I.

THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;

AMENDMENT AND REVISION
 !2

FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(G.R. No. 160261. NOVEMBER 10, 2003)

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted
to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and
three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second impeachment is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action
taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 83896. FEBRUARY 22, 1991)
 !3

FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino formally issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary, or other
appointive officials to hold other government officers in addition to their primary office but
still, subject to such limitations. The petitioner assailed and questioned its
constitutionality because such Executive Order is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order 284 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. It is clearly stated in Article VII, Sec 13 of the 1987 Constitution that “The
President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution hold any other office or
employment during their tenure.

Wherefore, subject to the qualification above stated, the petitions are granted.
Executive Order 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

(G.R. No. 122156. FEBRUARY 3, 1997)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
 !4

The respondent, Government Service Insurance System, pursuant to the

privatization program of the Philippine Government, sold its stake in Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC) in a public auction. Only two bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at Php 41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

The Manila Prince Hotel, as the petitioner, filed a petition before the Supreme
Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked
the Filipino First Policy embraced in Sec. 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which states that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision?

HELD:
Yes. Sec. 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect. It is couched
in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for
purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further
laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares
with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the
self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

Wherefore, respondents Government Service Insurance System, Committee in

Privatization and Office of the Government Corporate Counsel are directed to cease and
desist from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG
BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other
acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

IMBONG V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(G.R. No. L-32432. SEPTEMBER 11, 1970)

MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS:
The case is about two separate but related petitions, filed by petitioners Manuel
B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, who are running as candidates for the 1971
Constitutional Convention. Both parties are questioning the constitutionality of Republic
 !5

Act No. 6132, alleging that it prejudices their rights as candidates for the Constitutional
Convention.

Raul Gonzales assails the validity of the entirety of the law, Republic Act No.
6132, as well as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and of 8(a). On
the other hand, Manuel Imbong impugns only Sec. 8(a).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights of the petitioners to run for candidates for the
Constitutional Convention are prejudiced by Republic Act No. 6312?

HELD:
No. Prayers of both petitioners, Imbong and Gonzales, were denied, provisions
assailed by petitioners are constitutional.

Wherefore, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and Republic Act. No.
6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared
unconstitutional. Without costs.

GONZALES V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(G.R. No. L-28196. NOVEMBER 9, 1967)

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 4913 was passed on June 1967. The law provided for holding a
plebiscite for proposed amendments to the provisions of the Constitution by the
COMELEC. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same
day that the general national elections shall be held on November 14, 1967. It was
questioned and assailed by Ramon Gonzales and other groups concerned as
they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the
 !6

proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the
general election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.

Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress

when they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution. In this regard, the
COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defence that said act of Congress
cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 4913 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, the Supreme Court held that
there is nothing in this provision stating the election referred to is special and must be
different from the general election. The Congress deemed it best to submit the
amendments for ratification in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It does
not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general
elections. Petition is therefore denied.

TOLENTINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(G.R. No. L-34150. OCTOBER 16, 1971)

BARREDO, J.:

FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention were held on
November 10, 1970. On June 1, 1971, the convention held its inaugural session. On the
early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No.
1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting
age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional
Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8, 1971.
 !7

Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution shall be declared null
and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 passed was unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The act of the Constitutional Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single
amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1, Article XV of the Constitution
which states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or
plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to
assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately
but together.

SANIDAD V. COMMISSION ON ELECTION

(G.R. No. L-44640. OCTOBER 12, 1976)

MARTIN, J.:

FACTS:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve,
among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the
powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued
another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous
Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree
No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991. On the same date of
 !8

22 September 1976, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions
to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976.

On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction

seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential
Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as
well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections
to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on
October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there
is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not President Marcos can validly propose amendments to the
Constitution?

HELD:
Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate
the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by
the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power
to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly
during the period of transition. After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its
active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The
normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly
to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the
proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential
Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the
regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(G.R. No. 127325. MARCH 19, 1997)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement
for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to
Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and
directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between
petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file
their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18,
1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin
filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments,
among others: 1) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if
there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been
passed; and 2) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
 !9

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the
Constitution by people’s initiative?

HELD:
No. Republic Act No. 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on
amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system.
Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments to this constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right” This
provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by
Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Convention stated
“without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this
mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action.”
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of
the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot
exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason
does not provide for its implementation.

LAMBINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(G.R. No. 174153. OCTOBER 25, 2006)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under
Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars
had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The Lambino Group’s initiative
petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by
adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift
the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
of their initiative. The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC
declaring Republic Act 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals
to amend the Constitution.
 !10

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution?

HELD:
No. Sec. 2, Article XVII Amendments or Revisions of the 1987 Constitution
provides “Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall
be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative

upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This
means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus
sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as
an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy
of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26
September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

Wherefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. So ordered.

LAMBINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(G.R. No. 174153. NOVEMBER 21, 2006)

RESOLUTION

FACTS:
The actual antecedent fact of the case is, that the Supreme Court ruled in the
case of Lambino v. Commission on Elections with (General Record) G.R. No. 174153
that the petition of the Lambino Group is hereby declared dismissed that was
promulgated on October 25, 2006.

In a four-page resolution, the Court held that the basic issues raised had already
been duly passed upon and that no substantial arguments were presented to warrant the
reversal of the October 25, 2006 decision. The assailed decision, penned by Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, upheld the Commission on Elections’ August 31, 2006 resolution
denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the Constitution by petitioners.

Counsel for intervenor Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc. petitioned for

the inhibition of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban and Associate Justice Antonio
Carpio, who penned the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for Motion to Inhibit filed by the counsel for intervenor
Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc. against Chief Justice Panganiban and
Associate Justice Carpio is meritorious?
 !11

HELD:
No. The Court resolved by a unanimous vote to deny for utter lack of merit the
motion to inhibit filed by the counsel for intervenor Sulongbayan Movement Foundation,
Inc. that sought the inhibition of Chief Justice Panganiban and Justice Carpio. This Court
cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution,
which embodies the people sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to
defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative,
propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution
is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is
to lose this Court raison detre, said the Court in the October 26 decision.

II. CONCEPT OF THE STATE

 !12

1. TERRITORY
 !13

MAGALLONA V. ERMITA
(G.R. No. 187167. AUGUST 16, 2011)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioners, Magallona, et. al., assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act
9522 which mandates the adjustment of the country’s archipelagic baselines and
classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. Historically, Republic Act No. 3046
is the ruling law which demarcates the maritime baselines of the Philippines, as an
archipelago. Republic Act No. 3046 follows the framing of the Convention on Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958, which codifies the sovereign rights of the states
over their territorial sea. Republic Act No. 9522 aims to amend Republic Act No. 3046 by
complying with the terms of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III which
took between 1973 and 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional for reducing the Philippine
Maritime Territory?

HELD:
No. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III) has
nothing to do with the acquisition or loss territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating sea
use rights over maritime zones. Baseline laws such as Republic Act 9522 are enacted
pursuant to UNCLOS III and only serves to mark out specific basepoints from which
baselines are drawn straight or curve, and to serve and to start as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of maritime zones and continental shelf.
 !14

ARIGO V. SWIFT
(G.R. No. 206510. SEPTEMBER 16, 2016)

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines
and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of
call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu
Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of

the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies?

HELD:
No. The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be
filed separately.
 !15

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of

criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

PCA CASE Nº 2013-19, “IN THE MATTER OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
ARBITRATION” BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
(JULY 12, 2016)

DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

FACTS:
The Parties to this arbitration are the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s
Republic of China. Both States are parties to the 1982 UNCLOS, the Philippines having
ratified the Convention on 8 May 1984, and China on 7 June 1996. The South China
Sea is a crucial shipping lane, a rich fishing ground, home to a highly biodiverse coral
reef ecosystem, and believed to hold substantial oil and gas resources. The southern
portion of the South China Sea is also the location of the Spratly Islands, a constellation
of small islands and coral reefs, existing just above or below water, that comprise the
peaks of undersea mountains rising from the deep ocean floor. Long known principally
as a hazard to navigation and identified on nautical charts as the “dangerous ground”,
the Spratly Islands are the site of longstanding territorial disputes among some of the
littoral States of the South China Sea. The basis for this arbitration is the 1982 UNCLOS.
Similarly, although the Convention does contain provisions concerning the delimitation of
maritime boundaries, China made a declaration in 2006 to exclude maritime boundary
delimitation from its acceptance of compulsory dispute settlement, something the
Convention expressly permits for maritime boundaries and certain other matters. The
disputes that the Philippines has placed before the Tribunal fall broadly within four
categories. China has consistently rejected the Philippines’ recourse to arbitration and
adhered to a position of neither accepting nor participating in these proceedings. Despite
its decision not to appear formally at any point in these proceedings, China has taken
steps to informally make clear its view that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to consider any
of the Philippines’ claims. The Tribunal decided to treat the Position Paper and
communications from China as equivalent to an objection to jurisdiction and to conduct a
separate hearing and rule on its jurisdiction as a preliminary question, except insofar as
an issue of jurisdiction “does not possess an exclusively preliminary character.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not People’s Republic of China’s contention of 9-dashed line can be
the basis of their claims?

HELD:
No. The PCA under the United Nations ruled in favor of the Philippines in its
arbitration case against China over the South China Sea. The Hague-based international
 !16

tribunal ruled that China's nine-dash line claim over the disputed waters is invalid. As
between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign
rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea
encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention
and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive
limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention," the award read. The
international tribunal found that it has jurisdiction to consider the dispute between the
Philippines and China concerning historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements
in the South China Sea. The tribunal pointed out that there was no evidence that China
has exercised exclusive control over the disputed waters or its resources.

2. GOVERNMENT
 !17

EDU V. ERICTA
(G.R. No. L-32069. OCTOBER 24, 1970)

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector Law as well as
Admin Order No. 2 implementing it, as an invalid exercise of the police power for being
violative of the due process clause. Galo followed with a manifestation that in the event
that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of the Land
Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue
exercise of legislative power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and
valid?

HELD:
Yes. It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under
the police power to promote public safety. It bears repeating that the Reflector Law
construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which
it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety
which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a
categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner
to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such
fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative
Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far from formidable, launched against it by
respondent Galo.
 !18

PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION V. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS
(G.R. No. L-32052. JULY 25, 1975)

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondents (employees of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration)
filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a petition wherein they alleged the pay
of overtime services in excess of eight (8) hours a day rendered by them was not given
to them in accordance with Commonwealth Act. 444. The employer, Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration denied the allegations. Presiding Judge Martinez of the Court of
Industrial Relations rendered the decision in favour of the private respondents. Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied and so
they filed a petition for certiorari. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration contended
that Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the case because it exercise
governmental function and not proprietary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration exercise governmental
and not proprietary functions?

HELD:
Yes. Under Republic Act No. 2655 as amended by Republic Act No. 4155,
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration’s nature as governmental agency is apparent.
Thus, readily apparent from a cursory perusal of such statutory announced in the leading
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration case.
 !19

SHIPSIDE, INCORPORATED V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 143377. FEBRUARY 20, 2001)

MELO, J.:

FACTS:
Shipside Inc. filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals that contains
the requisite certification on non-forum shopping, but the petitioner failed to attach proof
that the person signing the certification was given authority to do such. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. A Motion for Reconsideration was submitted by the
petitioner, which in the petition, attached a secretary’s certificate attesting to the
signatory’s authority to sign certificates against forum shopping on behalf of the
petitioner. When the court of Court of Appeals denied the motion, the petitioner sought
relief with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an err in dismissing the petition
of the Shipside Inc.?

HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition. The Supreme Court
revised the decision of Court of Appeals recognizing the belated filing of the certifications
against forum shopping as permitted in exceptional circumstances. It further held that
with more reason should a petition be given due course when this incorporates a
certification on non-forum shopping without evidence that the person signing the
certifications was an authorized signatory and the petitioner subsequently submits a
secretary’s certificate attesting to the signatory’s authority in its motion for
reconsideration. The court allows belated submission of certifications showing proof of
the signatory’s authority in signing the certification of forum shopping.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted and the orders dated August 31, 1999
and October 4, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of the First National Judicial Region
(Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union) in Civil Case No. 6346 entitled Republic of the
Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, et. al., Defendants as well as the
resolutions promulgated on November 4, 1999 and May 23, 2000 by the Court of
Appeals (Twelfth Division) in CA-G. R. SP No. 55535 entitled Shipside, Inc., Petitioner
versus Hon. Alfredo Cajigal, as Judge, RTC, San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26, and
the Republic of the Philippines, Respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. The
complaint in Civil Case No. 6346, Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando City,
La Union entitled Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, et
al." is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action by the
Bases Development and Conversion Authority. So Ordered.

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESSICCATORS V. PHILIPPINE

COCONUT AUTHORITY
(G.R. NO. 110526. FEBRUARY 10, 1998)
 !20

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by Presidential Decree No.
232 as an independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development
and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that
coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development
and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law.

PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant

operators. In March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no
longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a
condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free
enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red
tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested
areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for
mandamus to compel PCA to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition of Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators
(APCD) should be granted?

HELD:
Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated
laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free
enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not
call for the removal of “protective regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is
so because under Art. 12, Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when
the public interest so requires.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MONTE DE PIEDAD

(G.R. No. L-9959. DECEMBER 13, 1916)

TRENT, J.:
 !21

FACTS:
In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish
Government then provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the
Philippine Treasury. Out of the said amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then
invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in jewelries.
But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the said amount, the bank
cannot provide for the amount. The government then filed a complaint. The bank argued
that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a
complaint. The bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the
said amount.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against
the respondent bank?

HELD:
Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de
Piedad, this is in accordance with the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being
the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such
laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such
right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the
money intended for the people

CABANAS V. PILAPIL
(G.R. No. L-25843. JULY 25, 1974)

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil (deceased), husband of Melchora Cabanas and brother of
Francisco Pilapil, insured himself and indicated his child to be the beneficiary. He
 !22

authorized his brother to act as the trustee during the minority of his child. The child was
ten when Florentino died. Francisco Pilapil took over the insurance proceeds.

Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint regarding the insurance proceeds that

Florentino received and asked if she can be the trustee for her child. Francisco argued
that the terms of the insurance policy left by Florentino should be followed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the state may interfere to the terms of the insurance policy by
virtue of Doctrine of “Parens Patriae”?

HELD:
Yes, the state may interfere, by virtue of “parens patriae”, to the terms of the
insurance policy. There is a constitutional provisions that reads “The State shall
strengthen the family as a basic social institution”. When a member of such would be
prejudiced and his interest be affected, the judiciary should resolve the case according
to the best interest. In this case, the state, acting as “parens patriae”, can intervene
when a litigation affects the interest of the minor.

Francisco Pilapil, the uncle of the child, should not be trustee. The court ruled
that it should be the mother who will be the trustee of the child because she was the
immediate relative of the minor and shows more care. The minor, likewise, lives with her.

Wherefore, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendant-
appellant.

CO KIM CHAM V. VALDEZ TAN KEH

(G.R. NO. L-5. SEPTEMBER 17, 1945)

FERIA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner files for mandamus for the lower court to continue proceedings for Civil
Case No.3012 (A Property Rights dispute). The court refused to take cognizance of the
petitioner's appeal since the courts are following Gen. Douglas McArthur's proclamation
that invalidates and nullifies laws, regulations, and process of any government in the
Philippines of that of the said Commonwealth and without legal effect in areas of the
 !23

Philippines free of enemy occupation. The courts refuse to take cognizance of the case
under the defunct state of the Republic of the Philippines since there is an absence of
law granting such authority. The respondent believes that the former government is not
de facto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proclamation of General MacArthur declared that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other Government other than that of the
commonwealth are null and void, invalidated and all judgments and judicial acts
proceeding from the courts?

HELD:
No. The declaration of McArthur does not invalidate the judicial acts and
proceedings. It could be added that the proclamation is an acknowledgment of the Gen.
Incapacity to do so and that the proclamation is simply an attempt to invalidate all judicial
proceedings therefore acting in accordance to international law. Hague Convention
article 43 states that the usurper not to suspend the assertion of civil life of the usurped,
which in this case is being thwarted by the nullity of judicial cases. In Ochoa v.
Hernandez, the US acknowledges the international rules. The fact that there was a
proclamation of Gen. McArthur shows that it is an abrogation and not fact ab initio.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES V. PRES. AQUINO

(G.R. No. 73748. MAY 22, 1986)

MINUTE RESOLUTION

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986,
proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption
of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines."

ISSUE:
 !24

Whether or not the Government of Pres. Aquino is legitimate?

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that the people have accepted the Aquino government
which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto government
but in fact and law a de jure government and the community of nations has recognized
the legitimacy of the new government.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANDIGANBAYAN

(G.R. No. 104768, JULY 21, 2003)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and by its powers the then Chairman Jovito
R. Salonga then created an AFP Anti-Graft Board which is tasked to investigate reports
of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel. Based on its mandate,
AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of Major General
Ramas and his alleged mistress Dimaano. PCGG then files petition against but since
petitioner was not able to show further evidence, private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss based on the principle in the case of Republic vs. Migriño that PCGG does not
have a jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere
position without showing that they are subordinates of former President Marcos.
 !25

Sandiganbayan then dismissed the amended complaint and ordered for the return of the
confiscated items to respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause filing of forfeiture
against private respondents?

HELD:
No. PCGG had no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas. PCGG cannot exercise
investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it for its powers are specific and
limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s sole task is to
recover ill-gotten wealth of Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. As he was not a
“subordinate” of President Marcos as contemplated under Executive Order No. 1 which
created PCGG, then it had no jurisdiction over Ramas. It was said that mere position
held by a military does not make him a subordinate, as used in Executive Order No. 1,
absent any showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos.
Court also ruled that the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized the
subjected items. Search warrant did not particularly describe the items to be seized.
Thus, the seizure of items was therefore void, and unless these are contraband per se,
which they are not, must be returned to the person from whom the raiding team seized
them.
 !26

3. SOVEREIGNTY

LAUREL V. MISA
(G.R. No. L-409. JANUARY 30, 1947)
 !27

RESOLUTION

FACTS:
Petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was arrested by the US Army and was interned
under a commitment order for his active collaboration with the Japanese during the
Japanese occupation. He was charged with treason but on September 1945 he was
then turned over to the Commonwealth government and since then he has been custody
of the Director of Prisons.

He then filed a petition for habeas corpus based on the theory that a Filipino
citizen who committed the crime of treason during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted because the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines at
that time was then suspended as well as its citizens’ allegiance and that there was a
change of sovereignty over it upon a proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines
and its citizens’ allegiance were suspended during the Japanese occupation?
2. Whether or not petitioner can be prosecuted for the crime of treason during the
Japanese occupation?

HELD:
1. No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the citizens of a territory
occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy’s occupation because the sovereignty of the government is not
transferred to the occupier and if it is not transferred, it must necessarily remain vested
in the legitimate government. What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy
passes temporarily to the occupant and that sovereignty itself is not suspended and
subsists during the occupation. The allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate
government subsists and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

2. Yes. Petitioner may be prosecuted for the crime of treason because the
inhabitants of the occupied territory by that time were still bound by their allegiance to
the latter.

PEOPLE V. PERFECTO
(G.R. No. L-18463. OCTOBER 4, 1922)

MALCOLM, J.:
 !28

FACTS:
On August 20, 1920, Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero
discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by
witness in the investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Thereafter,
the Philippine Senate, having been called by the Governor-General for a special
session, he then informed the body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken
by him to discover the guilty party. A day after the convening, newspaper La Nacion,
edited by Gregorio Perfecto, published an article against the Philippine Senate. Due to
the publication of article, he was then alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code which punishes those who insult the Ministers of the Crown.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still in force and can be
applied to the petitioner?

HELD:
No. Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted to protect the Spanish
officials as representatives of the King and in this present case, we no longer have
neither Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, since the
sovereignty was changed from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision
had been abrogated automatically. Article 256 was sought to be political in nature for it
deals with the relation of the State to its inhabitants. Thus, applying the principle that on
acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated. Hence, Article 256 is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to
the case at bar.

MACARIOLA V. ASUNCION

(ADM. CASE No. 133-J. MAY 31, 1982)

MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS:
 !29

Macariola filed a case against respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte with the “acts unbecoming a judge.” Respondent Judge was charged for having
been violated Article 491 of the New Civil Code when he acquired by purchase a portion
of a lot which was involved in a civil case decided by him and when he associated
himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and
a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code?
2. Whether or not respondent violated Article 14 of the Code of Commerce, Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Civil Service Rules and Canons of Judicial Ethics?

HELD:
1. No. Respondent did not violate Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 of the Civil Code
because the sale took place after the finality of the decision. Prohibition only applies
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.

2. No. Respondent may not also be held liable under paragraphs 1 and 5 of
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce (which is of Spanish vintage) because the provision
partakes of the nature of political law as it regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officers and employees and as such is deemed to have
been automatically abrogated with the change of sovereignty from Spain to United
States. Also, respondent may also not be held laible under Paragraph H, Section 3 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because there is no showing that he participated or
intervened in his official capacity in the business or transaction of the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., or that said corporation gained any undue
advantage by reason of respondent’s financial involvement with it and certainly because
neither the 1935 nor 1973 Constitution or any existing law expressly prohibits members
of the Judiciary from engaging or having any interest in any lawful business.
 !30

VILAS V. CITY OF MANILA

(220 U.S. 345. APRIL 3, 1911)

MR. JUSTICE LURTON:

FACTS:
Prior to the incorporation or cession of City of Manila by the treaty of Paris,
petitioners were creditors of City of Manila. After incorporation, with the theory in mind
that it is still the same juristic person and thus liable upon the obligations of the old city,
actions were then brought against it. Respondent alleged that its sovereignty had been
changed after the cession of Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and therefore
extinguishing its liability.

ISSUE:
Whether or not change in sovereignty extinguishes the liability of City of Manila
from its creditors?

HELD:
No. Inhabitants of the old city are the incorporators of the new. There are some
changes in the form of government and some changes in corporate powers and
methods of administration. The new administration is endowed with all of the property
and property rights of the old. It has the same power to sue and be sued which the
corporation had. There is not the slightest suggestion that the new corporation shall not
succeed to the contracts and obligations of the old corporation, Thus, in juristic sense,
the present city is in every legal sense, the successor of the old. As such, it is entitled to
the property and property rights of the predecessor and therefore shall also be subject to
all its liabilities.

PERALTA V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

(G.R. No. L-49. NOVEMBER 12, 1945)
 !31

FERIA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila, was prosecuted
for the crime of robbery and was found guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment
which he commenced to serve on August 21, 1944 by the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction, created in accord with Ordinance No. 7, promulgated by the
President under the military forces of Japan. Petitioner contended that the courts were
repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth for it does not afford fair judicial trial and
impairs constitutional rights of the abused.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction and the summary procedure adopted for that court are valid?
2. Whether or not the sentence during the military occupation is valid?

HELD:
1. Yes. The creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
and its summary procedures are valid. Existence of such court is to serve as a
government instrumentality of the belligerent occupant. Its functions solely apply the law
to any case that falls within their jurisdiction.

2. Yes. The sentence given during the military occupation is considered valid and
is within the power and competence of the Japanese to promulgate their laws. All
judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be
valid upon reoccupation, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime
of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid by the
principle of postliminy. Thus, sentence of life imprisonment is lifted.
 !32

RUFFY V. CHIEF OF STAFF

(G.R. No. L-533. AUGUST 20, 1946)

TUASON, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner, a Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary, retreated in
the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy. He organized and led a guerilla
outfit known as Bolo Area. It was a contingent of the 6th Military District which has been
recognized and placed under operational control of US Army.

Col. Jurado then effected a change in command in the Bolo Area and relieved
the petitioner as the then Commanding Officer of Bolo Area. However, Col. Jurado was
then slain allegedly the petitioners which gave rise to the petition. Trial court convicted
petitioner and he alleged that he was not subject to military law at the time of the offense
from which he had been placed on trial was committed. He also contended that by the
occupation, all laws and regulations creating and governing the existence of Philippine
Army including the Articles of War were suspended and in abeyance during such
belligerent occupation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was subject to military law at the time of the alleged
offense was committed?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner was subject to the military law at the time the alleged offense was
committed. The rule that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are
considered superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the
governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does
not bind the enemies in arms. Petitioners, by their acceptance of appointments as
officers in Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they
became members of the Philippine Army amenable to Articles of War. As officers in the
Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, petitioners operated under the orders of a duly
established and duly appointed commanders of the United States Army and thus
covered by Article 2 of the Articles of War which provides for persons subject to military
law.
 !33

ALCANTARA V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

(G.R. No. L-6. NOVEMBER 29, 1945)

FERIA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance in Ilocos Sur for the crime
of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, Court of
Appeals of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence and dentenced the
petitioner to an indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor to prision correccional.
Sentence as modified became final on September 12, 1944. Petitioner then questioned
the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the sole ground
that said court was a only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation of the Islands and that Court of Appeals was not
authorized by the Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of Court of Appeals was good and valid?
HELD:
Yes. Judgments of Court of Appeals were good and valid and remain good and
valid for the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. A
penal sentence is said to be a political complexion when it penalizes a new act not
defined in the municipal laws or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against
the legitimate government but taken out of territorial law and penalized as new offenses
committed against the belligerent occupant which is necessary for the control of the
occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier.

 !34

III. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE

IMMUNITY
 !35

1. BASIS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. VILLASOR

(G.R. No. L-30671. NOVEMBER 28, 1973)

FERNANDO, J.:
 !36

FACTS:
On July 3, 1961, a decision in favor of respondents (companies) was held
confirming arbitration award. On June 1969, Villasor issued an order to declare that said
decision be made final and executory. Pursuant to the order, as alias writ of execution
was then made and Villasor served notices of garnishments with several banks
especially on “monies due to AFP in form of deposits sufficient to cover amount
mentioned in the execution”. These monies of AFP are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pension, allowances, maintenance, etc. Thus, petitioner
filed a certiorari and prohibition proceeding against the order of respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Villasor acted in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting issuance of writ of
executions?

HELD:
Yes. What was done by the respondent judge was not in conformity with the
dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing
from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is
immune from suit unless it gives consent. Thus, it was held that disbursements of public
funds must be covered by corresponding appropriation by law.
 !37

2. TEST

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FELICIANO

(G.R. No. 70853. MARCH 12, 1987)

YAP, J.:

FACTS:
Feliciano filed a case to the Land Authority for recovery of ownership and
possession consisting of four lots. He alleged that he bought these lots from Gardiola
 !38

and upon information possessoria, took actual possession of it. However, when NARRA
was issued, Feliciano’s lots be excluded from it being his private property. IAC dismissed
Feliciano’s complaint and the Republic of the Philippines sought for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not State can be sued for recovery and possession of parcel of
lands?

HELD:
Yes. Suit against State is permitted, unless expressly or impliedly provided
through legislation. However, in the present case, Proclamation’s not a legislative act
and his information possessoria was just a duplicate and he failed to supply the original
copy thus dismissing the complaint filed by respondent Pablo Feliciano against the
Republic of the Philippines.
 !39

SANDERS V. VERIDIANO
(G.R. No. L-46930. JUNE 10, 1988)

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
Sanders was the Special Services Director of US Naval Station in Olongapo City.
On October 3, 1975, private respondents were advised that their employment had been
converted from permanent to part-time, effective on October 18, 1975. Private
respondents protested and resulted to a hearing officer who conducted proceedings for
reinstatement and back wages. However, Sanders disagreed for they are alleged to be
difficult employees and placed records in public places where others not involved in the
case could hear. Private respondents filed in Court of First Instance Olongapo for
damages against petitioners. Petitioners argued that their acts complained of were
performed in the discharge of their duties and the Court of First Instance had no
jurisdiction against State immunity. Motion was then dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were acting in their official duties when private
respondents sued them?

HELD:
Yes. It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the
petitioners were being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department had
supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their
employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. Thus,
petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of
their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts. Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts
of the petitioners are protected by presumption of good faith; even mistakes concededly
committed by such public officers are not actionable as it is not shown that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

TAN V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

(G.R. No. L-24548. OCTOBER 27, 1983)
 !40

MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in April 1961, Bureau of Forestry issued Notice NO. 2087 which
advertised for public bidding of a certain tract of public forest land in Olongapo,
Zambales. It is located within the former US Naval Reservation, which was turned over
by US government to Philippine government. On May 1961, Tan submitted his
application in due form after paying necessary fees. Nine others submitted their offers.
Thereafter, questions arose as to declare the area as forest reserve or award to the most
qualified bidder. On June 1961, President Garcia issued a directive to Department of
Forestry that the area is reserved for watershed purposes and bidding be rejected. On
August 1961, Secretary Fortich of ANR sustained decision of Bureau of Forestry and Tan
won the bid. On May 1963, ANR Secretary Gozon (new) issued grant to timber licences
and then Jose Feliciano, the acting Secretary of ANR, replacing Gozon, promulgated a
memo order revoking the previous order issued. On the same day the latter order was
issued, ordinary timber license was granted to Tan without approval of ANR. Then,
Ravago’s company wrote to ANR Secretary to revoke the license and make it thereafter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s timber license is valid?

HELD:
No. Petitioner’s timber license was signed and released without authority and is
therefore void ab initio. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the
impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of
the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the date of
the release or issuance, and not the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-
appellant's timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was
released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the
licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any
authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had
not acquired any legal right under such void license.

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. V. COURT OF

APPEALS
(G.R. No. 91359. SEPTEMBER 25, 1992)

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:
 !41

Petitioners alleged that Sections 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or Private
Security Agency Law violate 1987 Constitution which institutionalized PADPAO which is
monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency. A memo
agreement was executed by PADPAO and PC Chief which fixed minimum monthly
contract rate per guard for 8 hours.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s complaint against PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit
against state without consent?

HELD:
Yes. It was performed as part of their duties, without malice, gross negligence, or
bad faith so no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.
 !42

VINZONS-CHATO V. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION

(G.R. No. 141309. JUNE 19, 2007)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
On June 10, 1993, legislative department enacted Republic Act No. 7654 that
locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%.
Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands subject to ad valorem tax.
Two days prior to the effectivity of RA 7654, petitioner issued a memo (RMC)
reclassifying the brands as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand
subject to 55% tax. It was only on July 15 when Fortune received a certified photocopy
of RMC. Thus, Fortune filed a petition requesting the RMC’s recall but it was denied and
payment of tax deficiency was demanded within 10 days. Fortune then filed a complaint
for damages against petitioner in her private capacity in the Regional Trial Court saying
that she should be held liable for damages under New Civil Code because the RMC
issued violated right against property deprivation without due process and equal
protection of laws. Petitioner alleged that she issued RMC in the performance of her
function and thus the Republic of the Philippines is the one responsible for her acts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not public officer may be sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in connection with the discharge of his/her official functions?

HELD:
Yes. The general rule is that a public official is not liable for damages which
another suffers from just performance of official duties, within scope of tasks or duties
and the republic shall not be amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its
consent. In this case, public official may be sued he violated a constitutional right of the
plaintiff. Public officials may be sued in his private capacity when there is malice, bad
faith and negligence on his part or when he violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
 !43

3. SUIT AGAINST GOVERNMENT

AGENCIES
 !44

a. INCORPORATED

RAYO V. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN

(G.R. No. L-55273-83. DECEMBER 19, 1981)

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS:
On the outburst of Typhoon Kading, respondent opened simultaneously all the
three floodgates of Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden and simultaneous opening
 !45

said floodgates in Bulacan and were inundated. Petitioners then filed damages against
respondent corporation. Petitioners contended that at that time respondent was
performing a proprietary function and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be
sued.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent performs governmental functions with the respect of
operations in Angat Dam?

HELD:
Yes. It is considered as a GOCC, has a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from the government thus may be sued. Moreover, its own charter provided it
can be sued and may be sued thus charges may prosper against it.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION V. JUDGE FIRME

(G.R. No. L-52179. APRIL 8, 1991)

MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS:
A jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando,
La Union collided. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of Baniña filed a complaint for damages against the
owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against the
Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and
 !46

raised the defense of non-suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Baniña.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the municipality may be sued at this case at bar?

RULING:
Yes. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State
when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity from suit and simply because their charter provided that they can
sue and be sued. However, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of its governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not
acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
 !47

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE V. SPOUSES RAMOS

(G.R. No. 159402. FEBRUARY 23, 2011)

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
Spouses Ramos discovered that a portion of their land registered under Transfer
Certificate of Baguio City was being sued as part of the runway and running shoulder of
Loakan Airport operated by petitioner. Respondents agreed after registrations to convey
affected portion to ATO, however, ATO failed to do so. Thus, respondents filed an action
for collection against ATO. ATO defended that by virtue of Proclamation No. 1358 of
Marcos, respondents’ affected land had been reserved for the use of Loakan Airport and
RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain action without State’s consent. RTC denied ATO
then petitioner appealed to Court of Appeals but was also denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ATO can be sued without state’s consent?

HELD:
Yes. State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner because it is an
agency of the state engaged in an enterprise that is far from being state’s exclusive
prerogative.

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION V. MORALES

(G.R. No. 154200. JULY 24, 2007)
 !48

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:
Morales and 105 other employees of NEA filed with RTC a class suit against their
employer for payment of various allowance purportedly authorized under Republic Act
No. 6758. Court of First Instance granted the petition and issued a writ of execution,
thereafter a garnishment against funds of NEA with DBP. NEA filed a motion to quash
garnishment claiming that garnished public funds are exempt from execution under Sec.
4 of PD 1445, but they are willing to pay Morales, et al. Only it has no funds to cover the
same. RTC then denied. It was also appealed to Court of Appeals but also was denied
because NEA is a GOCC and can no longer take shelter of PD 1445 and could be
subjected to court practices.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NEA has the capacity to sue and be sued?

HELD:
Yes. It is without question that NEA is a GOCC, a juridical personality separate
from the government with the capacity to sue and be sued. But before garnishment, it
must first be filed with Commission on Audit for it was their primary jurisdiction.

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 129169, NOVEMBER 17, 1999)

DAVIDE, JR. C.J.:

FACTS:
 !49

In a competitive bidding held by NIA in August 1978, HYDRO was awarded

contract for the construction of main civil works of Magat River. HYDRO substantially
completed its work under contract and thereafter determined that it still had an account
receivable from NIA representing dollar rate differential in the contract. HYDRO then filed
with CIAC for the claim. NIA alleged CIAC’s jurisdiction and failure to submit dispute
within period under contract. NIA then filed with the Court of Appeals but it was however
denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NIA is performing governmental functions and is thus exempt
from suit for damages caused by its special agent?

HELD:
No. The functions of government have been classified into governmental or
constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty
and considered as compulsory and latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary
functions. Functions of providing water supply and sewerage service were regarded as
mere optional functions of the government even though it caters the community as a
whole.
 !50

b. UNINCORPORATED

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

(G.R. No. 70547. JANUARY 22, 1993)
 !51

MELO, J.:

FACTS:
Case arose from collision of PNR bound for Manila and a Baliuag Transit bus
which was on its way to Manila but before reaching railroad crossing at Calumpit got
stalled and was hit by defendant’s express train causing damage to plaintiff’s bus and
passengers. Plaintiff alleged that proximate cause was PNR’s negligence and
imprudence. Respondent court then held that PNR was liable.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PNR at this case is cloaked with immunity of state?
2. Whether or not the train engineer and employer are negligent in the case at
bar?

HELD:
1. Yes. Suits against state agencies without respect to matters in which they have
assumed to act in a private or non-governmental capacity are not suits against state.

2. Yes. Due to the circumstances said, the train engineer should have by nature
of his job required him to observe due care exercised by a prudent man.
 !52

BUREAU OF PRINTING V. BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION

(G.R. No. L-15751. JANUARY 28, 1961)

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

FACTS:
Action arose when BOP employees filed at CIR a petition against BOP. It alleged
that Salvador and Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering
with their right to self-organization. CIR then finds BOP’s functions to be proprietary in
nature.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BOP employees can be sued?

HELD:
No. BOP is an office of government created by Administrative Code. It has no
corporation existence and its appropriation are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act designed to meet the printing needs of government and not engaged
in business for pecuniary profit. However in this case, BOP employees, even though
they were receiving outside jobs for these jobs are moreover related to their government
works which they had intended to do.

FAROLAN V. COURT OF TAX APPEALS

(G.R. No. L-42204. JANURY 21, 1993)
 !53

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:
The vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk" arrived in Port of Manila carrying bales of screen
net consigned to Bagong Buhay. The items were declared through a customs broker as
80 bales of screen net of 500 rolls. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due.

The Officer of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the

shipments. The re-examination showed that the shipment consisted of 80 bales of
screen net of 20 rolls each. They declared that the shipments were misdeclared as to
the value and quantity of the items. The Collector of Customs forfeited the subject
shipment in favor of the government.

Respondent filed a petition asking for the release of the items, which the Court
denied. They, then, filed again for motions, which were later on favored upon. The Court
ordered the release of said goods. Sixteen bales were declared to be missing and some
were in bad conditions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bureau of Custom can be sued and be held liable for damages?

HELD:
No. Bureau of Customs cannot be sued and be held liable for damages incurred
with regards to the goods. By doing so, it would violate the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. By ordering the Commissioner of Customs to pay for the damages, it would
result to a liability of the government; meaning it would be considered as a suit against
the state.

As an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical

personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. The political
doctrine that “state may not be sued without its consent” will apply.

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. (VMPSI) V. THE

COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 91359. SEPTEMBER 25, 1992)

 !54

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:
VMPSI filed a complaint questioning the constitutionality of several provisions of
R.A. 5487, otherwise known as “Private Security Agency Law”. According to VMPSI,
R.A. 5487 violates the provision of the 1987 Constitution regarding monopolies, unfair
competition and combinations in restraint of trade.

In its complaint, VMPSI likewise questioned the validity of one of the provision in
the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security
Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO. The provision
requires all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members
of any PADPAO Chapter. It likewise violates the provision of the 1987 Constitution
regarding monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.

PADPAO and the PC Chief executed a Memorandum of Agreement fixing the

minimum monthly contract rate of guards per 8-hours of service. PADPAO found VMPSI
guilty of cut-throat competition. PADPAO Committee recommended the expulsion of
VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency.
VMPSI wrote to the PC Chief requesting him to consider their application for license,
because it will expire already, amidst the recommendation of PADPAO. PC Chief did not
reply. VMPSI filed a civil case against PC Chief.

ISSUE:
Whether or not VMPSI's complaint against the PC Chief is a suit against the
State without its consent?

HELD:

Yes. According to Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, the State may not be sued
without its consent. PC Chief is an instrumentality of the government exercising a
governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of several private
workers. Being an instrumentality, it may not be sued without the government’s consent.

In some cases, public officials are held liable in his personal or private capacity,
especially if he acts in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. In
this case, since the PC Chief performed the acts as part of his official duty, no recovery
may be held against him, specifically in his private capacity.

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC. V. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

(G.R. No. L-23139. DECEMBER 17, 1966)

BENGZON, J.:

FACTS:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad to Manila, consigned to
Mobil Philippine Exploration Inc. The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila and was
discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service. Customs Arrastre Service is
 !55

a unit of Bureau of Customs handling arrastre operation. Only three cases were
delivered to the broker.

Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed a suit against the Customs Arrastre
Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case of
rotary drill.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs are
suable?

HELD:
No. The Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs are parts of the
machinery of the Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the
Department of Finance and the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of
Customs.

Bureau of Customs was authorized to engage in arrastre services. The function

is proprietary and not governmental. When a non-corporate government entity performs
a function proprietary in nature, it does not necessarily make it suable. If said non-
governmental function engages in acts incident to its governmental function, there is no
waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity.

Even though it is engaged in proprietary function, it is a necessary incident of the

primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. Engaging in this kind of
activity does not necessarily render the Bureau liable to suit.

The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national

government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative
mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from
suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 51806. NOVEMBER 8, 1988)

CORTES, J.:

FACTS:
 !56

Private respondent went to Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-
law. His group proceeded in the viewing deck of the airport to get a better view of the
incoming passengers. While walking in the viewing deck, the private respondent slipped
over an elevation that resulted to him falling on his back and breaking his thighbone. The
next day he was operated.

Private respondent filed an action for damages against the Civil Aeronautics
Administration as the entity empowered "to administer, operate, manage, control,
maintain and develop the Manila International Airport”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Civil Aeronautics Administration can be sued and be held liable
for the damages incurred?

HELD:
Yes. Civil Aeronautics Administration is tasked with private or non-governmental
functions, which is not clothed with the rule on state immunity from suit. It is created for
the purpose of managing the airport operations, which primarily involve proprietary
functions. Thus, it cannot avail of the immunity from suit that is given to government
agencies strictly performing governmental functions.
 !57

4. SUIT AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH V. PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC.

(G.R. No. 182358. FEBRUARY 20, 2013)

DEL CASTILLO, J:

FACTS:
The Secretary of the Department of Health, Alfredo Romualdez, issued AO No.
27 setting the guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government suppliers of
pharmaceutical products for sale valid for 3 years. He amended AO No. 27, issuing AO
No. 10 reducing the validity to 2 years and stating that such accreditation may be
recalled, suspended or revoked after due deliberation and proper notice by the DOH.

AO No. 10 was amended by AO No. 66 which states that such accreditation may
be recalled, suspended or revoked after due deliberation, hearing and proper notice by
the DOH. DOH issued a memorandum providing a list and category of sanctions to be
 !58

imposed on accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of

violation committed.

Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. was invited to a meeting wherein Undersecretary Galon

handed them copies of document regarding violative products. BFAD found out that
PPI’s products were unfit for human consumption. PPI’s accreditation has been
suspended for two years. PPI questioned this, thus, filing a complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case filed by PPI be dismissed for being a suit against
the state?

HELD:
Yes. As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either
expressly or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit. In this case, the DOH can
validly invoke state immunity, being an unincorporated agency of the government not
giving its consent to be sued. It must also be noted that DOH is an unincorporated
agency, which performs governmental functions.

Non-suability may likewise extend to complaints filed against public officials for
acts done in the performance of their official function. In this case, Romualdez, Dayrit
and Galon are protected by the non-suability mantle for the acts done in discharge and
performance of their duties. The suability of a government official depends on whether
the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity. It is beyond
doubt that the acts imputed against Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, as well as
Undersecretary Galon, were done while in the performance and discharge of their official
functions or in their official capacities, and not in their personal or individual capacities.

SANDERS, and MOREAU, JR. V. VERIDIANO II

(G.R. No. L-46930. JUNE 10, 1988)

CRUZ, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station in
Olongapo City while Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base.
Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as gameroom attendants in the
special services department.

A change happened from a permanent full-time to permanent part-time in the

employment of the respondents. They instituted a grievance proceeding.
Moreau sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private
respondent's employment status. The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous
imputations. The respondent said that the petitioners were being sued in their private or
personal capacity.
 !59

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were acting in their private capacities when they
did the acts for which the respondents have sued them?

HELD:
No. The acts of the petitioner were performed in the discharge of their official
duties. Sanders, as the director of the special services department, had supervision over
its personnel, including the respondents. In the case of Moreau, the act he committed is
official in nature. He performed the act as an immediate supervisor of Sanders. The
letter he sent deals with solutions with their financial and budgetary problems.

Dealing with the character of the letter that was an issue between the respondent
and the petitioner, the Court concluded that the petitioners were being sued as officers of
the US government and they only acted on behalf of the government and within the
scope of the authority confined to them. It is the government who is responsible for the
acts committed.

The case will not prosper because the government did not give its consent to be
sued. The doctrine of state immunity is applicable also to foreign states. The government
of the United States did not give its consent to be sued

SHAUF V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 90314. NOVEMBER 27, 1990)

REGALADO, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner Shauf, a member of the US Air Force, applied for the vacant position of
Guidance Councilor in the base education office at Clark Air Base. Given the
qualification, she is said to be qualified for the position. Nevertheless, she was not
selected for the position. This led her to file for a complaint against the respondent
alleging that she was discriminated by reason of her nationality and sex.

Mr. Persi, the person in-charged to review their applications, considered Shauf’s
application is of minimum qualification for the position and referred the position to
someone who is not eligible.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are immune from suit being an officer of the
United States Armed Forces?

HELD:
 !60

No. The general rule is that a state may not be sued without its consent. This is
also extended to the officials of the state, which discharges duties assigned to them.
However, the doctrine of state immunity will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity.

WYLIE V. RARANG
(G.R. No. 74135. MAY 28, 1992)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J:

FACTS:
Petitioner Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while Williams was the
commanding officer of the U.S. Naval Base. Respondent Rarang was a merchandise
guard.

Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station
supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD). The respondent was
mentioned in the POD as Auring; this resulted to a case filed against the petitioners for
false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the officials of the Unites States Naval Base are immune from
suit?

HELD:
Yes. The POD was published under the direction and authority of the
commanding officer, U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay. As a rule, U.S. officials are immune
from suit if their actions are in performance of their official function. In this case, the
petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication.
 !61

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANDIGANBAYAN

(G.R. No. 142476. MARCH 20, 2001)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

FACTS:
The petitioners, the Republic of the Philippines and the Presidential Commission
on Good Governance or PCGG, filed a civil case for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against Cojuangco and 60 other.

PCGG issued orders, which covers the Falcon Jet. The aircraft was leased by
Unichem from Faysound Ltd., a company in the United States. After the expiration of the
lease, PCGG filed a motion for authority to sell sequestered aircraft, which the
Sandiganbayan denied. PCGG then filed a petition for certiorari. PCGG sold the aircraft
to Walter Fuller Aircraft Inc., a US corporation. The sale was without the authority of the
Sandiganbayan. PCGG was ordered to deposit the proceeds of the sale to PNB for the
account of the Sandiganbayan.

Faysound Ltd., filed with the District Court of Arkansas an action to recover the
aircraft from Fuller Aircraft, which the court approved. Fuller Aircraft sued the Republic
and the PCGG because it is said that it was deprived of the aircraft sold to it. The
Republic and PCGG were asked to pay Fuller Aircraft. PCGG filed a motion, to withdraw
funds, with Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic can be held liable under the “agreement”?
 !62

HELD:
No. Republic cannot be held liable under the “agreement”. The petitioner did not
authorize the PCGG to enter into such contract with Fuller Aircraft. Granting that the
PCGG was so authorized, however, it exceeded its authority and the sale was without
the authority of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner must take appropriate action against the
PCGG personnel involved in the unauthorized sale of the aircraft and not the Republic.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. REYES

(G.R. No. 79253. MARCH 1, 1993)

DAVIDE, JR., J:

FACTS:
Respondent Montoya is an American citizen who was employed as an
identification checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States
Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters. While petitioner Bradford is an
American citizen who was employed as an activity exchange manager at JUSMAG
headquarters.

An event involving Montoya and Bradford happened wherein Montoya’s body

and things were searched after buying some items in the retail store. Montoya filed a
complaint against Bradford for damages due to oppressive and discriminatory acts
committed by her because of her authority. Bradford filed a motion to dismiss he case
because of the reason she believed that the action is in effect a suit against the United
States of America, a foreign state immune from suit. Her order to have all employees
check was an exercise of her duty as the manager of JUSMAG.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bradford is immune from suit for acts done by her in the
performance of her official functions as a manager of JUSMAG?

HELD:
No. Bradford is not among those granted by diplomatic immunity under the 1953
Military Assistance Agreement. The act done by Bradford is outside the official functions
given to her; which falls to the exception in the law where immunity from suit is given.
 !63

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANDOVAL

(G.R. No. 84607. MARCH 19, 1993)

CAMPOS, JR., J:

FACTS:
The Mendiola Massacre was the culmination of 8 days and 7 nights of
encampment by several groups. They presented their demands for a genuine agrarian
reform. It started with a talk between a farmer and the MAR officials until a tension
happened between the parties.

The farmers marched from Quezon Memorial Circle to Malacanang. Upon

arriving in C.M. Recto Avenue, no dialogue took place and clash occurred. After the
clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead. A commission as created to
investigate regarding the event. The recommendation of the Commission was for the
deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the
government.

A petition was filed by the heirs of the deceased of the Mendiola Massacre and
by the injured Caylao group. The petition was to reverse the order of Judge Sandoval
dismissing the complaint for damages against the Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit?

HELD:
No. It is stated in the Constitution that the State cannot be sued without its
consent. In this case, the State did not give its consent to be sued.

Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification

of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not
in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State.
 !64

Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have
done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from
suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean
that there was an admission by the State of any liability.

While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign
state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given
its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any
liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government.

LANSANG V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 102667. FEBRUARY 23, 2000)

QUISUMBING, J:

FACTS:
National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) is a government initiated civic
body engaged in the development of national parks. Respondent is awarded a “verbal
contract of lease” by the NPDC. No documents were filled up to show the grant of
license to the respondent to occupy a portion of the government park.

Respondents were allegedly given office and space for kiosk. They were asked,
however, to remit 40% of their profits to NPDC without any record who received the
share of profits or how they were used or spent by the Committee.

With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of
the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the
verbal agreement and demanded that they vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran
privately within the public park.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit?

HELD:
No. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against
public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule does not apply
where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and
injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly
being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.

The petitioner is being sued in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his
personal capacity. The complaint filed by the respondents merely identified petitioner as
chairman of the NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in that
capacity. The Chairman likewise did not abuse his authority in ordering the ejectment of
the respondents.
 !65

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH V. PHILIPPINES PHARMAWEALTH

(G.R. No. 169304. MARCH 13, 2007)

CARPIO-MORALES, J:

FACTS:
Respondent, Philippine Pharmawealth Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in
business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government
hospitals in the Philippines. The Secretary of Health issued administrative orders
outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for
pharmaceutical products.

The respondent submitted a request to the Department of Health an inclusion of

additional items in its list of accredited drug products. The Department of Health issued
an invitation for bids. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding respondent's
request, respondent submitted its bid. The respondent lost and the contract was
awarded to YSS Laboratories. The respondent sued the DOH Secretary and
Undersecretaries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a case may be filed against the petitioners, the secretary and
undersecretary of the Department of Health and the Department of Health itself?

HELD:
Yes. While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against
the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The
individual petitioners are being sued in their personal capacities for illegally abusing their
official position. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot
hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.

With regards to the Department of Health, the defense of immunity from suit will
not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government.
 !66

5. OTHER STATES
 !67

MINUCHER V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 142396. FEBRUARY 11, 2003)

VITUG, J:

FACTS:
Minucher came to the Philippines to study. He, then, became a refugee of the
United Nations and continued to stay in this country. An information for violation of
Republic Act No. 6425, or the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”, was filed against the
petitioners and was followed by a buy-bust operation. The buy-bust operation was
conducted in the house of petitioner Minucher where a quantity of heroin was seized.

Minucher filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made
by Arthur Scalzo. In the defense of Scalzo, he only acted in the discharge of his official
duty as an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity from suit?

HELD:
Yes. Vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive
branch of the government. It is true that Scalzo worked for the US Drug Enforcement
Agency and was given the task to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities
within the country. Scalzo acted within the scope of his official function and duty.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from
suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state.
 !68

ARIGO V. SWIFT
(G.R. No. 206510. SEPTEMBER 16, 2014)

VILLARAMA, JR., J:

FACTS:
Tubbataha was declared to be a National Marine Park. It is located in the middle
of the Sulu sea and at the heart of the Coral Triangle. It is likewise considered to be a
World Heritage Site.

R.A. 10067 (Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009) ensures the
protection and conservation of the Tubbataha Reefs. Under the "no-take" policy, entry
into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited.
The US Embassy requested diplomatic clearance for the USS Guardian, a class mine
countermeasures ship of the US Navy, to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines. While the ship was transiting the Sulu Sea, it ran aground the northwest side
of the Tubbataha Reefs.

The US Ambassador assured the Foreign Affairs Secretary that they would
provide appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the ship. They created a
salvage team that will remove the grounded ship from the coral reef.

The petitioners filed a petition stating that the grounding, salvaging and post-
salvaging operation of the USS Guardian continues to cause environmental damage,
which violates their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the US respondents can be sued?

HELD:
No. The general rule is that the state cannot be sued without its consent. In
cases involving other states, the rule is that state immunity extends only to sovereign
and governmental acts. The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS
Guardian and its crew. The event happened while the respondents are performing official
military duties. This being the case, the suit is deemed to be a suit against the state.
 !69

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION V. AQUINO

(G.R. No. L-35131. NOVEMBER 29, 1972)

TEEHANKEE, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner Verstuyft was assigned, as an acting assistant director of health
services, by the WHO to the Regional Office in Manila. The petitioner is entitled to
diplomatic immunity pursuant to the Host Agreement between the Philippines and WHO.
The diplomatic immunity carries with it exemption from local jurisdiction and from
taxation and customs duties.

Verstuyft’s twelve crates entered the Philippines and allowed free entry from
duties and taxes. The respondent judge directed the search and seizure of the items in
the said crates. The WHO Regional Director defended Verstuyft stating that he is entitled
to immunity from search; him being a member of a diplomatic mission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Verstuyft is entitled to all privileges and immunities, exemptions
and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys in accordance with international law?

HELD:
Yes. The executive branch of the Philippines has recognized that Verstuyft is
entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement.
 !70

LASCO V. UNRFNRE
(G.R. Nos. 109095-109107. FEBRUARY 23, 1995)

QUIASON, J:

FACTS:
UNRFNRE is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. It is
likewise involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and UN for exploration
work in Dinagat Island. Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with United
Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE). Thus, resulting
to them filing a case in NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent enjoys diplomatic immunity?

HELD:
Yes. The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law.
Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine
Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its
specialized agencies.

The respondent enjoys diplomatic immunity from suit. Immunity is necessary to

assure unimpeded performance of their functions. The purpose is "to shield the affairs of
international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political
pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the
organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions"

SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE

DEPARTMENT V. NLRC
(G.R. No. 86773. FEBRUARY 14, 1992)
 !71

NOCON, J:

FACTS:
SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center, an international organization. Respondent Lazaga was employed by SEAFDEC-
AQD as a research associate on a probationary basis. Thereafter, he was appointed to
the position of Professional III.

Petitioner Lacanilao, in his capacity as a Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD, sent a notice

of termination to Lazaga informing him that he was being terminated due to financial
constraint being experienced by the department.
SEAFDEC-AQD filed to pay the respondent his separation pay thus resulting to a case
filed against it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit?

HELD:
Yes. SEAFDEC-AQD is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of NLRC.
The Philippines is a signatory to the agreement establishing SEAFDEC. Being an
intergovernmental organization, it enjoys functional independence and freedom from
control of the state in whose territory its office is located.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER V. ACOSTA

(G.R. Nos. 97468-70. SEPTEMBER 2, 1993)

VITUG, J.:
 !72

FACTS:
Labor cases were filed against the petitioner, SEAFDEC. The respondents claim
that they were wrongfully terminated from their employment. The petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss the case contending to be an international inter-government organization
immune from suit and challenging the jurisdiction of the respondent. The respondents
allege that the petitioner waived its immunity by raising the issue of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not SEAFDEC, as international agency, enjoys diplomatic immunity
from suit?

HELD:
Yes, SEAFDEC enjoys immunity from suit. The Philippines became a signatory to
the agreement establishing SEAFDEC. As an international agency, it enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of the state. SEAFDEC have a distinct juridical
personality independent of the municipal law of the State.

In the opinion of the Minister of Justice, he said that the basic immunity of an
international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction. This is to avoid the host
government to interfere in their operations or to influence or control their policies and
decisions. Therefore, NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.

CALLADO V. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

(G.R. No. 106483. MAY 22, 1995)

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:
 !73

Callado was employed as a drive of IRRI. While driving the vehicle of IRRI,
Callado was involved in an accident. IRRI issued a Notice of Termination against
Callado. He, then, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and for
indemnity pay. IRRI informed the Labor Arbiter that IRRI enjoys immunity from suit by
virtue of P.D. No. 1620. However, disregarding the letter of IRRI, the Labor Arbiter
released an order saying that in case of termination, IRRI waived its immunity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not IRRI is covered by the doctrine of immunity from suit?

HELD:
Yes. IRRI enjoys immunity from suit because it is an international organization
and it is a necessity to exercise their purpose and to prevent the host country from
interfering and controlling their plans. It is recognized principle of international law that
the courts should accept the claim of immunity from suit of international organizations.

In cases involving dismissal of employees, the international organization may

waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part. The
memorandum cannot be considered as an express waiver from suit by IRRI.

INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION V. CALLEJA

(G.R. No. 85750. SEPTEMBER 28, 1990)

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:
An agreement was entered into between the Philippine Government and the
United Nations High Commissioner. The agreement is about the establishment of
resettlement in Bataan. The International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), an
organization which renders voluntary and humanitarian services, is one of those
accredited by the government to operate the refugee processing center.
 !74

TUPAS filed a petition for Certification of Election among the rank and file
members employed by ICMC. The government granted diplomatic privileges and
immunities to ICMC. ICMC, then, sought the dismissal of the petition filed by TUPAS on
the ground that it is under the immunity from suit granted by the government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ICMC is covered by the grant of diplomatic privileges and
immunities?

HELD:
Yes. Since ICMC is granted with diplomatic immunity, it shall have a status
similar to that of a specialized agency. According to Article III of the convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, specialized agencies enjoy immunity
from every form of legal process. Also, the Executive branch of the government
recognizes ICMC as an international organization that enjoys immunity.

The grant of immunity to ICMC is necessary because of their international

character and respective purpose. This is to avoid danger of partiality and interference
by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor would defeat the purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs
of international organization from political pressure or control by the host country.
 !75

6. CONSENT
 !76

a. EXPRESS CONSENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FELICIANO

(G.R. No. 70853. MARCH 12, 1987)

YAP, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent, Pablo Feliciano, filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four lots, against the Republic of the
Philippines. He alleged that he bought the parcel of land from Victor Gardiola by virtue of
Contract of Sale followed by Deed of Absolute Sale.

President Magsaysay issue Proclamation No. 90, reserving for settlement

purposes under the supervision of NARRA and Land Authority. NARRA and Land
Authority started subdividing and distributing the lands to the settlers. A part of the lands
reserved was said to be a private property, specifically owned by the respondent. Plaintiff
prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property and to order the
cancellation and nullification of the awards to the settlers.
 !77

A motion to intervene was filed by 86 settlers and was tasked to file their
corresponding pleadings and present the evidences. The intervenors filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent, hence the action cannot prosper.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of
land?

HELD:
No. The doctrine of non-suability will apply in the case. A suit for the recovery of a
property must be directed towards a specific party. In this case, the recovery was
directed against the Republic of the Philippines.

The Court likewise declared that there be no merit in the submission by the
respondent. The plaintiff wants to recover a land not owned by a state, meaning it is
privately owned; in this case, Feliciano owns it.

The complaint submitted by the Feliciano is a suit against the State. According to
the law, a suit against the State is not permitted unless a fact that the State consented it
to be sued. The complaint filed fails to allege the existence of such consent. No consent
can be drawn from the proclamation, as well.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE V. NLRC

(G.R. No. 104269. NOVEMBER 11, 1993)

VITUG, J:

FACTS:
On April 1, 1989, the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency
entered into a contract for security services. And pursuant to their arrangements, the
guards were deployed in various premises of the petitioner.

On September 13, 1990, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of

wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday and overtime pay before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro
City. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the security guards
and against the Department of Agriculture and the Security Agency. The Agency did not
file for appeal, thus the decision became final and executor. The Labor Arbiter then
issued a writ of execution.

The Department of Agriculture filed a petition with the NLRC arguing that the
NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction in the above mentioned case filed by the security
guards, but the petition of DA was dismissed. Thus, this petition. The petitioner charges
 !78

the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion and faults them for assuming money claims.
Further, the petitioner asserts the non-suability of the State.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-suability of State applies in the case of Department of
Agriculture?

HELD:
The Department of Agriculture is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contractiong party in this instance. But the DA did not enter into the contract with
Sultan Security Agency with proprietary interest.

The NLRC has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution and decide on money
claims against the DA. Money claims are governed by Act No. 3083, claims must first be
brought to the Commission on Audit.

AMIGABLE V. CUENCA
(G.R. No. L-26400. FEBRUARY 29, 1972)

MAKALINTAL, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner Amigable is the owner of a lot which without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale was used by the government. Petitioner’s counsel wrote to the
President requesting for payment of the portion of her lot, this was then indorsed to the
Auditor General but on the 9th indorsement, disallowed it.

Petitioner then filed a case against Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of

the Public Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 m2 lot.
Amigable also sought the payment of compensatory damages, moral damages,
attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. The defendant argues on his answer that the
case was premature, she has no cause of action and that the State is immune from suit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Amigable may sue the government?

HELD:
Yes. The Doctrine of State Immunity cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. When the government takes away a property from
 !79

a private land owner for public use without legal process, the aggrieved citizen can file a
proper case against the government.

Thus, the basis of the payment should be the price or value of the land at the
time of the taking by the government for its use.

EPG CONSTRUCTION V. SECRETARY VIGILAR

(G.R. No. 131544. MARCH 16, 2001)

BUENA, J:

FACTS:
The Ministry of Human Settlement, through BLISS Development Corporation,
initiated a housing project on a property of government in Pasig City in 1983. For this
purpose, they entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Ministry of Public
Works and Highways wherein the latter made individual contracts with different
construction companies and corporations including EPG Construction Co.

Petitioners received payments for the construction work that was covered by the
contract but there was an unpaid balance from the additional constructions for the
completion of the existing housing units. Petitioners then demanded for the payment
through a letter.

The Secretary of the DPWH, Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject
money claims thus prompting the petitioners to file before the Regional Trial Court but
the court denied the petition. Hence this petition which focuses on the right of the
petitioners-contractors to compensation for the public works housing project.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an implied and verbal contract between the petitioners and the
Undersecretary should be upheld and whether or not the State is suable?
 !80

HELD:
Yes. The State is suable in this case and the implied verbal contracts should be
upheld. The Doctrine of State Immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice to a citizen. The petitioner construction should be duly compensated on the
basis of quantum meruit, or a reasonable sum of money for services or work done when
amount is not stipulated, for the construction done on the public works housing project.

SANTIAGO V. REPUBLIC
(G.R. No. L-48214. DECEMBER 19, 1978)

FERNANDO, J:

FACTS:
On January 1971, spouses Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of
Plant Industry but the donation comes with terms. One is that the Bureau should
construct a building on the donated lot and the building should be finished by December
7, 1974. Another term is that the Bureau should install lighting facilities on the lot.

On 1976, there was still no improvement on the lot and thus Santiago filed a case
pleading for the revocation of the contract of donation. The trial court dismissed the
petition saying that such suit is a suit against the government and will not prosper
without the consent of the government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the suit against the State will prosper in this case?

HELD:
Yes. The government is deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. Such
waiver is an implied one by virtue of the terms included in the donation of spouses
Santiago to the Bureau of Plant Industry. The terms in the deed of donation were not
met by the done thus the donor has the right to revoke the donations made by them.
The petition filed by Santiago should prosper.
 !81

MERRITT V. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

(G.R. No. L-11154. MARCH 21, 1916)

TRENT, J:


FACTS:
The plaintiff-petitioner here, Merritt, was riding a motorcycle when he was hit by
an ambulance that was owned by the General Hospital driven by the driver employed by
the said hospital. The Philippine legislature then enacted Act No. 2457 so that Merritt
could sue the government. A suit was then filed before the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the responsibility for the accident was rendered solely on the driver of the
ambulance and the amount to be given to Merrit was also determined. Both Merritt and
the ambulance driver appealed as to the amount of damages and in rendering the
amount against the government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government waived its immunity from suit and accepted
liability when Act No. 2457 was enacted by the legislature?

HELD:
The State only waived its immunity from suit but it does not follow that it has also
accepted liabilities that may arise from the suit filed. The legislative enactment only
gives the plaintiff-petitioner to sue the government and the government to submit itself to
the jurisdiction of the court. But it does not mean that the State also conceded to the
liability to the plaintiff.
 !82

REPUBLIC V. PURISIMA
(G.R. No. L-36084. AUGUST 31, 1977)

FERNANDO, CJ:

FACTS:
On September 7 1972, a motion to dismiss was filed by the Rice and Corn
Administration in a suit in the court of the respondent Judge Purisima. The case was
regarding the collection of a money claim from an alleged breach of contract. The
plaintiff in the said case is the private respondent here, Yellow Ball Freight Lines Inc.

Petitioner Republic claims Immunity of the State from suit but the respondent
Judge denied the Republic’s argument and consequently the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State is immune from suit in this case?

HELD:
Yes. The government in this case cannot be sued and the decision of the Judge
to deny the motion of the Republic to dismiss the case is not valid. The Court of First
Instance of Manila presided by the respondent Judge Purisima has no jurisdiction over
the case because the State has not consented the suit filed against it. A consent should
be expressly made by the State through an act of the legislature allowing the State to be
sued and without this consent, the State can validly invoke its immunity from suit.
 !83

b. IMPLIED CONSENT
 !84

FROILAN V. PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO.

(G.R. No. L-6060. SEPTEMBER 30, 1954)

PARAS, CJ:

FACTS:
Fernando Froilan purchased a boat from the Shipping Association which costs
him P200,00.00. He gave a down payment of P50,000.00 and to secure the unpaid
balance for the ship, a mortgage was made on the vessel.

The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in the proceedings and
prayed for the possession of the said vessel. The defendant Pan Pacific Oriental argued
against the intervention of the Republic. The defendant claims that they have the right to
the possession of the vessel stating that they have the contract which is in their favor.
The defendant, Pan Oriental Pacific demanded that the intervenor comply and deliver
the vessel to them.

The Republic of the Philippines argued that they cannot be sued because of the
State’s immunity from suit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government may be sued in a counterclaim?

HELD:
Yes. The trial court first dismissed the petition on the ground that the state is
immune from suit and therefore is not suable. But the Court said that the dismissal of the
case is not proper. The Court further held that when the Government filed its
intervention in the complaint it has then waived its immunity from suit. Thus, its
nonsuability cannot be invoked anymore.
 !85

LIM V. BROWNELL
(G.R. No. L-8587. MARCH 24, 1960)

GUTIERREZ-DAVID, J:

FACTS:
The property in dispute in this case consists of four parcels of land that is
situated in Tondo, Manila with an area of 29,151 m2. The land was found to be
registered to Asaichi Kagawa who is a national of Japan but was owned by Arsenia
Enriquez.

On March 14 of 1946, the Alien Property Custodian issued a vesting order

vesting two lot numbers in himself. On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator executed formal agreements transferring the lots to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Benito Lim filed on November 15, 1948 a notice of claim to the property on the
belief that the lands still belonged to his mother, Arsenia Enriquez. The claim was
disallowed by the Philippine Alien Property Administrator. Lim did not file for an appeal
thus the decision became final and executory.

On November 13, 1950, Lim filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance
of Manila against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator for the recovery of the
property in dispute but this complaint was dismissed by the CFI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lim can file a claim for damages?

HELD:
No. A claim for damages against the Republic of the Philippines is not proper
because of the immunity of the state from suit and thus it also followed that the state is
not liable for any damages. A claim for damages involves an amount of money from the
funds of the Republic which is not permitted.

The State cannot be sued without its express consent which is done through a
legislation. The argument of Lim that the State waived its right from immunity from suit
cannot be sustained because the Philippines intervened merely to unite with the
defendant in resisting the claim for the said land.
 !86

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. HON. RUIZ

(G.R. No. L-35645. MAY 22, 1985)

ABAD SANTOS, J:

FACTS:
Sometime in May of 1972, petitioner invited the submission of bids for the repair
projects of their Naval Station. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation
and submitted bids. The company responded to the requests of the petitioners, but later
the company was informed by the petitioners that they were not qualified to receive an
award for the projects because of previous unsatisfactory performance. Further stated
in the latter sent by the petitioner to the company that the project has been awarded to
third parties.

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. then filed a suit against the United States of
America which the latter moved for dismissal on the ground that they are a foreign
sovereign and hence immune from suit, but their motion was denied by the respondent
Judge Ruiz.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the United States of America may be sued?

HELD:
No. The projects in this case are an integral part of the naval base of the United
States of America which is connected to the defense of the US and Philippines. It is a
function of the government of the highest order and is not utilize nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes. The waiver of immunity of a state is not only
measured by the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act. The
petition is granted and the decision of the respondent judge is set aside.
 !87

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. GUINTO

(G.R. No. 76607. FEBRUARY 26, 1990)

CRUZ, J:

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case involving the doctrine of state immunity. In the first
case, G.R. No. 76607, the respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in
connection with the bidding conducted for contracts for a barber services.

In the second case, G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for
damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center in Camp John
Hay Air Station in Baguio City.

In the third case, G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista who was employed as a
barracks boy in an extension of Clark Air Base was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted. As a result of filing of charge, he was dismissed from his
employment and thus he filed a complaint for damages against the officers of the US Air
Force and special agents.

In the fourth case, G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages for injuries allegedly
sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the beating of the defendants. They further
alleged that they were handcuffed and that dogs were unleashed so that it may bite
them which caused extensive injuries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of state immunity is applicable under the Republic of
the Philippines and United States of America Treaty for acts done in the performance of
the official duties?

HELD:
The acts performed are sovereign and governmental acts and even if commercial
and proprietary, the petitioners may be suable but may not be liable. The first case was
remanded to lower court for further proceedings. In the second case, the act done might
have been proprietary in nature, but the Court finds that there is nothing arbitrary in the
dismissal of the cook. In the third case, he officials and agents of the US Air Force are
discharging their duties and thus cannot be sued. In the last case, the inquiry needed
must first be made in the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims
of the parties in the suit.
 !88

JUSMAG PHILIPPINES V. NLRC

(G.R. No. 108813. DECEMBER 15, 1994)

PUNO, J:

FACTS:
JUSMAG (Joint United States Military Assistance Group) assails the January 29,
1993 resolution of the NLRC reversing the order of the Labor Arbiter regarding the
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Florencio Sacramento against JUSMAG.

Private respondent Sacramento was one of the 74 security assistance support

personnel working at JUSMAG Philippines. On March 31, 1992, he filed a complaint
with the Department of Labor and Employment on the ground that he was illegally
suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG and he was asking for
reinstatement. JUSMAG filed a motion to dismiss invoking immunity from suit as an
agency of the United States. Labor Arbiter Castro dismissed the petition and
Sacramento appealed the decision to the NLRC. NLRC reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not JUSMAG is immune from suit and is beyond the jurisdiction of the
NLRC?

HELD:
Yes. The contract entered into by JUSMAG with the security agency was in the
discharge of its governmental functions and the sovereign state cannot be deemed to
have waived its immunity from suit. Thus, JUSMAG is beyond the jurisdiction of NLRC.

The petition by JUSMAG is granted and the assailed resolution of the NLRC is
reversed and set aside.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA V. VINZON

 !89

(G.R. No. 154705. JUNE 26, 2003)

AZCUNA, J:

FACTS:
Vinzons Trade and Services entered into a maintenance agreement with
respondent Republic of Indonesia. In the agreement, it was stated that it shall be
effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by
either party by giving thirty prior written notice.

When the Minister Counsellor assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he

allegedly found the respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance
with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. The Indonesian Embassy
terminated the agreement in a letter. Petitioners claim that they had earlier informed the
respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement.

Respondent then filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

Republic of Indonesia filed a motion to dismiss the case but was denied by the trial court
and the denial of the motion to dismiss was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and also
denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s decision
in denying the motion of the Republic of Indonesia’s to dismiss the case?

HELD:
Yes. The petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, was acting in pursuit of a sovereign
activity and the maintenance agreement was entered into in the discharge of its
governmental functions. Thus, in contracting the said agreement with Vinzons Trade
and Services, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal.

It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication and no such waiver is present in
this case.

The Court grants the petition and the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are reversed and set aside. The cases against the petitioners are dismissed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANDIGANBAYAN

(G.R. No. 142476. MARCH 20, 2001)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:
 !90

FACTS:
On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan
for the reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Eduardo
Cojuanco et. al. PCGG, acting on the strength of the complaint, issued sequestration
orders where an aircraft, Falcon jet, was covered.

The said Falcon jet was leased by Unichem and the lease expired in 1987.
Then, after the lapse of the lease, PCGG filed a motion for authority to sell the
sequestered aircraft. The Sandiganbayan denied the PCGG’s motion stating that there
was no prima facie evidence to justify such motion. PCGG filed a motion for certiorari
before the Supreme Court and the latter issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing
the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from enforcing the assailed decision. The
PCGG, relying on the TRO issued by the Supreme Court, sold the Falcon aircraft to
Walter Fuller Aircraft, Inc.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic is liable for the agreement with Fuller Aircraft for the
payment of the recovered Falcon jet that was sold by the PCGG which was
subsequently recovered by Faysound?

HELD:
No. The Republic cannot be held liable under the agreement the PCGG made
with Fuller Aircraft and it should be also noted that the Republic did not authorize the
PCGG to enter into the assailed agreement. Even if the PCGG was authorized, it
exceeded its authority because the sale of the Falcon jet was made without the approval
of the Sandiganbayam.

Further, the sequestering of the jet was erroneously made in the first place and it
was illegal for the PCGG to sell it to Fuller Aircraft. Thus, the sale of the aircraft to Fuller
was void and so it follows that the agreement between the PCGG and Fuller Aircraft is
also a nullity.

As previously held by the Court, PCGG or any of its member may be held civilly
liable if it be proven that they did not act in good faith or even acted without or in excess
of the scope of their authority in the performance of their duty. And an unauthorized act
of a government official cannot be deemed as an act of the State.

And thus, the Republic cannot be held liable in this case.

 !91

c. SCOPE OF CONSENT; SUABILITY

VS. LIABILITY

REPUBLIC V. VILLASOR
(G.R. No. L-30671. NOVEMBER 28, 1973 )

FERNANDO, J:

FACTS:
In a special proceeding, a decision was rendered against the Republic of the
Philippines thus confirming the money award in favor of the respondent corporation.
The decision was deemed final and executor and the respondent judge issued an order
directing the sheriff to execute the decision. The sheriff served notices of garnishment
 !92

for the funds in PNB and Philippine Veterans Bank. The banks received the notices but
argue that the funds are public funds appropriated for pensions and allowances of
military and civilian personnel. Petitioners also challenge the validity of the orders
issued by the respondent judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the writs of execution and notice of garnishments be issued
against public funds?

HELD:
No. Even if the State gave its consent to be sued, public funds cannot be the
object of garnishment proceedings. The power of the courts end when a judgment has
been rendered, because the funds and properties of the government may not be seized
under writs of execution and garnishment to achieve the judgment made by it.

The disbursement of public funds must first be covered by a proper appropriation

pursuant to law.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE V. NLRC

(G.R. No. 104269. NOVEMBER 11, 1993)

VITUG, J:

FACTS:
On April 1, 1989, the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency
entered into a contract for security services. And pursuant to their arrangements, the
guards were deployed in various premises of the petitioner.

On September 13, 1990, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of

wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday and overtime pay before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro
 !93

City. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the security guards
and against the Department of Agriculture and the Security Agency. The Agency did not
file for appeal, thus the decision became final and executor. The Labor Arbiter then
issued a writ of execution.

The Department of Agriculture filed a petition with the NLRC arguing that the
NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction in the above mentioned case filed by the security
guards, but the petition of DA was dismissed. Thus, this petition. The petitioner charges
the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion and faults them for assuming money claims.
Further, the petitioner asserts the non-suability of the State.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-suability of State applies in the case of Department of
Agriculture?

HELD:
The Department of Agriculture is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party in this instance, but the DA did not enter into the contract with
Sultan Security Agency with proprietary interest.

The NLRC has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution and decide on money
claims against the DA. Even if the Department of Agriculture is not immune from suit or
is suable, it does not necessarily mean that they are liable. To be held liable, the funds of
the government agency must first be appropriated by law, and without such the funds
cannot be disbursed. Money claims are governed by Act No. 3083, and claims must first
be brought to the Commission on Audit.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. JUDGE PABALAN

(G.R. No. L-33112. JUNE 15,1978)

FERNANDO, CJ:


FACTS:
On December 17, 1970, Judge Pabalan of the Court of First Instance of La Union
issued a writ of execution and followed by a notice of garnishment on the funds of
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration deposited in the Philippine National Bank.
PNB La Union then filed an administrative complaint against the respondent Judge for
grave abuse of discretion and further alleged that the respondent did not took
cognizance of the fund’s public character and therefore cannot be garnished or attached
or levied.

ISSUE:
 !94

Whether or not the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration deposited

in the Philippine National Bank can be garnished?

HELD:
Yes. The funds of PVTA, a public corporation which can sue and be sued, are
not exempt from garnishment. When the government enters into a commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and thus it is subject to the rules governing
the ordinary corporations.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V. HEIRS OF GUIVELONDO

(G.R. No. 154411. JUNE 19, 2003)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

FACTS:
On February 23, 1999, NHA filed a complaint for eminent domain against
Association Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. The
Heirs of Guivelondo were the claimants/owners of the lot located at Carreta, Mabolo,
Cebu City and that lands are within an urban area center which petitioners intends to
develop as a socialized housing project.

On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Guivelondo filed a manifestation that they
were waiving their objections to the petitioner’s power to expropriate their properties.
The court then declares that NHA has a lawful right to expropriate the properties and that
the Heirs be given just compensation of the subject properties to be fixed at Php
11,200.00 per square meter.
 !95

NHA then filed motions for reconsiderations assailing the inclusions of lots 12, 13
and 19, and the amount of compensation fixed by the court. The court stated that the
amount of compensation that was fixed had adequate basis and support. NHA further
contends that writs of execution and garnishment may not be issued against State in an
expropriation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the
State in an expropriation in the exercise of the State’s Power of Eminent Domain, and
whether the judgment has become final and executor?

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court denied the petition and the judgment made by the
lower court was affirmed. Power of Eminent Domain has two stages, first is the
condemnation and the second is the determination of just compensation wherein the
notice of garnishment is to be issued.

The Court further held that socialized housing is always for the public use and
that the public purpose of it is not diminished by the amount of just compensation that
the court has fixed.

The Doctrine of State Immunity cannot be invoked by or applied to NHA because

they have a juridical personality that is separate and distinct from the government. Thus,
the funds, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment.

LARKINS V. NLRC
(G.R. No. 92432. FEBRUARY 23, 1995)

QUIASON, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner was a member of the United States Air Force who is assigned to
oversee the dormitories at Clark Air Base in Pampanga. On August 10,1988, AGS
terminated the contract for the maintenance with the De Guzman Custodial Services.
The new contractor, JAC Maintenance Services, owned by Joselito Cunanan, chose to
bring his own workers. And as a result, the workers of De Guzman Custodial Services
were requested to surrender their base passes.

A suit was then filed against Larkins which Larkins failed to answer. The Labor
Arbiter thus rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent and held that Larkins
and Lt. Col. Frankhauster guilty of illegal dismissal.

Petitioner appealed but the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE:
 !96

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear the case filed against the
petitioner Larkins?

HELD:
No. The Labor Arbiter did not properly follow the procedure under the RP-US
Agreement. The Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction and although the petitioner
here participated in the NLRC, it does not necessarily follow that there is a voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction without them being served with summons.

Thus, the Court held that there was no jurisdiction ever acquired by the Labor
Arbiter over the case and the person of the petitioner and the judgment rendered is null
and void.

The petition is granted.

LOCKHEED DETECTIVE AND WATCHMAN AGENCY, INC. V. UNIVERSITY OF THE

PHILIPPINES
(G.R. No. 185918. APRIL 18, 2012)

VILLARAMA, JR., J:

FACTS:
Several security guards assigned to UP filed a complaint against Lockheed and
UP for payment of underpaid of salaries, 13th month pay, and other premiums. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the security guards. Consequently, a writ of
execution for garnishment was issued for the funds of UP deposited in an account in
PNB.

UP argues that the fund deposited in the account is public funds and therefore
cannot be disbursed except pursuant to an appointment required by law. But on
September 2, 2005 the amount stated in the writ of execution of the Labor Arbiter

ISSUE:
Whether or not the funds of UP deposited in the PNB can be subject to
garnishment?

HELD:
 !97

No. The Court agrees with UP that the funds are public funds which first need an
appropriation before disbursement. UP consented to be sued but what they question is
the hasty garnishment of its fund in its PNB account.

UP has a personality that is separate and distinct from the government but before
execution of garnishment, a claim for payment must first be filed with Commission on
Audit pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327 amended by Presidential Decree No.
1445.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DIZON

(G.R. No. 171182. AUGUST 23, 2012)

BERSAMIN, J:

FACTS:
The University of the Philippines Los Baños entered into an agreement for the
construction and renovation of the buildings in the campus with Stern Builders
Corporation. The University was able to pay the first two billing but the third billing was
disallowed by the Commission on Audit. The other party to the agreement filed a case
against UP before the Regional Trial Court. The RTC then issued a motion for execution
and thus the sheriff served notices of garnishment to UP’s depository banks. The RTC
also ordered that the funds of the University in the banks be released.

UP argues that the funds in their accounts are of government character and
cannot be subject to execution and garnishment. They further state that before
disbursement, there should be a proper appropriation to be made.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fund of the University of the Philippines can be subject to
garnishment?

HELD:
 !98

No. The funds of UP are governmental funds and of public character thus cannot
be subject to garnishment. Even if the University has its own charter, it is still an
institution performing legitimate governmental functions.

The funds of UP constitute a special trust fund and the disbursement of which
should be aligned with the University’s mission subject to auditing by COA.

Liability is not conceded by the fact that the State has allowed itself to be sued
because it is strictly mandated that ‘no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law’. While suability depends on the consent of
the State to be sued, liability depends on the applicable laws and the facts established.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN V. FERNANDEZ

(G.R. No. L-33727. JANUARY 30, 1990)

RELOVA, J:

FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 604-B entitled “Margarita D. Vda de Imperio v Municipal
Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et. al.”, the Court of First Instance rendered
judgment holding the petitioners in this case liable to private respondents. The appeal of
the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan was dismissed due to its failure to file the record
of appeal on time and the dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The respondents then moved for the execution of a writ for the satisfaction of the
judgment and the respondent judge then issued the writ of execution. Petitioners then
filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality’s
properties or the funds are all public funds which are exempt from execution, but this
motion was denied by the respondent judge.

ISSUE:
Whether the funds of the municipality of San Miguel Bulacan are public funds
and are exempt from execution?

HELD:
Yes. The funds are of public character which is held in trust for the people and to
be used for purposes to be determined by the municipality in pursuant to proper
appropriations to be made. If these funds are allowed to be garnished without prior
 !99

appropriation, this will impede and even defeat the purpose of the municipality with
regards to the programs lined up that has been previously determined. Thus, the funds
of the municipality are exempt from garnishment.

CITY OF CALOOCAN V. ALLARDE

(G.R. No. 107271. SEPTEMBER 10, 2003)

CORONA, J:

FACTS:
Mayor Samson of Caloocan abolished several positions including Assistant City
Administrator and 17 others in an ordinance, Ordinance No. 1749. The employees that
were affected thus assailed the legality of the said ordinance. The Court of First
Instance rendered a decision declaring the abolition illegal and ordered the
reinstatement of the dismissed employees together with the payment of the wages and
other emoluments.

The City appealed but it was dismissed. In 1986, Santiago was paid partially and
the other employees were paid in full. The City appropriated funds for the completion of
the payment for Santiago but the funds were not released and the City of Caloocan
further stated that Santiago is not entitled to receive the back-wages. Judge Allarde then
issued writ of garnishment against the properties of the City of Caloocan but the latter
argued that the properties of the City is exempt from garnishment because these are
public in character. Judge Allarde issued an order directing that the check be released in
favor of Santiago but the Treasurer cannot do so because the Mayor refuses to sign it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the funds of the City of Caloocan that is deposited in the PNB
may be garnished for the payment to Santiago?

HELD:
 !100

Yes. The funds of Caloocan City deposited in the bank can be garnished or a
writ of garnishment and execution can be issued because there has been an
appropriation made by the City for the payment to Santiago.

It has been held that the funds of the government cannot be or is exempt from
garnishment because it has a public character and the funds of it cannot be garnished if
there are no laws appropriating the use of such fund. But in this case, the appropriation
was already made by the City for the purpose of paying the back-wage of Santiago. It
was only the Mayor who refuses to release the appropriation. Thus, Judge Allarde
correctly issued the writ of garnishment and execution to enforce the prior judgment of
the court.

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 89898-99. OCTOBER 1, 1990)

CORTÉS, J.:

FACTS:
The present petition is an off-shoot of an expropriation proceeding was filed by
the Municipality of Makati against the private property of Arceli Jo. The petitioner opened
an account under its name at Philippine National Bank (PNB) depositing an amount of
P417,510.00, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree 42. The court fixed the
appraised value of the expropriated property at P5,291,666.00 and an advanced
payment was made in the amount of P338,160 leaving a balance of P4,953,506.

The respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution after the decision
became final and executory. A notice of garnishment was thereafter issued by the court
to the PNB account. A manifestation was filed by the petitioner informing the court that
the respondent was no longer the true owner of the expropriated property. Philippine
Saving Bank, Inc. (PSB) agreed to divide the compensation due from the expropriation
proceeding with the respondent. PNB was ordered to immediately release to them the
sum of P4,953.506 corresponding to the balance of the appraised value of the
expropriated property.

The bank manager of PNB refused to release the balance as he is waiting for the
approval of their head office. The Municipality of Makati contends that its funds could
neither be garnished or levied upon execution for to do so would result to the
disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law.
The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner ruling that the
account of the petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the lower court’s decision. A petition for review was filed to the Supreme
Court.
 !101

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can compel the disbursement of municipal funds?

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held in this case that the respondent may use the
remedy of mandamus to compel the enactment of the necessary appropriation
ordinance for the disbursement of municipal funds for the money judgement. The court
ordered the Municipality of Makati to immediately pay Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and
private respondent, within 60 days from the date of receipt of resolution, the amount of
P4,953,506.

PACIFIC PRODUCTS, INC. V. ONG

(G.R. No. L-33777. JANUARY 30, 1990)

MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS:
Pacific Products, Inc. (PPI) file a moneyed claim against H.D. Labrador, who is
under that businessname of BML Trading. After the case was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, BML Trading won in a bid of supplying 7.5 tons of bluestone copper
sulfate to Bureau of Telecommunications worth P10,500. On October 17, 1962, the
Sheriff of Manila garnished BML Trading P9,111.70 if the P10,500. On October 19, 1962,
H.D. Labrador handed over its rights of P10,500 to Vicente S. Ong. PPI learned about
the assignment of Vicente S. Ong only after they received the copy of the third party
claim of Mr. Ong with the Office of the Sheriff of Manila on November 19, 1962. PPI file a
case against the third part claim but was denied for lack of merit and H.D. Labrador
declared bankrupty and was ordered to pay P9,111.70 to PPI on December 21, 1962.

Ong filed an action for damages on February 14, 1963 against PPI, the Sheriff,
and First Quezon City Insurance to prove his claim on the garnishment. What happened
is that the Court of First Instance dismissed Ong’s case, but the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision, that is why PPI filed this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bureau of Telecommunications has state immunity after entering
into a transaction with BML Trading?

HELD:
Yes. The Bureau of Telecommunications has state immunity from suit even after
entering into a transaction with BML Trading. Since, the Bureau of Telecommunications
is not engaged in business and is a service bureau, the purchase of the bluestone
copper sulfate could not concluded the Bureau is engaging in proprietary functions.
 !102

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 129169. NOVEMBER 17, 1999)

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

FACTS:
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) had a competitive bidding in August 1978,
in which Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation (HYDRO) was awarded the contract
to construct the main civil works of the Magat River Multi-Purpose Project. The contract
provided that HYDRO would be paid partly in Philippine pesos and partly in U.S. dollars.
NIA was unable to pay the account receivable of HYDRO due to the dollar rate
differential of the price escalation for the contract of the Magat River Multi-Purpose
Project.
After unsuccessfully pursuing the case, on December 7, 1994 HYDRO filed with
the Contractors Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Request for Adjudication of
the aforesaid claim. On the same date, NIA filed a Compliance and made a counterclaim
for P1,000,000 as moral damages; P100,000 as exemplary damages; P100,000 as
attorney's fees; and the costs of the arbitration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CIAC has jurisdiction over the controversy?

HELD:
Yes. The CIAC has jurisdiction under the E.O. No. 1008, otherwise known as the
"Construction Industry Arbitration Law" vests in CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes arising from, or connected with contracts entered into by parties involved
in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the
completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. The instant
petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

 !103

IV. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND

STATE POLICIES
 !104

1. SECTION 1

VILLAVICENCIO V. LUKBAN
(G.R. No. L-14639. MARCH 25, 1919)

MALCOLM, J.:

 !105

FACTS:
Mayor Justo Lukban to ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute
(prostitutes) in order to exterminate vice. The Bureau of Labor with other city authorities
quietly perfected the arrangements of sending the women to Davao, Mindanao;
Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers.

The relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented

an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court for the ill-treatment
done to the women for the purpose of public interest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is applicable?

HELD:
Yes. The writ of habeas corpus shall be applicable even if there was no need for
actual confinement of the women. The forcible segregation and taking of women to
Davao deprived them of their freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they were
imprisoned. Thus any restraint that hinders freedom of action is sufficient for the writ of
habeas corpus to be actionable.
 !106

2. SECTION 2

KURODA V. JALANDONI
(G.R. No. L-2662. MARCH 26, 1949)

MORAN, C.J.:

FACTS:
Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during World War II. Kuroda was tried
before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed
against military and civilians. The military commission was established under Executive
Order No. 68. Kuroda argues that the military commission does not have jurisdiction
 !107

because the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hauge Convention and that E.O. No. 68
is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. E.O. No. 68 is constitutional and under Sec 3, Art II of the Constitution “The
Philippines renounces war as a instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land” regardless of the
country being a signatory to the Hauge Convention. The military tribunal has jurisdiction
to try Kuroda for his war crimes.

CO KIM CHAM V. VALDEZ TAN KEH

(G.R. No. L-5. SEPTEMBER 17, 1945)

FERIA, J.:

FACTS:
Eusebio Valdez Tan Keh and Hon. Arsenio P. Dizon argues that the lower courts
have no jurisdiction to the pending judicial proceedings. The respondent judge refused to
take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings in petitioner’s case on the
ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas
MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of court
during the Japanese occupation. Stating that the government during the Japanese
occupation was not a de facto government.
 !108

ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction on the pending judicial proceedings?

HELD:
Yes. The present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases that
are not of political complexion. The Philippine Executive Commission was a civil
government established by military forces and thus a de facto government of the second
kind. It is stated that legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto governments, which
are not of political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. The proclamation of
General MacArthur did not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not
invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V.

DUQUE

(G.R. No. 173034. OCTOBER 9, 2007)

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:
Executive Order No. 51, otherwise known as the “Milk Code” was issued by
President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986, by virtue of the legislative powers
granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the
law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA)
in 1981. The Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
Assailing that the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) was going
 !109

beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, and thereby amending and expanding the
coverage of said law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent officers of the Department of Health had
jurisdiction in promulgating the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Milk
Code?

HELD:
Yes. The DOH had jurisdiction to the promulgation, but the Supreme Court held
that Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006
are declared null and void for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and
respondents are prohibited from implementing said provisions. Under customary
international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Under the 1987
Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. “Generally accepted principles of international law”. The
provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land
that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by
competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the
restraint of trade.

ICHONG V. HERNANDEZ
(G.R. No. L-7995. MAY 31, 1957)

LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180, otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business”. Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil.
from having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life. Aliens actually engaged in
the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In
case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of
term. Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” deprives the
aliens of the equal protection of the laws?
 !110

HELD:
No. The law does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws and is a valid
exercise of police power. The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all
persons of one class are treated alike. While the citizen holds his life, his person and his
property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy
of the State. Thus, it is for the protection of the citizens’ interests and economic security
above aliens of the country.

GONZALES V. HECHANOVA
(G.R. No. L-21897. OCTOBER 22, 1963)

CONCEPCION, J.:

FACTS:
Two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice
was entered into by former President Diosdado Macapagal without complying with the
requisite of securing a certification from the Nationall Economic Council to prove that
there is a shortage in cereals. Hechanova then authorized the importation of 67,000 tons
of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements, because
R.A. No. 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 2 executive agreements were in conflict of R.A. No. 3452?

HELD:
Yes. The 2 executive agreements entered into by former President Macapagal
was in conflict with R.A. No. 3452. Our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law and when it runs counter to an
act of Congress. The President may not defeat legislative enactments that have
 !111

acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the
event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time
shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are
fundamental in our constitutional set up.
 !112

IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA

(AUGUST 15, 1961)

BARRERA, J.:

FACTS:
Arturo E. Garcia, a Filipino citizen, finished a law course in Spain and was
thereafter allowed to practice law. He contends that he is entitled to practice law in the
Philippines without submitting himself to the bar examinations under the Treaty of
Academic Degree and the Exercise of Professions between the Philippines and Spain.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a treaty may enable Garcia to practice law in the Philippines?

HELD:
No. The treaty only applies to Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession
in Spain and Spanish citizens desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines.
Since, Garcia is a Filipino citizen, he is therefore subject to the laws of his own country.
The executive department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. HON. RALPH C. LANTION

(G.R. No. 139465. JANUARY 18, 2000)
 !113

MELO, J.:

FACTS:
Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The
Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice
received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States. Mark
Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the U.S Government. The petitioner denied the request
for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the
Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mark Jimenez be given his right to a citizen’s basic due process?

HELD:
Yes. The petitioner’s right to due process should be upheld above the treaty. The
duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they
collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. The doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted
to harmonize them, but where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts.

LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 151445. APRIL 11, 2002)

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS:
 !114

Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started
arriving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan
02-1”. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the
United States in 1951. On February 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called
“Balikatan 02-1”, and that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a
permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in
Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the “Balikatan 02-1” is covered by the VFA?

HELD:
Yes. Under the doctrine of incorporation, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current
Balikatan exercises and permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent basis, in
the “activities”. “Balikatan 02-1” is a mutual anti-terrorism advising assisting and training
exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned activities in the context of the agreement.
Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA are indeed
authorized.
 !115

3. SECTION 3

ALIH V. CASTRO
(G.R. No. L-69401. JUNE 23, 1987)

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine
marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the
petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms,
ammunition and other explosives. Respondent, Major General Delfin C. Castro, raided
the compound occupied by the petitioners, the Alih Clan, in Zamboanga City in search of
 !116

loose firearms, ammunitions and other explosives. Petitioners demand to recover the
arms and ammunition seized from them and respondents be enjoined from using the
same against them since it was illegal search, due to the lack of search warrant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action done by Major General Delfin C. Castro is admissible?

HELD:
No. The action done by the respondents of taking the guns and ammunition of the
petitioners was not admissible, due to the lack of warrant to search and investigate.
Every person is entitled to due process and the Constitution states that “civilian authority
is at all times supreme over the military”, regardless of the allegations against the
petitioners with the suspected death of the mayor. There must be a valid search warrant
to authorize the respondents in conducting their raid.
 !117

4. SECTION 4 AND 5

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. TRANQUILINO LAGMAN

(G.R. No. L-45892. JULY 13, 1938)

AVANCEÑA, J.:

FACTS:
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman, a Filipino citizen whom have attained the age of 20,
is being compelled by Section 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1, otherwise known as the
“National Defense Law’ to join and render the military service. Lagman refused to join
the military and argued the provision was unconstitutional. He also defended that reason
he does not want to serve the military is because he has a father to support, has no
military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1 is constitutional?
 !118

HELD:
Yes. Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 is constitutional, because it is the duty of
the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. Thus,
the National Defense Law, may require its citizens to compulsory render military service.
Sec. 4, Art. II of the Constitution states that “The prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or
civil service.”
 !119

CHAVEZ V. ROMULO
(G.R. No. 157036. JUNE 9 2004)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:
In January 2003, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech to PNP Chief
Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance of Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of
Residence (PTCFOR). PNP Chief Ebdane issued regulations on banning the carrying
firearms outside of ones’ residence. Francisco Chaves, the petitioner, requested to the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the
implementation of the said regulation. Unfortunately, DILG denied the request of the
petitioner. Hence the petition for prohibition and injunction against Executive Secretary
Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane.

ISSUE:
Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property?

HELD:
No. The revocation of PTCFOR is a valid exercise of police power. In Sec. 5, Art
II of the Constitution it is stated that “the maintenance of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare” is of paramount importance. Thus, like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be revoked any time. The revocation of
it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege.
 !120

5. SECTION 6

GREGORIO AGLIPAY V. JUAN RUIZ

(G.R. No. L-45459. MARCH 13, 1937)
 !121

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced that he would order the issues of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The
petitioner, Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, as the Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to
raise the matter to the President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was in violation of the separation of Church and
State?

HELD:
No. The respondent did not violate Sec. 6, Art II of the Constitution regarding the
separation of Church and State. Juan Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052,
which contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the
discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.” The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The
design made for the stamp, showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a
Catholic chalice. Hence, the stamps in issue are for the promotion of tourism in the
country.
 !122

ANDRES GARCES V. HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO

(G.R. No. L-53487. MAY 25, 1981)

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:
On March 23, 1976, the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, adopted
Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of
April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia". A
wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by funds raised by means of
solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the
traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. Father Sergio Marilao
Osmeña, the parish priest, refused to return custody of the image to the council after the
fiesta, on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were
used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the
priest and posted the required bond.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of the barangay is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City,
"reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast
day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela" is constitutional and not
a violation of the separation of church and state. The acquisition of the image of San
Vicente Ferrer was done with the corresponding construction of a waiting shed as the
barangay's projects. Thus, the funds were collected by selling of tickets and cash
donations. This method does not establish any religion, nor appropriate money for the
benefit of any sect or priest. The funds used to purchase the image of the saint was
purchased with private funds and not with tax money.
 !123

EVERSON V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

(330 US 1. FEBRUARY 10, 1947)

FACTS:
A New Jersey law allowed parents reimbursements of money for sending their
children to school on buses operated by the public transportation system. The board of
education by resolution also authorized specifically qualified children who attended
Catholic schools for the transportation subsidy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the New Jersey law was in violation of the separation of Church
and State?

HELD:
No. A divided Court held that the law did not violate the US Constitution regarding
the separation of Church and State. Justice Black defended that services like bussing
and police and fire protection for parochial schools are "separate and so indisputably
marked off from the religious function" that for the state to provide them would not violate
the First Amendment. It was a "general program" to help parents of all religions with
getting their children to school.
 !124

ENGEL V. VITALE
(370 US 421. JUNE 2, 1962)

FACTS:
The Board of Regents for the State of New York authorized a law that required
public schools to open each day with the Pledge of Allegiance and a nondenominational
prayer in which the students recognized their dependence upon God. The blandest of
invocations read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and beg Thy blessings upon us, our teachers, and our country."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the nondenominational prayer in school is a violation of the
constitution?

HELD:
Yes. The nondenominational prayer to God in school is a violation of the
constitution regarding the separation of Church and State. By providing the prayer that is
towards God, New York officially approved religion or a belief in one. The Court held in
this case that that the establishment clause should eliminate religious activities of any
sort from traditional public ceremony.
 !125

ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. V. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY
(G.R. No. 153888. JULY 9, 2003)

CORONA, J.:

FACTS:
Executive Order No. 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal Certification
Scheme and designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its
implementation. Petitioner began to issue halal certifications to qualified products and
food manufacturers on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and
also due to halal food producers' request. The petitioners by arrogating the task of
issuing halal certifications forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an
and Sunnah on halal food.

ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. No. 46 was unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. E.O. No. 46 does not violate the Sec 6, Art II of the Constitution regarding
the separation of Church and State. The Court held that it did not find any reason for
depriving Muslim organizations that religious right to classify products as halal for the
benefit of the health of Muslim Filipinos. It was argued that Sec 6, Art II of the
Constitution is of immediate application, when there is grave danger to the security and
welfare of the public by an infringement of religious freedom.
 !126

6. SECTION 7

BAYAN (BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN) V. ZAMORA

(G.R. No. 138570. OCTOBER 10, 2000)

BUENA, J.:
 !127

FACTS:
Former President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total
membership of the Philippine Senate, entered into an agreement with the United States
of America to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Petitioner argued that the VFA
violates the Constitution because although the Philippine treats the agreements as a
treaty, it should also be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State before
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities are allowed in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The Visiting Forces Agreement is constitutional. The court held that the
phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the United States accepts or acknowledges
the agreement as a treaty, without further need of other supplementary documents. In
this case, the Philippines, under Sec 7, Art II of the Constitution shall pursue an
independent foreign policy and is able to exercise its national sovereignty in relation with
the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States.
 !128

LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 151445. APRIL 11, 2002)

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started
arriving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan
02-1”. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the
United States in 1951. On February 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called
“Balikatan 02-1”, and that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a
permanent writ of injunction or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in
Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the “Balikatan 02-1” covered by Visiting Forces Agreement
constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The Balikatan 02-1” covered by Visiting Forces Agreement is constitutional
with regards to Sec 7, Art II of the Constitution that provides that “The State shall pursue
an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount
consideration shall be the national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and
the right to self-determination.” The VFA is an agreement between the Philippines and
the United States in the national interest of the country to mutual anti-terrorism advising
assisting and training exercise for the promulgation of peace around locations that are in
threat of insurgent attacks.
 !129

7. SECTION 10

CALALANG V. WILLIAMS
(G.R. No. 47800. DECEMBER 2, 1940)

LAUREL, J.:
 !130

FACTS:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
certain roads for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic. The chairman of the National Traffic Commission recommended to the
director the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the
provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548. The director recommended to the
secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the chairman with
modifications. The secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers
in the mentioned to the detriment not online of their owners but of the riding public as
well

ISSUE:
Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitutes an unlawful interference?

HELD:
No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a
menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the
said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government,
the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be
made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very
means of insuring its preserving.

ALMEDA V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 113412. APRIL 17, 1996)

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Almeda filed a notice of appeal which was disapproved by the
trial court due to it being filed five (5) days late beyond the reglementary period and
 !131

subsequently denied of motion for reconsideration. Respondent court dismissed the

petition contending that the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal was not only
mandatory but jurisdictional such that the petitioner’s failure to comply therewith had the
effect of rendering the judgment final. Subsequently, petitioner motions for
reconsideration and is denied. Also, it was found that there was lack of merit in the
petitioner’s reason for the late filing of the notice of appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to comply with the requirement would render a judgment
final?

HELD:
Yes, the period to appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by
statute, particularly Sec 39 of BP 129, which states than the period for appeal from final
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment,
or decision appealed from. The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to
avail of it must strictly comply with the statutes or rules as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of
judicial business. Due to petitioner’s negligence of failing to perfect his appeal, there is
no recourse but to deny the petition thus making the judgment of the trial court final and
executory.

ONDOY V. IGNACIO
(G.R. No. L-47178. MAY 16, 1980)

FERNANDO, C.J.:

FACTS:
Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio
Ignacio. According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as
part of the workforce. He was invited boyfriends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and
thereafter was found dead. Therefore, Estrella was asking for compensation from the
death of her son while in the respondents employ. However, the statement given by the
 !132

chief engineer and oiler was ignored by the hearing officer and therefore dismissed the
claim for lack of merit. Even when a motion for reconsideration was filed, this was also
denied by the Secretary of Labor for the same reason, that is, lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is
social justice applicable in this case?

HELD:
Yes. The principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. As
between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to
secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter
compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.

SALONGA V. FARRALES
(G.R. No. L-47088. JULY 10, 1981)

FERNANDEZ, J.:

FACTS:
The defendant is the titled owner of residential lot in Olongapo City. Within the
owned parcel of land by the defendant, the plaintiff, spouses Salonga are the lessees of
the said land where the latter erected a house and is paying rentals to the defendant.
Sometime before 1968, the plaintiff failed to pay rental, and the defendant files an
ejectment case for non-payment of rentals against the plaintiff. The plaintiff then offered
that they will just buy their occupied parcel of land instead of vacating the land, however,
the defendant refused to accept their offer. The plaintiff then filed a petition for relief. The
case was heard and was raised to the CA, praying for ordering the defendant to sell the
 !133

parcel of land. The plaintiff invoked their right to be subjected under section 6 article 2 of
the new constitution, referring to the application of social justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the plaintiff correct to invoke social justice
provided in section 6 article 2 of the new constitution?

HELD:
No, the contention of social justice cannot be invoked by the plaintiff just gain
relief and force the defendant to sell her land. Social justice is said to be the promotion
of economic development and proper equilibrium between the relationship of all units of
the society. However, Social Justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
property owners who under the constitution and laws are also entitled for protection.
Social justice is not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another
who is not entitled thereto.
 !134

8. SECTION 11

SIMON V. COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

(G.R. No. 100150. JANUARY 5, 1994)

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission"
and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. On September 10, 1990,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental
motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority
should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil
and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and
political rights, but their privilege to engage in business". On March 1, 1991, the CHR
issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction.
 !135

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the
authority and power of the CRH?

HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and
power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the
CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights
violation, involving civil and political rights". The "order to desist" however is not
investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does not possess. The
Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an
restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to
issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any
court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
 !136

9. SECTION 12 AND 13

MEYER V. NEBRASKA
(263 US 393)

FACTS:
Plaintiff was convicted for teacheing a child German under a Nebraska statute
that outlawed the teaching of foreign languaged to students that had not yet completed
the eight grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

HELD:
Yes. The statue as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty
interests of the plaintiffand fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of
the state. The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from
bodily restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the
English language to be the native toungue of all children raised in the state.
Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other
languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere
knowledge of th German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.
 !137

PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS

(266 US 610)

FACTS:
Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and
maintain academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private
organization conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school,
obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregon’s
Compulsory Eduction Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children
between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act unreasonably with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringin and education of children under their control?

HELD:
Yes. The Acts violated the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected
liberty interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purposewithin the
competency of the state. The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing
the Act would be destruction of the appellees’ schools. The state has the power to
regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the
appropriate preparation for their children.
 !138

CABANAS V. PILAPIL
(G.R. No. L-25843. JULY 25, 1974)

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his
child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a
minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco
Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then
took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child. On the other
hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of
the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee.
Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its
terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms
of the insurance policy?

HELD:
Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic
social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be
prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed
should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here
should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of
the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child
than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this
 !139

country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the
parent (mother) is observed.

PEOPLE V. RITTER
(G.R. No. 88582. MARCH 5, 1991)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario
Baluyot in a hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario.
Afterwards, he inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning,
Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an
object inside her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has
already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with
bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City general
Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but
failed because it was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She was having
peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her
vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. RTC found him
guilty of rape with homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ritter was liable for rape and homicide?

HELD:
No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the
incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender
age. As evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist
also testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was
different from that which caused her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the following
day that the object has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro
inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago.

 !140

PEOPLE V. LARIN
(G.R. No. 128777. OCTOBER 7, 1998)

PANGANIBAN, J:

FACTS:
Carla Calumpang, assisted by her parents Rene and Susan Calumpang accuses
ERNESTO LARIN Y BONDAD of violation of Sec. 5(b) in relation to Sec. 31(e) of RA
7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation and for Other
Purposes). Their testimonies were summarized in the trial court. During the trial,
appellant denied committing the alleged acts. He added that he was only a lifeguard at
the University pool, and not a swimming instructor or trainor of the victim. The trial court
a quo found the testimony of Carla Lenore Calumpang worthy of full faith and credence.
It reasoned that, unless motivated by a genuine desire to seek justice, a young girl like
her will not fabricate a story, undergo medical examination, appear in court and
announce to the whole world that she was sexually abused. The trial court also found
that the defense failed to prove ill motive on the part of the private complainant and to
overcome the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Thus, it imposed upon appellant
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the sum of P100,000 as moral
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of sexual abuse?
HELD:
Yes. Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
7610, defines lascivious conduct as follows: The intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of
the genitals or pubic area of a person." In this case, appellant shaved the pubic hair of
the victim, performed cunnilingus on her, licked her breast, touched her genitalia, and
 !141

forced her to hold his sexual organ. These actions cannot be brushed aside as innocent;
rather, they manifest sexual perversity and lewd intentions. Larin was the swimming
instructor or trainor of Carla, a mere child. The Court finds no justification for Larin's
conduct. It is an accepted rule that different people react differently to a given situation or
type of situation. One cannot reasonably expect uniform reactions from victims of sexual
assault. Carla's submissiveness to Larin's lascivious conduct does not exonerate him
from criminal liability, as the law does not require physical violence on the person of the
victim. Moral coercion or ascendancy is sufficient.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION V. SAN DIEGO

(G.R. No. 89572. DECEMBER 21, 1989)

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS
Zoology. The petitionerclaims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take it again, thepetitioner rejected his application on the
basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela tocompel his
admission to the test.In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and qualityeducation. By agreement of the
parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of
court, he squarelychallenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972,
containing the above-cited rule. Theadditional grounds raised were due process and
equal protection.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom,
due process and equal protection?

HELD:
No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission tomedical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education.
 !142

VIRTUOSO V. MUNICIPAL JUDGE

(G.R. No. L-47841. MARCH 21, 1978)

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
On February 23, 1978, petitioner Francisco Virtouso , Jr., who filed an application
for the writ of habeas corpus, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that
the preliminary examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him
was a useless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, (1) failed
to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a
probable cause. (2) He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that
tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was
clearly excessive. (3) It was in the amount of P16,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV
set being imputed to petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence
of probable cause was constitutionally deficient?

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court declared that the petition is granted in accordance with
the terms of the Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978.The Court issued the
following Resolution: “Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco
Virtouso, Jr., the Court Resolved pursuant to section 191of Presidential Decree No. 603,
petitioner being a 17-yearold minor, to order the release of the petitioner on the
recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his
Counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity,
without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken
in accordance with law.” This Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force
to the Youth and Welfare Code.
 !143

IMBONG V. OCHOA
(G.R. No. 204819. APRIL 8, 2014)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the
constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH
Law on certain grounds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violations?

HELD:
No. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could
express their own views on this matter.
 !144

10. SECTION 14
 !145

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY V. NLRC

(G.R. No. 118978. MAY 23, 1997)

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21,
1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She
was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave
on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8,
1991. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a
probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in
the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she
had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the
marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder
about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was
dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down
decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman,
who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent
that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company policies.

ISSUE:
Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate an
employee?

HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly
prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is
recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to
firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of
unlawful discrimination or those provided by law. PT&T’s policy of not accepting or
disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right
against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our
Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were
dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts
of dishonesty.
 !146

11. SECTION 15 AND 16

OPOSA V. FACTORAN
(G.R. No. 101083. JULY 30, 1993)
 !147

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
A Group of minors, namely, Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., represented by their
parents, file a taxpayer’s class suit, representing their generation against the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources who was Fulgencio Factoran
Jr. The petition was a prayer to cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in
the country, and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs, and granting the petitioners which they specified as “other reliefs
just and equitable under the premises.” They also alleged that they have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and a healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by
the State in its capacity as “parens patirae.” They also claimed that allowing of TLA
holder to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and
impairment of the national resources property.

The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
the petitioners have no cause of action against him, and the issues raised by the
plaintiffs are political by nature which properly pertains to legislative and executive
branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit
to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. The court ruled in the positive. The petitioners assert that they represent
their generation as well as the generations to come. The SC ruled that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation, and for the future generation, file a class suit.
Their petition was based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a “balanced and healthful ecology.” Hence, every generation has a responsibility
to preserve the rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology.

C & M TIMBER CORPORATION V. ALCALA

(G.R. No. 111088. JUNE 13, 1997)

MENDOZA, J.:
 !148

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari by which C & M Timber Corporation seeks the
nullification of the order dated February 26, 1993 and the resolution dated June 7, 1993
of the Office of the President, declaring as of no force and effect Timber License
Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued to petitioner on June 30, 1972. Then Minister of
Natural Resources Ernesto M. Maceda suspended TLA No. 360 for FLDCs gross
violation of the terms and conditions thereof, especially the reforestation and selective
logging activities and in consonance with the national policy on forest conservation. On
July 26, 1986, Minister Maceda issued another order cancelling the license of FLDC on
the ground that in spite of the suspension order dated June 26, 1986, said
concessionaire has continued logging operations in violation of forestry rules and
regulations. Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., of the DENR, declared petitioner's TLA
No. 106 as of no more force and effect and consequently denied the petition for its
restoration, even as he denied FLDC's motion for reconsideration of the cancellation of
TLA No. 360. Secretary Factoran, Jr. ruled that petitioner's petition was barred by reason
of laches, because petitioner did not file its opposition to the issuance of a TLA to FLDC
until February 13, 1987, after FLDC had been logging under its license for almost two
years. On the other hand, FLDC's motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
Was the cancellation of the TLA valid?

HELD:
Yes. the DENR order of May 2, 1988, declaring petitioners TLA No. 106 as no
longer of any force and effect, was based on its finding that although TLA No. 106s date
of expiry was June 30, 1997 it had been suspended on June 3, 1983 because of CMTCs
mediocre performance in reforestation and petitioners laches in failing to protest the
subsequent award of the same area to FLDC. There is considerable dispute whether
there was really an order dated June 3, 1983 suspending petitioners TLA because of
mediocre performance in reforestation, just as there is a dispute whether there indeed
was a letter written on September 24, 1984 on behalf of petitioner protesting the award
of the concession covered by its TLA No. 106 to FLDC, so as to show that petitioner did
not sleep on its rights.

PAJE V. CASINO
(G.R. No. 207257. FEBRUARY 3, 2015)

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding expressing their intention to build a power plant in
 !149

Subic Bay Industrial Park. However, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City
issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008, expressing the city government’s objection to
the coal-fired power plant as an energy source and urging the proponent to consider
safer alternative sources of energy for Subic Bay. On December 22, 2008, the DENR
issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate for the proposed power plant.
Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional components in its
proposed coal-fired power plant. Due to the changes in the project design, which
involved the inclusion of a barge wharf, seawater intake breakwater, subsea discharge
pipeline, raw water collection system, drainage channel improvement, and a 230kV
double-circuit transmission line. Several months later, RP Energy again requested the
DENR-EMB to amend the ECC. Instead of constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power
plant, as originally planned, it now sought to construct a 1x300-MW coal-fired power
plant. In support of its request, RP Energy submitted a Project Description Report (PDR)
to the DENR-EMB. The DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended the ECC
(second amendment). The Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambales issued Resolution
No. 2011-149, opposing the establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant
at Sitio Naglatore, Brgy. Cawag, Subic, Zambales. On August 11, 2011, the Liga ng mga
Barangay of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12, Series of 2011, expressing its
strong objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Casino group failed to substantiate its claims that the
construction and operation or the power plant will cause environmental damages?

HELD:
Yes, the appellate court correctly ruled that the Casino group failed to
substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will cause
environmental damages of the magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On
the other hand, RP Energy presented evidence to establish that the subject project will
not cause grave environmental damage, through its environmental management plan,
will ensure that the project will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws
and standards.
 !150

12. SECTION 17

PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. V. CA

(G.R. No. 112844. JUNE 2, 1995)

BELLOSILLO, JR., J:

FACTS:
Petitioner PMMSI was made to produce and train competent marine officers.
Respondent has repeatedly disapproved petitioner’s requests for renewal of permit due
to some violations against public respondent’s orders. Despite the violations, the
petitioner still continued to enrol students and offer courses. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration regarding the non-compliance with the DECS’ minimum requirements
and it was denied. Petitioner sought reconsideration of closure order alleging the
compliance with the requirements.
 !151

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process of law?

HELD:
No. Set against the records of the case, the assertion of the petitioner that it was
deprived of its rights to a hearing and opportunity to correct the alleged deficiency readily
collapses. The earlier mentioned facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS
issued the phase out and closure orders, petitioner was clearly notified and given
several opportunities to correct their deficiencies.

VILLAR V. TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 69198. APRIL 17, 1985)

FERNANDO, C.J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners Villar, Recitis, Barreto, Salcon, de Leon, Laxamana and Guilatco were
all refused enrolment at the Technological Institute of the Philippines (TIP) due to their
exercise of their constitutional right tofreedom of assembly. As held in MALABANAN vs
RAMENTO, petitioners cannot be barred from enrolment for their exercise of their
freedom of assembly. In opposition to the petition filed by petitioners, respondent made
reference to the academic records of petitioners, invoking the constitutional provision on
academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning .Petitioners Barreto, de
Leon, Jr. and Laxamana all obtained failing grades while petitioners Villar, Salcon,
Guilatco and Recitis met the requirements for retention in the said institute,
entitling them to the writs of certiorari and prohibition against TIP.
 !152

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners can be barred from enrolment for their exercise of their
freedom of assembly?

HELD:
No. Petitioners have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their
expulsion from respondent College.

TABLARIN V. GUTIERREZ
(G.R. No. 78164, JULY 31, 1987)

FELICIANO, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,
the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order
No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing
of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the
NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said
petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional?
 !153

HELD:
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum
scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not
constitute an unconstitutional imposition. The police power, it is commonplace learning,
is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and
promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the
general community. An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and wellbeing of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is
a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that
needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the
one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the
other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

GUINGONA V. CARAGUE
(G.R. No. 94571, APRIL 22, 1991)

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8
Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the
appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to
P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by
P.D. No. 81, entitled “Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act),” by P.D. No.
1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society,” and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening
the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds
For The Purpose. The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D.
No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain
the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

ISSUE:
 !154

Whether or not the appropriation of budget violative of Section 29(1), Article VI of

the Constitution?

HELD:
No. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by law,” such as precisely the
authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words,
in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but
subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment
of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as
well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual
laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or
special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as
the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention
clearly and certainly appears from the language employed, whether in the past or in the
present.

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION V. DE GUZMAN

(G.R. NO. 144681. JUNE 21 2004)

TINGA, J:

FACTS:
The respondents are all graduates of Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela
City, Metro Manila. They passed Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades
of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult
subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and
Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima
examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got
99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed
that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects,
and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the
candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the
unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-
breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination. The PRC
asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or
irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination. For its part, the
NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993]
Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early
access to the test questions." Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated
July 21, 1993, charging respondents with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and
 !155

deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended

that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 2382 is a valid exercise of Police Power?

HELD:
Yes. It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to
select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State
to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the
people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring
scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular
pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.
 !156

13. SECTION 18

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 120095. AUGUST 5, 1996)
 !157

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. and Kary International, Inc. filed a motion
for intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15,
1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint. An appeal was
made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a
consequences, ARB requirement was issued. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's decision and concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid exercise of
Police power.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power?

HELD:
Yes. The ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its
issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police
Power by the State. The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the
state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of a legitimate
governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and
public morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your
property in such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the
legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which everyone
may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.
 !158

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. V. DRILLON

(G.R. No. 81958. JUNE 30, 1988)

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges
the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being
an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of
the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral
agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.


ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police
power?

HELD:
Yes. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure
should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to
"female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution
does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female
workers — rests on substantial distinctions.
 !159

BERNARDO V. NLRC
(G.R. NO. 122917, JULY 12, 1999)

PANGANIBAN, J.:


FACTS:
The 43 petitioners are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988
to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters
through a uniformly worded agreement called "Employment Contract for Handicapped
Workers". The said agreement provides for the manner of how they are hired and be
rehired, the amount of their wages (P118.00 per day), period of employment (5 days a
week, 8 hours a day, training for 1 month, 6 months period) and the manner and
methods of how their works are to be done (Sort out bills according to color; Count each
denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine; Wrap
and label bills per hundred; Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and Submit bundled bills
to the bank teller for verification.) Many of their employments were renewed every six
months. Claiming that they should be considered as regular employees they filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and recovery of various benefits.

Labor arbiter’s decision: complaint is dismissed for lack of merit. Affirmed by the
NLRC and denied motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are considered as regular employees?

HELD:
Yes. The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for
more than six months and whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence,
their dismissal from employment was illegal.The stipulations in the employment
contracts indubitably conform with Article 80, however, the application of Article 280 of
the Labor Code is justified because of the advent of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons) which mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given
the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person
(compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances) 27 of the
petitioners are considered regular employees by provision of law regardless of any
agreement between the parties as embodied in article 280 in relation to article 281 of the
Labor Code. Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and
desirable to the business of respondent bank. No employer is allowed to determine
indefinitely the fitness of its employees. Those who have worked for only 6 months and
employments were not renewed are not considered regular employees.
 !160

14. SECTION 19 AND 20

TANADA V. ANGARA
(G.R. No. 118295. MAY 2, 1997)
 !161

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein
respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty
associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted
benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free
market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits,
restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the
Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading
intervention.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a
global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?


HELD:
No. The 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a
global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out
foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy.
While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services
and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.

What the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such
exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review.
That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the
nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic
globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers.

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS V. PHILIPPINE

COCONUT AUTHORITY
(G.R. No. 156041. FEBRUARY 21, 2007)

MENDOZA, J.:
 !162

FACTS:
The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by Presidential Decree No.
232 as an independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development
and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that
coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development
and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law.

PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant

operators. In March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no
longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a
condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free
enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red
tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested
areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for
mandamus to compel PCA to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be granted?

HELD:
Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated
laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free
enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not
call for the removal of “protective regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is
so because under Art. 12, Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when
the public interest so requires.

PEST MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FERTILIZER AND

PESTICIDE AUTHORITY
(G.R NO. 156041. FEBRUARY 21, 2007)

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:
The case commenced upon petitioner’s filing of a Petition For Declaratory Relief
With Prayer For Issuance Of A Writ Of Preliminary Injunction And/Or Temporary
 !163

Restraining Order with the RTC. Petitioner, a non-stock corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, is an association of pesticide handlers duly
licensed by respondent Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). It questioned the validity
of Section 3.12 of the 1987 Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing Guidelines,
which provides thus:

Data submitted to support the first full or conditional registration of a pesticide

active ingredient in the Philippines will be granted proprietary protection for a period of
seven years from the date of such registration. During this period subsequent registrants
may rely on these data only with third party authorization or otherwise must submit their
own data.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the FPA go beyond its delegated power and undermine the
objectives of P.D. No. 1144 by issuing regulations that provide for protection of
proprietary data?

HELD:
No. The petition is devoid of merit. The law being implemented by the assailed
Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing Guidelines is P.D. No. 1144, entitled
Creating the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority and Abolishing the Fertilizer Industry
Authority. As stated in the Preamble of said decree, "there is an urgent need to create a
technically-oriented government authority equipped with the required expertise to
regulate, control and develop both the fertilizer and the pesticide industries.

There is no evidence whatsoever to support petitioner's allegation that the grant

of protection to proprietary data would result in restraining free trade. Petitioner did not
adduce any reliable data to prove its bare allegation that the protection of proprietary
data would unduly restrict trade on pesticides.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION V. DUQUE

(DUQUE, G.R NO. 173034. OCTOBER 9, 2007)

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:


FACTS:
On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
President Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president
under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect
to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a
code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
 !164

promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are
not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. The Philippines ratified the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State
Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
ensure that all segments of society, especially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,
2006. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the
RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and
expanding the coverage of said law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR?

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11
and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL
and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are
PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. Customary international law is
deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or customary international law
means “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become
part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The Milk
Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or
other forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code
expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be
allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency
Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding. Since all the regulatory provisions under the
Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm
in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are
in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code.

ESPINA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R NO. 143855. SEPTEMBER 21, 2010)

ABAD, J.:

FACTS:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the
United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On
September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States
panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
 !165

Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the complementing strategic interests of the
United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed,
among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement. Thereafter,
then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by
public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through
respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of
the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution



ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?


HELD:
No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of
sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers,
petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer’s suit refers
to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation.



 !166

15. SECTION 21

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES V. SECRETARY OF

AGRARIAN REFORM
(G.R. No. 78742. JULY 14, 1989)

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No.
228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.

It also seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it
is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
 !167

The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or
just compensation. Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not
issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.


ISSUE:
Whether or not agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent
domain?

HELD:
Yes. There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time
on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended
for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the
interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike
the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of
just compensation to the owner.

To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits
for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it
becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess
of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated
is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing
to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.
 !168

16. SECTION 25

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
(G.R. NO. 175368. APRIL 11, 2013)

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court
order the following: (1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section
24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and
(3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural
Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining
permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No.
7076 are unconstitutional for providing for executive control and infringing upon the local
autonomy of provinces?

HELD:
No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the
Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR
Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining
 !169

Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII

of the Constitution provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Under said
provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement
of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and
review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the People’s
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program
is to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local
government agencies. The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local
autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully
devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as
its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in
charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.

BASCO V. PAGCOR
(G.R. No. 91649. MAY 14, 1991)

PARAS, J.:

FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869,
pursuant to the policy of the government, “ to regulate and centralize through an
appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted
by law.” This was subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the government but
also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the
cash-strapped Government.

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is

allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.

ISSUE:
Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional?


HELD:
No. Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But
the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the government cannot regulate it in the
exercise of its police power, where in the state has the authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also,
local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
 !170

Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of

individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate.

The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the
political branches of government and the people themselves as the repository of all state
power.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this
case, the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption.
Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
 !171

LIMBONAS V. MANGELIN
(G.R. No. 80391. FEBRUARY 28, 1989)

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government
officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through
the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was
needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987,
the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was
unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared
null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending
further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the
Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot
and academic" because of its resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner has made the case moot and
academic?

HELD:
No. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply by
reason of the expulsion resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was done purposely
to make the petition moot and academic, it will not make it academic. On the ground of
due process, the Court hold that the expulsion is without force and effect. First, there is
no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation. It also does not appear
that the petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with graft and corruption
before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity
to rebut their accusations. As it stands, the charges now are leveled amount to mere
accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered reinstatement of the
petitioner.

LINA V. PANO
(G.R. NO. 129093. AUGUST 30, 2001)
 !172

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the
operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a
mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter
dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was
issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent
Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain
from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring
Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of
a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated
his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid?


HELD:
Yes. As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the
lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its
views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom
to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the
assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of
local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a
delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should
not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.
 !173

DADOLE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R NO. 125350. DECEMBER 3, 2002)

CORONA, J.:

FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor
issued notices of disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount
(maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively)
authorized by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges shall be
reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount they received
in excess of P1000 from the last six months.


ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the
supervisory powers of the President?


HELD:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units,
the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and
the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The
President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x
x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos
of the President. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he
will see to it that the local governments or their officials were performing their duties as
provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be
removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.
They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere
in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs.
 !174

17. SECTION 26

PAMATONG V. COMELEC
(G.R NO. 161872. APRIL 13, 2004)
 !175

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who
could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or
are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming
that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service"
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him
since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable
of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

HELD:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain
language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of
the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,

entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article
are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for
according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the
policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the
courts.

MAQUERA V. BORRA
(G.R. NO. L-24761. SEPTEMBER 7, 1965)

BENGZON, J.P.,:.
 !176

FACTS:
Maquera seek to ask Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national,
provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year
salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA no. 4421 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. Supreme Court held that property qualifications are inconsistent with the
nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the
principle of social justice underlying the same. The court reasoned out that Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn,
implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted shall not be dependent upon the
wealth of the individual concerned. Social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all,
rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be
denied the chance to be elected to public office.
 !177

18. SECTION 27 AND 28

LEGASPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

(G.R. No. 72119. MAY 29, 1987)

CORTES, J.:

FACTS:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
 !178

employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government

employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate
the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees?

HELD:
No. The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is
not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the
availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of
the information sought. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency
concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the
government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of
public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law
from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the
constitutional right. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to
their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to
confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in
the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who
are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those
who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing
secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is,
therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government
employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen,
has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The
civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of
express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for
said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
 !179

VALMONTE V. BELMONTE
(G.R. No. 74930. FEBRUARY 13, 1989)

CORTES, J.:

FACTS:
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he
would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of
Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty,
requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to
the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the
respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage stamps for printing the more important question raised refers to the alleged
violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that
this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3,
Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows: No public
money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian, institution, or
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister,
or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or
leprosarium. 


ISSUE:
Whether or not the stamp is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special
postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase
"advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It
does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for
the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however,
the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church It
appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2
of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was
"to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." Even if we were to
assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the
postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight.
Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a
gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act
assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
 !180

GARCIA V. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS

(G.R. No. 92024. NOVEMBER 9, 1990)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation,
applied for registration with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new
domestic producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally specified the
province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but later submitted an
amended application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the
site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy of
BPC’s original and amended application documents. The BoI denied the request on the
basis that the investors in BPC had declined to give their consent to the release of the
documents requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protects the
confidentiality of these documents absent consent to disclose. The BoI subsequently
approved the amended application without holding a second hearing or publishing notice
of the amended application. Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the BOI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the
wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding?

HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that the BOI violated Garcia’s Constitutional right to have
access to information on matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the
Constitution. The Court found that the inhabitants of Bataan had an “interest in the
establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital
because it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they breathe” The
Court also ruled that BPC’s amended application was in fact a second application that
required a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held.

The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, “the
Constitution does not open every door to any and all information” because “the law may
exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny”. Thus it excluded “the trade
secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial information of the applicant BPC, and
matters affecting national security” from its order. The Court did not provide a test for
what information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to access public
information, nor did it specify the kinds of information that BPC could withhold under its
ruling.
 !181

AQUINO-SARMIENTO V. MORATO
(G.R. No. 92541. NOVEMBER 13, 1991)

BIDIN, J.:

FACTS:
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer
requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting
slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and
television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or
classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato
on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their
decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience
votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal On February 27,
1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among
others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the
board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which
rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman.
Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips.
However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued
Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision
of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 10-89 is valid?


HELD:
No. The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an
individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or
belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large. As may be gleaned from
the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that
its very existence is public is character. it is an office created to serve public interest. It
being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency
or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the
Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts
made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in
nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which
is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

(G.R NO. 133250. JULY 9, 2002)
 !182

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions
of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as
reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation,
a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA
also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer is valid?


HELD:
No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred
to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA,
are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as
embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to
transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay,
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain.
 !183

V. SEPARATION OF POWERS

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO, V. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

(G.R. No. 47065. JUNE 26, 1940)

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan
Transportation Co. Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty
 !184

years in the business of transporting passengers in the province of Pangasinan and

Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public
Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC granted
the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on their
existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service
Commission.Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission is
unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation?

HELD:
No. The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and
constitutional because it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called
Subordinate Legislation. It is a valid delegation because of the growing complexities of
modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All that has been
delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of
discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the
promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.The Certificate of Public
Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers nop roperty rights and is a mere
license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC has
the power, upon notice and hearing, `to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any
certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of
25 years was never heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings.In
addition, the Court ruled that, `the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected
by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. When private
property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only

LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION V. RAMOS

(G.R. No. 127882. DECEMBER 1, 2004)

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued EO No. 279 which
authorizes the DENR Secretary to accept, consider, and evaluate proposals from
foreign-owned corporations or investors involving technical or financial assistance for
large-scale mining operations. On March 3, 1995, President Fidel Ramos approved RA
 !185

No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995) to govern the exploration, development,
and utilization and processing of all mineral resources. After the effectivity of RA 7942,
the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato. On August 15,
1995, DENR Secretary issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7942.

The Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7942, its Implementing Rules

and Regulations, and the FTAA executed by the government. On January 27, 2004, the
Court promulgated its decision granting the petition and declaring the unconstitutionality
of certain provisions of RA 7942 and the Implementing Rules and Regulations, and the
entire FTAA because FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of power of control over the
exploration, development, and utilization of the natural resources?

HELD:
The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporation. The Congress may review the action of the
President once it is notified of every contract entered into in accordance with the
constitutional provision within 30 day from its execution. Article XII of the Constitution is
silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President or Congress commits a
grave abuse of discretion, the Court may exercise its duty under Article VIII. The Court
must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and allow the President and
Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country.

MACEDA V. VASQUEZ
(G.R. No. 102781. APRIL 22, 1993)

NOCON, J.:

FACTS:
Maceda was the Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique. It was alleged that the petitioner falsified his Certificate of Service by certifying
that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90
days have been decided on or before January 31, 1998 when no decision had been
rendered in the cases submitted. Petitioner contends that the Court granted an
extension of 90 days to decide on the cases. Petitioner also contends that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case.
 !186



ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case?


HELD:
No, the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction over the case. A judge who
falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court and
criminally liable to the State for his felonious act. However, in the absence of any
administrative action taken against the petitioner, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII,
section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with
all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-45081. JULY 15, 1936)

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
In the election of September 17, 1935, Angara, Ynsua, and Mayor were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district
of the Province of Tayabas. Angara was proclaimed by the provincial board of
canvassers as member-elect of the National Assembly. On November 15, 1935, the
petitioner took his oath of office.The National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed. Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commision a Motion of
Protest against the election of the petitioner. On December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
 !187

Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that Ynsua can no longer protest because of
the National Assembly proclamation. Ynsua argued that proclamation of the Electoral
Commission governs and that it can take cognizance of the election protest and cannot
be subject to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the matter?

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly." The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow
from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.

ARNAULT V. NAZARENO
(G.R. L-3820. JULY 18, 1950)

OZAETA, J.:

FACTS:
The Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought
two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was
paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the
Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged
interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was all
paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila
Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of
the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate. The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was
the San Juan de Dios Hospital while the original owner of the Tambobong Estate was
the Philippine Trust Company. Burt failed to pay the installments of the purchase price of
the estates. His contracts were cancelled. On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted a
resolution creating a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong
 !188

Estates deal. Petitioner Arnault was one of the witnesses called and examined by the
special committee On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was arraigned for contempt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt?

HELD:
Yes, the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt. The Court finds
that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by
the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. Once an inquiry is admitted or
established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry,
to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or
necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate,
or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce
a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or
investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has
no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every
question that may be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or
possible legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined
by its direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the
necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the
action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result
of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question.

OSMEÑA V. PENDATUN
(G.R. No. L-17144. OCTOBER 28, 1960)

BENGZON, J.:

FACTS:
On June 23, 1960, Osmeña delivered a privilege speech entitled "A Message to
Garcia." A special committee was created to investigate the truth of the charges against
the President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 175 states that Osmeña was found guilty
of serious disorderly behavior for making malicious charges against the President.
Osmeña filed petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against Congressman Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He
contended that this violates his constitutional immunity for speeches delivered in the
House, that his speech constituted no disorderly behavior, and that the House does not
have the power to suspend one of its members.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members?

HELD:
 !189

Yes, the House has the power to suspend its members. The House is the judge
of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black
and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly
behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution
never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of
separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a
prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.

VERA V. AVELINO
(G.R. No. L-543. AUGUST 31, 1946)

BENGZON, J.:

FACTS:
The Commission on Elections submitted to the President and the Congress its
report on the national elections which stated that the voting in certain provinces did not
reflect the true expression of the popular will. When the Senate convened, a resolution
was approved ordering that the petitioners shall not be sworn nor seated as members of
the chamber. The petitioners instituted an action and prayed for an order annulling the
resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court may entertain the petition?

HELD:
No, the Court may not entertain the petition instituted by the petitioners. Granting
that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to suspension of the
petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the
power of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine Senate, the
petition should be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, the Court could not
order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would be to
 !190

establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances
wisely woven into our institutional setup.

ARNAULT V. BALAGTAS
(G.R. No. L-6749. JULY 30, 1955)

LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS:
This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch, Honorable Jose F. Flores presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring that
the continued detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison, in
pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is illegal, for the
reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of discretion in
considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of
the sum of P440,000 was made in the sale of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate, as
a refusal to answer the question directed by the Senate committee to him, and on the
further ground that said Jean L. Arnault, by his answer has purged himself of contempt
and is consequently entitled to be released and discharged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has the right to review the findings of
the Senate?

HELD:
No, the Court of First Instance does not have the right to review the findings of
the Senate. The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of
departmental discretion in the means used to accomplish legitimate legislative ends.
Since the legislature is given a large discretion in reference to the means it may employ
 !191

to promote the general welfare, and alone may judge what means are necessary and
appropriate to accomplish an end which the Constitution makes legitimate, the courts
cannot undertake to decide whether the means adopted by the legislature are the only
means or even the best means possible to attain the end sought, for such course would
best the exercise of the police power of the state in the judicial department. These the
judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to do, much in
the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the
ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is
known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the
fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only
instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a
violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the
legislative discretion.
 !192

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 72915. DECEMBER 20, 1985)

RESOLUTION

FACTS:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 calls for the holding of the Snap Presidential Elections
on February 7, 1986. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of BP Blg. 883. They
claim that BP Blg. 883 was in conflict with the Constitution because it allows the
President to continue holding office after calling an election.


ISSUE:
Whether or not BP Blg. 883 is unconstitutional and the Court must stop and
prohibit the holding of the Snap Presidential Election?


HELD:
No, BP Blg. 883 is not unconstitutional. The petitions were dismissed because
there are less than 10 votes to declare BP Blg. 883 unconstitutional. Escolin, in his
separate concurring opinion, stated that the petition is political in character. Judicial
department has no authority to determine the constitutionality of the acts of the
legislature and the executive. The jurisdiction of the Court is the issue involved, not the
provision which may be applied. Given the circumstances and a statute that’s not clearly
proven to violate the constitution, the court should not prevent the electorate from giving
expression to their sovereign will.
 !193

AVELINO V. CUENCO
(G.R. No. L-2821. MARCH 4, 1949)


PER CURIAM:

FACTS:
During the session of the Senate on February 18, 1949, Tañada requested that
his right to speak on the next session day be reserved in order to formulate charges
against Avelino. Avelino and his supporters deliberately tried to delay and prevent
Tañada from delivering his speech. They tried to adjourn the session and walked out.
Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the
session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and
was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the matter?

HELD:
No, the Court does not have jurisdiction over the matter in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the
Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The Court refused to take cognizance of the Vera
case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected
without any immediate remedy. The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the
Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a
resolution.
 !194

MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS
(G.R. No. 88211. OCTOBER 27, 1989)


PER CURIAM:

FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent “people power” revolution. Former President Marcos and his family spent
three years in exile. In his deathbed, Former President Marcos signified his wish to
return to the Philippines to die. President Corazon Aquino prohibited the return of former
President Marcos and his family because it poses a threat to national interest and
welfare. The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of the family of
former President Marcos to the Philippines?


HELD:
Yes, the President has the power to bar the return of the family of former
President Marcos. It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is
vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution.
The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the
article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her)
oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her
decision to bar the return of the Marcos family and subsequently, the remains of Mr.
Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this
bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or
with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.

CASIBANG V. AQUINO
(G.R. No. L-38025. AUGUST 20, 1979)
 !195



MAKASIAR, J.:


FACTS:
Respondent Yu was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the
1971 local elections. Petitioner Casibang filed a protest against the election with the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Yu filed a counter-protest but later withdrew it
after waiving the opening and revision of the ballot boxes. The proceeding continued
with respect to the election protest of the petitioner.

On October 10, 1973, Yu moved to dismiss the election protest on the ground
that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution by reason of which a political question has intervened in the case. The
respondent Judge sustained the political question theory of Yu and ordered the dismissal
of the protest.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the case involves a political question and beyond the jurisdiction
of the Court?



HELD:
No, the case does not involve a political question. The electoral protest case
herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever
been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the
Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent
Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means
in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."
 !196

TAÑADA V. CUENCO
(G.R. No. L-10520. FEBRUARY 28, 1957)


CONCEPCION, J.:


FACTS:
On February 22, 1956, the Senate consists of 23 senators from the Nacionalista
Party and 1 senator from the Citizens Party. The Senate chose Cuenco and Delgado as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The Senate Electoral Tribunal must be
composed of 9 members- 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 3 Senators nominated by the
party having the largest votes in the Senate, and 3 Senators nominated by the party
having the second largest number of votes. Since Tañada was the only member from the
Citizens Party, the two members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal would come from the
Nacionalista Party. Petitioners assailed this process. The respondents argued that the
court may not take cognizance of the issue.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court may take cognizance of the case?


HELD:
Yes, the Court may take cognizance of the case. The case is not an action
against the Senate and it does not seek to compel it to allow the petitioners to perform
their duties as members of the Senate. Although the Constitution provides thar the
Senate shall choose 6 members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part
neither of Congress nor of the Senate. Although the Senate has the exclusive power to
choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
Constitution has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. The
legislative power is vested exclusively in the Congress yet this does not detract from the
power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of the acts of Congress.
 !197

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA
(G.R. No. 134577. NOVEMBER 18, 1998)


PANGANIBAN, J.:


FACTS:
On July 27, 1988, the Senate convened for its first regular session. On the
agenda for that day was the election of officers. Senator Fernan was elected as Senate
President, Ople as president pro tempore, and Drilon as majority leader. Senator Tatad
manifested that allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the
position of minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during the discussion on who
should constitute the Senate minority. On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the
body that he received a letter signed by the members of Lakas-NUCD-UMPD senators
stating that they had elected Guingona as minority leader. Santiago and Tatad filed a
petition for quo warranto, alleging that Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding
and exercising the position of Senate minority leader.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition?


HELD:
Yes, the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. In the instant controversy, the petitioners — one of whom is
Senator Santiago, a well-known constitutionalist — try to hew closely to these
jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution,
has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke
the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of
respondents.
 !198

TAÑADA V. ANGARA
(G.R. No. 118295. MAY 2, 1997)


PANGANIBAN, J.:


FACTS:
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Secretary Navarro, representing the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. On August 12, 1994, the members of the
Senate received a letter from the President of the Philippines stating that the Final Act is
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution. The following day, Senate received another letter which stated that "the
Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution." On December 9, 1994, the President certified
the necessity of the immediate adoption of PS 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in
the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." On
December 14, the Senate adopted a resolution concurring in the ratification of the
President.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy?


HELD:
Yes, the Court has jurisdiction. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional
provision is raised before the Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound
by constitutional mandate to decide." In deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, the
Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in
enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a
policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative
restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional
duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes.

DAZA V. SINGSON
(G.R. 86344. DECEMBER 21, 1989)

 !199

CRUZ, J.:


FACTS:
After the congressional elections of 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionately apportioned its 12 seats in the Commission on Appointments among
several political parties. On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
was reorganized. 24 members of the Liberal Party resigned from the party and joined
LDP. The House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seats occupied by the petitioner and giving it to the
newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except Daza and including Singson.
Petitioner challenges his removal.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the matter?


HELD:
Yes, the Court has jurisdiction over the matter. What is before the court is not a
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed. What is
involved is the legality of the act of the chamber in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments. The exercise of the power of the House of
Representatives is subject to constitutional limitations. It is within the province of the
judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings.
 !200

VI. DELEGATION OF POWERS

 !201

1. CONCEPT

LIM V. PACQUING
(G.R. No. 115044. JANUARY 27, 1995)


PADILLA, J.:
 !202



FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila provides that the Municipal Board shall have
the legislative power to tax, license, permit and regulate wagers on different sporting or
athletic contests including Jai-Alai. On January 1, 1951, EO 392 transferred the authority
to regulate jai-alai to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). On June 30, 1953,
Congress enacted RA 954 which prohibits horse races and jai-alai.. On September 7,
1971, the Municipal Board of Manila passes Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor
to allow and permit the Associated Development Corporation to establish, maintain, and
operate a jai-alai in the City of Manila. On August 20, 1975, PD 771 was issued revoking
all existing franchises and permits issued by the local government. On October 16, 1975,
PD 810 was promulgated, granting the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a
franchise to operate, construct, and maintain a fronton. On May 8, 1987, EO 169
repealed PD 810 and revoking and cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-
Alai and Amusement Corporation.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress delegated the power to franchise?


HELD:
No, the Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power to franchise.
The Congress retained for itself the power to franchise. What the Congress delegated
was the power to license, permit, or regulate. The license to operate issued by the City
of Manila would not amount to something meaningful unless the holder was also
franchised by the national government to operate.
 !203

JAWORSKI V. PAGCOR
(G.R. No. 144463. JANUARY 14, 2004)


YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:


FACTS:
On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR approved an instrument denominated as Grant of
Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, which
granted SAGE the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting stations and Internet
Gaming facilities. Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its
operations


ISSUE:
Whether or not PAGCOR acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it
granted authority to SAGE to operate gambling activities in the internet?


HELD:
Yes, PAGCOR acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. While PAGCOR is
allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or management contracts, it is not
allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a
veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power
in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as
there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.
 !204

GARCIA V. DRILON
(G.R. No. 179267. JUNE 25, 2013)


PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:


FACTS:
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order against her
husband Jesus Garcia pursuant to RA 9262. She claimed to be a victim of abuse.
Petitioner Jesus Garcia assails the constitutionality of RA 9262. He contends that the
protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power.


ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials?


HELD:
No, there is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the other hand,
executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It
is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance." The BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in
nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws
and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
 !205

2. PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION

GARCIA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

 !206

(G.R. No. 101273. JULY 3, 1992)


FELICIANO, J.:


FACTS:
The President issued EO 438 which imposed an additional duty of 5% ad
valorem in addition to other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles
imported into the Philippines. It was imposed across the board on all imported articles
including crude oil and other oil products. It was subsequently increased to 9%. EO 475
was issued reducing the rate of additional duty to 5% except in the cases of crude oil
and other oil products. EO 478 levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude
oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.


ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to enact revenue bills to the
President?


HELD:
No, there is no undue delegation of power to enact revenue bills to the President.
The enactment of revenue bills is within the province of the Legislative. However,
Section 28(2) Article VI of the Constitution provides that the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President to fix tariff rates and other duties or imposts. There is explicit
constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President to fix, within specific
limits, tariff rates and other duties or imposts.
 !207

PHILIPPINE INTERISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 100481. JANUARY 22, 1997)


MENDOZA, J.:


FACTS:
The Philippine Ports Authority is the government agency which regulates
pilotage. Pursuant to PD 857, it has the power to supervise, control, regulate such
services as necessary in the ports vested in, or belonging to PPA and to control,
regulate, and supervise pilotage and the conduct of pilots in any Port District. It also has
the power to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees for
the services rendered by PPA or by any private organization within a Port District. EO
1088 fixes the rates of pilotage service.


ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 1088 would deprive PPA of its power to fix pilotage rates?


HELD:
No, it will not deprive PPA of its power to fix pilotage rates. The fixing of rates is
essentially a legislative power. Although the power to fix rates had been delegated to
PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges through the imposition of
uniform rates. As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to PPA, he could
also exercise without withdrawing the power vested in PPA. EO 1088 provides for
adjusted rates without withdrawing the power of PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or
decrease rates, charges or fees.
 !208

ARANETA V. DINGLASAN
(G.R. No. L-2044. AUGUST 26, 1949)


TUASON, J.:


FACTS:
Commonwealth Act No. 671 declared a state of total emergency as a result of the
war involving the Philippines. It authorized the President to promulgate rules and
regulations to meet such emergency. It, however, does not fix the duration of its
effectiveness. The President issued certain Executive Orders pursuant to CA 671.
Araneta is under prosecution for violation of EO 62 which regulates rental for houses
and lots for residential buildings. The petitioners in the consolidated cases aver that CA
671 is inoperative and all the Executive Orders issued pursuant to it ceased.


ISSUE:
Whether or not Commonwealth Act 671 ceased?


HELD:
Yes, Commonwealth Act 671 ceased. It became inoperative when the Congress
met in regular session on May 25, 1946. There is good basis in the language of Act No.
671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency
powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions
due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. EO 62, 192, 225, and 226
were issued without authority of law.
 !209

RODRIGUEZ V. GELLA
(G.R. No. L-6266. FEBRUARY 2, 1953)


PARAS, C.J.:


FACTS:
On August 26, 1949, the Court had already passed upon the status of
Commonwealth Act No. 671. The court held that it ceased to be operative when
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946. The petitioners seek to invalidate
Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546, which appropriates the sum of P37,850,500 for
urgent and essential public works and sets aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the
provinces and cities visited by calamities. Congress passed a bill which repealed all
Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President.


ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Orders 545 and 546 are still operative?


HELD:
No, Executive Orders 545 and 546 are no longer operative. The emergency
powers delegated to the President had been withdrawn. Commonwealth Act 671
expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing in force appropriations
which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act
is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can make new appropriations. The
specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such
other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." The framers of the Constitution
had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the
President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency."

DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(GR No. 171396. MAY 3, 2006)
 !210

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army
(NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and
take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified
the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no
refutation from petitioners’ counsels. The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the
Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners
has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not
respondents’ task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they
are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and General Order No. 5 are constitutional?

HELD:
No. Upon issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General
Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their
professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling
upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such
issuances are void for being unconstitutional.

PEOPLE V. VERA
(G.R. No. L-45685. NOVEMBER 16, 1937)

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
 !211

This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila
so that this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in
criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu
Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng
therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the
said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the
aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of
conviction rendered by this court in said case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in
these proceedings?

HELD:
No. Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional thus it comprises an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive.

CONFERENCE OF MARINTIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC. V. POEA

(G.R. No. 114714. APRIL 21, 1995)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated
association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed
manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their
 !212

respective foreign shipowner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of

1994, of the Governing Board" of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the grounds that
The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting
death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels;
only Congress can, granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the
standards for its exercise, resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional
because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts
clauses of the Constitution and resolution and the memorandum circular are not, valid
acts of the Governing Board because the private sector representative mandated by law
has not been appointed by the President since the creation of the POEA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the delegation of legislative power constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based
on impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by the
public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.
POEA. 6 The petitioner in that , case assailed the constitutionality of Memorandum
Circular No. 02 of the POEA (effective February 1984) which prescribed a standard
contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of
Filipino seamen for overseas. The challenged resolution and memorandum overseas
employment circular here merely further amended Memorandum Circular No. 02, which
was earlier amended in 1989 per Memorandum Circular No. 41, 7 series of 1989.
 !213

3. TESTS

PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL

(G.R. No. L-23825. DECEMBER 24, 1965)

CONCEPCION, J.:

FACTS:
On November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as
well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary
 !214

view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties —
referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question — have been
impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the
aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken away from the former
the barrios composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case.
Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were
allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said executive orders are null and void and constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power?

HELD:
Yes. Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and
the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities above referred to.

US V. ANG TANG HO
(G.R. No. 17122. FEBRUARY 27, 1922)

JOHNS, J.:

FACTS:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868,
entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice,
and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof,
and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue
the necessary rules and regulations. On August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a
proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold and a complaint was filed
against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive
price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months'
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming
that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force
 !215

and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the
sentence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the analysis and construction of Act No. 2868 authorizes the
Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold?

HELD:
Yes. It was noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-
General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions
or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it
may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the
discretion of the Governor-General.

YNOT V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

(G.R. No. 74457. MARCH 20, 1987)

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. The carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated
upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive
order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright.

Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another.
 !216

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order 626 is constitutional?

HELD:
No. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because
the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because
the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers.

DE LA LANA V. ALBA
(G.R. No. L-57883.MARCH 12, 1982)

FERNANDO, C.J.:

FACTS:
The Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any
executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of
the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial
review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a
conceded legislative power, that of judicial reorganization, may possibly collide with the
time-honored principle of the independence of the judiciary as protected and
safeguarded.

The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as

Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice
Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. Thus, "The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.". The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court
cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter.
 !217

ISSUE:
Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is constitutional?

HELD:
No. The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and
rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in
several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the
members of the Court, and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not
unconstitutional.

CHIONGBIAN V. ORBOS
(G.R. No. 96754. JUNE 22, 1995)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Pursuant to Article X, Section18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A.
No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a
plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del
Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato,
Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and
Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted
in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these
provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a

restructuring (reorganization) of administrative regions. While this reorganization, as in
Executive Order 429, does not affect the apportionment of congressional
representatives, the same is not valid under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art.
XIX of R.A. 6734 and Ordinance appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the
seats of the House of Representatives of Congress of the Philippines to the different
legislative districts in provinces and cities.
 !218

ISSUE:
Whether or not the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in
character?
HELD:
Yes. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the
standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A.
No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote
simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs
consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to
improve the service in the transaction of the public business.

TATAD V. SECRETARY OF ENERGY

(G.R. No. 124360. NOVEMBER 5, 1997)

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:

The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180
entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes”

First, the facts without the fat. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency
regulating the oil industry other than those dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil
companies were free to enter and exit the market without any government interference.
There were four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan Refining Company and
Filoil Refining) and six (6) petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty,
Mobil and Shell), then operating in the country.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 breach Article XII Sec 19 of the Constitution
prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition?

HELD:
Yes. Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the
aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or
unfair competition shall be allowed."
 !219

GEROCHI V. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

(G.R. No. 159796. JULY 17, 2007)

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist

Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this original
action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the
"Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge,
and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks to implement the said
imposition, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge
imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from
implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge.

Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing
the NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed
Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund
component of the Universal Charge.16. On the basis of the said ERC decisions,
respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi
and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric
bills starting from the month of July 2003.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax?

HELD:
Yes. The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in
the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary
 !220

purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the
imposition a tax.

VII. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

 !221

1. APPOINTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS
 !222

ALDABA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 188078. JANUARY 25, 2010)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of
Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos
City Charter by creating a separate legislative district for the city and the time the
legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162
(later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of
Malolos City was 223,069.

Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed a

petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as
provided under Article VI Section 5 Paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 9591 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. Republic Act No. 9591 is unconstitutional because it violates Article VI
Section 5 Paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution.
 !223

AQUINO III V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 18979. APRIL 7, 2010)

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
A petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
by Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, taxpayers and
citizens, who seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled
"An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the 1st and 2nd Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment."

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.

9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed
first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an essential requirement to make a
new legislative district in a province?

HELD:
No. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
 !224

MARIANO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 118577. MARCH 7, 1995)

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:
There are two petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." This petition involves
prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya
S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati.

The petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be
made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. The others are residents of
Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional
sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 are constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. For Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854, it attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. While Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment
law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every
census; the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill;
and the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population
of Makati stands at only 450,000.
 !225

TOBIAS V. ABALOS
(G.R. No. L-114783. DECEMBER 8, 1994)

BIDIN, J.:

FACTS:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein
petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong."

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675,
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three
provisions specifically Article VIII, Section 49, Article VI, Section 26 Paragraph 1 of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI,
Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)?

HELD:
No. Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify
to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be
allowed to stand.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right
of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd
since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress
cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
 !226

MONTEJO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 118702. MARCH 16, 1995)

PUNO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads
for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting
certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of
representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the
municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province. Intervenor
Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion
of Tolosa in his district. We gave due course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it
involves the validity of the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative
power of redistricting and reapportionment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to transfer municipalities from
one legislative district to another district?

HELD:
No. Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3
of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by
Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not
municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created."
 !227

SEMA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 177597. JULY 16, 2008.)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional as a valid
delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20
Paragraph 9, Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through
their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may be authorized by law for
the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region" and as an amendment
to Section 6 of RA 7160. However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
"prescribe standards lower than those mandated" in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces
contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, Sema proposed that Section
19 "should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing
standards that do not comply with the minimum criteria" under RA 7160. On the other
hand, respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not
among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution and the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in
Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article VI Section 19 of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays,
is constitutional?

HELD:
No. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities.
 !228

2. QUALIFICATIONS

MARCOS V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 119976. SEPTEMBER 18, 1995)

KAPUNAN, J.:
 !229

FACTS:
Imelda Marcos as the petitioner, filed her Certificate of Candidacy to run as a
Representative of the First District of Leyete where she claimed that she is a resident of
Leyte for 7 months. On the other hand, Montejo as the respondent later filed a Petition
for Cancellation and Disqualification against Marcos where he claims that she wasn’t
qualified to the constitutional requirement of one year residency.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections?

HELD:
Yes. A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a
startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile,
the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for
actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's
qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an
elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

AQUINO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 120265. SEPTEMBER 18, 1995)

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City.
 !230

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition
to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987
the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the
May 8, 1995 elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman?

HELD:
Yes. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in
his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe
indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind
of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile.

COQUILLA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 151914. JULY 31, 2002)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras,
Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United
States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973,
petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Subsequently,
petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special Committee on
 !231

Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November

10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued
Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration
Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000. On November 21, 2000,
petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His
application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001. On
February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two (2) years.

The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections
on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number
of votes (6,131) against private respondents 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On
May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers. He subsequently took his oath of office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla met the qualification, specifically residency to run as a
mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar?

HELD:
No. When the petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S.
citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10,
2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right
to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay
as a visitor or as a resident alien.
 !232

3. PARTY-LIST SYSTEM (REPUBLIC

ACT NO. 7941)

ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 203766. APRIL 2, 2013)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
The COMELEC disqualified 52 party list groups and organizations to partake in
the May 13, 2013 elections because they allegedly do not represent the marginalized
and under-represented sector of the society. The decision of the COMELEC was based
on the ruling in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT where the party list and
organization must represent the marginalized and under-represented sector of the
society.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the May 13,
2013 elections?
 !233

HELD:
No. The COMLEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the May
13, 2013 party list elections. However, since the court adopts the decision new
parameters in the qualification of national, regional and sectoral parties under the party
list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party list system, and to participate in
the coming May 13, party list elections , under the new parameters prescribed in this
decision.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD INC. V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 190529. MARCH 22, 2011)

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
The Philippine Guardian Brotherhood Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a
motion for reconsideration to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13,
2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying
PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004. These resolution delisted PGBI
from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalition under the party list system. Resolution No. 8679 specifically delisted PGBI
because it failed to get 2% of the vote cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
election. This decision was based on the ruling in the case or MINERO vs. COMELEC
which held that party-list that does not participate in a election necessarily acts, by
default, less than 2% of the votes cast.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution no. 8679 should be annulled?
HELD:
 !234

Yes. Sec. 6 (8) of RA 7941 used the word “OR”, which is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other. Thus, the plain,
clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two separate grounds for
delisting a party list which are failure to participate in the last two preceding elections
and the failure to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast in the 2 preceding elections for the
constituency in which it was registered. These two grounds cannot be mixed or
combined to support delisting. Thus, COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 was annulled
making PGBI qualified to be voted upon as a party list group in May 2010 elections.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 190582. APRIL 8, 2010)

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:
Ang Ladlad filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC and argued that
the LGBT (lesbian, gay. bisexuals and transgender) community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity, LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination and
violence and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this
Court in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC. However, COMELEC refused to
accredit Ang Ladlad because on moral grounds those petitioners tolerate immorality
which offends religious beliefs and advocates sexual immorality. Thus, Ang Ladlad filed a
petition to annul the assailed Resolution and direct the COMELEC to grant their
application for accreditation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC should grant the Ang Ladlad’s application for party
list accreditation?

HELD:
 !235

Yes. Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to

justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party list system. The LGBT is
a sector that can be represented in the party list system even if it is not specifically
enumerated in the law. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941. Thus, the petition is granted.

ANAD V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 206987. SEPTEMBER 10, 2013)

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
COMELEC cancelled Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy or ANAD’s
Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in the
2013 Elections for violating election laws and regulations. The three grounds were
illustrated on the Resolution issued by the COMELEC en banc, to wit:

I.
Petitioner ANAD does not belong to, or come within the ambit of, the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors enumerated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941
and espoused in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.

II.
There is no proof showing that nominees Arthur J. Tariman and Julius D.
Labandria are actually nominated by ANAD itself. The Certificate of Nomination,
subscribed and sworn to by Mr. Domingo M. Balang, shows that ANAD submitted only
the names of Pastor Montero Alcover, Jr., Baltaire Q. Balangauan and Atty. Pedro Leslie
B. Salva. It necessarily follows, that having only three (3) nominees, ANAD failed to
comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section 4, Rule 3 of Resolution No.
9366. IcaHCS
 !236

III.
ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the
2007 National and Local Elections as required by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166
("R.A. No. 7166").

A petition for certiorari was hence presented before the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC for issuing
Resolution resulting to cancellation of Certificate of Registration and disqualification of
ANAD in the 2013 elections on grounds of not meeting specified requirements under the
election law?

HELD:
No. COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections. In the case at bar, ANAD was given the opportunity to
prove its qualifications during the summary hearing and during which, ANAD submitted
documents and other pieces of evidence to establish said qualifications. It is also to be
noted that COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of
elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions
rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this
Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of
law.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATION OF SENIOR CITIZENS V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 206844-45. JULY 23, 2013)

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement,
entitled Irrevocable Covenant, containing the list of nominees to share power in their
sharing power agreement.

The COMELEC issued a Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP
No. 12-191 (PLM) stating that the list of nominees submitted to them shall be
permanent. This is in lieu of the empty seat in Congress after the 2010 elections
following the resignation of Rep. Kho. Two SENIOR CITIZENS were allocated seats in
the House of Representatives, the first being Rep. Arquiza, and Rep. Kho as the second.

Rep. Arquiza, honoring Rep. Kho’s resignation, stated that their fourth nominee
shall take the latter’s seat considering that the third nominee, Datol, has previously been
expelled from the party.

COMELEC claims that they shall stay true to the list presented by SENIOR
CITIZENS, regardless of Datol’s (being the third nominee) expulsion. Also that the
resignation of Rep. Kho shall not be recognized because it will change the order of
nominees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC for
issuing Resolution without due process?
 !237

HELD:
Yes. There is grave abuse on the part of COMELEC for violating due process.
Instead, the COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No.
12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further proceedings.

The Court ruled that the Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the
Commission on Elections En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM)
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Philippines, Inc. is concerned, and that the Commission on Elections En Banc is
ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list organizations during the May 13, 2013
elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total number of
votes it garnered during the said elections.

BELLO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 191998. DECEMBER 7, 2010)

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
On March 25, 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8807 which
prescribed the rules of procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list nominee
for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections. Section 6 of the said Resolution provides
that the party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence to duly
prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s,
and to the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent.
Moreover, under Section 10 of the same Resolution, the COMELEC may motu proprio
effect the disqualification of party-list nominees who violate any of the limitations.

Petitioner then filed for disqualification of Arroyo, that he cannot be considered a

member of the marginalized and underrepresented sector, particularly, the sector which
the AGPP represents — tricycle drivers and security guards — because he is not only a
member of the First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent member of the House of
Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the House's Energy Committee; and, (c) a member
of key committees in the House, namely: Natural Resources, Aquaculture, Fisheries
Resources, Ethics and Privileges, Justice, National Defense and Security, Public Works
and Highways, Transportation and Ways and Means.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over issues involving the qualifications
of party-list nominees?

HELD:
No. In the case at bar, Arroyo has already taken his oath of office as member of
the House of Representatives. We take judicial notice, too, of the filing of two (2)
 !238

petitions for quo warranto against Arroyo, now pending before the HRET. Thus, following
the lead of Abayon and Perez, we hold that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present
petitions and that the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule
upon Arroyo's qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.

ABC V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 193256. MARCH 22, 2011)

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondent filed petition to the or the cancellation of registration and
accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List on the ground that petitioner is a front for a
religious organization; hence, it is disqualified to become a party-list group under Section
6 (1) 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.

According to the COMELEC, Second Division, the Verification with Certification

Re: Forum Shopping and Special Power of Attorney was not duly notarized in
accordance with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended. In this case, the
COMELEC, Second Division found that the "Acknowledgment" at the end of the
verification did not contain the name of private respondent who supposedly appeared
before the notary public, and he was not identified by any competent evidence of identity
as required by the rules on notarial practice.

Petitioner assails that COMELEC no longer has the jurisdiction over the case
because ABC was already proclaimed winner in the 2010 elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC holds jurisdiction to determine qualifications of party-
list?

HELD:
No. In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has
jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list
organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and
becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the party-list nominee/
representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives.
 !239

However, it is to note that the COMELEC en banc did not act without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated August 3, 2010.

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 206952. OCTOBER 22, 2013)

REYES, J.:

FACTS:
COMELEC cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. The
COMELEC En Banc pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track
record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely
offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.
The COMELEC En Banc further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its
nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been
involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.

ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition 5 for certiorari, alleging that
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-
list system.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC?

HELD:
Yes. ABANG LINGKOD's registration must be cancelled due to its
misrepresentation is a conclusion derived from a simplistic reading of the provisions of
R.A. No. 7941 and the import of the Court's disposition in Atong Paglaum. Not every
misrepresentation committed by national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations
would merit the denial or cancellation of their registration under the party-list system.
The misrepresentation must relate to their qualification as a party-list group. In this
regard, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on requiring
ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group's track record is
no longer required pursuant to the Court's pronouncement in Atong Paglaum.
 !240

COCOFED V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 207026. AUGUST 6, 2013)

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
On August 23, 2012, the COMELEC conducted a summary hearing, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 9513, to determine whether COCOFED, among several
party-list groups that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the May 13, 2013
party-list elections, had continuously complied with the legal requirements.

In its November 7, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC cancelled COCOFED's

registration and accreditation as a party-list organization on several grounds.

COCOFED argues that the COMELEC's issuance of the assailed resolution

violated its right to due process because the COMELEC did not even conduct a
summary hearing, as ordered by the Court in Atong Paglaum, to give it an opportunity to
explain and comply with the requirement and that the COMELEC violated its right to
equal protection of the laws since at least two other party-list groups (ACT-CIS and MTM
Phils.) which failed to submit five nominees were included in the official list of party-list
groups.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC?

HELD:
No. The COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections.

Section 6 of RA No. 7941 requires the COMELEC to afford "due notice and
hearing" before refusing or cancelling the registration of a party-list group as a matter of
procedural due process. The Court would have demanded an exacting compliance with
this requirement if the registration or continuing compliance proceeding were strictly in
the nature of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. In several cases, however, the Court
had already ruled that the registration of party-list groups involves the exercise of the
COMELEC's administrative power, particularly its power to enforce and administer all
laws related to elections.
 !241

While COCOFED could have complied after the elections (as it in fact did), it
should have, at the very least, submitted an explanation justifying its inability to comply
prior to the elections. However, COCOFED simply chose to ignore the law; this, to us, is
a plain disregard of the administrative requirement warranting the cancellation of its
registration.

AMORES V. HRET
(G.R. No. 189600. JUNE 29, 2010)

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner filed for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of
office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the
party-list organization Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of
Representatives. Petitioner alleged that among other things, private respondent
assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at
the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31
years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from
CIBAC's youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not
effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to
represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Villanueva was disqualified to be a nominee in pursuant to
Section 9 of RA 7941?

HELD:
Yes. The Court finds no textual support for public respondent's interpretation that
Section 9 applied only to those nominated during the first three congressional terms after
the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter
registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. As the law states in unequivocal
terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate
who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since
this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth
sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
 !242

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA7941 V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 147589. JUNE 26, 2001)

GARCIA, J.:

FACTS:
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules
and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and
submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in
connection with the May 14, 2007 elections.

Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and
mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to
participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or

publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the
petitions, the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that
the private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the
party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply with
the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec]" and, 2)
correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from
participating in the May 2007 elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC may publish names of nominees of party lists?

HELD:
Yes. Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. Insofar as the disclosure
issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.

Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given
rationale therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-executory 15 Section 7,
Article III of the Constitution.

Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another
constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in
Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution.
 !243

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 136781. OCTOBER 6, 2000)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Petitions for certiorari were filed assailing two (2) Comelec Resolutions ordering
the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the
full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under Section
5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."

Comelec, together with the respondent parties, averred that the twenty percent
allocation for party-list representatives in the House under the Constitution was
mandatory and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 was unconstitutional,
because its strict application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the house
party-list complement.

The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
granting additional seats which violated the two percent threshold and proportional
representation requirements of RA 7941.

The Supreme Court held that Section 5 (2), Art. VI of the Constitution stating that
"[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list" is not mandatory; that this
percentage is a ceiling the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left to
Congress; that in the exercise of its prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941 by which it
prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election
must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system to qualify for a seat
in the House of Representatives but that no winning party, organization or coalition can
have more than three seats therein; that Congress has the prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement; and that the two percent
threshold is consistent with the intent of the framers of the law and with the essence of
"representation."

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is grave use of direction on the part of COMELEC?

HELD:
Yes. We hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the
thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled
to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two
percent threshold and proportional representation. The Comelec, which is tasked merely
to enforce and administer election-related laws, cannot simply disregard an act of
Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it
cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an
amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
 !244

ANG BAGONG BAYANI – OFW LABOR PARTY V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 147589. JUNE 26, 2001)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna filed the
present petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 37851 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26,
2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious. The Court remanded
the case to the Comelec and directed the Commission to conduct summary evidentiary
hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants. The Court rejected the
submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is,
without any qualification, open to all. According to the Court, such position does not only
weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also
prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of
generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would
further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization. The Court stressed that the
very reason for the establishment of the party-list system is the fundamental social
justice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. It was for them
that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but
genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific
concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and
in the larger affairs of the State. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. The Court also laid down some
guidelines to assist the Comelec in its work of conducting summary evidentiary hearings
on the qualifications of the party-list participants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse in proclamation of the
Omnibus Resolution No. 37851?

HELD:
Yes. What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual
determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously
approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list
elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law. Basic rudiments of due process
require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify
under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their
right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
 !245

BANAT V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 179271. APRIL 21, 2009)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution
No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections. On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number
of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041
(PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members
of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the
[COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would
apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats". There were no intervenors in
BANAT's petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

ISSUE:
Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the election?

HELD:
No. The Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. |||

Moreover, in determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives

under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in

paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
 !246

4. ELECTION, SALARIES,
PRIVILEGES

LOZADA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-59068. JANUARY 27, 1983)

DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
 !247

This is a petition for mandamus filed by Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada and Romeo
B. Igot as a representative suit for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the
election irrespective of party affiliation, to compel the respondent COMELEC to call a
special election to fill up existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan
Pambansa. The petition is based on Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.

Petitioner Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu

City and a transient voter of Quezon City, Metro Manila, who desires to run for the
position in the Batasan Pambansa; while petitioner Romeo B. Igot alleges that, as a tax
payer, he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as
mandated by the 1973 Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that
they are ". . . deeply concerned about their duties as citizens and desirous to uphold the
constitutional mandate and rule of law . . ."; that they have filed the instant petition
"on their own and in behalf of all other Filipinos since the subject matters are of profound
and general interest."

The respondent COMELEC, represented by counsel, opposes the petition

alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they
are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not
apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel COMELEC to hold a special
election to fill vacancies in the legislature?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by
certiorari the latter's decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-
C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads:

"Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy
thereof."

PHILCONSA V. MATHAY
(G.R. No. L-25554. OCTOBER 4, 1966)

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS:
PHILCONSA has filed in this Court a suit against the former Acting Auditor
General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines,
seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit
 !248

the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 (approved
June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives.

Petitioner contends that The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1,
1965 to June 30, 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14 of the
Constitution.The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and
who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30,
1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of
said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14, Art. VI of the Constitution require that not only the
term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the
increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

HELD:
Yes. In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to
"all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" in the same
sentence, as a single unit without distinction or separation between them. This unitary
treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the
full term" of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the
singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of office (six years
for Senators and four for Representatives), thereby rendering more evident the intent to
consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single
Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined with the following
phrase "all the members of the Senate and of the House", underscores that in the
application of Article VI, section 14, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of
office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or
Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can become
operative. Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole, accords in turn
with the fact that the enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire Legislative
body responsibility therefor is not apportionable between the two chambers.|||

LIGOT V. MATHAY
(G.R. No. L-34676. APRIL 30, 1974)

TEEHANKEE, J.:

FACTS:
The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed
on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress
(which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969,
while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become
operative only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at
 !249

the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress "as provided by
law" (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is meritorious?

HELD:
No. Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:

1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress
under Republic Act 4134 could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for
incoming members of Congress when the full term of all members of Congress
(House and Senate) that approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have
expired.

2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on

December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00
per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during
their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect
increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to
receive during their incumbency.

3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
was already operative when his retirement took effect on December 30, 1969, his
retirement gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot be
sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose
term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason
that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview
of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and "other
emoluments" to their salary as provided by law.

4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his claim were amply
refuted by the Office of the President in dismissing the appeal in the similar case
of ex-Congressman Singson and therefore likewise serve to show the
untenability of petitioner's stand in this appeal, mutatis mutandis.

PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS
(G.R. No. 132875. FEBRUARY 3, 2000)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
Accused-appellant is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. Accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance
at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense.|||

Accused-appellant insisted that having been re-elected by his constituents, he

had the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. According to him, his covenant
 !250

with his constituents cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraint arising from
pending criminal cases. He asserted that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or
interest, including the police power of the State?

HELD:
No. In the case at bar, the Court found the election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal enforcement. The functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions, which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restrict in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class. The Court was constrained to rule against the accused-
appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or
interest, including the police power of the State.

Instant motion was denied.

|||

TRILLANES IV V. PIMENTEL
(G.R. No. 179817. JUNE 27, 2008)

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident",
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup
d'etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati. Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in
detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-
year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.|||

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with
the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed
to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests” By Order of July 25, 2007, the trial
court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Hence, the present petition
for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and
 !251

for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff,
resource persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in
his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate
staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official
functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status
quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and
guests at the Marine Brig.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Trillanes election as senator allows him to work and serve his
mandate as senator?

HELD:
No. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no
"prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the
doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-
election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only
signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] . . . with the knowledge that
he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison." |||

CETDHA

OSMENA V. PENDATUN
(G.R. No. L-17144. OCTOBER 28, 1960)

BENGZON, J.:

FACTS:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a
verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen
in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No.
59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President, with
the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not
punish him.

In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged: first, the Resolution

violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his
allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule
 !252

XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other business has intervened
after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer
therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Osmena’s immunity was violated?

HELD:
No. Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the
English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense." Such immunity has come to this country from the
practices of Parliament as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States.
Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question
before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before
the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress,
Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following
language on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the
many infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2, pp.
798-799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing insulting words during
debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was
summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his
parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea.

JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG
(G.R. No. 15905. AUGUST 3, 1966)

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

FACTS:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L.
Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly
libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter
moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not
libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion
having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the
corresponding order of dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication?

HELD:
No. The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate
therein" — that is to say in Congress — used in this provision.
 !253

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance

of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in
the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According
to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication
to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by
His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
 !254

5. DISQUALIFICATIONS AND OTHER

INHIBITIONS

ADAZA V. PACANA
(G.R. No. 68159. MARCH 18, 1985)

ESCOLIN, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis
Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started
discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Elected vice-governor
for said province in the same elections was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who
likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their
respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.

On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the
May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27,
1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates,
while respondent lost.

Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought
this petition to exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said
office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his
term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the
parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective
official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an
elected member of Parliament.
 !255

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can hold simultaneous positions?

HELD:
No. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall
not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during
his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”

LIBAN V. GORDON
(G.R. No. 175352. JULY 15, 2009)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari
(petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having
Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During respondent's incumbency as a member
of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23
February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by
accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to
be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.

Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a

government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and
holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held
that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to
another government office.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of
respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the
Senate?

HELD:
We find the petition without merit. Petitioners have no standing to file this petition.
 !256

The Court declared that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

LIBAN V. GORDON
(G.R. No. 175352. JANUARY 18, 2011)

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
The case resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration filed on
August 10, 2009 by respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision
promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the Decision), the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration filed on August 27, 2009 by movant-intervenor Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC), and the latter's Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position
Paper filed on December 23, 2009.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration
and movant-intervenor PNRC's Motion for Partial Reconsideration is meritorious?

HELD:
Yes. Respondent Richard J. Gordon's Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration and movant-intervenor PNRC's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the Decision in G.R. No. 175352 dated July 15, 2009 are GRANTED. The
constitutionality of R.A. No. 95, as amended, the charter of the Philippine National Red
Cross, was not raised by the parties as an issue and should not have been passed upon
by this Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis, being neither strictly private nor
public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety.
 !257

6. SESSIONS, OFFICERS, QUORUM,

RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
 !258

AVELINO V. CUENCO
(G.R. No. L-2821. MARCH 4, 1949)

RESOLUTION:

FACTS:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañadare
quested that his right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate
charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was
approved.

On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada
and Senator Tañada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the
Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President and
ordering the investigation thereof on the next session.

The session was adjourned due to the disorder.

Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be

placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was
immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked
that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the
Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio
Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to
paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his
speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected
as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by
the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office
thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as
the rightful Senate President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
No. In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its
own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
 !259

judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the
electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate
remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding
officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices
against four resolved to deny the petition.

ARROYO V. DE VENECIA
(G.R. No. 127255. AUGUST 14, 1997)

MENDOZA, J.;

FACTS:
The petition challenges the validity of RA No. 8240 amending certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing “sin-taxes” on the manufacture and
sale of beer and cigarettes. The law originated from the House of Representatives and
was transmitted to the Senate which approved it on certain amendments. A conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions from the House and the
Senate, who submitted a report on Nov. 21, 1996.

During the speeches and interpellations, the petitioner moved to adjourn the
House for lack of quorum and upon a head count, the Chair declared the presence of a
quorum. In his interpellation, the petitioner announced that he was going to raise a
question but he never did. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House and Senate President, and was forwarded to the President which eventually
became a law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law passed is null and void for being in violation of the rules of
the House?

HELD:
No, it would be unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a co-equal department
for this Court to set aside a legislative action as void just because the House
disregarded its own rules of procedure. It would be acting in excess of its power and wit
would itself be guilty if it were to do so. A suggestion, instead, is to enact a new law, a
repeal or amendment of RA No. 8240. The Court must assume that the House acted in
good faith and its conduct was permitted in its rules
 !260

PACETE V. THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

(G.R. No. L-25895. JULY 23, 1971)

FERNANDO, J.;

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a writ of mandamus and prohibition, alleging that he was
appointed by then President on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan,
Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged duties as such. He
appointment was made during the recess of Congress, and was submitted to the COA
during its next session in 1965, and was unanimously confirmed later on. After 9 months,
the Secretary of Justice advised the petitioner to vacate his position, on the ground that
his appointment has been bypassed. Petitioner then sought clarification from the
Secretary of COA, and was informed that, one day after his appointment, a member of
the COA, wrote to the Chairman, filing a motion of reconsideration of the petitioner’s
appointment due to a derogatory information he received.

Respondent contended that a mere presentation of such letter of notification

“automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question” and the salary of
the petitioner was withheld.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the confirmation of his appointment had become final and
executory upon the adjournment of the 4th regular session of the Fifth Congress?

HELD:
Yes, the right of the petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in accordance with law, his confirmation having been duly
confirmed. The exercise of the presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by COA
when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the case, such appointment
was made during the recess of Congress and such appointment, which is an ad interim
appointment, takes effect at once and is complete until such would be disapproved by
the COA or until the next adjournment of Congress.
 !261

OSMEÑA V. PENDATUN
(G.R. No. L-17144. OCTOBER 28, 1960)

BENGZON, J.;

FACTS:
The petitioner delivered a speech entitled “A message to Garcia”,and in said
speech, he made serious imputations of bribery against the President, quoted in
Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created,
evidence to substantiate such imputations. Which resulted in his suspension from office
for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior, by resolution of the House.

Osmeña questioned the validity of the resolution, assailing that it violates his
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the Congress. The respondent then
contended that the SC has no jurisdiction over the matter for the Congress has the
power to discipline its members.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of Congress violated Osmeña’s parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in Congress?

HELD:
No, Sec. 15, Art. VI gives parliamentary immunity over members of the
legislature which is a fundamental privilege in a democratic world. IT guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions. It does not, however, protect him from responsibility from the
legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or
unbecoming of a member. For such unparliamentarily conduct, the members of
Congress could be censured, committed to prison, suspended or even expelled by the
votes of their colleagues.
 !262

SANTIAGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 128055. APRIL 18, 2001)

VITUG, J.;

FACTS:
The petitioner was the Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID). She approved the application for the legalization of stay of 32 aliens
which was allegedly illegal and was tainted with bad faith for it violates RA No. 3019 and
EO No. 324 prohibiting the legalization of disqualified aliens.

Two other criminal cases were filed with the RTC against the petitioner which are
libel and violation of PD No. 46. In 1995, pending resolution, the Sandiganbayan issued
an order suspending the petitioner, who was already a Senator by then.

The petitioner assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a 90-day

preventive suspension of the Senator petitioner, from any government position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can order the suspension of a member of the
Senate without violating the Constitution?

HELD:
Yes, the authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the suspension of a public
official in violation of RA No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support, as provided
in Sec. 13 of RA No. 3019. IN issuing the preventive suspension of the petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the unequivocal mandate of the law. The law does
not require the establishment of guilt in a pre-suspension proceeding. All it secures to
the accused is the adequate opportunity ot challenge the validity of the proceedings
against him.
 !263

7. RECORDS AND BOOKS OF

ACCOUNTS; LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL
AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

MABANAG V. LOPEZ VITO

(G.R. No. L-1123. MARCH 5, 1947)
 !264

TUASON, J.;

FACTS:
The petitioners are composed of 3 senators and 8 representatives, proclaimed by
the COMELEC as winners in the April 1946 elections. The 3 senators were suspended
by senate due to election irregularities and the 8 representatives were prevented from
taking their seat in the House of Representatives except in the election of the House
Speaker. A resolution for their suspension has been introduced the House of
Representatives, and as a consequence, the petioles did not take part in the passage of
the questioned resolution nor were they included in the necessary ¾ vote required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these Members were to vote, it would be
just short of the required ¾ vote in either branch of Congress.

Petitioners then prayed for the prohibition of the furtherance of the resolution
amending the Constitution.

Respondents contend that the SC has jurisdiction over the case because the
Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case at bar?

HELD:
The disposal of the issue by the Court does not imply a rejection of the
enrollment thrower, the due enactment of the law may be proved either of the 2 ways
provided in Sec. 313 of Act No. 90. The SC found no signs of irregularity in the passage
of law. It did not look upon the journals behind the enrolled copy to determine
correctness of the latter.

An enrolled bill is that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both
houses, signed by the proper officers of each House and approved by the President and
filed by the Secretary of the State. The SC then, is bound by the contents of a duly
authenticated resolution or an enrolled bill by the legislature. In case of conflict, the
contents of the enrolled bill shall prevail over the journals.

ARROYO V. DE VENECIA
(G.R. No. 127255. AUGUST 14, 1997)

MENDOZA, J.;
 !265

FACTS:
Petitioners are Members of the House of Representatives, filling a suit against
the respondents assailing a violation of the rules of the House which the petitioners
claim are constitutionally mandated.

In the course of the interpellations, the petitioner announced that was going to
raise a question but he never did even at the end of his interpellation. ON the same day,
the bill was signed by both the Speaker of the House and Senate President, as certified
by their respective secretaries, and was deemed passed on November 21, 1996. The
enrolled bill was therafter signed by the President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void for violation of the rules of the House?

HELD:
The rules are hardly permanent in character; they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Failure to conform
does not have the effect of nullifying the act. The matter complained of concerns a
matter of internal procedure of the House which the Court has no jurisdiction over. The
claim was not that no quorum has been reached but the petitioner’s questioning of a
quorum has been defeated.

CASCO PHILIPPINE CO. V. GIMENEZ

(G.R No. L-17931. FEBRUARY 28, 1963)

CONCEPCION, J.;

FACTS:
Central Bank issued on July 1, 1959 Circular # 95, fixing a uniform, margin fee of
25% on FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTION. Later, CB issued a memorandum RE:
 !266

establishing the procedure for application for exemption from the payment of said fee, as
provided in RA 2609. In November and December, petitioner bought foreign exchange
for importation of urea and formaldehyde (main raw materials of synthetic resin glues).
Petitioner paid the margin fee for said transaction amounting to Php 33,765.42. In May,
petitioner made another purchase and paid margin fee of Php 6,345.72. Relying upon
Resolution 1529 of the Monetary Board of the Bank dated November 3, 1959, separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is EXEMPT from said fees. Petitioner sought
refund for Php 33,765.42, then after the last purchase, sought refund for Php 6,345.72.
Auditor of the Bank refused to approve the refund, subsequently, auditor general
affirmed the action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the aforesaid
margin fee?

HELD:
Section 2 of RA 2069 states: The margin established by the Monetary Board
pursuant to the provision of section hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of the following: urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of
plywood and hardboard when imported by and for exclusive use of end-users.

Petitioner maintains that the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as

“urea and formaldehyde” and that respondents have erred in holding otherwise. The
National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed “urea formaldehyde is not a
chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde…” Hence, urea formaldehyde is clearly a
finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”
as separate articles in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea
formaldehyde”. It is well settled that the enrolled bill – which uses the term “urea
formaldehyde” is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed
by Congress.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.

ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS
(G.R. No. L-23475. APRIL 30, 1974)

MAKALINTAL, C.J;

FACTS:
On March 30, 1964, a bill of local application was filed in the House or
Representatives and passed the 3rd reading without amendments. It was sent to the
Senate for its concurrence and was sent to the appropriate committee which favorably
recommended approval with a minor amendment that instead of the City Engineer it
should be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the
 !267

Vice Mayor instead of the latter’s incapacity to act as Mayor as suggested by Senator
Roxas. Suring Senate deliberations, Sen, Tolentino proposed amendments which were
approved by the Senate.

The Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House informing them of the
approval with amendments. In the certification of the amendment, it was the one
recommend mended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were
approved by the Senate. The House signified its approval and was sent to the President
thereafter becoming RA No. 4065.

It was later found out that the one sent by the Senate to the House for approval
and which was transmitted to the President for approval is the wrong version. Due to
this, the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures.

The petitioner contends that said RA is still binding as the withdrawals of

signatures does not invalidate the statute.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an
amendment to the 1935 Constitution had been passed by a vote of ¾ of all the members
of Congress?

HELD:
No, the Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the Senate President and
the Presidents signatures from RA No. 4065, therefore it did not become a law. The
Court maintained that it involves a political question which was not within the province of
the Court to view. Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved
by both Houses by the signatures of their presiding officers which is merely a mode of
authentication. It is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential. The Court then denied said petition and declared RA No. 4065
to not have been duly enacted and therefore it did not become a law.

MORALES V. SUBIDO
(G.R. No. L-29658. NOVEMBER 29, 1968)

CASTRO, J:

FACTS:
The petitioner is the Chief of the detective bureau of Manila Police Department
and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen. Papa,
petitioner was designated acting chief of the MPD and given a provisional appointment
to the same by the Mayor. He served as captain for at least 3 years but does not hold a
college degree.

The respondent, Commissioner of the Civil Service, approved the designation of

the petitioner but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum education and
 !268

civil service liability for the said position. The respondent then certified other qualified
persons for the post and called the attention of the mayor to fill the vacancy within 30
days.

The petitioner challenged the order and contended that he is qualified despite
lacking a college degree under the requirement “has served in the police department
with the rank of captain or its equivalent for at least 3 years”. The petitioner furnished a
copy of the alleged approved version of the Sec. 10, of Police Act of 1966 which was
different from the one cited by respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court should look into the history of the bill, and
upon the journals to resolve the matter?

HELD:
No, the enrolled act in the office of the legislative secretary shows that Sec. 10 is
as it in the statute officially published. The Supreme Court cannot go behind the enrolled
act to know what really happened for the SC would be cast in the unwanted role of a
sleuth trying to figure out what happened in the process of lawmaking, impairing the
integrity of the legislative process.
 !269

8. ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS

TAÑADA V. CUENCO
(G.R. No. L-10520. FEBRUARY 28, 1957)

CONCEPCION, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner is a member of the Senate. During such time, the Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista party. The lone opposition is the petitioner
Tañada belonging to the Citizen’s party. Petitioner Macapagal ran for office but lost and it
now contesting said election to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. It is provided that SET
should have 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3
senators from the minority party, a total of 9 members for such. However, since Tañada
was the only senator from the minority party, the other 2 seats for the minority were
occupied by NP.

The petitioner then assailed this in the Court due to SET would be dominated by
NP Senators, then petitioner Macapagal would have no chance in his election contest.
 !270

The respondents contended that the SC do not have jurisdiction over this cases
as the power to choose SET members belongs to the Senate solely.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the election of the 5 NP members are valid?
2. Whether or not the issue is a political question?

HELD:
1. No, the last two members must not come from the majority party. In this case,
the Chairman of the SET have already appointed members that would fill the minority
seats along with petitioner Tañada. This is valid provided that majority of the members of
the SET concurred with the Chairman.

2. No, the issue not political question, therefore the Court can take cognizance of
it. IT the case at bar, the petitioners asked the Court to decide upon the official acts of
the Senate.

BONDOC V. PINEDA
(G.R. No. 97710. SEPTEMBER 26, 1991)

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:
On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for
Congressman of the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed the winner
having garnered a total of 31,700 votes compared to Bondoc’s 28,400 votes. The
petitioner filed a protest with the HRET, composed of 9 members, 3 Justices of the
Supreme Court, 6 members of the House chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from political parties. A decision was reached declaring Bondoc as the
winner by 23 votes, another recount was insisted by the LDP members of the tribunal
which increased Bondoc to 107 votes more than Pineda’s. Congressman Camasura
(LDP) along with the Justices, voted to proclaim Bondoc as the winner.

Thereafter, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was

expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
Cojuangco and inviting LDP members to join. The House voted for Cong. Cmasura’s
removal from the HRET and that his vote be withdrawn. The
 !271

ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with
election protests in the HRET by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in
the HRET?

HELD:
No, pursuant to Sec. 17 of Art. VI, the HRET is sole judge of all contests in
relation to the election, returns and qualification of their members. It is created as non-
partisan court to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for determination of
contests.

The House cannot just shuffle and manipulate the political component for their
benefit and interests. The alleged “party disloyalty” of Cong. Camasura, as a reason for
his removal from the party, when he voted in favor of Bondoc, undermines the
independence of the HRET. Such members of the HRET have security of tenure. They
can only be replaced in cases of term expiration, death, permanent disability, resignation
from the party. Disloyalty is not a valid cause of termination.

ABBAS V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 83767. OCTOBER 27, 1988)

GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:
In October 1987, the petitioner filed an election contest before the SET against
22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators and representatives elect.
The SET was at that times composed only of 3 justices of the Supreme Court and 6
senators. The petitioner then filed to inhibit said senators from partaking in the said
election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to the case.

To accommodate the disqualification, the petitioner suggested that according to

the Tribunal Rule 24, the concurrence of 5 members is a proviso that where more than 4
are disqualified, the remaining shall constitute a quorum. This resolution would leave the
resolution of the contest to the only 3 members remaining whom are justices of the
Supreme Court.

This is a civil action to nullify and set aside the resolutions of the senate electoral
tribunal dated Feb. 13, 1988.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Abbas’ proposal should be accepted?
 !272

HELD:
No, it is clear that SET is to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and
Members of the Senate. It was intended that both judicial and legislative share the duty
and authority in deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications.
Every member may refrain from participating in the resolution where he sincerely feels
that his personal interests will prevent him from providing an impartial and objective
judgement. SET cannot legally function as such – absent of the entire membership of
the Senate and only the 3 justces exercise the power of valid adjudication of an
senatorial electoral contest.

PIMENTEL V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 141489. NOVEMBER 29, 2009)

CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
The party-list system act took effect on March 3, 1995 which sought to promote
the proportional representative in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives and enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, who lack well-defined political
constituencies, to become members of the House.

The following elections, 14 representatives from 13 organizations were

proclaimed winners, wherein 2 representatives from APEC was sent to the House due to
the votes it garnered. The House elected their representatives to the HRET and CA,
which involves the nomination by the political parties of the House who are to occupy the
HRET and CA. After nomination, the HRET and CA were solely composed of district
representatives.

The petitioner then wrote letters requesting a restricting of the HRET and CA to
include party-list representatives in conformity with Sec. 17 and 18 of Art. VI.

ISSUE:
Whether the composition of the HRET and CA violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list
representatives in the HRET?
 !273

HELD:
No, the Constitution grants the House of Representatives to choose among its
district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
House in HRET and in CA. This discretion is not absolute, subject to the mandatory rule
on proportional representation. However, the Court may not interfere with the exercise
by the House of this Constitutionally mandated duty pursuant to the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers. The allegations that respondents prevented party-list
representatives from participating in the election for the members is without merit.
Instead, the facts showed that the party-list groups refrained from participating in the
election process leading to the House not considering any party-list representative for
election to the HRET or CA.

SAMPAYAN V. DAZA
(G.R. No. 103903. SEPTEMBER 11, 1992)

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:
On February 18, 1992, the petitioners, whom are residents of the 2nd District of
Samar, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent from
continuing to exercise the functions of his office on the ground that the latter is a green
card holder and a lawful permanent resident of the US since 1974. Petitioners allege that
Daza has not renounced his status as permanent resident by any act, in violation of Sec.
68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 18, Art. XI of 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a Member of the
House of Representatives?

HELD:
No, the Court voted to dismiss said petition. First, the case is already moot and
academic as the petitions seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman
for the duration of his term from June 30, 1987 to June 30, 1992. Second, it is the House
Electoral Tribunal who has rightful jurisdiction over this case for pursuant to Sec.17, Art.
Vi, it is the House Electoral Tribunal who shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of its members. Third, a writ of prohibition can no
longer be issued as the term of the respondent has already expired. Moreover, as he is a
de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.
 !274

AQUINO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 120265. SEPTEMBER 18, 1995)

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
On March 1995, petitioner filed his COC for the position of representative of the
newly created 2nd Legislative district of Makati. In his COC, the petitioner cited that he
was a resident of Makati for 10 months. Private respondents filed a petition to cancel
petitioners’ COC for lacking the residence requirement as qualification to be candidate.
The petitioner thereafter changed the entry on his COC, placing 1 year and 13 days.
COMELEC dismissed the petitions and allowed the petitioner to run for the May 1995
elections to which he won, having garnered a total of 38, 547 votes. Private respondents
filed a motion to reconsider with COMELEC wherein COMELEC found the petitioner
ineligible for elective office for lacking the residence requirement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not residency in the COC connotes domicile to warrant the
disqualification the petitioner?

HELD:
Yes, the term residence has only been understood as synonymous with domicile.
As found by the COMELEC, the petitioner was a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992
but that was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding the election. His
certificate also indicated that he is a registered voter of the same district, his birth
certificate also provides his and that of his parents’ birth place as Concepcion, Tarlac.
The petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is not
supported by the facts of the case. Domicile of origin is not easily lost.
 !275

VINZONS-CHATO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 172131. APRIL 2, 2007)

CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS:
The petitioner and respondent Unico were candidates for the lone congressional
district of Camarines Norte. Petitioner alleged that during the canvassing of election
returns, her counsel raised several objections and pointed to manifest errors and
obvious discrepancies in the election returns from various precincts in the municipality of
Labo. The Municipal Board of Canvassers gave her 24 hours to prove her allegations.

On May 14, 2004, Unico was proclaimed as the winner of the elections. The
petitioner filed with COMELEC a petition alleging that (a). total number of valid ballots is
more than the number of voters who actually voted; (b) entries in some election returns
coming from different barangays in the municipality of Labo appear to have been written
by 1 person; (c) no data on number of voters who actually voted and of ballots in some
barangays; (d) one election return is supposed to come from Brgy. Del Carmen, Labo
but there is apparently no Brgy. Del Carmen; petitioner then insisted of a correction of
manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns.

COMELEC then ordered the suspension of effects of proclamation of Unico.

However, they found that the relief sought by petitioner was for a rec-counting of votes,
not merely a correction of manifest errors. COMELEC then explained that a re-count is
not within a pre-proclamation controversy which is limited to an examination of the
election returns on their face. COMELEC then denied the petitioner ruling that the
COMELEC already lost jurisdiction over the case since the respondent already took his
oath as member.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the petitioner’s motion?

HELD:
No, COMELEC did commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution
ruling that it had lost jurisdiction of Unico’s proclamation. It merely showed that they
 !276

recognized the constitutional mandate of the HRET as the sole judge of all contests
relating to elections, returns and qualifications. In this case, as the respondent has
already taken his oath, and assumed his post as congressman, the issue of his
qualification is best addressed to the HRET.

BELLO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 191998. DEEMBER 7, 2010)

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
AGPP filed its manifestations to participate in the May 2010 elections, and
subsequently filed its Certificate of nomination and the certificates of acceptance of the
nominees wherein the 1st nominee is Mike Arroyo.

Petitions for disqualifications of Arroyo have emerged but have been likewise
dismissed both by the COMELEC. In the interim, AGPP secured the required percentage
of votes to secure a single seat in the House of Representatives, entitling Arroyo to a
seat in the House. On the same day, Arroyo took his oath of office, as AGPP’s
representative and his name was entered in the roll of members of the House.

2 petitions were filed thereafter with the HRET questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as
AGPP’s representatives. The HRET took cognizance of the petitions and by directing
Arroyo to answer the same

ISSUE:
Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s
qualifications as AGPP’s nominee after the proclamation and assumption to office as
member of the House?

HELD:
Yes, as the Court held in the latter cases that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass
upon the qualifications of party list nominees after their proclamation and assumption to
office. They are already elected members of the House of Representatives.

Since Arroyo, as AGPP’s first nominee, has been already proclaimed and taken
his oath of office as Member of the House, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, the
SC has no jurisdiction of the cases and that the HRET now has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over such cases to try and hear upon Arroyo’s qualifications
 !277

VILANDO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 192147 & 192149. AUGUST 23, 2011)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner, as taxpayer, filed petitions for Quo Warranto, challenging the
eligibility of Limkaichong. They contended that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and
was ineligible for office, and that she was born to a father whose naturalization had not
attained finality, and a mother whose citizenship has changed when she married.
Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural born citizen, the naturalization of her father
had already attained status of res judicata. HRET dismissed the petition on May 17,
2010. The petitioner contended that The petition for Quo Warranto is not a collateral
attack on the citizenship of the father of Limkaichong because her father’s certificate of
naturalization is of no force and effect; Limkaichong cannot derive her citizenship from
her mother because of her marriage to her father; and as HRET has the plenary,
absolute and exclusive jurisdiction over questions of eligibility of Members of the House
of Representatives, the HRET can look into the eligibility of Limkaichong, and as incident
thereto, look into the validity of her father’s certificate for naturalization.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition has merit?

HELD:
No, The expiration of Limkaichong’s term renders the question of her eligibility
moot and academic. However, as citizenship is a continuing requirement for Members of
the House of Representatives, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition.
Vilando’s contention which requires the Court to look into the alleged nullity of the grant
of naturalization of Limkaichong’sfather is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral
attack on the citizenship of the father, chich can only be done through a direct action. It
is true that HRET has complete na dexclusive jurisdiction over such cases but it does
carry the authority to delve into the legality of the grant of naturalization. Pursuant to par.
1, Sec. 1, Article IV of governing law of 1935 Constitution, records disclosed that
Limkaichong was born in Dumagete City to naturalizaed Filipino father, as a result,
Limkaichong is a Filipino citizen. In the petitioner’s contention that her mother is no
longer a Filipino when she married is without merit as her mother is natural born citizen
and LImkaichong, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship,
falling under par. 1, Sec. 1, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution.
Also, under par. 3, Sec. 1 of Article VI of the present Constitution, those born before
January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority are Filipino citizens. LImkaichong was deemed to elected Filipino
 !278

citizenship informally when she participated in barangay elections as a young voter, and
when she ran and won as Mayor of Negros Oriental.

ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-45081. JULY 15, 1936)

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates
for the position of the national assembly for the province of Tayabas.

On Oct. 17, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as the member-elect of the National
Assembly. Ynsua filed a motion of protest before the Electoral Commission, and that he
be declared as the member of the National Assembly. On Dec. 20, Angara filed a motion
to dismiss the protest on the ground that the protest was filed out of the prescribed
period. The Electoral Commission denied Angara’s petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy?

HELD:
Yes. The nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly. It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting
within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.
 !279

LAZATIN V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 84297. DECEMBER 8, 1988)

CORTES, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for the First
district of Pampanga during the May 1987 elections. During the canvassing, private
respondent objected to the inclusion of certain returns, since MBC did not rule on the
contention, it was referred to the COMELEC. Petitioner was then proclaimed as the
petitioner-elect of Pampanga. Private respondent then filed a petition to declare the
petitioners’ proclamation as void ab initio and prohibit petitioner from assuming office.
COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assume office.
The petitioner then questions the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his proclamation.
Petitioner claims that it should be the HRET who should have jurisdiction.
The private respondents (Lazatin’s opposition), contended that the issue has
become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC resolution had already
become final and executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be placed under HRET’s jurisdiction?

HELD:
Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due
course to the petition. The petition also the merit because Lazatin has been proclaimed
winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his
oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. The alleged invalidity
of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite
alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of
the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the
sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
 !280

9. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
 !281

DAZA V. SINGSON
(G.R. No. 86344. DECEMBER 21, 1989)

CRUZ, J:

FACTS:
On Sept. 16, 1988, the LDP was reorganized resulting in a political realignment
within the House of Representatives. 24 LP members formally resigned from the party
and joined LDP, reducing LP members to only 17 members and increasing LDP
membership to 159. The House then reorganized its COA representation by withdrawing
the seat from Daza and giving it to the new LDP consisting of the original members
except the petitioner and with the inclusion of SIngson as an additional member from the
LDP.

The petitioner challenges his removal from the COA contending that he cannot
be removed from the COA because his election thereto is permanent.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner’s question is political in nature?

HELD:
No, the issue presented is justiciable as it precludes the legality and not the
wisdom of the act complained of. The Court also resolves the issue in favor of the
authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the COA. IT is
understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include temporary
alliances or factional divisions. The petition is therefore, dismissed.

COSETENG V.MITRA
 !282

(G.R. No. 86649. JULY 12,1990)

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J:

FACTS:
The May 11, 1987 elections resulted in the election to the House of
Representatives of the candidates of diverse political parties such as PDP-Laban, LB,
LP, KBL, KAIBA and others. Petitioner was the only candidate under KAIBA. The House
then elected 11 out of 12 congressmen to represent the House in the COA. Thereafter,
Hon. Ablan, KBL, was elected as the 12th member of the COA.

A year later, as 158 out of 202 members of the House were affiliated with the
LDP, the House Committees, including the House representation in COA had to be
reorganized. Petitioner then wrote a letter to House Speaker Mitra, as a representative
of KAIBA, that she be appointed as member of the COA and HRET.

The House of Representatives revised the House majority members in COA to

conform with the new political alignments by replacing Daza with Singson.

The petitioner then filed the petition praying that the Court declared null and void
the election of the respondents and to enjoin them from acting as such for they violated
the constitutional mandate of proportional representation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the House in the COA were chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties as provided in Sec. 18, Art. VI of
the 1987 Constitution?

HELD:
Yes, there is no doubt that the composition of the House membership in the CIA
was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. LDP, as
the biggest, represents 80% of the House membership which gives them 9 out of 12
seat in the COA. The remaining 2 were given to LP and KBL. To be able to claim
proportional membership in the COA, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of
the House membership. Therefore, the petitioner, being the lone representative of her
party, KAIBA, consists only of .4% or less than 1% of the House composition and is
bound by the majority’s choices.

GUINGONA V. GONZALES
(G.R. No. 106971. MARCH 1, 1993)

CAMPOS, JR., J:
 !283

FACTS:
A petition for Prohibition was filed against Senators Alberto Romulo and Wilberto
Tañada to sit and assume the position of members of the Commision on Appointments
and to prohibit Senator Naptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio Chairman, to
recognize and allow the said senators to sit as members thereof. The appointments
were based on the rule of proportional representation (No. of Senators of a political
party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected) of each political party with elected
representatives in the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise that the
Senate elect 12 members for the Commission on Appointments. The proposal was
approved despite the objections of Senators Guingona and Osmena.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the election of Senators Romulo and Tañada as members of
Commission on Appointments is in accordance with Section 18, Article VI of the
constitution?

HELD:
No, the appointment of Senators Romulo and Tañada as members of the
Commission on Appointments is null and void. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution
assures representation in the Commission on Appointments of any political party who
succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators so
elected enables it to put a representative in the Commission on Appointments. And
based on the ruling in the case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, a political party must have at least
two senators in the Senate to be able to have a representative in the Commission on
Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership
in the Commission on Appointments.
 !284

DRILON V. DE VENECIA and MADRIGAL V. VILLAR

(G.R. Nos. 180055 and 183055. JULY 31, 2009)

CARPIO MORALES, J:

FACTS:
In August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their
respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments (CA). The first petition went
to Speaker Jose De Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. Senator
Madrigal then wrote a letter claiming that ―the Senate contingent in the CA violated the
constitutional requirement of proportional representatio. The Senator avers that political
parties PMP and KAMPI were given more seats than they were entitled to in the CA and
the political party PRP and other Independents cannot be represented in the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party concerned?

HELD:
The first petition has been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party
member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is
withdrawn. As for the second petition, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she
sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not in fact
allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that
she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus
standi.
 !285

BAUTISTA V. SALONGA
(G.R. No. 86439. APRIL 13, 1989)

PADILLA, J:

FACTS:
On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated Mary
Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights." Realizing
perhaps the need for a permanent chairman and members of the Commission on
Human Rights, befitting an independent office, as mandated by the Constitution, 4 the
President of the Philippines on 17 December 1988 extended to petitioner Bautista a
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. On the February 1, 1989, the
Commission on Appointments' Secretary informed petitioner Bautista that the motion for
reconsideration of the disapproval of her "ad interim appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights" was denied by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment made by the President is subject to COA’s
confirmation?

HELD:
No. When the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the
President to make without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, the
executive's voluntary act of submitting such appointment to the Commission on
Appointments and the latter's act of confirming or rejecting the same, are done without or
in excess of jurisdiction. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that
the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within
the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art
7), that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of COA. The Commission on
Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review
presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the
Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
 !286

SARMIENTO V. MISON
(G.R. No. L-79974. DECEMBER 17, 1987)

PADILLA, J:

FACTS:
Petitioners herein who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek the constitutionality of the
appointment of Salvador Mison in the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
The appointment was done without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution states the rule of the
appointments that the President can make and the positions that are subject to the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Salvador Mison is valid?

HELD:
Yes. The clear and expressed intent of the framers of the Constitution was to
exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence
of Sec. 16, Article VII. The third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely
that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their
appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the
government. It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the
consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. Moreover, the President is
expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
Hence, the President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Mison is entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
 !287

VIII. POWERS OF CONGRESS

 !288

1. CONCEPT

GONZALES V. HECHANOVA
(G.R. No. L-21897. OCTOBER 22, 1963)

CONCEPTION, J.:

FACTS:
 !289

Then president Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements

pertaining to the importation of rice from Burma and Vietnam without securing
certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in the
production of rice. Rufino Hechanova then authorized 67,000 tons of rice from said
countries. Ramon Gonzales of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association contested
the executive agreements, contending that Hechanova acted beyond his jurisdiction due
to the prohibition of RA 3452 of importing rice and corn.

ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 3452 trumps over the executive agreements entered into by
Macapagal?

HELD:
Yes. The executive may not supersede the will of the congress but instead must
act in enforcement of it. The constitution does not allow the president to perform acts
that would bypass the lawmaking power of the congress. It may not be said that the
executive agreements entered by the president impliedly repeals the law that prohibits
the very act done by him.
 !290

2. ONE SUBJECT RULE

TIO V. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-75697. JUNE 18, 1987)

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board.” PD 1994 was then issued and in effect amended the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). The petitioner contends that the amendment to
the NIRC was unconstitutional because it was considered as a riding provision.
 !291

ISSUES:
Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider?

HELD:
No. It is not a riding provision and said tax increase is within the subject of the
law. The courts considered the questioned tax imposition to be germane to the subject
matter expressed in the very title of law in question. Despite the title only stating the
creation of the VRB, the imposition of taxes falls onto the purpose of the act to regulate
the distribution of videograms.
 !292

PHILCONSA V. GIMENEZ
(G.R. No. L-23326. DECEMBER 18, 1965)

REGALA, J.:

FACTS:
The Philippine Constitution assailed the constitutionality of RA 3836 entitled “An
Act Amending Subsection”, Section Twelve of Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred Eighty-six as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty Hundred Ninety-six
which allow members of the Congress to retire after 12 years of service regardless of
age while other government officers and employees may only retire after rendering 20
years of service. The said amendment also granted one year salary for every four years
of service rendered.

ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution?

HELD:
Yes. The compensation for members of congress was fixed by the constitution
and any increase in it shall only take effect after the expiration of the term of all the
members of the National Assembly. Also, the said retirement benefits fall under the
prohibitions of “other emolument.”

LIDASAN V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-28089. OCTOBER 25, 1967)
 !293

SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS:
Lidasan assailed the constitutionality of RA 3790 which transferred 12 barrios in
two municipalities in Cotabato to Lanao del Sur. This shifted the boundaries of both
provinces. The Office of the President then recommended to the Comelec that the
statute should be suspended until rectified by legislation. Comelec then declared that the
statute should remain in effect unless deemed unconstitutional by Supreme Court

ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 4790 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The courts held that in embracing two subjects in a single statute renders
the act null and void. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur,” does not involve the shifting of the boundaries between the
province of Lanao del Sur and Cotabato. Congress must pass bills that only encompass
a single title and subject and cannot conglomerate heterogeneous subjects.
 !294

CHONGBIAN V. ORBOS
(G.R. No. 96754. JUNE 22, 1995)

MENDOZA, J:

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, was passed by Congress. This called for a plebiscite to be held in the
provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga
del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General
Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. Four provinces,
namely, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi were in favor of the creation
of an autonomous region and these provinces became the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. On the other hand, in accordance with Artice XIX, Sec. 13 of R.A. No.
6734, the provinces who did not vote in favor of the Autonomous Region will remain in
their existing administrative regions but the President may merge the existing regions.
President Aquino then issued E.O. 429, as amended by E.O. 439, transferring certain
provinces to other regions. Petitioners

ISSUE:
Whether or not the power to “merge” administrative regions is executive in
character?

HELD:
Yes. The power to merge is executive in character. The creation and subsequent
reorganization of administrative regions have been done by the President pursuant to
the authority granted to him by law. The Congress merely followed the pattern set in
previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in
1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the
country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local
governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires
should have regional offices.
 !295

MARIANO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 118577. MARCH 7, 1995)

PUNO, J:

FACTS:
The petitioners in this case assails certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854,
otherwise known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.” One of the provisions being assailed
is Section 52 for the increase in legislative district which was not expressed in the title of
the bill. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the increase in legislative district which was not expressed in the
title of the bill is unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Court did not find merit in petitioners’ contention that the creation of an
additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of
the bill. In the ruling of Tobias v. Abalos, the Court reiterated the “one subject-one title”
rule. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully
index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, the Court ruled that "it should be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to such general subject."
 !296

TATAD V. SECRETARY OF ENERGY

(G.R. No. 124360. NOVEMBER 5, 1997)

PUNO, J:

FACTS:
The herein petitions challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180,
otherwise known as “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes”. This Law ends the 26 years of government regulation of the downstream oil
industry. Under the deregulated environment, “any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and
market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only to
monitoring by the Department of Energy.” One of the petitions states that inclusion of the
tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its
title. Petitioner Tatad contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream
oil industry. Hence, this position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the
Constitution?

HELD:
No. It is consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all
contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in
the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject. Section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to
the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country
and make them rely less on imported petroleum
 !297

TOBIAS V. ABALOS
(G.R. No. 114783. DECEMBER 8, 1994)

BIDIN, J:

FACTS:
On February 9, 1994, Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise knows as “An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Mandaluyong”, was enacted. Prior to the enactment, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was
held wherein 18,621 people approved for the conversion of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. By virtue of the said results, R.A. No. 7675
took effect. Petitioners herein contends the constitutionality of Article VIII, Section 49 of
R.A. No. 7675, which states that “the remainder of the former legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan xxx”, because it
contravenes the “one subject-one bill” rule of Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution
which states that “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 violates Article VI,
Section 26 (1) of the Constitution?

HELD:
No. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city. The title of R.A. No. 7675. "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into
a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the
subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong. And as stated in the ruling in Sumulong v. Comelec, the rule
“should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be suffcient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject.”
 !298

LACSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 128096. JANUARY 20, 1999)

MARTINEZ, J:

FACTS:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, 11 persons who are believed to be
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were slain along Commonwealth Avenue by
ABRITG headed by Dhief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the PNP. It was said that
what actually transpired in the morning of May 18 was a summary execution and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG. A panel then
absolved that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. However, a review
board modified the pane’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against 26 respondents, including the petitioner and intervenors. While the motions for
reconsiderations were pending resolution, Republic Act No. 8249 – an act which further
defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan – was consolidated and approved into law
by the President. One of the petitions questions the constitutionality of Section 4 and
Section 7 of the said law. It is said that the title of the law is misleading in that it contains
the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather
than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-
subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. No. 8249 violates Article VI, Section 26
(1) of the Constitution?

HELD:
No. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines"
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction.
The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such,
does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the
necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only
have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough,
as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute
seeks to achieve. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the
title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the law are
germane to that general subject. The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the
title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution
itself empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of various courts.”
 !299

FARIÑAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 147387. DECEMBER 10, 2003)

CALLEJO, SR., J:

FACTS:
Herein petitioners, Fariñas, Garcia, Escudero, and Aquino, seek to declare
unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it
expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code)
for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to
have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. According to the petitioners,
the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in R.A.
No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject
matter of R.A. No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, on the other. R.A. No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who
run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced
in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 9006. Herein respondents
argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 9006
as expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term of
an elective official by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the
one which he is permanently holding. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 R.A. No. 9006 violates Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the
Constitution?

HELD:
No. The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and
log- rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its
title. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code
be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
 !300

CAWALING V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 146319. OCTOBER 26, 2001)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

FACTS:
On August 16, 2000, Republic Act No. 8806, otherwise known as “An Act
Creating The City of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In
The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriting Funds Therefor”, was enacted by former
President Estrada. The Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers proclaimed the creation of
City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite. In one of the petitions of Benjamin Cawaling, invoking his right as a
resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorosgo, contends that R.A. No.
8806 contains two subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b)
abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-
one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 8806 violates the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed
by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution?

HELD:
No. there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation
of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and
distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical,
natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act
Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in
the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude
the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have
deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.
 !301

GIRON V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 188179. JANUARY 22, 2013)

SERENO, J:

FACTS:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Section 12
(Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No.
9006. The said provisions would enable elective officials to gain campaign advantage
and allow them to disburse public funds from the time they file their certificates of
candidacy until after the elections. On the other hand, petitioner Giron asserts that the
insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26 (1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair
Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the
votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed, while
Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code

ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the "one subject- one bill"
rule?

HELD:
No. The proscription [under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution] is aimed
against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates)
and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed germane to the subject expressed in the
title of R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. The title was worded broadly enough
to include the measures embodied in the assailed sections.
 !302

IMBONG V. OCHOA
(G.R. No. 204819. APRIL 8, 2014)

MENDOZA, J:

FACTS:
On December 21, 2012, Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the
“Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted
by Congress. Different sectors are challenging the constitutionality of the law. One of the
petition avers that the RH Law violates the one subject-one bill rule provision under
tSection 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. According to the petitioner, being one for
reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violated the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent which is to act as a
population control measure. The respondents contend that the RH Law is not a birth
control or population control measure and that the concepts of responsible parenthood
and reproductive health are both interrelated, as they are inseparable. The Court sees
that the Law is a population control measure and it is geared towards the reduction of
the country’s population. The Court also agreed with the contention of the petitioners that
the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law but it does not violate the
one subject-one bill rule.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 10354 violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, or the "one subject- one bill" rule?

HELD:
No. A textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. It is expressed in the Section 2 (1)
of the RH Law that “The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health,
the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the
principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading
it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act." Considering the close intimacy
between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive
the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
 !303

3. ORIGIN OF BILLS; THREE

READINGS

TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE

(G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994; OCTOBER 30, 1995)

MENDOZA, J:

FACTS:
 !304

Various suits for certiorari and prohibition challenges the constitutionality of

Republic Act No. 7716 which seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. In view of
the petitioners’ argument, the said law violates the Constitution because it was not
passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version in the
Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 7716 violates Article VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution?

HELD:
Yes. S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by
the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day
because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section
26(2) qualified the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: a) the bill has
passed three readings on separate days and b) it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved. That upon the certification of a bill by
the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. The
certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the
condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being an unusual
condition in this country.
 !305

ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA
(G.R. No. 118303. JANUARY 31, 1996)

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J:

FACTS:
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 entitled, “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago” was
passed in the House of Representatives. In May 1993, Senate Bill 1243 was filed in the
Senate. HB 8817 was then transmitted to the Senate. The Senate Committee on Local
Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was the same
with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law which is Republic Act No. 7720. The
constitutionality of the said act is being questioned because the Act allegedly did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 7720 violates Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution?

HELD:
No. HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No.
1243 was filed in the Senate. Thus, HB No. 8817 was the bill that initiated the legislative
process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of
Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances
attending the instant controversy.
 !306

ARROYO V. DE VENECIA
(G.R. No. 127255. AUGUST 14, 1997; JUNE 26, 1998)

MENDOZA, J:

FACTS:
The validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amend certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes on the manufacture and
sale of beer and cigarettes, is being challenged. The law originated in the House of
Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September
12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with
certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the
House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. On the same day, the bill was signed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified
by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed
by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 8240 was passed in violation of the rules of the House?

HELD:
No. The due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the
House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day. The Journal is
regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to
be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect.
 !307

4. APPROVALS OF BILLS; VETO

BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION V. VALENCIA

(G.R. NO. L-20740. JUNE 30, 1964)

BARRERA, J:
 !308

FACTS:
This petition is filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle
Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and
operators of radio and television stations against respondents Secretary of Public Works
and Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio Control Division. In his veto
message regarding the Philippine Broadcasting Service Fund, the President included a
condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.

ISSUE:
Whether or not such veto is valid?

HELD:
No. Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular
item or items of an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill
affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at
the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20) It
may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the amount
appropriated for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject
to the condition that the same shall not be used or expended for operation of television
stations in Luzon where there are already existing commercial television stations. In the
leading case of State vs. Holder it was already declared that such action by the Chief
Executive was illegal.

GONZALES V. MACARAIG
(G.R. NO. 87636. NOVEMBER 19, 1990)

MELANCIO-HERRERA, J:

FACTS:
On December 29, 1988, President Aquino signed RA 6688 (or the General
Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989) into law. In the passage of the House Bill
 !309

19186 into the said law, seven Special Provisions and Section 55, a “General Provision,”
were vetoed. Petitioners question the constitutionality of the veto on the following
grounds: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to
item/s and does not cover provisions; and (2) when the President objects to a provision
of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the
entire bill.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to veto Section 55, a provision in the
Appropriations Bill?

HELD:
Yes. The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not
veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that
a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill
shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]).

BENGZON V. DRILON
(G.R. NO. 103524. APRIL 15, 1992)

GUTIERREZ, J:

FACTS:
Republic Act 910, as amended by RA 1797, provided for the retirement pensions
of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. The benefits of the
said law were extended to the members of the Constitutional Commissions under RA
1563, as amended by RA 3595. President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 which
repealed RAs 1797 and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of pensions for
 !310

retired Armed Forces officers was restored through the issuance of PDs 1638 and 1909.
Realizing that the adjustment of the retired pensions for members of the AFP was
restored while that of retired justices was not, Congress approved House Bill 16297. In
effect, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 certain
appropriations for the judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates
due the retired justices. However, the President vetoed the provisions relating to the said
appropriations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said veto is constitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that such veto is unconstitutional as it is not an
item veto. When it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration
needs the money to run the machinery of the government and it cannot veto the entire
bill even if it may contain objectionable features. It is for this reason that item veto
powers is provided by the Congress. However, the President cannot veto part of an item
in an appropriation bill while approving the remaining portion of the item.

PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ
(G.R. NO. 113105. AUGUST 19, 1994)

QUIASON, J:

FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and
identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets. The President thereafter signed the bill into law, and declared the
same to have become Republic Act No. 7663. 1994. On the same day, the President
delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed
 !311

and on which he imposed certain conditions which the Congress did not override.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7663 on the ground, among others, that it
contains a special provision which allows any Member of the Congress to realign
allocation for operational expenses. Petitioners claim that only the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House are authorize to exercise such function.

ISSUE:
Whether said provision is unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Court held that under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress
of the Philippines, the members of Congress may determine the necessity of the
realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the
best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are
deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation.
However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment.
 !312

5. APPROPRIATION

TESDA V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. NO. 196418. FEBRUARY 10, 2015)

BERSAMIN, J:

FACTS:
TESDA is an attached agency of the Department of Labor and Employment. In
2003, then DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued Administrative Order No. 430,
authorizing the payment of healthcare maintenance allowance amounting to
PHP5000.00 to all officials and employees of the DOLE, including its bureaus and
attached agencies. Said order was based on Memorandum Circular No. 33 and Section
34 of the General Provisions of the 2003 General Appropriations Act. Commission on
Audit Legal and Adjudication Office – National, subsequently issued Notice of
Disallowance No. 2006-15 indicating that the payment of the allowance had no legal
basis. TESDA filed for an appeal before the COA Commission Proper but was denied for
lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COA has the authority to issue the Notice of Disallowance?
 !313

HELD:
Yes. The Court upheld the decision of the COA disallowing the payment by
petitioner of healthcare maintenance allowance of PHP5000.00 to covered TESDA
employees for the year 2003. On TESDA’s reliance of Section 34 of the 2003 GAA, the
Court held that such reliance was misplaced. The provision was neither a source of right
nor an authority to hastily fund any or all personnel benefits without the appropriations
made by law. The provision of the GAA was not self-executory; the execution of the GAA
was still subject to a program of expenditure to be approved by the President. It is
important that the release of the funds be duly authorized, identified, or sanctioned to
avert putting the legitimate programs, projects, and activities of the Government in fiscal
jeopardy.

COMELEC V. QUIJANO-PADILLA
(G.R. NO. 151992. SEPTEMBER 18, 2002)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

FACTS:
In 1996, Congress passed Republic Act 8189 or the Voter’s Registration Act of
1996, providing for the modernization and computerization of the voter’s registration list
and the appropriation of funds therefor. In line with this, COMELEC conducted a public
bidding where Photokina, with a bid amounting to PHP6.588 billion, garnered the highest
total weighted score and was declared the winning bidder which was evidenced by
COMELEC Resolution 3252 approving the Notice of Award to Photokina. However,
under RA 8760, the budget appropriated by Congress for the said project was only
PHP1 billion. After the change in COMELEC administration, the VRIS Project was
scrapped. Photokina then filed a petition for mandamus, prohibition, and damages
against COMELEC which the Regional Trial Court granted. Petitioners now assail said
decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Photokina can compel COMELEC to formalize a contract with it
notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the
project?
 !314

HELD:
No. The Court held that the contract is inexistent and void ab initio. The Court
said that the existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable
requisites to, or conditions sine qua non for, the execution of government contracts.
Since Photokina’s bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress, the proposed
contract is not binding upon COMELEC and the former cannot compel the latter to
formalize the contract.

ARAULLO V. AQUINO III

(G.R. NO. 209287. JULY 1, 2014)

BERSAMIN, J:

FACTS:
Senator Jinggoy Estrada, in his privileged speech, revealed that some senators
had been allotted an additional PHP50 million each as incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice Corona. As a response, Department of Budget and
Management Secretary Abad explained that the funds released had been part of the
DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic
expansion. The DAP is a stimulus package intended to fast track public spending and to
push economic growth by investing on high-impact budgetary programs, activities, or
projects to be funded from the savings generated during the year as well as from
unprogrammed funds. Petitioners contend that the appropriations funded under the DAP,
being an appropriation that set aside public funds for public use, should require an
enabling law for its validity. Petitioners also question the constitutionality of such
realignments and transfers pursuant to Section 25 (5) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the DAP violated Section 29 Article VI of the Constitution?
2. Whether or not the DAP realignments or transfers are unconstitutional?

HELD:
 !315

1. No. The SC held that the DAP did not violate this constitutional provision. DAP was
merely a program of the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a
program for prioritizing government spending. As such, no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury; otherwise, an appropriation law would have been
signed. Funds already appropriated were merely realigned.
2. Yes. The Court held that for the transfer of appropriated funds to be valid, such
transfer must be made upon the concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1)
there is a law authorizing the president, the Senate President, the Speaker of the
HOR, the Chief Justice of the SC, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions
to transfer such funds within their respective offices; (2) the funds to be transferred
are savings, generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3)
the purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the General Appropriations Law
for their respective offices. That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To
comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize such transfers.
Whereas the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers of
funds under the DAP, such transfers were unconstitutional. DAP also failed to comply
with the second requisite since the DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what
was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA,
savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of
a certain project once it is completed, discontinued, or abandoned. The GAA does
not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis
for the transfers, further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal
year. However, under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
projects in the middle of the year and subsequently being declared as savings by the
Executive through the DBM.

BELGICA V. OCHOA
(G.R. NO. 208566. NOVEMBER 11, 2013)

PERLAS-BERNABE, J:

FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System in the Philippines. This is defined as the collective body of rules and practices
that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for
local projects, are utilized through the participations of the Legislative and Executive
branches. Petitioners consider the PDAF as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is a post-
enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power. In
addition, petitioners assai Section 8 of PD 910 (Malampaya Fund) and Sec 12 of PD
1869 (Presidential Social Fund) as invalid appropriation measures since they do not
have “primary and specific” purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the
National Treasury. As a result, petitioners seek that the annual “Pork Barrel System”
presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, as well as the Malampaya and PSF, be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD 1869 are valid
appropriation laws?
2. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF is unconstitutional?

HELD:
1. Yes. The Court held that “an appropriation made by law” in contemplation of
Section 29(1) exists when a provision of law (1) sets apart a determinate or
 !316

determinable amount of money; and (2) allocates the same for a particular public
purpose. Such designation, if written into the law, demonstrate the legislative
intent to appropriate. There is no provision in the Constitution that prescribes any
particular form of words or religious recital in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be made by law.” Even
though the creation of the funds are merely incidental to the primary and specific
purpose for which the PD’s were created, these are still valid.

2. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the 2013 PDAF cannot be deemed as a legal
appropriation because it contains post-enactment measures which effectively
create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate
appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since
they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur
outside the law. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (1) how much fund
would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves must
determine. This authority violates the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of Appropriation which is lodged in Congress.

PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS

(G.R. NO. L-10405. DECEMBER 29, 1960)

CONCEPCION, J:

FACTS:
In 1953, RA 920 or “An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works” was approved.
Such Act contained an appropriation amounting to PHP 85,000 for the construction of
roads within the Antonio Subdivision in Pasig, Rizal. In the same year, private
respondent Jose Zulueta, who was a member of the Senate at the time of the passage
and approval of said Act, donated said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal.
Petitioners contest that RA 920 be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appropriation is valid?

HELD:
No. The appropriation is void for it being devoted to a private purpose. The
subsequent donation of the property to the government does not cure the constitutional
defect. The fact that the law was passed when the property was still privately-owned
cannot be ignored. The appropriation is declared null and void ab initio.
 !317

GUINGONA V. CARAGUE
(G.R. NO. 94571. APRIL 22, 1991)

GANCAYCO, J:

FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of PHP98.4 billion in automatic appropriation (with
PHP86.8 billion for debt service) and PHP155.3 billion appropriated under RA 6831 of
the General Appropriations Act of 1990. The said automatic appropriation for debt
service is authorized by PD 81, PD 1967, and PD 1177. Petitioners seek the declaration
of unconstitutionality of said PDs on the ground, among others, that it is violative of
Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation of debt service is unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Court held that although the subject presidential decrees do not state
the specific amounts to be paid, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the decrees. According to the Court, the legislative
intent in RA 4860, PD 1177 Section 31, and PD 1967 is that the amount needed is
automatically set aside in order to enable the government to pay the principal, interest,
and taxes, and other normal banking charges when they become due without the need
to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. Although the
decrees do not state the specific amounts to be paid, the amounts are nevertheless
made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.
 !318

GARCIA V. MATA
(G.R. NO. L-33713. JULY 30, 1975)

CASTRO, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, until he was reverted to inactive status in 1960, pursuant to Republic Act No.
2334, providing that reserve officers with at least two years of active duty shall be
reverted to inactive status within three years from the approval of the act. When his
request for reinstatement failed, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus to compel
respondents to reinstate him, readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and
allowances due him. He argued that his reversion was in violation of the Special
Provision for the Armed Forces of the Philippines under Par, 11, Republic Act No. 1600,
which prohibits the reversion of reserve officers on active duty with at least 10 years of
accumulated active commissioned service.

ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision is valid?

HELD:
No. The Court held that the subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is
restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation of the government." Any provision
contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this restricted subject or any
matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a provision in the body
of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the
policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of
the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.
 !319

ARAULLO V. AQUINO III

(G.R. NO. 209287. FEBRUARY 3, 2015)

BERSAMIN, J:

FACTS:
In its July 1, 2014 Decision, the Supreme Court partially granted the consolidated
petitions for certiorari and prohibition and declared certain acts and practices under the
Disbursement Accelerated Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related
executive issuances unconstitutional for violating Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers. Hence, before the Court are the
Motion of Reconsideration filed by the respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said decision is still valid?

HELD:
Yes. The July 1, 2014 Decision of the Court was modified as follows: The Court
partially grants the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and declares the following acts
and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular
No. 541 and related executive issuances unconstitutional for being in violation of Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers,
namely: (a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies,
and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year without complying with the
statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts; and (b) The
cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of
other offices outside the Executive. The Court further declares void the use of
unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer
that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the
conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts
 !320

AGLIPAY V. RUIZ
(G.R. NO. 45459. MARCH 13, 1937)

LAUREL, J:

FACTS:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he
would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City
of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. Petitioner seeks to prevent respondent from issuing and selling said
postage stamps for the reason that it is violative of the provisions of Section 13, Article
VI of the 1935 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of such stamps violates said provision?

HELD:
No. The Court held that the issuance of the postage stamps was not impaired by
any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps
were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The only
purpose of the issuance was to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists and
not to publicize the religious event. It was held that the stamp issue was not invalid.
 !321

GARCES V. ESTENZO
(G.R. NO. L-53487. MAY 25, 1981)

AQUINO, J:

FACTS:
A wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council
with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash donations pursuant to Resolution
No. 5 of said council, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the
traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. The image was
brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day as per Resolution No. 6
which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the
fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest refused to return custody of the image to the
council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were
used for its acquisition. The parish priest and his co-petitioners thereafter filed an action
for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that
they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and state,
freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church. The lower
court dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Court held that the questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly
establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or
property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with
private funds, not with tax money. The wooden image was purchased in connection with
the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not
for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in
holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his
image) cannot be branded as illegal.
 !322

MANOSCA V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. 106440. JANUARY 29, 1996)

VITUG, J:

FACTS:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land in Taguig, Metro Manila with an area of 482
square meters. Said land was ascertained by the National Historical Institute to have
been the birthplace of Felix Manalo. As a result, NHI passed Resolution 1, pursuant to
PD 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The Regional Trial Court
authorized the republic to take over the property. Petitioners contend that the
expropriation was not for a public purpose, and incidentally, the act would constitute an
application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia
ni Kristo, a religious entity, contrary to Section 29 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the expropriation violates Section 29(2), Article VI?

HELD:
No. The Court held that the attempt to give some religious perspective to the
case deserves little consideration, for what is significant is the principal objective of, not
the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The practical
reality that greater benefit may be derived by the Members of the Iglesia than by most
others may be true, but such advantage still remains to be merely incidental for the main
purpose is to recognize the distinctive contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture of the
Philippines.
 !323

6. TAXATION
 !324

LLADOC V. COMMISSION ON INTERNAL REVENUE

(G.R. NO. L-19201. JUNE 16, 1965)

PAREDES, J:

FACTS:
In 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc. donated PHP 10,000 to Rev. Fr. Ruiz, then parish
priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental. A year later, M.B. Estate, Inc. filed the donor’s gift
tax return. CIR issued an assessment for donee’s gift tax against the parish where
petitioner Lladoc was the priest. Petitioner asserted that the assessment of the gift tax,
even against the Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid, for such would be a clear
violation of Section 22(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the parish is liable for the donee’s gift tax?

HELD:
Yes. The Constitution only refers to property tax and not excise tax in Section
22(3), Article VI of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax
imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on
property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of
the Constitution.

PROVINCE OF ABRA V. HERNANDO

(G.R. NO. L-49336. AUGUST 31, 1981)
 !325

FERNANDO, C.J:

FACTS:
The Provincial Assessor of Abra levied a tax assessment on the properties of
respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The latter filed a petition for declaratory
relief on the ground that it is exempted from payment of real estate taxes, its properties
being actually, directly and exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes as
sources of support for the bishop, the parish priest and his helpers. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss but the same was denied. After conducting a summary hearing,
respondent Judge granted the exemption without hearing the side of petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties of the said Church is exempt from taxes?

HELD:
No. The Court held that there must be proof of the actual and direct use of the
lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt
from taxation. The present Constitution added "charitable institutions, mosques, and
non-profit cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and
improvements," they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly"
used for religious or charitable purposes.

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE V. AQUINO

(G.R. NO. L-39086. JUNE 15, 1988)

PARAS, J:
 !326

FACTS:
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly
incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint in
the court a quo to annul and declare void the "Notice of Seizure" and the "Notice of Sale"
of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and
penalties. Petitioners contend that pursuant to Section 22(3), Article VI of the 1935
Constitution, they shall be exempted from property taxes. It was determined upon
investigation that the Director with his family is residing in the second floor of the main
building and that the first floor is being leased to the Northern Marketing Corporation. In
this regard petitioner argues that the primary use of the school lot and building is the
basic and controlling guide, norm and standard to determine tax exemption, and not the
mere incidental use thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Abra Valley College may be exempted from property tax pursuant
to Section 22(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution?

HELD:
No. The Court held that the school building as well as the lot where it is built,
should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the Director
and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used
for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of
commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.
While the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential
purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of
incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose — educational,
the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.
 !327

7. LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION AND

QUESTION HOUR

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO

V. GORDON
(G.R. NO. 174340. OCTOBER 17, 2006)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

FACTS:
Presidential Commission on Good Governance Chairman Camilo Sabio was
invited as one of the resource persons in the investigation of the anomalous losses
incurred by the POTC, PHILCOMSAT, and PHC due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors. Sabio refused to appear invoking
 !328

Section 4(b) of EO 1 issued by former President Corazon Aquino, which exempted all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative, or administrative
proceeding. Hence, he was arrested for contempt. Sabio subsequently filed petition for
habeas corpus alleging that the respondent Senate committees disregarded Section 4(b)
of EO 1.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution repealed Section 4(b)
of EO 1?

HELD:
Yes. The Court held that Section 4(b) of EO 1 is repugnant to Section 21 Article
VI of the Constitution and is deemed repealed. The power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. Certainly, a mere
provision of law cannot pose a limitation on the broad power of Congress in the absence
of any constitutional basis.

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. NO. 180308. JUNE 19, 2012)

PERLAS-BERNABE, J:

FACTS:
The PHILCOMSAT is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the POTC, a government-
sequestered organization in which the Republic of the Philippines holds a 35% interest in
shares of stocks. Petitioner PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC), meanwhile, is a
private corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and a holding
company whose main operation is collecting the money market interest income of
PHILCOMSAT. For several years, these institutions have been incurring huge losses. In
line with this, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Proposed Senate
Resolution (PSR) No. 455 directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the
 !329

anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement
committed by their respective board of directors. Petitioners Locsin and Andal were
invited to attend these hearings as "resource persons. Respondents Senate Committees
submitted Committee Report No. 312, which recommended, among others, the
privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC
and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department
of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC
and PHILCOMSAT. Petitioners questions the haste with which the Senate approved the
challenged Committee Report. They also claim that respondent Senator Gordon acted
with partiality and bias and denied them their basic right to counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolution?

HELD:
No. The Court held that score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be
said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional
mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for
doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide
latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been
settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.

In addition, the right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person

under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore
attaches only during such custodial investigation. Since petitioners Locsin and Andal
were invited to the public hearings as resource persons, they cannot therefore validly
invoke their right to counsel.

BENGZON V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

(G.R. NO. 89914. NOVEMBER 20, 1991)

PADILLA, J:

FACTS:
On September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile
delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged
"take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila Management of
Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado,
the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed
by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale
of the thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez." Petitioner
 !330

Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify invoking his constitutional right to due
process.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is valid?

HELD:
No. The inquiry was not held to be in aid of legislation. The Supreme Court
declared that the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of
RA No. 3019. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. Further, the issue to
be investigated is one over which jurisdiction has been acquired by the Sandiganbayan;
the issue had thus been preempted by that Court. To allow the Committee to invstigate
would only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments, but if the Committee’s judgment
is reached before the Sandiganbayan’s the possibility that its influence may be made to
bear on the ultimate judgement of the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted.

ARNAULT V. NAZARENO
(G. R. NO. L-3820. JULY 18, 1950)

OZAETA, J:

FACTS:
The Senate investigated the purchase by the Government of two estates known
as Buenavista and Tambobong for PHP4.5 million and PHP 500,000, respectively. A
certain amount of money was paid to Ernest Burt thru his agent, petitioner Jean Arnault.
Arnault was called upon by the Senate to answer questions regarding the whereabouts
of the PHP 440,000. Upon his failure to answer questions pertinent to the subject of
inquiry, the Senate ordered his confinement to the New Bilibid Prison. Hence, Arnault
filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that the Senate has no power to compel
him to answer questions which are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry and to
punish him for contempt.

ISSUE:

Whether the Senate has the power to punish for contempt a person for refusing
to answer a question pertinent to the matter under inquiry?
 !331

HELD:

Yes. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a

legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness
to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by
the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which
the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or
pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question
must be determined by its direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation.

ARNAULT V. BALAGTAS
(G.R. No. L-6749. JULY 30, 1955)

LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS:
Arnault was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the
purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the
Philippines. The said purchased was found to be anomalous and thus, Arnault, was
subjected to Legislative investigation. However, he refused to answer the question about
to whom a part of the purchased price, P440,000.00, was delivered. Thus, he was cited
for contempt by the Senate and was imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison. While still in
confinement in Bilibid, Arnault executed an affidavit, wherein he gives in detail the history
of his life, the events surrounding the acquisition of the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met one by the name
of Jess D. Santos, with whom he gave the P440,000.00. However, the Senate was not
convinced of his claim and thus adopted a Resolution which continued to hold his
imprisonment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Senate have the power and authority to order the continued
confinement of the petitioner?
 !332

HELD:
Yes. The principle that Congress has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses
is founded upon reason and policy. Moreover, the said power must be considered
implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said
power. Furthermore, the Senate, being a continuing body, may order imprisonment for
an indefinite period, with respect to the principles of due process and equal protection.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ERMITA

(G.R. No. 169777. APRIL 20, 2006)

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of
the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North
Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful
provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. President then issued E.O.
464, otherwise known as "ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING
IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.” On September 28, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita
wrote a letter informing Senate that officials of the Executive Department invited to
appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the
President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress?

HELD:
 !333

Yes. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of

Article VI of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of
the executive branch. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and
those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation. Moreover, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is
"in aid of legislation" under Section 21, their appearance is mandatory. Congress is not
bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such
inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS

(G.R. No. 167173. DECEMBER 27, 2007)

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, delivered a privilege speech entitled “Arrogance of
Wealth” before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing
Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in
violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a
similar fraudulent activity in the future. Thus, petitioners were invited to attend the
hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper. However, their respond
letter stressed that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same
issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of
respondent to continue with the inquiry, and lack of proper authorization from affected
clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts. Because of this, the hearing
was adjourned, however, the petitioners were later served with subpoena ad
testificandum and duces tecum to compel them to attend and testify at the hearing set
on March 15, 2005. Hence, petitioner filed a case to annul such issuance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not legislative inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to privacy?

HELD:
No. The legislative inquiry does not violate petitioners’ right of privacy. Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by
the legislative investigation. However, not every invocation of the right to privacy should
be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. The Court ruled that the right of
 !334

the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the
right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. Employing the rational basis
relationship test, there is no infringement of the individual's right to privacy as the
requirement to disclose information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the
government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the
public who invest in foreign securities.

NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC OFFICERS AND

INVESTIGATIONS
(G.R. No. 180643. MARCH 25, 2008)

LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
amount of approximately P16 Billion. The Project was to be financed by the People's
Republic of China. The Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
project but NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to
be financed through a loan from the Chinese Government. Neri, as the Director General
of NEDA, was issued an invitation to attend respondent Committees' proceedings to
shed light on the NBN project and explain the government's agreement with ZTE. Neri
honored the invitation and attended the hearing and testified on matters which he
personally knew, however, he refused to answer 3 questions, which he believed to be
covered by executive privilege. As a consequence, Senate issued a contempt order,
ordering Neri’s arrest and detention until he gives his testimony.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Senate's Order citing petitioner in contempt and directing his
arrest is valid?

HELD:
No. The Senate's Order citing petitioner in contempt and ordering his arrest is
void due to the non-publication of the Rules of Procedure. Section 21 Article 6 of the
Constitution requires that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published Rules of
Procedure governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. The Constitution
prohibits deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The Senate or its investigating
committees can exercise the implied power to arrest only in accordance with due
process which requires publication of the Senate's Rules of Procedure.
 !335

8. BOARD OF CANVASSERS IN
ELECTION OF PRESIDENT/VICE-
PRESIDENT
 !336

LOPEZ V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 163556. JUNE 8, 2004)

EN BANC:

FACTS:
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the
Joint Public Session of Congress, dated May 28, 2004, creating a Joint Committee
which shall preliminarily canvass the votes of the candidates for President and Vice-
President during the May 10, 2004 elections. He contends that such section violates the
constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress gravely abuse its discretion in creating such Joint
Committee?

HELD:
No. The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse of
discretion for Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee.
Moreover, it cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of
Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under
attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the
approval of the joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.
 !337

PIMENTEL V. JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS

(G.R. No. 163783. JUNE 22, 2004)

EN BANC:

FACTS:
Petitioner assails that with the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the
twelfth Congress of its last regular session, its term is also terminated and expired, thus
passing out of legal existence. He then filed a petition to prohibit Joint Committee to
cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the rules of the
Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing. He argued that the existence and
proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress are invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional
following the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress of their regular sessions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Joint Committee of Congress may canvass election votes even
after the adjournment of its last session?

HELD:
Yes. The legislative functions of the twelfth Congress may have come to a close
upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions, but this does not affect its non-
legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. Since the
twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and
proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National
Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the
preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass , has not
become functus officio. Despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal
impediment to the Joint Committee completing the task assigned to it and transmitting its
report for the approval of the joint pubic session of both Houses of Congress, which may
reconvene without the need of call by the president to a special session.
 !338

IX. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

 !339

1. THE PRESIDENT
 !340

MACALINTAL V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 157013. JULY 10, 2003)

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner, who is a lawyer, assails the validity of Sec. 18.5 of RA 9189 (Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003) which empowers the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and
Vice-President as it violates the constitutional mandate under Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for the President and Vice President shall be
proclaimed by Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 18.5 of RA 9189 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The phrase in the provision “proclamation of winning candidates”
necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and
vice-presidency. The assailed provision appears to be repugnant to Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution only insofar as it disregarded the authority given to Congress by the
Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the President and Vice-President. It
also clashes with the said constitutional provision, which provides that the returns of
every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the Board of
Canvassers to Congress. Sec. 18.5 allows COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to the Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-
president and proclaim the winners for the said positions. However, with respect to the
authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators
and party-list representatives, constitutionality is upheld.
 !341

LOPEZ V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 163556. JUNE 8, 2004)

EN BANC:

FACTS:
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the
Joint Public Session of Congress, dated May 28, 2004, creating a Joint Committee
which shall preliminarily canvass the votes of the candidates for President and Vice-
President during the May 10, 2004 elections. He contends that such section violates the
constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress is unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress to
promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. The Court ruled that it had no
power to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of
the Constitution. The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse of
discretion for Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee.
Moreover, it cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of
Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under
attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the
approval of the joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.
 !342

BRILLANTES V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 163193. JUNE 15, 2004)

CALLEJO, SR., J:

FACTS:
Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an AES for the
process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing the results of the national and local
elections. COMELEC then entered into a contract with Mega Pacific Consortium for the
Phase II of the program, and with PMSI which pertains to the electronic transmission of
results (Phase III) of the respondent’s modernization program.

COMELEC issued its assailed Res. 6712 approving the electronic transmission
of results. When apprised of the said resolution, NAMFREL, and the heads of the major
political parties as petitioners-in-intervention, wrote the COMELEC detailing their
respective concerns. When it went unheeded, they resolved to file an action against
COMELEC. They contend that the assailed resolution effectively pre-empts the sole and
exclusive authority of Congress under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution to
canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. Further, as there has been no
appropriation by Congress for the respondent COMELEC to conduct an unofficial
electronic transmission of results of the May 10, 2004 elections, any expenditure for the
said purpose contravenes Article VI, Section 29 (par. 1) of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 6712 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. COMELEC Resolution No. 6712 is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 4 Article VII of the Constitution which states that election returns certified by the
Board of Canvassers of each Province or City shall be transmitted to the Congress.
Such Resolution usurps, under the guise of an unofficial tabulation of election results
based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to
canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. If the COMELEC is
proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and
Vice-President, all the more it is prohibited from making an unofficial canvass of said
votes. Moreover, there is no constitutional and statutory basis for COMELEC to
undertake a separate and an unofficial tabulation of results, whether manually or
electronically, for in conducting such unofficial tabulation of the results of the election, the
COMELEC descends to the level of a private organization and spends public funds for
the purpose. This not only violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an
unofficial count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the election
returns, as well as the returns themselves.

PIMENTEL V. JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS

(G.R. No. 163783. JUNE 22, 2004)
 !343

EN BANC:

FACTS:
Petitioner assails that with the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the
twelfth Congress of its last regular session, its term is also terminated and expired, thus
passing out of legal existence. He then filed a petition to prohibit Joint Committee to
cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the rules of the
Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing. He argued that the existence and
proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress are invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional
following the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress of their regular sessions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Joint Committee of Congress performing election canvass even
after the termination of Congress’ session is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. Despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment
to the Joint Committee completing the task assigned to it and transmitting its report for
the approval of the joint pubic session of both Houses of Congress, which may
reconvene without the need of call by the president to a special session. The joint public
session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directives of Section 4 Article
VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected
President and Vice-President has not, and cannot adjourn sine die until it has
accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers
has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio.

POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 221698. MARCH 8, 2016)

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
 !344

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn

infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar in 1968. Emiliano Militar and
his wife, relative of Edgardo, reported and registered the child as a foundling with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of
Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."
The child was then adopted by celebrity spouses Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces in
1974. Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling
certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, it was only in 2005 when Susan Roses
found out that their lawyer failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live
Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. Roses then
executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-
Iloilo. A new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe,
was then released by OCR-Iloilo.

At the age of eighteen, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC
Office in San Juan City. In 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Llamanzares, a citizen of
both the Philippines and the U.S., and flew to the U.S. after their wedding. The petitioner
then became a naturalized American Citizen in 2001. However, when her adoptive father
died in 2005, she decided to move and reside permanently to the Philippines. In 2006,
petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, which was acted
favourably by the Bureau of Immigration, considering her as a dual citizen.
In 2010, the petitioner was appointed as Chairperson of the MTRCB. Before
assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship and submitted it to the
Bureau of Immigration. In 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a Certificate of
Loss of Nationality of the United States effective 21 October 2010.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner led her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May
2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner
attached to her COC an Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship subscribed
and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.
After the filling of the petitioner’s COC, Elamparo filed a petition with COMELEC
to cancel the petitioner’s COC contending that the petitioner committed material
misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years and 11 months up to the
day before the 9 May 2016 Elections, and that the petitioner cannot be considered as a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. It was argued that
international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings, hence she is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.
COMELEC ruled against the petitioner resolving that she is not a natural born
citizen and that she failed to complete the 10-year residency requirement for presidency.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner is not a natural born citizen and that she failed to
complete the 10-year residency requirement for presidency?

HELD:
 !345

No. The petitioner is a natural born citizen and was able to complete the 10-year
residency requirement for presidency. Foundlings are citizens under international law. In
the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC
and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that
no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot
be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be
at least eighteen (18) years old. The principles found in two conventions, while yet
unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The
first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the nationality
of the country of birth, to wit: “A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the
nationality of the country of birth.”

On her residency, the Court held that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other
conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence and
permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here
on 24 May 2005. Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is
clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

MACALINTAL V. PET
(G.R. No. 191618. November 23, 2010)

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
This case is an inquiry to the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal with the petitioner alleging that Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution does not
include the creation of PET, therefore violating Sec. 12, Art. VIII which bar members of
the Supreme Court and other courts established by law from being designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
 !346

In addition, Macalintal also held the ruling on the constitutionality of the Philippine
Truth Commission stating that the President may not create the PTC without an act from
the legislature. The Supreme Court must not be allowed to create PET.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the PET is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The courts held that PET is an exercise of the power of the Supreme Court
to promulgate its rules for the purpose of being the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election of the President and Vice President and is therefore supported by the very
section that Macalintal contends to be violated.
 !347

2. TERM OF OFFICE; PRIVILEGES

OSMEÑA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 100318. JULY 30, 1991)

PARAS, J.:

FACTS:
Republic Act 7056, otherwise known as "An Act Providing for the National and
Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections
Beginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor” was signed into law. Governor
Osmeña of the Province of Cebu filed a petition questioning the validity of the said RA.
Osmeña is assailing that RA 7056 is unconstitutional because: (1) it violates the
mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections
on the second Monday of May 1992; (2) it provides all incumbent provincial, city and
municipal officials to hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and to serve until their successors
shall have been duly elected and qualified, which violates Section 2, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provision) of the Constitution; (3) it shortens the term or tenure of office of
 !348

local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 which violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution; (4) it violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX
under the title 'Commission on Elections' of the Constitution by providing for the
campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections; and (5) its
goal to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second
Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the
local elections to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the
Constitution itself.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 7056 is constitutional?

HELD:
No. With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold synchronized
(simultaneous) national and local elections in the second Monday of May, 1992, the
inevitable conclusion would be that Republic Act 7056 clearly violated of the Constitution
because it provides for the holding of a desynchronized election. Stated differently,
Republic Act 7056 particularly Sections 1 and 2 thereof contravenes Article XVIII,
Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution. But this is not all. There are other provisions
of the Constitution violated by RA 7056. For one, there is Section 2, Article XVIII of the
Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent
local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified.

FORBES V. CHUOCO TIACO

(G.R. No. 6157. JULY 30, 1910)

JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS:
Chuoco Tiaco is a Chinese person who is and has been a resident of the
Philippine Islands for the last twenty-nine years, he was able to establish his rights to
remain in the Philippine Islands since the American occupation in accordance with law.
He was deported to Amoy, China in 1909 through the order of the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands, W. Cameron Forbes. Upon his return, he filed a petition for
preliminary injunction to prohibit Forbes to deport him again, and to condemn Forbes to
pay a sum of P20,000.00 for damages, which was granted by the Court. Forbes then
filed a motion to dissolve the injunction on the grounds that the complaint does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that the Court lacks jurisdiction to
issue such an injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Governor-General of the Philippine Island can be sued?
 !349

HELD:
No. The Governor-General, as Chief Executive, is immune from suit. The
principle of non-liability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no
authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his
office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean
that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad,
destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or
legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority
by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the
contrary, it means, simply, that the Governor-General, like the judges of the courts and
the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the
consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary
has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the occasion
justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as
nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived of his liberty or his
property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of
whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the
highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary cannot do is to mulct the
Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his
official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.

IN RE: BERMUDEZ
(G.R. No. 76180. OCTOBER 24, 1986)

PER CURIAM:

FACTS:
Saturnino Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief holding that Section 5 of
Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution is not clear as to whom it refers. He then
asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness
as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President
Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition will prosper?

HELD:
No. The petition will not prosper because it amounts in effect to a suit against the
incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally
elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to
court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. Furthermore, the petition states
no cause of action thus it was dismissed outright.
 !350

SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR
(G.R. No. 82585. NOVEMBER 14, 1988)

PER CURIAM:

FACTS:
President Cory filed as criminal complaint of libel against the petitioners. The
petitioners then argued that the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from
suit impose a correlative disability to the suit. He contends that if criminal proceedings
ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently
have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying
on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or
perjury.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-
affidavit?

HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that while the President is immune from suit, she may not
be prevented from instituting suit. The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not
by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
 !351

which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded
by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise
the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

ESTRADA V. DESIERTO
(G.R. No. 146710-15. MARCH 2, 2001)

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice- President in 1998. In 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor,
Luis "Chavit" Singson went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The House Committee on Public Order
and Security then investigated on the exposé of Governor Singson. House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more
than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate, leading to an
impeachment trial. During the trial, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the
second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde" that angered the people
thus hitting the streets and assembled at the EDSA Shrine for mass demonstration
calling for the President’s resignation.The President negotiated with the representatives
of the Vice-President. After such negotiation, it was announced that Chief Justice Davide
will administer the oath of Arroyo as President. Estrada and his family hurriedly left
Malacañang Palace and issued the following press statement: (1) reservations on the
constitutionality of Arroyo’s presidency, and (2) his incapability of dispensing his
responsibilities as President, allowing Arroyo to be the acting President. After his fall
from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several
cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
Estrada then filed a petition to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings until after his term as President is over and only if legally warranted.
He also filed a petition for Quo Warranto, and prayed for the confirmation the lawful and
 !352

incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge

the duties of his office, and declaring Arroyo to have taken her oath as and to be holding
the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit?

HELD:
No. It was ruled that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. We
now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged
mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Estrada cannot cite any decision of this
Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post tenure
immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from
liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands
in the same footing as any other trespasser. Indeed, a critical reading of current literature
on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.
GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 119903. AUGUST 15, 2000)

PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS:
Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City
Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino. Gloria, Secretary of
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, recommended to reassign Icasiano as the
Superintendent of Marikina Institute of Science and Technology to fill up the vacuum
created by the retirement of its Superintendent, which was approved by the President.
Icasiano then filed with Court of Appeal a petition for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) to enjoin the implementation of his reassignment. Court of Appeals granted
Icasiano’s petition and issued another resolution setting the hearing of the petition for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and enjoining the petitioners from
implementing the reassignment of the private respondent.

Gloria then filed a petition seeking relief from the decision of the appellate court
contending that Court of Appeals has allowed itself to be instrumental in Icasiano’s
circumvention of the presidential immunity from suit by giving due course and granting
reliefs prayed for in a suit purportedly filed against him but actually questioning an act of
the President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks
an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit?

HELD:
No. Petitioners' contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is
directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those
of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be
 !353

questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the
President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ERMITA

(G.R. No. 169777. APRIL 20, 2006)

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of
the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North
Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful
provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. President then issued E.O.
464, otherwise known as "ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING
IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.” On September 28, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita
wrote a letter informing Senate that officials of the Executive Department invited to
appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the
President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of people to information on matters of
public concern?

HELD:
Yes. Any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in
such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being
presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The
citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their
own opinions on the matter before Congress. Moreover, even if the executive privilege
exempt them from the obligation to disclose information, the necessity of withholding
information must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing
 !354

that obligation in a particular case. Thus, the Court finds it essential to limit the President
the power to invoke the privilege.

NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC OFFICERS AND

INVESTIGATIONS
(G.R. No. 180643. MARCH 25, 2008)

LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
amount of approximately P16 Billion. The Project was to be financed by the People's
Republic of China. The Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
project but NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to
be financed through a loan from the Chinese Government. Neri, as the Director General
of NEDA, was issued an invitation to attend respondent Committees' proceedings to
shed light on the NBN project and explain the government's agreement with ZTE. Neri
honored the invitation and attended the hearing and testified on matters which he
personally knew, however, he refused to answer 3 questions, which he believed to be
covered by executive privilege. As a consequence, Senate issued a contempt order,
ordering Neri’s arrest and detention until he gives his testimony.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the communication elicited by the three questions are covered by
Executive Privilege?

HELD:
Yes. The communications elicited by the three questions fall under conversation
and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her
executive and policy decision-making process, making the claim of Executive Privilege
valid. Moreover, the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China.

The Court is convinced that the communications elicited by the three questions
are covered by the presidential communications privilege because (1) the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President; (2)
the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
 !355

of President Arroyo's cabinet; and (3) there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

3. PROHIBITIONS/INHIBITIONS
 !356

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 152154. JULY 15, 2003)

CORONA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate
amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of
interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously
held by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain
Swiss banks. Moreover, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5
million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful
income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are
frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue
of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General
Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements were executed by the Marcos children
and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets
of the Marcos family to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets
presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under their conditions contained therein.
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/
Supplemental Agreements. However, in its resolution, Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's
motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the
motion to approve the compromise agreement "took precedence over the motion for
summary judgment”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Swiss funds can be forfeited in favour of the Republic, on the
basis of the Marcoses’s lawful income?

HELD:
Yes. Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and
fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of
the Swiss funds. The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful
income of respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides,
under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any
other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities."
Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not
receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other
 !357

source." In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to

accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 83896. FEBRUARY 22, 1991)

FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order 284 which states that
“Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of
the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than
two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad
hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
Chairman”. Petitioners herein challenged the constitutionality of the said EO maintaining
that such EO, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order 284 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The Court declared EO 284 unconstitutional for it allows Cabinet members
to hold other offices in the government, in direct contravention of Section 13, Article VII
of the Constitution. Section 13, Article VII states that "The President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure”. In
the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in
the Government”. The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is
therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office employment. However,
these sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official
family, are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the
Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the
armed forces. This only proves that the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter
prohibitions.
 !358

FUNA V. ERMITA
(G.R. No. 184740. FEBRUARY 11, 2010)

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Maria Elena H. Bautista as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department.
When MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. resigned, Bautista was designated as
Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary. Dennis Funa then, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and
lawyer, led the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista's appointment/
designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or
employment. During the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator
of the MARINA and assumed her duties and responsibilities as such.

ISSUE:
Whether or not s whether or not the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA,
concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which
she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple
offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants?

HELD:
Yes. The Court declared as unconstitutional the designation of DOTC
Undersecretary Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in a
concurrent capacity, as it falls clearly within the prohibition. Bautista being then the
appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII and consequently cannot invoke the exception provided in Section
7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary
functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio
capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union. The prohibition
against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these
posts do not comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials. Apart from their bare assertion that Bautista did not receive any compensation
when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her
designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary
functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
 !359

FUNA V. AGRA
(G.R. No. 133250. FEBRUARY 19, 2013)

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
President Arroyo designated Justice Alberto Agra the Government Corporate
Counsel as Acting Solicitor General in place of Agnes Devanadera who was in turn
appointed as Secretary of Justice. When Devanadera resigned as Secretary, Agra was
appointed as Acting Secretary. Agra then renounced his position as Corporate Counsel
and resumed to perform his duties as Acting Solicitor General.

Funa then contested Agra’s appointment stating that it was a violation under Sec.
13, Art. VII of the constitution. However, Agra contended that his designation was
temporary in nature and therefore did not receive salaries and emoluments from his
additional office.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Agra’s designation as acting secretary of justice is valid?

HELD:
No. It was held that the Agra’s contention that his position was temporary is
immaterial. Section 13 clearly shows the intent of the framers to impose a stricter
prohibition on the president and the cabinet members in holding other offices or
employments in the government.
 !360

NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No. 156982. SEPTEMBER 8, 2004)

CORONA, J.:

FACTS:
The National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government body established
under former President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347 to manage
applications for amnesty. Three ex officio members passed on their responsibility who
were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. NAC resident auditor Eulalia
disallowed COA from auditing the honoraria paid to their representatives.

ISSUES:
Whether or not can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members?

HELD:
No. The representatives assumed their responsibility not by appointment but by
mere designation from ex-officio members who were only designated as well.

The courts differentiated appointment and designation. An appointment is made

by proper authority while designation merely imposes additional duties. Mere
designation does not entail payment of additional benefits. Without appointment, a
designation does not entitle the officer salaries for his designated position.

BITONIO V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No. 147392. MARCH 12, 2004)
 !361

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the
Bureau of Labor Relations in in the Department of Department of Labor and
Employment. He then received per diem for every board meeting he attended between
1995 to 1997. COA then disallowed said payments to Mr. Bitonio, holding that it was
unconstitutional for cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold additional
office.

Bitonio argued that said prohibition do not cover the ranks below undersecretary
as dictated under the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case.

ISSUES:
Whether or not COA correctly prohibited Bitonio from receiving his per diems?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner Bitonio is not entitled to receive per diems for his board meetings
as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA. Since
the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for additional
employment, such prohibition shall apply to his representative, in this case, the petitioner
Bitonio.

ESTRADA V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(G.R. No. 146738. MARCH 2, 2001)

PUNO, J.:
 !362

FACTS:
This is in relation to the impeachment case of former president Joseph Estrada
and the corruption charges against him. After EDSA II, Estrada then called for a snap
election to be held with concurrently with the congressional and local elections on May
14, 2001 which was then rejected. Estrada was then ordered to vacate the Malacanang
before January 20. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo then took oath as president of the
Philippines.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Macapagal-Arroyo is only an acting president?

HELD:
No. The courts held that Estrada’s inability to perform his duties as president
were no longer temporary and thus acknowledging Macapagal-Arroyo’s presidency as
permanent until the end of the unfinished term of former president Estrada.
 !363

X. POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

 !364

1. GENERAL

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No. 143481. FEBRUARY 15, 2002)

TORRES, J.:

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside a ruling of the Commission on Audit for
the lifting of the disallowance on the payment of accelerated increase under Joint
Resolution No. 1. COA contended that pursuant to Article 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution,
“No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.”
 !365

On January 1997, NEA implemented the salary increases prescribed for the year
1997. The lump sum for said salaries were to be paid in two tranches dated January 1,
1997 and November 1, 1997. However, NEA accelerated the implementation by paying
the second tranche on January 1, 1997 instead of November 1, 1997.

NEA argues that COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of discretion in disallowing the increased salaries of NEA officials.

ISSUES:
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion?

HELD:
No. The courts held that this case would have not been meritorious had NEA
complied in good faith with the directives of the President in the implementation of the
last phase of the Salary Standardization Law II. NEA’s reasons for disregarding the
President’s orders were ill-conceived and cannot be allowed as it will result to chaos and
disorder in the executive branch.

VILLENA V. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR

(G.R. No. 46570. APRIL 21, 1939)

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
The Secretary of Interior recommended to the president, who then approved the
suspension of then Makati Mayor Jose Villena who was found to have committed bribery,
extortion, and malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized abuse of practice of the law
profession. Villena then moved for a preliminary injunction, claiming that the Secretary of
Interior is acting beyond his jurisdiction and is not qualified to suspend him.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend Mayor Villena?
 !366

HELD:
Yes. There is no express grant of power to the Secretary, however the courts
held that the express grant to Sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial
governor to suspend municipal officials is not exclusive and precludes the Secretary of
Interior. Villena also admitted that the President may himself suspend the petitioner from
office, thus holding that the said suspension was with merit for being approved by the
chief executive himself.

PLANAS V. GIL
(G.R. No. 46440. JANUARY 19, 1939)

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition to halt the investigations with view to her
suspension being conducted by respondent commissioner under the authority of the
President against the petitioner for a statement published on one of the local
newspapers in manila, criticizing the acts of several government officials including the
chief executive himself.

Petitioner contends that respondent lacks jurisdiction to conduct said

investigation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the president has the authority to order said investigation?
 !367

HELD:
Yes. The president is granted the power of control and supervision by the
constitution. Supervision is an active power and implies authority to conduct
investigations in order to properly exercise his power of control. Petition was therefore
dismissed.

LACSON V. ROQUE
(G.R. No. 6225. JANUARY 10, 1953)

TUASON, J.:

FACTS:
Then Mayor Arsenio Lacson allegedly broadcasted defamation against a certain
Judge Montesa. A libel case was then filed by Montesa against Lacson. A special
prosecutor was assigned to the case who then moved for a recommendation to suspend
Lacson from office to the president who then approved and issued the suspension of
Lacson.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president?

HELD:
No. The powers expressed for the president does not include the sweeping
authority to remove municipal officials. However, the president may remove officials from
their offices given that it is through the power of law or disloyalty against the republic. In
this case, the libel suit against Lacson is not tantamount to disloyalty.
 !368

MONDANO V. SILVOSA
(G.R. No. L-7708. MAY 30, 1995)

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:
Mayor Mondano was suspended by provincial governor Silvosa by issuing
Administrative Order No. 8 due to the case of rape and concubinage against him.
Mondano then filed a petition for prohibition to prevent the provincial governor from
further probing and declaration of the order of suspension by respondent provincial
governor to be illegal.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the provincial governor has power to suspend petitioner?

HELD:
No. According to Sec. 79 of the Revised Administrative Code, it expressly
authorizes the provincial governor to investigate complaints against municipal officers for
neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of maladministration and
conviction by final judgement of any crime involving moral turpitude. Rape and
concubinage does not fall under those enumerated under the said code. It may be
argued that rape and concubinage is a crime under moral turpitude however, the case at
bar did not first satisfy the requisite of conviction by final judgement before the filing of
 !369

the provincial governor of charges at the provincial board. The suspension was then
declared without any legal effect.

ALMARIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 189028. JULY 16, 2013)

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
The Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) and the National Commission for
Culture and Arts (NCCA) are the two bodies authorized by law to administer the National
Artists Awards. On July 29, 2009, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita announced to the
public the declaration of several persons as National Artists. However, said awardees
were not under the list of candidates the CCP and NCCA submitted to the president.
This then led to a petition for prohibition, injuction and certiorari that the Order of
National Artists conferred on Dr. Santos, Guidote, Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno
have been rendered through grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contended that
President Arroyo disregarded the selection process stated by law by the CCP and
NCCA.

ISSUES:
Whether or not President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion?

HELD:
Yes. It was held that President Arroyo acted beyond her power into proclaiming
said artists as National Artists without them being included in the list of candidates by the
CCP and NCCA. By allowing several people who were not vetted by the CCP and NCCA
to be awarded National Artists would be to disregard the statutory mandate given to the
said organizations to filter and recommend candidates.
 !370

2. APPOINTMENT
 !371

VALENCIA V. PERALTA
(G.R. No. L-20864. AUGUST 23, 1963)

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner was designated as acting chairman of the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) by then President Carlos Garcia. He took office on 1962
and his term to end on 1967. However, when President Diosdado Macapagal took office,
he appointed Macario Peralta to the same position Valencia was holding. Valencia
contended that his appointment was permanent as it was an ad interim appointment.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the appointment of Peralta is valid?

HELD:
Yes. Valencia’s appointment was merely temporary as he was appointed, “acting”
chairman only. This designation is temporary and could not become permanent in virtue
despite the concurrence of COA. It was also found out that Valencia’s appointment was
not ad interim, therefore Peralta was properly appointed by the new President
Macapagal.
 !372

BINAMIRA V. GARRUCHO
(G.R. No. L-92008. JULY 30, 1990)

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority saying that his removal was a violation of his security of tenure. Upon
the assumption of office, he had discharged duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-
Chairman of the Board of Directors.

Garrucho then demanded his resignation as the new Secretary of Tourism. A

memorandum was then sent to Garrucho from the Office of the President designating
him as new General Manager until the President may appoint a new permanent officer.

With Garrucho’s new position, Binamira filed a case against him to contest his
title.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Binamira’s removal violated his security of tenure?

HELD:
No. It must be understood that Binamira was not appointed by the president but
only designated by the Minister of Tourism. The court clarifies the difference between
appointment and designation. Appointment being a selection by an authority of an
individual to an office. Designation on the other hand merely implies an additional duties
to a sitting officer. Binamira’s argument that his security of tenure was violated is not
meritorious as law states that appointment must be done by the President and not an
officer. Binamira received his title not from the president but from the Minister of Tourism,
who cannot be assumed to be an alter ego of the president.
 !373

PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG MAYNILA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT
(G.R. No. L-65439. NOVEMBER 13, 1985)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Dr. Blanco was the president of PLM. He then appointed ad interim Dr. Esteban
as vice president for Academic Affairs. After Dr. Esteban’s term would lapse, he would
receive renewal of his term until he confronted Dr. Blanco to make him the permanent
VP. Dr. Blanco refused and demoted Dr. Esteban. The latter then filed against PLM
which ruled in his favor. PLM appealed repeatedly but the courts remained in favor of Dr.
Esteban.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Dr. Esteban is a permanent appointee?

HELD:
Yes. An ad interim appointee is permanent in nature and does enjoys security of
tenure. Ad interim appointees are those officers appointed by the president when the
board is not in session and may be removed upon the disapproval of the board. Dr.
Esteban’s appointment was confirmed by the Board of Regents in 1975 and was
therefore a permanent VP then without his knowledge as Dr. Blanco did not inform him
of the concurrence of the board.
 !374

MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
(G.R. No. 149036. APRIL 2, 2002)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner contests the appointment of Benipayo, Bora and Tuason by President
Arroyo, claiming that it was unconstitutional.

During Benipayo’s term as chairman, respondent issued a memorandum

transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration as
her transfer details were not allowed as it was prohibited to do so during election time.
Benipayo however denied her request. She then filed an administrative and criminal
complaint against Benipayo to the Law Department, alleging violation of several civil
service laws and codes.

While the case was pending, petitioner also filed another case questioning the
appointments of Benipayo, Bora and Tuason.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Benipayo, Bora and Tuason appointment is temporary in nature?

HELD:
No. Ad interim appointments are permanent in nature. Without the disapproval of
Commission on Appointments, Benipayo, Bora and Tuason would remain in office until
the expiration of their term. Petitioner’s contention was then found without merit.
 !375

SARMIENTO V. MISON
(G.R. No. 79974. DECEMBER 17, 1987)

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:
Sarmiento assailed the constitutionality of the appointments of Mison as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the appointment of Mison and Carague is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The courts held that the appointments of Mison and Carague are
constitutional as they are not specifically provided under the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Art. VII which states the appointments that need the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments.
 !376

QUINTOS-DELES V. COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS,

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
(G.R. No. 83216. SEPTEMBER 4, 1989)

BIDIN, J.:

FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino appointed petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles as
sectoral representative for women in 1988 while Congress was in session. However,
COA opposed the appointment of Deles alleging that her appointment requires its
confirmation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Quinto-Deles’ appointment requires the consent of COA?

HELD:
Yes. The sectoral seat reserved for the representatives in Sec. 5 (2), Art. VI may
be filled by the president fall under the provisions of Sec. 16 of Art. VII which states that
the consent of COA is needed for all other appointments granted to the president by the
constitution.
 !377

SORIANO V. LISTA
(G.R. No. 153881. MARCH 24, 2003)

CORONA, J.:

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition contesting the constitutionality of the
appointments of 8 officers of the Philippine Coast Guard by the President Arroyo without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
Whether or not appointments of the 8 members of the PCG is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The courts held, despite dismissing the case for lack of locus standi, that the
phrase on Sec. 16, Art. VII which pertains to the rankings of officers refers to members
of the military alone. President Arroyo did not commit grave abuse of discretion in the
promotion of said officers.
 !378

BAUTISTA V. SALONGA
(G.R. No. 86439. April 13, 1989)

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:
This case questions the presidential appointment of Mary Conception Bautista as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights without the confirmation of COA.
Bautista’s appointment was a power exercised by the president by virtue of Executive
Order No. 163.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is part of those found on the first
paragraph of Sec. 16, Art. VII?

HELD:
No. The court held that the exercise of appointment in this case was not made
through the limitations of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art VII but through the second one
which no longer needs the confirmation of the commission. The confirmation power of
COA is limited to the first sentence of said provision.

CALDERON V. CARALE
(G.R. No. 91636. April 23, 1992)
 !379

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:
Bartolome Carale was appointed by President Aquino as Chairman of the
National Labor Relations Commission by virtue of RA 6715 which amended PD 442
providing for the appointment of chairman, division presiding commissioner, and other
commissioners shall be appointed by the president, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

However, President Aquino upon the appointment of Carale, did not submit it to
COA for confirmation. Calderon then contested said appointment, stating that without the
confirmation of COA as prescribed by RA 6715, Carale cannot be appointed to office.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Carale’s appointment is valid?

HELD:
Yes. The solicitor-general argued that RA 6715 is unconstitutional as it violates
the provisions of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the constitution by expanding the powers of the
Commission on Appointments. The courts held in affirmative of this argument and
declared the requirement of confirmation from the COA to be unconstitutional.

MANALO V. SISTOZA
(G.R. No. 107369. Aug 11, 1999)

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:
 !380

This questions the constitutionality of the appointment of 15 police officers made

by former President Aquino without the confirmation of COA despite RA 6975 stating that
said appointments require confirmation. The petitioner in his capacity as taxpayer that
said appointments are unconstitutional without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, equating PNP to the Armed Forces as stated in Sec. 16, Art. VII.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the RA 6975 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. RA 6975 expands the power of COA conflicting the provision of Sec 16, Art
VII. The court also held that the PNP and Armed Forces are two different entities and
therefore do not fall under the first sentence of said provision.

RUFINO V. ENDRIGA
(G.R. No. 139554. July 21, 2006)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
President Estrada appointed new members of the board of trustees of the CCP.
However, members Endriga and others contended that under PD 15 issued by former
President Marcos, new appointments to the board may only be done in the event that
 !381

there is only a single surviving trustee. Endriga argued that it is for the members of the
board to appoint and elect their fellow trustees when there is vacancy.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Sec. 6 of PD 15 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The courts held that CCP cannot be beyond the powers of the president as
to create a self-perpetuating entity. Sec. 6 would then come in conflict with Sec. 17, Art
VII that specifies that the president shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. Endriga’s argument was then refuted by the court and held the
appointments of the new members of the board to be valid.

LACSON V. ROMERO
(G.R. No. L-3081. OCTOBER 14, 1949)

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS:
On July 25, 1946, Lacson was appointed by the President to be the provincial
fiscal of Negros Oriental. The appointment was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointment on August 6, 1946 and he took his oath on August 10, 1946 and thereafter
performed the duties of that office
 !382

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, On May 17 1949, he was

appointed by the President to be the provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date,
respondent Romero was also appointed by the President to be the provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental. The nominations were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
on May 14, 1949.

Lacson neither accepted or assumed the office while Romero did. Thus on June
16, 1949, he notified the Solicitor General of the fact and proceeded to his. Upon his
arrival at Dumaguete City, the capital of Negros Oriental, he notified Lacson of his
intention to take over but the latter object.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lacson is entitled to retain his office?

HELD:
Yes. Although appointments may be made by the President through nomination
and the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the appointee needs to
accept the nomination first before the process is complete. Since the petitioner did not
accept the appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac, he retained the post of provincial
fiscal of Negros Oriental. Respondent therefore is not entitled to the office, there being
no vacancy due to petitioner’s refusal of his appointment.

LUEGO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-69137. AUGUST 5, 1986)

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor,
Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon February 18, 1983. The appointment was
described as “permanent” but was approved as “temporary” by the Civil Service
Commission. On March 22, 1948, The Civil Service Commission found private
respondent Tuozo to be better qualified than the petitioner for the position and
subsequently directed the former to assume the latter’s position.
 !383

The private respondent was appointed June 28, 1984 by the new mayor, Ronald
Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment and questions
the Civil Service Commission’s order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission may validly disprove a permanent
appointment on the basis that it had found a more suitable candidate than the appointee
for the position?

HELD:
No. The Civil Service Commission does not have the authority to disprove
appointments- its authority is limited to approving or reviewing appointments in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. When an appointee is qualified for the post and
there being no legal impediment to his assumption of office, the Civil Service
Commission has no choice but to comply.

LAPINID V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

(G.R. No. 96298. AUGUST 5, 1986)

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of
Terminal Supervisor at Manila International Terminal on October 1, 1988. This
appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito
Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on
May 9, 1988, for a review of an earlier decision of the Placement Committee on May 3,
1988. He contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor or any other
position comparable thereto.

Upon later investigation, the Court later discovered records showing that the
respondent was more qualified than the petitioner based on evaluations conducted by
 !384

the Civil Service Commission and that it filed a resolution designated as Terminal
Supervisor. The resolution however was not informed and his subsequent appeals were
denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service may set aside an appointment on the basis that
it found a more qualified candidate?

HELD:
No. As held in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals, The Civil Service Commission is only
limited to assuring that the appointments are made in accordance with the requirements
of the Civil Service Law and may not disprove appointments made by the Executive on
the basis of it finding a more suitable person for the post.

POBRE V. MENDIETA
(G.R. No. 106677. JULY 23, 1993)

GRINO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:
The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable
Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A.
Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the
second Associate Commissioner of the PRC. On January, Executive Secretary Franklin
M. Drilon inquired whether the President may appoint as Commissioner PRC another
Associate Commissioner or any other person other than the Senior Associate
Commissioner. Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III stated that the
appointing power of the President is not limited by Section 2 of P.D. No. 223. On
February 15, 1992, the President appointed petitioner to be the PRC Commissioner/
Chairman and he took his oath of office on February 17, 1992.
 !385

Respondent contested the appointment on the basis that under Section 2 of P.D.
No. 223, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, he was legally entitled to succeed as
Chairman of the PRC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Pobre as PRC Chairman by the President is
valid?

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the power of appointment cannot be restricted
to the point where the appointing officer loses discretion. If the respondent’s contention
were to be followed, then a vacancy in the position of PRC Chair may only be filled by
succession or operation of law which strips the President of his power to appoint on his/
her own discretion.

PIMENTEL V. ERMITA

(G.R. No. 164978. OCTOBER 13, 2005)

CARPIO, J.:



FACTS:
Congress commenced their regular session on 26 July 2004 and the
Commission on Appointments was constituted on 25 August 2004. Meanwhile, President
Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments without the COA approval. When Congress adjourned in 22 September
2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to the respondents as
secretaries of their departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting
capacity.

Several senators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to declare the appointments unconstitutional.
They claimed that there President could not legally appoint in any a capacity, to a vacant
office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments without prior approval.

ISSUE:
 !386

Whether or not the President can appoint secretaries in an acting capacity while
Congress is in session?

HELD:
Yes. The purpose of an appointment in an acting capacity is to prevent a hiatus
of the office until such time when a permanent appointee may assume the position.
Since the office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session, it is necessary for the President to a person whom he/she has confidence in for
posts that are considered to be his/her alter ego. These temporary appointments may be
abused because they are a way of circumventing the need for confirmation but by
issuing ad interim appointments to the respondents immediately upon recess, the
President showed that there was no intent to abuse on her part since said appointments
are subject to approval by the Commission on Appointments.

DE RAMA V. COURT OF APPEALS


(G.R. No. 131136. FEBRUARY 28, 2001)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner
Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission,
seeking the recall of the appointment of fourteen (14) municipal employees on the basis
that they were allegedly midnight appointees by the former mayor in violation of Article
VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The Civil Service denied the petition for lack of
merit for failure to present sufficient evidence and upheld the validity of the appointments
on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office
in Laguna.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a recall of the appointments is valid?

HELD:
No. Citing Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the
Administrative Code, the Court held that an appointment accepted by the appointee
cannot be revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force until disproved
by the Commission based on proper grounds.
 !387

IN RE: MATEO VALENZUELA


(A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC. NOVEMBER 9, 1998)

NARVASA, CJ.:



FACTS:
On March 30, 1998, the President signed the appointments of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as judges of the Regional Trial Courts of Bago
City and Cabanatuan City. The referral was made in view of the constitutional issue that
the appointments were in violation of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution which
prohibited the President from making any appointments two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term except for temporary
appointments in order to facilitate the continued functioning of offices where vacancies
will be in the prejudice of public safety and public service.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointments were made in violation of Section 15, Article VII
of the Constitution?

HELD:
Yes. The appointments of the two judges to the Regional Trial Courts fall within
the prohibition contemplated by the Constitution. While the vacancies were filled in the
interest of the judiciary and of public interest, the Court held that there was no
compelling reason to justify their appointments during the two-month prohibition on
presidential appointments.
 !388

DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL


(G.R. No. 191002. MARCH 17, 2010)

BERSAMIN, J.:


FACTS:
In its January 18, 2010 meeting, the Judicial and Bar Council passed a resolution
stating that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of
Chief Justice which was to be vacated because of the impending retirement of
incumbent Chief Justice Reyanto S. Puno on May 17, 2010. The JBC therein opened the
position of Chief Justice for applications or recommendations and stated that it will
publish and deliberate on the candidates, conduct interviews and prepare a shortlist of
candidates.

Although the JBC had already begun the process for the filling of the position, it
had not submitted the list of candidates to the President because of the pending issue
that the appointment to be made would fall within the two-month ban on appointments
made by the President provided for in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.

Various cases were thus filed calling for the prohibition of the filling of the position
as well as mandamus calling for the JBC to pass the shortlist to the President in order
that the impending vacancy be filled.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the impending appointment to the position of Chief Justice will be
contrary to the prohibition provided for in the Constitution?

HELD:
No. The Court held that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to
fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. The court stated that the aforementioned
provision seemed to be in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII which states that any
 !389

vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof. Since the Constitution devotes independent sections to the Executive,
Legislative and Judicial Departments, it should be understood that had the framers
intended to include the Judiciary in the two-month ban on appointments, they would
have included the provision in Article VIII dedicated to the Judicial Department. Having
not done so, it therefore follows that the two-month ban does not extend to the Supreme
Court and the Judiciary in general. The Court further held that Section 4 imposes an
imperative duty upon the President and his failure to appoint would be tantamount to a
violation of the constitution.

VILLALUZ V. ZALDIVAR

(G.R. No. L-22754. DECEMBER 31, 1965)

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS:
In a letter to the President dated January 28, 1960, Congressman Joaquin R.
Roces as Chairman of the Committee on Good Government informed the former of the
findings of the Committee concerning gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed
by petitioner Villaluz in the Motor Vehicles Office leading to huge losses to the
government. Congress Roces recommended the replacement of the petitioner to
Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo and after further investigation and upon
submission of the report to the President, A.O No. 332 was issued decreeing the
removal of petitioner from office.

Villaluz filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, hence the petition to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has jurisdiction to investigate and remove petitioner
from office considering that he is a presidential appointee?

HELD:
Yes. The President has jurisdiction to investigate and remove Villaluz since he is
a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service
under Section 5 of R.A. No. 2260 wherein it can be inferred that the power to appoint
necessarily includes the power to remove. Furthermore, contrary to petitioner’s
contention, he in fact does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
because the latter may only exercise authority over permanent or classified officials and
employees.
 !390

ALAJAR V. ALBA

(G.R. Nos. L-10360 and L-10433. JANUARY 17, 1957)

FELIX, J.:

FACTS:
R.A. No. 603 created the City of Roxas and pursuant to Section 8 of the law,
Vivencio Alajar was appointed by the President to be vice mayor on January 1, 1954. He
took his oath on January 6, 1954 and the Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment on March 31. In November of 1955, he received a communication from the
Executive Secretary informing him that the President had designated respondent Juliano
Alba as acting vice-mayor and that he should turn over his office immediately. Petitioner
then initiated quo warranto proceedings against the respondent before the CFI of Capiz
where he received a favourable judgement.

Alba appealed before the Supreme Court, contending that under Section 2545 of
the Administrative Code, city officials appointed by the President may be removed at his
pleasure. Alajar on the other hand, averred that the said provision is incompatible with
the constitutional inhibition that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a vice-mayor appointed by the president may be removed upon
the president’s discretion?

HELD:
Yes. In enacting R.A No. 603, Congress provided for the period or tenure by
which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President hence it
can be inferred that Congress can legally and constitutionally make a the holding of an
office dependent upon the pleasure of the President.
 !391

APARRI V. COURT OF APPEALS


(G.R. No. L-30057. JANUARY 31, 1984)

MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS:
On January 15, 1960, the NARRA Board of Directors approved Resolution No.
13 appointing respondent Bruno O. Aparri, as General Manager with all the rights,
prerogatives and compensations to take effect on January 16, 1960.

On March 15, 1962, the same Board of Directors approved Resolution No. 24
declaring that pursuant to the Office of the President’s desire, the incumbent General
Manager’s term shall end on March 31, 1962 in accordance with Section 8(2) of R.A. No.
1160. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction with
the CFI of Manila. The petitioner prayed to annul Resolution No. 24 and to allow him to
continue serving as General Manager until he vacates his office in accordance with law.
The petition was denied, hence the petition with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal without cause?

HELD:
No. In the case at bar, the term of the office is not fixed by law therefore the
Board of Directors had the power to fix petitioners term of office. Resolution No. 24 does
not pertain to removal but rather an expiration of petitioner’s term.
 !392

DOMINGO V. RAYALA

(G.R. No. 155831. FEBRUARY 8, 2008)

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III
at the NLRC, filed a complaint for sexual harassment against NLRC Chairman Rogelio I.
Rayala before Secretary Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). Upon receiving the complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the complaint to the
Office of the President, Rayala being a presidential appointee. A committee was then
created to investigate the matter and found respondent to be guilty of the offense
charged. The Office of the President issued A.O. 119, disagreeing with the committee’s
recommended penalty and instead ordered that Rayal be dismissed from service for
being guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Rayala filed Motions for Reconsideration and was subsequently charged with the
aforementioned offense by the Court of Appeals

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President may validly call for the dismissal of the
NLRC Chairman?

HELD:
Yes. However in this case, The Office of the President incorrectly imposed the
penalty of dismissal because the imposable penalty for sexual harassment or for
disgraceful and immoral conduct on the first offense suspension of six (6) months and
one (1) day up to one (1) year only, as provided in Section 3, R.A. 7877. Thus the
dismissal cannot be carried out because such penalty can only be imposed upon the
commission of a second offense.
 !393

3. CONTROL
 !394

BANDA V. ERMITA

(G.R. No. 166620. APRIL 20, 2010)

LEONARDO DE-CASTRO, J.:




FACTS:
On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 378
amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of
the National Printing Office (NPO) over the printing services requirements of government
agencies and instrumentalities. Due to the issuance of the aforementioned E.O,
government agencies and instrumentalities were allowed to source their printing services
from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the
services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared
to the NPO’s services.

Perceiving a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO,

petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that it is beyond
the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal and an E.O. issued by
former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers and that E.O.
378 violates their security of tenure because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of
the NPO.

ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. 378 is constitutional?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative citing that it is well settled in Philippine
Jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies of
the executive department in line with the President’s control power as granted by the
Constitution itself, as well as by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to
reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

The National Printing Office is an agency that is part of the part of the Office of
the Press Secretary which itself falls under the Office of the President. Thus, it is within
the President’s authority to reorganize it in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency.
 !395

MALARIA EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHIL. V. ROMULO


(G.R. No. 160093. JULY 31, 2007)

PUNO, CJ.:

FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition on Certiorari on the Decision of the Court of Appeals
to uphold the validity of Executive Order No. 102, a law redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the Department of Health.

On October 19, 1999, the President issued E.O. No. 165 Directing the
Formulation of Institutional Strengthening and Streamlining Program for the Executive
Branch which created the Presidential Committee on Executive Governance (PCEG)
composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) as co-chair.

On July 9, 2000, the DBM issued a Notice of Organization, Staffing and

Compensation Action (NOSCA) and the PCEG likewise issued Memorandum Circular
No. 62 directing the rationalization and streamlining the functions and operations of the
Department of Health (DOH). Thereafter the Secretary issued Department Memorandum
No. 157, Series of 2000- ordering the Undersecretary, assistant secretaries, Bureau
Directors and other similar officers to direct all employees under their offices to
accomplish and submit a Personal Information Sheet pursuant to the DOH’s
rationalization and streamlining plan.

Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, INC. (MEWAP) is

a union of employees in the Malaria Control Service under the Department of Health.
They filed c complaint with the RTC seeking to nullify the Department Memorandum,
NOSCA and other implementing issuances for E.O. No. 102.

ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. No. 102 reorganizing the functions and operations of the
Department of Health is valid?

HELD:
Yes. The President has the authority to reorganize the Department of Health
under the Constitution as well as other existing laws. Sections 1 and 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution provide that the President shall have executive control over all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices. The power to reorganize is also vested in
the President by virtue of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O.
No. 292 which grants the President broad organization powers.

DOMINGO V. ZAMORA

(G.R. No. 142283. FEBRUARY 6, 2003)
 !396

CARPIO, J,:

FACTS:
On March 5, 1999, former President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 81
entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and defining the role of DECS in
School-Based Sports.
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No.
01594 reassigning the Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports’s (BPESS)
named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
Petitioners were among those transferred and were dissatisfied with their reassignment
thus the filing of the petition.

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of EO 81, claiming that the president’s

issuance of said order was in violation of the principle of separation of powers.
Petitioners also challenged the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of
tenure. However, during the pendency of the case, R.A. No. 9155 was enacted
expressly abolishing the BPESS and transferring its functions, programs and activities of
the DECS relating to sports competition to the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC).

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid?

HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being moot and academic but
nonetheless tackled the issue on the validity of EO 81. Citing Sections 31(2) and (3) of
EO 292, EO 81 is a valid exercise of the President’s delegated power to reorganize the
Office of the President. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, EO
292 authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the
Office of the President. Under its charter, the PSC is attached to the Office of the
President. Therefore, therefore the DECS programs and activities related to sports
development to the PCS.

The Supreme Court also held that the petitioners’ security of tenure was not
jeopardy since R.A 9155 mandated that all employees transferred shall be retained by
the receiving Department.

PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS


(G.R. No. 196425. JULY 24, 2012)

PERLAS-BARNABE , J.:

FACTS:
 !397

On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive
Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the Philippine Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) created
by former President Aquino via E.O. 12 and transferring its functions to the Office of the
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, specifically to the newly-established Investigative
and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before

the IAD-ODELSA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero
A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) and other incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees
which arose from the purchase of LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three
Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

On April 14, 2001, petitioner received an Order signed by Executive Secretary

Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective
written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and a charge of grave misconduct was already pending before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Thereafter he filed a petition with the Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of EO 13, alleging that it was in violation of the power of the legislature
to create a public office and for usurping the power of Congress to delegate quasi-
judicial powers to administrative agencies, among others.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional for vesting into an administrative office
a quasi-judicial function through an Executive Order and not through the legislature?

HELD:
No. Section 31 of Executive Order 292 (EO 292), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
The Court held that the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within ODELSA is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing “delegated legislative authority to reorganize” his
own office pursuant to EO 292.

Petitioner’s contention that the President created a new office is also misplaced
since the transfer of the PAGC duties and functions were simply vested within an already
existing office which is the ODELSA. The reorganization simply required the alteration of
the structure of the ODELSA through the establishment of a third division.

DENR V. DENR REGION XII EMPLOYEES


(G.R. No. 149724. AUGUST 19, 2003)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a
Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to
 !398

DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H.
Cerilles.

Respondents, who are employees of DENR Region XII filed a petition assailing
the Memorandum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR
Region XII office?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that under the qualified political agency doctrine, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments done in the performance of their
duties shall be considered as the acts of the Chief Executive, unless the latter disproves
them. In the present case, the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, can
validly reorganize DENR XIII Regional Office from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato.

CITY OF ILIGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS


(G.R. No. L-30852. FEBRUARY 26, 1988)

GANCAYO, J.:

FACTS:
On August 9, 1952, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 335
whereby pursuant to the provision of Section 88 of the Commonwealth Act (CA) 141 as
amended, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
he withdrew from the sale or settlement and reserved for the use of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) certain parcels of the public domain situated at Iligan City. The NPC
thereon constructed a fertilizer plant named “Maria Cristina”
 !399

NPC later on sold the fertilizer plant to Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corp along with
all the machineries, right of occupancy and use of the land and covenanted with the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources in facilitating the outright sale and/or
right to lease for at least twenty five (25) years, renewable for another twenty years, the
lands wherein the properties of the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant are erected, located
and/or situated.

Proclamations No. 20, series of 1962 and No. 198, series of 1964 were
subsequently issued excluding from operation, certain areas of occupied by Maria
Cristina and employees housing and declaring such lands open for disposition. On
March 17, 1964, Marcelo Steel and Ma. Cristina filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application
with the Bureau of Lands, these were sister corporations. The purchaser was Marcelo
Tire and Rubber but it was Marcelo steel that operated the plant.

In the Notice of Sale issued in Manila, the Director of Lands advised the public
that the Bureau of Lands will sell in auction the lands of Marcelo Steel. However, the
President issued a proclamation excluding from the reservation made in favour to the
NPC in Iligan and donating the lands to the City of Iligan. The Mayor of Iligan thereon
informed the Director of Lands that the city was now the owner of the lands to be sold in
auction but no action was taken by the latter.



ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to donate a portion of public land
to the City of Iligan?


HELD:
Yes. Under Section 60 of the Public Land Act, it is provided that tracts of land can
be disposed of by grant, donation or transfer made to a province, municipality, branch or
subdivision of government for public interest. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Environmental Resources has the authority to donate and him being merely an alter-ego
of the President, it necessarily follows the President himself has the authority to do the
same.

ARANETA V. GATMAITAN

(G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191. APRIL 30, 1957)

FELIX, J,:

FACTS:

Executive Order No. 22 was issued prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel
Bay subsequently amended by E.O 66 and 80 as a response for general clamor among
the majority of the people living in the area that the resources of the area were in danger
of depletion due to the widespread use of trawl fishing. This lead to a group of Otter
Trawl operators filing a complaint to restrain the Secretary of the DANR from enforcing
the aforementioned Executive Orders and declare E.O. No. 22 as null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Executive Orders are valid?
 !400

HELD:

Yes. The Executive Orders were valid as Congress had provided under the
Fisheries Act that the Secretary of the DANR was vested with the power to issue
implementing rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary. There was a valid
delegation from Congress to the Secretary of the DANR and the President committed no
violation since under the power of control, he has the authority over his subordinate
which in the case at bar is the Secretary of the DANR.

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO. V. PANO


(G.R. No. L-27811. NOVEMBER 17, 1967)

SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS:

In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-
hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of
Davao. On January 9, 1953, he ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the land to
the plaintiff. On 1954, the same was officially declared to be agricultural land.
On 1955, respondent and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of
90-hectares of the released area and in turn, plaintiff filed its own application for the
purchase of the entire released area. The Director of Lands rendered a decision in 1956
giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation. The case was elevated to the
Office of the President wherein the Executive Secretary reversed the decision and by
authority of the President, declared that it would be best for public interest that the lands
be given to the appellants, who were mostly landless farmers depending on the land for
their existence
 !401

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Executive Secretary, acting under the authority of the
President, may reverse a decision of the Director of Lands?

HELD:

Yes. The President has control over all executive departments including the
actions of his secretaries. As the alter-egos of the President, their actions may be
reversed upon the discretion the President since can be viewed as mere extensions of
himself. It follows that he may delegate to his secretaries, certain acts which the
Constitution does not require him to personally perform. In the present case, since the
Executive Secretary acted under the authority of President, then his decision is also that
of the President’s.

HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL V. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD


(G.R. No. 181293. FEBRUARY 23, 2015)

SERENO, CJ,:

FACTS:

Pursuant to Presidential Decree 1113 (PD 1113), the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC) with the right, privilege, and authority to construct, and
operate toll facilities in Expressways, agreed to transfer authority to perform of the South
Metro Manila Skyway to Skyway O&M Corporation (SOMCO). The agreements were
met with widespread disagreement by legislators as well as the PNCC Skyway
Corporation Employees Union (PSCEU). They argued that the terms of the contract
were highly irregular because for various reasons including the fact that it did not
indicate the conditions that shall be imposed on SOMCO as provided under P.D. 1112.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate toll facilities?

HELD:

The Supreme Court held in the affirmative, stating that Congress does not have
sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities. Unless a law
requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility, the agencies of the executive
department may authorize and issue licenses for the operation of the same.
 !402

GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS


(G.R. No. 119903. August 5, 2000)

PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS:

On June 29, 1989, Bienvenido A. Icasiano was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C.
Aquino. Upon recommendation DECS Secretary Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as
Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the
vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro on June
17, 1994.

Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injunction enjoining the

implementation of the reassignment. On December 21, 1994, the Court of Appeals
granted the petition holding that the reassignment would be violative of Icasiano’s right
to security of tenure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reassignment would be violative of Icasiano’s right to security
of tenure?

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the reassignment would indeed be in violation of
the right to security of tenure because it would seem that his reassignment to MIST
would be for an indefinite period of time. Citing the case of Bentain, the Court held that
 !403

security of tenure extends to protection from unconsented transfers which are

tantamount to illegal removes.

While a temporary transfer or assignment is permissible by law, even without the

consent of the employee, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step
towards his removal from office or is designed to indirectly terminate his service. It being
evident that the transfer will appear to be permanent, the Court held that its
implementation would be tantamount to illegal dismissal.

TAN V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

(G.R. No. L-24548. OCTOBER 27, 1983)

MAKIASIAR, J:

FACTS:
The bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract
of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on
or before May 22, 1961. This public forest land consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located
within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which
was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government.
Petitioner Wenceslao Tan submitted his application after paying necessary fees. Nine
other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline. Questions arose as to the
wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded
to the most qualified bidder. President Garcia issued a directive to director of forestry to
draft a proclamation establishing the said area as watershed forest reserve for Olongapo
and that the bids received for the issuance of timber license rejected. The area was
awarded to the petitioner. Against this award, Revago Commercial Company and Jorge
Lao Happick filed motion for reconsideration which were denied by the director of
Forestry. Ravago appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the latter declared Tan’s OTL as null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture as an executive department has the
authority to revoke the timber license issued by the director of Forestry?

HELD:
Yes. The utilization and disposition of forest is directly under the control and
supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, while Section 1831 provides that “forest
 !404

products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest only upon Director of
Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture
and natural resources who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the
exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer”. The power of control of the
Department Heads over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set
aside acts of subordinate officials. Accordingly, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber license issued by the
Director of Forestry. Hence, it is valid.
 !405

KILUSANG BAYAN V. DOMINGUEZ

(GR No. 85439. JANUARY 13, 1992.)

DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS:
The Petitioner questions the validity of the order of the Secretary of Agriculture
Hon. Dominguez, which ordered: (1) the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of
the management of the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda Ng
Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Department's
regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a Management Committee which
shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3) the
disbandment of the Board of Directors, and (4) the turnover of all assets, properties and
records of the KBMBPM to the Management Committee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order is valid?

HELD:
The procedure was not followed in this case. Secretary of Agriculture arrogated
unto himself the power of the members of KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to
remove the petitioning directors and officers. This section does not give him the right. An
administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily applied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by
implication beyond what may necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

Supervision and Control include only the authority to (a) Act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or
modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and
programs. Specifically, administration supervision is limited to: (1) generally oversee the
operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and
economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require the
submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance
evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards, and
guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may be necessary for the proper
performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other
forms of mal-administration: (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such
agencies but may not increase or add to them.
 !406

ANG-ANGCO V. CASTILLO
(G.R. No. L-17169. NOVEMBER 30, 1963)

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.

FACTS:
Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the Secretary
of Commerce and Industry requesting for special permit to withdraw certain commodities
from customhouse which were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance of
foreign exchange. Said commodities consisted of 1,188 units of Pepsi-Cola concentrates
which were not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. The Pepsi-Cola co.
requested for the withdrawal of Pepsi-Cola certificates which are not covered by the
Central Bank release certificate. Its counsels approached Collector of Customs Ang-
Angco to secure immediate release, but advised the counsel to secure the certificate
from no-Dollar office. The No-Dollar office said that they have no objection to the release
of concentrates. Ang-angco approved the release. When the Commissioner of Customs
learned of the release he filed an administrative case against Ang-Angco. After around
three years from the termination of investigation during which Ang-Angco was
discharging his duties of his office, Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of
the President, rendered a decision on the case finding Ang-Angco “guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service”, and considering him resigned effective from
the date of notice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the president has the power to remove officers and employees in
the classified Civil Service?

HELD:
No. The case of the petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Civil service, and having been deprived of the procedure in connection
with investigation and investigation of this case, it may be said that the petitioner has
been deprived of due process. The extent of the power of control given to the President
by the constitution over all officers and employees in the executive department was
interpreted by this court in the case of Hebron vs Reyes to mean “the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter”, to distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal
government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the power to remove
an officer or employee in the executive department.
 !407

HUTCHISON PORTS PHILIPPINES LIMITED V. SBMA

(GR. No. 131367. AUGUST 31, 2000)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner, a foreign corporation was awarded by the Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards committee (PBAC) of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) the concession
to develop and operate a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone. The SBMA Board of Director has already declared Petitioner as a winner
but later on, the office of the President reversed the decision and ordered a rebidding.
This was sought to be enjoined by the petitioner, but the trial court denied the same.
Hence, the petitioner seeking to obtain a prohibitory injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the president has control in awarding the winner of the bidding?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that it has clear and unmistakable right
to be declared winner with finality, such that the SBMA can be compelled to negotiate a
concession contract. Though the SBMA may have declared HPPL as the winning bidder,
such award cannot be said to be final and unassailable. The SBMA Board of directors
and other officers are subject to the control and supervision of the Office of the
President. All projects of the SBMA require the approval of the President of the
Philippines under Letter of Instruction no. 620, which places the SBMA under its ambit
as an instrumentality. When the President issued a memorandum setting aside the
award previously declared by the SBMA in favor of HPPL and directing a rebidding to be
conducted, the same was within the authority of the President and was a valid exercise
of his prerogative.

SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT V. HOW

(GR No. 140863. AUGUST 22, 2000.)
 !408

GONAGA-REYES, J:


FACTS:
On May 28, 1999, an information for estafa was filed against Ma. Fe Barriero
before the RTC of Parañaque based on the complaint by petitioner. Before the
scheduled arraignment on August 5, 1995 could take place, respondent judge issued an
order resetting the arraignment on the ground that private respondent had filed an
appeal with the Department of Justice. The case was further reset twice but before the
scheduled hearing on November 18, 1999, private respondent again asked for the
deferment of the arraignment. Due to this motion, respondent judge issued an order
further deferring the arraignment until such time that the appeal with the DOJ is
resolved. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to the order but the same was
denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus questioning the orders
issued by respondent judge regarding the indefinite suspension of the arraignment of the
accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice has been resolved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judge erred in the suspension of arraignment?

HELD:
No. The court is in complete control of the case and any disposition therein is
subject to its sound discretion. The decision to suspend the arraignment to await the
resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such discretion. A
court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, once and for all, the
issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file information. Thus, public
respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the
arraignment.
 !409

DADOLE V. COMMISION ON AUDIT

(GR No. 125350. DECEMBER 3, 2002.)

CORONA, J:

FACTS:
Petitioners as RTC and MTC judges stationed in Mandaue City received a
monthly allowance of P1,260 each pursuant to yearly appropriation ordinance.
Eventually, in 1991, it was increased to P1,500 for each judge. However, the DBM
issued Local Budget Circular (LBC) no. 55 which provides that the additional monthly
allowances to be given by local government unit should not exceed P1000 in provinces
and cities and P700 in municipalities. The Mandaue City Auditor issued notice of
disallowance to herein petitioners in excess of the amount authorized by the circular.
Thus, petitioners filed with the Office of the City Auditor for protest. They argued that
LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating uniform
amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges
stationed therein.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LBC 55 is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of
the president?

HELD:
Yes. Although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local governement units,
the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and
the power of supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution
provides that: “The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments…” This provision means that the president is only subject to
supervision and not control. The president can only interfere if he finds that the local
government unit has acted contrary to law.

DRILON V. LIM
(GR No. 112497. AUGUST 4, 1994.)
 !410

CRUZ, J:

FACTS:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government code. The Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies
and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as Manila Revenue
Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment
of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding that
the procedural requirements had been observed. It declared Section 187 of the Local
Government code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice
of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the
President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government code is unconstitutional
because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over Local
governments?

HELD:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance. When he alters or modifies or set aside a tax
ordinance, he is also not permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of
the local government that enacted the measure. That act is not control but supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done or he may even decide for
himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervision sees to it that the rules
are followed.
 !411

PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE
(GR NO. 132988. JULY 19, 2000)

PANGANIBAN, J:

FACTS:
On December 27, 1997, the President Ramos of the Philippines issued
Administrative Order (AO) 372. Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Estrada
issued AO 43 amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to 5% the amount of internal
revenue allotment to be withheld from local government units. In this original petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, Petitioner seeks to annul Section 1
of AO 372, insofar as it requires LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their
authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; and to enjoin respondents
from implementing section 4 of the order, which withholds a portion of their internal
revenue allotments.


ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 1 of AO 372 and section 4 shall be annulled?

HELD:
According to the Court, Section 1 of AO 372, being merely an advisory, is well
within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive
cannot be characterized as an exercise of power of control. Section 4 of AO 372,
however, which withholds the 10% of the LGUs clearly contravened the Constitution.
 !412

AMPATUAN V. PUNO
(G.R. No. 190259. JUNE 7, 2011)
ABAD, J.:

FACTS:
In 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then President Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to
undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent
and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. 3 days later, she
also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the
President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former
AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the
supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Petitioners filed this petition for prohibition alleging that the President’s
proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as these issuances
empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to seize the
regional government’s powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual basis
for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the deployment of
troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s
emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and
273-A be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy?

HELD:
The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take
over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the
respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
Massacre, the ARMM Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post
pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art. 7 of RA 9054. In turn, Acting
Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner
Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not
take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.
 !413

THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)

(G.R. No. 182574. SEPTEMBER 28, 2010)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner, through an approved Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution, granted
and released the payment for health care insurance benefits of the province’s officials
and employees without any prior approval from the President, as required by an
administrative order. COA disallowed the premium payment for such benefits because
aside from contravening the administrative order it is allegedly also a form of additional
compensation, which is against the Salary Standardization Law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the administrative order applies also to LGUs?

HELD:
No, the President, pursuant to Art X Sec. 4 of the Constitution can only exercise
general supervision, which is the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates
perform their functions according to law. This is different from the power of control, which
is to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate has done in performance of his duties.
Thus, an administrative order does not apply to LGUs but only to government offices/
agencies, and GOCCs which are under the control of the President. The grant of
additional compensation like health insurance benefits do not need the prior approval of
the President.
 !414

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V. PAREDES

(G.R. No. 130775. SEPTEMBER 29, 2004)

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:
DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the
Liga ng mga Barangay in giving remedy to alleged violations made by the incumbent
officer of the Liga in the conduct of their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars
which alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga. Petitioner contends that
DILG’s appointment constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga,
since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent judge
contends that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the
different leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a broad premise
of the supervisory power of the DILG.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DILG Secretary, as an alter-ego of the President, has power of
control over the Liga ng mga Barangay?

HELD:
No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President shall exercise
general supervision over local government, which exclude the power of control. As the
entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s authority is limited to seeing to it
that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the
discretion to modify or replace the same.
 !415

4. MILITARY POWERS

GUIDANI V. SENGA
(G.R. No. 170165. AUGUST 15, 2006)

TINGA, J.:
 !416

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of
2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. President Arroyo issued
EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of
Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et
al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However,
the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to
them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the
Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga
ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly
violating an order of a superior officer.



ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members
of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry?



HELD:
Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice.

The Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military
discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service,
including the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline.
Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness
of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the
maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without
question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal
views on the matter.
 !417

DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(G.R. No. 171396. MAY 3, 2006)

SANDOVAL-GUITERREZ, J.:

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency. On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing
the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence." David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct
injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017. During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that
the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 50 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of
the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional?

HELD:
PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional. The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in
issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA
declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits
or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC
ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise
of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call
the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And
such criterion has been met.

However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or

implied power to issue decrees are unconstitutional because legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of Congress.

The Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as
Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of
PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police
should take only the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence. But the words acts of terrorism found in G.O. No. 5
have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be
deemed deleted from the said G.O.
 !418

AMPATUAN V. PUNO
(G.R. No. 190259. JUNE 7, 2011)
ABAD, J.:

FACTS:
In 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then President Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to
undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent
and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. 3 days later, she
also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the
President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former
AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the
supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Petitioners filed this petition for prohibition alleging that the President’s
proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as these issuances
empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to seize the
regional government’s powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual basis
for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the deployment of
troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s
emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and
273-A be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy?

HELD:
The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take
over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the
respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
Massacre, the ARMM Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post
pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art. 7 of RA 9054. In turn, Acting
Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner
Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not
take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ZAMORA

(G.R. No. 141284. AUGUST 15, 2000)
 !419

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and
PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a
temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization
of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review?

HELD:

No. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents
wisdom or substitute its own. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary,
the President may call the armed forces. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the
military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it
were to have any effect at all.
 !420

LACSON V. PEREZ
(G.R. No. 147780. MAY 10, 2001)
MELO, J.:

FACTS:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proc. 38) on May 1,
2001 as well as GO 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the
NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion”
were thereafter effected. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that
the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist
arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they
are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that
hold departure orders were issued against them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not warrantless arrests and hold departure orders are valid upon a
declaration of a state of rebellion?

HELD:
No. President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6,
2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic.
Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities
intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to
and until May 1, 2001. Under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may
only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the
rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on
Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time
because an individual arrested with no warrant has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112
of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, providing for the period in which an arrested person with no warrant must
be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such
may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal
ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to
claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing
the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention
to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void
ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’
prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being
that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of
habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which
Petitioners are not subjected to.
 !421

GUANZON V. DE VILLA
(G.R. No. 80508. JANUARY 30, 1990)

GUITIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners allege that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were
conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is
no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of
arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and
without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their
sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the
point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to
their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that
they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables.
Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents
also reported incidents of mauling, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were
detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
information. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents
contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target
zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently
and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign
media joined the operation to witness and record such event.



ISSUE:
Whether or not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human
rights?



HELD:
No. It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the
procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities". Based on the
facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search
warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused
from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained
by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of the squatters and low
income families are fully protected. The conduct of the “saturation drives” or “areal target
zoning” by members of the AFP are also recognized as party of the military powers of
the President. In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were
committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the
senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.
 !422

SANLAKAS V. REYES
(G.R. No. 159085. FEBRUARY 3, 2004)

GUITIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
In the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of
AFP, heavily armed stormed the Oakwood Premiere in Makati demanding for the
resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and Chief of the PNP. By virtue of
Proclamation 427, a state of rebellion was declared and GO 4 of the same date, the AFP
and the PNP were directed to suppress and quell the rebellion pursuant to Section 18
Article VII of the Constitution. The soldiers returned to barracks on the same night and
the declaration of state of rebellion was lifted on August 1, 2003 by virtue of
Proclamation No 435. In the interim, several petitions were filed before the Court
challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4. Petitioners
contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of
a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. Because of the cessation of the
Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the
President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period. Solicitor General argues that the
petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.



ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution requires the declaration
of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces?

HELD:
No. The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main
from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief Powers. However, a mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot
diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. There is also no basis for the
apprehensions that, because of the declaration, military and police authorities may resort
to warrantless arrests. In calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of
rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state
exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
 !423

KULAYAN V. TAN
(G.R. No. 187298. JULY 3, 2012)

SERENO, J.:

FACTS:
In 2009, 3 members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
were kidnapped in Sulu by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09),

declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident as
a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human
Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call
upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and
lawless violence.

Petitioners filed the present petition claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued
ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-
in-chief of the armed forces.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of the President?

HELD:
No. A provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is
the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of
Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
 !424

RUFFY V. CHIEF OF STAFF

(G.R. No. L-533. AUGUST 20, 1956)

TUASON, J.:

FACTS:
During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned
at designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to
Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a
guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow
petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested
upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly
slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense
was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy?

HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since
members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of
War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and
a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to
military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them
even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction. The petitioners are in error for
courts martial are agencies of executive character and are not a portion of the judiciary.
The petition thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs.
 !425

KURODA V. JALANDONI
(G.R. No. L-2662. MARCH 26, 1949)
MORAN, C.J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in
the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine
Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68
that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused
war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention
on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes
not based on law, national and international.

ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. No. 68 is valid and constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. EO No. 68 which was issued by the President is valid in its section 3 that
"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation."
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner
for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention
because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in
1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of The Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of
international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent
nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such
rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was
not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of
rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government
may have been or shall be a signatory.

Also, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate

this unfinished aspects of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals, through
the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
 !426

OLGAUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION

(G.R. No. L-54558. MAY 22, 1987)
GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:
In 1979, Olaguer and some others, all civilians, were detained by military
personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. They were charged conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion and other various crimes. On 1980, the petitioners
went to the Supreme Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas
corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil
courts are open and functioning?

HELD:
No. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even
during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them
as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by
such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
military tribunal concerned.

QUILOÑA V. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL

(206 SCRA 821. MARCH 4, 1992)
 !427

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner, a policeman assigned at the Western Police District (WPD), was
charged before respondent General Court Martial with the crime of murder on two (2)
counts, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The case is entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Patrolman Oscar Quiloña."

On 14 December 1990, petitioner, through counsel, wrote a letter to President

Corazon C. Aquino, expressing his desire to be tried by a civilian court and sought a
waiver of military jurisdiction, for the reason, among others, that the "enactment of
the Philippine National Police Law creates his honest belief that he should now be under
the actual and real jurisdiction of a civilian court."

Although set for oral argument on 3 January 1991, respondent court decided to
have the motion argued on the day it was filed — 28 December 1990. And after a ten-
minute closed-door deliberation among the members of respondent court martial, it
resumed session where it denied the petitioner's "MOTION FOR THIS HONORABLE
COURT MARTIAL TO INHIBIT ITSELF FROM PURSUING THE ARRAIGNMENT OF
THE ACCUSED AND TO HAVE HIS CASE INVESTIGATED BY THE CIVILIAN
PROSECUTOR OR AT LEAST TRIED BY A CIVILIAN COURT.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not member of the Philippine National Police are within the
jurisdiction of a military court?

HELD:
The Court held that pursuant to R.A. 67975 which states that “"SEC.
46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided, That the courts-martial appointed pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have
already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing
authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as, the Articles of
War, as amended by Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for
Courts-Martial: Provided, further, that criminal cases against PC-INP members who may
have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this it shall be transferred to the
proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge.” The statute clearly
provides for the jurisdiction of regular courts over PNP members. Even if the statute is
not yet effective on the day the petition was arraigned, it is presumed that the court had
knowledge of the statute which was signed by the President and had been submitted for
general circulation before the petition took place.

NAVALES V. GENERAL ABAYA

(G.R. 162318. OCTOBER 25, 2004)

CALLEJO, SR., J:

FACTS:
 !428

At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP — the Philippine Army's Scout
Rangers and the Philippine Navy's Special Warfare Group (SWAG) — quietly entered
the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and
took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted explosives around
the building and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted at the Oakwood roof deck. They
claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration of
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00 p.m. to give up their
positions peacefully and return to barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the
existence of a "state of rebellion" and issued an order to use reasonable force in putting
down the rebellion. An agreement was forged between the two groups at 9:30 p.m.
Shortly thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was over.
The soldiers agreed to return to barracks and were out of the Oakwood premises by
11:00 p.m.

Under the Information dated August 1, 2003 filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged 321 of those soldiers
who took part in the "Oakwood Incident" with violation of Article 134-A (coup d'etat) of
the Revised Penal Code. Several of the accused filed for a motion praying that the trial
court would assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal in
accordance with Republic Act No. 7055. While the said motion was pending resolution,
the DOJ issued the Resolution dated October 20, 2003 finding probable cause for coup
d'etat against only 31, including the petitioners, of the original 321 accused and
dismissing the charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioners
herein where charged before the general martial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court may assume jurisdiction?

HELD:
No. Charges filed under the RTC has been moot and academic with the
resolution of the DOJ. Petitioners now are facing charges on violation of Articles of War
before the general court martial. Republic Act No. 7055 was made to return to the civil
courts its jurisdiction on offense which it traditionally held and this does not include those
violations on Articles of War which general court martials has jurisdiction. Hence, the
RTC (Branch 148) cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those
charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64
(Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the Articles of War, as these are
specifically included as "service-connected offenses or crimes" under Section 1 thereof.

LANSANG V. GARCIA
(42 SCRA 448. DECEMBER 11, 1971)

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

FACTS:
Two hand grenades caused 8 deaths and injury to people in the event of the
Liberal Party of the Philippines holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the
presentation of its candidates in the 1971 general elections. President Marcos then
 !429

announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889 which suspends the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus to suppress insurrection and rebellion by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
groups. Presently, petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed, by a number of
persons including the petitioner, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor
and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as well as
that of their detention.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
constitutional?

RULING:
Yes. The court abandoned the Barcelon and Montenergro doctrine that "the
authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege or the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final
and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." It has been ruled that the
Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required
by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ. Proclamation to
suspend must satisfy two (2) conditions for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend
the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or
— pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent
danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. In
the petitions involved, some of it became moot and academic for the fact that they have
been already released. After deliberations, including closed-door hearings, the Supreme
Court upholds the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus after finding
satisfying evidences of a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to
overthrow the government by force.

FORTUN V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
(G.R. NO. 190293. MARCH 20, 2012)

ABAD, J.:

FACTS:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan
family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway
in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central
Mindanao. On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
 !430

1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section

18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President's action. But,
two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 1959 is constitutional?

HELD:
The Court dismissed the case and has decided it as moot and academic. “The
Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.” The petition was passed more than two
years since the present actions to annul Proclamation 1959. “When the Court did not
decide it then, it actually opted for a default as was its duty, the question having become
moot and academic.”
 !431

5. PARDON

PEOPLE V. SALLE
(250 SCRA 581. DECEMBER 4, 1995)

DAVIDE, JR., J:

FACTS:
Accused Salle and Mengote whom were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as co-principals of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson. The appellants
filed their Notice of Appeal and the Supreme Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January
1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
The Court then required his counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the aforesaid motion. Atty. La'o informed the
Court that her verification disclosed that Salle signed the motion without the assistance
of counsel on his misimpression that the motion was merely a bureaucratic requirement
necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) following the grant of a
conditional pardon by the President on 9 December 1993. She further informed the
Court that appellant Ricky Mengote was, on the same dates, granted a conditional
 !432

pardon and released from confinement, and that he immediately left for his province
without consulting her. She then prays that this Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw
his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. The
appeal was then granted by the court, but the other accused Mengote has not filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his
appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable?

HELD:
No. As Section 19 Article VII provides that “Except in cases of impeachment, or
as provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment”. By
conviction by final judgment, it means ‘(a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b)
when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is
expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial
court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to
appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet
therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be
granted to the appellant.’ In the case at bar, accused-appellant was given thirty (30) days
from notice within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to
submit it to this Court.

PEOPLE V. BACANG
(260 SCRA 44. JULY 30, 1996)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On December 1, 1993, accused-appellants in this case were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced with reclusion perpetua and to pay P200,000
and P25,000 as actual damages and funeral expenses respectively. The accused then
filed a supplemental notice of appeal in December 8, 1993. On January 11, 1996, the
Supreme Court received an undated Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal without stating
any reason for such motion from the accused. The Court received a 1st Indorsement,
dated 18 March 1996, from Superintendent Venancio J. Tesoro informing this Court that
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin "were released on Conditional
Pardon on January 25, 1996.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conditional pardon given to the accused is valid during a
pendency of their instant appeal?
 !433

HELD:
No. As Section 19 Article VII provides that “Except in cases of impeachment, or
as provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment”. In the case
at bar, the grant of pardon or the process of granting such should not have begun since
there was still no final judgment on the motion to withdraw the appeal of the accused.
The Court then ruled to deny their Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal and ordered and
order the Bureau of Corrections, with the support and assistance of the Philippine
National Police, to re-arrest the accused.

PEOPLE V. CASIDO
(G.R. NO. 116512. JULY 30, 1996)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On December 1, 1993, accused-appellants in this case were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced with reclusion perpetua and to pay P200,000
and P25,000 as actual damages and funeral expenses respectively. The accused then
filed a supplemental notice of appeal in December 8, 1993. On January 11, 1996, the
Supreme Court received an undated Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal without stating
any reason for such motion from the accused. The Court received a 1st Indorsement,
dated 18 March 1996, from Superintendent Venancio J. Tesoro informing this Court that
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin "were released on Conditional
Pardon on January 25, 1996.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conditional pardon given to the accused is valid during a
pendency of their instant appeal?

HELD:
No. As Section 19 Article VII provides that “Except in cases of impeachment, or
as provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
 !434

pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment”. In the case
at bar, the grant of pardon or the process of granting such should not have begun since
there was still no final judgment on the motion to withdraw the appeal of the accused.
The Court then ruled to deny their Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal and ordered and
order the Bureau of Corrections, with the support and assistance of the Philippine
National Police, to re-arrest the accused.

PEOPLE V. NACIONAL
(G.R. NO. 111294. SEPTEMBER 7, 1995)

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:
On December 18, 1989, Walter Nacional alias "Ka Dennis," Absalon Millamina
alias "Ka Alvin," Efren Musa, Rudy Luces, Javier Mirabete alias "Commander" and
Zacarias Militante alias "Care" were charged with murder in two separate information.
When arraigned, all the accused, except Absalon Millamina who was at large, pleaded
"not guilty." The two information were later consolidated and assigned to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City. Trial court then rendered a decision finding the
accused (except Millamina) guilty of two counts of murder qualified by evident
premeditation and attended by a conspiracy. All five (5) accused appealed and were
granted by the Supreme Court.

Nacional, Militante and Musa then filed for the withdrawal of their appeal for the
reason of that the charges against them were political in nature "committed while they
were members of the New People's Army (NPA)." They informed the Court that as
political prisoners, they applied for and were recommended by then Secretary of Justice
Franklin M. Drilon for conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines. The Court
granted their motion on May 11, 1994.

ISSUE:
Whether or not conditional pardons also exempt accused from civil liability?
 !435

HELD:
No. The Court held that “a conditional pardon, when granted, does not extinguish
the civil liability arising from the crime.” A pardon exempts an individual from the
punishment which the law inflicts for the crime committed but other than this, it does not
exempt individual bestowed by this act of grace civil liabilities on the crime committed. It
was then ordered that accused are to pay P50,000 for each of the deaths of Quirino and
Joel Lagason must be shared solidarily by all the accused.

MONSANTO V. FACTORAN
(170 SCRA 190. FEBRUARY 9, 1989)

FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:
On March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion
A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a
fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded
and to pay the costs proportionately.

Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently

affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was
pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute
pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said pardon, petitioner
wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as
assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. The letter was directed to the
Finance Ministry and it ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute
pardon. Petitioner then moved for the payment of her back-pay for the entire period she
was suspended. Finance Ministry then forwarded this letter to the Office of the President
and Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran held that petitioner is “not entitled to an
automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must
secure an appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding said absolute
pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction.”
 !436

ISSUE:
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former
position without need of a new appointment?

HELD:
No. The Court affirmed Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran’s resolution on the
reinstatement of the petitioner. A pardon restores not only offender’s liberty but also his
civil and political rights. But one of the limitation on pardon, may it be an absolute or
conditional pardon, is that it will not restore offices forfeited.

SABELLO V. DECS
(180 SCRA 623. DECEMBER 26, 1989)

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:
Sabello was an Elementary School Principal of Talisay. He made a withdrawal
from the City Treasurer’s Office the deposited aid for the Barrio of Talisay. Because of
this, Sabello, together with barrio captain, were charged of the violation of R.A. No.
3019, and was convicted to suffer a sentence of one year and a disqualification to hold
public office. After a series of appeals, the President of the Philippines granted him
absolute pardon which restores him his full civil and political rights. With this, he applied
for reinstatement to government service. However, he was not reinstated to his former
position, but as a mere classroom teacher. Sabello then prayed to the Court that he be
reinstated to his former position as Elementary School Principal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sabello should be reinstated as the School’s Principal?

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that, on the consideration of justice and equity,
Sabello was deemed eligible for reinstatement to the same position as principal and not
to the lower position of a classroom teacher. Moreover, there were no circumstances that
would warrant diminution of his rank. Thus Sabello should be reinstated to his former
position as Elementary School Principal.
 !437

TORRES V. GONZALES
(152 SCRA 273. JULY 23, 1987)

FELICIANO, J:

FACTS:
Torres was convicted of estafa in 1978. In 1979, he was pardoned by the
President with the condition that he will not violate any penal laws again. However, in
1982, he was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. Hence, Gonzales, Chairman of the
Board of Paroles petitions for the cancellation of his pardon, which was granted by the
President. Torres then filed a petition before the Supreme Court avering that the
Executive Department erred in convicting him for violationg the conditions of his pardon
because the estafa charges against him were still on appeal and were not yet final and
executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary
before Torres can be convicted in violation of the condition in his pardon?

HELD:
No. A condition in the grant of pardon that the pardonee shall not violate any
other law does not require conviction before the pardon may be withdrawn. Moreover,
Section 64 ( i ) of the Revised Administrative Code, authorizes the President to order the
arrest and re-incarceration of such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with
the conditions of the pardon. Lastly, the exercise of the Presidential judgment is beyond
judicial scrutiny.
 !438

IN RE: PETION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILFREDO S. SUMULONG

(G.R. NO. 122338. DECEMBER 29, 1995)

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J:

FACTS:
The wife and children of the convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres filed a
petition praying for the immediate release from prison of Torres on the ground that the
exercise of the President’s prerogative under Section 64 ( i ) of the Revised
Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of the condition of a
pardon, violates pardonee’s rights to due process and the constitutional presumption of
innocence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the exercise of President’s prerogative constitutes a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that a conditional pardon is in the nature of a
contract between the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal. And by the pardonee’s
consent to the terms stipulated in the contract, the pardonee has placed himself under
the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty bound to see to it that
the pardonee complies with the conditions of the pardon. Section 64 ( i ) of the Revised
Administrative Code authorizes the President to order the arrest and re-incarceration of
such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the conditions of the pardon.
Moreover, the exercise of this Presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny.
Wherefore, the instant petition for habeas corpus is dismissed.
 !439

PEOPLE V. PATRIARCA
(G.R. NO. 135457. SEPTEMBER 29, 2000)

BUENA, J.:

FACTS:
Patriarca is faced in three criminal cases filed against him. He was a member of
the New People’s Army spreading in Sorsogon and is charged with murder for killing
several people. Patriarca then applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724
amending Proclamation No. 347 entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and
All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order,
Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of
War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission.” His application was favorably
granted by the National Amnesty Board and he was given a Notice of Resolution of the
National Amnesty Commission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Patriarca is guilty of the crime of murder, an offense committed in
furtherance of rebellion?

HELD:
No. The Court ruled that the person released under an amnesty proclamation
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Effects of the
pardon as provided in Paragraph 3 Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty. Moreover, its penalty and all its effect
are also extinguished.
 !440

VERA V. PEOPLE
(7 SCRA 152. JANUARY 31, 1963)

BARRERA, J.:

FACTS:
Vera et al were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of
Amadeo Lozanes. They invoked the benefits of the amnesty proclamation of the
President, which was referred to the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission. Vera was the
only one who took the wtness stand and denied that he killed Lozanes. Because of this,
the Commission denied his application for amnesty because benefits of amnesty could
only be invoked by someone who admits that he had committed the crime. Vera then
brought the case to the Court of Appeals, however, the Court of Appeals ruled the same
way as the Commission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not amnesty proclamation can be given to someone without admitting
the commission of the crime?

HELD:
No. The Court ruled that to avail of the benefits of amnesty proclamation, one
must admit his guilt of the offense covered by the proclamation. Amnesty presupposes
the commission of a crime. And when the accused maintains that he has not committed
a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty.
 !441

6. DIPLOMATIC
 !442

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. EASTERN SEA TRADING

(3 SCRA 351. OCTOBER 31, 1961)

CONCEPCION, J.:

FACTS:
Eastern Sea Trading is a shipping company, it imported onion and garlic from
Japan to the Philippines. These goods were imported without the certificate required by
Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the goods thus imported
were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of section
1363 ( f ) of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation to the aforementioned circulars
of the Central Bank. The said circulars are pursuant to Executive Order 328 on
regulating the importation of non-dollar goods from Japan pursuant to the trade and
financial agreement between the Philippines and Japan. Eastern Sea Trading sought for
the reversal of such before the Court of Tax Appeals and was granted. The Court of Tax
Appeals entertained doubts on the legality of the executive agreement sought to be
implemented by Executive Order No. 328, owing to the fact that our Senate had not
concurred in the making of said executive agreement. The concurrence of said House of
Congress is required by our fundamental law in the making of "treaties".

ISSUE:
Whether or not an Executive Order is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of
the members of the Senate?

HELD:
No. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court distinguishes treaties from executive
agreements. It has been held that "International agreements involving political issues or
changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a
permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements
embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and
traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually
take the form of executive agreements.” Treaties, being a formal documents, requires
ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. While executive agreements,
which are binding through executive action does not need of a vote by the Senate or by
Congress.
 !443

BAYAN V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. NO. 138570. OCTOBER 10, 2000)

BUENA, J.:

FACTS:
The Visiting Force Agreement (VFA) is an agreement between the Philippines
and the United States of America. VFA is to further strengthen their defense and security
relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty
on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external
armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft. President
Estrada submitted the agreement which was treated as a treaty to the Senate and was
ratified by 2/3 votes of its members.

Petitioners herein questions the validity of VFA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not VFA is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The Visiting Force Agreement since it met the constitutional requirement of
the concurrence of 2/3 of the senate. “This Court is of the firm view that the phrase
"recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the
United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.” Even
if the United States of America consider such as an executive agreement, it is still
binding equally as a treaty.
 !444

XI. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

 !445

1. JUDICIAL REVIEW
 !446

a. GENERAL PRINCIPLE

ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

(63 PHIL. 139. JULY 15, 1936)

LAUREL. J.:

FACTS:
 !447

In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas. On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the most number of votes; and took his oath of office on November 15, 1935.
On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the
Resolution No. 8 fixing the last date to file election protests. On December 8, 1935, the
herein respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of
Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only
protest filed after the passage of Resolution No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among
other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified. On
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution wherein stating that
the Commission will not consider any protest that has not been filed on or before this
date.

Petitioner filed for the motion of protest by the respondent to be dismissed but
was denied by the Commission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission?

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission.
Supreme Court has the judicial power to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. In the case at bar, it involves an
actual controversy and the court ruled that it has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

BONDOC V. PINEDA
(G.R. NO. 97710. SEPTEMBER 26, 1991)

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J:

FACTS:
In 1987 congressional election, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP)
were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the
 !448

province of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed as winner, in turn, Bondoc filed a protest
before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of
memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision. Therein the decision it was
held that Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura, HRET member and
member of LDP, voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to
proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

Congressman Camasura admitted to Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP

Secretary General, that he voted for Bondoc not only in the final tally but also in the
election itself. Congressman Cojuangco then expelled Congressman Camasura for
betraying and disloyalty to LDP. Pineda also moved for the withdrawal of Congressman
Camasura from HRET and was later on was removed by HRET’s chairwoman.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the act of HRET?

HELD:
Yes. What is assailed in the case at bar is the act of the House of
Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
Congressman Juanito Camasura as a member of the HRET. The said case is a judicial
one and not encroaching upon the separation of powers since what is in question is not
the act of the congress but the act of HRET. The Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.

YNOT V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

(G.R. NO. 74457. MARCH 20, 1987)

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for
recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his
filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case,
the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
 !449

produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority
and also for its presumed validity.

The petitioner then raised the case in the Intermediate Appellate Court but then
the decision of the trial court was upheld.

ISSUE:
Whether or not lower courts has jurisdiction on examining the constitutionality of
a law?

HELD:
Yes. As the Constitution provides, the Court may "review, revise, reverse, modify
or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide." In the case at
bar the Court held that “while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving
the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal.

GARCIA V. DRILON
(G.R. NO. 179267. JUNE 25, 2013)

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus
C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support. The RTC granted the TPO. Petitioner then filed to Court of Appeals a
petition questioning the validity of R.A. 9262.

ISSUE:
 !450

Whether or not the petition must be dismissed on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioners’ contention that RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality has no basis. He should have
questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 while the case is still in the RTC. Family
Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time. Thus, if such
question of constitutionality is not in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial.
Moreover, if it was not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

MIRASOL V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. 128448. FEBRUARY 1, 2001)

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses, sugarland owners and planters, entered into several crop
loan financing schemes secured by chattel and real estate mortgages with respondent
Philippine National Bank (PNB). In this scheme, PNB is authorized to negotiate and sell
sugar produced and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the Mirasol’s loan.
Pursuant to Presidential Decree 579, Philippine Exchange Co. Inc. was authorized to
purchase sugar allotted for export with PNB. Petitioners herein requested for liquidation
but was ignored by PNB. Petitioners filed a case before the trial court averring that their
obligations had been already paid by virtue of compensation with the unliquidated
amounts owed to them by PNB. Then the trial court, without notice to the Solicitor
General, rendered judgment holding PD No. 579 unconstitutional ordering private
respondents to pay petitioners the whole amount corresponding to the residue of the
unliquidated actual cost price of sugar exported and to pay moral damages and
 !451

attorney's fees. Respondents appealed on the Court of Appeals which reversed the
findings of the constitutionality of PD No. 579 ruled by the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Regional Trial Court has authority and jurisdiction to rule on PD
No. 579 constitutionality?

HELD:
Yes. It has been held that Regional Trial Court have the authority and jurisdiction
to rule on the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or executive order.
However, the Solicitor General must be notified any action assailing the validity of a
statute, treaty, presidential decree, order or proclamation in pursuant to Section 3, Rule
64 of the Rules of Court. ‘Without the required notice the government is deprived of its
day in court and it was improper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutionality of the
questioned PD.’

TAÑADA V. CUENCO
(100 PHIL 1101. FEBRUARY 28, 1957)

CONCEPCION, J.:

FACTS:
Senatorial Electoral Tribunal should be composed of nine members, three
coming from the Justices of the Supreme Court, three from senators of the majority party
and the remaining three from senators of the minority party. After the 1995 national
elections, there only is one senator from the minority party which is the petitioner herein,
Lorenzo Tañada, from the Citizen’s Party. Having only one member from the minority
party, the other two vacant seats were filed by members from the majority party, the
Nacionalista Party.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue is a political issue?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court took cognizance of the case and ruled that it is a
justiciable question. It was held that the Senatorial Electoral Tribunal is a separate and
independent office from the Senate. Aside from this, the SET is not performing a
 !452

legislative act. In the case at bar, the filling of seats for the minority party is valid
provided that when the Chairman of SET appointed members therein, it is with the
concurrence of the majority of the members sitting with the Chairman.

DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA

(G.R. No. 134577. NOVEMBER 18, 1998)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular
session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers.
Senators Fernan and Tatad were nominated to the position of Senate President. By a
vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was duly elected as the Senate President.

Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the
only other members of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who voted for him belonged to the minority. During the discussion,
Sen. Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD –
numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona, Jr. as minority
leader. No consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of
a letter that the 7 LAKAS-NUCD-UDMP senators elected Sen. Guingona as the minority
leader. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in main that Sen. Guingona had been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that,
according to them, rightfully belonged to Sen. Tatad.
 !453

ISSUE:
Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

HELD:
No. The matter complained of concerned the internal procedures of the House,
with which the Court had no concern. In the instant controversy, the petitioners claimed
that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, has not been observed in the
selection of the Senate Minority Leader. They also invoked the Court’s “expanded”
judicial power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of respondents. However, the
Court has no jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the
relief asserted. In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court
has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and
prerogatives.

VINUYA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 162230. APRIL 28, 2010)

DEL – CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari with an application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of DOJ, and the OSG. Petitioners are all members
of the MALAYA LOLAS, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of
rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during Second World War. They
narrated that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and
systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. They also
claimed that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the
DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to
assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with
the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Hence, this petition where
petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in
not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan?
 !454

HELD:
No. There is no grave abuse of discretion. Political questions refer "to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." Certain types of cases
often have been found to present political questions. One such category involves
questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "the conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision." Not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse
claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the
authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to
the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it
is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. For the Court to overturn the Executive
Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments
by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed. The petition is dismissed.

BELGICA V. OCHOA
(G.R. No. 208566. NOVEMBER 19, 2013)

PERLAS – BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
“Pork Barrel” is a political parlance of American- English origin. It refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representative district. In the Philippines, “Pork Barrel” has
been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature, although, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the
Executive. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to
the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork
barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

The allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner: a. P70
million: for each member of the lower house; b. P200 million: for each senator; c. P200
million: for the Vice-President. The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment
of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into
their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by
the legislator concerned.

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the
last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim
Napoles. Petitioners filed before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of
the pork barrel system.

ISSUE:
 !455

Whether or not the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial
review?

HELD:
No. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of the government but rather a
legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. The 1987
Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has
the power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of
the government.

CORONA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 200242. JULY 17, 2012)

VILLARAMA, JR., J:

FACTS:
This is a petition filed by the former Chief Justice of the Court, Renato C. Corona,
assailing the impeachment case initiated by the members of the House of
Representatives (HOR) and trial conducted by Senate of the Philippines. Petitioner was
charged with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and
corruption because it is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that "a
public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as
may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law." Respondent
failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as
required by the Constitution. It is also reported that some of the properties of
Respondent are not included in his declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in
violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. The petition argued that the
Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by
respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for
lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the
complaint which, aside from being a "hodgepodge" of multiple charges, do not constitute
allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or
hearsay; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and
unexplained wealth and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner's
alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the
result of an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that those documents
submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under
 !456

Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under
Sec. 10 thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case becomes moot and academic?

HELD:
Yes. In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the
conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges.
Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In
fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and
nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief
Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by
the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by
supervening events and his own acts.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and
value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be
entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

b. REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL

REVIEW
 !457

i. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

 !458

GUINGONA V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 125532. JULY 10, 1998)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted an investigation on the alleged participation and involvement of national and
local government officials in “jueteng” and other forms of gambling. The case was also
the subject of a legislative inquiry/investigation by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives.

In November 1995, Potenciano Roque claiming to be an eyewitness sought

admission into the Government’s “Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program.”
The DOJ Task Force on illegal gambling, created by petitioner, conducted a preliminary
investigation of the case and subpoenaed all the respondents. On January 1996, the
petition for reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano Roque to the Witness Protection
Program was denied by the petitioner Secretary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the facts and the issues raised by petitioners warrant the
expercise of the judicial power?

HELD:
No. The petition must fail because the facts and the issues raised by petitioners
do not warrant the exercise of the judicial power. The Court finds the petition
fundamentally defective. The Constitution provides that judicial power includes the duty
of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. The Court should then leave to the executive branch the
decision on how best to administer the Witness Protection Program. Judicial review,
which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands (1) there must be an actual case
calling for the exercise of the judicial power, (2) the question must be ripe for
adjudication and (3) the person challenging must have standing, that is, he has a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain
direct injury. Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to show
a case ripe for adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this Court might make in this
case would constitute an attempt at abstraction that can only lead to barren legal
dialectics and sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Wherefore, the petition is
hereby denied.
 !459

JOHN HAY PEOPLE’S ALTERNATIVE COALITION V. LIM

(G.R. No. 119775. OCTOBER 24, 2003)

CARPIO – MORALES, J:

FACTS:
The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then
President Ramos declaring a portion of Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone
(SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within the John Hay Special Economic
Zone. In the present petition, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the
proclamation. The Court also held that it is the legislature, unless limited by a provision
of the Constitution, that has the full power to exempt any person or corporation or class
of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. The
challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a
law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of Congress. Moreover, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ
from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on
which it is based. Thus, the Court declared that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax
exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ was void for being violative of the
Constitution. However, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to the law or the
Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp
John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by means of a
proclamation. Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, as in the case at bar,
may stand and be enforced.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to bring the petition?

HELD:
Yes. R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local
government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the country. The
grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases'
conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a
recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base
area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio,
in assailing the legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and substantial such that
they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being
challenged. Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation
and not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest, for what is at
stake in the enforcement of Proclamation No. 420 is the very economic and social
 !460

existence of the people of Baguio City. Moreover, petitioners .Claravall and Yaranon
were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance of
Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents
the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered
by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioners Claravall and Yaranon, as city
officials who voted against the Sanggunian Resolution No.
255 (Series of 1994)supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No.
420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.

BELGICA V. OCHOA
(G.R. No. 208566, NOVEMBER 19, 2013)

PERLAS – BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
“Pork Barrel” is a political parlance of American- English origin. It refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representative district. In the Philippines, “Pork Barrel” has
been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature, although, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the
Executive. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to
the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork
barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

The allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner: a. P70
million: for each member of the lower house; b. P200 million: for each senator; c. P200
million: for the Vice-President. The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment
of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into
their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by
the legislator concerned.

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the
last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim
Napoles. Petitioners filed before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of
the pork barrel system.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual
and justiciable controversy?

HELD:
Yes. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the
parties regarding the constitutionality of the pork barrel system. The case is ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their utilization are
currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury
to petitioners. The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the
abolition thereof does not actually terminate the controversy on the matter. The
President does not have constitutional authority to nullify or annul the legal existence of
the PDAF. The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from deciding the
case considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a situation of exceptional character
and is a matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive
 !461

ruling on the system’s constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the public,
and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence.

PACU V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

(97 PHIL. 806. OCTOBER 31, 1955)

BENGZON, J.:

FACTS:
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) here assails the
constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by RA 139. Act No. 2706 provides that
before a private school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the
Sec. of Education, which they aver restrains the right of a citizen to own and operate a
school. Said Act also confers on the Sec. of Education to maintain a general standard of
efficiency in all private schools. PACU contends this confers unlimited power constituting
unlawful delegation of legislative power. On the other hand, RA 139 provides the Board
of Textbooks power to review all textbooks to be used in private schools and prohibit the
use of those deemed, in sum, unsuitable. PACU avers this is censorship in its “baldest
form”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PACU can validly assail the constitutionality of foregoing
statutes?

HELD:
No. The action is premature. There is no justiciable controversy as petitioners
have suffered no wrong and therefore no actual and positive relief may be had in striking
down the assailed statues. Petitioner private schools are operating under the permits
issued to them pursuant to the assailed Act, and there is no threat, as they do not assert,
that the Secretary of Education will revoke their permits. Mere apprehension that the
Secretary might, under the law, withdraw the permit does not constitute a justiciable
controversy. Petitioners also do not show how the “general standard of efficiency” set by
the Secretary has injured any of them or interfered with their operation. It has not been
shown that the Board of Textbooks has prohibited certain texts to which petitioners are
averse and are thereby in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights.
 !462

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V. ROMULO

(G.R. No. 152774. MAY 27, 2004)

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC. The
Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed several
Resolutions which were approved by Pres. Estrada. The guidelines formulated by the
Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under
the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the
DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent
release of the corresponding funds. Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas,
petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) &
imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the
OCD reslutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991?

HELD:

Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions effectively
encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs. The entire process involving the
distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part
of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the
Constitution mandates that the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
Since the release is automatic. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs
and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate. The only possible
exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal
revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the
3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case. The Oversight
Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant
or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate
lawand not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate
legislation. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters
of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments
through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs. The value of
LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy.
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions
are based.
 !463

PORMENTO V. ESTRADA
(G.R. No. 191988. AUGUST 31, 2010)

CORONA, C.J.:

FACTS:
Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former President Joseph
Estrada for being a presidential candidate in the May 2010 elections. The petition was
denied by COMELEC second division and subsequently by COMELEC en banc.
Pormento then filed the present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the meantime,
Estrada was able to participate as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010
elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.


ISSUE:
Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for presidency in the May
2010 elections according to the phrase in the Constitution which states: "[t]he President
shall not be eligible for any re-election.”?

Held:
No. There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent did not win
the second time he ran. The issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any re-
election" will be premised on a person second election as President.


Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a
President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections; the same is no
longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not
elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "re-election" will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is hereby dismissed.

ENRILE V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 132986. MAY 19, 2004)
 !464

SANDOVAL – GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:
On January 1995, Senator Pimentel, private respondent herein, filed with the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an election protest against Senator Enrile, and other
senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections. On 1997, the SET,
without resolving the election protest, held a press conference at the Supreme Court
Session Hall announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the
pilot precincts. In the press release entitled “Partial Results in Pimentel’s Protest”, the
tabulation was issued and the name of petitioner dropped from number 11 to number 15.
Petitioner filed a “Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentel’s Protest and to
Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties.” Petitioner
alleged that the partial results were manifestly erroneous. Despite the 30, 000 votes
given back to the petitioner from tallies in Ilocos Norte, the SET denied petitioner’s
motion, holding that there is no sufficient basis to discard its partial tabulation. Petitioner
filed again his motion for reconsideration but was denied by the SET; hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that the partial results released by the SET are erroneous because
they are improbable and not supported by evidence. In their comments, respondent and
the OSG maintain that the SET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed resolutions. Furthermore, the OSG asserts that the present petition has become
moot and academic because the tenure of the contested senatorial position subject of
respondent’s protest where the assailed resolutions originated expired on June 30,
1998.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SET committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s “Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentel’s Protest and to Conduct
Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of all Parties?

HELD:
No. The petition becomes moot and academic because there is no actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. The Supreme Court sided with the SET in its resolutions explaining why the tally
of petitioner did not match that of the SET. However the petition has become moot and
academic since the tenure of the contested senatorial position expired as early as June
30, 1998. In Garcia v. COMELEC, the issues where held to become moot and academic,
there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same or of no
practical use or value.

LACSON V. PEREZ
(G.R. No. 147780. MAY 20, 2001)

MELO, J.:

FACTS:
 !465

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an “angry and violent

mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons” assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No.
38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She
likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were
thereafter effected.


Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a “state of rebellion,”

which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related
petitions were filed before the Court. Prior to resolution, the “state of rebellion” was lifted
in Metro Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests
and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same?

HELD:
No. President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6,
2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic.
Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities
intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to
and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may
only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the
rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on
Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time
because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may
be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the
arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity
of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the
country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio
must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for
relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no
complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas
corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners
are not subjected to. Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with
their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all
persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the
required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the
May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
GONZALES V. NARVASA
(G.R. No. 140835. AUGUST 14, 2000)

GONZAGA – REYES, J.:

FACTS:

On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed assailing theco
nstitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
 !466

(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. In his
capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from
passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers
a n d
assistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled through ama
ndamus to furnish the petitioner with information requesting the names of executive
officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list
of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to
Malacañang.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and
as taxpayer?

HELD:
No. The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as
citizen. Petitioner did not in fact show what particularized interest they have to bring the
suit. As civic leaders, they still fall short of the requirements to maintain action. Their
interest in assailing the EO does not present to be of a direct and personal character.
Furthermore, they do not sustain or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its
enforcement.As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation gr
anted fromCongress but only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by
Congress of its taxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the
PCCR’s creation. The petitioner has failed to show that he is a real party in interest. With
regards to the petitioner’s request of disclosure to public information, the Court upheld
that citizens may invoke before the courts the right to information. When a mandamus
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen. The Supreme
Court dismissed the petition with the exception that respondent Executive Secretary is
ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.

ATLAS FERTILIZER V. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

(G.R. No. 93100. JUNE 19, 1997)

ROMERO, J:

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case questioning the constitutionality Sections 3 (b), 11,
13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of RA 6657. That the said provision extends agrarian reform to
aquaculture lands even as Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the Constitution limits agrarian reform
only to agricultural lands. The said provisions being violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution by similarly treating of aquaculture and agriculture lands when
 !467

they are differently situated. That the said provisions distort employment benefits and
burdens in favor of aquaculture employees and against other industrial workers even as
Section 1 and 3 of Art. XIII of the Constitution mandates the State to promote equality in
economic and employment opportunities and that the questioned provisions deprived
petitioner of its government-induced investments in aquaculture even as Sec. 2 and 3 of
Art. XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to respect the freedom of enterprise and
the right of enterprises to reasonable returns of investments and to expansion and
growth.

In the petitioner's argument they contended that in the case of Luz Farms, Inc v.
Secretary of Agrarian and Reform, the Court has already ruled impliedly that lands
devoted to fishing are not agricultural lands. That in aquaculture, fishponds and prawn
farms, the use of land is only incidental to and not the principal factor in productivity and
hence, as held in the above-mentioned case, they too should be excluded from RA 6657
just as land devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for the same
reason.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed provisions of RA 6657 has become moot and
academic?

HELD:
Yes. The question regarding the constitutionality of the above-mentioned
provisions has become moot and academic with the passage of RA 7881 and RA 7881
expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded because the foregoing
provision shall not apply to agricultural lands subsequently converted to fishponds or
prawn farms provided the size of the land converted does not exceed the retention limit
of the landowner from the coverage of RA 6657.

REPUBLIC V. MANALO
(G.R. No. 192302. JUNE 4, 2014)

PERLAS-BERNABE, J:

FACTS:
On July 18, 2003, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented
in this case by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), filed a complaint for civil
forfeiture, entitled "Republic v. R.A.B. Realty, Inc., et al before the Manila RTC.
Subsequently, or on July 21, 2003, it filed a second complaint for civil forfeiture,
entitled "Republic v. Ariola, Jr., et al.," also before the same RTC. In the said civil
forfeiture cases, the Republic sought the forfeiture in its favor of certain deposits and
government securities maintained in several bank accounts by the defendants therein,
which were related to the unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting investments from the
 !468

public, in violation of the Securities Regulation Code as well as the Anti-Money

Laundering Act of 2001. On August 8, 2007, the Manila RTC rendered a Joint
Order denying respondents' separate motions for intervention. In view of the remedy
stated in the foregoing provision, the Manila RTC thus ratiocinated that respondents
"need not unduly worry as they are amply protected in the event the funds subjects of
the instant case are ordered forfeited in favor of the [Republic]." Dissatisfied,
respondents moved for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the Manila RTC in
an Order dated January 10, 2008, prompting them to elevate the case to the CA
on certiorari. In a Decision dated May 21, 2009, the CA granted respondents' petition,
ruling that the Manila RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondents'
separate motions for intervention. Feeling aggrieved, the Republic moved for
reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May 17,
2010, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Manila RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the joint order?

HELD:
No. The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic. A
case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is
no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case which presents a
moot question can no longer be enforced. In this case, the Manila RTC's rendition of the
Decision dated September 23, 2010 as well as the Decision dated February 11, 2011
and the Amended Decision dated May 9, 2011 by virtue of which the assets subject of
the said cases were all forfeited in favor of the government, are supervening
events which have effectively rendered the essential issue in this case moot and
academic, that is, whether or not respondents should have been allowed by the Manila
RTC to intervene on the ground that they have a legal interest in the forfeited assets. As
the proceedings in the civil forfeiture cases from which the issue of intervention is merely
an incident have already been duly concluded, no substantial relief can be granted to the
Republic by resolving the instant petition. Wherefore the petition is dismissed for being
moot and academic.
SALONGA V. PANO
(G.R. No. L-59524. FEBRUARY 18, 1985)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been
established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner
asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law
to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the
Philippines. The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro
Manila Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner
Salonga as one of those responsible. On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate
General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” stating that “the
preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on
December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the
 !469

charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The
petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and
despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against
him or any copies of the so-called supporting evidence. The counsel for Salonga was
furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12
March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA
1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel
for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge
Ernani Cruz Pano denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution
ordering the filing of information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as
amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated
2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for
certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established
by the prosecution to justify the filing of information against him. He states that to
sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to
admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the above case still falls under an actual case?

HELD:
No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s
judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and
separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz
granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case
against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution
restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as
one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution. The court is
constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the
draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once
again in the Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations. Insofar as the absence of
a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision
has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
SANLAKAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
(G.R. No. 159085. FEBRUARY 3, 2004)

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the
AFP stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City armed with high-
powered ammunitions and explosives. They demanded among other things, the
resignation of Pres. Arroyo, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the PNP. The
President then issued Proclamation 427 and G.O. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion
and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Despite the occupation
ending on the same night, the President did not immediately lift the declaration and did
so after 5 days. In the interim, several petitions were filed challenging the petition of P.
No. 427 and G.O. 4.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sanlakas has legal standing?

HELD:
 !470

No. Even assuming that petitioners are “people’s organizations,” this status
would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the
presidential issuances, as this Court made clear in Kilosbayan v. Morato.

The Constitution provides that “the State shall respect the role of independent people’s
organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic
framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and
lawful means,” that their right to “effective and reasonable participation at all levels of
social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged.” (Art XIII, Sections
15-16).


These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in
interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The
jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by
the “case and controversy” requirement of Art. VIII, Section 5. This requirement lies at
the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision- making in the
courts from decision- making in the political departments of the government and bars the
bringing of suits by just any party.

That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily
endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. No such
illegal disbursement is alleged. On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a
constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Again, no such injury is alleged in this case.

ACOP V. GUINGONA
(G.R. No. 134855. JULY 2, 2002)

AUSTRIA – MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:
On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the criminal group known
as the Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City
in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery Intelligence Task Group of the
Philippine National Police (PNP). SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
Investigation Command (CIC) of the PNP and who was one of the officers assigned to
conduct an investigation on the incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that
there was no shootout and the eleven (11) suspected members of the gang were
summarily executed. This was attested by SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, also a member of
the CIC. The senate conducted hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding
the subject incident and SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the
Senate hearings. On June 2, 1995, former Senator Raul Roco, who was then the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, recommended that
SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the government’s Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Accordingly, they were admitted into the said
Program. Herein petitioners, in their capacity as tax payers, but who are among the PNP
officers implicated in the alleged rubout, contend that under Sec. 3(d) for R.A. No. 6981,
law enforcement officers, like SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz, are disqualified
 !471

from being admitted into the witness protection program even though they may be
testifying against other law enforcement officers. Petitioners pray that the decision of the
RTC be reversed and set aside and instead – “ a) An injunction be issued enjoining the
Department of Justice from continuing to provide the benefits accruing under the
Witness Protection Program to respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz; b)
Order the immediate discharge of respondent SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz
from WPP and for the latter to be ordered to cease and desist from accepting benefits of
the WPP; and c) Order respondent officers to return whatever monetary benefits they
have received from the government as a consequence of their wrongful and illegal
admission into the WPP”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for judicial review should prosper?

HELD:
No. In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that the
petition lacks merit and that the same has been rendered moot and academic because
the coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the Program was
already terminated on December 3, 1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as
evidenced by the letter of the Director of the Program addressed to OSG, dated
February 10, 1999. In their comment, private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2
dela Cruz agree with OSG. Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered moot
and academic by reason of the release of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from
the coverage of the Program. However, the Court find it necessary to resolve the merits
of the principal issue raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) for future guidance of
both bench and bar as to the applications of Sec. 3(d) and 4 of R.A. No. 6981.

FUNA V. CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

(G.R. No. 191672. NOVEMBER 25, 2014)

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
In 2010, Pres. Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC. The
Commission on Appointments confirmed Duque’s appointment on February 3, 2010. On
February 2010, Pres. Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 in which Duque was
designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the following
government – owned or government – controlled corporations (GOCCs): a. GSIS, b.
Philhealth, c. ECC and d. HDMF. Petitioner Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned
citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi?

HELD:
Yes. The locus standi of the petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a
lawyer to bring a suit of this nature has already been settled in his favor in rulings by the
Court on several other public litigations he brought. To have legal standing, therefore, a
suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a “direct injury” as a result of a
government action, or have a material interest in the issue affected by the challenged
official act. However, the rules on locus standi are: 1) for taxpayers, there must be a
claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
2) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
 !472

law in question; 3) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and 4) for legislators,
there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as
legislators. This case before the Court is of transcendental importance, since it obviously
has “far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide
the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. The Court thus assume a
liberal stance and allowed petitioner to institute the instant petition.

ARAULLO V. AQUINO III

(G.R. No. 209287. JULY 1, 2014)

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a
stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program
called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as a remedy
to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign
funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project
is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will
be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings”
by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The
DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact
reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme
Court). Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA. Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made
an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as
an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed
upon the request of the Senators. This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out
that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-
Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front),
P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
 !473

Relocation Projects, etc. This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of

the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various
petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their
contentions was. DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.” Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain
laws particularly the GAP, Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution, Secs. 38 and 49 of
Executive Order 292.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable?

HELD:
Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act
prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The
DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the
Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm
than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP
cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity
of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the
authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate
tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
OPLE V. TORRES
(G.R. No. 127685. JULY 23, 1998)

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:
Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos
on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for
violating the right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two
constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it
intrudes the citizen’s right to privacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a
Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue
that the issue of Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s
concern that the Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress
is understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to
make laws and the power of executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance
and cannot be allowed.
 !474

MONTESCLAROS V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 152295. JULY 9, 2002)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to
Sangguniang Kabataan and limited its membership to youths “at least 15 but no more
than 21 years of age.” On 18 February 2002, Antoniette VC Montesclaros demanded
from COMELEC that SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. COMELEC
Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to the House of Representatives and the Senate on
20 February 2002 inquiring on the status of pending bills on SK and Barangay elections
and expressed support to postpone the SK election on November 2002. On 11 March
2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456,
resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age to at least 15
but no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the Senate and House of
Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002 respectively and signed by the
President on 19 March 2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for
temporary restraining order seeking the prevention of postponement of the SK election
and reduction of age requirement on 11 March 2002.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proposed bill has actual justiciable controversy?

HELD:
No. Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This petition presents no actual
justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be
unconstitutional. Petitioner’s perayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a
proposed bill does not present actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to
judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no
duty legally enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no constitutional
right or duty. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted
into law. After its passage petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that
could be unconstitutional.
 !475

MARIANO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 118577. MARCH 7, 1995)

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:
At bench are petitions for prohibition and declaratory relief, assailing provisions
of Republic Act No. 7854 "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." as unconstitutional. Mariano together
with the other petitioners, uing as taxpayers, assail as unconstitutional Sections 2, 51
and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:


"1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 'three consecutive
term' limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section
7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in
violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to
be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every
census;
(b) the increase in legislative district, was not expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000."

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy?

HELD:
No. The petitions are based on the occurrence of contingent events, and are
merely hypothetical. Such as Mayor Binay’s re-election, which at some point may or may
not happen. Thus, said petition is not yet ripe to be an actual case or controversy.
 !476

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are
well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Petitioners failed to comply with these requirements.

FERNANDEZ V. TORRES
(G.R. No. 102940. NOVEMBER 6, 1992)

FELICIANO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners seek prohibit and restrain the enforcement and implementation of
Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 entitled "Prescribing Additional Requirements,
Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment of Performing Artists." Item No. 1 of the
assailed DOLE Circular provides as follows:

"1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployed outside the Philippines except for
legitimate performing artists consisting of musicians, singers and members of dance
troupes. In all cases, the performing artists must have a track record of legitimate and
reputable performance in the Philippines for at least one year. In no case shall the
performing artist be below 23 years old.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing
artists from coverage hereof."

The labor representatives recommended that the minimum age for performing
artists seeking overseas deployment be raised from eighteen (18) years to twenty three
(23) years. In the present proceeding, petitioners allege themselves to be "qualified
performing artists, mostly singers and dancers," of ages eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22)
years. Through counsel, they challenge the constitutional validity of Item No. 1 of DOLE
Circular No. 01-91. Solicitor General urges that the petition at bar does not present a
justiciable controversy:

". . . petitioners, who claim to be performing artists, had not previously applied
with the Secretary of Labor for exemption from the coverage of the Circular in
line with the aforequoted provision. Said provision connotes that the prohibition is
not at all permanent or absolute. It admits of exception . . . But to repeat, there is
no allegation in the petition that petitioners had previously sought exemption from
the Secretary of Labor, from the coverage of the Circular, before filing the instant
petition. Obviously, the petition must fail for prematurity."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition presents a justiciable controversy?

HELD:
 !477

No. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General. The petitioners never sought
exemption from the Secretary of Labor, and therefore cannot claim that they have been
denied of such. Moreso, petitioners cannot say that respondent have continually
threatened to deny all applications which may lead to their assumption that they will
likely be denied if they seek such exemption. There is no actual case or controversy for
this petition is grouned on mere hypothetical circumstances. Which in fact, may or may
not happen.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)

(G.R. No. 119694. MAY 22, 1995)

FELICIANO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner, Philippine Press Institute, assails the consititutionality of Resolution
No. 2772 promulgated on March 2, 1995 by the COMELEC. Particularly Section 2 and 8
which reads:

Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free print space of not
less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in
every province or city for use as 'Comelec Space' from March 6, 1995 in the case
of candidates for senators and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the
absence of said newspaper, 'Comelec Space' shall be obtained from any
magazine or periodical of said province or city.

Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. — No

newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news,
opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or
comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by
unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political
party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise,
the Commission will respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of
the newspapers or publication that the accounts or views published are
significant, newsworthy and of public interest.”

PPI asks to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on
the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. Petitioner also argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution
No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press
and of expression. At the oral hearing, respondent Comelec through its Chairman, Hon.
Bernardo Pardo, stated that Resolution No. 2772, particularly Section 2 thereof and the
22 March 1995 letters were not intended to compel those members to supply Comelec
with free print space. On 4 May 1995, the Comelec resolved to clarify Sections 2 and 8
of Res. No. 2772.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition presents an actual case or controversy?

HELD:
 !478

No for Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, for petitioner failed to allege any act by
the COMELEC to enforce said provision. Neither has it claimed that it sustained any
actual injury.

Yes for Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772. Though the petition may have been
considered as moot and academic upon COMELEC’s resolution to clarify on May 1995,
the Court still deemed it appropriate to pass upon this issue due to an invalid exercise of
the power of eminent domain. Thus, the Court ruled that Sec. 2 of Resolution No. 2772
is null and void.
MACASIANO V. NATIONAL HOUSING INSTITUTE (NHA)
(G.R. No. 107921. JULY 1, 1993)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic
Act No. 7279 or the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He alleges that said
Sections "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his
"tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said
sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he
assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has
a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed."
Section 28 on Eviction and Demolition and Section 44 on Moratorium on Eviction and
Demolition. Petitioner maintains that the said provisions are unconstitutional because:

"(a) They deprive the government, and more so, private property owners of their property
without due process of law and without compensation;

(b) They reward, instead of punish, what this Honorable Court has categorically declared
as unlawful acts;

(c) They violate the prohibition against legislation that takes away one's property to be
given to plain interlopers;

(d) They sweep overbroadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State;
and

(e) They encroach upon the judicial power to execute its valid judgments and orders."

The Solicitor General contends that there is no actual case or controversy with
litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an
advisory opinion, and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the
very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not
constitutionally infirm.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition presents an actual case or controversy?

HELD:
No. The Court finds indubitable ground for the constitutional challenge, not even
a necessity to resolve it. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary, acts of political departments are presumed to be valid based on the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers.
 !479

BOARD OF OPTOMETRY V. COLET

(G.R. No. 122241. JULY 30, 1996)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners want to annul and set aside for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion the order of 25 August 1995 issued by public respondent Judge
Angel V. Colet in Civil Case No. 95-74770 which granted a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the petitioners herein "from undertaking in any
form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry Law [R.A.
No. 8050] or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder."

R.A. No. 8050, entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education,
Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the Revised
Optometry Law of 1995, was a consolidation of House Bill (HB) No. 14100 and Senate
Bill (SB) No. 1998.
On 31 July 1995, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order.

On 1 August 1995, the trial court, per respondent Judge Angel V. Colet, issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents from enforcing or implementing
R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics. On 11 August 1995, the petitioners herein, as
respondents below, filed an Opposition to the application for preliminary injunction and
alleged that:

(1) No proper ground exists to warrant the issuance of a writ as

(a) petitioners therein do not possess the requisite right as would entitle them to
the relief demanded;
(b) petitioners have unquestionably not shown their legal existence or capacity to
file the case, much less their authority to file it in a representative capacity; and
(c) petitioners have misled the court into believing that an act is being done in the
implementation of R.A No. 8050 tending to make the judgment ineffectual?;

(2) The implementation of R.A. No. 8050 carries no injurious effect;? and

(3) Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of R.A.

8050?

ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists an actual case or controversy in Civil Case No.
95-74770?

HELD:
No. It has been held that there is yet no actual case or controversy as private
respondents failed to prove their juridical personality, and are therefore cannot be real
parties in interest. Therefore, this petition is granted because respondent Judge acted
 !480

with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in the Civil
Case.

ii. PROPER PARTY

 !481

SALONGA V. WARNER BARNES & CO., LTD.

(G.R. No. L-2246. JANUARY 31, 1951)

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering
the defendant, as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York, to pay to
the plaintiff the sum of P717.82 with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint
until paid, and the costs. The case was taken to this court because it involves only
questions of law.

On August 28, 1946, Westchester Fire Insurance Company of New York entered
into a contract with Tina J. Gamboa whereby said company insured one case of rayon
yardage which said Tina J. Gamboa shipped from San Francisco, California, on steamer
Clovis Victory, to Manila, Philippines and consigned to Jovito Salonga, plaintiff herein.
According to the contract of insurance, the insurance company undertook to pay to the
sender or her consignee the damages that may be caused to the goods shipped subject
to the condition that the liability of the company will be limited to the actual loss which is
not to exceed the sum of P2,000. The ship arrived in Manila on September 10, 1946.
Upon examination the surveyors found a shortage in the shipment in the amount of
P1,723.12. Plaintiff filed a claim for damages in the amount of P1,723.12 against the
American President Lines, agents of the ship Clovis Victory, demanding settlement, and
when apparently no action was taken on this claim, plaintiff demanded payment thereof
from Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., as agent of the insurance company in the Philippines,
and this agent having refused to pay the claim.

In the meantime, the American President Lines, in a letter dated November 25,
1946, agreed to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P476.17 and when this offer was
rejected, the claim was finally settled in the amount of P1,021.25. As a result, the
ultimate liability of the defendant under the insurance contract was reduced to P717.82
only. After trial, the court rendered judgment as stated in the early part of this decision.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant having been denied, the case was
appealed to this court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is the proper party to raise the issue?
2. Whether or not petitioner may proceed with the case against Warner Barnes
& Co., Ltd.?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner Jovito Salonga has suffered a direct injury in the case at bar, due
to the consignment deal with Tina Gamboa who shipped the rayon yardage from San
Francisco.

No. It is claimed that a judgment, for or against an agent, in no way binds the real
party in interest. If the party sued upon is not the proper party, any decision that may be
rendered against him cannot be enforced or executed. Such would be the result of this
case if it will be allowed to proceed against the defendant, for even if a favorable
judgment is obtained against it, it cannot be enforced because the real party is not
involved. The defendant cannot be made to pay for something it is not responsible.
ADVOCATES OF TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. V. BANKO SENTRAL MONETARY
BOARD
 !482

(G.R. No. 192986. JANUARY 15, 2013)

REYES, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners, claiming that they are raising issues of transcendental importance to
the public, filed directly with this Court this Petition for Certiorari seeking to declare that
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank
Monetary Board (CB-MB) has no authority to continue enforcing Central Bank Circular
No. 905, which "suspended" Act No. 2655, or the Usury Law of 1916.

Petitioner "Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc." (AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-stock

corporation organized to engage in pro bono concerns and activities relating to money
lending issues. It filed this petition, joined by its founder and president, Eduardo B.
Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen. R.A. No. 265, which created the Central
Bank (CB) of the Philippines, empowered the CB-MB to set the maximum interest rates
which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit operations, within limits
prescribed by the Usury Law. On March 17, 1980, the Usury Law was amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1684, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe different
maximum rates of interest which may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof or the
forbearance of any money, goods or credits, provided that the changes are effected
gradually and announced in advance. In its Resolution No. 2224 dated December 3,
1982, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905. Under its General Provisions, it removed
the ceilings on interest rates on loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits.

Petitioners contend that under Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended by P.D.
No. 1684, the CB-MB was authorized only to prescribe or set the maximum rates of
interest for a loan or renewal thereof . Thus, according to petitioners, CB Circular No.
905 is void because it violated Article 5 of the New Civil Code. They further claim that
just weeks after the issuance of CB Circular No. 905, the benchmark 91-day Treasury
bills (T-bills), then known as "Jobo" bills shot up to 40% per annum, as a result. Finally,
petitioners point out that R.A. No. 7653 did not re-enact a provision similar to Section
109 of R.A. No. 265, and therefore, BSP-MB has been stripped of the power either to
prescribe the maximum rates of interest or to suspend Act No. 2655 and continue
enforcing CB Circular No. 905.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the petition?

HELD:
No. The petitioners failed to show that they sustained any injury brought by CB
Circular No. 905. Even as taxpayers, petitioners also do not claim that public funds were
being misused in this issue.

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question." The real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, a
party's standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION V. ENERGY

REGULATORY COMMISSION
(G.R. No. 174697. JULY 8, 2010)

BRION, J.:
 !483

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to nullify Section 2.6 of the
Distribution Services and Open Access Rules (DSOAR), promulgated by respondent
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC. Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders'
Associations, Inc. asserts that Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, is unconstitutional and
contrary to Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as "The Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)." Pursuant to its rule-making powers under the EPIRA, the
ERC promulgated the Magna Carta for Residential Electricity Consumers (Magna
Carta), which establishes residential consumers' rights to have access to electricity and
electric service, subject to the requirements set by local government units and
distribution utilities (DUs). Article 14 of the Magna Carta pertains to the rights of
consumers to avail of extension lines or additional facilities. The same article specifies
that if a developer initially pays the cost of the extension lines but passes it to the
registered customer, the customer would still be entitled to recover the cost in the
manner provided. On January 18, 2006, the ERC modified this provision when it issued
the DSOAR. Section 2.6.1 reiterates the old rule requiring consumers located beyond 30
meters from existing lines to advance the costs of the requested lines and facilities.
Section 2.6.2 likewise provides that the costs advanced by consumers may be refunded
at the rate of 25% of the annual gross distribution revenue derived from all customers
connected to the line extension. However, Section 2.6.2 amends Article 14 of the Magna
Carta by limiting the period for the refund to five years, whether or not the amount
advanced by the consumer is fully paid. The petitioner seeks to nullify Section 2.6 of the
DSOAR, on the following grounds: (1) it is unconstitutional since it is oppressive and it
violates the due process and equal protection clauses; (2) it contravenes the provisions
of the EPIRA; and (3) it violates the principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner claims that
Section 2.6 of the DSOAR is unconstitutional as it is oppressive to the affected end-
users who must advance the amount for the installation of additional facilities.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners has legal standing to challenge a statute or
government act?

HELD:
No. Petitioners do not question the DSOAR provision as a residential end-user
and it cannot do so because the challenged provision only refers to the rights and
obligations of DUs and residential end-users. Thus, neither the petitioner nor its
members can claim any injury, as residential end-users, arising from the challenged
Section 2.6 of the DSOAR. Nor cite any benefit accruing to them as residential end-
users that would result from the invalidation of the assailed provision.

Legal standing refers to a party's personal and substantial interest in a case,

arising from the direct injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged
governmental action. The term "interest" means a material interest, affected by the
governmental action.
PEOPLE V. VERA
(G.R. No.L-45685. NOVEMBER 16, 1937)

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the
issuance of the writs of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of
 !484

Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the Court of First Instance in
criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu
Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng
therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the
said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the
aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of
conviction rendered by this court in said case. Petitioners herein, the People of the
Philippine Islands and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are
respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu
Unjieng is one of the defendants in the criminal case.

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by Court of First Instance of Manila. Upon

appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty
of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and
twenty-seven days of prison mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
Unjieng filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the Supreme Court and the was
remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he
appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of.
Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office
(IPO). The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by
petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing.

The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides
that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of
probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to
a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered.
And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec. 1 Art. 3 of
the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability is
not uniform throughout the islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.




ISSUE:
Whether or not the People of the Philippines is a proper party in the case?

HELD:
Yes. The People of the Philippines isa a proper party, which has a substantial
interest, as represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of Manila. It is a rule that
the person who challenges the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest. Also, it has been held that the State can validly challenge the validity of its own
laws.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ZAMORA
(G.R. No.141284. AUGUST 15, 2000)

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the
order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the
 !485

Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police in visibility patrols around the
metropolis for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.

In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 which detailed
the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be
conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of
Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President
also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation
shall have improved.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul
LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of marines in Metro Manila is violative of
the Constitution because no emergency situation would justify, even only remotely, the
deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said deployment in derogation
of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner IBP has the legal standing to challenge the President’s
Order?

HELD:
No. Petitioner has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this
case, lacking a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. IBP
primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and
the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in
support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule
of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and
the whole citizenry.

ABAYA V. EBDANE
(G.R. No.167919. FEBRUARY 14, 2007)

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside and nullify Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012 dated May
7, 2004 issued by the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) and approved by then DPWH Acting Secretary Florante
Soriquez. The assailed resolution recommended the award to private respondent China
Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works for
 !486

Contract Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the
San Andres (Codon)-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the length of 79.818 kilometers, in
the island province of Catanduanes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the Philippines, through their
respective representatives, namely, Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Republic of the Philippines, and then Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, have reached an understanding concerning
Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines. These loans were aimed at promoting
our country’s economic stabilization and development efforts. A total of twenty-three (23)
foreign and local contractors responded to the invitation by submitting their
accomplished prequalification documents on January 23, 2003. In accordance with the
established prequalification criteria, eight contractors were evaluated or considered
eligible to bid as concurred by the JBIC. Prior to the opening of the respective bid
proposals, it was announced that the Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) was in the
amount of P738,710,563.67. The bid of private respondent China Road & Bridge
Corporation was corrected from the original P993,183,904.98 (with variance of 34.45%
from the ABC) to P952,564,821.71 (with variance of 28.95% from the ABC) based on
their letter clarification dated April 21, 2004. The petitioners anchor the instant petition on
the contention that the award of the contract to private respondent China Road & Bridge
Corporation violates RA 9184, particularly Section 31 thereof. Respondents urge the
Court to dismiss the petition on grounds that the petitioners have no locus standi and, in
any case, Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012 and the contract between the DPWH and
private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation are valid.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners, as taxpayers, have locus standi?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioners have shown that notwithstanding the fact that the CP I project is
primarily financed from loans obtained by the government from the JBIC, taxpayers'
money would be or is being spent on the project. Hence, the petitioners correctly
asserted their standing since a part of the funds being utilized in the implementation of
the CP I project partakes of taxpayers' money. The prevailing doctrine in taxpayer's suits
is to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or
government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of law. A
taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed,
or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.

KILOSBAYAN V. GUINGONA
(G.R. No.113375. MAY 5, 1994)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and
restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) in connection with the on-line lottery system, also known as "lotto." Petitioners
of Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN), except Senators Freddie Webb, Wigberto
Tañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of
the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
 !487

Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on-line
lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources
of funds. Several companies "became interested to offer its services and resources to
PCSO." As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees)
organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as
the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which "was intended to be the
medium through which the technical and management services required for the project
would be offered and delivered to PCSO."

KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing

the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
considerations. Even reiterating it during the meeting. On 19 November 1993, the media
reported that despite the opposition, "Malacañang will push through with the operation of
an on-line lottery system nationwide" and that it is actually the respondent PCSO which
will operate the lottery while the winning corporate bidders are merely "lessors."

Petitioners submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract
of Lease with the PGMC because it is in violation of Section 1 (B) of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or
joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic."
Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it
to establish and operate an on-line lottery and telecommunications systems.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have locus standi?

HELD:
Yes. It has been held that "the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely”. In line with the liberal policy
of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even
association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and
prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws,
acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
(G.R. No.192935. DECEMBER 7, 2010)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which
essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July
30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted
by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo
assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of
the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
 !488

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for
a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed
during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed
Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission). A mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Barely a month after the issuance of
Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and
to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
In their Consolidated Comment, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended
the assailed executive order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have locus standi as a taxpayer and citizen?

HELD:
No. In Biraogo’s capacity as a taxpayer and citizen, he has no standing to
question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. It emphasizes that
the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken
from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and
disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will
simply be an exercise of the President's power over contingent funds. As correctly
pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive
Order No. 1. However for the other petitioner-legislators, the Court ruled that they have
legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. COMMISSION

ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(G.R. No.155336. NOVEMBER 25, 2004)

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on Human
Rights Employees' Association (CHREA) challenging the Decision dated 29 November
2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the Resolutions dated
16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which
sustained the validity of the upgrading and reclassification of certain personnel positions
in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) despite the disapproval thereof by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Also assailed is the resolution dated 11
September 2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner.

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise

known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions
Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of its
 !489

special provisions, the CHR, promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September

1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in
the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional
plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga
Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers,
with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. By virtue of Resolution No.
A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR "collapsed" the vacant positions in the body
to provide additional source of funding for staffing modification. The CHR forwarded said
staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval,
but then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request. The officers of petitioner
CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the
CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request and reversed the

recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.

CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. It affirmed the

pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading,
retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is
within the ambit of CHR's fiscal autonomy. Petitioner CHREA grouses that the Court of
Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has locus standi?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR,
protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the
upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and
file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test.
AGAN V. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TERMINALS, CO.
(G.R. No.155001. MAY 5, 2003)

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed the instant petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to prohibit the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) and the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) and its Secretary from implementing the following agreements executed by the
Philippine Government through the DOTC and the MIAA and the Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).

On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an

unsolicited proposal to the Government for the development of Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-
operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957, as amended. It was endorsed to
the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which, in turn, reviewed and
approved it for bidding. The Paircargo Consortium was the only company that submitted
a competitive proposal. Later, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co., (PIATCO). And for failure of AEDC to match the price
proposal submitted by PIATCO, the project was awarded to PIATCO. On July 12, 1997,
the Government signed the 1997 Concession Agreement.
 !490

Thereafter, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) and

three Supplements thereto were signed by the Government and PIATCO. Consequently,
the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose
their employment upon the implementation of the said agreements, filed before this
Court a petition for prohibition. Later, the service providers joined their cause.
Congressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and Constantino Jaraula, alleging that
the said contracts compelled government expenditure without appropriation, filed a
similar petition. And several employees of the MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the
legality of these agreements.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners, NAIA concessionaires and service cintractors, have
locus standi?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioners are facing a direct injury or threat of losing their source of income
or livelihood upon implementation of PIATCO Contracts. Thus, conferring upon them
legal standing due to the financial prejudice brought by these said contracts.

BAGATSING V. COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION

(G.R. No.112399. JULY 14, 1995)

QUIASON, J.:

FACTS:
The petition for prohibition in G. R. No. 112399 sought: (1) to nullify the bidding
conducted for the sale of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock (40%
block) of Petron Corporation (PETRON) and the award made to Aramco Overseas
Company, B.V. (ARAMCO) as the highest bidder in the bidding conducted on December
15, 1993; and (2) to stop the sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO. The
Supplemental Petition in said case sought to annul the bidding of the 40% block held on
December 15, 1993 and to set aside the award given to ARAMCO. The petitioners all in
their capacity as members of Congress, taxpayers and concerned citizens, except in the
case of Mr. Saguisag, who sued as a private law practitioner, member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) in 1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." (ESSO)
as a subsidiary of Esso Eastern, Inc. and Mobil Petroleum Company, Inc. In acquiring
PETRON, the government aimed to have a buffer against the vagaries of oil prices in the
international market. Indeed, PETRON helped alleviate the energy crises that visited the
country.

President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50, in the exercise

of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, entitled "Proclaiming and
 !491

Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization of Certain

Government Corporations and/or the Assets thereof, and Creating the Committee on
Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust."

On January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the privatization of PETRON as part
of the Energy Sector Action Plan. COP Chairman, President Ramos approved the
privatization of PETRON up to a maximum of 65% of its capital stock. The Petron
Privatization Working Committee (PWC) was thus formed. In a meeting of the Petron
PWC held on December 15, 1993 at 12:00 noon, it decided that Westmont Holdings
(WESTMONT) was disqualified from participating in the bidding for its alleged failure to
comply with the technical and financial requirements for a strategic partner.

On February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase

Agreement and on March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the Shareholders'
Agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners, as Members of Congress, have locus standi to
chellenge the contract in question?

HELD:
No. Petitioners, as members of Congress, failed to claim that such contract
violates their rights or intrudes into the domain of Legislature. However, they were
allowed to proceed with the case suing as taxpayers.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER V. GARCIA

(G.R. No.115381. DECEMBER 23, 1994)

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and validity of certain
memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board LTFRB). On June 26, 1990, then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued
Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 allowing provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for
a period of one (1) year.

On December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the

Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. On December 6,
1990, private respondent PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-the-
board increase of six and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometer for ordinary buses. The
decrease was due to the drop in the expected price of diesel. The application was
opposed by the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautista. On
December 14, 1990, public respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate
increase in accordance with a schedule of fares on a straight computation method.

On October 8, 1992, public respondent Secretary of the Department of

Transportation and Communications Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued a memorandum to the
Acting Chairman of the LTFRB suggesting swift action on the adoption of rules and
procedures to implement Department Order No. 92-587. Private respondent PBOAP,
availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to
collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition
 !492

for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of
twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. Said increased fares were to be made
effective on March 16, 1994. KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward
adjustment of bus fares. Petitioner KMU anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. First, the
authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of
plus or minus fifteen (15) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus
twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to
file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the
establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed
transport service without having to prove public necessity, is illegal for being violative of
the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to raise issues on transportation
fares?

HELD:
Yes. As the ones who avail of the use of the several modes of transportation,
they are directly affected. Therefore, they are proper parties to question the said
memoranda, circulars, and orders authorizing bus and jeepney operators to increase or
decrease fares.

PAGUIA V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

(G.R. No.176278. JUNE 25, 2010)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original
action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's
nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide)
as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner
argues that respondent Davide's age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70,
disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of
RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes
an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide's
entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and
employees.

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition.
First, they question petitioner's standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law. Second, the Office of the President and the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither petitioner's
citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent
Davide's appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial
interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or
the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety
of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can
only be filed by a contender for the office in question.

ISSUE:
 !493

Whether or not petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, has legal standing?

HELD:
No. Petitioner’s mere status as a citizen and taxpayer does not grnat upon him
legal standing to sue. It has been previously held that citizen suits may be granted when
it raises an issue of transcendental importance calling for urgent resolution.

Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we
can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised — the character of funds or
assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory
prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to
bring the suit.

AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE V. ROMULO

(G.R. No.157509. JANUARY 18, 2005)

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:
In an original action for certiorari, petitioners invoke their status as labor unions
and as taxpayers whose rights and interests are allegedly violated and prejudiced by
Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March 2003 whereby administrative supervision over
the NLRC, its regional branches and all its personnel including the executive labor
arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary
of Labor and Employment. In support of their position, petitioners argue that the NLRC
— created by Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, during
Martial Law — was an integral part of DOLE under the administrative supervision of the
Secretary of Justice. During the time of President Corazon C. Aquino, and while she was
endowed with legislative functions after EDSA I, Executive Order No. 292 was issued
whereby the NLRC became an agency attached to the DOLE for policy and program
coordination and for administrative supervision. On 02 March 1989, Article 213 of the
Labor Code was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715 declaring that the NLRC
was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy coordination only while the
administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel, was
turned over to the NLRC Chairman. The subject E.O. No. 185, in authorizing the
Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional
branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-Rep. Act No. 6715 set-up,
amending the latter law which only Congress can do. The respondents herein, as
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petition on procedural
and substantive grounds. Procedurally, it is alleged that the petition does not pose an
actual case or controversy upon which judicial review may be exercised as petitioners
have not specifically cited how E.O. No. 185 has prejudiced or threatened to prejudice
their rights and existence as labor unions and as taxpayers. Closely intertwined
therewith, respondents further argue that petitioners have no locus standi to assail the
validity of E.O. No. 185, not even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor
unions are exempt from paying taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Even
assuming that their individual members are taxpayers, respondents maintain that a
taxpayer suit will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not require additional appropriation
 !494

for its implementation. As the petition can be decided without passing on the validity of
the subject executive order, respondents conclude that the same should be forthwith
dismissed. In their Reply, petitioners affirm their locus standi contending that they are
suing for and in behalf of their members — estimated to be more or less fifty thousand
(50,000) workers — who are the real parties to be affected by the resolution of this
Court. They likewise maintain that they are suing in behalf of the employees of the
NLRC who have pending cases for dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to raise the constitutionality of
E.O. 185?

HELD:
No. Petitioners failed to show that their members sustained or will sustain injury
from the assailed Executive Order No. 185. It is due to the limited scope of the Secretary
of Labor’s power to review, revise, or modify the decisions of NLRC.
DOMINGO V. CARAGUE
(G.R. No.161065. APRIL 15, 2005)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the legality of Resolution No. 2002-05 of
the Commission on Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The
above-named petitioners basically alleged therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for
want of an enabling law authorizing COA to undertake the same and providing for the
necessary standards, conditions, restrictions, limitations, guidelines, and parameters.
Petitioners further alleged that in initiating such Organizational Restructuring Plan
without legal authority, COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioners Eufemio C. Domingo, Celso C. Gangan, Pascasio S. Banaria are

retired Chairmen, while Sofronio B. Ursal, and Alberto P. Cruz are retired Commissioners
of COA. All claim "to maintain a deep-seated abiding interest in the affairs of COA,"
especially in its Organizational Restructuring Plan, as concerned taxpayers.

The other petitioners are incumbent officers or employees of COA. These

petitioners claim that they were unceremoniously divested of their designations/ranks as
Unit Head, Team Supervisor, and Team Leader upon implementation of the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan without just cause and without due process, in
violation of Civil Service Law. Moreover, they were deprived of their respective
Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA), thus causing them undue
financial prejudice.

Petitioners now invoke this Court's judicial power to strike down the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan for being unconstitutional or illegal.

Initially, for our resolution is the issue of whether petitioners have the legal standing to
institute the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to seek the nullification of the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan?
 !495

HELD:
No. Petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the said COA
Organizational plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. In fact, they
admitted that "they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or
improvident act against the respondents" and "are not motivated by any desire to seek
affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal
benefit or gain." Clearly, they do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit.

CUTARAN V. DENR
(G.R. No. 134958. JANUARY 31, 2001)

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
on March 25, 1998 and the order dated August 5, 1998 in CA-G.R SP No. 43930, a
petition for prohibition originally filed with the appellate court to enjoin the respondent
DENR from implementing DENR Special Order Nos. 31, as amended by 31-A and 31-B,
series of 1990, Special Order No. 25, series of 1993 and all other administrative
issuances relative thereto, for having been issued without prior legislative authority.

In 1990 the Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued
Special Order no. 31 entitled "Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance,
identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera
Administrative Region". The special task force created thereunder was authorized to
accept and evaluate and delineate ancestral land claims within the said area, and after
due evaluation of the claims, to issue appropriate land titles in accordance with existing
laws. On January 15, 1993 the Secretary of the DENR issued Special Order no. 25
entitled "Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and
natural resources offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral
land claims nationwide" and Department Administrative Order no. 02, containing the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25.

In 1990, the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives of herein
petitioners filed separate applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over
the land they, respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. In 1996 the
applications were denied by the DENR Community Special Task Force on Ancestral
Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and Applai tribes to which they belong are not
among the recognized tribes of Baguio City. Hence, this petition for prohibition originally
filed with the Court of Appeals. CA held that the assailed DENR Special Orders Nos. 31,
31-A, 31-B issued in 1990 prior to the effectivity of RA 7586 known as the National
Integrated Protected Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act of 1992, are of no force and effect "for
pre-empting legislative prerogative" but sustained the validity of DENR Special Order
No. 25, and its implementing rules (DAO No. 02, series of 1993) by the appellate court
on the ground that they were issued pursuant to the powers delegated to the DENR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have locus standi?

HELD:
 !496

No. The petitioners failed to prove that they suffered or will suffer direct injury
from the governmental action. There is no showing that the petitioners were being
evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR. Their
allegations that documents from the DENR were shown to them by the heirs of Carantes
to justify eviction is vague.

JOYA V. PHILIPPINE
(G.R. No. 96541. AUGUST 24, 1993)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and
Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the
auction sale by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th
century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and
placed in the custody of the Central Bank. On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then
Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for
authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc.
(Christie's of New York, or CHRISTIE'S) concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January
1991 of eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from
Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten
wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies.

On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, authorized Chairman Caparas to

sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the
subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. PCGG through
Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. On 26 October 1990,
the Commission on Audit (COA) through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted
to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment
Agreement to the effect that: (a) the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to
enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; (b) the contract was
highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG had a poor track record in asset
disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject of auction were historical
relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law. PCGG
through its new Chairman David M. Castro, wrote President Aquino defending the
Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo. After
the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our
resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled
sale of the artworks. The sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the
proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have locus standi?

HELD:
No. It is because first, petitioners are not the rightful owners of said properties to
be auctioned and therefore do not posses standing. Second, a taxpayer’s suit may not
 !497

prosper because petitioners do not challenge any spending of the public funds. Also,
said properties were not acquired using public funds but through private sources.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES V.

COMELEC
(G.R. NO. 132922. APRIL 21, 1998.)

MENDOZA, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is
and organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are
suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network,
Inc. operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under
a franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners challenge the validity of section 92 on
various grounds. Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires
COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section
92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it
contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing to sue?
HELD:
Petitioner TELEBAP is held to be without standing. A citizen will be allowed to
raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of allegedly illegal conduct of government.
Members of the petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of
the operation of Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. Nor do members of TELEBAP have an
interest as registered voters since this case does not concern their right of suffrage.
Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the
exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending power.

Petitioner GMA Network on the otherhand, has a standing on this case. Petitioner
operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines. Petitioner has shown
that it is affected by the enforcement of Section 92 requiring radio and television
broadcast companies to provide free air time to COMELEC for the use of candidates.
 !498

KILOSBAYAN V. GUINGONA
(GR. NO. 113375. MAY 5 1994)

DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS:
Petitioner avers that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-
spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to cause the
truth, justice, and national renewal. The rest of the petitioners are suing in their
capacities as members of Board of Trustees and as taxpayers and concerned citizen.
Senators Webb and Tañada and rep. Arroyo are suing in their capacity as members of
the congress, taxpayers and concerned citizens.

Petitioners sent an open letter to President Fidel Ramos strongly opposing the
setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious and moral ethical
considerations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file the petition?

HELD:
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in
the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In
the landmark Emergency Powers cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality
because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of
discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained," or that it "enjoys an open
discretion to entertain the same or not." The court finds the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public
interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited
cases.

TATAD V. SECRETARY OF ENERGY

 !499

(GR NO. 124360. NOVEMBER 5, 1997)

PUNO, J.

FACTS:
RA 8180, or the Downstream Oil Industry Regulation Act of 1996, was enacted
by the congress for the purpose of deregulating the downstream oil industry. Under the
deregulated environment, any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of
crude oil and petroleum products from foreign or domestic source, lease or own and
operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use
the same for his own requirement, subject to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Its
validity was challenged on various grounds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to assail the validity of RA
8180?

HELD:
Yes. It was held that the effort of respondents to question the locus standi of
petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too lucid to be misunderstood,
this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.
Petitioners pose issues which are significant to the people and which deserve the court’s
forthright resolution.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION V. COMELEC

(GR. NO. 159139. JANUARY 13, 2004)

PANGANIBAN, J:
 !500

FACTS:
On June 7, 1995, Congress enacted RA 8046, which authorized Comelec to
conduct a nationwide demonstration of computerized election system and allowed the
poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted RA 8436
authorizing Comelec to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of
voting, counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections. It also mandated the poll body to acquire automated counting machines
(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms
and printing materials. On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its resolution 020170 a
modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the 3
phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase 1 - voter registration and
validation system; Phase II – Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase
III- Electronic Transmission. On June 24 2003, President Gloria Arroyo issued EO no.
172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund AES for the May 2004 elections.
Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to
Bid".

On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president,
Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin
Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring
irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing?

HELD:
Yes. The court agrees with the petitioners suing in their capacities as taxpayers,
registered voters and concerned citizens. Our nation’s political and economic future
virtually hangs in the balance, pending outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can
be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is “a matter of public concern
and imbued with public interest” and “transcendental importance”. Petitioners’ legal
standing should therefore be recognized and upheld.

Moreover, the Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a
claim of “illegal disbursement of public funds,” or if public money is being deflected in
any improper purpose”; or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from “wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers,
assert a material interest seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used.

LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(GR NO. 151445. APRIL 11, 2002)

DE LEON, JR., J:

FACTS:
 !501

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the joint exercises, Balikatan 02-1.

The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by
the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is rooted from the
international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction
to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the
al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001.The
Petitioners filed suit in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers, while the
intervenors claimed that some of their members are resident of Zamboanga and Sulu
where the exercises would be held, and, hence, would be directly affected by the
operations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing?

HELD:
Yes. The court in relaxing the stringent rule on parties’ standing to file suit
because of the primordial importance of the issue involved, held that the VFA has been
held valid gave legitimacy to the Balikatan exercises. In Kilosbayan v Guingona, jr. the
court ruled that in cases of transcendal importance, the court may relax standing
requirements and allow a suit to prosper even when there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review.

KILOSBAYAN V. MORATO
(G.R. no. 118910. JULY 17, 1995)

MENDOZA, J:

FACTS:
On January 25, 1995 the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement
(thereafter called ELA) whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and
accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3 % of the gross
 !502

amount of ticket sale derived by the PCSO from the operation of the lottery which in no
case shall be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in
Commercial Operation. The rental is to be computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the
bi-weekly rentals in any year fall short of the annual minimum fixed rental thus
computed, the PCSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current
ticket sales. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the
Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is
still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It
violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be
questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is
different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:
The question whether petitioners have standing to question the Equipment Lease
Agreement or ELA is a legal question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which
petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different from the
1993 Contract of Lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the
determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that petitioners had standing to
challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude
determination of their standing in the present suit.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (PEA)

(G.R. No. 133250. JULY 9, 2002)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI for the
development of the Freedom Islands (FI). An investigation concluded that the lands that
PEA was conveying to
AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the FI were void;
and the J VA itself was
illegal. Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose
 !503

billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for
the full disclosure of the renegotiations between the parties. 


ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit?

HELD:
Yes. The petition has legal standing to bring the taxpayer’s suit which involves
the enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of
natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the
requisite locus standi.

TATAD V. GARCIA
(G.R. No. 114222. APRIL 6, 1995)
QUIASON, J.:

FACTS:
In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. The
EDSA LRT Consortium (ELC) was formed for this undertaking. An agreement was then
made between the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and ELC.
Under the agreement, ELC shall build the facilities and shall supply the train cabs. Every
phase that is completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent
for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was projected that the government
shall have fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter, ELC shall sell the facilities to the
 !504

government for $1.00. Petitioners opposed the implementation of said agreement as

they averred that ELC is a foreign corporation and cannot own a public utility such as the
EDSA railway transit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing?
HELD:
Yes. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to
question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or
controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona) and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved
(Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron). For as long as the
ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it
and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action.

BRILLANTES V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 163193. JULY 15, 2004)

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:
COMELEC issued a resolution, which provides “unofficial” count of votes.
Petitioners claimed that it would allow the usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress
to canvass the votes for President (Pres.) and Vice-President (VP) and encroach upon
the authority of the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) to
conduct the "unofficial" quick count.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have obtain locus standi?

HELD:
 !505

Yes. The petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the requisite standing as they have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds. Petitioners-in-
intervention Concepcion and Bernas represent the NAMFREL. They have sufficient,
direct and personal interest in the manner by which the COMELEC would conduct the
elections, including the canvassing of the votes. The petitioners-in-intervention Drilon
and De Venecia are the heads of Congress, which is exclusively authorized by the
Constitution to canvass the votes for Pres. and VP.

JUMAMIL V. CAFÉ
(G.R. No. 144570. SEPTEMBER 21, 2005)
CORONA, J.:

FACTS:
Stalls of the public market in Panabo, Davao del Norte were destroyed in a fire.
Mayor Café entered into contracts with individuals to aid in the construction of new stalls.
Later, the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo issued appropriation ordinances for the
construction of the stalls. After completion, the stalls were leased through a public raffle
limited to said individuals. Jumamil, as taxpayer, filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality of the ordinances. The lower courts declared Jumamil to lack legal
standing because he was not a party to the contract entered into.

ISSUE:
Whether or not one who has filed a taxpayer’s suit but who is not a party of a
contract lacks legal standing?

HELD:
 !506

No. The petitioner filed the suit citing his capacity as a taxpayer and not in his
personal capacity. Therefore, he does not need to be a party to the contract. However, in
order for the Court to rule on the issue of constitutionality, he still needs to prove
substantial interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds. Having failed at
such, the petitioner has no legal standing in the case. However, the Court may rule on
the issue in matters of paramount importance to the public.

ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 148560. NOVEMBER 19, 2001)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner assails “An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder”. The
focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses.
Particularly, this terms are: “combination”, “series” and “unwarranted”. Because of this,
the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi?

HELD:
No. On how the law uses the terms “combination”, “series” and “unwarranted”
does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair
warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly
argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s
reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against laws that is utterly vague on its face, wherein
 !507

clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not
invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld,
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

Overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved

by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made
to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon
protected speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists.

IMBONG V. OCHOA JR.

(G.R. No. 204819. APRIL 8, 2014)|

MENDOZA, J.:


FACTS:
R.A. 10354, The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. A perusal of the foregoing
petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn and the one
subject-one title rule among others. The respondents, aside from traversing the
substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the
principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues
are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question
the RH Law.


ISSUE:
Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy?

HELD:
Yes. In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a
First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.
 !508

These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After
all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful
assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.



In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. Consequently, considering that the
foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated
by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance and to determine if
the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this
Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has
been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

DAVID V. ARROYO
(G.R. No. 171396. MAY 3, 2006)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency. On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing
the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct
injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Petitioners also contend that PP 1017 is void on its face
because of its “overbreadth.” They claim that its enforcement encroached on both
unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent
a “chilling effect” to the citizens During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the
issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the
Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces.

ISSUE:
Whether PP 107 is void because of its “overbreadth”?
 !509

HELD:
No. A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces”
statutes in free speech cases, not for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate
state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful constitutionally
unprotected conduct. The incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored. A facial challenge
on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may
be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.

iii. EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY

 !510

MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
(G.R. No. 149036. APRIL 2, 2002)

CARPIO, J:

FACTS:
COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting Director IV” of the Education
and Information Department (EID). On February 2000, Chairperson Demetriou renewed
the appointment of petitioner in a “temporary” capacity. Commissioner Javier again
renewed the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a “temporary” capacity. On
March 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed ad interim, Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman and Borra 4 and Tuason 5 as COMELEC Commissioners, each
for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of
office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise
took their oaths of office and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners.
The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22,
2001 the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmations.
However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. PGMA
renewed the ad interim appointments. Benipayo, in his capacity as Comelec chariman,
reassigned petitioner in the Law Department. Petitioner then filed an instant petition
questioning the the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner
claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the
prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and
members.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before this Court
may exercise its power of judicial review in constitutional cases?
.
 !511

HELD:
Yes. The requirements are satisfied including the filing on the earliest opportunity.
Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3, 2001, when the first ad interim
appointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date of
filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the
earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in
the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, "if it is not
raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the
trial, it cannot be considered on appeal." Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the
ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition
before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue
before a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of
sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon. There is no
doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue on time.

ESTARIJA V. RANADA
(G.R. No. 159314. JUNE 26, 2006)

QUISUMBING, J:

FACTS:
Respondent Ranada, filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct
before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner Estarija, Harbor
Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port in Davao City. The Ombudsman
rendered a decision in the administrative case, finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct. Estarija then assails RA 6770 as unconstitutional because it gives the
Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for in the Constitution.
The Court of Appeals (CA) held that the attack on the constitutionality of RA 6770 was
procedurally and substantially flawed. The constitutionality issue was belatedly raised in
the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:
Whether the question of constitutionality was raised at the earliest possible
opportunity?

HELD:
Yes. In this case, petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No.
6770 in his motion for the reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision. Verily, the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a
law. Thus, when petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of RA 6770 before the CA,
the constitutional question was raised at the earliest opportune time.
 !512

UMALI V. GUINGONA
(G.R. No. 131124. MARCH 29, 1999)

PURISIMA, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner Umali was appointed appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue by the then President Fidel V. Ramos. He was assigned in Manila,
from November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994, and in Makati, from March 16, 1994 to
August 4, 1994. In 1994, then President Fidel V. Ramos, received a confidential
memorandum against petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and
regulations. Upon receipt of memorandum, former President Ramos authorized an
issuance for an order of preventive suspension of Umali and immediately referred the
complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC), for investigation. The PCAGC found prima facie evidence to support six (6)
charges of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance against petitioner. The
petitioner was dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement and benefits provided
by law. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner then brought
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction before the RTC of Makati, which
dismissed the same. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed the petition when its
jurisdiction was invoked, hence, petitioner found its way to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner can raise the issue of its constitutionality belatedly in its
motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision?

HELD:
It was held that constitutionality of the PCAGC was only posed by petitioner in his
motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too
late to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.
 !513

ZANDUETA V. DELA COSTA

(G.R. No. 46267. NOVEMBER 28, 1938.)

VILLA-REAL, J :

FACTS:

Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the
Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth
Judicial District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment
issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly on September 8th of the
same year. On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145,
otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received
from the President of the Commonwealth and new ad interim appointment as judge of
first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the
Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, issued in accordance with said Act. The
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the ad interim
appointment. The President then appointed respondent Sixto Dela Costa as the judge of
4th district, with authority to preside over the CFI of Manila and Palawan. The
Commission on Appointments approved the Appointment. Petitioner questioned the
appointment alleging that it is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioner can question the Constitutionality of

Commonwealth Act. 145?

HELD:

No. Petitioner is estopped by his own act from proceeding to question the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he was appointed, by
accepting said appointment and entering into the performance of the duties appertaining
to the office conferred therein, and pursuant to the well settled doctrine established by
both American and Philippine jurisprudence relative to the consideration of constitutional
questions, this court deems it unnecessary to decide the questions on constitutional law
raised in the petition.
 !514

iv. LIS MOTA

 !515

KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIHIRAP V. ROBREDO

(G.R. No. 200903. JULY 22, 2014.)
BRION, J:

FACTS:
The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and
Corazon de Jesus Homeowners' Association as well as the individual petitioners,
Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta Bagasbas, Jocy Lopez, Elvira Vidol and Delia Frayres,
were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of San Juan,
Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs). These LGUs sent the petitioners notices
of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give
way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure projects in the areas
illegally occupied by the petitioners. On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary
of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public respondents) to first secure an
eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their implementation of Section 28
(a) and (b) of RA 7279.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Sections 1 and 6,
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution?
HELD:
No. To be subject to judicial review, the four requisites must be present. In this
case, the lis mota is not present. It was held that it constrains the Court from touching on
the issue of constitutionality is the fact that the issue is not the lis mota of this case. Lis
mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in the principle of
separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity
accorded the executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government.
This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the
burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the
constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of
constitutionality should be avoided. Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative.

PLANTERS PRODUCTS V. FERTIPHIL

(G.R. No. 166006. MARCH 14, 2008)
 !516

REYES, R.T., J:

FACTS:
Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations
incorporated under Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and
distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals. On June 3, 1985, then
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465
which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC)
on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. After the 1986 Edsa
Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No.
1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection
and damages 8 against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and
an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged
that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds
to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutionality of LOI 1465 cannot be collaterally attacked
because it is not the lis mota of the case?

HELD:
No. It was held that the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is the very lis mota of
the complaint for collection. Fertiphil filed the complaint to compel PPI to refund the
levies paid under the statute on the ground that the law imposing the levy is
unconstitutional. The thesis is that an unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect.
Being void, Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all levies duly
paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be refunded under the civil code
principle against unjust enrichment. The refund is a mere consequence of the law being
declared unconstitutional. The RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does
not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is the unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers
the refund. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the complaint with the
RTC.

TARROSA V. SINGSON
(G.R. No. 111243. MAY 25, 1994.)

QUIASON, J:
 !517

FACTS:
Respondent Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by
President Fidel V. Ramos on July 2, 1993, effective on July 6, 1993. Petitioner argues
that respondent Singson's appointment is null and void since it was not submitted for
confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. The petition is anchored on the
provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the
Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. In their comment, respondents claim that
Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral.
They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments,
which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments citing Sec 16, Art. VI of
the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue raised is the lis mota of the case?

HELD:
No. The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks
the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or
exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil action can
only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a
public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another".

The Court refrains from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No.
7653 in deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question
unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case.

TY V. TRAMPE
(G.R. No. 117577. DECEMBER 1, 1995.)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
 !518

Petitioners Alejandro B. Ty, a resident of and registered owner of lands and

buildings in the Municipality (now City) of Pasig and MVR Picture Tube Inc., filed a case
impugning the validity of the new tax assessments prepared by the respondent
assessor. The legality of the tax assessment is being questioned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the new tax assessments are oppressive and confiscatory, and
therefore unconstitutional?

HELD:
The constitutionality of a law, regulation, ordinance or act will not be resolved by
courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it has been, settled on other grounds. In
the recent case of Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, this Court declared: "It is a
rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised
and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e.,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. To reiterate, the
essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are:
(a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a
proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity,
and (d); the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of
the case. " In view of the foregoing ruling, the question may be asked: what happens to
real estate tax payments already made prior to its promulgation and finality? Under the
law, 'the taxpayer may file a written claim for refund or credit for taxes and interests…”

ARCETA V. JUDGE MAGROBANG

(G.R. No. 152895. JUNE 15, 2004.)

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with
violating B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1599-
CR. It was alleged in the information that Arceta issued a Regional Bank check worth
P740,000 to Oscar R. Castro payable in cash, well-knowing that said accused well-
 !519

knowing that at the time of issue did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment. Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or
the Information quashed on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. She
reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be an
exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and
thus go against prevailing jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should render B.P blg 22 unconstitutional due to
economic crisis?

HELD:
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the
established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy
exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case. Only when these
requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of
unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsel's
spirited advocacy in both cases, we are unable to agree that the abovecited requisites
have been adequately met.

In a special civil action of certiorari the only question that may be raised is
whether or not the respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Yet nowhere in these petitions is there any allegation that the
respondent judges acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of
discretion is manifested.
 !520

c. FISCAL AUTONOMY

BENGZON V. DRILON
(G.R. No. 103524. APRIL 15, 1992)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws RA No. 1797 that were
repealed during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill HB No. 16297 on the ground
that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government
officials. Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the
Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their pensions. The Supreme Court then
readjusted their pensions.
 !521

Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations
Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices.
Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item
entitled: General Fund Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable
obligations in different branches of the government; among such obligations is the
allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.

However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the
pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that
portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.

This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to
question the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was
represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional?

HELD:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is
due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The
president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court
neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by
her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.

NITAFAN V. TAN
(G.R. No. L-78780. JULY 28, 1987)

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR,
all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the
provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased, even as it is anathema to the
Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution.

ISSUE:
 !522

Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes?

HELD:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income
tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not
clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the1986
Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to
revert to the original concept of non-diminution´ of salaries of judicial officers. Justices
and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting
service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees.

IN RE: CLARIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

AND ADMINISTRATIVE SET-UP OF THE PHILJA
(A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA. JANUARY 31, 2006)

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:
The instant administrative matter has its roots in the Resolution of the Court
promulgated on February 24, 2004, clarifying and strengthening the organizational
structure and administrative set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA).
Pursuant to said resolution, the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and
Supervising Judicial Staff Officer with Salary Grades (SG) 25 and 23, respectively, were
created in the following Divisions of the PHILJA: Publications Division, and External
Linkages Division (Research, Publications and Linkages Office); Mediation Education
and Management Division (Judicial Reforms Office); Corporate Planning Division, and
Administrative Division (Administrative and Finance Office).

However, in its Notice of Organization, Staffing, and Compensation Action

(NOSCA) dated May 5, 2005, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
downgraded said positions and their corresponding salary grades.

ISSUE:
 !523

Whether or not the action of DBM of downgrading the salaries and positions of
SC Chief judicial staff and supervising judicial staff officer and others is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. Clearly then, in downgrading the positions and salary grades of SC Chief
Judicial Staff Officer and SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer in the PHILJA, the DBM
overstepped its authority and encroached upon the Court’s fiscal autonomy and
supervision of court personnel as enshrined in the Constitution; in fine, a violation of the
Constitution itself.

IN RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE

PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT
(A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC. JULY 31, 2012)

PER CURIAM:

FACTS:
The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated July
14, 2011 and August 10, 2010, submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of
Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of
the Chief Justice. These

Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the proper formula to be used
in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and several Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the government properties they
used during their tenure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on
constitutional bodies is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. Computation of the appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of
`Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated
 !524

April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No.
03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Let the Commission on Audit be
accordingly advised of this Resolution for its guidance.

IN RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND

NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF
THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY
(A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC.JUNE 13, 2012)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
The Court received two letters from Rowena C. Paraan and Karol M. Ilagan
requesting for copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and networth (SALN) and the
Personal Data Sheet or the Curriculum Vitae of its Justices for the year 2008 for the
purpose of updating their database of information on government officials. The special
committee created by the Supreme Court to review the request issued a Memorandum
recommending the creation of a Committee on Public Disclosure to take over the
functions of the Office of the Court Administrator with respect to requests for copies of
SALN and other personal documents of members of the Judiciary. Meanwhile, several
requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of the Justices of the
Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan were led.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court Justices are mandated by law to release their
SALN to the public?

HELD:
Yes. Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution is relevant in the issue of public
disclosure of SALN and other documents of public officials, which provides that the right
of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
 !525

decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

d. APPOINTMENT
 !526

IN RE: MATEO VALENZUELA

(A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC. NOVEMBER 9, 1998)

NARVASA, CJ.:

FACTS:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President
dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of
the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear
prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution.
The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments
two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec.
15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in
the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII?

HELD:
Yes. During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so;
and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec.
15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during

the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to
appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public
interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making
of the appointments during the period of the ban.
 !527

DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

(G.R. No. 191002. MARCH 17, 2010)

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has
arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17,
2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009,
Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter
to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice
be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that
they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief
Justice.

As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step
of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their
sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice
Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the
President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being
unresolved.

The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called
for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass
the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight
appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments
Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held
 !528

that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to
appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the
shortlist of nominees by the JBC?

HELD:
No. Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to
the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise
of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.

e. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

 !529

CHAVEZ V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

(G.R. No. 202242. JULY 17, 2012)
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the
House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is
this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the
crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that
the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of
its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it
should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight
members, two of whom are members of Congress is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is
used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only
a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member
composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting.
 !530

CHAVEZ V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

(G.R. No. 202242. APRIL 16, 2013)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the
House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is
this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the
crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that
the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of
its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it
should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight
members, two of whom are members of Congress is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is
used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only
a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member
composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting.

The motion is denied.

 !531

JARDALEZA V. SERENO
(G.R. No. 213181. AUGUST 19, 2014)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Following Justice Abad’s compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the
application or recommendations for the position left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza,
the incumbent Solicitor General at the time, was included in the list of candidates.
However, he was informed through telephone call from some Justices that the Chief
Justice herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the so-called
unanimity rule against him. Generally, the rule is that an applicant is included in the
shortlist when she obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the
JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked because an applicant’s
integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Jardeleza was then directed to
make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the JBC during which he would be
informed of the objections to his integrity.

During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and
disclosed a confidential information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized Jardeleza’s
integrity as dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement
specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a
public hearing. He also requested deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc
has yet to decide in his letter-petition.

However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the
nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of 4
nominees. It was revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who made it to the
JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the invocation of the
unanimity rule.

Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the
JBC to include him in the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno
acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a
sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in
JBC proceedings?

HELD:
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not mean
that an applicant’s access to the rights afforded under the due process clause is
discretionary on the part of JBC.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings. Notwithstanding being a class of its own, the right to be heard and to
 !532

explain one’s self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications

is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s
duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the
nomination process.

f. SUPREME COURT
 !533

i. JURISDICTION
 !534

FORTICH V. CORONA
(G.R. No. 131457. APRIL 24, 1998)

MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting
a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because
of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike
generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates for the
upcoming 1998 elections intervened on behalf of the farmers.

Because of this blackmail, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, politically motivated, win-
win resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it
had become final and executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the win-win resolution, issued after the original decision had
become final and executory, had any legal effect?

HELD:
No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of
March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more
so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no
more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent
DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one motion for reconsideration is allowed to
be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided
in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have
been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not
seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality.
Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially
modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory,
was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.

LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING V. COURT OF APPEALS (CA)

(G.R. No. 118509. DECEMBER 1, 1995)
 !535

MELO, J.:

FACTS:
On June 23, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., a licensed real estate broker was given
formal authority by BPI to sell the lot for P1,000.00 per square meter. The owners of the
Philippine Remnants concurred this arrangement. Pedro Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim
of petitioner company who agreed to buy the land. On July 11, 1988, petitioner's officials,
Alfonso Lim and Albano Limketkai, went to BPI to confirm the sale. Two or three days
later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on terms had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went
to BPI on July 18, 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano. The
payment was refused because Albano stated that the authority to sell that particular
piece of property inPasig had been withdrawn from his unit. The same check was
tendered to BPI Vice-President Nelson Bona who also refused to receive payment. An
action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by
petitioner against BPI.

ISSUE:
Wether or not the case should be referred to the court en banc?

HELD:
No. It ruled that Court may take not only against counsel on record for the
petitioner for his irresponsible remarks, but also against other persons responsible for
the reckless publicity anent this case calculated to maliciously erode the people’s faith
and confidence in the integrity of this Court.

FRANCISCO, JR. V. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD

(G.R. No. 166910. OCTOBER 19, 2010)

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:
 !536

President Marcos issued PD 1113 authorizing the establishment of toll facilities

on public improvements. PD 1112 allowed the collection of toll fees for the use of certain
public improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of return on investments. The
same decree created Toll Regulatory Board, vesting it with the power to enter into
contracts for the construction, maintenance and operation of tollways, grant authority to
operate a toll facility. Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision. In
1993, the Government Corporate Counsel held that the PNCC may enter into a joint
venture agreement with private entities without going into public biddings. On February
1994, the DPWH together with other private entities executed a MOU to open the door
for entry of private capital in the Subic and Clark extension projects. PNCC entered into
a financial and technical JVAs with entities for the toll operation of its franchised areas.
Several Supplemental Toll operation Agreements (STOA) were entered for the South
Metro Manila Skyway, NLEX expansion, and South Luzon Expressway Projects.

Petitioners seek to nullify, the various STOAs anD assail the constitutionality of
Sections 3(a and d) of PD 1113 in relation to Section 8(b) of PD 1894. Insofar as they
vested the TRB the power to issue, modify, and promulgate toll rate changes while given
the ability to collect tolls.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the TRB may be empowered to grant authority to operate the toll
facility?

HELD:
The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with
authority to operate the toll facility. By explicit provisions of the PD's, the TRB was given
power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility projects.

JARDALEZA V. SERENO
(G.R. No. 213181. AUGUST 19, 2014)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Following Justice Abad’s compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the
application or recommendations for the position left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza,
the incumbent Solicitor General at the time, was included in the list of candidates.
 !537

However, he was informed through telephone call from some Justices that the Chief
Justice herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the so-called
unanimity rule against him. Generally, the rule is that an applicant is included in the
shortlist when she obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the
JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked because an applicant’s
integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Jardeleza was then directed to
make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the JBC during which he would be
informed of the objections to his integrity.

During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and
disclosed a confidential information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized Jardeleza’s
integrity as dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement
specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a
public hearing. He also requested deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc
has yet to decide in his letter-petition.

However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the
nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of 4
nominees. It was revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who made it to the
JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the invocation of the
unanimity rule.

Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the
JBC to include him in the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno
acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a
sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the
subject petition for certiorari and mandamus?

HELD:
No. Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. The JBC's duty to
nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something.

Yes. A petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch
or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi judicial or ministerial
functions.

PEOPLE V. REDULOSA
(G.R. No 94594. MARCH 29, 1996)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Appellant Romeo Redulosa (alias Micmic Redulosa, Romeo Solon and Micmic
Solon) and Roselo Carton were involved in kidnapping for ransom on December 3,
1981, then later on killed the victime and they were sentenced to death. The accused
appeal from the decision of the trial court was rendered before the present Constitution
(which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty) took effect on February 2, 1987. On
 !538

March 22, 1995, appellant sent from his prison cell at the Bureau of Corrections an
Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant can withdraw the appeal?

HELD:
Yes. The court granted the motion to dismiss appeal of the accused Romeo
Redulosa and the penalty of death therein imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE V. GARCIA
(G.R. No. 106531. NOVEMBER 18, 1999)

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:
On September 29, 1986, the Provincial Fiscal of Guimaras filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Iloilo City, an information charging petitioners with murder for the killing of
one Jose Estrella. After due trial, on September 21, 1990, the trial court promulgated its
decision convicting petitioners of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. On September 24, 1990, petitioners filed with the trial
court a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However, on September 2, 1991, the
trial court denied the motion. Petitioners did not interpose an appeal from the decision by
the filing of a notice of appeal. Thus, the decision became final on September 17, 1991.
 !539

On November 13, 1991, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to lift warrant of
arrest and to allow accused to appeal, arguing that there was no need for them to appeal
the decision as the same was subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court must automatically review a trial court's
decision convicting an accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua?

HELD:
No. As the petitioners did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their
desire to appeal from the decision convicting them of murder and sentencing each of
them to reclusion perpetua, the decision became final and unappealable.

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 135789. JANUARY 31, 2002)

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:
On May 5, 1982, Manuel G. Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C.
Zalamea and Jose Y. Campos organized HMHMI to serve as a holding company for the
shares of stocks of Hans M. Menzi.

On June 27, 1984, Hans M. Menzi died. On July 6, 1984, the court appointed
Manuel G. Montecillo executor of the Estate of Hans M. Menzi3 and later the president
of HMHMI. With the lone exception of Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C.
Zalamea and Jose Y. Campos, constitute the principal stockholders and incorporators of
HMHMI. PCGG issued Sequestration Writ No. 87-0206 against all shares of stocks,
assets, properties, records and documents of HMHMI.
 !540

On the same day, the PCGG requested the Governor, Central Bank of the
Philippines to instruct commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions to disallow
the withdrawal of funds and assets by Liwayway Publishing Incorporated and HMHMI.
PCGG issued Sequestration Writ No. 87-0206 against all shares of stocks, assets,
properties, records and documents of HMHMI. On July 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages against the defendants. On November 27, 1992, the estate of Hans M. Menzi,
in behalf of HMHMI, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Lift Freeze Order dated
February 12, 1987. On April 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion. On
October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On
January 15, 1993, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Supreme Court a petition
for review assailing the resolution of the Sandiganbayan lifting the freeze order. On April
13, 1998, the Sandiganbayan lifted the writ of sequestration dated February 12, 1987,
reasoning that there was no prima facie factual basis for its issuance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was prima facie factual basis for the issuance of a writ of
sequestration over the assets, shares of stock, property records and bank deposits of
HMHMI?

HELD:
Yes. Sandiganbayan has full authority to decide on all incidents in the ill-gotten
case, including the propriety of the writs of sequestration that the PCGG initially issued.

FABIAN V. DESIERTO
(G.R. No. 129742. SEPTEMBER 16, 1998)

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation PROMA which was engaged in the construction
business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of
the First Metro Manila Engineering District FMED.

Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and

Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her
attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led
an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself.
But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
 !541

The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and
executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 Ombudsman Act of 1989.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is invalid ?

HELD:
Yes. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against
a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC.

CARPIO-MORALES V. COURT OF APPEALS (CA)

(G.R. No. 217126-27. NOVEMBER 10, 2015)

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching"
Enciso VI beore the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, jr. and other public officers
and employees of the City Government of Makati accusing them of plunder and violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"
in connection with the five phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City
hall parking building. The Ombudsman constituted a special panel of investigators to
conduct a fact finding investigation. Before Binay, jr.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the
ombudsman, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, jr. Under
preventive suspension for not more than six months without pay, during the pendency of
the OMB. At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution dated March 16, 2015,
granting Binay, jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Peña, jr.'s assumption of duties as
Acting Mayor earlier that day.

ISSUE:
 !542

Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI
enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the
ombudsman?

HELD:
OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive
writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes
the first paragraph of section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence
under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that in order to Further ensure her
offices independence, RA 6770 likewise insulated it from judicial intervention,
particularly& from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts, claiming that
said writs may work Just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would.
 !543

ii. CHANGE OF VENUE

PEOPLE V. GUTIERREZ
(G.R. No. L-32282-83. NOVEMBER 23, 1970)

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS:
A group of armed persons set fire various inhabited houses in Barrion Ora
Centro, Municipality of Bantay, Ilocos Sur one morning. The same day afternoon, several
residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of
various houses and in the death of an old woman. Two cases were filed against the
accused with arson and arson with homicide. The prosecution moved to the respondent
judge, at the instance of the witnesses, seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to
either San Fernando, La Union or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal
safety, as shown in their affidavits. The respondent judge denied the motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against
private respondents should be transferred because a miscarriage of justice was
impending is tenable?

HELD:
Yes. The just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining
witnesses, who had on a previous occasion freely given evidence before the
investigators in Manila, renders manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the
place of trial to a site outside Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into
 !544

conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the state is to b given a fair chance to
present its side of the case.

iii. RULE-MAKING POWER

 !545

PRIMICIAS V. OCAMPO
(G.R. No. L-6120. JUNE 30, 1953)

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two
statutory offenses, with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, which was docketed
as criminal case No. 18374 and with a violation of section 129 in relation to section 2713
of the Revised Administrative Code, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18375.
On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying
that assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact
involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise
known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the aid of assessors
in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First
Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure. This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for the People of
the Philippines.

On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion
praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of
fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409,
otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that "the aid of
assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of
First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of
Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for the
People of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
 !546

Whether or not the right to trial with the aid of assessors, being a substantive
right, cannot be impaired by this court in the exercise of its rule-making power?

HELD:
Yes. The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive
law and as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. This
is so because in said section 154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a
party litigant. Section 2477 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is couched is such a
manner that a similar right is implied when invoked by a party litigant. It says that the aid
may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. And this right
has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS V. COURT OF APPEALS (CA)

(G.R. No. 110571. MARCH 10, 1994)

NOCON, J.:

FACTS:
BOI granted petitioner's application to amend its BOI certificate of registration
changing its scope from glazed floor tiles to ceramic tiles opposing Mariwasa filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision and thereafter filed a petition for
review with CA. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA
does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing
appeals of the Court of Appeals from a final order for r decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals and Quasi-Judicial agencies cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal because
the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of EO 226.
Mariwasa says that the inconsistency between the two on the question of venue for
appeal has already been resolved by circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe rules to eliminate
conflicts concerning rules of procedure?

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional power under sec. 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129 issued Circular
1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals.
 !547

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

(49 SCRA 22. JANUARY 9, 2002)

PER CURIAM;

FACTS:
The Commission on Bar Integration, in a report recommended that the Supreme
Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the
adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. The basis of said report is
lodged in Administrative Case No. 526 which prayed for the Court to order the
integration of the Philippine Bar, and after due hearing, given recognition to existing
provincial and other local Bar associations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

HELD:
Yes. In accordance with the provision of Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution,
the court may integrate the Philippine Bar. This power is covered by the court’s power “to
promulgate rules concerning…the admission to the practice of law.”

After studying Administrative case No. 526 and the report of the Commission on
Bar Integration, the court is convinced the said integration is “perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable.” Such integration will serve as a means to raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
 !548

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

(G.R. NO. 132601, JANUARY 19, 1999)

PUNO, J.;

FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted for raping his common law spouse’s ten year old
daughter. The sentence given to him was death penalty. Petitioner questioned the
constitutionality of RA 7659 or the Death Penalty Law.

Sec 8 of RPC which was initially amended by RA 7659 was later on amended by
RA 8177 wherein the mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal
injection. The Secretary of Justice was the one who promulgated the rules for carrying
out RA 8177.

Petitioner sought to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of Bureau of

Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 was unconstitutional is
so far that it is cruel and degrading.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in RA 8177 to the
Secretary of Justice?

HELD:
No. There is no undue delegation of legislative power under RA 8177 to either
the Secretary of Justice of Director of Bureau of Prisons.

The general rule of delegation of power is embodied in the latin maxim, potestas
delegata non delegari potest or what has been delegated cannot be delegated. There
are exceptions to this rule, such exception which applies to this case is the delegation to
administrative bodies where the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of
Health and Director of the Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules on
the execution of lethal injection under the contested act.
 !549

(5) WRIT OF AMPARO

 !550

CANLAS V. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS

(G.R. No. 182795, JUNE 5, 2008)

REYES, R.T., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy.
Manggahan, Pasig City seeks remedy through a Writ of Amparo after their dwellings
have bee demolished or is about to be demolished in pursuant with a court judgment.
Petitioners contend that respondents have fraudulent and spurious titles over said land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Writ of Amparo is a correct remedy for the case?

HELD:
No. The Writ of Amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The
threatened demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not
included among the enumeration of rights covered by the writ. Also, the factual and legal
basis for petitioner’s claim to the land in question is not alleged at all in the petition.

The rule on Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatenedwith violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or of a privateindividual or entity. The writ shall
cover extralegal killings or disappearances.
 !551

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ et al V. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO

(G.R. NO. 182484. JUNE 17, 2007)

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondents filed originally filed with Aklan MTC a complaint for forcible
entry and damages against herein petitioners and some 120 other persons.

Respondents contend in their complaint that they are the registered owners of
the disputed land which was taken from their possession when petitioners intimidated
them by entering the area armed with bolos and suspected firearms. After said
encounter, petitioners build a nipa and bamboo structure in said land.

Petitioners on the other hand argues that it was the respondents who were the
intruders of the land which was, according to them, is theirs and questioned the validity
of private respondents’ certificate of title. Petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the case
against them and filed a counterclaim for damages. MCTC, however, denied their
petition.

Petitioners appealed in the RTC but was again denied by respondent judge who
issued a writ for demolition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of a certiorari with a Writ of Amparo is proper for the
case?

HELD:
No. The court found that petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is fatally
defective with respect to content and substance.

The Writ of Amparo is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights of

life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those
available under the prevailing Rules or as a remedy supplemental to it. It is not a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial
 !552

JULIAN YUSAY CARAM V. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI

(G.R. NO. 193652. AUGUST 5, 2014)

VILLARAMA Jr., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Julian Yusay Caram is the child out of wedlock of petitioner Christina
with Marcelino. Christina told Marcelino that she had an abortion even though she
proceeded to have her pregnancy and planned to have the child adopted through the
Sun and Moon Home for Children (SMHC) in Paranaque.

SMHC shouldered all of the hospital expenses when baby Julian was born who
was then voluntarily given by Christina to the DSWD through a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment.

Baby Julian, together with adopter and spouses Medina, were already in
supervised trial custody when Christina wrote a letter to DSWD praying for the
suspension of the adoption proceedings.

Christina, after being informed that the certificate declaring baby Julian legally
available for adoption was already final three months after she signed the deed, filed for
the issuance of a Writ of Amparo for baby Julian’s custody.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for a Writ of Amparo is the proper recourse for
obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child?

HELD:
No. Seeing that there was no forced disappearance in this case, the court denied
the request for an issuance of Writ of Amparo. DSWD had not concealed the
whereabouts of baby Julian. Court ruled that the third and fourth element for the
issuance of a Writ of Amparo were not present.
 !553

(6) WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

 !554

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE V. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN

(G.R. NO. 203254. OCTOBER 08, 2014)

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Ilagan and petitioner Lee were common law partners. In August
2011, Lee confronted Ilagan after discovering that the latter’s digital camera contained a
sex video of him and another woman.

After refusing to return the camera, Lee had her head slammed by Ilagan. Lee
then used the said video as evidence in various complaints that she filed against Ilagan.
He latter claims that Lee reproduced said video and threatened him to upload it to the
internet.

Ilagan had a Writ of Habeas Data issued ordering Lee to appear before the court
and produce Ilagan’s camera. Lee now comes to this court questioning the issuance of
the Writ of Habeas Data to Ilagan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC correctly extended the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data?

HELD:
No. Under Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ is “a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.”

The allegations in the petition for the issuance of said writ must be supported by
substantial evidence showing an actual threat of the aforementioned rights of the victim.

The Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. 


MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA V. P.SSUPT. MARLOU C.CHAN

(G.R. NO. 193636. JULY 24, 2012)
 !555

SERENO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Gamboa comes to this court praying for the issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Data against respondents in their capacities as PNP officials of Ilocos Norte
after allegedly obtaining Gamboa and her aides’ information through a series of
surveillance operation. Said information was then used as a basis to include her in the
enumeration of individuals maintaining Private Army Groups.

Gamboa contends that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
tainted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when
the right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to
life, liberty or security?

HELD:
No. Gamboa was unable to prove that her inclusion and her aides in the list of
individuals with PAGs resulted to harassment of any sort and increased police
surveillance. Respondents were able to justify said investigations which were apparently
in connection with the criminal cases in which Gamboa was involved.

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES V. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE

(G.R. NO. 202666. SEPETEMBER 29, 2014)

VELASCO JR., J.:

FACTS:
 !556

Angela Tan, Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara, all students of St. Therese
College (STC) uploaded on the social media site Facebook several pictures of them
wearing only their undergarments.

After finding out about the photos, some of their classmates secured copies
which they then showed to their teacher Mylene Escudero. The latter then reported the
photos to STC for appropriate action.

After finding out that Tan, Daluz and Suzara had violated a rule in the student’s
handbook, they were banned by STC from marching in their graduation ceremony in
March 2012 despite being issued a TRO enjoining the school from barring said students
at the ceremony.

Rhonda Vivares, Daluz’s mother together with the mothers of the girls, filed for
the issuance of Habeas Data contending that the photos which were downloaded by
Escudero were in violation of the girls’ rights to privacy. The petition was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for Writ of Habeas Data is proper?

HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that though the case does not involve any extralegal killing
or enforced disappearance, a Writ of Habeas Data maybe availed because the Rule of
said writ does not limit its application to extralegal killings and forced disappearance.
STC’s contention the writ shall only be available only against abuses of a person or
entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing and collecting data is untenable.
 !557

(7) RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

MMDA, ET AL. V. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY

(G.R. NOS. 171947-48, DECEMBER 18, 2008)

VELASCO Jr., J.:

FACTS:
Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila filed a complaint against several
government agencies including petitioners herein for the cleanup and rehabilitation and
protection of the Manila Bay and to submit to the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite a
concerted plan of action for the purpose.
 !558

The complaint was about the water quality in the Manila bay which had fallen
way below the allowable standards set by law. Respondents contend that the omission
or inability to attend to the problem by the petitioners resulted

Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending that the
pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. They also asserted that
the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus. The CA sustained RTC’s decision stressing that petitioners were not
required to do tasks outside of their basic functions under existing laws, hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

HELD:
Yes. In accordance with Sec. 3(c) of R.A. 7924 creating the MMDA, the MMDA is
mandated to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and
liquid disposal as well as other garbage disposal systems. Not only is MMDA’s duty in
the area of solid waste disposal set forth in PD 1152 or the Environmental Code and RA
9003 but also in its charter and therefore it is ministerial in nature and can be compelled
by a mandamus.
 !559

iv. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION

JUDGE RENATO FUENTES V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO

(G.R. NO. 124295. OCTOBER 23, 2001)

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:
In an expropriation case won by the Government represented by the Department
of Public Works and Highways against the owners of the properties affected by the first
fly-over project in Davao City, said owners were given compensation for the taking of
their property. The property was then auctioned at the DPWH depot with Alex Bacquial
as highest bidder. Bacquial, together with respondent Sheriff Palisan, attempted to
withdraw the auctioned properties. They were, however, prevented from doing so by the
custodian of the subject DPWH properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo. Engr. Alejo
claimed that his office was totally unaware of the auction sale, and informed the sheriff
that many of the properties within the holding area of the depot were still serviceable and
were due for repair and rehabilitation.
 !560

Judge Fuentes granted Bacquial’s motion for the issuance of a breakthrough

order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of auctioned properties. The lower court
issued another order temporarily suspending the writ of execution it earlier issued in the
expropriation case and directing Bacquial not to implement the writ.

Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a
criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he
conducted an investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on
the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge
in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts
before the Supreme Court?

HELD:
No. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
provides that the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative
complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate
public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court
personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of
separation of power.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA V. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ
(G.R. NO. 102781. APRIL 22, 1993)

NOCON, J p:

FACTS:
Petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda prays for the dismissal of the case
filed against him by respondent Napoleon Abiera of the Public Attorney’s office after
petitioner had allegedly falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and
criminal cases submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have already been decided
when in truth, Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in the 5 civil and 10
criminal cases.

Petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman where

respondent has filed the complaint
.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts?
 !561

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious
misconduct under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Considering that the court had
not acted upon the issue on his certificates of service, the Ombudsman may not conduct
an investigation as such it would constitute an encroachment of the Court’s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. It would constitute a violation
of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative

supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA
down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC
that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take
the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
 !562

v. CONSULTATIONS/DECISIONS

PRUDENTIAL BANK V. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO

(158 SCRA 646. MARCH 15, 1988)

PER CURIAM

FACTS:
Respondent Castro filed this “Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for
Voluntary Inhibition” of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee and Justice Teodoro Padilla.
Respondent prays that the decision rendered in November 1987 and the resolution of
denial of the motion of reconsideration of said decision be set aside and a new one
entered by the Court dismissing the administrative case and exonerating the respondent.
Respondent argues that the decision of his case was violative of the provisions of the
Constitution due to the lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of
the Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member of
the Court for its opinion to be written

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s contention were valid?

HELD:
No.The Court finds Castro’s contention bereft of basis since the certification
requirement only pertains to judicial and not administrative cases. Even if such
certification is required, the conclusion of the court in its decision were arrived at after
 !563

consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who took part in said
deliberations and who have voted attest to that.

Being a per curiam decision or an opinion of the court as a whole, there is no

ponente although any member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such
cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.

ISAGANI CRUZ V. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

(G.R. NO. 135385. DECEMBER 6, 2000)

PER CURIAM:


FACTS:
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian doctrine embodied in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands”
which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of
said law violate the rights of private landowners.



ISSUE:
Whether or not the IPRA should be declared invalid?



HELD:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a
7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no
majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence,
 !564

ancestral domains may include natural resources – somehow against the Regalian
doctrine.

JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. L-82273. JUNE 1, 1990)

PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

Petitioner charges Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo P. Marasigan, Division
Clerk of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of Court respectively and Atty. Jose Ilustre, Chief
of Judicial Records Office of this Court, with usurpation of judicial functions for allegedly
“maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional
“Resolution” and “Entry of Judgment.”

The court dismissed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration after the Court found out that
the motion merely reiterated the same arguments raised in the earlier petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the minute resolution which resolved petitioner’s case was valid
even without the certification of the Chief Justice?

HELD:
Yes.The Court ruled that minute resolutions need not be signed by the members
of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor require the certification of
the Chief Justice. For to require the members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued
would not only delay the issuance of its resolutions but also a great amount of their time
would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerks of Court.
 !565

NORBERTO MENDOZA V. CFI of QUEZON

(G.R. NO. L-35612-14. JUNE 27, 1973)

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
A resolution promulgated by the court dismissed the petitions for Habeas Corpus,
certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit is sought to be reconsidered in this case.
Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that his confinement was marked with
illegality or that the order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioner comes to this court questioning the dismissal of the former
petition through a minute resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Minute Resolution issued by the Supreme Court offends
the constitutional provision requiring that no decision shall be rendered by any court of
record without stating clearly and distinctly the law and the facts on which it is based?

HELD:
No. Section 12 (now section 14), Article VIII of the Constitution refers only to
decisions of the merit and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such
as the one at bar.
 !566

SOLID HOMES, INC. V. EVELINA LASERNA

(G.R. NO. 166051. APRIL 8, 2008)

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:
Respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe and petitioner Solid Homes Inc.
(SHI) entered into a Contract to sell were in the former we buyers.

After paying 90% of the purchase price, respondents demanded the execution
and delivery of the Deed of Sale of the property upon the final payment of the balance.
SHI did not conform which resulted to the petitioners filing a Complaint for Delivery of
Title and Execution of Deed of Sale before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) which was then denied by the latter.

Laserna then appealed before the Office of the President which merely adopted
the findings and conclusions contained in the decision of HLURB.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President should be based on the
findings and facts of law as mandated by the Constitution?

HELD:
No. Sec. 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not apply to decisions rendered
in administrative proceedings. It only applies to decisions rendered in judicial
proceedings. It would be an error to hold that decisions of the Executive Department or
Administrative Agencies must be bound to the requirements set forth in said section.
 !567

ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON V. JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ

(A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338. SEPTEMBER 5, 1997)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Dizon was convicted for falsification of private documents. He now
comes to this court charging Judge Lopez with the violation of the Constitution, serious
misconduct, inefficiency and falsification in connection with his case

Dizon alleged that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the
decision until almost one year and eight months after the promulgation of its dispositive
portion on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, 14 of the Constitution which
prohibits courts from rendering decisions without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and law on which they are based and 15 of the same Art. VIII, which provides
that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions within three months from the
date of their submission. Respondent states that the delay in furnishing complainant with
a copy of the decision was unintentional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the Constitution by failing to furnish a
decision within the prescribed period?

HELD:
Yes. The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution
which provides: All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate
courts and three months for all other lower courts.

Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of the
submission of the case for decision, the fact is that only the dispositive portion was read
at such promulgation. She claims that on April 22, 1993 the text of her decision,
containing her findings and discussion of complainants liability, had already been
prepared although it had to be put in final form by incorporating the dispositive
portion. However, the fact is that it took a year and eight months more before this was
 !568

done and a copy of the complete decision furnished the complainant on December 16,
1994.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. VALENTIN BARING Jr.

(G.R. NO. 137933. JANUARY 28, 2002)

BUENA, J.:

FACTS:
Herein accused-appellant Valentin Baring Jr. was indicted for statutory rape
committed against the seven year old granddaughter of his common law spouse. He
was convicted after pleading guilty during his arraignment. Baring Jr. then filed a petition
to dismiss the case which was subject for review alleging among others that the decision
of the trial court is bereft of material facts supporting the conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a need to express in the decision the facts and the law on
which it is based?

HELD:
Yes.The Constitution mandates that there is need to present such facts and
bases which have guided the court in assessing whether the conclusion arrived at is
consistent with the facts of law.

In the case at bar, the trial court’s decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of
accused appellant. Such doubt may be affected by the trial court’s failure to fully explain
the correlation of fact, the weight or admissibility of the evidence presented for or against
the accused, the assessments made from the evidence presented and the conclusions
drawn therefrom after applying the pertinent law as basis for the decision.

A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as

the factual and legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions
drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid.
 !569

REV. FR. DANTE MARTINEZ V. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. 123547. MAY 21, 2001)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
In February 1981, private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister
Manuela De la Paz, married to Maximo Hipolito, entered into an oral contract with
petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City, for
the sale of Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe Subdivision in Cabanatuan City for the sum
of P15,000.00. At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name of Claudia
De la Paz, mother of private respondents.

Petitioner began paying the real estate taxes on said property and completed the
payment on January 31, 1983. Construction on the house was completed on October 6,
1981. Petitioner and his family have maintained their residence there. Private
respondents De la Paz never delivered the Deed of Sale despite the petitioner having
fully paid.

Private respondents sold three lots with right to repurchase the same within one
year to private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion for the sum
of P150,000.00. One of the lots sold was the lot previously sold to petitioner.

Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had been sold
to the spouses Veneracion after receiving a letter from private respondent Reynaldo
Veneracion on March 19, 1986, claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they
vacate the property and remove their improvements thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration is contrary to the constitutional requirement that a denial of a motion
for reconsideration must state the legal reasons on which it is based?

HELD:
No. Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that no petition for review or
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or
denied without stating the basis therefor. This requirement was fully complied with when
the Court of Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution
that it found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything
new. Thus, its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration states:
 !570



KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.), INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. 127682. April 24, 1998)

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
This is a pleading filed on March 4, 1998 in behalf of petitioner and denominated
as a Motion for Leave to file Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
resolution of September 10, 1997.

Petitioner attributes supposed errors and irregularities in the disposition of the

case to both the Court of Appeals and this Court. Retired Justice Teodoro Padilla was
particularly imputed by petitioner.

Petitioner, in his second motion for reconsideration contends that the minute
resolutions are in violation of Sec. Art VIII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not issuance of Minute Resolutions is valid under Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution?

HELD:
“Resolutions” are not “decisions” within the above constitutional requirements;
they merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained. And the petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing,
the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases “submitted for decision,”

i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings,
but not where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefor stating the
legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Supreme Court, after deliberating on a petition and
subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the
questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court’s
decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
 !571

RENATO TICHANGCO V. THE HONORABLE ALFREDO ENRIQUEZ

(G.R. NO. 150629. JUNE 30, 2004)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review of decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 54648. The said decision affirmed the findings of Alfredo
Enriquez, the Land Registration Authority administrator that there were no grounds to
initiate appropriate proceedings to nullify OCT Nos. 820 and 7477 and subsequent titles
derived therefrom all covering parcels of land in Tondo, Manila registered under the
names of private respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a compliance of Section 14 of Article VIII of the
Constitution?

HELD:
Yes. There is compliance with said provision when a collegiate appellate court,
after deliberation, denies a motion and states that the questions raised are factual or has
already been passed upon or cites some other legal basis.

The CA decision contains the necessary antecedents to warrant its conclusions,

the appellate court cannot be said to have withheld essential ultimate facts.
 !572

g. TENURE OF JUSTICES/JUDGES
 !573

IN RE FIRST INDORSEMENT FROM HON. RAUL M GONZALES

(A.M. NO. 88-4-5433. APRIL 15, 1988)

PER CURIAM:

FACTS:
Raul M. Gonzales, Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor, received a letter of
complaint with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court together
with a telegram from Michael Cuenco for comment within 10 days upon receipt which he
forwarded to Justice Fernan.

The complaint, which was originally addressed to Gonzales, referred to the

charges of disbarment sought by Cuenco against Fernan. The Court resolved to dismiss
the charges of Cuenco against Fernan for lack of merit and was asked to report the
reason why he should not be held administratively liable for the unfounded allegations
against Fernan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a Supreme Court Justice could be disbarred during his term of
office?

HELD:
No. Fernan, under the Constitution, is required to be a member of the Philippine
Bar as qualification of the office held by him. Considering his office, he may only by
removed by impeachment.

A member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via
impeachment, disbarment may only come after the proceedings.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GACOTT

(G.R. No. 116049. JULY 13, 1995)
 !574

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott was the ponente of a criminal case. Mr.
Gacott then ordered the dismissal of the case. Subsequently, he was reprimanded and
fined P10, 000.00 for gross ignorance of the law as a result of his negligence in reading
the text of the cited LOI. Afterwards, his order to dismiss the criminal case was annulled
by the Court. The judgment was made by the Second Division. The respondent then
questioned the competence of the Second Division of the Court to administratively
discipline him.

Mr. Gacott then cited his basis, the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constituion which reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon." The respondent then argued further that it is only the full Court and not a
division thereof that can administratively punish him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to
administratively discipline the respondent judge?

HELD:
Yes. The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly
shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which
states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is
a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the
procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that
all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court
since it would result in an absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein
and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that
the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein.” In this
instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court
itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the
Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is
the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or
either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding
P10, 000.00 or both.

CAOIBES, JR. V. OMBUDSMAN

(G.R. No. 132177. JULY 19, 2001)

BUENA, J.:

FACTS:
 !575

On May 20, 1997, petitioner Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. and respondent Judge
Florentino M. Alumbres were involved in a fight within the court premises over a piece of
furniture. Thereafter, the respondent judge lodged before the Office of the Ombudsman,
a criminal complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of
complainant's eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. He prayed that
criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner judge. The
respondent judge also filed an administrative complaint with the Supreme Court, praying
for the dismissal of petitioner judge from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct
or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer.
Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Order to the petitioner,
requiring him to submit a counter-affidavit. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner
judge filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying
that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case in abeyance, and
refer the same to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case
pending resolution of the administrative case?
HELD:
Yes. It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who
were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under
Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from
this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal
complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed
before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of
whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the
Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and
bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative
implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative
prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a
dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence. Maceda is
emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to
the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch
of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO

(G.R. No. 124295. OCTOBER 23, 2001)

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:
Pursuant to the government’s plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the
Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation case against the owners of the
properties affected by the project. The expropriation case was presided by Judge Renato
 !576

A. Fuentes. The government won the expropriation case. DPWH still owed the
defendants-lot owners. The lower court granted Tessie Amadeo’s motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. On May 3,
1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy, addressed to the Regional
Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties subject of the levy as ‘All
scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the Department of Public Works and Highways
depot at Panacan, Davao City. The auction sale pushed through and Alex Bacquial
emerged as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent
Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties on May 19, 1994.
They were, however, prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH
properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed that his office was totally unaware
of the auction sale, and informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the
holding area of the depot were still serviceable and were due for repair and
rehabilitation.

On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second

District of Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme
Court directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on
the report recommending the filing of an administrative case against the sheriff and other
persons responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. The
Department of Public Works and Highways, through the Solicitor General, filed an
administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Renato A. Fuentes
be charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3
(e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts
unbecoming of a judge.

Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao
a criminal complaint charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, Section 3 (e).

Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss

complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a
criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he
conducted an investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on
the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel.

The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an

investigation because the Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would
verify the propriety of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court
Administrator has not filed any administrative case against petitioner judge that would
pose similar issues on the present inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.

ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the
exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the
Supreme Court?
 !577

HELD:
No. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
provides:

“Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own
or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.”

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative

complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate
public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court
personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of
separation of powers.

Petitioner’s questioned order directing the attachment of government property

and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official
functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given
circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the
Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. “No other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any
functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final
and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order.
 !578

h. PERIODS FOR DECISION

YOUNG V. DE GUZMAN
(A.M. No. RTJ-96-1365. FEBRUARY 18, 1999.)

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Robert G. Young, President of Banawe Realty Development
Corporation, charged respondent Judge Pastor V. De Guzman, Jr., of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, with unreasonable delay in the disposition of Civil Case
No. 873-R, entitled "La Commercial Company, et al. vs. China Banking Corporation," for
recovery of unpaid rentals owing from store space lessees and accounting of all rentals
due and demandable, as well as the proceeds and receivables from the sales of units,
over a condominium property. On 16 July 1990, the condominium building was
destroyed by a relatively strong earthquake, prompting the parties to file a manifestation
to the above effect, along with a joint motion to dismiss the case, with the Court. On
 !579

December 1, 1994, counsel for both parties submitted, reiterating the above motion to
dismiss, an opposition to a request for answers by written interrogatories caused to be
made by the manager of Prudential Bank of Baguio City. The motion remained
unresolved until the institution, months later, of the instant administrative case. Instead,
complainant averred, Judge De Guzman had acted "with indecent haste" on a collateral
issue granting Atty. Helenea M. Dauz, former counsel of Banawe Realty Development
Corporation, attorney's fees amounting to P250,000.00 issuing forthwith a writ of
execution to enforce the award.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in bad faith or malice in the
disposition of the civil case?
HELD:
No. In the Court's resolution of 17 March 1997, the parties were required to
manifest whether they would be willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of
the pleadings theretofore on file. Respondent Judge submitted his manifestation, dated
02 May 1997, expressing his agreement thereto. Complainant failed to submit his
manifestation, constraining the Court to dispense with it and to deem the case submitted
for decision.
Respondent Judge, evidently felt that the issues raised could only be resolved
properly if and after all the parties concerned would have been fully heard. He made it
clear in his order of 20 December 1990 that the issue presented, i.e., the entitlement to
the rental deposits demanded, would require the question of ownership to be first
resolved. The matter was judicial in nature. This administrative case would not be the
right forum for it. There was utterly no showing that respondent Judge had been
motivated by, or had acted in, bad faith or malice.
With regard to the claim that respondent resolved the motion for payment of
attorney's fees to Atty. Helenea Dauz with undue haste, the order of 11 April 1995 would
show that the motion was granted only when Banawe Realty had failed to file any
comment thereon, let alone an opposition thereto, despite the opportunity given by the
trial court.
SANCHEZ V. VESTIL
(AM No. RTJ-98-1419. OCTOBER 13, 1998)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Atty. Raul A. Sanchez charged Presiding Judge Augustine A. Vestil of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, with (1) grave misconduct, (2) graft, (3)
gross ignorance of the law and (4) falsification of his certificate of service in relation to
Special Proceedings No. MAN 185 entitled "Intestate Estate Proceedings of the
Deceased Jose D. Sanchez."

On October 28, 1996, respondent filed his Comment, praying that the Complaint
be dismissed and specifically denying the allegations therein. In a Resolution dated July
30, 1997, this Court referred the Complaint to Justice Consuelo Y. Santiago of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. The Court also directed the
Office of the Court Administrator to send a team to conduct a judicial audit of cases
pending before the sala of respondent.
 !580

After the judicial audit was conducted, the Court, in its Resolution dated
December 3, 1997, adopted the following recommendations of the OCA and directed
respondent (1) "to concentrate meanwhile in deciding with dispatch" those cases which
have remained unresolved beyond the constitutionally prescribed ninety days and (2) to
explain within ten days from notice the reason for the delay in the resolution of said
cases. The Court further directed the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the OCA
to withhold the salary of respondent "until he has decided the said cases and has
submitted copies of the decisions" to the Office of the Court Administrator.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge committed grave misconduct?

HELD:
Yes. The Court reiterates that a "judge, as the person presiding over the court, is
the visible representation of the law and justice," and that "[a] judge's official conduct
should be free and untainted by the appearance of impropriety, and his or her personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in performance of judicial duties, but also in his or
her everyday life, should be beyond reproach." Evidently, the acts of herein respondent
judge have not been consistent with the conduct expected of his stature and profession.

Respondent judge is being charged with dereliction of duty for failing to resolve
numerous civil and criminal cases within the period prescribed by law. He is also being
called to account for falsely stating in his certificate of service that there were no cases
submitted for decision or resolution beyond the reglementary period pending before his
sala.

The Report on Audit and Physical Inventory of the Records of Cases in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City, submitted by the judicial audit team of
the OCA, disclosed a thorough and detailed inventory of respondent's case load. Clearly,
the foregoing shows that there are 114 cases before the sala of respondent judge which
have not been resolved within the reglementary period.

BERNARDO V. FABROS
(A.M. No. MTJ-99-1189. MAY 12, 1999)

PANGANIBAN, J:

FACTS:

Respondent was charged with failure to decide an ejectment case within the 30-
day reglementary period prescribed by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Respondent admitted the charge, offered no excuses and claimed the same was due to
an oversight because she failed to record the expiration of the period for resolving the
case. She, however, challenged the standing of complainant who was the attorney-in-
fact of plaintiff in the ejectment case claiming that "[i]n administrative actions where there
is a complainant and a respondent certainly it is a cognition sine qua non that the one
who complains or who appears to be the offended party must personally file the same.
"The Court Administrator, in its investigation report, found respondent guilty and
recommended that she be fined in the amount of P3, 000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the charges against the respondent will prosper?

HELD:
 !581

Yes. Respondent was found guilty of gross inefficiency and ordered to pay a fine
of P3, 000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.

The Court reiterates that judges may ask for additional time when they are
burdened with heavy caseloads, which they cannot dispose of within the reglementary
period. In the present case, however, respondent judge never asked for an extension.

Respondent avers that, due to "plain oversight," she failed to record the
expiration of the period for resolving the case. As she herself admits, this is not a valid
excuse. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management
and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business.
 !582

XII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL

COMMISSIONS

1. COMMON PROVISIONS
 !583

BRILLANTES, JR. V. YORAC

(G.R. No. 93867. DECEMBER 18, 1990)

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
The President of the Philippines designated Associate Commissioner Haydee
B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman
Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to
investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat attempt.

The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members
themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their
independence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent
Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is unconstitutional
in view of the status of the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional
body and the specific provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution that "(I)n
no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity."?

RULING:
Yes. The designation is unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Section 1, of the
Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as "independent."
Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President
of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these
 !584

Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules
and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject
only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A,
Section 7.

The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman

comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its
consent, by the President of the Philippines. There is no justification for the President of
the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the
respondent. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission
on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however well-
meaning.

The choice of the Acting Chairman and the basis thereof were for the members
of the Comelec and not the President to make.

MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
(G.R. No. 149036. APRIL 2, 2002)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the
Comelec’s EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity.
On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with
other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim
appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum
address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department.

She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10,
2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are
prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on
April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000,
exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.

Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the

COMELEC en banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law
Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of
the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service
laws, rules and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed
the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
 !585

respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the
basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution?

HELD:
No. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an
ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

(G.R. No. 158791. JULY 22, 2005)

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
By petitioner's claim, the amount of P215, 270,000.00 was appropriated for its
Central Office by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002. The total allocations for
the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount to P285, 660,790.44. It
complains, however, that the total fund releases by respondent to its Central Office
during the fiscal year 2002 was only P279, 853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased
balance of P5, 807,392.30. To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by
respondent DBM on the basis of its "no report, no release" policy whereby allocations for
agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents mentioned in Sections
3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on the
Release of the FY 2002 Funds. Petitioner contends that the application of the "no report,
no release" policy upon independent constitutional bodies is a violation of the principle of
fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.

Respondent denies having strictly enforced the policy upon offices vested with
fiscal autonomy, it claiming that the delay in releasing the balance of petitioner's budget
was not on account of any failure on petitioner's part to submit the required reports;
rather, it was due to a shortfall in revenues.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the “no report, no release policy” can be enforced against offices
possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution?

HELD:
No. The "no report, no release" policy cannot be enforced. "Automatic release" of
approved annual appropriations to petitioner Civil Service Commission should be
construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. Respecting
respondent's justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a shortfall
in revenues, the same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally
 !586

unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming that there was indeed such a
shortfall that does not justify non-compliance with the mandate of Article IX (A), Section
5 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal
autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, (such as petitioner
CSC) and the Ombudsman.

To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in

the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other
entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not
granted the same autonomy. The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal
autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations
over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall. Even
assuming that there was a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold
full release of petitioner's funds without violating not only the Constitution but also
Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.

FUNA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

(G.R. No. 191672. NOVEMBER 25, 2014)

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
Fancisco Duque, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission was designated as
ex-officio member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF, pursuant to EO 864 issued by President Arroyo on
February 22, 2010.
On April 8, 2010, petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer,
concerned citizen and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Supreme Court challenging: (a) the constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V EO 292, otherwise known as The Administrative Code of
1987, and; (b) the constitutionality of the designation of Duque as a member of the
Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear
violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO
292 violate the independence of the CSC and the prohibition imposed upon members of
constitutional commissions from holding any other office or employment.
ISSUE:
Whether the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impairs
the independence of the CSC and violates the constitutional prohibition against the
holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions?
HELD:
Yes. The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the
constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares
unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity as a
member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF.
 !587

GAMINDE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No. 140335. DECEMBER 13, 2000)

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma
P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission for a term expiring
February 2, 1999. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office.
On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines
confirmed the appointment.

However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of
the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998 opined that petitioner's term
of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999. Relying on said
advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,
1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit requesting
opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff
may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on
February 02, 1999.

On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an

opinion that "the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as
stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent." Consequently, on
March 24, 1999, the CSC COA Resident Auditor issued notice of disallowance No.
99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to
petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February 02, 1999.

ISSUE:
Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as
claimed by her?

HELD:
The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on
June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999. She is bound by the term of the
 !588

appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. However, she served as de
facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary
and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on
Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of
her co-terminous staff.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar
as they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and
her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from February 02, 1999, until
February 02, 2000.

ESTRELLA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(G.R. No. 160465. MAY 27, 2004)

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondent Rolando F. Salvador seeks a reconsideration from the
Supreme Court's Resolution of April 28, 2004 nullifying the status quo ante order issued
by the comelec en banc on the ground that the necessary four votes or majority of the
members was not attained. Commissioner Lantion previously inhibited himself in the
deliberations of the COMELEC Second Division involving the same parties but voted
when the case was elevated [to the] en banc. In the issuance of the questioned
COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante Order, five of the then incumbent seven members
of the COMELEC participated. Commissioners Abalos, Tangcangco, Javier and Lantion
voted for the issuance of said order, while Commissioner Borra dissented (4-1).

The Supreme Court in its Resolution of April 28, 2004 held that since
Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned
order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four
(4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed
to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or
order, as required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

In seeking a reconsideration of the above-quoted Resolution, private respondent

cites Cua v. Commission on Elections wherein this Court ruled that the three members
who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five members who
deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under the
aforecited constitutional provision. Private respondent argues that "[f]ollowing the
doctrine laid out in Cua, three (3) votes would have been sufficient to constitute a
majority to carry the decision of the COMELEC En Banc as provided by the Constitution
and the appropriate rules."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the majority vote necessary in the Comelec en banc is the
majority vote of "all its members," or the majority of the members who deliberated and
voted thereon?

HELD:
No. Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution is clear that it should be the
majority vote of all its members and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations. In the case at bar, following the clear provision of the Constitution,
counting out Commissioner Lantion's vote from the questioned COMELEC En
 !589

Banc resolution would leave just three (3) votes out of "all" seven (7) members of the
COMELEC.

For the foregoing reasons then, this Court hereby abandons the doctrine laid
down in Cua and holds that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter
brought before it by a majority vote of "all its members," and NOT majority of the
members who deliberated and voted thereon.

DUMAYAS, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(G.R. Nos. 141952-53. APRIL 20, 2001)

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
In a resolution dated August 24, 1999 but promulgated on March 2, 2000, the
COMELEC en banc reversed and set aside the resolution of the Second Division and
annulled the proclamation of petitioner Dumayas. Respondent Bernal, Jr. was
proclaimed by the newly-constituted Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected
Mayor of the Municipality of Carles, thereby unseating petitioner Dumayas.

ISSUE:
In view of the retirement of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani before the date
of the promulgation of the assailed resolution on March 2, 2000, should said resolution
be deemed null and void for being violative of Article IX-A, Section 7 of the 1987
Constitution?

HELD:
No. In Jamil vs. Commission on Elections, we held that a decision becomes
binding only after its promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or member of
the collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated office, his
vote on the decision must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled. Accordingly, the
votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani should merely be considered as withdrawn
for the reason that their retirement preceded the resolutions promulgation. The effect of
the withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had not signed the resolution at all and
only the votes of the remaining commissioners would be properly considered for the
purpose of deciding the controversy.

However, unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result
insofar as votes for or against a party is concerned, we find no reason for declaring the
decision a nullity. In the present case, with the cancellation of the votes of retired
Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent
commissioners at the time of the resolutions promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor of
respondent. Noteworthy, these remaining Commissioners still constituted a quorum. In
our view, the defect cited by petitioner does not affect the substance or validity of
respondent Commissions disposition of the controversy. The nullification of the
challenged resolution, in our view, would merely prolong the proceedings unnecessarily.

In the present case, with the cancellation of the votes of retired Commissioners
Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent commissioners at
the time of the resolution's promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor of respondent.
Noteworthy, these remaining Commissioners still constituted a quorum.
 !590

MAMERTOT. SEVILLA JR., V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(G.R. No. 203833. MARCH 19, 2013)

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Sucat, Muntinlupa City. Sevilla was proclaimed as the winner. So filed an election protest
with The Muntinlupa City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) which was dismissed. So filed
a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of a notice of appeal; he
also failed to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. The MeTC denied the
motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 6 ofA.M. No. 07-04-15-SC. So filed a petition for certiorari with
the Comelec, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge.

The Comelec Second Division granted So's petition and held that certiorari can
be granted despite the availability of appeals when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority. The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed
the Comelec Second Division's ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether the equally divided voting between three Commissioners concurring and
three Commissioners dissenting (3-3 votes) sustained the Comelec Second Division's
findings?

HELD:
No. The October 6, 2012 Comelec’s en banc resolution lacks legal effect as it is
not a majority decision required by the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that
"[e]ach Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members, any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution." Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the Comelec provided in Section 5
(a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure the votes required for the pronouncement
of a decision, resolution, order or ruling when the Comelec sits en banc, viz.:

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. — (a) When sitting en banc, four (4)
Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of
transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of
the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling.

In the present case, the equally divided voting between three Commissioners
concurring and three Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that
the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure require for a valid pronouncement
of the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc. In essence,
based on the 3-3 voting, the Comelec en banc did not sustain the Comelec Second
Division's findings. Under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a majority vote
of all the members of the Commission en banc is necessary to arrive at a ruling. In other
 !591

words, the vote of four (4) members must always be attained in order to decide,
irrespective of the number of Commissioners in attendance.
ALVAREZ V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(G.R. No. 142527. MARCH 1, 2001)

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
On May 12, 1997, petitioner Alvarez was proclaimed duly elected Punong
Barangay of Doña Aurora, Quezon City. Private respondent Sarmiento filed an election
protest claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board
of Election Inspectors. The Metropolitan Trial Court ordered the reopening and
recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. It subsequently rendered its decision
that private respondent won the election.

Alvarez filed an appeal. The Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that private
respondent won over petitioner. Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a Motion for
Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. Both petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration and private respondent's Motion for Execution pending appeal were
submitted for resolution. The COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration
and affirmed the decision of the Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution
pending appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when:
a. it did not preferentially dispose of the case;
b. it prematurely acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal;
and
c. it misinterpreted the Constitutional provision that "decisions, final
orders, or rulings of the Commission on Election contests
involving municipal and barangay officials shall be final, executory
and not appealable".

HELD:
Petition dismissed.

First, petitioner avers that the Commission violated its mandate on "preferential
disposition of election contests" as mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987
Constitution as well as Section 257, Omnibus Election Code that the COMELEC shall
decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days from the date of
submission.

Petitioner misreads the provision in Section 258 of the Omnibus Election Code. It
will be noted that the "preferential disposition" applies to cases before the courts and not
those before the COMELEC.

Further, we note that petitioner raises the alleged delay of the COMELEC for the
first time. In fact, private respondent points out that it was she who filed a Motion for
Early Resolution of the case when it was before the COMELEC. The active participation
of a party coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial
body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and
a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later
impugning the court or the body's jurisdiction. On the matter of the assailed resolution,
therefore, we find no grave abuse of discretion on this score by the COMELEC.
 !592

Second, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for
Execution pending appeal of private respondents on April 2, 2000 when the appeal was
no longer pending. He claims that the motion had become obsolete and unenforceable
and the appeal should have been allowed to take its normal course of "finality and
execution" after the 30-day period. Additionally, he avers it did not give one good reason
to allow the execution pending appeal.

We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner
had a motion for reconsideration before the Second Division. This pending motion for
reconsideration suspended the execution of the resolution of the Second Division.
Appropriately then, the division must act on the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when
the Second Division resolved both petitioner's motion for reconsideration and private
respondent's motion for execution pending appeal, it did so in the exercise of its
exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

The requisites for the grant of execution pending appeal are: (a) there must be a
motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good
reason for the execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a
special order.

In our view, these three requisites were present. In its motion for execution,
private respondent cites that their case had been pending for almost three years and the
remaining portion of the contested term was just two more years. In a number of similar
cases and for the same good reasons, we upheld the COMELEC's decision to grant
execution pending appeal in the best interest of the electorate. Correspondingly, we do
not find that the COMELEC abused its discretion when it allowed the execution pending
appeal.

Third, petitioner contends that the COMELEC misinterpreted Section 2 (2),

second paragraph, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. He insists that factual findings
of the COMELEC in election cases involving municipal and barangay officials may still
be appealed. He cites jurisprudence stating that such decisions, final orders or rulings do
not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, when
grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determination, and when there is
arbitrariness in the factual findings. We agree with petitioner that election cases
pertaining to barangay elections may be appealed by way of a special civil action for
certiorari. But this recourse is available only when the COMELEC's factual determination
are marred by grave abuse of discretion. We find no such abuse in the instant case. As
previously held, factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and
duly supported by evidence, are conclusive on this Court, more so in the absence of a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law in the questioned
resolutions. Unless any of these causes are clearly substantiated, the Court will not
interfere with the COMELEC's findings of fact.

ARATUC V. COMELEC
(G.R. Nos. L-49705-09. FEBRUARY 8, 1979)

BARREDO, J.:
 !593

FACTS:
On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang
Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the
results of the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur,
Lanao Del Norte,Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of
Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then
being undertaken by Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the
returns in 1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region had already been
canvassed showing partial results. A Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of
Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints of the
petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in the election records of the mentioned
provinces.

On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over
the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates, declaring all the eight Kilusan ng
Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the KB candidates to the
Comelec.

On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring
seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first eight places,
and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The
KB candidates interposed the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction?

HELD:
No. As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of
canvassers, the Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of
Canvassers, such as by extending its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting
centers in questions.

The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring
from any appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none
such provision anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct
control and supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in
administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here,
that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do
directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.

LOONG V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 


(G.R. No. 133676. APRIL 14, 1999)

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections
held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the
Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have
 !594

administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu. On May 12, 1998, some election
inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the
election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of
Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous
count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately
communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of
the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem
was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local
ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the
printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed
to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local
candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those
who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and
intervenor Yusop Jikiri, candidates for governor. The meeting discussed how the ballots
in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement.
Some recommended a shift to manual count, while the others insisted on automated
counting. Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu
was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five
(5) municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were
Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the
wrong sequence code.Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to
send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the
manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued
Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of
Pata. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750
approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation.
On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying
down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the
procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC. COMELEC started the manual
count on May 18, 1998.

ISSUES:
1. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering
a manual count (the main issue in the case at bar).
a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the
COMELEC when it ordered a manual count?

HELD:
The petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are
dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion
in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status
quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.

1. The big issue, one of first impression, is whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered a manual
count in light of R.A. No. 8436. The post-election realities on ground will show
that the order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious
or whimsical.

a. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly

the ballots in the municipality of Pata. A mayoralty candidate, Mr. Anton
 !595

Burahan, obtained zero votes despite the representations of the

Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors and others that they voted
for him. Another candidate garnered 100% of the votes.

b. It is likewise conceded that the automated machines rejected and would

not count the local ballots in the municipalities of Talipao, Siasi, Indanan,
Tapal and Jolo.

c. These flaws in the automated counting of local ballots in the

municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi, Indanan, Tapal and Jolo were
carefully analyzed by the Technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier
of the automated machines. All of them found nothing wrong with the
automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local
ballots by the National Printing Office. In the case of the municipality of
Pata, it was discovered that the ovals of the local ballots were misaligned
and could not be read correctly by the automated machines. In the case
of the municipalities of Talipao, Siasi, Indanan, Tapal and Jolo, it turned
out that the local ballots contained the wrong sequence code. Each
municipality was assigned a sequence code as a security measure.
Ballots with the wrong sequence code were programmed to be rejected
by the automated machines.

It is plain that to continue with the automated count in these five (5)
municipalities would result in a grossly erroneous count. It cannot also be
gainsaid that the count in these five (5) municipalities will affect the local
elections in Sulu. There was no need for more sampling of local ballots in
these municipalities as they suffered from the same defects. All local
ballots in Pata with misaligned ovals will be erroneously read by the
automated machines. Similarly, all local ballots in Talipao, Siasi, Indanan,
Tapal and Jolo with wrong sequence codes are certain to be rejected by
the automated machines. There is no showing in the records that the local
ballots in these five (5) municipalities are dissimilar which could justify the
call for their greater sampling.

JOSEPH H. REYES V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No. 125129. MARCH 29, 1999)

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:
By Resolution No. 89-003 the Technology and Livelihood Research Center
(TLRC) Executive Committee created a Provident Fund the primary purpose of which
was to augment the retirement benefits of the officers and employees of TLRC. The COA
Corporate Auditor suspended the transfer of funds from TLRC to the Provident Fund on
the ground that there is no law authorizing the grant of fringe benefits to TLRC officers
and employees.

Later on, the TLRC Provident Fund Board of Trustees issued a resolution
discontinuing the collection of contributions for the Fund from both the TLRC and the
members and ordered the immediate refund of the members' personal contributions.
 !596

After which, it issued another resolution dissolving the Provident Fund and ordering the
distribution of the personal and corporate/government shares to the members thereof.
On December 2, 1993, Corporate Auditor Flores issued Notice of Disallowance No.
93-003, disallowing in audit the refund of the government's share to the employee-
members.

ISSUE:
Whether a petition to review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari is the appropriate
remedy or mode of elevating a COA decision to the Supreme Court?

HELD:
No. Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders or
rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party. Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
judgment or final order of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved
party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65. Only when the Commission on Audit
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. However, setting aside the procedural error pro hac vice, and treating the petition as
one for certiorari under Rule 65, the Court finds that the Commission on Audit did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the distribution of the government
share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to its members. As correctly pointed out by
the COA in its decision, the government contributions were made on the condition that
the same would be used to augment the retirement and other benefits of the TLRC
employees. Since the purpose was not attained due to the question on the validity of the
Fund, then the employees are not entitled to claim the government share disbursed as
its counterpart contribution to the Fund. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to the use of
public funds outside the specific purpose for which the funds were appropriated. There is
no merit to petitioner's claim that the members of the Provident Fund acquired a vested
right over the government contributions. "A vested right is one which is absolute,
complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency." As previously
stated, the government contributions were subject to the condition that the funds would
be used to augment the retirement and other fringe benefits of TLRC employees.

MAHINAY V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 152457. APRIL 30, 2008.)

AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS:
On June 10, 1998, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) charged its
employee, petitioner Rodolfo R. Mahinay, for receiving unofficial fees from FRITZ
Logistics Phils. Inc. The said conduct of petitioner was alleged to be in violation of
the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations. The petitioner admitted receiving the fees from FRITZ Logistics Phils., Inc.
Consequently, PEZA rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty of the offense
charged. Petitioner filed for a motion of consideration, but was denied. He then
proceeded to appeal to the CSC. The CSC upheld PEZA’s decision, but modified the
penalty of forced resignation to dismissal from the service. On November 9, 2000,
petitioner filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
nullification of the CSC Resolution dismissing him from the service. On April 6, 2001, the
CA issued a Resolution stating that it had promulgated the Resolution dated October 30,
2000 dismissing the petition for certiorari, and that the Judicial Records Division Report
 !597

showed that neither a motion for reconsideration nor a Supreme Court petition on the
resolution had been filed. Consequently, the CA ordered the issuance of the
corresponding entry of judgment, and noted without action the petition for certiorari filed
on November 9, 2000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's appeal by way of special civil action
for certiorari on the ground that it was the wrong mode of appeal and that the appeal
was filed out of time?

HELD:
No. As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper mode of appeal
from the decision of a quasi-judicial agency, like the CSC, is a petition for review filed
with the CA. The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
does not apply in this case. The Court is aware of instances when the special civil action
of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, such as when public
welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; when the broader interests of
justice so require; when the writs issued are null; and when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. However, the circumstances in
this case do not warrant the application of the exception to the general rule provided by
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA, therefore, properly denied petitioner's Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Petition for Certiorari, which in effect dismissed his Petition
for Certiorari. There have been instances when a petition for certiorari would be treated
as a petition for review if filed within the reglementary period. In this case, the petition
was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing an appeal under Rule 43, which
period is within 15 days from notice of the judgment. Petitioner received a copy of the
CSC Resolution dated July 21, 2000 on August 11, 2000, so his last day to file an appeal
would be August 26, 2000. However, petitioner filed his Motion for Extension of Time to
File a Petition for Certiorari on September 12, 2000, while the petition was actually filed
on November 9, 2000. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the appeal was
filed out of time.
ABELLA, JR. V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(G.R. No. 152574. NOVEMBER 17, 2004)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
In 1998, two years after he retired, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and was issued a permanent appointment as Department
Manager III, Labor and Employment Center but was disapproved by the Civil Service
Commission Regional Office No. III on the ground that petitioner's eligibility was not
appropriate. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment. Petitioner
appealed the disapproval of his permanent appointment to the Civil Service
Commission, which issued a Resolution affirming the action taken by respondent CSC
Regional Office No. III. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner filed with [the CA] a petition for review seeking the reversal of the CSC
Resolutions on the ground that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994 is
unconstitutional as it rendered his earned civil service eligibility ineffective or
inappropriate for the position of Department Manager [III]. The CA shunned the issue of
constitutionality, arguing that a constitutional question should not be passed upon if there
are other grounds upon which the case may be decided. The appellate court ruled that
only the appointing officer may request reconsideration of the action taken by the CSC
 !598

on appointments. Thus, it held that petitioner did not have legal standing to question the
disapproval of his appointment.

On reconsideration, the CA added that petitioner was not the real party in
interest, as his appointment was dependent on the CSC's approval. Accordingly, he had
no vested right in the office, since his appointment was disapproved.

Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court and
raised issues as to “whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction 1) in ruling that petitioner lacks the personality and that petitioner is
not the real party in interest to question the disapproval of petitioner's appointment as
Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center, SBMA” and 2) in dismissing
petitioner's appeal on a mere technicality considering that petitioner is questioning the
constitutionality of Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994.

ISSUES:
A. Whether or not an appointee has legal standing to question the CSC
disapproval.
B. Whether or not the appointee whose appointment was disapproved is a real
party in interest, and
C. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission correctly disapproved
petitioner’s appointment.

HELD:
A.
Yes. While there is justification to allow the appointing authority to challenge the
CSC disapproval, there is none to preclude the appointee from taking the same course
of action. Aggrieved parties, including the Civil Service Commission, should be given the
right to file motions for reconsideration or to appeal.

“Legal standing" and "real party in interest" are different concepts. Kilosbayan v.
Morato explained:

Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have ‘alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy... "On the other hand, the question as
to 'real party-in-interest' is whether he is 'the party who would be [benefited] or injured by
the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'

If legal standing is granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a law or

governmental act despite the lack of personal injury on the challenger's part, then more
so should petitioner be allowed to contest the CSC Order disapproving his appointment.
Clearly, he was prejudiced by the disapproval, since he could not continue his office. E
T
Although petitioner had no vested right to the position, it was his eligibility that
was being questioned. Corollary to this point, he should be granted the opportunity to
prove his eligibility. He had a personal stake in the outcome of the case, which justifies
his challenge to the CSC act that denied his permanent appointment.

B.
Yes. Although the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing authority is
adversely affected by the CSC's Order and is a real party in interest, the appointee is
rightly a real party in interest too. He is also injured by the CSC disapproval, because he
is prevented from assuming the office in a permanent capacity. Moreover, he would
 !599

necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment

would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.

C.
Yes. Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his
permanent appointment. The appointee need not have been previously heard, because
the nature of the action did not involve the imposition of an administrative disciplinary
measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, merely examines the
conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointee's possession of all the
minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification.

In sum, while petitioner was able to demonstrate his standing to appeal the CSC
Resolutions to the courts, he failed to prove his eligibility to the position he was
appointed to.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks legal standing for

petitioner, but DENIED insofar as it prays for the reversal of the CSC Resolutions
disapproving his appointment as department manager III of the Labor and Employment
Center, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.

2. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

 !600

a. SCOPE
 !601

NATIONAL SERVICE CORP. V. NLRC 


(G.R. No. 70295. NOVEMBER 29, 1988)

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:
Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She
claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her reinstatement. NASECO
argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as
a government corporation by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly
owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National
Housing v Juco.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are
governed by the Civil Service Law?

HELD:
No. The holding in NHC v. Juco should not be given retroactive effect that is to
cases that arose before its promulgation of January 17, 1985. To do otherwise would
be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973
Constitution prior to the ruling in NHC v. Juco, this court recognized the applicability of
the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in
GOCC's, among them NASECO.

In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Constitution
starkly differs from the 1973 Constitution where NHC v. Juco was based. It provides that
the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government owned or controlled corporation with original
charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include GOCC which
are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.
 !602

JUCO V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATION

(G.R. No. 98107. AUGUST 18, 1997)

HERMOSISISMA, JR.:

FACTS:
Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National
Housing Corporation from No 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was
separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or
malversation of public funds. He filed for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the
Department of Labor which decided in his favor. Juco elevated the case to the NLRC
which reversed it. The case reached SC entitled “NHC vs. Juco” in which it was decided
that NHC was within the jurisdiction of labor arbiter and affirmed the decision of such.
Petitioner went to the CSC in 1989 but it was dismissed on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner returned to the labor arbiter and ruled that he was illegally
dismissed, which was reversed again by NLRC. Hence this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NHC is governed by CSC?

HELD:
No. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivision, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations
with original charter. (Article IX-B, Section 2[1]). In the case at bar, NHC is a government
owned or controlled corporation which was organized under the former Corporation law.
Therefore, it is a GOCC is without original charter. Hence it is not within the ambit of
jurisdiction of CSC.
 !603

LIBAN V. GORDON
(G.R. No. 175352. JANUARY 18, 2011)

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners are officer of the board of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter. They
averred that Respondent, who accepted the position of Chairman of Philippine National
Red Cross, violated the prohibition that members of the Senate No Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Respondent avers that PNRC is not a GOCC; hence, he did
not violate the prohibition

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine National Red Cross is GOCC with original charter
covered by the Civil Service Law, or GOCC without original or a Private Corporation
charter covered by Labor Code?

HELD:
No, PNRC is neither a GOCC nor a Private Corporation. The Philippine National
Red Cross, as a National Society is classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as
not to lose its character of neutrality, as well as independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an
auxiliary of the State.

Hence, when Gordon accepted the chairmanship, he did not violate the
prohibition because PNRC is neither a GOCC or a private corporation.
 !604

b. DISQUALIFICATION
 !605

FLORES V. DRILON
(G.R. No. 104732. JUNE 22, 1993)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise
known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992.” Under which, for the
first year of its operations, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. Private Respondent then
Richard Gordon was the Mayor of Olongapo City in which the law takes effect.
Petitioners aver that the law encroaches Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution,
which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 13 par. (d) of RA 7227 is constitutional?

HELD:
No, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective official shall
be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure. The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several
public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time
with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. In the case at bar,
sec 13 of such RA runs counter to the express prohibition of the law. By being appointed
as chairman of Subic Authority, Gordon, who is an elective official, violates the express
prohibition on holding an office by appointment. Hence, the law is unconstitutional.
 !606

FUNA V. ERMITA
(G.R. No. 184740. FEBRUARY 11, 2010)

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On October 4, 2006, President Arroyo appointed private respondent Bautista as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications. On
September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T.
Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. Petitioner
questions the constitutionality of her multiple appointments on the ground that they
violate Sec 13, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. Respondent avers that she relinquished
her post as USEC of DOTC; hence, the case is already moot.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as an OIC of MARINA
concurrent with position of DOTC violated sec 13 of Art VII of the 1987 Constitution?

HELD:
Yes, Sec. 13 of Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure and sec 7 of the same article provides that unless otherwise allowed by law or the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The court
held that Sec 7 is the general rule whereas sec 13 is the exception applicable only to
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants.
Hence, private respondent cannot invoke that she is within the ambit of sec 7 because
her position in the cabinet. Further, the phrase “unless otherwise provided in the
constitution applies only to Vice President authorizing her to become a member of the
cabinet, DOJ Sec as Chairman of Judicial Bar Council and the phrase word “any other
office” does not embrace ex office position. In these two instances, Bautista’s
appointment did not fit. Hence, her appointment is in direct contravention of prohibition of
Sec 13.
 !607

FUNA V. AGRA
(G.R. No. 191644. FEBRUARY 19, 2013)

BERMASIN, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Arroyo appointed Agra as
the Acting Secretary of Justice. On March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as
the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of the designation of respondent Alberto Agra as Acting Secretary of
Justice, concurrently with his position as acting Solicitor General Position positing that
the same violates Sec 13 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. Respondent avers that the
position was held only in acting capacities, the only effect of which is additional duties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Agra’s concurrent designation as acting Secretary of Justice and
acting Solicitor General is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes, section 13 provides that the President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure while sec 7 ix
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular
instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a
member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in
those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

In the case at bar, private respondent is clearly within the coverage of sec 13 and
not within the exception. Hence, he cannot validly hold regardless whether it is acting or
permanent position. Hence, the concurrent designation is unconstitutional.
 !608

FUNA V. CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

(G.R. No. 191672. NOVEMBER 25, 2014)

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
On January 11, 2010, then President Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of
the CSC which was confirmed on February 3, 2010. On February 22, 2010, President
Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 which allows Chairman of CSC to be a Board
member of GSIS, PhilHealth, ECC and HDMF. Petitioner avers EO 864 violates the
prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any other
office or employment and the independence of CSC because the positions were under
the President’s control and supervision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s appointment violates holding of multiple positions and
the independence of CSC?

HELD:
Yes, Section 2 of IX-A provides that no member of a Constitutional Commission
shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in
the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business
which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.

Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e.,
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants),
Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2),
Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the Government during his
tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
Respondents insist that Duque’s ex officio designation as member of the governing
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is allowed by the primary functions
of his position as the CSC Chairman. In other words respondent avers that the position
is an ex officio position.

However, applying the legal limitation of ex officio petitioner’s position cannot be

considered be ex officio because the powers he possesses in the GOCC are not related
to his office as being CSC chairman and that he received per diem salary.

Further, it also violates the independence of CSC because such positions are
under the supervision and control of the President.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER V. ELMA

 !609

(G.R. No. 138965. JUNE 30, 2006)

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to declare null and void the appointment of Elma as Chairman of
PCGG and Chief Presidential Legal Counsel for violating Sec 13 Art VII and Sec Art 7 (2)
of Article IX-B.Respondent avers that Sec 13 does not cover secretary,undersecretary
and assistant secretary. And his appointment falls under the exception in section 7(2)of
Article IX-B.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the position of Chairman and CPLC falls under the prohibition
against multiple office?

HELD:
Yes,The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an
appointive official to hold more than one office only if allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position. In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, there is
no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and
performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. The crucial test in
determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v.
Green [13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office
has the right to interfere with the other.

In the case at bar, an incompatibility exists. CPLC is enjoined to investigate

actions of the PCGG with rank equivalent to Cabinet Secretary, Undersecretary, and
Assistant Secretary not covered by Sec 13.Hence,Elma's multiple position violated sec
7(2) of Article IX-B.

NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No.156982. SEPTEMBER 8, 2004)

CORONA, J.:
 !610

FACTS:
NAC is tasked to receive process and review amnesty applications. It is
composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the
President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members. In 1994, the ex officio members were paid honoraria
but starting on December 12, 1994 to October 15, 1997, NAC auditor disallowed
payment to the representative.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COA’s disallowance is proper?

HELD:
Yes, the term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an
"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without
any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.”

In the case at bar, the other posts are held by the petitioner in ex officio capacity,
and as such there is no violation of because the other posts do not comprise “any other
office.” However, since holding additional office in ex officio office means additional
duties, the holder do not have right for additional pay. Hence, the disallowance of COA is
proper.
 !611

c. SECURITY OF TENURE

GENERAL V. ROCO
(G.R. No. 143366. JANUARY 29, 2001)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Roco was permanently appointed by then President Ramos in 1996
as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), a position equivalent to
CES rank level V .In 1999, President Estrada appointed General as Regional Director of
 !612

the LTO in Region V without CES eligibility. Roco filed a quo warranto in CA. CA nullified
General’s appointment and Roco was reappointed. Petitioner filed this petition for
review. Respondent avers that a mere CES eligibility is all that an employee needs to
acquire CES eligibility. Petitioner avers that mere CES eligibility alone will not suffice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent can claim for security of tenure?

HELD:
No, there are two requisites that must concur in order that an employee in the
career executive service may attain security of tenure are career executive service
eligibility and appointment to the appropriate career executive service rank. The security
of tenure in CES rank pertains only to the rank and no the office or the position to which
they may be appointed.

In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a
CES eligible, does not possess the appropriate CES rank, which is - CES rank level V,
for the position of Regional Director of the LTO (Region V). Falling short of one of the
qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES, respondent cannot
successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly
reassigned to other positions in the career executive service.

VILLALUZ V. ZALDIVAR
(G.R. No. L-22754. DECEMBER 31, 1965)

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J. :

FACTS:
Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in
1958. Congressman Roces sent a letter to the President alleging concerning alleged
gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by petitioner in the Motor Vehicles
Office: malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the government; failure to correct
inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the same, facilitating thereby the
commission of graft and corruption; and negligence to remedy unsatisfactory accounting.
 !613

He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar

suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After
investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then issued
an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his post. Respondent averred that the
President of the Philippines, contrary to Petitioner’s argument, has jurisdiction to
investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-
competitive or unclassified service under sec 5 RA 2260.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed
considering he is a presidential appointee?

HELD:
Yes, the power to remove is inherent in power to appoint. The president has
jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to
investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-
competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.

In the case at bar, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service

of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office
after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that “the power
to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” .

PALMA-FERNANDEZ V. DELA PAZ

(G.R. No. 78946. APRIL 15, 1988)

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:
On 1 May 1985, petitioner was extended a permanent appointment to the
position of Chief of Clinics at the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan (now East Avenue Medical
Center). In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center retitled the position of
Chief of Clinics to Assistant Director for Professional Services. On 1987, respondent De
la Paz, as Medical Center Chief, designated respondent Dr. Aguila, who was then
Medical Specialist I, as Assistant Director for Professional Services "vice Dr. Nenita
Palma-Fernandez, who will be transferred to the Research Office." And on the same
date, Hospital Order No. 22, series of 1987 was issued by respondent De la Paz,
whereby petitioner was relieved "of her present duties and responsibilities as Chief of
 !614

Clinic and hereby transferred to the Research Office. Petitioner filed this quo warranto
after respondent Secretary fails to act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dela Paz has power or authority to issue such order?

HELD:
No, Section 79 (D). of Revised Administrative Code provides the Department
Head, upon the recommendation of the Chief of the bureau or office concerned, shall
appoint all subordinate officers and employees whose appointment is not expressly
vested by law in the President of the Philippines, and may remove or punish them,
except as especially provided otherwise, in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the National Health Facilities
attached to the Department of Health, the power to appoint and remove subordinate
officers and employees, like petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of Health, not the
Medical Center Chief. The latter's function is confined to recommendation. Respondent
Medical Center Chiefs argument that petitioner was not appointed but was merely
transferred in the interest of the public service to the Research Office pursuant to
Section 24 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines will not alter the situation. Even a transfer requires an appointment, which is
beyond the authority of respondent Medical Center Chief to extend. Hence, since the
transfer of petitioner was without consent, such is equivalent to removal because it is
without valid cause and is violative of constitutional right to security of tenure.

DE LA LLANA V. ALBA
(G.R. No. L-57883. MARCH 12, 1982)

FERNANDO, C.J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner is a judge in Olonggapo. He assails the validity of B.P. 129 also known
as”An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary.” Petitioner avers that because of such law he and
the other judges would be removed and such would violate the security of tenure of
judges as it is only the Supreme Court can remove judges not the Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge can be validly removed by the legislature?

HELD:
Yes, Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of abolition of
office. There can be no tenure to a non existent office. After the abolition, there is in law
no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
 !615

lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of
any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.Valid abolition does not violate
security of tenure. In the case at bar, there is valid abolition. Hence, the petitioner can be
terminated by virtue of BP.

DARIO V. MISON
(GR No. 81954. AUGUST 8, 1989)

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS:
In 1986, President Aquino promulgated Proclamation Order no. 3 “Declaring a
national policy to implement the reforms mandated by people”. EO 127 “Reorganizing
the Ministry of Finance” was promulgated by then President Cory Aquino. Among those
reorganized is Bureau of Customs. It provided a new staffing pattern. Three days later,
1987 Constitution was ratified. On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of
Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the
Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," 12 prescribing the procedure in
personnel placement. Petitioners are among those whose employments were terminated
because of reorganization. Mison avers that Sec16 explicitly authorizes the removal of
career service employees not for cause but as a result of reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation no 3. Thus, the reorganization under EO 127 may continue even after the
ratification of the Constitution, and employees may be separated from service without
cause as a result of the reorganization

ISSUE:
 !616

Whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a

license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done
under an "automatic" vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason?

HELD:
No, Sec. 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that career civil
service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the
reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shag be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under
the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at
the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Government
or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career
officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.

In 1935, transition periods have been characterized by “automatic” vacancies but

the present constitution is silent. Plainly, the concern of section 16 is to ensure
compensation for victims of constitutional revamps, whether under the Freedom or
existing Constitution and secondarily and impliedly to allow reorganization. The present
constitution requires that removal “not for a cause” must be a result of restructure.

In the case at bar, the court held that Mison did not act in good faith as there is
no perceptible restructuring of the customs hierarchy, except for the change of
personnel, has occurred which would have justified the contested dismissal. Hence, the
dismissal is invalid.

CABAGNOT V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

(G.R. No. 93511 JUNE 3, 1993)

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:
A new organizational structure and staffing pattern of the provincial government
of Aklan was approved. The reorganization provided three hundred sixty four (364)
regular plantilla positions from the previous three hundred thirty nine (339).Petitioner
Cabagnot sent notices to newly appointed and re-appointed to send their requirements.
Private respondents, aggrieved, jointly appealed to petitioner pursuant to Section 18 of
the Rules on Government Reorganization issued by the Civil Service Commission and
Sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 12 of Republic Act 6656 (1988) entitled An Act to Protect the
Security of Tenure of Civil Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization. Private respondent aver that they possess the qualification for said
position. Petitioner denied their appeal. CSC reversed it, after finding irregularities, and
reinstated to their old positions, or equivalent marks and those demoted to were reverted
to position of comparable or equal rank. Petitioner argues that CSC acted with grave
abuse in discretion because she has wide latitude of discretion in appointing employees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CSC encroached upon appointing power of Cabagnot?

HELD:
 !617

No, the power to appoint is essentially discretionary. The only condition for its
proper exercise by the appointing authority is that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. In case at bar, there is no replacement but reinstatement.
Sec 2 RA 6656 requires prior determination of valid cause after due notice and hearing
before any officer or employee is removed or demoted. Petitioner failed to show valid
cause. Assigning an employee to a lower position in the same service which has a lower
rate of compensation is a clear case of demotion tantamount to removal when no cause
is shown for it or when it is not a part of any disciplinary action. Hence, when CSC
reinstated the employee it did not encroach upon the appointing power of Cabagnot.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DACOYCOY

(G.R. No. 135805. APRIL 29, 1999)

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:
Pedro Dacoycoy, respondent, is the vocational school administrator of Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades in Northern Samar. After formal investigation by the CSC, he
was found guilty of nepotism on two counts. CSC imposed on him the penalty of
dismissal from the service.

Respondent filed motion for reconsideration, anchoring on the argument that he

was not the appointing or the recommending authority. CA reversed CSC's resolution
ruling that the respondent did not appoint his two sons; therefore he is not guilty of
nepotism.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of nepotism and thus his removal is valid?

HELD:
Yes, Sec. 59 of EO 292 provides that (1) All appointments to the national,
provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof,
including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the
persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited. Under the
definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a)
 !618

appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and d)

person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

In the case at bar, CSC’s ruling which found respondent guilty of nepotism as a
result of the appointment of his two sons Rito, a driver and Ped, a utility worker, as they
are under his immediate supervision and control as the school administrator, is correct.
Hence, his removal is valid for violating the prohibition against nepotism.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 83896. FEBRUARY 22, 1991)

FERNAN, C.J:

FACTS:
In July 1987, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations
set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which
provides that the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure.

Petitioner avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: The Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par 2, Article 7; and the Secretary of
Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1),
Article 8.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional?

HELD:
No, it is unconstitutional. The court held that it is clear that the 1987 Constitution
seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
 !619

government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above
clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law. Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase
“unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot be
construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the
legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Hence, private respondents cannot
invoke sec 7 of Art IX-B. Further, the other positions they hold are not related to their
office; hence, they cannot be considered as ex-officio position. Therefore, their holding of
multiple position is clearly against the holding multiple position in Section 13.

CANONIZADO V. AGUIRRE
(G.R. No. 1331132. FEBRUARY 15, 2001)

GONZAGA-REYES, J.

FACTS:
In a decision of the Court in January 25, 2000, it declared Sec. 8 RA 8557 to be
violative of petitioners’ constitutionally mandated right to security of tenure. In this motion
for reconsideration, respondent avers that petitioner Canonizado’s acceptance of the
position Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP ipso facto abandons
his claims for reinstatement to NAPOLCOM as commissioner. Petitioner asserts his right
to seek gainful employment while this case is being tried.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner ipso facto vacates his first office upon acceptance of an
incompatible office?

HELD:
No, It is a well settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts
another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his title is
thereby terminated without any other act or proceeding. This principle does not to the
petitioner because at no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the two offices
simultaneously. Petitioner neither abandoned nor voluntarily relinquished his position.

Canonizado was compelled to leave his position as Commissioner, not by an

erroneous decision, but by an unconstitutional provision of law. Canonizado held a
second office during the period that his appeal was pending. A contrary ruling would
deprive petitioner of his right to live, which contemplates not only a right to earn a living,
as held in previous cases, but also a right to lead a useful and productive life.
Furthermore, prohibiting Canonizado from accepting a second position during the
pendency of his petition would be to unjustly compel him to bear the consequences of an
unconstitutional act which under no circumstance can be attributed to him. However,
 !620

before Canonizado can re-assume his post as Commissioner, he should first resign as
Inspector General of the IAS-PNP.

d. PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY

 !621

CAILLES V. BONIFACIO
(G.R. No. L-45937. FEBRUARY 25, 1938)

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner filed this quo warranto for ousting the respondent from the office of
provincial governor of Laguna. Petitioner avers that when respondent is a captain in the
reverse force of the Philippine Army and, for this reason, is ineligible to office. Petitioner
avers that Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution prohibits members of the armed
forces from engaging in any partisan political activity, or otherwise taking part in any
election except to vote, but it does not ex vi termini grant or confer upon them the right of
suffrage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not reserved member of the armed forces are covered by the
prohibition “that no member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any
partisan political activity except to vote?

HELD:
No, Section 2, Article XI, of the Constitution provides that officers and employees
in the Civil Service, including members of the armed forced, shall not engage directly or
indirectly in partisan political activities or take part in any election except to vote whereas
section 431 of the Election Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 233,
disqualified from voting only members in the active service of the Philippines Army.

In the case at bar, Petitioner is a reserved member of armed forces; hence he is

no covered by the prohibition. A contrary interpretation would lead to the disqualification
of all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 20 and 50 years, not specially
exempted by the National Defense Act, from holding election public offices or otherwise
taking part in any election except to vote and this result, for obvious reasons, should be
avoided
 !622

SANTOS V. YATCO
(G.R. No. L-16133. NOVEMBER 6, 1959)

BENGZON, J:

FACTS:

Alejo Santos is the secretary of National Defense. He was campaigning for

Governor Tomas Martin, candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the Province of Bulacan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not cabinet members are covered by prohibition against
electioneering or partisan political activity?

HELD:
No, Secretaries are not included in "officers and employees in the civil
service" (as disclosed in the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention wherein the
attempt of Delegate Mumar to include the heads of executive departments within the civil
service was rejected).
In the case at bar, Santos is a secretary of National Defense; hence, the prohibition
against electioneering or partisan political activity does apply to him.
 !623

e. RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
 !624

SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 85279. JULY 28, 1989)

CORTES, J.:

FACTS:
SSS filed with the RTC of Quezon a complaint against SSEA for illegal strike
praying for payment of damages and writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner.
Petitioner avers that the RTC has no jurisdiction because the subject matter is labor
dispute; hence DOLE has jurisdiction. Respondent avers that the petitioners are covered
by the CSC law and therefore, they have no right to strike.

ISSUE:
Whether or not SSS’s employees have right to strike?

HELD:
No, the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right
to strike. However, sec 11 of Labor Code expressly banned strikes by employees in the
Government.

Now, Sec 2(I) of Art IX-B provides that the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Since SSS is a government
owned or controlled corporation with original charter, petitioners have right to organize,
join unions, associations or societies but they have no right to strike because the term of
their employment is governed by law. The remedy for the employee is to go to the
legislative to pass a law accommodate their requests.
 !625

JACINTO V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 124540. NOVEMBER 14, 1997)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools. They incurred
absences in connection with the mass actions. DECS Secretary Isidro Cario immediately
issued a return-to-work. Petitioners ignored the order; hence secretary filed an
administrative complaint against them in CSC for gross misconduct and gross neglect
and found them guilty of violation of prohibition against strike, which was affirmed by CA.
Hence this case

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioners have right to strike?

HELD:
No, Government employees may through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment
which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any
unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages

The ability to strike is not essential to the right to association and the right of the
sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees is clearly
recognized. Hence, the petitioners, being government employees, have to right to strike.
 !626

3. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
 !627

a. COMPOSITION AND
QUALIFICATIONS

CAYETANO V. MONSOD
 !628

(G.R. No. 100113. SEPTEMBER 3 1991)

PARAS, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the position
of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. Petitioner based his allegation on the basis of Art IX-C Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that there shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a chairman and six commissioners who shall be natural citizens of the
Philippines and at the time of their appointment, at least 35 years old, holders of college
degree and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
member of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod possesses the qualification of having been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years?

HELD:
Yes, the court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of the court,
which requires the application of aw, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service which service require the use in any degree of legal, knowledge or skills.

In the case at bar, Atty. Monsod past experience as a lawyer-economist, a

lawyer-manager and a lawyer-legislator of rich and poor is held to be more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement of having been engaged in the practice of law for ten
years.

GAMINDE V. COA
(G.R. No. 140335. DEC 13 2000)

PARDO, J.:
 !629

FACTS:

On June 11, 1993, the president of the Philippines appointed Thelma P.

Gaminde, ad interim, commissioner of the Civil service commission. She assumed office
on June 22, 1993 after taking an oath of office. On Sept 07 1993, the commission on
Appointment confirmed the appointment. On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought
clarification from the office of the president as tot the expiry date of her term. The Chief
Legal counsel opined that her term would expire on Feb 02, 2000 not on Feb 02,
1999.Hence she remained in office. On February 4, 1999, the chairman of CSC wrote to
the commission on audit requesting opinion on whether petitioner and her co terminus
staff may be paid their salaries despite the expiration of their appointment on Feb 02,
1999. On March 24, 199 CSC auditor disallowed her receiving salaries. On April 5, 1999
COA en banc affirmed the disallowance. Petitioner moved for motion for reconsideration
but denied. Hence this case

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gaminde’s term of office will expire on February 02, 1999 as
stated in the appointment as against on February 02, 2000, claimed by her?

HELD:
Yes, Gaminde’s term will expire on February 02, 1999. Sec 1 (2) Art. IX of
Constitution provides that the chairman and the commissioner shall be appointed by the
president with the consent of Commission on Appointment for a term of seven years
without re-appointment. Of those first appointed, the first appointed shall hold office for
seven years, a commissioner for five years and another for three years. The operation of
the rotational plan required two conditions for its workability: first, that the terms of the
three commissioners should start on a common date and second, that any vacancy due
to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filed for
the unexpired term. Gaminde belongs to the 2nd member (5 years) of 1st appointed.
Barlongat was appointed on February 02, 1987 to February 02, 1992 and Gaminde’s
term start of February 02, 1992 to February 02, 1997. However, although Gaminde held
her position exceeding the appointment term, the Court still orders her to be paid
because she held her office in good faith.
 !630

b. DECISIONS

ESTRELLA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 160456. MAY 27, 2004)

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001
elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court an election
protest which consequently annulled Salvador‘s proclamation and declared Estrella as
the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a
 !631

petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the
Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion,
but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily
inhibited himself and designated another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second
Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC decision and declared
Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion
participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He
said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division deliberations, he
will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division
deliberations may participate in its En Banc deliberation?

HELD:
No. The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the
COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantion‘s voluntary piecemeal inhibition
cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a
Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En
Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any
satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.

DUMAYAS V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 141952-53. APRIL 20, 2001)

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the position
in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998 synchronized elections. During the canvassing
by the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts of
Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism, intimidation and coercion
committed in said precincts during the casting and counting of votes. The MBC denied
petitioner’s objections and proceeded with the canvass which showed respondent Bernal
garnering more votes than the petitioner.
 !632

Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election returns
from 3 precincts and directed the MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass of the
remaining or uncontested returns and then, to proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate.
Private respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Second
Division with the COMELEC en banc.

The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal
filed an urgent motion to declare void petitioner’s proclamation. The duly proclaimed
Vice-Mayor Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed n action for quo warranto against
petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo. Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to
cancel Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and motion declare void petitioner’s
proclamation on the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to have
abandoned said motion when he filed quo warranto action.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, annulled the
petitioner Dumayas’ proclamation; and constituted a new MBC. Respondent Bernal was
proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality.
Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set aside the COMELEC en banc
resolution.

Issue:
Whether the COMELEC was correct in including in the canvass the election
returns of the contested precincts?

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence presented by
the petitioner to prove the alleged irregularities were the self-serving contracts of his
watchers and inspectors. Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegations that the
returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their face appear to be regular
and without any physical signs of tampering. The election irregularities cited by the
petitioner would require the presentation of evidence which cannot be done in a pre-
proclamation controversy which is summary in nature.

SEVILLA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 202833. MARCH 19, 2013)

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections. On October 26, 2010, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed
Sevilla as the winner with a total of 7,354 votes. On November 4, 2010, So filed an
election protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud,
anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. So filed a petition for certiorari
on May 31, 2011 with the COMELEC, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the MeTC Judge. the COMELEC Second Division granted So’s petition. The COMELEC
En Banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s ruling. Sevilla
 !633

argues that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it entertained So’s
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it gave due
course to the petition for certiorari?

HELD:
No. But the October 6, 2012 COMELEC en banc’s Resolution lacks legal effect
as it is not a majority decision required by the Constitution and by the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure. The October 6, 2012 COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution must be reheard
pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. To break the legal stalemate in case the
opinion is equally divided among the members of the COMELEC En Banc, Section 6,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are
given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or arguments and
convince the members of the COMELEC En Banc of the merit of their case.
 !634

c. POWERS

IBRAHIM V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 192289. JANUARY 14, 2013)

REYES, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy to run as municipal
Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas, then Acting Election Officer in the
said municipality, forwarded to the COMELECs Law Department the names of
candidates who were not registered voters therein. The list included Ibrahim's name.

Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December 22,

2009 disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered voter of the municipality where he
seeks to be elected without prejudice to his filing of an opposition. It prompted Ibrahim to
file Petition Opposition but was denied by the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution
dated May 6, 2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC declared that the Resolution dated
December 22, 2009 was anchored on the certification, which was issued by Buagas and
Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase, stating that
Ibrahim was not a registered voter of the municipality where he seeks to be elected.
 !635

On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010
had not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest number cast for the Vice
Mayoralty race. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers, which was then chaired
by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims proclamation. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed resolutions?

HELD:
Yes. The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a
candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor.

In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed
resolutions, ordered Ibrahim's disqualification even when no complaint or petition was
filed against him yet. It's filed before the conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is the
appropriate petition which should have been instituted against Ibrahim considering that
his allegedly being an unregistered voter of his municipality disqualified him from running
as Vice-Mayor.

JARAMILLA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 155717. OCTOBER 23, 2003)

AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS:
Antonio Suyat and Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of the
Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the 14 May 2001
elections. On 16 May 2001, theMunicipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed
the winning candidates for the offices of Mayor,Vice Mayor and 8 members of the
Sangguniang Bayan. In the tabulated results issued by the Election Officer and
Chairperson of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, it is shown that Suyat
obtained 4,779 votes and was ranked 9. Upon review by Suyat, he discovered that
Jaramilla was credited with only 23 votes per Election Return from Precinct 34A1.
However, when the figures were forwarded to the Statement of Votes by Precinct,
Jaramilla was credited with 73 votes for Precinct 34A1 or 50 votes more than what he
actually obtained. On 13 June 2001, Suyat filed before the COMELEC en banc an
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to Reconvene, which the latter treated as a Petition
for Correction of Manifest Error. Jaramilla countered in his Answer that said petition
should be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for lack of the required
certification of non-forum shopping. On 24 October 2002, COMELEC en banc issued a
resolution, annulling the proclamation of Jaramilla and creating a new Municipal Board of
 !636

Canvassers Jaramilla filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction ascribing grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over the
petition for correction of manifest errors?

HELD:
Yes. election cases including pre-proclamation controversies should first be
heard and decided by a division of the COMELEC, and then by the commission en banc
if a motion for reconsideration of the division is filed. It must be noted however that this
provision applies only cases where the COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions.

TYPOCO V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 186359. MARCH 5, 2010)

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, petitioner and private
respondent vied for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and
canvassing of votes, petitioner Jesus O. Typoco was proclaimed winner with 80,830
votes, as opposed to respondent Edgardo A. Tallados 78,287 votes. Respondent Tallado
filed before the COMELEC a petition for correction of manifest error, he found that, in the
municipalities of Labo and Jose Panganiban, errors were committed in the transposition
of votes from the SOVP to the COC. Respondent contended that if the errors were
corrected, he would obtain a total of 80,697 votes and petitioner, 79,904 votes; thus, he
would be the true winner in the gubernatorial race in the province. After due
proceedings, the COMELEC First Division, on April 30, 2008, rendered the assailed
Resolution granting respondent Tallado’s petition. The proclamation of private
respondent Jesus Typoco as the winning gubernatorial candidate is annulled.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its
issuances?

HELD:
 !637

No. The Court does not find merit in petitioner’s argument. As stated at the
outset, the appreciation of election documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of
elections all over the country. The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when
supported by substantial evidence, are final and non reviewable by courts of justice.

VILLAROSA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 212953. AUGUST 5, 2014)

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa and respondent Romulo de Mesa Festin were
two of the four rival candidates for the mayoralty post in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. On May 15, 2013, private
respondent was proclaimed the victor, having garnered 20,761 votes, edging out
petitioner who obtained 19,557 votes. With a difference of only 1,204 votes, petitioner
filed a Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam before the Regional Trial Court alleging
irregularities attending the conduct of the elections. on February 3, 2014, private
respondent Festin elevated the case to public respondent COMELEC via a Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief. on April 10, 2014, public respondent
COMELEC granted private respondent’s request for a preliminary injunction, enjoining
the RTC Decision’s execution pending appeal. What petitioner considered questionable
was that the injunction was issued by a newly-constituted Special First Division,which
was allegedly formed due to the absence of several COMELEC commissioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Public respondent COMELEC (First Division) committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it did not find that
the Special First Division did not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction?

HELD:
 !638

No, there's no grave abuse of discretion, can be ascribed to the COMELEC when
the Special First Division issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction. Contrary to
petitioner’s claim, it cannot be said that the First Division and the Special First Division
are two distinct bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of the case
between the two. Strictly speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate Division but
merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies in both of its Divisions.

HAYUDINI V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 2017900. APRIL 22, 2014)

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
A Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy filed by
Mustapha Omar against Gamal Hayudini with regard to the mayoralty of South Ubian,
Tawi-Tawi, asserting that Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation
regarding his residence declaring that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian
when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City Thereafter, Hayudini filed a petition for
inclusion in the permanent list of voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the
MCTC, which was granted. On that same day, COMELEC's first division dismissed
Omar's petition for lack of substantial evidence.The case was elevated to the Bongao
RTC which reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered the deletion of Hayudini's name in
Barangay Bintawlan's permanent list of voters. In view of said decision, Omar filed
before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S.
Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening Event. Hayudini appealed the RTC decision to the
CA, but the same was denied. Hayudini subsequently won the mayoralty race in South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed; he took his oath. However, the COMELEC
Second division granted Omar's petition and cancelled Gamal Hayudini's Certificate of
Candidacy. Hayudini moved to reconsider, but the same was denied for lack of merit
thus, this instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari be given due course?

HELD:
 !639

No. A special civil action for certiorari under rule 12 is an independent action
based on the specific grounds and available only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It will only prosper if grave
abuse of discretion is alleged and is actually proved to exist. Grave abuse of discretion
has been defined as the arbitrary exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at
all in contemplation of law. or an act to be condemned as having been done with grave
abuse of discretion, such an abuse must be patent and gross. Here, Hayudini miserably
failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed resolutions with grave abuse of
discretion.

ABS-CBN V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 133486. JANUARY 28, 2000)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
COMELEC passed a resolution issuing a restraining order on ABSCBN from
conducting exit polls after the 1998 elections, upon the belief that such project might
conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
Namfrel. ABSCBN prayed for a TRO against the COMELEC resolution, which was
granted by the court. The exit polls were then actually conducted and reported by the
media without any difficulty or problem.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the freedom of speech and of the press also protect the holding
of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom?

HELD:
YES. The freedoms of speech and of the press should be upheld when what is
sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the
equally vital right of suffrage. When faced with borderline situations in which the freedom
of a candidate to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against
actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor
of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the state as
power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections
if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
curtailed.
 !640

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 205720. JANUARY 21, 2015)

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet by ten feet in size. They were posted on the front walls of the
cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH Law
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either Anti-RH Team Buhay with a check mark,
or Pro-RH Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as
the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against it form Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for
the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but
were not candidates for that election.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En
Banc or any if its divisions?

HELD:
No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not proper in this case. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
“prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either
branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
 !641

understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening

the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement
of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’
speech. In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as
COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.

LOKIN V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 193808. JUNE 26, 2012)

SERENO, J.:

FACTS:
CIBAC was a party-list that wanted to participate in the 2007 elections. They
submitted five nominees: Villanueva, P Lokin, Cruz, Tugna, and Galang. They amended
their list prior to the election: Lokin, Tugna, and Galang were withdrawn by the party,
while a certain Borje was substituted. Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC at the close
of the polls, transmitting the petitions confirming LTG's withdrawal. CIBAC, however,
supposedly changed course and filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion seeking the
proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. Such was opposed by Villanueva and
Cruz. Villanueva also filed a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, etc. The
COMELEC then issued Resolution 8219, where it would conduct a hearing wrt LTG.
CIBAC won a second seat, which could have been for Lokin, but the case re: certificate
was pending. Lokin did not get his seat-- the substitution was allowed. The COMELEC
explained that the actions of Villanueva as president were presumed within the scope of
his authority, and that the change was done with the Board's acquiescence or
understanding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution 7804 is valid?

HELD:
Yes. No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the
assailed Resolutions. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the COMELEC expunging
from its records the Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia B. Derla.
The nominees, as listed in the Certificate of Nomination filed on 19 January 2010 by
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, President and Chairman of Citizens’ Battle Against
Corruption CIBAC Party List, are recognized as the legitimate nominees of the said
party.
 !642

CAGAS V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 209185. OCTOBER 25, 2013)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Cagas while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur,
filed with Hon. Franklin Baustista, then representative of the second district of the same
province, HB 4451 a bill creating all province of Davao Occidental. HB 4451 was signed
into law as RA 10360, the charter of the province of Davao Occidental. The Province of
Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this chapter, upon approval by
majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be
conducted and supervised by the COMELEC within 60 days from the date of the
effectivity of this charter. COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of
Davao Occidental simultaneously with the October 28, 2013 Barangay Elections to save
on expenses

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolve the
to hold the plebiscite on October 28, 2013 simultaneous with the barangay election?

HELD:
No. The COMELEC has the power administer elections includes the power to
conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law. The conduct of plebiscite is
necessary for the creation of a province.
 !643

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 102653. MARCH 5, 1992)

FELICIANO, J.:

FACTS:
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the
prohibition is in derogation of media’s role, function and duty to provide adequate
channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues.

Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech
of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political
propaganda except those appearing in the COMELEC space of the newspapers and on
COMELEC time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial
reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in
the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. the rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are
not the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities. The
essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or
whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media
operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election
periods.
 !644

CHAVEZ V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 162777. AUGUST 31, 2004)

AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing Section 32 of its
Resolution No. 6520. He claims that said section in the nature of an ex post facto law.
He urges this Court to believe that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally
liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the
said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 in the nature of an
ex post facto law?

HELD:
NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes
a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when
they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined
in the assailed provision is not the putting up of propaganda materials such as posters,
streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image
or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing
the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or consider an
offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who
subsequently becomes a candidate for public office.
 !645

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 119694. MAY 22, 1995)

FELICIANO, J.:

FACTS:
Facts: Respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing
newspapers to provide free COMELEC space of not less than one-half page for the
common use of political parties and candidates. The COMELEC space shall be allocated
by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known
their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The
COMELEC space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
election information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. a non-profit organization of
newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare COMELEC
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent
COMELEC, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of
the power of supervision (police power) of the COMELEC over the information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure
a fair, impartial and credible election.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. It held that to compel print media companies to donate COMELEC space
amounts to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just
compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for
the taking has not been established by respondent COMELEC, considering that the
newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property
for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just
compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a
national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
 !646

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS (SWS) V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 147571. MAY 5, 2001)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. SWS is a private non-stock, non-profit
social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics,
politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and
publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation, which features news- worthy items of information including election surveys
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 Fair Election Act, which provides: Surveys
affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven days be- fore an
election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout
the period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media
the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election
survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14,2001

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press?

HELD:
Yes. Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of
freedom of speech, expression, and the press.The power of the COMELEC over media
franchises is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as
well as to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media facilities for public
information and forms among candidates.

SANIDAD V. COMELEC
 !647

(G.R. No. 90878. JANUARY 29, 1990)

MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS:
On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January
1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code BP 881, RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated
Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview
for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 Prohibition on
columnists, commentators or announcers of the said resolution, which provides During
the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 19 of COMELEC resolution 2167 is Unconstitutional?

HELD:
Yes. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and
unconstitutional. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and
intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues
presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum
where the right to expression may be exercised.

GMA NETWORK V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 205357. SEPTEMBER 2, 2014)

PERALTA, J.:
 !648

FACTS:
The 5 petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an
aggregate total of 120 minutes180 minutes, respectively. They contend that such
restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs
the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise
of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections
Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous per station
airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC
approval for candidates’ television and radio guesting and appearances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press?

HELD:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on aggregate based airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates
and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the aggregate based airtime limits leveling the playing field does
not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the
absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

SISON V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 134096. MARCH 3, 1999)

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:
It appears that while the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon
CityBoard of Canvassers but before the winning candidates were proclaimed, petitioner
 !649

commenced suit before the COMELEC by filing a petition seeking to suspend the
canvassing of votes and/or proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure of
elections. The said petition was supposedly filed pursuant to Section 63 of the Omnibus
Election Code BP. 881, as amended on the ground of massive and orchestrated fraud
and acts analogous thereto which occurred after the voting and during the preparation of
election returns and in the custody or canvass thereof, which resulted in a failure to
elect. While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon City, including the
winning candidate for the post of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC
promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the petition before it on the ground that
the allegations therein were not supported by sufficient evidence, and the grounds
recited were not among the pre-proclamation issues set forth in Section 17 of Republic
Act No. 7166.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ground for declaring a failure of election are valid?

HELD:
No. Petitioner's petition before the COMELEC but found nothing therein that
could support an action for declaration of failure of elections. He never alleged at all that
elections were either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to
elect stood as a bare conclusion bereft of any substantive support to describe just
exactly how the failure to elect came about.

SOLIVA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 141723. APRIL 20, 2001)

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
On May 12, 1998, all the LAKAS candidates (herein petitioners) were proclaimed
as the winning candidates. Six days after, or on May 18, 1998, respondent Alexander
Bacquial filed a petition to declare a failure of election due to alleged "massive fraud,
terrorism, ballot switching, stuffing of ballots in the ballot boxes, delivery of ballot boxes
by respondent Soliva, his wife and men from several precincts to the supposed
 !650

canvassing area, failure of the counting of votes in the precincts or polling places upon
instructions of respondent Soliva and other anomalies or irregularities, not to mention the
alleged attempt of one of Soliva’s men later on identified as Eliseo Baludio to assasinate
Mr. Bacquial when he was about to cast his vote in Precinct 17-A in San Antonio, RTR in
the early morning of May 11, 1998. Petitioners, on the other hand, denied that violence,
terrorism, fraud and other similar causes attended the conduct of the election. To
disprove private respondents’ allegations, they appended photocopies of the Minutes of
Voting and Counting of Votes in Precinct Nos. 17-A and 16-A. On February 11, 2000, the
COMELEC rendered the assailed resolution declaring a failure of election in the
municipality of RTR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack, or in excess, of jurisdiction when, without any formal proceedings and
absent any formal presentation of evidence and witness, It declared a failure of election
in Remedios T. Romualdez?

HELD:
No. The election held at RTR on May 11, 1998 cannot be accorded regularity and
validity as the massive and pervasive acts of fraud, terrorism, intimidation and
harassment were committed on such day. While it may be true that election did take
place, the irregularities that marred the counting of votes and the canvassing of the
election returns resulted in a failure to elect. And when there is a failure of election, the
COMELEC is empowered to annul the election and to call a special election. Thus, we
find that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
resolution.

BRILLANTES V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 163193. JUNE 15, 2004)

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:
Congress enacted RA 8436, authorizing COMELEC to use automated election
systems for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing the results of
national and local elections. Thereafter COMELEC approved Resolution 6712 that the
election results of each city and municipality shall be transmitted electronically in
advance to COMELEC Manila. Brillantes filed a petition seeking to nullify Resolution
6712 for grave abuse if discretion.

ISSUE:
 !651

Whether or not COMELEC can conduct unofficial tabulation of election results

based on true copy of election results?

HELD:
No. It is the sole and exclusive authority of the congress to canvass the votes for
the election of presidential and vice presidential. The said resolution usurps under the
guise of unofficial tabulation of election results based on copy of the election returns.

CERAFICA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 205136. DECEMBER 2, 2014)

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
On October 1, 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for the
2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on October 29, 1992, or that she will
be twenty three years of age on the day of the elections, in contravention of the
requirement that one must be at least twenty three years of age on the day of the
elections as set out in Sec. 9 (c) of R.A. No. 8487 (Charter of the City of Taguig). As
such, Kimberly (as summoned to a clarification hearing due to the age qualification.
Instead of attending the hearing, kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of withdrawal
of COC on December 17 2012. Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a
substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these events, the clarification hearing no longer pushed
through. In a Memorandum dated 18 December 2012, Director Esmeralda Amora-ladra
of the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of Kimberly's COC, and
 !652

consequently, the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. Relying on Coemlec

Resolution No. 9551, Director Amora-ladra opined that it is as if no COC (as filed by
Kimberly; thus, she cannot be substituted. In a Special En Banc Meeting of the Comelec
on January 3, 2013, the Comelec adopted the recommendation of Director Amora-ladra,
cancelled Kimberly's COC, and denied the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect
of the cancellation of Kimberly's COC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and contrary to law and
jurisprudence in issuing the assailed minute resolution resulting in the cancellation of the
COC of aspirant KImberly da Silva Cerafica and the denial of the substitution of Kimberly
da Silva Cerafica by Olivia da Silva Cerafica as an effect of the cancellation of the COC
of Kimberly?

HELD:
Yes. In declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have
filed a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance
candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, B.P.
881, the COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of
COCs.

AKBAYAN YOUTH V. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 147066. MARCH 26, 2001)

BUENA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before May 2001 General Elections for
new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to
register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC
under Republic Act No. 8189.

A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February

17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.

ISSUE:
 !653

Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a

special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC’s imposed
December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections?

HELD:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration
of new voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the
proper bounds and framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus
missed their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the President
issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the conduct of
special registration for new voters and that bills had been filed in Congress to amend
Republic Act No. 8189.

GOH V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 212584. NOVEMBER 25, 2014)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
On 17 March 2014, Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition, docketed as
SPA EM No. 14-004 (RCL),7 against Mayor Bayron due to loss of trust and confidence
brought about by "gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related gross inexcusable
negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional immaturity as Mayor
of Puerto Princesa City."

On 1 April 2014, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9864. Resolution

No. 9864 found the recall petition sufficient in form and substance, but. suspended the
funding of any and all recall elections until the resolution of the funding issue. On 28 April
2014, Mayor Bayron filed with the COMELEC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and for Clarification9 which prayed for the dismissal of the recall petition for lack of merit.

On 19 May 2014, Goh filed a Comment/Opposition (To the 27 April 2014

Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Clarification) with Motion to Lift
 !654

Suspension10 which prayed for the COMELEC's denial of Mayor Bayron's 27 April 2014
Omnibus Motion, as well as to direct COMELEC's authorized representative to
immediately carry out the publication of the recall petition against Mayor Bayron, the
verification process, and the recall election of Mayor Bayron.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882?

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition. “We hold that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882. The
2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its
constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental
legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014.” The 1987
Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to “enforce and
administer alE laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall."The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed the
COMELEC's fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as authorized by law, to
augment items in its appropriations from its savings. The 2014 GAA provides such
authorization to the COMELEC Chairman.

JALOSJOS V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 192474, 192704, 193566. JUNE 26, 2012)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia
and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to
the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then
renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as

voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of
Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by
Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC
who also affirmed the lower court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of

Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on
the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement
of the local government code.
 !655

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of
a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a
bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay?

HELD:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of
provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the
election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous
with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place
but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.

REYES V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 207264. JUNE 25, 2013)

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013
which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections
and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.

Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent
COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who
has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly
proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner

submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on May
18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on May 18
, 2013.

The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship
and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate of
candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any
basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court questioning the
COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision,
 !656

baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone
become valid and legal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?

HELD: 

Petitioner was denied of due process. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence"
without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She
assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy
of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was
a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity
to question and present controverting evidence.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I,
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a
petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature,
then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
SAHALI V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 201796. JUNE 15, 2013)

REYES, J.:

FACTS:
During the 2010 elections, Sadikul A. Sahali (Sadikul) and private respondent
Rashidin H. Matba (Matba) were two of the four candidates who ran for the position of
governor in the Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private respondent Jilkasi J.
Usman (Usman) ran for the position of Vice-Governor. The Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the duly elected
governor and vice-governor, respectively. Matba and Usman filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam with the COMELEC. Matba contested the results in 39 out of 282 clustered
precincts that functioned in the province of TawiTawi. Sadikul and Ruby filed their answer
with counter protest.

The COMELEC First Division directed its Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD) to conduct a technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia by comparing the signature and thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as
against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters. Sadikul and Ruby jointly
filed with the COMELEC First Division a Strong Manifestation of Grave Concern and
Motion for Reconsideration.

The COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed Order which denied the
said motion for reconsideration filed by Sadikul and Ruby. Sadikul and Ruby filed the
instant petition asserting that the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sadikul and Rubys resort to the remedy of certiorari to assail an
interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC first division is proper?
 !657

HELD:
The power of the Supreme Court to review election cases falling within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or
resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division
thereof.

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, Supreme Court elucidated on the import of Section 7,

Art IX of the Constitution in this wise: We have interpreted this provision to mean final
orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision must be a final decision or resolution
of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a
division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order
or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.

GALANG V. GERONIMO
(G.R. No. 192793. FEBRUARY 22, 2011)

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner before the
RTC. The court sheriff went to petitioner's residence to serve summons with a copy of
the petition. The Sheriff's Return of Summons stated that the sheriff was able to serve
Summons on petitioner.

Petitioner, together with his then counsel of record, Atty. Abner Perez, appeared
in court and requested a copy of the summons with a copy of the election protest. One of
his affirmative defenses was that the electoral protest was filed out of time, since it was
filed more than ten (10) days after the date of proclamation of the winning candidate.

The trial court then issued the assailed Order finding the service of Summons on
petitioner as valid, and declaring the Answer filed on as filed out of time.

Petitioner then filed before the Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65, alleging that respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in considering as
valid, the Sheriff's Service of Summons. However, respondents pointed out that the
petition for certiorari should not be filed with this Court but with the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedy was proper?

HELD:
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
provides that “in election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a
regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” Also, a petition for certiorari questioning an
interlocutory order of the regional trial court in an electoral protest case is considered in
aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC
 !658

FLORES V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 89604. APRIL 20, 1990)
CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the
highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with
Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private respondent
Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong
barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter’s
total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The
judge agreed that the four votes cast for “Flores” only, without any distinguishing first
name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally
between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total
credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place.

The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground
that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679,
that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in
barangay elections “on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable”. In his
petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the
petitioners appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC
considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679?

HELD:
The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more
significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the
COMELEC shall “Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials,
and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction”. Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited
 !659

jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the
decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed
directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No.
6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a
barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared
unconstitutional.

LLOREN V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 196355. SEPTEMBER 18 2012)

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent Rogelio Pua, Jr. (Pua) were the candidates for Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Inopacan, Leyte in the May 10, 2010 Automated National
and Local Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Pua as the winning
candidate with a plurality of 752 votes for garnering 5,682 votes as against petitioner’s
4,930 votes.

Alleging massive vote-buying, intimidation, defective PCOS machines in all the

clustered precincts, election fraud, and other election-related manipulations, petitioner
commenced Election Protest Case (EPC) No. H-026 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Hilongos, Leyte.

In his answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaim, Pua
alleged that the election protest stated no cause of action, was insufficient in form and
content, and should be dismissed for failure of petitioner to pay the required cash
deposit.

ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders is approached through two
questions: firstly, the procedural, which concerns the determination of whether or not
petitioner timely paid the appeal fee and motion fee under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.

HELD:
The petition is meritorious as to the procedural question, but not as to the
substantive question. The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case
requires two different appeal fees, one to be paid in the trial court together with the filing
of the notice of appeal within five days from notice of the decision, and the other to be
paid in the COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice
of appeal.
 !660

NOLLEN V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 187635. JANUARY 11 2010)

VELASCO, JR.,J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Susana M. Caballes and petitioner Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. were
candidates for punong barangay of Gibanga, Sariaya, Quezon in the October 29, 2007
barangay elections.Having garnered four hundred and fifty-six (456) votes as against the
four hundred and forty-eight (448) votes Caballes obtained, Nollen was declared as the
punong barangay-elect. Dissatisfied with the result, Caballes instituted an election
protest with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).The MTC rendered a decision declaring
protestant Caballes as punong barangay-elect. Nollen filed on June 5, 2008 his notice of
appeal and paid the MTC the appeal fee of PhP 1,000. The First Division of the
COMELEC dismissed Nollens appeal for his failure to pay the appeal fee of PhP 3,000
prescribed by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure within the
reglementary period of five (5) days.The COMELEC En Banc denied Nollens motion for
reconsideration on the rationalization that, while he timely filed his notice of appeal and
simultaneously paid the PhP 1,000 appeal fee with the MTC on June 5, 2008, the appeal
would be deemed duly registered and docketed only upon full payment of the filing fee to
the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack, or in excess, of jurisdiction?

HELD:
Pending resolution of this petition, several relevant incidents transpired bearing
on the payment of the appeal fees imposed by different rules in election cases.Payment
of appeal fees in appealed election protest cases is now separately required by the
Rules of Court and Sec. 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended
by Resolution No. 02-0130, Series of 2002, a situation not obtaining previously.

The Court takes judicial notice that the COMELEC promulgated on August 4,
2009 Resolution No. 8654 with regard to the determination of the sufficiency and timely
payment of the appeal fees as requisite for the perfection of appeals. The Resolution
provides that: 1) the appeal to the COMELEC of the trial courts decision in election
contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the
notice of appeal and the payment of the PhP 1,000-appeal fee to the court that rendered
the decision within the five-day reglementary period.The non-paymentor the insufficient
payment of the additional appeal fee of PhP 3,200to the COMELEC Cash Division, in
accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended,does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or
ipso facto dismissal of the appeal; and 2) If the appellant filed his appeal before the
 !661

effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8486, the appellant shall be directed to pay the
additional appeal fee of PhP 3,200within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice from the
Commission, in accordance with Resolution No. 8486.If the latter should refuse to
comply, then, and only then shall the appeal be dismissed.

RELAMPAGOS V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 118861. APRIL 27, 1995)
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the petitioner and private
respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes,
Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate. Unwilling to accept
defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC of Agusan del Norte. On June
29, 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won
with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in favor
of the petitioner.

The private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC which was later
on given a due course by the trial court. The petitioner then filed with the trial court a
motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court granted the petitioner's motion for
execution pending appeal despite the opposition of the private respondent. The
corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent
filed a motion for a reconsideration which was later on denied. The private respondent
then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid
order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of
execution. The COMELEC granted the petition on February 9, 1995, ordering the
petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position as Municipality Mayor of
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, upholding its exclusive authority to decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus where the COMELEC maintains that there is a
special law granting it such jurisdiction Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full
force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over
petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction?

HELD:
Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect but only in such cases
where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
 !662

BALAJONDA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 166032. FEBRUARY 28 2005)

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:
On 16 July 2002, petitioner Elenita I. Balajonda (Balajonda) was proclaimed as
the duly elected Barangay Chairman (Punong Barangay), having won the office in the
barangay elections held the previous day.[2] Her margin of victory over private
respondent Maricel Francisco (Francisco) was four-hundred twenty (420) votes.[3]
Francisco duly filed a petition for election protest, within ten (10) days from the date of
proclamation, lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch
35.[4]

In answer to the protest, Balajonda alleged that Franciscos petition stated no

cause of action and that the allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities were
baseless, conjectural, flimsy, frivolous, preposterous and mere figments of the latters
wild imagination. She also laid stress on the fact that although the grounds relied upon
by Francisco were violations of election laws, not a single person had been prosecuted
for violation of the same.[5]

After the issues were joined, the MeTC ordered the revision of ballots in sixty-
nine (69) ballot boxes, and eventually, the ballots in thirty-nine (39) precincts were
revised.[6] After trial, MeTC dismissed the protest with its finding that Balajonda still led
Francisco by four hundred eighteen (418) votes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections has power to order the immediate
execution of its judgment or final order involving a disputed barangay chairmanship is at
the heart of the present Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure?

HELD:
In support of her thesis that the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse
of discretion in granting execution pending appeal, Balajonda in essence submits the
following grounds, thus: (1) that the COMELEC may order the immediate execution only
of the decision of the trial court but not its own decision; (2) that the order of execution
which the COMELEC First Division issued is not founded on good reasons as it is a
mere pro forma reproduction of the reasons enumerated in Ramas v. COMELEC;[19]
and (3) the COMELEC exhibited manifest partiality and bias in favor of Francisco when it
transgressed its own rule.[20] Balajonda invoked only the first ground in her opposition
to the Motion For Execution, but definitely not the second and third. In any event, all the
grounds are bereft of merit.
 !663

CAWASA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 150469. JULY 3 2002)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Cawasa and Manamparan candidates for the office of mayor of
Nunungan,Lanao del Norte. Out of the forty precincts in Nunungan, only thirty-six
functioned, asthere was a failure of election in the remaining four precincts. Special
elections were setconsidering that the number of registered voters in the remaining four
precincts wouldaffect the election results. The special elections for Precincts of
Barangay Bangko wereconducted in the Sultan Naga Dimaporo, Lanao del
Norte while those of BarangayCabasara and Barangay Liangan were conducted in
Sapad, Lanao del Norte. After thecanvassing of the election returns, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers proclaimed thewinning candidates on the basis of the earlier election
returns of the regular electionsand the election returns of the 4 precincts subject of the
special elections. Prior to thespecial elections the lead of Cawasa was eighty six. After
the May 30, 2001 specialelections, Manamparan overcame the margin with a lead of
297 votes. Cawasa wasproclaimed mayor. Manamparan filed an appeal and petition to
annul the proclamation of Cawasawhich was later dismissed by the COMELEC 2nd
division. He then filed a petition for theAnnulment of Election Results of the Special
Elections and Annulment of Canvass andProclamation. The COMELEC en banc
promulgated a resolution annulling the results ofthe special elections as well as the
proclamation of all winning candidates insofar as theresults in the 4 contested precincts
affect the standing of candidates.

ISSUE:
Whether the Transfer of Polling Places and Appointment of Military Personnel
asMembers of the Board of Election Inspectors is legal?

HELD:
No. The transfer was made not only in blatant disregard of COMELEC
ResolutionNo. 4360 issued on May 21, 2001 specifying the polling places but also
Sections 153and 154 of the Election Code. As clearly provided by the law, the location of
pollingplaces shall be the same as that of the preceding regular election. However,
changesmay be initiated by written petition of the majority of the voters of
the precinct oragreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the COMELEC
after notice andhearing. But ultimately, it is the COMELEC which determines
whether a change isnecessary after notice and hearing.

DUMARPA V. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 192249. APRIL 2 2013)
 !664

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for the 1st District of Lanao del Sur at
the 10 May 2010 elections. The COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in seven
(7) municipalities, including the three (3) Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao and
Kapai, which are situated in the 1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao del Sur.
The conduct of special elections in the seven (7) Lanao del Sur municipalities was
originally scheduled for 29 May 2010.

On 25 May 2010, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8946, resetting the special
elections to 3 June 2010. Subsequently, COMELEC issued the herein assailed
resolution which provided, among others, the constitution of Special Board of Election
Inspectors (SBEI) in Section 4 and Clustering of Precincts in Section 12.

Dumarpa filed a Motion for Reconsideration concerning only Sections 4 and 12

thereof as it may apply to the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC did
not act on Dumarpas motion.

A day before the scheduled special elections, on 2 June 2010, Dumarpa filed the
instant petition alleging that "both provisions on Re-clustering of Precincts (Section 12)
and constitution of SBEIs [Special Board of Election Inspectors] (Section 4) affect the
Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, and will definitely doom petitioner to certain defeat,
if its implementation is not restrained or prohibited by the Honorable Supreme Court."

Parenthetically, at the time of the filing of this petition, Dumarpa was leading by a
slim margin over his opponent Hussin Pangandaman in the canvassed votes for the
areas which are part of the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Sur where there was
no failure of elections.

A temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction was not issued.

Thus, the special elections on 3 June 2010 proceeded as scheduled.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic?

HELD:
Yes. COMELEC's power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election

COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, in the exercise of its plenary powers
in the conduct of elections enshrined in the Constitution and statute. Thus, it brooks no
argument that the COMELEC's broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall,carries with it all necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
 !665

4. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

OROCIO V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No. 75959. AUGUST 31, 1992)
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
 !666

On accident occurred at the Malaya Power Plant of the National Power

Corporation (NPC) where two individuals suffered injury — Ernesto Pumaloy, an NPC
employee, and Domingo Abodizo, a casual employee OPLGS, the janitorial contractor of
the NPC. The two injured personnel were brought to the hospital.

NPC initially advanced the amount for the hospitalization expenses for the
treatment of Abodizo, and set up this as an account receivable from OPLGS deducted
on a staggared basis from the latter’s billing against the NPC until the same was fully
satisfied. Subsequently, OPLGS requested a refund of the total amount deducted from
their billings representing payment of the advances made by the NPC. In the light of the
favorable recommendation of the NPC legal counsel, the amount of hospitalization
expenses was refunded to the contractor OPLGS.

The Unit Auditor of the Commission on Audit disallowed the refund of the
hospitalization expenses of Abodizo contending that under the contract, there is no
employee-employer relation between the NPC and the OPLGS employees. Hence, NPC
is not answerable for such expenses. General Counsel asked for a reconsideration of
the said disallowance denied. The COA Regional Director, herein respondent, confirmed
the disallowance. NPC General Counsel submitted a second request for reconsideration
and justifies that his legal opinion is based on Sec 15-A of RA 6395 (NPC Charter) which
provides that “…all legal matters shall be handled by the General Counsel of the
Corporation…”

ISSUE:
Whether the disbursement on the basis of the legal opinion of the legal counsel
of the NPC (quasi-judicial function is within the scope of the auditing power of the COA?

HELD:
The Constitution grants the COA the power, authority and duty to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds and property
pertaining to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. The matter of allowing in audit a
disbursement account is not ministerial function, but one which necessitates the exercise
of discretion.

OSMENA V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No. 98355. MARCH 2, 1994)
NOCON, J.:

FACTS:
The controversy had its origin in the stabbing of Reynaldo de la Cerna, the son of
the dela Cerna Spouses. He was rushed to the Cebu City Medical Center, but died due
to severe loss ofblood. The de la Cerna Spouses claimed that their son died because of
the ineptitude, grossnegligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the
 !667

medical staff. They filed acomplaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City against the city of Cebu, theSangguniang Panlungsod, and five physicians. The
City of Cebu was impleaded as defendant onthe theory that as employer of the doctors,
it was vicariously responsible for the latter’snegligence. An amicable settlement was
entered into between the parties whereby the City of Cebu agreed topay the plaintiff the
sum of P30,000.00 as financial assistance. This agreement was ratified bythe
Sangguniang Panlungsod and the City Budget Officer was authorized to include in
theSupplemental Budget for the year 1989 the amount of P30,000.00. The agreement
was approvedby the Regional Trial Court.About eleven (11) months later, the
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the financialassistance declaring that it is not
within the powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to providemonetary assistance that
would promote the economic condition and private interests of certainindividuals only.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the City was denied by COA, hence, this petition
ascribinggrave abuse of discretion to the COA and its Members.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the
city’sappropriation of P30,000.00 made conformably with the compromise agreement in
the civil suitagainst the City of Cebu?

HELD:
COA’s disallowance of the appropriation is tainted by grave abuse of discretion
andshould be rectified.The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable
settlement of a pending litigationand its eventual execution of a compromise relative
thereto, are indubitably within its authorityand capacity as a public corporation; and a
compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as aparty, is a perfectly legitimate
transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law.That the City of Cebu
complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly bedoubted. The
compromise agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the
SangguniangPanlungsod, which approved it conformably with its established rules and
procedure. Neithermay it be disputed that since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu City
has the power to sue and besued, it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, as
well as the obligation to pay just andvalid claims against it.The COA failed to realize that
payment thereof was part of the consideration, not merely for thesettlement of a claim,
but for the settlement of an actual controversy. By making reciprocalconcessions, the
parties put an end to the action in a manner acceptable to all of them, thuseliminated the
contingency of being made to assume heavier liability in said suit for damagesinstituted
against it in connection with activities being undertaken by it in its
proprietaryfunctions and in accordance with which it may be held liable ex contractu or
ex delito, for thenegligent performance of its corporate, proprietary or business functions.

TESDA V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No. 204869. MARCH 11 2014)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
The TESDA audit team discovered that for the calendar year 2003, TESDA paid
for healthcare maintenance ALLOWANCE of P5,000.00 to covered TESDA employees.
This was pursuant to Administrative Order (AO) No. 430, series of 2003, authorizing the
payment of healthcare maintenance allowance of P5,000.00 to all officials and
employees of the dole,which was purportedly based on Civil Service Commission (CSC)
 !668

Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 33, series of 1997, and Section 34 of the General
Provisions of the 2003 General Appropriations Act.

In the letter of the CSC Director Imelda Laceras of Region VII to DOLE Region
VII Auditor, Ms. Damiana Pelino, the former, however, informed the latter that there are
no existing guidelines authorizing the grant of Health Care Maintenance Allowance and
medical allowance to all government officials and employees. Hence, DOLE
Administrative Order No. 430, series of 2003 is clearly without legal basis. Atty. Rebecca
Mislang, Officer-In-Charge of the COA LAO-National, subsequently issued Notice of
Disallowance (ND) No. 2006-015 dated May 26, 2006 of the P5,000.00 allowance.

MC No. 33 did not intend the health care program to be a single activity or
endowment to achieve a fleeting goal, for it rightfully concerned the institutionalization of
a system of healthcare for government employees. A careful perusal of MC No. 33 and
its precursor reveals the unequivocal intent to afford government employees a
sustainable health care program instead of an intermittent healthcare provision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Audit properly disallowed the payment of the
healthcare allowance?

HELD:
YES. COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its
constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds,
particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. Only in
instances when COA acts without or in excess or jurisdiction shall the Court interfere.

GONZALES V. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ILOILO

(G.R. No. L-20568. DECEMBER 28, 1964)

ZALDIVAR, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner Ramon Gonzales was appointed Assistant on Complaints and
Investigation, Office of the Governor, by Governor Jose C. Zulueta of Iloilo, effective July
1, 1961, with compensation at the rate of P250.00 a month. At the time of his
appointment the petitioner was holding the office of Municipal Councilor of Lambunao,
Iloilo, and he had not resigned from said office to accept the appointment in the Office of
the Governor. On July 31, 1961, the petitioner presented a voucher covering his salary
as Assistant on Complaints and Investigation for July 1961 in the amount of P250.00 to
the respondent Provincial Auditor of Iloilo for audit, but said respondent refused to pass
 !669

in audit the said voucher for the reason that the petitioner continued to hold office as
Councilor of Lambunao and so he may not be legally appointed Assistant in the Office of
the Governor with compensation payable from the provincial funds. The respondent
Provincial Auditor reasoned out that said appointment was in violation of the provisions
of Sec. 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code as construes by the Secretary of
Justice in his Opinion No. 121, Series of 1951. On August 2, 1961 petitioner appealed to
the Auditor General from the action of the respondent Provincial Auditor denying to pass
in audit his salary voucher for the month of July 1961.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the petitioner has no cause of
action for failure to appeal to the Supreme Court?

HELD:
The decision of the lower court dismissing the petition for mandamus is in
accordance with the law and the applicable decisions of this Court. After declaring that
the decision of the lower court is correct, and We have thereby disposed of the first
assignment of error, We do not consider it necessary to pass upon the other questions
raised by the petitioner in the other errors that be had assigned in this appeal. The
petitioner was a person in the government service when he claimed for payment of his
salary. When the respondent Provincial Auditor refused to pass in audit his salary
voucher, the petitioner appealed to the Auditor General The matter of passing in audit a
salary voucher is not a ministerial function. The Auditor General exercises a discretion or
a quasi-judicial power when he acts on whether to pass a salary voucher in audit or not.
Certainly the Auditor General has the power to look into the question of whether the
person claiming salary payment is entitled to the salary or not. The Auditor General may
err. The decision of the Auditor General is appealable to the President of the,
Philippines. When the Auditor General sustained the action of the respondent Provincial
Auditor of Iloilo in refusing to pass in audit the salary voucher of the petitioner, what he
should have done, being then a government employee, was to appeal to the President
from the decision of the Auditor General. This the petitioner did not do. Instead he filed
the present action for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The step taken
by the petitioner was not in accordance with the procedure provided by law. And the
Constitution and the law empower the President to grant relief to him. The rule, that no
recourse to court can be had until all administrative remedies had been exhausted and
that special civil actions against administrative officer should not be entertained.

GUEVARRA V. GIMENEZ
(G.R. No. L-17171. JANUARY 30, 1965)

BENGZON, J:

FACTS:
In 1954, the District Engineer of Sorsogon prepared a program of work and
detailed estimate for thereconstruction of the Sorsogon Central School building.
Specifications consisting of five pages were likewiseprepared. The Cost of painting was
left out in the detailed estimate and specifications. The papers weresubmitted to the
Division Engineer in Lucena, Quezon, who returned them duly approved with an
authorizedappropriation of P40,000.00 "provided that painting shall be included".
Whereupon, the specification forpainting was accordingly made and appended to the
specifications as page six. In August 1954 the District Engineer advertised an invitation
to bid for “furnishing of all materials, laborand plant, for reconstruction” project. Fernando
Guevarra's bid of P37,500 was declared lowest and the contractwas awarded to him.
Eighty five days after completion of the project, Guevarra file with the Director of
 !670

PublicWorks a written claim for the payment of P4,620.00 representing cost of painting
not covered by the contract. After hearing, Secretary of Public Works and
Communications denied the claim and two motion forreconsideration were also denied.
On appeal,the Auditor General also denied the claim. Guevarra appealed tothe Supreme
Court pursuant to CA 327.

ISSUE:
Whether the contract for the reconstruction of the school building included the
painting?

HELD:
Yes. Testimonies of the employees' should be given more weight than those of
the contractors. Thesegovernment employees testified as to what transpired in the
performance of their duties. The presumption is thatofficial duty has been regularly
performed.[Note:The main issue of the case has nothing to do with COA. However,
note that, claims anddisbursements of public funds should have be coursed to COA].

FELICIANO V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No. 147402 JANUARY 14 2004)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
A Special Audit Team from Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. VIII
audited the accounts of the Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD). Subsequently,
LMWD received a letter from COA dated 19 July 1999 requesting payment of auditing
fees. As General Manager of LMWD, Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano sent a reply dated 12
October 1999 informing COA’s Regional Director that the water district could not pay the
auditing fees. Feliciano cited as basis for his action Sections 6 and 20 of PD 198, as well
as Section 18 of RA 6758. The Regional Director referred Feliciano’s reply to the COA
Chairman on 18 October 1999. On 19 October 1999, Feliciano wrote COA through the
Regional Director asking for refund of all auditing fees LMWD previously paid to COA.
On 16 March 2000, Feliciano received COA Chairman Celso D. Gangan’s Resolution
dated 3 January 2000 denying Feliciano’s request for COA to cease all audit services,
and to stop charging auditing fees, to LMWD. The COA also denied Feliciano’s request
for COA to refund all auditing fees previously paid by LMWD.
 !671

ISSUE:
Whether a Local Water District (“LWD”) is a government-owned or controlled
corporation?

HELD:
The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to
private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-
owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. The Constitution
emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a general law
applicable to all citizens. In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private
corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private
corporations may exist only under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations
created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws,
that general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives. The Constitution authorizes Congress to create
government-owned or controlled corporations through special charters. Since private
corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create
corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or
controlled. Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created
under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no
stockholders or members. There are no stockholders or members to elect the board
directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the
directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which
constitutes their special charter. Since under the Constitution only government-owned or
controlled corporations may have special charters, LWDs can validly exist only if they
are government-owned or controlled. To claim that LWDs are private corporations with a
special charter is to admit that their existence is constitutionally infirm. Unlike private
corporations, which derive their legal existence and power from the Corporation Code,
LWDs derive their legal existence and power from PD 198.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(G.R. No. 88435. JANUARY 2002)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

On May 13, 1987, after learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a
private auditing firm for calendar year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP
Chairman that the COA resident auditors were under instructions to disallow any
payment to the private auditor whose services were unconstitutional, illegal and
unnecessary. On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the COA Chairman a copy of
the DBP's contract with Joaquin Cunanan& Co., signed four months earlier on March 5,
1987.

The DBP Chairman's covering handwritten note sought the COA's concurrence
to the contract. During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-request for
concurrence, the DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount of
P487,321.14despite the objection of the COA. On October 30, 1987, the COA Chairman
issued a Memorandum disallowing the payments, and holding the following persons
personally liable for such payment.

ISSUE:
 !672

Whether or not public corporations under the jurisdiction of the COA employ
private auditors?

HELD:
Yes. The petition is hereby GRANTED. The letter-decision of the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit dated August 29, 1988, and the letter-decision promulgated by the
Commission on Audit en banc dated May 20, 1989, are hereby SET ASIDE, and the
temporary restraining order issued by the court enjoining respondent Commission on
Audit from enforcing the said decisions is hereby made PERMANENT.

SAMBELI V. PROVINCE OF ISABELA

(G.R. No. 92279. JUNE 18, 1992)

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
An agreement was entered into by and between the City of Isabela and ECS
Enterprise for the purchase of 300 units of wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels, and 1
set of radio communication equipment. Based on the finding of the Price Evaluation
Division – COA Technical Services Office, the Provincial Auditor advised theProvincial
Treasurer that an overpriced in the total amount of P619,042.20 exists out of the total
price ofP761,077.20 offered by ECS Enterprises or an overpayment of P195,893.10. It
recommended that the future claim of ECS Enterprises be withheld. Provincial Auditor
formally forwarded the matter with the RegionalDirector who formally endorsed the
stand. ECS appealed the decision but was denied for lack of merit.

Hence this instant petition. Petitioner assails the ruling of the COA as not valid. It
contends that the contract of sale has not only been perfected between the Province of
Isabela and petitioner but delivery has been made by it with the corresponding partial
payment by the Province of Isabela. Thus, it is allegedly incumbent upon COA to
authorize the payment of the balance because to act otherwise will constitute an
impairment of contract.

ISSUE:
Whether the ruling of COA is invalid so far as it will constitute impairment of
contracts?
 !673

HELD:
In the exercises of the regulatory power vested upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission on Audit adheres to the policy that government funds and property should
be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. On
the proposition that improper or wasteful spending of public funds or immoral use of
government property, for being highly irregular or unnecessary, or scandalously
excessive or extravagant, offends the sovereign people's will, it behooves the
Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto… No less than the Constitution has ordained
that the COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for
the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures or use of government funds and properties. (Art. IX D,
Sec. 2 (2) 1987 Constitution of the Philippines).

BUSTAMANTE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No. 130685. MARCH 21, 2000)

PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of National Power Corporation (NPC).
As such he was issued a government vehicle with plate number SCC 387. Pursuant to
NPC policy as reflected in the Board ResolutionNo. 81-95 authorizing the monthly
disbursement of transportation allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the use of
government vehicle, claimed his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989.
On May 31,1990, the petitioner received an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable dated April
17, 1990 from respondentRegional Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing
P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance. The petitioner moved
for reconsideration of the disallowance of the claim for transportation allowance
which was denied. Petitioner appealed this denial to the Commission on Audit which
denied do due course. Hence this petition.The petitioner takes exception from the
coverage of said circular contending that such circular did not mention the NPC as one
of the corporations/offices covered by it. ( COA Circular No. 75-6).

ISSUE:
Whether such denial to give due course to the appeal of herein petitioner
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?

HELD:
NO. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
 !674

and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a

virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

DE JESUS V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. No. 149154. JUNE 10, 2003)

CARPIO, J:

FACTS:
An auditing team from COA Regional Office in Leyte audited the accounts of the
Catbalogan Water District in Catbalogan, Samar but the auditing team discovered that
the Board of Directors (BOD) of the Catbalogan Water District granted to themselves
RATA, rice allowance, productivity incentive, anniversary, and year-end bonus and cash
gifts, as authorized by Resolution No. 313 of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). The COA disallowed and ordered the refund of these allowances, for the
reason that they are not allowed by P.D. No. 198. (the Provincial Water Utilities Act of
1973). Petitioners appealed to the COA Regional Office No. VIII but COA Regional
Director Dominador T. Tersol denied the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting payment
to the petitioner of RATA amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

HELD;
No. The Catbalogan Water District was created pursuant to PD 198, as
amended otherwise known as the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973. PD 198
authorized the local legislative bodies, through an enabling resolution, to create their
respective water districts, subject to the guidelines and regulations under PD 198. PD
198 further created the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), a national agency,
and granted LWUA regulatory powers necessary to optimize public service from water
districts. Under Section 2 of Article IX of the constitution mandates the COA to audit all
the government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations
(GOCC) with original charters. The COA is vested with authority to disallow illegal or
irregular disbursements of government funds. A Water District is a GOCC with a special
 !675

charter since it is created pursuant to special law, PD 198. The COA can disallow
allowances not authorized by law, even if authorized by the LWUA. Therefore the
decision of COA is hereby affirmed.

FUNA V. MANILA ECONOMIC CULTURAL OFFICE

(G.R. NO. 193462. FEBRUARY 4, 2014)

PEREZ, J:

FACTS:
The aftermath of the Chinese civil war left the country of China with two
governments in a stalemate espousing competing assertions of sovereignty. The
Philippines subscribe to the one china policy of the communist people’s republic of
China under the joint communique between RP and PROC. Philippines also ended its
diplomatic relations with the government of Taiwan but the two country maintained an
unofficial relationship facilitated by Taipei Economic and Cultural Office for Taiwan and
Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) for Philippines. MECO was a non-stock
profit corporation and became the corporate entity entrusted by the Philippine
Government with maintaining friendly and unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
Petitioner Funa wrote to COA requesting for the latest financial and audit report of
MECO but the COA Asst. Commissioner issued a memorandum, which stated that
MECO is not among the agencies audited by any of the three cluster of the Corporate
Government Sector which prompted the petitioner to file mandamus petition in his
capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and a member of Philippine Bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not MECO is government entity and has COA has jurisdiction over
the case?

HELD:
The court held that MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. That it
is a sui generis private entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation
of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s faithful
commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its non–
governmental character, MECO handles government funds in the form of the verification
fees when it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it collects under
Section 2(6) of EO No. 15 issued on May 16, 2001. Under existing laws, this E) is
subject to the audit and COA has jurisdiction over the case. Therefore the petition is
 !676

partially granted by the court.

BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. NO. 177131. JUNE 7, 2011)

CASTRO,J:

FACTS:
This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-011 5 on August 19,
1999 with the subject Defining the Commission's policy with respect to the audit of the
Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) which provides for the conduction of an annual
financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the Phil and the expression of an opinion on the
fairness of their financial statements. The BSP shall also be classified among the
government corporations belonging to the educational, social scientific civic and
research sectior. BSP is a public corporation created under Commonwealth Act No. 111
whose function relate to the fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and
the general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth. National President
Jejomar Binay of BSP sought for reconsideration of the resolution stating that BSP is not
subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction because it is not a unit of government. Upon the
BSP’s request, the audit was deferred for thirty days. BSP filed a petition for prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction and Temporary Restraining Order before the COA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the BSP is a public corporation and is subject to COA’s audit
jurisdiction?


HELD:
Yes. Boy Scout of the Philippines is a public corporation and its funds are
subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction. Under Par 2 of Art. 44 of Civil Code juridical
persons are “Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law. Since functions of BSP is fostering of public virtues of citizenship
and patriotism and the general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth,
teaching the youth of patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues are
undeniably sovereign functions enshrined under the constitution. Since the BSP,
under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government
instrumentality, the court held to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the
exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the
provisions of the BSP Charter. Instant petition for prohibition is dismissed.
 !677

BAGATSING V. COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION

(G.R. NO. 112399. JULY 14, 1995)

QUIASON, J:

FACTS:
The petition for prohibition sought: (1) to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale
of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock (40% block) of Petron
Corporation (PETRON) and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company, B.V.
(ARAMCO) as the highest bidder in the bidding conducted on December 15, 1993; and
(2) to stop the sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO. The Supplemental Petition in
said case sought to annul the bidding of the 40% block held on December 15, 1993 and
to set aside the award given to ARAMCO|||. Petron is a government acquired company
aimed to provide for a buffer against the vagaries of oil prices in the international market
by serving as a counterfoil against price manipulation that may go uncheck if all oil
companies were foreign-owned. It is the largest and most modern complex refinery in
the Philippines and is also the country's biggest combined retail and wholesale market of
refined petroleum products. President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation 50 to
raise the revenue of the government and the ideal of leaving the business to private
sector, the privatization of Petron was initiated. President Fidel V. Ramos subsequently
approved this privatization as recommended by PNOC and the Committee on
Privatization. 40 % was to be sold to a strategic partner, 40% was to be retained by the
government and the remaining 20% was to be offered to the public. The bidding for the
40% block share was participated by PETRONAS, ARAMCO and WESTMONT.
WESTMONT’s proposal was rejected for not having met the pre-qualification criteria of
financial capability and lack of technical and management expertise. The bid of
ARAMCO was for US$502 million while the bid of PETRONAS was for US$421 million.
ARAMCO was declared the winning bidder. Petitioner argues that there was a failed
bidding as provided for in COA circular No. 89-296. It provides that there is a failure of
public auction when: 1) there is only one offeror; or (2) when all the offers are non-
complying or unacceptable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COA has jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
Yes. The court upheld the validity of the said bidding even it is only lone bidder.
The other two bidders were disqualified. PETRONAS for submitting a bid below the floor
price and WESTMONT for technical reasons, not all the bidders were disqualified. To
constitute a failed bidding under the COA Circular, all the bidders must be disqualified.
The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed
by government offices and corporations, had upheld the validity and legality of the
 !678

questioned bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given
more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to
administer.

NACION V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(G.R. NO. 202457. MARCH 17, 2015)

REYES, J;

FACTS:
In this case, petitioner Nacion was assigned by the COA to the Metropolitan
Waterworks Sewerage System (MWSS) as State Auditor V. 4 On June 27, 2011, when
Nacion was already holding the position of Director IV of COA, National Government
Sector, a formal charge 5 against her was issued by COA Chairperson Ma. Gracia M.
Pulido Tan who is chairperson for acts found to be committed when she was still with the
MWSS. The respondent filed an administrative case against the petitioner for receiving
benefits or bonuses from MWSS, availing of the MWSS housing project and availing of
the multi purpose loan program (car loan). Petitioner admitted that she also availed of
the MWSS Multi-Purpose Loan Program — Car Loan, upon an honest belief that she
was not prohibited from doing so. She emphasized that her car purchase was not
subsidized. She was obligated to pay in full the principal amount of the loan, plus interest
and incidental expenses like registration fees and insurance premiums. However,the
petitioner denied having received bonuses and benefits from MWSS. She argued that
the MWSS claims control index and journal vouchers upon which the charge was based
were not conclusive proof of her receipt of the benefits, absent payrolls showing her
signature. In any case, as a sign of good faith, petitioner offered to, first, restitute the full
amount of P73, 542 to save government time and expenses in hearing the case and put
to rest the issues that arose from it, and second, give up her right over the MWSS lot
provided she would get back her investment on the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion?

HELD:
No. The court held that grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence
but on caprice, whim, and despotism. Not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of
discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
contemplation of law. The court also cited the case of “Dycoco v. CA” that an act of a
court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act
is done in a 'capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.' The court holds that no such grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to
the COA for the procedure it observed, its factual findings and conclusions in Nacion's
case.
 !679

XIII. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS
 !680

1. IMPEACHMENT
 !681

CORONA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 200242. JULY 17, 2012)

VILLARAMA, J:

FACTS:
An impeachment case was initiated by 188 members of the House of
Representatives or above 1/3 of the required vote and the later transmitted to senate.
The grounds for impeachment imputed to Corona are: Betrayal of public trust for his
failure to state his statement of salary, liability and net worth; betrayal of public trust
evidenced by his track record of partiality and subservience in cases involving Arroyo
Admin, Culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust for failure to
meet and observe the stringent standard of Sec 7 (3) of the constitution, betrayal of
public trust:by issuing status quo in the impeachment case against OMB gutierrez,
through wanton arbitrariness and disregard the cases involving converting dinagat island
into province, impartiality toward Arroyo spouses in granting TRO in their favor Corona
averred that the grounds imputed to him are baseless and false and were meant only to
get revenged by Aquino in Case involving their land Tarlac which was decided by Corona
by granting the lots to the farmers. Hence he sought this inhibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not SC has jurisdiction in matter or incident arising from
impeachment?

HELD:
Yes, Impeachment is the sole prerogative of Congress however; its power is not
without limitation. Such is subject to judicially discovered limitation. Power of judicial
review includes review over judicial issue in impeachment proceeding by virtue of
extended power of the Court to review to determine whether or not there is a grave
abuse of discretion committed by the branches of the government. In the case at bar, the
court has power to review. However, the case has become mooted by supervening
events when Corona was proven guilty and accepted the HELD of Senate.

IN RE FIRST INDORSEMENT FROM HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ

 !682

(G.R. No. 8845433. APRIL 15, 1988)

PER CURIAM;

FACTS:
The Court considered the first Endorsement from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez who
was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a letter-complaint to Justice
Fernan. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC. The letter was
originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr.
Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking Gonzales to do something about it.
The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the per curiam Resolution of the SC,
dismissing the charges made by Cuenco against Justice Fernan for lack of merit. In that
resolution, Cuenco was asked to show cause why he should not be held administratively
liable for making serious accusations against Fernan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of
office?

HELD:
A public officer under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from
office only by impeachment and cannot be charged with disbarment during the
incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency,
cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any
offense, which carries with it the penalty of removal from office. The complaint should be
dismissed because under the Constitution, members of the Supreme Court may be
removed only by impeachment. The above provision provides for removal from office by
any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be removed solely by
impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an office that carries
the penalty of removal from office, would be violates the clear mandate of the
Constitution.

FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(G.R. No. 160261. NOVEMBER 10, 2003)

CARPIO, J:
 !683

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, Representative Felix William D. Fuentebell directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted
to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four
months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the
second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment was signed
by atleast (1/3) of all the members.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing for the second impeachment falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution?

HELD:
The court held that under Section 3 (5) of Article XI once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution. The case at bar, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

GUTIERREZ V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

(G.R. No. 193459. FEBRUARY 15,2011)

CARPIO, J:

FACTS:
 !684

Respondent Risa Hontiverps filed an impeachment complaint against the

petitioner on July 22, 2010. The other respondents filed another impeachment complaint
on August 3, 2010 both impeachment were endorsed by different party list
representatives, On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as
chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy Secretary General for
Operations to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied
with by their inclusion in the order of business for the following day. On September 6,
2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of
public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for
prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to
the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55
members of public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two
complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public
trust, sufficient in substance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the impeachment complaint violate the one year bar rule in the
constitution?

HELD:
The one-year bar rule under Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the
Constitution reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.” Petitioner reckons the start of the
one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22,
2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits
that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be
accepted and referred to public respondent. What the Court is deciding herein is merely
the scope of the constitutional limits on the power to initiate impeachment proceedings,
and how the delineation of that scope would affect the second Impeachment Complaint
filed by private respondent Reyes. The Court does not arrogate unto itself the power to
determine the innocence or guilt of petitioner with respect to the allegations contained in
the impeachment complaints of private respondents. Congress, the political branch of
government, was entrusted with the power of impeachment, specifically, "because the
objectives and the questions to be resolved are political." In the Constitution, the
impeachment power is an extraordinary political tool to oust a public officer. It must,
therefore, be exercised by those whose functions are most directly and immediately
responsive to the broad spectrum of the Filipino people, rather than by the Courts.
 !685

2. SANDIGANBAYAN

MACALINO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 140199-140200. FEBRUARY 6, 2002)

PARDO, J:

FACTS:
On September 16, 1992, two information’s were filed with the Sandiganbayan
against petitioner, being then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the
Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled corporation, and his wife,
Liwayway S. Tan, charging them with estafa through falsification of official documents
 !686

and frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile documents. Upon arraignment,

petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges. However, during the initial presentation of
evidence for the defense, petitioner moved for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public
officer because the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter. On August 5, 1999,
the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss for
lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employee of PNCC is within the coverage of RA 3019?

HELD:
The court held that PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under
the general law on corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer
within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice
or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction
of Sandiganbayan.

LACSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. No. 128096. JANUARY 20, 1999)

MARTINEZ, J:

FACTS:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the
ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors. The Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) involved petitioner Lacson in a criminal case that
started when eleven persons, believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
(KBG) were killed where the petitioner was one of the heads. Then, in a media expose, it
was said that what happened was a rub-out and not a shoot-out. Among other issues,
 !687

petitioner argues that Republic Act (R.A.) 8249, that was enacted during his case was
pending, has a retroactive effect and is plan from the facts and was made to suit the
petitioner’s case, thus, making it an ex-post facto law that would affect the right of the
accused to procedural due process. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statute R.A. 8249 may be considered as an ex post facto law
that may affect the petitioner’s right to due process?

HELD:
No. The Petitioner and intervenors’ contention that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
does not violate their rights. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were
presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is
presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following
concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally
to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case. Paragraph a of
Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and
under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary
to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases, which are
in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

BINAY V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 120281-120283. OCTOBER 1, 1999)

KAPUNAN, J:

FACTS:
Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan against Mayor
Binay of Makati for illegal Use of Public Funds (RPC A220) and Violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) on September 1994. The information filed
constituted crimes which were committed by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year
1987.The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years
constituted a violation of his constitutional right of due process. His arraignment
therefore was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the
SB issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to quash and further the latters motion
for reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the
accused pendente lite which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension.
Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the resolution
 !688

denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was denied of
his rights when the suspension was ordered even before he could file his reply to the
petitioners opposition. SC then, directed the (SB) to permit petitioner to file said reply.
The Sandiganbayan nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order after the
submission of the reply. RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May
1995 so much so that the petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to the
RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its
resolutions and suspension order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied
the petitioners motion. Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus
questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the criminal cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case of after the
passage of RA 7975?

HELD:
Yes. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act No.
3019otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the
offense:1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989Under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989, mayors are "local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher.

BOLASTIG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(235 SCRA 103)

MENDOZA, J:

FACTS:
Antonio M. Bolastig a governor of the province of Samar. Information was filed
against him and two others –Pedro Ason the provincial treasurer and Prudencio
Macabenta the property officer of the province- for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of
onionskin paper in violation of Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan
acting upon the motion of the Special Prosecutor suspended the Petitioner for 90 days
with the strength of the provision of sec. 13 of the Anti graft and corrupt practices act
However, the petitioner contends that his suspension was a mindless and meaningless
exercise and it was imposed without regard to the spirit and intent of the law in which it is
based. Petitioner further contends that his suspension may deprive his constituents of
the services of an elected official elected by them. Sandiganbayan rejected the motion of
the accused hence this petition.

ISSUE:
 !689

Whether or not sandiganbayan validly suspend the governor under section 13 of

anti- graft corruption?

HELD:
Yes. The court held that under sec 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 that mandatory
for sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information
charging violation of the law, book II title & of the RPC or any offense involving fraud on
government agencies or public funds or property is filed. The fact that an elected
official’s preventive suspension may deprive his constituents of the official elected by
them is not a sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory suspension
provided by law.
 !690

3. OMBUDSMAN

GONZALES V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

(G.R. No. 196231. SEPTEMBER 4, 2012)

BERNABE, J:

FACTS:
this case is a Petition for Certiorari with application for issuance of temporary
restraining order or status quo order which assails on jurisdictional grounds the Decision
dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the President in dismissing petitioner
Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement
Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect
of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The IIRC identified
petitioner Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie. The IRR made the
following findings: Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable
negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any
justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for
reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.
The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in removing
the petitioner in his office?
 !691

HELD:
No. The Ombudsman administrative disciplinary power over a deputy
ombudsman and special prosecutor is not exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the ombudsman.
Under Section 21 of RA 6770 declares the ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all
government officials, section 8 (2) grants the president express power of removal over a
deputy ombudsman and special prosecutor. RA 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion
that congress had intended the ombudsman and the president to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as deputy ombudsman.

GONZALES V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

(G.R. No. 196231. JANUARY 28, 2014)

BRION, J:

FACTS:
This is a case for a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with application for
issuance of a temporary restraining order or status quo ordervseeking to annul, reverse
and set aside (1) the undated Order requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit
a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave
offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with
Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary
Investigation, both issued by the Office of the President in the administrative case
initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770
giving the President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the president diminish the independence of the office of
ombudsman in removing a deputy ombudsman?

HELD:
No. Under Section 8 (2) of RA 6770 granting the president the power to remove a
deputy ombudsman from office totally frustrates if not resultantly negates the
independence of the office of the ombudsman is tenuous. The independence of office of
the ombudsman is vested which was intended is free from political considerations in
 !692

pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. The constitution

secures for the office of ombudsman is essentially political independence. Which means
terms of office, salary, appointments and discipline of all persons under the office are
reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians.

CAMANAG V. GUERRERO
(G.R. No. 121017. FEBRUARY 17, 1997)

HERMOSISIMA JR. J:

FACTS:
The PRC issued the results of those who failed the May 1993 CPA Licensure
Examinations. Petitioner was listed on page 11 was listed as having failed with an
average of 50%. However, later that year the petitioner indicated under question no 18 of
the personal data sheet that she passed the May 1993 Examination with a rating of
75.42%. On 1994, a letter was sent to the PRC Chairman claiming that certain BIR
employees allegedly passed the CPA Licensure Exams under anomalous
circumstances. Petitioner claimed to have received a copy of her passing-rating sheet.
PRC Chairman wrote to the Ombudsman that certain BIR Employees did not actually
pass the CPA Licensure Examinations. Associate Ombudsman Investigator found
probable cause against the petitioner for violating Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal
Code. Subsequently, the Ombudsman Investigator issued a resolution finding that there
were ground to engender a well founded belief that crimes of falsification of public
documents have been committed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 6770 empowering Ombudsman to conduct investigation is
violative of the constitution?

HELD:
No. RA 6770 clearly empowers the Office of Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute individuals on complaints reffered to or filed before the
said government agencies. The court upheld the validity of the grant of the prosecutorial
powers on the Ombudsman. Under par 8. Section 13 of Art. XI, validly empowered with
prosecutorial functions by the legislature and when passed by Ombudsman Act.
 !693

QUIMPO V. TANODBAYAN
(G.R. No. 72553. DECEMBER 2, 1986)

HERRERA, J:

FACTS:
On July 17, 1984, petitioner filed with respondent Tanodbayan a complaint with
the tanodbayan charging G. Dimaano and D. Remo, manager and analyst of Petrophil,
with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act )for their refusal to pay
Quimpo's fees as surveyor. The TB dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground
that his jurisdiction extended only to govt owned corps. organized under a special law.
Petrophil is a corp. organized under the Gen. Corp. Code; it was acquired by the govt to
carryout its oil and gasoline programs. Quimpo filed a petition for certiorari, questioning
the decision of the TB. The new Tanodbayan confessed judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PETROPHIL is a government owned or controlled corporation
whose employees fall within the jurisdiction Tanodbayan?

HELD:
Yes. The court uplhold the jurisdiction of Tanodbayan. PETROPHIL was not
originally "created" as a GOCC, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus
shed-off its private status. In this case it is now funded and owned by the government as
in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to governmental programs and
policies on oil. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform
essential government related functions.
 !694

LEYSON V. OMBUDSMAN
(G.R. No. 134990. APRIL 29, 2000)

BELLOSILLO J:

FACTS:
On 7 February 1996 International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a
domestic corporation engaged in the lighterage or shipping business, entered into a one
(1)-year contract other corporations for the transport of coconut oil in bulk through MT
Transasia. Under the terms of the contract, either party could terminate the agreement
provided a three (3)-month advance notice was given to the other party. However, prior
to the expiration of the contract, the CIIF companies with their new President, the
respondent terminated the contract without the requisite advance notice. The CIIF
companies engaged the services of another vessel, MT Marilag, operated by Southwest
Maritime Corporation. Petitoner filed with public respondent office of the ombudsman a
grievance case against respondent Torralba. On 4 June 1998 reconsideration of the
dismissal of the complaint was denied. The Ombudsman was unswayed in his finding
that the present controversy involved breach of contract as he also took into account the
circumstance that petitioner had already filed a collection case before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Moreover, the Ombudsman found that the filing of the motion for
reconsideration on 31 March 1998 was beyond the inextendible period of five (5) days
from notice of the assailed resolution on 19 March 1998.Petitioner now imputes grave
abuse of discretion on public respondent in dismissing his complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion?

HELD:
No. The court held that We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
Ombudsman. In the case at bar, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF
companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the
shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the
shares of UNITED COCONUT.Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI
OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled
corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED
COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that
 !695

petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT

and/ or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court
concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public respondent, private
corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.
.

KHAN V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

(G.R. No. 125296. JULY 20, 2006)

CORONA, J:

FACTS:
In February 1989, private respondents Rosauro Torralba and Celestino Bandala
charged petitioners before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for violation of RA 3019. In
their complaint, private respondents accused petitioners of using their positions in PAL to
secure a contract for Synergy Services Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling
and janitorial services in which they were shareholders.

Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the following

grounds: (1) the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since PAL was a private
entity and (2) they were not public officers, hence, outside the application of RA 3019.
The deputy ombudsman denied the petitoners omnibus motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ombudsman has jurisdiction since PAL is a private entity?

HELD:
Yes. The court held that although PAL was originally organized as a
private corporation, its controlling stock was later acquired by the government through
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).Therefore, it became a government-
owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) as enunciated in Quimpo v. Tanodbayan. The
Deputy Ombudsman held that petitioners were public officers within the definition of RA
3019, Section 2 (b). Under that provision, public officers included elective, appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
Government.therefoere finding no merit to petitioners the omnibus motion to dismiss.
 !696

ORAP V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. Nos. L-50508-11. OCTOBER 11, 1985)

ESCOLIN, J:

FACTS:
Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Rodolfo B. Aquino filed four information before
the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019, gravamen of all these charges was to the effect that the accused on different
occasions unlawfully and feloniously received and took various sums of money from
several persons in connection with a criminal case pending before his sala. Before his
arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
officer who signed the same had no authority to do so and that, corollarily, the
Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged. The respondent
court denied the motion to quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the reconsideration of
the order but the relief sought was denied. The Petitoner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the SC. It is the petitioner’s position that the Tanodbayan has no
power to conduct preliminary investigations, file information and prosecute criminal
cases against judges and their appurtenant judicial staff. He contended that under the
Section 9(a) of the Tanodbayan Decree, the courts, judges and other appurtenant
judicial staff, among others, are beyond the reach of the Tanodbayan, and that only
administrative acts of agencies of the government, whether or not criminal in character,
are within the powers of said official.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tanodbayan has authority to conduct preliminary investigation
against municipal judge and his clerk of court?

HELD:
Yes. Under the decree, the tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman but
as prosecutor as well As ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to complaints
initiated against officers and personnel of administrative agencies. As prosecutor, the
authority of the Tanodbayan is primary and without exceptions. His powers are defined in
Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607, as follows: SEC. 17. Office of the Chief Special
Prosecutor. considering that the Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to
“give effect to the constitutional right of the people to petition the government for redress
of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in the
government service.” Petition is dismissed.
 !697

INTING V. TANODBAYAN
(G.R. Nos. 52446-48. MAY 15, 1980)

ANTONIO, J:

FACTS:
In this case, petitioner filed complaints for perjury at the City Fiscal of Davao’s
office, against Angelina S. Salcedo which who is an appurtenant of the judicial staff of
the City Court of Davao. The city fiscal of davao thru special counsel Rodrigo Duterte
conducted preliminary investigation found prima facie case for perjury and filed three
separate counts of perjury under art, 183 of RPC. Now, salcedo interposed an appeal to
the ministry of justice. The ministry of justice forwarded records to Tanodbayan, pursuant
to Section 10 (f) of the PD No. 1630, which vests on the latter the power to file and
prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office.
Where Tanodbayan Vicente Ericta reversed decision of City Fiscal directing the city fiscal
to move for dismissal for the three criminal cases filed against salcedo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tanodbayan has jurisdiction and authority to review and nullify
the resolutions of the City of Davao?

HELD:
Yes. The court held that tanodbayan has authority to file and prosecute Salcedo’s
case. Under Presidential Decree No. 1630 provides that "Tanodbayan may file and
prosecute civil and administrative cases involving graft and pt practices and such other
offenses committed by public offices and employees, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations in relation to their office. The Tanodbayan is an
administrative body whose main purpose is to give effect to the constitutional right of the
people to petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher
standards of integrity and efficiency in the government service. Section 6 of Article XIII of
the Constitution specifically provides that the National Assembly shag create an office of
the Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which "shall receive and investigate
complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as
defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil or administrative case
before the proper court or body."therefore, Tanodbayan had authority to nullift and review
resolutions of the City Fiscal of Davao for reasons that the case involves a government
official related to his office.
 !698

GARCIA V. MIRO
(G.R. No. 148944. FEBRUARY 5, 2003)

AZCUNA, J

FACTS:
Julieta Ortega filed a letter complaint before the Ombudsman –Visayas charging
the petitioner with the crime of murder and the administrative offense of grave
misconduct and abuse of authority. Complaint arose from the death of Ortega’s husband
as a result of a vehicular mishap between a car driven by the petitioner and the
deceased driven the motorcycle. This case was treated as two separate criminal and
administrative complaints. In the report GIO Yap found the letter to be sufficient in form
and substance to conclude that the offense charged is not related to the functions of the
petitioner as a judge. Provincial prosecutor suggest that OCA and office of the
ombudsman would be more appropriate to conduct investigation. Information for the
crime was filed against the petitioner. MCTC issued an order granting the motion but
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted. While the petitioner
filed for motion for reconsideration which was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition can be directly filed before the SC?

HELD:
No. it is utter disregard on the rule of hierarchy of courts. In the case of “Vergara,
sr. v. Suelto” the court stressed that the SC is the court of last resort, and must so
remaine if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it.Pursuant to Sec. 4,
Paragraph B, Rule II and Section 5, Paragraph A, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7
issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioners are hereby ordered to file their
counter-affidavit to the herein attached fact-finding inquiry report of the Complainant,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT-Region VII, Cebu City, together with the Joint Statement of
State Auditors. However, the prerogative extends to administrative supervision. The
Ombudsman cannot encroach upon the courts to oversee judges and court personnel
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the
laws.
 !699

DIAZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 101202. MARCH 8, 1993)

GRINO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner, Ramon Diaz, was chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in 1988, when Solicitor General Frank Chavez, then counsel for
the PCGG in "American Inter-Fashion vs. PCGG," G.R. No. 79342, led a pleading in that
case, accusing Chairman Diaz with having lifted the sequestration on American Inter-
fashion. Diaz moved to strike out the pleading for being untrue. Chavez called a press
conference accusing Diaz of corruption and ineptness. He thereafter withdrew as
counsel for the PCGG and Diaz resigned as chairman of the PCGG to become the
Philippine Ambassador to Canada, President Aquino ordered acting PCGG Chairman
Adolf Azcuna to investigate Chavez' charges but apparently the investigation was not
pressed. The Ombudsman ordered the Special Prosecutor, Raul Gonzales, together with
Prosecutors Jose J. Parentela, Jr. and Diana L. Dungca, to investigate the charges also.
On May 30, 1989, Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez issued a Memorandum addressed
to the Office of the Special Prosecutor, approving the recommendation to conduct a
preliminary investigation against Diaz and others in ten (10) cases including those
involving Glorious Sun and Metro Port.On September 7, 1990, the Ombudsman issued a
resolution inhibiting himself from taking part in the cases against the petitioner. On
November 5, 1991, petitioner led a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court
(G.R. No. 102554) alleging that respondent Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of
discretion in finding a prima facie case and ling an information for graft and corrupt
practices against him on account of his actuations in the Metro Port case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion on the actions of Ombudsman?

HELD:
No. The sworn testimony, as transcribed, provided a sufficient basis for the
Ombudsman to investigate his charges for the Ombudsman may investigate "complaints
led in any form or manner," even complaints not drawn up in the usual form. Section 12,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints led in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and
shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof."
 !700

ACOP V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

(G.R. No. 120422. SEPTEMBER 27, 1995)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On May 18, 1995, eleven suspected members of the notorious robbery gang,
"Kuratong Baleleng," were killed in an alleged shootout with composite teams of the
National Capital Regional Command (NCRC), Traffic Management Command (TMC),
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), Central Police District Command (CPDC)
and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC).

SPO2 Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central Intelligence Command (CIC) then made
an expose', stating that there was no shootout and that the "Kuratong Baleleng"
members were victims of summary execution. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
received the complaint of the relatives of the slain suspected gang members, accusing
the PACC, NCRC, TMC, CIC and CPDC of murder. Acting Ombudsman Villa directed
public respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casaclang to create a panel to monitor the
investigations being conducted by the Commission on Human Rights, the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Director for Investigation regarding the alleged shootout. The panel recommended that a
preliminary investigation be conducted against petitioners and all the participating
personnel listed in the After Operations Report of the PNP. Casaclang then issued the
order directing petitioner[s] and nine others to submit their counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence within ten days from receipt thereof, which the petitioners failed
to comply. The petitioners instead filed a motion with Casaclang to suspend the
preliminary investigation against them pending resolution of the petition for certiorari filed
with the Supreme Court. Casaclang granted the motion, only to be reversed by Villa.
Villa then took over "the direct supervision and control of the preliminary investigation".
The petitioners challenged the take-over, asserting that neither the Ombudsman nor his
Deputy may conduct preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman are authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations?

HELD:
Yes, By express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution,
among the functions of the Ombudsman are those other powers, functions or duties as
may be provided by law.

LASTIMOSA V. VASQUEZ
(G.R. No. 116801. APRIL 6, 1995)
 !701

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe,
Cebu, led a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for
immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of
Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation ofcer
who, after an investigation, found no prim facie evidence and accordingly recommended
the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman,
Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that
Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. As no case
for attempted rape had been led by the Prosecutors Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica
ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to
show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to
obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.

Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to led a
criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from
prosecuting crime was led against her and the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for
indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the Ombudsman. In
the meantime the two were placed under preventive suspension. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition led by petitioner to set aside the orders of the
Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose penalties on public
official?

HELD:
No. In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to
the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment
or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive
measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after
such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found
guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty.

FABIAN V. DESIERTO
(G.R. No. 129742. SEPTEMBER 16, 1998)

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
 !702

Private respondent Nestor Agustin was administratively charged for inter alia grave
misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director of the Department of
Public Works and Highways before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Graft Investigator
found him guilty of the charge and henceforth issued a resolution ordering his dismissal
from the service. The resolution was approved by the Ombudsman, but on motion for
reconsideration, Deputy Ombudsman Jesus Guerrero set aside the resolution and
exonerated private respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is constitutional?

HELD:
Yes. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.

CORONEL V. DESIERTO
(G.R. No. 149022. APRIL 8, 2003)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:
Imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
petitioner filed the instant petition for c e r tio r a ri before the Supreme Court assailing
the Decision of the Ombudsman dismissing her from the service for dishonesty for
 !703

falsifying a receipt by making it appear that the luncheon bill was P1,213.00 when
actually it was only P213.00. The Ombudsman found that petitioner had acted
dishonestly when she increased the amount that she could reimburse by adding the
necessary numeral and punctuation mark on the subject cash invoice before she filed for
reimbursement of the meal expenses incurred. Petitioner argued that the Ombudsman's
finding of falsification was based on an unauthenticated photocopy of the alleged
duplicate original receipt, which has no probative value. The Solicitor General, however,
asked that the petition be dismissed contending, among others, that petitioner should
have filed her petition with the Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court, in accordance
with its ruling that appeals from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman?

HELD:
No. The Court held that the case at bar calls for the suspension of the application of
Circular A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC which provides that "any appeal by way of petition for
review from a decision or final resolution or order of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases, or special civil action relative to such decision, resolution or order filed with the
Court after March 15, 1999 shall no longer be referred to the Court of Appeals, but must
be forthwith denied or dismissed, respectively." It stressed that the rules of procedure
are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Thus, if the application of
the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the
Court's power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.
According to the Court, if petitioner's allegations were true, then the Ombudsman's fatal
error will remain uncorrected. Consequently, petitioner will suffer grave injustice and will
be banned for life to seek reemployment in any government office or its instrumentalities.
Indeed, where as here, there was a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice
would result from the strict application of the Rules, the Court will not hesitate to relax
the same in the interest of substantial justice.

UY V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 105965-70, AUGUST 9, 1999)

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:
The case under consideration is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to
annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's motion to
quash the six informations charging him with violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No.
3019 as amended, and to permanently enjoin the respondents from proceeding with the
criminal cases insofar as petitioner is involved. Records show that herein petitioner, a
Lieutenant Commander of the Philippine Navy, was accused, together with other five
 !704

Navy officers, for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner then filed a motion
to quash but the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor have the
authority to file the questioned amended information?

HELD:
No. I s the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the
corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The
Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.

LAUREL V. DESIERTO
(G.R. NO. 145368. APRIL 12, 2002)

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No.
223 "constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration
in 1998." The Committee, where petitioner was the Chairman, was mandated "to take
charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the
Malolos Congress." Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No.
128, "reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial
Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the "National Centennial
Commission." Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President
 !705

Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were

named Honorary Chairpersons. An investigation on anomalities in the construction and
operation of the centennial projects was affected and the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report
recommending for the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of the petitioner for violating
the rules on public bidding, in violation of the anti-graft law. Petitioner assails the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because both
NCC and the EXPOCORP are not public offices.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman?

HELD:
Yes. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public
office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.

HONASAN II V. PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS

(G.R. No. 159747. APRIL 13, 2004)

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:
On August 04, 2003, CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an affidavit-
complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ). A sword statement of AFP Major
Perfecto Ragil stated that Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga
to hold the NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed
struggle to achieve the vision of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the
new government. On August 27, 2003, Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the
DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since
the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office by a group of public
officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman
and the Sandiganbayan. Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director
Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of
 !706

discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September
10, 2003 directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence
on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation?

HELD:
No, because the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or
Higher) thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan. Whether or not the
offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present petition so as
not to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

OLIVAREZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 148030. MARCH 10, 2003)

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondent Tenoria instituted an action for illegal dismissal, which was
assigned to petitioner Olairez herein. Olairez dismissed Tenoria's complaint for lack of
merit, but the same was reversed upon appeal to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). When the case became due for execution, a pre-execution
conference was conducted. The petitioner originally ordered the reinstatement of Tenoria
with no back wages as the same was already earned in her employ with other company.
Tenoria assailed the order before the NLRC, which the latter granted and, thus, another
order was issued by Olairez granting a P310,000.00 back wages to Tenoria. However,
before the revised order was issued, Tenoria already led an anti graft charge against
Olairez. The case against the petitioner was approved and led with the Sandiganbayan.
His motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation having been denied, Olairez file this
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
 !707

Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting and dismissing the case before it’s evident?

HELD:
No. The Court revisited the rule in the abuse of discretion in the case of Ocampo, IV
v. Ombudsman, which states that: "The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they
could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant. "

PEOPLE V. VELEZ
(G.R. No. 138093. FEBRUARY 19, 2003)

CALLEJO, SR. J.,

FACTS:
Petitioner Salmingo, a former Sangguniang Panlalawigan member, filed a criminal
complaint against respondents with the Office of the Ombudsman. On July 28, 1997, a
Resolution was issued recommending the filing of a graft case against respondents; the
same was approved by the Ombudsman on October 17, 1997, and an Information was
immediately filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 22, 1997. Respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration of the July 28, 1997 Resolution with the Office of the
Ombudsman but the same was denied as the Information was already filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, respondents filed with the SB a Joint Motion for Reconsideration/
Reinvestigation and the same was granted. In this appeal, Salmingo insisted that the
motion filed with the Sandiganbayan is a second motion for reconsideration of the July
28, 1997 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, proscribed under Sec. 27 of RA
6770.

ISSUE:
Whether Salmingo is the proper party to file the petition?

HELD:
 !708

No, since he was not the party in the case filed in the Sandiganbayan.

MARQUEZ V. DISIERTO
(G.R. No. 135882. JUNE 27, 2001)

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes T. Marquez as Branch Manager of Union Bank of the Philippines,
Julia Vargas Branch, received an Order from Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April
29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in c a m e r a .
The accounts to be inspected are involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman
entitled, "Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v . Amado Lagmadeo." In relation
thereto, petitioner, together with Union Bank of the Philippines, filed a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and injunction with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
against the Ombudsman wherein petitioner sought a declaration of her rights from the
court due to the clear conflict between R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989),
Section 15 and R.A. No. 1405 (Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law), Sections 2 and 3. On
August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt.
Petitioner then filed with the Ombudsman an opposition, on the ground that the filing
thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court. But then, the
Ombudsman panel ordered her and her counsel to appear for a continuation of the
hearing of the contempt charges against her. Her motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied by the Ombudsman in the order dated October 14, 1998.

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
 !709

Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in c a m e r a inspection of the

questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits?

HELD:
Yes. In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of
competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman.
In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional
evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly,
there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank
account for inspection.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 160675. JUNE 16, 2006)

CALLEJO SR., J.:

FACTS:
Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia Corominas-Lim filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281
(Other Forms of Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code against herein Edmondo
Arregadas, Nicomedes Armilla, Delia Batasin-in, James Fuentes, Oscar Gador, Santos
Guigayoma, Jr., Clarito Miñoza, Nelson Obeso, Senen Seriño, Ernesto Naraja, and
Martin Yase, all employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Regional Office No. VII, Banilad, Mandaue City. The case was docketed as
OMB-VIS-CRIM-99-1227. The same criminal complaint was also treated by the Office of
the Ombudsman as an administrative complaint for abuse of authority and misconduct.

The Ombudsman Visayas ruled that except for Arregadas, the other named DENR
employees are guilty of simple misconduct and imposed ont them the penalty for one
month. A motion for certiorari was filed before the CA.

The CA ruled that the Ombudsman has no authority to impose administrative

sanctions on erring public officials. The petitioner challenges the decision of CA before
the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has the authority to impose administrative sanctions
against public officials?

HELD:
 !710

Yes. The Court rejected the argument that the power of the Office of the
Ombudsman is only advisory or recommendatory in nature. It cautioned against the
literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution which directs the
Office of the Ombudsman to "recommend" to the officer concerned the removal,
suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public official or employee at
fault. Notwithstanding the term "recommend," according to the Court, the said provision,
construed together with the pertinent provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 168079. JULY 17, 2007)

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Magbanua was the Local Treasury Operation Assistant of the Treasury Office of the
Bacolod City. COA conducted an examination and resulted to a shortage of P265,450
and upon demand, the respondent failed to produce the missing amount.Respondent
alleged that the shortage was due to the machinations and dishonest acts of Cash Clerk
I Monina Baja (Baja). Respondent alleged that Baja, acting as Paymaster, received
payroll funds for distribution to specific offices. Baja denied being designated as
Paymaster, and she also denied receiving the payroll funds. Respondent and Baja failed
to appear during the preliminary conference conducted on 26 July 1999. Despite their
non-appearance, they were given time to submit their respective Memoranda or Position
Papers before the case was considered submitted for decision.

The Ombudsman-Visayas found respondent guilty of Neglect of duty, and Baja guilty
of Dishonesty. The Ombudsman-Visayas dismissed the petitioner and Baja from service
as penalty. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

The Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not commit any reversible error in
finding respondent guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. The Court of Appeals ruled that
respondent was an accountable officer. On the other hand, Baja was not officially
designated as Disbursing Officer or Paymaster but was merely assigned to "take charge
of the listing of payrolls and vouchers to be included in the respective cash advances of
disbursing officers." However, the Court of Appeals ruled that while petitioner's findings
were correct, petitioner has no power to impose directly sanctions against government
officials and employees who are subject of its investigation.
The Office of the Ombudsman challenges before the Supreme Court the ruling of
the Court of Appeals.
 !711

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly
administrative penalties on public officials or employees?

HELD:
Yes. The SC reiterated Sec. 21 of Art. XI of the Constitution which states: “The
Office The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective of
the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials
of the Government and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials
who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.”

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. MADRIAGA

(G.R. No. 164316. SEPTEMBER 27, 2006)

CAPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
By letter complaint filed before the Office of Ombudsman, the San Juan School
Club, charged the respondent, Madriaga and Bernardo, with the violation of Section 1
Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Act No. 6713.

The Office of the Ombudsman investigated and found the respondents guilty of
charge and suspended them for six months.

The Court of Appeals having declared, by Decision of May 28, 2004, that the six-
month suspension meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to respondent Gertrudes
Madriaga (Gertrudes), school principal of San Juan Elementary School, San Juan, Metro
Manila, and her co-respondent Ana Marie Bernardo (Ana Marie), a classroom teacher
who was designated as Canteen Manager of the same school, is merely
recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority of removal and suspension of the Office of the
Ombudsman is merely recommendatory?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court stated that the word “recommendation”, in Sec. 15(3), is not
merely advisory in nature but it mandatory within the bound of law.
 !712

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. APOLONIO

(G.R. No. 165132. MARCH 7, 2012)

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
Dr. Apolonio served as the Executive Officer of the National Book Development
Board. On December 2000, the NBDB’s Governing Board approved a seminar with DBM
prescribed 900 Pesos allowance limit per day. Some participants of the seminar
requested to receive the allowance in cash instead spending the entire amount during
the seminar, Dr. Apolonio granted the request.
On August 24, 2001, Nicasio I. Marte, an NBDB Consultant, filed a complaint
against Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto before the Ombudsman. The complaint alleged
that Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto committed grave misconduct, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for the unauthorized purchase and
disbursement of the gift cheques. Mr. Marte alleged that the NBDB's Governing Board
never authorized the disbursement of the funds for the purchase of the gift cheques and
that the purchases were never stated in Dr. Apolonio's liquidation report. In her
response, Dr. Apolonio invoked good faith in the purchase of the gift cheques, having in
mind the best welfare of the employees who, in the first place, requested the use of part
of the budget for distribution to the employees. Furthermore, GIO Calderon found that
Dr. Apolonio illegally converted the use of her cash advance, which was solely intended
for the workshop, for the purchase of the gift cheques. Further, even if a clamor among
the participants occurred, the clear provisions of Section 89 of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1445, otherwise known as the "Government Auditing Code of the Philippines,"
prohibit Dr. Apolonio from releasing the cash advance for a purpose other than that
legally authorized. The supposed "noble purpose" for the technical malversation does
not negate the illegality of the act. On August 21, 2002, the Acting Ombudsman
approved the findings of GIO Calderon, thereby imposing the penalty of removal against
Dr. Apolonio. The Acting Ombudsman likewise denied Dr. Apolonio's motion for
reconsideration on September 18, 2002. This prompted Dr. Apolonio to file a petition for
review on certiorari in the CA. The CA held that the ombudsman has no power to directly
impose penalties of removal against public official, and that Dr. Apolonio did not intend to
violate the law for a corrupt purpose, thereby negating the Ombudsman’s finding that
she committed grave misconduct.
ISSUE:
 !713

Whether or not the Ombudsman can directly impose penalties of removal against
public official?
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court stated that, “The Ombudsman has the power to impose
the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The
challenge to the Ombudsman's power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that
the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by
this Court.”
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. QUIMBO
(G.R. No. 173277. FEBRUARY 25, 2015)

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
The case started when Gilda D. Daradal (Daradal), a clerk in the Provincial
Engineering Office of Catbalogan, Samar, filed a complaint against private respondent
Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas for Sexual Harassment and Oppression.On March 26, 1996,
Daradal filed a motion for withdrawal of the complaint. The motion, however, was denied
by the Ombudsman-Visayas in its Order, dated August 11, 1998. On December 9, 1998,
the Ombudsman-Visayas issued a resolution to dismiss the case of sexual harassment
against Quimbo but finding him guilty of oppression. Engr. Quimbo moved for motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the Ombudsman-Visayas. On January 21,
2005, the CA reversed the decision retiocinating that the Office of the Ombudsman has
no power to impose direct sanctions against government employees who are subject to
investigations.

On February 14, 2005, the Ombudsman filed an omnibus motion for intervention
and reconsideration of the CA decision, dated January 21, 2005, which the CA
subsequently denied. The Ombudsman instituted a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the CA. It posited that there was no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge the validity of
the assailed CA Resolution, dated May 2, 2005. Thus, it was constrained to resort to the
filing of the said petition. Quimbo also contended that the Ombudsman had no legal
standing to intervene or to seek reconsideration of the assailed CA decision because the
real party in interest was Daradal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman can impose direct sanctions?

HELD:
Yes. The court reiterated that the Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty
of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority.
 !714

COSCOLLUELA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 191411. JULY 15,2013)

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Office of the
Ombudsman) received a letter-complaint dated November 7, 2001 from People's
Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical
and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount of P20,000,000.00 which
allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office of
being Governor of the Province of Negros Occidental on June 30, 2011. Acting on the
letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted its
investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report dated April 16, 2002
which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. Consequently,
petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits. On March 27, 2003, the assigned
Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares (Cañares) prepared a Resolution, finding
probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and recommended
the filing of the corresponding information. On even date, the Information was prepared
and signed by Cañares and submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C.
Miro for recommendation. Miro recommended the approval of the Information on June 5,
2003. However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro, came
only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among
others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the
criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight years since the
complaint was instituted.In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to
Quash, explaining that although the Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it
still had to go through careful review and revision before its final approval. It also pointed
out that petitioners never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in the
proceedings during the interim. In a Resolution dated October 6, 2009, the SB denied
petitioners' Motion to Quash for lack of merit. It held that the preliminary investigation
against petitioners was actually resolved by Cañares on March 27, 2003, one year and
four months from the date the complaint was filed, or in November 9, 2001. Complying
with internal procedure, Cañares then prepared the March 27, 2003 Resolution and
Information for the recommendation of the Miro and eventually, the final approval of the
Casimiro. As these issuances had to undergo careful review and revision through the
various levels of the said office, the period of delay — i.e., from March 27, 2003 to May
21, 2009, or roughly over six (6) years — cannot be deemed as inordinate and as such,
petitioners' constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in finding that
petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated?
 !715

HELD:
Yes. In the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1)
the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

4. THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

 !716

ZALDIVAR V. GONZALES
(G.R. Nos. 79690-707. APRIL 7, 1993)

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought to restrain
the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the
prosecution and hearing of several criminal cases on the ground that said cases were
filed by said Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority, since under the 1987
Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the
present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the authority to file cases with the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether on not respondent Raul Gonzalez, as Special Prosecutor, has the authority
to hear cases under the New 1987Philippine Constitution?

HELD:
No. The incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987
constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the
Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he
has been divested of such authority.
 !717

PEREZ V. APOSTOL
(G.R. No. 166062. SEPTEMBER 26, 2006)

CHICO-NAZARIO, G.:

FACTS:
On September 1988, In the Municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Salvador
Perez, being then the Municipal Mayor and Juanita Apostol, Municipal Treasurer of said
municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another, committing the crime herein
charged in relation to and taking advantage of their official functions, and through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the purchase of one computer unit costing
P120,000.00 acquisition by personal canvass which is in violation of Secs. 362 and 367
of R.A. 7160, thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of San Manuel,
Pangasinan.

On January 16, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Leave of Court to file a Motion for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan denied initially, an later on
reconsidered. Accordingly, the Office of the Special Prosecutor conducted a
reinvestigation. Assistant Special Prosecutor Warlito F. Galisanao prepared a
Memorandum recommending the withdrawal of the Information.In an 8 March 2004
Supplemental Memorandum, Assistant Special Prosecutor III Warlito F. Galisanao
recommended an amendment of the Information, instead of a withdrawal thereof.This
time around, Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio approved the Supplemental Memorandum
and, pursuant thereto, Assistant Special Prosecutor Galisanao filed a Motion for Leave
to File Amended Information dated 12 March 2004. The Amended Information, which
again charges petitioners Perez and Apostol for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019.The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in the first assailed resolution, however,
petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a denial of procedural due process on the part of the
petitioners when the Special Prosecutor filed the Amended Information without authority
from or the approval of the Honorable Ombudsman, and against the latter's specific
instruction?

HELD:
No. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from the
incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient
(Sec. 13, par. 1) The Constitution likewise provides that the existing Tanodbayan shall
hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function
and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law (Art. XI Sec. 7).
 !718

5. ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH

PRESIDENTIAL AD-HOC FACT FINDING COMMITTEEE ON BEHEST LOANS V.

DESIERTO
(G.R. No. 130140. OCTOBER 25, 1999)

PUNO, J.:
 !719

FACTS:
On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13,
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. In its
fourteenth report on Behest Loans to President Ramos, dated 15 July 1993, the
Committee reported that the Philippine Seeds, Inc., (hereafter PSI) of which the
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors, was one of the twenty-one
corporations which obtained behest loans. On 2 March 1996, the Committee through
Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed with the Committee, filed with the
Ombudsman a sworn complaint against the Directors of PSI namely, Jose Z. Osias,
Pacifico E. Marcos, Eduardo V. Romualdez, Fernando C. Ordoveza, and Juanito
Ordoveza; and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved
the loans for violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.


In a resolution dated 14 May 1996, the Ombudsman dismissed OMB-0-96-0968, a

complaint filed against the Philippine Seeds, Inc., for an alleged behest loan it obtained
during the Marcos administration. Reckoning the prescriptive period from 1969, 1970,
1975 and 1978, when the disputed transactions were entered into, the OMBUDSMAN
rules that the offenses with which respondents were charged had already prescribed. Its
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the OMBUDSMAN, this action was
filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten
wealth apply to both civil and criminal cases?

HELD:
No. The so-called imprescriptibility as provided in Section 15 of Article XI of the
Constitution, “the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees…” applies only
to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases, such as the
complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968.

DISINI V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 180564. JUNE 22, 2010)

ABAD, J.:

FACTS:
In 1989 respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented in this case by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), wanted petitioner Jesus P.
 !720

Disini to testify for his government in its case against Westinghouse Electric
Corporation (Westinghouse) before the United States District Court of New Jersey and
in the arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and others
filed against the Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of
Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio T. Disini (Herminio), as an
executive in the latter’s companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic believed that the
Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant,
brokered by one of Herminio’s companies, had been attended by anomalies. On
February 16, 1989, respondent Republic and petitioner Disini entered into an Immunity
Agreement under which Disini undertook to testify for his government and provide its
lawyers with the information, affidavits, and documents they needed for prosecuting
the two cases. Acknowledging Disini's concern that the Republic could become a party
to yet other proceedings relating to the matters subject of his testimony, the Republic
guaranteed that, apart from the two cases, it shall not compel Disini to testify in any
other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic against the defendant.
Petitioner complied with his undertaking on February 27, 2007, upon application of
respondent Republic, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum
and ad testificandum against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce
documents before that court on March 6 and 30, 2007. Disini filed a motion to quash
the subpoena, invoking his immunity agreement with the Republic, but respondent
Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena, directing him to
testify before it on May 6 and 23, 2007. On July 19, 2007 the PCGG issued Resolution
2007-031, revoking and nullifying the Immunity Agreement between petitioner Disini
and respondent Republic insofar as it prohibited the latter from requiring Disini to
testify against the defendant. On August 16, 2007 respondent Sandiganbayan denied
Disini's motion to quash subpoena, prompting the latter to take recourse to this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked and nullified
the Immunity Agreement between respondent Republic and petitioner Disini?

HELD:
Yes. Respondent Republic contends that the power to grant immunity given the
PCGG covers only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. It does not cover
immunity from providing evidence in court. The Republic even believes that immunity
from the need to testify in other ill-gotten wealth cases would defeat the very purpose of
E.O. No. 1 which charged the PCGG with the task of recovering all ill-gotten wealth of
former President Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates, and close associates.