Distinguish Retaining Lien from Charging Lien:
Retaining Lien Charging Lien
Nature Passive lien. It cannot be actively enforced.
It is a general lien.
Basis Lawful possession of funds, papers,
documents, or property belonging to client
Coverage Covers only funds, papers, documents, and
property in the lawful possession of the
attorney by reason of his professional
employment
Effectivity As soon as the lawyer gets possession of
the funds, papers, documents, property
Notice Client need not be notified to make it
effective
Applicability May be exercised before judgment or
execution, or regardless thereof
Two Concepts of Attorney’s Fees:
Ordinary
- An attorney’s fee is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer for the
legal services he has rendered to a client.
The basis of this compensation is the fact
of employment by the client.
Extraordinary
- An attorney’s fee is an indemnity for
damages ordered by the court to be paid
by the losing party to the prevailing party
in a litigation. The basis of this is any of
the cases authorized by law and is
payable not to the lawyer but to the
client – unless they have agreed that the
award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part
thereof.
- Factors in awarding fees by the courts
(Rule 138, section 24): [1] the importance
of the subject matter of controversy, [2]
the extent of the services rendered, and
[3] the professional standing of the
attorney. According to jurisprudence, the
court may also take into consideration
the client's capacity to pay.
Modes of payment:
1. A fixed or absolute fee, which is payable
regardless of the result of the case
2. A contingent fee that is conditioned to
the securing of a favourable judgment
and recovery of money or property and
the amount of which may be on a
percentage basis
3. A fixed fee payable per appearance
4. A fixed fee computed by the number of
hours spent (“billable hours”)
Active lien. It can be enforced by
execution. It is a special lien.
Securing of a favourable money judgment
for client
Covers all judgment for the payment of
money and executions issued in pursuance
of such judgment
As soon as the claim for attorney’s fees
had been entered into the records of the
case
Client and adverse party need to be
notified to make it effective
Generally, it is exercised only when the
attorney had already secured a favourable
judgment for his client
5. A combination of any of the above
stipulated fees
Compensation to which a lawyer is entitled
depending on his capacity:
1. Counsel de parte – The counsel is entitled
to a reasonable attorney’s fees upon or in
the absence thereof, on quantum meruit
basis.
2. Counsel de officio – The counsel may not
demand from the accused attorney’s fees
even if he wins the case. He may,
however, collect from the government
funds if available based on the amount
fixed by the court. See Rule 138, section
32.
3. Amicus curiae – not entitled to attorney’s
fees.
Quantum Meruit means “as much as a lawyer
deserves.” Its essential requisite is acceptance of
the benefits by one sought to be charged for
services rendered under circumstances as
reasonably to notify him that lawyer expects
compensation.
When authorized:
- There is no express contract for
attorney’s fees agreed upon between the
lawyer and the client;
- Although there is a formal contract of
attorney’s fees, the stipulated fees are
found unconscionable or unreasonable by
the court;
- The contract for attorney’s fees is void
due to purely formal matters or defects of
execution;
- The counsel, for justifiable cause, was not
able to finish the case to its conclusion;
- The lawyer and client disregard the
contract of attorney’s fees; or
 - There is a contract but no stipulation as to
attorney’s fees.
Guides in determining attorney’s fees in QM basis:
1. Time spent and extent of the services
rendered
2. Importance of subject matter
3. Novelty and difficulty of questions
involved
4. Skill demanded of the lawyer
Is a contingent fee contract the same as a
champertous contract? No.
Contingent Contract – It is an agreement in which
the lawyer’s fee, usually a fixed percentage of
what may be recovered in the action, is made to
depend upon the success in the effort to enforce
or defend the client’s right. It is a valid agreement.
It is different from a champertous contract in that
the lawyer does not undertake to shoulder the
expenses of the litigation.
Champertous Contract – One where the lawyer
stipulates with his client the prosecution of the
case that he will bear all the expenses for the
recovery of things or property being claimed, and
the latter pays only upon successful litigation. Void
for being against public policy.
Termination of Attorney-Client Relation:
1. Withdrawal of lawyer under Rule 22.01
2. Discharge or dismissal of the lawyer by
the client
3. Death of the lawyer (includes
presumptive death)
4. Death of client
5. Disbarment or suspension of the lawyer
from the practice of law
6. Conviction of a crime and imprisonment
of a lawyer
7. Intervening incapacity or incompetence
of the client during pendency of case
8. Full termination of the case
9. Client refuses to rectify a fraud when
called upon by the lawyer (Rule 19.02)
The client has the right to terminate the
relationship at any time with or without just cause.
Limitations:
- Client cannot deprive counsel of right to
be paid services if dismissal is without
cause. (Aro v. Nañawa)
- Client cannot discharge counsel as an
excuse to secure repeated extensions of
time.
- Notice to discharge is required for both
the court and the adverse party.
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
Rule 139-B, Rules of Court
Power to Discipline Errant Lawyers
• Rule 138, section 27.
The Supreme Court has the full authority and
power to: (WARDS)
• Warn;
• Admonish;
• Reprimand;
• Suspend; and
• Disbar a lawyer.
Power to Discipline Errant Lawyers
 Rule 138, section 16.
- The Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts are also empowered to:
(WARS only)
• Warn;
• Admonish;
• Reprimand; and
• Suspend an attorney who appears
before them from the practice of law
for any of the causes mentioned in
Rule 138, section 27.
Forms of Disciplinary Measures
1. WARNING – an act or fact of putting one
on his guard against an impending
danger, evil consequences or penalties.
2. ADMONITION – a gentle or friendly
reproof, mild rebuke, warning or
reminder, counselling, on a fault, error or
oversight; an expression of authoritative
advice.
3. REPRIMAND – a public or formal censure
or severe reproof, administered to a
person in fault by his superior officer or a
body to which he belongs.
 CENSURE – official reprimand
Forms of Disciplinary Measures
4. SUSPENSION – a temporary withholding of a
lawyer’s right to practice his profession as a lawyer
for a certain period or for an indefinite period of
time
5. DISBARMENT – it is the act of the Philippine
Supreme Court in withdrawing from an attorney
the right to practice law. The name of the lawyer is
stricken out from the roll of attorneys.
• Suspension and Disbarment
• Nature of Proceedings:
– Sui generis – It is a class of its own since
it is neither civil nor criminal.
– Confidential in nature.
– Defense of double jeopardy is not
available.
– Can be initiated by the SC, motu
proprio, or by the IBP. It can be
 initiated without a complaint. There is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor.
– Can proceed regardless of interest
of the complainants
– Imprescriptible
– It is itself due process of law. Not
a trial of an action or a suit, but
rather an investigation by the
Court in the conduct of its officers
Suspension and Disbarment
- Public interest is the primary objective.
Not intended to inflict punishment, it is
no sense a criminal prosecution.
- Main issue: whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such.
- any punishment less severe such as
Objectives of Suspension or Disbarment
• To compel the attorney to deal fairly and
honestly with his clients
• To remove from the profession a person
whose misconduct has proved him unfit
to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of
an attorney
• To set an example or warning for the
other members of the bar
• To safeguard the administration of justice
from dishonest and incompetent lawyers
• To protect the public
Grounds for Disbarment
(Rule 138, section 27)
• Deceit
• Malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office – any malfeasance or dereliction of
duty committed by a lawyer
• Grossly immoral conduct
• Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude
• Violation of oath of office
• Willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court
• Corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without an
authority to do so
Officers authorized to Investigate Disbarment
Cases
• Supreme Court
• IBP through its Commission on Bar
Discipline or authorized investigators
• Office of the Solicitor General
Important Concepts
• The statutory enumeration of the grounds
for disbarment or suspension is not to be
taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a
lawyer. The inherent power of the court
over its officers cannot be restricted.
(Quingwa v. Puno, February 28, 1967)
• Disbarment should not be decreed where
reprimand, suspension or fine would
accomplish the end desired. (Amaya v.
Tecson, 450 SCRA 510)
• In disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof is upon the complainant. The Court
will exercise its disciplinary power only if
the complainant established his case by
clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence. (Aquino v. Mangaoang, 425
SCRA 572)
Procedure when compliant is initiated in the IBP
Filing of VERIFIED complaint to the IBP or IBP motu
proprio
- Complaint must be in writing, stating
facts complained of.
• Commission on Bar Discipline shall
appoint an investigator and notify
respondent lawyer within two days from
receipt thereof
• Respondent is required to answer within
15 days from notice
• Investigation (3 months)
– Investigator may issue subpoenas
– Provide the respondent with
opportunity to be heard
– May proceed with investigation ex
parte should respondent be
unable to comply
Procedure when compliant is initiated in the IBP
- CBD submits not later than 30 days from
termination of investigation a REPORT,
which contains:
o Findings of facts
o Recommendation: WARDS
– Supreme Court for Judgment
Procedure when compliant is initiated by the
Supreme Court
Supreme Court shall refer the case to an
investigator and shall notify the respondent
- Possible Investigators: Solicitor General,
any officer of the SC, any judge of a lower
court
– Respondent must answer within
15 days from notice
– Investigation (3 months)
– Report to be submitted by the
investigator not later than 30 days
from termination of investigation.
– Supreme Court for judgment
Imposition of Penalties
• Suspension
– By Division if one year or less
– En Banc if more than one year
• Fine
– By Division if Php10,000.00 or less
– En Banc if more than
Php10,000.00
• In case of two or more suspensions,
service will be successive, not
simultaneous
REINSTATEMENT
• It is the restoration in disbarment
proceedings to a disbarred or indefinitely
suspended lawyer the privilege to
practice law.
• Statutory basis: 1987 Constitution, Article
VIII, section 5(5). The power of the
Supreme Court to reinstate is based on its
constitutional prerogative to promulgate
rules on the admission of applicants to
the practice of law.
REINSTATEMENT
• Thus, the judgment of disbarment does
not become final notwithstanding the
lapse of several years from its
promulgation, as it may be reopened or
reconsidered by the SC upon proper
petition (or motion) and satisfactory
evidence.
• Quantum of evidence: clear, convincing
and satisfactory evidence – same proof
required for admission
• REINSTATEMENT
• The Court may impose certain conditions
on a lawyer’s re-admission.
o updating and payment of IBP dues;
o payment of professional tax;
o completion of at least 36 credit hours of
MCLE
o retaking of the lawyer’s oath
o requiring the lawyer to recognize and
support his child (In re: Puno, 43 SCRA
54) – superseded by Zaguirre v. Castillo
Matters taken into consideration in
reinstatement cases
• The applicant’s character and standing
prior to disbarment;
• The nature or character of the
misconduct for which he is disbarred;
• His conduct subsequent to disbarment
(Cui v. Cui, 11 SCRA 755);
• His efficient government service (In re:
Adriatico, 17 Phil 324);
• Time that has elapsed between
disbarment and the application for
reinstatement and the circumstances that
he has been sufficiently punished and
disciplined (Prudential Bank v. Grecia, 192
SCRA 381);
• Applicant’s appreciation of significance of
his dereliction and his assurance that he
now possess the requisite probity and
integrity;
• Favorable endorsement of the IBP, pleas
of his loved ones (Yap Tan v. Sabandal,
170 SCRA 207).
Condition for Reinstatement
A lawyer who has been suspended or disbarred
may be reinstated when the SC is convinced that
he has already possessed the requisites of probity
and integrity necessary to guarantee his worth to
practice his profession.
To be reinstated to the practice of law, the
applicant must satisfy the court that he is a person
of good moral character and a fit and proper
person to practice law. (In re: Rovero, 101 SCRA
803)
What is the effect of a grant of absolute
pardon by the President?
A previously disbarred lawyer who is given
absolute pardon by the President is not
automatically reinstated, he must still file a
petition for reinstatement with the SC.
Effects of Reinstatement
• Recognition of moral rehabilitation and
mental fitness to practice law;
• Lawyer shall be subject to same law,
rules, and regulations as those applicable
to any other lawyer (e.g. payment of legal
fees);
 • Lawyer must comply with the conditions
imposed on his readmission.
• CASES
• Adez Realty, Inc. v. CA
– 30 October 1992 – Atty. Dacanay
was disbarred
– 23 February 1994 – Atty.
Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift
(Disbarment) – DENIED
• GROUNDS:
– He was already 62 years old, has
learned his lesson from his mistake,
was terribly sorry for what he had
done, and in all candor promised that if
given another chance he would live up
to the exacting demands of the legal
profession.
– He appended to his motion
certifications of good moral character
from religious persons (priests, nun), a
law school dean, several judges of
Quezon City.
CASES
• Adez Realty, Inc. v. CA
– 1 December 1994 – Atty. Dacanay filed an
Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment -
NOTED
• GROUNDS:
– He had been deprived of his means to
life; he had pursued civic, religious and
community work, especially for the poor
and the underprivileged short of
extending legal assistance because of his
incapacity. His wife wrote the Court,
asking the Court to take a second look
into its decision disbarring her husband
as her entire family had been
traumatized by his disbarment.
– 4 August 1995 – again prayed for
his reinstatement – NOTED
– 17 November, 1995 – again
wrote the Court
– CASES
• Adez Realty, Inc. v. CA
– December 12, 1995 – Three (3) years has,
quite apparently, given him sufficient time
and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his
professional conduct, redeem himself and
prove once more that he is worthy to
practice law and be capable of upholding the
dignity of the legal profession. His admission
of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion
and reinstatement show that he is ready
once more to meet the exacting standards
the legal profession demands from its
practitioners.
CASES
• Zaguirre v. Castillo
– March 6, 2003 – Atty. Castillo was
indefinitely suspended
– April 11, 2003 – Atty. Castillo filed a motion
for reconsideration
GROUNDS: He submitted certificates from
government and civic organizations appreciating
his services as a lawyer, certificates of attendance
from religious groups, and certificates of good
moral character from judges and lawyers in
Occidental Mindoro.
– CASES
• Zaguirre v. Castillo
– IBP Occidental Mindoro Chapter
issued recommended the exoneration of
respondent from administrative liability.
– IBP, through Director for Bar
Discipline, commented that the motion
for reconsideration should be denied until
respondent admits the paternity of the
child and agrees to support her.
– Complainant’s counsel said that
respondent has not taken any move to
support complainant and her child.
– Atty. Castillo’s wife sent another
handwritten letter, arguing that
complainant should have filed a case for
support where the paternity of the child
could be determined and not use the
present administrative case to get
support from her husband.
• CASES
• Zaguirre v. Castillo
– In view of respondent’s show of
repentance and active service to the
community, the Court deems it just and
reasonable to convert the penalty of
indefinite suspension to a definite period
of two years suspension.
– Complainant’s further claim for
support of her child should be addressed
to the proper court in a proper case.
CASES
In re: Benjamin M. Dacanay
– March 1960 – admitted to the Bar
– December 1998 – migrated to Canada
– May 2004 – became Canadian citizen
– July 14, 2006 – reacquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225
ISSUE: whether petitioner lost his membership in
the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004
• CASES
• In re: Benjamin M. Dacanay
– OBC’s recommendation: Petitioner be
allowed to resume the practice of law in the
Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the
lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine
bar.
 – General Rule: Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege
to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.
CASES
In re: Benjamin M. Dacanay
– Exception: when Filipino citizenship is lost
by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to
RA 9225.
– Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar,
no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
(section 5 (4) of RA 9225)
CASES
In re: Benjamin M. Dacanay
– SC’s modification: Before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
9225 can resume his law practice, he must first
secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:
• the updating and payment in full of the
annual membership dues in the IBP;
• the payment of professional tax;
• the completion of at least 36 credit hours
of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments
and
• the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which
will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of
the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Effect: Compliance with the foregoing conditions
will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
Code of Judicial Conduct
A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC
Effective 1 June 2004
Judicial Ethics
Branch of moral science which treats of the right
and proper conduct to be observed by all judges
and magistrates in trying and deciding
controversies brought to them for adjudication
which conduct must be demonstrative of
impartiality, integrity, competence, independence
and freedom from improprieties.
Judge
Definition
A public officer who, by virtue of his office, is
clothed with judicial authority, a public officer
lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions in
accordance with law
• DE JURE JUDGE – one who is exercising
the office of judge as a matter of right; an
officer of a court who has been duly and
legally appointed, qualified and whose term
has not expired.
• DE FACTO JUDGE – an officer who is not
fully invested with all with all the powers and
duties conceded to judges, but is exercising
the office of a judge under some color of
right.
Qualifications
Justices of Collegiate Courts (SC and CA)
– Natural born citizen
– At least 40 years of age
– Must have been for at least 15
years a judge of a lower court or
engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines (Sec 7 (1), Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution)
RTC Judges
– Natural born citizen
– At least 35 years of age
– Must have been for at least 10
years engaged in the practice of
law in the Philippines or has held
public office requiring admission
to the practice of law as an
indispensable requisite
MTC Judges
– Natural born citizen
– At least 30 years of age
– Must have been for at least five
years engaged in the practice of
law in the Philippines or has held
public office requiring admission
to the practice of law as an
indispensable requisite
Bangalore Draft
of the Code of Judicial Conduct
• Intended to be the Universal Declaration
of Judicial Standards applicable in all
judiciaries
• Founded upon a universal recognition
that a competent, independent and
impartial judiciary is essential if the courts
are to fulfill their role in upholding
constitutionalism and the rule of law
 • PUBLIC CONFIDENCE in the judicial
system and in the moral authority and
integrity of the judiciary is of utmost
importance in a modern democratic
society
• Judges must respect and honor judicial
office as a public trust and strive to
enhance and maintain confidence in the
judicial system.
• Revised at the Round Table Conference of
Chief Justices at The Hague, on 25-26
November 2002
6 CANONS
• CANON 1 – Independence
• CANON 2 – Integrity
• CANON 3 – Impartiality
• CANON 4 – Propriety
• CANON 5 – Equality
• CANON 6 – Competence and Diligence
Judicial Independence
• A pre-requisite to the rule of law and a
fundamental guarantee of a fair trial.
• Must be upheld and exemplified by the
judge in both its individual and
institutional aspects.
• A pre-requisite to the rule of law and a
fundamental guarantee of a fair trial.
• Must be upheld and exemplified by the
judge in both its individual and
institutional aspects.
• Free from extraneous influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any
quarter or for any reason
• Objective: in order to reinforce public
confidence in the judiciary
People v. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 244 (1995)
– The judge found defendants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
with homicide. However, he sentenced the
accused with reclusion perpetua instead of
death penalty, as unequivocally required by
RA 7659.
– A court of law is no place for protracted
debate on the morality or propriety of the
sentence, where the law itself provides for the
sentence of death as a penalty in specific and
well-defined instances.
Go v. CA, 206 SCRA 165
– Mass media has a duty to fearlessly but
faithfully inform the public about events and
persons. However, when a case has received
wide and sensational publicity, the trial court
should be doubly careful not only to be fair
and impartial but also to give the appearance
of complete objectivity in its handling of the
case.
• Judicial Independence
Tahil v. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378 (1975)
– The discretion of the court to grant bail in
a capital offense, before conviction, must
be based upon the Court's determination
as to whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong. This discretion may only be
exercised after the evidence is submitted
at the summary hearing conducted
pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 114 of the
Rules. Respondent's admission that he
granted bail because of the request of a
congressman, despite his belief that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong, is indeed reprehensible.
Padilla v. Zantua, 237 SCRA 670 (1994)
– Constant company with a lawyer tends to
breed intimacy and camaraderie to the
point that favors in the future may be asked
from respondent judge which he may find
hard to resist. The actuation of respondent
Judge of eating and drinking in public places
with a lawyer who has pending cases in his
sala may well arouse suspicion in the public
mind, thus tending to erode the trust of the
litigants in the impartiality of the judge. This
eventuality may undermine the people's
faith in the administration of justice.
RE: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez,
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA
– While it is true that Justice Sabio could
not have possibly known prior to his
brother's call that his brother intended to
speak to him about the Meralco-GSIS case,
the fact remains that Justice Sabio
continued to entertain a call from his
brother, who also happens to be an officer
of the executive branch, despite realizing
that the conversation was going to involve a
pending case. In his Motion, Justice Sabio
asks the Court if he should have
immediately slammed the phone on his
brother. Certainly, such boorish behavior is
not required. However, as soon as Justice
Sabio realized that his brother intended to
discuss a case pending before him or in his
division, Justice Sabio should have
respectfully but firmly ended the discussion.
• Judicial Independence
RE: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez,
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA
– That Justice Sabio did not do as his
brother asked is of no moment. Section 5,
Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
maintains such a high bar of ethical conduct
 that actual influence is not a prerequisite
before a violation is deemed committed. If a
magistrate's actions allow even just the
appearance of being influenced, it is
deemed a violation.
Tan v. Rosete, September 8, 2004
– Respondent’s act of sending a member of
his staff to talk with complainant and show
copies of his draft decisions, and his act of
meeting with litigants outside the office
premises beyond office hours violate the
standard of judicial conduct required to be
observed by members of the Bench. They
constitute gross misconduct which is
punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Dimatulac v. Villon, October 12, 1998
– The judge should always be imbued with
a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of his obligation to promptly and
properly administer justice. He must view
himself as a priest, for the administration of
justice is akin to a religious crusade. The judge
must render service with impartiality
commensurate with the public trust and
confidence reposed in him. Although the
determination of a criminal case before a judge
lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and
competence, his discretion is not unfettered,
but rather must be exercised within reasonable
confines. The judge's action must not impair
the substantial rights of the accused, nor the
right of the State and offended party to due
process of law.
Integrity
• In the judge’s discharge of official
functions and personal demeanor.
• Must be above reproach in the view of a
reasonable observer. “Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to
be done.”
• Must initiate disciplinary measures
against lawyers and court personnel for
unprofessional conduct.
Romero v. Valle, January 9, 1987
– Respondent judge was also at fault for his
shortness of temper and impatience,
contrary to the duties and restriction
imposed upon him by reason of his office.
He failed to observe the proper decorum
expected of judicial officers. Judicial officers
are given contempt powers so that they can
remind counsels of their duties in court
without being arbitrary, unreasonable or
unjust. Respondent should have cited the
complainant in contempt of court instead of
throwing tantrums by banging his gavel
loudly and unceremoniously walking out of
the courtroom.
• Integrity
Romero v. Valle, January 9, 1987
– Although respondent had a valid explanation
for carrying a gun, his act of carrying it in
plain view of the lawyers (including the
complainant) and considering what just
happened, cannot be taken as an innocent
gesture. It was calculated to instill fear and
intimidate the complainant. Respondent’s
behavior constitutes grave misconduct. A
judge’s conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety not only in his
official duties but in his everyday life.
•
Castillo v. Calanog, A.M. No. RTJ-90-447 July 12,
1991
– It is of no import that the evidence on
record is not sufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the facts of concubinage
having indeed existed and been committed.
This is not a criminal case for concubinage
but an administrative matter… The
circumstances show a lack of circumspection
and delicadeza on the part of the respondent
judge by failing to avoid situations that make
him suspect to committing immorality and
worse, having that suspicion confirmed.
– A judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality:
a public official is also judged by his private
morals.
Macalintal v. Teh, October 16, 1997
– When the inefficiency springs from a failure to
consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law
or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a
judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and title he holds
or he is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith
and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In
both instances, the judge's dismissal is in
order. After all, faith in the administration of
justice exists only if every party-litigant is
assured that occupants of the bench cannot
justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of
legal principles.
Impartiality
• Applies not only to the decision itself, but
also to the process by which the decision
is made
• Extra Judicial Source Rule
 – To sustain a claim of bias or prejudice, the
resulting opinion must be based upon an
extrajudicial source – that is, some influence
other than the facts and law presented in the
courtroom.
• The rule on disqualification of judges
must yield to demands of necessity. A
judge is not disqualified to sit in a case [1]
if there is no other judge available to hear
and decide the case, or [2] if failure to do
so would result in a denial of a litigant’s
constitutional right to have a question
adjudicated.
• No less than imperative is that it is the
judge’s sacred duty to administer justice
without fear or favor.
Parayno v. Meneses, April 26, 1994
• The underlying reason for section 1, Rule
137 is obviously to ensure that a judge,
sitting in a case, will at all times be free
from inclinations or prejudices and be
well capable to render a just and
independent judgment. A litigant is
entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of a judge. Due process
requires it. Indeed, he not only must be
able to so act without bias but should
even appear to so be. Impartiality is a
state of mind; hence, the need for some
kind of manifestation of its reality.
• Verily, a judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, inhibit himself
voluntarily from sitting in a case, but it
should be based on good, sound or ethical
grounds, or for just and valid reasons. It is
not enough that a party throws some
tenuous allegations of partiality at the
judge. No less than imperative is that it is
the judge's sacred duty to administer
justice without fear or favor.
Grounds for Disqualification and
Inhibition for Judges
Mandatory or Compulsory Disqualification (Rule
137)
1. He, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, or creditor or
otherwise;
2. He is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity,
or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the
civil law;
3. He has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel;
4. He has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review.
Voluntary Inhibition
• A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case, for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned in the previous
slide.
• A judge’s decision to disqualify himself is
not conclusive and his competency may
be determined on application for
mandamus to compel him to act.
• A judge’s decision to continue hearing a
case in which he is not legally prohibited
from trying despite a challenge to his
objectivity may not constitute reversible
error.
Rule 137 – Disqualification of Judicial Officers
• Also, see Section 4, Canon 4 of CJC
• The rule rests on the principle that no
judge should preside in a case in which
the judge is not wholly free, disinterested,
impartial, and independent. A judge has
both the duty of rendering a just decision
and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to
fairness and integrity.
• Impartiality
Lorenzo v. Marquez, June 27, 1988
– A judge cannot sit in any case in which he
was a counsel without the written consent
of all the parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record. The
respondent alleged that since there was no
objection from any of the parties, he
proceeded to preside over the case and to
decide it. This is a clear violation of the law.
The rule is explicit that he must secure the
written consent of all the parties, not a
mere verbal consent much less a tacit
acquiescence. More than this, said written
consent must be signed by them and
entered upon the record.
Dumo v. Espinas, January 25, 2006
– The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule
137 does not give judges the unfettered
discretion to decide whether to desist from
hearing a case. The inhibition must be for
just and valid causes. The mere imputation
of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
them to inhibit, especially when the charge
is without basis. This Court has to be shown
acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can
 brand them with the stigma of bias or
partiality.
Ramiscal v. Hernandez, September 20, 2010
– The Rules contemplate two kinds of
inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under
the first paragraph of the cited Rule, it is
conclusively presumed that judges cannot
actively and impartially sit in the instances
mentioned. The second paragraph, which
embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the
sound discretion of the judges concerned
whether to sit in a case for other just and
valid reasons, with only their conscience as
guide.
Ramiscal v. Hernandez, September 20, 2010
– The bare allegations of the judge’s
partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in
the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption
that the judge will undertake his noble role
of dispensing justice in accordance with
law and evidence, and without fear or
favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be
considered valid reasons for the –
involuntary inhibition of judges, mere
suspicion is not enough.
Ramiscal v. Hernandez, September 20, 2010
– Marital relationship by itself is not a ground to
disqualify a judge from hearing a case. Under
the first paragraph of the rule on inhibition,
"No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise...." The relationship
mentioned therein becomes relevant only
when such spouse or child of the judge is
“pecuniarily interested” as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise.
Distinctions
DISQUALIFICATION
Basis:
Specific and exclusive
Role of the judicial officer:
He has no discretion to sit or try the case
INHIBITION
Basis:
Not specific, but there is a broad basis for such,
i.e., ethical grounds
Role of the judicial officer:
The matter is left to the sound discretion of the
judge.
Propriety
• A quality of conforming to conventionally
accepted standards of behavior or morals.
• Judges accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen.
Yno v. Dacanay, December 5, 2012
– We have previously ruled that an ocular
inspection without notice to nor presence of
the parties is highly improper. Good and
noble intentions notwithstanding, Judge
Dacanay’s actuations gave an appearance of
impropriety… In pending or prospective
litigations before them, judges should be
scrupulously careful to avoid anything that
may tend to awaken the suspicion that their
personal, social or sundry relations could
influence their objectivity. Not only must
judges possess proficiency in law, they must
also act and behave in such manner that
would assure litigants and their counsel of
the judges’ competence, integrity and
independence.
Arban v. Borja, August 26, 1986
Whatever the motive may have been, the
violent action of the respondent in a public
place constitutes serious misconduct and
the resultant outrage of the community in
Naga City is a blow to the image of the
entire judiciary.
Saburnido v. Madrono, June 15, 1992
– It was highly improper for a
judge to have wielded a high-powered
firearm in public and besieged the house
of a perceived defamer of character and
honor in warlike fashion and berated the
object of his ire, with his firearm aimed at
the victim — an unarmed policeman, also a
person in authority at that, thereby
threatening the latter's life.
Ompoc v. Torres, September 27, 1989
– Receiving money from a party litigant is
this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct
on the part of those who are charged with
the responsibility of administering the law
and rendering justice.
Sison v. Caoibes, May 27, 2004
– The act of a judge in citing a
person in contempt of court in a manner
which smacks of retaliation is appalling
and violative of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. The very delicate function of
administering justice demands that a
judge should conduct himself at all times
in a manner which would reasonably
merit the respect and confidence of the
 people, for he is the visible
representation of the law. The
irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges erodes public confidence in the
judiciary; as such, a judge must avoid all
impropriety and the appearance thereof.
Propriety
GENERAL RULE: Judges and members of their
families cannot accept gifts, etc.
EXCEPTION: Subject to legal requirements like
public disclosure, may accept gifts provided that it
might not reasonably be perceived as intended to
influence the judge.
Section 7 (d) of Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A.
6713) allows the following:
1. Gift of nominal value tendered and
received as a souvenir or mark of
courtesy
2. Scholarship or fellowship grant or medical
treatment
3. Travel grants or expenses for travel taking
place entirely outside the Philippine (such
as allowances, transportation, food, and
lodging) of more than nominal value if
such acceptance is appropriate or
consistent with the interests of the
Philippines, and permitted by the head of
office, branch or agency to which he
belongs.
Atty. Correa v. Judge Belen, August 6, 2010
– Respondent rebuked complainant for
some mistakes in managing the affairs of
the estate of Mr. Hector Tan, adding that it
is regrettable “because Atty. Raul Correa is
a U.P. Law Graduate and a Bar Topnotcher
at that.”
– A judge must consistently be temperate
in words and in actions. Respondent Judge
Belen’s insulting statements, tending to
project complainant’s ignorance of the laws
and procedure, coming from his
inconsiderate belief that the latter
mishandled the cause of his client is
obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful,
and inexcusable. Such abuse of power and
authority could only invite disrespect from
counsels and from the public. Patience is
one virtue that members of the bench
should practice at all times, and courtesy to
everyone is always called for.
In re: Marcelino Aguas, 1 Phil 1
– The action of the judge in seizing the
witness, Alberto Angel, by the shoulder and
turning him about was unwarranted and an
interference with that freedom from
unlawful personal violence to which every
witness is entitled while giving testimony in a
court of justice. Against such conduct the
appellant had the right to protest and to
demand were respectfully made and with
due regard for the dignity of the court.
• Competence and Diligence
Longboan v. Polig, June 14, 1990
– Proper and efficient court
management is as much the judge's
responsibility for the Court personnel are
not the guardians of a Judge's
responsibilities. A judge is expected to
ensure that the records of cases assigned
to his sala are intact. There is no
justification for missing records save
fortuitous events. The loss of not one but
eight records is indicative of gross
misconduct and inexcusable negligence
unbecoming of a judge.
Abad v. Bleza, October 13, 1986
– Even in the remaining years of
his stay in the judiciary, he should keep
abreast with the changes in the law and
with the latest decisions and precedents.
Although a judge is nearing retirement,
he should not relax in his study of the law
and court decisions. Service in the
judiciary means a continuous study and
research on the law from beginning to
end.
Dela Cruz v. Pascua, June 26, 2001
– By issuing orders indefinitely
postponing the hearing of election
protest, the judge manifested inefficiency
in the disposition of a case and this
overtly transgressed basic mandatory
rules for expeditious resolution of cases.
Liabilities of Judges
Discipline of Members of the Bench
Outline
• Basis for disciplinary action
• Grounds for disciplinary action
(administrative sanctions)
• Procedure (administrative liability)
• Civil liabilities of judges in relation to their
office
• Criminal liabilities of judges
• Concept of “judicial immunity”
• On Supreme Court judges
Basis for disciplinary action
• Section II, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution:
 “ xxx the Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.”
Grounds for disciplinary action
• Bases: Section 67, Judiciary Act of 1948 &
sec.1 rule 140 RoC.
• (a) serious misconduct:
“for serious misconduct to exist, there
must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial
acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or were in persistent
disregard of well known legal rules”
Grounds (contd.)
• Instances of serious misconduct:
- extorting money from a litigant who has a case
before his court
- solicitation of donation for office equipment
- Indefinite postponement for several years of a
criminal case pending in his sala
• (b) gross inefficiency: implies serious
negligence, incompetence, ignorance and
carelessness.
e.g. unduly granting repeated motions for
postponement, unfamiliarity with the application
of the ISLAW and graduation of penalties, extreme
delay in the disposition of cases
CASE: OCA vs. Judge Liwanag
• Appropriation of court-confiscated
firearms, removal of exhibits, poor court records
management, etc.
• The Court has emphasized the heavy
burden and responsibility which court officials
and employees are mandated to observe, in view
of their exalted position as keepers of the public
faith. They are constantly reminded that any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence
in the performance of official functions must be
avoided.
OCA vs. Judge Liwanag
• Insofar as Judge Liwanag is concerned,
the instant administrative complaint has been
rendered moot by this Court’s per curiam
decision of March 5, 2003 in A.M. No. MTJ-01-
1383, entitled “Perlita Avanceña vs. Judge
Ricardo P. Liwanag,” where the Court en banc
found Judge Liwanag guilty of violating Republic
Act No. 3019 (otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) and ordered him
“DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to re-
employment in any government agency and
government-owned or controlled corporation and
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits,” and also required him “to
show cause xxx why he should not also be
disbarred from the practice of law for conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bar.”
• In its per curiam resolution of July 17,
2003, the Court denied with finality Judge
Liwanag’s motion for reconsideration,
and, finding as wanting in merit his
explanations against disbarment,
disbarred him from the practice of law,
thus:
• WHEREFORE, the instant motion for
reconsideration is DENIED with finality,
there being no compelling reason to
warrant a reconsideration of our Decision
promulgated on March 5, 2003. Further,
pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,
respondent is DISBARRED from the
practice of law for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A.
3019) or conduct unbecoming of a
member of the bar.
SC Res. 17 September 2002 Re: Automatic
Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special
Courts, et al.
Lachica vs. Judge Tormis
• Judge Tormis was charged with abuse of
authority relative to criminal cases filed
against an accused who remained at large
since the filing of the information, that it
was improper for the respondent judge to
receive the cash bail bond as the function
belongs exclusively to the Office of the
Clerk of Court, that it was also improper
for the judge to call the police station to
verbally order the release of the accused
• Lachica vs. Judge Tormis
HELD: The respondent judge is guilty of gross
misconduct for having abused her judicial
authority when she personally accepted the cash
bail bond of the accused and for deliberately
making untruthful statements in her comment and
during the investigation of the instant
administrative case with intent to mislead this
Court.
Nedia vs. Judge Lavina
- Respondent judge was charged with gross
ignorance of the basic and simple procedural
rules by issuing an order of indirect contempt
initiated by an unverified motion.
HELD:
respondent Judge ought to be sanctioned
for his failure to properly apply the court
procedure. As can be seen, the law involved is
simple and elementary. When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply it, and anything less than that would
be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In
short, when the law is so elementary, not to be
aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to
consider so basic and elementary a rule, a law or
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is
either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds or is too vicious that the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad
faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
Other grounds for disc. action
• New Code of Judicial Conduct ( took
effect on June 1, 2004)
• Code of Judicial Conduct (1989)
• Canons of Judicial Ethics (AM 162)
• Code of Professional Responsibility
• Code of Professional Ethics
• Other related laws (RA 3019, Ra 7877,
etc.)
Procedure
• Basis: Rule 140 Rules of Court
• 1. Filing of VERIFIED complaint
- in writing
-stating the facts and charge
- supported by affidavits
• 2. Service of complaint / dismissal
• 3. Respondent answers w/in 10 days
(COMMENT)
• 4. Hearing
- conducted by a a member of SC, or CA,
as assigned RTC judge
• 5. Submission of report to SC by hearing
judge.
Nature of the proceeding
• Private and confidential
• Sui generis
• Summary in nature
• Is in itself due process
• Defense of double jeopardy not availing
• Proceeds notwithstanding the interest or
lack of interest of the complainant.
• Proceeding may constitute in itself an
administrative proceeding for suspension
or disbarment of the lawyer-judge.
Civil liabilities of judges
• GR: a judge shall NOT be personally liable
for damages resulting from his rendering
of a judgment (w/n he has jurisdiction
over the subject matter) – “JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY” PRINCIPLE
- ratio: public policy dictates it.
• Exceptions:
1. Acts in violation of article 32 NCC
2. Acts in violation of article 20 NCC
3. Acts in violation of article 27 NCC
4. Prohition in article 1491 NCC
Criminal liabilities of judges
• Basis: “public office is a public trust.”
(article XI, sec.1)
• Article 204 RPC – knowingly rendering
unjust judgment
• Article 205 RPC – judgment rendered
through negligence
• Article 206 RPC – knowingly rendering an
unjust interlocutory order
• Article 207 RPC – maliciously delaying the
administration of justice
• Malfeasance under sec.3(e) RA 3019
Judicial Immunity
• “judgments or judicial opinions which do
not fall under articles 204-207 of the RPC,
section 3(e) RA 3019, articles 20 & 27 NCC
, even if erroneous, do not make the
judges administratively liable.”
• Qualification: so long as he acts in GOOD
FAITH.
On members of the Supreme Court
• Article VIII, sec.6: “the SC has
administrative supervision over all courts
and personnel thereof.”
• Justices of the SC can only be removed
from office thru impeachment
• But judges who are not impeachable
officers may be removed from office,
suspended or even disbarred during their
incumbency
New Code of Judicial Conduct
• Enacted in accordance with the Bangalore
Draft ( roundtable discussion of Chief
Justices of the signatory states at the
Hague)
• Intended to universalize the judicial
standards applicable in all judiciaries
• Contains 6 CANONS (vis-à-vis the former
Code of Judicial Conduct which had 5
Canons)
 Salient features of the NOTARIAL LAW & the
2004 Rules
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC
• BASIS: §251 of the Revised Administrative
Code
• The Notarial Law is explicit on the
obligations and duties of notaries public.
They are required to certify that the party
to every document acknowledged before
them has presented the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the
residence tax); and to enter its number,
place of issue and date as part of such
certification.
BASIS: §246 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
• They are also required to maintain and
keep a notarial register; to enter therein
all instruments notarized by them; and to
“give to each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before [them] a
number corresponding to the one in
[their] register [and to state therein] the
page or pages of [their] register, on which
the same is recorded.
• BASIS: §249 of the Revised
Administrative Code
• Failure to perform these duties would
result in the revocation of their
commission as notaries public.
• See: Protacio v. Mendoza, 395 SCRA 10,
17, January 13, 2003.
Purpose of the 2004 Notarial Rules:
• (a) to promote, serve, and protect public
interest;
• (b) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the
rules governing notaries public; and
• (c) to foster ethical conduct among
notaries public.
Who may be a Notary public?
• (1) must be a citizen of the
Philippines;
• (2) must be over twenty-one (21)
years of age;
• (3) must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one (1) year and
maintains a regular place of work or
business in the city or province where the
commission is to be issued;
• (4) must be a member of the
Philippine Bar in good standing with
clearances from the Office of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
• (5) must not have been convicted in
the first instance of any crime involving
moral turpitude. (section 1, Rule 3 AM
02-18-13-SC.)
Form & contents of petition
• Every petition for a notarial commission
shall be in writing, verified, and shall
include the following:
• (a) a statement containing the
petitioner's personal qualifications,
including the petitioner's date of birth,
residence, telephone number,
professional tax receipt, roll of attorney's
number and IBP membership number;
• (b) certification of good moral
character of the petitioner by at least two
(2) executive officers of the local chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
where he is applying for commission;
• (c) proof of payment for the filing of
the petition as required by these Rules;
and
• (d) three (3) passport-size color
photographs with light background taken
within thirty (30) days of the application.
The photograph should not be retouched.
The petitioner shall sign his name at the
bottom part of the photographs.
(section 2, Rule 3 Ibid.)
Other matters
• Payment of application fee
• Hearing of the petition SUMMARY in
nature
• Notice shall be posted in the designated
court areas and published in a newspaper
of general circulation
• Any person who has cause to oppose the
same may file a written opposition
• Jurisdiction and term of a notary public
A person commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts in any place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court
for a period of two (2) years commencing the first
day of January of the year in which the
commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or
the notary public has resigned under these Rules
and the Rules of Court. (section 11, Rule 3, ibid.)
May the term be renewed?
YES.
• A notary public may file a written
application with the Executive Judge for
the renewal of his commission within
forty-five (45) days before the expiration
thereof. A mark, image or impression of
the seal of the notary public shall be
attached to the application.
 Failure to file said application will result in
the deletion of the name of the notary
public in the register of notaries public.
• The notary public thus removed from the
Register of Notaries Public may only be
reinstated therein after he is issued a new
commission in accordance with these
Rules. (section 13, Rule 3, ibid.)
Powers and limitations of a notary public
• POWERS: A notary public is empowered
to perform the following notarial acts:
• (1) acknowledgments;
• (2) oaths and affirmations;
• (3) jurats;
• (4) signature witnessings;
• (5) copy certifications; and
• (6) any other act authorized by
these Rules.
(section 1, Rule IV, ibid. )
Nadayag vs. Grageda (09-27-94)
Notarization is not an empty routine.
Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one and
renders it admissible in court without further
proof of its authenticity. A notary public should
therefore be conscientious in seeing to it that
justice permeated every transaction for which his
services had been engaged, in conformity with the
avowed duties of a worthy member of the Bar.
S/he must fully explain the intricacies and
consequences of the subject transaction.
Function of a notary public
- To guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements. That function would be defeated if
the notary public were one of the signatories to
the instrument. For then, he would be interested
in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly
involves himself and the validity of his own act,
and the very purpose of the acknowledgment,
which is to minimize fraud would be thwarted.
(Villarin vs. Sabate, Feb. 9, 2000)
What constitutes competent evidence of
“identity”?
• (a) at least one current
identification document issued by an
official agency bearing the photograph
and signature of the individual; or
• (b) the oath or affirmation of one
credible witness not privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who
is personally known to the notary public
and who personally knows the individual,
or of two credible witnesses neither of
whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each
personally knows the individual and
shows to the notary public documentary
identification. (section 12 Rule 2 AM 02-
18-13-SC)
A notary public is authorized to certify the
affixing of a signature by thumb or other
mark on an instrument or document
presented for notarization if:
• (1) the thumb or other mark is
affixed in the presence of the notary
public and of two (2) disinterested and
unaffected witnesses to the instrument or
document;
• (2) both witnesses sign their own
names in addition to the thumb or other
mark;
• (3) the notary public writes below
the thumb or other mark: "Thumb or
Other Mark affixed by (name of signatory
by mark) in the presence of (names and
addresses of witnesses) and undersigned
notary public"; and
• (4) the notary public notarizes the
signature by thumb or other mark
through an acknowledgment, jurat, or
signature witnessing. (ibid.)
A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of
a person who is physically unable to sign or make
a mark on an instrument or document if:
• 1) the notary public is directed by
the person unable to sign or make a mark
to sign on his behalf;
• (2) the signature of the notary
public is affixed in the presence of two
disinterested and unaffected witnesses to
the instrument or document;
• (3) both witnesses sign their own
names;
• (4) the notary public writes below
his signature: "Signature affixed by notary
in presence of (names and addresses of
person and two [2] witnesses)"; and
• (5) the notary public notarizes his
signature by acknowledgment or jurat.
(ibid.)
Prohibitions
• a) A notary public shall not perform a
notarial act outside his regular place of
work or business; provided, however,
that on certain exceptional occasions or
situations, a notarial act may be
performed at the request of the parties in
the following sites located within his
territorial jurisdiction:
 (1) public offices, convention halls, and
similar places where oaths of office may be
administered;
(2) public function areas in hotels and similar
places for the signing of instruments or
documents requiring notarization;
(3) hospitals and other medical institutions
where a party to an instrument or document is
confined for treatment; and
(4) any place where a party to an instrument
or document requiring notarization is under
detention.
Other prohibitions
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act
if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document —
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally
at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary
public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity
as defined by these Rules.
A notary public cannot notarize a document if
s/he:
(a) is a party to the instrument or document
that is to be notarized;
(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result,
any commission, fee, advantage, right, title,
interest, cash, property, or other
consideration, except as provided by these
Rules and by law; or
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner,
ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the
fourth civil degree.
• HELD: Acknowledgments must be made
before a notary public who shall certify
that the person acknowledging the
instrument is known to him and that he is
the same person who executed it and
acknowledged that the same is his free
act and deed.
Santuyo v. Atty. Hidalgo
Q: May a lawyer-notary public delegate to his
secretary the task of filling up his notarial register?
HELD: Respondent lawyer is negligent in his
practice of tolerating the secretary of their law
office to handle the aforementioned notarial
activities. For having wholly entrusted the
preparation and other mechanics of the document
for notarization to the secretary there can be a
possibility that even the respondent’s signature
which is the only one left for him to do can even
be done by the secretary or anybody for that
matter.
SLU v. Atty. Dela Cruz
Q: What is the effect is a lawyer notarizes
documents despite the expiration of his
notarial commission?
HELD: where the notarization of a document
done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a
time when he has no authorization or
commission to do so, the offender may be
subjected to disciplinary action and also
constitutes a violation of the lawyer’s oath to
obey the laws, more specifically the Notarial
Law.

Other prohibited acts

A notary public shall not perform any notarial act
described in these Rules for any person
requesting such an act even if he tenders the
appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to
believe that the notarial act or transaction is
unlawful or immoral;
(b) the signatory shows a demeanor which
engenders in the mind of the notary public
reasonable doubt as to the former's knowledge of
the consequences of the transaction requiring a
notarial act; and
(c) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is
not acting of his or her own free will.
Bon vs. Atty. Ziga and Arcangel
• Q: May a lawyer notarize a document
(“Waiver and Quitclaim”) w/o the party
appearing before him?