ANG TIBAY VS CIR (69 Phil.

635)
– Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies
Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Motion For New Trial; Grounds
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due
to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National
Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off
were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were
laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The
Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which
they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang
Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of
Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies,
due process can be complied with by observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Montemayor vs Araneta University Foundation GR 44251 31 May 1977

11WednesdayMAR 2015

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

≈ LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: Felix Montemayor was a faculty of Araneta University Foundation serving as Head of Humanities and
Psychology Department. The Chaplain filed a complaint of immorality against him. A committee was created
to investigate the allegation. With the assistance of counsel, he filed a motion to dismiss or to hold the hearing
in abeyance. The committee found him responsible of the act complained of and recommended for his
demotion by one degree. The President adopted such recommendation and thereafter referred the same to the
Board of Trustees of private respondent for appropriate action. Subsequently new charges was filed by
different faculty members against him and a new committee was formed to investigate the allegations.
Montemayor asked for postponement of the hearing and was denied. The hearing proceeded without him and
found him guilty of the same charges and recommended for the discontinuance of his service. He then filed a
complaint with NLRC. NLRC decided in favour of the Foundation. Hence the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the proceeding relating to Montemayor’s dismissal was done in violation of due
process?
Decision: Petition dismissed. In Montemayor’s absence the matter was heard and was sufficiently found by
the committee to be guilty of his conduct unbecoming and recommended his removal. Such deficiency was
remedied when Montemayor was able to present his case with the Labour Commission. Records will show
that after all efforts on conciliation had failed parties agreed to submit their dispute for compulsory arbitration.
Several hearings were conducted. he legal aspect as to the procedural due process having been satisfied was
then summarized by the Solicitor General thus: “All the foregoing clearly shows that petitioner was afforded
his day in court. Finally, and more significant, is the fact that petitioner claims denial of due process in the
proceeding had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before the NLRC wherein, as
shown heretofore, he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case.

11 SCRA 317, 1964MERALCO VS PSCFACTS:

Meralco made several applications for the revision and reductionof its rate, which were approved by the
Commission. On June 9,1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requestedthe Auditor General
to cause an audit and examination of Meralco's books of accounts. It was then examined and a reportwas
submitted to the commission.

Hearing was reset from May 30, 1956 to June 22, 1956. On saiddate, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio
L. de Peralta,Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the Commission, who was
duly authorized to receive the evidenceof the parties, announced that the hearing was an "informalhearing",
and its purpose was to hear any remarks or statementsof the parties and to define the issues "so that at the
hearing weknow exactly what are disputed at this informal hearing".

After reports had been submitted with regards to the auditing,Meralco was given by the Commission a period
of 30 days withinwhich to file an answer, specifying its objections to the report of the GAO.
Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2)Without having given the Meralco an opportunity,
as requested byit, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared thereport dated May 11, 1956, on
which report the Commissionbased its decision; and (3) Without having given the Meralco anopportunity, as
requested by it, to present evidence in support of its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report
andcontroverted by Meralco, on December 27, 1957, the saidCommission handed down a decision, wherein
Meralco isrequired to reduce its present authorized rates
effective January 1, 1958
based on the authorized rates.

Hence, the present petition for review with preliminary injunctionwhich was issued by this Court
ISSUE:
Whether or Not there was a violation of due process, thus thedecision of the court is considered void.
HELD:
The record shows that no hearing was held.

On June 22, 1956, parties appeared before "Attorney Vivencio L.Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief,
Finance and RateDivision, Public Service Commission, who was duly authorized toreceive the evidence of
the parties", and the record shows thatthe hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely aninformal
hearing because, using his own words, "I said at thebeginning that this is only preliminary because I want that
theparties could come to some kind of understanding.

The record further shows that after the "preliminary hearing"

held on June 22, 1956, no other hearing was held
; the cases werenever set for hearing; and Meralco was not given an opportunityto present evidence
to rebut the audit report

The decision therefore was null and void having beenrendered

without
any hearing; the Commission could not validlymake
findings
of fact without affording petitioner the right to
cross- examine and confront witnesses
, as well as the right to present itsevidence; the decision contained findings contrary to law and atany event,
the decision was based on
obsolete
allegations of fact,and since the submission of the audit report of the GAO, onwhose allegations the decision
was predicated, there hadoccurred recent developments which had substantially altered thesituation of the
Meralco and which have to be taken into accountby the Commission, in fixing just and reasonable rates

It should be remembered that there should be no short cuts in thedisposition of the time-honored principle that
no one should bedeprived of his life, liberty and property, without due process of law. Considering the fact
that the reduction of rates herein soughtmight involve huge amounts of money and the errors, alleged tohave
been committed, if true, would affect likewise not only theright of the petitioner but also public interest, it
would have been abetter part of valor and wisdom to have delayed a little bit the finalresolution of the
controversy

"Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicialproceedings, it must how its head to the
constitutional mandatethat no person shall be deprived of right without due process of law", which binds not
only the government of the Republic, butalso each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. "Dueprocess
of law guarantees
notice and opportunities to be heard
topersons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.
145 SCRA 100, 1986ATENEO vs. CA

FACTS:

Carmelita Mateo, a waitress inside the university charged JuanRamon Guanzon, a boarder and first year
student of theuniversity with unbecoming conduct committed on December 12,1967 at about 5:15 in the
evening at the Cervini Hall's cafeteria

"Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini … was asking for 'siopao.' I

was at the counter and I told him that the 'siopao' had still to beheated and asked him to wait for a while. Then
Mr. Guanzonstarted mumbling bad words directed to me, in the hearingpresence of other boarders. I asked
him to stop cursing, and hetold me that was none of my business. Since he seemedimpatient, I was going to
give back his money without any

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the college. The action of the petitioner is sanctioned by law.Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools recognizes violation of disciplinary regulations as valid ground for refusing re-enrollment of
a student (Tangonan v. Paño, 137 SCRA 245).

Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll, he received (1) the College of Arts and Sciences Handbook
containing the general regulations of the school and the 1967-1969 catalog of the College of Arts and Sciences
containing the disciplinary rules and academic regulations and (2) a copy of the Rules and Regulations of the
Cervini-Elizo Halls of the petitioner university one of the provisions of which is as follows: under the title
"Dining Room" - "The kitchen help and server should always be treated with civility." Miss Mateo was
employed as a waitress and precisely because of her service to boarders, not to mention her sex, she deserved
more respect and gracious treatment.

The petitioner is correct in stating that there was a serious error of law in the appellate court's ruling on due
process.

2.
No, complaint was not premature.

The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of administrativeremedies" in view of its pending appeal from
the decision of theMinistry of Education to the President of the Philippines. It arguesthat the private
respondents' complaint for recovery of damagesfiled in the lower court was premature.

The issue raised in court was whether or not the privaterespondents can recover damages as a result of the
dismissal of their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely legalquestion and nothing of an
administrative nature is to or can bedone. The case was brought pursuant to the law on damagesprovided in
the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongsto the civil courts.
3.
No, there is no basis for recovery of damages.

There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon wasafforded due process of law. The penalty is
based on reasonablerules and regulations applicable to all students guilty of the sameoffense. He never was
out of school. Before the decision could beimplemented, Juan Ramon asked for an honorable dismissalwhich
was granted. He then enrolled at the De la Salle Universityof Bacolod City and later transferred to another
Jesuit school.Moreover, his full and complete tuition fees for the secondsemester were refunded through the
representation of Mr. RomeoGuanzon, Juan Ramon's father.

There was no bad faith on the part of the university. In fact, thecollege authorities deferred any undue action
until a definitivedecision had been rendered. The whole procedure of thedisciplinary process was get up to
protect the privacy of thestudent involved. There is absolutely no indication of malice,fraud, and improper or
wilful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University in this case.

161 SCRA 7, 1988ALCUAZ vs. PSBA

FACTS:

Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and barricaded theschool because they wanted to admin to hear
their grievances
with regards to ―not being able to participate in the policy
-making
of the school‖, despite the
regulations set by the admin withregards to protest actions

During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly
blacklisted and deniedadmission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987.

Court ordered the school authorities to create a specialinvestigating committee to conduct an

investigation, who maderecommendations which the school adopted

A lot of procedural crap, petitioners and respondents filing andanswering the complaints

Petitioners claim that they have been deprived of due processwhen they were barred from re-enrollment and
for intervenorsteachers whose services have been terminated as facultymembers, on account of their
participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and aviolation of
their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.

Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural dueprocess which requires that there be due
notice and hear hearingand of substantive due process which requires that the person or body to conduct the
investigation be competent to act and decidefree from bias or prejudice.
ISSUE/S:
1.
Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process ?
2.
WON there was contempt of Court by the respondents
HELD:
1.
NO. there was no deprivation of due process.

There is no existing contract between the two parties. Par 137 of Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
states that when acollege student registers in a school, it is understood that he isenrolling for the entire
semester. Likewise, it is provided in theManual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachersare
for 'one semester. after the close of the first semester, thePSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either
with thestudents or with the intervening teachers. It is a time-honoredprinciple that contracts are respected as
the law between thecontracting parties The
contract having been terminated, thereis no more contract to speak of.
The
school cannot becompelled to enter into another contract with said studentsand teachers
. "The courts, be they the original trial court or theappellate court, have no power to make contracts for the
parties."

The Court has stressed, that

due process in disciplinary casesinvolving students does not entail proceedings and hearingssimilar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings incourts of justice.
Standards of procedural due process are:a. the students must be
informed in writing
of the nature andcause of any accusation against them;b. they shall have the
right to answer the charges
againstthem, with the assistance of counsel, if desired:c. they shall be
informed of the evidence
against them;d. they shall have the
right to adduce evidence
in their ownbehalf ande.the
evidence must be duly considered
by the investigatingcommittee or official designated by the school authorities tohear and decide the case.

Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. were distributedat the beginning of each school

Enrollment in the PSBA is

contractual
in nature and uponadmission to the School, the
Student is deemed to have agreedto bind himself to all rules/regulations
promulgated by theMinistry of Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he agreesthat he may be required
to
withdraw from the School at anytime for reasons deemed sufficiently serious
by the School Administration.

Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the school withregard to the protest actions. Necessary action
was taken by theschool when the court issued a temporary mandatory injunction toaccept the petitioners for
the first sem & the creation of aninvestigating body.

The Court, to insure that full justice is done both to the studentsand teachers on the one hand and the school
on the other,ordered an investigation to be conducted by the schoolauthorities, in the resolution of November
12, 1986.

Findings of the investigating committee:1. students disrupted classes2. petitioners involved were found to be
academicallydeficient & the teachers are found to have committedvarious acts of misconduct.

The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation
of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court Thus,
the Court has ruled

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that the school's refusal is sanctioned by law

. Sec. 107 of theManual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academicdelinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulations vs as validgrounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite viewwould do
violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the schooland enshrined under the Constitution.

Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless :1. the
factual findings are not supported by evidence;2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion;3. where the procedure which led to the factual findings isirregular;4. when palpable errors
are committed; or 5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.

Investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive andadequate.

2.
No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to citerespondents in contempt of court is likewise
untenable.

No defiance of authority
by mere filing of MOR coz respondentschool explained that the
intervenors were actually reinstated
as such faculty members after the issuance of the temporarymandatory injunction.

Respondent school has fully complied with its duties underthe temporary mandatory injunction
The school manifestedthat while the investigation was going on, the intervenors-facultymembers were
teaching and it was only after the investigation,that the recommendations of the Committee were adopted by
theschool and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case for having become moot and academic.

GR No. 89317, May 30, 1990NON vs. DANES

FACTS:

Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not allowed to re-enroll because they participated in student mass
actions againsttheir school the preceding sem

On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at MabiniCollege, petitioners continued their rally
picketing, even thoughwithout any renewal permit, physically coercing students not toattend their classes,
thereby disrupting the scheduled classes anddepriving a great majority of students of their right to be present
intheir classes

Together with the abovementioned fact, the lower courtconsidered that in signing their enrollment forms, they
waived theprivilege to be re-
enrolled. ―The Mabini College reserves the right
to deny admission of students xxx whose activities unduly
disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college xxx‖

In addition the students signed pledges saying they respect their alma matter, that they will conduct themselves
in a manner thatwould not put the college in a bad light.

Judge Dames‘ decision considering these facts said that what the
students assert is a mere privileges not a legal right. RespondentMabini College is free to admit or not to admit
the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by theschool.
ISSUE/HELD:
WON the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz insofar as itallowed schools to bar the re-admission or re-enrollment
of students onthe ground of termination of contract should be reversed. The re-admission or re-enrollment of
students on the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. àYES
RATIO:
In Alcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a written contract for onesemester and contracts are respected as the
law between thecontracting parties. At the end of each sem, the contract isdeemed terminated.

However, this case is not a simple case about a school refusingre-admission. The refusal to readmit or to re-
enroll petitioners wasdecided upon and implemented by school authorities as areaction to student mass action.

This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assemblyas exercised by students vis-à-vis the right of
school officials todiscipline them.

The student does not shed his constitutionally protected rights at the schoolgate.
In protesting grievances disorder is more or lessexpected because emotions run high. That the protection to
thecognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constiis similarly available to students is well-
settled in our jurisdiction.Right to discipline cannot override constitutional safeguards.Citing Malabanan and
Villar the court reiterated that the exerciseof the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barringstudents
from enrolling. Under academic freedom, students my bebarred from re-enrollment based on academic
deficiencies.

Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights within the school.

Constitutional freedom of free speech andassembly also not absolute. However, imposition of
disciplinarysanctions requires observance of procedural due process andpenalty imposed must be
proportionate to the offense committed.(procedural due process: right to be informed in writing, right toans
the charges, right to be informed of the charges against them,right to adduce evidence, and for this evidence
to be dulyconsidered)

The nature of contract between a school and its students is not an ordinary contract but is imbued with public
interest.
The Constiallows the State supervisory and regulatory powers over alleducational institutions. [see art XIV
sec1-2, 4(1) ]. According to
par 107 and 137 of the respondent school‘s manual, a student is
enrolled not just for one sem but for the entire period necessaryfor the student to complete his/her course. BP
blg 232 gives thestudents the right to continue their course up to graduation.

Academic freedom not a ground for denying students’ rights.

InVillar, the right of an institution of higher learning to set academicstandards cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students whoexercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise
there will be a violation of their right to equal protection.

School said most of them had failing grades anyway. In answer students say they are graduating students and
if there are anydeficiencies these do not warrant non-readmission. Also there aremore students with sores
deficiencies who are re-admitted. Andsome of the petitioners had no failing marks.

The court held that the students were denied due process in thatthere was no due investigation. In fact it would
appear from thepleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment becauseof failing grades was a mere
afterthought.

Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld be commensurate tothe offense committed with due process.

But penalty, if any is deserved should not anymore be enforced.

Moot and academic. They‘ve already suffered enough.