Posadas v Ombudsman

No. 131492 September 29, Mendoza, J.

2000
Plaintiff/Appellee Defendant/Appellant
Roger Posadas, Rosario Torres-Yu, Ombudsman and Orlando Dizon
Marichu Lambino
RECIT-READY:
Dennis Venturina was a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity and was killed by
another fraternity, Scintilla Juris. Posadas, Lambino, Torres-Yu, and Atty Villamor
(Counsel for the suspects) did not allow the arrest of the suspects (Taparan and
Narag) for the killing of Dennis Venturina. They were charged for violation of P.D.
1829 which makes it unlawful to obstruct the apprehension and the prosecution of
criminal offenders.

They did not violate 1829 because they prevented an illegal arrest of the students.
The reason why they didn’t allow them to arrest the students was because the
police officers did not have any warrant of arrest that time. Even if there are cases
when arrests can be made without a warrant, the officers did not fall under that
exception.
NATURE OF THE CASE:
 Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the
resolution of the Ombudsman for their prosecution
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Dennis Venturina was a member of the Sigma Rho fraternity and was killed by
another frat, Scintilla Juris. NBI officers attempted to arrest the the suspects
Taparan and Narag but was stopped by Posadas, Lambino, Torres-Yu, Atty
Villamor (counsel for the suspects) on the grounds that they did not have warrants
of arrest. Instead they promised to bring the suspects to the NBI office the next
day. The NBI were not able to arrest the 2 suspects that day but criminal charges
were filed against them (the suspects).

The counsels for the suspects were charged for violation of P.D. 1829 which
makes it unlawful to obstruct the apprehension and the prosecution of criminal
offenders.

ISSUES: Ruling
1. Whether a valid arrest could be made without a warrant of arrest NO
2. Whether there is probable cause for prosecuting the counsel for the NO
suspects for violating PD 1829

RULING/RATIONALE:
1. No. There are only 3 exceptions when an arrest could be made without a
warrant of arrest Rule 113 (5)

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

It is no question that A and C do not apply to this circumstances. B also

doesn’t apply since the requires that the act should have just been
committed. In this case, the police tried to arrest the suspects 4 days after
the commission of the crime.

2. No. They did not violate P.D. 1829 since they were trying to prevent an
illegal arrest.

LAWS, STATUTES, CODES INVOLVED:

P.D. 1829-Penalizing the obstruction and apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenders

Rule 113, 5-Rules of Criminal Procedure (When arrests without a warrant of arrest
can be made)
CASES CITED IN CASE:

PEOPLE v TONOG

“It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they
apprehended Accused-appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified
under Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
providing that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an
offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat.
Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts
gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation indicating that
Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.”

In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer
who later noticed the presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon
reaching the police station, the accused was asked to take off his pants for
examination at the crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the
admissibility of the maong pants taken from the accused. It is clear
that Tonog does not apply to this case.First, the accused in that case voluntarily
went with the police upon the latter's invitation. Second, the arresting officer found
blood stains on the pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded that
the accused probably committed the crime for which reason the latter was taken
into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the same day the crime was
committed. In the words of Rule 113, 5(b), the crime had "just been committed" and
the arresting officer had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
to be arrested had committed it."