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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15079 January 31, 1962

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
GUILLERMO I. VENTURA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.


Claro M. Recto for defendant-appellant.

BENGZON, C.J.:

Statement. —This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal finding Guillermo I. Ventura guilty of illegal practice of
medicine under Section 770 in connection with Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative Code, and sentencing him, this being his second offense,
to pay a fine in the sum of P500.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay costs.

Appellant, the accused, was charged with the above offense in an information which alleged that in February, 1955, he did, .

"willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and for compensation and reward, practice medicine in the said City (Pasay) by treating and applying
electrical appliances to patients for the purpose of curing them with their ailments, diseases, pains, and physical defects from which they are
suffering and by holding out himself to the public by means of signs, advertisements, and other means, to be a Doctor of Medicine."

Facts. — lower court found, as facts, the following:

"... in the year 1949, the accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, was convicted by the court of first instance of Rizal of a 'similar offense' or illegal
practice of medicine in the municipality of Pasay, now Pasay City and sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 under the same legal provisions, or Section
770 in connection with Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative Code.

"... by reason of certain complaints the National Bureau of Investigation had received from the President of the Philippine Federation of Private
Medical Practitioners and from the Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners, the National Bureau of Investigation on December 16, 1955, sent
its morgue attendant Jose Natayan to the clinic of the accused at No. 2454 M. de la Cruz Street, Pasay City. Natayan was at that time suffering from
pains in his back and he asked the accused to see his sickness. The accused attended to Natayan; wrote something on a piece of paper; and then he
told him that he (Natayan) 'was sick of lumbago'. Thereupon, the accused asked Natayan to pay P5.00 and then asked him to pay the amount to a
lady employee in the clinic which Natayan did. At the request of the accused, Natayan, then went around the other side of the clinic where he was
given an enema of hot water by a male attendant. Then Natayan was asked to lie down on a table where his back was exposed to a big bulb for
around fifteen minutes and afterwards to a red colored bulb for another ten minutes. Thereafter Natayan went back to the accused, who told him
to come back to his clinic for six consecutive days. After that Natayan went back on the same day or December 16, 1955 to his office in the National
Bureau of Investigation.

The following day, Natayan returned to the clinic of the accused with the National Bureau of Investigation raiding party composed of two agents,
two attorneys and one photographer. After he was dropped by the National Bureau of Investigation agents about seven meters away from the
clinic of the accused, Natayan proceeded to the office of the accused, who then and there told him that another treatment would be applied to him
and that he would pay P3.00. After paying this amount and while Natayan was lying on a table about to be given treatment the National Bureau of
Investigation agents raided the place.

The accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, is not a duly registered masseur or a physician qualified to practice medicine.

Issues. —Appellant seeks a reversal here of aforementioned judgment of conviction on the grounds: (1) that the offense charged in the information
had already prescribed; (2) that the laws involved are unconstitutional and void; (3) that granting that the said laws are valid, the accused should
not have been prosecuted thereunder because he was not engaged in the practice of medicine; (4) that Congress, in passing House Bills Nos. 2405
and 357 recognized and believed in the efficacy of the drugless systems of healing and although said bills were vetoed by the President of the
Philippines and thereby did not become regular statutes, they may be considered as concurrent resolutions formally establishing the drugless
system of healing as a separate and distinct profession, not covered by Section 770 of the Medical Law; (5) that the complainants and the
Government are estopped from prosecuting the accused under Section 770 because they were the ones who induced him to practice drugless
healing after his conviction in 1949; and (6) that the accused has an implied license to practice drugless healing from the people of the Philippines
and the Chairman of the Medical Board of Examiners.

Discussion. — Appellant, testifying on his behalf admitted that for the past 35 years, he had been practicing as a naturopathic physician, "treating
human ailments without the use of drugs and medicines" and employing in his practice "electricity, water and hand" without a license to practice
medicine; that during this time he had treated 500,000 patients, more or less about 90% of whom were healed, and that he had studied drugless
healing in the American University, Chicago, Illinois for about four years.

Invoking prescription, he argues that in view of the fact that he had begun the alleged practice of medicine thirty five years ago without the
required license, the crime charged in the information had already prescribed. 1

The records reveal that the accused began practicing his method of drugless healing 35 years ago. This practice was first discovered by the
authorities in 1949. He was prosecuted and convicted therefor the same year. Sometime after he again set up a clinic. He had a lucrative clientele
and nobody bothered him.1äwphï1.ñët

However, at about February, 1955, the President of the Philippine Federation of Private Medical Practitioners, complained to the National Bureau
of Investigation that appellant was advertising himself as capable of treating human ailments without drugs. Upon investigation, appellant was
found to be without certificate of registration to practice such profession either from the Board of Medical Examiners or from the Committee of
Examiners of Masseurs. So, this prosecution started in 1956. It is clear that the four-year period of prescription of the offense charged should be
computed from February, 1955 when the National Bureau of Investigation discovered appellant's alleged illegal practice of Medicine.

Appellant also questions the constitutionality of Section 770 in relation to Section 775 of the Revised Administrative Code. It is appellant's theory
that to require, of any person whose business is merely to stimulate by mechanical means the nerves of the body, many years of study in medical
schools, taking up obstetrics, general surgery, gynecology, bacteriology and many other sciences, is curtailment of the exercise of one's calling, a
violation of the constitutional principle that all men have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and are entitled to the equal
protection of the law. It is furthermore theorized that inasmuch as drugless healing is not taught in any of the medical schools prescribed, how
could the members of the Medical Board of Examiners pass on the competence of these drugless healers? .

This same contention was presented to and settled by this Court in the case of People vs. Buenviaje who was convicted of illegal practice of
medicine for practicing chiropractor.2 It held:

There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an examination is required relate to matters of which a thorough knowledge seems
necessary for the proper diagnosis of diseases of the human body and it is within the police power of the State to require that persons who devote
themselves to the curing of human ills should possess such knowledge.

In the instant case, we must again uphold these immutable concepts of the police power of the State. Under this power, the State may prescribe
such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequences of
ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has been the practice of different States, from time
immemorial to exact in any pursuit, profession or trade, a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently rely, their
possession being generally ascertained in an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a
diploma or license from an institution established for instruction on the subjects, scientific or otherwise, with which such pursuits have to deal.3

Appellant claims that his act of stimulating the affected nerves of the patients without use of any drug or medicine is not practice of medicine; that
"practice of medicine" is confined only to the systems taught by the medical schools, namely, the regular, the homeopathic and the eclectic schools
or systems.

Section 770 of the Revised Administrative Code in no uncertain terms covers appellant's acts. The statutory definition as to what acts constitute
illegal practice of medicine its provided in said Section 770 includes the acts and practices performed by appellant, By his own statements, he
admitted to have continuously diagnosed and treated more or less 500,000 instances of different kinds of human ailments and to have prescribed
remedies therefor.

As regards the contention that there are at least two concurrent resolutions declaring formally that Congress has recognized the drugless methods
of healing, we need not elaborate further than to say that not until such recognition is actually embodied in a statute, shall we extend
consideration of such method.

Appellant pleads that the lower court erred in not holding that the complainants and the government are estopped from prosecuting him because
they were the ones who induced him to practice drugless healing after his conviction in 1949. He tried to show that medical practitioners, members
of Congress, provincial governors, city mayors and municipal board members wrote to him requesting his help for persons suffering from all kinds
of ailments; that municipal ordinances and resolutions were also passed authorizing him not only to practice his method of healing but also to put
up clinics in some of municipalities; that he was even extended free transportation facilities to work in the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala,
Caloocan, Rizal.

Above plea cannot be sustained by this Court. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the government. 4 It is never stopped by mistakes or
errors on the part of its agents, even assuming without conceding that said municipalities had encouraged appellant's practice. We cannot allow
the bargaining away of public health and safety for the semblance of benefit to a few government officials, people or even municipalities.

Similarly, there is no such thing as implied license to practice drugless healing by the mere fact that the Chairman of the Board of Medical
Examiners had permitted appellant to serve free in the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan, Rizal, or that countless people persisted in
engaging his services. For one thing, these people might have contracted his services on the mistaken notion that he was duly licensed to practice
his profession; for another, a repetition of illegal acts can never make them legal.
As additional argument, appellant urges acquittal under the new Medical Act of 19595 wherein the practice of physiotherapy is recognized as a
distinct science. He claims coverage of said law on the ground that he practices physiotherapy by massage through physical devices and upon the
recommendation of duly registered physicians.

The above argument has no merit because there is strong evidence to the effect that appellant alone diagnoses his patients' ailments and applies
the remedies therefor6 without written order or prescription by a registered physician.

Judgment. — Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all parts and respects. Costs against appellant.

G.R. No. L-22945 March 3, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOVITA V. BUENVIAJE,Defendant-Appellant.

Francisco and Lualhati and Ariston Rivera for appellant.


Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

The defendant is accused of the violation of the Medical Act, the information alleging "that on or about the first day of June, 1923, and for some
time prior to said date, the said accused without having obtained from the Board of Medical Examiners the corresponding certificate of registration
for the practice of medicine in the Philippine Islands, voluntarily, illegally and criminally and for compensation, practiced medicine in the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, assisting, treating and manipulating the head and body of Regino Noble for the purpose of curing him of the ailments,
diseases, pains and physical defects from which he pretended to suffer, and advertising and offering her services as a physician, by means of cards
which she distributed and by letterheads and signs which she exposed on the door of her office, situated at No. 712 Calle Asuncion, and in
newspapers which are published and circulated in the City of Manila, in which cards, letterheads, signs and advertising she added and prefixed to
her name the letters `Dra.,' which is the abbreviation of the word `doctor,' for the purpose of causing the public to believe that she, the said
defendant, had received the corresponding title of doctor."chanrobles virtual law library

To this information the defendant demurred in the court below on the grounds: (1) That it stated more than one offense, and (2) that it was not
drawn in accordance with the form prescribed by law. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant pleaded not
guilty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

At the trial of the case the defendant made the following admissions: "That on the first of June, 1923, she had no certificate from the Board of
Medical Examiners authorizing her to practice medicine in the Philippine Islands; that on that day she treated and manipulated the head and body
of Regino Noble in order to cure him of ailments from which he pretended to suffer, the treatment consisting in a `thrust' by means of the
application of the hand to the spinal column; that she for such treatment received and collected from said Regino Noble the sum of P1; that the
said treatment took place in her office situated at No. 712 Calle Asuncion, District of Binondo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands; that she on or
about the first day of June, 1923, and for some time prior to that date, advertised herself as a `doctor of chiropractic,' in said City of Manila, said
advertisement appearing upon her business cards and in the newspaper `El Debate,' in its issue of April 29, 1923, edited and published in Manila
and in which cards and newspaper advertisement the defendant prefixed the abbreviation `Dra.' to her name; that she was graduated a doctor in
chiropractic on the 13th day of August, 1919, as evidenced by a certificate marked Exhibit I and issued by the American University School of
Chiropractic of Chicago, Illinois."chanrobles virtual law library

Upon this admission and some other evidence to the same effect, the trial court found the defendant guilty as charged in the information and, in
accordance with section 2678 of the Administrative Code, sentenced her to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs. From this judgment the defendant appeals to this court and presents four assignments of
error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

I. In the first assignment of error counsel contends that the demurrer to the information should have been sustained on the ground that said
information charged more than one offense. The Medical Law is contained in sections 758 to 783 of the Administrative Code and it is argued that
inasmuch as some of the illegal acts with which the defendant is charged are prohibited by section 770 of the Code and others by section 783, the
defendant is in reality accused of two separate and distinct offenses, namely, illegal practice of medicine and illegally representing oneself as a
doctor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We cannot accept this view. It may be noted that the Medical Law itself, as it appears in the Administrative Code, does not declare any of the
therein prohibited acts penal offenses. The penal provisions relating thereto are contained in section 2678 of the Code, which reads as follows:

SEC. 2678. Violation of Medical Law. - A person violating any provision of the Medical Law shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more
than three hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The offense here penalized is "violation of the Medical Law." The statute makes no distinction between illegal practice of medicine and illegally
advertising oneself as a doctor. Both are in violation of the Medical Law and carry the same penalty. They are merely different ways or means of
committing the same offense and both of these means are closely related to each other and usually employed
together.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In these circumstances and where, as alleged in the information in the present case, the various violations have taken place simultaneously, we do
not think it was the intention of the legislator that each single act should be regarded as a separate offense and separate informations presented
for each. The language of this court in the case of United States vs. Poh Chi (20 Phil., 140), in regard to the Opium Law, is opposite to the present
case.

It is true that the Commission has provided a certain punishment for the possession of a pipe used in the smoking of opium, for the smoking of
opium, as well as a punishment for the illegal possession of opium, but it is not believed that it was the intention of the legislature to have separate
complaints filed against a person who was found in the illegal possession of opium and a pipe at the same time. If that were true then every person
who was found to be smoking opium could be charged in three different complaints: First, with the illegal possession of the pipe; second, the illegal
possession of the opium; and third, for smoking the opium. Certainly the legislature did not intend any such consequences.

In the case of United States vs. Douglass (2 Phil., 461), the court said:

It is not objectionable, when a single offense may be committed by the use of different means, to charge, in the alternative, the various means by
which the crime may have been committed. (U.S. vs. Potter, 27 Fed. Cases, 604; Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, sec. 434.)

The same rule was followed in the case of United States vs. Dorr (2 Phil., 332); United States vs. Tolentino (5 Phil., 682); and United States vs.
Gustilo (19 Phil., 208) and is in harmony with the views of the courts in other jurisdictions. That the various means of committing the offense is
described in more than one section of the statute does not necessarily effect the general principle involved; the subdivision of a statute into section
is merely a matter of convenience and while it sometimes may be of some aid in ascertaining the legislative intent, it is, of course, not conclusive
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

II. Under the second assignment of error the appellant argues in substance that chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that the practice
of that profession can therefore not be regarded as practice of medicine. There is no merit whatever in this contention. Assuming without
conceding that chiropractic does not fall within the term "practice of medicine" in its ordinary acceptation, we have the statutory definition
contained in section 770 of the Administrative Code and which clearly includes the manipulations employed in chiropractic. The statutory definition
necessarily prevails over the ordinary one.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Under the same assignment of error the defendant also argues that the examination prescribed by section 776 of the Administrative Code for
admission to the practice of medicine, embraces subjects which have no connection with chiropractic and that to require chiropractors to take that
examination is unreasonable and, in effect amounts to prohibition of the practice of their profession and therefore violates the constitutional
principle that all men have the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and are entitled to the equal protection of the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an examination is required by section 778 of the Administrative Code, as amended
by Act No. 3111, relate to matters of which a thorough knowledge seems necessary for the proper diagnosis of diseases of the human body and it is
within the police power of the State to require that persons who devote themselves to the curing of human ills should possess such knowledge.
(State vs. Edmunds, 127 Iowa, 333; 69 L.R.A., 504; Underwood vs. Scott, 43 Kan., 714; People vs. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill., 370; State vs. Mylod,
20 R. I., 632; 41 L.R.A., 428; Stewart vs. Raab, 55 Minn., 20; Matthei vs. Wooley, 69 Ill. App., 654; State vs. Buswell, 40 Neb., 158; 24 L.R.A., 68;
O'Connor vs. State, 46 Neb., 157; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)chanrobles virtual law library

III. The third assignment of error is closely related to the foregoing. The appellant contends that the prohibition in section 783 against the
unauthorized use of the title "doctor" must be understood to refer to "Doctor of Medicine" and has no application to doctors of chiropractic. Under
different circumstances that might possibly be so, but where, as here, chiropractic is by statute made a form of the practice of medicine, it
necessarily follows that a person holding himself out as a doctor of chiropractic in legal effect represents himself as a doctor of
medicine.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

IV. In her fourth assignment of error the appellant attacks the constitutionality of Act No. 3111, amending section 770 of the Administrative Code,
on the ground that the subject of the Act is not sufficiently expressed in its title and that it embraces more than one subject. There is no merit in
this contention. The title of Act No. 3111 reads as follows:

An Act to amend sections seven hundred and fifty-nine, seven hundred and sixty, seven hundred and sixty-one, seven hundred and sixty-two, seven
hundred and sixty-five, seven hundred and sixty-seven, seven hundred and seventy, seven hundred and seventy-four, seven hundred and seventy-
five, seven hundred and seventy-six, seven hundred and seventy-eight, seven hundred and eighty, seven hundred and eighty-two, seven hundred
and eighty-three, and twenty-six hundred and seventy-eight of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative
Code, increasing the number of the members of the Board of Medical Examiners, conferring upon the same certain additional powers and
responsibilities and for other purposes.

All of the sections enumerated in the title quoted relate to the same general subject, namely, defining and regulating the practice of medicine, and
section 770 is expressly mentioned as one of the sections amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This is sufficient. Under constitutional provisions similar to ours the general rule is that a title which declares the amendatory statute to be an act
to amend a designated section or the like of a specified Code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory Act need not be further stated.
(Ross vs. Aguirre, 191 U.S., 60; Udell vs. Citizens Street R. Co., 152 Ind., 507; McGuire vs. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340; Lankford vs. County
Commissioners of Somerset County, 73 Md., 105; Tabor vs. State, 34 Tex. Crim., 631; Com. vs. Brown, 91 Va., 762.) For a full and authoritative
discussion of this subject, see Note to Lewis vs. Dunne, 55 L.R.A., 833. See also Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan
and Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia (32 Phil., 634) and Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad (p. 385, ante).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

We find no error in the judgment appealed from and the same is therefore affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 89095 & 89555 November 6, 1989

SIXTO P. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,


vs.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SPOUSES SHOJI YAMADA and MICHIYO YAMADA and SPOUSES TOMOTADA ENATSU and EDITA
ENATSU, respondents.

Salma Pir T. Rasul, Rosalinda L. Santos and A.E. Dacanay for petitioner.

Gonzales, Batiller Law Offices for respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres and Evangelista for Spouses Tomotada and Edita Enatsu.

Lino M. Patajo for Spouses Shoji and Michiyo Yamada.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

In his petition for certiorari, 1 the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the en banc resolution dated February 14, 1989 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in SEC EB Case No. 191 and the concurring opinions thereto (Annexes F, G, and H, pp. 39-62, Rollo), as well as its orders
dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (Annexes M and 0, pp. 83-86, Rollo) directing the corporate secretary of the United Doctors Medical Center,
Inc. (hereafter "UDMC") to call a special meeting of the stockholders to elect the officers and directors in the implementation of the SEC's
aforementioned en banc resolution of February 14, 1989, which the Court of Appeals affirmed in its decision dated June 8, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No.
17435, entitled "Sixto Crisostomo, petitioner vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, Spouses Dr. Shoji Yamada and Michiyo Yamada, and Spouses
Dr. Tomotada Enatsu and Edita Enatsu, respondents." On August 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied Crisostomo's motion for reconsideration of
its decision. On August 24, 1989, he filed a petition for review of said decision in this Court (G.R. No. 89555) which was originally assigned to the
Third Division, but was later consolidated with G.R. No. 89095.

At first blush, the petitions sound like a patriotic defense of the Constitution, but, at bottom they are only an artful scheme to defraud a group of
foreign investors who had been persuaded by the officers of UDMC to invest P57 million to save the corporation (its assets as well as those of the
Crisostomo's) from imminent foreclosure by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to which UDMC was indebted in the sum of P55
million. It is the kind of operation that sullies our collective image as a people and sets back our government's heroic efforts to attract foreign
investments to our country.

The antecedent facts, culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Sixto Crisostomo, Felipe Crisostomo (deceased), Veronica Palanca, Juanito Crisostomo, Carlos Crisostomo, Ricardo Alfonso, Regino Crisostomo and
Ernesto Crisostomo (known as the Crisostomo group) were the original stockholders of the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) which was
organized in 1968 with an authorized capital stock of P1,000,000 (later increased to P15,000,000 in 1972). They owned approximately 40% of
UDMC's outstanding capital stock, while the 60% majority belonged to the members of the United Medical Staff Association (UMSA), numbering
approximately 150 doctors and medical personnel of UDMC.

Despite their minority status, the Crisostomo group has managed UDMC from its inception, with Juanito Crisostomo as president, Ricardo Alfonso,
Sr. as chairman of the board, Carlos Crisostomo as corporate secretary and Sixto Crisostomo as director and legal counsel.

In 1988, UDMC defaulted in paying its loan obligation of approximately P55 million to the DBP. In the last quarter of 1987, UDMC's assets
(principally its hospital) and those of the Crisostomos which had been given as collateral to the DBP, faced foreclosure by the Asset Privatization'
rust (APT), which had taken over UDMC's loan obligation to the DBP.

To stave off the threatened foreclosure, UDMC, through its principal officers, Ricardo Alfonso and Juanito Crisostomo, persuaded the Yamadas and
Enatsu (Shoji Yamada and Tomotada Enatsu are Japanese doctors) to invest fresh capital in UDMC. The wife of Tomotada Enatsu, Edita Enatsu, is a
Filipina. They invested approximately P57 million in UDMC.
The investment was effected by means of: (1) a Stock Purchase Agreement; and (2) an Amended Memorandum of Agreement whereby the group
subscribed to 82.09% of the outstanding shares of UDMC.

Both transactions were duly authorized by the board of directors and stockholders of UDMC. They were submitted to, scrutinized by, and, finally,
approved by the Board of Investments, the Central Bank of the Philippines, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The elaborate
governmental approval process was done openly and with full knowledge of all concerned, including Sixto Crisostomo, the corporate legal counsel.
Upon the completion of the governmental approval process, shares of stock, duly signed by UDMC's authorized officers, were issued to the
Yamadas and Enatsus.

This capital infusion not only saved the assets of the UDMC (especially the hospital) from foreclosure but also freed the Crisostomos from their
individual and solidary liabilities as sureties for the DBP loan.

As it had been agreed in the Amended Memorandum of Agreement between UDMC and the Japanese group that upon the latter's acquisition of
the controlling interest in UDMC, the corporation would be reorganized, a special stockholders' meeting and board of directors' meeting were
scheduled to be held on August 20, 1988.

However, on the eve of the meetings, i.e., on August 19, 1988, Sixto Crisostomo, supposedly acting for himself, filed SEC Case No. 3420 against
Juanito Crisostomo, Ricardo Alfonso, Shoji Yamada, Michiyo Yamada, Tomotada Enatsu and Edita Enatsu, praying, among other things, (1) to stop
the holding of the stockholder's and board of directors' meetings; (2) to disqualify the Japanese investors from holding a controlling interest in
UDMC and from being elected directors or officers of UDMC; and (3) to annul the Memorandum of Agreement and Stock Purchase Agreement
because they allegedly did not express the true agreement of the parties (pp. 194-203, Rollo).

Two weeks later, on September 2, 1988, Crisostomo filed Civil Case No. 88-1823 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, where he also
sought a preliminary injunction and the Identical reliefs prayed for by him in SEC Case No. 3420 (pp. 317-335, Rollo). It was dismissed by the trial
court for lack of jurisdiction and is pending appeal in the Court of Appeals where it is docketed as CA-G.R. No. 20285-CV.

On September 13, 1988, the hearing officer, Antonio Esteves, granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents

... from holding the special meeting of the stockholders and of the Board of Directors of United Doctors Medical Center, [Inc.] (UDMC) scheduled
on August 20, 1988 or any subsequent meetings; from adopting resolutions to elect new directors and appoint new officers; from approving
resolutions directly or indirectly affecting the operations, organizational structure, and financial condition of the corporation, ... and from
disbursing funds of the said corporation except those ordinary day-to-day expenses pending the final termination of this case. (p. 30, Rollo.)

The private respondents' motion for reconsideration of this order was denied by the hearing officer on November 16, 1988. In the same order, he
created a management committee to administer UDMC (pp. 32-35, Rollo).

The respondents appealed by certiorari to the SEC en banc. On February 14,1989, Commissioner Jose C. Laureta, with whom Commissioners
Rosario N. Lopez and Gonzalo T. Santos separately concurred, set aside the preliminary injunction issued by Esteves and the management
committee which he created. The dispositive part of the decision reads:

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the Commission en banc ORDERS:

1. That the questioned orders of the hearing officer in SEC Case No. 3420 of September 13, 1988 and November 16, 1988, be immediately vacated;

2. That a special stockholders' meeting of UDMC be held for the purpose of allowing the stockholders of record of the corporation to elect a new
board of directors, which special meeting is hereby directed to be scheduled within 10 days from receipt of a copy of this resolution by the
incumbent corporate secretary or acting corporate secretary of UDMC, and to this end, that such officer be, as he hereby is, directed: (a) to issue a
call for such special meeting and serve notice thereof on all stockholders of record of the corporation, in accordance with section 6 of article VII of
UDMC's by-laws; and (b) to submit to the Commission, through the Commission Secretary, a written report of his compliance with this particular
order of the Commission, not later than 5 days prior to the scheduled date of the proposed UDMC special stockholders' meeting;

3. That upon the election of a new board of directors of UDMC, that such board be, as it hereby is, enjoined to meet as promptly as possible for the
purpose of electing a new set of officers of the corporation in order to ensure its proper management;

4. That the hearing officer be, as he hereby is, directed to continue with the proceedings of SEC Case No. 3420, and to do so with all deliberate
speed, for the purpose of resolving the alleged violation of certain rights of Sixto Crisostomo, as a stockholder of UDMC particularly, his right to
inspect the corporate books and records of UDMC, his preemptive right to subscribe to the P60 million increase in the authorized capital of UDMC,
and his appraisal rights; and

5. That the board of directors and officers of UDMC be, as they hereby are, ordered to submit to the Commission, through the Chairman, a written
report as to its plans as regards its nursing school, such report to be submitted at least one month prior to the commencement of the school year
1989-1990.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 49-50, Rollo.)


Sixto Crisostomo sought a review of the SEC's en banc resolution in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 17435).

On June 8, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition and lifted the temporary restraining order that it had issued against the SEC's
resolution (Annex K, pp. 65-81, Rollo). Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 418-434, Rollo). The Court of Appeals required the private
respondents to comment but it denied the petitioner's motion to reinstate the writ of preliminary injunction (Annex L, p. 82, Rollo),

On motion of the private respondents (Annex K, p. 413, Rollo), the SEC en banc issued an order on June 27, 1989 directing the secretary of UDMC
to call a special stockholders' meeting to elect a new board of directors and officers of the corporation (Annex F). Petitioner asked the SEC to recall
that order on account of his pending motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals. The motion was opposed by the private respondents. On
July 21, 1989, the SEC denied petitioner's motion (p. 86, Rollo). Whereupon, he filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
preliminary injunction alleging that the SEC en banc abused its discretion:

1. in setting aside Esteves' orders

2. in allowing the Japanese group to have control of UDMC for it will result in culpable violation of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals or corporations qualified to acquire or hold land of the
public domain, meaning corporations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens (Sec. 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution);
and

3. in allowing the Japanese investors to own more than 40% of the capital stock of UDMC (which operates a nursing and midwifery school) in
violation of Section 4 (2) Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution which provides that educational institutions ... shall be owned solely by citizens of the
Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.

The public and private respondents, in their comments on the petition, asked that the petition be dismissed and that the petitioner be cited for
contempt for forum-shopping.

We find no merit in the petition. The first allegation that the SEC en banc erred in reversing the orders of the hearing officer, Esteves, is the same
ground raised by the petitioner in CA-G.R. No. SP 17435. The issue is frivolous for the authority of the SEC en banc to review, revise, reverse, or
affirm orders of its hearing officers is too elementary to warrant any debate.

Equally unmeritorious are the second and third grounds of the petition — that the P57 million investment of the Japanese group in UDMC violates
the constitutional provisions restricting the transfer or conveyance of private lands (Art. XIII, Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution) and the ownership of
educational institutions (Art. XVI, Sec. 14[a], 1987 Constitution), to citizens of the Philippines or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is
owned by Filipino citizens. While 82% of UDMC's capital stock is indeed subscribed by the Japanese group, only 30% (equivalent to 171,721 shares
or P17,172.00) is owned by the Japanese citizens, namely, the Yamada spouses and Tomotada Enatsu. 52% is owned by Edita Enatsu, who is a
Filipino. Accordingly, in its application for approval/registration of the foreign equity investments of these investors, UDMC declared that 70% of its
capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, including Edita Enatsu. That application was approved by the Central Bank on August 3, 1988 (p. 249,
Rollo,).

The investments in UDMC of Doctors Yamada and Enatsu do not violate the Constitutional prohibition against foreigners practising a profession in
the Philippines (Section 14, Article XII, 1987 Constitution) for they do not practice their profession (medicine) in the Philippines, neither have they
applied for a license to do so. They only own shares of stock in a corporation that operates a hospital. No law limits the sale of hospital shares of
stock to doctors only. The ownership of such shares does not amount to engaging (illegally,) in the practice of medicine, or, nursing. If it were
otherwise, the petitioner's stockholding in UDMC would also be illegal.

The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature,
despite the petitioner's then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its
writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the SEC's en banc resolution in SEC EB Case No.
191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the dissolution
of a preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It "shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency
of an appeal." (Sec. 4, Rule 39, Rules of Court; Marcelo Steel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 89 [1973]; Aguilar vs. Tan, 31 SCRA 205 [1970];
Sitia Teco vs. Ventura, 1 Phil. 497 [1902]; Watson & Co., Ltd. vs. M. Enriquez, I Phil. 480 [1902]).

We now address the public and private respondents' separate motions to dismiss the petition and to cite Crisostomo and his counsel for contempt
of court for forum-shopping. The records show that Crisostomo had two actions pending in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 and CA-G.R.
No. 20285 CV) when he filed the petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 89095) in this Court on July 27, 1989. The case docketed as CA-G.R. No. 20285-CV,
is his appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, dismissing his complaint for annulment of the Memorandum of Agreement
and the Stock Purchase Agreement between UDMC and the Japanese investors. CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 is his petition for certiorari to review the
SEC's en banc resolution upholding those transactions and ordering the holding of a stockholders meeting to elect the directors of the UDMC, and
of a board of directors meeting to elect the officers.

Notwithstanding the pendency of those two cases in the Court of Appeals, Crisostomo filed this petition for certiorari 1 and prohibition on July 27,
1989 where he raises the same issues that he raised in the Court of Appeals.

The prayer of his petition in CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 reads thus:


3) After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered:

a) Annulling and setting aside the questioned rulings of the respondent COMMISSION 2for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

b) Making permanent the preliminary injunction issued in this case against the respondents. (p. 241, Rollo.)

In his petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 89095), he also prays that —

1. Upon the filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order issue enjoining respondents, their representatives or agents from implementing or
executing the SEC opinions (Annexes "F", "G" and "H") and its June 27 and July 21,1989 orders (Annexes "M" and "O") until further orders from the
Honorable Court.

xxx xxx xxx

3. After notice, this petition be given due course and a writ of preliminary injunction be issued for the same purpose and effect upon such terms
and conditions the Honorable Court may impose; and thereafter, judgment be rendered granting the writ prayed for and annulling and setting
aside the said opinions rendered by the SEC in their stead, affirming the orders of the Hearing Officer (Annexes "A" and "B"). (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)

Additionally, in his petition for review (G.R. No. 89555) he prays this Court to giant "all the reliefs" prayed for by him in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435. Here
is a clear case of forum-shopping.

There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in
the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was
brought, has no jurisdiction. (Villanueva vs. Adre, G.R. No. 8063, April 27, 1989.) (p. 303, Rollo)

Forum-shopping is prohibited by the Interim Rules of Court for it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes (E. Razon, Inc. vs. Phil. Port
Authority, 101 SCRA 450). Section 17 of the Interim Rules of Courts provides:

17. Petitions for writs of certiorari, etc., — No petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus or quo warranto may be filed in the
Intermediate Appellate Court if another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court. Nor may such petition be filed in the
Supreme Court if a similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to review the action taken by
the Intermediate Appellate Court on the petition filed with it. A violation of this rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the
summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned. (Interim Rules of
Court.)

Forum-shopping makes the petitioner subject to disciplinary action and renders his petitions in this Court and in the Court of Appeals dismissible (E.
Razon, Inc. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R. No. 75197, Resolution dated July 31, 1986; Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34, 38-39; Collado vs.
Hernando, L-43886, May 30, 1988). For this reason, if not for their lack of merit, the petitions should be, as they are hereby, dismissed.

WHEREFORE, these petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order which this Court issued on August 7, 1989 in G.R. No.
89095 is hereby lifted. The Court of Appeals is ordered to immediately dismiss CA-G.R. CV No. 20285. The petitioner and his counsel are censured
for engaging in forum-shopping. The petitioner is further ordered to pay double costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., G.R. No. 168512

doing business under the name and

style COMMUNITY DIAGNOSTIC

CENTER and BU CASTRO,[1]

Petitioners, Present:

Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),

- versus - Austria-Martinez,

Callejo, Sr.,

Chico-Nazario, and

Nachura, JJ.
RANIDA D. SALVADOR and

RAMON SALVADOR, Promulgated:

Respondents.

March 20, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the February 27, 2004 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 58668 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia liable for gross negligence; and its June 16, 2005 Resolution[4] denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

On October 1, 1993, respondent Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the Accounting Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal,
Inc. (the Company). As a prerequisite for regular employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostic Center
(CDC). Garcia who is a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and on October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test
result[5] indicating that Ranida was HBs Ag: Reactive. The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp signature
of Castro as pathologist.

When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter apprised her that the findings indicated that she is
suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus, based on the medical report[6] submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranidas
employment for failing the physical examination.[7]

When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at
the Bataan Doctors Hospital. During Ramons confinement, Ranida underwent another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result[8]indicated
that she is non-reactive. She informed Sto. Domingo of this development but was told that the test conducted by CDC was more reliable because it
used the Micro-Elisa Method.

Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs test conducted on her indicated a Negative result.[9]

Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa Method. The result indicated that she was non-
reactive.[10]

Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to the Executive Officer of the Company who requested her to undergo
another similar test before her re-employment would be considered. Thus, CDC conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which indicated a
Negative result.[11] Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC, issued a Certification correcting the initial result and explaining that
the examining medical technologist (Garcia) interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or reactive.[12]

Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida.


On July 25, 1994, Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint[13] for damages against petitioner Garcia and a purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC,
claiming that, by reason of the erroneous interpretation of the results of Ranidas examination, she lost her job and suffered serious mental anxiety,
trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities.

On September 26, 1994, respondents amended their complaint[14] by naming Castro as the unknown pathologist.

Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the scientific explanation for the false positive result of the first
HBs Ag test in his December 7, 1993 letter to the respondents.[15]

For his part, Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida;
and that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp signature.

On September 1, 1997,[16] the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to present sufficient evidence to prove the liability
of Garcia and Castro. It held that respondents should have presented Sto. Domingo because he was the one who interpreted the test result issued
by CDC. Likewise, respondents should have presented a medical expert to refute the testimonies of Garcia and Castro regarding the medical
explanation behind the conflicting test results on Ranida.[17]

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts findings, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered ORDERING defendant-appellee Orlando D. Garcia,
Jr. to pay plaintiff-appellant Ranida D. Salvador moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and
attorneys fees in the amount of P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The appellate court found Garcia liable for damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result. On the other hand, it exonerated Castro for
lack of participation in the issuance of the results.

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Garcia filed the instant petition.

The main issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the trial court, correctly found petitioner liable for
damages to the respondents for issuing an incorrect HBsAG test result.

Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not liable for damages, because he followed the appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as
dictated by his training and experience; and that he did everything within his professional competence to arrive at an objective, impartial and
impersonal result.

At the outset, we note that the issues raised are factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact which we cannot pass
upon in a petition for review on certiorari which is limited to reviewing errors of law.[19]

Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand,[20] whereby such other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did
the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did
something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient;[21] if yes,
then he is guilty of negligence.

Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation.

All the elements are present in the case at bar.

Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to
protect and promote the health of the people by preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported
clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations.[22] Their business is impressed with public
interest, as such, high standards of performance are expected from them.

In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we found the owner of a furniture shop liable for the destruction of the plaintiffs house in a fire which
started in his establishment in view of his failure to comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez,
we stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was
not only an act of negligence, but also the proximate cause of the death.[23]

In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do something, his omission or non-
performance will render him liable to whoever may be injured thereby.

Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as The Clinical Laboratory Law, provides:

Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to be professionally in-charge of a registered clinical laboratory unless he is a licensed physician duly
qualified in laboratory medicine and authorized by the Secretary of Health, such authorization to be renewed annually.

No license shall be granted or renewed by the Secretary of Health for the operation and maintenance of a clinical laboratory unless such laboratory
is under the administration, direction and supervision of an authorized physician, as provided for in the preceding paragraph.

Corollarily, Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and 25(25.1)(1) of the DOH Administrative Order No. 49-B Series of 1988, otherwise known as the Revised Rules
and Regulations Governing the Registration, Operation and Maintenance of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines, read:

Sec. 9. Management of the Clinical Laboratory:

9.1 Head of the Clinical Laboratory: The head is that person who assumes technical and administrative supervision and control of the
activities in the laboratory.

For all categories of clinical laboratories, the head shall be a licensed physician certified by the Philippine Board of Pathology in either Anatomic or
Clinical Pathology or both provided that:

(1) This shall be mandatory for all categories of free-standing clinical laboratories; all tertiary category hospital laboratories and for all
secondary category hospital laboratories located in areas with sufficient available pathologist.

xxxx
Sec. 11. Reporting: All laboratory requests shall be considered as consultations between the requesting physician and pathologist of the
laboratory. As such all laboratory reports on various examinations of human specimens shall be construed as consultation report and shall bear the
name of the pathologist or his associate. No person in clinical laboratory shall issue a report, orally or in writing, whole portions thereof without a
directive from the pathologist or his authorized associate and only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative except in
emergencies when the results may be released as authorized by the pathologist.

xxxx

Sec. 25. Violations:

25.1 The license to operate a clinical laboratory may be suspended or revoked by the Undersecretary of Health for Standards and Regulation upon
violation of R.A. 4688 or the rules and regulations issued in pursuance thereto or the commission of the following acts by the persons owning or
operating a clinical laboratory and the persons under their authority.

(1) Operation of a Clinical Laboratory without a certified pathologist or qualified licensed physician authorized by the Undersecretary of Health or
without employing a registered medical technologist or a person not registered as a medical technologist in such a position.

And Section 29(b) of R.A. No. 5527, otherwise known as The Philippine Medical Technology Act of 1969, reads:

Section 29. Penal Provisions.- Without prejudice to the provision of the Medical Act of 1959, as amended relating to illegal practice of Medicine, the
following shall be punished by a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, or imprisonment for not less than six
months nor more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court:

xxxx

(b) Any medical technologist, even if duly registered, who shall practice medical technology in the Philippines without the necessary supervision of
a qualified pathologist or physician authorized by the Department of Health;

From the foregoing laws and rules, it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician
authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist
must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that the results of any examination may be released only to the
requesting physician or his authorized representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist.

These rules are intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of substandard clinical examinations by laboratories whose
personnel are not properly supervised. The public demands no less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory examinations
through compliance with the quality standards set by laws and regulations.

We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards.

First, CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical
Technologist.[24] In the License to Open and Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the years 1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Naagas, M.D.,
Undersecretary for Health Facilities, Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was named as the head of CDC.[25] However, in his
Answer with Counterclaim, he stated:

3. By way of affirmative and special defenses, defendant pathologist further avers and plead as follows:
Defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community Diagnostic Center nor an employee of the same nor the employer of its
employees. Defendant pathologist comes to the Community Diagnostic Center when and where a problem is referred to him. Its employees are
licensed under the Medical Technology Law (Republic Act No. 5527) and are certified by, and registered with, the Professional Regulation
Commission after having passed their Board Examinations. They are competent within the sphere of their own profession in so far as conducting
laboratory examinations and are allowed to sign for and in behalf of the clinical laboratory. The defendant pathologist, and all pathologists in
general, are hired by laboratories for purposes of complying with the rules and regulations and orders issued by the Department of Health through
the Bureau of Research and Laboratories. Defendant pathologist does not stay that long period of time at the Community Diagnostic Center but
only periodically or whenever a case is referred to him by the laboratory. Defendant pathologist does not appoint or select the employees of the
laboratory nor does he arrange or approve their schedules of duty.[26]

Castros infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative supervision and control over the activities in the
laboratory. Supervision and control means the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units.[27]

Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of defendant-appellee Castro, who admitted that:

[He] does not know, and has never known or met, the plaintiff-patient even up to this time nor has he personally examined any specimen, blood,
urine or any other tissue, from the plaintiff-patient otherwise his own handwritten signature would have appeared in the result and not merely
stamped as shown in Annex B of the Amended Complaint.[28]

Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the authorization of defendant-appellee Castro.[29]

Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release of the HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply
with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.

Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcias failure to comply with the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She
was terminated from the service for failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo
several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical examination
and releasing the clinical report.

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation
of some legal provision.[30] This was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage because another has
violated some legal provision.[31]

We find the Court of Appeals award of moral damages reasonable under the circumstances bearing in mind the mental trauma suffered by
respondent Ranida who thought she was afflicted by Hepatitis B, making her unfit or unsafe for any type of employment. [32] Having established her
right to moral damages, we see no reason to disturb the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Exemplary damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages,[33] and attorneys fees may
be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded.[34]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 dated February 27, 2004 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. guilty
of gross negligence and liable to pay to respondents P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as attorneys
fees, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 46094 September 27, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
FERNANDO C. QUEBRAL, defendant-appellant.

Mabanag, Primicias, Abad and Mencias for appellant.


Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Kapunan, Jr., for appellee.

MORAN, J.:

In June, 1937, the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan filed an information against the accused, Fernando C. Quebral, for violation of section 770 of the
Administrative Code. The pertinent portion of the information reads as follows:

Que en o hacia y desde el año de 1930 en adelante hasta el mes de mayo de 1937, inclusive, en los municipios de San Jacinto, Mapandan,
Mangaldan y Dagupan, Provincia de Pangasinan, Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de este Juzgado, el acusado arriba nombrado voluntaria, ilegal
y criminalmente y sin haber obtenido previamente el certificado de registro correspondiente, expedido por la Junta Examinadora de Medicos,
ejercio la maedicina dentro de los terminos del articulo 770 del Codigo Administrativo Revisado, . . ..

There is no question that the accused diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain diseases suffered by certain patients, from whom he received
money as compensation; but it is contended that no evidence has been adduced to the effect that the accused had thus practiced medicine
"without having previously obtained the proper certificate of registration issued by the Board of Medical Examiners," as provided in section 770 of
the Administrative Code.

As to this question, the lower court said:

No hay cuestion alguna en cuanto al hecho de que los actos del acusado probados por la acusacion constituyen un ejercicio de la medicina. La unica
cuestion, por tanto, a determinar es la de si o no incumbia a la acusacion probar que dicho acusado habia ejercido la profesion medica sin estar
previamente registrado como tal medico.

Teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo 297 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil y la doctrina enunciada por nuestra Honorable Corte Suprema
en las causas Estados Unidos contra Gonzalez (10 Jur. Fil., 67); Estados Unidos contra Co Pinco (10 Jur. Fil., 370); Estados Unidos contra Tria (17 Jur.
Fil., 304); y Estados Unidos contra De la Torre (42 Jur. Fil., 65), el Juzgado cree que noe es necesario que la accusacion prueba que el acusado no
estaba previamente registrado como medico antes de ejercer la profesion medica, pues, si el acusado lo estaba, y funda su defensa en tal hecho, a
el incumbre probarlo.

The accused was found guilty of the offense charged and was sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred pesos (P200) with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. He appealed, and, in this court, he reiterates his contention that it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that he practiced
medicine without the proper certificate, and that there being no evidence to that effect, he should be acquitted.

The rule is, and has always been, that, if the subject of the negative avernment, like, for instance, the act of voting without the qualifications
provided by law, inheres in the offense as an essential ingredient thereof, the prosecution has the burden of proving the same. (Sec. 297, Act No.
190; U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303, 306, 307.) In view, however, of the difficult office of proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such
circumstance, need do no more than make a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. (U.S. vs. Tria, supra.) It would certainly be
anomalous to hold ". . . that mere difficulty in discharging a burden of making proof should displace it; and as a matter of principle the difficulty
only relieves the party having the burden of evidence from the necessity of creating positive conviction entirely by his own evidence; so that, when
he produces such evidence as it is in his power to produce, its probative effect is enhanced by the silence of his opponent. (22 C.J., pp. 81, 82.)

The rule, however, is different when the subject of the negative avernment does not constitute an essential element of the offense, but is purely a
matter of defense. In such case, the burden of proof is upon the defendant. As to whether or not a negative avernment is a matter of defense, is a
question which we have fully discussed in United States vs. Chan Toco (12 Phil., 262).

Section 770 of the Administrative Code provides that "no person shall practice medicine in the Philippine Islands without having previously
obtained the proper certificate of registration issued by the Board of Medical Examiners . . .." This provision clearly includes the want of certificate
as an essential element of the offense charged. The negative fact is not separable from the offense as defined. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove that negative fact, and failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal.
In the instant case, however, the decision rendered by the lower court makes mention of Exhibit F-2 as showing that the accused is not a registered
physician. That document is signed by Jose Ma. Delgado, chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners, wherein it is stated, in part, that "there is
nothing in the records of this Board to show that Mr. Fernando C. Quebral is a registered physician." This document is admissible as evidence of its
contents, under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, regarding official written statements. "The certificate of a custodian that he has
diligently searched for a document or an entry of a specified tenor and has been unable to find it ought to be usually as satisfactory for evidencing
its non-existence in his office as his testimony on the stand to this effect would be." (3 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 561.) Furthermore, Exhibit H-3 is
also mentioned in the decision of the lower court, which is a letter of the accused to the President of the Philippines, quoting approvingly an article
published in thePhilippine Herald, wherein it is said that Fernando Quebral is not a holder of a doctor of medicine degree. These Exhibits, F-2 and H-
3, are sufficient evidence to show that the accused has been practicing medicine without the required certificate of registration issued by the Board
of Medical Examiners.

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

G.R. Nos. 78813-14 November 8, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
FARHAD HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Nestor I. Madlansacay, counsel de parte for accused-appellant.

Nasser A. Marohomsalic, collaborating counsel for accused-appellant.

QUIASON, J.:

This is an appeal from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, convicting appellant in Criminal Cases No. Q-11867 and
No. Q-11868.

The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Farhad Hatani y Abolhassan, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal practice of
medicine in violation of R.A. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 (Secs. 8, 10) penalized by Section 28 thereof with "a fine of not less
than one thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, or by imprisonment of not less
than one year nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court; and considering the circumstances of
the case and the ignominy caused by him to his two teen-aged, female, then unmarried victims, this Court exercising its discretion granted under
said Section 28 of the law, hereby SENTENCES said accused FARHAD HATANI Y ABOLHASSAN to pay a fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency AND to suffer imprisonment of five (5) years; and to pay the costs.

This Court further recommends that after service of his sentence the accused be deported as undesirable alien (Rollo, p. 35).

The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11868 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, FARHAD HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby SENTENCES said accused to suffer life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua;
and to indemnify the complainant, Precila Borja, in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay costs (Rollo, p. 41).

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 charged appellant with illegal practice of medicine, in violation of R.A. No. 2382, otherwise known as
the Medical Act of 1959, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines the above named accused, knowing fully well that he has not satisfactorily
passed the corresponding Board Examination, neither is he a holder of a valid Certificate of Registration duly issued by the Board of Medical
Examiners, as in fact he does not even appear to have taken or completed the course leading to a medical degree, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously for compensation, fee and salary, paid to him directly, physically examined Priscila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja
Y Loquero, diagnosed, treated and administer injections on the persons of Prescila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja Y Loquero, in Violation of
Section 10, in relation to Section 28, Republic Act No. 2382 (Records, Vol. I, p. 1).

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11868, charged appellant with Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, and while she was deprived of
reason or unconscious after having been drugged or administered medicine, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the undersigned PRECILA BORJA Y LOQUERO without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such
amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code (Records, Vol. II, p. 1).
It appears that in the morning of July 6, 1979, Agustina Borja visited her comadre, Maura Fontreras, and requested malunggay leaves as medication
for her 16-year old daughter, Precila, who had high fever and loose bowel movement. Upon learning that Precila was sick, Marita, Maura's
daughter, introduced Agustina to her husband, appellant herein, whom she said was a medical doctor. Marita suggested that her husband treat
Precila and Agustina agreed.

Appellant and Marita went to the Borja residence, where he examined Precila. He gave her tablets to take and administered two injections (to her),
one in the morning and the second at noon. After each injection, Precila would feel dizzy and fall asleep.

It was appellant's diagnosis that Precila was a drug addict and required further observation and treatment. Appellant offered to attend to Precila at
his house and again, Agustina agreed in the belief that her daughter was a drug addict.

In the evening of the same day, Precila was fetched by appellant and Marita and was brought to appellant's house. Again, Precila was given an
injection which caused her to sleep. When she awoke, she realized that she was naked and her entire body was in pain. Appellant was seated on
the bed and was fondling her private parts. Shocked, Precila called for her mother and tried to get up. Appellant, however, punched her on the
chest and forced her to lie down. He pressed a pillow on her face and injected her again, causing her to fall asleep.

When Precila awoke the second time, she found appellant in bed with her. He was naked and fondling her private parts. The pain all over her body
lingered. When Precila touched her private parts, she saw blood stains on her hand. She tried to stand up but she was too weak. Appellant gave her
another injection rendering her unconscious.

The following morning, Agustina went to fetch Precila. Upon reaching the Fontreras' residence, she went straight to the bedroom, where, to her
great dismay, she found Precila and appellant both asleep and naked. She hurriedly dressed up Precila and brought her home.

When Precila woke up, she noticed she was already home and her mother was crying. Precila remained dizzy, with throbbing pains all over her
body. When talked to, she was incoherent.

That evening, Precila's oldest sister, Josefina, a nurse by profession, came home and saw Precila looking very weak. Her mother, who was crying
narrated what she had witnessed that morning. She also told Josefina that appellant was in the other bedroom, treating another sister, Wilma
whom he also diagnosed as a drug addict. Josefina immediately proceeded to the bedroom and saw appellant about to inject Wilma.

Josefina saw the open bag of appellant, which contained empty capsules of dalmane and empty vials of valium. She inquired on the need of the
injection and appellant replied that a second shot of plain distilled water was required to cure Wilma of her drug addiction. Josefina told appellant
to stop but he persisted. Only upon threat that she would call the police did appellant stop. Appellant and his wife then left the Borja residence.

The following day, Agustina and Josefina brought Precila and Wilma to the Philippine Constabulary Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City,
where Josefina and Wilma gave their statements (Exhs. "D" and "F"). Precila was physically examined by a doctor, whose medical report stated that
Precila's hymen and "deep, healing lacerations" and that "subject is in non-virgin state physically" (Exh. A). Several needle puncture marks were
also found on Precila's arms and buttocks.

A physical examination was likewise done on Wilma, which showed that she too had a needle puncture, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report (Exh.
"L").

Acting on the complaint filed before the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), a surveillance of appellant's residence was conducted.
Subsequently, a search warrant was secured from Judge Jose P. Castro of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Armed with the warrant, CANU
agents raided appellant's residence on July 15, 1979.

Assorted drugs, such as dalmane, valium and mogadon, as well as prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap (Exhs. "H" "H-4") and other
medical instruments, such as a "thermometer, a "hygomonometer (sic), stethoscope, syringes and needles, were seized.

The Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") on the prescription slips showed that these were written by the appellant himself. The report on
the chemistry examination of the seized tablets and capsules (Exhs. "J" "J-1") confirmed the presence of mogadon, dalmane and valium.

After the preliminary investigation, separate informations for rape and violation of R.A. No. 2382 were filed. Appellant pleaded not guilty to both
crimes.

The defense's version is that in the evening of July 6, 1976, Agustina and Precila Borja visited the mother-in-law of the appellant, Maura Fontreras.
In the course of the conversation, Agustina asked Marita if she could help Precila. Marita obliged and agreed to take care of Precila for the night
and allow her to sleep in her bedroom.

Precila and Marita chatted the whole night. Accordingly, Precila confessed that she was not really sick. She merely related her personal problems,
involving her parents. She also admitted her vice, such as drinking, smoking and taking drugs.

Their talk lasted until the wee hours of the morning and during their conversation, appellant would occasionally enter the room but he never joined
their discussion.

Precila and Marita shared the same bed. Appellant; who was wearing only his pajama pants, slept on the floor at the opposite end of the room.
The following morning Agustina arrived and Marita related some of Precila's problems. Nothing untoward happened that day and Agustina headed
for home while Precila and Marita followed later.

At past midnight of July 15, 1979, a raid was conducted by CANU agents in the house of the appellant under the supervision of C1C Agustin Timbol,
Jr. The raid was made upon Josefina's complaint for illegal possession of drugs.

Appellant and his wife were driven out of their bedroom, while three-men remained. Later, appellant was called to join them in the bedroom and
he was shocked to see assorted drugs scattered around. Appellant denied owning them. Photographs were taken of him with the drugs. A barangay
official was called to attest to the list of the confiscated drugs. Appellant, however, refused to sign the said list.

C1C Timbol offered to fur the case in exchange of money. Instead of acceding, appellant demanded to see the search warrant. C1C Timbol failed to
show a warrant on the pretext that they were military men without need of any identification or search warrant. Appellant, his wife and brother-in-
law were forced to join C1C Timbol for questioning in Camp Crame. Upon boarding the van, appellant saw Josefina aboard kissing C1C Timbol and
both exchanged victory signs.

The trial court rendered two separate decisions and convicted the appellant of both crimes. In finding appellant guilty of illegal purchase of
medicine, considerable weight was given to the prosecution's exhibits.

The Professional Regulation Commission certified that appellant is not among the list of registered physicians nor among those with special permit
to practice medicine in a limited scope (Exh. "K").

Appellant failed to refute the Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") released by the PC Crime Laboratory showing that the signature of Dr.
Jesus D. Yap (Exhs. "H" — "H-4") prescribing medicine belonged to him. The pictures also taken during the raid (Exhs. "G" - "G-8'" undeniably reveal
several medical equipment used by practicing physicians.

Notwithstanding the trial court's finding that there was no direct evidence of rape, it concluded that circumstantial evidence indicate that rape was
consummated by appellant considering the following:

1. The medico-legal examination of victim Precila, taken on July 8, 1979 at 10:25 in the morning or less than 48 hours from the evening of July 6,
1979 found "hymen with deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position"; thus indicating that the lacerations were recent as they are in the
process of healing; (Exh. "A-1")

2. The above undeniable findings of the expert confirms the statement of the victim, a young girl of 16 or 17 years of age, that when she held
private parts which were painful then, she noticed blood. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5).

The fresh laceration of the hymen further confirms the carnal assault. (People vs. Ocampo, L-47335, Aug. 13, 1986)

3. In the two short waking moments of the victim she noticed she was naked and beside her on the same bed was the accused, also naked. (tsn.
Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 3-5)

4. The accused, then 21 years of age was in the prime of youth, and the unconscious girl beside him was just 16 or 17 years of age, thus in the full
bloom of womanhood. The sexual excitement on the part of the accused was therefore exceedingly great.

5. When the mother, Agustina, came into the room of the accused that early morning of July 7, 1979 she saw her daughter and the accused on the
same bed and both naked. (tsn., Rogato, Jan. 27, 1981, p. 9)

6. The medico-legal found several needle puncture marks on the arms and buttocks of Precila (Exh. "A"); thus confirming Precila's testimony that
she had been injected by the accused, rendering her unconscious (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5; tsn., Nenita, May 21, 1984, pp. 3-6; also pp. 29-
30).

7. The medico-legal found the victim "in non-virgin state physically." (Exh; "A-i")

8. At the time of the medico-legal examination, i.e. morning of July 8, 1979, the victim was found to be "incoherent." (Exh. A) — after effect of the
injections or drugs.

9. At the time of the incident (July 6, 1979) the Borjas and Frontreras (sic) were "comadres" and neighbors. There is no enmity between and among
them.

10. Between accused and Marita on one hand, and the victim, her mother, and sisters, on the other hand, there was no misunderstanding before
the incident. There is absolutely absence of any ulterior motive for the teen-aged victim or her family to file the serious charge of rape which would
expose her to embarrassment of examination of her private parts and public trial (Rollo, pp. 38-39).

In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Appellant faults complainant for recounting her ordeal only after four years when she took the witness stand. This argument is misleading. The
record shows that the day after the rape, Josefina and Wilma Borja, accompanied by their mother, Agustina, issued their statements at Camp
Crame. Agustina gave her statement twice on separate days. Precila did not give any statement due to her weak condition but it cannot be denied
that she was instead physically examined. Suffice it to say, the Medico Legal Report (Exh. "A") indicates swellings and lacerations and concludes
that Precila was no longer a virgin. Although the records fail to show any sworn statement by Precila, such is not fatal where the sworn affidavits of
her mother, her two sisters and the medico-legal report are sufficient to show probable cause of rape (People v. Yambao, 193 SGRA 571 [1991]).

Precila was either dizzy or unconscious at the time she was sexually abused. We find her testimony consistent and credible. While her testimony is
limited to the times when she would gain her consciousness, it is not unlikely that such traumatic incidents would still be engraved on her mind
even four years after.

Appellant's assertion that Precila failed to inform her family of his misdeeds is explainable. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Precila
was still dizzy and incoherent as a consequence of the injections administered by appellant. In fact, when Precila was physically examined by the
doctor the day after, she was still sleepy and groggy (TSN, March 31, 1980, pp. 7-8).

Appellant also finds it strange that considering the acts allegedly committed by him against Precila, the medico-legal report fails to specify any
injuries on the body of Precila. Appellant need not inflict heavy blows on Precila for the simple reason that she was under sedation. The absence of
the injuries does not negate the commission of rape (People v. Torrevillas, 203 SCRA 576 [1991]; People v. Arenas, 198 172 [1991]) for rape may be
committed after rendering a woman unconscious (Art. 335, Revised Penal Code; People v. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 [1991]).

Appellant alleges that Precila was no longer a virgin on that fateful day and that her bleeding was actually the start of her menstrual cycle. It is
settled jurisprudence that virginity is not an essential element of rape (People v. Corro, 197 SCRA 121 [1991]; People v. Banayo, 195 SCRA 543
[1991]). To claim that Precila's menstrual cycle began on that day is highly speculative.

Appellant claims that the sworn statements of the Borjas (Exhs. "D", "E" and "F") were antedated and were prepared after the illegal search was
conducted in his residence. He also cites some inconsistencies in said statements. We find the claim to be devoid of merit. It is only now on appeal
that appellant disputes the execution of these affidavits. When they were presented and offered as evidence, appellant failed to raise such
objections and to refute them.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses merely refer to minor details, which cannot destroy their credibility
(People v. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632 [1991]). This is also true where statements made while on the witness stand are claimed to be inconsistent with
the affidavit, which are generally incomplete (People v. Lagota, 194 SCRA 92 [1991]; People v. Avanzado, 158 SCRA 427 [1988]).

With regard to the second assignment of error, appellant insists that his conviction arose from insufficient evidence and his failure to prove his
innocence.

Indeed, the circumstantial evidence established at the trial are more than sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant. The Medico-Legal Report on
Precila, taken within 48 hours from the commission of rape confirmed that her hymen had "deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position"
and Precila was "in non-virgin state physically" (Exh. "A"). Furthermore, the report confirms that Precila had at least six needle puncture marks and
swellings, which confirm that appellant had injected her several times.

On the two occasions that Precila woke up, she positively stated that appellant was with her on the bed and that they were both naked. She also
tried to free herself on both attempts from accused, but, he made her unconscious through injections (TSN, February 9, 1984, pp. 3-5). This is
corroborated by the testimony of Agustina, who saw her daughter and accused together naked on bed (TSN, January 27, 1981, p. 9). These
unbroken chain of events leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused actually raped Precila.

As held in People v. Yambao, supra, credence is given to the findings of the trial court where the rape victim's testimony is buttressed by the
corroborative testimony of the mother and the medico-legal report, as well as the report of the police investigator.

It must also be borne in mind that at the time of the commission of the crime, Precila was just sixteen years old. No young lady at the prime of her
youth would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her intimate parts and later bare herself to the disgrace brought to her honor
in a public trial unless she was motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit apprehended and brought to justice (People v. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354
[1991]; People v. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571 [1991]).

Appellant claims that his right to be presumed innocent was violated. He cites the trial court's decision holding that it. —

. . . finds that with these circumstantial evidences (sic) pieced together the prosecution has proved the crime of rape, and the burden shifted on the
defense to show the contrary (Rollo, p. 40).

Appellant was afforded a fair trial and in fact he availed of surrebuttal evidence. The statement of the trial court, as correctly argued by the
Solicitor General, implies that the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction unless the defense is able to provide
evidence to the contrary.

With respect to his conviction of illegal practice of medicine, appellant presented inconsistent claims. On one hand, he claims that the drugs and
other paraphernalia were planted by the raiding team; while on the other hand, he claims that these were seized without any warrant.

If indeed the evidence were all planted, how can appellant explain his handwriting on the prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap? A perusal
of the photographs showing accused during the raid, fails to indicate any protestation by him. In fact, the other photographs (Exhs. "G-l", "G-2", "G-
4" — "G-8") do not bear any sign of disorder, in contrast to appellant's testimony that his room was made into a mess during the raid.
The records fail to disclose a copy of a search warrant. However, the prosecution was able to present its return (Exh. "ZZ") and we are satisfied that
indeed a lawful search warrant was obtained. Besides, the judge who granted the search warrant was the same judge who initially heard both
criminal cases. It can therefore be presumed, that the search was made with a search warrant and absent of any showing that it was procured
maliciously, the items seized are admissible in evidence (People v. Umali, 193 SCRA 493 [1991]).

The evidence is overwhelming that appellant actually treated and diagnosed Precila and Wilma Borja. The positive testimony of Agustina, Precila,
Wilma and Josefina Borja; the medico-legal reports (Exhs. "A", "A-7", "C", "L" and "L-1") which attest to the needle marks; the Handwriting
Identification Report (Exh. I); the photographs (Exhs. "G-l — "G-8") showing assorted drugs and medical equipment in appellant's room; and the
chemistry reports (Exhs. "J" — "J-1") prove that appellant was engaged in the practice of medicine. And as to his allegation that there was no proof
of payment, the law specifically punishes said act whether or not done for a fee.

Appellant claims that Precila admitted in her cross-examination that she was in school the whole day of July 6, 1979 and it was therefore
impossible for him to have treated and diagnosed her on that date. An accurate reading of the transcript, however, will show that Precila's
testimony was in response to a question regarding her school schedule for that day.

Finally, appellant claims that the ponente of both decisions was not the trial judge, ergo said judge was thus deprived of the opportunity to assess
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Admittedly, the ponente's participation was limited to the resolution of the cases. The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one
who rendered the judgment, and for that reason the latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial
but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous (People v. Ramos, Jr., 203 SCRA 237 [1991]; People v.
Villamayor, 199 SCRA 472 [1991]), especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the judgments appealed from are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de oficio.

G.R. No. L-9651 August 4, 1915

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DOMINADOR GOMEZ JESUS, Defendant-Appellant.

Recarado Ma. Calvo for appellant.


Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

On the 17th day of July, 1913, C.A. Sobral, assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of said city, charging the defendant with the crime of practicing medicine without a license, in violation of section 8 of Act No. 310 of the Philippine
Commission. The complaint alleged:

That in, during, and between the months of January, 1911 and June, 1913, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Dominador Gomez Jesus
having been suspended from the practice of medicine on or about August 28, 1909, by the Board of Medical Examiners, in accordance with the
provisions of section 8 of said Act No. 310, and while his license as a physician and surgeon was revoked by the said Board of Medical Examiners,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously treat, operate upon, prescribe, and advise for the physical ailments of one Margarita
Dolores and other persons, for a fee, and presented himself by means of signs, cards, advertisements, and otherwise as a physician and surgeon,
duly admitted, empowered, and allowed to practice medicine, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, when in truth and in fact as the said
Dominador Gomez Jesus well knew, he was not allowed to practice medicine in any way in the city of Manila, or anywhere in the Philippine Islands,
for a fee, and when, as he well knew, the rendering of medical and surgical services by him to the said Margarita Dolores and other persons in the
city of Manila was for a fee, and not in a case of emergency, or in the administration of family remedies, or through a call in consultation with other
duly admitted physicians or surgeons."

On the 22nd day of July, 1913, the defendant appeared and demurred to the complaint, upon the following grounds: (1) That the complaint was
not in the form required by law; (2) that the facts in said complaint did not constitute a crime; (3) that the complaint itself contains allegations
which in truth would constitute a justification or legal exemption for the accused."chanrobles virtual law library

After hearing the arguments for the defense and the prosecution on said demurrer, the Honorable Jose C. Abreu, in very interesting opinion in
which he discusses fully said demurrer, reached the conclusion that the complaint was sufficient, and overruled said
demurrer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On the 26th day of August, 1913, the defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The cause was brought on for trial before the
Honorable George N. Hurd, on the 9th of September, 1913.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After hearing the evidence, the said judge, in a very interesting and well-reasoned opinion, found the defendant guilty as charged in the complaint,
and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the same or any part thereof, and to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignments of error:

I. The court erred in declaring that the provisions of section 8 of Act No. 310 are not in conflict with the provisions of the Philippine Bill enacted by
the Congress of the United States on July 1, 1902.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
II. The court likewise erred in declaring to be valid and effective that portion of section 8 of Act No. 310 which empowers the Board of Medical
Examiners to revoke the certificate of a physician who may have been convicted of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct or for
unprofessional conduct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

III. The court likewise erred in considering to be final the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners revoking the certificate of the herein
defendant, notwithstanding the appeal carried to the Board of Health and not yet heard and finally decided thereby as section 8 of Act No. 310
provides.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

IV. The court also erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the evidence adduced by the defense tending to demonstrate that the
defendant's certificate as doctor of medicine represents a value greater than P600.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

V. The court likewise erred in holding that the "Hotel Quirurgico" is Doctor Gomez himself and that such institution exists only to cloak the violation
of the law by the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

VI. The court erred, finally, in sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P200 or, in default thereof, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment and to pay
the costs of the trial.

The facts disclosed by the record are as follows:chanrobles virtual law library

1. That some time prior to the 28th day of August, 1909, the defendant had been admitted, or had been licensed to practiced medicine in the
Philippine Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. That some time prior to the said 28th day of August, 1909, the defendant had been accused, arrested, tried, and found guilty of a violation of the
Opium Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. That in the month of August, 1909, the defendant was cited to appear before the "Board of Medical Examiners for the Philippine Islands," to
show cause why his license to practice medicine should not be revoked, in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of Act No.
310.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. That on the date set, the Board proceeded to make an investigation of the question of the revocation of the license of the defendant to practice
medicine, based upon the fact that he had been theretofore convicted of an "offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct."chanrobles
virtual law library

5. That after the conclusion of said investigation, the Board reached the conclusion (a) that the defendant had been guilty of an "offensive involving
immoral or dishonorable conduct;" and (b) adopted a resolution revoking his license to practice medicine.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

6. That the defendant was duly notified of the action of said Board.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

7. That later the defendant appealed to the Director of Health, which appeal was finally withdrawn by him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

8. That later, and after the license of the defendant to practice medicine had been revoked, he did practice medicine in the Philippine Islands by
treating, operating upon, prescribing he charged a fee, and that said treating, operating, and prescribing medicine for said various persons were
not in cases of emergency, or in the administration of family remedies.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

9. That the defendant is not a medical officer of the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United States Marine Hospital Service, nor a
physician or surgeon from other countries called in consultation, nor a medical student, practicing medicine under the direct supervision of a
preceptor who is a registered doctor of medicine.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon the foregoing facts, the lower court imposed the fine indicated above.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant, in support of his first assignment of error, argues that section 8 of said Act No. 310 is in conflict with the provisions of the Philippine
Bill (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), and is, therefore, void. Act No. 310, among other things, provides:chanrobles virtual law library

1. (a) For the creation of "A Board of Medical Examiners for the Philippine Islands." (b) That said Board shall examine candidates desiring to practice
medicine in the Philippine Islands, and to issue a certificate of registration to such persons who are found to be qualified, in accordance with the
provisions of said law, to practice medicine, etc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. That after the 1st of March, 1902, it shall be unlawful for any person to practice medicine, surgery, etc., in any of its branches in the Philippine
Islands, unless he hold such certificate of registration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. That said Board of Medical Examiners may refuse to issue such certificate of registration to any individual convicted by a court of competent
jurisdiction of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. That said Board might revoke any certificate of registration theretofore granted to any person in case he should be convicted of any offense
involving immoral or dishonorable conduct, or for unprofessional conduct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
5. That any person shall be regarded as practicing medicine, who shall treat, operate upon, prescribe, or advise for any physical ailment of another
for a fee, or who shall represent himself, by means of signs, cards, advertisements, or otherwise, as a physician or
surgeon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

6. That said law did not apply to the rendering of services in case of emergency or the administration of family remedies, or to medical officers of
the United States Army, of the United States Navy, or of the United States Marine Hospital Service, or to a physician or surgeon of other countries
called in consultation, or to a medical student, practicing under the supervision of a preceptor who is a registered doctor of
medicine.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is the power of the Board of Medical Examiners to revoke a license, once granted, to which the appellant especially directs his argument, in
support of his contention that said Act is in conflict with the said Act of Congress.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Section 8 of Act No. 310 provides: "The Board of Medical Examiners may refuse to issue any of the certificates provided for therein [in this Act] to
an individual convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct. In case of such refusal, the
reason therefor shall be stated to the applicant in writing. The Board may also revoke any such certificate for like cause, or for unprofessional
conduct, after due notice to the person holding the certificate, and a hearing, subject to an appeal to the Board of Health for the Philippine Islands,
the decision of which shall be final."chanrobles virtual law library

That part of the Act of Congress upon which the appellant relies to show that Act No. 310 is void is paragraph 1 of section 5. Said paragraph reads
as follows: "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."chanrobles virtual law library

The appellants gives three reasons why section 8 of Act No. 310 is void. They are: (a) That the provisions of section 8 of Act No. 310 deprive the
herein defendant of his rights or property without due process of law. (b) That the power to revoke the certificate of a doctor of medicine resides
solely in the Courts of First Instance and the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. (c) That the power granted to the Board of Medical Examiners
to revoke the certificate of a physician has been repealed by section 88 of the Philippine Bill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

While the assignments of error present various questions, the real questions presented are three:chanrobles virtual law library

1. The right of the state to require of those who desire to practice medicine and surgery, etc., certain standards of morality and general and special
scholarship, as a prerequisite said professions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. The right of the state to revoke such a license, once granted; andchanrobles virtual law library

3. The right of the state to punish, by fine or imprisonment, or both, those attempt to practice the professions of medicine, surgery, etc., without a
license, and in violation of the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant argues, in support of his right assignment of error:chanrobles virtual law library

1. That section 8 of Act No. 310 is null and void because it deprives him of a right or of property, without due process of law;chanrobles virtual law
library

2. That the Board of Medical Examiners had no authority or right to revoke his license; that right, if any exists of all, belongs to the courts,
andchanrobles virtual law library

3. That said section 8 has been repealed by section 88 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (The Philippine
Bill).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Generally speaking, with reference to the general and inherent power of the state, we think the following propositions are so well established that
they no longer admit of dispute or discussion:chanrobles virtual law library

1. The state has general power to enact such laws, in relation to persons and property within its borders, as may promote public health, public
morals, public safety, and the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants. (New York City vs. Miln, 11 Pet. (U.S.), 102, 139; Passenger Cases, 7
How. (U.S.), 283, 423; Slaughterhouse House Cases, 16 Wall., 36, 62; Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U.S., 623; Dent vs. W.
Virginia, 129 U.S., 114 (25 W. Va., 1); Hawker vs. N.Y., 170 U.S., 189; Case vs. .Board of Health, 24 Phil. Rep., 250.)chanrobles virtual law library

2. To make reasonable provision for determining the qualifications of those engaging in the practice of medicine and surgery, and punishing those
who attempt to engage therein in defiance of such provisions. (Dent vs. W. Virginia, 129 U.S., 114 (25 W. Va., 1); Hawker vs. N.Y., 170 U.S., 189;
Reetz vs.Michigan, 188 U.S., 505; State vs. Webster, 150 Ind., 607.)chanrobles virtual law library

This power of the state is generally denominated the police power. It has been held that the state cannot be deprived of its right to exercise this
power. The police power and the right to exercise its constitute the very foundation, or at least one of the corner stones, of the state. For the state
to deprive itself or permit itself to be deprived of the right to enact laws to promote the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, and
promote public health, public morals, and public safety, would be to destroy the very purpose and objects of the state. No legislature can bargain
away the public health, public safety, or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. Governments are
organized with a view to the preservation of these things. They cannot deprive themselves of the power to provide for them. (Stone vs. Mississippi,
101 U.S., 814, 816.)chanrobles virtual law library

It has been held that a constitutional prohibition upon State laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not restrict the power of the State to
protect the public health, public morals, or public safety, as the one or the other may be involved in the execution of such contracts. Rights and
privileges arising from contracts with a State are subject to regulations for the protection of the public health, the public morals, and the public
safety, in the same sense and to the same extent as are all contracts and all property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations. (New
Orleans Gas Light Co. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S., 650, 672.)chanrobles virtual law library

In order to enforce the police power of the state, it may, under certain conditions, become necessary to deprive its citizens of property and of a
right providing for the continuance of property, when the property or the exercise of the right may tend to destroy the public health, the public
morals, the public safety, and the general welfare and prosperity of its inhabitants. For example, a tannery, a slaughterhouse, or a fertilizing
establishment may be located in such proximity to the residence portion of a city as to become a menace to the public health and the welfare of
the inhabitants. In such a case the discontinuance or the removal of such institutions may be ordered, under the police power of the state, even
though it amounts to depriving persons of their private property. (Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wal., 36, 62; Fertilizing co. vs. Hyde Park, 97 U.S.,
659.)chanrobles virtual law library

Mr. Chancellor Kent, in his valuable commentaries, in discussing the police power (2 Kent's Commentaries, 340) says: "Unwholesome trades,
slaughterhouses, operations offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam power to the propelling of cars, the building
with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead may all be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense masses of population, on the general
and rational principle that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors, and that private interests must be made
subservient to the general interest of the community."chanrobles virtual law library

This power is called the police power of the state. (Commonwealth vs. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.), 53, 84.) The police power is so extensive and so
comprehensive that the courts have refused to give it an exact definition; neither have they attempted to define its limitations. Upon the police
power of the state depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizens, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated
community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property. It extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property within the state. Persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. (Thorpe vs.Rutland & B.R. Co., 27 Vt., 140, 149; New York
City vs. Miln, 11 Pet. (U.S.), 102; Slaughter House Cases, 16, Wall., 36, 62.)chanrobles virtual law library

Neither will it be denied that the owner of a building, which, by reason of its decayed condition, becomes a menace to public safety, may be
ordered to destroy the same, and thus be deprived of his property. He may be ordered to repair or destroy it. Private property, under the police
power, may be destroyed to prevent the spread of a conflagration in order to save lives and property. The existence of bawdy houses which tends
to greatly affect the morals of the people of a community may be destroyed or may be removed. A manufacturing plant, so located in a thickly
settled community as to greatly disturb the peace and comfort of the inhabitants, may be ordered closed or removed. The state, under its police
power, may regulate or prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within its borders. Such a law may destroy the
established business of thousands of its inhabitants. (Mugler vs.Kansas, 123 U.S., 623; License Cases, 5 How., 504.) If any state deems that the
retailing or trafficking in ardent spirits is injurious to its citizens and calculated to produce idleness, vice, or debauchery, there is nothing in the
Constitution of the United States to prevent it from regulating and restricting such traffic, or from prohibiting it altogether, if it think proper. The
state may even declare that buildings where intoxicating liquors are distilled or sold shall be a nuisance and ordered destroyed. (Mugler vs.Kansas,
123 U.S., 623.) The state may regulate its domestic commerce, contracts, the transmission of estates, real and personal, and act upon all internal
matters which relate to its moral and political welfare. Over these subjects federal governments exercise no power. The acknowledged police
power of the state extends even to the destruction of property. A nuisance may be abated. Everything prejudicial to the health or morals of a city
may be removed. (Licenses Cases, 5 How., 504; Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25, 33; Foster vs. Kansas, 112 U.S., 201, 206; Case vs. Board of Health, 24
Phil. Rep., 250; Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U.S., 623.)chanrobles virtual law library

The police power of state extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property
within its borders. Under the general police power of the state, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restrictions and burdens in order
to secure the general health, comfort, and prosperity of all. This power, or the right to exercise it, as need may require, cannot be bargained away
by the state. (Case vs. Board of Health, supra.) Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own
will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the quiet enjoyment of the same right by others. (Case vs.Board of
Health, supra; Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S., 366, 395.)chanrobles virtual law library

It is as much for the interest of the state that public health should be preserved as that life should be made secure. With this end in view,
quarantine laws have been enacted in most, if not all, civilized states. Insane asylums, public hospitals, institutions for the care and education of
the blind have been established, and special measures taken for the exclusion of infected cattle, rags, and decayed fruit. States have enacted laws
limiting the hours during which women and children shall be employed in factories. (Case vs. Board of Health, supra.)chanrobles virtual law library

The present is not the first case which has been presented to the courts relating to the right of the state to regulate the practice of medicine and
surgery, and to define the conditions under which such practice may be continued and to revoke the license granted to exercise such professions.
Legislation or statutory regulations, similar to the one which we are now discussing, have been adopted in practically every one of the States of the
Union. The constitutionality of such legislation has been questioned in practically all of States where such legislation exists. Such statutes have been
uniformly sustained. (State vs. Webster, 150 Ind., 607, 616; Dent vs. W. Virginia, 25 W .Va., 1 (129 U.S., 114); Ex parteFrazer, 54 Cal., 94;
Harding vs. People, 10 Colo., 387; People vs. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill., 370; State vs. Mosher, 78 Iowa, 321; Iowa Eclectic Medical
College vs. Schrader, 87 Iowa, 659 (20 L.R.A., 355); Driscoll vs. Commonwealth, 93 Ky., 393; Hewitt vs. Charier, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 353;
Reetz vs. Michigan, 188 U.S., 505; People vs. Phippin, 70 Mich., 6; State vs. State Medical Examining Board, 32 Minn., 324; State vs. Fleischer, 41
Minn., 69; State vs. District Court, 13 Mont., 370; Gee Wo vs. State, 36 Neb., 241; State vs. Van Doran, 109 N.C., 864; State vs. Randolph, 23 Ore.,
74.)chanrobles virtual law library

The constitutionality of similar legislation, regulating the practice of dentistry, has been presented in many of the States, and has been sustained.
(Wilkins vs. State, 113 Ind., 514; Gosnel vs. State, 52 Ark., 228; State vs. Vanderluis, 42 Minn., 129; State vs. Creditor, 44 Kansas, 565.)chanrobles
virtual law library

So also have similar statutory regulations been sustained affecting the practice of pharmacy. (Hildreth vs. Crawford, 65 Iowa, 339;
People vs. Moorman, 86 Mich., 433; State vs. Forcier, 65 N.H., 42.)chanrobles virtual law library

Various States have attempted to regulate by statute the trade of plumbing, of horseshoeing, as well as that of engineering. Even the trade of
barbering is subject to statutory regulation in some States, because it has relation to the health of the people. (Singer vs. State, 72 Md., 464;
People vs. Warden, 144 N.Y., 529; Smith vs. Alabama, 124 U.S., 465.)chanrobles virtual law library

Legislation analogous to that under discussion has also been adopted in various States relating to the practice of the profession of law. The
constitutionality of such legislation has been uniformly sustained. (State vs. Gazlay, 5 Ohio, 14; Goldwaite vs. City Council, 50 Ala., 486;
Cohen vs. Wright, 22 Cal., 293; Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal., 241.)chanrobles virtual law library

In every case where the constitutionality of similar statutes has been questioned, it has been held that it is within the power of the legislature to
prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety, and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right
altogether.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The trade of plumbing vitally affects the health of the people. The lives of thousands of people may depend upon the result of the work of an
engineer. The property and life of citizens of the state may depend upon the advice of a lawyer, and no profession or trade is more directly
connected with the health and comfort of the people than that of a physician and surgeon. The practice of medicine and surgery is a vocation
which very nearly concerns the comfort, health, and life of every person in the land. Physicians and surgeons have committed to their care most
important interests, and it is of almost imperious necessity that only persons possessing skill and knowledge shall be permitted to practice
medicine and surgery. For centuries the law has required physicians to possess and exercise skill and learning. Courts have not hesitated to punish
those who have caused damages for lack of such skill and learning. The requirement of the Philippine Legislature that those who may engage in
such professions shall be possessed of both knowledge and skill before entering the same is no new principle of law. It is an exercise of the right of
the state, under its police power, which has been recognized for centuries. No one can doubt the great importance to the community that health,
life, and limb should be protected and not be left in the hands of ignorant pretenders, and that the services of reputable, skilled and learned men
should be secured to them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of Dent vs. W. Virginia (129 U.S., 114), the late Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen
[of the United States] to follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all
persons of like age, sex and conditions. This right may in many aspects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here
all vocations are open to everyone on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning
for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the estate acquired in them - that is, the right to continue their
prosecution - is often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property
can be thus taken. But there is no arbitrary deprivation of such right when its exercise is not permitted because of a failure to comply with
conditions imposed by the state for the prosecution of society. The power (police power) of the state to provide for the general welfare of its people
authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure, or tend to secure, them against the consequences of ignorance and
incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has been the practice of different States, from the time immemorial, to
exact in many pursuits (professions or trades) a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently rely, their
possession being generally ascertained upon an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of
a diploma or license from an institutions established for instruction on the subjects, scientific and otherwise, with which such pursuits have to deal.
... Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it than that of medicine. It has to deal with all those subtle and
mysterious influences upon which health and life depend and requires not only a knowledge of the properties of vegetables and mineral
substances, but of the human body in all its complicated parts and their relation to each other, as well as their influence upon the mind. The
physician must be able to detect readily the presence of disease, and prescribe appropriate remedies for its removal. Everyone may have occasion
to consult him, but comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the
assurance given by his license, issued by authority competent to judge in that respect, that he possesses the requisite qualifications. Due
consideration, therefore, for the protection of society may well induce the state to exclude from practice those who have not such a license, or
who are found, upon examination, not to be fully qualified. The same reasons which control in imposing conditions, upon compliance with which
the physician is allowed to practice in the first instance, may call for further conditions as new modes of treating disease are discovered, or a more
thorough acquaintance is obtained of the remedial properties of vegetables and mineral substances, or a more accurate knowledge is acquired of
the human system, and of the agencies by which it is affected. ... We perceive nothing in the statute which indicates an intentions of the legislature
to deprive one of any of his rights. No one has a right to practice medicine without having the necessary qualifications of learning and skill; and the
statute only requires that whoever assumes, by offering to the community his services as a physician, that he possesses such learning and skill, shall
present evidence of it by a certificate or license from a body designated by the state as competent to judge of his qualifications."chanrobles virtual
law library

The appellant contends, however, that the Legislature exceeded its authority in conferring upon the Board of Medical Examiners the right to revoke
his license. He contends that the right to revoke it rests in the judicial department of the Government; that the courts only are possessed of the
right, if the right exists, to revoke his license and to deprive him of his right to practice his profession of medicine and surgery. It will be
remembered that the law conferred upon the Board the right to grant the certificate, as well sa the right to revoke it, subject to the right of appeal
to the Director of Health. While, in some respects, the power exercised by the Board is quasi judicial, the action of the Board is not judicial, any
more than the action of a board appointed to determine the qualifications of applicants for admission to the bar, nor that of a board appointed to
pass upon the qualifications of applicants to be admitted to the profession of teaching. In many of the States of the Union, no one can engage in
the trade of barbering, or horseshoeing, without passing an examination before a board specially appointed for that purpose. States have deemed
it wiser to place such power and discretion in boards composed of men especially qualified, by reason of their learning and scientific knowledge,
rather than in the courts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is contended that the law provides no appeal from the decision of the board to the courts, and is, for that reason, null and void. A law is not
necessarily invalid, if it provides a remedy for those affected thereby, simply because it does not provides for an appeal to the courts. Due process
of law is not necessarily judicial process. (Murray's Lessee vs. Hoboken Land etc. Co., 18 How. (U.S.), 372; Davidson vs. New Orleans, 96 U.S., 97; Ex
parte Wall, 107 U.S., 265, 289; Dreyer vs. Illinois, 187 U.S., 71, 83; Reetz vs. Michigan, 188 U.S., 505.) Indeed, it not infrequently happens that a full
discharge of the duties conferred upon boards and commissions or officers of a purely ministerial character requires them to consider and to finally
determine questions of a purely legal character. The legislature may confer upon persons, boards, officers, and commissions the right to finally
decide may questions affecting various interest of the people of the state. If a remedy is granted, the law will be valid, even though no appeal to
the courts is provided. The right of appeal is a purely statutory right; it is not an inherent right. The right to appeal was not at common law, and it is
not now, a necessary element of due process of law. (McKane vs. Durston, 153 U.S., 684, 687; Reetz vs. Michigan, 188 U.S., 505, 508.)chanrobles
virtual law library

The objection that the statute confers judicial power upon the Board of Medical Examiners is not well founded. The law provided for an appeal to
the Director of Health. Many executive officers, even those who are are regarded as purely ministerial officers, act judicially in the determination of
facts in the performance of their duties, and in so doing "they do not exercise judicial power," as that phrase is commonly used, and as it is used in
the Organic Act in conferring judicial power upon specified courts. The powers conferred upon the Board of Medical Examiners are in no wise
different in character, in this respect, from those exercised by those of examiners of candidates to teach in our public schools, or by tax assessors,
or boards of equalization, in the determination for the purposes of taxation, the value of property. The ascertainment and determination of the
qualifications to practice medicine, by a board appointed for that purpose, composed of experts, is not the exercise of a power which appropriately
belongs to the judicial department of the Government. The same is true with reference to the power conferred upon such a board to revoke a
license, for the reasons given in the law. (People vs.Hasbrouck, 11 Utah, 291; Reetz vs. Michigan 188 U.S., 505, 507.)chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant further argues and contends that the present law is repealed by section 88 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. We think from the
foregoing argument we have shown that there is nothing in said Act of Congress which is inconsistent with the provisions of Act No. 310, under
consideration, and that it is not repealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

What has been said, we think also answers the argument of the appellant in support of his second, third, and fourth assignments of error. It may be
well, however, to observe in relation to the third assignment that the appellant cannot object to the decision of the Board, when he himself, after
his appeal, voluntarily withdrew it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

With reference to the fifth assignment of error, the record shows, beyond question, that the appellant had personally engaged in the practice of
medicine and surgery, in clear contravention of the law, without being authorized so to do. It is a matter of little importance whether the appellant
practiced medicine and surgery as the "Hotel Quirurgico" or not. The record shows that he personally and illegally engaged in the practice of
medicine. The poor sick patients who called him for medical assistance certainly did not believe or think that they were calling the "Hotel
Quirurgico." They believed that they were being treated by the appellant. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For all of the foregoing reasons the sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs.

SO ORDERED.