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1. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Medrano

Whether or not Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over

Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher, filed before the petitioner the administrative complaint against Medrano even if an affidavit

Office of the Ombudsman a sworn letter-complaint against her of desistance has already been filed by Dumalaog

superior herein-respondent Victorio N. Medrano for violation of

Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) HELD:

(criminal case), and grave misconduct (administrative case). While

The flaw in Medrano‘s argument that the execution of
the administrative case was pending investigation, Dumalaog filed
Dumalaog‘s Affidavit of Desistance and the dismissal of
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive Suspension, and was
the criminal case must result in the dismissal of the
granted by the Ombudsman ordering the preventive suspension
administrative case is that it ignores the whale of a difference
of Medrano for six months without pay. Medrano moved for
between those two remedies. In Gerardo R. Villaseñor and Rodel
lifting the suspension but was denied. When Medrano filed a
A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan and Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra (Office
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Ombudsman lifted the
of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman), the Court stressed the
preventive suspension order.
distinct and independent character of the remedies available to

The Ombudsman rendered its decision with an offended party against any impropriety or wrongdoing

the administrative case and found Medrano guilty of grave committed by a public officer. It provides the three remedies

misconduct. Medrano moved for reconsideration of the decision available: 1.) civil, 2.) criminal, and 3.)administrative. These

and assailed not only the factual findings and conclusions of the remedies may be invoked separately, alternately,

Ombudsman, but for the first time, challenged its jurisdiction over simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense

the case. With regard to the criminal case, Ombudsman found may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.

probable cause to indict Medrano and a criminal case was filed

At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, as a rule,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Biñan, Laguna
viewed with suspicion and reservation because it can easily be
against him. By joint order, the Ombudsman affirmed its
secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through
Resolution in the criminal case but modified its decision in
intimidation or for monetary consideration. And there is always
theadministrative case.
the probability that it would later be repudiated,

Medrano filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable. Hence, such

(CA), assailing Ombudsman‘s jurisdiction over desistance, by itself, is not usually a ground for the dismissal of an

the administrative case. The CA annulled Ombudsman‘s decision action once it has been instituted in court.

in the administrative case and dismissed the complaint on the

With regard to whether Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
sole ground that Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over it. The
the administrative complaint, Section 5, Article XI of the
Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA‘s
Constitution “created the independent Office of the
decision but was denied.
Ombudsman.” Hailed as the “protectors of the people,” the

Ombudsman and his Deputies are bestowed with overreaching

2. Aquino vs Acosta
authority, powers, functions, and duties to act
on complaints against public officials and employees, as
On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation
provided in Sections 12 and 13. in the U.S., bringing gifts for t he t hr ee j udg es o f th e C TA ,
i ncl u di ng r es po n de nt . I n th e aft er n o on of t he sa m e
day, he entered her room and greeted her by shaking her hand.
Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her on her cheek.
When an administrative charge is initiated against a public
On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he
school teacher, however, Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public
called complainant by phone, sayi ng h e w i l l g et s o me thi ng
School Teachers specifically provides that the same shall be i n her offi c e. S h or tl y th er eaft er , h e e nt er ed h er
r oo m, s ho ok her hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas."
heard initially by an investigating committee composed of the Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was able to free
herself by slightly pushing him away.
school superintendent of the division, as chairman, a
On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned
representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing complainant, asking if she could se e hi m i n hi s c ha mb er s i n
or d er t o di s cus s s o m e mat ter s . W h en c o mpl ai na nt
provincial or national teachers‘ organization, and a supervisor of ar r i ved th er e, respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to
evade his sexual attempt.
the division. Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989

directs that the petitioner “may refer certain complaints to the Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill
expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, w hi l e c o mpl ai n ant
proper disciplinary authority for the institution of and her c om pa ni o ns w er e co ng r at ul ati ng an d ki ssi ng
eac h ot h er , r es po n de nt suddenly placed his arms around her
appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public shoulders and kissed her.

officers or employees.” In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called

complainant, requesting her to go to his office. She then asked
Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany her.
In light of this, the Court holds that
Fortunately, when they reached his chambers, respondent had
the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman left. The last incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m.,
respondent called complainant and a sk ed her t o s e e hi m i n
over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is hi s of fi ce t o di sc uss t h e Se nat e bi l l o n th e C TA . S he
ag ai n r eq ue st ed R ub y to acc o m pany her . Th e l att er
concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd. ag r ee d b ut sug g est ed t hat t h ey sh o ul d act as i f t he y
me t by acci d ent i n r esp o nd e nts offi c e. R u by
th en a ppr oac he d t he s ecr e tar y ’s ta bl e w hi ch w as
While Ombudsman should have desisted from hearing se par ate d fr o m r es p on d en t’s offi c e by a tr a nsp ar e nt
g l ass.
the administrative complaint against Medrano and referred it to
For her par t, complainant sat
the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already concluded i n f r o n t o f r es po n de nt 's ta bl e a nd ask e d hi m w hat
he w a nt ed t o k now a bo ut t he Se nat e bi l l . R es po nd e nt
the proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon, Medrano is
seemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at Ruby who
now barred from assailing Ombudsman‘s acts under was searching for something at the secretary's desk. Forthwith,
respondent approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking
the principle of estoppel. He had actively participated in for and stepped out of the office. When he returned, Ruby said
she found what she was looking for and left. Respondent then
the administrative proceedings before the Ombudsman. In his approached complainant saying, me gusto akong gawin sa iyo
kahapon pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant
Counter-Affidavit, he asked Ombudsman for affirmative relief by instinctively raised her hands to protect herself b ut
r esp o nd e nt h el d her ar ms ti g htl y, pul l e d h er tow ar ds
seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint allegedly for hi m a nd ki ss e d h er . S he pus h ed hi m away, then slumped
on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and
being baseless. Verily, Medrano cannot be permitted to challenge covered his fac e w i t h hi s h an ds. T h er ea ft er ,
co mpl ai nan t l eft cr yi ng a nd l ock ed her s el f i nsi de a
Ombudsman‘s acts belatedly.
co mf or t room. After that incident, respondent went to her
office and tossed a note stating, sorry, it won’t happen again.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Acosta is guilty of sexually

Held: No, Judg e Acosta is not g uilty of sexual 3. Paiste vs Acosta
harassment. H e is exoner ated of the charg es
against him and is advised to be more circumspect in his Facts:
Complainant Goltiao is a Stenographer. She testified that on August 7,
“A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or 2000, at about 3:00 p.m., a representative from the Plaridel Insurance
favour and does not fall within the purview of sexual Co. came to their office seeking clearance. She immediately prepared
harassment under RA 7877.” the necessary form and, together with the representative, went to see
respondent in the courtroom to obtain his signature. When she asked
him to sign the document, respondent, who was at that time
playing tong-its (a card game) at the lawyers’ table with unnamed
individuals, got angry and threw his cards. He shouted at her: “Why
did you bring them with you? Did you like them to bring me to the
Supreme Court?”

She responded that such was not her intention and reminded him of
his requirement that he must first see the applicants before he sign
their clearance. He did not sign the clearance, sent then out and
shouted “Bullshit ka!” at her thrice. They all then went out of the
courtroom and proceeded back to the staff room. She went to her
table and buried her face in her hands, crying. Respondent followed
her and continued uttering unsavory remarks. Thereafter, he asked
the utility aide to buy him four bottles of beer.

Goltiao declared that her working relationship with the respondent is

“sometimes good and sometimes bad because of his ill temper. He
easily gets mad at her even for small, trivial mistakes. This situation
started, according to her, when she told him to stop courting and
sending her love notes as she is already a married woman. She related
an incident which happened early one morning when he asked her to
see him inside the judge’s chamber. At that time, the designated
judge was not around. Once inside, she was told to sit in one of the
chairs in front of the judge’s table.

The respondent, who was sitting at the judge’s chair, then extended
his hand to her, as if he wanted to shake her hands. She reciprocated
by extending her hands and jokingly put his hands on her forehead
(agmanmano). She afterwards tried to free her hands off his but he
would no let her. Instead, he told her, “Wait for a while, I would just
like to tell you something. I love you, is that okay? Tell me that you
love me too. No strings attached.” She retorted, “As if you are my
father.” Spurned, he got mad. This kind of incident happened at least
ten more times.

Furthermore, respondent sent her love notes. He wrote his love

messages on pieces of paper in front of her and handed them to
her.[9] She knew that they were intended for her as there was nobody
else present when he gave the notes to her. He would also call her at
her mother’s house. She did not respond affirmatively to his display of
affection as both of them are married. Finally, she explained that she
filed a complaint against him only on August 10, 2001 because of the
August 7, 2001 incident, when she got fed up at the way he treated

WON Accused is guilty of the charges filed against him.

Under the circumstances, we find respondent guilty of sexual
harassment. His severely outrageous acts, which are an affront to
women, constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily
result in an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working
environment for his female subordinates. He abused the power
and authority he exercises over them, which is the gravamen of
the offense in sexual harassment. Sexual harassment in the
workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by
reason of sexual desire – it is about power being exercised by a
superior over his women subordinates. That power emanates
from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse his amorous
ANTI-FENCING LAW (PD 1612) deprivation of one’s property.

1. D.M Consuji vs. Ramon Esguerra


In the instant case, the first and second elements were duly
established. Qualified theft had been committed. Quantities of
phenolic plywood were stolen and were discovered in the
premises of private respondents. The question is whether the
third element exists. Did private respondents know or should they
have known that the phenolic plywood were the subjects or
proceeds of crime?

Dizon-Pamintuan gives us the guidelines: "One is deemed to

know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or
awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or
has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within
the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of
the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high
probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it
does not exist. On the other hand, the words "should know"
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty
to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that
such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness
about a fact .

Thus, the prima facie presumption was successfully disputed. The

logical inference follows that private respondents had no reason
to suspect that said plywoods were the proceeds of qualified theft
or any other crime. Admittedly, there is no jurisprudence to the
effect that a receipt is a sufficient defense against charges of
fencing. But logically, and for all practical purposes, such receipt
is proof — although disputable — that the transaction in
question is above-board and legitimate. Absent other evidence,
the presumption of innocence remains.

2. Dunlao vs CA
Intent to gain is an element in Anti-Fencing Law. However, it
need not be proved. For the mere possession of any good,
article, etc. of value which has been the subject of robbery
or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.

In the case at bar, Dunlao was found in possession of

farrowing crates and GI Pipes inside his compound, they
were even displayed in his shelves. His testimony that a
group of people alighted from a jeep and left the items in
front of his shop is to no avail as it is held contrary to the
fact that he displayed such items in his shelves. Such act
presupposes a presumption that there is intent to sell such

3. Dela Torre vs COMELEC

The crime of fencing is a crime involving moral turpitude as the

element of knowledge displays some degree of malicious
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (BP 22) 2. Lopez vs People

1. Mejia vs. People Facts:

Facts: Petitioner prosecuted for estafa.

The trial court found that petitioner issued the check as The prosecution presented the testimonies of private complainant
guarantee for his loan obtained from Bernardo. At the time he Efren R. Ables and Valentin Luzuriaga, a bank teller of the
issued the check, he knew that his account with the PNB had been Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The prosecution
closed. When Bernardo deposited the check, it was dishonored by presented Exhibits "A" to "E" with submarkings consisting of the
the PNB, the drawee bank, for the reason "account closed." check issued by the petitioner, the demand letter sent by private
Petitioner was duly notified of such dishonor. In fact, he admitted complainant to petitioner and bank records to show that the said
having received Bernardo's demand letter urging him to make check was dishonored as the account was closed even before the
good the check within five (5) banking days from notice. But said check was issued.
petitioner failed to heed such demand.
Petitioner contends first that there was absence of deceit as the
Ruling: complainant knew that there was no funds at the time of the
issuance of the check. But it was settled that it is criminal fraud or
deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under
Issuing a check merely as guarantee is not a defense in the crime
the Revised Penal Code, and not the nonpayment of a debt.
of BP22, as compared to that of estafa. Also, the argument that
the subject check was issued without consideration is
inconsequential. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a Afterwards, Petitioner contends that no presumption or prima
worthless check. As stated in the case: facie evidence of guilt would arise if there is no proof as to the
date of receipt by the drawer of the said notice "since there
would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 3-day period"
“The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and
from receipt of notice of dishonor of the check within which the
conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding
amount necessary to cover the check may be done as provided by
such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of
paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued,
or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode
the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value
of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in Ruling:
banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22
is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum The absence of proof as to receipt of the written notice of
prohibitum. “
dishonor notwithstanding, the evidence shows that petitioner
had actual notice of the dishonor of the check because he was
verbally notified by the respondent and notice whether written
or verbal was a surplusage and totally unnecessary considering
that almost two (2) months before the issuance of the check,
petitioner's current account was already closed. Under these
circumstances, the notice of dishonor would have served no
useful purpose as no deposit could be made in a closed bank

Therefore, it may be gleaned from the fact that notice of written

dishonour is not a defense in estafa, however, as may be seen in
the next case, there should be explicit, actual and written notice
to the drawer of the check.
3. Suarez vs People


Petitioner prosecuted for BP 22 for issuing a check and its

subsequent dishonour due to the fact of a closed account. Upon
notification, petitioner still has not paid complainant.

The evidence shows that the prosecution proved that a notice of

dishonor was sent to petitioner through registered mail. The
prosecution presented a copy of the demand letter and properly
authenticated the registry return receipt.


WON there was sufficient notice to the petitioner to convict him

of BP 22?


It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of

dishonor was sent to the petitioner. It is also incumbent upon the
prosecution to show "that the drawer of the check received the
said notice because the fact of service provided for in the law is
reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee
of the check."

A review of the records shows that the prosecution did not prove
that the petitioner received the notice of dishonor. Registry
return cards must be authenticated to serve as proof of
receipt of letters sent through registered mail.

The presentation of the registry card, with an unauthenticated

signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the petitioner received such notice, especially
considering that he denied receiving it. As there is insufficient
proof that the petitioner received notice of dishonor, the
presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds
cannot arise.
ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972 (RA 6539) owner, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
1. People vs Ellasos
things; it is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if
- Miguel de Belen, who is the registered owner of the he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.”
tricycle subject of this carnapping case, was last seen by
his brother Fernando at the Caltex station at 9:00 p.m. on
April 2, 1992, he (Miguel) was seated beside the accused
Sonny Obillo inside the sidecar of his tricycle which was
being driven by the other accused Carlo Ellasos.
- Three (3) hours later, Fernando again saw the two
accused with the tricycle, but this time without his
brother. When Fernando finally asked the accused about
the whereabouts of his brother, Ellasos answered that
Miguel was in a drinking session with his (Ellasos') father
in Malasin.
- The following morning, the lifeless body of Miguel de
Belen, with a gunshot wound on the head, was found in
Tayabo. In the same morning, the two accused were
found sleeping at the gate of the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel
in Muñoz, and in possession of a gun and the wheel of
Miguel's tricycle. The rest of the tricycle was later
recovered in a culvert.

- The chain of proven circumstances leads to the logical
conclusion that the tricycle was unlawfully taken by the two
accused from its owner, Miguel de Belen, and the latter was
killed on the occasion thereof. Miguel was last seen with the
two accused; three hours later, the two were again spotted
riding the tricycle without Miguel. The following morning,
the two accused were found in possession of a wheel of the
tricycle. Such possession, which remained without any
satisfactory explanation, raises the presumption that the
two accused authored the carnapping. This presumption
remains unrebutted.
- That only the wheel was found in possession of the accused
and was intended to be appropriated by the latter is of no
moment. The unlawful taking of the tricycle from the owner
was already completed. Besides, the accused may be held
liable for the unlawful taking of the whole vehicle even if
only a part thereof is ultimately taken and/or appropriated
while the rest of it is abandoned.
- The crime was committed before the effectivity of R.A.
7659. Therefore, we have to apply the original provision
prescribing the penalty of "life imprisonment to death"
where the "owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the

“Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element

of the crime of carnapping, is an internal act and
hence presumed from the unlawful taking of the
vehicle. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the
taking of the vehicle without the consent of the
2. People vs Sirad Section 14, the penalty for carnapping in case the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
in the course of the commission of the carnapping shall
be reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that at the time
of the commission of the crime the death penalty was
- George Lozano, the victim in this case, made a living by
suspended, accused are hereby sentenced to reclusion
delivering bread around General Santos City using a red
perpetua. CEDHT
Kawasaki motorcycle owned by his employer Aniceto
- In the morning of February 4, 1992, he left his house “Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element
early at around 5:00 a.m. to get bread from the bakery of
Aniceto Dela. He returned to his house two hours later
of the crime of carnapping, is an internal act and
and after taking his breakfast, left again at past 7:00 A.M. hence presumed from the unlawful taking of the
proceeding towards Barangay Sinawal. vehicle. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the
- At about 9:00 a.m. Martillano Lozano was picking cotton
at a cotton farm in Sitio Cabuay (Cabuway), Barangay taking of the vehicle without the consent of the
Sinawal, General Santos City when he saw his cousin owner, or by means of violence against or
George Lozano pass by riding his red Kawasaki
motorcycle with the bread box attached at its side. At intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
around 12:00 noon he again saw the red motorcycle pass things; it is deemed complete from the moment
by, but this time it was not George who was riding the
motorcycle but three men and the bread box was no
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if
longer attached to the motorcycle. he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.”
- Rita Pino, a co-worker of Martillano Lozano at the cotton
farm also saw the red Kawasaki motorcycle pass by the
cotton farm at around noon of February 4, 1992, driven
by accused-appellant Akmad Sirad with the other
accused-appellants Orlie Sultan and Salik Amino riding at
the back.
- At around 1:00 in the afternoon, Martillano Lozano
reported to Nenita Lozano, wife of the victim George 3. People vs Mejia
Lozano, that he saw the motorcycle of George Lozano
ridden by another person and that the bread box was no Ruling:
longer attached to the motorcycle.
- Around 5:00 in the afternoon Nenita Lozano was worried
because George Lozano who usually arrived at that time The special complex crime of carnapping with homicide refers to
had not arrived. She then went to the wake of the consummated act of killing. Therefore, if it is merely
Bernardino Lozano where she could ask the people there frustrated homicide/ murder, as the case may be, the offense
about her husband's whereabouts. should not be denominated as the special complex crime of
- A search party was organized and they looked for George carnapping with homicide, but is merely an act that includes the
Lozano by tracing the usual routes he would take in
use of violence/ threat/ intimidation.
delivering bread.
- On February 7,1992, an informant provided information
that a motorcycle was hidden in Purok Islam, General
Santos City and that it would soon be transferred to 4. People vs Tan
- At around 1:30 in the afternoon, a motorcycle with two
men on board approached the police roadblock. The
motorcycle sped up when its driver Akmad Sirad
recognized police officer Domantay.
- The police officers gave chase on board their motorcycles
and were able to overtake and apprehend Akmad Sirad
and his companion Orlie Sultan. When Akmad Sirad was
asked to explain why they have the motorcycle of the
deceased George Lozano, accused told Domantay that he
was instructed by Salik Amino to deliver the vehicle to
Sultan Kudarat.

- During the commission of the crime, which was on February
4, 1992, there was no crime denominated as carnapping
with homicide. The proper denomination for the crime is
carnapping as defined and penalized under of Republic Act Prepared by: Shenna Jane Parado
No. 6539, Sections 2 and 14. Under Republic Act No. 6539,