Original Article

Nonlinear Effects of Cognitive Ability

on Economic Productivity
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A Country-Level Analysis
Thomas R. Coyle,1 Heiner Rindermann,2 Dale Hancock,1 and Jacob Freeman3
1
Department of Psychology, University of Texas at San Antonio, TX, USA
2
Department of Psychology, Chemnitz University of Technology, Chemnitz, Germany
3
Department of Sociology, Social Work, and Anthropology, Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA

Abstract: Cognitive capitalism theory argues that the positive effects of cognitive ability on economic productivity should increase nonlinearly,
with increases in ability amplifying increases in productivity. The theory was tested using country-level indicators of cognitive ability and
productivity. Cognitive ability was based on international student assessments (e.g., Program for International Student Assessment, PISA), and
productivity was based on economic inputs (e.g., scientific achievements and competitiveness) and outputs (e.g., gross domestic product). As
predicted, the effects of cognitive ability on all productivity measures increased nonlinearly at higher levels of ability, suggesting that higher
ability levels disproportionately boost a nation’s productivity. The findings are discussed in light of standard theories of cognitive ability (e.g.,
Spearman’s law of diminishing returns and differentiation theories), and suggest that interventions that boost cognitive ability can have large,
amplifying effects on economic productivity.

Keywords: cognitive capitalism, cognitive ability, economic productivity, nonlinear effects, quadratic effects

Cognitive capitalism theory predicts that the effects of cog-
nitive ability on economic productivity increase nonlinearly,
with increasing returns of cognitive ability to productivity at
higher ability levels (e.g., Rindermann & Thompson, 2011;
see also, Coyle, Rindermann, & Hancock, 2016; Lubinski,
2009; Wai, 2013). The theory is based on the assumption
that higher ability people contribute disproportionately to
economic gains by creating innovations that amplify
productivity. Such a theory contrasts with standard theories
of cognitive ability (e.g., Spearman’s law of diminishing
returns), which imply that the positive effects of ability on
productivity decrease nonlinearly at higher ability levels
(e.g., Coyle & Rindermann, 2013). These latter theories
are based on the proposition that cognitive ability has
diminishing returns to productivity at higher ability levels,
because noncognitive factors (e.g., personality traits) drive
productivity at higher ability levels.
Although positive (linear) effects of cognitive ability on
economic productivity have been repeatedly demonstrated
(e.g., Jones, 2016; Meisenberg, 2012), the current study is
the first to use country-level data to systematically examine
whether the positive effects of ability on productivity
increase nonlinearly at higher ability levels. The predicted
nonlinear pattern would manifest in regression as a positive
quadratic effect of ability on productivity, and would be
depicted on a scatterplot (of productivity against ability)
as a curve whose slope increased from lower to higher
levels of ability. Such a pattern would support the predic-
tions of cognitive capitalism, and suggest that policies
boosting cognitive ability through country-level interven-
tions (e.g., better nutrition) can have large, amplifying
effects on economic productivity (e.g., Coyle et al., 2016).
To examine the predictions of cognitive capitalism, cogni-
tive ability was measured using three international standard-
ized tests: Program for International Student Assessment
(PISA), Trends in International Mathematics and Science
Study (TIMSS), and Progress in International Reading
Literacy Study (PIRLS). These tests are given to students
throughout the world and can estimate cognitive ability at
the country level. The tests yield estimates of cognitive
ability that correlate strongly with adult IQs (r  .90) and
also with a general intelligence (g) factor (r  .99; Coyle &
Rindermann, 2013; Rindermann, 2007), which drives the
predictive validity of tests (Jensen, 1998, pp. 270–305).
Following prior research (Coyle et al., 2016), cognitive abil-
ity levels were estimated for two classes of people in each
country: average ability classes, which represent ability
levels at the 50th percentile, and intellectual classes, which

Ó 2018 Hogrefe Publishing Journal of Individual Differences (2018), 39(1), 39–47

https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-0001/a000247
 40
represent ability levels at the 95th percentile. Intellectual
classes are assumed to contribute disproportionately to
economic productivity, which is strongly influenced by
people with the highest ability levels (Park, Lubinski, &
Benbow, 2007; Robertson, Smeets, Lubinski, & Benbow,
2010; Wai, 2013). The ability levels of both classes predicted
economic inputs of productivity (science achievements,
innovation, competitiveness, and economic freedom) and
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economic outputs of productivity (gross domestic product
[GDP] and wealth).
The main hypothesis was that the effects of cognitive
ability on economic productivity would increase nonlinearly
at higher ability levels. In particular, cognitive ability was
expected to have positive quadratic effects (beyond linear
effects) on productivity inputs and outputs. Based on cogni-
tive capitalism, the effects of cognitive ability were predicted
to be relatively weak at lower ability levels and to strengthen
at higher ability levels. The pattern was predicted for both
ability classes (average and intellectual classes), whose abil-
ity levels correlate strongly at the country level (r > .90), and
for all productivity measures, which also correlate strongly
at the country level (r  .74, Coyle et al., 2016).
The hypothesis was tested by regressing each measure of
productivity on the ability levels of different countries. If the
effects of cognitive ability on productivity increase nonlin-
early, then quadratic effects of ability should significantly
predict productivity beyond linear effects. Moreover, the
quadratic effects should be represented by a curve whose
slope increases from lower to higher levels of ability. Such
a pattern, if confirmed, would be the first to show that the
effects of cognitive ability (on productivity) are nonlinear
and would support the predictions of cognitive capitalism.
Method
All data are measured at the country level (N = 99 coun-
tries) and were obtained from public sources.1 All variables
have been described elsewhere (Coyle et al., 2016), and are
summarized below. The data used in the analyses, and the
correlations among variables, are provided as electronic
supplementary material (Tables S1 and S2 in Electronic
Supplementary Material, ESM 1).
Variables
Cognitive Ability
Cognitive ability was based on international student assess-
ments for PISA, TIMSS, and PIRLS, from 99 countries in
1
The same data were analyzed by Coyle et al. (2016), who examined whether economic freedom moderated the (linear) effects of cognitive ability
on economic productivity. The study by Coyle et al. (2016) did not examine whether the effects of cognitive ability on productivity increase
nonlinearly at higher levels of ability, the question central to the current study.
Journal of Individual Differences (2018), 39(1), 39–47
T. R. Coyle et al., Nonlinear Effects of Cognitive Ability
years 1995–2012. The assessments measure reading, math,
and science abilities in 15-year-olds (PISA); math and science
abilities in fourth or eighth grade (TIMSS); and reading
abilities in fourth grade (PIRLS). Results from the assess-
ments were corrected for cross-country differences in school
attendance (low attendance decreases test scores) and age at
grade level (cognitive ability increases with age) (Coyle &
Rindermann, 2013, pp. 407–408). In addition, results were
averaged across subject (math, science, and reading), devel-
opmental level (age or grade), year (1995–2012), and assess-
ment (PISA, TIMSS, and PIRLS; Rindermann, Sailer, &
Thompson, 2009, pp. 6–7). The averages were standardized
and converted to Greenwich IQs (UK IQ = 100, SD = 15). The
IQs were used to estimate the ability levels of intellectual
(95th percentile) and average (50th percentile) classes in
each country. Compared to psychometric IQ tests, student
assessments are administered to larger and more represen-
tative samples, increasing their validity as ability estimates
in countries where psychometric IQ data are sparse (e.g.,
African countries; see Rindermann, 2013).
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM)
Achievement
STEM achievement was based on patent rates, Nobel Prizes,
scientist rates, and high-tech export rates (Cronbach’s
α = .70). Data were available for 188 countries; 97 countries
also had cognitive ability data and were used here.
Innovation
Innovation was based on the Global Innovation Index
(GII) of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(Dutta & Lanvin, 2013), which measures innovations in
science, technology, and the economy. The GII is based
on seven country-level variables (institutions, human capi-
tal, infrastructure, market sophistication, business sophisti-
cation, technology outputs, and creative outputs). GII data
were available in years 2006–2013 for 142 countries;
95 countries also had cognitive ability data and were used
here.
Competitiveness
Competitiveness was based on the Global Competitiveness
Index (GCI) of the World Economic Forum (Schwab, 2013).
The GCI measures factors that determine the level of
productivity of a country. It is based on 12 country-level
factors (quality of institutions, quality of infrastructure,
macroeconomic environment, health and primary educa-
tion, higher education and training, efficient goods markets,
labor market efficiency, financial market efficiency, techno-
logical readiness, market size, business sophistication, and
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 T. R. Coyle et al., Nonlinear Effects of Cognitive Ability
knowledge and innovation). GCI data were available for
148 countries; 94 countries also had cognitive ability data
and were used here.
Economic Freedom
Economic freedom was based on the Heritage Foundation
Index of Economic Freedom (Miller, Holmes, & Feulner,
2013), which measures rule of law, limited government,
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regulatory efficiency, and open markets; and the Fraser
Institute Index (Gwartney, Lawson, & Hall, 2013), which
measures size of government, legal system and property
rights, sound money, trade freedoms, and labor regulations.
The Heritage and Fraser indices were standardized and
averaged to produce a composite measure of economic
freedom (Cronbach’s α = .93). Data were available in year
2013 for 182 countries; 97 of these countries also had
cognitive ability data and were used here.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
GDP measures the market value of goods and services
produced by a country. GDP per capita was obtained for
year 2010 and converted to a log scale. The measure was
based on data from the Maddison project (Maddison,
2008; 2010 GDP data from Bolt & van Zanden, 2013).
The final logged GDP variable was available for 161 coun-
tries; 92 countries also had cognitive ability data and were
used here.
Wealth
Wealth measures the market value of financial plus nonfi-
nancial assets (housing and land), less debts, for a country.
Wealth per adult was obtained for year 2013 and converted
to a log scale (Credit Suisse, 2013). Wealth data were
available for 174 countries; 96 countries also had cognitive
ability data and were used here.
Statistical Analyses
The main hypothesis was that the effects of cognitive ability
on economic productivity would increase nonlinearly at
higher ability levels. To test this hypothesis, regressions
estimated the linear effects of ability in an initial step,
followed by quadratic (nonlinear) effects of ability in a
second step. Each analysis regressed a productivity mea-
sure on cognitive ability, separately for intellectual or aver-
age classes. To facilitate interpretation, all measures were
standardized and centered (M = 0, SD = 1) prior to analyses
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003, pp. 201–204). Linear
effects involved a centered ability measure; quadratic
effects involved the square of the centered ability measure.
To minimize collinearity, regressions were performed
separately for each productivity measure.
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41
Parallel regressions predicted a “criterion G,” which
measured the variance common to all productivity mea-
sures. (By convention, G refers to aggregate-level common
factor variance, whereas g refers to individual-differences
level common factor variance.) The criterion G was based
on the first unrotated factor in principal axis factoring of
all productivity measures and accounted for most of the
variance in the productivity measures (variance = 80%;
eigenvalue = 4.84; criterion G loadings = .71, .86, .84, .76,
.83, .59, for STEM, GII, GCI, GDP, wealth, freedom, respec-
tively). Criterion G factor scores were estimated for each
country using regression, which weighted productivity
measures by factor score coefficients (e.g., Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2007, pp. 622–625).
Key statistics were β, which measured standardized
effects at each step; R2, which measured the variance
explained at each step; and ΔR2, which measured the
change in variance explained from the first to second step.
ΔR2 measured the increment in variance explained by
quadratic effects, beyond linear effects. If the effects of
cognitive ability strengthen with increases in ability level
(as predicted by cognitive capitalism), and if these effects
manifest as quadratic effects, then quadratic effects should
explain significant variance beyond linear effects. In addi-
tion, the sign of the quadratic effects should be positive,
which (along with positive linear effects) would indicate
that the effects of ability on productivity strengthen at
higher ability levels. All effects are reported as standardized
coefficients (R2 or ΔR2), with mean effects (MR2 or MΔR2) in
parentheses.
Results
Table 1 reports the regressions of productivity measures on
linear effects of cognitive ability (Step 1), followed by quad-
ratic effects of cognitive ability (Step 2). The results of each
analysis are reported in the rows of Table 1, separately for
average classes (50th percentile ability level) and intellec-
tual classes (95th percentile ability level). A key statistic is
the increment in variance explained by quadratic effects
beyond linear effects (i.e., ΔR2). If the effects of ability on
productivity increase nonlinearly at higher ability levels
(as predicted by cognitive capitalism), quadratic effects
should explain significant variance beyond linear effects
(and have a positive sign).
Table 1 (Average class) reports regressions for average
classes (50th percentile ability level). As predicted, cogni-
tive ability had strong linear effects at Step 1 (MR2 = .43,
range = .21–.62), and modest but significant quadratic
effects at Step 2 (MΔR2 = .06, range = .03–.09). In addition,
the quadratic effects were slightly stronger for economic
Journal of Individual Differences (2018), 39(1), 39–47
 42 T. R. Coyle et al., Nonlinear Effects of Cognitive Ability

Table 1. Change in R2 (ΔR2) after adding a quadratic term (Step 2) to a linear term (Step 1) for ability level
Step 1 Step 2 Δ Statistics
Criterion N R2
βlinear Fmodel R2
βlinear βquad Fmodel ΔR 2
ΔF
Average class
STEM 97 .26 .51** 33.48** .34 .69** .34** 24.46** .082 11.68**
Innovation 95 .62 .79** 152.47** .71 .98** .36** 112.63** .089 28.20**
Competitiveness 94 .45 .67** 74.32** .51 .82** .29** 47.54** .064 11.93**
Freedom 97 .21 .45** 24.54** .28 .63** .33** 18.48** .077 10.09**
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GDP 92 .58 .76** 123.75** .61 .85** .19* 68.20** .026 5.90*
Wealth 96 .44 .66** 73.69** .48 .79** .24** 43.48** .044 7.87**
Criterion G 87 .55 .74** 103.96** .62 .90** .31** 69.10** .072 15.95**
Intellectual class
STEM 97 .29 .54** 39.45** .38 .70** .33** 28.56** .085 12.77**
Innovation 95 .66 .81** 180.41** .73 .96** .30** 123.84** .069 23.54**
Competitiveness 94 .47 .69** 82.79** .52 .80** .25** 50.20** .051 9.73**
Freedom 97 .24 .49** 30.59** .33 .65** .33** 22.86** .084 11.76**
GDP 92 .62 .79** 149.06** .65 .87** .17* 81.57** .024 5.93*
Wealth 96 .48 .69** 86.97** .53 .80** .25** 52.22** .048 9.56**
Criterion G 87 .60 .77** 125.60** .66 .89** .27** 79.73** .059 14.26**
Notes. Average class = average class ability levels (50th percentile); Intellectual class = intellectual class ability levels (95th percentile); STEM = achieve-
ments in science, technology, engineering, and math; Innovation = Global Innovation Index; Competitiveness = Global Competitiveness Index; Free-
dom = economic freedom index; GDP = gross domestic product per capita (log scale); Wealth = wealth per capita; Criterion G = factor scores based on all six
productivity measures. *p < .05, **p < .01 (two-tailed).

inputs (STEM, GII, GCI, and freedom; MΔR2 = .08) than
outputs (GDP and wealth; MΔR2 = .04). Results were similar
for the criterion G (based on all productivity measures),
which also showed significant linear (R2 = .55) and quadra-
tic effects (ΔR2 = .07). Consistent with predictions, scatter-
plots indicated that the effects of cognitive ability increased
nonlinearly, with increasing returns of cognitive ability to
productivity at higher ability levels (Figures 1A–1G).
Table 1 (Intellectual class) also reports regressions for the
intellectual classes (95th percentile ability level). The results
confirmed the analyses for the average classes. Cognitive
ability still had strong linear effects at Step 1 (MR2 = .46,
range = .21–.62), and significant quadratic effects at Step 2
(MΔR2 = .06, range = .02–.09). As before, the quadratic
effects were slightly stronger for economic inputs (MΔR2 =
.07) than outputs (MΔR2 = .04). Results were similar for
the criterion G, which showed significant linear (R2 = .60)
and quadratic effects (ΔR2 = .06). Consistent with theory,
scatterplots indicated that the effects of cognitive ability
strengthened at higher levels of ability (Figure 2A–2G).
Differences in analogous effects for the two ability classes
(intellectual-average) were very small for linear (MR2
difference = .033) and quadratic effects (MΔR2 difference =
.004).2 The small differences could be attributed to the
strong correlation between the ability levels of the two
classes (r = .98, Table S1).
The significant quadratic effects were probed by com-
puting simple effects of cognitive ability on economic
productivity at five levels of ability: 2 SDs below average,
1 SD below average, average (country mean), 1 SD above
average, and 2 SDs above average. Simple effects were
computed separately for each productivity measure and
ability class, after zero centering the linear and quadratic
effects of cognitive ability (cf. Cohen et al., 2003, pp.
206–207). The simple effects measured the slope of the
tangent line to the quadratic curve at a particular level of
cognitive ability.
Table 2 reports the simple effects, which bolstered the
pattern depicted in scatterplots (Figures 1 and 2). Simple
effects of ability on all productivity measures increased
from lowest ( 2 SD, 1 SD) to average ability levels, and
stabilized (at stronger values) from average to the highest
levels (1 SD, 2 SD). The pattern was found for all productiv-
ity measures and both ability classes (grand M = .59, .68,
.77, .80, .81, from lowest to highest ability levels, respec-
tively). Differences in analogous effects for the two ability
classes (intellectual – average) were trivial (Mβ difference =
.01, range = .02 to .04).

2
Parallel regressions of STEM on cognitive ability were performed after omitting an extreme STEM value in the upper-right quadrant (Figures 1A
and 2A). The value corresponded to Luxembourg, a country with very high-patent rates, which inflated its STEM rating (Rindermann et al., 2009,
Table 1). Consistent with the prior results, the effects of cognitive ability on STEM still increased nonlinearly (and significantly) for average
classes (ΔR2 = .12) and intellectual classes (ΔR2 = .12).

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 T. R. Coyle et al., Nonlinear Effects of Cognitive Ability 43

(A) (B)
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(C) (D)

(E) (F)

(G)

Figure 1. Scatterplots of average class ability levels and productivity criteria. Plots are fitted with linear and quadratic curves for the six
productivity measures (Panels A–F) and the criterion G (Panel G). R2 Linear = linear effects. R2 Quadratic = quadratic effects.

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 44 T. R. Coyle et al., Nonlinear Effects of Cognitive Ability
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Figure 2. Scatterplots of intellectual class ability levels and productivity criteria. Plots are fitted with linear and quadratic curves for the six
productivity measures (Panels A–F) and the criterion G (Panel G). R2 Linear = linear effects. R2 Quadratic = quadratic effects.

Journal of Individual Differences (2018), 39(1), 39–47 Ó 2018 Hogrefe Publishing

 T. R. Coyle et al., Nonlinear Effects of Cognitive Ability 45

Table 2. Simple effects (β) between ability levels and productivity unique variance beyond linear effects (Table 1). Moreover,
measures at different levels of ability, for average and intellectual
the effects of ability increased sharply from the lowest to
classes
average ability levels and stabilized (at strong levels)
2 SD 1 SD Average +1 SD +2 SD
thereafter, demonstrating increasing returns of ability to
Average class productivity (Table 2).
STEM .47 .60 .67 .69 .70 The nonlinear effects of cognitive ability replicated for
Innovation .75 .88 .96 .98 .99 both intellectual and average classes (Table 1), suggesting
Competitiveness .54 .62 .73 .77 .79 that the effects apply throughout the ability spectrum.
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Freedom .35 .45 .55 .59 .61 In addition, the nonlinear effects of ability replicated for
GDP .72 .78 .83 .85 .85 all productivity measures, with slightly stronger effects for
Wealth .59 .67 .74 .77 .78 economic inputs than outputs, suggesting that cognitive
Criterion G .65 .75 .84 .87 .88 ability has slightly greater impact on precursors of produc-
M .58 .68 .76 .79 .80 tivity (i.e., STEM, innovation, competitiveness, freedom).
Intellectual class The similar effects were partly attributable to the strong
STEM .47 .58 .68 .71 .71 relations among productivity measures, as indicated by
Innovation .76 .86 .94 .97 .97 their high loadings on a common productivity factor (i.e.,
Competitiveness .56 .60 .71 .76 .78 criterion G; M loading = .77). This common factor reflected
Freedom .39 .47 .59 .63 .65 variance common to all productivity measures, and yielded
GDP .76 .82 .87 .88 .88 factor scores that showed a pattern similar to the individual
Wealth .62 .69 .77 .79 .80 productivity measures (Tables 1 and 2).
Criterion G .68 .75 .84 .87 .88 The results are the first to demonstrate that the effects of
M .61 .68 .77 .80 .81 cognitive ability on economic productivity increase nonlin-
Grand M .59 .68 .77 .80 .81 early at higher ability levels, a pattern consistent with the
Notes. Average class = average class ability level (50th percentile); Intel- predictions of cognitive capitalism theory (Rindermann,
lectual class = intellectual class ability level (95th percentile);
STEM = achievements in science, technology, engineering, and math;
2012). The results suggest that prior research on country-
Innovation = Global Innovation Index; Competitiveness = Global Competi- level differences in cognitive ability, which has examined
tiveness Index; Freedom = economic freedom index; GDP = gross domestic linear effects, may have inadvertently missed nonlinear
product per capita (log scale); Wealth = wealth per capita; Criterion
G = factor scores based on all six productivity measures; M = mean effect; increases by excluding nonlinear (quadratic) terms from
Grand M = grand mean, averaged across all effects and ability classes. statistical models. The robustness of the results, which
Effects are computed at the following ability levels: 2 SD (2 SD below
replicated with different measures of ability and productiv-
average), 1 SD (1 SD below average), Average (country average), +1 SD
(1 SD above average), and +2 SD (2 SD above average). ity, suggests that future studies should check for nonlinear
effects by including quadratic terms in statistical models.
The pattern of effects is inconsistent with theories of
Discussion intelligence (e.g., Spearman’s law of diminishing returns),
which imply that relations of cognitive ability with various
The current study is the first to use country-level data to criteria should decrease nonlinearly at higher levels of ability
systematically examine whether the positive effects of (cf. Coyle & Rindermann, 2013; see also, Coyle, 2015). Such
cognitive ability on economic productivity increase nonlin- theories are based on the assumption that, at higher ability
early at higher levels of ability. Such a pattern is predicted levels, measures of cognitive ability become less loaded
by cognitive capitalism theory (Rindermann & Thompson, with g (i.e., variance common to tests), which drives predic-
2011), which predicts that higher levels of ability dispropor- tive validity, and more loaded with non-g factors, which
tionately account for higher levels of economic productivity. contribute less to predictive validity (Jensen, 1998,
To test cognitive capitalism, economic productivity was pp. 270–305). The results of the current study support the
regressed on ability levels for intellectual (95th percentile) opposite pattern. The effects of cognitive ability (on all
and average classes (50th percentile), using six measures productivity measures) increased nonlinearly at higher
of productivity (STEM, innovation, competitiveness, ability levels, suggesting that productivity is amplified at
freedom, GDP, and wealth). Linear effects of ability were higher levels of ability.
estimated at an initial step, followed by quadratic effects An alternative interpretation of the results is based on
at a second step, which examined whether the effects of differentiation theories (e.g., Deary et al., 1996; see also,
ability increased nonlinearly at higher levels. Consistent Woodley, 2012).3 Differentiation theories focus on specific
with theory, quadratic effects of ability explained significant abilities (e.g., math, verbal, and spatial), which are partly

3
We thank Michael Woodley of Menie for suggesting the alternative interpretation.

Ó 2018 Hogrefe Publishing Journal of Individual Differences (2018), 39(1), 39–47

 46
distinct from g. According to these theories, the effects of
specific abilities increase (and the effects of g decrease) at
higher ability levels, a pattern that reflects cognitive special-
ization in narrow domains. This specialization may lead to
increased divisions of labor and enhanced comparative
advantage and economic efficiency, which may boost
economic growth. Cognitive specialization may also con-
tribute to the Flynn effect, which is associated with
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increased effects of specific abilities (rather than gains on
g; te Nijenhuis & van der Flier, 2013), and is predictive of
GDP growth, both across countries (Pietschnig & Voracek,
2015) and over time (Woodley, 2012). Future research
could test for cognitive specialization by partitioning the
effects of g and specific abilities (obtained after removing g)
and examining their effects at different ability levels.
According to differentiation theories, the effects of specific
abilities may increase at higher ability levels, and the
pattern of effects may be nonlinear, reflecting increased
cognitive specialization at higher ability levels.
The results indicated that the effects of cognitive ability
increased disproportionately from the lowest to average abil-
ity levels, and stabilized (at strong levels) thereafter. In par-
ticular, the effects of cognitive ability changed most rapidly
at the lower end of the ability spectrum and plateaued at
the higher end of the spectrum. Such a pattern suggests that
boosting cognitive ability through environmental interven-
tions (e.g., adequate nutrition or better health care) may yield
disproportionate gains in productivity at the lower end of the
ability spectrum, where secular increases in ability are most
rapid (cf. Rindermann & Thompson, 2013).
The results are based on country-level ability estimates,
which have drawn criticism (e.g., Wicherts & Wilhelm,
2007). One concern is that the ability estimates are based
on student assessments (e.g., PISA, TIMSS, and PIRLS).
Student assessments measure cognitive ability in children,
who are not economically productive, and may not
accurately measure ability in adults. Such a concern is min-
imized by strong relations between ability estimates from
student assessments and adult IQs (r  .90, Rindermann,
2012), suggesting that countries with bright children tend
to have bright adults. A second concern is that country-level
ability estimates may be distorted by country-level differ-
ences in the timing of the Flynn effect (e.g., Pietschnig &
Voracek, 2015; Rindermann & Thompson, 2013), which
describes secular gains in ability levels. This concern is
minimized by the temporal stability of ability estimates
(r  .86, Rindermann, 2012, Figure 2), indicating that
countries maintain their rank order in ability over time,
which would minimize distortions from the Flynn effect.
A final issue is the assumption that student assessments
are weak indicators of the cognitive g factor, which
measures variance common to cognitive tests and drives
the predictive validity of tests (Jensen, 1998, pp. 270–305).
Journal of Individual Differences (2018), 39(1), 39–47
T. R. Coyle et al., Nonlinear Effects of Cognitive Ability
In fact, student assessments load strongly on the g factor,
which is based on diverse measures of ability (λ > .90; Coyle
& Rindermann, 2013; Rindermann, 2007).
Future research should explore nonlinear effects of
ability on noneconomic criteria such as government effec-
tiveness, disease rates, happiness, and well-being, which
have been linked to linear effects of cognitive ability (Jones,
2016; see also, Lynn & Vanhanen, 2012; Rindermann,
Kodila-Tedika, & Christainsen, 2015). Given the assump-
tion that higher ability levels contribute disproportionately
to outcomes, the effects of cognitive ability may increase
nonlinearly for noneconomic criteria.
Future research should also explore the influence of
personality traits on ability and economic productivity
(Heckman & Kautz, 2012). Personality traits include consci-
entiousness and agreeableness, which have been linked to
productivity at the country level (e.g., Freeman, Coyle, &
Baggio, 2016; Stolarski, Zajenkowski, & Meisenberg, 2013)
and may mediate or moderate nonlinear effects of cognitive
ability. For example, only countries with high levels of consci-
entiousness may invest the resources (e.g., research and edu-
cation) needed to produce the nonlinear effects of ability.
Alternatively, only countries with high levels of agreeable-
ness may have the levels of cooperation and trust needed
to produce the nonlinear effects of ability (cf. Freeman
et al., 2016).
In sum, the current study is the first to show that the
effects of country-level cognitive ability on economic
productivity increase nonlinearly at higher ability levels.
The results replicated for both intellectual (95th percentile)
and average (50th percentile) classes, and for all pro-
ductivity measures. Future research should examine
whether the nonlinear effects of ability are moderated by
other factors (e.g., personality traits), and whether the
effects replicate for noneconomic factors (e.g., happiness
and well-being).
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by a grant from the National
Science Foundation’s Interdisciplinary Behavioral and
Social Science Research competition (Award: 1620457).
Portions of the research were presented at the 2014 and
2015 conventions of the Association for Psychological
Science.
Electronic Supplementary Material
The electronic supplementary material is available with the
online version of the article at https://doi.org/10.1027/
1614-0001/a000247
ESM 1. Tables S1 and S2 (docx).
The tables report the data used in the analyses and the cor-
relations among the variables.
Ó 2018 Hogrefe Publishing
 T. R. Coyle et al., Nonlinear Effects of Cognitive Ability 47

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Ó 2018 Hogrefe Publishing Journal of Individual Differences (2018), 39(1), 39–47