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GREEK PHILOSOPHY

A COLLECTION OF TEXTS
WITH NOTES AND EXPLANATIONS

BY

C. J. DE VOGEL
PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL
PH.D.,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF UTRECHT

VOLUME II

ARISTOTLE, THE EARLY PERIPATETIC


SCHOOL AND THE EARLY ACADEMY

LEIDKN
E. J. BRILL
1953
The publication of this volume is facilitated by a subvention granted by
"The Netherlands Organization for Pure Research" (Z.W.O.)

Copyright 1953 by E. J .
Brill, Leiden, Holland
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce
this book or parts thereof in any form

Printed in the Netherlands


CONTENTS
BOOK III ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER X LIFE AND WORKS
i Prolegomena the Aristotelian question
: . . . 1-2
2 Life and works .of Aristotle 3-10
3 Date of Aristotle's works according to
W. Jaeger 10-15
4 Reactions and corrections *5-*9
CHAPTER XI THE EXOTERIC WRITINGS
i The Eudemus or Tlept ^DX^<; 20-23
2 The Protrepticus 24-28
3 Ilepl 9iXoCT09iac; 28-36
CHAPTER XII LOGIC
i The School- writings. Introductory remarks . .
37-40
2 The Categories: terms 40-42
3 TTspl epfjiYjvetac;: propositions 42-44
4 The Prior Analytics the doctrine of the syllogism
:
44-54
5 The Posterior Analyticis: the doctrine of
demonstration 54-64
6 The Topics and De Sophisticis elenchis . . .
64-66
CHAPTER xni ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
i Introductory remarks 67-68
2 The first book of the Physics 68-76
3 The second book of the Physics 76-93
4 Definitions of motion, space and time .... 93-96
5 The theory of the First Unmoved Mover. . .
96-101
CHAPTER XIV THE METAPHYSICS
i The object of methaphysics 102-110
2 Plato's theory of Ideas criticized 110-114
3 Substance 114-124
4 Potency and actuality 124-129
5 Being and truth 130-132
VIII CONTENTS

CHAPTER XV THE PRACTICAL SCIENCES


i The three ethics and their interrelation .
133-134
. .

2 The Nicomachean Ethics. Formal principles


(Bks 1-1115) 135-157
3 The Nicomachean Ethics. A phaenomenology
of virtue 157-181
4 The Politics 182-203
CHAPTER XVI THK PSYCHOLOGY
i Soul and its various functions 204-209
2 Sense-perception 209-212
3 Thinking 212-216
CHAPTER XVII RHETORIC AND POETICS
i The Rhetoric 217-224
2 Poetics 224-229

BOOK IV THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL AND


THE EARLY ACADEMY
CHAPTER XVIII THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL
T Thcophrastus 230-240
2 Dicaearchus 241-245
3 Aristoxenus 245-248
4 Demetrius of Phaleron 248-252
5 Strato of Lampsacus 252-259
6 Lyco and Aristo of Ceos 259-265
7 Aristo of Cos 265-267
7a Note on the Magna Moralia 267
CHAPTER XIX THE EARLY ACADEMY
i Speusippus 268-274
2 Xenocrates 274-282
3 Heraclides Ponticus 282-288
4 Eudoxus, Philippus of Opous and the Bpinomis 288-294
5 Polemo, Crates and Crantor 294-300

Bibliography 300-305
Index I of names 306-310
II of subjects 310-318
III of Greek words 3*8-337
PREFACE
To this volume have few things to add. Those who take the trouble
I
of reading it understand the purpose of the book. I altered
will easily
my first project so far as to think it better to divide Greek philosophy
after Plato into two volumes, so that after this one there will be a third
containing the Hellenistic systems and Neoplatonism with its preparation.
I wish to express my gratitude to Professor A. Mansion at Louvain,
who kindly read the manuscript of the chapter dealing with Aristotle's
philosophy of nature, and to Professor Fr. Wehrli of Zurich, who was so
kind as to give me the opportunity of reading his manuscript on Lycon
and the two Aristons before it was published, in September 1951, and
of discussing certain points with him x.

I thank also Dr. W. Vollgraff L. M. de Rijk, who read the


and Dr.
proofs with me, and two English ladies, Mrs. Paap and Mrs. Breuning,
who purified the barbarisms of my English text.
Perfection is a thing not easily attained in earthly life. A
few misprints
are rectified in the Errata. I hope that, for the rest, very few mistakes
have crept in. _ T , _r
C. J. d. V.

1
The references to Prof. Wehrli's edition of the fragments of Heraclides
Ponticus in ch. XIX, 3, were added by himself to the proofs of this work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
As to the text of Aristotle, I did not follow exclusively one edition.
Generally speaking, I used the editions of Sir David Ross of the Physics,
Metaphysics and Analytica, that of Minio-Paluello of the Categories and
De interpretation, Rackham's of the Ethica Nicomachea, Immisch for
the Politica. For the De anima I used P. Siwek's edition, of the Rhetoric
those of M. Dufour and J. H. Freese, of the Poetics those of By water and
of Hardy. Of Theophrastus' Metaphysics I used, as is indicated, the edition
of Ross-Fobes ;
where newer editions are lacking, the fragments are
taken from Wimmer. For the other Peripatetics I used Wehrli's Schule
des Aristoteles', for the Academy the indicated sources and the existing
collections of the fragments of Speusippus (Lang) and Xenocrates
(Heinze) .
BOOK III

ARISTOTLE
TENTH CHAPTER
LIFE AND WORKS
i PROLEGOMENA: THE ARISTOTELIAN QUESTION
395 Concerning Plato we had to ask the radical question whether the problem

we really know his doctrine; whether his own works do contain this
doctrine, or whether we have to pay more attention to the indications
of his disciples. Thismay be called the Platonic question. It dates from
Trendelenburg's work on the ideal Numbers (1826). One might speak
of an Aristotelian question too, in the sense of a radical problem of the
tradition. Werner Jaeger was the first to raise this matter radically in
his Aristotle of 1923. The problem is due to the following two points*
i. We have not the complete works of Aristotle at our disposal; 2. the

writings which we possess contain older and younger parts, and it


would not be difficult to make Aristotle contradict Aristotle.
Ad i. Of Plato we possess the complete literary works meant for publication.
On the other hand, his school-teaching is not directly known to us. With Aristotle,
the situation is exactly the reverse: his literary works, which were much read
in Antiquity, are lost, while his school-writings are preserved to us. A scholar
like Jaeger ascribed to this situation the seeming opposition of character between
Plato and Aristotle. This view, however, is only partly justified: it leaves out of
account the fact that the lost works of Aristotle all belonged to the period of his
youth. This being so, the study of their fragments can teach us something of the
development of their author and of the genesis of his philosctphy; but they are
not to be put on one level with his riper works. The true Aristotle remains for us
the author of the School-writings, more especially of the. ripest parts of them,
the utility of the older fragments being precisely this, that they give us a standard
by which to distinguish the older from the younger parts of his wt>rks.
Ad 2. The school-writings of Aristotle, as they are preserved to us, cannot
be divided into three chronological periods, as may be done with Plato's works.
The mixture of earlier and later parts runs through the whole of them. Now this
creates a rather complicated situation. Werner Jaeger was the first to realize this
problem clearly and to propose a solution which, although it may be corrected
and completed on several points, has given a new approach and new lan to the
studies of Aristotle.
E)e Vogel, Greek Philosophy II I
2 ARISTOTLE [396]

what has 396 Three points have been established:


been reached
1. The existence of a Platonic period in the thinking of Aristotle

has been proved by Jaeger l .

2. The period between the Academy and the Lyceum, which seemed
to be a vacuum
as long as the school-writings were all supposed to be
written during the latest period 2 has now been filled up with a large
,

part of them.
3. Our idea
of the latest period of Aristotle's activity as a teacher
has been considerably changed.

a restriction 397 From the fact that many points in the chronology of the works
of Aristotle are not definitely cleared up, it must not be concluded that

we cannot yet form for ourselves an idea of the philosophy of Aristotle


nor get a true knowledge of it. It must be noted first that the description,
given by W. D. Ross in his Aristotle of 1923, was made before its author
knew the work of Jaeger, which appeared in the same year. This fact is an
interesting illustration of the remark which has been made by A. Mansion
in his Introduction a la Physique Aristotelicienne : that, if one wishes to speak
of Aristotle's philosophy of nature, or even of any other part of his

philosophy, ethics excepted, the situation is not so unfavourable and


3
problems not so complicated as they might seem to be Why ? Mansion .

said it very clearly in his Introduction cited above: the reason could
be this, that in the development of Aristotle's thinking after all the
continuity is more important than the difference which might be seen;

in the fact that Aristotle himself did little to eliminate all the traces
works 4.
of his earlier opinions that may be seen in the final form of his

1
J. Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhaltnis zu seinen iibrigen
Werken, Berlin 1863, tries to confine the Platonic influence to the literary form
of Aristotle's early writings. V. Rose, who collected all these platonizing passages
from the Dialogues of Aristotle, went further and concluded that they were spurious
(Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, Lipsiis 1863).
2
In fact this was the opinion of Zeller (Ph. d. Gr. II 2, 3 p. 155), and also
of Bernays.
3
Mansion, o.c. 2 iQ46, p. 7.
t

4
lb., p. 33/34: "Mais ce qu'il faut noter surtout c'est que, de facon g6n6rale,
Aristote n'a pas jug6 ncessaire de remanier profond6ment ce$ redactions reprises
a quelque cours ant^rieur et ainsi 1'adaptation de la doctrine a des vues devenues
plus tard classiques chez lui, apparait par moments comme bien imparfaite. Cest,
sans doute, qu'il avait davantage conscience de I'unit6 et de la continuite de sa
pensee, que des 6tapes diverses et monies parfois contradictoires entre elles qu'elle
avait parcourues, pour aboutir a son deVeloppement ultime."
[398] LIFE AND WORKS 3

2 LIFE AND WORKS OF ARISTOTLE


398 Ep. I ad Ammaeum 5, p. 727 R. life
Dionys. Halic., :

*
'ApujTOTX7)<; TiaTpcx; {Jiev ?jv Nixojxaxou T& yvo<; xai TYJV Te^v/jv ocva9^-
J
povTO<; ei<; Ma^aova TOV 'AcrxXYjTULoii [ry)Tpo<; Si: OaiarlSog, aTroy^vou TLV&<;
,

T&V ex XaXxiSoc; TTJV obroixtav ayay^vTOv etg ZTayeipa- eyevvrjOyj 8e xara


TTjv evevYjxoaTYjv xal evaryjv oXujjuuaSa AioTpecpouc; 'AOyjVYjenv Sp^ovTOi;
5(0!. 99, i; a. 384)
2
... em Se IIoXoy)Xou dcpxovTo^ (ol. 103, 2; a. 366/7)
TeXei>T7)<javTO<; TOU TcaTpcx; oxTOxaiSexaTov TO<; S^fov e ^ 'A6Y)va<; ^X0ev, xai
au(iTa0el<; HXaTCovi %p6vov etxoaaeTY] SieTpupe aruv auTco. a7ro6avovTo<; Se

em eo^tXou <5cpxovTO<; (ol. 108, I a.


348/7) arcYjpe vupoc; 'EpfjLfav
;

'Arapvecoc; Tupavvov
3
xal TpteT^ ^povov Trap' auTco StaTpi^ac; ** ejc*
4
ioEupo\iXoi) dcp^ovToc; (ol. 108, 4; a. 345/4) ei<; MUTIXYJVTJV excoptc07) exetOev -

Se 7upo<; OiXtTcrcov &XSTO *** *aT<x IIu66SoTov ap^ovTa (ol. 109, 2; a. 343/2),

1 Aristotle's father was the court-physician of Amyntas II, king of Macedonia


and father of Philippus.
2
Diog. Laert. V9 gives the same chronology and traces it back to the Chronicle
of Apollodorus.
3
Hermias is known to us as one of the addressees of the Sixth Letter of Plato.
The two others, Erastus and Coriscus, disciples of Plato and his Academy, doubt-
less tried to introduce in their native town Scepsis certain political reforms that
had been suggested in the Academy. Jaeger, Aristotle, 2 i948, p. 113, sums up the
tendency of Plato's Letter in the following words: ''Presumably Plato wished to
institute a friendship between the two companions and their "neighbour" Hermias,
because, while he recognized their noble disposition, he was afraid they might be
somewhat doctrinaire. The letter that we possess is the solemn record of this
peculiar pact between Realpolitik and theoretical schemes of reform."
At the request of this Hermias, who possessed a formidable military power
and was practically independent of the Persian Empire, Ar. and Xenocrates-
established themselves at Assos after the death of Plato, and stayed there for three
years. For Aristotle these years were a period of intense work. An important
part of his works on logic, physics and metaphysics was written here. Surely
Erastus, Coriscus and Hermias attended his lectures. We find the name of Coriscus
frequently cited in the Organon to illustrate an individual case as opposed to the
xcc06Xou.
4
) That Aristotle left Assos and settled at Mytilene was probably due to the
influence of Theophrastus, who was a native of Lesbos and also an ancient disciple
of Plato and the Academy. That, during the years of Assos and Mytilene, Aristotle
was already occupied with biological research, may be inferred front the fact that
in his biological works localities in Asia Minor and Lesbos are rather frequently
mentioned. Consult: Thompson, Translation of the Historia animalium, p. VII,
and the same, Aristotle as a biologist, p. 12.

*
TTOCTP&C a correction of Van Herwerden. The Mss have
is ul6<;.
**
Wolf; Mss
***
$xeTO Usener; others read
ARISTOTLE [398]

l
xod St^Tpi^e XP VOV ottTaeTTJ Trap* OCUTG> xaO^youfJievo^ 'AXeavSpoi> [JLETOC
8

T>)V OiXtTCTTou TeXeur/jv EuaiveToo dcp^ovroc; (ol. in, 2; a. 335/4) acpixo-


ITT'

(xevo^ ei *A07)vac; ea^dXa^ev ev Auxeico %p6 vov ST&V ScoSexa. TCO Si: Tpiaxai-

SexaTco, (JLCTOC TYJV 'AXe^avSpou TeXeuTYjv em Kyj9iaoXa>pou <5cpyovTO (ol. 114, 15


2 ; a. 322) a7rapa<; ei<; XaXxtSa voaco TeXeuTa, rpia Trpo^ TOI<; e^xovra ptcoaa<; frnj.
three poems 399 a. Olympiodorus in his Commentary on Plato's Gorgias has
of Aristotle j r Iu x 11 r A x *i x r
preserved for us the following poem of Aristotle in commemoration of
Plato (Fr. 673 Rose):
011 Plato eXOwv S' I? xXetvov KexpojciTjc; SaTreSov

8v ouS* aivetv TOLCTI xaxotorL

o^ [jLovoc; 73 TupcoToc; OVYJTCOV xaT^Sei^ev evapyco^


olxeico TS pico xat (jteOoSotat Xoywv,
a><; aya06^ TS xal suod(Ji6>v ajxa yivsTat avvjp
ou vuv S' eart Xapecv ouSevl TOCUTOC TTOTC.

The poem has been interpreted by Wilamowitz in Aristoteles und Athen II,
p. 412-416. He
declares the construction po>(jLov 9iXia<; to be a metaphor that would
be tolerable "fiir backfische, aber nicht fiir Hellenen", and is most inclined to
explain 9iXta<; as a genitivus causae. "In any case Ar. means that the man about
4 whom he speaks, i.e. Eudemus, founded an altar for Plato for the sake of his
friendship" ("um seiner Freundschaft willen dem Platon einen Altar gestiftet
hat"). Jaeger protests against the assumption that Plato was formally venerated
as a god by his disciples, and I think he is right. Having stated that the dedicator
of the altar is unknown to us, he remarks: "a Greek would surely have assumed
without question that what was meant was that he set up an altar to most honour-
able Philia, in honour of the friendship of the man whom bad men may not even
praise" (Aristotle, p. 108).

*) Hermias had friendly relations with the Macedonian court (an anti-Persian
coalition). probable that on his recommendation Philip invited Aristotle
It is
to be the praeceptor of the young Alexander.
Of his years at the Macedonian court are doubtless Aristotle's six books
on philological problems in Homer ('ATropY^ocTa 'Oinrjpixa), brought to Alexandria
by Demetrius of *Phaleron. Here they became the foundation of philological
studies of the Alexandrian scholars.
For Alexander Aristotle wrote a work Ilepi (jiovapxiaq and another about co-
lonization.
According t6 a decree of the Delphians, found by Homolle in 1895, Aristotle
and his nephew Callisthenes were praised and honoured for having made a list of
the Pythionikai (Dittenberger, 5y//. 3 275). This list, which was a valuable
,

document for the history of Greek literature, must have been made by Ar. in the
very last years of his stay at the Macedonian court or during the first year of his
second stay at Athens, Callisthenes having gone to Asia in 334. Other similar
lists of the victors of the great Dionysia and of those at Olympia are mentioned

among the works of Ar.


[399]
LIFE AND WORKS 5

As to the last four lines of this elegy, cp. the nrs. 275a, b and 374a of our first

volume.

b. Fr. 674 Rose (Diog. Laert. V


6), an epigramma dedicated to
Hermias of Atarneus, who had been treacherously arrested at a con-

ference, and sent captive to the Great King. The latter, having vainly
tried to coerce him. into revealing Philip's plans, finally executed him
by a servile supplicium (crucifixion).
TovSe TTOT' on Hermias
ou^ 6aico<; Tcapapou; [Jiaxapcov Oefiiv ayvvjv
exTeivev Ilepa&v To^ocpopcov
ou 9avepo><; Xoy/Y) <povioi<; ev dyoaai
aXX* av&po<; TuaTei ^pY)<ya(jisvo<; SoXiou.

c. Fr. 675 Rose (Athenaeus XV, p. 696 A; also Diog. L. 7). V Hymn to

Hymn to Virtue, in honour of Hermias, who died as a martyr for the


sake of philosophy.

a, 7ToXu(Jio/Oe yevet
xaXXidTov (Sup,

xal Oavsiv ^aXa>TO^ ev 'EXXaSi


xal TTOVOUC; TX9)vai fiaXepoix; axdc
lid

xal yovewv [jLaXaxauyyjToto 6*

aeij 8' eve^' ot Ato^ 'HpaxXsTj^ AvjSac; TE xoupoi


5
to TcoXX av^TXadav

Se TroOoic; 'A^tXeix; Aia<; T' 'AtSao SOJJIOIK;

a^ 8' evsxsv 91X100 [zop9a<; xal 'ATapveot; eVrpo90

Totyap ao[St(jLO(; epyoi^, aOavaTov TS [juv au^douort

TS yepac; Ps(3aiou.

Wilamowitz explained this poem in AY. u. Athen IT, p. 405-412; Jaeger in


Aristotle, p. 117 if.
-
7r6voi> (jiaXepo^x; axajjiavTa? unceasing labours, wearing out.
xap?r6v fcaaOavarov. I have adopted the correction of Wilamowitz: taocOavocTov.
Athenaeus has aOavaTov, Diog. L. etq aOavaTov.
T*
The meaning is: taov iryj dOavacrCa.
Xpuaou TS xpefaaco xai yovlwv - better than gold and ancestors.
ooi<; 8& 7r60oi(; - not so much "through longing for thee" as "by enthusiasm for
thee" (cp. Gorgias' Epitaphios, Diels VS 5 II 8 1 B
6, the end, where the orator
ARISTOTLE [400]

says that, "though they have died themselves, 6 7r66o<; ou ouva7r6<xvev" which ;

does not mean "the longing for them" for this can hardly be called dc0<v<xTO<; ,

but "the enthusiasm for noble deeds" *).


Sevfou ai$<x.<; and ypa<; 9iXfoc<; may be paraphrased as follows: STI xai Ata
xal

two kinds 4QQ Ar. used to lecture during the morning hours for a selected

group of more advanced disciples, while in the evening he lectured


for a larger, non-selected circle of students.

Gellius, Noct. Att. XX 5, i:


Commentationum suarum artiumque, quas discipulis tradebat, Aristo-
teles duas species habuisse dicitur: alia erant quae
philosophus . . .

nominabat ecoTepixa, alia quae appellabat axpootTixa. ea>Tepixa dice-


bantur quae ad rhetoricas meditationes facultatemque argutiarum
civiliumque rerum notitiam conducebant, axpoocTixdc autem vocabantur 5
in quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur quaeque ad
naturae contemplationes disceptationesve dialect icas pertinebant. huic
disciplinae, quam dixi, axpoaTixyj tempus exercendae dabat in Lycio
matutinum nee ad earn quemquam temere admittebat, nisi quorum
ante ingenium et eruditionis elementa atque in discendo studium la- I0
boremque explorasset. illas vero exotericas auditiones exercitiumque
'dicendi eodem in loco vesperi faciebat easque vulgo iuvenibus sine
delectu praebebat ; atque eum SeiXiviv TOPITTOCTOV appellabat, ilium alterum
supra ewOivov; utroque enim tempore ambulans disserebat. libros quoque
suos, earum omnium rerum commentarios, seorsum divisit, ut alii 15

e x o t e r i c i dicerentur, partim acroatici.

Cp. Cic., De fin. V 12; Ep. ad Att. IV 16, 2; Strabo XIII i, 54, p. 609; Plut.,
Adv. Coloten 14, 4, p. 1115.

the fate of 491 The had a highly


Ar.'s library
J of Aristotle
library b J remarkable fate.

a. Strabo XIII i, 54, p. 608:


told by Q y $ v 'AptdjOTeXY)*; TYJV eaurou (pi(3Xio67)XY)v) 0eo9pa<TT6> TuapeScoxev,
xal T7)v <JX^) V a7rXi7rs, Trpomx; ^iv t(j(jt,ev auvayaywv pi(3Xia xai
sv ALYUTCTCO (iajiX^ac; pipXioOifjxY)^ auvTa^iv. 0s69paaTo^ 8k. N7]XeL vrap-

eScoxev, 6 8* ei^ SXYJ^LV xo[Ataa<; TOC<; (AST* auTov TuaplScoxev, iSicoTau; av0pa)7rot<; ?
ot xaTaxXetdTa el/ov TOC pi^Xta ouS* eTTtfjieXco^ xeifieva eTreiSyj Se ^a6ovTO ryjv 5

cnrouSYjv TCOV 'ATTaXixwv padiX^cav, 09* ol<; ^v Y) TroXi^, y)TouvTaw pt^Xta et;
r?]v xaTaaxeuTjv TTJS ev HepyafJico pi(3Xto0Y]X7]^, xara -pk Sxpu^av ev Sicopuyt

1
See the remarkable study of C. W. Vollgraff on the Epitaphios: L'oraison
funtbre de Gorgias, Leiden 1952, p. 85-87, and the following section (p. 87-169).
[401] LIFE AND WORKS 7

* 2
TLVI u?ri Sfi voTiac; xal OTJTCOV xaxco0vTa o^e TUOTS dbu^SovTO ot arco roil

yvou<; 'AraXXixcovTi TO) TTjtcp TuoXXcov apyupfccov T<X T 'ApidTOT^Xoix; xal TOC
IOTOU 09paaTou (3ipXfac' 9jv SE 6 'AraXXixcov 9iXo(3tpXo<; (xaXXov YJ 91X6(7090^*
3
810 xal y)Tcov 7r;av6p0cocTiv TCOV Sia(3pco[iaTcov ei^ avTiypa9a xaiva fxer/jveyxe
TYJV ypa9Y)v avaTuXvjpcov oux e5 xal e8a>xev afjiapTaScov TcXyipr] Ta pipXia.
SJ: TOIC; ex TCOV TreptTcaTWv, TOLC; [JLEV TcaXat Tot(;
(JLCTOC 0s69paaTOv,
oux
4
8X0)^ TOC Ptpxta TrXvjv oXCywv xal (JiaXiaTa TWV s^coTeptxoiv , (JLTjSev

aXXa 0aei<; XyjxuOl^eiv 5


tv 9iXoco9etv 7rpay(JiaTixca^, , TOL^ S* udTspov,
o5 Ta pt^Xta TauTa TUpoyjXOev, <5c(jLeivov (JL^V exeivwv 91X0(1095^ xal aptorTO-
avayxa^eaBat [JilvTOi Ta TroXXa eixoTa Xeyeiv Sta TO TtX^Ooc TCOV

ajxapTtcov. -rcoXi 8s ei^ TOUTO xal YJ 'PcofjiTj TrpoaeXapeTO euGuc; yap (jieTa T/]V

'AjceXXixcovTO*; TeXeur/jv 2ilXXa<; ^pe TYJV 'ArueXXixcovToc; ptpXioOvjxyjv 6 TOC<;

20 'A0yjva<; eXtov Seupo 8e (ei^; 'PcofJLYjv) Tupavvicov TS 6 ypa(jLjjLaTtxo<;


xo(jLio-0staav

9iXapuiTOTeX7)<; tov, OepaTieuaa^ T^V STTI TTJ<; pipXioOyjxY]^;, xal

xal ETul TCOV aXXcov aujjipaivet TCOV ei<; Ttpaaiv ypa90(Jivcov ^LpXicov xal ev0a8e
xal sv

b. Pint. Sulla 26, 1-2 tells the same andl> y


story:
J
Plutarchus

8e waciat? Tai<; vaualv e^ '980-00, TpiTaIo<; ev llsipaisl xa6cop-

(jLia07) xal e^eiXev eauTco TTJV 'ATceXXtxcovo^ TOU Tyjtou ptpXioOifjxYjv,


[xi)7]0el<;

sv '^
TOC TcXeiaTa TCOV 'ApiaTOTeXou^ xal 0so9pacrTou p^pXicov 9)v, OUTCCO TOTS

cra9cov yvcopt^6(JLva TO<; TcoXXotc;. XlyETat 8k xo(JLia0eta7](; auTY]<; i<; 'PcofXTjv

Tupavvicova TOV ypajJipiaTixov vaxuacraa0at Ta TroXXa, xal Trap* auToG TOV


'PoSiov 'AvSpovixov U7copY]C7avTa TCOV avTtypa9cov zlq, (Ji^aov 0tvaL xal ava-
TOIX; vijv 9po[Jivou(;

1
"in a cave". Athenaeus I 3 a tells us that, before the arranging of the library
at Pergamum, Neleus sold books of Aristotle to Ptolemaeus Philadelphus for the
library at Alexandria.
2
Moths or worms.
3
SiocppcojAaToc worm-eaten parchments.
4
If this accouift is true, we must note that the school- writings of Aristotle
came very near to being lost for ever, and that the full knowledge of his philosophy
barely escaped being confined to the first generation of the School. Up to Cicero

Antiquity would have known Aristotle almost exclusively from his exoteric writings.
We have some reason to doubt this. Zeller II 2, 3 138-154. Interesting from this
point of view is the list, given by Diog. Laert. V, 22-27, which is probably based
on a list made by Hermippus c. 200 B.C. Many of the school-writings of Ar., or
parts of them, are mentioned here under other titles.
5
0oct? Xr)xu6Ceiv declaim commonplaces.
8 ARISTOTLE [402]

works of 402 work main


Aristotle's literary
"
is divided J Ross
by into three
Aristotle ,.
sections :

(1) Works of a more or less popular order, which were published


by himself;
Memoranda and
(2) collections of material, which may have been
made by disciples;
(3) works, written by himself.
scientific

Nearly the whole existing Corpus Aristotelicum, so far as it is au-


thentic, belongs to the third group.

First group The list of Diog. begins with 19 works which seem to have been all more or less
popular and belonged to the Platonic period of Ar. The greater part were dialogues ;

some of them bore the same titles as certain dialogues of Plato: Sophisfes, Politicus,
Menexcnus, Symposion. The dialogue Eudemus or Jlepl ^ux?te, written shortly
after 354, was modelled closely on the Phaedo. The Protrepticus, addressed to
Themison, the prince of Cyprus, also belonged to the period of the Academy.
The Ilepi 91X0009(0^, still written in the form of a dialogue, was a work of Platonic
style but with marked differences in doctrine. It dates from the years of Assos.
Second group Of the second group a large number of titles is mentioned. Of the extant works
of Aristotle only book K of the Metaph., and probably the 'AOrjvaicov TroXireta may
be classed among this group.
Third group The so-called school-writings of Ar. Systematically classified the Corpus Aristo-
tulicum contains the following works:

I. On logic, brought together in the Organon.


1
1. KaT7)Yopiai (Categoriae). Probably authentic .

2. Ilepl ep[r/)veta<; (De interpret atione) There


. is no reason to doubt the au-
thenticity.
3-4. 'AvocXuTixa rrp^Tcpa and Qcrspa (Analytica priora and poster iora).
5. ToTuxa (Topica).
6. Hep! ao9taTixcov eXsyxtov (De sophisticis elenchis).

II. Philosophy of nature.


1. or Ouaixv) axpoaaiq (Physica), 8 books.
OoCTixdc
2. (De caelo), 4 books.
Ilepl oupavou
3. ITepl yeveaeax; xa ^ 90opa<;, De gencratione et corruptione, 2 books.
4. MerecopoXoyixa (Meteorologica), 4 books, of which the fourth is generally
considered as not genuine 2 .

In the Corpus follows, the short book Ilepl x6a(JLou (De mundo). It is surely not a
work of Aristotle. Probably it dates from the first century i3.C. Its philosophy
bears the traces* of Posidonius.

1
In modern times the authenticity has been doubted, because the idea
work differs from that of Metaph. ZH. Suzanne Mansion pleaded
of substance in this
against the authenticity (Proceedings of the tenth International Congress of Phil.,
Amsterdam 1949, pp. 1097-1100), L. M. de Rijk defends it (in Mnemosyne 1951,
pp. 129-159).
2
A. Mansion, Introd. p. 16, judges the unauthenticity not sufficiently proved.
[402] LIFE AND WORKS 9

If we follow the order of the Corpus Aristotelicum, we have to mention first


the psychological works, and then the biological.

III. Psychology.
1. Ilepl ^ u X*te (De anima), 3 books.
2. The so-called Parva naturalia, containing
(1) Ilepl ataOrjaecoc; xal aLaOyjTtov (De sensu et sensibili)
(2) Ilepl [AV7j(ry]<;
xai avajjLVTjaecoc; (De memoria et reminiscentia)
(3) Ilepl UTTVOU (De somno)
(4) Ilepl evuTcvttov (De insomniis)

(5) (De divinatione per somnum)


Ilepl TYJS xaO* UTTVOV (jLavTtxyjq
(6) ITepl (jt,axpopi6TY)To<; xal
ppaxup^nQTo? (De longitudine et brevitate vitae)
l
(7) Ilepl oiYJs xal OavaTou (De vita et movte]

(8) ITepl avaTTvoTjs (De respiratione).

In the Corpus follows here the short treatise Kepi 7rveu[j/xTo^ (de spiritu), which
may have been written i 250. It contains a later doctrine than was known to
2
Aristotle .

IV. Biological works.


1. Ilepl Ta cj>a taroptat (Historic* animalium) TO books, of which the tenth is
,

not of Ar. Probably also b. VII, a part of VIII, and b. IX are spurious. A large
collection of facts.
The following 4 works give the author's theories based on them.
2. ITepl ^cpoiv (/.optcov (De partibus animalium), 4 books.
3. Ilepl cowv xivi?)ae6><;( De motu animalium).
4. Ilepl Tuopetai; wwv (De incessu animalium).
5. Ilepl ^cocov yeveaea)? (De generatione animalium), 5 books.

In the Corpus these authentic works of Aristotle are succeeded by a series of


treatises which all originate from the Peripatetic School, but not from the Master
himself. Among them are the Problemata, a large collection of all kinds of problems
mathematical, optical, musical, physiological, medical partly they reach ;

back to Ar. himself.

V. Metaphysics.
Ta (jieTa Ta cpuatxa, 14 books, first collected by Andronicus and placed by him
after the Physics, whence they were called by this name. The science we call
metaphysics is named by Ar. himself Trpw-nr) 91X0009 a, or also OeoXoyia.
VI. Ethics.
Next follow in the Corpus the 10 books of the *HOixa Ntxojjiaxeia (Ethica
1.
Ni comae hea) % .

2. The 2 books of the *HOtxa fjieyaXa (Magna moralia).

3. Four books of the 'HOixa Eu8Y)[jLia (Ethica Eudemia), namely the books A, B, F,
H. The books A E Z have been left out, because they are the same as E Z H of

1
The
two chapters of this treatise are headed by the editors Ilepl
first
xal Ar. mentions this subject at the beginning of the first chapter, but he
YT)p<o<;.
does not deal with it here.
2
The distinction of veins and arteries, which was unknown to Ar.
io ARISTOTLE'S WORKS [402]

the Nicontachean Ethics. The last three chapters of the Eudemian Ethics (H 13-15)
are also separated and headed as a book VIII (0), e.g. by W. Jaeger.
These three works, of which only the Nic. Ethics are without doubt authentic l ,

are followed in the Corpus by a small treatise Ilepl dcpetcov xocl xaxi&v, which dates
probably from the first century B.C. or A.C.
VII. Politics and Economics.
i. HoXtTixdc, 8 books.
2. not accepted as authentic. The third exists
O^xovojiixa, 3 books, generally
only in a Latin translation.
Of the large collection of 158 politeiai, which was made in the School of Ar.
and on his suggestion, only that of the Athenians has been preserved (found on
a papyrus in 1890). This document being probably not written by Ar. himself
but by a disciple, we had good reason to mention it as belonging to the second
group.
VIII. Rhetoric and Poetics.
1.T^XVYJ ^YjTopixTj, 3 books, of which the third has been suspected, but is now
generally believed to be authentic.
In the Corpus it is succeeded by the 'PyjTopixv] 7upo<; 'AXav&pov, an early Peripatetic
work, but not of Ar. himself.
2. Ilepl 7roi7)TixTJ<;, authentic but fragmentary.

3 DATE OF ARISTOTLE'S WORKS ACCORDING TO W. JAEGER

Concerning the chronology of the works of Ar. W. Jaeger has come


to the following results:
Firstjperiod 403 To the first Athenian period (the Academy) belong the Dialogues of Ar.
(except the Ilepl 9tXo<Jo<pa<;) with the Protrepticus.
Jaeger fixed no special date
either to the logical treatises of Ar. or to his Rhetoric. But he says somewhere more
or less incidentally that Ar.'s logic was formed at an early date, probably still
in the Academy *. We have good reasons to put the Rhetoric in a later period.
In treating the Metaphysics, of which the older part must have been written at
Assos, Jaeger remarks that at that date the fundamental principles of the Physics

1
The Magna moralia are now generally considered as a work of a generation
after Aristotle,and are in fact proved to be so by various arguments, lastly by
an analysis of the style (K. O. Brink, Stil und Form der ps. Aristotelischen MM.
Thesis of Berlin 1933). As to the Eudemian Ethics, since Jaeger they are generally
believed to be an early .work of Aristotle, from his platonizing period. In a recent
study (Studien zu den Ethiken des Corpus Ar., Paderborn i$q.o) K. J. Schacher
tries to prove that they are not a work of Ar., but of his able disciple Eudemus
of Rhodos. The arguments he gives in order to prove this thesis, are for the greater
part not conclusive. Yet, in my opinion he has shaken the theory of Jaeger as to
the early date of the work in question and opened a new perspective.
8
Certainly it is not necessary to deduce that the six works of the Organum
were all written during the first period, and we can hardly admit that this was
the opinion of Jaeger. But he has left the task of stating this point more precisely
to others.
[403] JAEGER'S CHRONOLOGY n
were already fixed the idea of teleology, the principles of form and matter, potency
:

and act. Consequently J. admits that the first books of the Physics (I and II)
were conceived, and probably written, at Athens, under the eyes of Plato. He
assumes this explicitly for De caelo I, where the hypothesis of aether has been
proposed for the first time as a new solution opposed to Platonism.
At Athens was also written the oldest part of the Politics, the criticism of Plato's
Republic: Pol. II, 2-3. Ar. wrote it before having read the Nomoi. He must have
received this work at Assos and, having read it hastily, have added a short review
of it to the ch. 3 of Pol. II. "Perfectly Platonic" is, according to J., book III
of the De anima, which contains the doctrine of the nous. The actual form of this
book may be of a more recent date, the substance of the thought originates from
the Academy.

404 The years of Assos, Lesbos and the Macedonian court. At Assos was the middle
written the oldest part of the Metaphysics ("Urmetaphysik") the books A (historical
: period
survey, A (a kind of encyclopaedia of philosophical terms), K
1-8 (treating the
same subject-matter as the books B F E, but in an earlier form) next the book ;

A, the so-called Theology, a short survey of the whole metaphysical system, except
ch. 8, which is a later addition; finally chapters 9-10 of the book * M
and the whole
book N, in which the theory of the Ideas is shortly criticized and Speusippus'
2
theory of numbers amply .

The books B and F are also of an early date, but posterior to K 1-8.
P'rom the same time as Metaph. A dates the dialogue Ilepl <piXoao9ia<;, which
contains almost the same criticism of the theory of the Ideas as the first-mentioned
book.
From the period of Assos also date the Eudemian Ethics. Jaeger characterizes
this work as "reformplatonisch". He means by this term, that the author, having
given up the theory of Ideas, wishes to found a new, reformed Platonism. The
main argument for the early date of this work is that the term 9p6v7)ai<; is used
here in the Platonic meaning of philosophical insight into a transcendent reality,
whereas later, in the NIC. Eth., Aristotle uses it to indicate a gi<; TTPOCXTLXY), even
for animals (a kind of instinct for what is or is not harmful to them).
According to J. a part of the Politica too was written at Assos, namely the last
books, H 0, containing the ideal state (dcptoTT) TroXirefac), which is opposed to that
of Plato. To this part of the work belong the books B 3 and F 4 On the other hand,
.

the books A E Z are of a much later date: giving an empirical foundation to the
best constitution, they belong to the third period of Ar.'s activity. Book A has
then been put at the head of the whole, by way of introduction.
As to the Physics, we found that J. rather suggests that books I and II
were written at Athens during the life of Plato. In this case book VII too, which

1
These two chapters are an older introduction to the. discussion of the theory
*
of numbers.
a
In the bookN the name of Xenocrates is not mentioned. His tlleory is criticized
by Ar. very sharply in the book M, which for this reason must have been written
in a later period, namely in the Lyceum, when Xenocrates was the head of the
Academy. During the years of Assos, while Speusippus directed the School of Plato
at Athens, Xenocrates was in the company of Ar.
3
A survey of former theories of the state, partly written at Athens (the ch.
2-3) partly at Assos.
4
Book F treats the notion of 7roXi<; and
12 AR STOTLE'S WORKS [404]

belongs to the oldest parts of Ar.'s works, must be dated in the first period. Book
x

being a later addition (to be dated in the third period), we have the impression,
though J. does not say so explicitly, that Books III-VI must be placed in the middle
period, at Assos or later, but most probably at Assos, because in these years the
author was occupied with what is called by J. speculative physics.
What he states explicitly is, that the form in which we have the work De caelo
dates from these years (at least two years after the death of Plato, but not much
later). The style is near to that of Ilepl 91X0(109^1;; the theory of the movement
of the celestial spheres in B 8 is later than that of the movement of the celestial
bodies in II. 9tX
Also the Ilepl yevaeco<; xal 90opa<;, being a work of "speculative physics", is to
be dated in this period, probably still at Assos. J. sees these works of physics as
being of the same order of ideas as the politics of the ideal state, the ethics based
on theology (the Eudemian Eth.) and that part of the Metaphysics which exhibits
the same character ("Urmetaphysik").

the third 405 Ar.'s second stay at Athens: the years of the Lyceum. There is an im-
period portant province in the works of Ar. which, according to J., originates without
exception from the third period: the research-work, as well on the field of history
as on that of nature. The only argument for this late dating which J. gives, is,
that the expedition of Alexander furnished a great deal of material for zoology
as well as for botany 2 According to this theory all the biological works of
.

Ar. belong to the last period of his activity.


The Meteorology too is dated by J. in the last period. He docs so with reference
to the work on the rising of the Nile, which ends with the triumphant words:
OUXSTL 7rp6pX7)|jLa Icmv (0967) yap 9<xvpco<; OTI et; USTCOV attest.
J. cites these words as characteristic of the experimental method of Ar., as opposed
to that of Plato and the Academy, which was still closely followed by Ar. himself
3
in his early, Platonizing works .

To
the third period J. also reckons the whole group of anthropological-physiologi-
cal treatises: De anima I and II, the Parva naturaha without exception. (Not the
doctrine of the nofts in De anima III, which harmonizes with the early ethics
and metaphysics).
J. points especially to the method used in the treatise on divination by dreams,
which being purely experimental differs toto coelo from the point of view in the
4
middle period, in Jlepl 9tXocrc9ta<; .

Finally J. cites the fifth chapter of the De partibus animalium I in order to


illustrate the purely empirical character of Ar.'s idea of science during this last
period
5
. We
give the text of this famous chapter.
1
This book contains a revision of the theory of the Prime Mover.
2
In fact, J. opposes the method of research of Ar. and his successors to that
of Plato and the Academy, Ar.'s purpose being to study the details, while Plato's
was merely the division of notions. The question is first whether this opposition
is justified. We have to remark that, in order to make a division of notions, details
must be studied. Secondly, we saw Ar. occupied in Mikrasia and on Lesbos with
the collection of material for the Historia Animalium.
3
Jaeger, Aristotle, p. 331.
4
Ib., p. 162 ff., 333 f. In the DC divinatione per somnum Ar. no longer explains
the prevision of the future in the dream state as proceeding from metaphysical
regions, but he explains it in a purely natural way, by means of psycho-physiology.
6
!b., P- 337-34-
[406] JAEGER'S CHRONOLOGY 13

406 Aristotle, De part. anim. I 5, 644b aa-645aw :

T&v oiai&v 8aai <pi<ret auvcaraai, Ta? {Jifev ayev/jTou? *a ' i^iptou^ clvat
TOV #7cocvTa ateova, Ta; 8e [iST^xetv yevaeo>? xal 99opas. Sujijiiftyxe 8fc rapt
Ixetva? Ti^tac? ofiaa? xal Qeia? IXaTTOo? -fjfjiiv urcapxetv OecopCa? (xal yap
26 e &v $v TI? axe^aiTo Ttepl auT&v, xal Ttepl &v stSlvat 7to0o3(iev,
Icnrlv oXlya T ^avepa xaTa rJjv ata0Y)aiv) 7 Tcspl 84 TCOV 96apTo>v 9urc5v TS xal

^cocav e67copou(jiev (xotXXov irpis rJjv yvtoaiv Sta Ti mivTpocpov TCoXXa yip Ttspl
3ofxa<TTov ylvo<; Xapot TI<; av T&V uTcap^ivTcov pouX6ptevo; SiaTtoveiv txavo>^.

"E^ei S* exdcTepa x*P LV * Tcov fxv yap eL xaTa (jtixpiv ecpaTrrdfJieOa, 6(jtco^ Sta

T/JV TL(xi6T73Ta TOO yvcopt^eiv ^Stov ?) Ta Trap* Tjpuv <5c7ravTa, &(ncep xal T&V

35 Ipeofji^veov T^> TUX&V xal (juxpiv {Jt6piov xaTiSetv ^8t6v e<mv ^ noXXa STepa xal
>45 a (AeyaXa Si* axpi^sta^ JSetv T<X S4 Sta TO (jtaXXov xal TuXstco yvopt^siv aut&v
Xa(jLpdcvet r})v TYJC; l7naTY)[jL7]<; U7repox*/)v, 2rt 8^ Sia TO 7rX7)criatTSpa ^(JLWV slvat
x
xal TY]<; 9\iaeo><; otxei6Tpa avTixaTaXXaTTSTai TI 7upo<; rJjv Ttspl Ta 6eia

5 9iXoaocpav. 'Eirsl 8^ Trepl Ixetvcov 8ii/)XOo[jiv XlyovT<; TO 9aw6(xsvov v)(Jitv,

7 (jtvjSfiv :rapaXi7c6vTa<; fiE<; 8uva(jiiv (jiifjTe

v. Kal yap Iv TOL<; fXY) xxapi


2
rJ)v ataOvjaiv xaTa rJjv Qfioptav ofjLO)^ YJ SYjjjuoupyYjaacjoc 9\iai?
10
YjSova<; 7rapxet T ^ 8uva(jivoi<; Tac; aiTia^ yvo)pt^iv xal 9\iat 91X006901^.
Kal yap av tr] TcapaXoyov xal STOTTOV, ? Ta<; (jiev ixova<; au

XaipO(jiv OTI r}]v STjfjLioupyyjaaaav TX V<5


Q
V <ruv6copoi3(jiv, olov

7^ T7)v TrXaaTixyjv, auT&v 8e TWV 9u<Ti auvcrTa>T6)v (JL-J) (jiaXXov aya7r6>(xev TTJV
15 Oecoptav, 8uva(xsvot Ta? atTta? xaOopav. Ai6 St (JLYJ Sud^spatvEtv TratStxco?
y
T7]v ?Tpl Tcav dcTtfjiOTlpcov a>a>v l7ricrx^iv. 'Ev TTaort yap TO&; 9u<rtxot? SVSCTT

TI 6aufjtacTT6v xal xa0cx7Tp *HpaxXtTO(; XlyTat Trpo? TO&J; ?vou? l7Ttv Toic;

PouXOfJL^VOO? IVTUX^V aUTCp, 01 I7rt87) 7CpO<Jl6vTc; filSoV aUTOV 0p6[XVOV TCp6{;


20 TC> KTCVCO ^aTTjaav (exXi yap auTOu<; iffivai, OappouvTa? elvai yap xal
Ivrau6a OEO^C;), OUTCO xal 7Tp6<; r/jv ^yjnQatv Tcepl xaaTOO TCOV ^<l)0)v Tipoat^vat
3
8fit jjiY) Suaco7TOU(jLvov , d)? v GtTOxaw ovTO? Ttv6<; 9uatxou xal xaXou. T6 yap
jjtYj Tux6vT(o<; aXX* lvxa TIVO? Iv TOI? TYJ<; 9tici0)c; pyoi? IcrTl xal (idcXiara*
25 o5 8* 2vxa auv^<TTY)Xv ^ ylyov T^Xou?, T/]V TOU xaXou x^ipocv slXy)9ev. Et 81
<3cTt(iov elvai Vv6fjux, TOV auT^v Tp6:rov
oux laTt yap <5cvU TroXXvji; SuaxpLa? ISfitv I? &v
?, olov at(jia, crapxe^, 6aTa,' 9Xp? xal T<i

30TotauTa tx6pia. 'Opioiox; TE SEI VO^EIV TOV Ttspl ooTivoaouv T&V [loptcov Y)

balances somewhat. TI -
a
$1
- "Nature that created
Syjjjtioupy^acxaa 9\iai<; them as an intelligent artist*
See on the meaning of this version our Ch. XIII, 3, nrs. 499-501.
8
Tcpoailvai Set \ri\ SuorcoTcoiSjjLevov
- "we must not recoil with childish aversion".
14 ARISTOTLE'S WORKS [406]

T&V <rxeucov SiaXeyofAevov JIT] Trepi TYJ<; uXvj^ TcoieiaOai TYJV |rvY)|ry)v,

Ta\yn} X*P IV > XXa TTJ<; 0X7)^ (Jiop9^^, olov xai Trspi oixta<;, aXXa (JLYJ
TrXivOcov

xal TnqXou xai uXa)v xal TOV Tuspl 9uaea)^ Trspi TTJ<; auv6e<jeto<; xai T% 0X7)^ 35
ouaa<;, aXXa (JLY] Trepi TOtiTwv a JJLY) aofi(3aivei x<opi6[jieva TTOTS TTJ<;

Jaeger, calls this "a programme for research and instruction in the Peripatetic
I.e.,
School" which explains to us the spirit that reigns in the works of Ar.'s followers.
*,

As to Ar. himself, J describes the spirit of his later years as opposed to his former
.

conception of metaphysics in the following words: "He no longer speaks of the


world of appearances as more knowable to us but to be contrasted with the essence
of reality, which is more knowable naturally a He justifies metaphysics now by .

means of the everlasting longing of the human heart to penetrate the mysteries
of the imperishable and invisible world, and is ready to content himself with the
merest corner of that hidden truth, while the precedence of real science (YJ TYJ<; TUI-
uTrepox'O) is now clearly assigned to empirical research. This is the praise
<JT7)|A7)<;

of devotion to the small, the confession of allegiance to the study that fulfills its
highest achievements in the History of Animals, the collection of Constitutions,
the history of the theatre, and the chronicle of the Pythian competitions."
"He (Ar.) organizes and overcomes the manifold (&rceipov) of appearances, which
3
Plato simply passes over" .

the organi- 407 To the third period of Ar.'s activity belongs also the organization of the
aation of
writing of a complete history of the sciences. Theophrastus was charged with the
science
waiting of a detailed History of philosophy (the Ouoixcov S6$ai in 18 books), from
Thales up to his time. This work has been the basis for all later doxography.
Eudemus of Rhodos had to write a History of the mathematical sciences (arithmetic,
geometry, and astronomy), probably also of theology.
Meno wrote the History of Medicine, the 'laTpixdc, known to us by a papyrus-
fragment.
J. mentions here, too, the great illustrated work 'AvaTo{iat, a collection which
was regularly used in the medical lectures of the Lyceum. Ar. often refers to it
in his treatises.

the revision 408 To this last period belongs, finally, the revision of the theory of the
of the theory First Mover in
Metaph. A
8. This revision is based on new astronomic theories :

of the FirstE U(J OXUS admitted 26 celestial spheres, his (indirect) disciple Callippus assumed
Mover
^. ^ r h^^if comes in Metaph. A 8 to 47 or 55, and accordingly postulates
the existence of thet same number of Unmoved Movers. J. thinks this to be an
innovation after the original theory, which admitted of only one Unmoved Mover,
who alone governs the kosmos which is one, and is called therefore 0s6<;. Thus in

1
"em Forscnungs- und Unterrichtsprogramm der peripatetischen Schule".
2
We view of Ar. directly at the beginning of his Physics (I i)
shall find this
and of his Metaphysics (A 2). See our nrs. 470 and 519 (982a 23 - 26 ); also Eth. Nic.
2- 4
I, I095b (our nr. 566).
8
"Ar. organisiert und iiberwindet das Apeiron der Erscheinungen, das Platon
iiberfliegt", Jaeger says. The truth of this statement, however, seems to me doubt-
ful,because Plato in the Philebus designed as the especial task of philosophy the
determining of "the intermediate stages" between the One and the Apeiron.
[408] JAEGER S CHRONOLOGY 15

chapters A 7 and 9-10, which form a close unity. The 8th chapter is clearly a later
addition.
Phys. VIII also gives a revised treatment of the question of the First Mover,
and must be of a later date l .

409 To complete the image we have to make to ourselves of Ar.'s third period Parts of the
according to Jaeger, we must state the following points. Politics, Ethics

1. First the empirical books (A E Z) of the Politics must be reckoned to this and MetaP h -

last period, as they are based on the material of the 158 constitutions; then also
j
book A, which is an introduction to the whole.
2. J. does not say explicitly that the Nic. Ethics are to be placed in this period
too. This seems, however, to be an almost inevitable conclusion. First by the char-
acter of the work. The empirical books of the Politics are characterized by J. as a
phaenomenology of veal political life. Now the Nic. Ethics give such a phaenomenology
of moral life. And secondly, the relation to the Eudemian Ethics. We
have seen that
by J. this work was placed in the middle period. The Nic. Ethics, representing a
later phasis of Ar.'s thought, then seem almost necessarily to have been written
in the third period.
3. Finally the central books of the Metaphysics: Z H
0, containing the doctrine
of substance and that of potency and act, and with them the introductory book E.
Are they to be placed in the third period ? Such seems to be the opinion of J.,
though he only says explicitly that book M, which criticizes Xenocrates, must
have been written in the years of the Lyceum. The thesis of J., however, is not to
say that Ar. has abandoned metaphysics during this period and has turned to merely
empirical research, but rather that he has changed his conception of metaphysics,
the object of this science having been first to him supra-sensible being, after- ^

wards the Sv ?j t>v, which means: being in all its nuances, being in its multiplicity.'
Now this is in harmony with the spirit of empirical research. Thus it fits well to
the third period.

4 REACTIONS AND CORRECTIONS


410 The work of Jaeger has been generally acknowledged as a study the
2
of fundamental importance. Its chronology has been adopted by Ross , generally
4
E. Brdhier 3 and Uberweg-Praechter .
accepted

E. Hoffmann wrote in the Philologische Wochenschrift of 1924 that J. "had re-


suscitated the living Aristotle in the flesh". He understands Jaeger in this way
that a separation should be made between a metaphysical and an empirical period
in the development of Ar.
/. Bidez in Un singulier naufrage littdraire dans VAntiquit6\ a la recherche des
dpaves de VAristote perdu (Brussels 1938) is occupied with the early works of
Ar. in the footstepsof Jaeger.

1
We treat this question in our Ch. XIII, 5.
2
W. D. Ross remarks in the Introduction to his Aristotle-Selections (New-
York 1938, p. XIV: "The attempt to trace the development of Ar.'s thought
through his works is still in its infancy." Yet the main conclusions of J. are well
established in his opinion, and he adopts almost J.'s whole chronology.
3
Histoire de la Philosophic I, 1926.
4
Geschichte der Phil. I, "1926.
16 ARISTOTLE'S WORKS [410]

E. Bignone uses the traces of the lost works of Ar. for the study of Epicurus.
Jaeger's theory of the revision of the doctrine of the First Mover has found
an almost general agreement up to the very last years 1 So by .
/. LagrangeM .

in his article Comment s'est transform^ la pensie religieuse d'Aristote d'apres un


livre recent in Revue Thomiste 1926, p. 285 ff. and by R. Mugnier, La thforie du
f

premier Moteur et Involution de la pensfe aristotflicienne, Paris 1930.


With the same question deals M. Bousset, Sur la thSologie d'Aristote: monotheisme
ou polythdisme ? in Revue Thomiste 1938, p. 798 ff.

serious 4jj a> A. Mansion of Louvain has been the first to criticize J.'s
**
objections of .

A. Mansion theories in a more radical way 2 .

He remarks first that Metaph. A must be of a much later date than J. thinks it is,
so that the distance of time which lies between ch. 8 and the rest of this book
can by no means be so great as J. assumes it to be. Secondly, Ar. has left his
Metaph. unfinished. This fact implies that he worked at it till the end of his life.
It is impossible to accept that the work we have was finished before 335 3 .

Mansion's final judgment on the work of J. is that, in general, his


conclusions cannot be accepted as being definitive. "En somme son
travail est en grande partie a refaire."

b. After Mansion Von Ivanka protested against the separation


of a metaphysical and an empirical period, which would have succeeded
one another in Ar.'s development 4 .

Other 412 The objections of Mansion and Von Ivanka were based on a purely historical
protests method. Such is M. de Corte (in La doctrine de I'in-
not the case of the protest of
telligence chez Ar., Paris 1934) against the genetic method, applied by Jaeger to
the study of Ar. De Corte starts from the Thomistic interpretation of Ar. as being
the right one. Now the doctrine of Thomas on the intellectus agens as a part or
perhaps rather as a function of the human soul may have been a real correction
of Ar.'s doctrine of the nous; it is, however, more a philosophical than a purely
historical interpretation 5 But, if the method of W. Jaeger is to be criticized,
.

it should be done on purely historical grounds, not on dogmatic assumptions.


The same remark applies to the work of P. van Schilfgaarde, De zielkunde van
Aristoteles (Leiden 1938) the author pleads for a philosophizing interpretation
:

of Ar., which means with him, an interpretation in the style of Hegel .

1
Since the interesting study of Ph. Merlan on Ar.'s Unmoved Movers in Traditio
of 1946, others too find traces of a plurality of Unmoved Movers in Ar.'s early
works. See our* nr. 518.
2
In the Revue Ntoscholastique de Louvain, 1927, pp. 307 ff. and 423 ff.
s
In fact, I do not think this to have been the opinion of J. Vid. supra (nr. 409).
4
Scholastik VII, p. 27 ff.
6
F. Nuyens remarks rightly that the texts of Ar. point rather to the Averroistic
interpretation of the nous as a substantia separata.
6
Dr. Nuyens wrote a review of this work in Studien 1939, p. 66 f. I did ;

the same for the Museum 1940, p. 149 If.


[413] JAEGER'S CHRONOLOGY CORRECTED 17

413 Nuyens, Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles


F. the work of
u*ens
(thesis of the University of Amsterdam, 1939), French translation at
Louvain 1948 (L' Evolution de la Psychologic d'Aristote) has found in the
development of the psychology of Ar. a criterion which enables him to
a more exact determination of the chronology of Ar.'s works, and so
to an important correction of the results of Jaeger.
Standard is: the conception of the soul as entelechy of a body in De anima. the leading
Soul and body are then essentially joined. The soul is not a substance, as it was principle
with Plato and in the Eudemus of Ar. The question is: what are the intermediate
stages between the Eudemus and the De anima ? A special treatise on the soul,
dating from the middle period, does not exist. But Ar. speaks repeatedly on the
subject more or less incidentally, often in the Ethics and Politics, less frequently
but still in a sufficient measure in the Metaph. and in his biological works. Three
periods can be distinguished:
(I) The first is that of an antagonistic dualism, in which body and soul are
opposed to each other as hostile powers (the Eudemus)',
(II) A natural collaboration of soul and body. The soul does not directly lose
its independence. It is a vital power which, being joined to a special organ, lives
in the body. It dominates the body and uses it as its instrument (vitalistic instru-
mentism). This conception is characteristic of the middle period. Biological study
has influenced the author: in the Eudemus psychology was restricted to man, in
De anima it has become "general", i.e. extending to all living beings;
(III) In the third period the soul is the entelechy of the body. Soul and body
are essentially joined; whence follows that the soul comes into being and perishes
with the body. It is no longer deemed immortal, as it was in (I).
The problem of the nous is necessarily linked up with that of the soul. In the the problem
first period the nous belongs to the soul and is immortal with it; in the second of the noAs
nous and soul are separated, nous is what is not bodily. In the third the nous
comes 6upa0ev: it is immaterial and immortal. It does not belong to the soul.
This criterion leads its author to the following results: Results
1. llepl 9i,Xoao9ia<; does not belong to the middle period (Assos), as it was dated
by Jaeger, but to the first. It is of the same time as the Protrepticus *. In this last
work too the theory of Ideas is already criticized.
2. This statement has a further consequence: if IT. 9iX. was written in the
Academy, then also De caelo, Phys. I-VII, and De generatione et corruptione.
3. The Categories, Topica and II. 009. X. prove to belong to the first period;
De interpr., Anal. pr. and post, to the second.
4. To the middle period belongs, as it appears from the local references (to
the region of Assos and Lesbos) the Historia Animalium. Ross had already
remarked this. N. concludes: but with this fact the whole construction of Jaeger
that the biological w^rks of Ar. all belong to the third period and there mark a
new phase in their author's development, collapses.
To the Hist. anim. succeeds the De partibus anim. In this work the dualism
of body and soul is replaced by collaboration. The soul is localized in the heart.
The same view is represented by the De motu anim., and some of the Parva
naturalia, namely the De iuv. et sen., De vita et morte and the De resp.
1
We shall see in our next chapter that this conclusion of Dr. Nuyens cannot
be right. This fact surely must exhort us to a certain prudence as to the application
of his criterion.
De Vogel, Greek Philosophy II 2
i8 ARISTOTLE'S WORKS [413]

The 6th treatise of the Parva Nat. however, the De long, et brev. vitae, is nearer
to the De anima. It forms a transition to the third period. As to the rest of the bio-
logical works, only the De gener. anim. represents the same view as the De anima,
and therefore belongs to the final period.
5. Concerning the Metaph. N. confirms the early date of the book A, B, K 1-8,
M y-io and N; also that M1-9 belongs to the final period. Book T has no texts
relative to the soul, but E has. The view of the soul in this book is near to that of
De anima. It must be dated shortly before this work.
N.'s criterion leads to an exact determine' tion of the date of books Z H 0. These
books presuppose the definition of soul in De anima. Consequently they belong
to the last years of Ar.'s activity. In book , however, are also older traces. So
this book, as we have it, is probably a later redaction of an earlier treatise.
Book I gives no indications as to its date.
Concerning A Nuyens confirms the objection of Mansion against Jaeger. Soul
and body are considered in this book as form and matter of the living being.
This must have been written after De anima, i.e. very late. Chapter 8 is a later ad-
dition, but as to time it is not far removed from the rest.
6. N. determines also the date of the NIC. Ethics. Whether this work belongs
to the third period, to the beginning of it or to the end, is a question which was
left open by Jaeger. Both Mansion and Ross date the work very late. N. comes to
other conclusions the psychology which is presupposed here, is not that of De anima;
:

it is much nearer to Plato. For this reason the work must be dated surely ten years
before the DC anima: it may have been written towards the end of the middle
period or at the beginning of the third.
7. Also regarding the Politics N. comes to an important conclusion. We saw
a that books IV- VI were reckoned by Jaeger to the third period, and that the first
book was added, according to him, afterwards as an introduction to the whole.
Now the relation of body and soul appears to be conceived in this book in a clearly
mechanical way, and soul is divided into parts as was done by Plato but not in
Ar/s De anima. So this first book may have been written early in the third period,
but by no means very late.
8. N. too cites the fifth chapter of the De part. anim. I and comments on it in
a somewhat different way from Jaeger: we cannot cite this beautiful chapter as
a document in illustration of a "positivistic" period in Ar/s development. This
author never cultivated science at the cost of speculative philosophy. Both go
together, up to the end of his activity. The science which he defends here, is
according to himself the prerogative of the <pu<jet 91X630901.
9. Finally the De anima. The third book is not of an early date, as it was in the
opinion of Jaeger, and also of Ross. Its doctrine of the nous is not Platonic; it is
no remainder of a, former period, but just the result of the psychology of the final
period. The work shows a unity of composition; the problem of the nous pervades
the whole.
A is closely connected with the De anima De sensu
part of the Parvd naturalia :

et sensato, mcmoria et reminiscentia, De somno et vigifia, De insomniis and


De,
De divinatione. Together with the De gener. anim. they belong to the last years.
These then are the results of the work of Dr. Nuyens. The fact that they in their
turn must be corrected on several points, does not take away the importance of
the work.

Further 414 jh e chronology of the biological works has been determined


C
method niore precisely by I. Doring in Aristotle's De partibus animalium, Gote-
[414] JAEGER'S CHRONOLOGY CORRECTED 19

borg 1943; that of certain treatises of the Parva naturalia by H. J.


Drossaart Ltdofs, Arislotelis DC insomniis et de divinatione per
somnum,
Leiden 1947. Both authors know the book of Nuyens and make use
of his results.
Some objections against the method of Nuyens have been made by objections
G. Verbeke, L'evolution de la psychologic d' Aristote, in Revue philosophique
de Louvain, 1948, pp. 335-35 1 -

Verbeke remarks first that it is impossible to date whole works of Ar. on the
ground of a few texts in which the relation soul-body is touched upon. In the same
treatise may be earlier and later parts (as Doring proved that the first book of
the De parlibus is of a much earlier date than the following books of this treatise,
and Drossaart L,ulofs that both in the De Somno and in the De insommis there are
sections of an earlier and a more advanced date). Secondly he points out that the
arguments adduced by N. for the early date of the Topics are not conclusive;
thirdly that there arc serious difficulties as to the chronology of the Nic. Ethics,
the doctrine of the nous in this last work being much nearer to Plato than is
supposed by N.
1 myself had to make an objection to N. regarding the early date he attributes
to the llspl 91X0 CTO 9 tag. Now, because the chronology of the physical treatises is
based by N. on that of this dialogue, this point too must be revised.
The main result of the work of N. remains that the biological works of Ar. are
of a much earlier elate than Jaeger had admitted; that the later books of the
Metaphysics are of the author's latest years, and consequently that neither the
"research"-work of Ar. is to be attributed as a whole to his latest period, nor the
metaphysical speculation to a former phase of his development
1
.

1 have to remark here again that in


1
my opinion Jaeger's theory docs not
necessarily imply that the last books of the Meiaph. were written before 335, and
that, consequently, the results of Dr. Nuyens on this point are rather a precision
than a contradiction of Jaeger's views.
1 had the opportunity, after having written the above chapter, to ask Prof.

Jaeger himself, when he visited our country in July 1950, whether my impression
on this point was right. He confirmed to me that it has never been his intention
to make a radical separation between a metaphysical and a "positivistic" period
in Ar.'s development. He did not think it possible to date books Z H
of the
Metaph. more precisely, but he did not intend to exclude the possibility that they
might have been written very late.
ELEVENTH CHAPTER
THE EXOTERIC WRITINGS
i THE EUDEMUS OR IIEPI TTXIIS
the theme 415Ar. wrote this dialogue shortly after the death of Eudemus
of Cyprus, a companion of his in the Academy of Plato, who died in Sicily
under the standard of Dio (354). The story of his death is told by Cicero.

a. Cic., De div.
I 25 (Fr. 37 R.):

Quid ? singular! vir ingenio Aristoteles et paene divino ipsene


errat an alios vult errare, cum scribit Eudemum Cyprium
familiarem
suum Macedonian! facientem Pheras venisse, quae erat urbs in
iter in
Thessalia turn admodum nobilis, ab Alexandro autem tyranno crudeli
dominatu tencbatur. in eo igitur oppido ita graviter aegrum Eudemum 5
fuisse utomnes medici diffiderent. ei visum in quiete egregia facie
iuvenem dicere fore ut perbrevi convalesceret paucisque diebus inter-
iturum Alexandrum tyrannum, ipsum autem Eudemum quinquennio
post domum esse rediturum. atque ita quidem prima statim scribit
Aristoteles consecuta et convaluisse Eudemum et ab uxoris 10
fratribus interfectum tyrannum. quinto autem anno exeunte cum esset
spes ex illo somnio in Cyprum ilium ex Sicilia esse rediturum, proeliantem
eum ad Syracusas occidisse. ex quo ita illud somnium esse interpretatum
ut cum animus Eudemi e corpore excesserit, turn domum revertisse vi-
deatur. 15

b. Cp. Plut., Life of Dio, 22:


SuveTrpocTTov 8e (TCO AIGM) xal T&V iroXiTixcov TcoXXol xal T&V
8 TS Ku7rpio<; Eu&7)fJio<;, ei<; Sv 'ApiaTOTeXvjc; obroOavAvTa TOV

SiaXoyov eTuoiTjcre, xal

the soul no 415 i n this dialogue Ar. defends the immortality of the soul and
armo y
a ^ ac k s ^e doc t T i ne that the soul is the harmony of the body. Philoponus,

in hiscommentary of the De anima, mentions the following two argu-


ments, used by Ar. in the Eudemus.
[ 4 i6] THE EUDEMUS 21

a. Fr. 45 R., p 50: ar^ment


Tfj ap|AOvia, <py)aiv,

evavTiov. oux <5tpa /] apfiovia ecruv.

points to the corresponding logical formula in the Categ. 3 b ff.


24
Jaeger, y4y. 41, :

TTttxpxei. 8& TOCI<; ouaiaic; xal TO (jirjS^v aura!*; Ivavrtav elvat. "Substances never have
contraries". Soul, then, is a substance, as is said directly by Plotinus, Enn.
IV 7, 8: T6 JJL&V (sc. 7rp6Tpov, 73 ^x-r)) ouafac, ^) 8& apjxovta oux ouafoc.
1
Jaeger, though he does not think the Categ. authentic cites another parallel
,

between a Platonic argument (Phaedo 93 b-d) why the soul is no harmony, and
a formula in the Categ. Plato says: the soul is either good, moral and rational,
or the opposite. Now these opposed constitutions are a sort of harmony and dis-
harmony of the soul. But the attributes "good" etc. and their opposites admit
of a {laXXov xal YJTTOV. Consequently, if harmony --- soul, the soul would admit
of degrees, which is impossible. Cp. Categ. 3 b 33 -4 a9 Aoxei 8k. 7) ouata ^YJ In&ixe-
:

oOai TO (jtaXXov xal TO TJTTOV. E.q.s. "Substance does not admit of degrees".

b. Fr. 45 R., ib.: Second


argument
Tfj apfjiovta, <p"/3<n, TOU <7c!>{jiaTo<; evavTiov ICTTIV TJ avapfjioaria TOU aa>(JiaTOc;,
avapjJLoaTia 8k TOU (JL^UXOU crcifjiaTO*; voao^; xal aa6veia xal oda'/QC, &v TO
[lev a<JU[JL[JLSTpia TCOV (TToixetwv Y) voao^, T{> 8s; TCOV 6[Jioio(jiep(ov Y) aarO^veia, TO
S^ TCOV opyavtxcov TO adv/os. et TOLVUV YJ avapfjiocrTia voao<;
xal aaOeveia xal

alaxoc;, Y) ap(Jiovia Spa uyteia xal ta^ix; xal xaXXo<; ^WXT] Se ouSev eari TOUTCOV
OUTE uyteia cpTjfxl OUTS ta/u^ OUTS xaXXoc; ^u^rjv yap elye xal 6 0epatTYj<;.
cov. oux Spa eoViv f) ^ux^) apjiovia.

the soul
Simplicius in Ar., De anima
c. I 3, says that, according to Ar. an eidos
in the Eudemus, the soul is an eidos.
Fr. 46 R.:
Kal ev Toi EuSyjfjLco TCO Tcepl ^u^c; auTCp ysypafji^vcp SiaXoyto
TYJV fyvxr^ slvai.

remarks that in this period the young Ar. was still dependent on Plato
J., I.e.,
in metaphysics, but completely independent of him in the sphere of logic and
methodology. "The fundamental attitude embodied in the doctrine of the categories,
and the main portions of the doctrine itself, had been developed before Ar. dared
to shake the metaphysical foundation of Plato's philosophy" .

417 a. The story


Midas and Silenus, cited. by Plutarch in the
of thc

Consolatio ad Apollonium 27: Silenus, captured by Mida^ answers to the soul


the question of the king what is the highest good to man (TI TTOT CO-TL TO

1
Ar. p. 46, with note 3. I think the arguments adduced by J. on this point
not decisive. I am rather inclined to accept the authenticity of the Categ. and to
explain the doctrine of the Trpconr) ouala in this treatise as a strong reaction of the
author against the theory of the Ideas, which may be placed at the beginning of
the years of Assos.
22 EXOTERIC WRITINGS [4*7 J

TOLC; avOpcoTToi^ xal TI TO TravTcov aipeTWTaTov) ;


he answers
after a long silence, jz6Xis and avaxayxa^cov (fr. 44 R., p. 49):

Aaifxovoi; emTcovou xal TU^TJC; ^ocXeTcyj^ e97){Jiepov <TTrp|Jia, TI


Xlyeiv oc u(juv apeiov jr/) yvcovai ; JJLST' ayvoiag yap TCOV oixeicov xaxtov
6 (3io<;. av0pto7roi<; e Tua^Trav oux Son yevecrOai TO TTOCVTCOV apiarov oue
axetv TYJ<; TOO peXTiaTou <puoreco<; apiaTov yap Tuaat xal 7raaai<; TO [JLYJ yeveaOat,
TO JJieVTOl [JLTa TOUTO Xai TO TTp&TOV TJ>V avOpCOTTG) aVUCTTCOV TO yeVOJJLEVOU^
aTroOavstv ax; Ta^taTa. STjXov ouv J)^ oucry]^ xpstTTOvo^ TTJ^ sv TO> T&Ovavai

8taycoy^<; 7] TYJ^ ev TW ^v, OUTCOC;

J., ^(y. p. 48, rightly pointed to the Platonic style and spirit of this answer:
To yeva0ai
JA-JJ
is not merely "not to be born"; it also means "not to enter into

Becoming".
the doctrine fc. proc lus in Plat. Remp.\ Ar. fr. 41 R.:
accepted by Aeyei Se xal 6 Sai(JLOVLO<; 'Api<TTOTXv)<; aiTiav Si* YJV sxstiOev [isv Eoucra '/]

Ar.
^U^TJ Seupo sTTiXavOavsTai TCOV exec Osa^aTcav, svTsuOev Ss
sxe TWV svTauOa
The exeZ OsajjiaTa are doubtless the Ideas.

c. The same fr.


the life of the ^r. concludes from the above-cited fact that the life of the soul without

body normal body is normal and


a state of health, whereas the
like life in the body
is to be considered as abnormal and a state of disease.

yap o5v xal ai>TO<; ex (Jiev uyetac; voaov oSsiiovTa^ Xyj(h)v


elc;

xal auToiv TCOV ypa(JLfJLcxTO>v civ spi[Jia0Y)Xicrav, ex voaou 8e et<; uystav


(jLY]Seva Tca>7uoTe TOUTO Tuacr/etv eotxevat Se TYJV [JLSV aveu cr<o(i.aTO^
xaTa 9\jaLv oOaav <uyeta, vocrcp Se T"/)V
ev a<I)(JtaTt>.

the nous 4jg a. That the nous was considered by Ar. during this period

the soul as & P a rt of the soul (unlike the later doctrine of the De anima), appears
from the passage of Simpl. cited supra (416c: the soul an eidos), Fr.
46 R., where he continues (after the words eI86<; TL dcTro^aiveTat T/JV
elvai )
:

xal ev TOUTOK; eTraivei TOU^ T<OV elScov SexTLXY]v Xeyovya^ T'/JV 4(U X"') V > ^X
aXXa TY)\) voY)Tix7]v dx; TCOV aXTjOcov SeuTepco^ eiStov yvcoo-Tixyjv TC^J
yap
vco T<i

The question might be asked here whether the words ou^ oXrjv e.q.s. are still
a report of Ar.'s view in the Eudemus, or whether they rather contain an explanation
of Simplicius. In the first case which seems to be the right one this fragment
would prove that the doctrine of the nous as the highest part ot the human soul,
which therefore alone is divine and immortal, originates in the very first period
[418] THE EUDEMUS 23

of Ar.'s thought l This doctrine differs from that of De anima, where the nous
.

no longer is regarded as a part of the soul, but as a "separated substance" which


conies from the outside. We find it explicitly in the Protr. (fr. 61 R.), in Metaph. A 3
and in the Nic. Ethics.

61 R. (from n as akm
b. Ar., fr. v lamblichus, Protr. ch. 8,' p.
-
48 ed.
T Pistelli)/ :

immortal
OU&EV ouv 6etov TI [jiaxapiov i>7rap*/i Tot^ av0pco7roi<; TuXvjv EXSIVO
ye (Jiovov
OC<*LOV o"7rou&YJ<; oaov ECJTIV ev Y](JUV vou xal TOOTO yap {JLOVOV SOIXEV
<ppovYj<7<o<;.
elvai TCOV Yj(JLTepcov dOavaTov xal p.6vov OEIOV. xal Tiapa TO TYJS TOiauT7)<; Suva-
[JLEO^ SovaaOai XOIVCOVEIV, xatTrep cov 6 PLO^ aOXto(; (puaei xal /aXeTcoc;, 6fjico<;
OUTCO;; coxovojJiTjTai x a P L ^ VT<0 ^ COOTTE SOXSLV 7rpo<; T<X 6cXXa Osov elvai TOV a*vGpco-
TUOV. 6 vouc; yap YJJJUOV
6 0eo^, stTS 'EpfjioTifJio^ CITS 'Avaayopa<; eiTre TOUTO,
xal OTL 6 OvY]To^ aiwv (xepoi; zyzi Oeou

c. Ar., Metaph.
24 26
1070 a - A 3, .

Ar. is speaking here about pre-existing and non pre-existing causes.


He says: Motive causes (T<X (jtev xivouvra atria) precede, formal causes
(T<X Se he, 6 X6yo<;) are simultaneous with the thing they produce. It is
a further question whether the form survives the thing. In certain cases
this certainly possible, e.g. the nous.
is

EJ Ss xal u<7Tpov TI UTCojJievci, orxsTTTeov STC' evicov yap ou&ev xcoXuei, otov
TOIOUTOV, (JL7] Tracra aXX* 6 voO^ Traorav yap aSuvarov

d. Cp. Ar., Eth. Nic. 1177 b


26 - 31
X 7, .

In the preceding lines the author has spoken of the advantages of the
fiio<; 0wp7jTixfS(;, being that of the activity of the mind (YJ TOU vou Vpyia).
He then continues:
C
O 8s TOIOUTO^ av ELY](3iog XPELTTCOV 7j xaT* avOpcoTTov ou yap '^

<7Tiv o(>T6)^ ptcoaETai, aXX' ^ OELOV TI EV auTo> UTrap^si o<y^> S '

TOO (Tuv0Tou, ToaouTco xal 7) svEpyEia TY]^ xara TYJV aXXYjv apETYjv. Ei 8*J) 0stov
6 vou<; TTpo^; TOV avOpcoTrov, xal 6 xaTa TOUTOV (3io^ Osio^ Tipo^ TOV avOpcoTrivov
piov.
Now this vou<; is not only in man, but it is a part of him, and his chief
and best part. Sjp we could even say that man is his nous. 1178 a 2- 4 :

A6^i av xal Eivai Exacrro^ TOUTO, strap TO xupiov xal OJJIEIVOV


8* GCTOTTOV
oOv yivoiT* av, si [r/j TOV auTou [3iov aipotTO aXXa Ttvo^ aXXou.

1
I do not think it is already explicitly present in the Kudemus, but it is very
near. Certainly Dr. Nuyens is not right in admitting that the limitation of im-
mortality to the nous is a characteristic of the last period of Ar.'s development.
Koss and Mansion have rightly pointed out that this doctrine is of very early date.
24 EXOTERIC WRITINGS [419]

2 THE PROTREPTICUS
the theme 419 The Protrepticus was an exhortation to the philosophic life, the
pio<; OecopY)Tix6<;, such as it was understood in the Academy. It was
addressed to Themiso, the prince of Cyprus. Against the pragmatistic
conception of knowledge in the school of Isocrates Ar. here fervently
defends the beauty and the happiness of the purely contemplative life,
which is exercised solely for its own sake. We have the answer from the

school of Isocr. in the anonymous Protrept. ad Demonicum.

a. Ar., fr. 52 R., p. 59. The pragmatists speak:


SY) JIT] XeX7)0vai TOV [zeXXovTa Ttepl TOUTCOV esTaeiv OTI TCOCVTOC TOC
Aei
aya0a xal TOC 7up6<; TOV ptov wcpeXifza Tot avOpco7rot<; ev TCO ^p^dOat xal TrpocTTeiv

ecrav aXX* oux ev TCO yiyvcoaxeiv jxovov OUTS yap oyiatvofjLev TCO yvcopi^eiv TOC

TroiTjTixa TYJ uyieia<; aXXa TCO TrpocpspeaOai TOL<; aco[Jiacnv OUTS 7cXoi>TOU(JLev TCO

yiyvcoaxsiv TrXouTOV aXXa TCO xexT^aOat TroXXvjv oucriav, ouSe TO TTOCVTCOV [JLC- 5
yiaTOv e5 ^cojjtev TCO yiyvcoaxeiv <5tTTa TCOV OVTCOV aXXa TCO TcpdcTTeiv e5 TO yap
euSaifJiovelv aX7)0to<; TOUT* ^GTLV. COCTTS TrpooTjxei xal TTJV 9iXocro9tav
e<TTiv cI>9XijJLO^ ^TOI Tcpa^tv slvai TCOV ayaOcov

Ar.'s defence The answer of Ar.


"
b. Ar., fr. 58 R. (lamblichus, Protr. c. 9). :

templative To 8e ^>jTetv OCTCO 7ra<jy)<; eTTKTTTjfnqi; erep6v TI yeve<T0at xal

auTTjv elvai TcavTOHcaaiv ayvoouvToc; TIVO^ SCTTIV oarov SiecrTYjxev s

ayaOa xal TOC avayxata' Sia^spet yap TcXetaTov. TOC (JLSV yap Si* eTspov ayaTrco-
jjieva TCOV 7rpay(jtaTCov cov avei> ^v aStivaTov, avayxaia xal auvama XEXTEOV,
oaa 8s Si' aTropaivf] (jLTjSev eTspov, dcyaOa xupico?. ou yap SYJ ToSe 5
auTa, xav
[Jtev aipeTov Sia ToSe, ToSe Se Si* #XXo, TOUTO TS eic; aTreipov ofyeTai Trpoiov,

aXX' tdTaTal TUOU. yeXoiov oSv ^87) TcavTeXcoc; TO y)Tev OCTTO 7uavTO<; co^eXeiav
STepav Tcap* auTO TO Trpayjxa xal TL o3v ufJLiv S^eXo^ xal TI ^pY)(Ti,[jLOv epcoTav.
co^ aXv]0co<; yap, coarcep Xeyojjiev, et TI? ^(Jia^ olov st; (j-axapcov vrjaout;
TV) Siavoia xo{Jiiaeiev. exet yap ouSevo^ XP e ^ a ^^ TC^ V aXXcov TIVO^ S9eXo(; 10
av yevoiTO, [Ji6vov,8e xaTaXeiTieTai TO StavostaOai xal Oecopetv, ovirep xal
vuv eXeOOepov <pa[jiev PIOV elvai. et 8e TauT* eciTlv dXY)0Y] TUCOC; oux av aiaxu- 7

VOITO Sixaico^ oaTtc; Tftitov e^ouaia^ yevo|jivY3<; ev (Jtaxapc^v olx'/jaai VYJCTOK;,

aSuvaTo^ etr) 8u eauTov. ouxouv 06 (jLejjLTtTo^ 6 |xia06<; earTi Trj<; eTcicTTY)[JLY)^ TOL^
av6pco7roi<; ouSe [JLixpov TO ytyvojjievov arc' auT^<; ayaOov. codTuep yap Trj<;i5

8txaiocruv7)(;, &^ 9aaiv ot ao9ol TCOV TTOIYJTCOV, ev aSou xo|ju6[jie0a Ta? Scopeac;,
OUTCO T^C; 9pov7)aeco ev (jtaxapcov vyjaoic;, co^ Soixev. ouSev o5v 8etv6v, av jx^

9atv7jTat xpyjaifiT] o5aa {jtYjS' axp^Aipicx; ou yap co9Xi|JLOv aXX' aya0y]v auT/)v
elvat 9a{xev, ouSe Si* STepov aXXa 81* eauTTjv alpecdOai auTTjv TrpoanQxei.
[4*9] THK

20 yap el<; 'OXupiTrtav afa% &xa 1% 6a^ ATcoSTjfXoufjLev, xdt el


TtXttov &t* a&rifc &jfa0at, afitij Y^P ^f Ocwpia xpshrcov itoXX&v &rtt
xal Ta AiovtSerta 81;
OecopoGjjtev o$x &
Xv)^6(jtevo( Tt Ttapa T&V fotoxptt&v
xal TCpo<*6vre<;, TtoXXdcs Te 4XXa<; 6a<; tXotjie&x Sv 4vrl rcoXX&v xpqp
oSrca xal T?JV 06>pav TOO iravT& itportjiijtiov Tcdcvrwv T&V Soxoiivrcov
2 5 XP1Q a 'ti6)V * ^ Y^P S^wou iwl {xiv <4v9pcJ>7to\><; TO^C fii
SotSXoix; ToO; Si fxaxojjtivouc >cal 0iovra<; Set wopetieoflat
Ivexa ToQ Oedc0aar6at aikoii<, T>IV Si: TWV (JvTcov ytlcriv xal rJjv
otsadou Ssiv Oecopetv a[jiicr6L

In Metaph. A 2, 982 a 11 -*8 we shall again find the theme that philosophy alone
is exercised for its own sake and not wtiat&s TWOS Svcxev (our nr. 519).

420 a. Ar., fr. 52 R., p. 61 f. (Iambi, Protr. c. 6).

Phr6n&sis is the highest good therefore philosophy


;
is to be striven after.
ojxoXoYoujxev 8n Set (*iv T^V orcouSawSTOtTOV Spxeiv xal Tiv T?)V

xpdtTiaTov, T^V 8J: v6[xov (Kp^ovTa xal xtipiov clvat (x6vov o5to? Si
xal X6YO<; aTii <ppov^aeei<; I<JTW. In Si T<; tv xavv

Sv oSTO<; IXoiTO xari


5 TYJV iTctdTifjtJiTjv alpo6(Aevo^, TauT* IdTlv aYa8dc, xal xaxa Si T& evavrta
Irrsl Si Ttdcvre? alpouvTat (xdcXiaTa Ta xara TOC? otxeia<; I^ci^ 9

%ff* 6 Sxaio<;, T& Si xari r/jv ivSpeiav 6 rf)v avSpsiav Ix^ ^? ^ 1


& aet>9p6>v TO
xal T& ^povstv 6
TOUTO Y^P ^PYOV f<x,bnfi$ T^<; Suvdcjjteox;.

TYJV xuptcoTdcriQv xptatv xpaTt<TT6v iaTi TCOV dcYaO

Two remarks must be made here.


I. The sentence that the the highest standard of what is good,
9p6vtptoc is
at once reminds us of the Aristotelian definition of virtue as it is given in the
Eth. Nic. II 6, 15 (1106 b88 -iiO7 a8 ) "Virtue is a state of character, concerned with
:

choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a
rational principle, and as the <pp6vi(jio<; would determine it" (our nr. 57 Ib).
Here again the 9p6vt.pLo; has the arbitrium of what is good.
II. W. Jaeger has pointed out that the meaning of the term <pp6vr}<n<; as it is
used here differs from that in the Nic. Eth.: in the Protr., as'in the Eud. Eth. t

9p6vYjm< is used in the Platonic sense of the word, which means philosophical
Insight, based on the knowledge of a transcendent reality whereas in the Nic.
Eth. it means simply?>rac&cfl/ wisdom, which has nothing to do with a transcendent
reality, and may be predicated even of animals (Eth. Nic. VI 5, ^140 b ). It is
w
no longer directed towards the general, but towards the concrete. In Eth. Nic.
VI 7, 1141 b3 -5 it is therefore said explicitly that men like Anaxagoras and Thales
,

were not fp^vtptot, but 00901, because they were indifferent to their own advantage,
but strove after knowledge of the eternal laws of the universe (our nrs. 590a
and 591b). <

In the following passage of the Protr. we shall see that 9p6vi{io<; and <iof6<; are
here almost identic.
26 EXOTERIC WRITINGS [42OJ

Therefore b. The same fr. continued.


to be striven Ou ST) Set 9e\iyeiv 91X0*709^, si'Trsp scrrlv
Y] (zev 91X0(709^ xaOaTrep ol6(jisOa

after
xTYJaig TE xal XP*) aL S (109 Ca<;, 7]
Ss ao9ia TCOV (jLeytaTCov dyaOcov, ou Se Set

Xp^fJKXTtov fjiv vxa TiXetv 59* 'HpaxXeoix; cmf)Xa<; xal TcoXXaxu; xivSuvetletv,

Sia Se 9p6v73(7iv Tuovetv (jLY)Se SaTtavav. 3j JJLYJV dvSpaTroSwSec; ye TOU


(jtyjSev

aXXa [JiY)
TOU e5 yXi^ea6ai, xal rate; TCOV rcoXXcov auTov dxoXouOetv
Y)V

aXXa (JLY] TOU^ TtoXXou^ atodv ral^ aurou, xal ra fjtev xpYjfjtaTa ^vjTel'v TWV Se
xaXeov {jLY)Se{JLiav eTTLfjieXeiav TroLstaOat TO Tuaparcav.

The formula eS ^v is used by Ar. in the Nic. Eth. I 4, 1095 a 19 as a general and ,

preliminary definition of happiness: both 01 TuoXXot and ot xaptevre^ (more civilized


persons) agree on this point, that they identify happiness (TO euSaijjLo ;e tv) with
T& eu ^vjv xal TO ei> TrpaTTsiv.
Again we find the term used thrice in the eleventh chapter of the Magna
Moralia II.

the theory 421 That the author the Protr. still accepts the metaphysical
of

still accepted basis of the theory of the Ideas, appears from the following passage.

a. Ar., Protr. 13 Walzer (Iambi., Protr. p. 54 and 55 Pistelli):


Tcov [jLsv
aXXcov TS/V&V r.a TS opyava xai TOU<; XoytafJioix; Touq axpipscnraTouc
oux a TI' auTtov TCOV TupcoTCov Xa^ovTSc; ax^Sov taacriv, aXX* OCTCO TCOV
SeuTep<ov xal TpiTcov xal TroXXoaTcov, TOU^; Ss Xoyouc; it, e(jL7ripia<; Xa
(JLOVCO TCOV aXXcov a?r' a u T to v T co v a x p i p co v
TCO Se <piXoaocpoj */j

5
ICTTIV au T co v yap ICTTI OeaTYjc, aXX ou (jii[jL7][jLaTcov. Movo^ yap icpcx;

TY)v 9\iai,v pXcTTtov ^7] xal Trpo^ TO Ostov, xal xaOarcep av t xu[3epvY]T7)^ TI^
^ al'Sicov xai, (JLOVLJJLCOV ava^ajjisvos TOU PLOD Tat; ap'/at; 6p(jia xal ^vj

Jaeger, Ar. p. gi, rightly remarks that in Mctaph. A


25
2, 982 a the author no
longer speaks of aura ra TupcoTa, but simply of Ta TtpcoTa:
'AxpipsCTTarai Si: TtTiv
TUKJTY]{JLO)V at (jtaXiaTa TCOV rupcoTOJV eictv.
The omission is not fortuitous: it is a consequence of the rejection of the Ideas,
which makes the opposition to (jLi|jLY)|xotTa disappear.

terminology The expression auTa Ta axpiBri explained by the


fo. ^ r in the Protr. is
compared ,^ ^' N

with lollowmg passage from the ilepi LOSCOV.


TT. tSccTw
Ar., fr. 1^7 R -> P- J 49 (Alex. Aphr. in Ar. Metaph. I, 990 b
9,
10
):
"AXXcov Ss TIVCOV Trapa Ta xa(j* sxaaTa siatv al emcrT'/jjJiai, TauTa yap aTTS
TS xal aopiaTa, at Ss 7Tt(7T^(Jiai co p i G i v co v ECTTLV apa Tiva Tcapa Ta [JL

xaO* xaaTa, TauTa 8k al

Concrete things arc ajueipa and therefore not knowable; science has as its object
"the determinate": Ta a>pia(j(ivx. Cp. Jaeger, Ar. p. 93. The same term is used in
Protr. c. 6 (fr. 52 R., p. 60, 1. 21 ft.).
[^ 22] THE PROTREPTICUS 27

422 In this Platonically-minded work Ar. speaks in a tone of great


disdain about earthly things.
Disdain of
a. Ar., fr. 59 R. (Iambi., Protr. c. 8, p. 132 Kiessling):
l
FVOIT] 8* v TIS auTO xal OCTTO TOV avOpoa-
TOUTCOV, el Oeeapyjaeiev UTT* auya<; things
Tceiov BLOV. eup7)<7i yap TQC SoxouvTa elvai [xeyaXa TOL^ avOpcoTcoit; Travra ovra

<7xiaypa9iav. 60ev xal XeyeTai *aXoa<; TO [r/jSev elvat, TOV avOpcoTtov xal TO
[jLTjSev elvai pefSaiov TCOV avOpa>7riva)v. ia/u<; TS yap xal [isysOo^ xal xaXXo^
5yeXa><; ecra xal ou8evo<; aia. xaXXo<; ye rcapa TO [rqSev opav axpipe^ Soxet
clvai TOIOUTOV. ei yap TK; eSiivaTO pXeTretv xaGaTiep TOV Auyxea 9actv, 6g Sta
TO>VTOL^wv etopa xal TG>V SevSpwv, TIOT' av e'So^ev etvat Tiva TYJV o^iv avexTov
opav s^ otcov auveCTT7]X xaxcov Tifial 8e xal So^ai Ta ^7]Xo6(jisva (JtaXXov TCOV
;

XOITTCOV dcSt,Y]yY]Toi) ye(jiL ^Xuapta^. TCO yap xaOopcovTt TOJV atStoiv Tt Y]Xt6iov

10 Trepl TauTa aTrouSa^etv. TI 8' ecrui (laxpov ^ rcoXu^poviov TOW


aXXa Sta TYJV 7](jLeTepav aaGeveiav o!(jiaL xal PIOU ppa-/UT7jTa xal TOUTO

b. In this spiritual climate life in a body becomes the death of


the soul, and death the escape into a higher life. As we saw in the Eudemus
(fr. 41 R.), the life of the soul without body seemed normal to the
author and life with a body abnormal and like a disease (our nr. 417a).
Here the imprisonment of the soul in the body is painted in horrible
colours as an unnatural state full of awful suffering.
the im-
Ar., fr. Go R. (Iambi, Protr. 8, p. 134 K.):
^1 OUTO
~ >
n ~ < , ,
*'*'**'
yap UeLov 01 ap/atoTepoi XeyouaL TO cpavai oioovat TY)V
' f ' Prisonment
V U X^ V ^[Jioopiav O f the soul
xal srcl xoXaaet, (JieyaXcov TIVCOV a(jiapT7][JLaTCov. Travu in
^r]v 7](jia<; yap yj au^eu^i^
TOIOUTCO TIVL SOIXS 7Tp6<; TO CTCO[jLa T^ ^ U X^' ^^^^P T^Cp TOU^ V TV) TuppYjVia

<pa<rl paaavii^etv rcoXXaxtc; TOU^ aXiaxofjisvou^ TrpoaSscr^euovTa^ Trpo^ avjixpi

vsxpoix; dcvTtTCpoaojTTOix; exaaTov vrpoc exaaTOv [ispoc; 7rpocrap(jLOT-


GUTG> eoixev '/] ^I>^Y] SiaTeTaaOat, xal TrpoaxcxoXXyjaOai Tuaai Tol^
TOU

c. Next follows the fr. 61 R. on the divine character of the nous, N ?^ s alone
which alone is immortal. Our nr. 418b. immortal

423 Dr. Nuyens, Fr. cd. p. 93 ff., has pointed to what'seems to him
to be some later elements in the Protr. of Ar., namely firstly the idea
of teleology in nature, and secondly what he calls the instrumental
conception of the relation soul-body.

1
After UTT* ocuyas a word lias probably dropped out: TOU oucovo; is possible
(after Tim. 37 d).
28 EXOTERIC WRITINGS [423]

The principle a Ar., Protr., ii Walzer (Iambi., Protr. 9, p. 49 Pist.):


Tcov fjiev
o5v OCTTO Tiix>)<; yivofievtov ou8ev evexa TOU yiyveTai, o^S* ^ aTl Tl
TXO<; auToi^- TOL<; 8e OCTTO TEX^ yiyvo[ivoi<; lve<m xal TO TeXo<; xal TO o5
tSvexa xal TOUTO (SeXTiov ecmv
, 73
TO 8ia TOUTO yiyvojzevov. 'AXXa (JLYJV
TO
xaTa ye evexa TOD ytyveTai, xal peXTiovoc; evexev ael auvCcrTaTai YJ xa6a-
cpuoriv

Trep TO Sia T^V^ [AifJietTat yap ou TVJV T^V)V 73 ^uai^ aXXa auTT) TY)V
*

xal ECTTIV ?ul TO) poTjOetv xal Toe 7rapaXei7r6(Jieva

b. Ar., Protr. 6 Walzer (Iambi., Protr. 7, p. 41 Pist.):


"ETI Tobuv TO fjt^v eaTi ^ U X^1 T ^ v ^v fl^v T ^ <^ cro>[jta, xal TO [jiev ap^ei TO
8e apxeTai, xal TO fjisv ^p^Tat TO S* uTroxeiTat a)? opyavov. 'Ael TOLVUV 7rp6<; TO
ap/ov xal TO /pwpLevov auvTaTTETai YJ
TOU ap/o[Jivoi) xal TOU opyavou XP ^ a -

Thisis, according to Dr. N., a conception of the relation soul-body

different from that of antagonism, as it was seen in the Phaedo and in


the Eudemus: in principle it is just that instrumentism which is charac-
teristic of the middle period of Ar.'s development, and therefore points
to a later date of this work.
In fact, this argument of N. is not conclusive. We have to remark
that Plato's psychology in the Republic, where the rational part of the
soul is called the leading part or Y}yfjiovix6v, implied this kind of instru-
mentism; so that the differences, arranged by N. in periods of Ar.'s
development, were present at the same time in the thought of Plato.
Why could they not be present at the same time in the thought of Aristotle
too without there marking a different period ?
In the next paragraph we shall find decisive reasons for upholding
the early date of the Protr.

3I1EPI <DIAOi;O<I>JAS

the first 424 ln the first book of his 11. 9tX. Ar. seems to have treated of
the history of philosophy, including the Orient.

a. In fr. 6 R. Ije mentions the magi and the dualism of Zarathustra


(Diog. Laert.J 8).
the magi and
'ApiCTTOT^Xyj*; 8' ev TCpcoTO) Tuepl 9i,Xo<JO9ia<; xal TTpedpuTepou^ elvai (TOIK;

mentioned fAayoix;) TCOV AiyuTCTttov xal Siio xaT* auTOix; elvai ap/ac;, ayaOov Satjiova
xal xaxov Saifxova, xal TCO [xev ovo(xa elvai Zeu<; xal 'Qpo{jiaa8*/]<;, TO) 8e
xal

We know that, in Plato's later years, the Academy was keenly interested in
oriental wisdom. The doctrine of Zarathustra was mentioned also in the Alcib. Mai.,
[424] PERI PHILOSOPHIAS 2Q

certainly not a work of Plato but a product of his school in its early years
l
which is .

See :
J. Bidez, Eos ou Platon et I* Orient, Brussels 1945. Jaeger, Ar.p. 131 ff.

The the Orphic


b. 7 R. mentions the Orphic poems. Ar. distinguishes
fr.
ems
their doctrine, whichis old, from their literary form, which is of a much

later date (Philoponus in Ar. De anima I 5).

[lev yap eicri T<X 86y[JiaTa, TOCUTOC 8e (pvjaiv 'OvojiaxpiTOv ev eraai

Jaeger, Ar. p. 129 explains this as an instance of the author's view that the
f.,
same truths reappear human history several times. Thus in De caelo I 3, 270 b 19
in ,

where he says, speaking of the name of the "first body" (aether) "It seems too that :

the name of this first body has been passed down to the present time by the ancients,
who thought of it in the same way as we do" 2 oo yap <5bra!; ou8 Sic; dXX* dcTreipdbac;
Set vojx^eiv Ta<; OCUTCXC; a<pixvet<jOai. 86e;ac; efcc; 7)(i.a<;.

See also Metaph. A 8, at the end (1074 b 10 )


xotTa T& eix&c; rcoXXaxic; eupvj^vTjc; :

etc; T& SUVOCT&V exaa-nqc; xal T/VT)(; xai cpiXoaocpiac; xal TuaXtv 90etpo[ievcov xod TOCUTOCC; TOCC;
(sc. that the first principles are regarded as gods) Ixetvcov olov Xet^ava Trept-

"While probably each art and each science has often been developed as far
as possible and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have been pre-
3
served until the present like relics of the ancient treasure" .

425 a. In the second book Plato's doctrine of the ideal Numbers Second
was criticized. Fr. 9 R. (Syrianus in Ar. Metaph. 12, 9) :

'O(JioXoye [r/jSev etpyjxevai Trpoc; T<X<; exstvcov (sc. the Platonics before
Xenocrates) uTroOeoreic; (jiYjS' 8Xco<; 7rapaxoXou6ev TOLC; eiS-yjTixocc; apiO^ou;,
ETEpcH Twv fjLaOy][jLaTtxcov elev, (jtapTupsc ra ev TW ^ TCOV Tuepl T^C; 91X0-
TOUTOV TOV Tpovrov n ci(TT e txXXoc; apiOfJioc; at ESeai, {

, ouSefJitav rap! OCUTOU aiiveatv IXOL^SV av. TIC; yap TCOV ye


&XXov

the theory
b. Probably this passage belonged to a general criticism ot the
doctrine of the Ideas. We know, both from Proclus and from Plutarchus, criticized
that Ar. criticized this doctrine sharply in his Dialogues.
Fr. 8 R. (Proclus ap. loann. gramm., de mundi aetern. II, 2):
Ka! xtvSuveiiet (JiYjSev OUTCOC; 6 avyjp exetvoc; (6 'ApKTTOTsXV)^) aTUOTCotyjaaaOai
TWV nXaTCovoc; we; TY)V TCOV tSecov UTcoQecriv, ou JJLOVOV sv Xoytxotc; dtXXa xa! . . .

cv Y]6ixoi^ xaltv ^ucixotc;


. . . xa! ev Tyj (JieTa Ta fueiixa TroXXw TuXeov
. . . . . .

xa! ev TOCC; SiaXoyotc; (ra9^crTaTa xexpaywc; (JLTJ SiivaaOai TCO ^oyjiaTi TOUTCO
<ju|X7caOev x&v TIC; auTOv otY)Tai Sia ^tXoveixtav avTiXeyetv.

1
The arguments adduced by E. de Strycker in Les Etudes Classiques of 1942
are decisive.
2
Transl. of W. K. C. Guthrie.
8
Transl. of W. D. Ross.
30 EXOTERIC WRITINGS [425]

c. Plut., Adv. Coloten 14 (same fr. R.).

Ta^ y [r/)v tSsa^ TiEpl cov EyxaXst TCO HXaTCOVL TtavTaxou xivcov 6

TX7)<; xal Tcaaav ETraycov dbcopiav airraid EV TOLC; YjOixcH^ u7uo(jtv7)[jLa(Tiv, EV

<(JLT(X TOC <pu(jixa, ev Tol'<;> cpuaixoo^, t,a TCOV s^toTspixcov SiaXoycov, cpiXovEtxo-

Tspov vtot<; 9tXo<ro9coTpov lx etv T ^ SoyjzaTL TOUTCO, co<; 7rpoO(Zvo


eSo^ev 73

TYJV HXaTcovo<; uitEpi&ELv 9 1X0(109 tav OUTW (Jiaxpav ^v TOU axoXouOelv.


think Jaeger right in referring this crit cism of Platonism exclusively to the
;
I is
II. 9tX. Dr. Nuyens defends the thesis that in the Protv. too Platonism was criticized.
We shall see in one of our next numbers that this opinion of N. is erroneous.

426 This book contained further what is called by Jaeger Ar.'s

philosophy of religion.
TWO sources a< Ar., fr. io R. (Sextus, Adv. dogm. Ill, 20-22):
of religious , , , M ^ , , ^ ,

belief ApiaTOTeXr]^ oe a?ro ouoiv ap^cov evvoiav Uecov eXeye yeyovevai ev TO^ av-

c;,
(XTCO T TCOV TTSpl ^U^"J]V GTUfJLpaiVOVTCOV Xal OCTTO TO)V fJLT(Op6)V. aXX'
OCTTO fjLV TO)V TCSpl T7)V ^U^Y)V (TUfjlpatVOVTCOV Sl(X Toi^ V TOt^ UTTVOL^ yiVOfJLEVOU^

vOou<na(7[JLou<; xal Tac; (jiavTLa^. orav yap, 973(7^, EV TOJ UTCVOUV xaO*
yvr^Tai 7) ^u*/*/),
TOT rfjv tStov aTroXapouca 9uortv 7cpo{JtavT\ieTai TE xal 5
7ipoayopUi Ta {jiXXovTa. ToiarjTT] SE SCTTI xal v TCO xaTa TOV OavaTOv x^P^"
f/
TCOV ao)[jLaTCov. a7ioSXTaL youv xal TOV Tuoiyjryjv O(JLY)pov coc; TOUTO
vTa 7T7rot7]X yap TOV (JLEV IlaTpoxXov EV TCO avaipELaOaL Trpoayo-
pUOVTa 7Tpl "ExTOpO^
TYJ<; avat,p<TCO(;, TOV S' "ExTOpa 7Tpl TY]^ 'A^lXXeCO^
TXUT7J^. X TOUTCOV OUV, 97JCTLV, UTCEVOT^CTaV ol avOptOTTOl LVai Tl 0OV, TO Ol
xaO' auTo 01x6^; TYJ ^UXY) TUOCVTCOV ETTKTTYjfJiovixcoTaTov. aXXa SY] xal CXTTO

TCOV [JLETECOpCOV 0aca(JLVOL yap {JLSO* Y)(JLpaV (JLEV YjXlOV TCSplTTOXoUVTa, VUXTCOp
SE TTJV EUTaxTOv TCOV aXXcov aaTSpcov xtvvjaiv, svofjuo^av slvai Ttva Osov TOV
TTJ<; TOtauTYjc; XIVYJGECOC; xal UTaia<; atTiov. TOLOUTO<; (JLEV xal 6 'ApiaTOTeXT)^.

The thought is of Plato and the Academy. Cp. Laws XII 966 d: our nr. 394a-

Cosmic order fo pr n R. Sextus (ib. 26-27) expresses this last view in rather
the existence picturesque colours. The passage may be taken quite well from Ar.'s
of God(s) n.
9iX. II.

"Evioi SE Em T7)v aTcapa^aTov xal EUTaxTov TCOV oupavicov


1
XIVTJCTIV Trapayevo-
(jLEvot 9aai T7)v*ap/7)v Tatc; TCOV OECOV 7rivo(ai<; OCTCO TauTYjc; ysyovlvai TrpcoTOv
J/

COGTUEp yap EL TL<; ETcl T7J? TpCOlXY]^ Xa0^6(JLVO<; ISY]<; SCOpa T7]V TCOV 'EXXYJVCOV
CTTpaTEiav [jLETa TcoXXou x6<T(jLou xal Ta^sco<; TOI<; TueStoi^ Trpoatouaav ,,t7T7u^at;

JJLEV TTpCOTa (TUV LTTTTOKTIV Xal OXa9tV, TCS^OU^ S* E^OTClOEV*', TUOCVTCO^ OCV 6 TOLOOTOc; 5
etc; svvoiav YJXOs TOU STI sort Tt<; 6 SiaTacjacov TTJV TOtauTYjv Ta^iv xal yxXsu6-
JJLEVOC; TOL<;
UTT* auTov xoa[Jiou{JLvoL<; <jTpaTicoTai<;, olov NaTCOp y] &XXo<; TIC; TCOV
[426] PERI PHILOSOPHIAS 3!

6<; flSei ,,xo<j[ji7Jaai ETTTTOIK; TE xal avepac; aaTaSicoTa*;" xal 8v Tp6?iov 6


vewc; a(jia TCO OeaaaaOai TroppcoOsv vauv oupuo SicoxofJtevyjv
10 xal Tcacn, TOL<; Icmois euTps7ci^o{JLevY)v cruvhr]<Tt,v OTI <m TI^ 6 xaTeuOuvcov
xal ELS TOI> 7rpoxst(Xvoi><; XifJievac; xaravT&v, OUTGX; ot Trp&TOv Etc; oupavov
ava(3Ac^avT<; xal (kaaafjievoi qAiov (JLSV TOUC; OCTUO
avotToAyjs {^eXP 1 &ucra>

Sp6[Jiou<; GTaStsuovTa, aorTepcov Ss EUTOCXTOU^ TLva<; y/jpsia^, ETce^ifjTouv TOV

TYJ<; TcspixaXXou^ TauTY]^ SLaxoa^vjcreo)^, oux ix TauTOfJLaTou


xal

427 The same view occurs in the following interesting passage,


which shows us Ar.'s transposition of Plato's allegory of the den.
Ar.'s trans-
Cicero, De Nat. deorum II 37, 95 (Ar., fr. 12 R.):
^ 1 * . , . . position of
Praeclare ergo Anstoteles si essent, inquit, qui sub terra semper t h e allegory
. ,

habitavisscnt bonis et inlustribus domiciliis quae essent ornata signis of the den

atque picturis instructaque rebus iis omnibus quibus abundant ii qui


beati putantur, ncc tamen exissent unquam supra terram, accepisscnt

5autcm fama et auditione esse quoddam numen et vim deorum, deinde


aliquo tempore patefactis terrae faucibus ex illis abditis sedibus evadeie
in hacc loca quae nos incolimus atque exire potuissent, cum repente
terrain et maria caelumque vidissent, nubium magnitudinem vento-

rumque vim cognovissent aspexissentque solem eiusque cum magni-


lotudinem pulchritudinemque turn ctiam efficientiam cognovissent quod
is diem efficerct tot caelo luce diffusa, cum autem terras nox opacasset

turn caelum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum lunaeque


luminum varictatem turn crescentis turn senescentis eorumque omnium
ortus et occasus atcjue in omni aeternitato ratos inmutabilesque cursus:
1 5 quae cum viderent, profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera deorum
esse arbitrarentur. atque haec quidem ille.

We have to state that the rupture with Platonism has become a fact here: the rupture
the ideal World a transcendent Reality which alone is truly real and of which w th
sensible things are images the ideal World of Plato has disappeared. There is Platonism
a
just one reality: the sensible world in which we live. Its beauty and order point
the philosopher to a*divine Maker Surely this is a Platonic thought. But in the
1
.

later philosophy of Ar. it has disappeared completely: the Prime Mover of Phys.
VI II and Metaph. A is not the Maker of the kosmos as it is said in IT. 9tX.. II.
Two conclusions must be drawn from this fact :

i. As in this work of Ar. the theory of the Ideas has been abandoned, while

1
Surely not in the biblical sense of a Creator, but in the sense all Greeks gave
to the term: the "Builder of the Universe" who "made the kosmos", i.e. who
arranged formless matter into a kosmos.
32 EXOTERIC WRITINGS [427]

accepted in the Protr. (our nr. 42 la), it is impossible that the dialogue
it is still
7u. would be anterior to the Protr. Hence the chronology of Jaeger must be
<piX.

right on this point, and it must be stated that the criterion of Nuyens has failed
x
here .

2. in this work, n. 9iX., Ar. admits of a Demiourgos, who "made the kosmos"
As
in the Greek sense of the term, while in the so-called "theology" of Metaph. no A
trace of this view can be found, it is impossible that this last book was written
by its author at a rather early date, such as during the years of Assos or even
before them. On the contrary, the chapters A 7, 9 and 10 represent a very different
mind, and we must suppose that a considerable space of time elapsed between
the half- Platonic view of II. <piX. and the full-grown Aristotelian view of Metaph. A.
So on this point A. Mansion appears to be right when he dates this book of the
Metaph. much later than Jaeger does.
On the other hand, on the well-known words of De caelo I 4, 271 a 33 ,,'O 8k 6e&s :

xal $i <pu(jt<; ouS&v jxar/jv Tcotooatv" a great light is poured by the present fr. from
II. <piX. It has been supposed 2 that these words are a mere literary form, an expres-
sion without any real meaning, because they do not fit in with Ar.'s view of the
Prime Mover in Phys. VIII and Metaph. A. True, but they do fit in excellently
with the belief of the young Ar. in IT. 9tX., who, having rejected the theory of the
Ideas, still keeps the religious principle of Plato that a divine Mind must be the
cause of order in the visible world.

428 The spirit of the Timaeus still speaks in the following fragments
of II. 9tX.
the spirit of a pr .
I4
** R. (Seneca,
\
Ouaest.
V nat. VII 30,
> ~> i):
/
the Timaeus
Egregie Aristoteles ait numquam nos verecundiores esse debere quam
cum de dis agitur. si intramus templa compositi quanto hoc magis . . .

f acere debemus, cum de sideribus, de eorum natura, de stellis disputamus,

ne quid temere, ne quid imprudenter aut ignorantes adfirmemus aut


mentiamur.
scientes

b. Fr. 18 R. (Ps. Philo, TT.


cfyGapata^ xoafjioo, p. 222, 12, Bernays) :

'ApiorTOTeX7)<; Se [JLTJTCOT' eucrepco<; xal


oaicoc; evi<7Ta(jievo^ ayev/jTOV xal

&<p6apTOv 97) Seivvjv Se


TOV xoajjiov slvai,
aOsonqra xaTeyivcoaxe TCOV T<X
evavrfac Ste^ovTCov, ot TCOV ^Lpox(Ji7)TCov ouSev toYjOrjaav Siacpepeiv TOCFOUTOV

opaTOV Oeov TjXtov xal aeXvjvjqv xal TO SXXo TCOV TrXavvjTCov xal dbrXavcov tb$
aXy)6coq TreptexovTa TtavOeiov.
This fr. belonged to the third book TC. cpiX.

A dialectical 429 a. A formal proof of the existence of God seems to have been
existence of given by Ar. in the so-called argumentum ex gradibus.
God 1 from me to pretend that this criterion is altogether useless. No,
It is far
but should be applied with greater prudence and controlled from other points
it
of view.
a
By Mansion in his Introd. a la Phys. Ar.
[429] PERI PHILOSOPHIAS 33

Ar., 16 R. (Simpl. in Ar., De caelo I 9)


fr. :

Ka06Aoi> yap ev ol<; ecrrL TI P&TIOV, ev TOUTOK; Icrrf TI xal (Scpicrrov. CTTEL

o5v eaTiv ev TOI*;' oSaiv #XXo <5XXou peXTiov, gaTiv Spa TI xal apia-rov, orap
SIT) av TO Oetov.

Anothei proof 17 R.
A second
b. is given in the fr. :

*H apx>) 5) p-ta Y)
TtoXXaL xal ei {Jtev (jita, Sx ^
T^ *)Tou[jievov ei Se

73 TSTayfievat YJ
&TOCXTOL. aXX' el [Jiev <5cT<xxToi, dcTaxTOTepa TOC e^ aurcov, xal
oux e<m xo<T(jio<;6 xoafioc; aXX* axoajjua, xal eaTL TO Tiapa cpiicriv TOO xaTa

) 8vTO<;. ei Se TeTay^evai, Y) e eauTwv eTaxQvjaav y) UTCO e^coOev TLVCX;


<;. aXX* ei jxev 6<p* eauTtov eTaxQ^^av, exouat TI xoivov TO auvaicTov
xaxetvo 73

This text reminds us of the final passage of Metaph. AS: T<X Se ovra ou
TroXiTcijeaOat xax&c "oux dya06v TroXuxoipav(y)" etc.

430 The fragments 18-26 concern the kosmos and the Third book
eternity of the
doctrine that the celestial bodies have souls. With the first thesis Ar.
is against Plato's doctrine in the Tim. (at least as he took it) with ;

the latter he showed himself to be still closely connected with the doctrine
of the Academy.
Cic., De nat. deorum I 13, 33 (Ar. fr. 26 R.). The Epicurean Velleius difficulties

is speaking. doctrine
of God
Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro
suo Platone non dissentiens. modo enim menti tribuit omnem clivinita-
tem, modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam
praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut rtplicatione quadam mundi
l

smotum regat atque tueatur. turn caeli ardorem deum dicit esse, non

intellcgens caelum mundi esse partem, quern alio loco ipse design arit
deum. quo modo autem caeli divinus ille sensus in celeritate tanta

1
1 do not think, after all, that by the words replicatione quadam Cic. means
a retrogade movement, such as is meant by Plato in Pohticus 270 d (T^J TOU TT(XVT&<;
dcveiXt^eO' an<i D Y Ar. in Metaph. A 8, 1074 a (a9aipa<;
2
aveXiTTouaac;). Since the . . .

chief aspect of Aristotle's theory of the movement of the celestial bodies is that
they move by a motion returning on itself, i.e. by a circular movement, I think that
the plain and obvious sense of Cicero's words is to state that, sometimes, Ar.
admitted a God to whom he attributed the role of governing and m'aintaining the
movement of the universe by a motion returning on itself. Festugiere, Le Dieu
cosmique p. 245 f., adopts the interpretation of J. Moreau who suggests that by
replicatione quadam Cicero meant the movement of the first heaven which turns
round in the opposite sense to that of the planets. In fact, since the motion of the
first heaven is considered by Ar. as the Trpcoryj 90900 (De caelo II 12), one could

hardly qualify this as ''retrograde" or "reacting", such as the movement of the


planets presents itself to us when we compare it with the fixed stars.
De Vogel, Greek Philosophy II 3
34 THE EXOTERIC WRITINGS [430]

conservari potest ? ubi deinde illi tot dii, si numeramus etiam caelum
deum ? cum autem sine corpore idem vult esse deum, omni ilium sensu
privat, etiam prudentia. quo porro modo moveri carens corpore, aut 10
quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest?

That Velleius found sonic difficulties in Ar.'s theories about the first principle
or God, is comprehensible and not without reason. When he says that Ar. called

now "Mind" God, now the Universe, or "Someone else" whom he put at the head
of it, or even aether (caeli ardorem), we can understand what is behind it. In fact,
Ar. admitted one dcpxv) (fr. 17). He called it God and seems to have conceived his
idea of an Unmoved Mover at an early date: even if Metaph. A 6 and 7 are
much later, we have a proof for the existence of a Prime Mover in Phys. VII i, and
we see Ar. occupied with the problem of motion in the De caelo and De gen. et
corr. In De Caelo 11 3 he calls "the heaven" a Oeiov awpta which as such must be in
eternal movement, i.e. in circular movement. For Oeou Ivepyeta aOavaala, TOUTO 8'
loTl <OY) atSio^. &CJT' avayxY) TCO Oeuo XIVYJCTLV at&tov uroxpxetv. Now, this being so, it
is contradictory to admit of a Prime Mover with the purpose of excluding a regressus

ad infinitum, as is argued in Phys. I. This contradiction remains even when the


celestial bodies are no longer regarded as animated beings having a Oetov acofjux
which consists of aether, as was taught by Ar. in II. 9iX. Ill (see our next nr.).
In Metaph. A 8 we find Ar.'s final doctrine of the celestial spheres which have
each an unmoved Mover, the "first heaven" being moved by the First Unmoved
Mover, who is placed as the first principle above the others. In the same way we
have to imagine that the star gods of II. 9iX. were considered by the author as
inferior to the first principle. The inconsequence, also of the final doctrine, is that,
the circular movement of heaven being considered as a necessary consequence of
its divine character, the relation to a Prime Mover becomes problematic.

the divinity 43l_ a .


Cic.,' De nat. deontm II 15, 42 (Ar., fr. 23 R.).
ofthecelest- _, ,
. .
A ,
t
. T A ^ xu , . ,

iai bodies That the stars are animated beings, was proved by Ar. first by the
following argument.
Cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra sit, aliorum in aqua,
in acre aliorum, absurdum esse Aristoteli videtur in ea parte quae sit
ad gignenda animantia aptissima, animal gigni nulluin putare. sidera
autem aetherium locum obtinent. qui quoniam tenuissimus est et

semper agitatur et viget, necesse cst quod animal


in eo gignatur id et5
sensu acerrimo et mobilitate celerrima esse. quare cum in acthere astra
gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse et intellegentiam.
ex quo efficitur in* deorum numero astra esse ducenda.

Plato, Tim\ 39 e, spoke of the four elements as peopled by living beings. Cp.
Epin. 984 d, where the fifth element (aether) is mentioned, an argument for
the later date of this dialogue.
We find the argument again in Philo, who interprets the inhabitants of the
air as angels l and finally in Apulcius, in the De deo Socratis (on the daemonium)
,

VIII 137. He too makes "daemons" out of the inhabitants of the air.

De gig. 2, 7-8; De plantat. 3, 12; De somn. I 22, 135.


[431] PERI PHILOSOPHIAS 35

Consult: Jaeger, Ar. p. 144 ff.

b. Cic. ib. The


must have a superior intellect, stars thev feed
16, 42-43.
8
because they feed themselves on aether, the finest and lightest of elements. <, aether
Etenim licet videre acutiora ingenia et ad intellegendum aptiora
eorum qui terras incolant eas in quibus aer sit purus ac tenuis quam
illorum qui utantur crasso caelo atque concreto. quin etiam cibo quo
utare interesse aliquid ad mentis aciem putant. probabile est igitur
5 pracstantem intellegentiam in sideribus esse, quae et aetheriam partem
mundi incolant et marinis terrenisque umoribus longo intervallo exte-
nuatis alantur.
The same doctrine occurs in Plato, Laws V 747 d, and in the Epin. 981 e.

c. The divinity of the celestial bodies proved


Cic. ib. (16, 43-44). '
their order
f . , , ,
.
proves that
by their order and by their movement ,

.
they are
Sensum autem astrorum atque intellegentiam maxume declarat ordo animated

corum atque constantia (nihil est enim quod ratione et numero moveri
possit sine consilio), in quo nihil est temerarium nihil varium nihil
fortuitum. ordo autem siderum et in omni aeternitate constantia neque
5 naturam significat (est enim plena rationis) neque fortunam, quae arnica
varietati constantiam respuit. sequitur ergo ut ipsa sua sponte suo
in Theirdivini
"
sensu ac divinitatc moveantur. Nee vero Aristoteles non laudandus
j x -j. x ty proved by
eo quod omnia quae moventur aut natura moveri censuit aut vi aut t h e ir move-
voluntate; moveri autem solem et lunam et sidera omnia; quae autem ment
10 natura moverentur, haec aut pondere deorsum aut levitate in sublime

ferri, quorum neutrum astris contingeret propterea quod eorum motus


in orbem circumque fcrretur; nee vero dici potest vi quadam maiore
fieri ut contra naturam astra moveantur (quae enim potest maior esse ?) ;

restat igitur ut motus astrorum sit voluntarius.


15 Quae qui videat non indocte solum verum etiam impie faciat si deos
esse neget.

Cp. Plato, Laws X, 888 and the Epin. 982 a sqq., where is spoken of an
e sqq.
apiary) pouXeu<Ji<; of the stars, by which they accomplish their circular movement.
point explicitly, e.g. in the Nic. EtH. F 5, 1112 a
21
Later Ar. denies thjs Tiepl :

Toiv d'iSlcov ouSelc;

d. Also the doctrine that nous is of the same substance as the heavenly Notts of the

bodies, viz. aether, appears to have been taught by Aristotle, probably in stance as the
II. T
<piX. heavenly
bodies
Cic., Acad. post. I, 7, 26:

Quintum genus, eo quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque


36 THE EXOTERIC WRITINGS [43*]

quattuor (sc. elementorum) quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles quoddam


esse rebatur.
History of This doctrine, which appears first with Alcmaeon of Croton (our nr. 46b cp. also
;

the doctrine Socr. in Xen., Mem. I 4, our nr. 216, vol. I


p. 145, n. i, and Plato in Tim. 40 b-c,
42 b-d our nrs. 352 and 354b) had a remarkable history. It revived in the Arabian
;

doctrine of the intelligences of the spheres, the last of which is the "active intellect"
of man (intellectus agens separatus). Hence the disputations of Western philosophers
of the 1 3th century: de unitate intellectus (Albertus Magnus, Bonaventura, Thomas,
and again Duns Scotus). In the i6th century we find the doctrine of the consub-
stantiality of mind with the stars in Jacob Boehme. By his influence it appears
again in certain poems of the Dutch i7th century poet Jan Luyken
1
.

e. On the influence of Ar.'s II. <piX. in later Antiquity, in particular the


doctrine of the heavenly bodies, see the volume of A. J. Festugiere, Le dieu cosmique
(La Relation d'Hermes Trisme'giste II), Paris 1949, ch. VIII ff. Also E. Bignone,
L'Aristotele perauto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro, Firenze 1937; J. Moreau,
L'Ame du monde de Platon aux Sto'iciens, Paris 1939; A. J. Festugiere, Epicure
et ses Dieux, Paris 1946, ch. V.

1
Vid. A. C. M. Meeuwesse, Jan Luyken als dichter van de Duytse Lier, diss.
Utrecht 1952, p. 234/5 and 271 (the modern author did not understand the doctrine).
TWELFTH CHAPTER
LOGIC
i THE SCHOOL-WRITINGS. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
432 Strictly speaking Ar.'s logic does not belong to the system of
philosophy according to his own intention. Ar. made a systematical
division of all human thinking. There is no place for logic in this scheme.

a. Ar., Metaph. E i, 1025 b


25
:
Ar.'s division
cs, / * x * x A /
of all human
oiavoia TJ TrpaxTiXT] TJ TCOIYJTIXT] 7) UeoapTjTtXT). thinking

The TcpaTTEiv is the province of ethics; it depends on free choice


aeats). The rcotetv aims at the realization of a concrete 'pyov, technical

or artistic. Theoretical thinking has "a kind of being" as its object


(rcepl yevoc; TL TOU OVTOC; eaTiv). Now, as this genus may have three dif-
ferent theoretical thinking contains three main provinces:
species,
physics, which deals with things which exist separately but are not
immovable; mathematics, which has to do with things which are im-
movable but do not exist separately, and the first philosophy (called
metaphysics by a post-aristotelian term) which deals with things which
are both immovable and exist separately.
Ar. expresses this view in the following passage.

b. 1026 a 13 - 18 18 - 19 the three


Ar., ib., ;
:

'H [Jiev yap 90(71x7] Tcepi /wp terra (JLV aXX* o6x axivTjTa, T% Se [laOyjixaTixYJc; theoretical
evta Tcept axtv7)Ta [JLEV
ou /captaTa S^ tarox; aXX' ox; ev uXyj TJ
Se TrpcoTT) xat thinking
r

Tcepl ^(opiara xat axtv7]Ta. '2(TT Tpst^ av etev 9tXo(T09iai OscopTjrtxat,


9i>atx7], OeoXoytxT).
As to the object^of mathematics, Ar.'s formula betrays a certain hesitation:
in fact, he rather inclined to regard mathematical objects as an accident of physi-
is
cal things and it is clear that, in this case, mathematics are rather near to physics.
;

We have to treat this point in our ch. XIII, 3.


c. Ar., ib., 1026 a 19 - 23 Ar. continues after the lines cited sub b: a
.
hierarchy
r\>
Uu yap \ * * ^ v \/\~e/
TO Uetov
~ / / </ * sciences
ao7]Xov ort et TUOU urcapxet, ev TTJ TotauTT) 9ucret
xal T7]v Tt(jLtcoT<xT7)v Set Tcept T6 TtjJttcoTaTov yvo<; elvat. at JJL^V ouv OecopTjTtxat
iXXcov eTTtarTTjfjLcov alpeTcoTarat, auTT] 8k TCOV 0ecop7]TtxSv.
LOGIC [432]

the object of d. Ar., ib. IO26 a 27 - 32 :

philosohpy Ei [jiev ouv (JLTJ


SOTTI TIC; erepa ouaia rcapa TOC^ <puaei a-uv<7TiQxi>ia<;, YJ

av ELY] TcpcoTT) eTutaTYjfjiT] el 8' gain Ti ouciia axLVYjTOc;, auTT) TcpoTepa xal 91X0-

crocpia TrpooTT], xal xaOoXou OUTOX; cm Trpamq


1
xal Tie pi TOU OVTOC; ^ ov TauTY)^
2
av el'yj Oecopvjaai, xal TI ecm xal TO, uTrap^ovTa fj
ov.

We shall consider this conception of metaphysics more closely in our ch. XIV, i .

The 433
place
of logic
According to Ar. logic has the character of a propaedeusis to all
sciences. He calls it T<X avaXimxa (the term "logic" is of a later date;
it is generally used by Stoic writers in the first century), and Ar. thinks
it necessary to study this discipline before exercising any science at all.

2-5
a. Ar., Metaph. T 3, 1005 b :

J
"Oaa S YX P^ (Tl T ^ v ^YOVTCOV TIVS<;
l '
ruepl TYJC; aXvjOeiac; ov Tporcov SsZ
J

(XTcoS^eaOai, SL aTratSEuatav TCOV avaXuTtxcov TOUTO Spcoatv SeZ yap Tispl


TOUTWV T^xeiv 7cpoTui(TTa(JLvou(; aXXa [JLY] axoiiovTa^ ^TJTSLV.
"As to the attempts discuss the terms on which truth
of some of those who
should be accepted"
Ar. means that the inquiry into the conditions under which beliefs are to be
accepted as true, should not be mixed up with questions about the nature of
reality. It belongs to logic, which should be studied before one approaches the
questions of being, which belong to metaphysics. Ross supposes that with the Ttvsq
TCOV Xcy6vTtov Antisthcnes and his school are referred to 3 .

aXXa axouovrac; ^YJTEIV - One should not inquire into the formal principles of
(JLY)

knowledge which belong to logic while attending lectures on metaphysics.


12 - 14
b. The same principle displayed in Metaph. a 3, 995 a
is :

Aio Set TreTratSeucrOai TT&C; exaora aTuoSexreov, cl)^ &TOTUOV a(Jia


7TiaTY](JLY]V Xal TpOTTOV

Later we find a different division of philosophy.


c. Directly after Ar.
of phii. The Stoics take logic as a part of it, dividing philosophy into these three

parts: logic, physics (including metaphysics), ethics. See our vol. III.

Logic an 434Because then logic had the character of an "instrument" for


"instrument*
philosophy and science, the Ancients gave to it the name of organon.
all

We find this term used in the following instructive passage of Philoponus.


Philoponus'in Ar. Anal. pr. 6, 19 Wallies:
Zy]T7]Teov, TcoTepov [Jipo<; ecmv 7^ opyavov 7) Xoyixv) TE xal StaXexrixY)
xal 8ia96peo<; Soxet TO<; 7raXatot<;

"And must be universal in this way, because it is first".


it
"And the attributes which belong to it".
See the commentary of Ross on this place, Metaph. I, p. 263.
[434] INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 39

Tuepl auTTJ^. ol [JLEV yap Zrcotxol


avTixpi><; [zpos aurvjv a7ro<pavovTat, TOI<;
8uo 9tXoao9ia<; OCUTYJV avTiSiaipouvT<; ol Se IlspLTraTYjTixoi
(jLepecrt, TTJC;

ol dbro 'ApwrroT^Xous opyavov ol Se OCTUO TYJ<; 'Axa8y)|jua<;, &v ecm

xal nXdcTcav, xal [lipoc, xai opyavov 9aivovrat


We may see from this fragment, that the author does not consider logic as the
proprium of Ar. and the Aristotelian spirit: Plato too was a logician, and Ar.
built on the foundations which were laid by him. This view is confirmed by modern
scholars.
See: E. Kapp, Greek Foundations of traditional Logic, New- York 1942.
Cp. also the interesting study of R. Schaercr, La dialectique platonicienne dans
ses rapports avec le syllogisme et la methode cartesienne in Revue de The'ol. et de
Phil. N.S. t. XXXVI, 1948, p. 24-40.

435 The centre Ar/s The


a. logic is his doctrine of the syllogism.
of
This term occurs in Plato's Theaet. 186 d, our nr. 319b, in the general the doctrine
of
sense of thought or reflexion. Ar. uses it technically in the sense of drawing ^e
a conclusion from two theses which have been admitted (premisses).
He gives his definition in An. pr. I i, 24 b
18
:

SuXXoyiajJio^ Si ecm Xoyoc; ev & TsOevTtav TLVCOV erepov TI TCOV xei(Jivcov

si; avayxY)^ <TD(Jipaivi TO) TaCka elvai.


Three of the six works of the Organon deal with the syllogism: the
prior and posterior Analytics, the Topics, and as a fourth may be joined
to them the IT. (109. eX., which is closely connected with the Topics.
The interrelation of these works is as follows:
In the pr. Anal, the syllogism is defined and its various forms are treated.
Abstraction is made of the truth of the premisses, so that the conclusion ought
not to be true (This is what Ar. calls the dialectical syllogism}.
The post. A nal. give the doctrine of demonstration they deal with the apodeictic :

or scientific syllogism, of which the premisses are true.


The Topics are a large collection of arguments, not limited at all to the three
main forms of the syllogism, but displaying a great multiplicity of forms. The II.
009. IX. is often considered as a part of the Topics and cited as the IXth book of them.

x the
b. already remarked that the Topics would have been
Brandis Topics

written very differently, if their author had had in his mind a clear t h e Anal.

conception of the syllogism. The greater part of this work must be


anterior to the doctrine of the Analytics.
This remark has been confirmed by modern critics, such*as Fr. Solm-
2 3 4
sen ,
P. Gohlke and E. Kapp .

1
Ober die Reihenfolge der B ticker des Aristotelischen Organons. Abh. der Berl.
Akad. 1833.
a
Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik u. Rhetorik, 1929.
8
Die Entstehung der ar. Logik, Berlin 1936.
4
Greek Foundations of traditional Logic, New-York 1942.
40 LOGIC [435]

The latter cites the opening phrase of the Topics in order to prove
that here the doctrine of the syllogism is not presupposed.
18 - 21
Ar., Top. I i, 100 a :

'H (jiev 7tp60eai<; TYJS TupayiiocTeia^ |ji0oov supeiiv, deep* 9j<; SuvYjaofieOa
aoXXoyi^ecrOat, Trepl TTOCVTOS TOO rcpoTeOevTO^ TroopX^fiaTo^ eJ; evSo^cov, xal
Xoyov i>7rex VTS ? (JW)6v epoufiev uTievavTiov.

Next follows: TTpcoTov oftv ir)Teov T e<m auXXoytCTfioc; xal TIVSC; auToo Sux9opai, e.q.s.
Kapp thinks that this has been added later. It more probable perhaps that this
is

introductory chapter has been added later by the author and has been adapted
by him to the characterof the whole work.

. and c i n the Corpus the Analytics are preceded by the Categories


and the De interpr.
The Categ. begin with an explanation of the terms homonymous, synonymous
and paronytnous. Chapters 2 and 3 contain more grammatical than philosophical
remarks. Ch. 4 gives the list of the ten categories, which are explained in the fol-
lowing chapters.
The De interpr. begins with a definition of nouns and verbs, gives remarks upon
simple and compound nouns, on indefinites, on declension and conjugation;
next on sentences or propositions (general, particular and indefinite; affirmative
or negative, and the like).

Now in traditional logic the doctrine of the syllogism is preceded


by a first chapter on terms and a second on propositions. Modern historians
of philosophy, however, have pointed out that in Ar.'s Analytics the
doctrine of the Categories and De interpr. is not presupposed l These .

works may have been added later.

2 THE CATEGORIES: TERMS


aequivocai 436 a. Ar., Categ. i a 1- 3 :

'O[Jic!>vi)(Jia XeysTou &v Svojxa [Jiovov xoivov, 6 S& X<XT<X To(>vo(Jia X6yo<;
Tpo<;, olov coov 8 TE avOpcoTroc; xal TO

univocal 5 x a6_8.
Jb^
2uvcovu(JLa Se XeysTat &v TO TS SvofJta xotv6v, xal 6 xaTa Toiivofxa
ouaLac; 6 auTO^, olov ^coov 8 TC (SvGpcaTcot; xal 6

derivatively c Ib.,
'
I a 12 - 15 :

Ilapcovofxa Se XeyeTat 8cra arco Ttvo^ Sia9lpovTa Tyj TUTCOCTSI TTJV xaTa TOU-

1
Thus E. Kapp in Gr. Foundations etc. It seems to me very doubtful whether
this thesis is right. W. D. Ross says (Ar., p. 21 f.): "The categories some or all
of them appear in almost every one of Aristotle's works, and the doctrine is
everywhere treated as something already established".
[436] THE CATEGORIES 41

vofia TrpotJYjyopl'av g^st, ^ ov t* 710


^S ypaf/,(JiaTiX7J<; 6 ypa(Z(JiaTix6<; xal OCTTO

437 Ar., Categ. 2, ia -


a. 16 19
:
uncombined
Tcov Xeyonvcov T <* (lev xaT<x au[ucXoxY)v XeyeTai, T(* 8* aveu dUfJLTrXoxy)^. combined
TO. JXEV o5v xaTa au[rrcXox7)v olov SvOpcoTioc; Tpexei, words
av8pa>7co<; vtxa* TOC 8'

aveu cri)(JL7cXox9j<; olov #v6pco7ro<;, (3ou^, TpE^SL, vixa.

b. Ib. 4, ib 25 -2a4 :
the te
?
Tcov XOCTOC (jL7]8e[jL(av <ju[Ji7uXoxY)v Xsyofjisvcov Sxao~Tov YJTOI ouaiav

Y)
TTOCTOV 7]
TTOIOV ^ 7Cp6<; Tl 7)
7TOU TJ
7COTS YJ
XEOaOoCl Y) ^Xeiv ^ ^OLELV 7]

Si: ouata [Jiev coc; TUTTCO eiTcetv olov avOpcoTroc;, CTCTTO^ TUOOOV 8e olov
TToiov &
olov Xeuxov, ypa(ji(jLaTt,x6v Trpoc; TI 8s oTov SiTrXaaiov,
piTTY)^
Y)(JLt(Tl), pLEl^OV
V Al)XStO) 1 SV ayopa 7TOTS 8e olov i'$i$j 7TpU<7LV
*
7TOU 8e olov ,
*

xsLdOai 8e olov avdcxeiTOU, xa07)Tat, ex^tv Se olov uTcoSeSsTai, coTrXtcrTai,


Troieiv 8e olov TSfjivei, xaiei Traaxsiv Se olov Tefjiverai, XOCISTOCI.

20 23
The same list occurs in Top. I 9, 103 b - .

In other places xetaOai and ^x etv are omitted the other eight are cited as forming ;

a complete list. So in An. post. I 22, 83 b 15 - 18 Cp. Phys. V i, 225b 5 - 9 2, 226 a 23 - 25 . ; .

Ross (Ar., p. 22) remarks: "It seems as if he had later come to the conclusion
that posture and possession are not ultimate, unanalysable notions".
In Top. I o instead of ouaia the term T <m is used, both in the sense of substance
and in that of essence. In other places Ar. uses in the latter sense the term TO TI vjv
9 - 10
elvoci, e.g. Top. 8, 103 b where he speaks about the "conversion" or interchange
,

of terms:
'AvdcyxY) Trav TO ru&pi Tivoq xaTYjyopo^svov >5 Tot avTLxaTYjyopetaOai. TOO TrpayfjiaToc;
$1 (17) xal el {JL^V avTtxaTTjyopeiTat, 6po<; r) ?8tov av etyj EL (/Iv yap <j7][jLaCvei.
TO TI vjv slvai,
o p o q, el Se (JL7) oYjjjLaivei, t S i o v.

438 Ar., Categ. 5, 2 a -


a. 11 19
:
Substance

a Se ecrnv 7) xupicoraTa TE xal rcpcoTox; xal (jLaXiara XeyofjievT],


UTTOXElfJLEVOU TIVO^ XsyETai (JLTJT* EV UTTOXELfJL^VCO TIVL ECTTLV, olov 6
6 Tic; I'TTTCO^. SeiJTepat Se outrtat XyovTai, ev ol<; etSeatv al
ouatai Xeyofzevai uTcapxouai, Taura TL xal TOC T&V eiScov TOtiTtov yevT], olov 6

TIC; av6p<07co<; ev etSei (Jiev uTrapxet TCO av6pco7rcp, y^voc; 8e TOO etSoix; earl TO

^wov SeiJTepat ouv a^Tat, XeyovTai ouatai, olov 8 Te fivOpcoTro^; xal TO coov.
According to this jpassage oucria in its first and proper sense means: the concrete,
individual being.
Now according to book 2, of the Metaph. substance is not the individual, but the
T ICTTI, i.e. the essence or quiddity, which is neither purely individual for it is the
intelligible "form" of the concrete being nor purely universal for it is bound
up with matter. See: A. M. de Vos, La vraie substance d'apres la Mtiaphysique
1
The fact that the Lykeion is mentioned, is used by Jaeger as an argument
for the later date of the treatise (Aristotle, p 46 n. 3). Butcp. Plato, Euthyd. 271 a.
42 LOGIC [438]

d'Aristote (in Proceedings of the tenth internat. Congress of Phil., Amsterdam 1949,
p. 1094 ff.). For this reason, S. Mansion (ib., p. 1097 ff.) stating that the doctrine
of the Categ. is the farthest removed from Plato, infers that this treatise is not au-
thentic, as there is no period in Ar.'s development in which we could place it.
L. M. de Rijk argues against this (in Mnem. 1951, p, 148 if. and in The Cat-
egories of being, p. 51 f.).

Definitions Both senses arc mentioned in Ar.'s book of definitions:


of substance
fa Metaph.
,

b A
10 21
in Metaph. 8, IOI7 b , .

XeyeTaL TO. re arcXa awfjiaTa xal 6Xo><; acofjiaTa . . . . . . OTL ou xa0'


vou X^yeTaL aXXa xaTa TOUTCOV Ta aXXa. CTL TO TL . . .
-?jv slvat, ou
6 Xoyoc; opLafJioc;, xal TOUTO ouffta XlysTai exaaTou.

the first c The first sense is also found in Metaph. B 6,


7 9
1003 a - :

sense in two , \ ,

other places ^i (JLSV yap xaUoXou, oux eaovTat ouartat ouuev yap TOW xotvcov TOOS Tt

av)[JLaivei aXXa ToiovSe, YJ S' ouaia TO&E Tt.


34
Metaph. Z 13, 1038 b -iO39 a
2
d. It seems to occur again in :

"Ex TS 87] TOUTWV Oecopoucri 9avep6v OTI ouSev TWV xaOoXou urcap^ovTcov J
ouata SCTTL, xal cm ouSev ayjfJiatvet TWV XOLV^ xaTY)yopoi>[alva>v 2 ToSe TL,
aXXa TotovSe.
Ar. is proving here that universals are no substances. Yet it would be too rash
to conclude that substances are in his final opinion individual things, even when
he gives us some reason to make this inference. He is not yet at his final conclusion.
We have to face the question again in dealing with the metaphysics.
other char- 439
Besides by the definitions, given under 438a, the author char-
of substance acterizes substance by the following three points.

24 25
a. Substances never have contraries. Categ. 5, 3 b - :

'Yrcapxsi' Se TaT<; ouatat^ xal TO fiyjSev auTatc; evavTtov elvai.

b. No substance admits of degrees. 3 b


33 - 34
Ib., :

Aoxet Se v) ouoia (JIY) s7uiS^a6ai TO [xaXXov xai TO YJTTOV.


10 11
Opposite qualifications can be predicated of
c. it. Ib., 4 a - :

MaXtaTa Se tStov TTJ<; ouartac; Soxet elvai TO TauTOV xal ev apiOfjico 6v T&V
evavTicov elvai SEXTLXOV.

3 IIEPI EPMHNEIAL : PROPOSITIONS


440 De interpr. i, i6a
Ar.,
1-8
:

IIp&Tov Set O^crGai TL ovojia xal TL pvj(Aa, IrceiTa TL eaTLv aTro^acrLc; xal
xal a7co9avaic; xal Xoyo<;.

TWV xa66Xou ijTrapx^vreov


- no universal attribute.
2
ouS&v TCOV xowfj xaTY)yopoupivoiv - no common
predicate.
[440] DE INTERPRETATIONE 43

v
E(ra oi5v sv Tfj fl T&V iv rfj cni(A(3oXa, xai T& Words **

173 . xat aat T<X a6ra, ou84


9coval a!
these are
images of
In this case a declaration or statement (dc7r69avat<;) does not consist of grasping things
combinations in reality, but of making combinations of "impressions" (TtaG^aTa)
of the soul. These then may be called "notions* But they are 6pLoici>(jt.aTa of things.
1
.

A statement will be true when it combines two notions which are an image of two
combined elements in reality; it will be untrue in the opposite case. So this passage
10, 1051 b (our nr. 557):
8
does not contradict the famous passage in Metaph.

8k 6 evavTta> e^cov $ rot

In the same way dcXY)6^<; and (fttuftfjc X6yo? are defined by Plato, Soph. 263 b-d
(our nr. 343). Ar. builds on the foundation which has been laid by Plato.

441 His definitions of nomen and verbum are new.

a. Ar., De interpr. 2, i6a19- 21 :


definition
of noun
"Ovofxa [Jiv o5v ecm 90)V7] cnjfJiavTtx'}) xocra 6cveu

<TTl <ry}[AavTix6v xexcopicrjjisvov ev yap


ouSev auri xa0* eauTO cryjfjtatvei, &(T7csp Iv TW Xoyco TO) xaX6<;

According to the definition of X6yo^ (see our next nr.) in ch. 4, this word does
not only indicate a phrase or sentence; it can also indicate a part of it, an "ex-
pression" consisting of words which have a meaning separately. Consequently
the T$ before xaX6s ITCTCCH; ought not to be dropped.

b. Ib. 3, i6b- 8 :
verb

xal Scrav asi TWV xa6* Xeyo(Jivcov (n)(jLecov.

442 a. Definition of logos. Ib.4, 16 b 26 - 30 ;


1 7
17 a - .
phrase or

A6yo cnr)(jtavTix J]
<

xaTa TCOV (jiepcov TI <n}{xavTix6v


Tt xex aXX' ou .
X^yco S6,
5
olov <3cv8p<o7co<; [JLV Tt, aXX oux aXX' l<rrat

,
eav TI
"Ecm 8^ X6yo<; a7^a<; (jilv <n}fjLavTix6<;, . . . 8i ou Tra?, aXX* ev propositions
<5) T& aXTjOeieiv 7^ ^eiSeaOai UTrdcpxei, oux Iv Sc urcapxet, olov eux^)?)

X6yoc (JL^V, aXX' o^Te aXTjG^ o(>Te tjjeuSif)<;. oi o5v SXXot a9tGf0o)crav

yap ^ 7roiY]TtxY]<; otxstoT^pa y)


S^ a7co9avTt,x6<; TTJC; vuv

8 - 12 simple
b. Ib. 5, 17 a .

propositions
*E<ra 8^ el^ 7cpo>To<; Xoyo? ol 8'
44 LOGIC [442]

X6yov dbrocpavTixiv ex p7)(


elvai 7) 7CTO>aeco<; pvjjjLaTo^ xal yap 6 TOU avOpcoTrou X6yo<;, eav JJIYJ TO &ITIV
7) ^v T)
garai 7)
TOIOUTOV TrpoaTeOyj, ofi-reco X6yo

affirmation, ^ Jfo 5^ a 25- 26 :

6 ecrav a7ro9avort<; TIVOC; xara Ttvo^, a7uo<paat<; 8i ECTTLV a?c6-


TIVOC; OLTCQ

4 THE PRIOR ANALYTICS: THE DOCTRINE OF THE SYLLOGISM


Division of 443 a. Ar., An. pr. I i, 24 a 16 - 22
propositions:
universal,
__, **.,/ / /

llpoTacri^ [xev ouv eari Xoyoc; xaTa^arixo^ v; aTcocpaTixoc; TIVO<; xara


:

>^
particular O 5 TO<? Si 7) xaOoXou ^ ev [jiepsi 73 aSioptaTo^. X^yw Se xaBoXou (JL^V TO wavrl TQ

(jiY)8evl uTrapxetv, ev [jiepei Se TO Tivl Y^ [JLYJ


TLVL yj (JLYJ
TcavTt uTrapxetv, aSiopicrTov
8e TO uTrapxetv uTrapxsw &veu TOU xa06Xou 7] XOCTOC {Ji^po^, olov TO TWV
Y] [JLT)

svavTtav elvai T/]V auTTjv eTrtarTTQjjLYjv 73 TO TTJV 7]Sov7]v JJLTJ elvai ayaOov.
I. ,,lTp6Tacii(; est propositio ad conclusionem inde efficiendam praemissa".
II. The division of propositions into universal and particular is called a division
according to quantity. Ar. makes it first in De interpr. 7, where he gives the fol-
lowing examples:
(a) Universal propositions:
Ila?

(b) Particular propositions:


Tig
ECTTI
ftripcoTto; Uwc6 ) __ Q ,
g aTl s r ^ '

The division into affirmative and negative propositions, which has been made
in De interpr. 6, is called in traditional logic a division according to quality.
Traditional scheme:
a. All x is y Universal affirmative Sa P
e. No x is y Universal negative S e P
i. Some x is y Particular affirmative S i P
o. Some x is not y Particular negative S o P

modality fa Ar. distinguishes also what is called in traditional logic the


modality of propositions. In De interpr. 12 (beginning) he mentions:
SUVOCTOV Xal (17)
&UVOCTOV

'evSe^ojJLevov xai JJLTJ evSex^lJLevov


(what may and may not happen: contingent)
aSuvocTOV xal avayxatov.

The same distinction is made in An. pr. I 2,25 a -


1 2
:

assertoric, 'Eicel Se Traaa TrpoTaat*; ecmv TJ TOU uTrapyetv T\ TOU ei; avayxTic;
apodcictic, * ~
problematic Y)
TOU
[443] THE ANALYTICA PRIORA 45

29 - 30
Again in An. pr. I 8, 29 b :

'Ercel 8* frrep6v ecmv fordpxeiv re xal e avdyxvjc; xa

c. Between the four kinds of propositions which are mentioned sub a the relations
between
following relations are possible.
propositions
Sa P contraries S e P

tessara
logica

SiP subcontraries SoP


1. From
the truth of the general proposition follows the truth of the subaltern
particular ("All men are mortal" "Some men are mortal"), but not inversely.
In modern terminology the general proposition is also called superimplicant
to the subaltern particular, while the latter is called subimplicant to the former *.
2. From the untruth of the particular follows the untruth of the subaltern
general ("Some Romans are not brave" "All Romans are not brave"), but not
inversely.
3. Contradictory propositions cannot be both true or both untrue.
4. Contrary propositions cannot both be true; they can both be untrue.
5. Subcontrary propositions cannot both be untrue; they can both be true.
The third rule is the fundamental law of thinking, on which all reasoning is built Principium :

the principium contradiction is. contra -


dictionis
Ar. does not formulate it in his De interpr., nor at the beginning of his Anal.
But the principle itself is presupposed in his whole doctrine of the syllogism.
It is mentioned as such in An. post. I n, a chapter which deals with axioms
(fundamental theses, which are presupposed without any proof).

444 a. The classical formula of the principium contradictionis is


19 32
found in Metaph. T 3, 1005 b ,
:

T6 atai #(Jia uTcdpxew TC xal \rf\ urudpxeiv aSiivarov TO> auTto xal xara TO
aur6 auTT) 89) Traacov e<m pepaiOTaTY) T&V ap^aiv aSuvarov yap 6v-
TIVOUV TauTov uTcoXajjipavsLv elvat xal (JLYJ elvat. 816 7uavT<; ot a7roSeixvuvTe<;

ei<; TauTYjv avayouaiv ecrxaryjv 86av.

b. Cp. An. p'ost. I n, 77 a 10 - 11 :

avai xal

22- 24 principium
c. Ib., 77 a :

exclusi tertii
T6 8* &7cav cpavai Y] a?tocpavat YJ etc; TO aSiivaTov a7r68et^i<; . xal
8
ouS* del xa66Xou, dXX' 8aov Ixav6v, txaviv 8 eTrl TOU

Consult: S. Stebbing, A modern introduction to logic, London S


i948, p. 58 f.
46 LOGIC [444]

For instance, a mathematician will not say in general that either the affirmation
or the negation is true, but that this or that line is straight or not straight,
This is the so-called principium exclusi tevtii, another formulation of the princ.
contradictionis.

apodeicticai 445 a. Anal. pr. I i continued (24 a 22 - 26 ):


dialectical Aia9^pet S& ^ aTToSeiXTixT) 7Cp6Taai<; TYJC; SiaXexTix9j<; t STI, ?) jjd
premisses
x?j<|/i<; Gar^pou (Jtopfou 1% dvT^aaecic; ecmv yap IpcoTa, aXXa
(ou
6 daioSeixviicov), ^ SiaXexTtxv) Ipcoryjcru; avricpcSco'eto^ cmv.
This passage shows us which method of reasoning was exercised in the Academy
and was called dialectical by Ar. A dialogue is carried on by two persons. One of
them has the part of questioner, the other that of respondent and opponent.
The question dealt with is called Ttp^pXTjjxa. Every proposition can become a "pro-
blem": you have just to give the form of an dtvr^aats to it: "Is it in this or in that
way?" E.g.: "Is two-footed animal the definition of man, or not ?" Or: "Is animal
the genus of (the species) man, or not ?" 1 The simple question "Is two-footed
animal the definition of man ?" is a proposition. The Avr^acic makes a "problem"
out of it. Now the questioner makes his partner choose his position the responder :

says yes or no. That is: he "grasps one part ol the avT^aai?". Then the questioner
takes the other position. He continues asking. The responder has to see that he
does not contradict himself; the questioner tries to get from the answers of his
opponent a syllogism for his own thesis.
This, then, is the "reasoning from opinions that are generally accepted about
every problem propounded to us" (auXXoyKeoOai ruepl TraWx; TOU 7cpoTe0vTo<;
7cpo(3X^(Jt,aTO< ! !v&6cov), as it was said in Top. 1 i (cited supra, nr. 435b), for
which the author said that he was seeking the right method in that work a method
which, in fact, has been found later in the An. pr.

25 12
b. The same passage continued (24 a -b ) :

OuSev 8 Sicnast, 7rp6<; TO yev^dOai T&V exairpoi> auXXoyiajxiv xal yap 23


2
6 dcTcoSeixviieov xal 6 epcoT&v (TuXXoyt^erai XafScov TI xardc TLVO
3 4
^ |r}) UTcap^siv . COSTS laTai auXXoyumxY)* (jtlv 7cp6Tacrt<; a7rX&<;

^ <&7r69aai<; TIVO<; xaTa TIVO<; TOV eipYjfJilvov TpoTcov, aTuoSetXTixY) S, sav 0X738^ 30
5
^ xal Sta Tc5v e^ apx^<? U7co8eascov SLX^jjievT) , SiaXexTixv] Ss 7cuv6avo[jLv6i 24
6
[xv IpcoTYjatc; avTt^aarecoi; , auXXoyi^o(ievcp Se XTJ^I^ TOU <paivo^vou xal
!v86ou, xa0<iTcep cv

28 37
Examples taken* from Top. I 4, 101 b -
1
.

a - draws
ouXXoyiCeim a conclusion.
8
Xocpe&v e.q.s.
-
"by first assuming that some predicate
1
applies or does not apply
to some subject' (H. Tredennick).
4
ouXXoyicmxT) j/iv Tcp6Ta<jis
- the premiss of a syllogism.
6
8i& T&V i% dtftx^? uTToOloecov eCXTjpL^vYj - "if it is based on fundamental postu-
lates". &PX^fc OKoO^asti; are unprovable first principles, which are assumed in
science: axioms or postulates. Ar. defines them in An. post, I 2, 72 a 14 .

* - a
question to his partner, which of the two possibilities
!p<i>TT)<n<; dtvTi9dtaeco<;

propounded to him the latter will accept.


[445] THE ANALYTICA PRIORA 47

A definition of proof and dialectical syllogism is given in Top. I i, directly after


the definition of syllogism. We have to cite it later.

446 16 - 18 term defined


An. pr. I I, 24 b :

"Opov 8k xaX& ei<; 8v SiaXuETat TrpoTaa^, olov TO TE xaTY)yopou(ivov xal


Y)

T& xaO' o3 xaTTjyopetTai, ?) TcpoaTiOsfjiivou Y) SiaLpoufjisvou TOU slvai xal JAY) elvai.

447 _a .
Ib., 24 b
18 - 22
:
syllogism

oXXoyicr{Ji6<; 8e ECTTI X6yo<; EV & TsOsvTeov TIVCOV ETEpov TL TWV xeipievcav

avayxTjc; cru(JLpatvei TO) TauTa elvat. Xeyco 8e TW TauTa elvat TO Sta Tau
TO 8e Sia TOCUTOC aufjipatveiv TO [JiyjSevoc; e^coOev opou TrpocrSsl'v
TO yev^aOai, TO avayxatov.

Nearly the same definition occurs in Top. I i.

22 - 26 Perfect and
b. Ib., 24 b :

TeXetov (jiev
oSv xaXoi auXXoyiajjiov TOV [jf/jSevoc; aXXou TrpoaSeofxevov Tcapa syllogisms

eiXY](Ji[jiva Trpoc; TO cpavvjvou TO avayxal'ov, aTeX^ Se TOV TrpocrSsofievov

TcXeiovaiv, a SOTI [JLv avayxaca Sia TWV uTroxetfievcov opt*>v, ou


Sta TupoTacrecav.

I.e.: when the premisses have been formulated incompletely, so that something
must be added in order to make the form of the syllogism complete.
26 30 "To be wholly
C. Ib., 14 b - :

T ^ A contained in"
rpv 'csx ,
*,,\
r , x > N N .
'
lo oe ev oXco ivai Tpov Tpco xat TO xaTa 7ravTO<; xa-r/jyopEoaUai UaTEpou
0(XTpOV TaUTOV ECTTLV. XyO(JLV TO XaT(X TCOCVTO^ XaT7]yOpLCT6at,

^ Xaftetv TWV TOU U7uoxt(ji6vou, xaO' ou 0aTpov ou Xex0Y]aTaL- xal TO xaTa

An example of T& Iv SXqi elvai: All men are mortal. Represented in a diagram:

(All S is P).
p

1 - 13
448 An. pr. 1*2, 25 a :

'Erai SE Tcaaa TupoTaat^ ICTTLV ^ TOU


^ TOU EvS^e^at U7capxt.v, TOUTOOV SE al (JLEV xara9aTixal at 8k
xaG* xaaT7)v 7rp6ap7;aiv, TraXtv 8k TCOV xaTa^aTixwv xal a7T09aTixcov al (JLEV

5 xa06Xou at 8k v (jipt at 8k aSt6piCTTot, TYJV (JLEV EV TCO ujcapxetv xaOoXou aTp>]-


Conversion
TIXYJV avayxY) TOL<; 8poi^ avTtaTp^eiv, olov el [JL7]8[JLia 7]8ov7) aya06v, ouS'
aya06v ouSsv SaTai 7)8ovY) TYJV 8k xaTTjyoptxvjv avTicrrpscpEiv JJLEV avayxatov,
48 LOGIC [448]

ou [JiYjv
xa66Xou aXX* ev fjtipei, olov el Traaa -/jSovJ) aya06v, xal aya06v TI elvai
Y)8ovY)v T&V Se xaTa9aTix7)v avTiaTp<peiv avayxr) xaTa pipo^ 10
ev [jiipei TYJV [jiev

(el yap vjSovT) TK; aya66v, xal aya06v TI &TTOCI Y)8ov)f)), TYJV Se crTepy)TixY)v oux
avayxaiov ou yap el #v0pco7ro<; (JLY) uTcap^st Tivl fc><o, xal q)ov oux
Tivl

On the modal, qualitative and quantitative division of premisses, see supra,


443a, b.
r/)v (ji^v v TO) uTrdcpxetv xa66Xou etc. - "It is necessary that in universal attribution
the negative premiss should be convertible in its terms". In these and the fol-
lowing lines rules are given for the conversion of terms in assertoric premisses
l
(v TO) uirapxeiv) .

- the
TTjv (assertoric) affirmative premiss.
8& xaTTjyopixYjv
In ch. 3 rules are given for the conversion of terms in apodeictic and proble-
matic premisses.

Figures and 449 n% p Yt J A 26


25 b -26 a
2
.

moods of T ,, .

Ka P? wntes on
,

thls P assa R e:
syllogism
"It is one of the most impressive passages in Aristotle's writings, unsurpassed
in itsproud objectivity, when after careful preparation he introduces his syllogistical
principle, which has predetermined the history of logic for more than two thousand
years".

26- 30
Syllogism a 25 b :

Aicopiafzevcov Se TOUT<OV XeyofJiev r$t\ &a Ttvcav xal TTOTC xal 7uc5<; ytveTat26
(TuXXoytajJLO^ uarepov Se XexTeov Trepl aTroSet^eco^. ?rp6Tepov Se Trepl

auXXoytajjiou Xexr^ov ^ Trepl aTroSei^eo)^ Sia TO xaOoXou jxaXXov elvai TOV

auXXoytapiov YJ piev yap a7u68eii<; auXXoyiafio^ TIC;, 6 auXXoyiajJio^ Se ou Tra^ 30

3
Cp. Top. \ i, 100 a 22 - 33 :
'A7r68eil;u; (Jiev o5v ecmv, oTav it, aXyjOcov xal 7rpoVro>v 6 auX-

Xoyta(jL6(; fj, StaXexTixoc; 8^ cuXXoyLo^oc; 6 iZ, ivSo^wv auXXoYt^M- evo<5 ("which draws
its conclusion from probable premisses").
We shall see proof more precisely denned in the An. post.

The first 32 2
fe 35 b -2& a 1

"
oOv opoi Tpet<; OUT(O(; ex^ai 7rp6<; aXXyjXou^ COCTTC TOV ea^aTov ev 32
oXco elvai TW fia(p xal TOV [jiiaov ev oXco TCO TupcoTw ^ elvai ^ fjt/y) elvai, avayxyj
TWV &xpcov elvai auXXoyiajjiov TeXeiov. xaXco Se (jieaov [lev o xal auTO ev &XX<o 35
xal SXXo ev TOUT<O eaTiv, o xal Tyj 6^oei yiveTai {Jteaov S^pa Se TO auT6 Te ev
6v xal'ev & aXXo ecTiv. et yap TO xaTa TiavTOc; TOU B xal TO B xaTa A
TOU F, avayxv] TO A xaTa 7ravTO<; TOU F xar/jyopeurOat ?rp6Tepov

1
The above sentence might be translated also as: "The assertoric universal
negative premiss is necessarily convertible in its terms".
2
GY. Foundations etc., p. 66.
3
TrpcoTcov is defined in An. post. I 2 as e dpx&v obcelwv.
[449] THE ANALYTICA PR1ORA 49

40 yap etp>)Tat TTCOC; TO xaTa 7tavTO<; Xyo[Jiev. ofAolw? Se xal e T& (JL&V xaTa A |
Celarent

26a8evo<; TOO B, T& $k B xaTa 7ravTO<; TOU F, STL TO ouSevl TGJ F U7rap?;ei. A
Instance of a syllogism of the first Figure: Example
All men
are mortal (propositio) maior 7rp6Ta<ji<;

Kings are men ,, minor ,, iXarreov.


Therefore Kings are mortal conclusio

Each syllogism contains three terms : the 3 terms


TCX#xp<x (the extremes), namely
T& rupwTov (<5txpov), which is called TO ^etov (terminus maior),
T& &JX<XTOV (<5cxpov), which is called T& gXaTTov
(terminus minor),
and T& jx^oov (middle term, terminus medius), which occurs in both premisses but
not in the conclusion.
The minor extreme (kings) is the subject of the conclusion (S),
the major extreme (mortal) is the predicate (P).
The middle term is indicated by M.
So S must be wholly contained in M, and M must be wholly contained in P. First mood:

Scheme : MaP Diagram :

SaM
SaP Barbara

Or M must be excluded from P. Second mood:

Instance: No man is sincere Celarent

Philosophers are men


Therefore etc.

Scheme : MeP
SaM
SeP

%
c. Two
other r^odes are possible, namely a i i and e i o (second premiss
particular), which are called by the names Darii and Ferio.

d. Ar. concludes his exposition of the First Figure thus (ib. 26 b 28 - 33) :

28, 29 AyjXov Se . . . STL TcavTec; 01 ev auTw auXXoyiajjiol T^Xsiot elm xal STL
31 TravTa T<X TrpopXvjfjiaTa SebcvuTai Sta ToriTou ToG axv^aTos
*
*" Y^P T ^
xal TO fjL>]Sevl xal TO TIVI xal T& (JLY)
TIVI uTtapxetv. xaXco Sk TO TOLOUTOV

De Vogel, Greek Philosophy II


50 LOGIC [450]

second
pr. I 5, 26b -27a :
34 3
450 a. An.
"
Se TO auTO TCO filv Travrl T<*i Se jnqSevl UTiapxif), ^ exaT^pco TcavTl YJ

jjL7)Sev(, T& (lev ax>)(Aa TO TOIOUTOV xaXco Se^Tepov, (jtaov Se ev auT(p Xya> TO 35
xar/jyopoufxevov afj^oiv, ixpa Se xa0* &v XeyeTat TOUTO, [xet^ov 8e Sxpov TO
Tq> (Jt^aco xeC(jtevov, IXarrov Se T6 TroppcoTepeo TOU [Jtlaou. TtOeTai Se TO

S^co (lev T&V Sxpcov, TUptOTOV Se Tyj Oeaet. TeXetoc; jxev o5v oux SorTat 27

(JLO^ ouSajJLax; ev TO\iT(> TC) axv){JiaTi, SuvaTig


8* eVrai xal xa06Xou
xal [XT]
xa06Xou TCOV 6pcov SvTtav.
Instance of this figure: Every living being moves a
(camestres) No stone moves e
No stone is a living being e

Scheme : PM Diagram :

SM
S P

7- 9
b. In this figure there will be only negative syllogisms. Ib. 28 a :

ArjXov Se . . . 8Tt ou yfcveTOU xaTa<paTtxo<; auXXoytcrfAo^ Sta TOIJTOI) TOU


dXXa TravTec; GTepTjTixoi, xal ot xa66Xou xal ol xaTa

451 a. An. pr. I 6, 28 a 10 - 20 :

'Eav Se TO> auTCJi TO fzev TcavTl TO Se [JL7]Sevl uTrapxfl, >3 ^(A^co TravTl 7^ fjiy]Sevt,
10
TO [xevax^(Aa TO TOIOUTOV xaXco TptTOv, (jieaov S' ev auToS Xeyco xaO' o5 &[iyu>
Ta xaTTjyopoujJLeva, <5cxpa Se T<X xaT7]yopo\i[JLeva, (Jtei^ov S* dcxpov TO Tcoppca-
Tepov TOU (xeoou, SXaTTOV 8e TO eyyuTepov. TtOeTat Se TO [jiaov e^ca jxev Tc5v
ixpcov, Sa^aTov 8e Tyj O^aei. TeXeto<; (JLCV o5v ou yiveTai auXXoyi(j(jL6(; ouS* ev 15
TOUT6) T<I) ax^ocTi, SuvaTO<; S' e'aTai xal xa06Xou xal (JLTJ
xaOoXou TCOV opcov
Darapti gvTcov Tipo^ TO [Jieaov. xaOoXou [xev o5v OVTWV, 8Tav xal TO II xal TO P
T<j> S uTcapXY), ^TI Tivl Tw P TO II uTrap^eL e^ avayxyjc;.
Instance of this figure: Every seal is a marine animal a
Every seal has lungs a
Some marine animals have lungs i

Scheme: MP Diagram:
MS
SP
[451] THE ANALYTICA PRIORA 51

14- 18
b. In this figure will occur only particular syllogisms. Ib., 29 a :

Oavepov 8e . . . STI auXXoylcraaOai, TO xa06Xou Sia TOUTOU TOU


oux gaTai, OUTS CTTep-yjTixov oftae xaTa<paTtx6v.

452 The Rules of the


principal rules of the syllogism have been formulated expli-
citly by Ar. in the later chapters of the same book.

36 - 37 three terms
a. An. pr. I 25, 41 b :

/ ~ 3 x
required for
AyjXov 8e . . . STL Tcaaa dcTroSet^i^ <rrai Sia Tpuov Spcov xal ou 7rXei6va>v. demonstra-
tion
32 - 33
b. Ib., 42 a :

TOUTOU 8' 8vTo<; cpavepou SyjXov ax; xal ex Suo TcpoTaaecov xal ou TcXeiovtov prci ^ig 8e8
01 yap Tpei<; Spot Suo TUpOTaaei^. required

the middle
c. An. pr. I 32, 47a 39 -b 6
:

term in both
x , , e ,

39 'AvayxT] ... TO [ASCTOV ev ajicpOTepai^ UTrapxetv (sc. Tat^ TrpoTaaeaiv )


ev premisses
a*7ra(7i TOLC; ax^atriv. eav [lev o5v xaTYjyop^ J xal xaTTjyop^Tat TO [Jieaov,

47 b^ auT6 [Jtev xaT^yopTJ, <5tXXo 8' SXSLVOU aTrapvTJTai, TO TrpwTOv SaTai cr^fxa-
eav 8e xal xaT7]Yopyi xal aTrapvYJTaL OCTUO TLVOC;, TO [Jteaov 2 eav 8* &XXa exetvou
3
xaTYjyopTJTai, 7) TO (JLSV aTrapv^Tat TO 8e xaTTjyopyJTai, TO ea^aTov OUTCO .

5, 6 yap elxev ^ v sxaaTco (rx^aTt TO |A<TOV.

6 - 13 In ever y
d. ^4n. r
^r. I 24,
"*> 41 b
^ :

syllogism
6 4
"ETL TS ev aTcavTi (sc. auXXoyt(T[jL<p ) Set xaTYjyopixov Tiva TCOV fipwv elvai one premiss
xal TO xaGoXou ujcapxetv aveu yap TOU xa06Xou 73 oux eaTat auXXoytafio^,
ou Tipoc; TO xetjievov 5 \ TO e^ apx^^ atTYjaeTai 6 KeiaOa) yap TTJV fJLouartxyjv . and one
7 universa
io7)Sov7)v elvat ajuouSatav. et fjiev o3v a^icoaeiev YjSovrjv elvai aTiouSaiav, (JLYJ

7cpoaGel<; TO ))7iaaav((, oux eaTai auXXoyia[Ji6<; ei 8e Tiva 7j8ovY)v, ei [Jtev


8
(StXXyjv,
ou8ev Tipoc; TO xeifxevov, et 8'
auTYjv TauTr^v, T^ e^ ap^% Xafi^avei, .

453Syllogisms of the second and third figures are to be controlled


by reducing them to the first.

lav xaTYjyopTJ - if it is a predicate.


T& you have the middle figure.
jjilaov
-

goxaTov then you will have the third


T& -
figure.
- affirmative.
xaTY)yopix6v
ou Tup6<; T& - the conclusion will be unrelated to the assumption.
XE^EVOV
petere id quod ab initio ad demonstrandum propositum
T& -
apx^S alretaOai
est\ what is called a petitio principii. See our nr. 454.
7
dtuoaeiev - If we postulate or assume.
- there is a
Xa(jtpavei petitio principii.
LOGIC [453]

All imperfect a An. r


4>r. I 7 aqa 30 - 39 :

syllogisms ,
are validated $avepov Se xal STI TravTe^ oi aTeXeic; cuXXoyiafJiol TeXeiouvTai Sia TOU 30
l
TTpcoTou orx^fJLaTOc;. Y) yap 8eixTixo><; >)
Sia TOU aSuvaTou rcepatvovTai 7tavTe<; .

d(Ji90Tepa><; 8e yiveTai TO TipaVrov ax^a, SeixTixcoc; (Jiev TeXeiou|Jivcov, STI


2
Sia TYJ<; avTiaTpocpyjc; evrepaivovTO 7ravTe<;, r\
8* avTiaTpo^T] TO TcpcoTOv eTcotei
x, Sia Se TOU aSuvaTou Seixvufjievcov, STI Te6evTo<; TOU ^euSou^ 6 auXXo- 35

yiveTai Sia TOU TrpcoTou a^H-aTO*;, ^ ov ^v T ^ TeXeuTaito a/TQfiaTi,


ei TO A xal TO B TiavTl TOJ F uTtapxei, STI
3
TO A Tivl TW B uTcap^ei. ei yap
[jLTjSevi, TO 8e B TcavTl TW F, ouSevl TCO F TO A. aXX
s

?jv TravTi. ofioicoc; Se xal


e?ul Toiv &XXcov. 39
In the second and third figures syllogisms are reduced to the first "by means
of conversion", i.e. by transposing the terms of one of the premisses. E.g. in a
syllogism of the form
)
(third figure) the terms of the second premiss should be converted.
/ JVl o
We then get a syllogism of the form
MP )
$
(first figure).

Every de- b. An. pr. I 23, 41 b 1- 5


.

monstration
reducible to In the preceding passage Ar. has spoken of the procedure of hypothe-
the first tical proof Now in this case too a demonstration is to be reached by prov-
.

ing some proposition syllogistically. Ar. continues:


Ei Se TOUT* Traaav dar6Sei!;iv xal TuavTa auXXoyi<T(ji6v avayxyj yivedOai b
aXrjGec;,
Sia Tpi&v TCOV TrpoeipYjfxevcav a^fJiaTCOv. TOUTOU 8e Sei^OevToc; SvjXov ax; aTcac;
Te auXXoyiajjLcx; emTeXeiTai Sia TOU rcpcoTou ax^aTO^ xal avayeTai ei^ TOIX;
ev TOUTO) xaOoXou auXXoyicyfjiou^. 5

Petitio 454 An. pr. II 16, &4b 28 -65a4 :

principii
To S* ev apxfj aiTeiaOai xal Xafjipdcveiv e<JTi (JLV, co<; ev y^vei Xa(3ecv 4 , ev 28
TCO (AY)
otTToSeixvuvai TO TTpoxeifjievov, TOUTO 8e eTuicu^patvei TcoXXaxw^ xal
s

yap ei 6Xco(;
[JIT] auXXoyi^eTai, xal ei Si ayvcacrTOTepcov vj 6(Jioio)(; ayveoaTtov, 31
xal el Sia TCOV uaTepcav TO TrpOTepov Y) yap aTuoSei^it; ex TriaTOTepov Te xal

TcpOTepcov eCTTiv. TOUTCOV jiev ouv ouSv eaTi TO aiTeiaOai TO e^ ap^vjc; aXX'
e?rel TCX (/.ev
Si' auT6>v Trl^uxe yvtopi^e(J0ai Ta Se Si* SXXcov (at [Jiev yap ap^al 35

Si* auT<ov, Ta 8* UTCO T<X(; ap^ac; Si' ocXXcov), OTav [JLTJ


T(i Si* auToG yvcoaTOV
J
Si* auTou TK; eTuixeipf) Seixvuvai, TOT aiTetTai TO e^ apx^^. TOUTO 8* IGTTI (Jiev

- all the conclusions are reached.


TrepatvovTat 7ravTs<;
8etxTtxw<; by demonstration.
-

yj
Sia TOU dtSuvdtTou - or by reduction ad impossibile.
8ia TYJ<; dvTioTpo9yj<;
-
by means of conversion.
6n - we get a syllogism to the effect that .

& v yvei Xa^eiv - to take the


expression in its widest sense.
[454] THE ANALYTICA PRIORA 53

TO 7rpoxi(jivov,

40 ere* dcXXa dcTTa TG>V 7r9ux6Tcov 81 exevou SetxvuaOai 8ia TOUTCOV dcTcoSsixviivai,

65 a TO apx^k* ^ ov e& To A SEIXVUOITO 8ta TOU B TO 8e B TOU F, TO Se F


SL<X

SetxvuaOai Sta TOU A au^patvei yap auTo 81 auTOu TO A


Ssixviivai,

OUTO> auXXoyio|Ji'vou<;.

Strictly speaking there is petitio principii when the conclusion is

included in one of the premisses.

455 13 - 19 induction
a. Top. I 12, 105 a :

'ETcaycoyy)
'

(IdTiv) YJ
dbro T&V xaO' IxaaTOv em Ta xaOoXou 9080^, olov
et ICTTL xu(3pvY)T7)<; 6 7TL(iTa(JLVO<; xpaTLaTO<; xal YJVIO/O^, xal oXco^ EOTTLV 6
s

TCpl SxaaTov apiaTo^. eaTi, 8 Y] (JLSV eTOxycoyT) TiiOavwTepov xal


xal XOCTOC T'Jjv aLaOvjaiv yv(opi[jLa>Tpov xal TOI? TroXXotc; xot,v6v x ,

2
6 8s:
auXXoyiajjio^ ptacTTtx(OTpov xal 7up6<; TOIX; avTtXoyixouc; VpyorTpov.

b. from the preceding passage, that induction, by which


It is clear

we conclude a general law from a number of particular cases, is no


syllogism. Yet Ar. treats it as a kind of syllogism in the following
passage.
An. pr. I 23, 68 b 15- 37 :

ouv xal 6 TO 8ia TOU 3 dcalt with


15 'ETraywyy] (JLv ECFTI E ETcaycoyyjc; m>XXoytcr(Ji6<; Tpou
6aTpov axpov TW (ji(TO) auXXoyiaacjOai
4
,
olov i TCOV AF JJLECTOV TO B, Sia TOU kind O f
F 8t^ai TO A TO) B i>7rapxtv OUTCO yap 7rotou(ji6a Ta<; 7ray6)yac;. olov <7T6) syllogism

TO A (Jtaxpoptov, TO 8' 9' &B TO x^V M-^ X OV ^9* w S F TO xaO' SxacrTov


20 (jiaxpopiov, olov avOpoj7ro<; xal titno$ xal Y][JLIOVO^. TO) SYJ
F oXq) uTrap^EL TO
A* Trav yap TO a^oXov (jLaxpo^tov 5 aXXa xal TO B, TO (r/) ^ov
. v 7ravT ^ X^ )

l)7TapXt TW F. OUVL
aVTtC7Tp9l TO F TO) B Xal (Jl7] U7TpTtVt TO (I(70V
6
,

25 avayxY] TO A TCO B uTrap^ELV S8i,XTat, yap 7rpoTpov OTt av Suo aTTa TW

UTrapxy) xa>l ^po^ 6aTpov auTcav avTtaTp97) TO axpov, OTt TO)


xal OaTpov U7uap^t TCOV xaT7]yopou(jtvo)v
7
. 8cl 8s votv TO F TO
29 TCOV xa0' xaarTov auyx[(JLvov 7) yap iTraycoyv) 8ia TTOCVTCOV.

1 -
xoiv6v accessible.
2
ptoccmxcoTEpov
- has more force to overcome opposition.
8
Sia TOU Irfpou -
by one extreme term, sc. the minor extreme, namely concrete
cases.
4
establishing a relation between the other extreme and the
-
CTuXXoytaaaOai
middle term.
6
This remark is a petitio principii. Tredennick has seen rightly that these words
cannot be attributed to Ar. Ross explains them by suggesting that a copyist has
substituted #xoXov for F.
8 - if the middle term is not wider in extension.
el .jjd) uTiepTeCvet T& jxaov
7
Constr. Odcrepov TCOV xaTyjyopou^vcov - the other predicate.
54 LOGIC [455]

"Ecra 8* 6 TOIOUTO^ auXXoyi<7|Ji6s TYJ<; TrptoTY)^ xal a[jiaoi> TrpoTaaea)^ &v


yap <TTI fjilaov Sia TOU [xeaou 6 CTuXXoyKT^o^, &v Se [JLY) ecm, Si* eTrayayyyjs.
xai TpoTiov Tiva avTixetTai YJ eTcayoyy] TCO cyuXXoytaptco 6 (JLSV yap Sia TOO

(leaou TO Sxpov TC> Tptacp Seixvocnv, YJ Se Sia TOO TpiToo TO Sxpov TCO (JL^CTCJ).
9UGTSI [lev o5v 7cpoTepo<; xal yvtopL(jLcoTepo<; 6 Sia TOU [JL^CTOU cn>XXoyia{Ji6<;, 35
jLtv 8* evayeaTepo<; 6 Sia TT
"This kind of syllogism is concerned with the first or immediate premiss" (1. 30).
AT. means to say that induction supplies, without the aid of a middle term,
the universal proposition which may stand ?s major premiss of a demonstrative
syllogism. Concretely speaking: by means of some special cases (man, horse and
mule) the universal proposition is established.:
Every bileless animal is long-lived.

Now this proposition might be used as the major of the following demonstrative
syllogism :

Every bileless animal is long-lived


Man, horse and mule have no bile
Therefore: man, horse and mule are long-lived.
Induction is from observation; but
clearer for us, Ar. says, because it starts
objectively speaking 9uaei the syllogism, which proceeds deductively, from the
universal to the particular, is clearer and "more knowable".
By his theory of induction Ar. has given an answer to the question which has been
left open in the Pr. Anal.: How do we get our first premisses ? Consequently we
might expect that he would introduce induction as another means of getting
knowledge next to the syllogism. In fact, induction has this meaning in An. post.
I 1 8 and 31 (vid. infra). Cp. also An. post. II 19. On the other hand, if induction
is treated as a syllogism, it is a bad kind of syllogism, and therefore its conclusions

cannot be true. For this reason then only the syllogism is treated by Ar. in his
doctrine of demonstration, while induction is dealt with in the book on dialectical
syllogism.

induction c j n thi s sense we have to understand Ar. when he An.


says, in pr.
non-demon- TT
strative but H 23,
x-
DO D
, 14
14
!

dialectical "AraxvTa yap 8ta CToXXoyia^oij


TtiaTstiojjisv 7) vj IJ; e7caya>y9j^.

5 THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS: THE DOCTRINE OF DEMONSTRATION


Thestudent's 456 a. An. I 1 - 11
need of post. i, 7ia :

^ ^ x
pre-existing Haaa St8a<TxaX[a xal Tcaaa (jiaOTjcr^; SiavoyjTixy) ex Tcpo/JTcap^oucnq*; ytveTai a
knowledge
yvcGaeca^. 9avep6v Se TOUTO Gscopouaiv srcl icaawv at TC yap (JLa0yj[JUXTtxal
T&V e7ri(iTY)(JL(ov Sia TOiiTou TOU Tp67tou 7rapayvovTai xal TCOV SXXcov exaaTY)
Teyvcov. ofjLota^ Se xal icepl TOIK; Xoyou^ oE TS Sia cyuXXoytajJicov xal ol 81* 5
S7ray6>y9]<; a^oTepot yap Sia Tcpoytvcoffxofilvcov TcotouvTat TYJV

CY)
-
"by means of discursive thinking", as opposed to the intuitive
"seeing" of the nods.
[456] THE ANALYTICA POSTERIORA 55

* 2
OL (Jiiv Tuapa UVLVT<OV, ol Si
Xa|JipavovTe<; SeLxvtivTec; TO xa66Xou SLOC TOU
<*><;

89jXov elvai TO xa0' SxaaTov. ax; 8' auTto<; xal ol


p-yjTopLXol aujJLTrelOouaiv
10 yj yap SL<X TuapaSeiyfjiaTcov 3 8 eanv eTrayoayy), 73 Si* ev6u|JLY)(JLaTcov 4 , #7rep
,

earl ai>XXoyLcr(Ji6<;.

11 - 16 Its nature
b. Ib., 71 a :

5
ALX& avayxaiov TcpoyLvcoCTxeLV TO. [xev yap, STL CTTL
8* , TrpouTroXa^paveiv
avayxaLOv, 8k TL T& Xeyojjievov ICTTL 6
T<X iwevai Set, TOC ,
8* <5c[A9<o, olov
&TL
7
(jtev
arcav yj cpTJcrar ^ aTTO^Tjaat aXvjOec; STL S<m ,
TO Si Tp^ycovov, STI ToSl
8
t
, TYJV 8s (xovaSa (JfJi^co, xal Tl onrjjjialvei xal STL

9 - 12 Knowledge
457 a. ^4n. />os^., I 2, 71 b :

'ETrtaTaaGai Se otofJieO' xao~TOv aTrXcoc;, aXXa (JLTJ


TOV O^ICTTIXOV Tp67cov
T^V xaTa au[jLpepY]x6(;, Tav TYJV T' aiTiav oia>[JLe0a yivaWxsiv Si* YJV TO 7rpay[jLa

eaTtv, STL exetvou atTta eaTi, xal [li] ev8^ea0at TOOT* &XXco<;

Real knowledge is according to Ar. (i) knowledge of the causes; (2) knowledge :

of the necessary, where we can see that it cannot be otherwise. So also in Metaph.
A 1-2.
In An. post. II i Ar. says: We can ask ourselves four kinds of questions, namely:
T& #TI, TO 8i6Ti, (mv. Now the knowledge of the simple fact (TO 8ri)
el gaTi and T
is, according to Ar., not yet true knowledge. then have to know the 816, We
and in such a way, that we see that the thing cannot be otherwise.
The last point means that knowledge in the strict sense of the word is only
possible of what is necessary, not of the contingent. See our next cited passage.

b. Ib., I 33, 88 b 30- 35 :

To 8* eTttcmrjTov xal 7aaTY][i7) 8ia<pepei TOO 8oaaTOu xal 8ofyi$, STI Y) (Jiiv

7tt<TTY)[ji7)
xaOoXou xal Si' avayxaicov, T& 8* avayxacov oux evSex^oct <5cXX<o<;

Ixew- e'ffTi Si Tiva cxX7]0Y) (Jiev xal 8vTa, ev8ex6fjieva


Si xal <5cXXa><; Sxetv. S^Xov
o5v STL rcepl [Jiiv TaoTa ETCLaTiQfJiT] oux O~TLV SLTQ yap av aSiivaTa (5cXX<oc;

Ta SuvaTa #XXco<;

1
ol JJL^V e.q.s.
- "In the first case (i.e. with syllogism) we take premisses supposing
that they are known and accepted by our opponent".
2
ol 8^ - "In the other case (i.e. with induction) the universal is exhibited through
the fact that the particular is clear".
3
The instance infers the particular from the particular and therefore is called
by Ar. an imperfect form of induction, by which the universal is inferred from the
particular (See An. pr. II 24).
4
In An. pr. 1127 enthymema is defined as a syllogism starting from probabilities
or signs.
8
ra - "that the matter in question exists", i.e.: the fact must be assumed.
ort
8
T& Xey6^ev6v ion - "the meaning of the term used".
T(
7
"E.g. to say that in every question truth lies in the affirmation or negation,
that is to assume the fact" (First case).
8
Second case: the meaning of the term.
56 LOGIC [458]

458 a. Ib. I 2, 7ib 16- 25 :

demonstra-
ra- 1
16
8s xal 81 aTcoSet^ecoc; EiSsvai. aTcoSei^iv 8 Xsyto auXXoyio~(Ji6v E
E7tlCTT7]plOVlx6v 8s XsyCO Xa0' OV TCO xeiv a UTOV 7Ul(JTa[Jl0a. El TOIVUV O~Tl

TO 7TiaTaa0ai olov E'OE^EV, avayxr) xal TTJV a7ro8LXTixy)v ETuaTyjiJiYjv ! aXy)0tov 20


T' elvai xal TtpcoTtov xat a^acov xal yvcopifJuoTepcav xal Trporepcav xal aiTicov
2
TOU (TU[X7repaa(jLaTO(; OUTW yap ecrovTai xal at ap/al ofxetai TOU Seixvufievou .

(Jtev yap earai xal <5veu TOUTCOV, aTuoSei^t^ 8' oix ScrTat ou yap

7Tl(JTlf]|JL73V. 25

Its b. The same passage


^ 5 continued (71
V/ b 25-72
/ a 5/ ) :

conditions
examined i. The premisses must be true.
'AXY)Oyj [lev oijv Sei elvat,, OTL oux edTi TO (JLY)
ov 7it(JTaCT0ai, olov OTI y)
Sta- 25

2. They must be primary and indemonstrable.


'Ex Tcpo>Tcov 8* avaTroSaxTcov, OTI oux 7rt,aTY)(TTai {JLY) E'X^V a7To8i^iv aii- 26
TO yap 7rtaTa(T0au oiv aTCoSfii^ic; EGTTI JJLT)
xaTa <TU(JLpp7]x6i;, TO E'XSW
(TTLV.

3. They must be the causes of the conclusion, better known than it,

and prior to it.

AiTia T xal yvcopt(jLCOTpa SEI Eivai xal 7rpoTpa, atTta (JLV oTt TOTE ETTI- 29

aTa(jL0a OTav TTJV aiTtav iS(o[jLv, xal rcpoTEpa, L7Tp atria, xal 7upoytvca<rx6-
[IVa OU [JLOVOV TOV TpOV TpOTTOV TO) ^l)VlVai, aXXa Xal TCO lSVat 4 OTI (TTLV.

What is meant by "prior" and "better known".


s

IlpoTEpa 8 CTTl xal yvcopifjLO)Tpa Si^coc; ou yap TauTov TTpoTEpov T^ 9\iai 33


xal ?rp6<; 7](Jiai; 7rpoTpov, ouS yvtopi(ia>Tpov xal yjfjiiv yvwptfJicoTEpov. Xlyco 72 a

SE TTpo^ Yj(JLa(; JJLEV TrpoTEpa xal yvcapipicoTEpa T<X lyyuTEpov TYJC; aidOyjarECOc;,

aTcXco^ SE TupoTEpa xal yvcopifxcoTspa Ta 7uoppo)Tpov. E'CTTI 8s TcoppwTaTco [JLEV


s
Ta xaOoXoo (jtaXiciTa, EyyuTaTto 8s Ta xa0 ExaaTa xal avTixeirai TauT* 5

Cp. Metaph. A n, 1018 b


32 - 34 : Kara JJLEV yap T^V X6yov Ta xa06Xou Trporepa, xara
Ta xaO*
TTJV afo07)<7iv

1
He means knowledge of the first, non-demonstrated principles. The question
:

is dealt with in I 3, I 10, and most of all in II 19. See our nrs. 459, 460 and 465.
2
"Unless these conditions are satisfied, the basic truths will not be appropriate
to the conclusion" (G. R. G. Mure).
3
"that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with its side" would be a
(JLT) 6v, and as such it cannot be the object of demonstration.
4
Not only in the second sense mentioned in 456b, namely that of under-
standing the term used, but also in the first sense: that of knowledge of the fact.
[459] THE ANALYTICA POSTERIORA 57

"The premisses must be primary and immediate", Fir st


459 i.e. not de- . .

ducible from other premisses. This leads directly to the question how mdemon-
we can know our first premisses and whether there is another kind of strabie
knowledge which does not depend on demonstration. Ar. states first
that we have to start necessarily from indemonstrable first principles.
5- 7 18 - 25
An. post. I 3, 72 b ,
:

'Evtoi (JLSV o5v Sia TO 8etv Ta Tcp&Ta ETCiaTaaOai ou 8oxeZ eTuoTTjfjuq elvat,
l's 8' elvai [Jiev, TTOCVTOV (jievTot a7roSei?;ei<; eivai.

18 ieu; 86 cpafxev eTcianrjiryjv aTCoSeixTwajv eZvat, aXXa TYJV TCOV


OUTS Traaav
20 afjtecrwv avaTroSeixTov. xal Tou6' OTI avayxaiov, 9avepov ei yap avayxr] [lev
eTricrracrOai Ta rcpoTepa xal e &v 73 a7r68eii<;, idTaTai 8e TUOTS Ta a(Jieaa,
TaijT* avaTToSeLXTa avayxv) elvai. TauTa T* o5v OUTW Xyo[Jiev, xal ou [JLOVOV

25 eTUcrnfjjJiTjv aXXa xal ap^yjv eTridT^fAYji; elvat Tiva 9a(jiev, fj TOIX; Spouc;

Ar. means that beside demonstrative science there exists a higher and more
fundamental science, which precedes demonstration, namely the intuitive know-
ledge of the first principles (apxat) by the noils.

460 Ar. deals with first principles in chapters 10 and IT of An. post. I.

An. 31 - 32 First
a. post. 1 10, 76 a :

principles
Alyeo 8
J

ap^ac; ev exacrTco yevei


l
TauTa<; ac; OTL R defined

What are
b. Ib., 76a 37 -b 16 :

special
"Ecm 8' &v xpwvTat, ev rate; aTuoSeLXTixatc; 7ri(jTY)[JLai(;
Ta [Jisv tSia

7ut(jTy](jL7]<;
Ta Se xotva, xotva xaT* avaXoytav, eral xp^crtpLov ye ocrov ev TO>
Ss:

4 UTTO T7)v e7n,(TTYj(Ji7]v yevet,


2
. ^Sia [xev olov ypa[JifJiY)v etvai TOiavSt, xal TO eu0ii 3 ,

s
xotva Se olov TO taa arco fecov av 9^X7), OTL taa Ta XoiTia. ixavov 8 exaaTov
J
76 b TOUTtov OCTOV ev TO) TauTO yap xav xaTa TuavTcav Xapyj aXX
yevei TuotYjceL, (IT)

eTul [jLeyeOcov (Ji6vov, TW 8* apiOjjiyjTixto ere' apLO[Acov.


4
8' USta [xev xal a Xa^paveTai, elvat, , Trepl a YJ e7rtaTY)(jL7] OecopeZ Ta

1
Iv IxaaTco yevet - in every branch of science.
2
What means by the analogous character of the xoiva, is clear from the
Ar.
example given infra: "Take equals from equals and equals remain". This rule
can only be applied "in the genus which constitutes the province of the science
in question"; e.g. geometrical magnitudes cannot be subtracted from numbers,
nor numbers from geometrical magnitudes. But "the geometer may apply it to
magnitudes and the arithmetician to numbers"; i.e. magnitudes can be subtracted
from magnitudes, and numbers from numbers.
3
vpa^V elvat roiavSl x. T& euOu - the definitions of line and straight.
4
& XafzpaveTcu elvat - sc. by the special sciences.
58 LOGIC [460]

'
l
xa aura j
ofov [xovaSaq Y) apiOfnrjTiXY), Y)
Si:
yecofxerpia ay)(Jieia xal 5
1
^. raura yap Xafjipavoucri TO slvat xal ToSi elvai. TOC 8e Toircov TraO"/)

xaO* aura, TI [xev <j7)(jtaivei Sxacrov, Xafxjiavouaiv, olov TJ (jtev apiOfJiyjTixT) T

TcepiTTOv ^ <5cpTtov Y) TETpaytovov ?} xujios, Y)


8e yeco(JLTpia TI T& SXoyov Y}
TO
xexXacrOai 73
veuetv 2 , STL 8' fe'crrt,
Seixvuooai Sta TS TO>V xoivwv xal ex TCOV 10

aTuoSeSeiyfji^vcav. xal 7) aaTpoXoyia cacrauTco^. Traaa yap obro&sixTiXY) eTriaTYjfJiY)

Trepl Tpta ecmv, 6aa TL elvat TiOsTai (Taika S* eaTl TO y^voc;, o3 TCOV xaO*
7ra0Y](JiaTcov eaTl OecopyjTixY]), xal Ta xoiva Xey6(Aeva a^cofjLaTa, e^ cLv
3
aTcoSeixvuat, xal TptTOv Ta 7ua6y), &v Tt crTjfjtaivet SxaaTov Xa(j$avei. 15

In the next paragraph Ar. qualifies these three elements shortly as Trepl 6
vuat xal a 8sxvu<Ji xal 1^ <> v i- e the subject of the demonstration (jrepl
-
6), its

object (#), and its basis or starting-point (IE, &v).

Thesis, 451 Not all things which are assumed without demonstration are
and axioma called by Ar. He
speaks of 6ecrst<;, i>7coO(ji<; and aio>(jiaTa.
axiomata.
Thesis is what is accepted without proof as basis of a demonstration.
Theseis are of two kinds: (i) those which posit the meaning of a term

(TI avjfjiaivei). These are definitions (opicfjioi). (2) Those which posit also
the existence of the matter. These are hypotheseis.
Axioms are truths which intrude upon the mind. They include existence,
but differ from hypotheses by being known from themselves and by
being absolutely necessary for whomsoever wishes to learn anything.
14 17
An. post. I 2, 72 a - :

'A(jiffou 8* apxyfc truXXoyio-Tixvjc; Oeoriv |iev Xeyeo YJV (JLT)


gffTi Set^at,
TI. 8* ava

From this definition of axiom appears clearly that Ar. does not only think of
mathematical axioms, such as "Take equals from equals" etc., but also of the
universal laws of logic: the principium contmdictionis and exclusi tertii. We found
supra (nr. 444b, c) that they are mentioned in Ar. post. In.
See on Ar.'s doctrine of first principles: Ross, Aristotle, p. 43 if.

1 - well as the
Trepl & ti ImorrjQfztj Oecopet the subjects, the existence a^s meaning
of which the science in question assumes, and the essential attributes (TOC uTrdtpxovTa
xa6' auTdt) of which it investigates. T& forapxovTa are called later in the same
passage T<X Tudc07).
2
T& xexXdcaOai yj veuetv - "deflection or verging of lines". "xXaaOat is used of
a straight line deflected at a line or surface veuetv is used of a straight line tending ;

to pass through a given point when produced" (W. D. Ross, Comm. in An. post.,
P- 539).
3
1% &v 7rpcx)T<ov aTCoSekcvuai - "which are the primary premisses of its demon-
stration".
[462] THE ANALYTICA POSTERIORA 59

462 According to Ar. strict science knows not only the fact, but A hierarchy
also the cause. Now practically a science often does not know the causes.
In this case the science which and the causes is knows both the facts
"more precise and prior" to that which only knows the facts. And
generally the more abstract science is to be ranked higher than that
which studies a more concrete object.
31 - 37
An. post. I 27, 87 a :

'AxpipeaT^pa 8* e7ri<7TY)(jiY) e7riaTY)[JiY)<; xal TipoTepa YJ Te TOO STL xal SIOTI Y)

auTY], aXXa |JIY) X 00 ?^ T0 ^ OTI T7K T0 ^ SIOTL, xal Y] [JLY] xa6' uTroxeifJLevou TYJ<;
xa0' i)7uoxei|Jivoi> *, olov apiOfjiYjTiXY] apfJiovixyjc;, xal Y) 1^ eXaTTovov TYJ<;
ex
2
,
olov yeco(jieTpa<; apiOjmjTwcf]. Xlya) ex 7Upoa0aeco<; 8* ?
olov
ouaia <5t6eTo<;, cm? 8^ ouaia OBTO^ 3 TatiTYv ex

We shall find the same ideas again in the opening chapters of Metaph. A.

463 In ch. 31 of the same book Ar. deals with the question whether Science and
science can be reached by sense-perception. As we might expect from perception
his treatment of induction in An. pr. II 23, he answers this question in
the negative. Strictly speaking the syllogism is in his opinion the only
means by which knowledge can be acquired by man. This chapter,
however, must be compared with An. post. I 18, if we want to understand
rightly the author's view of the function of sense-perception with regard
to knowledge.

a. An. I 8ia38 -b 9 Sense -


post. 18, :

perception
38 <avep6v Si xal STL, et TK; ata&yjai^ exX^Xoixev, avayxY) xal e7uaTY)[JiY)v Tiva a necessary

exXeXoi7cvai, YJVaSiivaTov Xa^etv, eiTcep |iav6avo[Jiev Y) eTtaycoYTJ YJ dbroSei^ei.

40 gem 8* Y) fiev a7r68ei5^ ZK ^cov xa66Xou, YJ 8' eTraywYY] ex TGJV xara piepo^ knowledge
81 b dSiivarov 8e ra xaOoXou OeeopYJarat [JLYJ
Si' eTraycoyYi^, e?rel xal ra e

1
A science is (JLYJ
xa6* ^TroxetjjLlvoi) when it studies vorjTa and <5foXa (e.g. arithmetic) ;

uTToxet^vou when it is concerned with concrete objects (abOrjTa xal oXixa).


it is xocO'
Thus harmonics consider numerical relations Iv Tat<; xP^ a^-
2
1^ IXaTr6vcov is a science which starts from less undemonstrated principles
?) ;

i.e. which studies simpler entities. Such a science is, Ar. says, more exact and there-

fore prior to those sciences which study more complex entities and therefore have
to assume more "theses" or "hypotheses". E.g. arithmetic is prior to geometry,
which adds the principles of extension to those of number.
8
The unit is o&crfoc (JcOero^: "substance without position", while the point is

ouafoc 8er6^: "substance with position".


60 LOGIC [463]

Si'
3
Svia ,
xal
(JLYJ ^wpicrTa IcrTtv, 73 TotovSl exaaTov. eTuaxOrjvai 8e (JLYJ l^ovra^ 5
et

ata07]<nv aSuvaTov. T&V Y<*p xaO' exacrrov YJ afaOyjatc; ou Y<xp evSexeTat Xa(3eiv
TYJV eTUCTTTjfjnrjv ofire Y^P ^x TCOV xaOoXou <5cveu e7uaYtoY?j<; ofi^e Si* 7

8, 9
' '

It is also clear that the loss of any of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding

portion of knowledge". This sentence indicates the existence of a certain neces-


sary relation between sense-perception and knowledge: the former is a necessary
condition to acquiring the latter, for it procures (indirectly) the universals by
induction. Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu. Cp. the larger ex-
position of II 19 (our nr. 465).
The position of An. pr. II 23 is sustained: knowledge of the particular is not pos-
sible. Therefore, science is only of the universal and by demonstration. But to the

question "How do we come to knowledge of the universal?" Ar. answers clearly:


by induction. And this is only possible by sense-perception.

No 28 8
b. An. post.
'
I o > / b -88 a
31, 87 .

knowledge
through In the preceding chapter the author has stated that no science can
^e aC(l u i re d by chance conjunctions. He now continues:
perception
OtiSe 81 ataOyjaeo)^ eariv eTtttfraaOai. et Y^p xal e<mv Y] ataSrjaic; TOO rotoOSe 28
xal (JLY]
TouSe Ttvo^, aXX' alcr6avea6at Y avaYxalov ToSe TL xal TUOU xal vuv.
TO 8k xaOoXou xal errl Traariv aSiivaTOv ataOavsaOai ou Y^P ^o^ e ^Ss vuv 30
ou Y^ ^v ^3
V xaOoXou TO Y^P ^
KV& TtavTaxou xaOoXou ^afjLgv elvai. eruel
s
oov at (lev aTuoSet^et^ xa66Xou, TauTa S oux ecrTtv aiaOavscrOai, 9avsp6v OTI
s
ouS*
>

7rto Ta<70at 8i aicr07]cre<o<; e<7Ttv. aXXa SvjXov oTt xal el ^v ataOavso-Oai TO 35


OTI Sualv opOalc; taac; ex et T ^ Y cov ^ e^Toufxev av aTroSet^iv xal
coaTrep cpaai Tive<; YjTrKJTafjieOa atcrOaveaOai, (Jiev Y^p avaYXT) xaO' sxadTOv,
8' sTciaTY)[jL7j TO) TO xaOoXou Y vc P^ l v eaTtv. 816 xal el srcl aeXYjvYjc; OVTEC;

TYJV Y^ V o^ x av f)Ssi[Jiev TY]V aiTtav TTJ^ sxXsL^eco^. 40


vTi9paTTOuaav >

Y)a6av6[JL6a Y^p av OTI vuv exXetTrei, xal ou 8ioTi, oXcoc; ou Y^p ^v Toii xaGoXou 88 a

ataOYjdK;. ou [JLTJV
aXX* ex TOU 6ewpetv TOUTO TioXXaxK; <Ti)(jLpatvov TO xa66Xou
av OirjpeuaavTe^ aTroSei^iv et/ofjiev ex Y^p TCOV xaO' SxaaTa TcXeiovcov TO xaOoXou

SvjXov. TO 8e xa66Xou TIJJLIOV, OTI, 873X01 TO atTiov <&CTTe rcepl TCOV TOLOUTCOV YJ 5

1
Ta I? a9atpaeco(; Xeyo^eva -
By these "products of abstraction" the objects
of mathematics are meant. In opposition to Plato and the Pythagoreans Ar. con-
siders them not as existing xocG* oonra (separate entities), but as properties of sensible
objects. They can be isolated only by abstraction and thus constitute the subjects
of mathematical demonstration. Cp. De anima III 7, 431 b 12 - 19 .

2
E.g. line or solid.
3
gvia - certain properties which can be treated as separate though they are not
[463] THE ANALYTICA POSTERIORA 6l

2
xa06Xou TijJUcoTepa T&V aiaGrjaecov xal TYJS voyjasax; *, Sacov eTepov TO afruov

Tcepi Sk. T&V TipcoTcov <5tXXo<; Xoyo<;.


The end of the passage refers to II 19, where knowledge of non-demonstrated
first principles is dealt with.
See on Ar.'s theory of induction: L. Robin, Aristote, p. 56 ff., where the in-
stance of the eclipse is cited in order to prove that in Ar.'s opinion "induction
is alien to science" (L* induction est ttvangwe a la Science) a thesis which is right ;

in this sense that induction in itself is no demonstration and therefore does not
lead in itself to science. It would be wrong, however, if it were taken in the sense
that induction has nothing to do with science. The above-cited passage clearly
shows that such was not the opinion of Ar., and so does the final chapter of the
An. post. (II 19), with which we have to deal in our nr. 465.

464 The second book of the An. post, is concerned with definition.
As we found before, of the four questions man can ask himself that
of the OTI is preliminary to that of the SIOTI. In the same way that of
the ei e<m leads on to that of the TI e<m.
Answering the last question is defining a thing. But true definition
is not only nominal (e.g. eclipse is aTepvjau; 9<oToc;); it has to mention
also the cause (aTepvjaic; 9toTo<; OCTTO aeXYjviqs UTTO yvjc; avTi9pai;eto) In this .

sense then A. can say that the TI ecru and the Sia TI are one and the same
15
(An. post. II 2, 90 a ).
As we have seen Definitions
a. supra, definitions belong, according to Ar.,
to the first principles, which are assumed in the sciences without proof, principles
24 - 25 30 - 33
An. post. II 3, 90 b , :

Al ap/al T&V aTroSet^ecav 6pia(jiot, &v OTI oux edovrai a7To8si^ei<;


3
TCpOTSpOV .

'Opiafxoc; (jLev yap TOU T SCTTI, xal ouatac; al S' aTcoSet^eic; 9<xivovTai

UTroTiOe^evai xal Xa^pivouaat, TO TL ecmv, olov al (JLa67](JiaTi,xal TL [xovac; xal


TL T^ TrepiTTov, xal at aXXat 6p.oieo<;.

b. Nominal and causal definitions Nominal and


distinguished.
29 - 32
Ib. II 10, 93 b b 3 *- 94 a 7
, :

29 'Opta(jLo^ 8* eTceiSy] X^yerat elvat Xoyo<; TOU Tt IdTt, 9avepov OTC 6 (JLSV Tt^
4
IcTTat, Xoyoc; TOU TL orYjfjLatvei TO ovo(jLa TQ Xoyoc; CTepoc; ovofiaTcoSyjc; ,
olov TI

32 CTYjfjLatvei [TI EGTLV] T{5tycovov.

What is called here voyjai*; anticipates the exposition of II 19, where grasping
1

the universal from a multiplicity of concrete data is attributed to the nous, a


faculty which surpasses discursive thinking.
2 - in the case of facts like these which have a cause
rcepl TWV TOtouTOJv tfocov
other than themselves.
8
Our nr. 459.
4
X6yo<; grepcx; 6vo[xaTa>8Y)<;
- an equivalent nominal formula.
62 LOGIC [464]

8* ecrriv 8po^ X6yo^ 6 STQX&V Sia T SGTIV. &crre 6 [iev 7rp6Tepo^ cnrjpiat- 38
f
vet piv, 8eixvuat 8* ou, 6 8 uaTepo^ 9avep6v STL Scrrat olov a7i68et5^ T
*
e<m, TV) 6aei Sia9p<ov TYJ<; a7toSeiea><;. 8ia9e*pei yap etaeiv Sia T[ (3povTCJt
2
xal T ecru ppovnq epei yap OUTCO [lev 8161*1 a7rocrpvvuTai T& mip ev TO&<;
s
T 8 larl ppovrvj ; ^090? aTToapevvufjievou 7rupo<; ev v^eaiv. &(rre 6 5
3
X6yo(; SXAov Tp6?rov X^yeTai, xal cbSl [jtev a7r6Set^i<; auvexiQ? ,
w8l 8e

Part the c. The formula that definition proceeds per genus et differentiam
f t ^

(specificam) is not in the Analytics, but in the Topica.


16
Top, I 8, 103 b :

*0 opKTfJio^ ex yvou^ xal 8ta90pa)v ecrrtv.

465 The final chapter of the An. post, deals with the question of
how we come to the apprehension of first principles.
the 17 17
An. post.
r II 19, go b -ioo b :

apprehension
of first Ilepl 8e TCOV ap^tov, TTCOC; TE ytvovTai yvcopifjioi xal TI<; TJ yvcop^oixra tU^ic^
pr ncip es | VT QQ^ V ^ aTl 4
S^Xov TTpoaTropyjcracrt, TTpcaTOv .

f/
Difficulties OTt (jLev
ouv oux evSe^eTat eTriaTaaOat 81* aTioSet^ecoc; (JLTJ ytvcoaxovTi Ta? 99 b
10

TTpcoTac; dcp^ac; TOK; a[AcroU(;, etpyjTai TcpoTepov. TCOV 8* dfjLeacov TYJV yvcoatv,
xal TTOTepov 73 auTY) eariv ^ oux 71 aurv), 8ia7ropY)aeisv av xal 7u6Tepov ETUI-
TI^,
5
(TTYjiJiY) ^ ou, >j TOU (Jiev e7riorT7)[jiY] TOU 8'
exarlpou erep6v TI y6vo<;, xal TTOTepov
oux evoucrat at S^eis eyyivovTat y] evoucrat XeXyjOaatv. et (xev Srj l^o{i,ev auTa^, 25
&TOTCOV 6 aufxpatvet yap axpipecruipac; 2x VTa ^ yvcoaetc; aTroSe^eco^ Xav0avetv.
ei 8e Xa^pavofJLev {JLTJ e/ovTe^ TrpoTepov, xcoi; av yv(opt^oi[JLev xal [JLav6avoi(JLev

ex (JIT] TrpouTcapxoucnrjc; yvcoaecoc; ;


aSuvarov yap, coaTcep xal em T^ aTroSet^eco^ 30

eXeyojxev. 9avepov Tofvuv ort, OUT' e^ew olov TO, OUT* ayvooucri, xal (jL7]8e(Jiiav

Solution exouatv eyytveo'Bat. avayxy) &pa e^eiv fiev -uva 8uva(JLtv, (JLTJ TOtauTYjv 8*
e^iv
First stage: e^etv 7] Sarai TOUTWV TifJLiWTepa xaT* axptpetav. 9atverat Se TOUTO ye Traatv

u ^ ^p^ ov TO ^
^cooi<;. ^et yap SuvafJLtv (JU{JL9UTOV xptTixyjv, YJV xaXouatv atdOvjcTLV. 35
(

'Evoucnrjs 8' ataOyjcreaic; TOG? (zev TCOV ^oiov eyytverat (JLOVYJ


TOU

1
Tyj Oiaet - in the arrangement of its terms.
2
OUTCO piv - in the first case.
3
"Demonstration, like a line, is continuous, because its premisses are parts
which are conterminous (as linked by middle terms), and there is a movement
from premisses to conclusion. Definition resembles rather the indivisible simplicity
of a point" (G. R. G. Mure).
4
TrpoaTTopYJaaai TrpcoTov
-
by raising some preliminary problems.
5
7t6Tspov whether there is scientific knowledge of both,
^Tri(jTT)(i7] ixaiipou
-

sc. as well of the primary premisses as of demonstrative knowledge.


6 - it
#TOTTOV leads to impossible consequences.
[465] THE ANALYTICA POSTERIORA 63

8' oux eyytveTai. Saou; [Jiev


o5v (JLY) eyylveTai,
oux S<ra TOUTOK; 2t> T u ala6avec6ai ev ol^ 8', SveaTiv aia6avo(ivou; Second
yvcoai<;
100 a S^eiv STI ev Tyj ^u^f). TtoXX&v 8 TOIOUTCOV yivo(ivcov ^8y] Sia<popa Tig y[veTai ?

(Jiev yfcvearOai Xoyov ex TTJ<;


TCOV TOIOUTCOV (Jtov%, TOI<; 8e [/,Y).

3 'Ex o5v ataOvjcrewg ytveTat ex Si TcoXXaxi<;


T ird stage:
[/Iv {AVY)[JL>), ciaTrep Xeyo(jiev, [JivY)[JLr]c;
^
TOU aoTou ytvofJLevY)? ejJLTcetpta' at yap TroXXal [xv^fzai TOJ api0(Ji(5 I(ji7reip(a

6 'Ex 8* [i7csip(a TQ
ex Tiavroc; rjpejjLYjdavToc; TOU xaOoXou ev T^ ^ux^, TOU
Ta Four* hsta ^ e:
evog Tcapa TroXXa, o av ev iTcaatv ev evyj exetvoi<; TO auTO, T^V); ap^*/] xal

*;,
eav [xev Trepi yevecrtv, T^ v<y
3^j
eav 8e Tuepl TO 8v, eTcio'TifjiJLTjc;. an(j
x
10 OuTe SY] evuTuap^ouciv a9a)pia(JL^vai at eei^, OUT* OCTC' SXXcov S^etav yivovTai

yv(oaTtxeoT^pG)v, aXX' OCTCO aia6Y)<Teco<;, olov ev [AaxY) TpoTi^c; yevo(ieVy]<;

aTavTog STepog eaTY), e!0' STepog, e<o<; im apxV ^XOev


2
.
r]
8e ^i>x

Toiaiinr) ouaa ota SiivaaOai 7Tao~xeiv TOUTO.

15 8* eXe^v) fiev TuaXai, ou cra9c5(; 8e eXex9iQ, TraXtv etTccofxev. aTavTogyap


3
TWV dSia^opcov evog , Tupokov (zev ev Tfj ^u^ xaOoXou (xal yap abOaveTai
J

[jiev
TO xa6 exaciTov, 7]
8* ataOrjc'ig TOU xaOoXou eciTtv, olov avOpcoTtoo, aXX* ou
100 b KaXXfou avOpcoTTOi) ) TraXiv ev ToiiToig I'crTaTat, e'cog av Ta a^epv] CTT^ xal Ta
4 5 Knowledge
xaOoXou ,
olov TOtovSl ^oiov, ecog J^coov xal ev TOUTO) (baauTOc; .
SyjXov 8v]
STL TjfJLLv
Ta TrpcoTa eTraycoyyj yvcopi^etv avayxatov xal yap xal atdOyjatg OUTO) premisses
T6 xa06Xou e(JL7roiet.
by induction
5 'Ejrel Se TWV Tcepl TYJV Stavotav S^eov, al<; aXyjOeuo^ev, at (lev ael aXy]6ei<;
eiaiv, at 8e eTctSe^ovTai TO ipeGSog, olov S6^a xal Xoytafjioi;, aXyjOrj 8* del eTCLaTyj-

[JL7)
xal vou<;, xal ouSev eTrio'TYjfjLT)^ axpLplcTepov aXXo yevoc; ^ voiig, at 8* dp^al
6
i T(ov dbroSet^ecov yvcaptfjicoTepat, e7rtCTTy)(ji7]
8' avraaa [ieTa Xoyou eaTt ,
TCOV

e7riaTY)[JL7] (Jiev
oux av e&q, eTcel 8* ouSev aX7]6eaTepov evSe^eTai elvat

^ vouv, vou<; av ei>] TWV dp^oiv, ex Te TOUTCOV axoTrouat xal STI


fJLTjc;

a7co8ei^eeo<; apx*/] oux aTroSet^ig, a>oV ouS* e7TtCTT7)(JLY)<; eTtiar/jfAir]. et ouv fjiYjSev
av In* u ition
apxr). xal
I 5 <5cXXo
reap* eTCLaryjfjLYjv yevog e^ofJiev aX7]6e<;, vou<; eiY] eTrtaTyjfjLYjg

_____ the primary


premisses
1
OUTS -
acpa>pia[xvai : these states of knowledge are neither innate in a deter-
minate form, nor .
,

2
2co<;
- until the original formation has been restored.
-?jX0ev:
3
TCOV dc8iacp6pcov ev6q - one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars.
4
TOC dc[zepYJ - xal T xa06Xou: "the indivisible concepts, the true universals",
i.e. the categories, which are par excellence universal and are indivisible because
not constituted of genus and differentia. Cp. Metaph. M 8, 1084 b
14
;
A 25, 1023 b
24

(Note of G. R. G. Mure).
6
xal Iv TOUT<I) wdauTax; - "which by the same process is a step towards a further
generalization" (Mure).
X6you IGT!: "and all scientific knowledge is discursive" .
64 LOGIC [465]

tv) <v, 73
8 rcaaa
From this passage it is clear, (i) that indeed in Ar.'s opinion sense-perception
is at the basis of all human knowledge (the scholastic adagium Nihil est in intel-:

quod non prius fuerit in sensu. Cp. Kant, the opening sentence of the Kr. d. r. V.
lectu :

"Dass alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfange, daran ist gar kein
Zweifel";
(2) that knowledge reached only by the function of a higher intellectual
is

faculty, which he nous (the intellectus agens of the scholastics). This faculty
calls
grasps directly the intelligible, which is one, out of the multiplicity of sense data.
Two remarks must be made in this place.
I. When we ask the question how the nous can do this, Ar. answers: The
soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process. Which means: he traces this
function back to the organization of the human mind. Now by this acknowledgement
what is called an apriori-clemcnt is introduced in Ar.'s theory of knowledge.
II. It is not sufficiently clear from the above passage that, according to Ar.'s
doctrine, the intelligible appears only at the fourth stage of the process of knowledge.
Between JJLVYJJJLY) and {jareipta he speaks of a logos which arises out of the persistence
of sense-impressions. By no means could this term be translated here by "notion",
a notion being reached, according to Ar.'s account, only after experience, "when
the universal has come to rest within the soul", being "one beside the many",
and "residing as an identity in all the particular subjects".
Instead of the word logos, which is used by Ar. somewhat vaguely in 100 a 2 ,

he uses later (in the De anima) the term phantasma, which indicates the sensible
image resulting from sense-perception by memory. In this way Thomas Aquinas
says: "Phantasma est intelligibile in potentia", and: "Abstrahit intellectus agens
2
species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus" .

III. A third remark must be added. In 100 b - 3 Ar. speaks very shortly of 1

that process of generalization, which he calls elsewhere dc9aipeai<;. Mathematical


abstraction, which is called "abstraction of the second degree" by scholastics, is
dealt with in two passages of the De anima, namely II 6, 418 a 7 - 25 and III i,
13 - 20
425 a See our chapter XVI,
. 2, nr. 641.

6 THE TOPICS AND DE SOPHISTIC1S ELENCHIS


Topica 466 \v e had to cite the Topics several times in dealing with the

Analytics. On the general character of the work see our nr. 435a, b.

De soph. el.
467 The fl. IX. deals with fallacies.
(709.

aDe soph. el. L i,


20 22
164 a - :

riepl 8k TCOV aocpKTTix&v eXy^<ov xal T&V cpaivofjievcav (jiev sXey^aw OVTCOV
Se TrapaXoyiafJLwv aXX' oux eXyyo>v Xeyaifjiev, ap^ajjievoi xotTa cpiiaiv OCTTO
T&V

1
Y) 8& Tcaaa - 7rp6<; T& irav Trpay^a: "while science as a whole is similarly related
as originative source to the whole body of fact" (Mure).
2
S. Th. I 85, i, ad 4.
[467] PERI SOPH. ELENCHON 65

Kod adds a defining expression.


what are
b. Ib., i64b 27 -i65a4 :

*O [Jiev yap auXXoyiafJicx; ex TIVCOV ecru TeOvTCov ware Xeyeiv eTep6v TI e

<xvayxY)<; T&V xeifxevoov SLOC TCOV xeifjievcov, eXey^oc; Se auXXoyiajjioc; JJLET' OCVTL-
*
cpaaeax; TOO au(Ji7repaa[jiaTO<;. ol 8e TOUTO rcoiouai (xev ou, Soxouca Se Sia 7coXXa<;

468 Ar. divides them into two main groups: (i) the sophismata in
2
dictione Xeiv), where the deceitfulness appears in the form;
(Tcocpdc TTJV

(2) sophismata extra lectionem ('<o TYJS Xe^eox;), where the fallacy can be
seen only when the contents is regarded.
a. De el. I ^
23 24
165 b -
TWO main
^
soph. 4, :

groups
TpoTcoi 8' eicrl TOU JJLSV eXey^etv 8iio ol (lev yap ewri Trapa TT]V X^iv, ol

8' S^c
24 - 27 Sophismata
b. Ib., b :

in dictione
2
''Ecru Se Ta piev Tiapa TYJV Xe^iv e|jL7roi,ouvTa TY]V 9<xvTa<yiav e^ TOV apiOfJiov
TOCUTOC 8* ecrTiv 6(JLCovu(jiLa, a(jL9ipoXia, aiivOeau;, Staipeai^, TUpoawSia,

Ar. explains them in the following pages (165 b 30 -i66 b 20 ).


(1) Equivocation: ambiguity in a word. When a term is used in a double sense
in a syllogism, this syllogism has not three but four terms (quatermo terminorum),
which is a breach of one of the first rules of the syllogism.
(2) Amphiboly: ambiguity in a sentence, e.g. when we cannot see which word
is subject and which is object.
Composition: when words are wrongly combined, e.g. "A man can walk
(3)
while sitting, and can write while not writing".
(4) Division: by wrong separation of the words. E.g. 5 is 2 and 3.
(5) Accent: wrong interpretation of written words by changing the accent,
e.g. pronouncing ou in stead of ou.
(6) Figura d idioms: misunderstanding caused by the grammatical form of a
word, e.g. a masculine word with a female ending, etc.
c. Ib., i66b-: Extra
dictionem
Tcov 8' eco Xeeoo<; TrapaXoyiafJicov eESvj eeruv CTUTOC, ev {Jiev Tcapa TO
TYJC;

Tjxoi;, Seiirepov Se TO a7rXco<; r\ [U] a7uXa><; aXXa 7173 ^ TTOU ^ TUOTC ^ Trpo^
XeyecOat, TPLTOV Se TO T^apa TYJV TOU eXey^ou ayvotav, TeTapTov Se TO Trapa
TO eTrofJievov, TcejXTiTov Se TO Tiapa TO ev apxyj Xajx^aveLV, exTov Se TO jr
ax; aLTtov TiOevat, S^SofJiov Se TO Ta TtXetco epa>T7)[JiaTa ev Tcotetv.

1
sc. the sophists.
2
An with the expression might be found in
M etaph. Eanalogy
1027 b 4,
19
: T& Si cbt; aXyjO&<;
CT09(a(jLara Trapa TY;V XJ;tv
6v xal JJIT)
6v ax; vj;eu8o<;, ITUEISYJ icapa
OTI xal StaCpeatv, ("since they depend upon" ).

De Vogel, Greek Philosophy II


66 LOGIC [468]

These fallacies are explained in ch. 5.


(1) Accidens: whenever any attribute is claimed to belong in a like manner to
a thing and to its accident. E.g. "If Coriscus be different from "man", he is differ-
:

ent from himself: for he is a man".


(2) A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter whenever an expression used
:

in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely. E.g.: "If what is
not is the object of an opinion, then what is not is".
(3) Ignoratio elenchi to give a merely apparent refutation, e.g. by contradicting
:

not really the same attribute but merely the name, or by proving that the attribute
cannot be predicated of the subject, but not in the same respect and in the same
way in which was asserted.
it

(4) Consequens: whenever people suppose that the relation of consequens is


convertible. E.g. bile is supposed to be honey because honey is attended by a yellow
colour; also, since after rain the ground is wet in consequence, we suppose that if
the ground is has been raining.
wet, it

(5) assumption of the original point to be proved.


Petitio principii:
(6) Non causa pro causa whenever what is not a cause is inserted in the argument
:

as though the refutation depended on it. I.e. people try to refute a thesis by re-
:

futing a premiss which had not been assumed as such.


(7) Facere ex pluribus interrogationibus unam: whenever the plurality is un-
detected and a single answer is returned as if to a single question. E.g., when
part is good and part bad, "Is the whole good or bad ?"
m
Some instances of ao9iaTixol SXeyx ot ay be found in our nr. 197.
THIRTEENTH CHAPTER
ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
i INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
469 Ar.'s philosophy of nature is not only found in his physical
treatises (Phys., caelo, De gen. et corr., Meteor.), in which anorganic M-.'S works
De
nature is but also in those which deal with organic nature, the on nature
treated of,

biological works. Nature is, according to Ar., principle of motion. Now


the theory of motion is expounded by Ar. in his Phys., and books I and II
of this work, forming a general introduction to this theory, are at the
same time a philosophical introduction to the whole of Ar.'s physical
and biological works. On the other hand, the general philosophical
principles, which have been expounded in the introductory books of the
Physics, can be illustrated not only by the cosmological theory of the
De caelo, by the theory of generation and passing away of beings and
their qualities in De gen. et corr. and by that of atmospheric phenomena
in the Meteor. they can as well be commented on by numerous passages
;

from the biological works. As A. Mansion put it in his excellent Intro-


duction a la physique aristotelicienne: "Aristote se commente excellem-
ment lui-meme".
That this whole group of treatises was conceived by Ar. as a unity,
can be seen from the introduction to the Meteor ologica:

20 22 5 - 10
Meteor. I i, 338 a -b 339 a , .

20 Hepl (JLEV
OUV T&V TTpCOTOV OCITICOV T7J<; CpUCTEOX; XOCL TCepl 7Ca<7Y)<; XlVY)(ieCO

9U(7ixY]<;, ETI 8e Tuepl TCOV xara TTJV avco 9opav 8iaxexoafry)[Jiva>v Sarpcov xal
Tiepl TCOV aToixeicov TCOV aa)(jiaTixcov, Trocra TC xal Troia, xal TYJ<; et<; (5cXXv]Xa

(jLerapoXvjc;, xal Tuepl xal 96opac; TTJ<; XOIVTJC; eiprjcai TrpoTspov.


yeveaeco;
25 &' ecm {Jiepo^ Tyj<; [xeOoSou TauTY]<; ^TL 6ecopY)Teov, o TTOCVTS^ ol Tcporepov
Xoytav exaXouv Taura 8* earlv 8(ra au^paivei xara 9\iaiv (JLSV,

[JL^VTOl T7]^ TOU 7Up(OTOU CTTOlXefou T6)V (TCOfJiaTCOV, TTEpl TOV yeiTVLCOVTa
TOTTOV 17) 90pa TCOV fiaTpcov. (Follows an enumeration of this kind of pheno-
mena: the Milky Way, comets and shooting stars, dcpo<; xoiva TraOr) xai 6aTo^,
19 a5 winds and earthquakes etc.). AteX06vT<; 8e Trepl TOIJTCOV, 6ecopY)aa)(jLev et TI

8uva(jie0a xara T^V u97)Y>)[Ji^vov TpoTcov dbroSouvai Trepl ^cptov xal 9UTWV,
68 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [469]

xaOoXoo re xal X W P^' axeSov yap TOIJTCOV prjOevTcav TeXoc; av efaq yeyovoc;
&8' oOv apa[Jievoi Xyco[Jiev Tcepl
10

Division of The opening sentence of this passage (TTepl (xv ouv TWV Trporrcov ai-dew T% <puaea>c;
the Physics xa
^gpl Trdcovjc; xivqaeax; 9uaixrj<;
|,
etpTjTai 7rp6Tepov) points to a division of the Phys.
into two parts: (i) on the causes (bb. I and II), (2) on motion (bb. III-VIII). The
distinction is not so clearly made by the ancient commentators. It has been re-
established by A. Mansion.

2 THE FIRST BOOK OF THE PHYSICS


Introductory 470 Phys. I I, l84a
10
-b 14 :

c ap er
'ETreiSyj TO eiSevai xal TO eTuiaTaorOai au(ji(3aivei Tuepl Traaa^ T<X<; (Jie668oi><;,
10
&v eicrlv ap^al ^ acTia ^ GTOLX^, ex TOU TauTa yvtopi^eiv (TOTS yap

yivcoaxeiv SxaaTov, oTav Ta atria yvcopiacofjiev TOC TrpcoTa xal Ta

7up(OTa(; xal [xexP 1 T & v aToi^eiwv), S9]Xov OTI xal TYJS Tcepl 9\iaeco(; 7ri<TT7)(JL7)<;
x
SiopiaaaOai TipaiTOv Ta Trepi Tac; ap^ac; . 15
xal aa9eaTep(ov errl Ta aa9^c7-
8e ex T<OV yvcopijJLWTepcov Y][JLLV 73 6S6<;

Tepa T^ 9\iaei xal yvcopijjicoTepa ou yap TauTa T][JUV


TC yvcapifjia xal a7rXco<; 2 .

Ai67rep avayxTj TOV TpOTrov TOUTOV Trpoayeiv ex TO>V aara9eaTepcov (jiev Tyj 9\i(rei
JIIV 8e
(ja9eaTepcov em Ta aa9e7Tepa T^ 9uaei xal yvcopL[ic[>Tepa. *'Eo-Ti 8* 20
rcpcoTOv S^Xa xal aa97J Ta cruyxe^u(jteva (zaXXov ucrrepov S' ex TO^Tcav
3
ytveTai yv<opi(za Ta (TTOix^a xal at ap^al Siaipouori TauTa . Aio ex TWV xaO-
6Xou ini Ta xaO* exaarTa Sel Trpoievai. To yap 8Xov xaTa TTJV aiaOyjaiv yvwpi-
[xcoTepov, TO Se xa66Xou 6Xov TI eaTiv TcoXXa yap TrepiXapipavei coc; [xepY]TO 25
4
xaOoXou .

n^TcovOe Se TauTo TOUTO TpoTrov Tiva xal TOC ovofiaTa 7rpo<; TOV Xoyovi84b
8Xov yap TI xal aSioptdTOx; avjfjLatvei, olov 6 x\ixXoq 6 8e 6pia(x6<; auTOu Siaipet
J

eU Ta xaO exacJTa. Kal Ta TiaiSia TO (Jiev Tipokov Trpoaayopeiiei TcavTac; TOU^


(SvSpac; 7raTepa<; xal (jiYjTepac; Tat; yuvatxa^, vxrrepov 8e Siopi^ei TOUTCOV exaTepov.
15 - 22
471 a. Phys. I 2, 184 b :

or many 8' T^TOI (Jiiav eivai T7)v xal ei [xiav, YJTOI axivv]Tov,
'AvayxT) ap^yjv TI TuXeioix;, 15

&<; 97)01 IIap(ievi87] xal MeXiacroc;, yj xivoufjiev/jv, cooTrep ol 9ucrixof, 01 [xev


s

aepa 9cxaxovTe(; eivai ol 8 uSeop TYJV TipcoTYjv ap/^v el 8e TrXeioix;,

1
The principle that we can only be said to have knowledge if we know the
causes of a phenomenon, is more than once repeated by Ar. Cp. Metaph. A i,
where the difference between Ifirceipta and T^VYJ or emor^T) is marked in this
way, that the first knows only the OTI, the latter also the SIOTL.
2 -
<x7cX&<; absolutely.
8
TauTa - "if we analyse them".
Stocipouai
4
"For the universal comprehends many things within it, like parts".
[471] PHYS. i
69

7) aTcefpou?, xal d 7re7repac7(Jiva<; TrXeLou? Se (JLLa?, 7] Suo 7} Tpet? 7}


TT-
20Tapa? T)
SXXov TLV<X dpi6(ji6v, xal ei araipou?, 75 OUTCO? oicnrep AvjjjioxpiTcx;, TO

yevo? ev, ay)(jiaTL Se T)


el'SeL 8La9epou<ra<;, 73
xal evavTLa?.

b. 25 5
a 12- 14 The Eieatic
Ib., i84b -i85a ; ib., :

To (JLev
ouv eL ev xal OCXLVTJTOV TO ov axoTreiv ou Tcepi cpiiaeax; eera axoTueiv excluded

yap xal T<j> yecofxeTpT) OUXCTL Xoyo? e<m Tupoc; TOV aveXovra Ta
aXX* Y)TOt eTepac; em<jTY)[Ji7)<; TQ
Tuacroiv xoiv%, OUTCO<; ouSe T<O Tiepl ap/cov ou
yap ETI ap^T) eaTtv, ei ev [JLOVOV xal OOTCO^; ev earTtv. 'H yap ap^Y) Tiv6<; Y^
TLVWV l .

'Hpuiv S uTuoxetaOco Ta 9\icrei YJ


Travra T)
Svia xivou[Aeva elvai* S^Xov S' ex
2

:o, 21
472
>A\CSX>
oe
Ap/v)
a. Ib., i85a
/

otxeioTaTT] Tracwv, eTreiov)


20
-b 5
~^x
:

^^^^, >,/*-
7roXXa^co<; Xeyerai TO loetv ov,
~
TCCO<;
Refutation
of the Eieatic
thesis ex

Xeyoucriv ol XeyovTe^ elvat Iv Ta TravTa, TtoTepov ouortav Ta TuavTa T) Troaa y)


TTOLa, xal TtaXiv TroTepov oucrtav [Jitav Ta TtavTa, olov avOpcoicov eva y) ZTCTUOV
25 eva y) ^D^TJV (Jiiav, 7)
TTOLOV ev Se TOUTO, olov Xeuxov 7) 0eppLov 7]
TCOV aXXa>v TI

TGJV TOLOUTCOV. TauTa yap TravTa Sia^epei Te TroXu xal aSuvaTa Xeyetv. EL jxev

yap larai xal outrta xal TUOCTOV xal TTOLOV, xal TauTa e?T* a7roXeXu(jtva OCTU*

30 aXXTjXwv etTe [JLTJ,


TroXXa Ta ovTa. EL Se TravTa TCOLOV yj TUOCTOV, CLT' oucryj^ oi(TLa<;
ELTS (JIT) ouay)^, &TOTCOV, CL Set OCTOTUOV XeyeLv TO aSuvaTov. OuOev yap TWV <5XX<ov

^wpLCTTOv ICTTL Tuapa T7]v oucrfav TcavTa yap xa6' 6?roxeL[JLevoi) TTJC; ouaia^
XeyeTat. M^XLCTCTOC; Se TO ov avreipov elva[ 97](7Lv. Ilocrov Spa TL TO ov TO yap

185 baTieLpov ev TWouaiav Se avreipov elvaL 73 TTOLOTTjTa 73 TtaOoc; oux


TCOCTCO,

eL (JIT]
xaTa au(j.pep7)x6<;, eL ajjia xal ruoda aTTa elev 6 yap TOU aTceLpou
TCO TcocTO) Trpoor^pTJTaL, aXX* oux ouaLa ouSe TO) TCOLCO. El (Jiev TOLVUV xal ouafa

5 eari xal rcoaov, Siio xal ou^ ev TO ov eL 8* oucria (JLOVOV, oux aTreLpov,

^eL ouSev TCOCTOV yap TL

5 - 25 Refutation
b. Ib., 185 b :

5, 6 "ETL eTcel xal auTO TO ev TroXXaxw^ XeyeTaL cooTcep xal TO ov, axeTTTeov TLva unius
Tp67uov XeyouffLv elvaL ev TO Tiav. AeyeTaL S* ev y) TO (juvexe<; T)
TO aSLaLpeTOV 7)
3
oiv 6 X6yo<; 6 auTcx; xal el? 6 TOU TL )]v elvaL, &cnrep (xe6u xal olvo?. EL (JLev

10 TOLVDV yap SiaLpeTov TO auve^e?.


auve/e?, TroXXa TO ev ei? a:reLpov
4
8* arcopLav Trepl TOU (Jiepou? xal TOU oXou, LO>O)<; Se ou Tupoc; TOV Xoyov

1
I.e. : an inquiry into principles or into the first principle always presupposes
a multiplicity.
2
Which means : Ar. starts from the concrete reality of movement. A hypothesis
which destroys this elementary fact has no sense.
3 -
X6yoq definition, essence.
4
:rp6<; T&V X6yov - relevant to the present argument.
70 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [472]

aXX* auT/jv xa0* aunqv, 7r6Tepov Sv iq


TrXeico TO jxepoc; xal TO oXov, xal TCG><;

iv >) TrXstto,
xalTT&S TrXeta, xal rep! T&V (xepcov TCOV [JLTJ crovexeov
si TrXeico,

xal ei T(p 8Xco Sv exaTSpov ax; aSiaipSTOv, OTI xal auT<x airrou;. 15
'AXXa (Jiyjv el co<; aSiaipeTov, ouOev Scnrai TTOCJOV ouSe TTOIOV, ouSs v) aTceipov
T6 8v, ciaTrep MlXiacioc; 9Y)aiv, ouSe 7re7rspaa[JLvov, cocrTrep Ilapfjiev^Y]*; T6

yap Tr^pac; aSiaipeTov, ou TO 7re7repaa(jievov.


l
'AXXa fJL7)v el TO> Xoyco Sv T<X SvTa ruavTa we; XCOTTIOV xal t[jLaTtov, TOV 'Hpa- 20
xXeiTou Xoyov aufxpaivei X6yeiv auTotc; TauTov yap eaTat, ayaOco xal xaxoi
elvai xal (JLYJ ayaOco xal ayaOw, ciaTe TauTov e'aTa& ayaOov xal oux ayaOov
xal a"vOpa>7uo<; xal ITCTTO^, xal ou ruepl TOU Iv elvat Ta ovTa 6 Xoyoc; earTai, auTOLc;
2
aXXa Trepl TOU fjLY)Sev,
xal TO ToicoSl elvai xal ToacoSi TauTov .
25

473 Having refuted the Eleatic hypothesis, Ar. examines the opinions
Anaxagoras o f older physicists about the principles of physical bodies. Anaxagoras
is discussed rather amply (ch. 4). He too admits, as Democritus did,

an infinite number of first principles. To this thesis Ar. opposes the


remark that the infinite cannot be known. There are several difficulties
with the doctrine of Anaxagoras. Ar. concludes that it is better to assume
A finite a smaller and finite number of iprinciples, as Empedocles did.
number of
r r
principles Phys. I 4, i88a 17 - 18 :

assumed BeXTiov TS eXdcTTO) xal 7te7repaa(Jieva XajBelv, fijuep rcoieZ E(jL7re8oxX^<;.

474 Another correct view of the ancient physicist is, that opposites
should be assumed as by apxoci. This
explained is done e.g. those who
the genesis of the elements and condensation (we know
by rarefaction
this of Anaximenes, and it is said of Heraclitus too), even by Farm.,
who assumed two principles relative to the world of doxa, and by Democr.
in his doctrine of the 7rXY)pe<; xal xsvov.
26- 30
opposite PhySt i 5 i88a :

principles
should be "OTI (Jiev
ouv TavavTta TUOX; TravTec; Ttoiouat Ta^ ap^a<;, SyjXov. Kal TOUTO
assume
e \jX6yco<; Sei yap T<X<; apx<i<; [JiYjTe i aXXvjXcov elvai {JLYJTE iE, aXXcov, xal ex
'
TOIJTCOV TuavTa evavTio^ TOL<;
TOCC; 7rpa>Toi<; uTuap^e^ TauTa, Sta (JLSV T6 7up6>Ta
elvai [Jiv] e^ SXXcov, Sia 8e T& evavTia (JLT) e^ aXXrjXcov.

How many 475 A pair of opposites, however, is not sufficient. A third principle
should be added, namely a subject, somewhat as the substratum of the
contraries.

- raiment.
"There will be no difference between quality and quantity".
[475] PHYS.

21
a. Phys. I 6, i89a -b 3 :

21 'ETTSI 8e TOTcepaffulvai, TO LIYI TTOIEIV Suo u,6vov Syei


TLVOC Xoyo Three
a7ropif)<jsie
x ~ ,x T , ~x / / * * principles
yap av TI<; TTOX; y) 7) TCUXVOTYJS TYJV (xavor/jTa TTOIEIV TI 7re9i>xev Y)
ai)TY
ai)TY) TJV
TYJV necessary
7:uxv6TY)Ta. '0(iotco 8e xal a*XXY] oTroiaouv svavTiOTYjs ou yap 71

25veixo<; auvayei xal Tuoiet TI e auTou, ouSe TO vei!xo<; e exetvY)^, dXX*

?Tp6v TI TpiTov. "Evioi 8k xal TrXetco Xa[xpavoudLv E^ &v xaraaxeua^ouaiv


T7)v TCOV OVTWV 9\iaiv. IIp6(; Se TO^TOK; STI xav ToSe TIC; aTropTjaeisv, ei [JLTJ TIC;

ETepav UTTOTt6Y]ai TOI<; evavTtoi^ 9\iatv ou6ev6<; yap 6pco(JLev TCOV SVTOW oucrtav
x
30 TavavTta TYJV . 8* apxv)v ou xa0*
UTTOXSI^VOU Sei Xlyea8ai Ttvo^.
yap TO yap uTcoxelfievov apx*/), xal TcpoTspov Soxet TOU
apx*/) TT)<; apx>)<;'
2
yopoi)(Jtvou elvai. "ETi oux elvai 9a(Jiev ouartav evavT^av ouaia TTCO^ o5v ex

(jiY)
ouafwv ouata av ELY) >J TTCO^;
av TrpoTepov (JLYJ
;
ouata ouaia<; ELY) ;

35 Ai67rep et TI<; T6v TE Tcp6Tpov aXYjOv] vojAiCTEiEv slvai X6yov xal TOUTOV, avay-
iSgbxaiov, el (jtEXXsi SiacrcoaELv a|Ji90Tpoi)<; auTouc;, uTCOTtGsvai TI TPLTOV,

9aalv 01 (itav Tiva 9uaiv elvai XeyovTEc; TO Trav, olov SScop TQ Trup ^ TO
TOUTCOV.

Ar. seems here to come near to the conception of the older physicists
not Emped. who admitted some primary element and then differ-

entiated it by rarefaction and condensation. We shall see, however,


in the following chapters that his own theory is elaborated in a very
different way.
b. Rejection of any theory of four elements.
19 - 27
Ib., i8gb :

Ei SE TETTapcov OVTWV Suo soovTat, evavTLtoaei^, Not four


19. -20 SsTjaEt, X^P^ sxaT^pa^
uTuapxsiv ETspav Ttva fXETa^i) 9\iaiv si 8' e aXXifjXcov SuvavTai ysvvav 8\io oSaat,
f

Trepiepyoc; av YJ ETEpa TCOV svavTwoascov ELY). 'A(Jia 8s xai aSuvaTOv 7rXstou<;


slvai evavTiaxTEic; T<X<; TupcoTac;.
f
H yap ouata Sv TL ysvo<; ECTTL TOU 8vTo<;, cSaTe

25 TCO irp6Tpov xal ficTEpov SioicTouaiv aXXvjXcov aL ap^al (JLOVOV, aXX' ou TCO ysvEi
ael yap ev svl ysvei (Jiia evavTtcoatg ICTTIV, Ttaffafc TS a[ IvavTicocretc; avayedOai
Soxouatv st^ (Jttav.

476 Ar. now begins to expound his own theory of the principles of
"becoming" in the broadest sense. He introduces three principles: The three
the form (sTSo?), privation of the form (aTspTjan;), and a subject (uTroxeifxevov)
or matter (uXy)). These three principles occur in every form of production.

See the definition of ouata in Categ. 5, 2 a 11 - 13 (our nr. 438a).


Categ. 5. 3 b 25 (439a).
72 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [476]

"
First the distinction is made between becoming'' in the absolute
sense (a7cXco<;) and "becoming this or that". The first is the coming-
into-being of substances, e.g. fivOptorcos yiyvsTai or TO p) [JLOIKIIXOV (what is

called in scholastic terminology generatio simpliciter), the latter the

arising of a certain determination of a subject which already existed


(generatio secundum quid), e.g. TOV (JLTJ (JLOUGLXOV avOpcoTrov ytyveaOat
The Now always some pre-exist-
i.
SvOpcoTiov. in all these cases, Ar. says, there is
UTUOXEtLLEVOV .
, .

ing subject.

31
a. Phys. I 7, igoa -b 10 :

IloXXaxcos 8e Xeyo|ievoi> TOU yiyvea0at, xal TCOV [Jiev ou ytyvsaOai aXXa 768531
TI yiyveaOai, a:rXeo^ 8k yiyvo~6ai TCOV outricov (JLOVCOV, xaTa (Jiev
TaXXa 9avpov
STC avayxr) UTCOxelcrOat Tt TO yLyv6(JLevov xal yap TTOCTOV xal TUOIOV xal Tupo^
Xal 7TOT Xal TCOU ytVETai U7TOXL[JLVOU Tt,VO<; SlOC TO [JIOVYJV T7]V OUCTiaV 35
xaT* SXXou XeyeaOai uTroxeijievou, Ta 8' aXXa rcavTa xaTa T^<; ouata<;
OTL 8e xal al ouatat, xal oaa aXXa a7rX(o<; ovTa e^ i)Tcoxt[JLevou TLVCX; yiveTai, 190 b
eTciaxoTTouvTt yevoiT* av 9avepov. 'Asi yap etTTi TI o uTuoxetTai, s o5 ytveTai
TO yiyv6(Jievov, olov Ta 9UTa xal Ta wa ex a7rep[JLaTO(;. FiyveTai 8e Ta yiyvo-

[jLeva aTrXcoc; Ta jxev (jLCTaa^jJiaTLcrei, olov av8pt,a<; ex /aXxou, Ta Se TrpoorO^cret, 5


f e
olov Ta au^avofJLeva, Ta 8 a^aipearsi, olov sx TOU XtOou 6 Ep(j.%, TOC 8s auvOeaei,
s
otov otxta, Ta 8 aXXoicoaet, olov Ta TpercofJieva xaTa TYJV uXvjv. llavTa Se Ta
OUTCO yivofisva ^avepov OTI e^ u7roxei(JLVG)v yivsTai. 10

it can not b \y e ma y no ^ conclude from this passage that, according to


a e
directiy
can always be directly stated. At the end of the
Ar., the uTroxetfievov
known same chapter he tells us that, sometimes, it can be known only xaT
s

avaXoyiav.
7 - 12
Ib., 191 a :

J s f
'H 8 uTioxeifAevY) 9uai<; eTcidTTjTY) xaT avaXoytav. Q^ yap 7cp6<; avSpiavTa
^aXxo<; TQ rcpcx; xXivvjv ^\iXov ^ TTpo^ aXXo TL TCOV S/OVTCOV piop97)v Y) uXv) xal
TO a[JLOp9ov ex et TC P^ V ^apstv TYJV (Jiop97)v, OUTGX; auTT) 7rpo<; ouatav e"/ l xa ^ T0
ToSe Tt xal TO 8v. .

As he himself will explain later: the substratum, being undetermined, is not


yet a "being" in the full sense: it is only potentially a being. It must be brought
to being in the full sense by the determining form.

The term c< xhe term not used in this passage. Ar. here speaks of the
uXr) is

U7roxe(jievov or u7uoxet(jieVy] 9u<n<;. In the Metaph. the term OXv] is generally

used. E.g.:
[476] PHYS. i
73

20 - 21
Metaph. Z 3, 1029 a :

Ay<o 8* uX7)v 73
xa6* auTTjv {ATJTS rl (JLYJTE TTOCTOV (JLTJTS SXXo [ATjSfiv XeyeTai ol^
TO OV.

A
d.

y co
The
yap
classical definition of
x,,.
u X 73
v TO
%
TI
p to
~< (JXT)

T o v
occurs in Phys.
uTroxeifievov
,
I 9, 192 a
,
31 - 32

x a a T cp,
:
its classical
definition

s ?; o 5 y i v T a t T i
vu7uapx ovTO x a T a ai>{jLpe(3Y)x6^.
H* ?)

"The primary substratum of each thing, an immanent principle from which


a thing comes into being in a non-accidental way" (i.e. so that matter persists
in the object which comes into being).
See further sub 496.

10 - 23
477. Ar. continues, Phys. I 7, 190 b :

TO "io~T 89JXOV ex TtOV lp7){JlV(OV TO ytVOfJlSVOV (XTTOCV (Xel GUvOsTOV SCTTl,


OTl,

xal SCTTI [Jiev


TL yiv6(jisvov, SCTTL Se TL 6 TOUTO yivsTai, xal TOUTO SLTTOV 73 yap
TO i)7coxei[jLevov 73
TO avTixeipievov. Aeyco Se avTixefoOai [Jiev TO afjiouaov, UTCO-

15 xetffOai TOV 3cv0pco7uov, xal TTJV p,v a<7^Y](Jioc7uv7]v xal TTJV apLOp9tav xal TTJV
8^;

aTa^tav TO avTixeifJievov, TOV Ss ^aXxov Y) TOV Xi6ov 73 TOV xpucrov TOV U7coxt[jivov.
talv aiTtat, xal ap^al TWV 9\jo"t OVTCOV, &v TrpwTWv 2. the form:
Oavpov oijv ax;, etTcep ^
xal yyovacrt (JLY] xaTa o'UfJLpEpyjxoc; aXX* Sxaarov 5 XlyTai xaTa TYJV oucitav,
2o8Ti yiyvTai rcav EX T TOU i)7roxt(jivou xal TYJS (JLop^YJ^; auyxLTat yap 6 (JLOU-

aixo<; Sv6po)7ro(; ^ av6pa>7rou xal {JLOUCTIXOU TpoTrov Ttva- 8iaXuo~i^ yap [TOU;;
l
Xoyoix;] i^ TOU<; Xoyou^ TOU^ EXELVCOV .
A9jXov ouv ax; ytvoiT* av Ta yiyv6[jLva
X TOUTG)V.
For a definition of the different meanings of eI8o<; Ar. refers at the end of this
book (Phys. I 9, 192 a^-b 1 to the Metaph. Cp. our nr. 497.
)

478 a. The same passage continued, 190 b 23 - 29 :

"EaTi $ TO (JLv u7ioxt(jLvov api6[A(o (jtv 2v, i8i 8k, Suo. '0 [Jtv yap avOpco-
25 TCOC; xal 6 xpucrcx; xal oXcog 73 iiX7) apLOpLTjTTj TO yap TL [xaXXov, xal ou xaTa aspect of the
TO yi,yv6(JLvov 73 subject:
aTEpTjaic; xal 73 vavTLa>o-i<;

V 8k TO filSoc;, oloV 73 TalS 7^ 7J (JLOUCTIXT) T)


TCOV SXXCOV Tl TCOV

OUTCO xaT7)yopoi>(jLva>v.

The third principle is introduced here in very concise terms. The meaning of
the passage might be paraphrased as follows.
Things come to be, as it seems, by two principles: form and matter. The subject,
however, has two succeeding states, which might be called the terms of the process
of becoming: (i) the original state, from which it comes to be, e.g. ^.73

1
"You can analyze it into the definitions of its elements" (Hardie). About
the omission of the first TOIX; X6you<; see the commentary of W. D. Ross on this
place (p. 493).
74 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [478]

(2) the opposite state, that which is to become, namely VLQUGIK&S. The first or
negative state is called orpT)oi (privatio), the privation of the form. The subject
is in this state; it is identical with it, but accidentally (xarot au[ipep7)x6<;), for it

makes way for the form and thus it does not enter as a constituent element into
the being which comes to be. So, in a certain sense, the tTTipyjan; is no real principle
of the generated being. E.g. a man is generated. Before there is "something un-
qualified",which is not-man.
In metaphysics the aTepyjoic; means hardly anything; but in physics, for the ex-
planation of coming to be, it takes a very important place, as important as that of
the two other principles.

29 3
b. Ar. continues, ib. 190 b -igi a :

Ai6 <m (JLEV dx; 8uo XXTOV ecm 8' a><; Tpi<; xal e<m (Jtev 30
elvai Ta^ ap^a*;,

a><; Tavavda, olov ec nq


Xeyot TO pioumxov xal TO a^ouffov TJ TO 6ep(ji6v xal
TO ^UXpOV Y)
TO Y]p[JLO<J[XVOV Xal TO avapfJLOOTOV, SCTTl 8' O> Ol>' U7T* aXXY)XcOV

yap Tracrxeiv TavavTia aSuvaTov. AiieTai 8e xal TOUTO Sia TO <5tXXo elvai TO

UTioxeifxevov TOUTO yap oux IvavTiov. "QaT OUTC TrXsiou^ T&V evavTtcov at 35

ap/al TPOTCOV TLVOC, dcXXa Suo ax; SLTCSLV TO> aptOfjiw, OUT' ai5 TiavTeXco^ 8\io Sia
TO STepov uTrap^etv TO elvai auToIc;, aXXa Tpsts eTepov yap TO avOpcaTia) xal 191 a
TO dcfJiouCTO) elvat, xal TO a(j;(7)(jiaTLO"T(o xal

479 In the next chapter Ar. states that his theory is the true solution
of the difficulties, which his predecessors were unable to solve.
23 - 34
Difficulties a. Phys. I 8, 191 a :

ofpredeces- , ,

sors solved UTI oe (zova^wc; OUTCO XueTai xai y] TCOV ap^aiwv aTropia, Xeycojiev
by this Ta tj Ta ZrjTOUvTec; yap ol xaTa 9tXoo~09tav rcpcoTOt TT]V aXvjOetav xal TYJV 960^^ 25
.

TYJV TWV 8vT(ov c^STpaTTYjaav olov 686v Tiva <5fXXY]v aTTwaOevTec; UTTO
xal 9aalv OUTS ytveoOai TOW OVTOV ouSev OUTC 90etp(jOai Sta TO avayxaiov

(jtev elvai ytyvscrGai TO yiyv6(Jivov y e^ OVTO<; ^ ex (JLTJ OVTO^, ex Se TOUTCOV

a[JL90Tep(ov aSuvaTov slvai OUTS yap TO ov ytveaOai (slvai yap ^Sv] ) sx TE [JLT] 30
OVTO<; ouSev av yeveaOai,* uTroxeicrOai yap TI Set. Kal OUTCO SYJ TO iysZjfic, aupi-
]
auovT<; ouS* elvai TioXXa 9acriv aXXa [xovov auTo TO ov. 'Exetvoi
oiliv TaoTiQv sXa^ov TY]v So^av Sta Ta tp7j(jLva.

the Eleatic aporia: what comes to be must


This is come forth either from being
or from non-being. Both are impossible. Ergo .

Ar. replies: it is possible, namely if both are admitted at the same time and in
a special sense. If it is taken in the absolute sense, then, surely, nothing springs
from non-being; but accidentally it does. For a being springs from aTpr]<ji<;, which
in itself is non-being. It springs from privation accidentally, because the pre-
existing non-being is not admitted into the being that becomes.
And in the same way being springs from being, not essentially, but accidentally.
For it is not the pre-existing being which is generated in that which comes to be.

-
lq>eY)<; aufipaivov auovTe<; they exaggerated the consequence of this.
[479] PHYS - l
75

But the new being springs from the pre-existing, as far as the latter contained a
non-being in itself, which is now filled with a new determination.
This is expressed by Ar. in the following text.

13 - 23 solution of
b. Ib., 191 b :

i<; Xe xal auTOi 9<x(Jisv yiyveaOai [Jiev


ouSev aTcXocx; ex piT] OVTOC;, O(JLCO<; aporia

I5 (jteVroi ytYveaOai sx {JIT) OVTO<;, olov xaTa aufJipepYjxo^ ex yap TYJ<;


x
8 ecm xaO' auTO [Lr\ yiyveTai TI. 0au [lateral Se TOUTO
ov, oux evuTtap'/ovTO^
xal aSuvaTov OUTCO 8oxet, yiyveaOai Tl ^ x (^ oVro<;. '}<7auTeo<; Se ouS'
ouSe TO ov yiyvsaOai, TrXvjv xara CTUjJipejiTjxo^ OUTCO 8e xal TOUTO
TOV auTov TpOTrov, olov ei ex J^coou ^wov yiyvoLTO xal ex TLVO<; J^coou TL
2
20 ofa> v et xucov <ex xovo<; 7^ tTC7T:o(;> e^ tTUTtou yiyvoiTO .
FtyvotTO (Jiev yap av ou
(JLOVOV ex TIVO^ ^cjiou 6 xuwv, aXXa xal ex ^coou, aXX* ou^ f]
wov iTrapxei yap
TOUTO *

The above solution borrows its terms from logic: the distinction between using
a term essentially and accidentally is referred to in this chapter and illustrated by
the instance "The doctor builds a house, not qua doctor, but qua housebuilder,
and turns grey, not qua doctor, but qua dark-haired" (191 b4 - 6 ).

c. Beside this solution Ar. gives a metaphysical one: in his theory Metaphysical
of potency and act, which is explained at length in Metaph. 0. The
theory is referred to here, perhaps with reference to some older treatise.
27 - 29
Ib., 191 b :

ET<; (Jiev SYJ Tpo7ro<; OUTO<;, <xXXo<; S OTI evSe^eTai, TauTa Xeyetv xaTa TTJV
xal TTJV evepyetav TOUTO 8* ev &XXou; SicoptdTai Si axptpeia<; [JiaXXov.

480In his last chapter of this book Ar. compares his own theory This th eory

of becoming with that of Plato in the Timaeus and shows the superiority W i t h piato's
of his own theory. He reproaches Plato for not having acknowledged the
principle of orTeprjortc; : relative non-being, which is accidentally identical
with matter, but essentially different. Because Plato neglected this
distinction, he could not solve the difficulties of Eleatic philosophy:
he formally attributed to matter a kind of non-being which does not
belong to it and seems to reduce it to absolute non-being.
3 - 12
Phys. I 9, 192 a :

'Hjjieft; yap uXYjv xal orTepYjaiv eTepov 9a[iev elvat, xal TOUTGW TO
(lev [lev

5 oux ov elvai xaTa au(JL(3epY]x6<;, TTJV uXyjv, T>]V Se CTTepTjcriv xaO' auTYjv, xal TYJV

1 -
oux IvuTrdcpxovroc; "this not surviving as a constituent of the result".
2
About the insertion of the words x xuv6<; ^ I'TTTUO? see the comment of Ross
on these lines (p. 495 f.).
76 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [ 4 80]

[zev eyyu^ xal ouaiav TUOX;, r/]v uXvjv, TT]V 8s (jTepyjcriv ouSajzco*;. Oi 8k TO
Sv TO [Jteya xal TO [juxpov ojjioiax;, ^ T& aovapi^oTepov yj
TO
"QaTe TravTeXcoc; Tepo<; 6 Tpo7ro<; OUTO<; TYJC; Tpia8o<; xaxetvo^.

Seupo TcpovjXOov, &TI Set Tiva UTroxeurOat 9uatv, Taur/jv (JLEVTOL (juav Troiouffiv 10
xal yap ei TL<; SuaSa TUOIEI, Xeycov [xeya xal (jiixpov auTYjv, ouOev TJTTOV

TY)V yap eTepav


The meaning of Ar. is clear: by introducing his third principle (the x^P a i n )

Tim. 48 6-50 d, Plato did assume a substratum, but he did not make any distinction
between the substratum as a real principle in things (see Ar.'s definition of uXyj
sub 476 d), a potential being, which can be in the full sense and only per accidens
does not do so now, and, on the other hand, a second principle, which is in itself
a non-being, namely the privation of the form which is still to be realized.
To this we might reply, that by Plato x (^P a i n t introduced at all as "matter"
in the sense of a substratum, which is an immanent principle; but only as space,
wherein coming to be happens to take place. Consequently, Ar. docs not introduce
a second principle next to Plato's principle of the Great-and-small. He introduces
two totally different principles.
It should be granted, certainly, that Plato's description of becoming is difficult
to understand and far from clear. On the other hand, Ar.'s hypothesis of a totally
unqualified substratum contains certain difficulties. It is, finally, a purely logically
construed hypothesis: a theory, which can serve as a basis for the explanation
of becoming. But what corresponds with it in the order of reality, remains
problematical.

3 THE SECOND BOOK OF THE PHYSICS


481 Ar. now begins to define "physis".
8 - 23
Phys. II i, 192 b :

What is
Tcov yap OVTCOV Ta ecra cpuaeL, Ta 8e Si' Ta TE
(Jiev &XXa<; aiTia^, 9\ia>ei, [lev
&a xal Ta auT<ov xal Ta 9i>T<x xal Ta dbuXa T&V 10
and what [xepT] aoi(jiaT(ov, olov yvj xal
is not :al avjp xal uSa>p TauTa yap elvai, xal TOC TOiauTa IlavTa
^liaei, ^ajjiev.
Se Ta p7]6evTa ^atvsTai StacpspovTa 7rp6(; Ta [XT] 9ucret cruveoT&Ta. Ta ptev yap

9
Ta piev xaTa TOTTOV, Ta Se xaT au^vjaiv xal 90Lcri,v, TCX Se xaT* aXXoicoaiv xXtVT) 15
8e xal IfiaTLov, xal et TI TOLOUTOV aXXo yvo<; e<mv, fj (Jtev TeTii^Y)xe T^C;

yopiac; exaaTYjc; xal xaO* oaov ecmv axo TexvYjc;, ouSefxiav opfjiYjv e^s
poXv)^ S(JL9UTov, Y)
8e aufipep^xev auTol^ stvai XiOivot^ y] yy]tvoi^ ^ (JLIXTOL^ ex
Definition of
TOUTCOV, 2^et, xal xaTa TOCJOUTOV, &$ OU<TYJ<; T'^<; 9UCTeco^ apx>] TIVO^ xal atTta^
'

cpuau;
TOU xiveLCT0at xal yjpefJLSLV ev & urcap^ei TrpwTox; xa0 auTO xal JJLY] xaTa CTU[JL-
s

"Nature is a principle of motion and rest for the thing in which it is immediately
present, in virtue of itself (i.e. essentially) and not in virtue of a concomitant
attribute" (i.e. per accidens).
[481] PHYS. ii 77

The latter restriction excludes certain cases where nature comes very near
to art. With art namely the cause works from without, with nature from within.
But there are some cases where art works from within, e.g. the physician who
treats himself. Yet these cases do not come within the definition of nature, Ar.
says, for here art does not belong to the subject essentially, but per accidens.

482 32 - 34 Natural
a. Ib., 192 b :

Ouai<; [zev oijv ecrrl TO p7)0ev cpucnv 8s e'xei.


^ora TOIOCUTYJV e'xst apxV- Kal always
Icm TcavTOc TOCUTOC ouata TL xal ev U7coxeipievco earlv aeL realized in
uTuoxetfjievov yap r\ 90(71*;

"Each of them is a substance; for it is a subject, and nature is always realized


in a subject".
Mansion calls this "an expression of peripatetic realism, which indeed attributes
l

a reality to abstract principles, but on condition of finding them in a material


substratum, of which they can be separated only by thought".

These things, then, and their essential qualities are "according


b. what is

,, called
to nature .

35 - 37
Ib. 192 b :

s
Kara cpu<ri,v SE TOcuTa TE xal oaa TOUTOU; uTrapxet xa() auTa, olov T>

(pepsaOai avco TOUTO y^P 9^cri^ (zev oux Scmv, ouS' ex st 9^^^v, (priest 8e xal
xaTa 9ilcrtv ICTTIV.

483 now TWO aspects


Ar. proceeds to explain his theory of the two aspects o/
nature: (i) there is a lower nature, matter, which is undetermined and
"potential" with relation to the form; (2) a higher nature, form, which
is intelligible (because determinate) and, by its presence, brings matter
to full being (see nr. 484).

a. 10 - 21 28 - 30 Matter
Ib., IQ3a ;
;

10 Aoxel' S* Y] cpuatc; xal Y]


ouaia T&V cpuaet OVTCOV evioi<; elvat, TO TrpcoTov
2
evuTuapxov sxacrTW appuO^tarov <ov> xaO' sauTO, olov xXivv)^ yuan; TO ^liXov,
3
<xvSpiavTO(; S* 6 x<*Xxo<;. Sir][Jie1!ov Se 'AvTL9cov
^YJCTLV STI, et TLC; xaTopii^eie

xXiv7]v xal Xa^oi Suvafiiv 7] aY)7isSo>v coaTe avetvai pXaaTOv, oux av ysvecrOai
15 xXtvyjv aXXa uXov, ca<; TO [JLEV xaTa aujJLpspvjxo^ UTcapxov, TTJV xaTa vofxov
SiaOeaiv xal TTJV TEXVTJV, TT]V ouatav oucav SXSLVYJV 8* YJ
xal 8ia(jievei TauTa
juvex^?- EL Se xal TOUTCOV exaaTov 7cpo<; Tp6v TL TauTO TOUTO
v, olov 6 {lev x^Xxoc; xal 6 xpu<K> Tipo^ u8a>p, Ta 8* OCTTOC xal ^uXa 7rpo<;

1
Introd., p. TOO.
2
T& TrpcoTov evuTuapxov exaaTw appuOfziaTov <6v> xaO' aur6 - "that immediate con-
stituent of it which taken by itself is without arrangement" (Hardie Gaye). &
3
Diels, VSa 87, B 15. Cf. Zeller I 2 6 ,
pp. 1324-28.
78 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [483]

2
yyjv *, ojjLotco^ 8c xal TCOV SXXcov OTIOUV, exeiva T^JV cpucrtv elvat xal TYJV ouatav 20

"Eva (lev o5v Tporcov OUTGX; r) (puau; XeyeTai, Y) TTptoTT) exaaTto u7toxei|JilvY) 28

liX?) TCOV e^ovTcov ev auToic; ap^v xivyjaeax; xal (ieTa(3oXYj<;.

'The immediate material substratum of things which gave in them-


selves a principle of motion or change''.

Form b 30 - 31
Ib., igaa :

"AXXov Se TpoTcov Y) ptop97] xal TO elSo<; TO xaTa TOV X6yov.


"The form and the
type, the definable form" (T& xara T&V X6yov: "which
sc. is

specified in the definition of the thing". Hardie and Gaye).

c. In the next passage Ar. explains what he means by this definition.


31 5
Ib. I93a -b :

yap Te^w) XeyeTai TO xaTcx TXV ^ V xa ^ Texvix6v, OUTCO xal


Matter with- T ^ X aTa OUTE
9uatv XlyeTai xal TO 9uo~ixov. Se exet TCCO 9aI(Jtev av

not yet /r
^]
v T ^Xv>y 3
v ^8^ v i
e ^ Suvajxet, (JLGVOV ECTTI xXivyj, (jiv)
TTCO 8* e^ei TO elSoc; TTJ<;

9uaet xXivy)<;, ouS* elvai TE^V^V, OUT* ev TOLC; 9\iaei auv terra [j(ivoi<; TO yap Suvajxei 35

oapl; ^ OGTOUV OUT' ex et ^^ T^l v eauTou 9u<riv, Tuplv av Xa^yj TO elSo? TO xaTa 193 b
TOV Xoyov, o 6pt^6(jievot Xeyofzev TI ICTTI ffap!; ^ OGTOUV, OUTE 9uasi SGTTIV.
"iiffTe aXXov Tporrov 73 ybaic; av el'yj TCOV I^OVTCOV ev auTOtc; xtvyjaefo^ ap^Yjv

73 fAOp97)
xal TO elSo<; ou ^copiaTov ov aXX* 7) xaTa TOV Xoyov.
7 5
another sense, nature is the form or type of things which have in them-
"So, in
selves a principle of motion, a form not separable from them except in thought".

484 Real things, then, are the composites of these two constituents.
5- 8
Ib. 193 b :

The To ex TOUTCOV 9uat<; ulv oux Kal aaXXov


S* e'orTt, 9uaet Se. olov av0po)7uo<;.
compositum tf \ / / / >

T^C uXvj^' exaaTOV yap TOTC XeyeTai OTav evTeXexeta 73, [jiaXXov

Relation to 485 A. Mansion, Jntrod. pp. 82-92, explained excellently how this Aristotelian
Plato's doc-
conception of nature is related to that of Plato, especially in his later works, the
trine of jim> an(j Laws. Plato* was deeply convinced that coming to be and passing away
nature
an(j ^e existence of things cannot be caused by matter. He sought a reasonable
ground for them: "that it is best for things to be as they are" (Ph. 96 a fl), and,
seeking this, assumed his "hypothesis" of Ideas. In Laws again PI. delivers a X
severe verdict on materialistic philosophy of nature the regularity of the celestial :

movement can only be caused by an intelligence, a soul. Therefore, if we mean by

3
Plato in the Tim. derived gold and bronze from water (59 b) and bones
(64 c, 73 e) from earth.
2
xe!voc - the stable element.
[485] PHYS. ii 79

"nature" what is original and wants no further explanation, we should say that
soul is "natural" (9uoei), not the material elements (981 0-892 c; our nr. 388).
In Tim. 52 d-53 b PI. describes the x^P a before the creation of the kosmos as
being filled with formless elements, in which irregular forces work and shocks
occur. So there exists, according to Plato, some irrational element, next to soul and
independent of it. But PI. does not call this physis. As to Aristotle, he starts from
such a physis and calls it by this name. But he does not adopt Plato's doctrine
of soul. Instead of this he gives another explanation above the irrational nature, :

called hyle, he superposed not soul, but a superior nature, form. This form is
not an intelligent principle, not a thinking and deliberating being, but it is intelligible :

the rational element in corporeal beings.


Thus it may be said in a certain sense that to Ar. nature is rational; only not
in any personal sense.

486 Ar. now asks himself three questions: Three


questions
(1) Where is the border-line between physics and mathematics?
For physical bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines and points,
and these are the subject-matter of mathematics.
(2) Where is the place of astronomy? Does it belong to physics,
or not ?

(3) Since nature has two senses, form and matter, with which is the
physicist concerned?
22 - 25
a. Phys. II 2, 193 b :

^JKLf
9uau; XeyeTai, pieTa TOUTO OscopyjT^ov TLVI u n e between
SitopidToci 7coaocx&<; Y)

6 fjiaOYjjjiaTLXcx; TOU 9i>crtxou. Kal yap emTucSa xal aTepea lyzi TCX P h y s and -

\ / \ r r \ i

9001x01 crcofjiaTa xat fiYjXYj xai emyfjia^, Trepi cov axoTtsi o [jiaUY)(iaTixo<;.
math. ? \ ~<n /

26- 26 The
193 b
2. place
b. Ib., :

"ETi Y) dcaTpoXoyta eiipa 73 [xpoc TTJ<; ^OCTIXYJ^. astronomy

c. Ib., icua 12 - 13 16- n :


3. which
is the object
9601^ St/coc;, TO re elSo<; xal Y) (iXY),
8' Y] aTropyjdeiev <5cv TI?, O f natural
TOU TOU 'AXX* si rapt TOU e^ science?
Tcepl 7roT^pa(; 9UCTtxoij, \ Tcepl e^ a(jL90iv. a[JL9Otv,
xal rapl exaTepa<;. OoTepov ouv TTJ<; auTY}<; YJ &XXY)(; exaTepav yvcapt^etv ;

These questions are answered here by Ar. very shortly. They have been broadly
treated by Mansion in his fifth chapter (Introd., pp. 1 22-205).

487 The First


first question should be understood starting from Platonism.
question
a. According to Ar. in Metaph. A 6 Plato distinguished three degrees
Plato's
of being: aiaOYjTa (jiaGYjfjiaTtxa rf8i), corresponding with three kinds
of knowledge. As to the introduction of elSij an imperishable and non-
changing kind of being, on which the aia0Y)T<x depend by {jie0e^<; ,
we
80 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [487]

gave the texts of A 6 and M 4 in our nr. 204a and b. In A 6 Ar. continues
14- 18
(987 b )
:

Se Ttocpa Ta aic67]Ta xal TOC eiS?) TOC [jiaOYjfjiaTixa T&V TcpayfjiaTCov elval
jLSTa^ii, Stacpepovra TCOV (jlv atcrOyjTcov atSia xal dxtvyjTa elvat,
TGJ

TCOV S* slS&v TW ra (JLSV TcoXX' <3cTT<x S^jLoia elvai T& 8s eZSo<; aur6 Sv Ixaorov

JJLOVOV.

We know from PL, Rep. VI, 509-511 l and VII 533-534: dialectic
this doctrine
is placed at the top; reaches up to true Reality and the Good. Next follows ma-
it
thematical knowledge, which does not extend to contemplation of the highest
Reality, because it cannot render an account of its first principles ("hypotheses").
Finally there is doxa, which is no knowledge in the strictest sense and cannot be
so, because its object is the ever-changing nature of the sensible things. Plato has
come very near to a science of nature. The essential purpose of his theory of Ideas
was to explain how rational knowledge of sensible things is possible. But in the
strictest sense PL denied it up to the end 2 .

b. Ar. gives to physics a place in the system of sciences. True


knowledge physical objects is possible, because they contain an
of

intelligible element within them, which is their essence: the form.


In physical objects this form is essentially joined to matter. In his
Metaph. we shall see Ar. occupied with the question whether there exists
any purely intelligible being, not joined to matter (what Ar. called
"separate", x^P^^ov). He answers in the affirmative. This, then, is the
1 '

object of metaphysics, which is called by Ar. "first philosophy or


"theology So we get the
.
following tripartition of sciences:

Metaph. E i, 1026 a 13 - 16 :

Ar.'s tri- ']-[ ^ yp v cpucnxY] TO pi x c P t(TT ^ H-


ev <*^' ^ x dbdvyjTa, T% 8e [/.a6r)(jiaTiX7Jc

sciences vl a 7re pi axLVTjTa [Jiev


ou x^P 1 ^^ ^ LCTGX; aXX' a><; ev uXfl Y]
Se TrpcoT?) xai
a xai axtv/jTa.

The tripartition itself is Platonic, but Ar. connects it with a different theorv
of knowledge, namely, his doctrine of abstraction. The objects of mathematics
are the result of a further degree of abstraction than are those of physics. Physical
objects, which are essentially joined to matter, cannot be separated from it, even
in thought; mathematical objects, which are according to Ar. not "separate"

1
Our nr. 294.
2
Phil. 59 a-b. In Examcn critique de I' interpretation traditionnelle du plato-
my
nisme (Revue de Mdtaph. 1951, pp. 249-268) I argued that in later platonism the op-
position of an unchanging and immovable ideal World to that of ever-changing
sensible things has been essentially broken down. If it is true that in Farm, and
Soph, motion was introduced by Plato in the ideal World as I think it was
this statement should be accepted. It does not take away the fact that, on the point
in question, sc. the establishing of the possibility of natural science, Ar. has com-
pleted what Plato had begun.
[487] PHYS. II 8l

(as Plato tho ught they are) but "somehow connected with matter", can be separated
,

from it in abstracto.
This is what Ar. explains in the next passage of Phys. II, ch. 2.

1- 7 Difference
C. Phys. II 2, 194 a :

8* av TOUTO SvjXov, et TU; exaiiptov TreipcpTO Xeyeiv TOVK; opoix;,


phys. and
xal auTtov xal T&V au(JipepY)x6TCov. T6 (ji&v yap TtepiTTOv 'a>Tai 2 xal TO SpTiov math objects
l '

xal TO euOu xal TO xafimiXov, STL 8e api6[zo<; xal ypa(jL(ji7) xal ax^f* 01 * veu
CTECO^, aap5 Se xal OCTTOUV xal <5cv0pc*>7ro<; OUX^TI, aXXa TauTa <&<T7tep pl<;
aXX'
The latter are defined like "snub nose", not like "curved". ot^6v is with Ar.
a classical instance of an accidens, and at the same time of a form which is realized
in matter. E.g. the next passage.

d. Metaph. E i, 1025 b
30 - 34
:

"Ecru 8e TCOV 6pio[jLevcov xal TCOV TI ecfTi Ta (Jiev <I>c; TO ai^ov Ta 8* a><; TO
xoiXov. Stacp^pet 8e TauTa STL TO JJLEV CTLJJLOV auveiXy][jifjLevov

(EGTI, yap TO crtfjiov xotXY] pU), '?]


8e xoiXoT7)<; aveu uXv]<;

488 What second


is the place of applied mathematics: of astronomy,
optics, harmonics? In other places mechanics, too, are mentioned.
These sciences have to do with natural bodies; they also treat the accidents
of them. Therefore Ar. calls them T<X cpuaixcoTepa TO>V {jLaGTj^arcov. E.g. his work
De caelo is a truly physical treatise. Yet the method of these sciences is a mathe-
matical one. Where, then, are they to be placed ?
Ar. answers: The position of astronomy is similar to that of geometry. Both
deal with bodies, but from a special point of view, namely, making abstraction of
corporeal reality. In the same way optics are a system of geometrical relations,
harmonics of arithmetical propositions, mechanics an application of stereometry.
But the method of astronomy is in a certain sense the inverse of that of geometry.
Ar. explains this in the passage following that which has been cited sub 487c.

7 12 The method
Phys. II 2, 194 a -
a. :

A-yjXoL 8e xal Ta 9i)aixcoTepa T&V {jLaOyjfJLaTOV, olov OTTTIXTJ xal apjjiovtxy] mathematics
xal acTTpoXoyia avaTuaXtv yap TpoTiov TLV' E^OIKTL 173 yecofieTpta. 'H [lev yap

yecofjLETpta Ttepl ypafzfxyjc; 9i>crix7J<; axoTrec, aXX* oux f] 9uaixy], YJ


8* oTruxy)
5

(jLaOY](jLaTixy]v JJLEV ypa(j.(nf)v, aXX' ou^ f) [JLaOYjjjiaTixv) aXX vj ^uatxv).


What he means to say is: astronomy etc. follow a mathematical method, but
they have to return to physical reality and there apply the mathematical relations
found by abstraction. Cp. Metaph. B 2, 997 b 14 - 35 where Ar. argues (against the ,

platonic hypothesis of an intermediate world of mathematical objects, existing


separately) that astronomy has to deal with the actual heavens of our world.

1 -
OCUT&V the subjects.
2
goTai - to be linked with dtveu

DC Vogel, Greek Philosophy II


82 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [488]

b. On the other hand, Ar. repeatedly teaches that sciences, the


object of which is realized in phenomena and which therefore have to

do directly with concrete things, are by this very reason less accurate,
because the object is more complicated. E.g.

Metaph. 2, 982 a A
26 - 28
:

'AxpipaTaTai Se T&V STriaTTjfJi&v at (juxXiara T&V TtptoTCOv eiaiv (at yap e!;
1 2
eXaTTovcov axpipeaTepai TCOV ex upoaOeaecoc; Xsyojjiivcov ,
olov api0[ry)TixY)

yecofjieTpiac;).

Nearly the same is said in An. post. I 27, 87 a 31 .

Third 439 Which "nature" is the object of r form or matter?


J physics:
j
question
Ar. answers: both.
Both matter 12 - 15
Phys.
y II 2, ^ a
IQ4 :

and form
are the 'ETisl 8* 7} 9uai<; 8i)(co<;, TO TS elSoc; xal Y) uX*/), ax; av ei Tuepl ai|Ji6TY)TO<; CTXO-

hsics rcotfJLev T^ eo~Tiv, ouTG) OecopvjTeov. "QaT* OVT* aveu uXvjc; Ta ToiaijTa OUTS XOCTOC

Pre-socratic philosophers dealt almost exclusively with matter, e.g. Empedocles


and Democritus. To their view Ar. opposes the subordination of matter to form.
Hence follows that for the physicist form is of primary importance.

Matter and Ar. also asks the question whether the two aspects of nature
499
form are TT .

they object belong to one and the same science or to a different one. He answers
of the same that both
science?
belong to the same, and illustrates this by the analogy of art ;

e.g. the building of a house.

First a> phySf u 2 i 94 a 21 - 27 :

the analogy EL Se 7) TE^VV] (jLifjLSLTat TY]V <piicriv, TYJ<;


Se auTTJc; 7ri(TTY){Jiy]<;
etSevat TO elSo<;
of art xa ^ T^ v (jXyjv ^expt TOD (olov taTpoo uytetav xat v xa ^ 9^Y(^^7 sv o^ x^ "^

uyteia, 6(JLotca^ Se xal olxo86(Jiou TO TC sISoc; T*?^ olxia^ xal TTJV (iXvjv, OTI TcX
xal ^uXa tbaauTax; Se xal evrl T&V fiXXcov), xal TV]<; ^uaixyjc; av SLT) TO
T<X<;

Second 27 - 36 7- 8
5. Ib., 194 a. ; 194 b :

teleology in "ETi T6 ou evexa xal TO TeXog T*^ auT^^ xal oara TOUTCOV evexa 3 .
e
H 8i
nature
cpuaL<; TeXoc; xal ou Svexa oiv yap auve^ou^ TYJ^ xtvYjaew^ ouav)^ eaTi TI
4
xtvYjaeco^, TOUTO ^axaTov xal TO ou Svexa. Aio xal 6 TUOLTJTT]^

1
ai ^^ XaTT6vcov - those which involve fewer principles.
2 at x 7Tpoa0cfeco<; Xey6[ievaL - those which involve additional principles (Ross).
3 - eiusdem
T% auTvfc (sc. ^Tutarry)^^) xal ac.
4
6 7ToiY)nf)<;
- sc. Euripides, in a play unknown to us.
[490] PHYS. II

8
eiTreiv e'xei TeXeinr/jv, ^dTuep ouvex eyveTO. BoiiXeTai yap ou ?cav
elvai TO Ic^aTov TXO<;, aXXa TO piXTiaTOv e?uel xal Troiouaiv at T^^vat ^) v

uXirjv at (JLEV a7cXa><; al 8e euepy6v \ xal xP^^^a ax; Y)(i&v evexa TCCXVTCOV uicap-
'EafJLev yap TTGX; xal 7)fAeu; TXO<; Si^eo? yap T& ou sfvexa 2 . 'Ev
oov TOC<; xaTa T^VYJV ^H- 6^ Tcoioufiev T/)V uXyjv TOU Ipyou evexa, ev Se

8-9 Third
c.Ib., 194 b :

TI ~ / * ,/^ x vcs *^ f/. argument:


r/ri Ttov TTpo^ TI
7) uXv)
aXXco yap eioei aXXv) uXyj. matter and
Which means Form and matter are correlatives. They claim each other mutually.
:
form * re
But form can exist without matter (not in physical objects, but as object of meta-
physics), matter cannot without form. Therefore Ar. says that matter belongs
to the ?rp6c; TI.

491 heborder "


Hence, in the final passage of our chapter the author speaks T
about metaphysics, as it should be distinguished from physics. Phy 8 and .

metaph '

Phys. II 2, 194 b- 15
:

&7j TTOCJOU TOV 9DCJIXOV Sei etSevai TO eZ8o<; xal TO TI COTTIV ; TJ ciaTcep
veupov 7\ ^aXxea x aXxov, (i^xpi TOU. Tivo^ yap evexa exaaTOv, xal ?repl
a eaTL ^copiCTTa [Jiev etSei, ev uXy] Se. ''AvOpoTro^ yap avOpamov yevva
xal T^Xioc;. 11 ox; 8' e/et TO ^copiaTOv xal TL ICTTL, 9iXoao9ia^ TY;<; TrpwTTjc; Siopicrat

epyov.
The meaning of this passage is physics have to do with the eidos up to a certain
:

point, namely, until the physicist understands the purpose of each thing. He has
not to do with the eidos as far as this can exist in itself, not joined to matter. For
in that sense the eidos is the object of a different science: metaphysics. Physical
objects, however, are always form joined to matter. "Man is begotten by man, and
by the sun as well".- The author means to say physical generation can be explain- :

ed from itself. A metaphysical man-in-himself is of no use to it. Organic beings


generate themselves, ''together with the sun" because the heavenly bodies,
especially the sun, have an important part in the physical process of generation.

492 The next chapter (3)deals with the four causes, a subject which Chapters
iscontinued in ch. 7 and 8, where the author argues that form is properly
the cause of things. Having treated the questions of ^li^'y) and auTOfjiaTov,
which are also considered as causes of things, in chapters 4-6, he applies
in his last chapter (9) the principle of the final cause to the problem of

1
Some make the matter (from something different), others make it more
arts
serviceable when iron is melted).
(e.g.
2
From De anima 415 b 2 we know what Ar. means by this distinction: T& 8* oS
vexa SiTT6v T& ^v oft, T& 8 &. E.g. in one sense health is the oft Svexoc of the medical
art; in another sense the patient is.
84 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [492]

the necessity of physical phenomena. This necessity does not proceed


from antecedents to consequences, but inversely: the final cause is of
primary importance.
This is the main thesis of Ar.'s natural philosophy.

the four causes 23 3


493 Phys. II 3, 194 b -I95 a :

causa "Eva o5v Tporcov atTtov XeyeTai, TO e oJi yiveTai TI evuTtapxovTog, olov 6
fjiev

TOO avSpiavTog xal 6 <5cpyupog TYjg 9iaXY)g xal T<X TOUTCOV yeVy). 25
c. formalis "AXXov Se TO eZSog xal TO 7capa8eiyp.a TOUTO 8* IGTIV 6 Xoyog 6 TOU TI 9)v
elvat xai TOC TOUTOU yevY), olov TOU Sia rcaorcov TOC 8\io Trpog ev, xal SXcog 6
l
api6(i6g xal TOC [JiipY]
TOC ev TCO Xoyco .

c. efficiens
"g Tl gQ ev ^ ^p^ ^^ jAe^apoX^g Y) TCpcoTY] Y^ TYJC; TjpefJLYjaecac;, olov 6 (iiouXeuaa*; 30

g, xal 6 TcaTYjp TOU Texvou, xal 8Xco<; TO TUOIOUV TOO Trotoufjievou xal TO
TOIJ (jteTapaXXofisvou.
c. finalis "ETL TOUTO 8* eaTi TO o5 Svexa, olov TOU TteptTraTetv Y) uyieia
TO TeXoc;
o><;

Sia T( yap TiepiTcaTsc; ^ajjLsv ova uyiaivY], xal etTu6vTe<; OUTCOC; ot6(jLs0a arco-
SeScaxevai TO atTiov. Kal oaa SYJ xivYjaavTog aXXou [jteTa^u ytyveTat TOU TeXou^, 35
*
olov TYJ<; uyieia^ Y] Lcr/vaaia r\ Y] xaOapCTi<; Y^ TOC 9ap[iaxa Y^ Ta opyava TravTa

yap TauTa TOU TeXouc; Svexa eaTi, Sta^epei 8* aXXYjXcov <o<; ovTa TOC (JLEV epya
TOC 8* opyava.

instances 494 a. Metaph. H 4,


32
1044 a -i044 b
1
:

"Ckav SYJ TIC; ^YJTT) TO aiTiov, Irel 7rXeovaxo><; Ta atTLa XeysTat, Tiaaac; Set

Xlyetv TOCC; evSex o ^va ^ occTtag. olov avOpcoTtou TIC; atTta ax; uXYj ; apa TOC xaTa-
(XYjvia ;
TI 8' cog xtvouv ; Spa TO aTiepjjia ;
TI 8* cog TO elSog ;
TO TL Y)V elvau TI
8* cog ou evexa; TO

b. Metaph. B 2, 996 b
5- 8
:

'EvS^s T^P 1-
T^> OCUTCO TravTag Toug TpoTcoug Toug TWV aiTicov
2
olov otxiag 86ev jxev YJ xivYjaig Y] Texvy )
x *l 6 oixo86(jLog, oi5 8* evexa TO Spyov ,

3
uXY] Se yYl xal Xi0oi, TO 8' elSog 6 Xoyog.

In the last example it is clear that the formal cause is identical with
the final, only seen, from a different point of view. In a sense the form is
the efficient cause, too. For the notion of "house" works as an idea which
is present in the mind of the architect and directs his activity. The

TOC Iv TCO -
the parts in the definition.
X6y<|)
Final cause the ipyov, i.e. the function of the house: "giving shelter to
is

things and bodies", as is said in the definition of Metaph. 2, 1043 a


16
(otyyetov H
7
P )^'76 xa & aeojjuxTow), and again in De anima I I, 403 b 8
.

Formal cause is the notion "house", the definition.


[494] PHYS. ii 85

same might be remarked as to the first instance, and so


generally it is

with natural beings. For the form, which within them, is the cause of
is

their motion (growth), and it is at the same time the end.


This is expressed by Ar. in the next passage.

495 22 - 29 The three


,r,
JUrei
% *,,,,io8a
Phys. II
o
7,
~
ai aiTtai TeTTapeg, Trepi Traacov
:

N ~ ~
TOO <puaixou eioevai, xai
,*, x ,

etc;
,
non-material
Tiaaac; causes often
coincide
ocvaycov T& Sia TL dbroScoaei 9i><7ixco<;, TYJV uXvjv, TO eZ8o<;, TO xivTjcrav, TO oo
25 Svexa. "Ep^ETat Se Ta Tpia eic; ev TioXXdbac; TO [lev yap TI ecm xal TO o5 evexa
J
2v ecm, TO 8 88ev 73 xiv/jatc; TrpcoTov TW el'Set TauTo TOUTOI^; av6pco?ro<; yap

dcvOpcoTrov yevva. Kal 8Xco<; ocra xtvorifzeva xtvet' oo~a OUXSTL ^uatx^c;'
Ss (JLYJ,
5 5
ou yap ev auToic; S/ovTa xtvyjaiv ouS ap^V xtvyjascoc; xtvet, aXX (XXLVTJTOC ovTa.

496 We saw the definitions of matter sub 476c, d. Matter there


appeared as a perfectly undetermined substratum, which has to receive
its determination from the form. So matter is potential, form the ac-

tuating principle.
In other places Ar. makes a distinction between matter in the absolute Relative

sense, which is called by the scholastics materia prima, and matter matter
on a higher level, called SsuTepa uXv) by the commentators. The first
is perfectly undetermined and potential; the second, though it received

a certain (elementary) determination, is still potential in relation to a


higher form.
Thus, prime matter is the substratum of elementary bodies (fire, air, water, earth).
In a second stage these elementary substances become in their turn "matter"
for some more complicated substance of a superior determination: homogeneous
parts are formed (r) TWV 6(jLoio[zepwv 960^) in organic beings, e.g. bone and flesh.
Then, in the third and last stage, heterogeneous parts are formed ft TWV avojxoio-
jxtpaiv), such as face and hand.

12 - 24
a. De part. anim. II i, 646 a :

Tpiwv 8* oucicov T&V ai)v0aea)v 7rpa>T7)v (Jiev


av TI<; OeiT) TT]V ex TWV xa-

15 Xou[xvcav wro Ttvcav OTOixetwv, olov y9j<; aepo<; uSaToc; 7iupo<;. STI 8s peXTiov
LCTWC; sx T&V 8uva[JLea)v Xeysiv, xal TO\JTCOV oux e^ aTraacov, aXX' ciaTrsp ev ETepoi?

etpyjTat xal TrpoTepov. uypov yap xal ^vjpov xal Ospfjiov xal ^uxP ov ^^ T ^ v
auv6T6>v cjG)fjLaT6)v ecrTtv at 8* SXXai 8ta90pal TauTau; axoXouOouatv,
olov

zopapo<;xal xou90TY](; xal TTUXVOTY]*; xal (JUXVOTT^ xal TpaxuT7]<; xal Xei6TY)<;
xal TSXXa Ta TOiauTa 7ra6Y) TCOV awfjiaTCov. SeuT^pa 8e aucrTaai*; ex

7rp(OT(ov y]
TCOV 6(jLoio[Aepoiv yvGic, ev Tote; <poi<; ecTTiv, olov OCTTOU
xal TWV iXXwv TCOV TOIO^TCOV. Tpta?) 8e xal TeXeuTaia xaT* api6[iov ^ TCOV

cov, olov TrpoercoTrou xal


86 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [496]

Therefore, matter is called by Ar. something relative (490 c: T&V 7rp6q Tt i\ (SXrj).

Reaction is essentially passive, it does possess a certain


fo Though matter
against activity. This might be inferred from the existence of monstrosities.
form j n a sense these are natural beings, because they are generated by living

beings according to a natural process. Yet they deviate from the normal
type. Why? Ar. replies: Because matter offers resistance to form and
prevents it from realizing itself perfectly.
9 - 17
De gen. anim. IV 4, 770 b :

s
"Eon yap TO Tspac; TCOV ?capa cpucriv TI, Tcapa cpiiaiv 8 ou Traaav aXXa TTJV 10

a><; ITTI TO TroXu Tcepl yap TYJV ael xal TY]V e avayxY]<; ouOev yivsTat rcapa
aXX' Iv TOI<; co<; STU TO 710X0 [isv OUTCO yLvofjtlvoic;, evSs^ojjtevoi^ Ss xal
eTrel xal TOUTCOV Iv oaoLc; au[ipatvei Tiapa TTJV TOC^IV [Jtev TauTTjv, ael [jievToi
(jLY) TUXOVTCO^;, YJTTOV eZvai Soxsl Tepac; Sia TO xal TO Trapa cpuaiv clvai TpOTrov 15
Ttva xaTa 9uaiv, Tav [Jtv] xpanfjcrfl TYJV xaTa TTJV uXy)v Y)
xaTa TO sISoc; 9\iai^.

See Mansion, Introd. pp. 114-116.

Matter
*
Generally speaking, matter sets bounds to the possibility of
c
element production of nature for not every matter can adopt every determination.
;

in nature
Metaph R ^ IO44a
i7
;

"Eo~Ti Ti oLxeta sc. iiXy) exaaTou.

Form 497 Form is used in parallel senses to matter.


*

matter Now, 'matter" is sometimes used by Ar. to indicate the corporeal


object, as our senses can grasp it. Form, then, is the intelligible type,
which is, opposite to the sensible substratum, the determining element

in the order of knowledge.


the essence with the terms
Form, therefore, is the essence. Ar. often speaks of it

T& TI 9)v elvai, ouaia and Xoyoc; (notion, definition). Cp. the passage about
the four causes (493).

a. Cf. Metaph. A 2, 1013 a


26
:

To sISoc; xal TO TuapaSeiyjjia, TOUTO &' ecmv 6 Xoyo<; TOU TL ^v elvat xal Ta
TOUTOU ysvT) etc.

Exactly the same words as in Phys. II 3.

b. De gen. et corr. II 9, 335 b


6
:

73 [Aop97) xal TO eI8o<; TOUTO 8 earlv 6 X6yo<; 6 T^ exadTou ouaia^.


In general 1/0997) indicates a visible form, elSo? an intelligible form or structure
[498] PHYS. II 87

498 a. Nature acts for the sake of an end, and it is itself an end. teleology

This is Ar.'s main thesis as to his doctrine on nature.


28
Phys. II 2, 194 a :

'H Si yvaic, TeXo<; xal o3 Ivsxa.


This view of natureis closely connected with that of Plato in Norn. and is X
directed against pre-socratic materialism, especially against Empedocles' doctrine
on the forming of organisms (our nr. llla-d).

b. Not every thing can claim to be an end, but only that which The end is

is best. We saw this in 490b (194 a32 BouXsrai yap ou Tuav elvai TO :

aXXa TO

Again in Phys. II 3, 195 a 23 - 25 :

Tex 8' ox; TO TeXo<; xal TayaOov T&V #XXoav (sc. aiTia ECTTLV)- TO yap o5
evexa peXTKJTOv xal TeXo<; T&V aXXcov eOeXei elvau
The same in Afetaph. A 2,
25 27
1013 b - .

c. An ayaOov is to Ar. always a certain plenitude of being, never always a


' J
plenitude
a non-being. of being
28 29
De gen. et corr. II 10, 336 b - :

BeXTLov TO elvai TOO [JLY]


slvai.

Hence a being never can own neve


d. strive after its extinction, nature y

striving always for "what is best", a fuller development. Ar. therefore


i.e.

finds fault with Platonism, which would lead up to the impossible conse-
quence that "the contrary would strive after its own extinction".
19 - 20
Phys. I 9, 192 a :

Tote; s (sc. nXocTowxol*;) aufjtpaivei, TO evavTtov opeyecrOai TYJS eauTOu


90opa<;.

Positive
e. Passing-away of individuals should be positively valued, as
i xu i j value of
keeping up the universal order. passing-
De b 10 away
gen. et corr. II 10, 336 :

sv tcrco XP VCI) xa>l ^ 90op<i >tal /) yvsm<; YJ


xaTa 9\i(TLv.

"The natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy

499
a. The
00
equal periods of time" (Joachim).

Ar. gives four arguments for the finality


J of nature.

stands against Empedocles' theory of the forming of


first
First
argument
for fmalitv

organisms. Ar. argues natural facts happen regularly but what happens
:
;

regularly, cannot be ascribed to chance.


PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [499]

35 8
Phys. II 8, ig8b -i99a :

IlavToc T<X 9ucrei Y)


dcel OUTCO YIVSTOCL Y) ax; em TO TroXu, TCOV 8 OCTCO TUX**)? xal
TOU auTopiaTou ouSev. Ou yap OCTTO Tux7)*? uS' OCTTO oru(JL7CT(0[JLaTO(; SoxeZ ueiv 199 a
TroXXaxic; TOU xs^&vo*;, aXX* lav UTUO xuva ouSe xaufiaTa OTTO xuva, aXX' av

Xei[jLcovo<;. Ei ouv ?) tb<; OCTTO <7U[i7rra>[jiaTO<; Soxei YJ


evexa TOU elvai, si (AY) olov
TS TauT* elvai (JLTJTS OCTTO au(JL7UTO)(JLaTO<; (JLYJT*
aruo TauTOfAocTou, evsxa TOU av 5
J
eiT). 'AXXa 9uaet y' eaTi Ta TOtauTa TuavTa
(JiY]v &<; xav auTol ^atev oi TauTa ,

XeyovTS<;. "EaTiv apa TO Svexa TOU ev TOL<; 96051 ytvojjievoi,^ xal ouciiv.

Second 8 - 15
b. Ib., 199 a :

argument
TL ev OCTOK; TeXoc; eaTt TL, TOUTOU evexa TupaTTeTai TO TcpoTepov xal TO
Ouxouv I0
vj^. ca^ TrpaTTeTat, OUTCO TT^uxe, xal w<; rce^uxev, OUTCO TcpaTTeTai
exaaTov, av (JLVJ
TL IjjiTcoSi^T]. UpaTTeTai 8' evexa TOU* xal 7re9uxev apa TOUTOU
2vexa. Olov ei oixia TWV 9uorei yivo[Aev(ov ?]v, OUTCOC; av eyiveTO a><; vuv

T^<; Texv7)<; et Se Ta 9uaei (JLYJ JJLOVOV 9uaei aXXa xal Te^vv] yiyvoiTO,
av yivoiTO I5
yj Tr^uxev. "Elvsxa apa OaTepou OaTepov.
Mansion paraphrases lines 8-12 as follows.

''With things that have a final term which is their completion,


all

the development leading to that final term is the result of an action


which aims at that term as an end. With a natural action, however,
corresponds a natural agens, and the nature of this agens shows itself
in the character of the development. Therefore, if the development
aims at an end, then the nature which is its agens, does too".

Third 15 - 20
c. Ib., 199 a :

argument r/

OXo><; Te 7) Te^vy) Ta (Jiev emTeXet a Y)


aSuvaTet aTcepyacracrOai, TOC 8e
yvaic,

(jtifjieiTat.
EL ouv Ta xaTa T/)V Te^v7]v evexa TOU, SvjXov OTI, xal Ta xaTa TT]V
9U(jiv ofJLOiax; yap e^ei, Tupoc; aXXvjXa ev TOLC; xaTa Texvvjv xal ev TOIC; xaTa
9ricriv Ta uaTepa rrpoc; Ta TrpoTepa.

Fourth 20 - 30
d. Ib., 199 a :

argument
MaXidTa Se 9avep6v em TCOV J^cocov TWV <5cXXcov, a ouTe TC^VY) OUTC y)TY)<7avTa
ouTe pouXeuaafJteva TUOiet 86ev StaTropoucrL Ttve<; TroTepov vco YJ
TIVL SXXcp epya-
S

^ovTat oi T dcpa/vai xal ol (jLup(ry]xe<; xal TOC TOiauTa. KaTa [xtxpov 8* OUTCO

Tcpol'ovTi xal ev TOOC; 9UTO^ 9aiveTai Ta au^epovTa ytv6(Jieva Tcp6(; TO TeXo^,


olov Ta 9\iXXa TY^<; TOU xapTrou Svexa arx^TTY]^. "QarT* ei 9uaet, Te Tcoieti xal Svexa 25
TOU Y) xe^^Scov TY)v veoTTiav xal 6 apaxvv]^ TO apaxvtov, xal Ta 9UTa Ta 9\lXXa

1
T(i ToiauTa Ttavra - e.g. teeth (mentioned in the
preceding passage) and other
parts of the body, which seem manifestly to have been made for some special use.
[499] PHYS. ii
89

gvexa TCOV xapTr&v xal T<X<; pia<; otix <5tvo> aXXa XOCTCO Svexa TTJ^ TpO9YJ<;, cpavspov
OTI ICTTIV 7) aMa YJ ToiauTT) ev TOI<; 9\icret yivo[Avoi<; xal
Fin aiity is
Mansion remarks might seem from the third argument, that Ar.
: It
conceives of nature, on the analogy of art, as a deliberating and consciously according to
Ar
acting being. If this were true, Ar.'s teleology would be anthropomorphist,
-

as it is usually thought to be by modern critics. That it is not so, appears


from the fourth argument to Ar. finality implies neither deliberation nor
:

intelligence. The cosmic order is intelligible, but impersonal. There is in


nature a coordination of certain activities and certain essences, in such a
manner, that those forms of activity assure to each species a regular
development, repeated in innumerable individuals. This, and nothing
else, appears to be the meaning of Ar/s teleological explanation of nature.

Nature often
500 Nevertheless, a great number of passages might be cited in which
A ^ i r x 11- x j i-
Ar. speaks of nature as of an intelligent and consciously acting being
-
i
1
represented
by Ar. as an
-i .

We togive some instances. intelligent


being
16
a. De gen. anim. II 6, 744 b :

"iicrTrsp yap oixovofJLoc; <xya06<;, xal 7] 9\i(n<; ouOev aTtojSaXXsiv eEcoOev e


&v ecm TroiYaafc TI

b. De part. anim. IV 10, 686 a 20 - 24 :

2
Tol<; (Jiev ouv SXXot<; ecm xa(X7rTo<; xal a9ov&uXou<; e/cov ,
ol Se Xiixoi
xal XCOVTE^ fiovoaTOUv TOV au/eva e'^oumv e^Xe^e yap Y] cpucns OTUCO^ rcpcx;

TTJV taxuv xpTjffLfAov auT^v excadL (jiaXXov ^ Trpo^ ra<;

33 9
c. Ib., Ill 8, 67ob -67ia :

ou TTOCVT* ^x T(^ ^ a ^^'


L
>
Soixev Y]

TOV TrXeiifJiova evatfjiov [JLOVOV, TOUTOI<; S* euXoyw^. Sia yap TYJV

UCTSWI;, Y)v e'x oucriv ev TO> (Jioptcp TOUTCO, SI^IQTLXOC TS TaijT* earl
TCOV ^coo)v, xal SetTai Tpocp^ ou (JLOVOV T^<; ^Y)pa<; aXXa xal TTJ<; uypac;
,
WCTT' e^ avayx7)(; xal TrepiTTOifxa ytvedOai TuXetov xal (xy)
TOCTOUTOV

[JLOVOV 8o~ov 6^6 TYJC; xotXiac; Tr^TTeaOai xal exxpiveaOai [XSTOC TOU Taunr)^ TTE-

ptTTcajjiaTO^. avayxT) TOIVUV elvat TL SexTixiv xal TOUTO\> TOO 7repiTTCo[JLaTO<;.

SioTcep 8(ra TrXeiifiova 2xei TOIOUTOV, aTravT* l^et xuanv.

d. Ib., IV 5, 682 a 6 - 8 .

Ar. is speaking here about insects which continue to live after they have been

1
Mansion, p. 261, notes 31-36, cites 20 passages, and in addition the whole
treatise on The Parts of Animals.
2
Sc.
90 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [5]
cut into pieces. The reason of this is, he says, that in such insects as have long bodies
the central organ, which is the seat ot perception, consists of several parts.
BouXsTOU [Jiev yap T) cpiidic; ev Tram [JLOVOV ev 7rot,elv TO TO&OUTOV *, ou Suva-

(jLevv)
8' evepyeia TTOISL (JLOVOV ev, SuvajjLet, 8e rcXeico SvjXov 8' ev eTpoi<; erepcov
[xaXXov.

e. D0 g. anim. Ill 2,
7 11
753 a - :

2
Eoixe Se xal y] 9u<7tc; poiiXecrGat, TTJV TCOV TSXVCOV aEaOijartv eTUfjLeXYjTtxvjv

aaxeua^eiv aXXa TOI^ [Jiev xeipoat, TOUT' e[jL7coieZ f^exP 1 TO ^ fs^etv (JLOVOV,

L<; Se xal Tcepl TT]V TeXecoaiv, 6<roc Se 9povL(jia>Tpa, xal Tcepl T'^v sxTpocpYjv.

4- 9
f. Ib., IV 10, 778 a .

In the preceding lines the author has spoken about the influence of the so-called
natural periods (day and night, month and year) on the generation of living
beings. He continues:
3
BouXeTai (Jiev
ouv
TOU; TOUTCOV api0(JLou;
7) apiO(JLtv Ta^ ysveaeLc;
<pu<7L<;
4
xal TOC^ TeXeuTac;, oux axpipol Se Sia Te TYJV T*^ uXvj^ aopio~Tiav xal Sia TO

ytveaOai TcoXXac; ap^a<;, at Tag yeveaeig Tag XOCT& ^uatv xal Tag 90opag e(JL7uo-
Si^ouaat TroXXaxig aiTiat. TCOV Tiapa ^UGLV CTU^TTITCTOVTCOV eiatv.
4
Cp. Phys. II 8, 994 b : xa ^ TC^ TEpara a[JiapT7)(jLaTa exetvoo TOU 2vex TOD.

How to ex- 501 How, then, to explain this?


Mansion 5 answers, and we think he is right : The theory, expounded
in Phys. not anthropomorphistic, the application is. However, as
II, is
all those passages are of a later date than Phys. II, so that it is not possible

to explain them as expressing a more primitive stage in the thought of


Ar., while, on the other hand, the author passes extremely severe judg-
ment on Plato in the Tim., we must conclude that the anthropomor-
phistic version is with Ar. rather a form of expression, which should
not be taken too literally.

Cp. De caelo II 9, 291 a 24 :

coaTiep TO (jLeXXov IcreciOat Trpovoouavjg TYJg

"As if nature foresaw the consequences". Here it is explicitly indicated, that


we have only to do with an image. Wherever, then, the (foarcep has not been added,
we have yet to understand this kind of expressions metaphorically.
To this, M. adds the argument that anthropomorphistic expressions are especially
numerous in the fragments of Ar.'s literary works (those of II. <piX. in De caelo).

The said organ.


TXVCOV ata07)<Kv ^TUjjieXYjTLXYjv - a special sense of care for their young.
r?)v TCOV
"by the measure of these periods".
"but she does not bring this to pass accurately".
Introd., p. 262-263.
[501] PHYS. II
91

Many instances of the same metaphorical use might be adduced from modern
writers, and this not in popular works only.
Cp. in Bergson's Evolution crdatrice the frequent use of terms like "nature has
to triumph over resistances"; she "finds" or "tries different solutions for the same
problem"
1
she "operates not in this, but in that way" 2 etc.
; ;

502 De caelo I 4, 271 a 33 :

'O 8k Oe6<; xod 7] 9\iai<; ouSev (JKXTYJV Ttotouai. De cae i

"God and nature" almost as synonyms. What does this mean?


Mansion answers: Not much, or rather nothing. It is just an expression,
a metaphor. For it does not harmonize at all with Ar.'s conception of
God in his scientific treatises on this subject (see 5 of this chapter).
Now, certainly, M. is right. Only, when we remember that in the dialogue II.
9iX. the aspect of our visible world and of cosmic order seemed to Ar. a proof for
the existence of gods 3 it might become clear to us that the author of De caelo I,
,

which is of an early date, still adhered to, or at least was not far away from, Plato's
religious conviction that a god or a divine Mind must have created the order of
the sensible world. We can imagine that, only a few years later, the same author
detached himself from this conviction.

503 Chapters 4-6 deal with chance and spontaneity (TU^ and <XUTO-
(JLOCTOV), which are generally considered as causes of many things in nature.
First, they are said to be neither the cause of things which always come to pass
in the same way, nor of those which mostly do so.
The next distinction made by Ar. is that between things which happen TIVO<;
Ivexa and others which do not. Chance and spontaneity occur in the first group.
We cite the text.
17 - 32
a. Phys. II 5, 196 b :

Twv 8k yivo^Jilvcov TOC p.ev evsxa TOD yiyveTai, T(* ^' ^ "
TOOTCOV 8k T<X JJLSV

xara Trpoatpecnv, ou xaTa Tupoatpeatv, a(Ji<pG> o ev TCH<; evsxa TOD, COCTTC


Ta S'

20 STjXov OTI xai ev TO<; Trapa TO avayxatov xat TO &$ ITU TroXu SCTTW evta Trepl
a evSe^eTai i>7uapxsw TO evexa TOD. "EorTi 8* Svexa TOD 8aa TC OCTUO Siavoia^
av TrpaxQe^ xat oVa arco 9ti(T6)<;.
Ta Sr) TOtauTa OTav xaTa (TUfJipepTjxo^ yevyjTai, OCTTO TU^^ 9afJLev slvai.
f

25 'Qa7rep yap xal- 8v IGTI TO [lev xaO* auTO TO 8k XOCTOC au(JLpepY]x6<;, OUTCO xal
aiTiov evS^eTai, elvai, olov oixtac; xa6* auTO [JLEV aiTtov TO otxoSojJiixov, xaTa
s

cru[Jipep7)x6(; 8k TO Xeuxov ^ TO [XOIXTLXOV. T6 (lev ouv xa0 auTO atTiov a>pio~(jivov,


TO 8e xaTa au[jLpep7)x6(; a6pi(iTov &Tcei,pa yap av TW evl (rufJipaiT].

1
Reason (in man) and instinct (in animals) are, according to Bergson, "different
solutions for the same problem".
2
Not by composition or construction, like a human artisan, but by division.
The "method" of nature is put in opposition to the method of man. Yet, nature
"operates" after some intelligible method!
8
Our nr. 427.
Q2 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [503]

KaOdbrep o5v eXe^O^ foav ev TOI<; evexa TOU yiyvofjievoic; TOUTO yeV/jTai, 3
TOTS X^yeTai daro TauTOjiaTou xal OCTTO TUX*/]?. AUT&V 8e 7tp6<; #XXY)Xa TYJV

Siacpopav TOUTCOV uaTepov SiopiaTeov.

So both chance and spontaneity are in the sphere of things which


happen evexa TOU. I.e.: chance is not against the finality of nature; it
is subordinate to it, being an accidental cause.

instance 33 3
fo ft f 196 b -ig7 a : an instance of chance.

Olov gvexa TOU aruoXapelv TO apyupiov YjX6ev av, xo(juopie~vou TOV epavov,
*
el f)8ei ?]X6e 8* ou TOUTOU evexa, aXXa (juve^Y) auTco eXOelv, xal TtoiYJcrai TOUTO
TOU xo[AiaaaOai evexa 2
TOUTO 8e ou8* co<; em TO TioXu cpotTcov ei^ TO ^capiov
OUT* e^ dvayxY)<; e'cm Se TO TeXo<;, r\ xo^iSr), ou TCJV ev auTto atTtcov, aXXa TWV
TrpoaipeTcov xai, aruo Siavoia^ xal XyeTai ye TOTe OCTIO TUX^C; eXOeiv-
Definition ft 5-6
c> 157 a :

AvjXov apa OTL y) TU^T) aWa xaTa au(jLpepr)xo<; ev TOIC; xaTa rcpoaipeaiv
evexa TOU.

Automaton 504 36
~b 8
b 13- 18
a. Phys. II 6, I97a ;
:

notion than Aia^pepei 8 OTI TO auTOfiaTOv eTil TrXeiov ecm* TO (Jtev yap OCTTO TUX"/)?

tyche ^Q J

TauTOfJicxTou, TOUTO S ou Trav OCTTO TUy)^. *H (Jiev yap TU^IQ xal TO (XTTO 19?
b

TUX*/)^ ea-Ttv oaoi^ xal TO euTu^^ai av uTuap^etev xal oXco<; 7rpa^t(;. Ai6 xal

avayxY) Tuepl Ta TrpaxTa elvai TYJV TU^V S' OTI Soxet ^TOI, TauTov *
c77](jLel'ov
1
elvat TYJ euSaifjiovia Y] euTU/ia Y] eyyuc, Y)
S euSaifjiovta 7upat<; Tig euirpa^ia yap. 5
f/
liaO' oTTocroig (JLY) evSexeTai rcpa^ai, ouSe TO a;c6 TU^^ TI Troi^aaL. Kal Sta
TOUTO ouTe a^u^ov ouSev OUTC OYjpfov ouTe Trat-Stov ouSev Tioiet a7ro TU/Y^,
OTI oux e/ei Trpoaipeortv
s
To 8 auTO(jtaTov xal TO^ aXXoig ^cooig xal TroXXotg TO>V a^6x wv ?
^ ov

LTTTUOC; auT6(jLaTog, 9a(jiev, Y^XOev, STL eaa>0Y) [xev eX6a>v, ou TOU aco0YJvai 8e 15
evexa 9)XOev. Kal 6 TpiTiouc; auT6(iaTog xaTeTteaev eaTY) [xev yap TOU xaOYJcrOai
J

evexa, aXX ou TOU xaOYJdGat evexa xaTeTrecrev.

1
the reading xo^o^evou is right, we must render: "A man gets back his
If

money from his debtor who (at the very moment the other enters the market)
is receiving contributions for a feast. He could have gone to the spot for the purpose
of getting back his money, but" etc.
2
If the words TOO must be kept here, it is necessary to put a
xojjLtaaaOai 2vexa
comma after iXOetv: "But he went
some other reason, and now, (in fact), he
for
has done it for the sake of receiving his money". The expression of this idea
might seem to us rather strange. Bonitz simply ejected TOU xopUaadOat vexoc, and
this might appear to the modern reader a highly attractive solution. Yet, I do
think it possible that Ar. wrote these words. Cf. 197 b 17 (our next nr.), where he
says of the tripod that it "came to stand there so as to serve for a seat", though it
did not fall for that use.
[504] PHYS. ii
93

18 - 22 Definition
b. Ib., 197 b :

f/
l<7T <pavsp6v 8n ev TOI^ aTrXw^ evexa TOU yivo^vot^, 8rav JJI

Svexa yv7]TaL o5 Sco T6 aiTiov, T6re OCTCO TauTOfxaTou XeyofJiev OCTTO

TOUTCOV 8aa OCTTO


TauTOfjiaTou ylveTai TCOV TtpoaipeTcov TOL^ e'xouat,

505 Finally, is necessity in nature absolute, or is it hypothetic ? Necessity

Ar. answers: the material cause is tbv oux aveu, but the final cause is

the real and decisive cause.

34 10
a. Phys. II 9, 199 b -2OO a :

To S* e avayxTjc; TOTepov e uTroOecrecoc; uTcapxet ?)


xal arcXco^ ;
vuv fjtev

zoo a yap OIOVTOCI TO e^ dvayxTjc; elvai ev T^ TOV TOI^OV e^


yevecrei, caaTcep av si TIC;

avayx7)<; yeyev^c0at VOJJLI^OL, OTL Ta [JLEV (3apea


XOCTCO Tre^uxe 9epea0ai T<X Se
xou^a IrciTToX^, Sto ol XtOot (JL^V XOCTO) xal TOC OejieXta, Y] Se y^ Svco Sta xou-
cpoTTjTa, eTiiTToXr^ Se fJiaXiaTa Ta ^uXa- xou^OTaTa yap.
5 'AXX* 8(jL(o<;
oux aveu (Jiev
TOUTCOV y^yovev, ou [jilvTGi,
Sta TauTa 7rX7]v coc; Si*
e
evexa TOU xpuinreiv aTTa xal aco^eiv. O[AOtct)^ Se xal ev T0t<; aXXoic;
uXvjv, aXX'

Traaiv, ev OCTOK; TO evexa TOU eaTtv, oux Sveu (xev TCOV avayxaiav I/OVTCOV TYJV
10 9uatv, ou [xevTOi ye Sta TauTa aXX' ^ coc; uXyjv, aXX' evexa TOU.

b. Ib., 200 a 30- 34 :

Oavepov STJ 8Tt TO avayxal'ov ev TOC^ ^uatxolc; TO co<; uXrj Xey6(xevov xal at
at TauTTjc;. Kal ajji^w [Jtev
TCO 9uaix(o XexTeai at aluaL, jxaXXov Se y]

Svexa amov yap TOOTO TTJ<; uXv]c;, dXX' ou^ auTT] TOU TeXou<;.

Mansion l concludes Finality, then, is according to Ar. the normal rule of nature,
:

a necessity of an intelligible character. What is not governed by this law is what


we call contingent, and is ascribed to accidental causes. But Ar. is not so much
interested in the accidental and contingent as in the regular order of normal
phaenomena, by which the universe is sustained in that being which is its agathon.

4 DEFINITIONS OF MOTION, SPACE AND TIME

506 Ar. now tries to define motion. The definition Motion


is preceded by
some preliminary remarks.

a. Phys. Ill i, 200 b 16 - 21 :

Aoxet S' /) xivY)ai<; elvai TCOV auve^cov, TO S* a*7reipov ejjLCpatveTat TcptoTov ev


TCO auvexet* 816 xal TOI^ 6pio(jLevoi<; TO auve^e^ aujApatvei 7rpo<jxpv)<raa6ai

TcoXXaxu; TCO X6y<o TCO TOU dbcetpou, co^ TO etc; oareLpov SiaipeTOv auve^<; 8v.
8k TOUTOK; Sveu TOTTOU xal xevou xal ^povou XLVY]aiv aSiivaTov elvat.

Introd., p. 327.
94 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [506]

b. Ib., b 26- 28 :

"E<m 873 [TI] TO [Jiev lvTXXia JJLOVOV *, TO 8i Suva(iet xal evTeXexeta, TO

[Zv ToSe TI, TO 8e TocrovSe, TO Se TOtovSe, xal ETU TCOV SXXcov T&V TOU 6vTO<;

xar/jyopicov ojiotox;.

Definition c J^ ^ 2 OI a 10 - 11 1

73
TOU SuvafJiei o v T o <; IvTfiX^xeia, f) TOLOUTOV, x -

v Y)
a i <; aT i v.

the definition J Jb 201 a 11 - 15 :


^

OIov TOU [lev aXXoicoTou, fj aXXoicoTov, <xXXoicoCTi<;, TOU Se au^vjTou xal TOU
avTixeijjlvou 90iTou (ouSev yap ovofxa xotvov ITT' a^^otv) au^Y]ai^ xal 90t
TOU 8e Y ev7 T0 ^ xa ^ ^QapTou yeveatc; xal ^Oopa, TOU Se ^opyjTou 9opa.
)

E.g. something is actually x (stones, wood and mortar), potentially y (a house).


:

Now motion is: actualizing the y-ness (the building of the house).

space 507 a. Phys. IV 4, 212 a 21 - 22 : definition.

TOTOU 7cepi/ovToc Trepan (XXIVYJTOV ?rpo>Tov, TOUT'


S a T i v 6 TOTTOC;.

Space is
212 a 14- 20
motionless
b. Ib.,
o
f,

coaTcep TO
x ,
:

M ,

ayyetov TOTT;O<; |XTa9op7jTO<;, OUTCO xai o TOTCOI; ayyeiov


, ^ .,,..
v. Aio OTav [lev ev xivoujjievo) TI xLvvJTai xal (jLTa(3aXXy) TO SVTO<;,
olov ev 7roTa[jLcp TtXoiov, co^ ayysico ^pYJTat, piaXXov r\
TOTUCO T<O Trepte^ovTt.
BouXeTat 8* axtvv]Toc elvat 6 TOTUO^- 816 6 ?ra^ jzaXXov TroTajjio^ TOTTOC, OTL

6 Tra^.

Time 508 Preliminary remarks on time.


a. Time has to do with motion, but it is not motion.
9 - 18
Phys. IV 10, 218 b :

not= motion 'Eirel Se SOXSL (jiaXiaTa elvai xal TL<; 6 /povo<;, TOUT*
xivY)ai<; (JLeTapoXv)
av ELY) <JX7UTOV. 'H (JLV OtJV Xa<TTOU [XCTapoXY] Xal XtVYjat^ V aUTW TCO (JLTa- 10

paXXovTt [Jiovov (TTV, YJ


ou av TU/YJ 6v auTO TO xivoufjivov xal [JiTapaXXov
6 SE xp vo ? >al TuavTa/ou xal Tiapa Tcaaw. "ETL
O(JIOLCO<; jxeTapoXYj [JLv ECTTI
Traaa OOCTTCOV xal ppa8uTpa, XP^ V ^' oux CTTIV TO yap fipaSu xal Ta^u 15

Xpovco captaTai, Ta^u JJLEV TO Iv oXiyco TioXu xtvou(jivov, PpaSu 8k TO Iv TuoXXco


oXtyov 6 SE XP^ V0 ^ OU X &P&cjTat XP^ V(^ ^T T^ TTOOTO^ Ti elvai OUT TO>

(Jiv TOLVUV oux 2<iTi xiv7]ai<;, ^avepov.

1
TL is bracketed by Ross; Spengel, Bonitz and Prantl inserted T& B
after (jL6vov, a correction which has been adopted by Hardie in his translation.
[508] MOTION, SPACE AND TIME 95

b. Ib. ii, 2i8b 21 - 23 :

'AXXa (JLYJV
ouS' <5tveu ye OTav yap
{JLeTa(3oX9j<; (jiYjSev auTol [jieTa(3aXX<0{Jiev change
TY)V Siavoiav ?) XaOa)(jiev fieTapaXXovTCc;, ou Soxei 7](juiv yeyovvai,

509 Time an
a. Time, then, appears to be a certain aspect of motion. aS P CCt f
TU d
2- 4
Ib., 219 a !
motion
Ss, sTcel y)Tou[jiev TI ecmv 6 xpw<^evTeuOev ap^o(jilvoi<;, TI

Yjasax; ecmv. "Afjia yap xivv)aeco<; a[(j0av6(jieOa xal ypovou.

10 - 14 Motion
b. Ib., 219 a :

TO xtvou(Jivov xtvetTat ex Ttvo<; el'^ TI xal Tuav (xey0o<; (ruvsxe<;, magnitude


axoXouOel' TCO [xeyeOei, TJ xtvyja^ Sta yap TO TO fxeyeOoc; elvai cjuve^e^ xal T)

xivY)at(; eaTi auve^v)^, 8ta Se TTJV xivyjaiv 6 /povo<; OCTYJ yap YJ xivyjaK;, TOCTOUTOC;
xal 6 XP^ V S && SOXSL yeyovevat.

c. Ib., 2ioa 14- 21 :


on/1
15 T6 Se S*/] TTpoTepov xal (icrrspov ev TOTTW TcpcoTov SCJTIV. 'EvTauOa (JLSV SYJ

T^ Oeaei eicel 8' ev TO) fjieyeOsi, saTl TO TTpoTepov xal uarepov, avayxv) xal ev

xivyjaei elvat TO TcpoTepov xal uaTSpov, avaXoyov TOL<; exei. 'AXXa (JLT]V
xal ev

^povco IcrTl TO TcpoTepov xal ucjTepov Sta TO axoXouOstv asl OaTepco OaTepov
20 auTcov. "EaTi Se TO TrpOTepov xal uaTepov ev not identical
TYJ xtvyicei. o ptev TIOTE ov xtvyjaic;
i ,r ~ / , / ,
with motion x
1
SGTIV TO (jtVTOi eivai auTco Tpov xat ou xtvYjai^.
-

d. Ib. 2IQ a 22- 25


'
Yetconnect-
'

, A ^ > > x / ,<, <> >


ed Wlth thC
v / X
AXXa xai TOV XP OVOV T
(JLYJV yv(opi,Qo[JLv, oTav opiaw[JLv TT^V XIVTQGIV, TO apprehension
xal xal TOTE 9a(JLev yeyovevai /povov, OTav TOO of time
TrpOTepov (iaTepov opi^ovTec;
TcpOTepou xal ucrrepou sv T^ xtvyjaei alaOTjaiv

1 -2 Definition
510 a. Ib., 219 b :

TOUTO yap ECTTIV 6 /povoc;, apL0(Ji6<; xivyjorewc; xaTa


TO TupoTepov xal (icTTSpov.
5- 9
b. Ib., 219 b :
the definition
s
l 8 aptOfjio^ ICTTL SLXCO^; yap TO aptOfjiou^evov xal TO a
(xal
Xeyofjisv, xal & apt6[JLou(JLv), 6 Ss XP^ VO<? ^ aT ^ T0 aptO(jLoii(jievov xal
& apt6fjLou(jiev. "EaTi 8
s

eTspov $ apL0(jioij(jLev xal TO aptO(jiou[jLevov.

So time "the countable aspect of movement". If an event comes to pass "in


is

time", this means that it is measurable ("countable") by time.

1
As to its substratum it is identical with motion yet
; it differs from it in essence.
96 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [5ll]

Existence 4- 9
511 a. Phys. IV 12, 221 a :

Kal 2<m T7) xLvqaeL TO ev XP^w efvai TO

xal TO elvai auTTJS' a[ia yap TYJV xlVqaLV xal T& elvai Tyj xivyjaei
xal TOUT' e<m aoTfl TO ev XP^ V< ) elvai, TO [xeTpeLaOaL aoT>j<; TO elvaL.
!

AyjXov 8* STL xal TOL<; aXXoL<; TOUT* e<m TO ev XP^ VC elvaL, TO [jieTpet<T0aL
auTcov T& elvai UTTO TOO

Eternal b. 221 b 3- 7
Ib., :

not in time "i^crre 9avepov STL TOC ael OVTOC, f]


ael ovTa, oux eaTtv ev
TO etvai auTcov UTUO TOO XP^ VOU
UTUO xpovo^, o^Se (JteTpecTat

Se TOUTOU STL ouSe Tuaaxst ouSev OTTO TOO XP^ VOU ^^ ^ K ov^a ev
Rest, too, is
^ Jj-)j 221 b 7 - 12 :

'
8* earlv 6 xp^ v ^ pteTpov xLVYjaeco^, ecTaL xal Y]pe(jLLac; jxeTpov xaTa
Tcaaa yap y]pe[JLLa ev xpovco. Ou yap co<J7rep TO ev xLvyjaeL ov avayxY)

,
OUTCO xal TO ev xpovco ou yap XLVTJCLC; 6 xp6 v ?5 4^' apL6{ji6c; XLVY)-
ev aL0Jia> 8e

Would there 5J2 At the end of this book Ar. raises the important question
there were whether there would be time if there were no soul, i.e. if there were no
no soul?
knowing subject which could "count" or measure. He replies by saying
that, in this case, there would still be movement, which is the "sub-
stratum" of time (TOUTO 6 TIOTC ov eaTiv 6 xpovo<0, but not its measurable
aspect, which is "time".
21 29
Phys. IV 14, 223 a - :

IloTepov 8e (JLTJ ouonr)<; 4*


U X'^ S &Q ^ v XP^ VO(^ ^ ^ aTropifjaeLev av TLC; aSuvaTou
yap OVTO^ elvaL TOU apL6(ji7]aovTo^ aSuvaTov xal aptO^Tov TL etvaL, ciaTe SvjXov
OTL ouS* apLOfjLO^; apLOfjLoc; yap r\ TO Y)pLO(JL7][jLevov Y] TO apLO[XY)T6v. EL 8e (jL7]8ev
'
&XXo Tre^uxev cxpL0fJLeZv U X*) xa L ^ U
?j 4* X^
vou^, aSiivaTov elvaL xpo vov ^ U X^) ? 2 5 <

[JLY] oiia7]<;, aXX' IQ


TOUTO 6 TCOTC ov eaTLv 6 xpo v ?> ^ v e ^ evSexeTaL XLvyjaLv
elvai aveu ^uxvj^. To Se rcpoTepov xal uaTepov ev XLV/JCTCL CGTLV xpo vo<? 8e
5
TauT eaTiv v) apL0(JLY)Ta eaTLv.

5 THE THEORY OF THE FIRST UNMOVED MOVER


513 Ar. starts from the fact of movement in the sensible world.
Now whatever is in movement is moved by something else. There must,
then, be a First Movent, which unmovable. This first Movent
is itself

must be eternal, because movement and such it is, in Aris-


is eternal
totle's opinion, necessarily. It can have no parts nor magnitude, because
[513] THE PRIME MOVER 97

in a finite magnitude resides a finite force, and this could not be the
cause of eternal motion. The firstMovent, then, is incorporeal.
Ar. finally argues that the first Movent must be at the circumference
of the world, because here the movement is quickest and therefore
nearest to the Source.
We cite the end of Ar.'s exposition, where he resumes his main
argument.
Phys. VIII 10, 267a
21
-b 9 :
the theory of
~ the Primc
>
8' ev TOU; oScriv avdcyxY) XIVYJCTIV elvat auve^vj, OCUTY) 8e (xta eaTiv, dvayxYj Mover in
ys *
8e TYJV [Jiiav fJieyeOouc; T TLVOC; elvat (ou yap xivetTai TO ajjtiyeOec;), xal ev6<;
s
xal 69' evos (ou yap SCFTOCI <iuvexY)<;, aXX exofJiivY) erlpa eTepa<; xal 8iY)pYj{jivY)),

25 TO SY] xivouv et 2v, YJ xivotifjievov xivet, YJ OCXIVYJTOV 8v. El [i^v SY] xivoufxevov,
cuvaxoAouOeLv SSYJOTEI, x xal (XETapaXXstv auTo, ajia 8e xiveicrOat UTTO Tivoq.
2
6yb ^CTTE GT/jareTai et^ T6 xtvLCT0ai UTUO axivvjTou
xal yj^ei TOUTO yap oox
3
avayxY] au[X{jLeTapaXXsi,v, aXX* aei TS SuvYjaeTai xtveov (STTOVOV yap TO OUTW
xiveiv ) xal 6fJLaXv)<; auTT) Y) xtvy]cri<;, ?) (JLOVYJ 7^ [xaXiaTa ou yap 2^ei

5 TO xivouv ouSejjLLav. Aet 8e ouSe TO xtvoujjievov irpoc; exelvo xeiv


'iva ojJLota ^ 7) xtvYjcjic;.

'AvayxY) SYJ YJ
ev (xecrco Y)
ev xiixXco elvai 4<
auTat yap al apxai 5 'AXXa Ta- .

XtarTa xivetTat TOC eyyuTaTa TOU XIVOUVTO?, ToiauTYj 8* Y) TOU oXou xivY)ai<;'
exei &a TO xivouv.

514 The conclusion


of the preceding passage leaves us with two

problems: (i) can a How


non-corporeal First Movent have its place at
the outside of the universe ? (2) How can it impart a physical movement ?
To these questions Ar. gives the answer himself in the famous words
in Meta1>h. A 7, 1072 b
3
:
it works as
a final cause
TT
mvei
.,
^
OY)
,
co<;
, ,

epcofxevov.

"It produces motion as being loved" or striven after.


Now this again leaves some difficulties: (i) If there is eternal movement, i.e.
circular movement, which is the first and most perfect of motions, why then a
First Mover ? (2) If this First Mover, whom Ar. calls God (in Metaph. A), produces
motion "as being loved", than a soul must be attributed to tne first heaven; and,

1
subject to the same conditions as
auvaxoXouGetv Se^aei- "it will have to be

that which moves".


it
2
"So we have a series that must come to an end".
3
O(>TCO - sc. [L^i oujxjxeTapdtXXov.
4
sc. T& xtvouv. v xuxXci) - at the circumference.
5
at dtpxat - sc. the first principles from which a sphere is derived. In ch. 8 Ar.
has argued that only circular movement can be continuous and infinite.
De Vogel, Greek Philosophy II 7
98 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [514]

if more unmoved movers are admitted (as Ar. teaches in A 8), so for each heavenly
sphere.
Now the first point is against logic, the second against the view of modern science.

the Prime 515 What Ar. says further in Metaph. A, must be seen in connection
Metaph. A with his doctrine of matter and form and of potency and act, which
is expounded in the books Z- (see our next chapter). We met with
these principles in Phys. I-II.

(1) the indefinite, form the determining. In the physical world form
Matter is

and matter are united in the physical objects. But form can exist by itself, not in
physical, but in metaphysical reality. The highest being, which as prime cause is
at the beginning of all motion, must be pure form without matter.
(2) In order to explain the fact of physical change, Ar. assumes a potential
being. This is something real (e.g. an acorn can become an oak, never a beech),
but it must be brought to full reality (vpyeia or IvTeX^xeta) by an efficient cause.
Therefore the definition of motion, given sub 506c. God, then, as supreme being,
must be full reality or completion, and therefore absolutely necessary.

God as the a A 4 11
Metaph.' 7, 1072 b - :

absolutely _,, , T ., , , rf ._ .
,

necessary &* ouv TI xiveiTai, evoex^at xai aXXox; X eiv O)(JT ei L*)J <pop<* rcpomq
f*ev > 4,
being v pyeia ecmv, fj xiveLTat, TOCUTY) ye evSex Tai &&<**$ e'xsw, xara TOTCOV, xal
.fj

el [!>)
XOCT* ouaiav eTcel 8e 2<m TI XLVOUV auTo axivYjTov ov, evepyeia 8v, TOUTO
oux evS^x e ^ ai aXXco^ e'xstv ouSa(jL6>^. ^opa yap Y] TrpcoTY] TCOV (JieTapoXcov, rauTT)^
Sfe T] x\ixXo> Toctrnqv 8e TOUTO xivcL e^ dcvayx7)<; <5cpa SGTIV ov xal fj avayxy), 10
xaXcoc;, xal OUTCO<;

b. As absolutely necessary being, then, it is the First Principle,


on which the universe depends.
13 - 14
Ib., 1072 b :

On this x
]
ToiauTY]<; apa ap/% ^pT7)Tai 6 oupavo^ xal YJ 9\icri^.

the universe One might justifiably call this a monotheistic principle. We find it expressed
depends again at the end of the same book:

c. Metaph. A 10,
3 4
1076 a - .

In the preceding lines Ar. rejects the theory of Speusippus, who assumed mathe-
matical number as first principle, instead of the Platonic Ideas and ideal Numbers.
He rejects it on the ground, that by this theory a multiplicity of dtp/at would be
introduced.

Ta Se 8vTa ou (SouXeTai, TroXiTeiieaOai xax&<;.


0ux aya66v TuoXuxoipavtY) elc; xotpavo*; &mo.

516 Ar. now undertakes to describe the life and character of his
Prime Mover.
[516] THE PRIME MOVER 99

1 ^ 80
a. Metaph. A 7, 1072 b :
ThtUtoo*
the Prime
, 15 AtaY<>Y^ 8* laTlv ota ^ ip(<rn) (juxpov xpovov :?)(uv. ofiTco yofcp Ael ixeivo Mover
(J)fjuv fi4v Y<fcp AStivaTov), fcrcel xal ^SovJ) ?) ivlpyeta Tofoou (xal 8ti TOUTO

J)
84 v6r]ai^ ?)
xa6* aurJjv TOU xaO* a^To iptcrrou, xal ^ (xdcXiaTa TOU fzdcXterra.

2oa6Tov Si voet 6 vou<; xaTA TOU VOTQTOU* VOYJTO<; y^P


(xsTdcXyj^tv 061 6 1
TY^" Y^^
vcov 2 xal vocov, &0Te TauT^v vous xal vo>)T6v. T6 Y^P SSXTIXOV TOU VOTJTOU
xal T?)^ oierCa^ vou^, IvepYet 84 2x o)V 5 <*>(JT> 4^*f v ou {JtaXXov TOUTO 8 8 8oxei
6 vou^ 0eiov S^eiv, xal *J) OscopCa TO i]&i<yTov xal ipiGTov. si o5v
25 xet ^^ f)(xet^ TCOT^, 6 0e6<; dcet, 0au(iaaT6v el 8e (xaXXov,
*
xal I^wy) 8 Y i^^PXet
'
fl Y^P vo ^ 4v^PY eia ^^ xeZvo$ 84 f)

'IpYsia 84 Y)
xa6* auryjv Ixetvou ^oi-Jj Aptcnry) xal dltSioc;. q>a|JL4v

TOV 6e6v elvat ^(jiov itSiov SptaTov,


1

&<iTe ^o) }) xal alciv 0uvsx^<; xal


TOUTO Y&P 6
If asked: what is the relation of this God of Ar. to the world,
the question is

our answer must be Certainly not that of Creator to creation. First, Ar. assumes
;

eternal matter; so he does not know creation in the biblical sense of the word.
Secondly, his God does not know the world. He only knows Himself, and to Ar.
this knowledge does not include any knowledge of the world 6 on the contrary, ;

it excludes it.

b. Cp. Metaph. A 9, 1074 b


33 - 36 :

AUTOV &pa vost, eteep eaTl T& xpcxTtorTOV, xal

517 We could read chapters 7, 9 and 10 of Metaph. A as a unity, theory of

in which we find one line of thought the establishment of the principle :


Of unmoved
of the Prime Mover, who is the one apxv) on which depends the whole of m vers

the universe and nature.


Ch. 8 introduces a theory, which might appear to us as harmonizing
rather badly with the preceding, namely, that, as there are 47 or 55
celestial spheres, for each of them an unmoved mover should be assumed.

1
the value of knowledge and perception in itself cp. Metaph. A i.
On
coming into contact with its objects. Cp. nr. 559b (Metaph.
1 - in
Oifydcvwv
10, 1051 b 24 1).
8
TOUTO - the actual possession of its object is rather the Setov which thought
seems to contain in itself, than "that" (xe(vou), sc. than the mere SCXTIXOV elvat
TOO VOTQTOU.
4
These words have been chosen by Werner Jaeger as a motto for his Aristotle.
Thomas Aquinas, who explained Ar. with great benevolence, found the
8
S.

way to a larger interpretation: directly the divine Mind knows only itself, but in
Himself God knows all things. ("Nee sequitur quod omnia alia a se ei sunt ignota;
nam intelligendo se intellegit omnia alia. 11 ) So also in Brentano, who christianizes*
Ar. even far more than S. Thomas did.
100 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE [5*7]

a. Metaph. A 8,
14 16
1073 a - a^-b 1
; :

IIoTepov 8k fjuav OETOV TTJV TOtaiinqv ouatav T) 7rXe[ou^, xal Tc6<ra<;, SSL

JJL7)
XavOavetv x .
15
'H [Jiev yap ap^T) xa ^ T0 rcpcoTov TCOV SVTCOV OCXIVTJTOV xal xa6' auTo xat xaTa
dUfjipepYjxoi;, xivouv 8e TTJV TUpcoTTjv atSiov xal p,iav xtvTjmv ?cel Se T& xivoii- 25

(jievov avayxT) UTCO TIVOC; xivetaOai, xal TO TrpcoTov xivouv axtvvjTOv slvat xaO*
auTo, xal TTJV atSiov XIVYJCILV OTTO al'Stoo xivetaGaL xal TTJV fjLiav 69* ev6<;, 6poJ(JLev
S^ Tuapa TTjv TOU rcavTog TYJV a7rX9jv ^opav, *^v xtveiv ^a^xev TTJV TrpcoTTjv ouaiav
xal axCvyjTov, SXXac; ^opac; ouaac; TCX^ TCOV TcXavyjTcov aiStou<; (atSiov yap xal 30
aaraTov TO xuxXci acajjia SeSeixTai 8* ev TOL<; 9uaLxot<; x Tiepl ToiiTwv), avayxTj
xal TOUTCOV exaaTYjv TCOV cpopcov UTU* axtvyjTou Te xtvetaOat xa6* auTYjv xal
al'Stou ouatac;. 73 Te yap TCOV <5caTpo>v 9\i(TLc; atSto<; ouata TI<; o5aa, xal TO xtvoov 35
atStov xal 7rp6Tpov TOU xtvoufji^vou, xal T& 7Tp6Tepov oua(a<; ouatav avayxatov
slvai. <pavep6v TOLVOV STI ToaauTa^ TE ouata<; avayxatov elvat TYJV TC cpiicriv at'Stou^
xal dxivY]Tou<; xa0* auTac;, xal aveo (jLeyeOou<; Sta TYJV etpYj^vyjv aLTtav TcpoTCpov. b

b. The numbers of these substances, then, must be determined


by astronomy.
1-8
Ib., 1073 b :

fjLev o5v etalv outrtai, xal TOUTCOV Ti TrpcoTT] xal SeuTepa xaTa TTJV ao
Ta<; 9opat<; TCOV &<TTpcov, ^avepov T& Se TrXYjOo^ i^Sy] TCOV ^opcov ex

9iXoaocpia TCOV [jLaGyjfjLaTLXcov eTTKTTTjfJLcov axoTiecv, ex TYJC; 5


Set

aaTpoXoyta<; auTT} yap ruepl ouatac; aia6y]T7j<; fjiev ai'Stoo Se TcotecTai TTJV Oecopiav,
at S* &XXat Tiepl ouSe(JLia<; ouaiac; 2 , olov T^ Te Trepl TOIX; apiOfJioix; xal TTJV yeco-

c. Astronomical calculation leads Ar. to the following result.


Ib., 1074 a 10 - 16 :

*O STJ aTraaoyv TCOV Te 9epouacov xal TCOV aveXtTTOuacov 3 TauTa^ 10


api6jjLo<;

TrevTTjxovTa Te xal rcevTe. et Se TTJ aeXTjVT) Te xal Tcp TjXtco [JLTJ TcpoarTiOeiT) TLC;
a; eiTiofjLev xLVT]crei<;, at Tcacrat ^atpat eaovTat eTUTa Te xal TecraapdxovTa.
TO jiev o5v 7rX^6o<; TCOV <79ai,pcov CCTTCO TOCFOUTOV, ciaTe xal T<X<; ouatac; xal T<X<; 15
dpxa<; Tac; (XXLVTJTOOC; [xal Ta<; aLa0T)T<x<;] ToaaiiTa<; eoXoyov
1
Cf. Phys. VIII 8, 9; De caelo I 2, II 3-8.
2
Ar. states here without mathematics have no ouaCai as
any hesitation, that
their object. In E
sub 487b) the formula is by no means so categorical.
i (cited
Our passage, then, seems to have been written rather late, at any rate at some
posterior date than E i.
3
dbraacov - sc. TCOV a9aiptov, both those which move the planets and those which
"roll them back", counteracting the motion of certain spheres admitted by Eudoxus
and Callippus, so that the first motion is restored. Vid. Heath, Aristarchus of Santos,
p. 217 ff.
[518] THE PRIME MOVER IOI

518 This chapter x is generally considered as being of a later date wce Of

than the rest of book A. Jaeger, who devotes a whole chapter to this
2
question estimates the interval at some twenty years at least Mansion
, ;

does not think it so long.


The question has been treated lately in an original way by Ph. Merlaii in Traditio
IV (1946), pp. 1-30. The author argues that Ar. was not concerned with the question
of monotheism or polytheism at all that indications for the latter might be found
;

in Phys. VIII 6 and in De caelo I 9 8 as well, and that Metaph. A 8 harmonizes


perfectly well with its surroundings. This chapter, therefore, should not be considered
as a later addition. The unmoved movers of Ar. have taken the place of the ideal
Numbers of Plato, as is clearly shown in the beginning of A 8, where Ar. finds
fault with PI. for not having determined the number of these beings with any
satisfying argument.

Metaph. A 8,
14 23
1073 a - :

IIoTepov 8e [juav BETOV TYJV TOIOCUTTJV ouaiav vj TrXsiouq, xal Troaou;, Set [JLYJ
4 aXXa
15 XavOaveiv [JLS{jLV7J<rOat xal TQC<; TCOV <3tXXcov a7co9a<7ei<;, OTI Trspl 7rXy)0ou<;
ou0ev sipvjxaa-iv 6 TI xal <ra9e<; etTretv. 7) JJLSV yap Tiepl TOCC; t&ea<; u7u6Xyj^i,<; ou&e-
(juav xei <ixe^iv iStav (apiOfjioOc; yap Xeyoucri TCX<; tS^ac; ol Xeyovrec;
20 Tcepl Se TCOV apt,0(jicov OTE (Jtev cog Tcepl aTCSLpcov Xyoucn,v OTE e co^
5
copio'fJL^vcov Si* Y)V 8* aiTtav TOCTOUTOV TO TrXyjOoc; TCOV apt,0(JLcov,

XeyeTai {JLETOC aTrouSyjc; aTroSeixTLxyjc; ) T)(JLLV S" ex TCOV uTcoxeifJLevcov xal


v XexTeov.

Then follows the rest of the text given sub 517a.


Now there can belittle doubt that, in Phys. VIII too, Ar. admitted of more
axvv)Ta. But (i) this book is not of an early date, and (2) chapter 8 of Metaph. A
makes the impression of a later addition. So probably Mansion is right in supposing
that there is some interval between this chapter and its surroundings, but not
as long a one as Jaeger thought.

31 88
Except the passage 1074 b - ("Ort 8i etc; oopavo<;, 9<xvepov E.q.s.), which
1

seems to be an early fragment, embedded in a chapter written rather late in Ar.'s life.
2
Aristotle, p. 342-367.
3
The reference is
to 279a 19 - 24 where Ar. speaks of -rdcxet, i.e. that which is outside
,

the heaven, as being above place and time, immutable and immovable.
4
This part of the opening sentence has been cited above, sub 517a.
5
We
dealt with this text in 366.
FOURTEENTH CHAPTER
THE METAPHYSICS
i THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS
519 What is the object of metaphysics (in Metaph. A indicated by
the term ac^ia) ? Ar. answers in the opening chapters of this book:
Wisdom is knowledge of the first causes.
21 23
Metaph. A, i and 2, 980 a -g83 a :

Value of
knowledge ,
IIavTe<; avOpcoTroi
,
r
xai yap
TOU eiSevai opeyovTai
N

x^P 1 ^ Ty)^ XP
, ,
cpiiaei.

ia ^ ayaTrcovTai dt
*,%/*
crYiuetov 8' YJ

xat (jtaXidTa TCOV


ainra<;,
TCOV aLcr6y)<Tetov 9 8
~ a21

#XXcov 7)
Sia TCOV 6(jL(jiaTCov. ou yap {jiovov tva TupaTTCofjiev aXXa xal [Ji7)8ev [

TtpaTTeiv TO opav atpou(jLe6a OCVTL TTOCVTCOV co<; SITCSLV TCOV #XXcov. atTiov S* STI 25

(jiaXicTTa Tuoiel yvcopi^ecv Y](Jiac; ai>TY) TCOV alaOvjcrecov xal 7roXXa(; SyjXo
*
Its genesis
O\iaei (JLSV
o5v aLa07](Tiv lx ovTOC ytyveTai TOC ^coa, ex Se TaiJT7)(; TO<;
auTcov oux eyytyvsTai (JLVYjfr/), Tot<; S* eyyiyvsTai,. xal Sia TOUTO TauTa

[icoTepa xal fjLa07)TixcoTpa TCOV [JIT] SuvafJtevcov [xvYjfxovetisiv CIT, ^povifia JJLEV

(Stveu TOU (jiavOaveiv oaa (JLYJ


SuvaTai TCOV <];6cpcov dcxoiietv (olov [xeXiTTa xav et

TI TOIOUTOV SXXo yevo<; ^cocov SCTTI), [JiavOavei S* 8aa ?rp6<; T|j (^VY](JL7]
xal Tarinqv 525

Ta (jLsv o5v aXXa Tat<; cpavTaaiaK; ^ xal Tai^ (jLVY)[JLai(;, sfjuretpta*; Se

[jLixpov TO Se TCOV avOpcoTucov yevoc xal tiyyfi xal Xoyidfjioi^. ytyveTat 8* ex


TY)^ fjLVYjfjLY)^ efjLTueipia TOU; avOpcoTTO^; at yap TroXXal (jtv^at TOU auTOu 7rpay(Jia-
TOS {xia(; efJiTreipia^ 8uva[JLi,v aTcoTeXoucriv. xal Soxei axeSov e7ri<TT7)jJLY] xalgSia
T ^XV 7) O(AO^OV elvai xal efjucetpia, aTuopaivei 8' e7uwiTY)(JL7] xal T^X^ Sia TYJ(;
2
e(ji7reipCa<; TOIC; avOpcoTcoic; 7) (jtev yap ejjiTreipia T^XVY V ! eTuotyjcrev, clx; 97]crl

TlcoXoc;, Y)
8* aTretpta TUXY]^- 5
Difference 3
FtyveTai 8e T^X^ ^<*v ex TcoXXcov TYJ<; efiTreiptac; evvoYjfJtaTCOv [ila. xaOoXou
experience yvY)Tai Trepl TCOV ofjtotcov UTCoXyj^K;. TO [Aev yap exeiv UTroXyj^tv OTI KaXXfa
and science voaov ToSl auv/jveyxe xal ScoxpaTet xal xa0* SxadTov OUTCO
xajjivovTi TYjvSl TYJV

1
The following passage should be compared with Anal. post. II 19 (our nr. 465) .

See also 457a.


2
dcTropocfcvei 8& -
Tot? dtvOpcoTtoi? : "but really science and art come to man through
experience".
3 -
T. {jwreipfoes ^vvoyjfjtaTa empirical notions.
[519] THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS 103

s, efi7reipfac<; SCTTIV TO 8 8ri rcacri TOL<; ToiofoSe xaT* eZ8o<; ev a90pia6etcrt,

xajivouat TYjvSl TYJV v6<iov, auvyjveyxev, olov TOI^ 9Xey(jiaTa>8eaiv ?) x^^ e<Jt

[7^] TrupeTTOuai, xauaG), TX VY)'

Ilpo<; {JL^V o3v T& TcpaTTSiv ejjuueipia Txvy3? ouSev Soxel 8ia9peiv, aXXa
* 2
xal (laXXov eTUTuyxavoixnv ol 2(jL7ceipot T&V Sveu TYJ<; s|ji7retpta<; X6yov
15 IXOVTCOV (aiTiov 8* 6ri y) fjiev IjjiTueipla T&V xa9' exaar6v SCTTI yv&aris 7)
8e

TexvTj T(ov xa06Xou, ai 8k Tupa^ei? xal at yev^aetc; Traaai Tuepl T6 xa6* 2xacrT6v
etdiv ou Y^P SvOpcoTrov uyta^et 6 taTpeuwv aXX* ^ xara au(jipepY)x6(;, aXXa
3
20 KaXXiav ScaxpaTTjv Y) TWV SXXcov TLVCX TO>V OUTO> Xeyop^vtov 4> (TUfjipepTjxev )
7^

av0pa)7cco elvai eav o5v &veu TYJ<; ejiTuetpta^ S^lf] TI? TOV Xoyov, xal TO xaOoXou
J

[Asv yv<opty) TO S sv TOUTO> xa0* exaaTOV ayvofj, TioXXaxtc; SiapiapTYjasTai TYJ^

6spa7rea<; OepaTueuTOv yap TO xa0* SxacTOv )


TO ye etSevai xal TO dcXX' ojia)^

257rateLv T^ TEXVY] TYJ^ e(jL7reipia(; uTcapxeiv otojieOa [JiaXXov, xal ao<pa>Te'pou<;


TOIX; TexviTa^ TCOV efjiTreipcov UTroXa[jLpavo|jLev, we; xaTa TO eiSevai (JiaXXov
s
axoXouOoucrav TTJV cro9iav Traat TOUTO 8 STL ol fiev TYJV atTtav taaari-v ol 8* 08.

ol TO STL SIOTI 8* oux laaCTiv ol 8s T^ SIOTI xal Science


[Jtlv yap e'|iTceipot, [JLSV to~a<7L, TYJV
knows the
, t

3oaiTiav yvcopi^oudtv. causes


Ai6 xal TOU<; apxtTexTOva^ Trepl exadTov Ti(xtcoTpou<; xal (jiaXXov

taaatv (TOIX; 8', axiTrcp xal T&V a^ux^v evta TCOLS! (Jiev, oux el86Ta 8e
(
Troiet, olov xatet, TO
Tcijp (Jiev
ouv a^uxoc 9uo~ei Ttvl Tuotelv TOUTWV exaaTov
T<X

5Toi><; 8^ x L P OT^Xva ^ ^ l> ^O ?)? &$ ^ xaTa TO TipaxTixoix; elvat (T09<OT^pou<;


He wno
8vTa<; aXXa xaTa TO Xoyov ex eLV auToix; xal T<X<; aiTiae; yvcopi^eiv. oXw^; TE

cjyjfjLelov TOU etSoToe; xal (JLTJ etSoTO^ TO SiivaaOat, StSaaxeiv eciTtv, xal 8ia TOUTO teach

TYJV Tlx v<y


3
v T^? efjLTcetptac; Y)you[jLe6a (xaXXov iTutcrTYjpLyjv elvat SiivavTat yap,
ol Se ou SuvavTai StSaaxsiv.

10 T&V al(T0Y)creci)v ouSe(jLiav vjyoufjLeOa elvai ao9tav xatTOi


*'ETI 8e
5

y* elalvauTai TWV xa0* SxaciTa yvaxrei^ aXX ou X^yoixri TO Sia TL Trepl ou


olov Sia TL Ospfjiov TO Tcup, aXXa [AOVOV STL Oepjiov. TO p.ev ouv TrpcoTOv etxo^; TOV
4
eup6vTa TEXVTJV Trapa Ta^ xoiva^ ataOifjcrsK; Gaufia^edOai UTCO Toiv
OTroiavoiiv

15 avOptoTicov {!}) (JLOVOV Sia TO xp^^ v stvai TL TWV eupe0evT(ov aXX' cae; ao9ov
xal 8ia9epovTa TCOV SXXtav TcXeiovcov 8' eupicrxofjisvcov Texveov xal TCOV (iev

- "hit the mark", succeed.


2 -
X6yov theory.
3
co aujjip^Yjxev Ross rightly - remarks that it is "of course not an accident of
Callias, as opposed to his essence and he is a man". The term
his properties, that
is used simply to indicate that it is not directly "man" that the doctor cures, but
directly Callias and indirectly man because C. is a man.
4
Trocpa
- that went beyond the common perceptions of man.
104 METAPHYSICS [519]

x
rcpog Tavayxata TCOV e Ttpog Siaycoy/jv ouacov, ael ao9coTpoug Toug TOioircoug
exetvcov u7coXa(jipavea0ai Sia TO (173 Tcpog XP^ atv e ^vat - T(*<? e7ut<7TYj[jiag auTcov. 20
Purely "OOev YjSYj TravTCOv TCOV TOIOIJTCOV xaTeaxeuaaruevcov at LIT) Trpog YiSovYjv tnnSe
theoretical , , ~ , , A , , ,. , ,

science was rcpog Tavayxata TCOV eTuaTYjjicov eupevbjaav, xat rcpcoTov ev TOUTOig TOig TOTCOig
invented Sio Tuepl AiyuTtTov at {jLaOvjfiaTtxal rcpokov
ofoep ecr^oXacrav
aav, exet yap a^eiOv) crxoXa^eiv TO TCOV tspecov
2
EtpYjTai, [jiev o5v ev TOI<; Y)Oi,xoL(; T^ Sia9opa T^xv<y)? xa ^ ewiaTYJpiY]^ xal TCOV 25
<5cXXcov TCOV ofjioyevcov ou 8' evsxa vuv TcoiotifieOa TOV Xoyov TOUT* SCTTIV, OTL
3
LevY]v ao9tav Tuepl TOC TrpcoTa a?Tia xal T<X<; ap^a<; UTcoXapLpavouat
xaOaTrsp etpyjTat TupoTepov, 6 JASV l[X7rsipoc; TCOV oTTOiavouv
COSTS,

aiaOTjciiv elvai Soxst ao^coTepoc;, 6 Ss TSXVITYJC; TCOV e^Tteipcov, Xei P" 30


4
TS^VOU 8e apxtTSXTcov, at Se 0ecopY)TLxaL TCOV TTOIYJTIXCOV [xaXXov. STI (lev
o3v Y] ao9ia Tiepi Tiva^ cxpxac; xal ama<;
With what 'Ercel 8k TauTYjv TYJV TOUT* av
e7rt,(TT7)fjLY)v ^yjTOUfJiev, eLY) axeTCTeov, Y] ?cepl

wisdom is TCOLa<; atTia<; xal rcepl 7ioia<; apx^ e7cicrTY)pLYj ao9ta eciTtv. et SYJ Xapoi TI<; Tat; 5
concerned TOU 00901!, Tax' av ex TOUTOU 9avep6v yvoiTO (JiaX-
67coXYj<J;eig ag e'xofjiev Trepl
5
Xov. u7coXa[xpavo[JLev SYJ rcpcoTOv (xev em(7Ta<70ai TravTa TOV <ro9ov cog evSexsTai ,

[XYj
xaO' SxaaTOv e'xovTa eTriaTYjfJLYjv auTcov efaa TOV TOC x^XeTra yvcovai Suva- 10

[zevov xal HYJ paSia av0pco7rco yiyvcoaxeiv, TOUTOV ao9ov (TO yap aicr0avecT0ai
TravTCOv xoivov, Sto paStov xal ouSev ao9ov ) eTi TOV axptp^CTepov xal TOV
SiSaaxaXtxcoTepov TCOV aiTicov (T09coTepov elvai Trepl Ttaaav eTriaTYjjjiYjv xal
TCOV e7TicTTYj(jLcov 8e TYJV auTY^g evexev xal TOU eiSevat X^P tv atpeTYjv oucjav [xaXXov 15
elvai O09^av TQ TYJV TCOV a7ro(3aLvovTcov evexev, xal TYJV apxixcoT^pav TYjg

TouoYjg [xaXXov co9iav ou yap 8eiv eTTiTaTTeaOai TOV cro9ov aXX*


xal ou TOUTOV eTepco TceiOeofiai, aXXa TOUTCO TOV ^TTOV ao9ov.
Tag (Aev ouv ujcoXYj^eig TOiauTag xal TocrauTag exo(Jtev Tcepl TYJg ao9iag xal 20
TCOV CT09COV TOUTCOV Se TO TravTa eTTLCTTaaOat TCO [AaXicTTa SXOVTI TYJ xa06Xou
[lev V
6
avayxatov UTrapxetv (ouTog yap olSe Trcog TtavTa Ta UTCoxeifzeva )
e7UiaTYj(JLYjv ,

axs86v 8e xal x a^ 7i: ^ TaTa ^a^^a yvcopi^eiv TOtg avOpcoTroig, T<X (jiaXicTTa
xa06Xou (TUOppcoTaTCo yap TCOV atc0Yjaecov eaTiv), axpip<JTaTai 8e TCOV 711-25
ciTYjfjLcov at [JicxXiciTa TCOV TrpcoTcov etaiv (at yap e eXaTT6vcov axptpldTepaL
7
TCOV ex 7ipoaOaecog XeyojJievcov ,
olov api,0(jLYjTixYj yecojjieTptag ) aXXa [JLYJV

xal SiSaaxaXixYj ye YJ
TCOV aiTicov 0ecopYjTixYj (jtaXXov (O^TOI yap SiSaaxouariv,

1 -
7up6<; Staycoyvjv Tupog TO eu ^TJV.
3
Eth. Nic. VI
Ii3 9 b *-ii 4 i b.
1
3,
8 - elsewhere called first
T. 6vo(jLa^o(jLV7]v oo9^av philosophy.
4
T. TuoirjTixtov - those which produce concrete results.
6 ~ as ^ar as
cog ^V^XSTOCI possible.
6 TuAvTa Ta wroxetiieva - all the instances that fall under the universal.
7
We explained this sentence sub 488b.
[519] THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS IO5

30 ol T<X<; aMas XyovTe<; rcepl exaaTou), TO 8* eiSevai xal TO eTUCTTaaOai auTCov


1
Ivsxa [JiaXiaO' UTcap^ei 17) TOU (AaXicTTa eTacmqTou e7ticmf)[jiY) (6 yap TO eTtt-
982b cTTacrOai, SL* auTO alpoupievo^ TYJV (jiaXicTTa 67rtaTY)(JLY)v (laXurra alpvjaeTat,
TOiaUTY) 8* e<mV Y) TOU (JLOcXtCTTa eTUCTTTJTOu), (JiaXl<7Ta 8* 7tt(TT7]Ta T<X TTpCOTa
xal T<X ama (Sia yap TauTa xal ex TOUTCOV TaXXa yvcopi^eTai aXX* ou
58ia TCOV UTTOXEI^VCOV), apxtxcoTaTT) 8e TCOV eTiicmqiJicov, xal (xaXXov apytxY) TYJ<; Especially
u7n)peTOU<n)<;, 7) yvcopi^ooara TIVOC; svsxv SCTTI rcpaxTeov exaaTOv TOUTO 8* final cause
ICTTI TayaOov exacrTOu, 8Xco<; 8e TO (SptcrTov ev T^ ^uarei Traayj 2 .

*E^ aTcavTCOv o5v T&V slpTjfievwv em TYJV auT7]v e7ci(JT7)(jiY)v TciTTTet TO J^TJTOU-

(jtevov ovofxa Set yap TauTTjv TOW 7rpa>Ta>v ap^wv xal aiTLtov elvai 6ecapy]Tix7)v
10 xal yap Taya66v xal TO ou evexa ev TCOV aiTtcov earTtv.

OTt 8 ou TCoiYiTixv]. SviXov xal ex TCOV TTOCOTCOV oiXoaocpyiCTavTCov Sta yap phil no
s
f/
-

n ^ >Y c n ~ ,/ ~ y r X v ~ >r , ~ Science with


^ v
TO UaofjiaQeiv ot avUptoTioi xai vuv xai TO rupcoTOv yjp^avTO 9iXocro9eiv. e^ apxv)<; practical use
3
(jtev
T<X TTpo^etpa TCOV OCTOTCCOV OaufjiaaavTei;, elTa xaTa [xtxpov OUTCO Tcpoi6vTe<;
15 xal Tuepl TCOV (xet^ovcov SwcTropyjcravTec;, olov Tuepi Te TCOV TYJS aeXYjvY]^ 7ua07]fjLaTCOv
xal TCOV Tiepl TOV -J^Xiov xal aaTpa xal ?repl T^C; TOU rcavToc; yeveaeco^. 6 8'

dcTiopcov xal Oaufxa^cov oi'eTai ayvoelv (816 xal 6 cpiX6[jiu6o<; 91X0^096^ TTCOC;

ecTTiv 6 yap [jLuOo^ auyxeiTat, ex Oaufzaatcov )


COOTT' etTrep Sia TO 9etiyeiv TYJV

2o&yvoiav e9iXoa69y)CTav, 9avep6v OTI 8ia TO etSevat TO eTTtaTaaOai eStcoxov xal


4
ou xp^<Jew<; TLVOC; evexev. (jiapTupei 8e auTO TO aujipe^xo^ a/eSov yap TTOCVTCOV
.

U7uapx6vTCov TCOV avayxatwv xal 7cp6<; pa^TCovyjv xal Siaycoyyjv y) TotauTY] 9po-
s
5
vvjcTtc; ^p^aTO ^7)Teia6ai .
SvjXov oOv cbs; 8i ouSefjuav auTTjv ^YjTOujxev xpeiav
25 eT^pav, aXX' coaTuep av6pco7ro^, 9aaev, eXeuOepo<; 6 auTou evexa xal [JLYJ
aXXou
OUTCO xal auT7]v coc aovinv oucrav eXeuOepav TCOV Thereforethe
cov. e7ri<7TY]u.cov LLOVTI '
vapr
l

c t, , , only free
aoTY) auTY)c; evexev ecmv. science
Ato xal Sixaico^ av oux av6pco7rivY) VO(JLI^OITO auT7]<; r) XTTJ^K; TroXXaxf) yap
30 Y) 9ucn^ SouXyj TCOV avOpcoTccov ecrav, COCTTC xaTa SifxcoviS^v 0eo^ av (JLOVO<; TOUT*
6
yepac;u, avSpa 8* oux aEt-ov (JLT)
ou ^yjTelv TTJV xa6* auTOV eTucFTTjfjnqv .

wv vxa = pursued for their own sake.


2
On
the primary importance of the final course see nrs. 492 fif., 498 ff.
3
Ta 7Tp6xetpa TCOV OCTOTTCOV - Alexander of Aphrodisias cites the following examples :

why amber attracts chaff-like substances (a question which interested Thales),


the nature of the rainbow (discussed by Anaximenes and by other early thinkers),
and other meteorological problems.
4
T& CTU(jLpepY)x6; - what really has happened; "the course of events".
6
I think TCOV must be inserted: in 981 b 27 two groups are mentioned, namely

(T^vat) at (JL^V Trpcx; Tavayxata, al 8k 7rp6<; Siaycoyyjv oSaai, the last being partly for the
material, partly for the spiritual or mental s& 9jv (xal 7rpo<; paaTcovYjv x. Siaytoyviv).
quotation, known to us by Plato's Protagoras
8 - The
(5tvSpa 8* oux <5cl;iov e.q.s.
341 e, continues: <5tv$pa 8* oux m
(r/) ou xax6v ^(levat (Edmonds, Lyrici II, p. 284).

oux a'Siov - "it is unfitting". Ar. again refers to this question in Eth. Nic. X, at
io6 METAPHYSICS [519]

et SYJ Xfiyoucri TI ol TroiYjTal xal TTE^UXE 90ovstv TO 0stov, inl TOUTOU


l
[jiaXiaTa ix6<; xal SUCITU^EIC; stvai TcavTac; TOU<; TtsptTTOuc; dcXX* OUTS TO 0tov .

90ovp6v EvS^XETai elvai, aXXa xaTcx TYJV 7rapoi[A(av TroXXa ^suSovTai aoi8o,
the most *

OU T T 9j<- TO iauTY)<; iXXYjv ^pY) vofxtt^Eiv TifxicoT^pav. Y) yap OEIOTOCTYJ xal Ti[xicoTa- 5
divine and
honourable f7 ) TOiauTY)
; ^\^~^\>/
av oix^^ ELY) JJIOVY)
/ f? \ ^
TE yap (JLaXiarT av o UEO*; EXO^, oEia TCOV
YJV
>-AA\/ /\/ ~

TCIOTY)(JLCOV EGTl, XOCV Et TL<; TCOV 0tCOV EtYj. (JLOVY] 8* aUTY) TOUTCOV (X{JL90T^pCOV
2
TETUX^XEV 8 TE yap 0o<; SOXEC TCOV atTtcov Tcaaiv filvai xal apx*/) TI^, xal

TYJV TOiauTYjv YJ (jLovo<; Y) {jLaXiaT* av ^ot o OEO^. avayxaioTspai (JLEV o3v Tracrai 10
I > / <N

TauTYjc;, ajxsivcov 6
Its final 3
Aet [xevTOL TTCO<; xaTacTTYJvai TYJV eic, TouvavTtov YjfjLtv
TCOV
result
^rjTY)<Tcav. apxovTai (Jiev yap, coarcep ,
OCTTO TOU Oaujia^siv
4
ec OOTCOJ; g^e ^ xa0a7rep <7cepl> TWV uTOfjtaTa [TOIC; (jnfjTueo
TE-

0eopY)x6<Tt TYJV aiTiav] Y) Trepl Ta^ TOU Y]Xiou Y) TYJV TY]<; Stafx^Tpou aaujji- 15
5
[jteTptav (0au(JLa(TTOv yap slvai Soxei Tca fjLY)7ra> TeOecopYjxoai TYJV
atTfav> ei TI TW eXaxtaTW [JLYJ
Sei Se
sic; TouvavTiov xal T& 4[xeivov

xaTa TYJV 7rapoi(juav xaOaTrep xal sv TOIJTOK; 8Tav

ou0v yap av OUTCO^ 0au(jtacTiEv avYjp yEcofXETpixoc; co<; EL y^voiTO Y) 8ia{ATpo<; 20

6 crxoTcoc; o5 SSL Tuy/avstv TYJV ^YjTYjanv xal TYJV oXYjv {Jt^OoSov.

520 After having given an account of earlier philosophy (the rest


of book A), Ar. now proceeds to state the main problems of metaphysics.

Metaph. B i,
24
995 a -9g6 a
17
:

x
List of ETcsXOsEv
'AvayxYj 7rp6<; TYJV ETU^YJTOUJJIEVYJV ETTLCTTYJIJLYJV Y)[Jia<; TtpcoTOv TUEJ
dbtopiai
cLv aTropYJaai SSL rcpcoTov TauTa 8* Ecrrlv oaa TE ruspl auTcov <XXco<; U7riXY)9aai 25

Tive^, xav i TI X^P^ TOUTCOV Tuyxavsi TcapEcopafAsvov. CTTI SE Tote; EUTropYJaat

pouXo[JLvoi(; Tcpoupyov TO StaTcopYJarai xaXcoc;* YJ yap ucrTSpov EUTCopia Xiia^


TCOV TcpoTEpov aTTopoufilvcov EOTi, Xustv 8* oux ^'cTTiv ayvoouvTac; TOV SsarfJLOV, 30
aXX* r, TY)? 8iavoia<; aTtopia 8Y)Xoi TOUTO HEpl TOU TCpayfiaTOc; fj yap aTTOpet,
?i:7tov0 Tolq SESsfjiEvoic; a8uvaTOv yap <x(ji90Tpco<; TuposX-

the end of ch. 7 (ii'77b 26 ): *O 8& TOIOUTCK; av etrj PIO? xpeiTTtov y) xaT* <5tv6po)7rov,
where he answers to this objection: Ou xpyj 8i xara TOU<; TrapaivoOvrac; av6p<omva
9povetv <5tv0p<o7rov 6vra ouSe OvrjTa T^V 6vY)T6v, aXX* 9* oaov IvSe^eTai aOavaT^eiv xal
TravTa TCOIEIV 7cp6<; T^ ^rjv xara T& xpaTiarov TWV ^v auToi (nr. 606b).
1 - "all those who
Travra^ TOIX; 7reptTTou(; occupy themselves with things which
do not concern them".
2 -
rraoiv of all things.
3
Set xaTaaTTJvat - must end in.
4 -
Taur6jjiaTa marionettes.
6
The incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side.
[520] THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS 107

Oetv ei<; TO 7up6cr6ev. 816 Sei TOC; Suaxepeiac, TeOecopYjxevai Ttaciac, TcpoTepov,

Totacov TS x<*P lv xal Sia TO TOU<; y)ToovTac. a*vi> TOO SiaTcopYJcrai TtpcoTOv 6(Jio(ouc

35eZvai TOIC, Trot SSL pa8t^iv ayvooucri, xal Tcpoc, TOUTOIC, ouS' e? TCOT TO frrjTOii-
)5b (jLvov stfpYjxsv Y) (JLYJ yiyvcoaxEiv
TO yap TfiXoc, TOUTCO (JLSV ou 89jXov TCO 8e rcpo-

YjTuopYjxoTi 89jXov. STL 8e p>.Tiov avayxY) ey etv Tupoc. TO xpivai TCV coaTisp avTiSCxcov
xal TCOV aiA-mcr^YjTO'JVTCov ) OYO>V axrjxooTa TcavTOjv. EOTL 8* aTuopia rcpcinr)
5 {x^v Tiepl 5iv ev TOL<; Trerppoi^tad^voic; 8iY)7Uop7)(ja[jLev, 7r6Tepov (jtia^ Y)
TcoXXcov

eTUiaTYjfJicov Oswpyjaat, T<X<; aiTiaj;


xal rcoTSpov TOCC; TYJ^; oucr[a<; ap/ac; TOC<; TCparca^
ECTTI Tvjc; eTutcrTYjfJLTjq I8stv [JLOVOV 7j xal TTipl TCOV apx&v IE cT)v Seiy.vuouat 7cavTe<;,

olov TtoTspov evSex2 ^* TauTO xal v a(j,a ^avai xal aTrooavai vj ou, xal 7C*pl
1-

10 TCOV iXXcov TCOV TotouTCov et T' cm Trspl TY)V ouaiav, TOTepov (jia TUSOI :ryaa(;

Y) TrXeiove^ eicn, xav el 7u?\eiovs(; TCOTS^OV ajuaaai auyyevcLc YJ TOC^ aev cooia;
Ta; 8e &X>o TI XexTSov auTtov xal TOUTO 8* auTO TCOV avayxaCcov eoTl CYjr^aai,
15 7u6Tspov Ta? aicr0Y]Ta^ oiaria^ slvai ptovov ^aTeov YJ
xal Tuapa TauTaj; aXXa;, xal

TOTEpov [jiovaxco^ Y) TtXeiova ycvY] TCOV ouaricov, olov 01 TCOIOUVTS^ Ta TS SL^Y] xal
Ta (jLaOYjfjiaTtxa (JieTa^u TOUTCOV TS xal TCOV ai<j9Y)Tcov. Tcepi TS TOUTCOV o5v,

xaOajcep 9a[xev 7 eTridxeTCTeov, xal TcoTspov Tiepl Tac; oucrtac; Y] Oecopia (JLOVOV
20 eaTtv Y) xal Tcepl Ta G\j[Lfi$r xoTa xa6* auTa Talc ouaiai^, 7>;p6<; Ss TOUTOL; Tcepl
TaoToij xal STepou xal ofjiotou xal avojioiou xal svavTLOTYjTOc., xal icepl TupoTSpou
xal ucTTepou xal TCOV aXXcov aTuavTcov TCOV TOLOUTCOV Tcepl ocrcov ol 8taXexTixol

TUStpCOVTat aXOTTSLV SX TCOV IvSo^COV (JLOVCOV 7UOlO\i(jLVOL TY]V CTX^IV, TIVOC, EGFTl

25 OccopY^crat Tcepl TOXVTCOV STI 8s TOUTOL^ auTotc. 8cra xa0* auTa <ri){jij3e[3Y]xev,
xal

fZY] fzovov TI <TTI TOUTCOV sxadTov aXXa xal apa sv svl svavTiov xal TUOTepov al

ap^al xal Ta crrotxeta Ta ylvY] <TTlv y) LC, a 8iaipiTai ivuTcap^ovTa xao*Tov


xal t Ta yVY), TUOTCOOV 8aa TO'^ aT6(JLOt^ XyTa& TiXUTaZa Y) Ta TCpcoTa,
ETUC

30 olov TuoTEpov J^coov Y] av9pco7Toc, ap^Y) ^ xal (xaXXov <TTI Tuapa TO xaO' xac7Tov.
the chief
xal TupayaaTSOTEOv TUOTpov (TTt Tt Tuapa TYIV uXYW atTtov
problem
xa6* auTO Y^
TOUTO x^p^^ov '0 oii, xal 7uoTpov v Y] TcXsico TOV dcptOfiov,
ou, xal

35 xal 7COTpov ICTTL TI rrapa TO criivoXov (Xyco 8k TO criivoXov, OTav


Tl TYJC. UXY)^) Y] OUOV, Yj TCov {JLV TCOV 8' Q(), Xal TUOta TOiaUTa TCOV OVTCOV. Tt at

96aap^al TcoTepov apt,6(Jicp Y] L8i coptcr[JLvai, xal at v TOIC; Xoyoi; xal at v UTCO-
xi[xvco; xal TCOTEPOV TCOV cpOapTcov xal a90apTcov at auTal Y) eTepai, xal
th most
TcoTepov (fopOapTOi Tcacrai, Y) TCOV ^OapTcov cpOapTai; STL 8 TO TcavTcov x aX7cco- f

5 TaTov xal TcXeicrTYjv dcTcopiav E^OV, 7roTpov TO Sv xal TO ov, xaOaTCEp ol OuOayd-
pioi xal nXaTCOv SXyv, ou^ Tpov Tt ECTTIV aXX* oucrta TCOV SVTCOV, Y) ou,
aXX* Tpov TI TO u7coxL(Jievov, codTuep 'EfjLTcsSoxXYJc; ^Yjcn cpiXtav &XXo(; 8i TIC;

Tcup 6 8e uScop Y) aepa xal 7c6Tpov at ap^al xa06Xou eicrlv Y) co<;


Ta xaO' exaaTa
10 TCOV 7cpay(JiaTcov, xal Suvajiei
Y) Evepyeia'
ITI TtOTepov a"XXco<; YJ xaTa XIVYJGIV
xal yap TauTa aTioptav av Tcapaaxoi TioXXYjv. 7Tp6^ Si; TOUTOIC; TcoTepov ol apiOjiol
I08 METAPHYSICS [520]

'
xal T<X [iY)XY] xal ax QlJLaTa xaVl a 1 ffTiyfial ouaiai Tive"<; etcriv Y) oO\ xav el
T<X i

ouatat, 7r6Tepov xex^pia^vai TCOV aldOyjrwv YJ evuTrapxouaai ev TOIJTOK;; Tcepl 15

yap TOUTCOV arcavTtov ou (Ji6vov /vXenov TO euTropYJaai TYJ<; aXY)0eia<; aXX* ouSe
T& SiaTtopYjaai T& Xoyto pciSiov xaX&<;.
These questions are dealt with throughout the following work.

521 There is a science which investigates being as being, and is

different from the sciences that investigate special parts of being.


21 32
Metaph. r i, 1003 a - :

Philosophy "EaTiv TOUTW UTrap/ovToc xa0' auTO.


eTci<yTY)[AY] TIC; YJ Oecopet TO ov xai, T<X
of being aunrj S* eaTiv ouSepiia TO>V Iv {jLepei Xeyo(JLevcov TJ auTY) ouSe(JLia yap TCOV (iXXcov
as such ETuaxoTret xa66Xou Tiepl TOU OVTO^ fj ov, aXXa auTou Tt a7uoTS(ji6(JLevai 25
(Jiepo<;

Tuepl TOUTOU 0ecopouat TO <ru(JLpepy]x6^, olov al {jia67)jjLaTixal TO>V e7riaTYj(jicov.

7Tsl Ss Tac ap^a^ xal T<X<; axpOTdcTac; atTiac; ^7)Tou[JLv, 89jXov roc; ^uaecix; TIVO?
auTac; cxvayxaiov elvat, xa6* auT*/jv. SL ouv xal ot T<X aTo^s^a ^ v OVTCOV ^YJTOUV-

Tec; TauTa<; Ta^ ap^a<; I^YJTOUV, avayxv] xal Ta aToixe^<* T0 ^> OVTO<; elvai {JLYJ 30
5
xaTa aufjipepYjxoc; aXX /] 6V 8to xal 7)[JLtv TOU OVTO<; f) ov Tac; TipeoTa^ aiTia<;

522 Ar. continues speaking about the manifold senses of the term
"to be". As, then, science everywhere deals chiefly with that which is
primary, the philosopher has first to do with substances.
16 - 19
Ib. 2, 1003 b :

substances IlavTa^ou 8e xupio)^ TOU TcpcoTou Y) 7uaTY)(j.Y), xal e ou Ta #XXa


the first >
xa L
>
g X^yovTai. et o5v TOUT' ecrrlv av Seoi
L
Y] ouarta, TCOV ousio>v Ta<;

phil. xal TOC<; atTta^ ex etv TOV

523 a. The philosopher must also consider the things that are in
mathematics called axioms, for these are true of all existing things, and
therefore no special science inquires into their truth.
19 -b 2
Metaph. T 3, ioo5a :

Phil, must AexT^ov Se TOTCpov ^ cTepa^ e7:i<TTY)(jLY)^ Trspt TS T&V ev TOL? (jLaOYjfjLacri
|ua<;
the axioms xaXou(Jievcov a^icofjiaTtov xal Trepl TYJ<; ouaiac;. ^avepov SYJ OTI |jua<; TC xal TYJC; 20
TOU cpiXoa6<pou xal Y) Trepl TOUTGW eaTl oxe^i^;* aTcaat yap UTcap^ei TOLC;
aXX' ou yevei Tivl x^pk ^ta TCOV <5cXXtov. xal xpto^^aL (lev TuavTec;, OTL TOU OVTO<;
eaTlv TI 6v, exaciTov Se TO yevo<; ov em TOCTOUTOV Se xp&VTai 9* oaov auTot^ 25
ixavov, TOUTO 8' ICTTIV oaov iniysi TO yevo<; Trepl o5 9^pouat Tat; ocTuoSet^eig*
COCTT' eTtel 89jXov STI YJ 8vTa urcapxet Ttacri (TOUTO yap auTOi<; TO xoiv6v), TOU
[523] THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS IOQ

Tcepl TO Sv yvcopt^ovToc; xal Trepi TOUTCOV ecnrlv 7) Oecopla. Siorcep ouOelc; TCOV xara
30|Jiepo<; emaxoTcouvTcov eyxeipet Xeyeiv TI Trepl auTcov, el 4X7)09] 7) [lyj,
OUTS yeto-

fjilTpTjs OUT* api6[ji7)TLx6<;, aXXa TCOV 9uaixcov e'vioi, elxoTcoc; TOUTO SpcovTe^-
fji6voi yap $OVTO Trepi Te TTJ<; 8X7)<; <puaeco<; crxoTtetv xal Trepl TOU OVTO^. ercel
8* ecmv STL TOU 91x11x01) TL^ avcoTepco (ev yap TI yevo^ TOU SVTOC; 7] 9iiart^),

35 TOU xaOoXou xal TOO Trepl TTJV Tcpa>T7]v oucnav OewpTjTixou xal 7) Trepl TOUTCOV
av etTj axl^K; eVci Se ao9ta TLC; xal 7) 9uaix7) aXX* ou T

b. He must also study the law of contradiction, which is the most


fundamental principle of all.
5 - 23
Ib., 1005 b :

o5v TOU 91X0(1690^ xal TOU Tcepl Tracnrj^ TYJS oucrtac; OetopouvTO^ and the law
f/

6 OTi fzev

^ TT^uxev, xal Tcepl TCOV auXXoyLCFTixtov ap^cov eaTlv eTuiaxe^aa0aL, STjXov diction

TrpocTTjxei Se TOV (jtaXiaTa yvcopi^ovTa Trepl exaaTOv yevo<; ^xs^v Xeyetv

I0 pepaioT<xTa<; ap^a^ TOU Trpay[xaTo<;, coaTe xal TOV Trepl TCOV OVTCOV TJ
ovTa
TcavTCov pepaioTaTac;. ecm 8' OUTO^ 6 9iXoao9oc;. pepatoTaTT) 8* apx
Sia^euaO^vai aSuvaTov yvcopifjicoTaTTjv Te yap avayxaiov elvai TTJV
Ttepl T)V

TOtauTTjv (Trepl yap a [JLTJ yvcopt^ouaiv aTcaTcovTai TiavTec;) xal avuTtoOeTOv.

15 V Y^P avayxatov ^xeiv TOV OTLOUV ^uvievTa TCOV SVTCOV, TOUTO oux UTCoOeaic;'
8 8e yvcop^eiv avayxatov TCO OTIOUV yvcopt^ovTi, xal TJxeiv ^x VTa avayxatov.
s
OTI [lev oijv pepatOTaTT) 7] ToiauTT) rcaacov apx^, 89]Xov vl$ 8 Scrav auTTj,

[JieTa TauTa TO yap auTo a[xa uTcapxetv Te xal (JLTJ uTtapxetv aSuvaTov
X^ycofjiev.

20 TCO auTco xal xaTa TO auTo


'

auTT) STJ Traacov ICTTL pepaiOTaTT] TCOV apxcov

yap TOV etpTjfjievov Siopicr^ov.


In the following chapters of this book the law of contradiction is established
by proofs, and objections to it are refuted.

524 In E i Ar., having first divided all intellectual work into three
main groups theoretical, practical and productive x
,
next divides the
theoretical sciences into three other provinces: physics, mathematics
and first philosophy or theology 2 the last having the axivT)To<; ouaia ,

as its object.

Metaph. I i, 1026 a 18 - 32 : First phii.


or theology
Tpet<; av elev 91X0009^1 OecopTjTixai, Aa (h)(JLa/u x7)i t 9ucrix7), GeoXoyixT) has the im-
20 (ou yap mutable8ub "
SSTjXov OTI et TTOU ib 6etov uTrapxet, ev rfi TOiauTT) 9ucrei uTuapxeO^ xal
TTJV TijxicoTaTTjv Sei Trepl T& TijJLicoTaTOv yevo<; elvau at [xev o5v OecopTjTtxal TCOV object
fiXXcov e7rtaT7](jLcov alpeTcoTaTai, auTT] Se TCOV OecopTjTixcov. aTropTjaete yap Sv

1
Our nr. 432a. a
432b.
110 METAPHYSICS [514]

TL^ i:6Tep6v 7:06*?) Ttpcanr) cptXoao9(a xa66Xou ecruv ^ Ttepi TI y^vo^ xai, 9\i<nv
Ttva {Atav (ou yap o airi^ rp67co^ ouS* ev Tat<; |jLa6y](jiaTixaZ, aXX* T) (jiiv yeco- 25

[jieTpia xai aoTpoXoyla rapt Tiva cpiiaiv etaiv, Y) Se xa06Xou icaatov XOIVYJ )
el (JL^V o5v (JL7)
'CJTI TLS erlpa ouaia ruapa ra^ ^lioei auveaT)Qxu[a(;, ^ cpucrixTj
av e'tY] TrptoTY] 7CLaT7)|jL7) et 8* <TTI TI^ ouaia axtv7}To<;, aiinr] TcpoT^pa xai 91X0-

ao9ia Tupcory],xai xaOoXou OUTOX; ort 7vpci)T7] a xai Tcepl TOU 8vToc; f;
6v rauTY)^ 30
av etyj Oecopyjaai, xai TL EGTTI xai ra uTrap^ovTa fj 8v,

There might seem to exist a contradiction between this definition of


the object of metaphysics and that of F i (cited sub 521). Duns Scotus 2 ,

who had the interpretations of Avicenna and >Averroes before him, re-
garded them as a dilemma: Avicenna, who follows F i, says that being
as such is the object of metaphysics, Averrocs, according to E i, teaches
that this object is God and the intelligences. Duns Scotus, after a long
hesitation, takes the part of Avicenna. Aristotle himself, however, seems
not to have considered the two views as contradictory in F 2 (cited sub :

522) he gives, if not a synthesis, yet a transition from the first to the
second.

2 PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS CRITICIZED


Chapters 525 I n Metaph. A () the author gives an outline of the theory of Ideas :

the introduction of supra-sensible Forms as the true object of knowledge,


because sensible things are always changing 3 the assumption of mathe- ;

matical objects as existing between Forms and scnsibles 4 and the theory ,

of first principles, the One and the great-and-small, from which the
Numbers were deduced 5
. He compares this doctrine with that of the
Pythagoreans, from which distinguished by a few features, and
it is

concludes that Plato knew only the material and the formal cause 6 .

In ch. 9 of the same book he gives a more elaborate criticism of the


theory.

Metaph. A 9, 9goa -b
First 33 8
526 :

llepl (JL^V o5v


TWV IluGayopEuov d^staOco TOC vuv (txavov yap auTcov
TOCJOUTOV ) ol 8k Ta<; I86a<; aiTiaq Ti0e[Jievoi rcpcoTov [xev ^TJTOUVTEC; TtovSl TCOV b
8vTov Xapetv ra<; atTta<; Irepa TOUTOL^ taa TOV apiOjjtov exojiiaav, coarrep et TI^

1
"and it will be universal in this sense, because it is first".
2
Quaeshones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis 1, qu. i (Ed. Wadding, t. IV, p.
510-518).
3
Our nr. 204a; cp. 204b and 268a.
4 5
Nr. 362b, with n. i. Nr. 365a. 365b.
[526] PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS CRITICIZED in

api6(JLYJaai (3ouX6(ievo<; eXaTT6vcov [Aev Svrcov OIOITO JJIT] SuvrjaeaOat, TtXetco 8e


TcoiYjaa^ aptGjjioiT] (a^eSov yap taa y)
oux eXaTTco earl TOC etSy) TOUTOI^
5 Trepl cov y)TOuvTec; Ta^ aMac; ex TOIJTCOV ITT* exeiva TcpoijXOov xa0* Ixacrrov
yap ojxcovufjuSv TO Icm
xal Trapa TOC<; ouota<;, TCOV TC dcXXcov J
Icrav ev ITCI TroXXcov,

xal e:rl ToiaSe xal inl TOI<; ai8ioi<; 2 ).

8 - 17
527 Ib., 990 b :

3
8e xaO* ou<; Tp67iou<; 8eixvu(jLev STI IdTL Ta e'tSv], xaT* ooOeva 9a(veTai examined
ev[cov JJLSV yap oux avayxY] yiyveorOat auXXoyi<T(i6v, ei; evicav Se xal

&v 4
oi6fjte0a TOUTCOV etST) yiyverai . xara TS yap TOUC; Xoyou<; TOUC; ex TCOV
6
icov etSY) ScTai TUOCVTCOV oacov 7ri<7T7J[iai eiat, xal xara TO Iv em
6 7
TcoXXciv xal TCOV a7ro9aaecov, xaTa 8e TO voetv TI 96apevTO^ TCOV <p6apT&v
8
15 9avTaa[Jia yap TI TO\!)TCOV ecjTtv. STI Se ol axpip^aTepoi TCOV X6ycov ol p.ev
9
TCOV ?rp6c; TI TTOIOUCTIV iS^a^ cLv ou cpa[j(.ev slvai xaO' auTo y^vo^, ol Se TOV
,

10
Xeyouatv.

528 22 - 34 There should


Ib., 990 b :

xaTa [lev TYJV UTcoXyj^Lv xa6' YJV elvat 9afJiev Tac; tSeac; ou (Ji6vov TCOV ideas of
ouaicov ^GTat etSy) aXXa rcoXXcov xal eT^pcov (xal yap TO voy)(JLa Sv ou (Jt6vov substances

1
TCOV TE aXXov - "so also in the case of all other groups", i.e. even for those
things other than substances.
2
TOU; &lSioi$ - i.e. the heavenly bodies.
3 -
8exvu(/.ev "we", disciples of Plato.
4
"others would prove the existence of Ideas of tilings of which we Platonists
think there are none" (Ross).
5 The argument "from the sciences" would imply the existence of Ideas of
artefacta, which were probably not recognized by the Platonists of Aristotle's time.
The arguments here referred to are given in a very concise form. We need the
comments of Alexander of Aphrodisias to understand their sense fully.
6 T& v ini TroXXwv is the argument for the existence of Ideas from the existence
of groups of particulars.
xal TWV a7T09dtaecov - On the positive sense of negations according to Plato, see
Soph. 257 d-258 b (our nr. 342). W. D. Ross comments: "There was no need to
suppose bare negative Ideas; anything that could be explained by participation
in a negative Idea could be explained more simply by non-participation in the
positive Idea".
argument from the fact that it is possible to think
7 - the
T& voetv TI 90apvTo<;
an object even when the thing has perished. Ar. argues that according to this
argument there must be an Idea of each perishable thing.
8
ol dxpip&rrepoi TCOV X6ywv - Ross, citing Jackson, explains: Ar. has previously

pointed out certain consequences of Platonic arguments he now points out certain ;

implications actually stated in Plato's more accurate arguments, though unwelcome


to his successors.
9 Phaedo the Idea of TO ECTOV (74 a-77 a).
TWV rrp6<; TI - e.g. in the
10
TOV TP(TOV <5tvOpw7rov - See on this argument Farm. 132 d-i33 a (our nr. 327c).
112 METAPHYSICS [528]

Trepl TOCC; ouaiac; aXXa xal xaTa TCOV SXXcov eaTi, xal eTTicrojjjiai ou [/,6vov T% 25
ouaia<; elalv aXXa xal eT^pwv, xal iXXa 8e (jiupia aufjipaivei TotauTa) xaTa Si;

TO avayxaiov xal Tac; 86a<; Tac; Trepl auTcov, ei ecm (ie6exTa Ta e?S-yj, TCOV

ouaicov avayxaiov iSeac; elvai [Jiovov. ou yap xaTa aujjipepyjxoc; (xeTexovTai l


aXXa Sel TauTfl exacrrou [Letiyjzw fj [JLT]
xaO* i>7roxei[xevou XyeTai 2 (Xyco 8' 30

olov, el TL auToSiTrXaaiou (JLETS^SI, TOOTO xal atStou (jieTexei, aXXa xaTa au(jt-
TCO SiTrXaatcp ai'Sto) eivai), &CTT' IdTai ou<j(a T

529 Ar. now presents his main objection: Forms do not contribute
anything to sensible things, nor to our knowledge of them.

of no use IlavTCov Se ^.aXiaTa SiaTtopyjaeiev av TI<; TI TCOTS oufjipaXXeTat Ta el'&Y)

TCOV aiaOvjTcov 3
73 TOLC; yiyvo^evoti;
xal 96eLpo(jLevoic; otae yap XLVYJ- I0
OUTS [ieTapoX9j<; ouSe(jLia^ laTiv alria auToic;. aXXa (JIYJV OUTS 7rp6<; TYJV
ouOev poy)OeL TYjv Ta>v aXXcov (ouSe yap ouata exetva TOUTCOV ev
TOUTOK; yap av ^v), OUTE ei^; TO elvai, [JLYJ evuKap^ovTa ye Tot(; (jieTx oU(ytv
*

OUTCO fjtev yap av taco^; aiTia So^etev elvat toe; TO Xeuxov [jie[jLiy[ievov TCO Xeuxco,
j^
aXX* OUTOC; (Jiev 6 X6yo<; Xiav euxivv)Toc; 4 6v 'Ava^ayopac; ^ev 7rpcoTO(; EiJSo^o^ 6
,

S* (io~Tepov xal aXXot TIV^<; eXeyov (paSiov yap auvayayetv TroXXa xal aSuvaTa
Tcpo^ T7)v ToiauTYjv So^av).

b. Ib., a 19 -!) 1 :

5
'AXXa (JLTJV
TaXXa xaT ouOeva Tp6?rov TCOV eico00Tcov 2 o
ou8' ex TCOV et8cov eaTt

X^yeaOai. TO 8e Xeyetv TcapaSeiyjiaTa auTa elvai xal pieTe^eiv auTcov TdcXXa xevo-

Xoyetv ecm
xal [zeTa9opa<; X^yetv TroivjTtxa^. TI yap edTt TO epya^6(jievov 7Cpo<;
'
6
Tac; i8a^ aTropXercov evSx Ta ^ T xa L elvat xal ytyveaOai OJJLOIOV OTIOUV
;

7
xal etxa^6(Jtevov Tcpoc; exetvo coaTe xal OVTO<; ScoxpaTOU^ xal (JLYJ OVTOC;
(JIT) ,
25
yevoiT* av oloc; ScoxpaTT]^ 6{AOtco(; 8e SvjXov OTL xav ei 9jv 6 ScoxpaTYjc; atSioc;.

eaTai Te TtXeico 7rapa8ety(JiaTa TOU auToO, cocrTe xal el'&yj, olov TOU avOpcoTrou

1
"for participation per accidens does not exist".
2
"but a thing must share in its Form as in something not predicated of a sub-
ject".
3
T. di8fcot<; TWV at<j073To>v
- as in 526: the heavenly bodies.
4
Xav ux(vY)Toc;
-
easily refutable. On the doctrine of Anaxagoras referred to,
see our nr. 124.
5
Eudoxus of Cnidus, the famous astronomer, who spent long years in Plato's
Academy ( 365), seems to have taught that the Ideas are immanent in things,
though he held that they are substances. On the last point he did not agree with
the (later) theory of Ar.
6
These words refer to the Demiurgus in Plato's Timaeus.
7
"without being copied from it".
[529] PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS CRITICIZED 113

coov xal TO Steouv, &[Lo. 8k. xal TO auToav0payrco^. STI ou p.6vov T<OV aiCT07)Tcov
x
T<X e87j aXXa xal auT&v, olov TO yevo<;, <b<; yvoc; elS&v
T& auTo eaTai TrapaSeiyfza xal eixaw.

530 1- 9 How can


Ib., 991 b :

So^etev av aSuvaTOV elvai X^P^ /r^3 v ouaiav xal oij 73


ouaia- ciaTC separately?
av at i8ai, ouafai TCOV 7rpay[JiaTOov oScrai
cbc; xal ToO elvai xal TOU yiyveoOat aiTta Ta 1873 eaTtv xatTot TO>V
eiScov OVTOV fifjtcoc;
06 yiyveTai Ta {jLeTS^ovTa av (JLY) ^ TO xivyjaov, xal TroXXa

STepa, olov oixia xal SaxTuXio^, 6v ou 9a[xev etSy] elvai COCTS S^Xov
l T$XXa xal elvat xal ytyveaOai Sia TOtauTa^ aiTtaq ota^ xal

Ta pY)6lvTa vuv.

9- 21 If Ideas are
531 Ib., 991 b :

eforep eialv aptOfJiol T<X etSv), TTCO<; aiTioi SaovTai TcoTepov STI ^Tepoi how can they ;

ioapi0[zot dm Ta ovTa, olov (jiiv <6> 681


apiOjAoc; &v6pa>7ro<; 681 8e ScoxpdcTYjc; 681 be causes?
Se KaXXta^ ;
TL oSv exelvoi TOUTOI^ atTiot eidiv ouSe yap et ol (Jiev atStoi oi ;

2
Se fjiy],
ouSev Siotaei. el 8* OTL Xoyoi dtptOfjicov TavTa\50a, olov 7]

S^Xov STL eaTlv ev ye TI 5>v eial Xoyoi. et SY] TOUTO 73 6X73, 9avepov OTI xal
I5 ol api0(jLol Xoyot Ttvec; ecovTat eTepou Trpo^ eTepov. Xeyco 8* olov, et SGTLV 6
KaXXiac; Xoyo<; ev apiOfjLotc; Tuupoc; xal xal (JSaToc; xal aepo<;, xal &XXcov y%
TLVCOV uTcoxeifievcov e'aTat xal 73
ISea cxpiOfio^ xal auToavOpcoTro^, etT* api0(Ji6(;
SaTat Xoyo^ ev api0{JLOL<; TIVCOV xal oux apL0jxoc;,
[JIT), 8{JLO><;
ouS*
8ta TauTa api0[i.6c;.

532 Ar. repeats his main objection to the theory of Ideas, and
a.

reproaches the Academy for having abandoned the chief task of philoso-
phy to seek
: the cause of sensible phenomena.
Ib "' QQ2 a24- 29 '
'
Ideas do not
^-^
3 explain
"OXeo<; Se y)TOUCT7]<; TTJ<; (TO9La^ Tcepl T&V 9avepcov TO atTtov, TOUTO (lev phenomena
eiaxajjiev (ou0ev yap Xeyofiev rapl TTJ? aiTtac; oOev 73 apx'/j

TTJV 8* ouatav oiofjievot Xeyetv auTwv eTepa^ (lev ouaiac; elvai ^ajjiev, OTCOX; 8'
4
exetvai TOIJTCOV ouaiai, Sta xev7]<; Xyo(Jiev T^ yap (jLeTe^eiv, waTrep xal TupoTepov
eLTcojxev, ou06v eaTiv.

-- Ou8e

2
b. Ib.,

873
a 89-!) 1
:

87uep Tac<; e7n,aT7j(JLai(; 6pa>[/,ev ov atTiov, 81

In the sense of genus of various species.


X6yot dtpiOjzcov
- ratios of numbers.
o xal 7ua<; vou<; xal
They have
nothing to do
w ith the final
cause

8 -
T. 9<xveptov sensible things.
4
8i& xevTfc Xyo[*ev = xevoXoyoG(jtev (is empty talk).
De Vogel, Greek Philosophy II
114 METAPHYSICS [532]

9uai<; TTOICI, ouSe TaiiTY)<; TYJC; aiTia^, Y]V <pa[jiev elvai, [jtiav TCOV
1
ouOev aTCTETai TOC el'Sv), aXXa yeyove T<* |Jia0Y)[iaTa TOI^ vuv Y) 91X0009^,
9aax6vTtov &XXcov x^P LV aura Seiv

3 SUBSTANCE

533 ~~ a Mrfa M- z i. 1028 a 10- 20 29 - 31


'
,
:

primary To 6v XyTai TtoXXaxto*;, xaOdarep SteiXo^eOa TCpOTepov ev TOL<; rcepl TOO 10


sense is 2 3
cjY)[jiaiveL yap TO (JLSV TI ecm xal ToSe TI TO Se Troiiv ^ jcoafcv ^
7t
aax&<; ,

TCOV <5cXX(ov IxaaTOv TCOV OUTCO xaT7]yopou(Jivcov. ToaauTa^coc; 8e XsyofJivou


TOU 6vTO<; 9avepov OTI TOUTCOV rcpwTOv 6v TO T e<mv, oTiep cnr][jiaivei TTJV ouatav
(STOCV (Ji^v yap etTrw^sv Tuotov TI ToSe, ^ aya66v Xeyojjiev ?) xaxov, aXX* ou 15
TplTUYJ/U ^ (5cV0pt07UOV OTav OU XeUXOV OuSe OspfJLOV OuSe TptTTT)^?
Tl IcTTtV,

aXXa SvOpaiTtov vj Oeov), TCX 8' aXXa XeyeTat ovTa TCO TOU OUTCD<; OVTOC; Ta
4
[jL^v Troo-OTTjTec; elvat ,
Ta Se TcoLOTTjTe^, Ta Se TcaOyj, Ta 8e aXXo TI. A^Xov 20
5
oSv STL Sia TauTTjv xaxeivcav exaaTov ECTTIV, ciaTe TO TTpcoTox; ov xai ou TI
8v aXX* ov a7cXco<; TJ outrta av SLY].

Substance is
Jj. IO28 a 31 -b 2
Ib., :

definition, IloXXax&c; ptev ouv XeyeTai, TO TupcoTOv O(JLCO<; Se TTOCVTW^ YJ ouaia TrpcoTOV,
in knowledge xa Xoyco xal yvcoaei xal ypov6>. TCOV (JLSV yap aXXcov xaTYjyopTj^aTCov ou0ev
and in time \\ / ~ VN\/ / >/ ~ > / \

v, auTY] oe (JLOVYJ xat TCO Xoyco oe TOUTO jcpcoTov (avayxY) yap ev TCO
exaaTOU Xoyw TOV TYJC; ouatac; evuTcap^ei-v) xal siSevai Se TOT' ol6[jLeOa SxaaTOv 35

[xaXiaTa, fiTav TL ECTTIV 6 avOpco7ro<; yvcojjiev Y]


TO ruup, [xaXXov ^ TO TCOLOV Y] TO
7UOGOV Y^
TO 7TOU, 7TL Xal aUTCOV TOUTCOV TOTS SXaCTTOV LdJJLSV, TaV Tt SCTTt T& b
TTOdiv Y^
TO 7TOIOV yVCO(JLV.

The eternal c Ib., 1028 b 2 - 4 :

'What is Kal SYJ xal TO TcaXai TS xal vuv xal asl ^YJTOUJJLSVOV xal asl aTropoujJievov,
being" T [ T ^ g v TO ^ T Q aTl T [^ oucria.

----
-Jj
means
"What is
substance" i
T0 ^
v ^v _ yjlc Deference is certainly to Speusippus, head of the Academy
since the death of Plato.
2
Sc. in A 7.
3
T[ <m xai T/>8e TL - It should be noticed that the author, before coming to his
definitive conception of ouaia, in the beginning of this very book uses the term in
exactly the same way as it is used in Categ. 5 (our nr. 438a), namely, not only
in the sense of essence or quiddity (TI ICTTI), but also in the sense of the individual
being.
4
TOO - clvai: "by the fact that they are, some of them, quantities of that which
is in this primary sense, others qualities of it", etc.
5 -
8ta TatjTYjv sc. T. Tuptonqv xarrjyopCav.
[534] SUBSTANCE H5

534 first qualified ooaia as T eari or as T68s TI, Ar. now


Having
proceeds to ask whether, then, natural bodies and their parts are sub-
stances (as he seems inclined to admit *), or something else next to them
(e.g. Ideas and mathematical objects), or even not these but some other
things.
8 - 15 Are natural
Metaph. Z 2, 1028 b
A~VO</</ ~ /**
:

v- bodies and
Aoxsi o Y] ouaia uTcapxeiv cpavepcoTara (lev TOU; aoo^aaiv (oio Ta TE (,coa their parts
/ / \ /

10 xal TOC 9UT<x xal Ta (Jt6pia auT&v oudia<; slvai 9a(xev, xal Ta 9i>aixa crcofjiaTa, substances?
olov mip xal uScop xal yyjv xal T&V TOLOUTCOV sxaciTov, xal oaa y) {Ji6pta y)

TOUTCOV yj
ex TOUTCOV eaTiv y) fioptcov y) TUOCVTCOV, olov 8 Te oupavoc; xal Ta [Jt6pia

auTou, (SccTTpa xal aeXyjvy] xal 7]Xio<; ) TcoTepov Se aJ)Tai (/,6vaL oudtai eialv y)
xal
15 SXXai, y)
TOIJTCOV TIVE<; y)
xal &XXai, yj
TOUTCOV [lev ou0ev eTepai Se TIVE^, axsTUTeov.

535 a. Four possibilities must be considered.


Four
Metaph. Z
33 - 36
3, 1028 b :

i 8* y) oidia, EL {ly) taTa xa ^ Y*P of the term


7cXeova^to<;, aXX' ev
T^TTapat y e ^^ "

TO Tt yjv elvai xal TO xaOoXoo xal TO jivo^ ouata Soxet elvai exaaTOU, xal "substance"
TOIJTCOV TO UTTOXetflEVOV.

b. 1028 b 36 -I029 a 2 Canthesub-


Ib., :

T6 8* uTcoxELfJisvov EGTI xa6* o3 Ta &XXa XsysTai, EXELVO 8e auTO (jLyjXETi substance?


*
&XXou 816 TipcoTov Tcspl TOUTOU StopicjTEov fzcxXtaTa yap SOXEL slvat
T6 UTCOXstfJLEVOV TUptOTOV.

c. Now matter is defined as that which is nothing in itself: neither


a definite being, nor a quantity nor any other thing by which being is
qualified (our nr. 476c). "For there is something of which each of this is
predicated". . .

26 - 33
Ib., 1029 a :

*Ex o5v TOUT<OV 0o>pouai cuixBaivEi ouaiav slvai TYW uXinv aSiivaTOv 8' In fact tnis
M-SV

xat,
x xi
yap TO ^wpicrrov xai TO TOOE
x x x /5, e , *
TI uTrap^stv ooxsi (jiaXtdTa T/J
~ /. ~ , , ^x consequence
x

ouaia, oto TO | S impossible


xal T& it, a(jL90iv oiata SO^EIEV av slvai fxaXXov T^ i)Xy)<;. Tyjv [JLEV TO[VUV
3 E a{JL9otv ouartav, Xsyci) S^ TY)V 2x TE

yap xal SyjXyj 9avspa 8 TCCO^ xal y) uXyj vrspl 8s T^^; TpiTyj<; CTXETCTEOV,

yap

now He Substance
536 Ar. proceeds
r to study
J essence. begins with some logical as essence
remarks.

1
Note the expressions 9avepwTaT<x JJL^V and 9<x(iev.
Il6 METAPHYSICS [536]

a. The first question is: What is the Tt 9jv elvat?

Metaph. Z 4, 1029 b
13 - 16
:

*
Meaning of aT t T0 T [ fy etvoci sxaaTOU S XeysTat xa6' auT6. ou yap ecm TO aot
elvat TO [Aouatxcp elvat ou yap xaTa crauTov el (Jiouatx6<;. 6 (Spa xara <raur6v.

b. Only those things have an essence whose account is a definition.


It belongs .
T, 6- 7
fi
Ib., IO 3 O a :
only to things
which can T0 Tt* ^ v sfoat eaTtv fiacov 6 Xoyo<; IGTIV
be defined
E.g. "white man" cannot be denned, because it is a compound of substance and
another category, the essence being "just what something is".

Species only 7 14
c Ifo., 1030 a - :

C s

definition 0ptc7(jt6 8 scmv oux av ovo(xa Xoyw TOCUTO ayj^aivy) (TravTS^ yap av elev OL

Xoyot opof SaTai yap 8vofjia OTCOOUV Xoyw, ciaTe xal 7) 'IXiac; 6pia(ji6<;

aXX* eav Trpcorou TIVO^ f]


rotaura 8* ecrrlv oaa Xeyerai SXXo xar* SXXou I0
JATJ
TCO

XeyeaOai. oux eaTai, &pa ouSevl TWV JXTJ yevouc; siS&v UTcapxov TO TI 9)v etvai,
aXXa TOUTOLC; [JLOVOV (TauTa yap Soxec ou xaTa {jLeTO^V XlyeaOai xal 7ca0o^
ouS* d)

Other things 14 32
d. Ib., 1030 a - :

secondary 'AXXa X6yo<; fxev e'aTai exaaTOU xal TCOV aXXcov


Tt a7](JLatvei, eav ^ ovofxa, STI
sense T0 e T ai8 e facapxei, ^ avd Xoyou aTrXou axptfieCTTepO(; opidjAO^ 8' oux
ouSe TO TI 9jv elvat. ^ xal 6 6pi<T(jLo<; wcrTtep xal TO TI eaTt TuXsova^eo^ XeyeTai ;

xal yap TO TL ECTTLV eva piev TpOTrov avjfjiatvei TTJV ouaiav xal TO T68e TI, fiXXov
8e SxaaTOv T&V xaT7)yopou(Jivcov, TCOOOV TTOIOV xal 8ca aXXa TOtauTa. &<TTCEP 2 o

yap xal TO saTtv UTcap^eL TiraaLv, aXX* ou^ 6[jiotcoq aXXcx TW JJLSV TrpcoTOi^ TOI^
8* ETCO(JLVO)^, OUTCO xal TO TL scmv aTuXa)^ (JLEV Tyj ouaia TTOX; 8e TOIC; aXXotc;*
xal yap TO TCOLOV lpoi(jLe6' xal TO TTOIOV TCOV TI eaTiv, aXX*
av TL ECTTLV, O><TTE

TtXtos, aXX* coaicep eTil TOU (JIT) OVTO^; Xoytxcoc; 9aai TIVS<; elvai TO (JLT) ov, 25

arcXto<; aXXa piY] ov, OUTCO xal TO TTOLOV. SEC JJLEV ouv CTXOTUELV xal TO TUCO<;
Set Xsysiv TOpl sxacjTov, ou (JLTJV (jtaXXov ys Y)
TO TICOC; EXEI 816 xal vuv ETTEL T6

Xsy6[Xvov 9avEpov, xal TO TI 9)v elvat o^otco^ uTrap^et TrpcoTcoq [isv xal aTuXco^
TYJ ouata, elTa xal TOI? <5XXoi(; coaTcsp xal TO TI saTtv, oux aTrXco^ Tt ^v elvat ^
7

aXXa Tcotco 75 uoaqi Tt ^v slvat.

conclusion e g o j n f ac ^- definition and essence belong primarily to substance,


secondarily to the other categories.
4 7
Ib., 1030 b - :

*Exetvo 8e 9avspov oTt 6 TipcoTCoc; xal aTrXco^ optcyfio^ xal TO Tt Tjv elvat TCOV
oucrtcov eaTtv. ou fjtrjv aXXa xal TCOV &XXcov 6(jto[to<; eaTt, TrXvjv ou TcpcoTco?.
[537] SUBSTANCE ii7

537
In the next chapter (5) Ar. deals with some difficulties concern-
ing the definition of ra ou^ arcXa, aXXa duvSeSuao-p^va, such as (iifi6TY)<;,
where the definition of "snub" always implies a reference to the sub-
stance to which it belongs ("nose"). Ultimately all terms in categories

other than substance are shown to be in principle of this type, the de-
finition of them being ex TrpoaGeaetoc;, i.e.
involving a reference to the
substance to which they belong.
The
Metaph. Z
1 5 defi-
5, 1031 a - :

nition of
A ~^ / r/ / > / > f < / x x ~ ,/.
AyjXov TOIVUV OTI [JLOVTjc; T7)<; oucyias eonriv o opui[jio<;. ei yap xai TCOV aXXcov compounds
*
xar/jyopicov, avayxyj ex 7upoa0e<ieco<; eZvai, olov TOU t^oioijt * a & TrepiTTou- always^
ou yap #veu apiO^ou, ouSe TO 09jXu aveu coou (TO 8e ex TrpoaOeaeco^; Xeyo) ev aeco;
i^ TO auTO Xeyetv cidTuep ev TOUTOK;).

538 Ar. now raises the question whether a thing is identical with
its essence. He answers: Not always. E.g. not in terms formed by a sub-
stance coupled with an accidental predicate, such as "white man". But
in terms xaO' OCUTO they are the same. E.g. "the Good" itself cannot
differ from its essence, nor can "living being".

15 - 18
a. Metaph. Z 6, 1031 a :

IIoTepov 8e TOCUTOV ecruv 7) eTepov TO T ^v elvou xaL exadTOv,


g<m yap TI ?rp6 epyou 7up&<; TTJV Trepl T^ outrtac; crxe'jav IxaorTov Te yap oux
aXXo Soxec elvaL T^<; eauTOu oucrta^, xat TO Tt 9jv elvai XeyeTat eZvat 7]
exacrTou
oucr^a.

19 - 24 Not in the
b. Ib., 1031 a :

'Em [jiev TWV


Xeyo(Jiev6)v xaTa cri)[JLpep7)x6<; So^eiev av eTepov eZvat, olov accidental
8y)
unities
Xeuxcx; eTepov xal TO Xeoxo> avOpwTTCi) eZvat. ei yap TO auTO, xal TO
(5cv0pa>7T;o^

av0pa>7uc> eZvat xal TO Xeuxco avOpcoTrco TO auTO TO auTO yap av0pa>7ro<; xal
Xruxoc; dcvOpcoTuoc;, ca<; cpaaiv, cidTe xal TO Xeuxw avOpcoTcw xal TO avOpcojucp.

30 'Em
c. Ib.,
28 4 11 16
1031 a -b b -
8e TCOV xaO' auTa Xeyojjievtov
,
:

avayxv) TauTo eZvai, oZov et Tive^ subsistent


ap'
^ Jj j^
eialv ouaiat cLv eTepat (JLYJ elalv oucnai fjtTjSe 9u<reic; ?Tepai rcpoTepai, ota^ 9aal beings

b Ta<; t8ea<; eZvat Tive<; ; ei yap e'crrai eTepov auTO TO ayaOov xal T6 ayaOco eZvai,
xal ^wov xal TO ^cl>cp, xal TO OVTL xal TO ov, ecrovTat (SXXai, Te oudiai xal cpuaei<;
xal iSai Trapa T<X Xeyojievac;, xal TupoTepat oucriat execvai, et TO Tt 9jv eZvat
2
ouata eaTtv. xal el [Jiev a7coXeXu(jivat aXXifjXcov, TCOV (jtev
oux eaTai e7tiaT7)[iY)

1
TTOIOU codd. Bonitz conjectured
2 - the ouaiai.
TCOV (JL^V
Il8 METAPHYSICS [538]

l
T<X 8* oux gcTTai 8vTa. 'AvayxY) <5cpa ev elvat T& <xya66v
xal xaXov xal xaXco elvat, <xal> 8aa (JLTJ xar* #XXo XyeTai, aXXa xaO* aura
xal TcptoTa' xal yap TOUTO Ixaviv av forapxif), xav fry) f) eiS?), (jtaXXov 8* lcrco<;
xav

other 18 22
d. Ib., 1031 b - :

for the "Ex TS 873 TOUTCOV TCOV Xoycov Sv xal TauTO ou xara (TU(jLpep7)x6<; auiri Sxaarov
x
identity xa ^ T ^ T ( )j
xa t g Tli y T ^ eTCidTacjOai exaarTov TOUTO sari, T& rt ?)v elvai
v e |;vai9
2
xal xaTa TYJV ex0eatv avayxy] Sv TI elvat <

The case of e Jb
accidental
terms (
T& 8J: xara (TUfjLpepTjxi^ Xeyojxevov, olov TO [JLOUCTLXOV 73 Xeuxov, Sia TO
cnrjfjLaiveLv oux aXvjOec; elTtetv co<; TauTO TO TL Y)V elvat xal auTO xal
3
yap & au[x(iep7)xe Xeux6v xal T6 cru(ipepY]x6<; ciaT* ECTTI [lev a>c; TaiVnSv, ,

^ ou TauTO TO TI TJV elvai xal auTO TW [jiev yap avOpcoTuco xal TW Xeuxq>
4
oo TauTO, TCO 7ua0L Se TauTO ).

Conclusion 4 6
f 15^ 1032 a - :

"OTL (lev ouv inl TCOV TupcoTcov xal xaO' auTa Xeyo[Aevcov TO exaaTco elvai
xal SxaaTOv TO auTO xal ev ECTTI, 89]Xov.

Essence and 539 After a digression on the various kinds of becoming (ch. 7-9),
Ar. now raises the question as to what belongs to the essence, and there-
fore to the definition. Should the definition of a whole contain the de-
finitions of the parts?

whole and 20 28
a> Metaph. Z io, 1034 b - :

'
5
e 6 6pi<T(jLo<; X6yo<; eorTt, 7ta<; Se Xoyos (Jtepv) e^et, cb<; Si 6 Xoyo^ 20

7rp6<; TO 7rpay[jLa, xal TO jxepoc; TOU Xoyou 7rpo<; TO {Jtepoc; TOU 7rpay(jLaTo<; 6(jiotco<;

S/ei, aTuopetTai, ^8y) rcoTepov Sec TOV TCOV X6yov evuTcapxetv ev


(iepcov TCO TOU
8Xou Xoyco Y)
ou. ITU' evtcov {xev yap 9aivovTat evovTec; evfcov 8* 08. TOU [lev yap
xiixXou 6 X6yo<; oux S^et. TOV TCOV T(JL7)(jiaTcov, 6 Se TTJ<; auXXapyj<; S^et TOV TCOV 25

cTTOt^eicov xaiToi SiaipetTat xal 6 xuxXo<; ei^ Ta T{jL7)[xaTa cocrTrep xal Y)

elc; T<X

Ta 8^- the Ideas


themselves, e.g. the Good.
Itbecomes clear by the exhibition of instances.
"For both that to which the accidental quality belongs, and the accidental
quality, are white" (Ross).
But it will be the same as the quality "white".
Ross translates "formula", with reference to De interpr. 16 b 26 (our nn 442 a).
[5393 SUBSTANCE IIQ

b. Then, are the parts prior to the whole ?

Ib. 10^4 b 28 - 32 Are thc P arta


'

\ 7 / f ^ < prior?
,
SE el TrpOTEpa Ta [JLEpY]
TOU oXou, TY)<;
8s 6pOYJ<; Y] o^sta [Jtepo^ xal 6 Sax-
TOU coou, TupoTSpov ocv SLY] Y) o^ela TYJ<; 6p(JY)^ xal 6 SaxTuXo^ TOU avOpto-
s
TTOU. Exsiva sivai TupOTEpa TCO Xoyco yap XsyovTai E
Soxet 8 sxstvwv a xal ,

2
Toi elvai 8s &VEU aXXifjXcov TrpoTepa .

540 Why, then, is man


prior to the linger and a circle to its segments,
whereas individual are prior to the syllable? Ar. answers:
letters
material parts are not prior, parts of the form are.

1 - 12 Material
a. Ib., 1035 a :

i s i \ y ,/ parts not
El o5v s<m TO (JLEV uXY] TO Ss slSo^ TO 8 EX TOUTWV, xal ouaia Y)
TE uXY] xal prior
TO ElSo? Xal TO EX TOUTCOV, ECTTt [JLEV &C, Xal Y) liXY) [JLEpO^ TLVOi?XyETai, SaTl 8*
3
<o<; ou, aXX' s!; ^>v 6 TOU stSou^ Xoyo<; olov .
T% (Jisv xoiXoTY)TO<; oux EGTI (Jispo^

.5Y] aap^ (auTY) yap Y) uXY) 9* fa yiyvETat), TYJ^ 8s CJIIJLOTYJTOC; [Jtspoc;- xal TOU
5

(jisv auvoXou av8p!,avTO(; (Jtspo^;


6 xaXxoq TOU S co<; si'Souc; Xsyo[Jivou avSptavTOc;
4
ou (XEXTEOV yap TO sT8o<; xal J] sI8o(; E/EL ExaaTOv ,
TO 8' uXixov ouSsTTOTS
xa6' auTO XEXTEOV 5 ) 810 6 [JLEV
TOU xuxXou Xoyo<; oux tiyjzi
TOV TWV TfJtYjpiaTCOv,

TY]<; auXXap-?];; ey^ei TOV T&V aTOi-/icov


106 Ss Ta (JLEV yap aTOi)fla TOU Xoyou
[JLEpY]
TOU Et8oU^ xal OU^ liXY), Ta SE T(JLYj(jtaTa OUTOX; (JLEpY) d)^ liXY] 9* ETCt- %
yiyvETai.

b. So parts of the definition are prior. E.g. the acute angle is not
a preceding part of the right angle, but the right angle is logically prior.
For the acute angle is defined as being smaller than the right angle.
4- 8 E g the
1035 b
' '
Ib., :

acute angle
"Oaa [JLEV yap TOU Xoyou [JLEpY] xal el<; a SiaipeiTai 6 Xoyo<;, TauTa TrpoTepa
6
Y)
evta* 6 Se T% 6pO% Xoyo^ ou SiaipetTai, st<; 6^eta<; Xoyov ,
dcXX* <6>

TY]<; o^etac; els opOiQv xP^ Tat -


T^P opL^OfjLevog TYJV o^etav Tyj 6p09] eXaTTCOv((

yap wopO^a Y] o^eia.

1
The parts
are explained by reference to the whole (e^ exeivcov Xeyovrat).
2
"in respect also of the power of existing apart from each other the wholes
are prior to the parts" (Ross).
3
aXX' IE, <ov etc. - but only the elements of which the formula of the form exists.
4
T& el&oq xal /] elSoc s^ei - "the form, or the thing as having form, should be
said to be the thing".
6
T& 8' uXixov ouS^TTOTE - "but the material element by itself must never be said
to be so".
8 The formula of the right angle does not include the formula of the acute angle.
120 METAPHYSICS [540]

9 14
c. Other examples and conclusion. Ib. 1035 b - :

p * r* 8 p*
the 8e xal 6 xuxXo<; xal TO Y){JUxuxXiov 'xou<nv TO yap YjfjLixiixXiov TCO
'OfjLoioc;

prior xuxXco 6pieTai xal 6 8axTuXo<; T& oXco TO yap TOi6vSe [zpo<; av0pco7rou
SaxTuXos. waO* 8aa piev [JtlpY] ax; uXv) xal ei^ a SiaipetTai a> uXYjv, uarepa
8cra 8e (oc; TOU X6you xal TYJ<; ouaia*; TYJ<; xara TOV Xoyov, TtpoTepa YJ Ttavra

^ Svta.

d. Thus in living beings, too: parts of the soul have priority,


material parts have not.
Sointhecase 14 22
Ib. f 1035 b - :

beings "ETtel Se ^cocov ^DX*/) (TOUTO yap oucrta TOU IJJL^UXOU) Y) xara TOV
T]
T&V
Xoyov oudta xal TO eZSoc; xal TO TL Y^V elvat TCO TOiaiSe acofjiaTi (IxaarTov youv 15
Ti [iepO(; eav 6pty)Tai xaXco^, oux aveu TOU epyou opietTai, o ou^ UTuap^SL <5cvsu

alaOTjaea)^), ciare Ta Taiiryjc; [Aepvj TrpoTepa YJ


TravTa Y^
evta TOU auvoXou ^coou,
xal xaO' exaaTOV SYJ ofioico^, TO SE ac5[ia xal Ta TOUTOU [xopta udTepa TauT7)(; 20
TT]<; ouCTiac;, xal SiaipeiTai eit; TauTa co<; et^ uXyjv ou^ v] ouata aXXa TO auvoXov.

541 To the question whether matter should be admitted into the


definition of physical beings, these being essentially composed of form
and matter, Ar. answers: no, matter does not enter into the definition.
27 31
a. Ib., 1035 b - :

matter the Q 8' <5cv0pa>7ro<; xal 6 xal Ta OUTCO<; em TO>V xaO' exaaTa, xa06Xou 8e
ITUTCCX;
individuating, ^ ,
\ , 7 , ^., , J - , c

principle otj >^ EGTLV ouaia aXXa aruvoXov TL ex TOUOI TOU Xoyou xai TY]arot, TY]<; uXY]<; c

s
xaOoXou- xa0 exaaTov 8' ex TY^<; eaxaTYji; uX7)<; 6 SwxpaTY)*; Y)8y) eaTiv, xal
erel TCOV aXXcav

In the last sentence (xaO* exacrrov Se e.q.s.) matter is qualified as the


principle of individuation "As to the individual, immediately after :

the ultimate matter Socrates comes in".

parts of the Mpo<; fiev ouv earl xal TOU eiSouq (elSoc; 8e Xyco TO Tt T^V elvat ) xal TOU
definition CTUV 6Xou TO (j x TO [> eJSou^ xal TY^ uXY)^ <xal TYJC; uXY)<;> auTY)<;. aXXa TOU Xo-
you [JLepY] Ta TOU et8ou<; (Jiovov e^Ttv, 68e X6yo^ earl TOU
xa06Xou TO yap xuxXc) elvai xal xuxXoc; xal ^u/Y) elvai xal

Concrete 2 8
Ct Jb ^ 1036 a - :

definable Tou 8e auv6Xou i^SY], olov xiixXou TOuSl xal TWV xa0* SxadTa TIVO<; Y^ ata0Y)Tou

ITC! TWV xaO' exaoTa etc. - terms which are thus applied to individuals,
but universally.
[541] SUBSTANCE 121

VOYJTOU Xey<o 8k VOTJTOIK; [Aev olov TOIK; (jia07][iaTixou<;, aia07)Tou 8& olov
Yj
'
a 1 TOU uXlVOU - TOUTCOV 8s OUX SffTlV OptCTfJLO^, <xXX(X (JLT(X
*
ai(70Y)aeoa<; yvcopi^ovTat, dcTieXOovTec; Si ex T% svTsXexeta; ou

89jXov TTOTepov ei(jLv 7]


oux eiaiv aXX* asl XeyovTai xal yva>piovTai, T& xa06Xou
Xoyw.
8 12
d. Ib., 1036 a - : SXTQ

'H 8' ($XY) (icyvworTOc; xa0' auTTjv. uXr) Ss YJ {jiev ai<T0Y]TY) SCTTLV YJ Se VOTJTY), {Jx

ata97]TY) (JLEV
olov ^aXxoc; xal uXov xal ocry] xivyjTY] uXy), VOYJTY) Ss Y] ev

aia07]Tot<; uTuap/oucra (JLYJ ^ atdOyjTa, olov Ta (JLa0Y)(JLaTixa.

is identified by Alexander with extension.

542 Ar. now proceeds to discuss the question why that, the account
of which is a definition, is one.
E.g. : "two-footed animal" one and not two ? "Man" and "white" are two
why is

when the one does not belong to the other, one when it does. But in "two-footed
animal" one element does not share in the other; the genus does not share in the
differentiae (else it would share in contraries at the same time). And even if it
were to share in its differentiae, the same difficulty would arise, for the differentiae
of man are more than one: possessed of feet, two-footed, wingless. Why, then,
are these one ?
Ar. answers: o>ov is the genus, SITTOUV the differentia. But this difference is to be
divided again, and again, until the indivisible species is reached. The last difference
will be the substance and definition of the thing.

16 20
Metaph. Z 12, 1038 a - :

OUTOX; dcel poiiXeTai (3a8ieiv sax; av e'X0fl ei$ TOC a&id^opa TOTS 8'

ToaaijTa e&Y) TtoSoc; ocraiTisp at Stacpopai, xal ra


SL Sy] raura O($TG> S^et, <pavepov STL 73
TeXsuraia Siacpopa YJ
otiaia TOU
xal 6
So the last difference constitutes the unity of the subject of a definition.

543 The author now comes to his conclusions from the preceding
points (ch. 13-17).

a. First, the universal cannot be a substance.


Z 8 - 16 No universal
Ib. 13, 1038 b :

"Eoixe y^P aSiivarov elvai ouaiav elvat OTIOUV TCOV xaOoXou Xeyo^vcov.
10 First
IlpcoTov [Jtev yap ouaia exaaTOU r\ io\o<; exaaTq), Y) oux uTrapxet a"XXcp, r6
Sk xa06Xou xoivov TOUTO yap XeysTat xaOoXou 8 TuXeioatv uTrapxetv 7re9uxev.

TIVO^ o5v ouata TOUT' saTai ; ?) yap TTOCVTCOV rj ou8evo<;, TTCXVTCOV S* oux olov TS

x TTJ<; ^vTeXexeta^
- as soon as they are no more actuated by
or by ata0Yjai<;.
122 METAPHYSICS [543]

8* ei &TTOCI, xal TaXXa TOUT' eVrai* cov yap [jua YJ


ouaCa xal T6 T y^v elvat

2v, xal auTa ev.


Second "E Tl oua ( a XeyeTai TO xaO* uTtoxeiaevou. TO 8e xaOoXou xaO' uTtoxeiaevoo
reason -
ay) ^ ^ 15
, , , ,

Ttvo<; XeyeTai, aet.

b. No substance can consist of substances.


3 - 10
Ib., 1039 a :

No substance >
ASuvaTov yap ouaiav e oucncov elvat evuTiap^oucrcov TOC
co<; evTeXe/eia yap
substances Suo OUTCO<; evTeXe^eia ouSeTTOTe ev svTeXe/eta, aXX' lav Suvafjiei Siio ^, eaTai 5
sv (olov Y)
SiTcXadta ex Suo Yjfjuastov Suvaaei, ye- /] yap
COCTT* el oux eaTai e^ ouai&v evuTrap/ouacov xal xaTa TOUTOV TOV
7]
ouaia ev,

TpOTTOv, 6v Xeyei AvjaoxpiTO^ opOw<; aSuvaTov yap elvat 97jaiv ex Siio ev y) e


ev6<; Suo yeveaOai. 10

544 The next consequence concerns the theory of Ideas.


Absurd con- 30 6
b 17 - 1<J
Metciph. Z 14, 1039 a -b ,
:

sequences as , , , / (

to the Ideas Et o5v ecm TL<; avOpcoTro^; auTO<; xaO* ai>Tov ToSe TI xal xe^wpKraevov, avayxv)
xal iE, <&v, olov TO J^coov xal TO Sfeouv, ToSe TL xal elvat ^
(TY)[JiaiveLV

xal ouaiac; coaTe xal TO J^coov. el [Jiev ouv TO auTo xal ev TO ev TCO LTTTTCO xal TCO

avOpcoTTco, cocTTrep au aauTco, TTCOC; TO ev ev TOL<; often, x 03 ?^ ^ v ecr^at, xal Sia TI b


oii xal X CO P^ auTOu eciTat TO J^eoov TOUTO ;
ercetTa et aev (jteOe^et TOU StTUoSoc;

xal TOU 7roXu7ToSo<;, aSuvaTov TI au(jL^aivei, TavavTta yap aaa UTrap^ei auTco
evl xal TtoSs TLVI OVTI ei 8s (JLT), TL^ 6 Tpo7ro<; OTav eiTTY] TI^ TO o)ov elvat SITCOUV 5
y)
7ie6v ;
aXX* LGTG)^ auyxetTat xal aTTTeTai y) (jiefJiiXTai aXXa rcavTa &T07ca.
Therefore, ][ ^ aSuvaTov OUTCO^ e^eiv, SyjXov OTI oux ecTTtv ei'Sy) auTCov OUTCO(; &<;

substances TIV? cpaaiv.

545
Another consequence concrete individual beings are not definable :
;

therefore, the Ideas, which are said to be separate particulars (!),


cannot be defined.
individual a 20 - 31
Metaph. 7, 15, 1039 b :

beings not f / /

definable ouata eTepa, TO Te auvoXov xal 6 Xoyo<; (Xeya) 8' OTI y) (Jiev OUTCOC; 20
'Ercel 8' yj
s
e<mv ouata, auv T^ GXyj (ruvetXy](jL[JLevo<; 6 Xoyoc;, y] 8 6 Xoyo^ oXco<;), 6aai [Aev
oSv ouTG) XeyovTai, TOUTCOV [xev eaTi 96opa (xal yap yevecri*;), TOU 8e Xoyou
oux ecmv (ouSe yap yeveai<;, ou yap yiyveTai TO oixia
OUTCOC; coaTe 96etpec6ai,
elvat aXXa T^ TyjSe T^ olxta), aXX* aveu yeveaeax; xal 90opa^ etcrl xal oux 25
etoiv Se8eixTai yap (m ouSelc; TauTa yevva ouSe Ttoiet. Sta TOUTO Se xal TCOV
ouaiwv TCOV aia6y]Tcov TCOV xaO' exacJTa ouTe op 1(7(0.6^ ouTe dbroSeii;^ SCTTIV,

OTI S^ouaiv uXyjv fa yj 9uaic; Toiaury) COGT' evSe/eaBai, xal elvai xal [JLTQ
816

TcavTa Ta xa6' exa<TTa auTcov. 3


[545] SUBSTANCE 123

8 9 Therefore,
b. Ib., 1040 a - :

Ou& XT) tSav ouSe[Juav Icmv optaaaOat. TCOV yap xaO* exacrTov 7) iSea, O f ideas
cog cpaafc, xal
A very strange conclusion, which, really, does not redound to the credit of its
author.

546 Two wrong views about substance.


5 10 Most
a. Metaph. Z 16, 1040 b - :

so-called
5 OavEpov SE OTL xal TCOV Soxouacov Etvat ouatcov at TcXeZarai 8uva(JLt<; siai, substances
TOC TS [lopta TCOV cocov (ou0v yap xs^coptafjtEvov auTtov <mv oTav 8k )

xal TOTS ovTa co<; uXv) TcavTa ) xal y9j xal rcup xal ayjp ouSsv yap auTcov 2v
s

,
aXX olov acopoc;, Trplv ^ 71296^ xal yevvjTaL TI e^ auTcov sv.

b. Ib b 16 - 27 '
Unity and

8k TO ev XeyeTai coaTcep xal TO ov, xal 7]


oudia YJ
TOU svo^ (Jiia,
xal substances
x
cbv [Lioi api,6(JLCo ev api6fjLc7> , cpavepov OTI OUTS TO ev OUTS TO ov evSs^eTai ouaiav
elvat TCOV 7upay(jiaTCov, coa^sp ouSe TO aToixs^^ elvai, YJ apxf]
*
aXXa ^YjTOUfjiev
2
20 TL^; o5v 73 ap^T), Lva e^ yvcoptfJicoTEpov avayaycofjLsv. [jLaXXov [isv o5v TOUTCOV
ouata T^ ov xal ev YJ YJ
TE ap'/rj xal TO aTOL^el'ov xal TO atTiov, OUTTCO Se ouSe

TauTa, eiTiep fjLYjS*


SXXo xoivov oucrta
[JLYJ^SV ouSevl yap uTcap^si 7) ouata aXX*

257) ai)T^ T Xal TCO E/OVTt aUTTjV, OU (TTtV OUGta. Tt TO Iv TtoXXa^ OUX OCV tY]

a(Jia, TO SE xotvov afia 7uoXXa*/9j U7rapxf COCJTE SyjXov 6Tt ou5v TCOV xaOoXou
i)7uap^t Tcapa Ta xaO* IxaaTa
To the question why a thing is, and why it is one, Plato answered: because it
participates of being and of unity. Ar. rejects this answer, for the "one" and
"being" are no substances. They are xotva, being predicated of all things.

547 Ar.'s final view of substance: substance is "form" or "quiddity".

a. Ar. now again asks the question: Why is a thing what it is?

E.g. why are these stones etc. a house ?


26 - 32
Metaph. Z 17, 1041 a :

Ata Tt TaSt, olov TuXtv6ot xal Xt0ot, otxta <7Ttv; cpavpov TOtvuv OTt /)Tt TO what it is?
TOUTO 8' CTTl TO Tt 9JV EtVat, tb<; t7CtV XoytXCO^, in EVtCOV [JLV CTTt

VXa, olov t(TCO<; 71* OtXta<; ^ xXtVY)<;, ETC* EVtCOV 8k Tt XtV7)(T TIpCOTOV
3atTtov yap xal TOUTO. aXXa TO [Jiv TotouTov atTtov inl TOU ytyvd0at
xal 90tp(j6at, 0aTpov 8k xal em TOU lvat.

sv apt0(jico - as things whose substance numerically one are


1
JJv is
\d(x. dlpiOfjLco

numerically one,
2
TOUTCOV - partitive ly: of these concepts.
124 METAPHYSICS [547]

b. The question really means: why is this material a certain thing ?

Because the 4 9
Ifr 1041 b - 1

belongs to it 'ETrel &e Set e^ew TS xal UTcap^etv TO elvat, SvjXov 873 8rt TYJV uXYjv y)Tet
Sta Tt <Tt> eoTiv olov otxta TaSl Sta Tt; OTI uTrapxei 6 9jv olxta elvat. xal &V
OpcoTroc; To8, Yj
TO aco(ia TOUTO ToSl S^ov. OXTTE TO a'mov y)TstTai TYJ^ uXY)<;
J J

(TOUTO S ecnrl TO eZ8o<; ) & Tt e<mv TOUTO S Y] oiaia.

This, then, is Ar.'s final answer to the question: what substance is.

4 POTENCY AND ACTUALITY


548 a. A definition of "potency" in its primary sense ("power")
is given in
Primary 1046 a
11
sense of the
Metaph.
r i, :

, ^ , ,, ,,

term apx*/) (JLTa[3oXY3(; ev (kXXcp 7] Y)


aXXo.

i<a source of change in another thing, or in the thing itself qua other".
b. From this primary sense the author derives (a) the potency of
being acted on by another or by the thing itself qua other; and (b) in-
susceptibility to change for the worse by the agency of another thing, etc.
11 - 16
Deriyated Jb., 1046 a :

f
H fjtev yap TOU TuaOetv eaTt &uva(ju<;, Y)
ev atJTa> TCO Traa^ovTi ap^*?)
UTT' SXXou r\ vj dcXXo Y)
S* KJL$ aTraOetac; TYJ^ ejul TO x e ^P ov x
TYJC; UTT* &XXou TI ^ aXXo UTC' ap^v]^ (JiSTapX7]TLx9j(;. ev yap TOUTOK; eveaTi Tcaai

Tot(; opoic; 6 TYJS TCpcoTYj^ Suva^eax; Xoyoc;.


Ar. wants to distinguish the notion of "power" of the term 8\iva-
c.

[LI<;
from the notion of "potentiality". This sense of the term is explained
in ch. 6 of the same book,
Potentiality 32 - 36
1048 a :

A^yo(jtev 8e 8uv<i(Jiei (sc. uTrap^eiv TO Tcpayfia) olov ev TOJ !;oXcp *Ep[jiY]v xai
ev T^ oXy] TTJV 7](jL((reiav,
STI a^aipeOetv] av, xal e7rto"T7](jLova xal TOV (Jtv) OecopouvTa,
av SuvaTO^ fj Oecopvjaau

549 Ar. continues speaking on potency in the sense of "power".


Rational and 36 9 15 - 20
non-rational
Metaph. 2, 1046 a -b ,
:

, , , , , , ,

powers liiTreL o at (lev ev TOL^ a^u^oi? evuTrap/oucriv ap^at TOtauTai, at o ev TOI^


efJL^^X ^ xa>L ^ v 4* U X^ xa ^ T ^? ^ U X^ ^ v T ^ Xoyov e^ovTi, Sv^Xov OTI xal TCOV b

Suvajjiecov at (lev eaovTai iXoyoi at 8e (jteTa Xoyou Sio Traaai at T^vat xal at

TiotYjTtxal e7tiaTY)(Aat Suva[JLet^ etdtv ap^ocl yap (jieTapXY)Ttxat etatv ev fiXXco YJ

fl
4XXo. xal al (lev (AeTa X6you Tracrai TCOV evavTtcov at auTai, at Se aXoyot (Jtta
[5491 POTENCY AND ACTUALITY 125

olov TO 0ep(ji6v TOU 0ep|xatveiv [ji6vov Y)


8e laTpixY) voo~ou xal uy.e[a<;.
afaiov 8e STL X6yo<; eonrlv 7] cTuanfjfry), 6 8Xoyo^ 6 auTo? STjXoZ TO repay [ia xal
rJ)v CTTlpyjaiv. 'Ereel 8 Ta evavTia oux eyyiyveTai ^ v T V auT&, y] 8* eTuaTYJi///)
Siivajjus TCO X6yov e'xetv, xal YJ ^ux/] xivyjaecoc; e'xei, apx>)v, TO [lev uyieivov

17 uykiav [x6vov TTOIEI xal TO 0ep(JiavTix6v OeppionqTa xal TO ^UXTIXOV


6 8* 7uanf)|iG>v

550 The existence of any "potential being" when there is no actuality,


1
is denied by the Megarian school . Ar. defends his theory against this
attack.
29 - 33 The attack
a. Metaph. 3, 1046 b :

2
Eial 8 Tive<; 01 9aatv, olov ol MeyaptxoC, 8Tav evepy^ (JLOVOV 8\ivaa0ai , r i a n school

6Tav 8e 1

(X }] evepyij ou S\ivaa6ai, olov TOV f/,7) oixoSofzouvTa ou 8\ivacr0ai oixoSo-


(Jieiv,
aXXa TOV olxoSofiouvTa OTav oixoSo^ ofiotcag Se xal em TCOV &XXcov.

ol(; Ta au[JLpa(vovTa STOTra ou x a ^ TCOV ^Setv.

b. 33 17 Absurd
Ib., I046b -i047a :

A9]Xov yap OTI OUT' olxoS6(jLoc; eaTai eav (JLTJ oixoSofiyj (TO yap olxo&opuo O f this theory
35 elvai TO SuvaTW elvai eaTiv otxoSofJieLv), 6(Jtotcoc; Se xal eTrl TOW &XXo)v Te/vcov.
ei oSv aSuvaTOv TOC^ ToiauTac; xeiv T^Xva<^ ^ (^aOovTa TTOTC xal Xa^ovTa, xal

^xetv (AY] <x7co(3aX6vTa TTOTC (^ yap Xif)0y) YJ


TraOei Tivl ^ XP^ V( ) }
"
ou Y^P ^
TOU ye 7rpay[juxTO<; ^OaplvTOi;, ael yap eVrtv), OTav TrauayjTaL, oux 25ei TYJV

^XVY V 3 >
TC *^tv 8* euOuc;TTW^ Xapcov
otxoSofjLrjaet ;

5 Kal ouTe yap ^uxpov OUTC 0eppi6v OUTC yXuxu OUTS


TOC (Sc^uxa Sv) OIJLOLOX;
3
8Xcoc; a[a0Y)Tov ou0ev SaTat (JLT) ataOavofjievov coerce TOV IIpcoTayopou Xoyov

au{JLpY)ceTai Xyetv auTotc;. aXXa JJLYJV ou8' al'crOTjaiv e^et, ouSev av (JLY) aiaOav/jTai

(JLY]8' evepy^. ei o5v TucpXov TO {JLYJ ^x ov o^v ? 7re<puxo<; 8e xal OTe 7re9uxe xal ITL

10 8v, ol auTol TU9Xol eaovTat rcoXXax^ TYJ^ Y)|ipa<; 7


xal xco^oi.
>;
ETI ei aSuvaTov TO eaTepy)[jLevov Suva^eox;, TO (JLY) yiyvofjievov aSuvaTOv
SaTat yevla0ai T& 8* aSiivaTov yevearOai 6 Xeycav ^ elvai >j eaeaOai ^euoeTai

15 ( TO Y*P aSuvaTov TOUTO eCT7)(JLaivev), ciaTe oijTOi ol Xoyoi, e^aipouai xal XLVYJCTLV
xal yevecrtv. ael yap TO Te eaTTjxcx; eaTYj^eTai xal TO xa0y)(Jievov xaOeSetTai
ou yap avaaTTjaeTai av xaOl^yjTaL aSuvaTov yap eaTat avaaTYJvat o ye fir)

8\ivaTai

551 Ar. now proceeds to explain what actuality is. Actuality

a. Metaph. & 6, 1048 a


30- 32
,
35 :

1
See our nrs. 234 and 235.
2
6T<xv vepyfj (x6vov SuvaoOat
- "that there is only &uva(ju<; when there is vpyeia".
8
T&V IIpcoTay6pou X6yov - see our nr. 171.
126 METAPHYSICS [551]

"E<m 8r) evepyeia TO uTtap/etv TO 7rpay(jta [JLY) OUTOX; <&<j7cep Xyo[jt,ev 8u-
2
Ti 8e evepyeta.

b. The author wishes to explain the thing by instances, not by


definition. He apologizes for this method.
Explained Jb ^ 1048 a 3 M) 5 !

A9jXov 8* ercl TCOV xaO' exacrra Tyj eTraytoyrj 8 pouX6|jLe6a Xeyeiv, xal ou 8el 35
7cavTO<; opov ^YJTSLV aXXa xal TO avaXoyov auvopav, STL ax; TO oixo8o[Jiouv
3
Tcpo^ TO otxoSo[JLtx6v xal TO eyp7)yop6<; npbc, TO xa6eu8ov, xal TO op&v Tupoc; b
,

'
TO (jiuov [jiev o^iv Ss ^x ov xa L T ^ aTroxexptfjL^vov ex T^ uXv]^ Tupoc; TY)v liXvjv, xal
>

TO aTreipyaapL^vov ?cp6^ TO avepyaaTOv. TauTY]<; Se T^ Sta'-popac; OaT^pa) fiopUo


7] evlpyeia a^wptGrfievy] 6aTpco
Se TO SuvaTov. ^

Difference 552 Potential being must be actualized by a moving cause; but


movement movement as such is not really action, or not complete action. It is
and actuality ac t uaiity only when the end is present in it.

Ib., 1048 b 18 - 36 :

'ETcel Se T&V Trpa^ecov &v S<TTI Trepa^ ou8e(jua TsXo^ aXXa TCOV ruspl TO T^Xoc;,
4
olov TO icr^vatvsiv taxvacria [auTo], auTa 8e
YI OTav Ear^vatvT] OUTCO^ IdTtv ev 2 o
6
xivvjaei, (JIT) UTrap^ovTa cov Svexa YJ XLVTJCJ^
oux ecm TauTa 7rpa^L(; ^ ou TeXeia
,

ye (ou yap TeXoc;)' aXX' IXEIVYJ <TJ> evuTrap^ei TO TeXo<; xal [YJ] Trpa^i^. olov

6pc a(Jta <xal ecopaxe>, xal 9povei <xal Tce9p6vy)xe,> xal VOEL xal VSVOYJXSV
aXX' ou [JiavOavei,xal fjie[ia0Y)xev ouS' uyta^eTai xal uyiaaTai. e3 ^yj xal s5 25

ajjLa, xal euSaipioveL xal euSaijxovYjxev. et 8e (JLYJ, e'Sei <Sv TCOTS TraueoOai
Tav laxvaivT), vuv 8* ou, aXXa ^ xal e^Yjxev. TOUTWV SYJ <Sei> T<X(; fiev

Xyeiv, Tac; 8* evepyeta<;. rcaaa yap xtvyjai*; aTeXTjc;, t(Txva<T ^ a H-a6yj(Tt<;

olxoSofJLYjaic; auTat STJ XIVT)<TL<; xal aTeXeZ^ ye. ou yap a(jia paSt^ei ^
?

xal pe[3aSixev, ou8' oixoSofJiet xal cpxoSo^vjxev, ouSe yiyveTai xal yeyovev r)
xivetTai xal xexiv/jTai, aXX' eTepov, xal xivec xal xextv7)xev ecopaxe 8e xal
opa afjia TO auTO, xal voei xal vevoyjxev. TYJV [jiev o5v TOiauTYjv evepyeiav Xeyco,
exeivYjv 8e XIVYJCTLV. ^^

553 When is one thing the potency of another? E.g. can we say
that earth is potentially a man, or even that sperma is ?

Here follows the description of the Suvafzei o v , cited sub 548c.


The thing which stands in contrast to this.
- that which
T& obco8o^ix6v is capable of building.
<XUT<X Si - the bodies.
(jL-yj tiirdpyovToc etc.
- without being already that at which the movement aims.
[553] POTENCY AND ACTUALITY 127

37 5 when does a
a. Metaph. 7, 1048 b -iO49 a :

IIoTe Se SuvajJiei eo~Tiv exaonrov xal TCOTC ou, SiopiCTeov ou yap oTTOTeouv. potentially?
olov 7) y?) ap' ecm Suvapiei a* v0p COTTON 73 ou, aXXa (jtaXXov OTav 7^873 yevTjTai
;

aTiepfJia, xal ouSe TOTC taeo^ ; ciaTrep ouv ouS' UTCO taTpLx^^ a^rav av uytaaOetTj
ouS' a7co TUX*/)?, aXX* SaTi TL 6 SuvaTov eaTi, xal TOUT' eo^Ttv uyiatvov Suvajxei.

b. Ar. distinguished two ways of passing from potentiality into


actuality: (i) dbro Siavoia^, i.e. by art, (2) in natural beings by an immanent
principle (ev auToi TCO
5 - 12 In products
Ib., 1049 a :

5 "Opoc; 8e TOU (Jiev OCTTO 8iavota<; evTeXexeia yiyvo(jtevou ex TOU 8uva(Jtei 8vTO<;,
Tav pouXTjO^VTO^ ytyvTjTai (Ji7)0ev6<; xcoXuovTO<; TCOV exTO(;, exei 8* ev TCO uyta-
^o(jievcp, 8Tav (jL7j0ev xcaXuTj TO>V ev auTO) 6(jLofco<; Se Suva^et xal otxta ei

(jLTjOev xoXuei TWV ev TOUTW xal TTJ uX/3 TOU yiyveaOat oixtav, ouS' eaTtv 8 Set
10 TCpoayeveoflai aTToyeveaOai 73 (jLeTapaXetv, TOUTO SuvafJiei oixia-
7)
xal inl
Ttov SXXcov cacrauTOx; 8acov e^wOev 73 apXTJ TT)<; yeveaeax;.

13 - 18 In natural
C. 1049 a
Kal
Ib.,
8<icov STJ ev auTO) TCO
:

X ovri
* n v " "r " ' ^ beings

arai St* auTOu olov TO a7cep(jLa OUTCO) (Sei yap ev aXXw <7ueo~eZv> xal

i5paXXeiv), OTav 8* 73873 8ia TYJ^ auTou ap/73<; fj TOLOUTOV, 73873 TOUTO
l
exelvo Se eTepa^ ap/7J<; SetTat, coaTcep 73 y9j OUTCCO av8p!,a<; Suva(Jiei

yap e'crrat

554 Actuality is prior to potency in tlv? broadest sense.

4 - 12
a. Metaph. 8, 1049 b :

^or^uT
2
'ETrel Se TO TupoTepov StwptaTai Troaax&s X^yeTai , cpavspov STL TipoTepov potency
5 evlpyeia SuvafJieax; eaTiv. Xeyca Se 8uva(Jieco<; ou [JLOVOV TTJ<; capiajjievT}^ 73
X

pXTjTixTj ev aXXco 73 r\ aXXo, aXX' oX<o<; 7uaa7j<; apx^? XIVTJTIXTJ^ 73

%. 9uai^ ev TauTw [ytyveTat ev TauTco yap] yevet TTJ Suvafjiei,


xal yap 73

10 apX^l T^P KWTJTIXT), aXX* oux ev aXXo) aXX' ev auTW ^ auTO. TKXOTTJC; 873 TTJ^

TOtauTTj^; vrpoTepa ecrTlv 73 evepyeia xal Xoyco xal T^ oucrfa Xpovw 8' Sari
(lev <&(;, SaTi Se coc; ou.

12 - 17
b First it is logically prior. Ib., 1049 b : i. logically

Tw X6yco (lev o5v STL TrpoT^pa, S^Xov (TW yap ev8exeo~0ai, evepyTJaai SuvaTiv
eaTi TO TcpcaTox; 8uvaT6v, olov Xeyco oixoSo[JLix6v TO Suvajievov otxoSojjieLv,

1
xetvo 8^ - in the former state.
namely, in A n.
2 -
SicopiaToci
128 METAPHYSICS [554]

xai opaTixov TO opav, xal opaTov TO SuvaTOv opaaOai' 6 8* auTO^ X6yos xal 15
ercl TCOV a*XXtov, COCTT' avayxT) TOV Xoyov Trpoihrapxetv xal TTJV yvcoaiv TTJS yvto-

aetoc).

c. Next, it is prior in time in the following sense.


17 - 27
2. in time Ib., 1049 b :

TCO 8e XP^ VCP rcpoTepov coSe TO TCO etSei TO auTO evepyouv TrpOTepov, apiOfjico
8* ou. Xyco 8e TOUTO OTI TouSe [xev TOU dvOpcoTiou TOU 7^87) 6vTo<; XOCT' eve'pyeiav 20
'
xal TOU GITOU xal TOU 6pwvTO<; TrpOTSpov TCO XP^ VCP ^ ^^ xa 1 T ^ ^TtepM-a xal TO

6paTix6v, a Suvajiei (JLCV EGTIV avOpcoTioc; xal <JITO<; xal opcov, evepyeia 8* OUTCG)
aXXa TOUTcav TrpoTSpa TW XP^ VCP ^ T P a ovTa evepyeia e 5iv TauTa eyeveTO

ael yap ex TOU Suvajjiei OVTO<; ytyveTai TO evepyeta 6v UTTO evepyeia 8vTO<;, 25
olov a*vOpa>7ro<; e^ avOpcojcou, (Jiouaixoc; urco (jLouaixou, ael XIVOUVTO<;

7Cpa>TOU TO Se xtvouv evepyeta 7^87]

in d. in substance. Ib., 1050 a 4 - 10


3-
substance >A\\
AXXa
\/ prior
Thirdly,
xai ouata ye, rcpcoTOv
[JLY)v
it is
\ ~ / \ ~/c\
[jiev OTL Ta TJT) yeveaei uaTepa TCO etoet xai
/ r/
:

TtpOTepa (olov avyjp 7rai86<; xal avOpo^7ro<; a?rep[JLaTO(; TO (jiev yap


TO eI8o^ TO 8* ou), xal OTL a?cav in ap^v paSi^ei TO yiyvopievov xal
l
(apx^ yap TO ou evexa, TOU TeXouc; 8e evexa YJ yeveat^; ), TeXoc; 8* r) evepyeia,
xal TOUTOU x^P tv "h 8uva[Jii<; Xa[ji(3aveTai.

Actuality 555 a J can either be in the obiect


Actuality J
which is made, or in
either in the
object, or in the agent.
the agent Tl n u3
30
Ib., 1050 a -b :

f/
0acov
(jiev
ouv eTepov TI eaTi Trapa TTJV xp'^ tv TO yiyv6|Jievov, TOUTCOV [jiev 30
:
y] evepyeia ev TCO Troioufjievco eariv (olov r\
Te oixoS6fJiY]ai^ ev TCO o 1x080 (Jioufji^vco
xal y) U9avaic; ev TCO U9aivopievcp, 6(jioico<; Se xal eTul TCOV aXXcov, xal 6Xco<; r\

xivrjaic; ev TCO xivoupievco ) oacov Se (JIT]


eaTiv aXXo TI Spyov Trapa T-/JV evepyeiav,
ev auTOic; UTrapxet v] evepyeia (olov 7] opaaK; ev TCO opcovTi xal Y) Gecopia ev TCO 35
2
OecopouvTi xal 7] ^COTJ ev Tyj ^U/YJ, 816 xal T] euSai(jiovia ^COTJ yap Troia TIC;

eaTiv). coaTe cpavepov OTI 7)


ouaia xal TO eiSo^; evlpyeia eaTiv.

In time, one actuality precedes the other, straight back to the


b.
First Mover.
the First 3 6
Mover first
Ib. ; 1050 b - :

, > f/ > ~ / > cs

actuality KaTa Te 07) TOUTOV TOV Xoyov 9avepov OTI TrpoTepov TTJ oucria evepyeia ouva-

principle, i.e. an end.


1 - to a
apxrjv ... xal TXO<;
IT:
2
That eudaemonia is an "energy" of the soul, is the starting-point or basis
of Ar.'s treatise on the virtues in the Eth. Nic. See our nr. 566 (EN I 7, 15, logSa 16 - 17 ).
[555] POTENCY AND ACTUALITY 129

1
&<ntep efaofjiev ,
TOO xp6vou ael 7rpoXa{i|3avet vpyeta frrlpa rcpi

TTJ<; TOU ael xtvouvros 7Epa>T6>$.

c. The eternal is always actual. It cannot be potential, for the


potential is contingent, and therefore perishable.
6-14 16- 17 18 : Eternal
Ib.,1050 b ; ,
beings
*AXXa jrJjv xal xopicoTpa> Ta [i,iv yap atSioc 7ip6Tepa Tfj ouata T&V 98apT&v, always
actual
lart 8* ouOiv Suvajjiei atStov. Xdyo$ Si 6Se Traaa SivajJits a*[xa TYJS avTi9aae<o
loiemv TO p,iv yip V^l SuvaTiv UTuapxstv oix cUv tiraip^eiev ouOevf, TO SuvaTiv
Si Ttav lvS^xSTat V^ ^vspystv. T6 fipa SuvaT^v elvat ivSlxe^ai xal slvai xal (JL^J
elvai- T6 auT& 4pa SuvaTiv xal elvai xal (JLTJ slvat. TO 8e SuvaTov pfy elvat

14, 16 ivSe^eTai (JL*?)


elvai TO Si ivSe^H-svov {JLTJ
elvai 98apT6v. OuOiv <Spa T&V
eo^ Suva[Jit ICTIV aTtXco^. 'Evepyeta 4pa

556 4- 15 The good


a. Metaph. 9, 1051 a :

actuality
"(Hi Si xal xal TijxicoT^pa TYJ<; a?couSata^ Suva(jiea)^
(3sXT(cov iv^pyeia, *?) more
valuable
5 Ix TwvSe S^Xov. 8aa yap xaTa TO S\ivaa0ai X^yeTai, Tafa6v IGTI SuvaTiv Tdcvav- than the
Tta 2 , olov TO SiivaaOai Xey6(ievov 6yia(vetv TauT6v eaTi xal Ti voaetv, xal good
8 potency
4(Jia Y] aur?) yap Stivajxt^ TOU uyiatveiv xal
xal Tjpe^etv xal xivewrOai, XOCJJLVSIV,

10 xal otxoSofxetv xal xaTajBaXXeiv, xal oExo8o(xeti<i8ai xal xaTa7c7CTStv. TO (Jiiv


oSv SiivaaOai TdcvavTta &jia uirapxet Ta 8* svavTfac dcpta iSivaTov, xal Ta^ Svep-

yeta^ Si 4(xa ASivaTov iTcdcp^eiv (olov uytatveiv xal xdtfjtvetv), <&OT' avdlyx>)
TO^TCOV OdlTepov elvat Taya06v, T6 8i StivaaOat 6(xotco<; ajj^Tepov 73 oOS^Tepov

4pa Ivlpyeia peXTfwv.

b. Ib.,
16 19
1051 a - :
A bad
actuality
'AvAyxiQ Si xal Ircl T<OV xaxcov TO T^Xo<; xal T-Jjv Iv^pyetav elvat xe^P v worse than
TO yap Suvafievov Tafai TdcvavTCa. SvjXov ofix bad
8uva{JLe<o$ fificpa) &pa 6*Tt

T6 xaxov Tcapa Ta Tcpdty^aTa *


ucrrepov yap T^ ^tiaret TO xax6v

c. From this fact the author draws an important conclusion,


namely, that there is no evil among eternal things.
19- 21
Ib., 1051 a :

Oux pa ouS* v TOL^ i% apX^ xal TOt^ dftStou; ouOiv aTtv ofiTe xax6v ofiTS eternal
4
a(jLapTY)[xa oOTe 8te90ap(jiivov (xal yap *J) 8ta90opa TCOV xax&v

1
Vid. supra (554b, the end).
*
"Ooa ydtp etc. - "Everything of which we say that it can do something, is alike
capable of contraries" (Ross).
8
xal &(ia - "and it has both potencies at one and the same time".
4 - -
&i98ap{j^vov perverted; 8ta90op<i perversion.
De VogeJ, Greek Philosophy II 9
130 METAPHYSICS [557]

5 BEING AND TRUTH


557 In the last chapter of Metaph. the author gives his definition
of truth, which has become so famous in the history of human thought.
It is presented as follows.
Metaph. Q 10,
34
1051 a -b
9
:

'ETTCI Se TO 6v XlyeTai xal TO JATJ 6v TO [Jtev xaTa TOC a^^aTa TCOV xaTYjyopi&v,

TO Se xaTa 8uva[juv YJ evepyeiav TOUTWV Y) TavavTia, TO Se [xupicoTOtTa 6v] b


aXY)6e<; Y) <peu8o<;, TOUTO S* ercl T&V TipayfJiaTcov eaTi TC> auyxeiaOat, yj SiYjpYJaOai,
Definition & CTTg a X e e e v 6 TO SiY)pY)[jLLVOv
Y)
ii i
oi6p.evo<; S
(JL p i
Y) YJ
-

a a xal
i TO auyxeijjievov auyxscia8ai,<j;suaTai Se 6

evavTia><; l^cov ^ TOC TrpayfJiaTa, TTOT' eaTtv y oux S<m TO


Xey^fxevov 73 ^eijSo<; ;
TOUTO yap axsTCT^ov TI X^yojiev. ou yap Sia TO Yj^a^
oteaGai aX7)6w<; ae Xsuxov elvai el au Xeuxo<;, aXXa
Sia T6 a e elvai Xeuxov e 01 7) (A
t c; 9avTe TOUTO a X v) -
<;

e u o (A
e v .

558 In Metaph. E 4 Ar. separated truth from the province of


a.

Metaphysics, because truth and falsity are not ''in things", but merely
a TraOos TY]<; Si

E 4 '
I02 7 b25 - I028al:
eluded
from met a- Ou yap eo"Tt TO ^euSoc; xal T6 aXTjGe^ ev TOL<; TrpayfAaaiv, olov TO(Jiev aya06v

physics in E 4 T 6 8e xaxov euOu^ ^euSoc;, aXX' ev Stavota, Trepl Se Ta aTiXa xal T<X Tt
dcX7)Oe<;

ecTiv ouS' ev Stavota 8aa (Jtev


oSv Set Oecop^aat Tuepl TO OUTO^ ov xal (AY)

ov, uaTepov erctaxeTUTeov ercel 8k. 73 aufiTcXoxif] eaTtv xal r) Scatpeo*t^ Iv Siavoia 30
aXX* oux ev TOCC; 7cpdy(Jiaai, TO 8' OUTWC; ov eTepov Sv T&V xupico^ l (73 yap TO
T( eaTtv Y] o*Tt TTOIOV TI oTt Tioaov 7] Tt <5fXXo auvaTUTet v) SiaipeZ YJ Stavoia), T6 (Aev

<5><; aufjLpepY)xo<; xal T6 6)^ aXY)6e<; ov a9eTeov TO yap afaiov TOU (Jiev aopiaTOv
TOU Se r/i$ Siavoia(; TI
To this new element, namely that, with the
view our passage in 10 adds a
aufjiTrXoxY) in thought, a must correspond.
OUJJLTUAOXT) in reality
The same view has been expressed with some emphasis by Plato, at the end
of his Sophist, as a solution of the difficulty concerning <peu8$)<; 86Ea. See our nr. 343.

b. That truth and


falsity depend on combination, is also said in
Categ. 4, Immediately after having enumerated the ten
at the end.

categories, with a few instances of each, the author continues (Categ. 4,


2 a 4- 10 ):

1
T& oi>T<o<; 5v repov TCOV xup(co<; - since which is in this sense is a different sort
of "being" from the things that are in the full sense.
[558] BEING AND TRUTH 131

"ExaaTOV 8 TCOV a&To xa8* ai>TO ev Truth and


elpY){j(ivcov (Jiiv ouSefiicx xaTa9<xaei
XyeTai, rfl ^
rcp6<; <5cXXy)Xa TO\JTCOV aujjurXoxyj xaTo^acrtc; $ &n6<p&ai$ yiveTai. depend on
Soxet combination
<5c7raaa yap xotT^aats xal a7u69aai<; qToi, aXTjOvjc; >) ^euS-yjc; elvat TCOV 8
XOCT<X {jt.7)Se(Aiav au[i7uXox7)v Xeyoplvcov ouSev OUTS aXY)0e<; OUTS <JjeuS6<; e<mv,

olov <5cv6p COTTON, Xeux6v,

559 In
10 Ar. develops the consequences of this view.

Considering first truth and being in the case of "composites


l
he states: "Being ,

is being-united; not-being is not-being-united. About things which may be either


united or divided the same opinion is at different times false and true not so with ;

regard to things that must be as they are" (Ross).


9 - 17 Truth and
a. Metaph. 10, 1051 b :

s
Et SY) Ta (Jiev ael auyxei/rai, xal aSiivocTa 8iaipe69jvai, TCX 8 act Si*/)p7)Tat, case of
10 xal aStivara duvreO^vat, TCX 8* evSex^^at rcxvavTia, TO JJLSV elvod ICTTI TO auyxetorOat composites
xal ev elvat, TO 8e [JLYJ
elvat TO (JLTJ auyxsLaOai aXXa TrXeico elvai Tuepl (Jiev
o3v
2
TCX IvSexoH-sva Y) auTY] ytyveTai ^e^Syj^ xal aX7]0v)<; 86?a xal 6 Xoyoc; 6 auTO<;,
1 5 xal evS^x^at OTE [Jiev aXyjOeueiv OTE 8e ^e\i8eaOai- irepl Se TCX cxSiivaTa c2XXto<;
ou yiyveTai OT^ (Jti:v cxXyjOe^ OTS 8k. ^e^So^;, aXX* ael TauTcx cxXy)6y) xal

Bonitz (Metaph. 409) remarked that the meaning of "composites" in this passage
is not "quae ex pluribus elementis coalucrunt" and in this he was right but
"in quibus cum substantia coniungitur accidens aliquod, veluti homo albus, homo
sedens, diagonalis irrationalis et similia". Now, if this last point were true, the
whole class of composites would consist of IvSexVeva, and those things which
"are always composed" or "cannot be divided" could not belong to them. By
ouvGeToc then is rather meant: judgments, in which a subject is copulated with a
predicate, be it accidental or not; so that the "truth" intended here is what is called
the veritas logica by the schoolmen (adaequatio rei et intellectus) .

Since being and non-being, truth and falsehood then depend on


b.

combination, the question arises: what is being and non-being; what


truth and falsity, in the case of incomposites.
17 30 Truth and
Ib., 1051 b - :

Ilepl Se T<X aa\iv6eTa Tt TO elvai, elvai xal TO aXY)6e<; xal TO <J;ei>8o<;; Ca8e O f i n _
Y) (JLYJ

ou yap ecm auv0STOV, Tav auyxe7]TaL, (JLTJ elvai, 8e eav Si^pyj- composites
WGTE elvai fjiev

(Jievov f], axjTrep T& Xeuxiv <TO> ^\iXov 5) TO aa\i(JL[JieTpov TTJV SiafJLSTpov
20 T& aXvjOec; xal Ti ^eu8o<; ofioiax; STI UTrap^et xal ETT* exetvaiv. >j &a7csp

1
For the meaning of this term see our explanation under the text. It has been
suggested to the author by Mr. L. M. de Rijk, who deals with it in the first chapter
of his thesis, The Categories of being, Assen 1952.
2
consisting of a
-
T<3t
v8ex6jieva "contingent things", i.e. composed things,
substance and an accidental attribute, e.g. "white man".
132 METAPHYSICS [559]

TO X7]0&s inl TOUTCOV TO afrro, OUTGX; ou8e TO elvat, aXX' SCTI TO jxev
*
^ ^euSoc;, T6 [xev OtyeZv xal 9<xvai aXy]6e<; (ou yap Tatai xaT&paai^ xai
TO 8* ayvoeiv (JLYJ Otyyaveiv (aTraryjOYJvai yap Ttepl T& T eaTiv oux 'aTiv aXX' vj 25
xaTa <ju(Jipep7jx6 ou yap SCTTLV
ofzotax; Se xal Trepl T<X<; {JLYJ <7uv9eTa<; ouoia<; 7

a7caT7)0YJvai xal Ttaaai elalv evepyeta, ou SuvajJLei, eyiyvovTO yap av xal e^Oet-

POVTO, vuv 8^ TO Sv auTO ou ytyvsTai ouSe 90e(psTai, Ix TIVO<; yap 5v eytyvsTo). 30


By dtaiivOeToc, is meant: being as the object of think-
as opposed to the ouvOsTov,
ing, before the act of judging; being as the object of simple apprehension.
i.e.

Thought "grasps" a thing without any affirmative or negation. This apprehension


is called by Ar. OiYyavetv. Rightly he says that, strictly speaking, there is no

question of falsehood in this case: things do not lie (i.e.: they do not cause an
untrue image of themselves in our mind). "Truth" may then be spoken of here as
far as things are the causes of images in our mind. This is what is called by scholas-
tics veritas ontologica.

c. The author concludes: About all things that are essences and
"actualities" (i.e. actually existing beings) we cannot err. Either we know

them or we do not.
In this case J^ 105 1 b 30- 33 !

excluded "Oaa Sr) ecmv Srcep elvai TI xal evlpyeiai, Trepl TauTa oux '<mv aTtaTYjOyjvai
aXX* YI
voetv 75 (JLYJ
aXXa TO TI e<m y)TLTai Ttepl auToiv, EL ToiaoTa EGTIV YJ (JLY).

So "being" in the sense of truth, and non-being in the sense of


d.

falsity, isone group (depending on combination) the other (that of the ;

acTuvOeTa) is "true" only in this sense that it is known, the opposite


being not "falsity" or "error", but "ignorance".
33 4
Ib., 1051 b -io52 a :

To 8e elvai cb^ TO aXTjOe^, xal TO (JLYJ


elvai T6 &<; TO ^euSo^, Iv [lev EOTTIV 2 ,
3
el aiiyxetTai, aXvjO^^, T6 S' et (JLYJ aiiyxeiTai, ^e^Soc; TO S^ 2v , etrcep 8v, OUTCOC; 35
eaTtv 4 el Se [JLY] OUTGX;, oux SGTLV ; TO Se aXY]0^(; T^ voetv TaijTa TO Se
oux eaTtv, ouSe dcTraTT), aXXa ayvoia, oux ^ a f) TU9XoTy)<;- 73 [Jt^v yap
ICTTLV ox; av et TO VOYJTLXOV 8Xa><; JJLTJ e^ 01 Tl(?'

560 As
to eternal being, something has been said of it in the books
on Substance (Z H) and in that on Potency and Actuality. The existence
and nature of the unmoved Movers is dealt with in A 6-10. We have
treated this part of Ar.'s first philosophy in connexion with Phys. VIII
(nrs. 515-518).
1
Otyetv
- Ar. means by this: an apprehension which is infallible and direct.
2
2v piv - is one group.
3 -
TO Sfc v the other .

4 -
ofrrcoc <rctv it exists in the sense as indicated supra.
FIFTEENTH CHAPTER
THE PRACTICAL SCIENCES
i THE THREE ETHICS AND THEIR INTERRELATION
561 The three Ethics of the Corpus Aristotelicum are first mentioned Threc w ? rks
as works of Ar. by Atticus, a Platonist in the days of Marcus Aurelius, attributed
cited by Eusebius, Praep. Ev. XV 4, 9, p. 795 d :
to Ar -

at youv "ApiaTOTeXoix; Trspl TOCUTOC Trpay^aTeiai, EuSTjpisLOt TS xai Nixo-


i xal MeyaXcav 'HOix&v e7ctypa96(JLevaL . . .

562 a. Five books of Ethics are mentioned in the list of Aristotle's


works in Diog. Laert. V I, 23:
'HOix&v a' 0' y' &' e'. the Eth. Eud.

By these five books the Eudemian Ethics must have been meant.

b. A work on ethics in ten books is mentioned in the list of Hesy- the Eth. NIC.

chins: the Nicomachean Ethics.


From these data we may infer that books A E Z of the Eud. Eth., which are
identic with Eth. NIC. E Z H, belonged to the last work, and not to the Eud. Eth.

563 That the Eth. Nic. were in earlier Antiquity generally con- who is the
a.

sidered as a work of Ar., may be inferred from Cic., De fin. V 5, 12. these works?

(One should not concede too much space to Fortune, the author says; for in
doing so you encroach upon the force and dignity of virtue).
Quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate
scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video
cur non potuerit patri similis esse films.

b.In later Antiquity traces may be found here and there of the
opinion that Eudemus and Nicomachus were the authors of the works
named after them. E.g. Diog. Laert. VIII 88:
97]<rl S' auTov sc. E88oov Nix6(/,axo<; 6 'ApiaToreXou^ TTJV y)Sovy)v

Here a passage from Eth. Nic. X is referred to under the name of N.


134 PRACTICAL SCIENCES [564]

Difference 554 Th e reason why these works have been attributed to different
in character
authors, may have lain in the fact that they show a remarkably different
conception of life. we find a platonic view of life, of a
In the Eud. Eth.
clearly religious character. Philosophy is directed to the contemplation
of the highest Being, the Good. And it is this contemplation which endows
man with the force and the power of acting virtuously. On the other
hand, in the Nic. Eth. the bond with religion is severed: moral life
depends on itself.
See for this difference Jaeger, Ar.> p. 238 ff. Of great importance is the meaning
of the term 9p6vy)ai<; in both works. In the Eud. Eth. it means philosophical insight
into the highest Being, while in the Nic. Eth. it indicates practical wisdom, which is
not even limited to man, but may be attributed to animals too. Cp. our nr. 42 Oa,
remark II.

Modern 555 a jjie authenticity Eud. Ethics was first defended by


of the
J J
judgment
about the P- von der Miihll (Gottingcn next by E. Kapp (Freiburg
thesis, 1909),
authenticity thesis, 1912). W. Jaeger adopted Kapp's results and determined the place
of the Eud. Eth. as a platonizing work of Ar.'s early years, between the
Protr. and the Nic. Eth.
This view has been generally accepted, e.g. by Ross and by A. Mansion.
Recently E. J. Schacher, Studienzu den Ethiken des Corpus Aristotelicum, Fader-
born 1940 *, has come back to the ancient hypothesis which makes Eudemus the
author of the Ethics named after him. Schacher tries to prove by a comparison
of the passages on cpiXta, that the Eud. Eth. depend on the Nic., not inversely,
and that the Magna Mor. were written before the Eud. Eth., this work being
apparently unknown to the author of the M. M. The arguments used by Sch. are
for the greater part not conclusive. Yet he has re-opened the discussion on the
authenticity of the Eud. Eth., and further inquiry must decide whether his solution
is correct.

b. As to the Mor., modern research has led to reliable


Magna
results: this work dates from the first generation of the Peripatetic

School, the years of Theophrastus and before the influence of the Stoa.
The question has been hotly debated by W. Jaeger and H. von Arnim, during
the years 1924 - 1929. This discussion has been amply reported by A. Mansion,
AutouY des Ethiques attributes a Aristote, in the Revue Ndoscolastique de Louvain,
1931, p. 80-107, 216-236 and 360-380.
E. J. Schacher, in the first of his above-cited Studies, begins with Schleiermacher
and deals too with the studies of Brink (an analysis of the style of the MM, Berlin
thesis, 1933) and Theiler (1934).
If any doubts were still possible as to the date of the MM, they have been

definitely removed by the thesis of Brink.

1
Studien zur Geschichte u. Kultur des Altertums, herausgeg. von der Gorres-
gesellschaft, XXII. Band, i. u. 2. Heft.
[566] ETH. NIC. I-III 135

2 THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. FORMAL PRINCIPLES


(the Books I-III 5)

566 Ar. qualifies all human action as being directed towards a purpose,
and defines the final purpose as well-being (eudaemonia), which consists
of an activity of the soul in accordance with reason, i.e. in accordance
with virtue.
20 AH human
Eth. Nic. I, 1-7, 1094 a^iogS a .

Ilaaa Te/vY) xal Tcaaa ^OoSo^, OJJLOIGX; 8k 7rpa!;i<; TC xal Tipoaipeau;, ayaOou ai m at
l some od
TIVO<; e9iecrOai Soxei 816 xaXcoc; dbrecpYjvavTO TayaOov, ou TUOCVT' e9ieTai.
Ata^opa 8e TI<; cpaiverai TCOV TeXcov T<X [xev yap eiaiv evepyeiai, Ta 8e Trap*
r J

5 auTa^ epya Tiva. Qv 8 eial TeXY) Tiva Tiapa TOC<; Trpa^eu;, ev TOUTOK; peXTico

evepysicov TOC Spya. HoXXwv 8e Trpa^ecov oucicov xal Te^vcov xal


TcoXXa yiverai xal Ta T^Xy] laTpix9j<; (lev yap uyieia, vauTryjyixvjc; S^
0aai S etdl TCOV TOIOU- A hierarchy
f/ J
Se VLXTJ, otxovo[JiixY](; Se 7rXoijTO(;.

IOTCOV UTCO (Jitav Ttva S\iva(Jiiv, xaOaTusp UTUO TYJV

6aai aXXai TWV ITTTCIXWV Spyavcov eiatv, auTT) Se xal Traaa TroXefiixT]
6716 TYJV crTpaTTjyixYjv, Tov auTOv 8e TpOTuov aXXai 69* eTepa^, ev

15 SY] Ta TCOV ap^iTexTOVLxciv T^Xr) TravTcav ecrTlv atpeTcoTepa TCOV UTU* auTa. TOUTCOV

yap x^P lv ^axeZva SicoxeTai. Aia9epei, 8* ouSev Ta<; evepyeia? aoTa^; elvat Ta
TCOV Tcpa^ecov ^ Trapa TaiJTa^ SXXo TI, xaOaTrep inl TCOV XexOeiacov im-

Ei SY) TI TeXo(; lari TCOV TupaxTcov o Si' auTO pouX6[JLe0a, Ta SXXa Ss Sia TOUTO, The sPme
20 xal (JIT)
TravTa Si* eTepov aipoii[Jie0a (Ttpoeicri yap OUTCO y' eic; aTteipov, COGT'
elvai xevY]v xal [JiaTaiav TTJV ope^iv), SyjXov co<; TOUT' av eiTj TO ayaOov xal TO

apidTOV. *Ap' TOV PIOV Y) yvcoan; auTOU (jieyaXYjv S^ei poTTYjv,


oijv xal 7rpo<;

xal xaOaTuep To^OTai axoTrov SX OVTS ^ (^aXXov av Tuy^avoifjisv TOU SSOVTO<;;

25 Ei S' OUTCO, TreipaTeov TUTICO ye TrepiXa^eiv auTO TI TIOT' eaTl xal TIVO^ TCOV
8' av TYJC; xupicoTaTY)<; xal (jtaXicTTa apx^TexTOvi-
Jt is th
Y) Suvajjiecov. Ao^eie

ToiauTY] S' -/] TioXiTixY] 9aiveTai. Tivac; yap elvai XP COV TC^ V e7TiaTY)(jLcov politics
2
Tai<; TioXecri, xal Tcoiac; exao~Tou<; fiavOaveiv xal (xe^pi TIVOC;, auTY] SiaTaarcrei

6pco(Jiev Se xal Ta<; evTi[xoTaTa^ TCOV SuvajJiecov UTUO Tarir/jv oCaa<; 7


olov

1
W. D. Ross rightly remarked that, according to the division of Traaoc Siavota
in Metaph. E i, we might have expected that Ar. would have distinguished between
productive and moral activity, the first being TrotrjTLXY], the second TcpaxTixr) and ;

that, if this distinction had been made, a very different system of ethics would
have resulted.
2
of the sciences should be studied in a state, and up to what point they
Which
should be learned, is a question which has been dealt with at length in the Republic
of Plato. To a disciple of the Academy it was indeed a major point of politics.
I3& PRACTICAL SCIENCES [566]

yixYjv otxovofjiiXYjv py)ToptxY)v. Xpcofievvj^ Se Ta\jT7)<;


TCOV eTUCTTyjplCOV, Tl Se VOfJL00TOUaY)^ Tl Set TTpaTTElV xal T&VCOV VL"KiyZGQLl *, 5
TO Tiept^ 01 av T<X TCOV <5cXXcov, COGTS TOUT* av eiY) TO avOpcomvov
TauT7)<; TeXo<;

aya06v. El yap xal TauT6v ecmv evl xal TuoXei, (Jiei6v ye xal TeXei6Tepov T&
TYJS 7c6Xeco<; 9a[veTai xal Xa^eiv xal aco^eiv ayaTTTjTOv [lev yap xal evl (jtovcp,
xaXXiov 8e xal OeiOTepov eOvei xal TioXeaiv. 10
Different <jj ^ v O jv ^QoSo^ TQUTCOV e9feTat, TuoXiTixY] TIC; o5aa- XlyoiTO 8* av txavco<;,

precision in et xaTa TYJV u7Uoxei[jLV7)v uXTjv Siaara^YjOetT). T6 yap axpi(3e<; oux OJJLOICOC; ev
different ( J Tca(y l T0 ^ Xoyoic; eTT^TjTYjTeov, &(T7rep ev tol<; SYjfjLioupyoufJtlvot^. Ta Se xaXa
xal Ta Sixaia, ?uepl &v yj TroXiTtxv) axoTueiTai, ToaauTTjv e'xet Sia90pav xal 15

TuXavyjv codTe Soxeiv vofjico (JLOVOV elvat, 9uaei Se (JLYJ. ToiauTTjv S Ttva TcXavyjv

e^ei xal TayaOa SL<X TO rcoXXoi^ aujjipaivetv pXa^ac; arc* auTtov ^Sv) yap Tivec;
aTTcoXovTO Sia TrXouTov, eTepot Se Si* avSpetav. 'AyaTrvjTov o5v ?repl TOIOIJTCOV
2 3
xal ex TOIOUTCOV XeyovTa^ Tiax^Xcoc; xal TUTCCO TaXY)Oe^ IvSeixvuciOaL, xal ?repl 20
TCOV cb<; e?rl TO rcoXu xal ex TOIOUTCOV X^yovTag ToiauTa xal (TU|jL7repatve(r0ai 4 .

Tov atJTov Se TpoTrov xal aTcoSexeaOat XP (^ V s^acTOv TCOV Xeyo(jievcov 7ue?uai-


5

Seufjievou yap eaTiv inl TOCTOUTOV Taxpipec; eTTi^TjTeLv xa6 exaaTOv yevo<;, e^'
8aov Y)
TOU TcpayfjtaTO^ 9\ia^ eTriSexeTai* TcapaTrXrjaiov yap 9aiveTai ^873-25

[laTLXoG Te TTtOavoXoyoiivTo^ aTcoSexsaOai xal pTjToptxov aTuoSet^et^ aTraiTecv.


"ExaaTO<; Se xptvei xaXco^ a ytvaxrxet, xal TOUTCOV e<TTlv aya06<; xptTYj<;.
The student KaO' exaaTOv
r- ^ Aio KXH
apa 6 TreTraiSeurjievoc, aTrXcoc 8* 6 Trepl Trav TreTraiSeupilvoc. vj
should have M ; ~ , , x , , , N

reached ^7]^ TCoXiTixY)^ oux ecjTtv otxeLOi; axpoaTYjc; o veo<; aTretpo^ yap TCOV xaTa TOV
riper years ex TOUTCOV xal "ETI 8k TOL^
p[ ov ^pa^ecov, ol Xoyoi 8* Trepl TOUTCOV. TcaOecrtv

axoXou0y)Tix6<; cov [xaTaico^ axouaeTai xal avco9eXco(;, eTreiSv) TO TeXo<; eaTlv 5


ou yvcoCTts aXXa Trpa^t^. At,a9epei 8* ouSev veoc; TYJV yjXtxiav 73 TO ?)0o^ veapoc; ou

yap Tcapa TOV XP^vov Y) ^'XXet^K;, aXXa Sia TO xaTa 7ua0o^ ^TJV xal Stcoxetv IxaaTa.
Tot<; yap TOLOUTOIC; av6vr]TO(; YJ yvcoatc; yiveTai, xa0a7rep TOL^ axpaT^at TOI^
Se xaTa Xoyov Ta^ 6pe^et(; Trotoufjievot^ xal TupaTTOuat 7coXuco9eXe<; av etr) TO 10

Trepl TOUTCOV eiSevai.


What is the
supreme
j a ^gp^
ffOto TOdauTa'
^ X poaTou, xal
8'
TTCO<; aTtoSexTeov, xal T[ 7cpOTi0[JLe0a, 7ce9pOLLLia-
xal 7cpoaipeat<;
Ttacra yvcoat^
good? Xeycofjiev avaXap6vTe<;, eTceiSy)

aya0ou TIVOC; opeyeTai, TL eaTLv ou Xeyojjiev TY]V TcoXiTixyjv e9iea0ai xal TL TO 15


TravTCov axpoTaTov TCOV TrpaxTcov aya0cov. 'Ov6[xaTi |iev o5v axe86v UTUO TCOV

1
''What we are to do and what we are to abstain from" has been minutely
prescribed in the Laws of Plato. Ar. again shows himself a true disciple of the
Academy in regarding this point as the normal task of legislation.
2
x TOIOUTCOV - with such premisses.
3 -
Troc/uXtof; roughly.
4
It is a basic law of the syllogism that the conclusion cannot contain more
than the premisses.
[566] ETH. NIC. Mil 137

ofjioXoyeiTai TTJV yap eu8ai[Jiovav xal ol TroXXol xal ol

Xlyouaiv, T& 8* e3 9jv xal T& eu rcpaTTeiv rauTOv u7roXa(j,pavoi)cri TCO euSaifJiovetv
20 Tcepl 8e TTJS eu8ai[Jiovia<;, TI ecmv, a^LdpyjTOiiaiv xal city 6[iouo<; ol rcoXXol TOU;

ao90i ajcoStSoacriv. 01 [Jiev yap TCOV evapycov TI xal cpavepcov, olov 7)8ov7)v

7]
TrXoijTOv 73 Ti|nf)v, (SXXoi 8* aXXo, TToXXdcxi^ 8e xal 6 airroc; erspov (vocryjcra^

25 p,ev yap uytetav, n;ev6[Jivo<; Se TuXouTOv), oruveiSoTSc; 8' eai)Toi<; ayvoiav TOU?
{iya TI xal UTtep auTou^ XeyovTac; Oaufjia^ouatv qiovTo vrapa Ta IVIOL 8*

TToXXa TauTa ayaOa aXXo TI xaO* aura elvai, o xal ToTaSs Traatv atrtov eari
TOU elvai ayaOa. 'ATracrac; (xi:v
ouv e^eTa^eiv Ta<; S6^a<; (JiaTaioTepov LCTW^ ecrrfv,

3olxav6v Se
A methodical
Tac; (JtaXtdTa eTTiTroXa^ouGra^ >] Soxoiiaac; /eiv Tiva Xoyov. MYJ XavOa-
2 2
VSTCO 8* 7)[Jia<;
STI 8La9epoucrtv ol ATCO TCOV ap^wv Xoyoi xal ol ercl Ta<; ap/a<; .

E5 yap xal DXaTcov YjTropet TOUTO, xal e^rei TOTCpov dbro TCOV ap^cov
3
io95bT<x<; ap^a(; IdTtv T) oSoc; coaTrep ev TW aTaSico dbuo TCOV aOXoOeTcov STUI TO
,

^ avaTuaXiv. 'ApXT^ov (lev yap arco TCOV yvcopi(Jicov, TauTa Se SLTTCO^ Ta (Jiev
4
yap TjfJLiv Ta 8* a?rXco(; .
"lacoc; o3v Y][JLCV ye apxTeov OCTTO TCOV Y](JLLV yvcoptfjicov.
5
5 Aio Set Toii<; IBeaiv ?jx ai xaXcot; TOV Tuepl xaXcov xal Stxatcov xal oXcog TCOV
TroXtTtxcov axoua6(jievov lxavco<;. 'Ap/yj yap TO OTL- xal ei TOUTO 9aivoiTO

apxoilvTCO^, ouSev TupocrSeyjdet TOU SIOTI. '0 8e TOLOUTO<; 7^ 6^ei 7^ Xapoi av


T
apxa<; pa8tco<;
6
. Q 8k (jiTjSeTepov uTrapxet TOUTCOV, axouoraTco TCOV 'HaioSou 7 -

10 o5TO^ [Jiev TOXvapwrnx; 8^ auTO^ rcavTa


s

eaOX6<; 8 au xaxeivoc; 8^ e3 CITTOVTI 7ri07]Ta


5

o^ Se xe fjiTjT auToc; voey] (JLTJT*


aXXou axoiicov
ev 6i)(jLco paXXyjTat, 6 8' aijT* axpTjtoc; avTjp.

8e X^ycojjtev 86ev Trape^^Tj^ev. To yap aya96v xal TTJV euSai(xo-


i5vtav oux aXoyco^; eotxaaiv ex TCOV PLCOV UTroXa^paveiv. 01 (Jiev
TCoXXol xal

1 -
ol x a P^ 8VTe ?
people of superior refinement.
2
"Arguments from the first principles" are deductive or apodeictic arguments;
those to the first principles are inductive. See our nrs. 447-455.
3
Ross points to Rep. VI 511 b, the passage about the avuTrdOerov (our nr. 294,
p. 203). But in fact, neither Plato's ascent from the hypotheseis, used as dpx<xt,
upward to the anhypotheton is anything like Aristotle's deductive argument,
nor is his descent from the anhypotheton back to the inferior etSyj of the same kind
as a X6yo<; ini Ta? ap/a? with Ar. Mark also the use of the imperfect: 7)7r6pet and
IftrJTei. Evidently there are frequent X6yoi inl T<X<; apxa? in the Socratic dialogues.
And whenever things are explained by participation in Ideas, what else is this
than a X6yo<; dc7r6 TCOV &p/cov ?
4
On the distinction between yvtopijjLcoTepa Y)(itv and yvtopifxcoTepa a7rXco<; see our
nr. 406, n. 5.
5
"must have been brought up in good habits".
8
The man who is trained by good habits possesses moral principles implicitly.
7
Erga 293, 295-297 Rzach.
138 PRACTICAL SCIENCES [566]

Three main xcoTOCTOi 816 xal TOV (3(ov ayaTC&ai TOV a7roXau<mx6v.
Tvjv YjSovYjv Tpei? yap
elai [xaXiaToc ol 7tpox VT ^ 8 TS vuv eipY)[Jievo<; xal 6 7roXmx6<; xal Tptao<; 6
1
. 01 (Jiev o5v TroXXol TravTeX&c; av8pa7ro8e!>8ei<; 9aivovTai POCTXT)- 20
[JLOCTCOV (3iov Tipoaipoufjievoi, Tuy^avouCTi Se Xoyou Sta TO 7uoXXoi!)<; TCOV ev
2 3
eoua[ai SapSavaTraXXco
6(j.oio7ra6ev 01 8k ^apfevTe*; xa>

TtfjtYJv.
Tou yap TtoXmxoij fiiov a^eSov TOUTO TXO. Oatverai 8* e7U7uoXai6Tepov
elvai TOU y)TOU[Avou Soxet yap ev TOI<; TLJA&CTI [JLaXXov elvai Y^ ev TO> Ti(JL(0(JLevc), 25
s

TayaOiv S OIXELOV TI xal SuaacpatpeTOv slvai (lavTeuofxeOa. ^ETI S* sotxaai TTJV

Ti(jL7)v
Siwxeiv tva TciaTeuataaLv eauTOix; ayaOoix; elvai* ^Y)Touai youv UTO TOW

9povi(jio)v TifjiaaOai, xal Trap* ol<; yivcoaxovrai, xat CTC' apeTy) 89jXov ouv 8ri
xaTa ye TO\iTou<; 7] apeTV) xpsiTTWv. Ta^a Se xal jxaXXov Sv TI<; TeXo<; TOU TcoXiTi- 30
xou PIOU TauTTjv uTToXapot. OaiveTat 8k aTsXeaTlpa xal auTT) Soxet yap evSI-
^saOai xal xaOeuSetv e^ovTa TY]V apeTYjv ^ onrpaxTeLv Sta PIOU, xal Tipic; TOUTOK;
xaxoTcaGeiv xal aTi)x^v ^a jxeyiaTa' TOV 8' OUTO)<; J^covTa ou8el<; av euSaifjio- iog6a

vicetev, et (JiY) Geatv 8ia9i)XaTT6)v. Kal Tcepl [xev TOUTCOV aXt<; (ixavto<; yap xal

eyxuxXtoK; eLpvjTai Trepl auTwv ) TpiTo<; 8* eaTlv 6 OewpTjTtxo^, uxep


e7rioxed/iv ev TOIC; e7ro[jievoi<; 7Coi7)(j6(JLeOa. '0 Se ^p7][AaTi<jTY)(; (3tai6<; T[C; 5
4
,
xal 6 TrXoijTOc; STjXov STI ou TO ^Y)TOU{Jievov ayaOov ^pvjcrifjiov yap xal
1
Ar/s three (3tai are clearly of Pythagorean origin. Cp. our nr. 4.
2
Athenaeus mentions two epitaphs of Sardanapallus (336 a and 530 b, c). The
first is :
"EaOie, rctve, rual^e ox; T#XXa TOUTOU oux &5ta, sc. TOU dcTcoxpoT7)(jiaTO<;

(is not worth a snap of the fingers).


The second was probably cited by Ar. in his Protrept., and by this quotation
it became famous in Antiquity. It runs. :

*
Ketv' x<> ^ aa
9<xyov xai ecpuppiaa xal {JLET*
groxOov Ta 8i rcoXXa xal tfxpia Tuavra
T^pTcv*
Cic. translates it in Tusc. Disp. 35, 101 V :

Haec habeo quae edi quaeque exsaturata libido


hausit; at ilia iacent multa et praeclara relicta.
He adds to it these lines of Ar., which Jaeger thinks were taken from the Protr. :

"Quid aliud, inquit Ar., in bovis, non in regis sepulchro inscriberes ? Haec habere
se mortuum dicit, quae ne vivus quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur".
He refers again to it in De finibus II 32, 106.
3
See p. 137, note i.
4
The text as we read it contains some difficulties. Modern interpreters mostly
supply pto? with xpYj^aTicmfe and translate: "The life of money-making is a life
of compulsion" or "constraint"; by which they mean either that this life is under-
taken only under compulsion (Ross), or that in this life a man cannot follow his
natural inclinations, or perhaps both. Yet there remains some doubt as to the
question whether the text is sound. We have no other instances of xp^aTicrnfe used
adjectively. And even if this is right, I think it would be better to supply the
word <pto<;> after xp^aTioTY);, because in copying it could be easily dropped be-
fore ptaio?.
A
former generation made some conjectures. G. Ramsauer in his edition of the
Eth. Nic. of 1878 proposed to write pdcvai>(j6<; TI? instead of fUai6$TK;. James Watt,
[566] ETH. NIC. I-III 139

iXXou X<*P tv ' A&6 [JtaXXov ra TupoTepov Xex6vTa TXYJ TK; av

yap ayaTraTai. OouveTai, 8e 008* exeiva xaiToi rcoXXol Xoyoi 7cp6<;

ulv o5v acpeia0co TO 8e xaOoXou 1


BlXTiov fajcoc e7uaxd>acr6ai xal The Good *

~ , / , ~ / ,
Plato
i TWO?
XeyeTai, xairap TrpoaavTOix; TYJC; ToiauTYjc; c,y)TY]aeeo^ yiyvo(Aev7)<; criticized
Sta TO 91X01)^ #vSpa<; eiaayayeiv T<X eESrj. A6eie 8' av I'aax; (^XTLOV elvat xal
2
15 Seiv ercl aamjpia ye TYJ<; aXY]0eta<; xal Ta otxeta avaipeZv (SXXox; TS xal 91X0- ,

3
Ot 8e lm Ar ^ u "
yap OVTOLV 9^Xoiv fiaiov TcpoTtjjiav TYJV aXvjOeiav
[jL9oiv .

JV So^av TauTTjv oix STTOIOUV iSeac; ev ol<; TO vrpoTepov xal fidTSpov the doctrine
4 of the
gXeyov (SiOTrep ouSe TWV aptOpicov ESeav xaTeaxeuaJ^ov ) TO Se aya06v XeyeTai
20 xal ev TW TL xal ev TW TUOIW xal ev TO> Tupoc; Tt, TO Se xaO* auTO xal V)
ouaia
5
7cp6Tepov T^ 9uaei TOU Tcp6(; Tt (7rapa9uaSt yap TOUT* Ifotxe xal
>;
TOU OVTOC; ) OXTT' oux av etT) xoivv] TIC; em TOUTCOV tSla. ETI 8* ercel TayaGov
iGOLySx; X^yeTai TO) OVTI (xal yap ev TCO TI X^yeTai, olov 6 6eo<; xal 6 vou<;, xal
25 ev TCO TTOio) al apeTai, xal ev TCO TTOCTCO TO [jieTptov, xal ev TW 7rp6<; Tt TO XPV
ai{JLOv, xal ev XP ^
xaip6^, xal ev TOTTW StaiTa
6
xal eTepa TOiaijTa), 89jXov
ax; oux av eiT) xotvov TL xaOoXou xal ev ou yap av IX^yeTO ev TcaCTai? Tat<;
30 xaTTjyoptatc;, aXX' ev [jua {Jtovyj. "ETI 8' e?rel TCOV xaTa fxtav iSeav (jtta xal ITU-

followed by Burnet, read the text as it stands in this way: PLOC OCTI? Icrav ("the
business-man is by compulsion whatsoever he is"). C. M. Mulvany (in Class. Quart.
XV 1921, p. 85-98) suggests that pfouoc; should be explained as pai6<;: little, trifling.
He translates: "The business-man is a little person" sc. of minor importance
towards happiness.
1
T6 Si xaOoXou - sc. aya06v. In the conception of Ar. the Platonic Ideas are
"univcrsals", which are abstracted from the concrete things or phenomena. In
this case "the good" as a universal should be abstracted from many concrete dyaOa.
But this is impossible, Ar. says since these good things fall under different categ-
;

ories, no xotv6v could be found here.


2
Ta oixela dvatpetv - to sink our personal feelings.
3
This maxim, which has become famous by the above words of Ar., has been
expressed as clearly and explicitly by Plato in criticizing Homer: 'AXX' ou y^P ^P^
ye TTJS dXyjOetac; TI^YJTSCK; avr)p (Rep. X, 595 c).
4
Plato and his followers do not admit of Ideas of things within which they
recognize a priority and a posteriority. Well, Ar. says, this is exactly the case
with the categories: substance is prior to the others. He means priority in the
hierarchy of being: like two presupposes the monad and three the dyad; again,
like body presupposes the plane, and plane presupposes the line. In the same way
to Ar. the more primitive soul has priority of being over the more developed soul :

the vegetative soul over the sensitive, the sensitive over the rational. And that is
why there does not exist a "soul" in general, which is a reality in itself (De anima
A i, 402 b 6 - 8 B 3, 414 a 29 -b 19 ). So it is with substance and the other categories:
;

substance can exist without the others, not inversely.


5
See the doctrine of the categories in 437b and 438a.
6
S(cura is used here for the good in the category of place. Heliodorus explains :

v eu Sidtyo^ev.
140 PRACTICAL SCIENCES [566]

crr/jp) *, xal TCOV ayaOcov dbravTcov ?jv av [jifoc TI<; emery) fry) vuv 8 del TioXXal
xal TCOV UTTO [jdav xaryjyopLav, olov xaipoo, ev TuoXejjicp [xev yap orpaTYjywa)
s
ev voaco 8 focTpixy), xal TOO (jLerpiou ev Tp09fj [/iv laTpixv) ev TTOVOI^ Se yufiva-
2- "Man" <v TI TTOTC xal poiiXovTai Xeyeiv
crnxy). 'ATcopTjcreie 8* Tt<; auToexaaTOV, efaep 35
himself" Sv re auToavGpcoTcco xal av6pco7ccp xal 6 auTO<; Xoyo<; ecniv 6 TOU avOpcoTrou. iog6b
sic;
J

Y " P *v8pw7uo?, ouSev fcoteooaiv el 8 ofiTCO?, ouS' J aya66v. 'AXXa (JL^V


-

ou8 TW
atSiov elvat [JiaXXov ayaOov Icrrai, etTrep [X7)8^ Xeuxorepov TO TcoXu-

Xp6viov TOU e^Yj^pou. FliOavarrepov 8i eoLxaatv ol IluOayopeLoi Xyeiv


2
auTOu, TiOevTec; ev T^J TWV ayaOcov auaToixia TO ev ol<; Sv) xal
Distinction
iTtaxoXoue^aat SoxeL
primary and 'AXXa Tiepl [Jtev
TOUTCOV (5cXXo<; eaTca Xoyo^, TOL<; 8e XexOetCTi
secondary . 3
Tt( u7T09a[veTai Sia TO [XT) Tcepl TravTOj; ayaOou TOIX; Xoyoix; TcoieLaOat, XlyeaOai
8e xa0' ev eZSoc; Ta xaO* auTa Sicoxofxeva xal aya7rco[JLeva ?
TOC Se 7roL7]Tixa TOUTOV 10

y 9i)XaxTtxa TTWC; r^
TCOV evavTicov xcoXuTixa Sia TauTa Xyea0ai xal TpoTuov
dfXXov. A9jXov ouv OTI SLTTCO^ XeyoiT* avTayaOa, xal Ta [lev xa6' auTa, OaTepa
8e 8ia TauTa. XcopiaavTe^ o3v aruo TCOV cb^eXificov Ta xaO' auTa c7xe^ci(jLe0a ei 15

XyeTat xaTa (iiav iSeav. Ka6' auTa 8e Troia OeiY] TL^ av *H oaa xal (jLovoiifjieva ;

SicoxeTat, olov TO ^povetv xal opav xal yjSovai Tive^ xal TLjjiat TauTa yap ei ;

xal 81 aXXo TI SicoxofJiev, 8(Jico<;


TCOV xa6* auTa ayaOcov 0ehq Tt^ av. *H ouS'
4
fiXXo ouSev TcXvjv TTJ^ iSea^; ;
"QaTe {xaTatov ecrTat TO eZ8o<; . Et 8^ xal TauV 20
J
5
eo"Tlv TCOV xa0 auT<x, TOV TayaOou Xoyov ev aTuacriv auTot^ TOV auTov i[L<p<x.i-
No common VaQ ai K<d ^(xuOico TOV 8e
8eyj<yg^ xaOdarep ev x^ vt TTJC; XeuxoT7)TO^. Ti(jiy)(;

xal <ppovy]oreco xal TjSov^ eTepoi xal 8ia<pepovTe<; ol Xoyoi TauTT] fj ayaOa.
Oux SCTTIV apa TO ayaOov xoivov TI <xal> xaTa [Jitav iSeav. 25
Whence '
AXXa TCCO^ 8v) XeyeTai Ou yap Soixe TOL^ ye dbro TU^V]^ 6{icovii(xo^. 'AXX* Apa
;

6
homonymy ? y e t& &<?' &*<>> elvai ^ Tupoc; ev aTiavTa auvTeXetv, y [jiaXXov xaTa avaXoytav 'flc; ;

1
a Platonic principle. Cp. Laches igSd-igga; Parm. 134 a.
This is
2 - See our nr.
v T^ TCOV dcyaOcov auaToixta42, the Pythagorean table of opposites.
Ar. means it is more acceptable to range the one in a series of good things than to
:

identify it with the Good itself.


f/
So this text of the Eth. Nic. provides evidence for the identification of the Ev
and the 'Aya66v by Plato. Cp. our nr. 364c.
3
dc(jL9tap7)T7)a^ TI<;
- room for dispute.
4
"QcjTe jidraiov - "In that case the form will be empty".
5 -
X6yov notion, definition.
6
Ar. distinguishes three kinds of homonymy. The first is what is called in
scholasticism equivocation: mere identity of names, the notions being different
(see our nr. 436a). The second is what is called by Ar. T& 9' v&<; xai 7up&<; gv things :

are called by the same name because they are related to the same object or the
same idea; e.g. we speak of a healthy person (who possesses health), a healthy sleep
(which is a symptom of health), a healthy climate (which preserves health), etc.
[566] ETH. NIC. Mil 141

yip Iv cr<o(Jt,aTi 8^t<;, Iv <|;uxfl vou$, xal 4XXo S-J)


Iv &XXej>. 'AXX*

30 <peTlov TO vuv, laxpi|3ouv yap uTtlp auT&v &XXY)<; Sv etiQ <pt,Xocro<pta$ otxetfoepov
6[iota> SI xal Ttepl T% ISea^. Et yip xat UCFTIV v TI xat xotvyj xanqyopoufAevov

aya6ov $ x w P lorT ^ v Tt auTO *6' auTO S 89jXov ox; oux Sv stv) TtpaxT
35 XTYJTOV dvOpcoTccp vuv 8k TOIOUTOV TI CqTeiTai. Ta^a 81 Tcp 86eiev Sv

yvwpl^stv auri Ti
xal TCpaxTa T<OV ayaOcov olov ydcp 7rapx-
7rp6(; XTTJTOC

8siyfjia TOUT' ^OVTSS {AaXXov elaofxeOa xal T& ^[Jilv aya6a, xav elStofiev, STCI-

Teu6(Ae6a auTcov. IIiOavoTYjTa (JL^V o5v Tiva S^ei 6 X6yoc;, Soixsv 8 Tatc;
2
jiat(; 8ia<povetv :raarai yap ayaOou TIVO<; s^ilfisvat xal T6
3
TrapaXeiTcouat TYJV yvtoatv auTOu Ka^Toi po^Oyjiia T
.

ayvosiv xal [XYjS* STT^YJTSOV oux eSXoyov. "Arcopov 8k xal


5
avTT)^ ^ T^XTCOV 7rp6<; TTJV auTou T^VIQV el8<i)^ auTo TO aya66v,

COC; laTpixcoTspo^ 73 aTpaTY)ytxcJ)Tepo<; larTai 6 rqv tS^av auTTjv Te6ea{Jtvo


6
<l>aiveTai (Jtlv yap ouS^ TYJV uyteiav o5T<o^ iTiiaxoTcstv 6 laTp6^, dXXoi: rJ
J

(iaXXov 8* feco<; TYJV Tou8e- xa6 SxaaTOv yap EaTpeuei.


Kal TcaXtv 8
s
Return *
15 rcepl [xv TOUTCOV Ini TOGOUTOV slpif)o*6o) ^TcavlXOtofxev eTtl TO

aya66v, T TCOT* av fiivj.


OalveTai (jtlv yap SXXo ev SXX-jQ 7rp<4i;a xal What is the

Y^P ^v taTpwcyj xal aTpaTYjyix^ xal Tai^ XoiTiat^ optotca^. TL


o5v xa<TTY)<; Taya06v;
J/
H o5 x^P tv T<^ XotTta TrpaTTSTat; TOUTO 81: Iv EaTptxfj Good?
s
20 [xlv uyteia, sv aTpaTYjyixy) 8e VIXTJ, Iv oixoSojjuxyj 8 olxta, ev <5cXX<p 8* dtXXo, Iv

a7r<4o~jf)
8k,
Ttpdc^si xal rcpoatpso'ei TO T!XO<; TOUTOU yap Ivsxa TOC Xotira TcpaTTOuo't

7cdcvTS<;. "QaTe et TI TCOV TupaxTcav a?ravTtov larTl TlXo^, TOUT* Sv styj TO TrpaxTov

In the same way the word "medical" indicates that which is relative to the medical
art, the doctor because he possesses it, a treatment because it is a function of it, etc.
u Z 4, 1030 a aa -b 3 ). In scholasticism this is called analogia
(Metaph. T i, 1003 a -b
38
;

attributionis. This third kind is the analogia proportionalitatis. It is denned in Poet.


16
21, 1457 b ff. as a transference from
analogy, which is possible "whenever there
are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D)
to the third (C) for one may then metaphorically put D in lieu of B, and B in lieu
;

of D." E.g. old age is to life as evening is to day. Now evening may be called old
age of the day, or old age the evening of life. It seems to be the author's intention
to qualify the good as homonymous in the second sense.
1
"Even if the good is universally predicable, or if there is a Good existing
separately and absolute",
Souilh6 rightly remarks that the first and the second part of the sentence are
not the same a thing might be a common predicate but not an Idea. The ^ then
:

must be understood disjunctively, not in the copulative sense.


"But it seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences" (Ross).
"But they do not trouble about the knowledge of the ideal Good" (Rackham).
- sc. if it existed.
poif)6YjfjLa rjqXixouTov
- as in Plato's Cratylus.
- "not in this not in abstracto.
. .
O#T(O<; way", i.e.
142 PRACTICAL SCIENCES [566]

The8U P reme
dya06v, el 8k TuXetco, TauTa. MeTapatvcov Sir) 6 X6yo; ei; TauTov
supreme end TOUTO 8k STL [laXXov 8iaaa97Jaai TieipaT^ov. 25
'Ercel 8e TrXetco ^aiveTai TOC TlXv), TOUTCOV Si aipoupie0a Tiva Si' Srepa, olov

auXou; xai 8Xco; Ta Spyava, 89jXov co; oux e'cmv TravTa liXeiof T& 8'

Te*Xeiov TI 9atveTai. "}CTT' el [Jiev


e<mv ev TI fx6vov Te*Xeiov, TOUT* av

e?7] TO >)Tou[j,evov, ei Se TrXeico, TO TeXeioTaTov Toiircov. TeXsioTepov Si XlyoH-ev


Si* ^Tepov xai TO [XYjSeTTOTS Si' <5cXXo alpeTOv TWV <xal>
TO xa0' auTO SIOXTOV TOU
xaO' ai>Ta xai Sia ToijG' alpeTtav, xai aTrXcot; SYJ TeXeiov TO xa0' auTO
Happiness a [ e xa ^
^-yjS^oTe Si' 4XXo. TOIOUTOV S' Y] euSaifjiovia (JLaXio-T* elvai Soxei'
end TauTTjvyap aipoifieOa del Si' auTYjv xai ouSeiuoTe 81' <5cXXo, TI(JLY)V 8e xai YjSovyjv
xai vouv xai Traaav apeTYjv alpoujjieOa jxev xai Si' auTa ((jiY]6ev6<; yap

VOVTO^ eXo[[jie0' av 2xao*Tov auT&v), aipo\i[jLe6a Se xai T^C; eu8ai(Jiovia<;


Sia TOUTCOV UTCoXajxpavovTec; eu8at(jLOV7jaeiv. TTJV 8' euSai[iov[av ouSelc; aipeiTai 5
s

TOUTCOV X^P LV > OU S' 8Xco^ 8i &XXo. OaiveTai Se xai ex T% auTapxeia^ TO auTO

au(Jipaiveiv. T6 yap TeXeiov ayaOov auTapxe<; elvai Soxei. To Se auTapxec; Xlyo-

[jiev
oux auTco (jL6vco TCO ^COVTI piov [JLOVCOTTJV, dcXXa xai yoveuci xai Texvoic; xai 10
yuvaixl xai 8Xco<; Toig 91X01; xai TcoXiTai^, eTueiSv] 9uaei TroXiTixov 6 avOpcoTio?.
TOUTCOV 8e XvjTUTeo^ 8po; TI<; eirexTeivovTi yap CTCI TOU; yovet; xai TOU; a7ioy6-
vou; xai TCOV 9iXcov TOU; 9iXou; ei; arueipov TTpoeiaiv. 'AXXa TOUTO (Aev elaau-

61; eTciaxeTTT^ov, TO 8' auTapxe; TiOe(jiev o [xovoufxevov alpeTov Tioiec TOV PIOV 15
xai [T/jSevo; evSea- TOIOUTOV Se TTJV eu8ai(jioviav oiofieOa elvai, eTi Se TCOCVTCOV
2
aipeTCOTaTTjv auvapi6[jiou[jievyjv
(JLYJ SuvapiOfzoufjLevyjv yap S^Xov co; aipeTco-
.

3
T^pav TOU eXa/tcrrou TCOV ayaOcov uTrepo^v) yap ayaOcov yiveTai TO
[jieTa

7cpoaTi0e(jievov, aya0cov 8e TO pteit^ov aipeTcoTepov aiei. TeXeiov STJ TI 9aiveTai 20


xai auTapxe; 7] euSaijiovia, TCOV TrpaxTcov o5aa TeXo;.
What is
'AXX' iaco; TYJV jjiev euSaifxoviav TO apiaTov Xeyeiv 6fioXoyou[iev6v TI 9aiveTai,
TcoOeiTai 8' evapyecrrepov TI eaTiv eTi XexO^jvai. Ta^a SY) yvoiT* av TOUT' ei
XY]90eiY] TO gpyov TOU av0pco7iou. "QaTrep yap auXTjTy] xai ayaX(jiaT07roicp xai 25
Travel TexviTf), xai 8Xco; cLv CCTTIV epyov TI xai Tipa^i;, ev TCO ^'pyco Soxei Taya06v
elvai xai TO e5, OUTCO So^eiev av xai av0pco7uco, eiTcep ecTi TI fe'pyov auTou.

1
"So the argument has by a different way reached the same point" i.e. the

same as in ch. namely, that the supreme good is identical with the supreme end.
i,

"By a different way" in ch. i the argument was: "Every art and every inquiry
etc. aims at some good; therefore, the supreme good is the supreme end, which is
aimed at by every human activity". Here the argument runs: "The good and the
end are identical in all individual cases; therefore, the supreme good and the
supreme end will be also identical" (the stress being laid on Tl oSv i x 6. a T TJ ; Tdlya v ^
and TWV TrpaxTcov aTuavTwv).
2
(XY) auvapiO^oujjL^vrjv
- "without being counted as one good thing among
others" (Ross) i.e. not as a number of a series.
;

8 -
jxera by the addition of .
[566] ETH. NIC. Mil 143

o5v TXTOVO<; fxlv xal crxuT^c^ lartv Ipya TIVOC xal Trpdc^eis, avOpcircou
5
30 8 oiSlv t<mv, dcXX' apyiv rc^uxsv ; ^ xaOdcirep 6<p0aX|Jio5 xal xe &P& *al ttoS6<;

xal 8Xa> IxaaTOU T<OV (zoptwv 9atvsTaC TI Spyov, OUTCO xal av0pc(>7Tou rcapa
TtavTa TauTa 0eh) TL$ av Ipyov TI Tt o5v Si] TOUT' av etv) TOT T6 [xlv yap ^v
; ;

xotviv elvat <pavgTai xal T<H<; <puTOt^, ^Tetrai S^ t6 tSiov. A9opiatlov Spa
zogSa nfjv TS OpsTTTix^v xal T)JV ai^iQTtx^v J^coifjv *. *E7tO(Ji^v>) SI aJaOTjTtxif] TI? Av eliq, defined l>y
SI xal auTYj xoivJ) xal farcy xal ^ot xal -nravrl 4>(j>. AetTCSTat Si) the special
T i $ TOU X6yov SXOVTOI; (TOtiTOO SI T& (zlv ax; e:n7rsi6lc of man
2
S* d>^ lx ov xa ^ Siavoo6[Jtevov ) SITTC!)^ SI xal

rJjv xar* evlpyetav 0eT^ov xupicorepov yap a5ry) Soxet X^ysaGat. El S* Icrrlv

Spyov av0pa>7cou ^u^^^ ev^pysia xara X6yov


^ (ji-J) Sveu
8
X6 yo u,
T& S* aur6 ^afxev Ipyov slvat Tq> yvsi rouSe xal TouSs (TTiouSatou ,
10 &cncep xiOaptcTTOu xal orTiouSatou xiOapiaTou, xal obrX&s SYJ TOUT* eirl TidcvTCov,

TJ^ xaT* dtpST/jv UTcepo/^ ^P^^ ^^ Spyov (xt0api<TToij [xlv yap

07couSaou SI T& s5)* et S* otfTox;, dcv0pa>7rou SI Ti6e(Xv Spyov


ijcoyjv Tiva, TaiTTjv SI ^uxvj<; evpyeiav xal Trpa^ei*; (iSTa Xoyou, aTcouSatou 81
15 AvSp6<; e5 Taura xal xaXcoc;, Sxaarov SI e5 xara TYJV olxetav ape'rijv aTcoreXetTai
et SYJ ofiTCo, 16 dvOpcoTCivov aya06v ^ux^<? ev^pyeta ytverai xaT* Definition

apeTYjv, eJ SI TuXetou^ at apsTat, xaTa T^V apt<TT7]v


xal TeXeiOTaTTjv. v ETt 8* ev pcj> reXsCto. Mfa
Sap oO Tcotet, ouSI (zta ^(Jtlpa
f
O(>TCO SI ouSI (jtaxcxpiov xal suSa((xova
068*

567 Book II deals with moral virtue in general. It is engendered in


us not by nature, but by habit. By nature man possesses a capacity to
receive virtues; he receives them actually by the habit of right action.

a. Eth. Nic. II, no3a 14-b 2 :

7<; S1 1% apet% o8<n)<;, TVJ<; (Jtlv StavovjTix^ T% SI -?)0ix%, ^ [jilv


Sia-
T& irXetov ex 8i8aorxaX(a<;
xal XP 6vou
xet xa^
8 ^ tfiw*l *5
<r
^l
v Y^ VS<TLV
^o u
xa ^ ^ aS^artv, 8t67rep Moral virtue
4
60sv xal res " lt* from
"0 <; TcepiytyvsTat , .

*E^ o5 xal SvjXov

x. a6T)Ttxifjv etc. - See De anima II 3, 4i4a29 -b


6
;
1 7
415 a - on the
,

faculties of the soul (our nr. 639).


8
This parenthesis has been condemned by Burnet. Rackham follows him
somewhat hesitatingly, and declares the sentence to be "an irrelevant anticipation
of ch. 13, 9". SouilhS defends it.
s T& $* <x,M 9a^ev Ipyov elvai etc. - "and if we acknowledge the function of an
,

individual (TOU&C) and of a good individual (roOSs (nrou8atai>) to be genetically the


1 '
same (T& aOr6 T$ ylvei).
4 -
iteptyCyvsrat results from,
144 PRACTICAL SCIENCES [567]

STL ouSefuoc TCOV r)0ixtov apeTtov 9\Jcrei 7)(uv eyytyvETai* ou0v yip TCOV 9\iaei

8vTcov fiXXcoc; eOt^erai, olov 6 X[0o^ cpuaei XOCTCO 9p6(jivo<; oux av s0ia0eb} 20
&vco 9^pea6at, ouS* av [U)piaxt<; 01^7) TI<; &vco ptaTcov, ouSe TO Tcup XOCTCO,

ouSe $XXo ouSsv TCOV aXXax; TW^UXOTCOV aXXco^ av eOiffOety). OUT' Spa 9\Jo~ei
OUTS Trapa 9uaiv syyiyvovTai ai apETai, aXXa n:e9ux6at [jt^v yjfjitv 8l5ad0ai25
S/

auTas, TsXetoufJisvoK; Se Sia TOU eOouc;. ETI 8aa fiev 9\iaei Y)[JLLV TrapaytveTat,
Tac; SuvafjLCK; TOUTOV TipOTepov xop.i^6{jLe0a, (iaTepov Se T<X<; evepyetac; aTroSi-

SofJiev, OTusp em TWV alo0Y)ae(ov SyjXov (ou yap ex TOU TroXXaxL^ ISetv ?j 7uoXXaxi<;
axouaat Ta<; ata0y)aei(; eXa(3o[zev, aXX* avaTuaXiv S^ovTec; exP Y ]
a<^(JL ^a) ^ 3

Xp>)crafjievot ea^Ofxev ) T<X<; Ss apsTa^ Xajjipavofxev evepy/jaavTSt; TipOTepov,


ciaTiEp xal 7cl T&V dcXXcov TE^VCOV.
rt
A yap SSL (jta06vTa<; Troietv, TauTa TroiouvTet;

|zav0avo(jiev, olov otxoSojjioiivTe^ olxoSofioi, yiyvovTai xal xi0apiovT<; xi0a-

piGTaL OUTW Se xal Ta (JLEV Sixaia TipdcTTOvTec; Sixaioi yiv6{Jie0a, Ta Se aco9pova 11035

aco9pove<;, Ta S* avSpeta avSpelot.

b. Since, then, virtue results from habit, and habit is formed by


action, it is incumbent on us to exhibit activities of a certain quality.
Practical 22 - 26
Jb., 1103 b :

consequence
Aio Set TOU; evepyeta^ 7roia<; aTuoSiSovai xaTa yap Ta<; TOUTCOV
axoXouOouaiv at E^SK;. Ou [jttxpov ouv Sta9ept TO OUTGX; T] OUTCO^ euOix; ex
ve*6)v I0i^eo"0at, aXXa 7ra{jL7uoXu, fxaXXov 8k TO ?rav.

568 How, then, are we to act rightly? Ar. answers this question

by developing his theory that virtue is the mean between two extremes.

Moral a Efa jvic. II 2, no4a n - 27 :

destroyed HpoJTov [xev o5v TOUTO OewpvjTeov, OTI T<i TOiauTa 7ce9uxev UTT* evSeta^ xalno4a
by excess and u7re 90Lpea0aL (Set yap uTrep
l
TCOV a9avcov TOU;
ppoX9j<;

), coa7Tp ITU! TYJ^ la^uo^ xal TYJ<; uyiia<; 6pco(jLv Ta T yap u


XovTa yufjivaata xal Ta eXXEircovTa 90tpi TTJV tCT^v, OJJLOLCO^ SE xal Ta TCOTOL 15

xal Ta atTta xal sXaTTco yiyv6[jiva 90ipi T'/JV uytsiav, Ta SE au{JL{ATpa


TrXEtco

xal TTOIEL xal aust xal CTCO^EL OUTCOC; ouv xal 7ul aco9poauvy3(; xal avSpsta^

E^si xal TCOV SXXcov apETcov. "0 TE yap vravTa 9tiycov xal 9opou(jivo^ xal 20

fjLYjSEv i)7uo[JLvcov ^EiXo? ytyvsTai, o TE (JL7)8v 8Xco<; 9o^ou[jLvo^ aXXa 7cpo<;

TravTa ^aSt^cov Opaauc;, ofJiotcoc;


SE xal 6 [JLEV 7racTY]c; Y)8ovYJ<; aTioXaucov xal

fjL7)S(jLia(; a7rx6|jLEvo(; axoXaaToc;, 6 SE 7raaa<; 9uycov, cocrTrsp ol aypotxot,


avaicr07]T6<; TIC; 90stpTai SYJ YJ c7C09pooruvY] xal 7) dvSpEia UTUO TTJC; U7tp(JoXY]s 25
xal T% IXXEL^ECOC;, UTTO SE TYJC;

- in illustration of.
[568] ETH. NIC. I-III 145

b. Not only man becomes virtuous by acting in a certain way, but


virtue is also exercised by the same actions.
27 -b 3
Ib., II04a :

excised in
'AXX* ou jx6vov at yev^areu; xal au^yjaeu; xal al 96opal ex TCOV auTcov xal the actions

30
,..
em
TCOV auTcov vtvovTai, aXXa xal at evlpyeiai ev TOLC auToic ScovTai xal yap by which Jt
_ , T
TCOV aXXcov TCOV 9avepcoTepcov OUTCOC; e^ei, olov
>
em % ~ /

LCT^O^- ytveTat
TTJC;
/

yap ex TOU TroXXvjv Tpo^vjv Xa(Jipaveiv xal TcoXXoi^ TTOVOU<; uTiofjisveiv, xal [JiaXtdTa
SivaTai TauTa Tcoietv 6 laxopo^. OUTCO S* e^ei xal evrl TCOV apeTcov ex Te yap
TOU aTrexeaOai TWV yjSovcov yiv6{xe0a aw^pove^, xal yev6(Jievoi [xaXicrTa Suva-
35 [JLe0a a?rxe<y0at auTtov. *0{JioLCo<; 8e xal em TTJ^ avSpeta^ eOi^ofjievoi yap
[ i O4b xaTa9povetv TCOV 9o(3epcov xal uTcofJieveiv auTa yivofJteOa avSpeiot, xal yev6-

8uv7)<y6(JLe6a uTcofjtevetv Ta

569Pleasure in acting virtuously is a sign that the virtuous disposition


has been acquired. For there is an essential connexion of moral virtue
with pleasure and pain.

a. Eth. Nic. II 3, 1104 b 3 - 11 :


Pleasure

8e Set TroietaOat TCOV eecov TTJV eTutyivofxevyjv YjSovy]v ^ XUTCTJV TOI<; the test of
virtue
5 Ipyoi^ 6 fxev yap aTce^o^evoc; TCOV acofiaTixcov yjSovcov xal auTCp TOUTCO x^Lpcov
aa>9pcov, 6 8* ax66(JLevoc; ax6XaciTO<;, xal 6 [xev uvrofjievcov TOC Setva xal ^atpcov
$ (JLY) XuTcoilfievoc; ye avSpetoc, 6 8e XuTcoufJtevoc; 8eiX6<;. Ilepl ^Sovac; yap xal
loXiiTca^ eaTlv 73 y)0ixy] apeTY). Aia (xev yap TYJV TjSovyjv TOC 9auXa TupaTTOfxev, Sia
Se T/]v X\i7c>)v TCOV xaXcov

b. Again, this view leads to a practical consequence.


Ib., II04b
n- 13 :
Consequence

Ai6 Set ^X^ a ^ Ktos eu6u<; ex ve*cov, co<; 6 IIXaTcov 973crtv, tocrre x a ^P lv T xa>L education
olc; Set* r) yap opOv) TraiSeta ai>TY] IGTLV.

570 Against Ar.'s theory that a man becomes virtuous by doing


virtuous actions, the objection could be made: How can anyone do just
actions when he is not yet just, or temperate when he is not yet temperate ?
On the contrary, if he does just actions, he is already just. To this
objection Ar. answers: No, only by doing just actions a man is not yet
just. Three other conditions must be fulfilled.

Eth. Nic. II 4, 1105 a 17 - 33 How can a


A/a.
co* / f/ct~\\ct/
:

man do just
ATTopiQcreie o av TU; rcco^ Xeyofjiev OTI oei Ta [xev oixaia TrpaTTOvTa^ oixaiou? actions when
/ ^/
Ta 8e aci)9pova crco9pova^. EE yap TrpaTTouaiv Ta Sfxata xal TOC crco- heisnot i ust?
De Vogel, Greek Philosophy II 10
146 PRACTICAL SCIENCES [570]

9pova, 7^873 eial SCxaioi xal aco9pove^, coanep el TOC ypa|i[jiaTixa xal TOC [Jiou- 20

aixa, ypajJifjiaTixol xa ^ [AouaixoL *H ouS* ercl TCOV Texvcov O(>TCO<; 'xei ;


'EvSI-

XSTai yap ypajjifjiaTixdv xal &XXou U7io0e(jiivou.


TI TCOITJCTOCI xal OCTCO TUX"*]?
T6TE o5v eVrai ypa[Ji{JiaTix6?, eav xal ypa|ji[JiaTix6v TI TcoiTjay] xal ypa(ji[JiaTixco
TOUTO Si ecra TO xara TYJV ev auTco ypafZfjuxTtxyjv. "En ou $' 8[*oi6v ecmv eTrl 25
TGiv TSXVCOV xal TWV apSTCov. Ta fjilv yap 6^i ^wv Tex^wv yiv6(jLeva Ti e5 ?xeL
ev ai>Tot<;, apxel o5v TauTa TCCO<; 2x VTOC yeva6af Ta Se xaTa T<X<; dpeTac; yiv6-
[jieva oix eav auTa TCCO^ SxTJ^ 8ixao>^ ?) a6>9p6vco^ TrpaTTeTai, aXXa xal eav 6 30
TrpaTTCov TCWC; lx <ov T^paTTyj, TcpcoTov (xev eav eiSco*;, STUSIT* eav
xal 7tpoaipou[jievo<; Si* auTa, TO 8^ TptTOv eav xal ^epaicoc; xal af

9 - 18
Conclusion b. Ib., II05b !

E3 ouv X^yeTat STI ex TOU TOC Sixata TtpdcTTeiv 6 Sfxaioc; ytveTat xal ex TOU bio
TOC aco9pova 6 aco9pcov ex Se TOU |xv) TcpaTTeiv TauTa ouSel^ av ouSe fjteXXvjaete
yevlaOai dya06^. 'AXX' ot TcoXXol TauTa [xev ou TcpaTTOuaiv, eTil Se TOV Xoyov
xaTa9euyovTe<; otovTai 9iXocro9ecv xal OUTOX; SaeaOai ciTrouSacoi SJJLOIOV TI
TcoiouvTe^ Tot^ xdcfjivouatv, ot TCOV laTpcav axououai (Jtev e7ci(jieXco<;, TTOLOUCTI 8* 15

ouSev TCOV TTpoaTaTTOjJi^vcov. "QdTcep o5v ouSi: exetvoi eu S^OUCTLV TO acofia


OUTCO 0epa7ceu6(Jievoi, ouS' oSTOt TYJV 8 TCli 9iXoao9ouvTe<;. ^xV
571 Ar. now proceeds to define virtue.

a. Its genus is: a state of character, not a passion, nor a faculty.

defined
Eth ' Nic ' H 5 '
II0 5 bl9- IIo6al2:
Its genus T s
8 eaTiv YJ apeTY) e^? axeTCTeov. 'ETrel oSv TOC ev Tyj ^^Yl yivojjieva Tpfa 20
ICTT!, 7ca0Y] 8uva(Jiei<; eei, TOUTCOV <5cv TI etY) 7] apery). Aeyco S^ TraOy] {xev

(xiav opyyjv 96pov Oapao? 906vov x a pav 9iXiav [iiao(; TioOov ^vjXov SXeov, SXax;

olc; SrceTai YjSovv] TJ XUTTY) 8uva(iei<; 8i xaO* a<; Tca07)Tixol TOUTCOV Xey6(Jie0a,
olov xa0' a^ SuvaTol 6pyiCT09jvat ^ Xu7ry)09jvai ^ eXevjaai Ifyzic, Se xaO* a<; ?rp6^ 25
Ta 7rd07) e^ofjiev e5 75 xaxco<;, olov 7rp6<; TO opyiaOyjvai, et (iev a9o8pco<; 73
avei-

[JLVCO<;, xaxco<; Sxo[iev, ei Se (ji^acoc;, eij, ofjtotco^ Se xal ?up6<; TaXXa. FlaO?) (Jtev

o5v oux eialv ou0' at apeTal o80* at xaxiat, STI ou Xey6(Jte0a xaTa TOC 7ca07)

GTcouSaiot y 9auXoi, xaTa Se Ta<; apeTa^ 7) T<X<; xaxta<; XeyojieOa, xal STL xaTa 30
JJLCV
Ta
TraOY) ouTe e7Tatvou(jLe0a ofiTe ^ey6(xe0a (ou yap eTiatvetTai 6 9opou[xevo<;
ouSe 6 6pyi6[jievo<;, ouSe ^lyeTat 6 obrXco*; 6pyi^6[jLevo(; aXX' 6 TCCO^), xaTa Seiio6
Ta^ apeTa^ xal Ta^ xaxla^ e7raivou(jie0a ^ ^ey6(Jie0a. "ETI 6pyi^6(Jie0a {xev xal

9opou[Jie0a obrpoaipiTco^, at S* apeTal TcpoaiplaeK; Ttves $ oux &veu 7rpoatpaeco<;.


IIpo^ Si TOUTOK; xaTa (lev TOC TraOy) xivela0ai Xey6(jte0a, xaTa 8 TOC^ apeTa^ 5
xal TOCS xaxiac ou xivetaOai aXXa Siaxeia0ai TUCO^. Aia TauTa Se ouSe Suvaptet^
[57*] ETH. NIC. I-III 147

eiortv ofiTS yap dyaOol Xey6(xe0a TCJ) SiivacrOat Traaxetv dbrX&s OU*TE xaxof,
ouY ercatvoiifxeOa ofire ^ey6[Ae0a. Kal STI SuvaTol fxev ea^ev 9uo~et, ayaOoi Si
10 Y}
xaxol ou yivofjteOa 9\iaet efaoiiev Se Trepl TOUTOU TrpoTepov. Ei o5v

7rd0Y) elalv at apeTal [AYJTE Suva[xei<;, XstTtETat l$st<; auT<x<; slvat.

b. Its differentia: it is a disposition to choose the mean between


two extremes.
Ib. 6, 1106 a 12-no7 a 8 :

"0 ouv IffTtv TO) ysvst Its


TI {JLEv Y) dpETY), E?pY)Tat Sst SE (AY) [JLOVOV OUTO? ewrsiv,

15 STL S^K;, aXXa xat TTOIOC TL<;. 'PrjTsov o5v OTI Tiacra dpSTT), o5 av % apery], auT6
TS eS S^ov arcoTeXeL xal TO epyov auTou e5 aTcoSiSwciv, olov Y] TOU 6(p6aX(jLou
TOV TE 6<p6aX(ji6v (TTrouSatov Tiotet xal TO epyov auTou T^ yap TOU o98aX(jLou virtue *

TJ
eu 6p<o(jiev. 'OjJioLcoc; 7]
TOU LTCTCOU dpeTY) ITTTTOV Te crTiouSatov rcotei xal

2odya06v SpajJiEtv xal eveyxelv TOV ETrtpdcTYjv xal [Jieivat Tout; 7toXe[Atouc;. Et SYJ

TOUT* ETcl 7ravTO)v ouTOx; E^st, xal TOU av0po)7uou apETY) s


Y]
t
Y)
a v Virtue of man

2 t <;
(X9* 9j c;
dya o <; <5cv0po)7i;oc; y v s T a xal a 9' t t
?) t; s5
TO eauTou spyov a ?r o S o> a s t .
Ilcac; SE TOUTO SaTat, Y^SYJ [JLEV

25 etpY)xa(jiv, fru SE xal &S* laTat 9avspov, sdv 0o>pY)ao)[jisv Trota Ttc; saTtv Y)

9\latg auTYJ*;. 'Ev rcavTl SYJ auvexEt xal StatpSTto IGTI Xa^scv T& [IEV TrXEtov
s
TO 8* SXaTTOv TO 8 taov, xal TauTa Y)
xaT* auTO TO Trpayjjia YJ 7up6<; Y)(jia<;
TO SE
taov [JL^CTOV Tt u7CppoXY)<; xal EXXst^sox;. A^yco Se TOU [Jiev 7rpdy(JiaTO<; [ilaov

30 ^o foov aTTe^ov a9' exaT^pou TCOV fixpcov, oTrep ecrTlv ev xal TO auTO Tcaatv, 7rp6<;
Y)[Aac;
Se o [AY)Te TrXeovd^et [jtY)Te eXXetTief TOUTO 8* ou/ ev, ouSe TauTOv Traatv.
Olov et Ta Slxa TroXXa Ta Se Suo oXtya, Ta 1% [Jilca Xa{i(3avouat xaTa TO
yap taa> TS xal U7repxe/r<*t TOUTO 8e [xeaov eaTl xaTa TYJV
U7tepxet
*

3^ TCpayjxa
apt0[jLY]TtxY]v avaXoytocv. T6 8e ?rp6<; YJJJLOCC; ou^ OUTO) XYjTCTeov ou yap ei TCO

[jtvat 9ayetv TuoXu


Suo Se oXtyov, 6 dXe^TUTYjc e [Jivac; TrpocTa^et SaTt yap
xal TOUTO TcoXu TO) XYj^ofxevo) Y) oXtyov MtXeovt [Jiev yap oXtyov, TO) 8e

apxo[xvo) TWV yufjivaaricov TioXii. '0[Aoto)<; em


Spofiou xal TcaXYjc;. OUTCO SYJ 7ia<;

j e?rtaTY][jto)v TYJV uTieppoXYjv [lev xal TYJV iXXet^tv 9eiiyet, TO Se [I^CTOV t^YjTet xal
Tou0* atpetTat, (JL^CTOV
Se ou TO TOU TrpayfjtaToc; aXXa T^ Tupo^ Yjfjtac.
Et SY] Tcaaa

|TCICTTY](JLYJ OUTO)(; TO epyov e3 eTctTeXet, rrpoc; TO (Jteaov pXeTiouca xal etc; TOUTO
Ta Spya (80ev etcoOaotv e?ttXyetv TOL^ eu e^ouatv Spyot^; 8Tt ouTe

SaTtv ouTe 7rpoa0etvat, we; TYJC; [Jtev urceppoXYJc; xal TY^C; eXXet^eo)c; 90et-

pouaYjc; T6 e5, TYJC; 8e (xea6TY)TO<; acp^ouoYjc;), et SYJ ot ayaOol Te/viTat, we; Xeyofiev,

Tcpic; TOUTO pX^TOVTec; epya^ovTat, Y] 8e apeTY) 7iao~Y]c; TXVV)<; axpt^eaTepa xal


earTlv woTcep xal Y) 9iiotc;, TOU |JL(TOU av etY) aTOxacrTtxYj. Aeyw Se TYJV
u seeks the
I5 ajjtetvcov
J)0txY)v auTY) yap eaTi Tiepl 7ud0Y] xal 7cpae;etc;, ev Se TOUTOte; SaTtv u7rep(3oXY)
xal SXXet^tc; xal TO (xlaov. Olov xal 9opY]0Y^vat xal OappYJaat xal
PRACTICAL SCIENCES [57l]

xal ipytaOYJvai xat IXeyjaai xal 8X(0 YjaOyjvai xal XurtYjGYJvat, &m xal fxaXXov 20
xal -JJTTOV, xal dfjt^Tepa oux e5, TO 8& free Set xal 69* ol$ xal rcp6<; ou$ xal oS
Ivexa xal a>$ Set, (ji<rov Te xal fipioTov, feep earl T% apeTYjs * 6[io[<o<; Se xal

rcepl TOC<; 7rpaei O*TIV 67cep(3oX:J) xal {XXci<ju xal TO (jilaov. *H 8* apeTY)

xal 7rpa^ei<; I<TT(V, Iv ol<; y) (Jtiv uTceppoX ^ a|iapTaveTat xal


4

7ca0Yj

i, r6 8k piaov iTraweiTat xal xaTop0ouTat rauTa S* 4^90) T


I< $pa ecrTlv ^ apeTY], dTOxaaTtxT] ye oCcra TOU JJI^CTOU. ''ETi, ti (JL^V
x
7toXXa^co<; SCTTLV (Ti yap xaxiv TOU a7te(pou, <*>; oi IluOayipetot
etxa^ov, TO Si; dya6ov TOU TreTrepacfjiivou), TO Se xaTopOouv (jiovax<><; 81630
xal T6 (iv ^Stov TO 84 xaXer:6v, 4o* tov (JL^V TO aTcoTuxetv TOU O-XOTOU,
Sfe TO iTciTuxetv. Kal Sta TauT* o5v TT); fxv xaxLa^ ^ UTteppoX }) xal 73
1

[Jtiv yap a7tX&<;, TcavToSaTtcoc; S^ xaxot 2 . 35

Definition of
moral virtue r
"EaTiv Spa
^
Y)
. . ~ ^
2^K
TCpoaipeTtxV). ev aea6TY)Ti
dpeTY]
ouaa Tyj ?rpo<; yj (A a coptajAevy] X6yct> xal co<; av o 9po-no7a
,
/ / \ c e /

vt[xo<; 6p[aete.Meo-6TYj^ 8k Suo xaxtoJv,T^c pt-^v xa6*


u7cep(3oXy]v T>J^ S^ xaT* IXXei^tv* xal STL TCO Ta<; pt^v eXXebcetv
Ta<; 8k u7cep(3dXXetv TOU S^OVTO^ 2v Te TOI^ TrdOeai xal Iv Tat^ Trpdc^eoi, TV^V 8k
ipeTYjv TO [ilcrov xal eupiaxeiv xal atpetaOau Aio xaTa fxv TTJV ouatav xal T^V 5
X6yov TOV T6 rl ^v elvai X^yovTa [xecr6T7]<; eaTlv Y) apenf], xaTa Se T6 <5piaTOv
xal T^ e

572 This definition applied to the particular virtues.


Eth. Nic. II 7, no7a 33-no8b 10 :

rableofmor-
fjepl ^v o5v ^6pou? xal OdtppYj avSpela [Jieo6TY)<; TCOV S* o7teppaXX6vTcov 6no7b
means V>kv rft d<po(3[a dvcivufjio^(TroXXd laTiv avcovufxa), 6 S* ev T(p 6appeiv u?tep-
S'
between two
p^^v Qpacru?, 6 8k tq> (iev epopetcrOai uTrepjJdXXwv T(p 8^ 6appetv
8etX6<;. Ilepl Y)8ova<; 8^ xal XuTtas ou Tcdaa^, Y^TTOV 8k xal Tcepl Ta<; XuTra^, 5

Yj
8 dxoXaafa. *EXXe(7tovTe<; 8k
5

Yj8ova<; ou TCOCVU ytvovTaf Siircep ouS 6v6(jiaTO(; TeTUXY)xa<ytv ouS^ ot TOIOUTOI,


2crTCoo*av 84 dvato^YjTOt. Ilepl 8e S6atv xp^^aTto^ xal XYJ^IV [Jiea6TYjc jiiviXeu-
8^ xal IXXei^ii; dcrcoTta xal dveXeu6epa. *EvavT(co<; 8* ^v 10
8eptoTY)<;, uTrepjioXy)

auTai; UTueppdXXoucrtv xal iXXetTuoucrtv 6 (*v yap 4aa>TO^ ev (jiiv Tcpo^cret


UTreppdXXet ev 81 X^ei IXXeteet, 6 8^ dveXeuOepo^ iv ptiv XYJ^CI 6rceppdXXet ev
8k 7cpoaei IXXeC^ei. Nuv (x^v ouv TUTTCO xal e?rl xe9aXa[co Xlyofzsv, dpxoufjtevoi

1
See our nr. 42, the table of Pythagorean opposites.
1 A quotation of unknown origin.
[572] ETH. NIC. I-III 149

15 auT& TOUTOJ Gcrrepov Se axpifie'crTepov Trepl auT&v 8iopwy07)creTai. Ilepl 8k TOC


XpintAaTa xal &XXai Sia0aei<; eioi, [jie<r6T7)<; jjiev [jieyaXoTupe>cei,a (6 yap fjieya-

XoTrpeTC7)<; Siacplpci eXeuOepiou 6 [Jiev yap Trepl [jieyaXa, 6 Se Tuepl (juxpa),


*
UTceppoXy] Se aTueipoxaXta xat pavauata, XXeii]si So (juxpoTrpeTteia Swc^epouai
20 S' aSrai TCOV Tcepl TTJV eXeu0epi6T7)Ta, TCJJ
8e Sia^epouarLv, uaTepov p7)07)o-eTat.
Ilepl Se TifXYjv xal ocTifJitav [Aea6T7)<; jjiev (jieyaXo^u/La, OTceppoXv) Se xaovdryjc; TIC;
XeyofJievv), gXXetipic; Se jxtxpo^ux^a ax; S' eXeyo^ev xetv 7rpo<; T/JV [jieyaXo7rp-
25 Tcetav TYJV eXeu0epi6T7jTa, ?repl fjttxpa Sta^epouaav, OUTCO^ e'^et TI^ xal 7rp6<; TTJV

(xeyaXo^uxiav, Trepl TifjLTjv oSaav fjLeyaXyjv, aoTT) Tiepl (jitxpav oScra- SCTTL yap
ax; Set 6pyea0aL TipL9j<; xal (jtaXXov
Set xal 3JTTOV, XeyeTai S' 6 [jiev UTceppaXXcov
YJ

pe^eai 9iXoTt[JLO(;, 6 Se eXXeiTrcav a^t-XoTLfJioc;, 6 8e (jLeaoc; ava)vujjio<;. 'Ava>-


Se xal al Sta0eaet^, TcXYjv 7) TOU 9tXoTt[jLOu 9tXoTt(jtia. "OOev eT
2
ot axpot T7]<; tzla7j<; x^P a ^ t
xa ^ >)H,SL^ Se SCTTI [xev STC TOV f

xaXou[xev SCTTL S' ore a9iX6Ti{JLov, xal Scruv ore [xev ercaivou^ev TOV 9iXoTi[jLOv
8* ore TOV <X9iXoTi[JU>v. Aia Ttva S* atTtav TOUTO 7iotou[Jiev, ev TOLC; e^Tj^

vuv Se Tcepl T<OV XotTraiv Xeya)[zev xaTa TOV u97jyY](jievov Tporcov.


"EaTi Se xal Trepl TYJV opyvjv uTceppoXy) xal eXXei^L^; xal (jtecroTT)^, a^eSov Se
5 avcovu[jLa)v OVTO>V auTtav, TOV [jieaov Trpaov XeyovTec; TTJV {jteaoT7]Ta TcpaoTTjTa
TCOV S' Sxpaw 6 [Jiev uTceppaXXcov opyiXo^ e'crrto, 7) Se xaxta 6p-
6 S' eXXetTTCov aopyTjTOi; TI<;, r)
S' eXXec^^ aopyyjcrta. Etai Se xal
10 &XXai Tpetc; (JLeaoTTjTec;, Sxouaat [Jiev Tiva ofjLotoTYjTa Ttp6<; aXXrjXa^,
S' aXXvjXtov Tcaaat jiev yap etori Tcepl Xoycov xal Tcpa^ecov xoLvcoviav,
Se OTL 7] (Jiev eo~Ti Trepl TO aXyjOe^ TO ev auTotc;, al Se Tuepl TO Y]S\i TOUTOU Se TO

(jiev
ev TcatSta TO S' ev Tuaai TOt^ xaTa TOV PIOV. 'PyjTeov ouv xal Trepl TOUTCOV,
1 5 Eva (JiaXXov xaTiSco^ev STL ev Tra<riv YJ jjieaoTYji; eTtaiveTov, TOC S* axpa OUT'
6p6a OUT* eTcaiveTa aXXa 4>exTa. "EaTi [jiev o5v xal TOUTOOV TOC TrXeia> ava>vu(Jia,
TreipaTeov 8*, cocrTtep xal em TOiv fiXXcov, auToix; 6vo[JiaTOTuoieiv
Svexa xal TOU euTrapaxoXouOvjTou 3 Ilepl fjiev oi5v TO aXYjQed; 6 (Jiev.

20 TK; xal 73 (jieaoTTjc; aX7)Oeia XeylaOco, 7] Se TrpoCTTcoiTjoric; T] (lev STTI TO (Jiec^ov


aXa^oveia xal 6 e^cov auTTjv aXa^cov, TJ Se inl TO e'XaTTOv eipoveia xal etpcov.
Ilepl Si T& TjSu TO [Jiev ev TraiSia 6 [jiev fjieaoi; euTpaTceXo<; xal 7) SiaOeo^Lc; euTpa-
25 TreXta, Se uTceppoXTj ^cofjioXoxta xal 6 e'xtov auTTjv pco[jioX6xo<;, 6 S' eXXetTccov
TJ

aypotxd^ TI? xal 73 e^tc; aypoixta- Tcepl Se TO XOLTCOV 7)Su TO ev TCO (3ico 6 (lev
4
to<; Set TjSix; cov 9(Xo; xal 7) [jiea6T7j^ 9tXta, 6 S* uTreppiXXtov, et (Jiev ouSevcx;

1 - tastelessness.
dc7reipoxaXa
a
7tt8i,xaovTai etc. - the extreme characters lay claim to the middle place.
3
TOO euTrapaxoXouOifjTou (Svexa) - so that we may be easily followed.
4 - amiable.
9^X0?