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Obligation to love each other, FC 68

B. Obligation to live with the other spouse

1. General rule and exceptions

FC 68
Art. 100 (1); 127 (1); 101; 128
NCC 921 (4)
RPC 11 (2)
RPC 247

313. Republic v FACTS:

Molina, G.R. No. ● Roridel Molina and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in
108763 February Manila and that a son, Andre O. Molina was born.
13, 1997 ● After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband
and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
JOSOL squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
● Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had
been the sole breadwinner of the family.
● In October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was
● In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio
● A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them.
● Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself
as a king to be served, and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage
from the start.
● On August 16, 1990, Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Reynaldo; to
which the latter argues that it is not due to psychological incapacity.
● On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void.
● The Solicitor General (petitioner) filed an appeal to the CA but was denied and affirmed the ruling of
the RTC.
● The Solicitor General, however, argues that the CA’s judgment is erroneous, hence the current
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Reynaldo failed to commit his marital obligations; YES.
● In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.
● Despite the fact that such unfulfillment of marital obligations is not rooted on psychological
incapacity, the Court ruled in its sixth guideline for filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on grounds of psychological incapacity that “the essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.”

314. Goitia v. DOCTRINE: SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT. — The complaint of the wife which alleges unbearable conduct and
Campos - Rueda, treatment on the part of the husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance.
35 Phils 252
MANLONGAT That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that
she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene
demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the
defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous
demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated
the defendant and induced him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face
and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to
desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.

it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it
necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living
separate from her husband.

The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is
dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from
the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on
the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied
terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the
enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the law will not permit him to terminate
it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for
separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict
legal sense of that term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the
mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the
purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of
assaulting her. the pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment
of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a
stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means
of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the
marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.

The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for
judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.

315. Mariano FACTS: Case is an action by the husband to compel wife to return to the marital home & cohabit w/ him.
Arroyo v. Dolores ● 1910: Mariano & Dolores married. Even with short intervals of separation, they lived together as
Vasques de husband and wife until July 4, 1929 in Iloilo.
Arroyo, ● After many efforts convincing Dolores to return the matrimonial home, Mariano initiated this
G.R. No. L-17014, petition to compel Dolores to do so.
42 Phil 54 ● Dolores admitted the marriage & leaving their home. She alleged as defense that she had been
compelled to leave by his husband’s cruel treatment. She prayed for affirmative relief consisting of
August 11, 1921 (1) a decree of separation, (2) liquidation of conjugal partnership; (3) allowance for counsel fees &
Street, J. permanent separate maintenance.
● Lower court decided in favor of Dolores, reaching the conclusion that Mariano was more to blame
OCULTO than Dolores- authorized her to live apart from her husband, granted P400 monthly alimony, &
directed Mariano to pay Dolores’ counsel fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dolores act of leaving the matrimonial home is justified - - - NO
Whether or not Dolores should receive allowance for her separate maintenance - - - NO
Whether Dolores can be compelled by the Court to return home and cohabit w/ Mariano - - - NO
● No. Dolores’ abandonment of the marital home was without sufficient justification in fact.
○ Dolores is afflicted with w/ a disposition of jealousy towards her Mariano in an aggravated
degree. This has caused difficulties to their marital relations. In so far as the proof in record
shows that neither of the spouses has at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity or has
given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relation with any person, the tales of cruelty
against Mariano are no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles normal to a
married couple. Dolores’ complaint is not well-founded.

● No. Provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears
that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from
the fault of the husband.
Articles 142 & 143 of the Civil Code clearly expressed the obligation imposed by the law on the husband to
maintain the wife as his duty universally recognized in civil society.
○ Goitia v Campos Rueda: where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to
live apart from her husband, she can compel him to make provision for her separate
○ HOWEVER, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts
should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of
the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a
state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned.
○ Davidson v Davidson: an action for support of the wife separate from the husband will only
be sustained when the reasons for it are imperative. The imperative necessity is the only
ground which such proceeding can be maintained.
The duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties admitted.
Cruelty in law: What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they are
not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of
manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of
passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty.

● Dolores is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit
with Mariano. However, it is not within the province of the courts to compel her to do so.
○ Experience of countries where the court of justice has assumed to compel the cohabitation
of a married couple shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. In the
past, contempt in case of disobedience was met with imprisonment, and later a decree for
the restitution of conjugal rights.
○ Court is unable to hold that Mariano is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for
the Dolores’ return to the marital domicile, which is sought in his petition. He is certainly
entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife presented herself without sufficient cause and
that it is her duty to return.
Decision is REVERSED. Court declared that Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without
sufficient cause and that she is admonished that it is her duty to return.

316. Cuaderno v. FACTS:

Cuaderno 12 ● November 17, 1956- since then the couple has been living separately due to Angel inflicted bodily
SCRA 505 injuries on Lourdes during a quarrel.
● Lourdes stayed with her mother until the institution of the claim for support. The wife claimed
SOBREVEGA maltreatment and abandonment by the husband as basis therefore, whereas the husband, in
resisting her demand for maintenance, contended that it was she who left the conjugal dwelling
and, consequently, is not entitled thereto.
● August 14, 1957- Lourdes (petitioner) filed a complaint for support against her husband, Angel
● The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court rendered judgment ordering the latter to give the
plaintiff-wife a monthly support of P150.00, from the date of the filing of the complaint, plus
attorney's fees, and to pay, the costs.
● The trial court, in granting the wife's demand, sustained the theory that she was driven out of the
dwelling or, at least prevented from returning thereto by reason of defendant's maltreatment.
● On appeal by the husband to the Court of Appeals, said decision was reversed and set aside "so that
(in the language of the court) appellant and appellee may again resume cohabitation which they are
hereby admonished to do as their duty as husband and wife."
● The wife filed the instant petition for review of the aforesaid ruling of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: WON Lourdes is entitled to demand for maintenance despite leaving their conjugal dwelling.
Yes. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the infliction of physical injuries on the wife by the husband,
gave rise to their separation. It is likewise shown it was the husband who took his wife to her parents' home
where he left her. The fact that the wife allegedly accepted money from her husband and desisted from
accepting any later, because according to the latter, she was demanding for more, only indicates that even
before the filing of the present case, the defendant-husband was already providing something for the
separate maintenance. Considering that the wife has no income of her own, while the husband has an
employment, the sum of P150.00 fixed by the trial court for the wife's monthly support does not seem to be
unreasonable. Needless to state that, as the separation has been brought about by the husband and under
the circumstances established during the trial, the same shall subsist until a different situation between the
parties shall take place.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and that of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court is hereby revived, without costs. So ordered.

317. Ilusorio vs. Doctrine:

Bildner, G.R. No. A writ of Habeas Corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
139789. May 12, custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. - it is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy
2000 to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
Essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
KANG restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal
Mental incapacity; person about 86 year of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated; soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical conditions but on the capacity
of the individual to discern his actions
Right to privacy; Person of sound mind is possessed with the capacity to make choices, and even as the
choices he makes may not appeal to some of his family members these are choices which exclusively belong
to him.
In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any
penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife; Coverture cannot
be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process.

● Petitions for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
● July 11, 1942 - Erlinda Kalaw (petitioner) and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony ad lived
together for 30 years.
● 1972 - they were separated from bed and board (legally separated) for undisclosed reasons
● They had 6 children namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age
50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
● Due to overdose of drugs that was intook by Potenciano, (200mg of Zoloft depressant) his health
was deteriorated.
● February 25, 1998 - Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the his age (86), frail health, poor eyesight, and impaired judgement.
● Upon Potenciano’s leave with no return, Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of
lawyer Potenciano Illusorio.
● CA denied due course, as it hereby dismissed for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the
subject of the petition and granted Erlinda’s visitation rights.
● October 11, 1999 - Potenciano filed an appeal via certiorari that he never refused to see Erlinda and
their children.
● W/N the wife, ERLINDA ILUSORIO, may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel Potenciano to
live with her

● No. Erlinda Illusario cannot secure a writ of habeas corpus for Potenciano to live with her.
● The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant
of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
● The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of
the individual to discern his actions.
● He did not object to see his children and wife; Court observed that he is in rightful state of mind -
able to make his own rightful choices.
● No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s
free choice.

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs. In G.R. No.
139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives
visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.

2. Designation of domicile

(a) General rule: jointly

FC 69 par. 1, compare with NCC 110, Art. 156

(b) Exception, FC 69 par. 2

318. De la Viña v. Facts:

Villareal, 41 Phil ● September 17, 1917 - Narcisa Geopano (Narcisa) filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
13 at pp. 16-21 the Province of Iloilo against Diego de la Viña (Diego), alleging:
○ That she was a resident of the municipality of Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, and that the
LUNA defendant was a resident of the municipality of Vallehermoso, Province of Oriental Negros
○ That she was the legitimate wife of the defendant, having been married to him in the
municipality of Guijulñgan, Province of Negros Oriental, in the year 1888
○ That since their said marriage plaintiff and defendant had lived as husband and wife and
had nine children, three of whom were living and were already of age
○ That during their marriage plaintiff and defendant had acquired property, real and
personal, the value of which was about P300,000 and all of which was under the
administration of the defendant
○ That since the year 1913 and up to the date of the complaint, the defendant had been
committing acts of adultery with one Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with her and
having her as his concubine, with public scandal and in disgrace of the plaintiff
○ That because of said illicit relations, the defendant ejected the plaintiff from the conjugal
home, for which reason she was obliged to live in the city of Iloilo, where she had since
established her habitual residence
○ That the plaintiff, scorned by her husband, the defendant, had no means of support and
was living only at the expense of one of her daughters. Upon said allegations she prayed for
(a) a decree of divorce, (b) the partition of the conjugal property, and (c) alimony pendente
lite in the sum of P400 per month.
● Narcisa presented a motion, which was later amended, alleging, among other things, that since the
filing of her complaint she had personal knowledge that the defendant was trying to alienate or
encumber the property which belonged to the conjugal partnership
● Diego opposed the said motion for a preliminary injunction, and, subsequently, demurred to the
complaint upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause, "nor
over the person of the defendant."
● Respondent judge, in two separate orders, dated November 1 and November 2, 1917, respectively,
overruled the defendant's demurrer, and granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by the
● April 27, 1918 – Diego filed the present petition for certiorari in this court, upon the ground that the
respondent judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action in question, and had exceeded
his power and authority in issuing said preliminary injunction

Issue: W/N a married woman can acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during
the existence of the marriage.

Held. YES.
As a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is founded upon the
theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that,
from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote,
strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony
prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule. "Under modern laws it
is clear that many exceptions to the rule that the domicile from of the wife is determined by that of her
husband must obtain. Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her
husband where the theorical unity of husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce
proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties
by agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to
cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of
the husband's domicile.

C. Joint management of family life

FC 71, 94 (last par.), 121 (last par.), 122, 146

D. Joint Obligation to Support

FC 70, 194, 94 (1) and (last par.), 121 (1) and (last par.), 146

E. The right to exercise a profession or calling

FC 73 as amended by RA 10572 (May 24, 2013), compare with NCC 117, FC Art. 94 (2), (3); FC Art. 121 (2), (3) Art. II Sec. 14 and
Art. XIII Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution

cf. NCC 113 compare with ROC Rule 3 Sec. 4

cf. R.A. 7192, “An Act Promoting the Integration of Women as Full & Equal Partners of Men in Development and Nation

cf. R.A. 8187, “An Act Granting Paternity Leave...”

RA 9710, Magna Carta of Women

F. Related rights/obligations

319. Republic v FACTS:

Molina, G.R. No. ● Case at bar is a petition for review on certiorari under the Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
108763 February decision of CA affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the RTC of La Trinidad Benguet which
13, 1997 declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio on
the ground of ―psychological capacity (Article 36 of the Family Code)
ARUGAY ● April 14, 1985: marriage of Roridel and Reynaldo, san Agustin Church. Had a son: Andre Molina
● After a year of marriage, Reynaldo:
○ Showed signs of immaturity
○ Squandered his money and preferred to stay with peers and friends
○ Dependent on parents for aid and assistance
○ Never honest with his wife with regards to finances
● February 1986: Reynaldo relieved from work which left Roridel to be the sole breadwinner of the
● October 1986: the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was
● March 1987: Roridel resigned from job in Manila and went to live with parents in Baguio City
● Few weeks later: Reynaldo left Roridel and their child and abandoned them
● Case filed August 16, 1990 (nullity of marriage): Reynaldo psychologically incapable of complying
with essential marital obligations
● Reynaldo claims that misunderstandings were due to:
○ a) Roridels‘s strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her friends even after marriage
○ b) Her refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals
○ c) Roridel‘s failure to run the household and handle their finances
● The ff. were stipulated:
○ Petitioner is not asking for support for her child and her
○ Respondent is not asking for damages
○ Parties are separated in fact for three years
○ Common child of the parties is in custody of the petitioner‘s wife
● Roridel’s witnesses: Friends: Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla; Ruth Lalas a social
worker and Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison (psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital)
● RTC: declaring marriage null and void
● CA: denied appeal of petitioner and affirmed in toto the RTC‘ decision
● SOLICITOR GENERAL: insists that the CA made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase ―psychological incapacity. Opposing and conflicting personalities is not equivalent to
psychological capacity. PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY: is not simply neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties but a defect in their psychological nature which renders
them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties

W/N the marriage should be declared void on the ground of Psychological Incapacity – NO. Petition

1. Justice Vitug: psychological incapacity refers to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage; this condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated
2. It should be characterized by: a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence and c) incurability
3. In the present case:
○ There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity—but
merely a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
○ Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity
○ It is essential to show that the parties are incapable of meeting their marital responsibilities
and not mere failure
○ No gravity in the problem, neither juridical antecedence nor incurability
4. Court invited two amici curiae (Most rev Oscar Cruz and Justice Ricardo Puno) [Molina Doctrine]
a. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff- any doubt
should be resolved in --favor of the validity and continuation of the marriage—permanence,
solidarity and inviolability of marriage
b. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
1. medically or clinically identified;
2. alleged in the complaint;
3. sufficiently proven by experts and
4. clearly explained in the decision—the evidence must convince the court that the
parties or one of them, was mentally or psychologically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
c. The incapacity must be proven existing during the time of the celebration of the marriage
d. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable—
incapacity must be relevant to assumption of marriage obligations not necessarily those not
related to marriage like exercise of profession
e. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage- illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability
and not a refusal, neglect or difficulty much less ill will
f. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts 68-71 of family code (to
husband and wife) and ARTs 220, 221 and 225 (parents and their children)
g. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts—Art 36 taken from the Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law (1983)- what is
decreed to be canonically void be also civilly void
h) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor general to
appear as counsel for the state

320. Yasin v. FACTS:

Shariah Court 241 ● On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a
SCRA (1995) "Petition to resume the use of maiden name"
● The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990, on the
ALMADRO ground that the petition is substantial for change of name and that compliance with the
provisions of Rule 103, Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to
be granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and
● Hence, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court to the instant case.

ISSUE: WON a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of


The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register. While it is
true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official name
recorded in the Civil Register.

The civil register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal purposes, is his real
name. And correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the civil status of persons. A
name given to a person in the church record or elsewhere or by which he is known in the
community — when at variance with that entered in the civil register — is unofficial and cannot be
recognized as his real name.

We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of
the Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.
Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul.

In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead,
prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage
to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.

Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, as follows:
● Art. 45. Definition and forms. — Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage
bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after exhaustion of all possible
means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by: (a) Repudiation of
the wife by the husband (talaq); xxx xxx xxx (c) Judicial decree (faskh).
Thus, Article 54 of PD 1086 provides:
● Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. — A talaq or faskh, as soon as it
become irrevocable, shall have the following effects: (a) The marriage bond shall be
severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with this Code;
The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda
(Art. 56, PD 1086) the duration of which is 3 monthly courses after termination of
the marriage by divorce (Art. 57[b], PD 1083).
Under Article 187, PD 1083, the Civil Code of the Philippines, the Rules of Court and other existing
laws, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Code (the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws), shall be applied suppletorily.

Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil
Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband
(Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372,
Civil Code). Thus, Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides:
● Art. 370. A married woman may use:
○ (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
○ (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
○ (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife,
such as "Mrs." Art. 371.
○ In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she
may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to
continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees
otherwise, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless,
no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In view of such
circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be
applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname.
In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been
alleged supported by competent proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition
for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course
and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.

G. Civil and Criminal Sanctions

H. Enforcement of Rights of Women and Children

Republic Act No. 9262 – Anti-Violence Against Women and Children

321. Sharica Mari FACTS:

Go Tan vs ● Sharica Mari and Steven were married and had 2 children.
Spouses Tan, GR ● 6 years into the marriage, Sharica filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
No. 168852, Sept. protective order (TPO) against Steven and his parents, Spouses Tan.
30, 2008 ○ Steven, in conspiracy with the spouses, was verbally, psychologically, and economically
abusing her in violation of Sec 5, pars e (2) (3) (4), h (5), and i of the RA 9262 or the Anti-
KO Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004 (VAWC).
○ RTC granted the TPO.
● Spouses Tan filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to the issuance of the protection order.
○ RTC lacked jurisdiction over them since, as the parents-in-law, they are not covered by
● Sharica filed a comment on opposition to the the motion to dismiss.
○ The spouses were covered under a liberal interpretation aimed at promoting the protection
and safety of victims of violence.
● RTC: Ruled in favor of Spouses Tan.
○ To include the spouses under the coverage of VAWC would be a strained interpretation of
the provisions of law.

● W/N parents-in-law may be included in a petition under RA 9262 –YES

Sec. 3 of VAWC defines violence against women and their children as “any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.”

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the RPC.

Sec 47 of VAWC expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. — For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.
Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future
may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall
be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws, such as VAWC, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Therefore, general provisions of the RPC which by their nature are necessarily applicable may be applied

In addition, Sec 5 of VAWC expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children
may be committed by an offender through another person.

322. San Diego vs FACTS: Petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated September 13, 2010 2 and October 5,
RTC, G.R. No. 2010 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 which denied
193960, Jan. 07, petitioner's Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.
● That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, the above-named
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS accused, being then the boyfriend of the complainant, . . . did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
y SAN DIEGO, petitioner,
vs. REGIONAL TRIAL feloniously use personal violence [on] the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant's
COURT, BRANCH 59, back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainant's intrinsic worth and
(PAMPANGA), BY ITS dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.
PRESIDING JUDGE ● After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a
warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009.
PROSECUTOR, ANGELES ● August 12, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion
CITY (PAMPANGA); AND to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident, he was no
ABC, respondents.
longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
PERLAS-BERNAB, ● Private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject
J incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had lent to
YNIGUEZ petitioner, but the latter could not pay. She asked if he was responsible for spreading rumors about
her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner which he retaliated to
which he inflicted on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.
● The RTC denied petitioner's motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties' dating
relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a
prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence
against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting the petitioner.
Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. . . .
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered
as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or
her child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating
relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of
such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable
acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating

Finally, the Court Ends the Order 9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days to amend the
Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and the offended party,
to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and October 5,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 are AFFIRMED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is directed to continue with the
proceedings in Criminal CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 Case No. 09-5210. SO ORDERED.

323. Tua v FACTS:

Mangrobang, G.R. ● Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City. They have three
No. 170701, children.
January 22, 2014
● In her Affidavit attached to the petition, respondent claimed, among others, that: a) the petitioner
ZUNO pointed a gun at her to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed; b) when
she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with the latter's presence, petitioner got furious
and threatened her of withholding his financial support; c) petitioner choked her and threatened
physical harm on their children for misbehaving, and; c) while she was at work, petitioner with
companions went to her new home and forcibly took the children.
● The RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).
● Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion, under the CA to lift the TPO. Petitioner denied respondent's
allegations and claimed that she had been a) living with another man; b) left their conjugal abode
and took their children, and; c) was psychologically incapacitated.
● Petitioner contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional for being
violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. He prayed that the enforcement of all orders,
decision to be issued by the RTC and all the proceedings therein be restrained.
● We find that since petitioner is assailing the validity of RA 9262 wherein respondent's right to a
protection order is based upon, the constitutionality of the said law must first be decided upon.
After all, the alleged unconstitutionality of RA 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for
the non-issuance of a protection order.

● WoN issuing a TPO ex parte is violative of the petitioner’s rights to due process, ergo the TPO must
be lifted. - NO

● Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. No. 9262)
● We find no merit to declare RA 9262 unconstitutional.
● The court is authorized to issue a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) on the date of the filing of the
application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Thus, it is within
the court's discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that
the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.
This is clearly stated in R.A. No. 9262, and is not violative of the petitioner’s right to due process.
● It bears stressing that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their
children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very
purpose of the law against Violence Against Women and Children.
● A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
● The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim.
● It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
● WHEREFORE, the petition to lift the TPO is DENIED. The RTC hereby ORDERED to resolve with
dispatch respondent's Petition for a Permanent Protection Order (PPO).

324. BBB v AAA, FACTS:

G.R. No. 193225, ● Both [BBB] (Petitioner) and [AAA] (Respondent) allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date
February 9, 2015 seriously only in 1996. AAA was then a medical student and was raising her first child born from a
previous relationship, a boy named [CCC], with the help of her parents.
MASCARENAS ● [AAA] bore two more children namely, [DDD] (born on December 11, 1997) and [EEE] (born on October
19, 2000)
● October 10, 2002, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights; the birth certificates of the children, including
[CCC’s], was amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.
● According to [BBB], [AAA] has been suspicious of [BBB] and his relationship with his female coworkers,
which [BBB] alleges, are purely professional. Because of their repeated fights, he was forced to leave the
family home to prevent the brewing animosity between him and his wife. Soon after [BBB] left, [AAA]
herself decided to leave the family home and brought the children with her, which made it difficult for
[BBB] to see their kids regularly. This has also caused the family expense to double, making it even more
difficult for [BBB] to fulfill his financial obligations.
● [AAA], on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were often due to [BBB’s] incessant
womanizing. When confronted about it, [BBB], instead of denying the same, would even curse [AAA].
● [BBB’s] alleged mistress, a woman by the name of [FFF], insulted and humiliated [AAA] in public, in the
presence of [BBB] himself, who, according to [AAA], did nothing to stop the same. Extremely hurt, [AAA]
decided to leave the conjugal home with the children and lived temporarily at a friend’s house. She
however went back to the conjugal home with [DDD] and [EEE] after some time, leaving her son [CCC] at
her friend’s house.
● S according to [AAA], [BBB] was biased in favor of [DDD] and [EEE]. That despite his promise to treat [CCC]
as his own, [BBB] would still treat the latter differently from the two kids, putting [CCC] at a disadvantage.
[AAA], cites as example the instances when, [BBB] would buy food and toys for [DDD] and [EEE] only,
buying nothing for [CCC].
● [AAA] discovered that [BBB] was not paying the rentals due on the condominium unit they were
occupying, forcing [AAA] to move out. [AAA] was likewise compelled to find work to support the family,
after [BBB] has started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the family. According to [AAA], the
amounts given by [BBB] were not sufficient to cover the family expenses, forcing her to request for loans
from friends.
● [AAA] alleges that she found out that [BBB] has sought the help of one [GGG], a friend of [BBB] who lives
within the same compound where [AAA] lives, to go through the guard’s logbook to monitor their every
● Temporary Protection Order (TPO) filed on RTC due to economic & Psychological abuse.

RTC Ruling:
TPO given, was made permanent thereafter. Ordered BBB to provide support (62.9k/month)

● BBB petitioned to CA, issuance of the PPO against him, (b) award to AAA of the sole custody over their
children, (c) directives for him to pay attorney’s fees and costs of litigation and to post an excessive
amount of bond, and (d) declaration that he had an abusive character lack factual bases.

CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC, but ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings
who shall be awarded custody of the children.

● W/N acts of VAWC can be compromised- NO
● W/N the RTC should determine who will be awarded the custody of the children. -YES

● Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the issuance of a
TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially
being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA. The rules, however, intend
that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not subjects of compromise agreements. It bears
stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 041011SC20 explicitly prohibits compromise on any act
constituting the crime of violence against women
● Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue
of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. AM No. 10416SC, on the other hand, directs the
referral to mediation of all issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody,
visitation, property relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by
R.A. No. 9262.
● the choices of the children as with whom they would prefer to stay would alter the effects of the PPO.
Hence, this Court affirms the herein assailed PPO relative to who shall be granted custody over the three
children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing
financial support, which are matters the RTC is now directed to determine with dispatch.
● Since the children are now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they
want to stay with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then
the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if any of the three children
would choose to be under BBB’s care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to them is to be
modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of the children who opt
to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial
support BBB should give depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the children. Pursuant
to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBB’s resources and means and the necessities of AAA and the
children are the essential factors in determining the amount of support, and the same can be reduced or
increased proportionately

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution dated
August 3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 89581 are AFFIRMED. The Permanent Protection Order,
dated August 14, 2007, issued against BBB by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162 STANDS except
items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i) thereof. The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to accordingly modify the
aforecited items after determining with dispatch the following: (1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise
custody over the three children; (2) how the parties shall exercise their respective visitation rights; and (3) the
amount and manner of providing financial support.

325. AAA v BBB, FACTS:

G.R. No. 212448, On April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [BBB], being then legally
Jan. 11, 2018 married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit relationship with a
certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph with his purported paramour Lisel Mok and her children
(ABARY) and the e-mailed letter by his mother mentioning about the said relationship, to the damage and prejudice of
MANLONGAT [AAA], in violation of the aforecited law.

● Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two
children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009.
● In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident
status in September of 2008.
● AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no Financial support, and
only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to
augment her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment,
mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse,
BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he
allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB
had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids.

W/N Philippine courts are deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse
under R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place
outside the Philippines?

YES. We say that even if the alleged extramarital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional
anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond
the reach of Philippine courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 and May 2,
2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is ordered REINSTATED.