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Section 1, Rule 115


G.R. NO. 148821

JULY 18, 2003



Jerry Ferrer was charged with rape for having raped his stepdaughter, Mary Grace Pataksil.
When arraigned, Ferrer pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, his counsel, Atty. Mohd Hassan
Macabanding of Public Attornyes Office filed an urgent Motion for Medical Treatment, which
was granted by the court. The court ordered his temporary release and ordered him to submit
the findings and record of his treatment.

On the scheduled pre-trial, however, both the accused and his counsel failed to appear. Because
of repeated failire to appear despite due notice, the court issued a warrant of arrest and
allowed the prosecution to present evidence in absentia. After to present, the court granted the
prosecution's motion to submit the case for decision.


WON the accused had been properly represented as required under Section 1, Rule 115 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.


No. The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in criminal
proceedings should never be taken lightly. It may be stressed that the right to counsel must be
more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard
questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal
assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts
accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings,
particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in
the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an
efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.
Gonzales vs.Salvador

GR No. 168340

December 5, 2006

J. Carpio Morales


Rafael Gonzales filed a complaint against Glen Dale. After posting the necessary cash bond, Dale
filed a petition for Review challenging the resolution of the City Prosecutor's Office. Said
petition and his motion for Reconsideration were denied. Dale then elevated the Resolution to
the Court of Appeals.

As no order was issued, Dale was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. He then filed a Motion to
Quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which motion was granted by the Court on May 29,
2002. 26 days after receiving the May 29, 2002 order, Gonzales filed a Motion (to order the
Public Prosecutor to Amend the Information and to admit said Amended Information)

Gonzales argued that the motion was timely filed since the Rules allow the filing of a new
information within such further time as the court may allow for good cause.


WON Gonzales' motion was timely filed.



It is gathered that petitioner never asserted the propriety of amending the Information, he
having maintained that the allegations in the Information provided sufficient and adequate
bases to confer jurisdiction. When the trial court granted the motion to quash, petitioner did
not assail the same within the reglementary period. The order quashing the Information thus
became final and executory.
The clause denotes no other construction than a plain extension of time. The allowance of
additional time qualifies the period of filing a new information pursuant to an order, and not the
period of issuing an order to file a new information. It presupposes that an order has been
previously issued, as signified by the prior phrase if having been made. As earlier stated, this
order to file another information, if the trial court finds that circumstances warrant its issuance,
must be included in the order granting the motion to quash. The time limitation in the rule was
intended to prevent the accused from being unnecessarily detained at the whim of the
prosecution. Since the order granting the motion to quash had attained finality, it had become

Section 4, Rule 118

People vs. Uy

G.R. No. 128046

March 7, 2000

C.J Davide, Jr.


Ramon Chua Uy was arrested in the course of a buy bust operation and a follow-up search of
his residence, and was subsequently charged with violation of R.A. 6425. When arraigned, Uy
pleaded not guilty in each case. During the pre-trial, the parties agreed on a joint trial and to
dispensed with the testimony of the forensic chemist. They also agreed on the marking of the
exhibits for the prosecution.

The trial court found Uy guilty. On appeal, It submits that without the testimony of NBI forensic
chemist, the prosecution's case falls to pieces and that the chemist's testimony cannot be
waived. He insists that at the pre-trial, he did not waive the testimony of the chemist but only
"stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's evidence".

The OSG, on the other hand, posits that the chemist did not testify anymore because the parties
agreed during the pre-trial to dispensed with his testimony. Uy never objected to the order.
Neither did he move to reconsider it. The facts thus stipulated and Incorporated in the pre-trial
order bound him.


WON the pre-trial binds Ramon Chua Uy


Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON admitted during the pre-trial that Exhibits
"D" to "D-4," inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, the
admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the Joint Order was not signed by
RAMON and his counsel. Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be
signed not only by him but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further
safeguard the rights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or
admissions which his counsel may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have
waived his presence at the pre-trial conference;[36] eliminate any doubt on the conformity of
the accused to the facts agreed upon.[37]

Nevertheless, RAMON cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his counsels signatures
on the pre-trial order. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when
a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal

Section 17, Rule 119

Ampatuan, Jr. Vs. De Lima

G.R. No. 197291

April 3, 2013

J. Bersamin


Datu Andul Ampatuan,Jr. was charged, among others, with 41 counts of murder in relation to
the Maguindanao Massacre. The Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one
Kenny Dalandag who admitted his participation in the planning and execution. Dalandag was
admitted in the Witness Protection Program. Ampatuan then filed a Petition for Mandamus to
compel herein respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima to include Dalandag in the
information for murder.


WON Kenny Dalandag may be included in the information for murder

HELD: no.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state
witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119
of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Act).39 These modes are intended to encourage a person who
has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission to come forward and testify in
court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting him from
reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation.

Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more
of several accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon
motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution
to present evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in
support of the discharge.

The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future
prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in
accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. Accordingly, he
could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which
his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance
with the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for
the crimes.

Section 1, Rule 120

Yao vs. CA

G.R. no. 132428

October 24, 2000

C.J. Davide, Jr.


George Yas was charged before, and convicted by, the MeTC of Caloocan City for unfair
competition. Yao appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City which, in it's one-page
decision, affirmed in Toto the MeTC decision. In so doing, the presiding judge merely quoted the
dispositive portion of the MeTC and stated that after going over evidence on record, the Court
finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of theMeTC.

WON the MeTC decision/judgement is valid



Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by
the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how
it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions
of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y
and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached
and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of
the court for review by a higher tribunal.

Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of
Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier
attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the

Section 7, Rule 120

People vs. Viernes

G.R. Nos. 136733-35

December 13, 2001

J. Panganiban


Eladio Viernes was charged with two counts of rape and one count of attempted rape. The RTC
of Lips City convicted him of the said charges and imposed upon him the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for each of the two counts of rape, and an indeterminate sentence of prision
correccional as minimum and prision mayor as maximum. One day after the promulgation of
the Decision, the prosecution moved for Reconsideration, seeking the imposition of death
penalty for the two counts of rape, and Reclusion Temporal for the attempted rape. The trial
court granted the Motion.

WON the modification of the penalty is proper.



Early on, in People v. Ang Cho Kio, the Court, citing Article 2 of Rule 118 of the pre-1964 Rules of
Court, held that the prosecution cannot move to increase the penalty imposed in a promulgated

Significantly, the present Rules, as amended last year, retained the phrase upon motion of the
accused, as follows:

SEC. 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused,
be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.

Therefore, the assailed Order is erroneous and reversible. The trial court cannot increase the
penalties without the consent of the accused.

Section 6, Rule 121

People vs. Amparado

G.R. No. L-48656

December 21, 1987

J. Fernan


Norman Amparado was found guilty of the crime of murder for the death of one Manuel
Maghanoy. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He now seems a new
trial on the ground of discovery of new and material evidence. The newly discovered evidence
consists of the testimonies of Antonio Cachin, Jr. And Manuel Henry Auza .

In his affidavit, Amparado stated that upon receipt of the decision of the Supreme Court, he
learned that there are two persons present on the road when the stabbing incident occurred.
These two persons, Cachin and Auza, were the ones who rendered aid to Maghanoy; and would
testify on his claim of self-defense. Further, he was told that the alleged eyewitness Rogelio
Patangan, whose version of the crime was given full faith and credence, was not present at the
scene of the crime.


WON there can be a new trial



Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the evidence sought to be presented
are newly-discovered as defined by the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the proposed testimonies
of Antonio Cachin Jr. and Manuel Henry Auza, who aver to be the first persons to render
assistance to the victim immediately after the stabbing incident, if admitted, would tend to
show that the alleged eyewitness Rogelio Patangan, whose version of the crime was given full
faith and credence by the trial court and sustained by this Court, was not present at the scene
of the crime.4 If this is true, then, the version of the prosecution might perforce fail and that of
the defense prevail. Consequently, the judgment of conviction could be reversed, or at the very
least, modified.

Section 1, Rule 125

People vs. Fitzgerald

G.R. No. 149723

October 27, 2006

J. Austria-Martinez

Victor Keith Fitzgerald was charged with, and convicted of, violation of R.A. 7610. Fitzgerald
appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. He then filed a Motion for New Trial on the
ground that a new and material evidence not previously available had surfaced. The CA granted
the motion, and the records of the case were this remanded to the RTC. Fitzgerald filed a
Petition for Bail which was granted by the CA.

The people now sought the nullification of the Resolution, contending that the crime with which
Fitzgerald was charged, is punishable by Reclusion Perpetua, and the evidence of guilt is strong.
It also questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on the motion, considering that the case had
been remanded to the RTC for New trial.


WON the CA has jurisdiction to acton the motion, considering that the case had been remanded
to the RTC for New Trial.



When this Court grants a new trial, it vacates both the judgment of the trial court convicting the
accused and the judgment of the CA affirming it, and remands the case to the trial court for
reception of newly-discovered evidence and promulgation of a new judgment, at times with
instruction to the trial court to promptly report the outcome. The Court itself does not conduct
the new trial for it is no trier of facts.

However, when the CA grants a new trial, its disposition of the case may differ, notwithstanding
Sec. 1, Rule 125 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides for uniformity in
appellate criminal procedure between this Court and the CA. Unlike this Court, the CA may
decide questions of fact and mixed questions of fact and law.Thus, when it grants a new trial
under Sec. 14, Rule 124, it may either (a) directly receive the purported newly-discovered
evidence under Sec. 12, or (b) refer the case to the court of origin for reception of such
evidence under Sec. 15. In either case, it does not relinquish to the trial court jurisdiction over
the case; it retains sufficient authority to resolve incidents in the case and decide its merits.

Section 3, Rule 126

People vs. Lacerna

G.R. No. 109250

September 5, 1997

J. Panganiban


Lacerna was riding a taxicab when PO3 Carlito Valenzuela signalled them to stop as they were
looking suspicious according to the latter. PO3 Valenzuela and his co-police officer asked
permission to search the vehicle, to which Lacerna agreed. When asked about the content of
the knapsack and the dark blue grocery bag, co-accused Noriel Lacerna answered that the bag
contained his vomit.

Skeptical as to the answer, PO3 Valenzuela made a hole in the bag and peeped inside. He found
several blocks wrapped in newspaper, with distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. PO3
Valenzuela opened one of the boxes and saw dried marijuana leaves. Lacerna was charged with
violation of r.a.6425, as amended.

The defense argued that the bricks of marijuana were inadmissible in evidence as they were
obtained through illegal search and seizure. The precipitate arrest and seizure violated their
constitutional rights and the marijuana seized constituted fruits of the poisonous .


WON the search violated the accused's constitutional rights


No. appellant and his baggage were validly searched, not because he was caught in flagrante
delicto, but because he freely consented to the search. True, appellant and his companion were
stopped by PO3 Valenzuela on mere suspicion -- not probable cause -- that they were engaged
in a felonious enterprise. But Valenzuela expressly sought appellants permission for the search.
Only after appellant agreed to have his person and baggage checked did the actual search
commence. It was his consent which validated the search, waiver being a generally recognized
exception to the rule against warrantless search.

In this case, appellant himself who was urbanized in mannerism and speech expressly said that
he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing
wrong. This declaration of appellant is a confirmation of his intelligent and voluntary
acquiescence to the search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally through a
valid search and seizure. They were admissible in evidence; there was no poisonous tree to
speak of.

Section 3, Rule 114

Yap vs. Inopiquez

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1431

May 9, 2003

J. Sandoval-Gutierrez


Complainant SPO2 Jose B. Yap, pursuant to an arrest warrant, arrested Antonio Laurent, Jr. on
March 6, 1999( Saturday). On the same day, respondent judge issued an order of release on the
basis of the cash bond posted on March 8, 1999 was shown by the corresponding official

Also, on March 6, respondent judge issued another order of release, this time based on a
property bond. This bond was subscribed and sworn to before him on March 10, 1999 by
bondsman Antonio Laurente, Sr.


WON respondent judge ordered the release of accused Antonio Laurente, Jr. although the cash
or property bond for his temporary liberty had not yet been posted and approved



We observe that the property bond was subscribed and sworn to by bondsman Antonio
Laurente, Sr. before respondent judge on March 10, 1999 (Wednesday). However, very clear to
the naked eye is that 6 was superimposed on 10th (day of March) to make it appear that the
bail was accomplished and filed on March 6. The jurat positively shows that the property bond,
in lieu of the cash bond, was filed, not on March 6, but on March 10, 1999, or four (4) days after
respondent judge issued his second Order of Release on March 6, 1999.
Therefore, there is no doubt that respondent judge ordered the release of the accused despite
the fact that there was yet no bail filed and approved for his provisional liberty.

Section 17, Rule 114

Inoturan vs. Limsiaco, Jr.

A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362

May 6, 2005

J. Sandoval-Gutierrez


Judge Napoleon Inoturan of RTC br. 133 of Makati City stated that one Mario Balucero was
charged before his court with violation of BP22. However, when the cases were called for
arraignment, Balucero failed to appear despite notice, prompting Judge Inoturan to issue a
bench warrant.

The return of said warrant stated that Balucero was arrested in Bacolod City on December 6,
1996, and that he had posted a property bond before the MCTC of Valladolid-San Enrique-
Pulupandan. Attached to the return was the order of release dated November 21, 1996 signed
by Judge Manuel Limsiaco, Jr.

Judge Inoturan then ordered the Clerk of Court Denilla to forward to his sala the property bond
posted for Balucero. Denilla sent a letter stating that Balucero did not post any property bond
in Judge Limsiaco's court and that he did not receive any copy of the release order. Denilla
referred the letter to Judge Limsiaco who told him that since no documents were submitted by
Balucero, there was nothing to forward to the Makati City.


WON Judge Limsiaco is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for acting without authority in
approving Balucero's application for bail.


It is a dictum that a person applying for bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of liberty.[6] Indeed, bail is unavailing with respect to an accused who has not
voluntarily surrendered or has yet to be placed in legal custody. In this case, respondent judge
issued the Order for the release of accused Balucero on November 21, 1996 or fifteen (15) days
before December 6, 1996, the day he was actually arrested.

Moreover, Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that if the
accused is arrested in a province, city of municipality, other than where the case is pending, bail
may be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. Here,
respondent should not have approved Baluceros application for bail. It is only one of the 14
Branches of the RTC in Bacolod City which has the authority to act thereon.

Clearly, respondent judge blatantly disregarded the Rules and settled jurisprudence tantamount
to gross ignorance of the law.

Section 1, Rule 116

US vs. Jamad

G.R. No. L-12678

December 15, 1917

J. Carson


Moro Jamad was charged with parricide, two murders, and one frustrated murder for killing his
wife, Mora Aring, Isidro Torres, and Juan Labonete, and a frustrated attempt upon the life of
Taclid. Upon arraignment, the accused, under advice of counsel, pleaded guilty.

Notwithstanding the plea of guilt, several witnesses were examined, under the well-settled
practice which contemplates the taking of additional evidence in cases wherein pleas of guilty
are entered into complaints or information charging grave crimes, and more especially in crimes
for which the prescribed penalty is death.


WON the trial court is correct in admitting evidence after a plea of guilty by the accused


Having in mind the danger of the entry of improvident pleas of "guilty" in criminal cases, the
prudent and advisable course, especially in cases wherein grave crimes are charged, is to take
additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the
commission of the crime.

The better practice would indicate that, when practicable, such additional evidence should be
sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilty, or at least to
leave no room for reasonable doubt in the mind of either the trial or the appellate court as to
the possibility of a misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the precise nature of the
charges to which he pleaded guilty.

Victory Liner, Inc. vs. Bellosillo

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321

March 10, 2004

C.J. Davide, Jr.

Judge Reynaldo Bellosilo was the presiding Judge ofOrani, Bataan MCTC and ating Judge in Dinalupihan,
HermosaBataan.One of the bus of Victory Line was cruising along the national highway of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, itaccidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista Moraleswho died a day after. Victory Liner
Bus Inc. shouldered thefuneral and burial of Marciana Morales and entered into an Agreement with the
heirs of Marciana Morales. Upon the payment of VLI to the heirs ofMarciana Morales they executed
PINAGSAMANG SALAYSAYbetween VLI and the heirs executed Release of Claimand affidavit of Desistance
in favour of VLI and Reino dela Cruz,driver of VLI.

However, 2 of the sons of Marciana Morales who are also a signatories in the executed agreement with
VLIalready filed a criminal case against the driver Rieno dela Cruzof the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. After the Preliminary examination, Judge Bellosillo ordered the issuance of
warrant of arrest of Dela Cruzand fixed his bail of P50k in cash and ordered the Chief ofPolice of Bataan
to impound the bus involved in the accidentwhich could be released only upon posting bail of P50k. VLI
paid cash bond under protest and upon showing the official recipt to the chief of police theimpounded
of bus was released. Again, the Judge ordered the Chief of Police to explain in writing why did they
released the bus without court order. The bus was re-impounded by virtue of Judge BEllisillo’s order.

VLI filed with Office of the Court ofAdministration against Judge Belosillo claiming his ignorance of the
law for impounding the bus and requiredVLI to post bond for the release , gravely abused his
authoritywhen it revoked the srety bond of driver Edwin Serrano, rendered unjust and oppressive order
when heordered the bail to be increased from 50k to 350k and requiredit to be posted in cash, guilty of
inaction for failing toresolve the petitiuon of VLI despite of the time lapse .The respondent justifies his
action in his comment, that thebail he required for VLI was to pay the damagaes by way ofsubsidiary
liability in case of insolvency, the cash requirementfor bail according to him was required for it was the
prayer ofthe prosecution and it is his iscretion as Judge as to what for ofpayment of the bail as per the
Rules of Court., the increase bail from 50k to 350k was ordered because the driver was already a fugitive.


WON the imposition of cash bond and requiring the accused to pay in cash tantamount to grave abuse
of authority, gross ignorance of the law, excessive bail , unjust and oppressive



In fixing the amount of bail, the judge must primarily consider the factors enumerated in
Section 9, Rule 114.

The amount of bail should, therefore, be reasonable at all times. It should be high enough to
assure the presence of the accused when required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated
to serve this purpose. Excessive bail shall not be required. In implementing this mandate, the
accuseds financial capability should particularly be considered. What is reasonable to a wealthy
person may not be so to a man charged with a like offense. Where the right to bail exists, it
should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.

While cash bail is authorized under our rules, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond
primarily belongs to the accused,as can be gleaned from the language of Section 14, Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended.

The respondent judge, therefore, grossly erred in converting Serranos surety bond to cash bond
and in demanding that De la Cruz post a cash bond to obtain their provisional liberty.