0 views

Uploaded by Rhys C. Jeremias

harsanyi

- Ch05 Uncertainity and Consumer Behaviour
- Joseph Alois Schumpeter, On the Concept of Social Value
- 38 Proofs III (Mds)
- Www.rff.Org Documents RFF DP 09 19
- ec220_-_ps1
- Introduction, Functions and Drivers
- An Introduction to the Smarandache Geometry
- Spontaneous Economic Order
- Utility
- Happines, Morality and Game Theory
- Chap015ETTO
- Geometry for College Students
- 01-Agricultural Economics Enj
- Issue-Based Work Planning and Hypothesis Problem Solving
- Aaron Consumo
- Rational numbers
- Consumption System Review
- Math So Hard Redux
- Wilkinson Bayes Theory
- Concepts and Theory in Political Science

You are on page 1of 7

Author(s): John C. Harsanyi

Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the

Ninetieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1978), pp. 223-228

Published by: American Economic Association

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1816692 .

Accessed: 14/08/2013 02:36

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The

American Economic Review.

http://www.jstor.org

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics

By JOHN C. HARSANYI*

One of the great intellectual achievements similar economic and noneconomic vari-

of the twentieth century is the Bayesian ables affecting other individuals in the

theory of rational behavior under risk and society. Thus, mathematically, any situation

uncertainty. Many economists, however, are can be regarded as a point in a finite-dimen-

still unaware of how strong the case really is sional (say, r-dimensional) Euclidean space

for Bayesian theory, and many more fail to E'r

appreciate the far-reaching implications the In the case of risk and of uncertainty, an

Bayesian concept of rationality has for individual's choices can be modeled as

ethics and welfare economics. The purpose choices among different lotteries whose

of this paper is to argue that the Bayesian "prizes" are situations, that is, points in E'.

rationality postulates are absolutely ines- A lottery can be described as

capable criteria of rationality for policy de- L = (AI I|el . ** Ak I ek, . AK

(1) I eK)

cisions; and to point out that these Bayesian

rationality postulates, together with a indicating that this lottery L will yield

hardly controversial Pareto optimality re- prizes A1... AK, depending on which one

quirement, entail utilitarian ethics as a mat- of K mutually exclusive and exhaustive

ter of mathematical necessity. events el, ... eK occurs. These events el,

* . eK will be called conditioning events.

1. The BayesianRationalityPostulates Mathematically, any event ek (k = 1 ... ,

K) can be regarded as a measurable subset

In discussing the criteria for rational be- of the space S2of all possible "states of the

havior, I will distinguish behavior under world." A lottery L will be called a risky or

certainty, under risk, and under uncer- an uncertain lottery, depending on whether

tainty. Certainty obtains when we can pre- the decision maker does or does not know

dict the actual outcome of any action we the objective probability Pk = Prob (ek)

can take. Risk obtains when we know at associated with every event ek (k = 1.

least the objective probabilities associated K) used in this lottery L.

with alternative possible outcomes. Finally, In analyzing the behavior of any indi-

uncertainty obtains when even these ob- vidual i (i = 1 ... n), strict preference by

jective probabilities are partly or wholly him will be denoted by >i and nonstrict

unknown to us (or are possibly even unde- preference including indifference, or equiv-

fined). alence, by >?i

In the case of certainty, I will assume that Rational behavior by a given individual i

each individual chooses among various under certainty can be characterized by two

alternative situations, where each situation rationality postulates:

is characterized by finitely many economic 1. Complete preordering. The nonstrict

and noneconomic variables, such as his preferences of this individual i establish a

holdings of different commodities, includ- complete preordering over the space E' of

ing money, his health, his social position, all possible situations (or over some suitable

his social relationships, etc., as well as by closed subset of Er).

2. Continuity. Suppose that the sequence

*Professor of business administration and of eco- Al, A2 ... . of situations converges to a

nomics, University of California-Berkeley. I wish to particular situation AO, and that another

thank the National Science Foundation for supporting sequence B1, B2 .. - of situations con-

this research through grant SOC77-06394 to the Center

for Research in Management Science, University of verges to Bo, with Ak >i Bk for all k. Then,

California-Berkeley. AO >i BO.

223

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

224 AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION MA Y 1978

For convenience I will call these two pos- 4. Sure-thing principle. Suppose that

tulates the basic utility axioms. Using these A* >i Ak fork = 1, ...,K. Then

two axioms, we can characterize rational

behavior as follows. (4) (A* Iel,..,AK eK)

THEOREM 1: Utility Maximization. If an In other words, other things being equal, a

individual'spreferences satisfy the two basic rational individual will not prefer a lottery

utility axioms, then his behavior will be equiv- yielding less desirable prizes over a lottery

alent to maximizing a well-defined (ordinal) yielding more desirable prizes. Note that

utility function.' (For proof, see Gerard the sure-thing principle is essentially identi-

Debreu, pp. 55-59.) cal with the game-theoretical principle that

a rational individual will avoid using any

To characterize rational behavior under (weakly or strongly) dominated strategy.

risk and under uncertainty, we need two Obviously, both postulates 3 and 4 are

additional rationality postulates: extremely compelling rationality require-

3. Probabilistic equivalence. Let ments. But they are subject to two qualifica-

L tions.

(2) = (AI eI ... SAK I eK)

(i) Both postulates presuppose that the

and utility U(A4k) of any prize Ak iS independent

of its conditioning event ek. This require-

L* = (A e

... AKe) ment can always be satisfied by suitable

and suppose that the decision maker knows definition of the prizes. For example, the

the objective probabilities associated with utility of an umbrella depends on whether

events e, . eK as well as with events it is raining or not (and whether there is a

e* ... IeK and knows that these probabili- heavy rain or a light rain). Therefore, it

ties satisfy would be inappropriate to make an um-

brella a prize of a lottery when the nature of

(3) Prob(ek) = Prob(e,*) the weather is the conditioning event;

for k = 1 . . . K rather, we must redefine the prize as staying

dry, or as getting slightly wet, or as getting

Then he will be indifferent between lotteries very wet since, as a rule, the utilities asso-

L and L*. ciated with these prizes can be assessed

In other words, a rational individual will without knowing the weather, etc.

be indifferent between two risky lotteries if (ii) More importantly, both postulates

these yield him the same prizes with the (and especially postulate 3) presuppose that

same probabilities even if the two lotteries the decision maker has no specific utility or

use quite different physical processes to gen- disutility for gambling as such, that is, for

erate these possibilities. Note that this pos- the nervous tension and the other psycho-

tulate implies von Neumann and Morgen- logical experiences directly connected with

stern's postulate on compound lotteries: gambling. In other words, the -two postu-

that a rational individual will be in- lates assume that the decision maker will

different between a two-stage lottery and a take a purely result-oriented attitude toward

one-stage lottery if both offer the same lotteries, and will derive all his utility and

prizes with the same probabilities. disutility from the prizes he may or may not

win through these lotteries, rather than

IFor some purposes it may be desirable to define from the act of gambling itself.

rational behavior without requiring that it should sat- Clearly, this assumption is seldom, if

isfy the continuity postulate (postulate 2). It can be

shown that if a given individual's preferences satisfy at

ever, satisfied in the case of gambling done

least the complete preordering postulate (postulate 1), primarily for entertainment. For example,

then his behavior will be equivalent to lexicographi- people who gamble in a casino will usually

cally maximizing a certain utility vector. do this because they are attracted by the

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

VOL 68 NO. 2 ECONOMICS AND ETHICS 225

nervous tension associated with gambling; ever, that for deriving the theorem, all we

and since the latter may strongly depend on need, apart from the two basic probability

the details of the physical process used to axioms, are the probabilistic equivalence

produce the relevant probabilities, they may postulate and the sure-thing principle, both

be far from indifferent to the nature of this of which represent absolutely compelling

physical process. (For example, they may rationality requirements for serious policy

not at all be indifferent between participat- decisions.

ing in a one-stage lottery and participating

in a probabilistically equivalent two-stage THEOREM 2: Expected-Utility. If an indi-

lottery.) vidual'spreferences satisfy postulates 1, 2, 3,

On the other hand, it is natural to expect and 4, then he will have a (cardinal) utility

that, in making important policy decisions, function Ui such that assigns, to any lottery L

responsible decision makers will take a re- ofform (1), a utility equal to its expected

sult-oriented attitude toward risk taking. utility, that is, equal to the quantity

This is probably a reasonably realistic de-

scriptive prediction; and it is certainly an K

obvious normative rationality requirement (5) Ui(L) = EPk Ui(Ak

as well as a moral requirement: responsible k= I

business executives using their shareholders'

money, and responsible political leaders where Pk (k - 1,...,K) is the probability

acting on behalf of their constituents, are associated with the conditioning event ek.

expected to do their utmost to achieve the More specifically, if L is a risky lottery, then

best possible results, rather than to gratify Pk must be interpreted as the objective prob-

their own personal desire for nervous ten- ability Pk = Prob(ek) of this event ek,

sion (or for avoiding nervous tension). Even whereas if L is an uncertain lottery, then Pk

clearer is the obligation of taking a purely must be interpreted as the subjective prob-

result-oriented attitude in making impor- ability Pk = Prob,*(ek) that the decision

tant moral decisions. maker chooses to assign to this event ek.

Thus, we can conclude that while postu-

lates 3 and 4 have little application to gam- Property (5) is called the expected-utility

bling done for entertainment, they are very property, and any utility function Ui pos-

basic rationality requirements for all serious sessing this property is called a von Neu-

policy decisions as well as for personal mann-Morgenstern utility function. For

moral decisions. short reference, I will call postulates 1, 2, 3,

and 4 the Bayesian rationality postulates.4

11. Expected-UtilityMaximization

The main conclusion of Bayesian theory will consistently act on the opinion that some events

is that a rational decision maker under risk are more likely to occur than not to occur, while other

events are more likely not to occur than to occur). In

and under uncertainty will act in such a way my own view, consistency in the use of qualitative or

as to maximize his expected utility; or, quantitative subjective probabilities should not be

equivalently, that he will assess the utility of assumed as an axiom, but rather should be inferred

any lottery to him as being equal to its ex- from some more basic-- and, one may hope, more

pected utility (expected-utility theorem). compelling---axioms. This is the approach taken by

F. J. Anscombe and Robert J. Aumann.

Different authors have used different 30wing to space limitations, the proof has been

axioms to derive this theorem, and some of omitted. But see my working paper.

these axioms had somewhat questionable 4As M. Hausner has shown, we can obtain a weaker

intuitive plausibility.2 It can be shown, how- form of the expected-utility theorem without using

postulate 2: it an individual's preferences satisfy at

2For example, Leonard Savagc's Postulate 4 directly least postulates 1, 3, and 4, then his behavior will be

assumcs that the decision makcr will act on the basis equivalent to lexicographically maximizing the ex-

of consistent qualitative subjective probabilities (i.e., he pected value of a certain utility vector.

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

226 AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION MAY 1978

for Utilitarian Morality viduals' utility functions. I will assume that

society consists of n individuals. Consider

Now I propose to show that the Bayesian the social welfare function of individual j.

rationality postulates, together with a very The following three axioms will be used:

natural Pareto optimality requirement, log- Axiom a: Individual rationality. The

ically entail a utilitarian ethic. personal preferences of all n individuals sat-

According to Theorems I and 2, the be- isfy the four Bayesian rationality postulates.

havior of a rational individual i (i = 1 . . . , Axiom b. Rationality of moral prefer-

n) would be equivalent to that resulting ences. The moral preferences of individual j

from the maximization of the expected satisfy the four Bayesian rationality postu-

value of some cardinal utility function Ui lates.

expressing his personal preferences. In the Axiom c. Pareto optimality. Suppose

case of most individuals, these personal that at least one of the n individuals person-

preferences will not be completely selfish; ally prefers social situation A over social

but usually they will give greater weight to situation B, and that none of the other indi-

his own personal interests and to the in- viduals personally prefers B over A. Then,

terests of his family, friends, and other asso- individualj will morally prefer A over B.

ciates, than to the interests of complete Axiom a is an obvious rationality re-

strangers. quirement. So is Axiom b: it expresses the

Yet, there are situations where an indi- principle that an individual making a moral

vidual's behavior will not be guided by his value judgment must follow, if possible,

more or less self-centered personal prefer- even higher standards of rationality than

ences, but rather will be guided by much an individual merely pursuing his personal

more impartial and impersonal criteria. We interests. Thus, if rationality requires that

expect that judges and other public officials each individual should follow the Bayesian

will be guided in their official capacities by rationality postulates in his personal life as

some notions of public interest and of im- postulate I asserts, then he must even more

partial justice; and, more importantly, every persistently follow these rationality postu-

individual will have to be guided by certain lates when he is making moral value judg-

impartial and impersonal criteria when he is ments.5 While Axioms a and b are rational-

trying to make a moral value judgment. In- ity requirements, Axiom c is a moral

deed, by definition, any evaluative judg- principle-but it is surely a rather noncon-

ment based on biased, partial, and personal troversial moral principle.

criteria will not be a moral value judgment In view of Theorem 2, Axiom a implies

at all, but rather will be a mere judgment of that the personal preferences of each indi-

personal preference. vidual i can be represented by a von Neu-

I will describe the criteria guiding an indi- mann-Morgenstern (vN-M) utility function

vidual when he is honestly trying to make Ui, whereas Axiom b implies that the moral

an impartial and impersonal moral value preferences of individual j can be repre-

judgment as this individual's moral prefer- sented by a social welfare function Wjwhich

ences. likewise has the nature of a vN-M utility

In view of Theorems I and 2, if the moral function. Finally, the three axioms together

preferences of an individual i satisfy certain imply the following theorem.

consistency requirements, then his moral

value judgments will be such as if he tried to THEOREM 3: Linearity of the social wel-

maximize a special utility function ex-

pressing these moral preferences. This util-

ity function will be called his social welfare 5Axiom b, and, in particular, the assumption that

people's moral preferences should satisfy the sure-

function Wi. thing principle, was criticized by Peter Diamond. As I

I now propose to show that a rational have tried to show in my 1975 paper, his criticism is

individual's social welfare function must be invalid.

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

VOL. 68 NO. 2 ECONOMICS AND ETHICS 227

of individualj must be a real-valued function commitments,then we can obtain a some-

over all social situations A, and must have the what stronger form of Theorem 3 (to the

mathematicalform effect that the social welfare function must

n be the arithmetic mean of all individual

(6) Wj(A) = ai Ui(A) utilities). What is more important, we can

achieve deeper philosophical insights into

with caistrictly positive f(r i = 1, . . n the nature of moral value judgments.

I have argued that moral value judgments

For the proof, see the author (1955, pp. must be based on impartial and impersonal

313-14).6 criteria. Now I propose to give a more spe-

Note that the proof of Theorem 3 does cific formal definition for this requirement

not assume the possibility of interpersonal of impartiality and of impersonality.

utility comparisons. The theorem will re- Suppose individual j expresses a value

main valid even if such comparisons are not judgment about the relative merits of one

admitted. Of course, if such comparisons possible social situation A as against an-

are ruled out, then the coefficients ai will other possible social situation B. How do

have to be based completely on individual we know whether he expresses a genuine

j's personal-and more or less arbitrary- moral value judgment, based on impartial

value judgments. and impersonal considerations? He would

On the other hand, if interpersonal utility certainly satisfy our impartiality and im-

comparisons (or at least interpersonal com- personality requirements if he did not know

parisons of utility differences) are admitted, how his choice between A and B would af-

then our three axioms can be supplemented fect him personally and, in particular, if he

by a fourth axiom: did not know what his own social position

Axiom d. Equal treatment of all indi- would be in situations A and B. More spe-

viduals. Individual j's social welfare func- cifically, let us assume he would think that

tion Wjwill assign equal weights to the util- in either situation he would have the same

ity functions Ul, . . . , Unof the n individuals probability I/n to occupy any one of the n

when these utility functions are expressed in possible social positions and,indeed,to be

equal utility units. put in the place of any one of the n indi-

Using this axiom, we can infer that in (6) viduals in the society. Then, he would

we must have clearly satisfy the impartiality and imper-

sonality requirements to the fullest possible

(7) a, an degree. I will call this assumption the equi-

probability model of moral value judg-

IV. The Equiprobability Model for ments.

Moral Value Judgments Obviously, this equiprobability model

cannot be taken literally. When individual j

The axiomatic analysis of Section III has makes a value judgment as to the relative

the advantage that it uses only extremely merits of situations A and B,he will often

weak philosophical assumptions: it derives have quite a good idea of the actual social

utilitarian ethics from two rationality re- position he would have in each situation;

quirements and one very natural moral re- and he will certainly know his own personal

quirement. However, if we are willing to identity. Nevertheless, his judgment as to

the relative merits of situations A and B will

61n view of Hausner's results, a weaker form of qualify as a genuine moral value judgment

Theorem 3 will remain true even if, in Axioms a and b, as long as he at least makes a serious at-

we redefine the Bayesian rationality postulates so as to tempt to disregard these morally irrelevant

omit postulate 2 (the continuity postulate). In this case

both the quantities Ui and the quantity W1will have to pieces of information in making this judg-

be reinterpreted as lexicographically ordered utility ment.

vectors. If we apply Theorem 2 to this equiprob-

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

228 A ME'RICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIA TION MA Y 1978

ability model, then we obtain the following tween Bayesian theory and utilitarian moral-

theorem. ity becomes even more obvious (Theorem 4).

as an arithmetic mean of all individual utili- REFERENCES

ties. Suppose that individual j follows the

Bayesian rationality postulates. Then, under F. J. Anscombe and R. J. Aumann, "A Defini-

the equiprobability model, he will make his tion of Subjective Probability," Annals

moral value judgments in such a way as to Math. Statist., Mar. 1963, 34, 199-205.

maximize the social weljare fitic tion: Gerard Debreu, Theory of Value, New York

1959.

n

P. Diamond, "Cardinal Welfare, Individual-

(8) Wj(A) = - E Ui(A) istic Ethics, and Interpersonal Compari-

son of Utility: Comment," J. Polit. Econ.,

The theorem follows from the fact that Oct. 1967, 75, 765--66.

under the equiprobability model, j's ex- J. C. Harsanyi, "Cardinal Welfare, Indi-

pected utility will be given by the right-hand vidualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal

member of (8). Comparisons of Utility," J. Polit. Econ.,

Unlike Theorem 3, Theorem 4, as well as Aug. 1955, 63, 309-21.

the equiprobability model itself, does pre- , Nonlinear Social Welfare Func-

suppose the possibility of interpersonal tions," Theory Decn., 1975, 6, 311-32.

comparisons of utility differences (utility in- ,(1977a) "Morality and the Theory

crements). of Rational Behavior," Soc. Res., Winter

To sum up, we have found that the 1977, 44, 623- 56.

Bayesian rationality postulates, together , (1977b) "Bayesian Decision The-

with a Pareto optimality requirement, logi- ory," work. paper no. CP-404, Center

cally entail utilitarian ethics (Theorem 3)- Res. Manage. Sci., Univ. California-

even if interpersonal utility comparisons are Berkeley 1977.

not admitted. But, in actual fact, as I have M. Hausner, "Multidimensional Utilities,"

tried to show elsewhere (see the author, in Robert M. Thrall et al., eds., Decision

1977a), there are no valid arguments against Processes, New York 1954, 167-80.

such comparisons. Yet, once such compari- LeonardJ. Savage, The Foundations of Statis-

sons are admitted, the logical connection be- tics, Ncw York 1954.

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

- Ch05 Uncertainity and Consumer BehaviourUploaded bySudhir Patel
- Joseph Alois Schumpeter, On the Concept of Social ValueUploaded byOikos Venezuela
- 38 Proofs III (Mds)Uploaded bySrinivas Vamsi
- Www.rff.Org Documents RFF DP 09 19Uploaded byKetaki Dalal
- ec220_-_ps1Uploaded bysenteli
- Introduction, Functions and DriversUploaded byprabu06051984
- An Introduction to the Smarandache GeometryUploaded byAnonymous 0U9j6BLllB
- Spontaneous Economic OrderUploaded byZFisher
- UtilityUploaded byKazu Yoshinaga
- Happines, Morality and Game TheoryUploaded byFelipe Proença
- Chap015ETTOUploaded byjologs
- Geometry for College StudentsUploaded bybrr
- 01-Agricultural Economics EnjUploaded byIssac Ebbu
- Issue-Based Work Planning and Hypothesis Problem SolvingUploaded bySTRATICX
- Aaron ConsumoUploaded bySteven Chigne Angulo
- Rational numbersUploaded byVIGNESH L R
- Consumption System ReviewUploaded bykinhtetaichinh
- Math So Hard ReduxUploaded by1234josephnguyen
- Wilkinson Bayes TheoryUploaded byKosKal89
- Concepts and Theory in Political ScienceUploaded byGarcia
- 1308.4526v3.pdfUploaded byJoey Wolf
- IJAIEM-2015-11-03-2.pdfUploaded byeditorijaiem
- Assignment for Micro 2_2019Uploaded byRinaYanti
- Assignment 1.docUploaded byramizul
- Non Euclidean GeometryUploaded byGeorge Tsavd
- University of Windsor 62-190 Axioms of the Real NumbersUploaded byTaylor Tracey Kyryliuk
- 2008 Ross - Ontic structural realism and economics.pdfUploaded byEsteban Leiva Troncoso

- 831740994 Rad Bfc 0 dUploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- c10d5_probitUploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- optimizaciondinamicayteoriaeconomica-161012152602.pdfUploaded byraul
- Aportes y RecomendacionesUploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- Libro1Uploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- Libro1Uploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- xdUploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- CIAUploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- Mundial Brasil 2014 - V2.0Uploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- Libro1Uploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- sintesis-arequipa-12-2013Uploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- Stata GuideUploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- grabacion 3y4.docxUploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- grabacion 3y4.docxUploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- Múltiplo de 6Uploaded byRhys C. Jeremias
- 578236990Uploaded byRhys C. Jeremias

- Forecast 2Uploaded bySansar Birman
- phy10OCBsyllabusUploaded byJohn Luke Cruz
- Company Onganogram and PersonnelUploaded byrose123654
- m.tech CadcamUploaded bysat
- MIME 1650 Report RequirementsUploaded byfreeziy
- tmp198D.tmpUploaded byFrontiers
- Pocket-Version-Programme.pdfUploaded byagggela
- Stangor2_1-TIF-Ch01Uploaded byChinonso Ahuna
- 01 Introduction to Research.ppt [Compatibility Mode]Uploaded byJiun Qing Tan
- Phases of Clin TrialUploaded byPraneeth Sanjeev Reddy
- Universal Design Revisited. A Methodological Extension for SustainabilityUploaded byno name
- Summary on Evidence Based PracticeUploaded byteena17
- chapter 1.pptUploaded byAtoy Liby Ojeñar
- Beautiful TreeUploaded byBhadraKaali
- Introduction to sociologyUploaded byconvey2vino
- Undergraduate Nursing Students’ Attitudes and Use of Research AndUploaded bySri Wahyuni Yk
- [Bellack a.S., Hersen M. (Eds.)] Comprehensive Cli(BookFi)Uploaded byAnonymous VrqSuXu
- (Comparative Territorial Politics) Arjan H. Schakel (eds.)-Regional and National Elections in Eastern Europe_ Territoriality of the Vote in Ten Countries-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2017).pdfUploaded byDomnProfessor
- JojinUploaded byBogdan Lupu
- Charles Greenwood Et Al. - Ecobehavioral Analysis in the Classroom. Review and ImplicationsUploaded byIrving A. Pérez Méndez
- 12 HBEC2203 T8Uploaded bysiti umminor
- arts integration in math and scienceUploaded byapi-239517962
- L3a-TypesofResearchListUploaded byJulieSanchezErsando
- UMD College of Agriculture and Natural Resources ViewbookUploaded byAnonymous t78iYQcH
- Alfaro_Psicologí Comunitaria y Políticas Sociales_Institucionalidad y Dinámica de ActoresUploaded byAndrea Sosa
- Andrea Bennett-Design Studies_ Theory and Research in Graphic Design-Princeton Architectural Press (2006)Uploaded byRasha Kamal
- ACT_Test_2014-15Uploaded bynotyouravguplo876
- Harmonized Random Numbers 9Uploaded byvagalboomer
- 9700_y15_syUploaded byFarhad Ali
- Growth Versus Scientific Collaboration in the FieldUploaded byM Muthukrishnan