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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who
created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its
decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on
one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week
as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his
mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for
four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that
she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist
at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain
his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he
loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it
can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and
these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2)
that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still
a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza,
Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his
Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"),
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection
and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the
defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his
soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff
with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision
be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar
of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving
the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus
between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged
in the complaint shall always be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment
of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence
was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that
no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts.
88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows
that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the
relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial
lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation
was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it
appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage'
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995).4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error
the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth
analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there
might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner
and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has
never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either
party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason
for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is
ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did.
At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife
could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency
and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,


An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same
bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted
his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p.
330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not
go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest
her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who
has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the
basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it
is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not
have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and
a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage
contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsoi’s mother. There
they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night of
their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and then
turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and
wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Ching’s mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by
her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a
long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989
(ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did not
even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is
healthy, normal and still a virgin while Ching’s examination was kept confidential up to this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had
observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband only
married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a
normal man
Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with
Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on
his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him
and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage
entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.

The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children basedon the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and fidelity,
the sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate
or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is
an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self
is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the
Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's
effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision
in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and
Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born;
that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father
since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and
their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle
their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29,
1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied
by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation
of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it
sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize
the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of


mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in
the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed
and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding
the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions
thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing
such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The
expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings


that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure
to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely
and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument
on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes
even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the
case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of
Appealsand Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still
maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid
marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case
is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld
petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological
incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in
the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage
annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to exclude mental
inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated
in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before
the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple
reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a
lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express
it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person
may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence
its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even
comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid
until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who,
because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided
the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate
the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found
themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a
valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter
into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the
same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at
least not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category)
required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.'
Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
weddingand therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying
out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to
give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves
shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to
these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds
for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies
but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to
a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be
'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on
the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of
one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of
reasonable expectations.

xxx xxx xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties'
to assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence).
An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage
was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital
responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into.4

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered equivalent to
psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of
the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages
remain valid and subsisting.

However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner
husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged
that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife
brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

We declared:

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.

1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent psychological
incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most
helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive
Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code
explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon Law.1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law —

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those) —

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage —

that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction
of the statutory enactment.2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a
congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and
41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being
of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological
incapacity.4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end
discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual
help and support;

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations
and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would
suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce;
however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It
might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal
command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —

Section 2, Article XV:


Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there
resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered
mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly
would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage
and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but
one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Facts : On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina married Reynaldo Molina which
union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo show signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to spend more time with his
friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never honest with his wife
in regard to their finances resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC
granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed
by CA.

Issue : Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personality constitute


psychological incapacity?

Ruling : There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an


incapacity. It appears to be more of a “difficulty” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect”
in the performance of some marital obligations.

Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise


constitute psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not
physical) illness.

The evidence merely adduced that Roridel and her husband could not get along with
each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability.

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
 The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
 The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical.
 The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of
the marriage.
 Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically of clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
 Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be
accepted as root causes.
 The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven be
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from the 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983.
 The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition.

Judgment reversed and set aside.


SECOND DIVISION

March 8, 2017

G.R. No. 188400

MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner


vs
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital
obligations.

This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Maria Teresa B. Tani- De La Fuente (Maria Teresa) assailing the Court
of Appeals Decision2 and Resolution3 dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA- G.R. CV. No.
76243, which reversed the Decision4 dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q- 99-37829.

Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when they were students at the
University of Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts. 5

After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at the University of Sto. Tomas Treasurer's
Office.6Meanwhile, Rodolfo, who was unable to finish his college degree, found continued employment at his family's
printing press business.7

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to
jealousy.8 She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life and felt insecure of his siblings, who
excelled in their studies and careers.9

On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in Mandaluyong City. They had two children: Maria
Katharyn, who was born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who was born on April 6, 1986. 10

Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria
Teresa, and would even skip work at his family's printing press to stalk her. 11 Rodolfo's jealousy was so severe that he
once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who was staying at their house because he suspected his cousin of
being Maria Teresa's lover.12

In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have sex four (4) or five (5) times a day. 13 At
times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch break, just so they could have sex.14During
sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the bed or poke her with things. 15 Rodolfo also suggested that they
invite a third person with them while having sex, or for Maria Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's
presence.16 Rodolfo's suggestions made Maria Teresa feel molested and maltreated. 17 Whenever Maria Teresa
refused Rodolfo's advances or suggestions, he would get angry and they would quarrel. 18
Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a priest, as well as any person she thought could help her
and Rodolfo.19 Maria Teresa also suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo marriage counselling, but Rodolfo refused
and deemed it as mere "kalokohan".20

Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. 21 In the
heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. Maria Teresa, with their two (2) daughters in tow,
left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gunpoking incident. Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that,
and she supported their children by herself.22

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage 23 before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The case was initially archived because Rodolfo failed to file a responsive pleading.24 Maria Teresa
moved for the revival of the Petition.25 The trial court granted the motion and referred the case to the Office of the City
Prosecutor for collusion investigation.26 Assistant City Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion and
recommended the trial of the case on the merits.27

Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference.28 The pre-trial conference was declared
closed and terminated, and Maria Teresa was allowed to present her evidence. 29

Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, was presented as an expert
witness.30 Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather information on her
family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of psychological tests.31 Dr. Lopez
also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend.32

After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr. Lopez concluded that Maria Teresa was not suffering from
any severe mental disorder and had no indication of any organic or functional impairment. 33 Although Dr. Lopez found
that Maria Teresa had an emotionally disturbed personality, he opined that this was not severe enough to constitute
psychological incapacity.34

Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of invitation through registered mail. 35 After two (2) months, Rodolfo
contacted Dr. Lopez and said, "Doctor, ano ba ang pakialam niyo sa amin, hindi niyo naman ako kilala." Dr. Lopez
explained that he only wanted to hear Rodolfo's side of the story, but Rodolfo replied with, "[I]nuulit ko doktor, wala
kayong pakialam sa akin."36

Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like
reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends
and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his
emotional coldness and severe immaturity."37

Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of personality disorder, even more severe than
the other personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.38 Dr. Lopez explained that
Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably caused by a pathogenic parental model.39 Rodolfo's family
background showed that his father was a psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic
contamination called double insanity, a symptom similar to his father's.40 Dr. Lopez further claimed that Rodolfo's
disorder was serious and incurable because of his severe paranoia. 41

Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's incapacity to
perform his marital obligations.42

Summons was served upon Rodolfo but he did not file any responsive leading. 43 He likewise did not appear during the
pre-trial conference.44 He was given a specific date to present evidence but he still failed to appear. 45 he trial court
eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present evidence. 46

On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's
formal offer of evidence.47 The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to submit its certification. 48 The Office
of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for
decision without the certification and comment from the Office of the Solicitor General. 49

On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision50 granting the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the trial court gave credence to his findings as they
were based on information gathered from credible informants. The trial court held that the marriage between Maria
Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null and void because "[Rodolfo's] psychological incapacity [was] grave,
serious and incurable."51 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:

WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner, MARIA TERESA B. TANI DE LA FUENTE to respondent, RODOLFO DE LA
FUENTE, JR. null and void on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code. Their conjugal partnership (sic) property relations is hereby dissolved. There being no mention of
properties acquired by the parties, no pronouncement as to its liquidation and partition is hereby made;

(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and Maria Kimberly, both surnamed De la Fuente shall remain legitimate. They
shall remain in the custody of the petitioner.

(3) Both parties must support their children. There being no evidence presented as to the capability of the respondent
to give support, no pronouncement is hereby made in the meantime;
(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be known by her maiden name, TANI.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon City and Mandaluyong City where the
marriage was celebrated upon the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)

On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration.53 The Office of the Solicitor
General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification because it had no copies of the transcripts of
stenographic notes.54 It was also unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it
was handling.55

On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, with the dispositive portion reading:

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is
hereby deemed moot and academic.

This Court would like to call the attention of the Office of the Solicitor General that this case was filed on June 3, 1999
and there should be no more delay in the disposition of the case.56

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. 57 It argued that the trial court erred a)
in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the Solicitor General, 58 and b) in giving
credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was
based on insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case.59

The Court of Appeals granted60 the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay, thus, the trial court
should not have given it weight.61 The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Dr. Lopez's finding that Rodolfo's
behavior descended from psychological illness contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. 62

In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria Teresa's admission that she married Rodolfo with the belief
that he would change, and that they were in a relationship for five (5) years before getting married, showed that they
were in good terms during the early part of their marriage. It also negated her claim that Rodolfo's psychological
defect existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage, and that it deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage.63 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is REVERSED and the petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of the parties is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.64 (Emphasis in the original)

Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration65 but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution 66 dated May
25, 2009.

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.67

Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial courts had a wider discretion on whether expert opinion
was needed to prove psychological incapacity.68 Petitioner further argued that for as long as the trial court had basis
in concluding that psychological incapacity existed, such conclusion should be upheld. 69

Rodolfo filed a Comment70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that
there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married." 71

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment,72 agreed that a physician was not required to declare a person
psychologically incapacitated but emphasized that the evidence presented must be able to adequately prove the
presence of a psychological condition. The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that Maria Teresa was unable to
sufficiently prove Rodolfo's alleged psychological incapacity.73

The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr. Lopez's psychological report stated that his assessment was
based on interviews he made with petitioner and two (2) of the parties' common friends. However, Dr. Lopez did not
name the two (2) common friends in the report.74 Furthermore, during trial Dr. Lopez testified that he only interviewed
petitioner and Rodolfo's best friend, not two (2) friends as indicated in his report. 75 The Office of the Solicitor General
insisted that the finding of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity should be dismissed as hearsay as it was based solely
on information given by petitioner to Dr. Lopez.76

The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage because petitioner's evidence was insufficient to prove that Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.

The Petition is granted.

The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals77 was the first case that attempted to lay down the standards for
determining psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Santos declared that "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."78 Furthermore, the
incapacity "should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage[.]" 79

Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,80 provided the guidelines to be followed when
interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church - while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.81 (Emphasis in the original)

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the
nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent
suffered from psychological incapacity.
The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no
chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition. The
Court of Appeals cited Republic v. Dagdag,82 where this Court held that "the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts." 83 The Court of Appeals then ruled that
"[o]bviously, this requirement is not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testifies on the
alleged psychological incapacity of one party." 84

The Court of Appeals is mistaken.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes85 states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as
hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition,
necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and
marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other." 86

Marcos v. Marcos87 emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to
be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence presented establishes the party's
psychological condition.88

Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from psychological
incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and acts
of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage. As the trial
court found:

Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent' [s] personality by taking into consideration the
psychological impression and conclusion he gathered from the analysis of the different behaviors he manifested
during the time that he and petitioner were living together. According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual,
he found the respondent to be suffering from a paranoid personality disorder manifested by the respondent's
damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts
and distrust of friends and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to
treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity. He also testified that this kind of disorder is actually
one of the severe forms of personality disorder even more severe than the other personality disorders like the
borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.

As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been caused by a pathogenic parental model. As he
investigated the family background of the respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered that his father was a psychiatric patient
such that the respondent developed a similar symptom or psychic contamination which is called double insanity. This,
according to Dr. Lopez is usually developed among close family members, bestfriends (sic), sweethearts and even
couples who are close to one another; that people close to one another get psychically contaminated; that
surprisingly, the symptom that the father manifested is the same as those of the respondent. The said disorder
started during respondent's late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years.

He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious and incurable because of the severe paranoia of the
patient; that patients with this kind of personality disorder could never accept that there is something wrong with them
and if ever forced to seek treatment, they would rather engage in an intellectual battle with the therapist rather than
cooperate with them.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends that the marriage be
1âwphi 1

annulled.89 (Emphasis supplied)

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of decision-making, must give due regard to
expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. 90

The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was hereditary in nature as his own father suffered from
a similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological disorder probably started during his late
childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological
incapacity to perform his marital obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic parental model.

The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was also sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner
attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even before their marriage, and that he would often follow her to
make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him. 91 She believed that he would change after they got
married;92 however, this did not happen. Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that these
caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head.93

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He
vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was something wrong and
that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly
refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to
respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused
to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the
facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him
as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards petitioner, which show his need to
intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive control. At first, respondent only inflicted nonphysical forms of
mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her family and friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to
his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon escalated into physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked a
gun at his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.

Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner
through different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults, and economic
deprivation.94 Although not specifically named, coercive control as a form of psychological abuse or harm has been
recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the
victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form
or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her
family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of
comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that
petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent
truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to
believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.

In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of Maria Teresa and Rodolfo, this Court reiterates the
pronouncement we made in an opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin:95

Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in our individuality. Consequently, when the law speaks
of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers to responsibility to children,
property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of society. The
1âwphi 1

state's interest should not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.

Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion of psychological incapacity should not only
be based on a medical or psychological disorder, but should consist of the inability to comply with essential marital
obligations such that public interest is imperiled.96

Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation that a straitjacket application of
the Molina guidelines "has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our
basic social institutions."97 Ironically, the ultimate effect of such stringent application of the Molina guidelines is the
perversion of the family unit, the very institution that our laws are meant to protect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The marriage of Maria Teresa Tani-De La Fuente
and Rodolfo De La Fuente is declared NULL and VOID. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV. No. 76243 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829
is REINSTATED.

On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in
Mandaluyong City after being in a relationship for five (5) years. They had two children.

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an
introvert and was prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life.
His jealousy became so severe that he even poked a gun to his 15 year old cousin and he treated
Maria Teresa like a sex slave who made the latter feel maltreated and molested. Sometime in
1986, the couple quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. In
the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. She left and never saw
Rodolfo again after that, and supported their children by herself.

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. As
support to her petitions, clinical psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was presented as an expert
witness. However, Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading. The trial court eventually
deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present evidence.

Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the
Office of the Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to submit its certification. The Office of the
Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was
submitted for decision without the certification and comment from the Office of the Solicitor
General. On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its decision granting the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for
reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit the
required certification because it had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes. It was also
unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was
handling On September 13 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration..

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. It argued
that the trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office
of the Solicitor General, 58 and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's
severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and
did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case. Still, Rodolfo did not file any
responsive pleading.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. In its resolution dated May 25,
2009, CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Maria Teresa.

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This time
Rodolfo filed a Comment 70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e
firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married."

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage.

Held:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient
compliance with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent.
Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from psychological
incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken when it chided the lower court for giving undue
weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough
study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not
automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or
psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner
and respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent
failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even
apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise
discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would

refuse to admit that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was
corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment.
Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counseling to
respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help.
Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated


to perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He
recommends that the marriage be annulled.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and


isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence,
are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership
entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain
married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This
shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact
is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.

The petition is granted.

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