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Martin Kment
“After the Turnaround in Energy Policy:
Germany on the Road to a
Planned Economy?,”
Volume 40, Number 2

Copyright 2015

Martin Kment*

Bottlenecks in the German Power Supply System

T he tragic events in Fukushima, Japan, shocked the world. They changed the
energy landscape in Germany and they will probably continue to do so in the
future. But even before that accident on March 11, 2011, the German legislature
had not been unaware of the need for action in the energy sector,1 since it had
already set the ambitious German goal of employing renewable energies to reduce
national greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 by an amount 40 percent below the
1990 levels.2 This applies in particular to the German electricity supply networks.3
Renewable energy, which is being generated increasingly in areas of low con-
sumption and whose availability fluctuates according to weather conditions, must
be transported to distant load centers—and this is especially the case if it is to be
generated by offshore wind farms.4
Apart from these efforts at climate protection,5 the policy objective of the
European Union (EU) additionally placed the national energy networks under
a great deal of strain.6 In its third energy package from mid-2009, the EU also

*Martin Stefan Kment, Director of the Institute for Environmental Law of the University of
Augsburg and Chair of Public Law and European Law, Environmental Law and Planning Law,
earned his Doctor Iuris from the University of Münster (Germany) and a LL.M. from the University
of Cambridge The author received a First State Examination in law in 2000 and a Second State
Examination in law in 2004. His postdoctoral Habilitation addressed transnational administrative
law topics. Prior to becoming a professor at the University of Augsburg, the author also held
a professorship at EBS University of Business and Law (Wiesbaden, Germany). His research areas
of interest include environmental law, energy law, and infrastructure law.

The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. 40, Nos. 1 and 2

Copyright Ó 2015 by the International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development
(ICEED). All rights reserved.

defines, in the form of directives and regulations, requirements for international

network access so as to optimize further cross-border trade in electricity in the
EU.7 This hits the German transmission network at its core, because Germany,
which for historical reasons is focused on a predominantly regional market with
electricity generation taking place near consumers, is already today the central
transit country for electricity in Europe.8 Against this background, it is not sur-
prising that on July 14, 2010 the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung should have had
the pointed headline: “It’s going to get tight on the electricity highways!”
In the times of the politically proclaimed “energy turnaround”—away from
nuclear power and embracing renewable energy sources—the already insufficient
balance of Germany’s electricity network has deteriorated rapidly. The trans-
mission network, which in 2007 already was operating at its capacity limits, needs
to have its capacity increased as quickly as possible.9 According to current esti-
mates, more than 3,600 kilometers (km) of extra-high-voltage lines alone must be
built by 2020,10 estimates that do not take into account the hunger for energy
spurred on by new electronic communications and e-mobility.11 As the German
Chancellor has stated, “a Herculean task – no ifs and buts. We are facing having to
square the circle.”12

Social Criticism of the Control by Regulatory Law of the Expansion of the

Electricity Networks

When the ambitious expansion targets stall (because, for example, the network
connection in the offshore area no longer seems assured),13 then it does not take
long for the first words of criticism to be expressed. For example, the Frankfurter
Allgemeine newspaper reiterated concerns in March 2012 that a nationalization of
the German networks should be considered in order to respond to the slow rate of
network expansion.14
These remarks, voiced in one of the most renowned German newspapers,
openly question the concept of regulatory law in the domain of energy network
infrastructure. But is something not being criticized here that perhaps already has
disappeared, albeit perhaps only partially15 and largely unnoticed,16 as a result of
the turnaround in energy policy? The thesis of this paper is that the legislature
deliberately has not embraced nationalization of the electricity networks for the
sole reason that the purchase necessary for this or for the expropriation required,
which would lead to obligations with regard to purchase price payments or con-
stitutionally guaranteed compensations,17 would have involved financial burdens
that would have been politically unacceptable at a time of limited state budgets.18
Long-term negative consequences, such as the typically diminishing spirit of
innovation and inefficiencies, also spoke against this approach.19 That is the rea-
son that the legislature sought a solution in the modification of regulatory law

governing the energy industry. The legal modification has attacked the foundations
of regulatory law, deprived it of a portion of its substance, and, finally, endangered
the future of regulatory law in the domain of energy infrastructure law.20 To illus-
trate this, we require a short overview of the nature of regulatory law.

Nature of Regulatory Law

The origins of regulatory law lie in the United States,21 where regulatory law
includes (very widely understood) any legislative and administrative action on so-
cial and economic spheres.22 From there, it found its way via English and European
law to Germany and can be classified as both governmental and administrative
law.23 In Germany, “regulatory” is understood as being any administratively dog-
matic influence by the government on an area of life shaped by the economy that
ensures, on the one hand, conditions conducive to competition and, on the other, the
securing of the common good in the relevant segment of life.24 The common good
must be interpreted broadly here: typically, securing the common good is about
social or environmental policy objectives.25 Regulatory law can also be found in
various places of the national legal system and is expressed in various ways there.26

Introduction of the Network Expansion Acceleration Act (NABEG)—An


This basic understanding of regulatory law should be placed within the context
of a current set of laws that the German parliament adopted in 2012 to bring about
the energy turnaround in the energy network infrastructure. To this belongs firstly
the adaptation of the Energy Act (EnWG)27 and, in particular, the introduction of
xx 12a-12e and the modification of x 65. In addition, there is the Network Ex-
pansion Acceleration Act, which came into force on July 5, 2011,28 and which has
since been made the subject of legal dispute by various parties.29
Scope of Application: Contrary to what its name suggests, the Network
Expansion Acceleration Act does not take on the entire problem of the energy
network. Rather, its scope is limited to extra-high-voltage lines of trans-regional
or European importance. Other network lines are left unaffected by its legal
Federal Specialist Planning and Planning Approval: To begin with, this
piece of legislation introduces a federal specialist planning, which checks the
spatial and environmental compatibility of route corridors for the extra-high-
voltage lines that are desired. The results obtained are binding for federal states
and municipalities in accordance with x 15 Paragraph 1 of the Network Expansion
Acceleration Act.

Connected to the federal specialist planning is a planning approval process,31

which can be carried out uniformly throughout Germany in accordance with
a federal law regulation requiring consent.32 The German federal states declared
their willingness on December 6, 2012 to give their consent to such a federal law
regulation.33 In this case, both federal specialist planning and planning approval
would lie in the hands of the Federal Network Agency; therefore, the federal states
would be deprived of their executive authority. The transfer of authority to the
Federal Network Agency is designed in particular to avoid double testing in
staggered processes. This corresponds to the telos of the Network Expansion
Acceleration Act, which seeks to accelerate processes.34 It should be noted that
originally the jurisdiction of the Federal Network Agency was intended un-
conditionally for all processes under the Network Expansion Acceleration Act in
planning approval processes. However, in response to objections raised by the
federal states, the compromise was then found in the conception of the statutory
order. If, ultimately, the statutory order does not come about, then the planning
approval process remains a matter for the federal state’s own administration.
Constitutionally, this construction is not entirely acceptable35 with regard to the
stipulations of Article 87 Paragraph 3 Sentence 1 of the constitution.36 In partic-
ular, this specifies a central function to be performed.37 Planning approval related
to the energy network should therefore be a function that covers the entire country
and that does not require any assistance by downstream middle or lower author-
ities.38 This is more than doubtful with regard alone to the usual compartmen-
talization in the realization of projects to be approved.39

Modifications to Parameters of Regulatory Law in the Electricity Network


After this brief illustration of some of the content of the Network Expansion
Acceleration Act, we now concentrate on those elements of the Act that are of
particular interest from the point of view of regulatory law. The focus will fall here
on the introduction of a federal specialist planning in the field of network ex-
pansion as well as on the subsequent planning approval process that accompanies it.
Both show that energy law has lost, in the long term, some of its regulatory law. We
shall also give thought to the obligation on network operators to invest, although
they are legally anchored outside the Network Expansion Acceleration Act.40

Corporate Decision-Making on Investment and Governmental Responsibility

for Infrastructure: To illustrate the correlations, one should start by saying that
a network expansion that, in accordance with x 1 Paragraph 1 of the Energy Act,
not only guarantees the security of network and supply but is also inexpensive,
consumer friendly, efficient, and takes account of the environment, from the outset

needs a requirements planning.41 This planning attempts to determine the likely need
for transmission capacities, defines the expansion priorities, and deals with the future
ratio of individual forms of energy.42 In particular, it should be noted that, in accordance
with x 5 Paragraph 1 of the Renewable Energies Act (EEG), renewable energies must
be connected to the electricity network as a matter of priority, even if the network is
already fully occupied.43 If necessary, the network operator has to meet a resulting
connection need by strengthening and expanding its network in accordance with x 9 of
the Renewable Energies Act.44 Under current law, the responsibility for overall network
development planning lies with the private operators of energy networks (unlike rail-
way lines or roads).45 The responsibility of transmission system operators for de-
termining the need for network expansion therefore corresponds not least with their
own corporate responsibility for making decisions concerning infrastructure
investment,46 and thereby corresponds also with the fundamental idea of the
European Electricity Market Directive.47 That means that expansion and main-
tenance of the energy network infrastructure generally follow economic laws.48
Parallel to this is the responsibility that the state has for infrastructure.49 The
state receives reports concerning the development and performance of the energy
network infrastructure and checks the network planning envisaged.50 It also obliges
network operators under x 11 Paragraph 1 of the Energy Act to operate a safe, reliable,
and efficient energy supply network.51 This network must also be maintained and
optimized as needed, and strengthened and expanded as far as is economically rea-
sonable.52 Network operators therefore actively contribute to security of supply in
Germany.53 Thus, the network operators’ prediction of demand, which has to be based
on the components identified, certainly does not occur without legal obligation.

Network Development Plan—Drafting and Binding Effect: According to

stipulations in the new Energy Act, the network operator has to specify in a 10-year
network development plan the means by which it intends to comply with its legal
obligations.54 The network operator must therefore set out its future investment
activities.55 The plan required for this is drafted together with the other network
operators.56 Under x 12b Paragraph 1, in conjunction with x 12c, of the Energy Act,
the plan also has to be validated by the regulatory authority —that is, it is subject to
governmental review.57 As part of this review, the regulatory authority may, in
accordance with x 12c Paragraph 4 Sentence 3 of the Energy Act, also specify which
network operator is responsible for the implementation of the measures identified in
the network development plan.58 Only after the Federal Network Agency’s regu-
latory review under x 12c of the Energy Act can the network development plan
result in a nationwide requirements plan under x 12e of the Energy Act.59
What is peculiar about the federal requirements plan is that its adoption by the
federal legislature determines the energy needs and the priority demands for the
projects that it contains.60 This triggers a chain reaction that is significant and
binding on both transmission system operators and the subsequent federal

specialist planning and planning approval process under the Network Expansion
Acceleration Act. If, then, the creation of the national requirements plan is still
based heavily on the estimates of the network operators, then the operator can no
longer withdraw from this plan under its legislative commitment.61 What it then
comes to is a state involvement of private network operators, which are enlisted to
implement the network expansion (i.e., to fulfill an administrative task of the state
that has the character of serving the public interest) on the occasion of its exercise
of a constitutionally protected activity.62
Once a requirements plan has been drawn up, the federal specialist planning
under x 4 of the Network Expansion Acceleration Act then begins, in the form of
the Federal Network Agency, to look for route corridors for the expansion projects
envisaged. In accordance with x 5 of the Network Expansion Acceleration Act,
and in line with the requirements of regional policy under x 3 Paragraph 1 No. 1 of
the Regional Policy Act (ROG), the spatial and environmental compatibility of
certain corridors shall be embedded in a Strategic Environmental Assessment.
This creates the conditions to secure the respective corridors for future network
expansion.63 The federal specialist planning is aided in securing route corridors
by its strong binding power under x 15 Paragraph 1 of the Network Expansion
Acceleration Act. It extends to all planning approval processes related to the
construction, operation and modification of extra-high-voltage lines.64 In addition,
the federal specialist planning takes precedence over the specialist plannings of
federal states and municipal plans. The fact that, under x 15 Paragraph 3 Sentence
1 of the Network Expansion Acceleration Act, the federal specialist planning
should have no direct external effect must, therefore, be understood in a limited
way.65 It should be interpreted to the effect that what is meant is solely the external
effect in relation to private individuals.66 Ultimately, x 15 Paragraph 1 of the
Network Expansion Acceleration Act allows penetration into the legal system of
federal states and municipalities. There is, therefore, at least one immediate ex-
ternal effect with regard to legal entities governed by public law.67

Application Obligations on Network Operators in the Determination of Routes

and Project Approval: What is particularly noteworthy from the perspective of trans-
mission system operators is probably that, unlike before the adoption of the Network
Expansion Acceleration Act, they have now lost their freedom to decide autonomously
on the date that network expansion measures are initiated. Even the Energy Line Ex-
pansion Act (EnLAG),68 which has 24 priority projects in the field of extra-high-
performance networks (at least with regard to their start and end points),69 has so far not
obliged network expansion operators to implement specific expansion measures.70
Since the Network Expansion Acceleration Act has come into force, this com-
fortable position enjoyed by network operators has changed;71 under x 6 of the Act,
they are now obliged by the Federal Network Agency to submit an application within
a reasonable period of time, provided that they have not already made the application

necessary to initiate the process on their own accord. Also, in accordance with x 34,
the time limit can be given weight through a financial penalty of up to 250,000 V.
This regulatory framework continues at the level of planning approval, too;
although the planning approval process in accordance with x 19 of the Network
Expansion Acceleration Act is started essentially on the initiative of the respective
network operator, the Federal Network Agency does assist where necessary to prompt
the decisiveness of those concerned. Again, there is the possibility here of obliging the
project proponent, through official notification, to make the necessary application within
a reasonable period of time.72 In legal terms, this power is to be found in an unfortunate
place in x 12 Paragraph 2 Sentence 3 of the Network Expansion Acceleration Act in the
regulatory context with the completion of the federal specialist planning.

Investment Obligations on Network Operators: These obligations of plan-

ning and plan-approval law have their counterpart at the level of the investment
decision, since network operators’ lack of willingness to invest is currently seen as the
“biggest stumbling block” to network expansion.73 If the legal requirements for
the energy network expansion have been met, and the network operator fails to make
the necessary investments, then, in accordance with x 65 Paragraph 2a of the Energy
Act, the Federal Network Agency may call on the network operator to make the
necessary investment within a specified period of time.74 On the expiration of this
period, the Agency may initiate a tendering process for the implementation of the in-
vestment.75 Qualitatively, this tendering process is a form of execution by substitution.76

Law of the Electricity Network Infrastructure on the Road to a Planned

Economy: The basis of regulatory law, which lies in the fundamental freedom of
private market behavior,77 clearly disappears with these compulsory obligations to
submit applications and to make investments. Some speak already of a “paradigm
shift,”78 an assessment based on the fact that the legal framework that regulatory law
ideally wishes to give to the economic behavior of private actors79 is narrowed ap-
preciably by the Network Expansion Acceleration Act. If the establishment of ex-
pansion needs already is subject to supervision, and if network operators are then
obliged to initiate planning procedures intended to implement the requirements plan,
and if this finally ends in an obligation to invest, then the energy sector is turning slowly
but surely into a planned economic system.80 Regulatory law thereby is alienated and
noticeably impaired in its performance.81 The private network operator is losing the
power to make investment decisions autonomously while bearing the economic risk of
investment. The operator must make the relevant applications and invest later.
It therefore may seem almost cynical that, under x 8 or x 21 of the Network
Expansion Acceleration Act, the Federal Network Agency may also then demand
the documents necessary for the decision-making process when the commencement
of proceedings has been forced by the setting of an application deadline.82 The
transfer of the burden of cost and production onto the network operator in this

case also is designed to be (according to the statement of legislative intent) “an

expression of the environmental principle that the polluter pays.”83 This merely
confuses cause and effect, however.84

Critical Evaluation of the Paradigm Shift

Practical Considerations: Finally, we shall make two critical remarks regarding

developments in energy-infrastructure law. The first concerns the practical ca-
pacity to function within the legislative path chosen: the shifting onto the energy
network operators of the investment risks and efforts triggered by the energy
turnaround is certainly a clever move from a governmental point of view, par-
ticularly from a financial perspective. The idea reaches its limits, though, where
the investment needs become so great, and especially when they involve such huge
volumes that the private sector, in the form of a private investor, can no longer
shoulder the financial burden. The fate currently covered by the media of the
network operator Tennet TSO GmbH illustrates this quite clearly.85 Tennet has
stated that it has already invested 6 billion euros in network expansion (which is
more than the gross national product of Mauritania or Liechtenstein in 2010),86 but
has been unable to muster the necessary 15 billion euros.87

Constitutional Considerations: The second critical remark concerns the diffi-

cult constitutional situation in which network operators find themselves: this situ-
ation represents an intervention in the freedom of network operators under Article
12 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1, in conjunction with Article 19 Paragraph 3, of the
constitution to practice their profession.88 We can start by saying that co-opting
network operators for the common good is admissible in principle.89 Brought into
the present context, the sufficient proximity of fact and responsibility between the
practicing by network operators of their profession and the imposed activity re-
quired for the common good therefore becomes significant.90 In any case, those
affected should receive an appropriate compensation for their burdens, and par-
ticularly for the significant investments that they make, a compensation that may
also be passed on to the consumer.91 The current regulatory framework for the
energy sector provides various compensation models in favor of the network
operator affected, but none of these guarantee full financial compensation.92
Therefore, the network operator must then have the power to decide to refrain
from a project of network expansion, if this expansion is no longer economically
viable. x 65 Paragraph 2a Sentence 1 of the Energy Act therefore goes too far when
it declares, as a legitimate obstacle to expansion, only compelling reasons as being
significant when they are not within the sphere of influence of the network op-
erator.93 In any case, the network operator does not have to make any investments
that exceed the value of its network; this is dictated by Article 14 of the

constitution.94 This is likely to be especially relevant in the offshore area, which

presents network operators with obvious risks in terms of cost and liability.95


In conclusion, we may state that the legislature has responded to the supposed
inefficiencies of the energy-network infrastructure. Through the Network Expansion
Acceleration Act and several amendments to the Energy Act, changes have occurred
in energy law that shake its very foundations. In carrying out network expansion
projects of trans-regional and European importance, the Network Expansion Ac-
celeration Act is turning away from traditional regulatory law and, from a critical
evaluation, is tending toward a planned economy. Therefore, from the perspective of
the legislature, the question of whether regulatory law is a model for the future or
a model that has run its course seems to be answered with regard to the energy-
network infrastructure with a somewhat negative overtone. A part of regulatory law
relevant here has, in any case, become lost on the road to the turnaround in energy
policy.96 Some may accept this break in the system as an exceptional case, since,
when compared to the nationalization of the networks, it seems to be the lesser
evil.97 Perhaps this is also the beginning of a trend that could develop into a con-
flagration for regulatory law in its entirety. Of that, though, only time will tell.

Editorial note: The citation system used here follows an accepted legal style.
See the coalition treaty between the CDU, the CSU, and the FDP, “Wachstum. Bildung.
Zusammenhalt”, 2009, p. 26 ff.
Kment, Rechts vor links? – Ü berlegungen zur Vereinfachung der rechtlichen Vorfahrtsregeln
im deutschen Stromnetz, ZNER 2011, 233, 233.
See here Neumann, Stromnetzausbau und Umweltvertrag̈ lichkeit – Notwendigkeit umfassender
Konzepte und Pruf̈ ungen, UVP-report 2010, 118.
Scholz/Tüngler, Zum Verhältnis des Einspeisemanagements nach dem Erneuerbare-Energien-
Gesetz und der Systemverantwortung der Übertragungsnetzbetreiber nach dem Energiewirtschaftsgesetz,
RdE 2010, 317, 317; Kment (Fn. 1), ZNER 2011, 233, 233.
There are further reasons for the increasing burden on networks, such as the relocation of power
stations; see Scherer, Neue Entwicklungen im Recht der regulierten Netzinfrastrukturen, NVwZ
2010, 1321, 1322; Säcker, Netzausbau- und Kooperationsverpflichtungen der Übertragungsnetzbetreiber
nach Inkrafttreten des EnLAG und der Dritten StromRL 2009/72 EG vom 13.07.2009, RdE 2009, 305, 306.
Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Maßnahmen zur Beschleunigung des Netzausbaus Elektrizitätsnetze,
BT-Drs. 17/6073, p. 31.
Gundel/Germelmann, Kein Schlussstein für die Liberalisierung der Energiemärkte: Das Dritte
Binnenmarktpaket, EuZW 2009, 763; see also Directive 2009/72/EC, ABl. EU No. L 211 of 14.
8. 2009, p. 55; Directive 2009/73/EC, ABl. EU No. L 211 of 14. 8. 2009, p. 94; Regulation (EC)
No. 713/2009, ABl. EU No. L 211 of 14. 8. 2009, p. 1; Regulation (EC) No. 714/2009, ABl. EU
No. L 211 of 14. 8. 2009, p. 15, Regulation (EC) No. 715/2009, ABl. EU No. L 211 of 14. 8.
2009, p. 36, corr. ABl. EU No. L 229 of 1. 9. 2009, p. 29 and ABl. EU No. L 309 of 24. 11. 2009,
p. 87.
Scherer (Fn. 5) NVwZ 2010, 1321, 1323; Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Maßnahmen zur Bes-
chleunigung des Netzausbaus Elektrizitätsnetze, BT-Drs. 17/6073, p. 31.
Bundesnetzagentur (Federal Network Agency), Bericht über die Systemstörungen im deutschen und
europäischen Verbundsystem am 4. 11. 2006, 2007, p. 30; Scherer (Fn. 5) NVwZ 2010, 1321, 1322.
Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Maßnahmen zur Beschleunigung des Netzausbaus Elek-
trizitätsnetze, BT-Drs. 17/6073, p. 33.
See Säcker (Fn. 5) RdE 2009, 305, 306; idem., Der beschleunigte Ausbau der
Höchstspannungsnetze als Rechtsproblem, 2009, p. 117 ff.
See the Chancellor’s policy statement of 9.6.2011;
The Federal Network Agency recently refused to give certification to Tennet, the network
operator responsible for connecting offshore wind farms, because it failed to provide enough financial
evidence; see Financial Times (Germany) of 9.11.2012, available at
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 16.3.2012, “Die Energiewende ist gescheitert”, available at
Glaser, Das Netzausbauziel als Herausforderung für das Regulierungsrecht, DVBl. 2012,
1283, 1289, speaks in this respect of a “third way” which lies between regulatory law and the
nationalization of networks.
See, though, Kment, Vorbote der Energiewende in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: das
Netzausbaubeschleunigungsgesetz, RdE 2011, 341, 344 f.; Erbguth, in: Kment (Ed.), Netzausbau
zugunsten erneuerbarer Energien, 2013, p. 29.
See Article14 Paragraph 3 of the constitution.
See Jarass “Umbau statt Ausbau - das wäre ‘dramatisch billiger’”, Interview with tagesschau.
de of 2.11.2012, available at
Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1289.
See in this regard the comments below.
Masing, Die US-amerikanische Tradition der Regulated Industries und die Herausbildung
eines europäischen Regulierungsverwaltungsrechts, AöR 128 (2003), 558, 559.
Eifert, Regulierungsstrategien, in: Hoffmann-Riem/Schmidt-Aßmann/Voßkuhle (Eds.),
Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, Vol. I, 2012, x 19 Paragraph 2.
See Ruffert, Begriff, in: Fehling/Ruffert (Eds.), Regulierungsrecht, 2010, x 7 Paragraph 13 ff.
Ruffert (Fn. 23), x 7 Paragraph 58.
Ruffert (Fn. 23), x 7 Paragraph 54.
See, for example, Hermes, Die Regulierung der Energiewirtschaft zwischen öffentlichem und
privatem Recht, ZHR 166 (2002), 433; Angenendt/Gramlich/Pawlik, Neue Regulierung der Strom-
und Gasmärkte - Aufgaben und Organisation der Regulierungsbehörde(n), LKV 2006, 49; Frenzel,
Das Regulierungsverwaltungsrecht als öffentliches Recht der Netzwirtschaften, JA 2008, 868;
Kühling, Sektorspezifische Regulierung in den Netzwirtschaften, 2004; Röger, Neue Regulierungsansätze
im Telekommunikationsrecht - eine erste Analyse des neuen Telekommunikationsgesetzes 2004, DVBl.
2005, 143.
See Article 2 of the Act introducing Measures for the Acceleration of Network Expansion of
Electricity Networks of 28.7.2011, BGBl. 2011 I, p. 1690.
Netzausbaubeschleunigungsgesetz Übertragungsnetz of 28.7.2011, BGBl. I, p. 1690.
See, for example, Moench/Ruttloff, Netzausbau in Beschleunigung, NVwZ 2011, 1040;
Erbguth, Energiewende: großräumige Steuerung der Elektrizitätsversorgung zwischen Bund und
Ländern, NVwZ 2012, 326; Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl 2012, 1283; Wagner, Bundesfachplanung für
Höchstspannungsleitungen - rechtliche und praktische Belange, DVBl 2011, 1453.
See x 2 Paragraph 1 of the Network Expansion Acceleration Act.
The planning approval process is an authorization process with especially demanding pro-
cedural requirements and a planning element.
Wagner (Fn. 29), DVBl 2011, 1453, 1455; Appel, Neues Recht für neue Netze - das Rege-
lungsregime zur Beschleunigung des Stromnetzausbaus nach EnWG und NABEG, UPR 2011, 406,
411; Grigoleit/Weisensee, Das neue Planungsrecht für Elektrizitätsnetze, UPR 2011, 401, 402.
Message from of 6.12.2012, available at
See x 1 Sentence 1 of the Network Expansion Acceleration Act as well as the draft Act
introducing Measures for the Acceleration of Network Expansion of Electricity Networks, BT-Drs.
17/6073, 6. Critical of the acceleration effect is Durner, Die aktuellen Vorschläge für ein Net-
zausbaubeschleunigungsgesetz (NABEG) - Bewertung der Verfassungsmäßigkeit und des Bes-
chleunigungspotentials, DVBl. 2011, 853, 858 ff.
Durner (Fn. 34), DVBl. 2011, 853, 857 f.
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (GG) in the Federal Law Gazette Part III,
Section Number 100-1, published streamlined version, last amended by Article 1 of the Act of
11.7.2012, BGBl. I p. 1478.
See Sachs, in: Sachs (Hrsg.), GG, 2011, Art. 87 Rn. 65; Mikešic/Strauch, Stromautobahnen:
Ende der Planung auf der Kriechspur?, RdE 2011, 347, 352 f.
See Constitutional Court, 24.7.1962 – 2 BvF 4/61, 2 BvF 5/61, 2 BvF 1/62, 2 BvF 2/62,
Constitutional Court decision 14, 197, 210 f.; Constitutional Court 3.3.2004 – 1 BvF 3/92, Consti-
tutional Court decision 110, 33, 49; for details, see Durner (Fn. 34), DVBl. 2011, 853, 857 f.
See Kment/Pleiner, Abschnittsbildung bei energiewirtschaftlichen Streckenplanungen, 2013;
Greinacher, Energieleitungsausbau: Tatsächliche Herausforderungen und rechtliche Lösungen,
ZUR 2011, 305, 309.
See x 65 of the Energy Act.
See Hellermann/Hermes, in: Britz/Hellermann/Hermes (Eds.), EnWG, 2010, x 1 Rn. 23ff;
Schalast, Der fortdauernde Zielkonflikt zwischen Umweltschutz und Wettbewerb im deutschen
Energierecht, RdE 2001, 121.
Scherer, Neue Entwicklungen im Recht der regulierten Netzinfrastrukturen, NVwZ 2010,
1321, 1323.
See x 5 Paragraph 4 of the Renewable Energies Act.
See Ziekow, Öffentliches Wirtschaftsrecht, 2013, x 15 Rn. 23.
Säcker (Fn. 5), RdE 2009, 305, 305.
Weyer, Der Rechtsrahmen für den Ausbau der Übertragungsnetze in Deutschland, ZNER
2009, 210, 210.
Article 12 Letter a RL 2009/72/EC.
Kment (Fn. 16), RdE 2011, 341, 343.
Hermes, Staatliche Infrastrukturverantwortung, 1998, p. 336ff.; Fehling, in: Fehling/Ruffert
(Eds.), Regulierungsrecht, 2010, x 20 Rn. 70f.
Weyer (Fn. 46), ZNER 2009, 210, 210.

Theobald/Zenke/Dessau, in: Schneider/Theobald (Eds.), Recht der Energiewirtschaft, 2011, x


15 Rn. 114.
Schwarz, in: Säcker (Ed.), Berliner Kommentar zum Energierecht, 2013, x 11 Rn. 2ff.
See x 12 Paragraph 3 Sentence 1 of the Energy Act; see also Ruthig, in: Baur/Salje/Schmidt-
Preuß (Eds.), Regulierung in der Energiewirtschaft, 2011, Capital 91 Paragraph 2.
Säcker (Fn. 5), RdE 2009, 305, 305; Schneider, in: Schneider/Theobald (Eds.), Recht der
Energiewirtschaft, 2013, x 2 Rn. 64. See for the current network development plan – electricity
(NEP) of 9.7.2012 the position of the solar-energy development association in Germany
(Solarenergie-Föderverein Deutschland), ZNER 2012, 387.
Scherer (Fn. 5), NVwZ 2010, 1321, 1326; Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1284.
Salje, Das neue Energiewirtschaftsgesetz 2011, RdE 2011, 325, 326.
Erbguth (Fn. 29), NVwZ 2012, 326, 327; Theobald/Gey-Kern, Das dritte Energie-
binnenmarktpaket der EU und die Reform des deutschen Energiewirtschaftsrechts 2011, EuZW
2011, 896, 899.
Moench/Ruttloff (Fn. 29), NVwZ 2011, 1040, 1042.
Kühling/Rasbach, Kernpunkte des novellierten EnWG 2011, RdE 2011, 332, 336f.; Elspaß/
Schwoon, Energiewende ohne Erdkabel?, NVwZ 2012, 1066, 1068.
Schmitz/Jornitz, Regulierung des deutschen und des europäischen Energienetzes: Der Bun-
desgesetzgeber setzt Maßstäbe für den kontinentalen Netzausbau, NVwZ 2012, 332, 333.
Kment (Fn. 16), RdE 2011, 341, 344.
Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1285.
Erbguth (Fn. 29), NVwZ 2012, 326, 329.
Wagner (Fn. 29), DVBl 2011, 1453, 1454.
See here and on what follows, Kment (Fn. 16), RdE 2011, 341, 344. See also Elspaß/Schwoon
(Fn. 59), NVwZ 2012, 1066, 1068; Grigoleit/Weisensee (Fn. 32), UPR 2011, 401, 405.
Durner, Vollzugs- und Verfassungsfragen des NABEG, NuR 2012, 369, 371.
This also has significance for legal protection; see Wagner (Fn. 29), DVBl 2011, 1453,
1457 f.; Erbguth, Trassensicherung für Höchstspannungsleitungen: Systemgerechtigkeit und
Rechtsschutz, DVBl. 2012, 325, 327 f.
Energieleitungsausbaugesetz of 21.8.2009, BGBl. I, p. 2870, last amended by Article 5 of the
Act of 7.3.2011, BGBl. I, p. 338.
Weyer (Fn. 46), ZNER 2009, 210, 211; Elspaß/Schwoon (Fn. 59), NVwZ 2012, 1066, 1067.
Scherer (Fn. 5), NVwZ 2010, 1321, 1324; Kment (Fn. 16), RdE 2011, 341, 344.
On this and on the following, see Kment (Fn. 16), RdE 2011, 341, 344f.
Erbguth, in: Kment (Ed.) (Fn. 10), p. 29; Moench/Ruttloff (Fn. 29), NVwZ 2011, 1040, 1044.
Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1284.
Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1285.
An action pursuant to x 65 Paragraph 1 of the Energy Act was also already possible before the
current amendments to the Energy Act; see Säcker (Fn. 5), RdE 2009, 305, 306.
Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1285.
Gärditz, “Regulierungsermessen” und verwaltungsgerichtliche Kontrolle, NVwZ 2009, 1005,
Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1285.
Lepsius, in: Fehling/Ruffert (Eds.), Regulierungsrecht, 2010, x 19 Rn. 1; Schorkopf, Reg-
ulierung nach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates, JZ 2008, 20, 21.
Kment (Fn. 16), RdE 2011, 341, 344.
Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1289.
Kment (Fn. 16), RdE 2011, 341, 345.
Draft Act introducing Measures for the Acceleration of Network Expansion of Electricity
Networks, BT-Drs. 17/6073, 25.
Kment (Fn. 16), RdE 2011, 341, 345.
The Federal Network Agency has denied certification to the network operator Tennet, which
was responsible for connecting offshore wind parks, due to a lack of financial evidence.
See the description available at
See also Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1284.
Bourwieg, in Britz/Hellermann/Britz (Eds.), EnWG, 2010, x 11 Rn. 31.
Constitutional Court, 2.3.2010 – 1 BvR 256/08, 1 BvR 263/08 and 1 BvR 586/08, Constitu-
tional Court decision 125, 260, 360 f.
Constitutional Court, 22.1.1997 – 2 BvR 1915/91, Constitutional Court decision 95, 173, 187,
BB 1997, 694; Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1286.
Ringel, Die wirtschaftliche Zumutbarkeit im Energierecht, 2011, p. 220 f.
Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1286.
Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1287.
Constitutional Court, 16.2.2000 – 1 BvR 242/91 and 1 BvR 315/99, Constitutional Court de-
cision 102, 1, 19 ff., BB 2000, 1369 (mit BB-Komm. v. Knopp); Constitutional Court, 14.4.2010 – 1
BvR 2140/08, NVwZ 2010, 957, 958.
See Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 1283, 1287; Pfeil/Töpfer, Neuregelungen für die Genehmi-
gung von Offshore-Windkraftanlagen und Leitungssystemen, NordÖR 2011, 373, 373 and 376 ff.
Gärditz/Rubel, Die regulierungsbehördliche Sanktionierung ausbleibender Netzinvestitionen
im Rahmen des dritten Legislativpakets zur Liberalisierung der Energiebinnenmärkte, N&R 2010,
194, 204.
Glaser (Fn. 15), DVBl. 2012, 128, 1289.