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Finals Cases (Pending)

Calleja v Panday

Phil Bank of Communications v Go

#12 MATIAS, Michelle Dulce Candelaria

Remedies Against Final Judgment

IX. Rule 37

Mendezona vs Ozamis

G.R. No. 143370

February 6, 2002

Doctrine. New Trial; Newly Discovered Evidence; Requisites. A motion for new trial upon the ground of
newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the following requisites,
namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial ;(b) the evidence could not have been discovered
and produced during the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material
and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would
probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at
the new trial.

Facts: Petitioners are relatives of Carmen Ozamis with whom they entered into a Contract of Sale, for
consideration, over 3 parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City. They filed an action to quiet title of a cloud over
their properties by reason an inscription of notice of lis pendens caused by the guardians appointed for
Carmen Ozamiz through guardianship proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1250). Respondents opposed the
petitioners’ claim of ownership of the Lahug property and alleged that the titles issued in the petitioners
names are defective and illegal, and the ownership of the said property was acquired in bad faith and
without value inasmuch as the consideration for the sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable. The
trial court found the sale valid, and such decision was appealed to the CA who reversed the former.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court. Subsequent thereto, the
petitioners filed a motion for a new trial and/or for reception of evidence. They contended, among other
things, that the appellate court totally ignored the testimony of Judge Teodorico Durias regarding the mental
condition of Carmen Ozamiz a month before the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question, which
testimony was taken in the Sp. Proc. No. 1250. However, Judge Durias was not presented as a witness in
the action to quiet title. Petitioners alleged that Judge Durias’s testimony is a newly-discovered evidence
which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence.
Issue: WON the testimony of Judge Durias is a newly-discovered evidence.
Held: No, it is not a newly-discovered evidence. A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered
evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(a) the evidence had been discovered after trial;
(b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and
(c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such
weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result.
All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial. We
find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As early as the pre-
trial of the case at bar, the name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible witness for the
defendants, herein respondents. That the respondents chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of
suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to choose who to present as his witness. Neither
can Judge Durias’ testimony in another case be considered as newly discovered evidence since the facts
to be testified to by Judge Durias which were existing before and during the trial, could have been presented
by the petitioners at the trial below. The testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be
elicited from him by questioning. It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly
discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred
to the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure it. Thus, the
testimony of Judge Durias cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial.

XII. Rule 47

Celerina J. Santos vs Ricardo T. Santos

G. R. 187061

October 8, 2014

Doctrine. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment: Annulment of judgment is the remedy
when the Regional Trial Court’s judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.

Facts: On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.
Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.

Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon
City, but they did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other relatives
and friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the
date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could
no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court
when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a
resident of Tarlac City. According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional
Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until
Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and
opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead.

Celerina claimed that all the allegations of Ricardo were fraudulent, that she never resided in Tarlac and
never left to work as a domestic helper abroad. Further, she also claimed that it was not true that she had
been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It
was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. Celerina referred to a
joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his
petition. Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it
had never been published in a newspaper. She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.

The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the proper
remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance
with Article 42 of the Family Code.

Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Issue: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment
for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.

Held: Yes. The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is
an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person
declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

Annulment of judgment is the proper remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi. For fraud to become a basis for
annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an
issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party
from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.

Rules 57

Provisional Remedies

Lim Jr. vs Lazaro

G.R. 185734

July 3, 2013

Doctrine. Remedial Law. Provisional Remedies. Attachment; Preliminary Attachment; By its nature,
preliminary attachment under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its
own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in
the main or principal action. It is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action.

Facts: Petitioner Lim Jr filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the respondent Spouses Lazaro. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary
attachment application and upon the posting of the required bond issued the corresponding writ on October
14, 2005. 3 parcels of land owned by the respondent spouses were levied upon.

The parties later entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the
amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis, following a schedule of payments covering the period
from September 2006 until October 2013. The RTC rendered a decision on the basis of the compromise.

Sps. Lazaro then filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift the writ of preliminary attachment annotated on
the subject TCTs.

In granting the Motion, the RTC ruled that a writ of preliminary attachment is a mere provisional or ancillary
remedy, resorted to by a litigant to protect and preserve certain rights and interests pending final judgment.
Considering that the case had already been considered closed and terminated by the rendition of the
decision based on the compromise agreement, the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted and
quashed.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted.

Held: NO. By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an
ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief
sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to
the main action. As such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final
judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action
by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service
of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.

In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an attachment
lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said lien
continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the
judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.

Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment against
the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper.

Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had already been
approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the obligations thereunder have yet to be
fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence,
given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have
continued to subsist.

Rules 57

Provisional Remedies

Tantano Vs Espina-Caboverde

G.R. 203585

July 29, 2013

Doctrine. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Receivership; Receivership is harsh remedy to be


granted with utmost circumspection and only in extreme situations.

Facts: Petitioners Mila CaboverdeTantano and Roseller Caboverde are children of respondent Dominalda
Espina-Caboverde. Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna, are the registered owners
and in possession of certain parcels of land, identified as Lots 2, 3 and 4 located at Bantayan, Sindangan
and Poblacion, Sindangan in Zamboangadel Norte, having purchased them from their parents, Maximo and
Dominalda Caboverde.

The present controversy started when respondents Eve and Fe filed a complaint before the RTC of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte for the annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring Lots 2, 3
and 4 from their parents Maximo and Dominalda in favor of petitioners Mila and Roseller and their other
siblings, Jeanny, Laluna and Ferdinand.

The defendants together with Maximo and Dominalda posited the validity and due execution of the
contested Deed of Sale. During the pendency of Civil Case Maximo died. Consequently, Eve and Fe filed
an Amended Complaint with Maximo substituted by his eight (8) children and his wife Dominalda.

The parties executed a Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA) where they fixed the sharing of the
uncontroverted properties among themselves, in particular, the adverted additional eight (8) parcels of land
including their respective products and improvements. Josephine, daughter of Dominalda shall be
appointed as Administrator. PSA provides that Dominalda shall be entitled to receive a share of one-half
(1/2) of the net income derived from the uncontroverted properties. The PSA also provided that Josephine
shall have special authority to provide for the medicine of her mother. The PSA was submitted to the court
for approval.

Dominalda, filed a Motion to Intervene separately in the case, she claimed that the verified Answer which
she filed with her co-defendants contained several material averments which were not representative of the
true events and facts. She added that it was never explained to her or even read to her when it was
presented to her for her signature. She then filed filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer and
her intention to divide all their properties equally among all their children without favor. She also asked that
the Amended Complaint be granted with the modification that her conjugal share and share as intestate
heir of Maximo over the contested properties be recognized. RTC approved the PSA.

Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, Dominalda filed with the RTC a Verified Urgent
Petition/Application to place the controverted Lots 2, 3 and 4 under receivership. She claimed that while
she had a legal interest in the controverted properties and their produce, she could not enjoy them, since
the income derived was solely appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance with her selected kin. She
alleged that she immediately needs her legal share in the income.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the appointment of a
receiver despite clear showing that the reasons advanced by the applicant are not any of those enumerated
by the rules; and

Held: The petition is impressed with merit.

This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession
of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer
property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute
and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of evident
usurpation. Furthermore, this Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper
when the rights of the parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, depend on the
determination of their respective claims to the title of such property unless such property is in
danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage on it or
its portions are being occupied by third persons claiming adverse title.

It must be underscored that in this case, Dominalda's claim to the disputed properties and her share
in the properties' income and produce is at best speculative precisely because the ownership of the
disputed properties is yet to be determined in Civil Case No. S-760. Also, except for Dominalda's
claim that she has an interest in the disputed properties, Dominalda has no relation to their produce
or income. By placing the disputed properties and their income under receivership, it is as if the
applicant has obtained indirectly what she could not obtain directly, which is to deprive the other
parties of the possession of the property until the controversy between them in the main case is
finally settled.

This Court cannot countenance this arrangement. To reiterate, the RTC's approval of the application
for receivership and the deprivation of petitioners of possession over the disputed properties would
be justified only if compelling reasons exist. Unfortunately, no such reasons were alleged, much
less proved in this case. In any event, Dominalda's rights may be amply protected during the
pendency of Civil Case No. S-760 by causing her adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates
of title covering the disputed properties.

Rule 63

Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

People v Roque

G.R. No. 204603

September 24, 2013

(In Relation to Southern Hemisphere Case, 632 SCRA October 5, 2010)

Doctrine. Special Civil Actions; Declaratory Relief; Requisites for an Action for Declaratory Relief. Case law
states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation,
or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction. Third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth, there must be
an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons whose interests are adverse;
fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not available through
other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

Facts: Private respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC assailing the constitutionality
of Sections 3, 7, 18, 26 and 27 of RA 9372 or the Human Security Act of 2007.

Petitioners move to suspend the proceedings averring that certain SC petitions raising the issue of RA
9372’s constitutionality have been lodged before the court. The motion was granted.

Meanwhile, the Court promulgated its decision in the Southern Hemisphere cases and thereby dismissed
the SC petitions on the basis of lack of justiciable controversy.

Petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the
requisites for declaratory relief. RTC denied the subject motion to dismiss since the respondent’s petition
for declaratory relief was properly filed.

Issue: Whether or not the requisites for declaratory relief was satisfied/sufficient

Held: No, the requisites were not sufficient to satisfy the granting of declaratory relief to the respondents.
The denial of the subject motion to dismiss was improper.

The rules of court provide the following requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the subject matter
of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction. Third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth,
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons whose
interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
Rule 69

Partition

Mangahas v Brobio

G.R. No. 183852

October 20, 2010

Doctrine. Partition. An action for partition implies that the property is still owned in common.

Facts: Pacifico Brobio died intestate leaving three parcels of land, and was survived by his wife Eufrocina
Brobio, and four legitimate and three illegitimate children. Petitioner Carmela Brobio-Mangahas is one of
the illegitimate children of Pacifico.

The heirs of the deceased executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the late Pacifico with
Waiver. The petitioner together with her other siblings waived and ceded there shares in favor of the
respondent.

According to Mangahas, Brobio promised her an additional amount aside from the P150,000 she acquired
from Brobio in consideration of her share from her father’s estate. After the signing of the Deed, Mangahas
demanded the promised amount but Brobio refused to pay.

Brobio, while processing her tax obligations with the BIR, she was required to submit an original copy of
the Deed. Left with no more original copy of the Deed, she asked Mangahas to countersigned the document.
Mangahas signed the document but demanded Brobio to pay her 1M as his share from the 20M worth value
of the 3 parcels of land. Brobio signed a promissory note to give a financial assistance to Mangahas in the
amount of P 600, 000.00

The PN became due and demandable, but Brobio refused to pay Mangahas. Petitioner Mangahas filed an
action for specific performance with Damages. RTC decides in favor of the petitioner. However, CA upon
that there was a complete absence of consideration in the execution of the PN, which made it inexistent
and without any legal force and effect, thereby reversing the decision of RTC and dismissed the complaint.

The CA in his decision said that Mangahas should file instead for an action for partition not for specific
performance.

Issue: Whether or not the remedy suggested by the CA to file for an action for partition is proper

Held: No, the suggested remedy of the Court of Appeals is not the proper one under the circumstances.
The CA went on hold that if the petitioner disagreed with the amount she received, then she should have
filed an action for partition.

An action for partition implies that the property is still owned in common. Considering that the heirs had
already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and waived their shares in favor of respondent, the
properties are no longer under a state of co-ownership; there is nothing more to be partitioned, as ownership
had already been merged in one person.