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Crimes Against The Fundamental Laws of the State: CASES

1. P v Aruta GR No. 120915 April 3, 1998 Arbitrary Detention


After alighting from a bus from Baguio City, accused Aruta was pointed to by the informant
as the one transporting marijuana. The NARCOM agents approached Aruta, introducing
themselves as such and asked Aruta about the contents of her bag. The accused handed it to them.
Upon inspection, marijuana was found. Aruta was then arrested and brought to the NARCOM

Despite challenging the legality of the search and arrest, Aruta was convicted by the RTC
for transporting prohibited drugs and sentenced to life imprisonment. Hence, this appeal.
W/N the warrantless search resulting to Aruta’s arrest was valid.

No. there was no valid warrantless search. Generally, a warrant must be issued first by a
judge based on probable cause. However, the following cases of warrantless searches are allowed
by law:
1) Search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2) Seizure of evidence in plain view;
3) Search of moving vehicle;
4) Consented warrantless search;
5) Customs search;
6) Stop and Frisk;
7) Exigent and Emergency Circumstances;

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement
officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons
against unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
In the instant case, it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. The records show
that what prompted the NARCOM agents to approach the accused was not probable, but rather the
finger-pointing of the informant. Neither can it be said that the accused validly gave her consent
to the search. Her act of giving her bag upon the NARCOM agent’s inquiry is merely passive
conformity to intimidating and coercive circumstances.
2. P v Flores GR No. 116488 April 31, 2001 Arbitrary Detention

On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking beer at the
store owned by Terry Cabrillos. Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar
Villeran were at the same store drinking beer. Sayam joined the four accused at their table.
Sometime later, all the accused and the victim left the store and walked towards the direction of
the military detachment headquarters. After the accused left the store with Samson Sayam,
witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing coming from the direction of the
detachment headquarters.2 That was the last time Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent
efforts of Sayam's mother and relatives, he has not been found.

The prosecution contended that the victim was detained by the accused at the HQ and was
never released. The RTC convicted the three accused for the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention. Hence this appeal.
W/N the accused are guilty of the aforementioned crime.
W/N the accused arbitrarily detained Samson Sayam.

No. The first element of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is that the offender is a
private individual. Hence, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element of the said crime is that the
offender must be a private individual. In the case at bar, accused-appellants were members of the
local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was committed.

No. Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal
grounds, detains a person. Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers, the
question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court
proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accused-appellants.

The deprivation of liberty must be proved, just as the intent of the accused to deprive the victim
of his liberty must also be established by indubitable proof. In this case, there is no hard evidence
to show that Sayam was forcibly taken into the detachment HQ to be detained, nor is there proof
as to any intention on the part of the accused to detain Sayam. Circumstantial evidence is not
enough as proof beyond reasonable doubt is the quantum of evidence.

3. Astorga v P GR No. 154130 October 1, 2003/August 20, 2004 Arbitrary Detention

On September 1, 1997, private offended parties together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr.
and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team
found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at
Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who
turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the
DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed
men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioner’s
house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.
W/N the petitioner is guilty of the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

No, on the ground of reasonable doubt. The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in
the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the evidence on record,
the court find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties.
The court failed to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the
police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their mission. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified
that they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted
that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the team from leaving
the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.

As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral
certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be
granted as a matter of right. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in
this case, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is
compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is
better to acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocent man.

4. Sayo v Chief of Police GR No. L-2128 April 12, 1948 Delay in the Delivery

Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed
the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners
on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until
April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners
were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an
information with the proper courts of justice.

W/N the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
W/N there was a failure of delivery of the petitioners to proper judicial authorities.

No. the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or
judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement
of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as may be established by law".
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a
warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize
the detention of a person arrested without warrant.

Yes. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any public officer or employee who,
after detaining a person, “shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within
the period of six hours. In the case at bar, the arresting officer did not deliver Sayo and Mostero to
any authority, much less any judicial authority. Their filing of the complaint with the office of the
fiscal of Manila is not a delivery of the persons of petitioners. The continued detention and
confinement of petitioners for more than six hours is a clear violation of the article. Hence, Sayo
and Mostero were released immediately.

5. Agbay v Dep Omb GR No. 134503 July 2, 1999 Delay in the Delivery

On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was arrested
and detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A.7610. The
following day, or on September 8, 1997, a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against
petitioner and Jugalbot. Counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the
immediate release of petitioner considering that the latter had "failed to deliver the detained Jasper
Agbay to the proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours from September 7,
1997."Privaterespondents did not act on this letter and continued to detain petitioner. Petitioner
filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against herein private respondents
SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr., SPO2 Eleazar M. Salomon and other unidentified police officers
stationed at the Liloan Police Substation, before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the

W/N the filing of the complaint with the MTC constitutes a proper judicial authority as
contemplated in Art. 125 of the RPC.
No. Art. 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person
without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail. More specifically,
it punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground and
shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by
law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods
provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial

The words "judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 mean "the courts of justices or
judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement
of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other
such inferior courts as may be established by law. The power to order the release or confinement
of an accused is determinative of the issue.

In contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal court judge, even in the
performance of his function to conduct preliminary investigations, retains the power to issue an
order of release or commitment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person
is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be
released on bail.

Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied
for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125
has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. The Court agreed with the
position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period
prescribed in said Article.

6. Albior v Auguis AM No. P-01-1472 June 26, 2003 Delay in the Delivery

Two informations for rape was filed against Edilberto before the sala of Judge Avelino
Puracan of which Auguis was the clerk of court who received the complaints. Auguis immediately
issued an order for the detention of Edilberto which was directed to the BJMP. Edilberto was
detained. Claiming that his son was illegally detained because no warrant was issued for his arrest
and neither was there a preliminary investigation, complainant filed a motion for the release of
Edilberto but was ignored by Auguis.

This forced the complainant to sue for Habeas Corpus. During the Habeas Corpus trial,
Auguis testified that this was not the first time he ordered the commitment of persons but said he
did so in the best interest of those persons and upon request of the Chief of Police. He justified his
actions by saying that since PNP jails didn’t have meal provisions for detainees, he ordered their
commitment to BJMP facilities.
The court, in the Habeas Corpus proceedings, found the detention illegal and ordered the
release of Edilberto. On the same day, a preliminary investigation was conducted and in an
Omnibus Motion, confirmed the arrest of the accused. Complainant then filed an administrative
case against Auguis for usurpation of judicial functions before the Office of the Court
Administrator. The OCA found Auguis administratively liable and imposed a fine of 3,000 with a
warning not to repeat the violations anymore.

W/N Aguis is liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons to proper judicial

Yes. The functions of the clerk of court are clearly defined in Section 5 Rule 136 of the
Rules of Court. Nowhere in that provision does it provide that, absent a judge, the clerk of court
has the power to issue detention orders which is clearly judicial in nature. The good faith defense
of Auguis, does not excuse his behavior. If a judge is not available, the detaining officer must
release the accused upon the expiration of the maximum period of detention allowed in Art. 125
of the RPC.

Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused and his
relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing such detention order,
he trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused. Because of the unauthorized order
issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior was deprived of liberty without due process of
law for a total of 56 days

7. P v Go GR No. 116001 March 14, 2001 Violation of Domicile

One evening, SPO1 Mauro Piamonte and SPO3 Candido Liquido, went to the police
outpost at Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to follow up an intelligence report that methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu, a regulated drug, was being supplied there. Near the outpost, herein
Accused-appellant Luisito Go, also known as King Louie, enter the Flamingo Disco House with
two women. Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked in accused-appellants waist. Together,
the three policemen proceeded to the Disco House, which was located about a hundred meters
away from the outpost.

When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the owner that they were
conducting search for illegally possessed firearms. Eventually, the police officers saw accused-
appellant and his lady companions seated at a table. The policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist
and also found out that it was no licensed, so they confiscated it.
On the way out of the disco, the police officers accompanied accused-appellant to his car.
They noticed that a Philippine National Police identification card hanging from the rearview
mirror. They asked accused-appellant if he was a member of the PNP, and he said no. Later on,
accused-appellant was ordered to give his driver’s license and the registration papers of the vehicle,
but he was unable to produce them.

When accused-appellant opened the door, the police officers saw pieces of glass tooters
and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. They asked accused-appellant why he had these
items, but he did not say anything. Instead, accused-appellant suggested that they talk the matter
over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that they should talk at the police
headquarters. Accused-appellant took out an attach case from the car and opened it. There were
two black clutch bags inside. Accused-appellant opened the first bag, which contained shiny white
substance wrapped in cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00 in cash.

The police officers brought accused-appellant to the police station. The investigator found
eight cellophane bags containing granules suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When
the attach case was opened, the police officers found that it also contained three glass tooters, tin
foils, an improvised burner, magazines and newspapers.

Consequently, two Informations were filed and eventually, lower court rendered judgment
convicting accused-appellant in the two criminal cases.
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction in one of the Criminal Cases, directly to this
Court, asking consideration for the penalty imposed

On the other hand, accused-appellant brought his appeal of the other case before the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed accused-appellants conviction but modified the penalty
imposed by the trial court by sentencing him Hence, this petition for review. The two cases were
W/N the arrest and the subsequent seizure is illegal.

No. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest may
be effected without a warrant. Among these are when, in the presence of a peace officer, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or
when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellants waist when he stood up. The
gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Accused-appellant could
not show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was
in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was
necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.
As a consequence of appellants valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. This is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest. The subsequent
discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which was later identified
as shabu, though in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed,
cannot be said to have been made during an illegal search. As such, the seized items do not fall
within the exclusionary clause, which states that any evidence obtained in violation of the right
against warrantless arrest cannot be used for any purposes in any proceeding. Hence, not being
fruits of the poisonous tree, so to speak, the objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the
firearm, the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against appellant. Besides,
it has been held that drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in evidence.

8. Alvarez v CFI GR No. 45358 January 29, 1937 Malicious Search Warrants

On June 3, 1936, the chief of of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to
Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information,
the petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chits and other
papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender charging usurious rates of
interest in violation of the law.

In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements upon
his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon this
questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of the petitioner’s
house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate
delivery of such to him (judge). With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered
the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night and seized and took possession of
various articles belonging to the petitioner.

The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain
accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta,
Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to
retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question
be returned to him.
W/N the search warrant is illegal on the ground that it is based on hearsay.

Yes. The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable cause before
the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath required must refer
to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because
the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test
of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn
in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages

It appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and
therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the
books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to
which the petitioner was subjected.

9. Burgos v Chief of Staff GR No. L-64261 December 26, 1984 Malicious Warrants

On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal
[Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants whereby the business addresses of the “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books
and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-
editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be

issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles
thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants
issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant
were real properties
W/N the two warrants were valid to justify the seizure of the subject properties.
No, the two warrants null and void. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not
satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere

Another factor under consideration is that the warrants are general warrants, which are
prohibited. The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized
did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

10. P v Alipit and Alemus GR No. 18853 August 22, 1922 Prohibition, Interruption

The accused Exequiel Alipit had been elected municipal president of Cabuyao, Laguna. A
petition not to confirm said election was filed because said president-elect was a minor. An
investigation proceeded and Alipit left the chair.

The municipal council held a meeting which was presided over by vice-president Basa
because the president’s absence. While the meeting was ongoing, the accused Victorio Alemus,
chief of police of that municipality, entered the room, saying that he had an order from the
president to arrest vice-president Basa. One of the councilors persuaded Alemus to wait until the
meeting was over.
Then Alipit arrived, taking one of the revolvers in the police office, fired a shot in the air,
entered immediately the room where the meeting was being held and said in a loud voice to the
chief of police who was there: "Arrest him, arrest him," pointing out the vice-president. The chief
of police obeyed the order, holding the vice-president by the arm and taking him to the jail,
president Alipit following them with the revolver in his hand. They took the documents used in
the meeting and went to Calamba where he asked and obtained from the Constabulary three armed
soldiers to protect him against any possible attack from the vice-president Basa. The three soldiers
watched vice-president Basa and held him in communicated in the jail until about two o’clock in
the evening, when he was released by the provincial governor who had come there.
W/N the accused are liable for the disturbance and interruption of the meeting.

Yes. The legality of that meeting is attacked on the ground of lack of notice to some
members of the council. Nobody has the right to dissolve by means of violence the meeting of a
municipal council, under the pretext that said meeting is legally defective, when the defect is not
manifest, and requires an investigation before its existence can be determined. Where a municipal
council is holding a meeting, a presumption arises that the meeting is not legally defective.

Pursuant to Article 143 of the RPC, any stranger, even if he be the municipal president himself
or the chief of the municipal police, must respect the meeting of the municipal council presided
over by the vice-president and he has no right to dissolve it through violence under the pretext of
lack of notice to some members of the council, which was not apparent, but required an
investigation before it could be determined.

However, that the members present constituting a quorum and there existing the presumption
that meeting was not legally defective, the crime committed by the president and the chief of police
is not coercion through arbitrary detention, but a violation of Act No. 1755, the chief of police not
being exempted by the fact that he acted in obedience to an order of the president, because said
order was unlawful.

11. P v Mejica CA-G.R. No. 12980-R December 29, 1955 Interruption of Religious

In a barrio chapel, a priest was ready to say mass and a number of barrio folks were there
to hear the said mass. The barrio lieutenant however made a threat on the life of the priest should
the latter persist in his intention to hold the mass. As a result, the mass was not celebrated.
W/N the barrio lieutenant is liable under Article 132.

Yes. The elements of the crime aforementioned are the following: 1) that the offender is a
public officer or employee; 2) that religious ceremonies or manifestations of any religion are about
to take place or are going on; and 3) that the offender prevents or disturbs the same.

In the instant case, the foregoing facts clearly show that the accused is guilty under Article
132, interruption of religious worship.

12. Celdran v P August 2018 Interruption of Religious Worship


In the celebration of the second anniversary of the May They Be One Campaign (MTB)
and the launching of the Hand-Written Bible which coincided with the feast of Saint Jerome, a
throng of people composed mainly of catholic church dignitaries intermixed with those of different
religions such as members of the military, police, media, non-Catholics, students, representatives
of various religious organizations gathered around the Manila Cathedral in the afternoon of
September 30, 2010.

The event was comprised of three (3) inseparable parts. The first part was the ecumenical
liturgical religious worship wherein the heads of the different protestant mainland churches and
the catholic church were present celebrating the words of God. It was followed by the Eucharistic
celebration - the holy mass. The last part was the hand-written unity bible.
While Brother Edgar J. Tria Tirona was reading a passage from the Bible around 3:00 p.m.,
petitioner entered the Manila Cathedral clad in a black suit and a hat. Petitioner went to the center
of the aisle, in front of the altar and suddenly brought out a placard emblazoned with the word
"DAMASO." Commotion ensued when petitioner started shouting while inside the church saying
"Bishops, stop involving yourself (sic) in politics," disrupting and showing disrespect to an
otherwise solemn celebration. The defense, on the other hand, alleged that the incident did not
happen during the celebration of the holy mass and nothing happened that disturbed the
W/N Celdran is guilty of offending religious feelings under Art. 133

Yes. In the case of People v Baes, it was held by the Court that “Whether or not the act
complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which
must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic and not those of other faithful ones.”

It was clear that the acts of the petitioner were meant to mock, insult and ridicule those
clergy whose beliefs and principles were diametrically opposed to his own.

13. P v Baes GR No. 46000 May 25, 1939 Offending Religious Feelings

Jose Baes, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna, charged
the accused Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario with an offense against
religion for causing the funeral of a member of the “Church of Christ” to pass through the
churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church which was devoted to religious worship. The
parish priest opposed but was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the churchyard
because of the force and threats of physical violence by the accused.
W/N the act complained of is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, thereby violating Article 133 of the RPC.

Yes. As defined in the RPC, two essential elements must be present under Article 133, to
wit: (1) That the acts complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or
during the celebration of any religious ceremony; and (2) that the said act or acts must be
notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.

The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in said
article of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts
and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established, the court
may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass
under Article 281 of the Revised Penal Code.

Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics,
is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic and not
those of other faithful ones.