 79- 81. 124. not sole correct regime. progress in.

119- 20. and lawgiver's decision. 175n14 incontinence (akrasia). 122 < previous page page_244 next page > .imitation of laws: condemned by Protrepticus. 177n29 imperfect conditions. 120- 21. and Aristotle's listeners. 76. and critical evaluation.

concerning constitutions. 154n35. 35. 43 individualism. 99. vs. 157n66 information. Wisdom intemperance (akolasia): and ignorance. time and experience necessary for. concerning incorruptible things. concerning corruptible things. 59.< previous page page_245 next page > Page 245 individual good. 48- 49. Intellectual intuition. and prior knowledge. 24. 95 intellectual intuition (nous): analog of apperception. incontinence. 3. discourse as instrument of. and comprehension. good (agathos krites): and Aristotle's listeners. 189n2 intellectual virtues. 120 J judge. 78. 154n35. 47. 41- 45. . See Comprehension. 156-57n54. 104- 5. 99 inquiry: concerning character traits. 35 intellectual learning. and interpretation of NE. 19. 78. 101. 19. 39-40. and principles of science. Aristotle's project. vs. 156nn46-47. 155n43. Prudence. 78. 81. 24. 78. 81. concerning virtues.

reflections on. 66. 101. 170n8. power of. virtue of public life. user as. 121. and incontinence. 125 K knowledge: and didactic discourse. 48. 119 L lack of judgment. Educated person judicial art (dikastike). virtue contributing to leisure. 197n10. as instrument of education. 52. 100 law (legislation): Aristotle's conception of. and experience. discursive. 107. 71. 59- 61. See Collections of laws lawgiver (nomothetes): . 71. of good. and proper pleasure. needed by lawgiver. 105-9. 44. 66. and permanence. conveyed by political discourses. 63-64 justice: and happiness. insufficient for good actions. 110-14 language. See Critical faculty. 55.

and genuine action. formation of. 3. and citizen in democracy. 61. 58. 48. philosopher as normative guide for. 169n21 Laws. . 45. self-awareness of. 38- 39. 56. psychological knowledge necessary for. 48-49. 122. and defining compulsive norms. science. inculcates practical norms. 59. 61. intended audience for NE teachings. 57-59. 62. vs. 65. in the ideal regime. and informative discourse. and arrangements to promote happiness. capacity (nomothetike): and critical knowing. 65. 171n1. 45. and philosophy. speculative faculty in practical order. 67. 123 legislative art. 45. as not acting. instruction necessary for happiness. 71. of Plato. 3. 189n3. man of action par excellence. 3. 75. 125. and heads of household. 65. 122. prudence as practical disposition. must know nature of happiness. part of politics.

107-9 liberality. 159n9. 61 legislative prudence ( = legislative art): and determination of laws for given society. and judgment. facts of. politically active (practical) vs. theoretical. and general laws. according to reason. 91 < previous page page_245 next page > . and practical disposition needed for. 98 life (bios): according to passions. 120. 116. 122. and basic goods. forms of. and philosophical teaching. 53. 65. 39. more intellectual than "practical science. 121-22 leisure. 45 life. supreme part of politics. 125 liberal education: and general education. 120- 21." 66. 52-53.

45 magnificence. and uneducated person. 180n12. and educated person. Hellenistic authorship of. and educated person. and discourse. 154n32 magnanimity. the: . 119- 22. 53. good judgment needed by. as educated person. 111-12 M Magna Moralia: and ethical inquiry as political. 41. 89 logic: and beginning study of Aristotle. 112 many (masses. 50 manner (mode): in reason. 87. audience for. 45 man-woman distinction. 111- 12. 85. See Audience literary aesthetics. term implies oral presentation. majority). chapter 5.< previous page page_246 next page > Page 246 listener (akroates). in expression. 12. direct utility of NE for. 111 literary works. 97- 98.

" 111- 12. 23- 24. 107. Plato's use of paradigm. and oral presentations. 65. rules of mildness." 24. 53 master craftsman (architekton): paradigm for ruling professional. 114- 15. and quick learning. 88. 117 methodological rules (horoi). 63. 189n3 mature persons. vs. 95. and "ethical science. 85- 87. primary propositions of science. 102-3. 114. and "educated person. 84. and passions. for receiving NE lectures. 63. 119. 109 method: exoteric methods. 45 modern exegesis: and Aristotle's "treatises." 143nn7. political. 65. 9. See Method. remarks concerning. rules of. . drawn from experience. 170n1 mathematics: precision in. in NE prologue. rules of. and external regulation. 195n4 mechanic.

144n4. 13. 35 natural virtue (arete phusike). 24. 146nn31. 31. 24-26 moral development. 124. and possibility of harm. 147nn9. 62. and prudence. true virtue. and educated person. 60. 145nn16. analyses aimed at clarification." 41. and where to begin Aristotle. aimed beyond disciples. 49-50 Neoplatonist commentators: and acroamatic writings. 56 multiplicity: of correct constitutions. 49. 116 N natural knowledge (reason): and synderesis. 50. 60. 19. 54. . 122. 48. 48-51. of sciences. and term "political. and unity of ethics with politics. not source for practical principles in Aristotle. 27-30. 35. 134n21. ancient controversies. by habituation. 35-36 nature. 49- 50. vs. 12 Nicomachean Ethics (NE): addressed to politician-lawgiver. 91. 125. and legislative science.

differences from Protrepticus. 90. 94- 95. 52-53. 74- 75. and public larger than EE's. and early composition. prologue. and didactic precaution. Laws < previous page page_246 next page > . 70- 71. 62- 63. vehicle for general knowledge. 60. See Compulsive norms. final chapter. prologue. final chapter. and common books. prologue. as scientific discourse. and correspondences with final chapter. 52-53. and comprehension. and defining penal law. listeners' duty to test discourse. 57. exhortation as minor aspect. 70- 71. 95. prologue. final chapter. 98. correspondences with prologue. See Eudemian Ethics norms of praxis. 114. final chapter. 97. prologue. 71- 77. 71-73. 55. final chapter. 57. 105. 170n22. and nonspecialist audience. affinities with Politics vii-viii. 90. and appropriate method. ultimate. political approach announced in. 70- 71.

97-99. 119-20. and young persons. and discursive teaching. 119. life in accord with. 87. pistis). 93. 59. 160n7. implied by term "listener. vs. and scientific monologues. rules of. . 53. 84-93. 52. See Acroamatic writings P passion(s) (pathos. 120- 22. 170n22 persuasion (conviction. 4. and action. texts not definitively fixed. 94- 95. 120. 122. pathe): enslavement to. life in accord with. and didactic precaution. and incontinence." 85. and the NE. opposed to reason. See Desire paternal education. and proper education. 87. 87. See Private education penal law. 93. 99. and nature of NE audience.< previous page page_247 next page > Page 247 O oral presentations (akroaseis). collections. 53.

needed by lawgiver. 98. 63 . 97- 98. 170n25. 90 philosophy: divisions of. 43. 98- 99. 101. for purely formal method. 21. 125. aspect of teaching. 23. and good judgment. 80. discourse as instrument of. 107. for new political contrivances. 15-16. and comprehension. and didactic discourse. study of. 77-81. 59. 97 philosophical discourses. 133n12. 17 pleasure: and pain. 80. and speaker's moral excellence. proper. criticisms of: for negligence of lawgiver's critical formation. and explanation of error. and appeal to common opinions. for dichotomous divisions. 59. 99. for sacrificing state's parts. and experience. virtue contributing to leisure. Practical philosophy Plato and/or Platonists. 118. human. 18-20. and correct education. 99. as politicians' study. See Political philosophy.

58- 59. senses of term. See City-state political art (political science. 27. 80. 4. politics. politikos). 27 political science. 67. 23- 24. as synonym for practical science. politike): and acquisition of happiness. practical science. and ancient commentators. 123- 25. 70. lacks discernment for choosing laws. See Prudence political leader. . 3-5. 112- 13. and educated citizen. existing. 27. 24-26 political philosophy: analogy with lawgiving. vs. 38-39. and the EE. and uneducated persons. 38. lacks general knowledge. 38-45. political philosophy. 46. 116- 17. vs. See Political art politician (political leader. as architectonic art. political capacity. See Politician political perspective (on Aristotle's ethics). 25. 64- 65.polis. 63- 65. 172nn1. and modern exegesis. existing.

23. See Political art Politics. acknowledgement compelled by society. and philosophical teaching. books vii-viii as early works. Political art politics. vs. . 33-34. 91 practical philosophy: and modern exegesis. 25. 71-73 practical disposition (hexis praktike): and division of sciences. and educated person. Legislative art. 173-74n1. insufficient for teaching lawgiver. 24. during Hellenistic era. 63. 122. 36-38. theoretical. 38. books vii-viii and NE's final chapter. the: disinterest in. 24 practical principles. 23- 24. 143n4. relation to Ethics for ancients. 141nn7-9. prudence as. term not in Corpus. philosopher reflecting on politics. 60. 105- 9. 11. See Lawgiver. 14. 22. needs general knowledge. 32 practical (political) life: and rejection of separable mind. 142nn1-3. vs.

< previous page page_247 next page > . 151n70. acquired by practice. 34. and apperception of end.

24. and political science. and prudence. 144n15. 33 practical science (praktike episteme). 36. 22. acquisition of. 76. 36. 33-34 . knowledge of. wickedness deludes about. as ends of action. and discursive study. virtue necessary for. principles not discursively taught. and discourses. universal. its aim. 39. 30. 18. 25- 26.< previous page page_248 next page > Page 248 practical principles (continued) and cultural relativity. 22- 27. 37. 25-26 practical syllogism. 27. vs. not supplied by nature. knowledge of. 28 practical truth. speculative theory. 26. 37. principles defined by lawgiver. 39. 38. defined by lawgiver. and modern epistemology. philosophical inquiry not direct basis for. 35. and concrete action. fixed empirically in prudent persons.

and habituated virtue. 2 problems. 55. 113-14. 106- 9. 32-33. 12. and educated person. See Action. division of. See Prudence "practical" writings. 106- 9. Experience. 95. and interpretation of Corpus. and guidance of law. 124 problematic (aporematic) perspective: and "contradictions" in Aristotle. of Ethics to Politics. adequateness (appropriateness). 149n31 priority. precision (akribeia). ultimate purpose of. and political regime. 186n2 prescription (command). 166n22. vs. 107 progress: .168n8 private (paternal) education: advantages. 128n14. 16 professional: vs. 49-50. 121. 26 practice (praxis): and acquisition of virtue. and mechanic. educated person. 52. ideal of: and Academy. 28.practical wisdom. 55-57. laws as ultimate norms of.

preambles): brevity as virtue of. 35-37. 147nn9. 150- 51n59. 4. 37. 145nn16. 24. and apperception. 33. 144n4. and comprehension. as introductions. in philosophy generally. 29. and ends of action. and learning from discourses. 34-35. 79-81. and teacher as guide. and means to happiness. chapter 1. 37. and excellent leader. forms of. and didactic precaution. 192n17 prudence (phronesis). V. 19. . and moral virtue. 63-66 (table. 35. 13. and practical principles. 30. modern exegesis. 44. in human philosophy. 51. concerning individual. ideal in children's activity. 64). See Nicomachean Ethics proper mean. 178n19 prologues (prefaces. 37. and cleverness. 44- 45. 104. 148n25. as excellence of political life. 185n5. 32. 95. 146nn31. and correct intuition of happiness. 35- 36. sect. acquisition of. 27-30. 94- 95. 64.

prescriptive faculty. as permanent practical disposition. 32-33. open to rational persuasion. 75. 51. analog of manual labor. 48. 150n53. . 118. 31-32 prudent person (phronimos): deliberation of. 65. 57. how become lawgiver. political (narrow sense). 120. in Thomas Aquinas. 36. 62. 32- 36. as source of laws. 149n31. 55. p. 66. 174n12 Q questions: how become good. as such needs no theoretical capacity. as model for imitation. and incontinent. and deliberative excellence. 121. 64. 58 R reason (logos): action conforming to. superiority of. and true general principles. existence of teachers in politics. discursive teaching improves effectiveness. 48. and education. 169n21 public education. 51. See Prudence psychological knowledge. p.

internal reg- < previous page page_248 next page > .

53. and harmony with character. 101 reform. preventive measures against. 124-25 relativism: and educational regimes. 164n6. . 197n9 rhetoric. and reflections on language. Plato's theory of. 151 n65 revolutions: and constitutions. 50.< previous page page_249 next page > Page 249 ulator permitting teaching. 103. 100 science (episteme): acquisition of. 54. 58 rules. 120. arguments refuted by Aristotle. 160n7 recollection. 101. in constitutions. 124- 25. 99. 124. and perfect regime. 53. and comprehension. Law. See Compulsive norms. Method S scepticism: and acquisition of virtue by teaching. and need for laws. guides disciplined passions. 152n73 responsibility for vice. opposed to passion.

recommend collecting laws. 112. and human philosophy as "ethics. 13. 12. 102- 3." 41. inexperienced in politics. 16. 57-58. 50. verbal knowledge. 112. 165n19 specific education. 116. 125. 176n14. confuse rhetoric with politics. 140nn10. possession of. ignorant about politics. 58. 20-23. 177n30. 76 Sparta. and formation of lawgiver. divisions of. 108. 154n32. 110 Sophists: and acquisition of virtue. 97. tripartite concept of philosophy. 12. and liberal education. 9. possession of. 17 subjects: . 56. and logic as philosophy. 58. 79-80 Stoics: and ethics for individuals. 138-39n2. constitution and laws of. 97 servility. and general education. 139nn4. multiplicity of sciences. 102-3 scientific discourse: NE as. 115 speculators on political arrangements. and teaching. vs. and experience. 13. Isocrates as example.

32 systematizing perspective: and completion of human philosophy. 102. and formation of judgment. of NE. 9- 10. and acquisition of prudence. exoteric. of NE. obscurities about. optimal conditions of. 61. of NE. practical. 93. and Hellenistic thought. and early commentators. 49. 67. 88. 4 T teaching (didaskalia): and acquisition of virtue. addressed to lawgiver. 4. 131nn7. 27. 122. described by Aristotle. See Practical syllogism synderesis (of Thomas Aquinas): naturally knows first principles. 88. 35. of lawgiver. politicians' inability at. 31. 78. and prudence. 122. . and interpretation of Corpus. in Aristotle's time. esoteric. 30. 92-93 syllogism. 101. 58. and virtuous actor's self-understanding. 9. needed to promote happiness. 2. and intellectual virtues.

98 treatises of Aristotle: and modern exegesis. 79 temperance: virtue of public life. 154nn26-29 < previous page page_249 next page > . 112 ultimate norms of praxis. 123. See Discursive teaching teleological perspective. 111. virtue contributing to leisure. 110- 14. practical. 55 unity of Ethics and Politics. 26-27. and wealth. oral tradition in writing. 110. See Practical truth truthfulness. 111. 180n17 truth. and literary style. 45 U uneducated person (apaideutos). 38-45. 111- 12. 24. and decorum. 111. and logic. and demonstrative science. 125 testing discourse. 45.

comprehension. 19 universal practical principles. 102- 3. not discursively taught. equated to knowledge (Socrates). and prudence. contributing to leisure. 104. 158n73. of dramatic actor. 102- 3. 49. 151n65. 125. possession of science. 102-3 vice: and errors of understanding. do not occur by nature.< previous page page_250 Page 250 unity of philosophy (in Plato). moral excellences. moral (virtuous habits. and knowledge of practical principles. 50. and perception of good. 61. 35- 36. 148n25. 49. 76 unwritten doctrine (of Plato). 50- 51. . and young people. and chance. 150n58 virtues. and historical contingencies. and compulsive rules. 92 V verbal knowledge: vs. ethikai aretai): acquisition of. vs.

men of. 44- 45. Corpus Aristotelicum Y young people (youth. 120. 118. Habituation voluntary. 10. and external regulation. 84- 93. 53. 195n4. Dialogues. political. "practical" and "theoretical. 112 well-born characters. 179n26 writings: acroamatic. and verbal knowledge. subjects in ideal regime. 170n22 vulgarity. 35." 26. the. 52 wisdom (sophia): theoretical analog of prudence. 102- 3. 47. See Children . unable to follow political discourse. of public life. 110. hoi neoi): compared to incontinent. See Character. ancient source of. 110 W wealth. excluded from audience. See Catalogs. 119.

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