[People vs Antonio Lauga, G.R. No.
186228, Social Justice Society vs
March 15, 2010]
Facts:
Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape
committed against his 13-year old daughter.
One of the witnesses for the prosecution was
Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the
barangay. Banting testified that after his
assistance was sought, he proceeded to
Lauga's house and found the latter wearing
only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the
police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the
police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he
raped his daughter AAA because he was
unable to control himself. Lauga contested
the admissibility in evidence of his alleged
confession with Banting. He argues that even
if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy
Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession
was inadmissible in evidence because he was
not assisted by a lawyer and there was no
valid waiver of such requirement.
Issue:
Is the extrajudicial confession made before a
bantay bayan without the assistance of a
lawyer admissible in evidence?
Held:
No. Bantay bayan is a group of male residents
living in the area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community. Barangay-
based volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay
bayan,” are recognized by the local
government unit to perform functions
relating to the preservation of peace and order
at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on
the legality of the actions taken by Moises
Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties
and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay
bayan,” particularly on the authority to
conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry
he makes has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional
rights provided for under Article III, Section
12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as
the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore,
the extrajudicial confession of appellant
taken without counsel was inadmissible in
evidence.
Atienza (2008)
FACTS:
Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS) et.al.
filed a petition against Hon. Jose L. Atienza,
Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027, reclassifying
the Oil Depot in Pandacan Terminal, from
industrial to commercial area and to cease
and desist from operating their businesses
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Oil companies, Chevron, Shell, Petron as
well as DOE sought to intervene and asked
for the nullification of said ordinance. The
oil companies assert that they have a legal
interest in this case because the
implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will
directly affect their business and property
rights. They allege that they stand to lose
billions of pesos if forced to relocate.
On the other hand, the Committee on
Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila who
recommended the approval of the ordinance
cited:
1. The depot facilities contained 313.5
million liters of highly flammable
and highly volatile products which
include petroleum gas, liquefied
petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel,
gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil
among others;
2. The depot is open to attack through
land, water or air;
3. It is situated in a densely populated
place and near Malacañang Palace
and
4. In case of an explosion or
conflagration in the depot, the fire
could spread to the neighboring
communities.
ISSUE:
Whether the enactment of the ordinance a
legitimate exercise of Police Power.
HELD:
Yes. The ordinance was intended to
safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and
not just of a particular class.
In the exercise of police power, property
rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government. Otherwise
stated, the government may enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare.However, the
interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the
methods or means used to protect public
health, morals, safety or welfare must have a
reasonable relation to the end in view.
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting
for their right to property. They allege that
they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced
to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy
of constitutionally protected rights, the right
to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state
or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes
with a few individuals’ right to property, the
former should prevail.
SC reiterated the enforcement of Ordinance
No. 8027
G” Holdings, Inc., v. National Mines and Allied
Workers Union Local 103 (NAMAWU)
G.R. No. 160236, October 16, 2009
Facts:
NAMAWU was the exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees of Maricalum
Mining Corporation (MMC), an entity operating a
copper mine and mill complex. MMC was
incorporated by the DBP and PNB on account of their
foreclosure of MMC’s assets. Later, DBP and PNB
transferred it to the National Government for
disposition or privatization because it had become a
non-performing asset.
On October 1992, pursuant to a Purchase
and Sale Agreement (PSA) executed between
petitioner and APT, petitioner brought 90% of MMC’s
shares and financial claims. Upon signing of PSA and
full satisfaction of the stipulated down payment,
petitioner immediately took physical possession of
the mine and its facilities and took full control of the
management and operation of MMC.
Four years after, a labor dispute arose
between MMC and NAMAWU with the latter filing
with the NCMB of a notice of strike. LA ruled in favor
of NAMAWU. It ruled that the lay-off implement by
MMC is illegal and it committed ULP. On petition
with this Court, we sustained the decision of LA. A
partial writ of execution was issued. The writ was not
fully satisfied because of MMC’s resisted its
enforcement.
On October 2002, GHI filed with RTC a
Special Civil Action for Contempt with issuance of
TRO. GHI contented that the property were subject
of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage
executed MMC in favor of petitioner. RTC issued a
TRO. On appeal to CA, CA set aside the RTC issuance
of writ. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether RTC can validly issued TRO to
prevent the execution issued by labor tribunal.
Ruling:
It is settled that a RTC can validly issue a TRO
and, later, a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent
enforcement of a writ of execution raised by a labor
tribunal on the basis of a third-party’s claim of
ownership over the properties levied upon. While, as
a rule, no temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order in any case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute shall be issued by any court – where
the writ of execution issued by a labor tribunal is
sought to be enforced upon the property of a stranger
to the labor dispute, even upon a mere prima facie
showing of ownership of such claimant – a separate
action for injunctive relief against such levy may be
maintained in court, since said action neither involves
nor grows out of labor disputes insofar as the third
party is concerned.
Petition is granted.
G.R. No. 177809 October 16, 2009
SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP vs. ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA
DOCTRINE:
 Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory
or discretionary on the courts.
 The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by
courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt
on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative.
 Judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
 within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be
assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.

FACTS:

Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane

Building, a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue
corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City.
Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages
against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses
Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over
two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by
Spouses Latip. A year after the commencement of the lease and
with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie,
through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of
back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased
cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie’s demand, she
instituted the aforesaid complaint. Spouses Latip asseverated that
sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights
over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk
sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted
Rosalie’s offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which
was still under construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip,
the immediate payment of ₱2,570,000.00 would be used to finish
construction of the building giving them first priority in the
occupation of the finished cubicles.Spouses Latip averred that the
contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase
of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to
receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel and the subsequent
filing of a complaint against them.

MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie.RTC reversed the MeTC

and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence
to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all
other substantial aspects, incomplete. CA reversed the RTC and
reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract
of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not
notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC
had, the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in the contract
of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of
whether the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment
of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common
practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the
Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial
notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the
stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill
money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Spouses
Latip then filed the present appeal.

ISSUE:

WON the judicial notice is proper

HELD:

NO. Judicial notice does not meet the requisite of notoriety.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the
taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts.

The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion

of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised
by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative (State Prosecutors v.
Muro )