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CASE TITLE HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA I, (IN SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS OF MELECIO BUENO), Petitioners,

vs.

1. HEIRS OF GARCIA V. MUN. OF IBA – Ejectment suit against the Mun of Iba for their public market was constructed on large portion
of Pet’s land without consent.

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MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES, Respondent.

APPLICABLE RULE / SECTION / The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under
TOPIC (based from the syllabus) Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review
by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In
contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the
exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. Verily,
the CA has the discretion whether to due course to the petition for review or not.

FACTS Melecio R. Bueno, a tenant-farmer beneficiary of an agricultural land located in Poblacion, Iba, and Zambales,
brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of Iba, Province of Zambales, claiming
that in 1983, the Municipality of Iba had constructed the public market on a substantial portion of his land
without his consent and that his repeated demands for the Municipality of Iba to vacate the property had
remained unheeded.

REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC MTC ruled in favor of Bueno. Then, the Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal,
1. Provide the description of the but the MTC denied due course to the notice of appeal.
initial complaint at the court a
quo. RTC Thus, the Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC in Iba, Zambales
2. Let us be accurate as to the to assail the denial of due course by the MTC. The case was assigned to Branch 69
remedy used in each court (i.e. which ultimately granted the petition for certiorari.
petition for certiorari, appeal, The petitioners, who meanwhile substituted Bueno upon his death, moved for the
petition for review, etc.). reconsideration of the judgment granting the petition for certiorari, but the RTC
denied their motion for reconsideration.

CA / CTA Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court.

CA "dismissed" the petitioners' petition for review on October 28, 2003 for not being
the proper mode of appeal, observing that the assailed orders had been issued by
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was ultimately denied by the CA.

ISSUE Although admitting that their petition for review under Rule 42 was inappropriate, the petitioners maintain
(based from the syllabus) that they substantially complied with the requirements of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, and pray that
the Court exercise its equity jurisdiction because a stringent application of the Rules of Court would not serve
the demands of substantial justice.

RULING We affirm.
(If possible, highlight or underline the
doctrine) An appeal brings up for review any error of judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction over the subject
of the suit and over the persons of the parties, or any error committed by the court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. It was, therefore, very crucial for the
petitioners and their counsel to have been cognizant of the different modes to appeal the adverse decision of
the RTC in the special civil action for certiorari brought by the Municipality of Iba. Such modes of appeal were
well delineated in the Rules of Court, and have been expressly stated in Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court since July 1, 1997,'0 to wit:

Section 2.Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal.- The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon
the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review.- The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with
Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari.-In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal
shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (n)

Pursuant to this rule, in conjunction with Section 3 and Section 4 of Rule 41, the petitioners
should have filed a notice of appeal in the RTC within the period of 15 days from their notice of
the judgment of the RTC, and within the same period should have paid to the clerk of the RTC
the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The filing of the notice of appeal
within the period allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the remedy of ordinary appeal because the appeal is
deemed perfected as to the appealing party upon his timely filing of the notice of appeal. It is upon the
perfection of the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties that

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the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the case. On the other hand, the non-payment of the appellate court
docket fee within the reglementary period as required by Section 4, is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the
non-compliance with which is fatal to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the appeal under Section 1, (c),
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The compliance with these requirements was the only way by which they could
have perfected their appeal from the adverse judgment of the RTC.

In contrast, an appeal filed under Rule 42 is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the
timely filing of the petition for review before the CA, while the RTC shall lose jurisdiction upon
perfection thereof and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or
lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal
by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right,
which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the
trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is
taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary
appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. Verily, the CA
has the discretion whether to due course to the petition for review or not.

The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule 41 also significantly differs from that taken
under Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is burdened to immediately
undertake the transmittal of the records by verifying the correctness and completeness of the records of the
case; the transmittal to the CA must be made within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal. This
requirement of transmittal of the records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon order of the CA when
deemed necessary.

As borne out in the foregoing, the petitioners' resort to the petition for review under Rule 42 was wrong.
Hence, the CA did not err in denying due course to the petition for review.

Yet, the petitioners plead for liberality, insisting that their petition for review, albeit the wrong mode, was a
substantial compliance with the proper mode of appeal.

The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. We have always looked at appeal as not a
matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. As the parties invoking the privilege, the petitioners should
have faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so forfeited their
privilege to appeal. Indeed, any liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be properly invoked
only in cases of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but definitely not in cases like now
where a liberal application would directly subvert the essence of the proceedings or results in the utter
disregard of the Rules of Court.

2. ESTINOZO V. CA – JUMALON- Recruitment agency owner convicted of ESTAFA

CASE TITLE CECILIA B. ESTINOZO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SIXTEENTH DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.||| (Estinozo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150276, [February 12, 2008], 568 PHIL 390-
401)
APPLICABLE RULE /
SECTION / TOPIC (based
from the syllabus)
FACTS
Petitioner represented to private complainants that she is a co-owner of the Golden Overseas Employment and that
she was recruiting workers to be sent abroad. She then asked from the said complainants the payment and processing
fees. Few months after, herein complaints were not yet deployed, hence, they seek for the return of their money and
filed a complaint of Estafa against petitioner.

The RTc found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the case to the CA
which affirmed the RTC decision. Within 15-day reglementary period to file MR or petition for Review, petitioner
filed with the appellate court a Motion for Extension of Time to file MR. the CA denied the motion.Petitioner filed an
MR but likewise denied. Displeased with the series of denial, petitioner then filed the instant Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65
REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC
3. Provide the description RTC Petitioner found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ESTAFA.
of the initial complaint CA / CTA Appealed case to CA but CA affirmed RTC
at the court a quo. Filed motion for extension of time then MR, both denied.

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4. Let us be accurate as to Others (Quasi Displeased with this series of denials, petitioner instituted the instant Petition for Certiorari 29 under
the remedy used in Judicial Rule 65, arguing, among others, that: (1) her previous counsel, by filing a prohibited pleading,
each court (i.e. petition Agencies, if foreclosed her right to file a motion for reconsideration of the CA's decision, and consequently an
for certiorari, appeal, any) appeal therefrom; 30 (2) she should not be bound by the mistake of her previous counsel especially
petition for review, when the latter's negligence and mistake would prejudice her substantial rights and would affect her
etc.). life and liberty; 31 (3) the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed petitioner's
conviction for the other four (4) criminal cases — Criminal Cases Nos. 1264, 1265, 1267 and 1269 —
absent any direct testimony from the complainants in those cases; 32 (4) she was deprived of her
constitutional right to cross-examine the complainants in the aforementioned 4 cases; 33 and (5)
she presented sufficient evidence to cast reasonable doubt as to her guilt in all the seven (7)
criminal cases. 34 ||| (Estinozo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150276, [February 12, 2008], 568 PHIL
390-401)
ISSUE
(based from the syllabus) WON Petition for Certiorari is the proper remedy

RULING
(If possible, highlight or The petition is the wrong remedy to question the appellate court’s issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45, expressly
underline the doctrine) provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA may file
a verified petition for review on certiorari.

In this case appeal by certiorari was available to petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special
civil action of certiorari, a limited form and review of last recourse, which lies only where there is no appeal or
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule65 are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with
an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature of the question of law intended to be raised on appeal is of
no consequence. It may well be that those questions of law will not treat exclusively of whether or not the
judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is
immaterial. The remedy is appeal not certiorari as a special civil action. The rule as it stands now without exception
is that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be
extended, except in cases before this court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant the
extension requested. This rule also applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to
be extended. Thus, the appellate court correctly denied petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file MR.

It is well to point out that with petitioner’s erroneous filing of a motion for extension of
time and with her non-filing of MR or PR from the judgment of the CA’s decision, the
challenged decision has already attained finality and may no longer be reviewed by this court. The instant Rule 65
petition cannot even substitute for the loss of appeal---certiorari is not a procedural device to deprive the winning
party of the fruits of the judgment in his favor. When a judgment becomes final and executory, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to reviewthe judgment.Relief will not
be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at
law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure.

DOCTRINE

3. HEIRS OF RETERTA V. SPS. MORES – Quieting of Title

CASE TITLE Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta vs. Spouses Lorenzo Mores and Virginia Lopez, G.R.
No. 159941, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 580.
APPLICABLE RULE / SECTION / Rule 41
TOPIC (based from the syllabus)

FACTS On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece
Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-983), averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land (the land)
situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, containing an area of 47,708 square meters, having inherited the land from
their father who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his
occupation and cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive,
notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an
affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights,
interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in
favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.

On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. TM-983 due to the land being friar land, and that the petitioners had
no legal personality to commence Civil Case No. TM-983.

On October 29, 2001, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss.


The petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration on
February 21, 2002.

On May 15, 2002, therefore, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the

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petition on the ground that certiorari was not a substitute for an appeal, the proper recourse against the dismissal.
On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.

The petitioners posit that a special civil action for certiorari was their proper remedy to assail the order of dismissal in
light of certain rules of procedure, specifically pointing out that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court ("An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an
appeal from the judgment or final order") prohibited an appeal of a denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that
the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court ("No appeal may be taken from: . . . An order
denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration") expressly declared that an order denying a motion for
reconsideration was not appealable. They remind that the third paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided
that in the instances "where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65."
REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC n/a
5. Provide the description of the RTC Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires
initial complaint at the court a
quo. City (Civil Case No. TM-983).
6. Let us be accurate as to the
CA / CTA Due to the dismissal of the case in the RTC, petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for
remedy used in each court (i.e. certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that certiorari was not a substitute for an
petition for certiorari, appeal,
petition for review, etc.).
appeal, the proper recourse against the dismissal.

Others (Quasi n/a


Judicial Agencies, if
any)

ISSUE Whether or not special civil action of certiorari was the correct remedy against the dismissal of the action.
(based from the syllabus)

RULING Yes, However, the petitioners' position has no basis.


(If possible, highlight or underline the doctrine)

For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting the
respondents' motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting
the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial
court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.

Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the petitioners, indicates that the proper remedy
against the denial of the petitioners' motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the
action upon the respondents' motion to dismiss. The said rule explicitly states thusly:
Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration. — An order denying a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final
order.

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order
is logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence,
or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the
same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying a
motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason either to reverse or
to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is
to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.

The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court — the version in force at the time when the CA rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 — included an
order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the
ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows
an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (n)
It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule
41, supra, by deleting an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of
non-appealable orders, and that such a revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse
the CA on that basis would not be right and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure in
force at the time when it issued its assailed final order.

Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to

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prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial,
or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of
failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is
plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order,
or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the
less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the
trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a proper remedy against an
assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary
disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it
conformable to law and justice. Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so
is to destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the
discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either
prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to
be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will be
granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

Since an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one's title involves the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the RTC, unless the
assessed value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction
would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the
allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby sought.

The authority of Land Management Bureau (LMB) under Act No. 1120, being limited to the administration and
disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners' action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once
the friar land is disposed of in favor of a private person and title duly issues in the latter's name. By ignoring the
petitioners' showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the allegations of the
complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously.

Given all the foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The term grave
abuse of discretion connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the petitioners bereft of any remedy to protect
their substantial rights or interests in the land. As such, they would suffer grave injustice and irreparable damage. In
that situation, the RTC's dismissal should be annulled through certiorari, for the task of the remedy was to do justice
to the unjustly aggrieved.

4. MANALOTO V. VELOSO III – Unlawful detainer case

CASE TITLE Manaloto vs. Veloso III


G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010

APPLICABLE RULE / Fresh Period Rule


SECTION / TOPIC (based
from the syllabus)
FACTS [PRIOR CASE] Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. (petitioners) filed an unlawful detainer case against Ismael Veloso III
(respondent). The MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered respondent to vacate.

The RTC reversed the MeTC decision. After successive appeals, the case went up to the Supreme Court which
affirmed the decision of the RTC and that decision became final and executory.

Meanwhile, while respondent’s appeal of the MeTC’s decision was pending before RTC Branch 88, he filed before RTC
Branch 227 a Complaint for Breach of Contract (allegedly, the petitioners as lessors failed to make continuing repairs
on the property and keep it tenantable) and Damages (because he suffered embarrassment and humiliation when
petitioners distributed copies of the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case to the homeowners of Horseshoe
Village) against petitioners.

REMEDIAL MATTERS RTC Branch 227 Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss respondent’s complaint. GRANTED

RTC Granted it Branch 227 dismissed respondent’s complaint for violating the rule against
splitting of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose the pendency of a
related case. Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 decision on September 26,
2003.

He filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said judgment on October 10, 2003, which RTC-
Branch 227 denied in an Order dated December 30, 2003. Respondent received a copy of the

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RTC-Branch 227 order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on February 20, 2004, and he
filed his Notice of Appeal on March 1, 2004. However, the RTC- Branch 227, in an Order dated
March 23, 2004, dismissed respondent’s appeal for being filed out of time. Respondent received
a copy of the RTC-Branch 27 order dismissing his appeal on April 30, 2004 and he filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the same on May 3, 2004. The RTC-Branch 227, in another Order dated
May 31, 2004, granted respondent’s latest motion.

Court of Appeals The CA then gave due course to the appeal and ruled in favor of respondent on his claim for
damages and ordered the petitioners to pay him moral damages.

Supreme Court Petitioners now contend that respondent’s appeal was filed out of time and the decision of the
(Petition for RTC which dismissed respondent’s complaint had already attained finality.
Review)
ISSUE
Whether or not Ismael Veloso (respondent) timely filed his appeal?

RULING Yes. Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh period rule,” according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the
Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from
receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or
denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.

In this case, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 dismissing
his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10,
2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC-Branch 227 denied respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received on February 20,
2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh period rule, respondent was able to file his
appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15 days, and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to said
appeal.

5. LATORRE V. LATORRE – Contract of Lease - Respondent entered such with Ifzal, resp declaring he is the owner , Pet said she and
respo co owners.

CASE TITLE GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE VS. LUIS ESTEBAN LATORRE


G.R. NO. 183926, March 29, 2010

TOPIC Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41

FACTS Petitioner averred that respondent and Ifzal entered into a Contract of Lease over a property situated in Makati.
Under the said contract, respondent, as lessor, declared that he was the absolute and registered owner of the
subject property. Petitioner alleged that respondent's declaration therein was erroneous because she and
respondent were co-owners of the subject property in equal shares.

Petitioner narrated that she and respondent executed their respective Deeds of Donation, conveying the subject
property in favor of The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc. Thus, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in the name of the Foundation. Subsequently, on petitioner and respondent
executed separate Deeds of Revocation of Donation and Reconveyance of the subject property, consented to by
the Foundation, through the issuance of appropriate corporate resolutions. However, the Deeds of Revocation
were not registered; hence, the subject property remained in the name of the Foundation. Petitioner insisted,
however, that respondent was fully aware that the subject property was owned in common by both of them. To
protect her rights as co-owner, petitioner formally demanded from Ifzal the payment of her share of the rentals,
which the latter, however, refused to heed.

Moreover, petitioner averred that she discovered that respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim on
the TCT of the subject property, claiming full ownership over the same by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Petitioner also claimed that the deed was a falsified document.

REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC


RTC Petitioner Generosa Almeda Latorre (petitioner) filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a
Complaint for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with
application for Injunction against her own son, herein respondent Luis Esteban Latorre
(respondent), and Ifzal.

Respondent immediately filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that the venue of the
case was improperly laid. Since the subject property is located in Makati City, respondent

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argued that petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not
of Muntinlupa City.

Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss (DENIED) on the ground of want of jurisdiction,
asserting that he was immune from suit because he was an officer of the Asian Development
Bank, an international organization.

The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order, restraining Ifzal from paying his rentals
to respondent and enjoining the latter from receiving from the former the aforesaid
rentals. The RTC also directed both Ifzal and respondent to pay petitioner her share of the
rentals, with the corresponding order against respondent not to commit any act in derogation
of petitioner's interest over the subject property.

In its Order, the RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss.

Respondent filed an Answer Ad Cautelam, insisting, among others, that the case was a real
action and that the venue was improperly laid.

The RTC dismissed petitioner's claim against Ifzal because the dispute was clearly between
petitioner and respondent.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent stating that the case should have been filed and tried in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to hear the matter as
aforementioned the same being clearly a real action.

Hence, this Petition, claiming that the RTC erred in treating the venue as
jurisdiction and in treating petitioner's complaint as a real action.

CA / CTA
Others (Quasi
Judicial
Agencies, if
any)

ISSUE Whether or not the filing of the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law is proper in this case.

RULING No. In Murillo v. Consul, we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of
the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment was
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme
Court.

The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is
filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

In her Reply to respondents Comment, petitioner prayed that this Court decide the case on the
merits. To do so, however, would require the examination by this Court of the probative value of the evidence
presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy on the merits. This,
unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with this Court
ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to
the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the
lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.

Note: Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally. When the RTC denied his Motion to Dismiss,
respondent could have filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition inasmuch as the denial of the motion was
done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. However, despite this lapse, it is clear that respondent did not waive his objections to the fact of
improper venue, contrary to petitioner's assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was denied, respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his
ground that the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of improper venue.

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6. ALFREDO V. BORRAS – Sps Alfredo sold to Borras the subject land but later on the latter found out former RESOLD portion of land
to diff buyers. Facts of the case found by trial court are generally binding.

CASE TITLE G.R. No. 144225 June 17, 2003


SPOUSES GODOFREDO ALFREDO and CARMEN LIMON ALFREDO, et al, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ARMANDO BORRAS and ADELIA LOBATON BORRAS, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
APPLICABLE Rule 45 Petition for Review on certiorari
RULE /
FACTS The Antecedent Facts
FACTS: The private respondents, Sps. Borras filed a complaint for specific performance against Sps. Alfredo. Sps. Borras alleged
in their complaint that Sps. Alfredo mortgaged the Subject Land with the DBP. To pay the debt, Sps. Alfredo sold the Subject
Land to them. Sps. Borras gave Sps. Alfredo the money to pay the loan to DBP which signed the release of mortgage and
returned the owner’s duplicate copy to Sps. Alfredo. Sps. Borras subsequently paid the balance of the purchase price of the
Subject Land for which Sps. Alfredo issued a receipt. Sps. Alfredo then delivered to Sps. Borras the owner’s duplicate copy, with
the document of cancellation of mortgage, official receipts of realty tax payments, and tax declaration Sps. Alfredo even
introduced Sps. Borras as the new owners of the Subject Land, to the the old tenants of the Subject Land. Sps. Borras then took
possession of the Subject Land.
Sps. Borras learned that hired persons had entered the Subject Land and were cutting trees under instructions of allegedly new
owners of the Subject Land. Subsequently, Sps. Borras discovered that Sps. Alfredo had re-sold portions of the Subject Land to
several persons.

Sps. Borras filed an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds. They discovered that Sps. Alfredo had secured an owner’s
duplicate copy after filing a petition in court for the issuance of a new copy. Sps. Alfredo claimed in their petition that they lost
their owner’s duplicate copy. Sps. Borras wrote Sps. Alfredo complaining about their acts, but the latter did not reply. Thus,
Sps. Borras filed a complaint for specific performance.

Sps. Borras amended their complaint to include the “Subsequent Buyers". The Subsequent Buyers, who are also petitioners in
this case, purchased from Sps. Alfredo the subdivided portions of the Subject Land. The Register of Deeds of Bataan issued to
the Subsequent Buyers transfer certificates of title to the lots they purchased.

In their answer, Sps. Alfredo and the Subsequent Buyers (collectively "petitioners") argued that the action is unenforceable under
the Statute of Frauds. Petitioners pointed out that there is no written instrument evidencing the alleged contract of sale over the
Subject Land in favor of Sps. Borras. Petitioners objected to whatever parole evidence Sps. Borras introduced or offered on the
alleged sale unless the same was in writing and subscribed by Sps. Alfredo. Petitioners asserted that the Subsequent Buyers were
buyers in good faith and for value. As counterclaim, petitioners sought payment of attorney’s fees and incidental expenses.

REMEDIAL RTC RTC rendered its decision in favor of Sps. Borras. The trial court ruled that there was a perfected contract of sale.
MATTERS That all the elements of a contract of sale were present in this case. The object of the sale was specifically identified,
the purchase price was fixed at ₱15,000.00, with the buyers assuming to pay the sellers’ DBP mortgage loan including
its accumulated interest. The balance of the purchase price was to be paid in cash to the sellers. The last payment
constituted the full settlement of the purchase price and this was evidenced by the receipt issued by Carmen.

The trial court found the following facts as proof of a perfected contract of sale: (1) Sps. Alfredo delivered to Sps. Borras
the Subject Land; (2) Sps. Alfredo turned over to Sps. Borras documents such as the owner’s duplicate copy of the title
of the Subject Land, tax declaration, and the receipts of realty tax payments in the name of Godofredo; and (3) DBP
cancelled the mortgage on the Subject Property upon payment of the loan. Moreover, the receipt of payment issued by
Carmen served as an acknowledgment, if not a ratification, of the verbal sale between the sellers and the buyers. The
trial court ruled that the Statute of Frauds is not applicable because in this case the sale was perfected.

The trial court concluded that the Subsequent Buyers were not innocent purchasers. Not one of the Subsequent Buyers
testified in court on how they purchased their respective lots. The Subsequent Buyers totally depended on the testimony
of the Calonso (broker) to explain the subsequent sale.

Calonso did not inquire on the nature of the tenancy of the old tenants and on who owned the Subject Land. Instead,
she bought out the tenants for ₱150,000.00. The buy out was embodied in a Kasunduan. The old tenants testified that
he and his wife accepted the money and signed the Kasunduan because Calonso and the Subsequent Buyers threatened
them with forcible ejectment. Calonso brought the old tenants to the Agrarian Reform Office where he was asked to
produce the documents showing that Sps. Bortas is the owner of the Subject Land. Since Apolinario could not produce
the documents, the agrarian officer told him that he would lose the case. Thus, the old tenants was constrained to sign
the Kasunduan and accept the ₱150,000.00.

Another indication of Calonso’s bad faith was her own admission that she saw an adverse claim on the title of the
Subject Land when she registered the deeds of sale in the names of the Subsequent Buyers. Calonso ignored the
adverse claim and proceeded with the registration of the deeds of sale.

CA AFFIRMED
The Court of Appeals found the factual findings of the trial court well supported by the evidence. Based on these
findings, the Court of Appeals also concluded that there was a perfected contract of sale and the Subsequent Buyers
were not innocent purchasers.

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ISSUE 1. WON the sale is valid and enforceable. Yes.
(based from the 2. WON the sale was void on the ground that Carmen Alfredo sold the Subject Land without the marital consent of Godofredo
syllabus) Alfredo and that sale was made during the 25-year period that the law prohibits the alienation of land grants without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. No.
3. WON the action is barred by prescription and laches. No.
4. WON the subsequent sale of portions of the subject land were valid on the ground that the subsequent purchasers purchase
and registered the subject land in good faith. No.

RULING In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts.9 The factual
(If possible, findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this Court.10 This applies with greater force when both the trial court and
highlight or the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their factual findings.11 In this case, there is no reason to deviate from the
underline the findings of the lower courts. The facts relied upon by the trial and appellate courts are borne out by the record. We agree with
doctrine) the conclusions drawn by the lower courts from these facts.

1. WON the sale is valid and enforceable. Yes.


The contract of sale between the spouses Alfredo and the spouses Borras was a perfected contract. In the instant case, the
object of the sale is the Subject Land, and the price certain is ₱15,000.00. The trial and appellate courts found that there was a
meeting of the minds on the sale of the Subject Land and on the purchase price of ₱15,000.00. This is a finding of fact that is
binding on this Court. We find no reason to disturb this finding since it is supported by substantial evidence.

The contract of sale of the Subject Land has also been consummated because the sellers and buyers have performed their
respective obligations under the contract. In a contract of sale, the seller obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the
determinate thing sold, and to deliver the same, to the buyer who obligates himself to pay a price certain to the seller. 13 In the
instant case, Sps. Alfredo delivered the Subject Land to Sps. Borras, placing the latter in actual physical possession of the Subject
Land. This physical delivery of the Subject Land also constituted a transfer of ownership of the Subject Land to Sps.
Borras.14 Ownership of the thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon its actual or constructive delivery.15 Sps. Alfredo also
turned over to Armando and Adelia the documents of ownership to the Subject Land, namely the owner’s duplicate copy, the tax
declaration and the receipts of realty tax payments.
On the other hand, Sps. Borras paid the full purchase price as evidenced by the receipt dated 11 March 1970 issued by Carmen
Alfredo. Sps. Borras fulfilled their obligation to provide the ₱7,000.00 to pay the DBP loan of Sps. Alfredo and to pay the latter
the balance of ₱8,000.00 in cash. The ₱2,524.00 paid under the receipt dated 11 March 1970 was the last installment to settle
fully the purchase price. Indeed, upon payment to DBP of the ₱7,000.00 and the accumulated interests, the DBP cancelled the
mortgage on the Subject Land and returned the owner’s duplicate copy to Sps. Alfredo.

The trial and appellate courts correctly refused to apply the Statute of Frauds to this case. The Statute of Frauds16provides that a
contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable unless the contract or some note or memorandum of the sale is in
writing and subscribed by the party charged or his agent. The existence of the receipt dated 11 March 1970, which is a
memorandum of the sale, removes the transaction from the provisions of the Statute of Frauds.

The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts either partially or totally performed.17Thus, where
one party has performed one’s obligation, oral evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement.18 In the instant case, the
parties have consummated the sale of the Subject Land, with both sellers and buyers performing their respective obligations
under the contract of sale. In addition, a contract that violates the Statute of Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits
under the contract.19 Sps. Alfredo benefited from the contract because they paid their DBP loan and secured the cancellation of
their mortgage using the money given by Sps. Borras. Sps. Alfredo also accepted payment of the balance of the purchase price.

2. WON the sale was void on the ground that Carmen Alfredo sold the Subject Land without the marital consent of Godofredo
and that sale was made during the 25-year period that the law prohibits the alienation of land grants without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. No.

Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the wife’s consent is not void but merely
voidable. Following petitioners’ argument that Carmen Alfredo sold the land to Sps. Borras without the consent of Carmen’s
husband, the sale would only be voidable and not void. However, Godofredo Alfredo can no longer question the sale. Voidable
contracts are susceptible of ratification.24 Godofredo ratified the sale when he introduced Sps. Borras to his tenants as the new
owners of the Subject Land. That Godofredo and Carmen allowed Sps. Borras to enjoy possession of the Subject Land for 24
years is formidable proof of Godofredo’s acquiescence to the sale. If the sale was truly unauthorized, then Godofredo should
have filed an action to annul the sale. He did not. The prescriptive period to annul the sale has long lapsed. Godofredo’s conduct
belies his claim that his wife sold the Subject Land without his consent.

Petitioners contend that Sps. Alfredo did not deliver the title of the Subject Land to Sps. Borras as shown by this portion of Adelia
Borras’ testimony on cross-examination:
Q -- No title was delivered to you by Godofredo Alfredo?
A -- I got the title from Julie Limon because my sister told me.26

Petitioners raise this factual issue for the first time. The Court of Appeals could have passed upon this issue had petitioners raised
this earlier. At any rate, the cited testimony of Adelia does not convincingly prove that Sps. Alfredo did not deliver the Subject
Land to Sps. Borras. Adelia’s cited testimony must be examined in context not only with her entire testimony but also with the
other circumstances.

It is not necessary that the seller himself deliver the title of the property to the buyer because the thing sold is understood as
delivered when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.27 To repeat, Godofredo and Carmen themselves
introduced, their old tenants, to Sps. Borras as the new owners of the Subject Land. From then on, Sps. Borras acted as the
landlords of the old tenants. Obviously, Sps. Alfredo placed control and possession of the Subject Land in the hands of Sps.
Borras.

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Petitioners invoke the absence of approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to nullify the sale.
Petitioners never raised this issue before the trial court or the Court of Appeals. Litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time
on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.However, we will address this new issue
to finally put an end to this case.

The sale of the Subject Land cannot be annulled on the ground that the Secretary did not approve the sale, which was made
within 25 years from the issuance of the homestead title. The failure to secure the approval of the Secretary does not ipso facto
make a sale void.32 The absence of approval by the Secretary does not nullify a sale made after the expiration of the 5-year
period, for in such event the requirement of Section 118 of the Public Land Act becomes merely directory33 or a formality.34 The
approval may be secured later, producing the effect of ratifying and adopting the transaction as if the sale had been previously
authorized.

3. WON the action is barred by prescription and laches. No.

The Amended Complaint by Sps. Borras is captioned as one for Specific Performance. In reality, the ultimate relief sought is the
reconveyance to them of the Subject Land. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully
registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.37 The body of the pleading or complaint determines the nature of an action,
not its title or heading.38 Thus, the present action should be treated as one for reconveyance.39

Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes by operation of law a trustee of
an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. The presence of fraud in this case created an implied trust in
favor of Sps. Borras. This gives Sps. Borras the right to seek reconveyance of the property from the Subsequent Buyers.40To
determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, plaintiff’s possession of the disputed property
is material. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years.41 The ten-year prescriptive period
applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property.42 However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive
period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him.43 In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if
nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.44

In this case, the appellate court resolved the issue of prescription by ruling that the action should prescribe four years from
discovery of the fraud. We must correct this erroneous application of the four-year prescriptive period. In Caro v. Court of
Appeals,45 we explained why an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust should prescribe in ten years.Following Caro,
we have consistently held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years.47 We went further by
specifying the reference point of the ten-year prescriptive period as the date of the registration of the deed or the issuance of the
title.48

Had Sps. Borras remained in possession of the Subject Land, their action for reconveyance, in effect an action to quiet title to
property, would not be subject to prescription. Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed
land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action
to vindicate his right.49 His undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title.50

Sps. Borras lost possession of the Subject Land when the Subsequent Buyers forcibly drove away from the Subject Land the old
tenants, the tenants of Sps. Borras.51 This created an actual need for Sps. Borras to seek reconveyance of the Subject Land. The
statute of limitation becomes relevant in this case. The ten-year prescriptive period started to run from the date the Subsequent
Buyers registered their deeds of sale with the Register of Deeds.The Subsequent Buyers bought the subdivided portions of the
Subject Land on 22 February 1994, the date of execution of their deeds of sale. The Register of Deeds issued the transfer
certificates of title to the Subsequent Buyers on 24 February 1994. Sps. Borras filed the Complaint on 7 March 1994. Clearly,
prescription could not have set in since the case was filed at the early stage of the ten-year prescriptive period.
Neither is the action barred by laches. We have defined laches as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable time, to do that
which, by the exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.52 It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.53 Sps. Borras discovered in January 1994 the subsequent sale of the Subject Land and they filed this case on 7 March
1994. Plainly, Sps. Borras did not sleep on their rights.

4. WON the subsequent sale of portions of the subject land were valid on the ground that the subsequent purchasers purchase
and registered the subject land in good faith. No.

Sps. Alfredo had already sold the Subject Land to Sps. Borras. The settled rule is when ownership or title passes to the buyer,
the seller ceases to have any title to transfer to any third person.54 If the seller sells the same land to another, the second buyer
who has actual or constructive knowledge of the prior sale cannot be a registrant in good faith.55 Such second buyer cannot
defeat the first buyer’s title.56 In case a title is issued to the second buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of the property
subject of the sale.57

The Subsequent Buyers purchased their respective lots only on 22 February 1994 as shown by the date of their deeds of sale.
Consequently, the adverse claim registered prior to the second sale charged the Subsequent Buyers with constructive notice of
the defect in the title of the sellers.

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7. PEOPLE V. CORPUZ – Recruitment agency sec Corpuz was convicted at the RTC for Illegal recruitment in large scale constituting
economic sabotage. SC reviewed facts because the principle that the facts found by TC is binding does not apply when the trial court
ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELIZABETH “BETH” CORPUZ, appellant.

APPLICABLE RULE / SECTION / The principle that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses
TOPIC (based from the syllabus) and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by the court great
respect if not conclusive effect does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued
cogent facts and circumstances of substance which if considered would alter the outcome of the case.

FACTS On June 1998, private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego, Erlinda Pascual and Restian
Surio went to Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation at Malate, Manila to apply for
employment as factory workers in Taiwan. They were accompanied by a certain Aling Josie who introduced
them to the agency’s President and general Manager Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes. Mrs. Reyes asked them
to accomplish the application forms. Thereafter, they were told to return to the office and pay 10,000 pesos
processing fee. Corpuz was the one who received their documents and processing fees and informed them
to await their contracts. Two months later, nothing happened to their applications. Private complainants
decided to ask for the refund of their money from appellant who told them that the processing fees they
had paid were already remitted to Mrs. Reyes. However, Reyes told them that the money she received from
appellant as in payment of the latter’s debt. They then filed complaint before the NBI. Corpuz was then
charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic sabotage under Sec. 6 (l) and (m) in
relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the ―Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of l995. During the pendency of the case before RTC, private complainants received their refund, hence,
executed an affidavit of desistance. RTC convicted Corpuz. Corpuz appealed directly to the SC.

REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC


7. Provide the description of the RTC Corpuz was then charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale constituting
initial complaint at the court a economic sabotage under Sec. 6 (l) and (m) in relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042,
quo. otherwise known as the ―Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of l995.
8. Let us be accurate as to the
remedy used in each court (i.e. RTC convicted Corpuz. She thereafter appealed directly to the SC.
petition for certiorari, appeal, CA / CTA
petition for review, etc.).
Others (Quasi
Judicial Agencies,
if any)
ISSUE Whether or not the SC should review the factual circumstances surrounding the case.
(based from the syllabus)

RULING YES. It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of
(If possible, highlight or underline the witnesses and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this
doctrine) Court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing
and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify
before the trial court. However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of
the case. The exception obtains in this case.

The records of the case show that Alga-Moher International Placement Service Corporation is a licensed
land-based recruitment agency. Its license was valid until August 24, 1999. Likewise, appellant was its
registered secretary while Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes is its President/General Manager. Part of its regular
business activity is to accept applicants who desire to work here or abroad. Appellant, as secretary of the
agency, was in charge of the custody and documentation of the overseas contracts. It is clear that all
appellant did was receive the processing fees upon instruction of Mrs. Reyes. She neither convinced the
private complainants to give their money nor promised them employment abroad. Appellant Elizabeth
Corpuz is ACQUITTED of the offense charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.

8. PAL V. CA – Not honoring their confirmed tickets. TC found for Private respondents which was affirmed by CA in toto. Pet invokes
par b of the exceptions provided under ROC but SC said no.

CASE TITLE PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDY AMOR, JANE GAMIL, minors GIAN CARLO
AMOR represented by ATTY. OWEN AMOR, and CARLO BENITEZ represented by JOSEPHINE BENITEZ, respondents.
APPLICABLE RULE / Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us especially when in complete accord with the
SECTION / TOPIC findings of the trial court. This is because it is not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.

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FACTS Private respondents Judy Amor, Jane Gamil, minor Gian Carlo Amor, represented by his father, Atty. Owen Amor,
and, minor Carlo Benitez, represented by his mother, Josephine Benitez, filed with the Regional Trial Court (Branch
53), Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a complaint for damages against petitioner due to the latters failure to honor their
confirmed tickets.

Private respondent Judy Amor purchased three confirmed plane tickets for her and her infant son, Gian Carlo Amor
as well as her sister Jane Gamil for the May 8, 1988, 7:10 a.m. flight, PR 178, bound for Manila from defendants
branch office in Legaspi City. Judy Amor, a dentist and a member of the Board of Directors of the Sorsogon Dental
Association, was scheduled to attend the National Convention of the Philippine Dental Association from May 8 to 14,
1988 at the Philippine International Convention Center.

On May 8, 1988, Judy with Gian, Jane and minor Carlo Benitez, nephew of Judy and Jane, arrived at the Legaspi
Airport at 6:20 a.m. for PR 178. Carlo Benitez was supposed to use the confirmed ticket of a certain Dra. Emily
Chua.

They were accompanied by Atty. Owen Amor and the latters cousin, Salvador Gonzales who fell in line at the check-
in counter with four persons ahead of him and three persons behind him while plaintiff Judy went to the office of the
station manager to request that minor plaintiff Carlo Benitez be allowed to use the ticket of Dra. Chua. While
waiting for his turn, Gonzales was asked by Lloyd Fojas, the check-in clerk on duty, to approach the counter. Fojas
wrote something on the tickets which Gonzales later read as late check-in 7:05. When Gonzales turn came, Fojas
gave him the tickets of private respondents Judy, Jane and Gian and told him to proceed to the cashier to make
arrangements.

Salvador then went to Atty. Amor and told him about the situation. Atty. Amor pleaded with Fojas, pointing out that
it is only 6:45 a.m., but the latter did not even look at him or utter any word. Atty. Amor then tried to plead with
Delfin Canonizado and George Carranza, employees of petitioner, but still to no avail. Private respondents were not
able to board said flight. The plane left at 7:30 a.m., twenty minutes behind the original schedule.

Private respondents went to the bus terminals hoping to catch a ride for Manila. Finding none, they went back to the
airport and tried to catch an afternoon flight. Unfortunately, the 2:30 p.m. flight, PR 278, was cancelled due to
aircraft situation. Private respondents were told to wait for the 5:30 p.m. flight, PR 180. They checked-in their bags
and were told to hand in their tickets. Later, a PAL employee at the check-in counter called out the name of private
respondent minor Carlo Benitez. Plaintiff Judy approached the counter and was told by the PAL personnel that they
cannot be accommodated. Fojas who was also at the counter then removed the boarding passes inserted in private
respondents tickets as well as the tags from their luggages.

Manuel Baltazar, a former Acting Manager of petitioner in Legaspi City in May 1988, testified that based on his
investigation, the private respondents, although confirmed passengers, were not able to board PR 178 in the
morning of May 8, 1988 because there were go-show or waitlisted and non-revenue passengers who were
accommodated in said flight. He also noted that there was overbooking for PR 178.
REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC
RTC The RTC rendered judgment upholding the evidence presented by private respondents
CA Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity) which affirmed the judgment of the
trial court in toto and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Others
ISSUE Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling that private respondents were late in
checking-in.

RULING No. In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions
of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. Factual findings of the appellate court are
generally binding on us especially when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court. This is because it is
not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again. However, this general rule admits of exceptions, to
wit:
(a) where there is grave abuse of discretion;
(b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the factual findings are conflicting;
(f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and,
(h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere
conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by
the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record.

Petitioner invokes exception (b).

After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to disturb the affirmance by the CA of the findings of the

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trial court that the private respondents have checked-in on time; that they reached the airport at 6:20 a.m., based
on the testimonies of private respondent Judy Amor, and witnesses Salvador Gonzales and Atty. Owen Amor who
were consistent in their declarations on the witness stand and corroborated one anothers statements; and that the
testimony of petitioners lone witness, Lloyd Fojas is not sufficient to overcome private respondents evidence.

Superlines Transportation Co. Inc., vs. ICC Leasing & Financing Corporation:

The Court is not tasked to calibrate and assess the probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial
all over againSo long as the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are consistent with or are not palpably contrary
to the evidence on record, this Court shall decline to embark on a review on the probative weight of the evidence of
the parties

YES. As to award of damages. We find no justifiable reason that warrants the award of P100,000.00 as actual
damages in favor of all private respondents. Article 2199 of the Civil Code, provides that actual or compensatory
damages may only be given for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.

It should be stressed that moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at he expense of the defendant but
are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone due to the defendants culpable action.[44] We emphasized in Philippine National Bank
vs. Court of Appeals that moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to somehow alleviate the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. We have held that even though moral damages are
incapable of pecuniary computation, it should nevertheless be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering
inflicted. And, to be recoverable, such damage must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the
factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party.

9. AUGUSTO V. RISOS – No appeal in an interlocutory order. Sblings sold to Spouses gomolon property . When wife Gomolon pet for
recons of the OCT and presenting it to RD, she found out that an owners copy has already been issued to Ruben Augusto and copy
with Atty. Archival. Latter said deed of sale fictitious.
CASE TITLE [G.R. No. 131794. December 10, 2003]
RUBEN AUGUSTO and ATTY. NOEL D. ARCHIVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE TEODORO K. RISOS,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City, CLEOFE OMOLON, respondents.
APPLICABLE RULE /
SECTION / TOPIC (based RULE 41 (APPEAL)
from the syllabus)
FACTS Felisa Augusto and her siblings, Jose Augusto, Magdalena Augusto and Alfonso Augusto, all married, were the co-
owners of a parcel of land, identified as Cadastral Lot No. 4429, with an area of 1,857 square meters. The lot is
located in Barrio Mactan, Opon, Cebu. On April 20, 1961, the then Justice of the Peace and Ex-Officio Notary Public
notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale where they, sold the property to Guillermo Omolon for P200.00. Guillermo Omolon
and his wife, Cleofe Omolon, caused the aforesaid document to be registered in the Office of the City Assessor of
Lapu-Lapu City. Tax Declaration No. 02729 was issued thereafter, and the vendors took possession of the property.

In the meantime, the property was registered in the names of siblings Augusto, under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. RO-3560.

Guillermo Omolon died intestate and was survived by wife Cleofe Omolon. Sometime in July 1995, Cleofe Omolon filed
a petition for the reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot No. 4429, before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 54,
docketed as LRC Case No. 21. On January 10, 1997, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Omolon.

However, upon presentation of the aforesaid order to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, Cleofe
was informed that the owners copy had already been issued to Ruben Augusto, pursuant to an Order issued by the
court dated August 23, 1996, and that based on the record, the same was in the possession of Atty. Noel Archival.

REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC


9. Provide the description RTC On May 14, 1997, Cleofe filed a petition before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, docketed as Cad. Case
of the initial complaint No. 21, alleging that as lawful co-owner and possessor of Lot No. 4429, she had every right to have
at the court a quo. and hold the owners duplicate of the said OCT. She prayed that after due proceedings, the
10. Let us be accurate as to respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival be ordered to surrender the owners copy of the
the remedy used in said title.
each court (i.e. petition
for certiorari, appeal, In their Comment on the petition, therein respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival
petition for review, alleged, inter alia, that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Felisa, Magdalena, Alfonso and Jose,
etc.). all surnamed Augusto, was falsified and fictitious, and, thus, null and void. In
the interim, Cleofe had her adverse claim annotated at the dorsal portion of the title in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City.

On October 22, 1997, the RTC issued an order directing Atty. Noel Archival to produce the owners
copy of OCT No. 3560 to allow the annotation of Cleofes interest, upon which the owners duplicate
copy of the title may thereafter be returned.

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The trial court declared that, based on the pleadings of the parties, the issue of ownership over the
property had been raised, a matter which the court, sitting as a cadastral court, could not pass
upon. The trial court further ruled that pending resolution of the issue of ownership over the
property in an appropriate proceedings therefor, there was a need for the annotation of the
petitioners interest over the property.

The respondents therein filed a Motion for a Partial Reconsideration of the Order alleging that
Cleofes interest over the property had been sufficiently protected by the annotation of her adverse
claim.

However, on November 14, 1997, the court issued an Order denying the motion of the
respondents therein.

CA / CTA On November 26, 1997, the respondents filed a notice of appeal from the said order to the Court of
Appeals. On December 5, 1997, the RTC issued an order denying due course therefor, on its
perception that the orders subject thereof were interlocutory; hence, not appealable.

The respondents, now the petitioners, filed the instant petition (Supreme Court) alleging that the
public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
when it issued the assailed orders, and that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law available to them. The petitioners argue that contrary to the
ruling of the public respondent, its October 22, 1997 Order was final and appealable, as the same
disposed of the case.
Others

ISSUE Whether or not the remedy of an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order.
(based from the syllabus)

RULING No.
(If possible, highlight or
underline the doctrine) Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final order, and not from an
interlocutory one. A final order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding
or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. An order or judgment is
deemed final if it finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either
on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or
set aside. Where no issue is left for future consideration, except the fact of compliance with the terms of the order,
such order is final and appealable. In contrast, an order is interlocutory if it does not finally dispose of the case.

In this case, the order of the public respondent directing the petitioners to produce the owners copy of
OCT No. 3560 in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the annotation of the private respondents
interest over the property is merely interlocutory and not final; hence, not appealable by means of a
writ of error. The public respondent had not fully disposed of the case as it had not yet ruled on whether
to grant the private respondents prayer for the surrender of the owners copy of OCT No. 3560. As gleaned
from the order of the respondent judge, he believed that he had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue of
ownership over the property and was disposed to dismiss the petition. Before so doing, he believed it was necessary
that the petitioners claim over the property be annotated at the dorsal portion of the title before the institution of an
ordinary motion for the resolution of the conflicting claims of ownership over the property:

Going over the pleadings of the parties, the court gathers that ownership over the land in question is disputed
by the parties, which this court, sitting as a cadastral court, cannot pass upon. However, since the petitioner has
also shown enough basis for claiming possession of the owners copy of OCT No. 3560, by virtue of the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Annex A), and in view of the willingness of Atty. Archival to have petitioners interest annotated at
the back of the title, the court feels that for the protection of both parties, the owners copy of OCT No. 3560 in
the possession of Atty. Noel Archival must be produced, in order that petitioners interest may be annotated
therein pending resolution of the issue on ownership in the proper proceedings.

In fine, the assailed order of the respondent judge partook of the nature of an ad cautelam order. This is not to say
that the respondent court sitting as a cadastral court had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue of
ownership over the property.

It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right
of registration, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case,
where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one anothers claims over the parcels sought to be
registered, in which case, registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the court first
decided it.

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10. ESCUETA V. LIM - SAPIT

CASE TITLE ESCUETA vs. LIM


CORAZON L. ESCUETA, assisted by her husband EDGAR ESCUETA, IGNACIO E. RUBIO, THE HEIRS OF LUZ R.
BALOLOY, namely, ALEJANDRINO R. BALOLOY and BAYANI R. BALOLOY, Petitioners, vs. RUFINA LIM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 137162 January 24, 2007 FIRST DIVISION

APPLICABLE RULE / Rules 40-45 Appeals


SECTION / TOPIC (based Rule 38 Relief from Judgments, Orders, or other Proceedings
from the syllabus)
FACTS  Rufina Lim alleged that she bought the hereditary shares of Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy,
namely: Alejandrino, Bayani, and other co-heirs, paying therefore a down payment or earnest money in
the amount of P102,169.86 and P450,000.
 However, Rubio allegedly refused to receive the balance of P100,000.
 Rubio exec a deed of sale in favor of Escute despiter he knowledge of the sale bet Lim and Rubio.
 Lim filed an action to Quiet title to real property against petitioners.
 Baloloys failed to appear at the Pre Trial and was declared in default . TC allowed presentation of evidence
ex Parte. Partial Decision against Baloloy was adjudged on July 23, 1993.
 Baloloys -- filed a petition for relief from judgment and supplemental petition
- RTC – denied
 Baloloys -- appealed to CA
 CA -- initially affirmed RTC BUT later on reversed; then denied Baloloys’ MR (

The CA affirmed the trial court s order and partial decision pertaing ton the Baloloys but reversed the later
decision pertaining to Rubio and Escueta

 Baloloys’ arguments:
 First, the CA did not consider the circumstances surrounding petitioners’ failure to appear at the pre-trial
and to file the petition for relief on time.
 As to the failure to appear at the pre-trial, there was fraud, accident and/or excusable neglect, because
petitioner Bayani was in the United States. There was no service of the notice of pre-trial or order. Neither
did the former counsel of record inform him. Consequently, the order declaring him in default is void, and
all subsequent proceedings, orders, or decision are void.
 Furthermore, petitioner Alejandrino was not clothed with a power of attorney to appear on behalf of
Bayani at the pre-trial conference.
 Second, the sale by Virginia to respondent is not binding. Petitioner Rubio did not authorize Virginia to
transact business in his behalf pertaining to the property. The Special Power of Attorney was constituted
in favor of Llamas, and the latter was not empowered to designate a substitute attorney-in-fact. Llamas
even disowned her signature appearing on the "Joint Special Power of Attorney," which constituted
Virginia as her true and lawful attorney-in-fact in selling Rubio’s properties.
 Third, the contract between respondent and Virginia is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. The real
character of the contract is not the title given, but the intention of the parties. They intended to reserve
ownership of the property to petitioners pending full payment of the purchase price. Together with taxes
and other fees due on the properties, these are conditions precedent for the perfection of the sale. Even
assuming that the contract is ambiguous, the same must be resolved against respondent, the party who
caused the same.
 Fourth, Respondent failed to faithfully fulfill her part of the obligation. Thus, Rubio had the right to sell his
properties to Escueta who exercised due diligence in ascertaining ownership of the properties sold to her.
Besides, a purchaser need not inquire beyond what appears in a Torrens title.

REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC

RTC The Baloloys filed a petition for relief from judgment and order dated July 4, 1994 and
supplemental petition dated July 7, 1994. This was denied by the trial court in an order dated
September 16, 1994.
CA Hence, appeal to the Court of Appeals was taken challenging the order denying the petition for
relief.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s order and partial decision, but reversed the later
decision
Others (Quasi
Judicial
Agencies, if
any)

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ISSUE Should SC review the factual circumstances surrounding the case?
(based from the syllabus)

RULING NO.
(If possible, highlight or  The petition lacks merit. The contract of sale between petitioners and respondent is valid.
underline the doctrine)  Bayani Baloloy was represented by his attorney-in-fact, Alejandrino Baloloy. In the Baloloys’ answer to the
original complaint and amended complaint, the allegations relating to the personal circumstances of the
Baloloys are clearly admitted.
 "An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof." The "factual admission in the pleadings on record [dispenses] with the need x x x to
present evidence to prove the admitted fact." It cannot, therefore, "be controverted by the party making
such admission, and [is] conclusive" as to them. All proofs submitted by them "contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a party or not." Besides, there
is no showing that a palpable mistake has been committed in their admission or that no admission has
been made by them.
 Pre-trial is mandatory. The notices of pre-trial had been sent to both the Baloloys and their former counsel
of record. Being served with notice, he is "charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by
him." He must "see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial." What the Baloloys
and their former counsel have alleged instead in their Motion to Lift Order of As In Default dated
December 11, 1991 is the belated receipt of Bayani Baloloy’s special power of attorney in favor of their
former counsel, not that they have not received the notice or been informed of the scheduled pre-trial.
Not having raised the ground of lack of a special power of attorney in their motion, they are now deemed
to have waived it. Certainly, they cannot raise it at this late stage of the proceedings. For lack of
representation, Bayani Baloloy was properly declared in default.
 Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states:
 SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either of
the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more
than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was
taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
 There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the above-cited rule. "The 60-day period is
reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and not from
the date he actually read the same."13 As aptly put by the appellate court:
 The evidence on record as far as this issue is concerned shows that Atty. Arsenio Villalon, Jr.,
the former counsel of record of the Baloloys received a copy of the partial decision dated June
23, 1993 on April 5, 1994. At that time, said former counsel is still their counsel of record. The
reckoning of the 60 day period therefore is the date when the said counsel of record received a
copy of the partial decision which was on April 5, 1994. The petition for relief was filed by
the new counsel on July 4, 1994 which means that 90 days have already lapsed or 30
days beyond the 60 day period. Moreover, the records further show that the Baloloys received
the partial decision on September 13, 1993 as evidenced by Registry return cards which bear
the numbers 02597 and 02598 signed by Mr. Alejandrino Baloloy.

DOCTRINE:
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states that a petition provided for in either of the preceding
sections must be verified within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order
or other proceeding to set aside. x x x

The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or
proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same.

11. SPRINGFIELD V. RTC JUDGE – Pet to annul judgment filed by Pet to RTC which denied it. CA also dismissed pet for cert or lack of
merit, ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision because it is a co-equal body.

G.R. NO. 142628 February 6, 2007


SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. and HEIRS OF PETRA CAPISTRANO
CASE TITLE
PIIT, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 40, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, Respondents.

APPLICABLE RULE /
Annulment of judgment
SECTION / TOPIC

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Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in Cagayan de Oro City and then sold
Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. Lot No. 2291-C and Lot No. 2291-D and developed these
properties into a subdivision project called Mega Heights Subdivision.
The Department of Agrarian Reform, through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice of
Coverage, placing the property under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988. There being an opposition from the heirs of Petra Piit, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Abeto A.
Salcedo, Jr. rendered a decision declaring the nature of the property as residential and not suitable for
agriculture.

FACTS The Regional Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial Adjudicator disallowed for being
pro forma and frivolous. The decision became final and executory6 and Springfield proceeded to
develop the property.

The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from judgment of the DARAB Decision, which
granted the petition and gave due course to the Notice of Coverage, and directed the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to proceed with the documentation, acquisition, and distribution of
the property to the true and lawful beneficiaries. The DARAB also issued an Order ordering the heirs of
Piit and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries the amount corresponding to the value of the
property since the property has already been developed into a subdivision.
MTC NA
 Springfield and the heirs of Piit filed a petition for annulment of the DARAB
and all its subsequent proceedings, contending that the DARAB decision was
rendered without affording petitioners any notice and hearing.9
RTC  On motion filed by the farmer-beneficiaries, the RTC issued an Order
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

 Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it ruled that the annulment of judgment filed before it is actually an
action for certiorari in a different color. According to petitioners, what it sought
before the RTC is an annulment of the DARAB Decision and not certiorari, as
REMEDIAL MATTERS the DARAB Decision is void ab initio for having been rendered without due
process of law.12
 The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the RTC does not
CA have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision because it is a co-equal
body.
 However, the CA ordered the elevation of the DARAB records before it,
declaring that it "overlooked the fact that petitioners likewise applied for a writ
of prohibition against the enforcement of the DARAB decision which they claim
to be patently void." But receipt of the records, the CA simply denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration without specifically resolving the issues
raised concerning the prayer for a writ of prohibition.

Others NA

ISSUE Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the DARAB.

NO. The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative
bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature,
and logically, beyond the control of the latter. Consequently, the silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the
jurisdiction of the CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies like the
DARAB indicates its lack of such authority. But, a final and executory judgment may be set aside in
three ways; and a collateral attack, whereby in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof, is one of these.
RULING
The assailed DARAB Decision granting the petition for relief from judgment and giving due course to
the Notice of Coverage was made pursuant to a petition for relief from judgment filed by the DAR,
albeit petitioners are contesting the validity of the proceedings held thereon. The assailed DARAB
Decision appears to be regular on its face, and for its alleged nullity to be resolved, the Court must
delve into the records of the case in order to determine the validity of petitioners' argument of lack of
due process, absent notice and hearing. Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally

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to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases
involving factual issues. The question of whether the DARAB Decision is null and void and enforceable
against petitioners for having been rendered without affording petitioners due process is a factual
question which requires a review of the records of this case for it to be judiciously resolved.

The Court notes that the CA, indeed, failed to resolve petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition, which focuses on the alleged nullity of the DARAB Decision. On this score, the CA found
that the application for the issuance of the writ of prohibition was actually a collateral attack on the
validity of the DARAB decision. But, a final and executory judgment may be set aside in three ways;
and a collateral attack, whereby in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof, is one of these. This tenet is based upon a court's inherent
authority to expunge void acts from its records. Despite recognizing the need to resolve petitioners'
application for the writ of prohibition in its Resolution, the CA nonetheless summarily denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration leaving the matter hanging and unresolved.
At first, the Court considered resolving the merits of petitioners' motion for reconsideration concerning
their application for a writ of prohibition against enforcing the DARAB Decision. Thus, in a Resolution,
the Court directed the CA to transmit the records of DARAB Case which was previously required by the
CA to be forwarded to it. However, the CA has not complied with the Court's Resolution. Withal, upon
re-examination of the issues involved in this case, the Court deems it more judicious to remand this
case to the CA for immediate resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration, re: their application
for the writ of prohibition.

Moreover, the radical conflict in the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and the DARAB as regards the
nature of the subject property necessitates a review of the present case. In this regard, the CA is in a
better position to fully adjudicate the case for it can delve into the records to determine the probative
value of the evidence supporting the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and of the DARAB. In
addition, the CA is empowered by its internal rules to require parties to submit additional documents,
as it may find necessary to promote the ends of substantial justice, and further order the transmittal of
the proper records for it to fully adjudicate the case. After all, it is an avowed policy of the courts that
cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their
causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the
ends of justice would be served better

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals
which is DIRECTED to resolve petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of prohibition in their
Motion for Reconsideration.

12. YUK LING ONG V. CO – Marriage between Foreigner and Filipino. Foreigner was called to BID coz her Permanent Res was for
cancellation due to the Nullification of marriage. Foreigner filed Pet to Annulment of Judgment on the grounds of FRAUD and LACK OF
JURISDICTION. Court allowed.

CASE TITLE YUK LING ONG, Petitioner, v. BENJAMIN T. CO, Respondent.


G.R. No. 206653, February 25, 2015
APPLICABLE RULE / RULE 47 - ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT; Substituted Service of Summons
SECTION / TOPIC
***This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals (CA), which denied the petition for annulment of judgment.

FACTS Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent Benjamin Co (respondent), a
Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate Church.

Sometime in November 2008, Ong was subpoenaed by the the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) to
appear before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was subjected to cancellation proceedings
reportedly her marriage with Co was nullified by the court.

When Ong appeared before the BID, she was furnished copies of petition for declaration of marriage and RTC decision
declaring the marriage between Ong and Co as void ab initio dated December 11, 2002.
Ong was perplexed that her marriage with Co had been declared void ab initio.

REMEDIAL MATTERS
RTC On July 19, 2002, respondent CO filed another petition for declaration of nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306.
Respondent indicated that petitioner’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden
Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons. In his Server’s Return, process
server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the
copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on
petitioner. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security officer.

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On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 finding
respondent’s marriage with petitioner as void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that summons was served on
petitioner on August 1, 2002, but she failed to file her responsive pleading within the reglementary
period. The public prosecutor also stated that there were no indicative facts to manifest collusion.
Thus, the RTC concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.

CA / CTA Consequently, Ong filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
before the CA on November 24, 2008 claiming that she was never notified of the annulment case
filed against her. She prayed that the RTC decision dated December 11, 2002 be nullified on the
ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Ong alleged that Co committed extrinsic fraud because he deliberately indicated a wrong address to
prevent her from participating in the trial. Jurisdiction over her person was not acquired because of
an invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient explanation showing impossibility of
personal service was stated before resorting to substituted service was made on a security guard of
their townhouse and not a member of her household.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 27, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision finding the petition for
annulment of judgment to be devoid of merit. It held that there was no sufficient proof to
establish that respondent employed fraud to insure petitioner’s non-participation in the trial of Civil
Case No. CV-01-0177.

Relying on Robinson v. Miralles, the CA further ruled that the substituted service of summons in Civil
Case No. 02-0306 was valid. It found that there was a customary practice in petitioner’s townhouse
that the security guard would first entertain any visitors and receive any communication in behalf of
the homeowners. With this set-up, it was obviously impossible for the process server to personally
serve the summons upon petitioner. It also declared that the process server’s return carries with it
the presumption of regularity in the discharge of a public officer’s duties and functions.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution,
dated March 26, 2013.

ISSUE 1. Whether the annulment of judgment is the proper remedy to invalidate the decision dated December 11,
2002 that has long lapsed into finality.

2. Whether the substituted service of summons is valid.


RULING 1. YES. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character allowed only in exceptional cases as
where there is no available or other adequate remedy.

Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, that is,
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party – litigant another opportunity
to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the
burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.

Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the
courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law for it involves
the service of summons or other processes on the defendant.

2. NO. There was lack of jurisdiction over her persons because there was an invalid service of summons.

In the present case, petitioner contends that there was lack of jurisdiction over her person because there
was an invalid substituted service of summons. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a
valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not
voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as
laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which state:

Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.

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***Although the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was promulgated as early as December 11, 2002, the Court must
strike it down for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. The favorable judgment enjoyed by respondent
cannot be categorized as a genuine victory because it was fought against an adversary, who was ignorant of the
existing dispute. Whatever prize bestowed upon the victor in such a void decision must also be undone. Respondent, if
he wishes to pursue, must start from scratch and institute his action for declaration of nullity again; this time with
petitioner fully aware and ready for litigation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and the March 26, 2013 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106271 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City is hereby declared VOID.

13. DE VERA V. SANTIAGO - ABEJUELA

CASE TITLE Wilfredo De Vera, Eufemio De Vera and et. al vs. Sps. Eugenio Santiago Sr. and et. al

APPLICABLE RULE The RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the lower courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
/ SECTION/ Clearly then, the amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction; all cases decided by the MTC are
TOPIC generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved. Hence, the CA grossly erred in nullifying the RTC Decision for
lack of jurisdiction, and in declaring as moot and academic the factual issues raised in the respondents' petition for review when it
should have proceeded to review on appeal the factual findings of the RTC. This is because the RTC not only has exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitioners' action for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages, but also appellate
jurisdiction over the MTC Decision itself.

FACTS  On Feb. 2000 De Vera and et. al filed a petition for reconveyance of ownership or possession with damages against Sps.
Santiago and et. al. in MTC Pangasinan. they discovered that their respective lots covered by Lot 7303 were already
covered by Free Patent Titles in the names of respondents, except Eugenio Santiago, Sr., which were acquired through
manipulation, misrepresentation, fraud and deceit.
 De Vera et al. alleged that they are the owners of subdivided land located at Bolinao, Pangasinan. They are in
actual and continuous possession and occupation of the land without disturbance by 3rd person.
 While Sps. Santiago et. al. that they are the owners of parcel of land and acquisition of titles over the land was regular
and done in accordance with law. Their predecessors in interest are the actual possessor and owner of disputed land.
They also alleged that MTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the assessed value of land is more than 20,000 which
is within the jurisdiction of RTC.
REMEDIAL MTC The court held in favor of Sps. Santiago and et. al. declaring them as the lawful owners and possessors of the land.
MATTERS
RTC De Vera et. al appealed the decision of MTC. The court reverse the decision of MTC in toto
CA Aggrieved by the decision of RTC, Sps. Santigo filed a petition for review under Rule 42. Set aside the MTC and RTC
dec.
The CA granted the petition and annulled and set aside the decision of both RTC and MTC on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Devera File MR but was denied
SC Petition for review on certiorari was filed to SC by De Vera et. al. which contend that while the MTC of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, is without jurisdiction to act upon the action for reconveyance of ownership and possession with
damages, involving a land with an assessed value of more than P20,000.00, the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan,
nonetheless correctly assumed jurisdiction thereon on appeal pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.

Sps. Santiago et. al. counter that Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in the case at bar, as it
refers only to cases where the lower court (MTC) dismissed a case filed with it without trial on the merits, and an
appeal to the RTC was taken from the order of dismissal. In which case, according to respondents, the RTC may
reverse the dismissal and, if it has jurisdiction, shall try the case on the merits as if the case were originally filed with
it.

ISSUE/S WON CA gravely erred in annulling the decision of RTC for lack of jurisdiction?
WON Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 is proper remedy on question of fact? NO
RULING  YES. While the CA is correct in ruling that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case for reconveyance and recovery of
ownership and possession of a land with an assessed value over P20,000.00, the ruling with respect to RTC’s lack of
jurisdiction in incorrect . Under Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, if the MTC tried a case on the merits
despite having no jurisdiction over the subject matter, its decision may be reviewed on appeal by the
RTC.

 Section 8, Rule 40 contemplates an appeal from an order of dismissal issued without trial of the case on the merits,
while the second paragraph deals with an appeal from an order of dismissal but the case was tried on the merits. Both
paragraphs, however, involve the same ground for dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction. Verily, the second paragraph
refutes respondents' contention that Section 8, Rule 40 refers solely to cases where the MTC dismissed a case filed

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therein without a trial on the merits and an appeal to the RTC was taken from the order of dismissal. Therefore, the
RTC correctly proceeded to decide the case on the merits despite the MTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

 Clearly RTC has jurisdiction over the case, under Sec.22 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended it exercises appellate jurisdiction
over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, the amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s appellate
jurisdiction; all cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved.
Hence, the CA grossly erred in nullifying the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction, and in declaring as moot and
academic the factual issues raised in the respondents' petition for review when it should have proceeded to review on
appeal the factual findings of the RTC. This is because the RTC not only has exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitioners' action for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages, but also appellate jurisdiction over the
MTC Decision itself.

 NO, SC is not the trier of facts. The issue whether the CA erred in annulling the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a
question of law. The resolution of such issue rests solely on what the law (B.P. Blg. 129, as amended) provides on the
given set of circumstances as alleged in petitioners' complaint for reconveyance of ownership and possession with
damages. Meanwhile, the factual questions necessitating a review of the evidence presented by the parties are raised in
the respondents' petition for review filed with the CA. An issue is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of alleged facts, or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and
to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation. The issue raised before CA failed to resolve all question of facts
which are beyond the province of a petition for review.

14. PNCC V. ASIAVEST - ALVARADO

CASE TITLE G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015


PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ASIAVEST MERCHANT
BANKERS (M) BERHAD, Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
APPLICABLE RULE / Appealed Cases to the CA; Appellant’s Brief
SECTION / TOPIC
(based from the syllabus)
FACTS Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest
Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd.
(Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to construct rural roads and bridges for the
State of Pahang, Malaysia.

In connection with this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The
four contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the
State of Pahang "the due performance by PNCC of its construction contracts . . . and the repayment of
the temporary advances given to PNCC." These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of
Malaysia.

There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State of
Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance bonds. It
"entered into a compromise agreement with the State of Pahang by paying a reduced amount.
Consequently, the corporation demanded indemnity from PNCC by demanding the amount it paid to the
State of Pahang.
REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC n/a
11. Provide the RTC Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of money
description of the against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. It based its action on Malaysian
initial complaint at laws.
the court a quo.
12. Let us be accurate as PNCC filed three (3) Motions for extension of time to file its Answer. The trial court
to the remedy used granted these motions. However a day after the expiry of the last extension, PNCC filed a
in each court (i.e. Motion for another five-day extension. The trial court denied this and declared PNCC
petition for certiorari, in default for failure to file any responsive pleading, and allowed Asiavest Merchant
appeal, petition for Bankers (M) Berhad to present its evidence ex parte.
review, etc.).
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M)
Berhad, finding that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad complied with the requisites
for proof of written foreign laws.

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The trial court denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of Default and PNCC's Motion for
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam.
CA / CTA PNCC brought its case before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of law
exclusively cognizable by this court. It likewise denied reconsideration.
ISSUE (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground that it raised pure
(based from the syllabus) questions of law.
(2) Whether the two Malaysian corporations, Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. and Asiavest-CDCP Sdn.
Bhd., should have been impleaded as parties.
RULING (1) No. A question of law exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
(If possible, highlight or state of facts," while a question of fact exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
underline the doctrine) the falsehood of alleged facts." Questions of fact require the examination of the probative value of
the parties' evidence.

This Petition originated from a default judgment against petitioner. Petitioner was not able to
present evidence before the trial court. Necessarily, the errors raised from the trial court involved
only questions of law.

(2) No. The bases of its argument to implead and hold the two Malaysian corporations liable are the
subcontract agreement and guaranty agreement. Copies of these agreements were not submitted
with any of its pleadings. Thus, the lower courts could not have determined for certain whether the
two Malaysian corporations did enter into the alleged agreements, the subject of the agreements, or
the extent of their liabilities, if any.

Petitioner adds that it has consistently mentioned its argument on the two Malaysian companies in
its pleadings before the lower courts. Respondent counters that this was not assigned as an error
before the Court of Appeals.

Rule 44, Section 13 of the Rules of Court enumerates the required contents of an appellant's brief.
In paragraph (e), the appellant's brief must include "a clear and concise statement of the issues of
fact or law to be submitted to the court for its judgment."

In its appellant's Brief before the Court of Appeals, petitioner only assigned the following two
errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION AS IT HAD NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AD
CAUTELAM FILED BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT DEPRIVED THE LATTER OF HIS DAY IN
COURT.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The argument on the two Malaysian corporations was raised by petitioner for the first time in its
Motion to Lift Order of Default with Affidavit of Merit.The trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Lift
Order of Default. There is no showing whether petitioner questioned this trial court Order.

In any event, this court has held that "[i]t is essential, to boot, that that party demonstrate that he
has a meritorious cause of action or defense; otherwise, nothing would be gained by setting the
default order aside."

Also, since petitioner mentioned its argument on the two Malaysian corporations in its Motion to Lift
Order of Default and Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam filed before the trial court, these were
already considered by the lower court when it ruled on both Motions.

Nevertheless, petitioner may later claim reimbursement from this Malaysian corporation the amount
it was made to pay by judgment in this suit.
OTHER ISSUES (1) Whether the trial court "erred in not refusing to assume jurisdiction on the ground of forum
non-conveniens”

No. The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. All of its pertinent
documents and employees involved would be in its main office. Our courts would be "better positioned
to enforce [the] judgment and, ultimately, to dispense” in this case against petitioner.

(2) Whether petitioner Philippine National Construction Corporation was deprived of due process
when the trial court declared it in default

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 No. Petitioner had been able to file a Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam before the trial court,
and later elevated its case before the Court of Appeals. There is no denial of due process if a party
was given an opportunity to be heard in a Motion for Reconsideration.
 Petitioner also did not take advantage of the opportunities it was given to file a responsive pleading.
It allowed the periods it was given for the filing of pleadings to lapse.
 Petitioner never attempted to file its Answer, even belatedly. It argued that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, yet it did not file a Motion to Dismiss on this ground.
 Also, it was only after five months that petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default. Its Affidavit
did not state the evidence it plans to present in the event its Motion is granted, or attach documents
in support of its claims.

(3) Whether respondent's claim already prescribed under Malaysian laws

No. Prescription is one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss, but petitioner did not avail itself of this
remedy. Prescription was also not raised as an error before the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, we have
ruled that prescription may be raised for the first time before this court.

Petitioner invokes Malaysian laws on prescription, but it was not able to prove these foreign law
provisions. Even assuming that the six-year prescription applies, the Complaint was filed on time.

(4) Whether this case "should be dismissed considering that respondent is no longer an existing
corporation"

No. Petitioner has not proven the relevant foreign law provisions to support its allegations that
respondent has ceased to exist and that all its claims are consequently extinguished.

15. MARAVILLA V. RIOS - AU

CASE TITLE MARAVILLA vs. RIOS


G.R. No. 196875
August 19, 2015
APPLICABLE RULE / Petition for Review under Rule 42
SECTION / TOPIC
(based from the syllabus)
FACTS Respondent Joseph Rios accused petitioner Teddy Maravilla of recklessly driving his jeep which caused it to collide
with the motorcycle he was then driving; as a result, respondent was injured and incapacitated to work for more than
ninety days.

REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC Rios filed a criminal case against Maravilla for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
13. Provide the description injuries before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.
of the initial complaint
at the court a quo. MTCC acquitted Maravilla as the Quantum of proof necessary for the conviction of the accused not
having been clearly established beyond any reasonable doubt. However, the court found
14. Let us be accurate as to
preponderance of evidence to hold the Maravilla liable in damages for the injuries sustained by Rios
the remedy used in
as a result of the lack of proof or lack basis. Hence, Maravilla was ordered to pay Rios temperate
each court (i.e. petition damages in the sum of P20,000 while other claim for damages was dismissed either for lack of basis
for certiorari, appeal, and/or the same not proper in this case.
petition for review,
etc.). RTC Rios interposed an appeal before the trial court.

May 19, 2008: RTC of Negros Occidental modified the decision of the MTCC.
1. The award of temperate damages in the amount of P20,000.00 is hereby deleted; and
2. Maravila is hereby held liable to pay Rios the amount of P256,386.25 as actual and
compensatory damages;
3. No award for moral damages and Attorney's Fees and no costs.

CA / CTA Maravilla filed a Petition for Review with the CA.

July 25, 2008: CA dismissed the Petition.

Maravilla moved for reconsideration invoking the rule on liberal application of procedural laws. But,
CA stood its ground, stating –

In trying to rectify the dearth in his petition, Maravilla attached to his motion certain portions of the
record of the case in the court a quo.

A perusal of Maravilla’s motion for reconsideration, as well as the attachments thereto, shows that
he still failed to comply with Section 2(d), Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court. There are

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allegations in the petition that draw support from the transcripts of stenographic notes, formal offer
of evidence by the respondent, and the Order of the trial court that admitted said formal offer of
evidence. Maravilla, however, had not appended the aforesaid documents to the petition. Thus, with
such deficiency, the Court resolves to deny his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Review under Rule 42 due to technicalities.
(based from the syllabus)

RULING No.
(If possible, highlight or
underline the doctrine) Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for review shall be accompanied by, among
others, copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition. Section 3 of the same rule states that failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
requirements regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that there are three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching
pleadings and portions of the record to petitions under Rules 42 and 65 of the 1997 Rules, to wit:

First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those
which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document
in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out
a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is
shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached to
the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned
judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or
reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents
required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the
merits.

In Maravilla’s case, while he submitted additional necessary attachments along with his Motion for Reconsideration, he
left out important parts of the record - excerpts of the transcript of stenographic notes, Rios’ formal offer of evidence,
and the trial court's Order admitting said formal offer of evidence - that would support his claim that the trial court
erred in awarding damages to Rios since the latter failed to testify as to his hospital expenses and identify particular
exhibits.

Since he was acquitted of the criminal charge, the only issue left in the appealed case is the matter of damages.

Nowhere in the trial court's recitations may be found any reference to the transcript covering Rios’ testimony, which
Maravilla assails. The same is true with the MTCC's Decision; a perusal thereof generates the same conclusion. In the
absence of such reference, it was incumbent upon Maravilla to attach to his CA Petition such portions of the evidence
and transcript as are relevant to and supportive of his claim. Without them, the appellate court could not have any
factual basis to resolve the case or, at the very least, make out a prima facie case for him.

Thus, going by the ruling in Galvez, Maravilla’s failure to attach relevant portions of the evidence and transcript of
stenographic notes - to his Petition, initially, and Motion for Reconsideration, subsequently - which were not tackled in
the decisions of the courts, but which are material to his claim that Rios failed to testify as to and prove actual
damages, is fatal to his Petition for Review before the CA. In short, none of the three guideposts spelled out
in Galvez were observed in Maravilla’s case.

16. PROV. OF AURORA V. MARCO – Former Gov’s appointee was recalled due to lack of avail of funds. No appeals on Writ of
Execution. Proper remedy is Rule 65

CASE TITLE The Government of Aurora versus Hilario M Marco under GR No. 202331, Promulgated om April 22, 2015
APPLICABLE RULE / Rule 41, Section 1, Appeal from the Regional Trial Court.
SECTION / TOPIC (based
from the syllabus)
FACTS Governor Ramoncita P. Ong (Governor Ong) permanently appointed Marco as Cooperative Development Specialist II
on June 25, 2004, five (5) days before the end of her term as Governor of the Province. On June 28, 2004, Marco’s
appointment, together with 25 other appointments, was submitted to the Civil Service Commission Field Office-Aurora
(the Field Office). Annexed to Marco’s appointment papers was a certification from Provincial Budget Officer Norma R.
Clemente (Provincial Budget Officer Clemente) and Provincial Accountant Wilfredo C. Saturno (Provincial Accountant
Saturno) stating that funds from the Province’s 2004 Annual Budget were available to cover the position. The said
Appointment was duly accepted by Mr Marco Hilario.

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Upon the assumption of office of Gevernor Bellaflor Angara-Castillo, made a meeting with the different heads of her
province where Budget Officer Clemente averred that there is no funds for 26 of the former Governor Ong’s
appointment that resulted to the recall of all the certification of availability of funds.

On July 5, 2004, the appointment of MR Marco’s appointment was disapproved and was ordered to stop working on
July 8, 2004. Administrative and other court remedies as stated below:
REMEDIAL MATTERS Civil Service Marco mover for the reconsideration of the disapproval of his appointment with the Civil Service
15. Provide the description Commission Commission Region IVA that denied it on the ground of unavailability of funds.
of the initial complaint
at the court a quo. Through a letter dated May 17, 2005, appealed before the Civil Service Commission and the Human
16. Let us be accurate as to Resource Office of the province received the same on May 23, 2005 but failed to reply within 10
the remedy used in days as required by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases.
each court (i.e. petition
for certiorari, appeal, Marco’s appointment was rendered valid by the Civil Service Commission on April 14, 2008 for
petition for review, failure of the Province of Aurora to substantiate that there is no funds available to support Governor
etc.). Ong’s appointees who underwent the regular process of the Selection Board prior to election ban.

The petition of relief file by Mr Alex N Ocampo, Administrator of the Province of Aurora, was denied
by the Commission for having no authority to represent the province absent the authority
from the governor.

Despite having the authority of the Governor, Ocampo filed a motion for reconsideration, was
denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period.

Marco requested the implementation of the order which the Commission granted based on a
resolution dated April 14, 2008.

Ocampo under Rule 43 filed for a motion for reconsideration with motion to quash “execution”
arguing that the April 14, 2008 resolution has already been implemented.

The province refused to reinstate Marco despite the January 24, 2011 resolution denying the same.
Thus, the controversy.
CA Under a petition for review, praying for the issuance of the temporary restraining order was filed
and arguing for the first time that Marco is a midnight appointment.

The CA denied the petition of the province and upheld the decision of the Commission on the
ground of availability of funds and undergoing the selection process of Mr Marco.

The province files a motion for reconsideration which was denied the same.

ISSUE 1. Whether or not the appeal of the province of Aurora at the Court of Appeals taken from an order of
(based from the syllabus) execution is proper?
2. Whether or not the principle of midnight appointment is applicable?
RULING 1. No, the province erred in filing an appeal with the Court of Appeals, as no appeal may be taken from an
(If possible, highlight or order of execution pursuant to Rule 41, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Instead, it should have taken a petition
underline the doctrine) for certiorari under Rule 65.

The rule prohibiting appeal from orders of execution is based on the doctrine of immutability of final judgement.
Under this doctrine, a final and executory judgment is “removed from the power and jurisdiction of the court
which rendered it to further alter or amend it, much less revoke it.” The judgment remains immutable even if it is
later on discovered to be erroneous. The doctrine “grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of the courts must be final at some definite
date fixe by law. To allow courts to amend final (and executory) judgment will result in endless litigation.

The doctrine of immutability of judgment applies to decisions rendered by the Civil Service Commission. A
decision of the Civil Service Commission becomes final and executory if no motion for reconsideration is filed
within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule VI, Section 80 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service.

2. No, “Midnight appointment is not applicable to appointees of the local government.

17. THOMASITES V. RODRIGUEZ – Korean hired Fil teachers but later on dismissed them due to the disagreement between Fil and Am
teachers. Filed a case at NLRC who decided in favor of Rodriguez. Pet for relief from judgement filed by TCI was dismissed because ti
was filed beyond the period allowed.

CASE TITLE Thomasites Center for International Studies (TCIS) vs. Rodriguez
728 SCRA 391

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APPLICABLE RULE / Nature of the Petition for relief from judgment. Rule 38 Sec. 3
SECTION / TOPIC(based
from the syllabus)
FACTS Dr. Jae Won Park, President, and Dr. Cheol Je Cho, Academic Dean of TCIS respectively, both Korean nationals, hired
Rodriguez, Rillera, and Padrigon holders of PRC teaching licenses and graduates of UP on July 29, 2005. They were to
develop the academic programs of the school, design its curriculum, create materials for the school website, recruit
American and Filipino staff, draft document required by the school’s TESDA accreditation, supervise the construction of
the school in SBMA, and draft the student handbook as well as rules and regulations of the school. There was no written
contract but were promised a monthly salary of Php25,000 and shares of stock.

Disagreements arose between the American teachers and the respondents regarding salary. On January 5, 2005, in a
meeting called by Dr. Cho, the American teachers threatened to resign unless the respondents were terminated. That
same afternoon the respondents were served with termination letters citing that it is restructuring of the company and
consequent re-evaluation of its staffing requirements.

They filed with the NLRC for illegal dismissal and money claims against TCIS and Dr. Cho. The Labor Arbiter (LA)
decided in favor of the respondents with Dr. Cho receiving a copy of the decision on June 21, 2006. On August 11,
2006, the complainants moved for the issuance of a Writ of Execution which the LA directed its issuance which was
served on the counsel of TCIS on February 8, 2007. LA merely noted the petition for relief due to wrong venue and
lack of jurisdiction and also because it is a prohibited pleading.

On February 19, 2007, TCIS re-filed it petition for relief, with prayer of TRO and or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the NLRC. Petition was denied.

The petition for certiorari of TCIS was dismissed by the CA on May 24, 2012, for its failure to indicate the material
dates to show the timeliness of the petition. The CA also denied TCIS’ Motion for Reconsideration.
REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC N/A
17. Provide the RTC N/A
description of the CA / CTA Petition for Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration.
initial complaint at
the court a quo. Others A decision rendered by the NLRC for illegal dismissal and money claims. Appealed to CA.
18. Let us be accurate as (Quasi
to the remedy used in Judicial
each court (i.e. Agencies, if
petition for certiorari, any)
appeal, petition for
review, etc.).
ISSUE Whether the Petition for Relief will prosper.
(based from the syllabus)

RULING NO. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no
(If possible, highlight or other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion
underline the doctrine) for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed,
relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy
at law was due to his own negligence: otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which
had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

As provided in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly
comply with two (2) reglementary periods: first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the
judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of
such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition for relief
from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further
the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to
put an end to litigation.

The NLRC pointed out that TCIS 's petition for relief was filed beyond the period provided under Rule 38. The
earliest that it could have learned of the LA's judgment was on June 21, 2006 when Dr. Cho received a copy thereof,
and the latest was during the pre-execution conference held on September 22, 2006, when Atty. Bayona formally
entered her appearance as counsel for TCIS and Dr. Cho. TCIS's petition for relief was filed only on February 13, 2007,
well beyond the 60-day period allowed.
Also, no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence prevented TCIS from filing an appeal from the
decision of the LA.

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18. DIONA V. BALANQUE – Unpaid loan. Complaint for collection was filed and decided in favor of Diona with 5% monthly interest.
RTC issued writ of exec but could not be sat so public acution. Resp filed motion to correct /amend judgement as there was no
agreement on the interest. Court modified which is an abuse of disc, cant modify but can annul only.

CASE TITLE LETICIA DIONA vs. ROMEO A. BALANGUE et.al, G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013

APPLICABLE RULE While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of
/ SECTION/ extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment.
TOPIC

FACTS (RTC) Respondents obtained a loan from petitioner, payable by a Real Estate Mortgage. When the debt became due and upon
failure of respondents to pay, the petitioner filed a complaint. The RTC granted the complaint but awarded 5% per
month interest.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution alleging that respondents did not interpose a timely appeal despite receipt by their
former counsel of the RTC’s Decision. Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment,
claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons. According to the other respondents, they had no knowledge of
the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. They prayed that the RTC’s Decision be set aside and
a new trial be conducted.
RTC issued a Writ of Execution. However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the public auction of
the property which the RTC likewise granted. The auction sale was conducted with the petitioner as the only bidder.
Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale dated, claiming that the
parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her
Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum). RTC granted respondents’ motion and
accordingly modified the interest rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum.

REMEDIAL CA Displeased with the RTC’s Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under
MATTERS Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On August 5, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision declaring that the RTC
exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that
the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of interest to 12% per
annum. It ruled that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction. However, the proper remedy is not to amend the
judgment but to declare that portion as a nullity. Void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation (Leonor vs. CA). No legal rights can emanate
from a resolution that is null and void (Fortich vs. Corona)
From the foregoing, the remedy of the respondents is to have the Court declare the portion of the judgment
providing for a higher interest than that prayed for as null and void for want of or in excess of jurisdiction. A void
judgment never acquires finality and any action to declare its nullity does not prescribe (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio
Galvez vs. CA). Respondents pet for annulment of Judgement to nullify the portion of the October order .
SC This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the November 24, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
issued in G.R. SP No. 85541 which granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the
respondents seeking to nullify that portion of the October 17, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 75, Valenzuela City awarding petitioner 5% monthly interest rate for the principal amount of
the loan respondent obtained from her.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the CA committed grave and serious error of law when it granted the petition for annulment of judgment
as a substitute or alternative remedy of a lost appeal
RULING No. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under
exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a
remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is traceable to
the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final,
the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest."

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a
judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon
mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of
law.
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of
violation of due process.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the
party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief
sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the
proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of
recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even stricter in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was declared in default
than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is
allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section

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3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been
prayed for in the Complaint.

19. SANTOS V. SANTOS – Sps filed pet for dec of presumptively death and remarried. Wife only learned of such after and filed a pet to
annul. CA said declaration of reappearance is proper but SC said Pet for Annulment is proper on the grounds of Ex. Fraud and
Lack of Juris.

CASE TITLE Santos v. Santos


APPLICABLE RULE / Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) judgment, order, or
SECTION / TOPIC resolution has become final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
(based from the syllabus) appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”—

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul
the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead
has never been absent.
FACTS Ricardo Santos (Ricardo) was married to Celerina Santos (Celerina). Due to the fact that the
business of Ricardo did not prosper, Celerina told that she would work as a domestic helper in Hong
Kong. Ricardo was reluctant, however Celerina insisted. Celerina applied through an employment agency
in Ermita Manila back in Feb 1995. Celerina left 2 months after and was never heard from again.
REMEDIAL MATTERS RTC RTC of Tarlac City declared Celerina Santos presumptively dead after Ricardo, her
20. Provide the husband, had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
description of the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo then later remarried on Sept 17, 2008
initial complaint at
the court a quo. Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina, however no one knew where
21. Let us be accurate as she was.
to the remedy used - He went to her parents in Cubao, QC
in each court (i.e. - He inquired from relatives and friends
petition for certiorari,
appeal, petition for He claims that it was almost 12 years form the date of his RTC petition since CElerina left
review, etc.). he believed that she had passed away.
CA / CTA Celerina alleged that she learned of Ricardo’s petition only sometime in Oct 2008, and
filed a petition for annulment of judgement on Nov 11, 2008 before the Court of Appeals.

The petition was based on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
She alleged that she was not given her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge
of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac city.
She alleged that her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional avenue, QC.

She claimed that:


- She never resided in Tarlac
- She never left work as a domestic helper abroad
- That it was not true that she was absent for 12 years
- That Ricardo was aware that she had left their conjugal dwelling.
- That it was Ricardo who left the conjugal dwelling to cohabit with another
woman

Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention
that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.

She also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo’s petition because
it never been published in a newspaper. That the Sol Gen and the provincial prosecutors
office were not furnished copies of Ricardo’s petition.

CA Dismissed Celerinas petition for annulment of judgement for allegedly being


the wrong remedy. CA held that the proper remedy was to file a sword statement
before the civil registry declaring her reappearance in accordance with Art. 42 of the
Family Code

Celerina Filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied


ISSUE WON the CA erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgement for beign a wrong remedy for a
(based from the syllabus) fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.

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RULING Yes, the CA erred.
(If possible, highlight or
underline the doctrine) Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court’s judgment, order, or resolution has
become final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies)
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”

The grounds for annulment of judgement are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction

Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:


- For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is
intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the
acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated. It is extrinsic or collateral when a
litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or
from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.

The allegations made by Celerina before the CA were allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Such allegations are sufficient for annulment of judgment.

Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment on November 17, 2008. This was less than two
years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her
discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four year period
allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period
allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.

There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud
perpetrated on her. The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain
admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of
extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
SO ORDERED.

20. LASALA V. NFA - CAPURCOS

CASE TITLE ALBERTO T. LASALA, PREVIOUSLY DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE STYLE PSF SECURITY
AGENCY, Petitioner, v. THE NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY, Respondent.

TOPIC Rule 47

FACTS Lasala, through his company PSF Security Agency, used to provide security guard services to the NFA. Lasala's
employees who were deployed to the NFA filed with the NLRC a complaint for underpayment of wages and
nonpayment of other monetary benefits. The NLRC ruled for the employees and held Lasala and the NFA
solidarily liable for the employees' adjudged monetary award. Consequently, the sheriff garnished the NFA's
P383,572.90 worth of bank deposits with the Development Bank of the Philippines.

Believing that it had no liability to Lasala's employees, the NFA filed with the RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City, a
complaint for sum of money with damages and an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against Lasala. In response, Lasala filed an answer with counterclaim and opposition to the prayer
for preliminary attachment. In his counterclaim, Lasala prayed for the payment of moral damages of
P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages of P500,000.00; attorney's fees of P300,000.00, compensatory damages of
P250,000.00; and unpaid wage differential of P1,500,000.00, for a total amount of P3,550,000.00..

REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC


RTC Initially, the trial court granted the NFA's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. However, this writ was eventually nullified when Lasala questioned it with the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 41124. The trial court dismissed the NFA's complaint for failure of the lawyer
deputized by the OGCC, Atty. Mendoza, to present the NFA's evidence-in-chief, due to his
repeated hearing absences. The NFA replaced Atty. Mendoza and administratively charged him
with dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interests of the
service, and gross neglect of duty. It subsequently employed Atty. Atty. Cahucom as its new
counsel.

Although the NFA's complaint was dismissed, Lasala's counterclaim remained, and he
presented evidence to support it. Interestingly, Atty. Cahucom, the NFA's new counsel, did not
submit any evidence to controvert Lasala's counterclaim evidence. When asked during trial,
Atty. Cahucom simply waived his right to cross-examine Lasala and did not exert any effort to

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counter his testimony. Notably, this amount is substantially higher than the amount of
P3,550,000.00 Lasala originally prayed for.

Despite the huge award to Lasala, the NFA failed to appeal its case to the CA. Atty. Cahucom
did not inform the NFA's management about the trial court's adverse ruling. When asked to
explain, he reasoned out that he only discovered the decision after the lapse of the period for
appeal.

Having lost its chance to appeal, the NFA filed with the trial court a petition for relief from
judgment (petition for relief) grounded on excusable negligence.12 In its petition, the NFA
through Atty. Cahucom, attributed its failure to appeal to one of the NFA's employees.
Allegedly, this employee received the copy of the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision but
did not inform Atty. Cahucom about it. It was only after the lapse of the period for the filing of
a motion for reconsideration and an appeal that the NFA learned about the adverse ruling.

The trial court did not accept the NFA's reasoning; thus, it denied the petition for relief for
insufficiency in substance.

In the meantime, then NFA Administrator Arthur C. Yap had assumed his position. One of his
first instructions was the legal audit of all NFA cases. In doing this, the NFA management
found out that the two lawyers (Attys. Mendoza and Cahucom) assigned to the case against
Lasala, grossly mishandled it; hence, causing a huge and unjust liability to the NFA in the
amount of P52,788,970.50
CA / CTA Thus, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, the NFA, now through the
OGCC, filed with the CA a petition and an amended petition for annulment of judgment of the
trial court's September 2, 2002 decision which had granted a substantially higher award than
what Lasala originally prayed for in his counterclaim.

The CA granted the petition and annulled the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision.

Others (Quasi
Judicial
Agencies, if
any)
ISSUE WON THE CA ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ANNULLMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY NFA

RULING NO. In the present case, the CA annulled the trial court's decision granting Lasala's counterclaim as the RTC
ruling was not supported by any concrete and convincing evidence. According to the CA, the RTC
effectively acted without jurisdiction. CA Associate Justice Rosmari Carandang fully communicated the
sense of the majority's ruling in her concurring opinion, when she held that the trial court committed an error of
judgment and acted beyond its lawful jurisdiction when it relied solely on Lasala's self-serving testimony.
Otherwise stated, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
rendered a decision that was not supported by factual and evidentiary basis.

The court ruled that the CA committed an error; it violated the restrictive application of a petition for annulment;
only extrinsic fraud and/or lack of jurisdiction may annul a final judgment. By seeking to include acts committed
with grave abuse of discretion, the CA's ruling enlarged the concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground for
annulment.

In a petition for annulment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner cannot rely on jurisdictional
defect due to grave abuse of discretion, but on absolute lack of jurisdiction. As we have already held,
the concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a judgment does not embrace grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

However, the actions of Attys. Mendoza and Cahucom, under the unique circumstances of this
case, amount to extrinsic fraud that warrants the grant of NFA's petition for relief from judgment.
The party in the present case, the NFA, is a government agency that could rightly rely solely on its legal officers
to vigilantly protect its interests. The NFA's lawyers were not only its counsel, they were its employees tasked to
advance the agency's legal interests. NFA's lawyers acted negligently several times in handling the case that it
appears deliberate on their part.

First, Atty. Mendoza caused the dismissal of the NFA's complaint against Lasala by negligently and repeatedly
failing to attend the hearing for the presentation of the NFA's evidence-in-chief. Consequently, the NFA lost its
chance to recover from Lasala the employee benefits that it allegedly shouldered as indirect employer. Atty.
Mendoza never bothered to provide any valid excuse for this crucial omission on his part.

For these failures, Atty. Mendoza merely explained that the NFA's copy of the adverse decision was lost and was
only found after the lapse of the period for appeal. Under these circumstances, the NFA was forced to file an
administrative complaint against Atty. Mendoza for his string of negligent acts.

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Atty. Cahucom, Atty. Mendoza's successor in handling the case, notably did not cross-examine Lasala's
witnesses, and did not present controverting evidence to disprove and counter Lasala's counterclaim. Atty.
Cahucom further prejudiced the NFA when he likewise failed to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal
from the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision, where Lasala was awarded the huge amount of
P52,788,970.50, without any convincing evidence to support it.

When asked to justify his failure, Atty. Cahucom, like Atty. Mendoza, merely mentioned that the NFA's copy of
the decision was lost and that he only discovered it when the period for appeal had already lapsed. The trial
court's adverse decision, of course, could have been avoided or the award minimized, if Atty. Cahucom did not
waive the NFA's right to present its controverting evidence against Lasala's counterclaim evidence. Strangely,
when asked during hearing, Atty. Cahucom refused to refute Lasala's testimony and instead simply moved for
the filing of a memorandum.

The actions of these lawyers, that at the very least could be equated with unreasonable disregard for the case
they were handling and with obvious indifference towards the NFA's plight, lead us to the conclusion that Attys.
Mendoza's and Cahucom's actions amounted to a concerted action with Lasala when the latter secured the trial
court's huge and baseless counterclaim award. By this fraudulent scheme, the NFA was prevented from making
a fair submission in the controversy.

21. MANGUBA V. MORGA-SEVA

CASE TITLE (2015)


Abner Mangubat vs Belen Morga-Seva
APPLICABLE RULE / It must be stressed that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under certain
SECTION / TOPIC (based exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final judgments.
from the syllabus)
The RTC's jurisdiction over petitions for revival of judgment may be filed either 'in the same court where
said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other
place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.

An action for annulment of judgment or final order if based on lack of jurisdiction, must brought before
it is barred by laches.
FACTS On March 5, 1974, Gaudencio Mangubat (Gaudencio) and his wife Aurelia Rellora-Mangubat (Aurelia) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against
respondent Belen Morga-Seva (Belen) and two other defendants.

RTC in favour of petitioners.

Belen and her co-defendants' appeal to the CA and later to this Court, both unsuccessful, so the RTC Decision
became final and executory.

Gaudencio and his children as heirs of the deceased Aurelia filed with the same court a Complaint for Revival of the
Decision in Civil Case No. P-279. They averred that the writ of execution could not be implemented because Belen and
her co-defendants evaded service thereof. And since five years had already lapsed from the date of its entry,
Gaudencio and the heirs prayed for the revival of the RTC Decision.

Both parties entered into compromise agreement which the RTC approved.
Upon finality, Writ of Execution was served.

Abner, on his own behalf, moved to substitute his father Gaudencio who died. A few months thereafter and now
allegedly in behalf of his co-heirs, Abner filed another motion to substitute Gaudencio exclusively for the purpose of
executing the final judgment in the case on the claim that it was necessary for the settlement of the intestate estate of
his father. The RTC granted Abner's motion for substitution but for purposes of execution only.

Belen handed to Atty. Herrera her payment in accordance with the Compromise Agreement. But she alleged that the
heirs refused to convey to Belen the lot covered by TCT No. 6337. The RTC directed Abner who was allegedly in
possession of the owner's copy of the title to surrender the same to the Clerk of Court and the Clerk of Court to
execute in behalf of the heirs a deed of sale or conveyance of the lot in favor of Belen pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 39 of
the Rules of the Court. Abner, however, manifested that as far as he is concerned, Belen has not yet made any
payment to the heirs as he was not notified by Atty. Herrera. Atty. Herrera reported to the court that out of the
P91,280.00 handed to him by Belen, he had turned-over the amount of P84,480.00 to the Clerk of Court and retained
6,800.00 as his attorney's fee.

Abner terminated the services of Atty. Herrera.In behalf of all the heirs, Abner, through Atty. Vista-Gumba, filed a
Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void. He alleged therein that Gaudencio acted only on his own
behalf when he entered into the compromise agreement with Belen, hence, the same is null and void for want of

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consent and participation of the heirs who were indispensable parties.

Ruth Mangubat Parcia and Job Mangubat, Abner’s co-heirs filed a Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the Heirs'
Respective Shares. They declare that they were seven siblings all in all and each is entitled to P12,068.00 from Belen's
payment. They do not agree with the course of action taken by Abner relative to the case and prayed that the case be
considered closed and terminated and their respective shares from Belen's payment released to them. Belen
questioned Abner's capacity to assail the compromise agreement. She averred that in the decision of the probate court
regarding the intestate estate of Gaudencio, Abner was disinherited by his father.

The RTC ruled on the Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void as against Abner.

Again purportedly on behalf of all the heirs, Abner moved for the reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. When
the same became final, Belen filed a Motion for Execution of Specific Acts. This was granted by the RTC. Abner
refused to comply. Hence, the said court issued its Order vesting the ownership of the property to Belen Morga-Seva
which has the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law pursuant to the last sentence of Sec.
10(a) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

The RTC ordered the RD to transfer the Title to Belen.

Abner filed a Petition for Annulment of Final Order with the CA. He contended that Belen was supposed to make her
payment on or before June 30, 2001. However, the same was made only on December 18, 2003 or way beyond the
period agreed upon. Thus, it was unjust for the RTC to have issued its Order divesting the heirs of ownership of the
subject property. Abner also argued that since the RTC’s Decision approving the Compromise Agreement had long
become final and executory, the RTC had already lost its jurisdiction over the case.

The CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The Motion for Reconsideration thereto was also denied.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA.


REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC
22. Provide the description RTC Gaudencio Mangubat (Gaudencio) and his wife Aurelia Rellora-Mangubat (Aurelia) filed a Complaint
of the initial complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against Belen Morga-Seva (Belen) and two other defendants.
at the court a quo.
23. Let us be accurate as to RTC favored petitioners.
the remedy used in
each court (i.e. petition Belen and her co-defendants' appeal to the CA and later to this Court, both unsuccessful, so the RTC
for certiorari, appeal, Decision became final and executory.
petition for review,
etc.). Gaudencio and his children filed with the same court a Complaint for Revival of the Decision. Both
parties entered into compromise agreement which the RTC approved.
Upon finality, Writ of Execution was served.

Abner moved to substitute his father Gaudencio who died. Abner then filed another motion to
substitute Gaudencio exclusively for the purpose of executing the final judgment in the case on the
claim that it was necessary for the settlement of the intestate estate of his father. The RTC granted
Abner's motion for substitution but for purposes of execution only.

The RTC directed Abner to surrender the TCT to the Clerk of Court and the Clerk of Court to execute
in behalf of the heirs a deed of sale or conveyance of the lot in favor of Belen.

Abner filed a Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void The RTC ruled on the Motion
to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void as against Abner.
Ruth Mangubat Parcia and Job Mangubat, Abner’s co-heirs, filed a Manifestation with Motion to
Withdraw the Heirs' Respective Shares. The RTC ruled on the Motion to Declare the Amicable
Settlement Null and Void as against Abner.

Abner moved for the reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. When the same became final,
Belen filed a Motion for Execution of Specific Acts. This was granted by the RTC. Abner refused to
comply. The said court issued its Order vesting the ownership of the property to Belen Morga-Seva.

The RTC ordered the RD to transfer the Title to Belen.


CA / CTA Abner filed a Petition for Annulment of Final Order – dimissed.
He filed a Motion for Reconsideration - denied.
Others (Quasi
Judicial
Agencies, if
any)

ISSUE WON annulment of judgment was proper remedy? NO


(based from the syllabus)

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RULING It must be stressed that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under certain
(If possible, highlight or exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final judgments. It is
underline the doctrine) allowed only on two grounds, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

"Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner." Here, it is
undisputed that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Abner, he having asked for affirmative relief
therefrom several times.

"In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction,
that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law." The RTC's
jurisdiction over petitions for revival of judgment may be filed either 'in the same court where said
judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place
designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general. Here, the Complaint for revival of
judgment was filed in the same court (RTC-Pili Camarines Sur, Branch 31) which rendered the Decision. Undoubtedly,
the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. There is therefore no valid ground for the Petition for Annulment of Final
Order that Abner filed with the CA.

Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over
the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of such
jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
which are the proper subject of an appeal.

Even assuming that the claim of lack of jurisdiction is well-grounded, Abner's Petition for Annulment of Final Order is
barred by laches. An action for annulment of judgment or final order if based on lack of jurisdiction, must
brought before it is barred by laches. "The principle of laches or 'stale demands' ordains that the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier ~ negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it." In this case, it was only after
almost four years from the finality of the September 25, 2006 Order that Abner brought an action to annul the same.
He did not even care to provide in his petition any justification for his inaction for such a long period of time. Such
unreasonable delay warrants the presumption that Abner has declined to assert his right to the property covered by
TCT No. 6337. Verily, to permit him now to assert the same would be unfair and inequitable.

In any event, Abner's Petition for Annulment of Final Order was not the proper remedy to nullify the
September 25, 2006 Order which is an interlocutory order. "An interlocutory order refers to a ruling respecting
some point or matter between the commencement and end of the suit, but is not a final adjudication of the claims and
liabilities of the parties that are in dispute in that suit.[50] The September 25, 2006 Order merely dealt with the
incidental matter of causing the transfer of the title to the property covered by TCT No. 6337 under the name of Belen
in accordance with the final and executory February 23, 2001 RTC Decision after Abner refused to comply with the
directive to deliver the owner's copy thereof. No further settlement of any claim or imposition of any further liability
was made in the said order.

22. SIBAL V. BUQUEL - DORADO

CASE TITLE CAMILO SIBAL, Petitioner, vs.PEDRO BUQUEL, SANTIAGO BUQUEL, JR., ROSALINDA BUQUEL, represented by
FRANCISCO BUQUEL, Respondents.

TOPIC Rule 40-45?

FACTS Respondents Pedro Buquel, Santiago .Buquel, Jr., Rosalinda Buquel and Francisco Buquel inherited from their
parents, Santiago Buquel, Sr. and Faustina Buquel, a parcel of land consisting of 81,022sq. m. covered by OCT
No. 0-725 sometime in January 1999.

Petitioner Camilo Sibal and Tobi Mangoba possession of a portion of the property which belonged to Santiago,
Sr. Thereafter, the Buquels made several demands against Sibal and Mangoba for them to vacate and turn over
the property, but the latter refused to do so. Hence, they filed a complaint before the Tuguegarao RTC for
recovery of possession and damages.

REMEDIAL MATTERS MTC


RTC RTC ruled in favor of the Buquels .The Tuguegarao RTC ruled in favor of the Buquels,
Thereafter, said RTC decision became final and executory hence, the trial court issued a
writ of execution.

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CA / CTA Sibal filed a Petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision before the CA, where he raised lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud as grounds. the CA dismissed Sibal' s petition
Others (Quasi
Judicial
Agencies, if
any)

ISSUE 1. Whether or not the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and
2. Whether or not the Buquels were guilty of extrinsic fraud.

RULING The petition is devoid of merit. Sibal contends that the RTC decision should be annulled on the ground
that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case as the complaint filed merely alleged that the value of the
subect property is P51,190.00, without, however, categorically mentioning its assessed value, and only the real
property tax order of payment was attached to the complaint and not the tax declaration that could determine
the assessed value of the property.

According to Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, fraud is extrinsic when th unsuccessful
party has been prevented from fully exhibiting his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent,
as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had
acknowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real
contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and
annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.

As a ground for annulment of judgment, extrinsic fraud must arise from an act of the adverse party, and
the fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The fraud is not extrinsic
if the act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel.

By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in character ,i.e., it relates to any
fraudulent act the prevailing party in litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, where the
defeated party has been prevented from presenting fully his side of the cause, by fraud or deception practiced
on him by his opponent. And even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unless the fraud is committed
by the adverse party, not by one's own lawyer. In the latter case, the remedy of the client is to proceed against
his own lawyer and not to re-litigate the case where judgment had been rendered.

Sibal asserts that the negligence of his former counsel in handling his defense during the proceedings in
Civil case No. 6429 resulted in violation of his right to due process. He claims that this counsel's inexcusable
negligence denied him of his day in court. However, he admitted that he attended only one stage of the
proceedings blow, which was the preliminary conference. He was not aware of the subsequent proceedings as
he was totally dependent on his former counsel and would merely wait for the latter to notify him if his
attendance would be required. There was likewise no indication that his counsel was in fact in cahoots with the
Buquels to obtain the assailed judgment. Sibal must therefore bear the unfortunate consequences of his actions.
As a litigant, he should not have entirely left the case in his counsel's hands, for he had the continuing duty to
keep himself abreast of the developments, if only to protect his own interest in the litigation. He could have
discharged said duty by keeping in regular touch with his counsel, but he failed to do so. The petition was
denied.

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