Legal Ethics Review Cases

A.M. No.
RTJ-92-802 July 5, 1993

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
HON. GENARO C. GINES, as Presiding Judge, Branch 26; MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES, Court
Interpreter and Officer-in-Charge, Branch 26; ROSIE M. MUNAR, Stenographic Reporter, Branch 26,
PACITA B. DIAZ, Staff Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court; MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ, Staff
Assistant I, Branch 26, and ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR., Staff Assistant II, Branch 26, all of the
RTC, San Fernando, La Union, respondents.
2.1. From April 3, 1989 to April, 1991, there were forty-four (44) Special Proceedings cases, twenty-seven
(27) Land Registration cases, six (6) Civil Cases, and three (3) Criminal Cases which were directly assigned
to the RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, without passing through the mandatory, raffling
procedure, of cases except for three (3) special proceedings cases which were assigned to Branch 27, which
anomaly had been going on since 1986;
2.2. Pacita Diaz, Ma. Concepcion Diaz and Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. were the court employees in-charge in
(sic) the receiving and docketing of the Land Registration Cases, Special Proceedings cases and Civil Cases,
respectively; and
2.3. There is a probability that the aforesaid clerks, who were in-charge of receiving the cases, did not
submit deliberately to the Officer-in-Charge, some of the cases received from mandatory raffling in
compliance with the Administrative Orders/Circulars of the Supreme Court.
3. In the Affidavit-Complaint dated September 19, 1991, of Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz, which was received by
the Office of the Court Administrator on September 20,1991, she asserted, inter alia, that:
3.1. She blamed Judge Genaro C. Gines, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, Ma.
Gorgonia Flores, Court Interpreter and Officer-In-Charge, same Court, and Rosie Munar, Stenographic
Reporter, same Court, for applying pressures and intimidations to her in order that the cases of their choice
may no longer be forwarded to the proper Officer-in-Charge;
3.2. Several petitions have been prepared by the (sic) Judge Gines himself in coordination with his
Stenographer Rosie Munar and Court Interpreter Ma. Gorgonia Flores.
Justice De Pano, Jr. then made the following observations, findings and conclusions in his REPORT:
Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon of the San Fernando, La Union Regional Trial Court, in
a letter dated June 20, 1991, transmitted to the Court, the report dated June 17, 1991, of
Attorney Aurora Sanglay, the said Court's Clerk of Court, on the subject of cases that had
not been raffled by the appropriate committee on raffle but which nevertheless, found their
way mostly, to Branch 26 of the said Court (presided over by respondent Genaro Gines
from January 1987) and Branch 27 (the letter and its annexes were later marked Exhibit B).
In 1986, the report states, 6 criminal cases, 9 civil cases, 51 special proceeding cases and 9
land registration cases, (a total of 75 cases) did not pass through the raffle committee but
went directly to the branch which apparently acted on the cases without question. In 1987,
8 criminal cases, 9 civil cases, 13 special proceedings cases, 2 land registration cases (a total
of 32 cases) did not pass through the raffle committee. In 1988, 9 civil cases, 18 special
proceedings cases and 2 land registration cases (a total of 29 cases) went directly to the
branches mentioned. A total of 136 cases from 1986 to 1988, Attorney Sanglay reports, went
from filing/docketing direct to two branches without undergoing the mandated raffle by
the raffle committee.
The more germane report, one which demonstrates the continuing perpetuation of the
above obviously illegal and nefarious system of directing cases filed with the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union to Branches 26 and 27 of that court, is the undated
report of Clerk of Court Aurora P. Sanglay to Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon, and
received by his office on June 6, 1991. The letter, uncontroverted, is marked Exhibit A,
Court Administrator, and it reads thus:
In compliance to (sic) your memorandum dated May 23, 1991, directing
the undersigned to make an investigation re the matter of cases filed
before my office (Office of the Clerk of Court), which did not undergo the
mandatory raffle procedure, herewith are my findings:
The period covered by my investigation is from April 3, 1989 to April 1991.
In summary, during this period, there were FORTY-FOUR (44) Special
Cases, TWENTY-SEVEN (27) Land Registration Cases, SIX (6) Civil Cases,
and THREE (3) Criminal Cases which did not pass through raffle, but
which were instead directed to specific RTC Branches, particularly Branch
26 and Branch 27. A great majority of these cases however were assigned
to Branch 26.
Attached is the list of these cases mentioned for your reference. This data
obtained (sic) by counterchecking the Minutes of previous raffles covering
the period of my investigation vis-a-vis the corresponding docket books.
Until your memorandum dated May 24, 1991, the following persons were
in-charge of receiving and docketing the following kinds of cases:
Mrs. Pacita Diaz — Land Registration Cases
Miss Ma. Concepcion Diaz — Special Proceedings Cases
Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana — Civil Cases
Criminal Cases were docketed by Mr. Vicente Tatunay of the Prosecutor's
Office and received by either Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., the person
handling all cases filed for raffle, or Mr. Oscarlito Fantastico or any of the
clerks in the OCC, in his absence.
Supposed to be, all these filed cases are to be turned over to Mr. Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr. for raffle, but as per my findings, some of these cases were
not at all included in the mandatory raffle, but were instead directed to
specific RTC Branches. The possibility is not remote that these clerks in-
charge of receiving their respective cases deliberately did not submit some
of their received cases for raffle.
A lapse in the system and poor monitoring also provided for this thing to
happen. Instances are common where a client/lawyer is allowed
possession of the papers to be filed at certain critical stages of the receiving
process, specifically after the docketing and payment of filing fees, and
after said stages, the possibility is not likewise remote that these papers
are not submitted to the person in-charge of the raffle.
The undersigned had already instituted procedures, i.e. centralized
receiving, payment of filing fees, docketing, and has strengthen (sic)
monitoring of the cases and the number of cases filed to prevent
occurrence (sic) of similar nature. (Exhibit A, Court Administrator, pp. 76-
77, rec., 3rd Folder.)
Clerk of Court Sanglay's report includes 44 special proceedings cases, 27 land registration
cases, 6 civil cases and 3 criminal cases or a total of 80 cases that did not pass through raffle
from April, 1989 to April, 1991 but found their way directly to Branches 26 and 27 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La union. Of these 80 cases, all, except 3, found their
way to Branch 26, occupied by respondent Judge Genaro Gines who, as he admits, was
assigned in (sic) that branch since January, 1987.
The respondents here are Judge Genaro Gines, the incumbent presiding judge of Branch
26 of the RTC in Judicial Region No. 1 based in San Fernando, La Union; Pacita Diaz, a staff
member in that court now retired in the period covered by the Sanglay report, in charge of
filing and docketing of land registration cases; Pacita Diaz's daughter, Ma. Concepcion
Diaz, another staff member in Branch 26, during the period covered by the Sanglay report,
the clerk in charge of the filing and docketing of special proceedings cases; Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr., in the period covered by the Sanglay report the clerk in-charge of the filing
and docketing of civil cases; Rosie Munar, court stenographic reporter; and Ma. Gorgonia
Flores, court interpreter and the Officer-in-Charge of Branch 26. Francisco Lacsamana, Jr.,
additionally, was assigned to gather all cases filed and docketed in the week — civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land — one day before the weekly raffle, and to transmit
these newly filed cases to the Committee on Raffle. Ma. Gorgonia Flores, Officer-in-Charge
of Branch 26, oversees the administrative machinery of Branch 26 (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., September
28, 1992).
The respondents felt that since the Court Administrator limited himself to the sworn
statement and report of Clerk of Court Attorney Aurora Sanglay, they were not called
upon to present evidence in their behalf as it would amount to self-incrimination. They
refused to testify; they refused to be cross-examined. Your investigator informs the Court
that the Sanglay affidavit and report are uncontroverted. Admissions in the sworn
statements forming part of the record are utilized in this report in addition to the stipulated
facts.
The respondents are charged in the administrative complaint:
(1) for dishonesty, in violation of paragraph (e), section 3 of Republic Act
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended;
(2) for violation of Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30, 1975;
(3) for violation of Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974; and
(4) for violation of Administrative Order No. 1, dated January 28, 1988.
The last three, Supreme Court issues, have to do with the creation of a raffle committee in
multi-branch Regional Trial Courts, with supervision of the raffle of newly-filled cases;
with the manner of raffling cases, and establish the policy that no case, in multi-branch
trial courts, may be assigned to any branch or sala unless it had undergone the raffle
process.
Supreme Court Circular No. 7, September 23, 1974 mandates that in courts with several
branches, cases shall be assigned to the different branches only by raffle. "No case may be
assigned to any branch without being raffled." (Part I) And immediately after raffle, the
Executive Judge is mandated by the said Circular to indicate the particular branch to which
the case is raffled, "the same to be written in words and in figures on the cover of the Rollo and
on the first page of the original complaint or information and initialled by the Executive Judge and
the two other officers who attended said raffle." (Part III). The same circular created a raffle
committee of three, composed of the Executive Judge and two other judges of the court.
The Executive Judge, supervises the Raffle. Administrative Circular No. 1, (January 28,
1988) reiterates strict compliance with Administrative Order No. 6 (June 30, 1975) and
Circular No. 7 (September 23, 1974 Raffle of cases, this later Circular required, must be "in
open session in the presence of lawyers and spectators . . . . ." (Section 8.1). The Court in
this later Circular restated the res ipso loquitor (sic) rule regarding the conduct and removal
of judges (Section 5.2).
It is therefore, beyond cavil, that under the rules governing the administration of courts,
all cases filed in court must go through the raffle committee for assignment. No case must
be assigned, in multi-branch courts, unless it is raffled by the Raffle Committee. The 80
cases involved in this case, filed from April 1989 to April 1991, were not raffled, but were
directly assigned to, or taken by, Branch 26 (except 3) under respondent Judge Gines.
Respondent Judge Gines must know, under the above Supreme Court acts, at a simple
glance on the cover of the rollo and the first page of every such record, whether a case was
assigned to him after going through raffle or not. Cases assigned to his branch, after going
through the required raffle, show on the face of the rollo, in words and in figures, the
branch to which the case is assigned, authenticated by the initials of the Executive Judge
and the two other members of the Committee. From January 1987, when respondent Judge
Gines was appointed to Branch 26, the respondent judge had received unraffled cases,
considered them and decided them. He had done so, apparently, not because he was a
maniac of a worker, nor because he loved his work but for reasons unspoken in this case.
Why should a sane judge accept additional cases for study and decision, in addition to his
regular load, without any benefit or consideration? Here obviously, the res ipso loquitor(sic)
doctrine applies.
Among the administrative officers charged here, Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., as stipulated,
gathers all the cases filed and docketed in any particular week, for transmittal to the
Committee on Raffle. He prepared the cases for raffle, including the preparation of the
pieces of paper properly written on, to be picked in the raffle. It was his job to do so. He
was assigned to do so; he admitted so. That he did not do so is obvious from the Sanglay
Report — from 1989 to 1991, he failed to transmit 80 cases — and these cases found their
way (except for 3) to respondent Judge Gines. The Sanglay report is not controverted. It
was Lacsamana's job to collect all cases docketed, and to transmit them to the Raffle
Committee. 80 such cases he did collect and failed to report to the Raffle Committee from
April, 1989 to April, 1991.
The Diazes, in the period covered by the Sanglay report had apparently fallen out with
respondent Judge Gines and respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana. In an affidavit
dated September 18, 1991 executed by respondent Ma. Concepcion Diaz, the following
passages appear, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The conflict between the Diazes and the other respondents deem (sic) to have arisen from
the suspicion the respondent Judge entertained that the Diazes had 'squealed' on him to
the Executive Judge, the Honorable Braulio Yaranon. This is contained in the Diazes Joint
Affidavit dated September 9, 1992 (Marked C-Diaz), in the following passage:
xxx xxx xxx
As to the two other respondents, respondents Ma. Gorgonia Flores, who is officer-in-
charge of Branch 26 and Rosie Munar, court interpreter, there appears to be no evidence.
The record shows that when the Court Administrator's lawyers rested their case with the
presentation of the Sanglay report, the respondents refused to be cross-examined on their
sworn statements. Consequently, each sworn statement lost value as evidence against the
other respondents. However, it may be easily inferred that as court officer-in-charge,
respondent Flores was in (sic)-duty bound to supervise the work of her subalterns. The
non-raffling of 80 cases during the period covered from April, 1989 to April 1991 reflects
her failure to do her job.
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court orders and circulars complained of as having been violated, are
directed to district judges, while Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 is inclusive in scope,
penalizing public officers for causing undue injury to any party . . . . or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative a (sic) judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. . . .
The prosecution had limited itself to presenting the Sanglay report. It is apparent that we
must take the Diazes' statement that they were pressured to do that which they had to do,
and whatever it was, was done without consent, and against their will. However, under
the facts here, all the cases filed docketed in Branch 26 were collected by respondent
Lacsamana, Jr., who was in (sic) duty bound to forward the cases to the Raffle Committee.
That 80 such cases did not find their way to the Committee, but ended up as 80 extra cases
(except 3) in the docket load of the respondent judge, means at the very least that
Lacsamana, Jr., failed to perform his job. The respondent judge in accepting or securing,
such 80 cases, (minus 3) that did not pass through raffle, for his action and resolution, and
which he eventually resolved violated all the Supreme Court circulars on the matter with
the help and cooperation of respondent Lacsamana, Jr. Evidently, respondent judge must
have received undue benefits and advantages (which have not been demonstrated in this
case) in securing this extra load of cases, benefits and advantages coming from the party
benefited (sic) by his action, and at the same time, granted the parties involved in the some
(sic) 80 cases that did not undergo raffle, undue and unwarranted benefits resulting from
the bias and partiality in their favor coming from the respondent judge. As earlier
observed, a single glance at the cover and first page of each of the 80 or so rollos would
show that they were unraffled, and yet, the respondent judge knowing that such cases
were unraffled, secured the said cases, considered them and decided or resolved them, in
violation of law.
It would appear, therefore, that the respondent judge is guilty of the charges in the
administrative complaint. Along with him as guilty, is respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr.
This conclusion is bolstered by, among other things, the Diazes' statement that cases were
indeed directly secured by the respondent judge without their undergoing raffle.
With respect to the other respondents, it could be deduced that the respondent Ma.
Gorgonia Flores, as officer-in-charge of Branch 26, would have known that Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr. was not doing his job of forwarding all docketed cases to the Raffle
Committee faithfully.
He then recommends:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended:
1. That respondent Judge Genaro C. Gines be appropriately penalized for
violation of all the Supreme Court orders and circulars mentioned in the
Administrative Complaint for the period covered from April 1989 to April
1991, plus apparent violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019;
2. That respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. for his apparent failure to do
his job, be, likewise appropriately penalized, at least with a 6-month
suspension without pay; and
3. That respondent Ma. Gorgonia Flores be likewise penalized with a 3-
month suspension without pay; and
4. That the other respondents be warned against committing any such
violations.
The continuing deliberate violations of Administrative Order No. 6 (dated 30 June 1975), Circular No. 7
(dated 23 September 1974) and Administrative Order No. 1 (dated 28 January 1988) for the years reported
in Atty. Sanglay's report, and their belated discovery boggle our minds. The irregularities should have been
easily discovered by the respondent Judge either because the fact that a case has not been properly raffled
off is at once discernible on the cover of the records and on the first page of the original of the initial
pleading (complaint, information, etc.), or because plain common sense would have told him that
something was wrong somewhere as an unusual number of cases of the same class had been "assigned" to
his sala. That he had failed to appreciate the physical evidence or, at the very least, exhibit surprise at the
unusual number of cases is quite amazing. Thus, we are loathe to grant him the benefit of the doubt and
conclude that he had no interest whatsoever in having those cases raffled off to him and that he only loved
to work more than the others. Given the circumstances of this case, we cannot merely cut him some slack
and assume good faith on his part; he deserves no such treatment. As the investigating Justice himself
assessed the situation:
. . . . The 80 cases involved in this case, filed from April 1989 to April 1991, were not raffled,
but were directly assigned to, or taken by, Branch 26 (except 3) under respondent Judge
Gines. Respondent Judge Gines, must know, under the above Supreme Court acts, at a
simple glance on the cover of the rollo and the first page of every such record, whether a
case was assigned to him after going through raffle or not. . . . From January 1987, when
respondent Judge Gines was appointed to Branch 26, the respondent judge had received
unraffled cases, considered them and decided them. He had done so, apparently, not
because he was a maniac of a worker, nor because he loved his work but for reasons
unspoken in this case. Why should a sane judge accept additional cases for study and
decision, in addition to his regular load, without any benefit or consideration? Here,
obviously, the res ipso loquitor(sic) doctrine applies.
The irregularity and violations of the aforementioned administrative orders and circular could not have
been committed so blatantly, brazenly and openly for an unusually long period of time if the respondent
Judge did not have the cooperation of some of the court employees. We therefore agree with the
investigating Justice that such support and cooperation were extended by subordinates who likewise had
something to do with the raffle of cases. Hence, the findings on the degree of participation, either by
commission or omission, of respondents Flores and Lacsamana are sustained.
In his report, the investigating Justice absolves the Diazes and Munar from responsibility in the aforesaid
irregularities.
With respect to respondent Pacita Diaz, the case has become moot as she died on 10 February 1993. 1 Thus,
the case is dismissed insofar as she is concerned.
On the other hand, while we find no evidence to link respondent Munar to the aforementioned
irregularities, we hold that respondent Ma. Concepcion Diaz is not entirely blameless. In her affidavit of 18
September 1991, the relevant portions of which are quoted in the REPORT of Justice de Pano, she explicitly
admitted:
11. In my explanation dated May 27, 1991 to the Memorandum of Judge Yaranon, while I
might have made an admission that I was the clerk receiving cases that later turned out to
be unraffled, I placed the direct blame on Judge Gines and my two officemates, namely,
Mrs. Ma. Gorgonia L. Flores and Mrs. Rosie Munar who had applied all sorts of pressures
upon me, including series (sic) of intimidation and, insinuations in order that cases of their
choice receive (sic) by me may no longer be forwarded to the proper officer-in-charge of
the raffle, but to them directly in Branch 26. 2
It is to be noted that Ma. Concepcion did not elaborate on the nature of such intimidation and insinuations.
In view of the fact, however, that she was in charge of receiving and docketing special proceedings cases,
and that out of the controversial 80 unraffled cases, 44 were special proceedings cases, her participation
could, by no means, be considered as insignificant. And even if the alleged "intimidation" and
"insinuations" were true, they still would not exculpate her in view of the length of time involved, the
number of cases questioned and the absence of proof that such intimidation and insinuations were
persistent, continuous and irresistible. It is thus clear that she had, by neglecting her duty, allowed herself
to be used by the other respondents.
A far more serious matter which has escaped the attention of the investigating Justice involves the charges
set forth under paragraph 3 of the Administrative Complaint, particularly on the preparation by the
respondent Judge, allegedly in coordination with respondents Munar and Flores, of petitions in certain
cases, some of which are (a) Special Proceeding No. 1965 wherein it is made to appear that the petitioner
therein an aunt of the respondent Judge and a resident of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur — resides in San Fernando,
La Union, and (b) Special Proceeding No. 1967 wherein the Office of the Solicitor General and the other
parties were not furnished with copies of the petition upon order of the respondent Judge. Not having
undergone the prescribed raffle procedure, these two cases were directly assigned to the respondent Judge
who then acted thereon. The said petitions, the pertinent orders issued in the course of the proceedings
therein and the minutes thereof were attached by the respondent Judge to his 14 May 1993 Comment, which
he had adopted as his direct testimony pursuant to his 17 September 1992 Manifestation (Exhibit "J"). These
documents provide conclusive proof of more serious irregularities amounting to either gross ignorance or
malicious disregard of applicable procedural laws, grave misconduct, grave abuse of authority and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The respondent Judge made a mockery of the judicial process
as it is obvious that he had displayed a special interest in these cases; in fact, he even caused the cases to be
excluded from the raffle. A careful review of the abovementioned petitions will reveal that the designation
"Branch 26," indicating the branch presided over by the respondent Judge, has been originally typewritten
as part of the caption, and not merely entered in the blank space reserved for the branch to which the case
may subsequently be raffled off. It is to be further observed that the petition in Special Proceeding No. 1965
was subscribed and sworn to before respondent Flores in her capacity as the Officer-in-Charge of the Office
of the Clerk of Court, Branch 26.
Special Proceeding No. 1965 involves a petition for guardianship over the person and property of a certain
Juan R. Lagmay. The said petition was filed by Regina Lagmay Valdez — who claims to be a resident of
Poblacion, San Fernando, La Union3 — on 24 September 1990, and alleges that Juan R. Lagmay is "presently
residing at No. 2579 Pamintuan Village, Mabalacat, Pampanga." Upon its filing, the respondent Judge
immediately issued an order (a) giving due course to the petition, (b) directing that notices be served to
Juan Lagmay's nearest of kin, namely Bonifacia Lagmay, Lilia Gumangan and Mariano Lagmay, all
residents of Las-ud, Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur and (c) directing the latter to submit their opposition to the
petition, if any, on or before 8 October 1990 at 8:30 a.m. 4 No order setting the case for hearing at that
particular date, time and place was issued. It would appear, however, that this 24 September 1990 order
was considered by the respondent Judge as the order setting the case for hearing on 8 October 1990 because
respondent Flores prepared the Minutes of the alleged proceedings conducted on 8 October
1990. 5 The said Minutes show that the following exhibits were offered for jurisdictional purposes,: (1)
Notice of hearing, as Exhibit "A" and (b) the dorsal side of Exhibit "A," purportedly to show that Juan
Lagmay's nearest of kin were furnished with the notice of hearing, as Exhibit "A-1. " Said Minutes further
disclose that the petitioner therein was not assisted by counsel; that respondent Flores acted as Interpreter
while respondent Munar acted as Stenographer; and that since no opposition was filed therein, the
testimony of the petitioner was received. The latter then allegedly declared that she is a resident of
Poblacion, San Fernando, La Union; she is Juan Lagmay's niece as he is her father's brother; and Juan
Lagmay is an American citizen, single, childless, a resident of 2579 Pamintuan Village, Mabalacat,
Pampanga and a retired seaman receiving pension from the Social Security Administration of the United
States of America in the amount of $550.00 a month. Thereafter, the respondent Judge issued an order
appointing petitioner Regina Valdez as the guardian of the person and property of Juan R. Lagmay, and
directing her to take her oath as such upon the filing of a bond of P500.00, after which she would be issued
letters of guardianship. Without the bond having first been filed, however, respondent Flores administered
the oath to Regina Valdez. 6 Thereafter, or on 18 October 1990, respondent Flores issued to the latter her
letters of guardianship. 7
A closer examination of the so-called proofs of notice of hearing to the nearest of kin, consisting supposedly
of "registry return receipts," reveals that there are no entries in the blanks reserved for information on the
name of sender, name of post office, municipality or province where the same post office is located, registry
number and case number. It is not likewise indicated therein when the addressees received the "registered"
letter. In view thereof, the conclusion that the so-called notices were not sent at all is inevitable.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to have known that his court was not the proper venue for the case
because the person sought to be placed under guardianship was alleged to be a resident of Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Guardianship of the person or estate of a minor or incompetent may be instituted in the
Court of First Instance of the province, or in the justice of the peace court of the
municipality, or in the municipal court of the chartered city where the minor or incompetent
resides,. . . . (emphasis supplied).
Worse, the aforesaid Order of 24 September 1990 did not even direct that notice be served on Juan Lagmay,
the very party sought to be placed under guardianship. Such an omission, therefore, clearly violated Section
3, Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court which directs the court to fix the time and place for hearing and
cause reasonable notice to be given to the person named in the petition, including the minor if above 14
years of age or the incompetent himself. We have ruled that service of notice to the minor above 14 years
of age or the incompetent is jurisdictional. 8 Failing to have notice sent to Juan Lagmay, respondent Judge
had no jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing on 8 October 1990, receive the petitioner's testimony, if he
did at all, and thereafter appoint her as Juan Lagmay's guardian. Nor was the respondent Judge justified
in issuing on 22 January 1990 — pursuant to the petitioner's 17 January 1990 motion9 — an order appointing
deputy sheriffs Oscar Fantastico and Romualdo Baladad as special sheriffs to take custody over the person
of Juan Lagmay from one Florencio "Boy" Cortes of Bolinao, Pangasinan. In the said order, respondent
Judge further directed Boy Cortes "to release from his custody and deliver the person of said Juan R.
Lagmay, a.k.a. John R. Lagmay to the aforementioned special sheriffs immediately upon receipt of this
Order, under pain of contempt." 10 Based on the special sheriffs' report, 11 however, Boy Cortes did not
release Juan Lagmay because the latter was too weak and sickly to travel. This refusal prompted the
respondent Judge to order Boy Cortes' arrest (for contempt) and confinement until he shall have complied
with the said order. 12 It was respondent Flores who forwarded the warrant of arrest to the PNP Regional
Command at San Fernando, La Union for its service. 13
Having acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case and appoint Regina Valdez as Juan Lagmay's guardian,
respondent Judge acted clearly beyond his authority when he designated special sheriffs to take custody
of Juan Lagmay, directed the person who had custody over the latter to deliver him to the said special
sheriffs and ordered the arrest of the said person who refused to surrender custody. And even if we are to
assume, for the sake of argument, that the respondent Judge had validly acquired jurisdiction over the case
and appointed Regina Lagmay as guardian, and that Boy Cortes did in fact refuse to deliver Juan Lagmay
to the special sheriffs, he (respondent Judge) would still be guilty of gross ignorance of the law for ordering
Cortes' arrest and confinement. In such a situation, the petitioner's remedy would be to file a petition
for habeas corpus, and not to have Boy Cortes cited for contempt, much less arrested.
We shall now focus our attention to Special Proceeding No. 1967. It is very strange proceeding. The case
involves a petition for the "judicial confirmation of the de facto adoption" of Cecilia Averion filed on 11
October 1990. The petitioner therein alleges that she and her late husband, Fernando Averion — who died
in 1987 — "adopted" Cecilia Averion in 1967; only 1 year and 3 months old at the time, Cecilia was
supposedly given up by her natural parents, the whereabouts of whom remain unknown. Petitioner further
avers that she and her husband, during his lifetime, reared the child and gave her all their love, attention,
care and understanding. They also provided her with an education and considered her as their own child.
Hence, the petition was filed "for the purpose of judicially confirming the de facto adoption of Cecilia
Averion by herein petitioner and her late husband."14 The said petition was not accompanied by the written
consent of Cecilia Averion who, at the time of filing, was already of legal age. On the very day the petition
was filed, respondent Judge forthwith issued a Notice of Hearing which provided that the petition would
be heard on 31 October 1990; it was likewise ordered therein that "a copy of this notice be published once
a week for three consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioner in a newspaper of general circulation
in La Union and in the Philippines." 15
From the so-called Minutes of the proceedings of 31 October 1990, 16 as prepared by respondent, Flores, it
appears that the following exhibits were offered to establish the jurisdiction of the court: (1) the affidavit of
the Editor of the North Tribune, "a newspaper of general circulation in La Union and Northern Luzon
provinces," published in San Fernando, La Union, as Exhibit "A"; (2) clippings of the published order in the
10, 17 and 24 October 1990 issues of the North Tribune, as Exhibits "A-l," "A-2" and "A-3," respectively; and
(3) the entire issues of the North Tribune for 10, 17 and 24 October 1990, as Exhibits "B," "B-1" and "B-2,"
respectively. It may further be gleaned from the said Minutes that since no opposition was registered by
any other party, the petitioner's testimony was received by the court. On 6 November 1990, the respondent
Judge handed down a decision 17 granting the petition and decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the petition and hereby confirms the de
facto adoption of Cecilia Averion by herein petitioner and her late spouse Fernando
Averion retroactive to the year 1967.
The remedy pursued in Special Proceeding No. 1967 is certainly unusual as we are not aware of any
prescribed action that may be instituted for the judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption. Nor do our
adjective and substantive laws on adoption provide for such a proceeding. In fact, the only proper and
authorized procedure relative to adoption is outlined in the rule on adoption itself. 18 That Cecilia Averion
had been treated by the petitioner and her husband as their own child during the former's minority may
only provide compelling reasons to grant the decree of adoption notwithstanding her (Cecilia's) having
attained the age of majority. This is one of the exceptions provided by the Family Code to the rule that a
person of legal age cannot be adopted. 19
In "confirming" the so-called de facto adoption and decreeing the same to be "retroactive to the year 1967,"
respondent Judge has carved a name for himself in history for, as already pointed out, no action or
proceeding for judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption is authorized in this jurisdiction. Furthermore,
by its very nature and purpose, a decree of adoption can never be made to retroact. Lastly, considering that
the petitioner's husband had died in 1987, or three years before the petition was filed, he could not now be
resurrected for purposes of the adoption, be in fact declared an adopter and be subsequently bound by the
decree to the prejudice of his heirs.
Then too, respondent Judge completely disregarded the fact that Cecilia Averion had submitted no written
consent to the adoption at the time of the filing of the petition or at any subsequent date — a manifest
infirmity. Nor was Cecilia called to testify in the case. Moreover there seems to be an irregularity in the
publication of the notice of hearing. It is to be observed that as indicated in the upper right hand corner of
the first page of the petition, the proceeding was instituted on 11 October 1990. If this were so, the notice of
hearing which was issued by the respondent Judge on that same date 20 could not have been published in
the North Tribune in its 10 October 1990 issue. In his affidavit, the Editor of the said newspaper disclosed
that the notice was indeed published on 10 October 1990.
All told, respondent Judge completely ignored the procedural rules on adoption and promulgated
guidelines for himself to suit his own purpose and design.
Hence, it is evident that Special Proceeding No. 1965 and Special Proceeding No. 1967 were not only
directly filed with the court of the respondent Judge without passing through the raffle procedure, the two
cases were also resolved by the latter in a manner that may be characterized by gross ignorance or the
brazen and blatant disregard of the applicable procedural laws, grave misconduct, palpable abuse of
authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He is therefore unfit to continue in the
service a day longer. He has evidently forgotten that the administration of justice is a sacred task. Upon
assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He becomes "the visible representation of the
law and, more importantly, of justice." 21 A judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence, 22 and should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it
be a demoralizing example to others. 23
As shown in the above disquisitions, respondent Flores was a willing participant in the commission of the
irregularities in both proceedings. On the other hand, however, respondent Munar's participation has not
been substantiated.
Before closing, we would like to point out that per our Resolution of 2 March 1993, we referred to Justice
De Pano for inclusion in his investigation the 29 January 1993 letter of Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon
which was addressed to Deputy Court Administrator Juanito Bernard. 24 In his letter, Judge Yaranon
informs the latter about matters discovered in the course of the audit which are more serious than the
"illegal raffling" of cases. He then exposes alleged case fixing and illegal office practices committed on a
large scale by a syndicate composed principally of court officers and personnel, and describes the modus
operandi of those involved as follows:
The operation in a particular case, starts with "AMBULANCE CHASING"; after
arrangements are made with a prospective applicant/petitioner, a petition is prepared by
the syndicate; the same is then signed personally by the petitioner/applicant; and the oath
for purposes of verification, is administered also by the syndicate.
The petition/application is then filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court, where syndicate
members receive and docket the case in the docket book of Branch 26; the case is
deliberately separated from the cases that are turned over to the Raffle Committee, and is
directly turned over to Branch 26. Care is taken that the date of filing is made to coincide
with the scheduled day for raffling of cases (Tuesdays).
On the same date of filing, the ORDER setting the case for initial hearing, is issued by
Branch 26. On the date of initial hearing, a lawyer-contact of the syndicate enters an
appearance for the petitioner/applicant, and he then presents jurisdictional facts.
On the very same day of initial hearing (in special proceedings) and without any ACTUAL
HEARING (in special proceedings and land registration cases), for the reception of
evidence on the material allegations of facts in the application/petition, a DECISION is
forthwith issued.
Judge Yaranon then partly concludes:
Just one aspect of the matter is herein submitted for consideration. The issuance of a
DECISION without any previous hearing being held for the reception of evidence by the
applicant/petitioner, constitutes FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT by a
public officer, under Article 171, Revised Penal Code committed by:
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in an act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate; . . . (par. 2, Art. 171, Revised Penal Code).
According to Justice De Pano, he received the 2 March 1993 Resolution just as he was about to write his
report in this case. He then suggests that the matter subject thereof be treated separately and that
"appropriate, charges be leveled against the respondent Judge principally, and his cohorts with the Tanod
Bayan, for criminal prosecution." 25Indeed, the referral of Judge Yaranon's letter to Justice De Pano may
have been too late. In any event, the charges proffered therein may be separately dealt with.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) DISMISSING from the service respondent Judge GENARO C. GINES with prejudice to
re-employment, in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and with forfeiture of all benefits except earned leave credits. This dismissal
shall be immediately executory and said respondent Judge is hereby ordered to forthwith
vacate his position and desist from performing any further official function;
(2) SUSPENDING from office respondents MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES and ALFREDO
V. LACSAMANA, JR. for a period of six (6) months each, without pay;
(3) SUSPENDING from office respondent MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ, for a period of
three (3) months, without, pay.
The foregoing suspensions shall take effect immediately upon the service of a copy of this
Decision on the aforenamed respondents MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES, ALFREDO V.
LACSAMANA, JR. and MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ. The periods of their respective
suspensions shall not be charged against their leave credits, if any;
(4) DISMISSING this case as against respondent PACITA B. DIAZ in view of her demise;
and
(5) DISMISSING this case as against respondent ROSIE M. MUNAR for lack of substantial
evidence.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to evaluate the 29 January 1993 letter of Executive
Judge Braulio Yaranon — subject of the 2 March 1993 Resolution of this Court in this case and to submit to
this Court appropriate recommendations thereon within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
DR. AMPARO A. LACHICA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROLANDO A. FLORDELIZA, MCTC, Jose Abad
Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, respondent.
complainant was forced by some persons to sign a death certificate where she was not the attending
physician and has no personal knowledge of the cause of his death, she refused to sign the certificate. Later,
Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk, told her in an angry manner: Bakit hindi mo pinirmahan ang Death
Certificate? Complainant tried to explain her reasons but to no avail. After exchanges of words, respondent
threatened complainant that he will file an administrative case against her if she will refuse to sign the
death certificate.
The Issue: whether respondent-judge is guilty as charged of abuse of judicial position and intimidation
amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Courts Ruling
As noted by the Investigating Judge, this is yet another occasion for reminding members, of the bench
to conduct themselves beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of their official duties, but in their private
lives as well.
Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide as follows:
Canon 1. A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
xxx xxx xxx
Canon 2. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
On the other hand, item 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reads:
this Court is convinced that the charge of misconduct against the respondent judge has been
established by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases. [5] His
undue interest in having complainant sign the Death Certificate is highly questionable, to say the
least. Further, his inebriated demeanor and incoherent behavior during the festivities, as attested to by a
witness,[6] is reprehensible in a judge and should be subjected to disciplinary action.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge ROLANDO A. FLORDELIZA is hereby HELD

ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE for violation of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as
item 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS.
SENA TE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE SA VINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO,
MARILYN PRIMICIAS- AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL
DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA, REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE
PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENT A TIVES), Respondents.
yr
31\epnbHc of tbe !lbtlippines
QColttt ;Manila
ENBANC
CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R. No. 200242 Present:
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,• LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION •• '
PERALTA, BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,• ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
JULY 17, 2012
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
' No Part. •• On leave.
G.R. No. 200242
Resolution 2 G.R. No. 200242
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
RESOLUTION
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of
this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the
House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified
complaint for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice.
After a brief presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed
and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.
On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment
court the following day, December 14, 2011.
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, allegedly committed as follows:
ARTICLE I
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY
PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM
THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS
APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.
ARTICLE II
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED
THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OF
ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that “a public officer or employee shall,
upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under
oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.”
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required
by the Constitution.
2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act.
2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring
assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. It has been reported that Respondent
has, among others, a 300-sq. meter apartment in a posh Mega World Property development at the Fort in
Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is constitutionally-required under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution in
his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN)? Is this acquisition sustained and duly
supported by his income as a public official? Since his assumption as Associate and subsequently, Chief
Justice, has he complied with this duty of public disclosure?
ARTICLE III
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR
BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT
STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT “[A]
MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY,
PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE” IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE
LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS
IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS.
ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH
LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.
ARTICLE IV
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION WHEN HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS BY ISSUING A “STATUS QUO ANTE” ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN
MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ.
ARTICLE V
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS AND
PARTIALITY IN CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES
INVOLVING THE 16 NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO
A PROVINCE.
ARTICLE VI
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF, AND TO A
COMMITTEE HE CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE
A JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY REPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT.
ARTICLE VII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM
AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND
IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF
A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S OWN TRO.
ARTICLE VIII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED GRAFT AND CORRUPTION
WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF)
1
AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.

2
On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer assailing the “blitzkrieg” fashion by which the
impeachment complaint was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to the
Senate. Citing previous instances when President Aquino openly expressed his rejection of petitioner’s
appointment as Chief Justice and publicly attacked this Court under the leadership of petitioner for
“derailing his administration’s mandate,” petitioner concluded that the move to impeach him was the
handiwork of President Aquino’s party mates and supporters, including
12
Rollo, pp. 60-62, 71-72. Sub-Paragraphs of other Articles omitted. Id. at 134-212.
“hidden forces” who will be benefited by his ouster. As to the charges against him, petitioner denied the
same but admitted having once served the Offices of the President and Vice-President during the term of
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and granted the request for courtesy call only to Mr. Dante
Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) while Mr. Lauro Vizconde appeared
with Mr. Jimenez without prior permission or invitation. Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds
or offenses imputed to him were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed
for the outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that
the Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press conference
revealing evidence which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner. The following day,
newspapers carried front page reports of high-priced condominium units and other real properties in Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig and Quezon City allegedly owned by petitioner, as disclosed by prosecutors led by
respondent Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. The prosecution told the media that it is possible that these properties
were not included by petitioner in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) which had
not been made available to the public. Reacting to this media campaign, Senators scolded the prosecutors
3
reminding them that under the Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials they are not allowed to
4
make any public disclosure or comment regarding the merits of a pending impeachment case. By this
time, five petitions have already been filed with this Court by different individuals seeking to enjoin the
impeachment trial on grounds of improperly verified complaint and lack of due process.
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced
trial proceedings against the petitioner.
34
Rule XVIII.
Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 5, 2012, Vol. 27, No. 28.
Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary hearing was denied. On January 18, 2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal,
Clerk of Court of this Court, in compliance with a subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court, took the
witness stand and submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010. Other prosecution
witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs for the previous years (Marianito Dimaandal, Records
Custodian of Malacañang Palace, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio, Register of Deeds of Taguig and Atty. Carlo V.
Alcantara, Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City).
In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the prosecution and defense submitted their
respective memoranda on the question of whether the prosecution may present evidence to prove the
allegations in paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report some properties in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth and failure to disclose in SALN such bank accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld
property at the Fort in Taguig) under Article II (par. 2.2. refers to petitioner’s alleged failure to disclose to
the public his SALN as required by the Constitution).
5
On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution which states:
IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules:
1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II of
the Articles of Impeachment;
2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 of the Articles of Impeachment, with
respect to which, this Court shall be guided by and shall rely upon the legal presumptions on the
nature of any property or asset which may be proven to belong to the Respondent Chief Justice as
provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379.
6
SO ORDERED.
7
In a subsequent Resolution dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment

Court granted the prosecution’s request for subpoena directed to the officers
567
Rollo, pp. 354-360. Id. at 360.
Id. at 361-368.
of two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar currencies, as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority votes to grant the Prosecution’s Requests for
Subpoenae to the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and Bank of the Philippine
Island (BPI), for them to testify and bring and/or produce before the Court documents on the alleged bank
accounts of Chief Justice Corona, only for the purpose of the instant impeachment proceedings, as follows:
th
1. a) The Branch Manager of the Bank of Philippine Islands, Ayala Avenue Branch, 6 Floor, SGV
Building, 6758 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m.
on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening forms/documents
for Bank Account no. 1445-8030-61 in the name of Renato C. Corona and the bank statements
showing the balances of the said account as of December 31, 2005, December 31, 2006, December
31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010.
2. b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings Bank, Katipunan
Branch, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, is commanded to bring before the
Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening
forms/documents for the following bank accounts allegedly in the name of Renato C. Corona, and
the documents showing the balances of the said accounts as of December 31, 2007, December 31,
2008, December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010:
089-19100037-3 089-13100282-6 089-121017358 089-121019593 089-121020122 089-121021681 089-
141-00712-9 089-141-00746-9 089-14100814-5 089-121-01195-7
8
SO ORDERED.
On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to
enjoin the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena
requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to testify and to bring the original and certified true
copies of the opening documents for petitioner’s
8
Id. at 366-367.
alleged foreign currency accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including
the bank statements showing the year-end balances for the said accounts.
On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of
the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective
for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which,
aside from being a “hodge-podge” of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less
ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of Par.
2.3 is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of
evidence under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more
than a hollow relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on
charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due process
because first, Art. II does not mention “graft and corruption” or unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for
impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that “graft and corruption” is
a separate and distinct ground from “culpable violation of the Constitution” and “betrayal of public trust”;
and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged bank accounts as requested by the
prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act (“fruit of the poisonous tree”) considering
that those documents submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts
under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof.
Petitioner thus prayed for the following reliefs:
(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the Impeachment Court; (ii) implementation of
Resolution dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or representatives of BPI and PSBank from testifying and
submitting documents on petitioner’s or his family’s bank accounts; and (iv) the presentation, reception
and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render judgment:
(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab
initio;
(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the
Impeachment Complaint;
(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court’s Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6 February 2011 [sic], as
well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and
(iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
9
Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.

Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno on the
ground of partiality, citing their publicly known “animosity” towards petitioner aside from the fact that
they have been openly touted as the likely replacements in the event that petitioner is removed from
10
office.
On February 9, 2012, this Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 200238 enjoining the Senate from implementing
the Resolution and subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum issued by the Senate sitting as an Impeachment
Court, both dated February 6, 2012. The Court further resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for the
inhibition of Justices Carpio and Sereno “in the absence of any applicable compulsory ground and of any
voluntary inhibition from the Justices concerned.”
11
On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is
being violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the cold
9 10 11
Id. at 46-47. Id. at 3-6.
Id. at 378-425.
neutrality of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-Judge
Franklin S. Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the Impeachment Court, to no avail. He further
called attention to the fact that despite the Impeachment Court’s January 27, 2012 Resolution which
disallowed the introduction of evidence in support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no motion for
reconsideration would be entertained, “the allies of President Aquino in the Senate abused their authority
and continued their presentation of evidence for the prosecution, without fear of objection”. In view of the
persistent efforts of President Aquino’s Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of Presiding Officer Juan Ponce
Enrile that the prosecution could not present evidence on paragraph 2.4 of Article II -- for which President
Aquino even thanked “his senator allies in delivering what the prosecution could not”-- petitioner
reiterates the reliefs prayed for in his petition before this Court.
12
In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti filed on behalf of the respondents, the Solicitor General
argues that the instant petition raises matters purely political in character which may be decided or
resolved only by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being filed by the
respondents “without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and
without conceding the constitutional and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment
13
and of the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment.” Citing the case of Nixon v. United States,
respondents contend that to allow a public official being impeached to raise before this Court any and all
issues relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint would result in an unnecessarily long and
tedious process that may even go beyond the terms of the Senator- Judges hearing the impeachment case.
Such scenario is clearly not what the Constitution intended.
Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that the Impeachment Court did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion; it has, in
12 13
Id. at 973-1023.
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
fact, been conducting the proceedings judiciously. Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing
impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of impeachment. They contend that the
constitutional command of public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully disclose his assets,
liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject
of this case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the ongoing impeachment proceedings,
which was initiated and is being conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce
the principle of public accountability and ensure that the transgressions of impeachable public officials are
corrected, the injury being claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from the impeachment trial has no
factual and legal basis. It is thus prayed that the present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for issuance
of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be dismissed.
The core issue presented is whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters
or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of
right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
Impeachment and Judicial Review
14
Impeachment, described as “the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,” was foreseen as
creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger
that “the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
15
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.” Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the
judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective
14
15
Edward S. Corwin, cited in Judicial Review of Impeachment: The Judicialization of Philippine Politics by Franco
Aristotle G. Larcina, University of Santo Tomas (UST) Law Review, Vol. L, AY 2005-2006. THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 65, Alexander Hamilton, accessed at
http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/fed/blfed65.htm.
functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our
government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review
if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct
as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its
roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law
on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. Petitioner
was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was
accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause.
Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the
alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during
the hearings.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the
behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or
allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate’s sole power
to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these
constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the
actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when
sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator- Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the
witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of
partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the
Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Court’s power
of expanded judicial review.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
16
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. we ruled that the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes
the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House
17
of Representatives Committee on Justice, the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous
referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation
of the due process clause and of the one- year bar provision.
On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents committed
a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures
from the Court.
Mootness
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than
the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without
any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening
applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice
within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
16 17
G.R. Nos. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44. G.R. No.193459, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 199.
Resolution
14 G.R. No. 200242

present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be
18
In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which
19
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is
DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.
without practical use and value.
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
18
19
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Pascua, G.R. No. 143258, August 15,2003,409 SCRA 195,202. Vda. de Dabao v. Court
ofAppeals, G.R. No. 116526, March 23, 2004,426 SCRA 91, 97.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
o art)
0 J. VELASCO, JR.
(On leave) ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
(.
Resolution
15 G.R. No. 200242

ROBE RTO A. ABAD Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
--
(No Part) MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
EREZ
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice
A&, ESTELA MfPERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
;·
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 196231, 2014-01-28

Facts:
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled
that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The
Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i)... found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and
Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings
against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The
Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against her... after upholding the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.
In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).
In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others,
before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent
Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The
Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of the
prosecution's evidence against Garcia.
Issues:
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on April 27,
2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to the Office of
the Ombudsman for final approval. Since the draft... order on Mendoza's motion for reconsideration had
to undergo different levels of preparation, review and approval, the period it took to resolve the motion
could not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only within nine (9) calendars days from
his receipt of... the order.
Ruling:
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales' petition and to
declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman.
a. The Philippine Ombudsman
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the
"protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially
as a complaints and action bureau.[36] This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically
intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and
excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution.
Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive
officers, during their tenure.
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government
constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative
bodies."[39] It has powers, both constitutional... and statutory, that are commensurate with its daunting
task of enforcing accountability of public officers.[40]... b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies... vis-a-
vis the Ombudsman's independence
Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are
created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal... autonomy. In general terms, the
framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated from political pressure
to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the impairment of their core functions.
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the... developments in
the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure.
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior but is
similar in degree and kind to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the
Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political... interstices of a republican democracy
that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting... disciplinary authority in the President... over the Deputy
Ombudsman violates... the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is thus... unconstitutional... we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline
and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject
to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the... independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate,
includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the... constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the
Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and...
balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents
of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place
her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as... independent as she is, if only because they
are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal
setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major
problem... for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President
may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.
he statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive power
to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them,
would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the
Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who can
remove or suspend its members.
e. Congress' power determines the... manner and causes for the removal... of non-impeachable officers is
not... a carte blanch authority
Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,[53] Congress is empowered to determine the modes
of removal from office of all public officers and employees except the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.
he intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the second sentence of Section 2,
Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more... stringent rule of "removal only by
impeachment" to favored public officers
While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be consistent
with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive due process;
the constitutional guarantee of security... of tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the principle
of checks and balances.
a. The Office of the President's... finding of gross negligence has... no legal and factual leg to... stand on... b.
No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency
Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the case were already
pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez.
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other... persons may be affected. In the case of public
officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[71]
Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case forwarded
to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP[72] relied on Section 8, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 7 (or the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales
should have acted on Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration within five days:
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds Whenever allowable, a motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the
decision or order by the party on the basis of any of... the following grounds:
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer shall
resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of submission for resolution. [emphasis and underscore
ours]
Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales since
he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer
tasked with the initial resolution of the motion.
c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates
The facts do not show that Gonzales' subordinates had in any way been grossly negligent in their work.
While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for more than three months, it is noteworthy
that he had not drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to... review the case for the first
time.[77] Even the Ombudsman herself could not be faulted for acting on a case within four months, given
the amount of cases that her office handles.
The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved: examination of the records,
research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and discretion.
d. No undue interest... he fact that Gonzales had Mendoza's case endorsed to his office lies within his
mandate, even if it were based merely on the request of the alleged victim's father. The Constitution
empowers the Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or... manner
against any public official or employee of the government.[78] This provision is echoed by Section 13 of
RA No. 6770,[79] and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as amended.[80]
Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the basis of the unverified
affidavit of Kalaw.
we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales' decision differs from the decision of the PNP-
IAS (which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza).
Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be held liable for our own misdeeds; we can be made
to account only... for lapses in our responsibilities. It is notable that of all the officers, it was Gonzales who
took the least time nine days followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia the writer of the draft took less
than four months, and the Ombudsman, less than four months... until the kidnapping incident rendered
Mendoza's motion moot.
D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue
Thus, by constitutional design, the Special
Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the
Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in
the Executive Department.
Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the Office
of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a
differential treatment between the Ombudsman's Deputies, on one... hand, and the Special Prosecutor
himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies
but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in the
performance of... her duties.
Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at par with
the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned, and
must also enjoy the same grant of independence under the
Constitution.
n the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,[108] the Court resolved to reverse its September 4,
2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2) of
RA
No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy
Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7,[109] the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be
constitutionally within the
Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman
Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to... conduct an
administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman
Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
[A.M. NO. 09-2-19-SC : February 24, 2009]

IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO V. NOGRALES
AND LIMKAICHONG, G.R. No. 179120.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is the Report of the Investigating Committee created under the Resolution dated
December 10, 2008, to investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Ruben
T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v.
Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed as G.R. NOS. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120
and 179132-33, respectively, to determine who are responsible for the leakage of a confidential internal
document of the En Banc.
The investigating committee, composed of Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing as Chairperson and Mme.
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales and Mr. Justice Renato C. Corona as Members, submitted the following
report:
INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE CREATED UNDER THE
EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HON. REYNATO S. PUNO, Chief Justice
HON. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, Associate Justice
HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Associate Justice
HON. MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Associate Justice
HON. DANTE O. TINGA, Associate Justice
HON. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, Associate Justice
HON. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR., Associate Justice
HON. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, Associate Justice
HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Associate Justice
HON. ARTURO D. BRION, Associate Justice
HON. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA, Associate Justice
RE: Report on the Investigation of the Unauthorized Release of the Unpromulgated Ponencia of Justice
Ruben T. Reyes in the Consolidated Cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC,
Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, Docketed as G.R. NOS. 178831-32, 179240-
41, 179120 and 179132-33, Respectively, to Determine Who are Responsible for the Leakage of a
Confidential Internal Document of the En Banc
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court the following report on the results of the investigation of the committee created under the
En Banc Resolution dated December 10, 2008.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
During its session on July 15, 2008, the Court En Banc continued its deliberations on the draft of Justice
Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. Comelec, Villando v. Comelec, Biraogo v. Nograles
and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed as G.R. NOS. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33,
respectively, (Limkaichong case) which was used by this Court as a working basis for its deliberations.
Since no one raised any further objections to the draft, the En Banc approved it. It having been already
printed on Gilbert paper, albeit a number of Justices manifested that they were concurring "in the result,"
Justice Reyes immediately circulated the ponencia during the same session.
After the session and during lunch, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno noted that seven of the 13 Justices
(excluding Justice Reyes) concurred "in the result" with the ponencia of Justice Reyes (hereafter Gilbert
copy or Justice Reyes's ponencia or ponencia or unpromulgated ponencia). Justices Minita Chico-Nazario
and Teresita Leonardo-De Castro then informed the Chief Justice that they too wanted to concur only "in
the result." Since nine Justices, not counting the Chief Justice, would concur only "in the result," the Justices
unanimously decided to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy. It was noted that if a majority
concurred only "in the result," the ponencia would have no doctrinal value. More importantly, any decision
ousting a sitting member of the House of Representatives should spell out clearly the legal basis relied
upon by the majority for such extreme measure. Justice Antonio T. Carpio then volunteered to write
his Reflections on Justice Reyes's ponencia for discussion in the following week's En Banc session.
During its session on July 22, 2008, the En Banc deliberated on Justice Carpio's Reflections which had in the
meantime been circulated to the members of the Court. As a result, the En Banc unanimously decided to
push through and set the date for holding oral arguments on the Limkaichong case on August 26, 2008.
On the request of Justice Reyes, however, the Limkaichong case was included in the agenda of July 29, 2008
where it was listed as Item No. 66. The decision to hold oral arguments remained, however.
On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120,
held a press conference at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila, and circulated
to the media an undated letter signed by him, together with what appeared to be a xerox copy of the
unpromulgated ponencia. In his letter, Biraogo insinuated that the Court, at the instance of the Chief Justice
and with the implied consent of the other Justices, unlawfully and with improper motives withheld the
promulgation of the ponencia.
Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia infringed on the
confidential internal deliberations of the Court and constituted contempt of court, the Court, in a Resolution
dated December 10, 2008, directed
1. The creation of an Investigating Committee, chaired by Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, with Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson,Third Division and Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Working Chairperson, First Division, as Members to investigate the
unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes to determine who are responsible for
this leakage of a confidential internal document of the En Banc, and to recommend to the En Banc the
appropriate actions thereon;
2. Mr. Louis C. Biraogo to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he
should not be punished for contempt for writing the undated letter and circulating the same together with
the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes.
As directed, the committee, composed of the aforementioned three senior Justices, conducted initial
hearings on December 15 and 16, 2008.
In the meantime, in compliance with the Court's above-quoted Resolution dated December 10, 2008,
Biraogo submitted to the Court his Compliance dated December 22, 2008 to which he attached the
following annexes: (1) an undated photocopy of a 3-page printed letter addressed to "Dear Mr.
Biraogo"which purportedly was sent by a "Concerned Employee" as Annex "A"; (2) a June 12, 2008 note
handwritten on a memo pad of Justice Reyes reading:
Re: G.R. NOS. 178831-32, etc. [the comma and "etc." are
handwritten]
Dear Colleagues,
I am circulating a revised draft of the ponencia.
(Sgd.)
RUBEN T. REYES,
together with a copy of Justice Reyes's Revised Draft ponencia for the June 17, 2008 agenda as Annex "B";
(3) a photocopy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices as Annex "C"; and (4) a
photocopy of Justice Carpio's Reflections as Annex "D".
Justice Ynares-Santiago later inhibited herself upon motion of Justice Ruben T. Reyes while Justice Carpio
voluntarily inhibited himself. They were respectively replaced by Justice Renato C. Corona and Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales, by authority of the Chief Justice based on seniority. Additional hearings were
then held by the reconstituted committee on January 14, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 22, 2009.
The following witnesses/resource persons were heard:
1. Armando A. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
2. Rodrigo E. Manabat, Jr., PET Judicial Staff Officer II, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
3. Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
4. Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
5. Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
6. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
7. ACA Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief, Public Information Office
8. Ramon B. Gatdula, Executive Assistant II, Office of the Chief Justice
9. Atty. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, Clerk of Court En Banc
10. Major Eduardo V. Escala, Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, Office of Administrative
Services
11. Atty. Felipa B. Anama, Assistant Clerk of Court
12. Willie Desamero, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court
13. Glorivy Nysa Tolentino, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
14. Onofre C. Cuento, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court
15. Chester George P. Del Castillo, Utility Worker, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
16. Conrado B. Bayanin, Jr., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
17. Fermin L. Segotier, Judicial Staff Assistant II, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
18. Retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes
SUMMARIES OF TESTIMONIES
Below are the summaries of their testimonies:
1. ARMANDO A. DEL ROSARIO, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes,
testified as follows:
He was in charge of circulating ponencias for the signatures of the Justices and of forwarding signed (by
all the Associate Justices who are not on leave) ponencias to the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ).
On July 15, 2008, after the En Banc session, he received from Justice Reyes the original of the unpromulgated
ponencia (Gilbert copy). Because he was busy at that time, he instructed his co-employee Rodrigo Manabat,
Jr. to bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature and to wait for it. He instructed
Manabat to rush to Justice Nachura's office because the latter was going out for lunch. After more than 30
minutes, Manabat returned with the Gilbert copy already signed by Justice Nachura, who was the last to
sign.1 Del Rosario then transmitted the Gilbert copy together with the rollo, temporary rollos, and diskettes
to the OCJ pursuant to standard operating procedures for the promulgation of decisions. The documents
were received by Ramon Gatdula on the same day at around 3:00 p.m.
The following day, on July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes instructed him to retrieve the Gilbert
copy and the accompanying documents and diskettes as he was told that the promulgation of the ponencia
had been placed on hold. He brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who told him to keep it. He then
placed the Gilbert copy in a sealed envelope and placed it inside his unlocked drawer and wrote a note in
his logbook when he retrieved the Gilbert copy that its promulgation was on hold and would be called
again on July 29, 2008.2
The Gilbert copy was in his sole custody from July 16, 2008 until December 15, 2008 (when the investigating
committee held its first hearing).3 He never opened the envelope from the day he sealed it on July 16, 2008
until December 10, 2008, when Justice Reyes told everybody in their office that the Gilbert copy had been
photocopied and leaked. He did not have any news of any leakage before then. And he also did not
photocopy the Gilbert copy. The seal placed on the envelope was still intact when he opened it on December
10, 2008.4 Although the lawyers in their office knew that he kept original copies of drafts in his unlocked
drawer, he believed that nobody in his office was interested in photocopying the Gilbert copy. He was
solely responsible for keeping the Gilbert copy. He did not know any of the parties to the case and none of
them ever called him. And he did not know what Gatdula did after receiving the Gilbert copy. 5
The Limkaichong case was called again on July 29, 2008 as Item No. 66. The Office of Justice Reyes received
the En Banc agenda for the said date on July 25, 2008. Upon receipt of the said En Banc agenda and the new
item number, their office prepared a new cover page and attached it to the Gilbert copy. The original cover
page of the Gilbert copy for the agenda of July 15, 2008 showing the case as item number 52 was thrown
away.6
On being recalled on January 20, 2009, Del Rosario further testified as follows:
On July 15, 2008 when the Justices were about to leave the En Banc session room after the adjournment of
the session, he entered the room just like the rest of the aides. 7 He carried the folders of Justice Reyes,
returned them to the office, and went back to, and waited for Justice Reyes until Justice Reyes finished
lunch at the En Banc dining room.8 The Gilbert copy was left with Justice Reyes. 9 Before 1:00 p.m., after
the Justices had taken lunch,10 Justice Reyes, who was then carrying an orange envelope, handed to him
the Gilbert copy and instructed him to speed up the ponencia's signing by Justice Nachura (who was not
taking part in the oral arguments of a case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day) since the latter might be
leaving.11 He heard Justice Reyes say "Ihabol mo ito' Ihabol na ipapirma kay Justice Nachura" in the
presence of Judicial Staff Head, Atty. Rosendo Evangelista, as the three of them were going down the stairs
to their office from the session room.12
He was not the one who brought the ponencia to the Office of Justice Nachura because he gave the task to
Manabat to whom he relayed the instruction.13 There were already signatures on page 36 of the ponencia
when he gave it to Manabat and only the signature of Justice Nachura was missing. 14 He pointed this to
Manabat saying, "ito na lang ang walang pirma, dalhin mo doon." Manabat obliged him. 15
After a few minutes, Manabat returned to their office bearing the Gilbert copy. He went to Atty.
Evangelista, showing him that the ponencia had already been signed by Justice Nachura. Atty. Evangelista
then instructed him to have the ponencia promulgated by delivering the same to the OCJ. He (Del Rosario)
complied, personally handing the Gilbert copy with the rollo, records and diskettes to Ramon Gatdula of
the OCJ at 3:30 p.m., also of July 15, 2008. 16 The ponencia stayed at the OCJ until the afternoon of the
following day, July 16, 2008.17
He was not told that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold until the afternoon of July 16, 2008,
when Justice Reyes called him to his chambers and instructed him to retrieve the ponencia. He also stated
that someone from the OCJ called their office and requested them to retrieve the ponencia because its
promulgation was on hold.18 At 4:00 p.m. that day, he retrieved the ponencia etc. from the OCJ 19 and gave
the ponencia to Justice Reyes.20
He merely showed the ponencia to Justice Reyes who ordered him to keep it ("tabi mo muna yan").21 He
then placed a note "Hold, reset July 29" in his logbook after being informed by Atty. Evangelista of such
date of resetting.22 He reiterated that he placed the Gilbert copy in a brown envelope, sealed it with the
officially issued blue and white seal provided by the Printing Office, and placed the envelope inside his
unlocked drawer. The envelope was still sealed when he checked it on December 10, 2008. 23 He admitted
that from the time he kept the Gilbert copy in his drawer until the Special En Banc meeting on December
10, 2008, he and no one else was in possession of the Gilbert copy. But he denied that he ever opened the
envelope or photocopy the Gilbert copy. In fact, he did not mind it. 24 And nobody inquired about it since
July 16, 2008 until December 10, 2008.25 He likewise denied that he knew Congressman Paras or Biraogo or
that the two ever called his office.26
When asked if he could produce the envelope into which he placed the Gilbert copy, he replied that Justice
Reyes had taken it.27 He also informed that what was placed on the face of the brown envelope was a
computer print-out containing the title of the case, the names of the ponente and the other Justices, and the
manner they voted.28
When he was asked by Justice Carpio Morales whether it was possible for him to recognize any tampering
if, for instance, the envelope and the seal were replaced with a similar envelope and blue and white seal
with a similar print-out information on the face of the envelope, he answered in the negative. 29 (At that
point, Justice Carpio Morales remarked that Del Rosario, therefore, could not have been certain when he
said that the envelope remained sealed from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008.)30
Nobody else knew where he put the Gilbert copy in the same place as the other drafts. It was possible for
someone to take the Gilbert copy from his drawer and photocopy it on a weekend or after office
hours.31Nobody told him to guard the Gilbert copy.32
Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox machine. 33 He drew a sketch of the layout of the
desks inside the office of Justice Reyes, illustrating that his location was two desks away from the table of
April Candelaria, a secretary in the office, and that the xerox machine was situated at the back of the long
table of the receiving clerks.34
He stayed in the office as long as Justice Reyes was still there but he could not say for sure that nobody
photocopied the Gilbert copy after office hours as he also went out of the office to smoke in the nearby
garden area or repair to the toilet.35
He never reported to office on Saturdays and there was one time Justice Reyes went to office on a Saturday
as he was also asked to report but he refused.36 Justice Reyes sometimes dropped by the office on Sundays
after attending services at the United Methodist Church along Kalaw Street, as told to him by the driver. 37
He also circulated copies of the Revised Draft of the decision to the other Justices but he never received a
copy of Justice Carpio's Reflections.38 He did not offer an explanation why the Gilbert copy, which was in
his possession, and the Revised Draft, were leaked.39 No information was supplied by his officemates,
friends or relatives to help explain the leakage.40 Among his relatives working in the Court are his mother-
in-law, Jasmin P. Mateo of the OCJ, sister of former Court Administrator Ernani Pano, and Mrs. Mateo's
sibling, who works at the Hall of Justice Committee.41
He and the driver of Justice Reyes were given keys to the main door of the Office of Justice Reyes but he
could not say that only the two of them held keys to the main door.42 April Candelaria and Atty. Ferdinand
Juan asked for and got duplicates of the key, but could not remember exactly when. Atty. Juan got a
duplicate of the key because the lawyers sometimes went out for dinner and needed to go back to the office
to retrieve their personal belongings.43
April Candelaria's secretarial functions included recording of the social activities of Justice Reyes and
delivering door-to-door papers to his chambers.44 Candelaria and the driver were in the staff of Justice
Reyes since the latter's stint at the Court of Appeals, while Atty. Juan was employed ahead of him. 45
Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox machine because all of them photocopied personal
documents and were too ashamed to ask other officemates to do it for them. 46
When news of the leakage came out, Justice Reyes called all his legal staff and him to a meeting. In a tone
that was both angry and sad, Justice Reyes asked them if they knew anything about the leakage.47A meeting
among Justice Reyes, Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and him took place on December 15, 2008, before the
initial hearing by the investigating committee.48 Justice Reyes also talked to him one-on-one and asked him
if a copy of Justice Carpio's Reflections was attached to the Gilbert copy and other documents when they
were sent to the OCJ. He replied that there was none and that he just kept the Gilbert copy in his drawer
and had in fact forgotten all about it until Justice Reyes inquired about it in December. 49 He was not able
to read Jarius Bondoc's column about the leakage of the Gilbert copy (which came out in the Inquirer in
October 2008 about the Gilbert copy) nor had Justice Reyes confronted him about said column before
December 2008.50
During the initial hearing in December 15, 2008, nobody talked to him or knew that he was testifying as he
was even surprised that he was called to testify.51 When confronted with the testimony of his officemate,
Chester Del Castillo, who testified that Justice Reyes called only one meeting, he opined that Del Castillo
might not have known about the meeting with the lawyers since Del Castillo was frequently absent.52
2. RODRIGO E. MANABAT, JR., PET Judicial Staff Employee II, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes,
He was the personal aide of Justice Reyes. On July 15, 2008, he brought the Gilbert copy to the Office of
Justice Nachura for signature upon the instruction of Del Rosario and Atty. Evangelista. 53 He gave the
Gilbert copy to the receptionist and waited outside the said office. After ten minutes, the document was
returned to him.54 He then immediately gave it to Del Rosario. It took him not more than 15 minutes to
return the document to Del Rosario.55 He averred that he did not photocopy the Gilbert copy nor did he
notice if anybody from the Office of Justice Nachura photocopied it. 56 He also did not know if Del Rosario
placed the document in a sealed envelope or photocopied it.57 After returning the Gilbert copy to Del
Rosario, he went back to Justice Reyes who asked him if Justice Nachura had already signed the ponencia.
He answered yes and told Justice Reyes that the ponencia was already with Del Rosario. 58
3. ATTY. ROSENDO B. EVANGELISTA, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes,
testified that as follows:
Around 1:00 p.m. on July 15, 2008, Justice Reyes instructed him to have signature page 36 of the ponencia
reprinted and circulated for signing allegedly because Justice Minita Chico-Nazario wanted to change her
qualified concurrence thereon' "in the result" to an unqualified concurrence. He thus instructed Jean Yabut,
the stenographer in charge of finalizing drafts, to reprint page 36 of the Gilbert copy. Then he ordered the
reprinted page circulated for signatures together with the other pages of the ponencia. He assumed that
the original page 36 was discarded as it was no longer in their files. He likewise assumed that the signatures
were completed on the reprinted page 36 as the Gilbert copy was forwarded around 3:00 p.m. to the OCJ
per standard operating procedure.59 He was not informed then by Justice Reyes or anybody that the
promulgation of the Gilbert copy had been put on hold per agreement of the Justices.60 He came to know
that it was on hold only on July 17, 2008, when Del Rosario informed him upon his arrival at the office.
Because the information was unusual and because it was his duty to make sure that signed decisions were
promulgated, he asked Justice Reyes. Justice Reyes then confirmed that the promulgation of the ponencia
was on hold.61 After that, he just assumed that the Gilbert copy was in their office with Del Rosario who
was assigned to keep such documents. However, he did not know exactly where in his work area Del
Rosario kept it.62 He did not make a photocopy of the Gilbert copy nor did he order Del Rosario and
Manabat to make photocopies. Neither did he know how the Gilbert copy was photocopied. He only came
to know about the leakage last December 10, 2008.63
When, on January 22, 2009, he was recalled by the committee, he further testified as follows:
He occupied the last cubicle in the lawyers' room and the xerox machine was located outside the lawyers'
room.64 It was upon the instruction of Justice Reyes that their office reprint page 36 of the Gilbert copy and
circulate it for signature. The instruction to circulate the reprinted page, which was circulated together with
the other pages of the Gilbert copy, was given by him to either Manabat or Del Rosario.65He saw the original
page 36 where Justice Chico-Nazario (supposedly) wrote the phrase "in the result" on top of her
signature.66 Aside from him, Court Attorney VI Czar Calabazaron, who principally researched on the case,
also saw the qualification in Justice Chico-Nazario's signature while the Gilbert copy lay on top of Justice
Reyes's coffee table inside his chambers. He recalled that at about 12:30 p.m. or before 1:00 p.m. right after
the En Banc session on July 15, 2008, Justice Reyes called the him and Atty. Calabazaron to his
chambers.67 In that meeting, Justice Reyes phoned Justice Chico-Nazario after noticing that Justice Chico-
Nazario's signature bore the notation "in the result."68 He, however, did not hear what they talked about
since the less-than-five-minute phone conversation was inaudible, even though he was just approximately
one meter away.69 Justice Reyes thereafter instructed him to reprint the second signature page (page
36). He assumed from the context of the instruction that it was due to the change in Justice Chico-Nazario's
concurrence, without asking Justice Reyes the reason therefor. 70 He then directed the stenographer to, as
she did, reprint the second signature page, page 36, which was brought in to Justice Reyes in his chambers. 71
He attended the oral arguments on a case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. on that day (July 15, 2008) and arrived at
the session hall before that time.72 As far as he could recall, he went down to the Office of Justice Reyes
about 3:00 p.m. to retrieve a material needed for the oral arguments. He denied having testified that he
went down purposely to check if the ponencia had been circulated and the second signature page signed
anew and to make sure that the ponencia had already been transmitted to the OCJ.73 When confronted with
the transcript of stenographic notes, he maintained that it was part of his duties to see to it that every
ponencia of Justice Reyes was promulgated.74 He was sure that he went down to their office at around 3:30
p.m., although he could not recall his purpose for doing so. It was probably to get some materials related
to the oral arguments, and that it just so happened that Del Rosario saw him and informed him that the
Gilbert copy had already been transmitted to the OCJ. 75
When asked as to the whereabouts of the original signature page 36, he surmised that it must have been
shredded since it was not made part of the official documents submitted to the OCJ. 76 While he searched
for it in his cubicle, it could no longer be located.77 He did not inquire from Justice Reyes or from Del Rosario
who also had access to that page, because he assumed that it could not be located since what was submitted
to the OCJ was the one where Justice Chico-Nazario's concurrence was no longer qualified by the phrase
"in the result."78 As he was attending the oral arguments, he had no opportunity to see the reprinted
signature page 36 with the affixed signatures prior to the transmittal to the OCJ. 79
He came to know that the Gilbert copy was retrieved on July 16, 2008. 80 It was Del Rosario who informed
him on July 17, 2008 that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold and was returned to their
office.81 Justice Reyes did not advise them earlier that the promulgation was on hold.82 After learning about
it, he inquired from Justice Reyes who confirmed that the promulgation was indeed on hold. He never
asked for the reason even though that was their first "on hold" incident because he thought that the case
would be called again at another session.83 He read the newspaper reports about the unpromulgated
ponencia but did not validate them with Justice Reyes.84
He assumed that Del Rosario, being the custodian, kept the Gilbert copy in their office.85 Their office
reprinted the second signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy. 86 When shown page 36 of the Gilbert copy by
the committee, he assumed that it was the reprinted page since Justice Chico-Nazario's signature no longer
contained any qualification.87 He stated that it was the practice of their office to photocopy drafts signed
by Justice Reyes and to furnish the other Justices with advance copies for their review before the session.
Only such drafts were photocopied. Ponencias, which had already been signed by the other Justices and
printed on Gilbert paper, were never photocopied. Del Rosario only logged them in his logbook and
prepared soft copies for submission to the Division Chair or the Chief Justice.88 He assured the committee
that this practice was 100% complied with despite the fact that he was not one of those assigned to
photocopy, but later yielded to given situations by Justice Carpio Morales.89
When directed to compare the front page of the photocopy Biraogo submitted as Annex "C" to his
Compliance to the Show Cause Order with the original Gilbert copy submitted to the committee by Justice
Reyes, Atty. Evangelista noticed the difference in the dates of the agenda. He noted that Biraogo's copy,
which was the copy allegedly leaked to him, bore the agenda date "July 15, 2008," while the Gilbert copy
submitted by Justice Reyes to the committee bore the agenda date "July 29, 2008." He also noted that
the item numbers were also different because the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 52 in the
photocopy submitted by Biraogo, whereas in the Gilbert copy, the case was listed as Item No. 66.90 To him,
it was probable that Biraogo got his copy from another source but it was not probable that Biraogo
photocopied a copy in the office.
Only a few persons were authorized to operate the xerox machine in their office, namely, Conrado Bayanin,
Jr., Armando Del Rosario, Chester Del Castillo, a certain Leonard and a certain Ramon. 91 He could not recall
who among the five had been directed to photocopy the July 15, 2008 draft. 92 He ventured a guess that the
top page of the Gilbert copy might have been reprinted but could not impute any motive to any
person.93 Even if he was the staff head, he was not privy to the preparation of the first page nor of the top
cover bearing the date "July 29, 2008" copy.94
Finally, he manifested that from the time the Gilbert copy was signed by 14 Justices until December 15,
2008, he did not acquire exclusive control or possession of the Gilbert copy because Del Rosario was the
custodian thereof.95 He reiterated that he did not know where, exactly, Del Rosario kept the documents.He
admitted that he was remiss in his duties as staff head for not knowing. 96 It was their practice not to lock
drawers.97 He was aware that Justice Reyes eventually prepared another draft of a ponencia changing his
position in the Limkaichong case because he helped in the research in November 2008. 98He never consulted
the Gilbert copy because he had a softcopy thereof in his computer.99 He did not ask why Justice Reyes was
departing from his original position.100 He denied that he knew Biraogo, Limkaichong, Jerome Paras, Olive
Paras or any party to the case.101
He winded up his testimony by manifesting that the investigation was an experience that he hoped would
not happen again and that he would not have to undergo again. 102
4. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO testified as follows:
She signed the Gilbert copy only once, in the En Banc conference room before going to the En Banc dining
hall.103 Justice Reyes was beside her, looking on, when she affixed her signature. Immediately after signing,
she returned the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who circulated it for the signatures of the other Justices. She
remembered that Justice Reyes was holding the document even when the Justices were already at the
dining hall. She did not photocopy the ponencia nor was there any opportunity for her to do so as there
was only one Gilbert copy and the only time she held it was when she affixed her signature. She added
that her concurrence to the ponencia was without qualification but when it was noted during lunch that
most of the Justices had simply concurred "in the result," she and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro
signified their intention to qualify their concurrence and concur likewise only "in the result."104 However,
she was no longer able to indicate the change on the document as she and the other Justices had decided
to put on hold the promulgation of the decision until after holding oral arguments on the Limkaichong
case. No reprinted signature page was ever sent to her office for her signature and she did not affix her
signature on any other copy of the ponencia. She was not the last to sign the ponencia. 105
5. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO testified as follows:
She signed the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc session and Justice Reyes was right beside her when she
signed the ponencia.106 No reprinted signature page 36 was ever sent to her office for signature and she did
not affix her signature on any other copy of the ponencia. She did not photocopy the ponencia and there
could have been no opportunity to do so right after she signed it. 107
6. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA testified as follows:
He believed that he signed the ponencia in the En Banc conference room just before he went to the En Banc
dining hall for lunch. He believed he was never sent a reprinted signature page. He either returned the
ponencia to Justice Reyes right after signing it or passed it on to the other Justices for them to sign. He could
not recall if he was the last to sign the ponencia. Asked whether he leaked the decision, Justice Nachura
replied that he did not. Nor did he order any of his staff to photocopy it. In fact, there was no opportunity
to photocopy the ponencia as he was not in custody thereof. 108 Although he knew the husband of one of
the petitioners, Olivia Paras, neither she nor her husband ever asked for a copy of the ponencia. 109
7. ASSISTANT COURT ADMINISTRATOR JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ, Chief, Public Information
Office (PIO), testified as follows:
The copy of Biraogo's undated letter with the attached copy of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice
Reyes, which he furnished the En Banc, came from a member of the media. Around 3:00 p.m. on December
9, 2008, a reporter called him on the phone, asking if he would like to give a statement because Biraogo was
going to hold a press conference about the Limkaichong case later that day at Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, in
front of the Court of Appeals. He requested the reporter to inform him of what was going to be taken up
during the press conference. The reporter went to his office around 5:00 p.m. the same day, and furnished
him a copy of Biraogo's undated letter. Attached to the letter was a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia.
The reporter informed him that Biraogo distributed to the media during the press conference copies of the
letter and the attachment.110
Sometime in October 2008, months before Biraogo held the press conference, Jarius Bondoc had published
a blind item column on the Limkaichong case. On November 8, 2008, another column, this time by
columnist Fel Maragay, came out in the Manila Standard. The words used in both columns were the same
so he thought that there was really an effort to report the story in the media. Knowing Jarius Bondoc to be
a respectable journalist, he met with him to clarify matters as many of the statements in the news item were
false or inaccurate. He provided Bondoc with the surrounding circumstances on the matter so that Bondoc
would have the proper context in case he was again requested to publish the story. Bondoc offered to write
about what he had said, but he told Bondoc that there was no need because there was no truth to the story
given to the media anyway. He left it to Bondoc whether he would use the new information if he was again
asked to publish the story.111
The leak could not have come from the PIO as they were never given a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia
bearing the signatures of 14 Justices. He also did not bring drafts from the OCJ to the PIO. It is only after a
case has been promulgated that the Clerk of Court gives the PIO copies. But in this case, the Clerk of Court
did not even have a copy as the decision had not been signed by the Chief Justice.112
8. RAMON B. GATDULA, Executive Assistant III, Office of the Chief Justice, testified as follows:
On July 15, 2008, at 3:30 p.m., he received from Armando Del Rosario the Gilbert copy of the ponencia
together with the rollos and two diskettes. He kept the Gilbert copy in his locked cabinet overnight and
gave it to the Chief Justice's secretary the following day. In the afternoon of July 16, 2008, an employee from
the Office of Justice Reyes retrieved the Gilbert copy. He did not inquire anymore about the reason why
they were retrieving it as it was common practice for the offices of the ponentes to retrieve drafts whenever
there were corrections. When asked whether he photocopied the ponencia, Gatdula said that he does not
photocopy the decisions he receives. Their office also never photocopies decisions. They forward such
decisions straight to the Clerk of Court for promulgation and they receive copies thereof only after the
Clerk of Court has affixed her signature thereon and indicated the date of promulgation. 113
9. ATTY. MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA, the En Banc Clerk of Court, testified on the procedure for
promulgation of ponencias.
After the Chief Justice affixes his signature on a decision, the decision is brought together with the rollo to
the En Banc Clerk of Court to be logged, recorded and checked. If the necessary requirements for
promulgation are present, she signs the decision. It is at this time that the decision is considered as
promulgated. The Office of the Clerk of Court distributes copies to the parties to the case. The date of
promulgation is then encoded in the case monitoring system and a copy of the decision is given to the
PIO.114 Decisions reaching their office usually come with the rollos except where a particular decision is
considered rush.115
She denied having seen the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes and stated that the same never
reached their office during the period from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008. 116 She and her staff only
learned of the draft decision after it was circulated by the media.117 In her office, decisions for promulgation
are always brought to Verna Albano for recording, then to her for signature.118 If Verna is absent, it is Atty.
Felipa Anama, the assistant clerk of court, who receives the ponencias and rollos. 119She further stated that
in her more than 10 years of work in the Court, she never heard any incident of a draft ponencia being
leaked except this one.120
10. MAJOR EDUARDO V. ESCALA, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Security Division, Office of
Administrative Services, testified as follows:
Security personnel inspect all offices everyday at 5:00 p.m. 121 Security personnel used to inspect even the
offices of the Justices, but they stopped doing so since last year. 122 As far as photocopiers are concerned,
security personnel only make sure that these are unplugged after office hours. 123 His office has nothing to
do with the operation of the machines.124 They always check if employees bring out papers from the Court.
But they encounter problems especially from the offices of Justices because employees from these offices
always claim that they have been allowed or instructed by their Justice to bring papers home with them,
and there is no way to check the veracity of those claims. 125 Since he assumed office on July 14, 2008, he is
not aware of any record of a leak.126 He suggested that the memory cards of the machines be checked.127
11. ATTY. FELIPA B. ANAMA, Assistant Clerk of Court, testified as follows:
She acts as Clerk of Court in the absence of Atty. Villarama. 128 Their office never releases unpromulgated
ponencias129 and they ascertain that every decision or resolution to be promulgated is complete. 130 She
remembered that their office released the Show Cause Resolution dated December 10, 2008 and had it
delivered personally to Biraogo as it was an urgent resolution. 131 Willie Desamero was the employee who
personally served the resolution on Biraogo.132
She indicated that it was very difficult to serve something at Biraogo's residence for by the account of
Desamero, he was stopped at the guard house and was made to wait in the clubhouse until Biraogo was
notified of his presence; and that it took Desamero two hours to serve the December 10, 2008 resolution on
Biraogo.133
She has been with the Supreme Court for 29 years and she never encountered a leak nor did she ever issue
a resolution or decision without the signature of the Chief Justice. 134
12. WILLIE DESAMERO, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc, testified as follows:
He served the December 10, 2008 Resolution on Biraogo on December 12, 2008. 135 It was difficult to serve
the Resolution. It took him six rides to get to Biraogo's subdivision in Laguna and when he got there, he
was stopped by the security guards at the entrance of the subdivision. They asked him to wait at the
clubhouse and it took Biraogo two hours to arrive. 136 When Biraogo saw him, Biraogo commented, "Ang
bilis naman"137 and "bakit ka lang naka-tricycle? Meron naman kayong sasakyan"?138 Birago read the
Resolution before he signed to receive the document.139 Biraogo arrived in a car and had a back-up
car.140 Biraogo was in his early 50s, was wearing short pants, and had a sarcastic smile at that time. 141
An officemate of his had also been to Biraogo's house to serve some Resolutions.142 While it was not his
usual duty to serve court processes, Atty. Anama and Atty. Villarama requested him to serve the resolution
on Biraogo since the regular process servers in their office were not then available and he is the only one in
their office who resides in Laguna.143 In his years of service with the Court, he knew of no case which
involved leakage of court documents.144
13. GLORIVY NYSA TOLENTINO, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura, testified as follows:
She is responsible for communications, drafts and door-to-door papers that come in at the Office of Justice
Nachura.145 She presented page 267 of her logbook, to which Justice Reyes had earlier invited the
committee's attention. According to the logbook entry, the Gilbert copy was brought to their office on July
15, 2008 and that Justice Nachura signed the copy. However, since it is not office practice to record the time
of receipt or release, she could not remember what time the Gilbert copy was brought to their office for
signature.146 Nonetheless, the Gilbert copy did not stay long in their office because it was a door-to-door
paper and was accordingly given preferential treatment. Justice Nachura immediately signed the ponencia
when she gave it to him.147 However, she could not recall if Justice Nachura was the last to sign the Gilbert
copy.148 She added that their office did not have a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the
signatures of 14 Justices. They only had the advance copies circulated for concurrence. 149
14. ONOFRE C. CUENTO, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc, testified as follows:
He personally served two resolutions on Biraogo at his residence last August 6, 2008, together with driver
Mateo Bihag.150 On the day he served the resolutions, they were stopped at the guardhouse and were
escorted by a barong-clad security officer to Biraogo's house.151 They had a hard time getting to the
residence of Biraogo whom he does not personally know. 152 Biraogo did not mention or send his regards
to any member of the Court.153
15. CHESTER GEORGE P. DEL CASTILLO, Utility Worker, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes,
He joined the staff of Justice Reyes in September 2007 upon the recommendation of Court of Appeals Justice
Mariano Del Castillo and Retired Justice Cancio Garcia. 154
He was the most proficient in the use of the photocopiers in the office of Justice Reyes so it was to him that
the task of photocopying documents was usually given by Del Rosario and the lawyers.155 He, however,
never photocopied any paper bearing the signatures of the Justices. 156 He did not handle ponencias in
Gilbert paper nor ever photocopy any ponencia in Gilbert paper. 157
He usually left the office at 4:30 p.m. He sometimes saw members of the staff photocopying papers even
beyond 4:30 p.m. It was Del Rosario who often gave orders to photocopy drafts and who was the most
trusted member of the staff as demonstrated by the fact that he could go in and out of Justice Reyes's
chambers.158 Del Rosario never left the office before Justice Reyes and he (Del Rosario) often left late. 159
He had never been to Barangay Malamig although he had been to Biñan, Laguna. 160 He does not know
Biraogo or his wife.161 Neither does he know Paras.162 He did not know where Gilbert copies were
kept.163 When he was asked who would leave the office first, Justice Reyes or Del Rosario, he said he did
not know. Del Rosario was tasked to lock the main door of the office.164
The office staff knew of the leaked decision on the Limkaichong case, but the staff remained apathetic and
did not talk about it.165 The apathy was probably because the staff thought that the matter had already been
settled since Del Rosario and Atty. Evangelista had already been interviewed.166 He was not sure if anyone
from their office was involved in the leakage. 167 He was not part of the meeting called by Justice Reyes
before the start of the investigation.168 Only Atty. Evangelista, Del Rosario, and Manabat were called to the
meeting.169 He surmised that the meeting was about the leakage.170
16. CONRADO B. BAYANIN, JR., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, who was called
by the committee upon Justice Reyes's suggestion, testified as follows:
Part of his duties in the Office of Justice Reyes was to receive and release papers and rollos as he was seated
near the door.171 It was not his duty to handle or receive ponencias in Gilbert form. 172 He could not
remember if he had ever received any paper in connection with the Limkaichong case. 173 While he knew
how to operate the xerox machine, just like all the other utility workers in the office, 174 he had never
photocopied anything signed by the Justices, especially those on Gilbert paper. 175
When asked who handled photocopies ordered by Justice Reyes, he replied that he did not know.176 He did
not know and had no opinion on how the ponencia was leaked. 177 He only knew that his officemates talked
about the leak,178 but he did not know specifically what his officemates talked about.179 Before Justice
Reyes's retirement ceremony, Justice Reyes called him to his chambers and very calmly asked him if he
knew if anybody had photocopied the unpromulgated ponencia.180
17. FERMIN L. SEGOTIER, Judicial Staff Assistant II and receptionist at the Office of Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, testified as follows:
His duty is to receive communications, but only Glorivy Nysa Tolentino keeps a logbook for the door-to-
door papers that come to their office. 181 He does not remember any details pertaining to the July 15, 2008
signing of the Limkaichong Ponencia, aside from the fact that it was to Justice Reyes's staff to whom he
gave it back.182 He assumed that it was to Del Rosario to whom he returned the Gilbert copy because in the
Office of Justice Reyes, Del Rosario was the one in charge of circulating ponencias in Gilbert form for
signature.183 He could not recall handing a Gilbert paper to Manabat. 184 The ponencia stayed only for a
short time (about 5 minutes) in their office because it was a door-to-door paper. After it was signed by
Justice Nachura, it was handed back to the staff of Justice Reyes, so there was no chance for them to
photocopy the ponencia.185 It was not their standard operating procedure to leave any Gilbert paper in their
office if it could not be signed right away.186
18. RETIRED JUSTICE RUBEN T. REYES, for his part, submitted during the hearing on January 22, 2009,
a written statement entitled "Notes/Observations" (Notes) consisting of 12 paragraphs. In his Notes, Justice
Reyes stressed the following:
Biraogo did not point to him as the source of the leak of the unpromulgated ponencia; 187 in Biraogo's
December 22, 2008 Compliance with the Court's Show Cause Order, Biraogo stated that his informant was
allegedly a "SC concerned employee" who left a brown envelope with a letter and some documents in his
Biñan, Laguna home; it could be seen from the attachments to Biraogo's Compliance that it was not only
the unpromulgated ponencia or Gilbert copy that was leaked but also two other confidential documents:
his Revised Draft ponencia for the June 17, 2008 agenda (attached as Annex "B" to the Compliance) and
Justice Carpio's Reflections (attached as Annex "D"); and since these other documents were circulated to all
Justices, the investigation should not only focus on the leak of the unpromulgated ponencia but also on the
leak of the two other confidential and internal documents of the Court.188
Justice Reyes also pointed out in his Notes as follows: the committee should not only look into his office
but also the offices of Justice Carpio and the other Justices. He, however, reiterated that he had said in his
media interviews that he believed that none of the Justices themselves, much less the Chief Justice, leaked
the ponencia or authorized its leakage.
Justice Reyes pointed out that Biraogo's informant mentioned a certain Atty. Rosel, who was allegedly a
close friend and former partner of Justice Carpio. Justice Reyes said that Atty. Rosel allegedly asked a favor
from Justice Carpio before the latter wrote his Reflections.189 Thus, he said, the committee should also
question Atty. Rosel and even Justice Carpio himself.
On why he did not lift a finger when Biraogo got hold of the decision, despite reports regarding the leak,
Justice Reyes stated that he was on a sabbatical leave with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
research in four States in the United States from October 10, 2008 to November 1, 2008.
He had nothing to do with the leak and he even prepared a second draft decision (deviating from his prior
disposition) after oral arguments were held on the case.
Thus, in his Notes, he posed: "If he leaked it, why would he prepare a second different decision?" He
willingly obliged to the holding of oral arguments. He had no commitment to anybody and had no reason
to leak the unpromulgated ponencia.190 He added, "[I]f he had a hand in the leak, why would it include
Justice Carpio's Reflections which was contrary to the unpromulgated decision?"
Justice Reyes, still in his Notes, stated that no Justice in his right mind would leak the unpromulgated
ponencia or other confidential documents, such as the Revised Draft and Justice Carpio's Reflections.
He went on to refer to Biraogo's Compliance that the informant was purportedly "an old hand in the
Supreme Court who was accustomed to the practices of the Justices" and had a "circle" or group in the
Supreme Court. Since all his office staff, except two stenographers, one utility worker and one messenger,
were all new in the Court, then the "old hand" referred to could not have come from his office. But if it
could be proven by evidence that one of his staff was the source of the leak, Justice Reyes argued that only
that staff should be made liable, for he had publicly declared that he did not and would never allow nor
tolerate such leakage.191
More on Justice Reyes's Notes: He suggested that Newsbreak writers Marites Vitug and Aries Rufo be cited
for contempt of court, for obtaining, without lawful authority, confidential information and documents
from the Court, officials or employees, and for writing false, malicious articles which tended to influence
the investigation of the committee and to degrade, impede and obstruct the administration of justice. 192
Aside from submitting his Notes, Justice Reyes also testified as follows:
While he was first heard on January 16, 2009, after he presented a 9-paragraph written statement, he noticed
that it needed refinement and revision so he requested for time to edit it. Hence, he submitted his above-
mentioned Notes on January 22, 2009.
Justice Reyes identified the Gilbert copy, which he submitted earlier to the committee for safekeeping, and
his Notes."193 He clarified that the Compliance he was referring to in his Notes was Biraogo's December 22,
2008 Compliance with the Court's Show Cause Order. 194
His desire to include Justice Carpio in the investigation, per number 4 of his Notes, came about because it
appeared from Biraogo's Compliance and from the alleged informant's letter that it was not only the
unpromulgated ponencia signed by 14 Justices that was leaked but also the Revised Draft ponencia and
Justice Carpio's Reflections.195 He suggested that what should be investigated was the source of the three
documents.196 Justice Quisumbing replied that the matter seemed settled because Justice Reyes also
mentioned in Paragraph No. 6 of his Notes that he believed that none of the Justices, much less the Chief
Justice, caused or authorized the leak.197 Justice Reyes stressed that he thought it was only fair that the
Committee also call Justice Carpio to shed light on the matter in the same way that he was asked to shed
light thereon.198
Justice Carpio Morales pointed out that Justice Reyes's ponencia as signed by 14 Justices did not come into
the possession of the other Justices but only of Justice Reyes.199 She added that if logic were followed, then
all of the Justices should be investigated because copies of Justice Carpio's Reflections were circulated to
all. She declared that she was willing to be investigated and that she was volunteering to be
investigated.200 However, she pointed out that the logic of Justice Reyes was misplaced, considering that
the documents attached to Biraogo's Compliance were allegedly received at the same time. If Biraogo
received the documents at the same time and one Justice never took hold of the ponencia as signed, said
Justice could not have made the leak to Biraogo.201
Justice Reyes went on to testify as follows: The Gilbert copy which he submitted to the committee was
given to him by Del Rosario.202 He did not photocopy the Gilbert copy nor provide Biraogo a copy thereof
or instruct any of his staff to photocopy the same. 203
The xerox copy of the Gilbert copy attached to the Compliance of Biraogo appeared to be the same as the
committee's copy because he (Justice Reyes) looked at the initials on each page and found them to be
similar.204 Justice Quisumbing thereupon invited Justice Reyes's attention to the cover page of the Gilbert
copy which had been submitted to and in custody of the committee (committee's copy). 205 Upon perusal
thereof, Justice Reyes stated that the cover page of the committee's copy did not appear to be the same as
the cover page of Biraogo's copy. He observed that the cover page of the committee's copy showed
the agenda date "July 29, 2008," and that the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 66, whereas the cover
page of Biraogo's copy showed the agenda date "July 15, 2008," and that the same case was listed as Item
No. 52.206 Justice Reyes then qualified his earlier statement and said that he was only referring to those
pages of the decision itself which bore his initials, when he spoke of similarity, and said that the cover page
did not bear his initials.207
Justice Corona pointed out, and Justice Reyes confirmed, that page 1 of the committee's copy also differed
from page 1 of Biraogo's copy. Justice Corona pointed that in the committee's copy, there were asterisks
after the names of Justice Azcuna and Justice Tinga and footnotes that the two were on official
leave, whereas no such asterisks and footnotes appeared on page 1 of Biraogo's copy.208 Justice Corona also
pointed out and Justice Reyes once again confirmed that there was a slight variance between the initials on
page 34 of the committee's copy and the initials on page 34 of Biraogo's copy. 209
Justice Quisumbing then posed the question whether Justice Reyes would admit that there were at least
two sources.210 At this juncture, Justice Reyes brought out another photocopy (new copy or Justice Reyes's
new copy) of the Gilbert copy to which new copy the left top corner of the top cover was stapled a 1"x1"
piece of thick paper bearing the initials "RTR" and on the right top corner of the same cover appeared a
handwritten notation reading "Gilbert copy." Justice Reyes repeatedly stated that his new copy was a
facsimile of the committee's copy. He pointed out that the initials on page 34 of the new copy and that of
the committee's copy matched. He concluded, however, that page 34 of Biraogo's copy was not a faithful
reproduction of the committee's copy.211 Justice Reyes avoided the question of whether he or his staff kept
more than one xerox copy of the Gilbert copy that had been signed by majority or 14 members of the Court,
saying that he could not say so because he did not personally attend to photocopying of decisions. 212 He
stressed that his initials on page 34 of the new copy differed from the initials appearing on page 34 of
Biraogo's copy.213 He also pointed out that in Biraogo's copy, particularly on page 3, there was a
handwritten correction superimposed over the misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such
handwritten correction appeared on page 3 of both the committee's copy and the new copy. 214 He added
that he did not know who made the handwritten correction in Biraogo's copy and that the new copy he
was presenting to the committee was furnished to him by the committee. Said copy was allegedly the xerox
copy of the Gilbert copy.215
Justice Reyes professed that he had nothing to do with the leak as he would not leak, authorize, allow, or
tolerate any leak of his decision or revised draft. He dispelled any pecuniary profit from such leakage,
especially since he was about to retire when the leak happened. He could not, however, say the same of his
office staff since he did not want to speculate, so he was giving the committee the broadest latitude in
calling any of his staff.216
Upon Justice Carpio Morales's interrogation, Justice Reyes stated that he found the new copy in his files
just the week before the January 22, 2009 hearing.217 Justice Carpio Morales then invited his attention to the
fact that page 1 of the new copy, like page 1 of Biraogo's copy, did not contain the footnotes and asterisks
appearing in the committee's copy. She also noted that the copy of Biraogo and the new copy presented by
Justice Reyes matched to a T.218 Justice Reyes only replied that he did not pay particular attention nor
personally attend to the photocopying.219
Justice Reyes stated that there should only be one copy of the Gilbert copy, 220 but it appeared that he
supplied the committee with two apparently different copies (the Gilbert copy and the new copy).221Justice
Reyes noted that the new copy and Biraogo's copy did not match exactly as regards pages 3 and 34. He
stressed that there appeared on page 3 of Biraogo's copy a handwritten correction over the misspelled name
of Jerome Paras while no such correction was made on the new copy. Additionally, on page 34 of Biraogo's
copy, his initial appeared to have a smudge while on page 34 of the new copy, there was no smudge.222
When asked to explain why the new copy, which he claimed to have been photocopied from the
committee's copy, did not match the committee's copy on page 1 but matched page 1 of Biraogo's
copy, Justice Reyes offered no explanation.223 Justice Reyes also refused to submit the new copy to the
committee ("Why should I?") and questioned the committee's request that he initial the controversial pages
of the new copy.224 Thus, the committee members decided to affix their signatures on the first five pages of
the new copy and then drew a rectangle around their signatures and the date January 22, 2009. 225 The
committee then had the new copy photocopied. 226 Justice Corona soon noticed that Justice Reyes was
trying to hide the new copy between his files. At that point, Justice Corona pulled out the new copy
from Justice Reyes's files. Justice Reyes then repeatedly said that he was not submitting it to the
committee.227 The committee proceeded to discuss the other matters contained in Justice Reyes's Notes.
Justice Reyes at that point then stated that he had not withdrawn his standing motion for inhibition against
Justice Carpio Morales, to which Justice Carpio Morales replied that she would remain impartial. Justice
Carpio Morales likewise stressed that the committee would decide according to the evidence. 228
Upon being asked by the committee, Justice Reyes said that he could not recall if he was holding the Gilbert
copy after the En Banc session and while having lunch. 229 He stated that per standard arrangement, his
staff would usually get his folders and bring them to his office.230 As far as he could recall, before the Court
adjourned, the members already knew that many concurred only in the result. 231He could not recall,
however, if the Chief Justice learned about it only at the dining room. 232
Justice Reyes denied having given Atty. Evangelista the instruction to reprint signature page 36 of the
Gilbert copy and stated that it must have been Atty. Evangelista's sole decision. What Justice Reyes
remembered telling Atty. Evangelista after the En Banc session was that many concurred only "in the result"
and that Justice Chico-Nazario wanted to change her concurrence.233 Justice Carpio Morales confronted
him with certain portions of the December 15, 2008 TSN where he clearly volunteered the information that
he was the one who instructed Atty. Evangelista to reprint page 36 which is the second signature
page.234 Justice Reyes replied that maybe Atty. Evangelista was under the mistaken impression that the
change of the said page pushed through because, as it turned out, there was no qualification in the
concurrence of Justice Chico-Nazario. He also insisted that he did not volunteer the information that he
was the one who ordered the reprinting of page 36. He contended that he was in fact questioning Atty.
Evangelista when the latter said that the instruction came from him. 235
With regard to the "re-signing" by Justice Nachura,236 Justice Reyes declared that it was difficult to speculate
and rely on inaccurate recollection, especially since several months had passed. Justice Corona replied that
the testimonies could not be inaccurate since there were entries in the logbook, showing that Justice
Nachura indeed signed in his chambers.237 Justice Reyes stated that the changing of the original signature
page 36 was not carried out238 and that Atty. Evangelista's recollection of the event was inaccurate. Justice
Reyes also stated he could not recall calling Justice Chico-Nazario on the phone after the En Banc session
on July 15, 2008.239
Justice Reyes stated that Del Rosario was assigned to keep and take care of the circulated drafts and
ponencias printed on Gilbert paper, and from time to time Atty. Evangelista would have access to them
since the latter was the judicial staff head.240 Justice Reyes's staff members in October were the same until
he retired on December 18, 2008.241 Justice Reyes's impression of Biraogo's letter was that somebody who
had an axe to grind against the Chief Justice or who wanted to discredit him could have done it. 242
Justice Reyes said that he never had any personal interest in the case and argued that the best proof of this
was that he did not stick to his original decision after the case was heard on oral arguments on August 26,
2008, just to prove that he was not beholden to any party.243
Justice Reyes could not offer a straight answer to the question of what his undue interest was in still trying
to have the signature of all the Justices after he had taken his lunch and to forward the Gilbert copy and
the rollo etc. to the OCJ even after the decision to put the promulgation of the ponencia on hold was arrived
at, at lunchtime of July 15, 2008. He simply dismissed the recollections of his staff and preferred to believe
Del Rosario's over those of Evangelista's or Manabat's. He insisted that he never had the chance to talk to
Del Rosario or to Atty. Evangelista right after the En Banc session, and claimed that he never gave the
instruction to bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura. He likewise insisted that the testimony
of Atty. Evangelista was incorrect and that he would rather believe Del Rosario's testimony.244
THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS OF FACT
From the testimonies of the witnesses, the committee finds the following facts established.
On July 15, 2008, even after the Justices had agreed at lunchtime to withhold the promulgation of the
Gilbert copy in the Limkaichong case, Justice Reyes, under his misimpression that Justice Nazario had
"concurred in the result" and that she would finally remove such qualification, instructed his Judicial Staff
Head, Atty. Evangelista, and Del Rosario to have the signature page 36 (where the names of Justices
Nazario, Nachura and three others appeared) reprinted and to bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice
Nachura for signature as Justice Nachura, who was not participating in the oral arguments on the case
scheduled at 1:30 that afternoon, might be going out. Jean Yabut was tasked by Atty. Evangelista to reprint
the second signature page (page 36) on Gilbert paper.
The reprinted signature page 36, together with the rest of the pages of the Gilbert copy, was then given by
Atty. Evangelista to Del Rosario. Del Rosario, in turn, gave the Gilbert copy, together with the reprinted
signature page 36, to Manabat whom he instructed to go to the Office of Justice Nachura for him to affix
his signature thereon.
Manabat immediately went to the Office of Justice Nachura and handed the Gilbert copy to Fermin
Segotier, the receptionist at Justice Nachura's office. As the Gilbert copy was a door-to-door document,
Segotier immediately gave it to Glorivy Nysa Tolentino who recorded it in her logbook. She then brought
the Gilbert copy to Justice Nachura. When the reprinted page 36 of the Gilbert copy was brought out from
Justice Nachura's chambers and returned to Tolentino, she recorded it in her logbook that it was already
signed. The whole process took not more than five minutes. The Gilbert copy was returned to Manabat,
who had waited outside the office of Justice Nachura.
Manabat then repaired to the chambers of Justice Reyes who inquired from him if Justice Nachura had
signed the reprinted page 36 to which he answered in the affirmative. Manabat thereafter handed the
Gilbert copy to Del Rosario.
When Atty. Evangelista, who was attending the oral arguments on a case scheduled that afternoon, went
down the Office of Justice Reyes at about 3:30 p.m., he and/or Del Rosario must have eventually noticed
that Justice Nazario did not, after all, qualify her concurrence on the original signature page 36 of the Gilbert
copy with the words "in the result." Since neither Atty. Evangelista nor Del Rosario was advised by Justice
Reyes that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold, Del Rosario brought the Gilbert copy, together
with the rollo, records and diskettes to the OCJ to be promulgated and gave it at 3:30 p.m. to Ramon Gatdula
of the OCJ. Gatdula later transmitted the Gilbert copy to the secretary of the Chief Justice.
The following day, July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes called Del Rosario to his chambers and
instructed him to retrieve the Gilbert copy, etc. from the OCJ, informing him for the first time that the
promulgation of the ponencia had been put on hold. Around that same time, the OCJ phoned the Office of
Justice Reyes and told them to retrieve the ponencia for the same reason.
Thus, Del Rosario went to the OCJ and asked for the return of the Gilbert copy. As Gatdula had already
forwarded the same to the Chief Justice's secretary for the Chief Justice's signature, Gatdula retrieved it
from the secretary. Del Rosario retrieved all that he submitted the previous day, except the rollo which had,
in the meantime, been borrowed by Justice Carpio.
Del Rosario then brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who told him to keep it. Del Rosario informed
Atty. Evangelista the following day, July 17, 2008, that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold.
After Atty. Evangelista verified the matter from Justice Reyes, he (Atty. Evangelista) told Del Rosario that
the case would be called again on July 29, 2008. Del Rosario made a note in his logbook to that effect.
On July 25, 2008, the Office of Justice Reyes received the En Banc agenda for July 29, 2008 where the
Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 66. A new cover page reflecting the case as Item No. 66 was thus
prepared and attached to the Gilbert copy bearing only 14 signatures.
After the Gilbert copy was retrieved from the OCJ on July 16, 2008, it remained in the sole custody of Del
Rosario until December 15, 2008, the initial hearing conducted by the investigating committee. The Gilbert
copy remained inside his unlocked drawer, in a brown envelope, which he had sealed with the blue and
white seal used by all Justices. He opened it only on December 10, 2008, after Justice Reyes informed his
staff that there was a leak of the ponencia.
When news of Biraogo's conduct of a press conference on December 9, 2008 bearing on the leakage came
out, Justice Reyes immediately called his legal staff and Del Rosario to a meeting and asked them if they
knew anything about the leakage. He called for a second meeting among Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and
Del Rosario on December 15, 2008, before the hearing by the investigating committee took place in the
afternoon of that day. Justice Reyes likewise had a one-on-one talk with Del Rosario and asked him if a
copy of Justice Carpio's Reflections was attached to the Gilbert copy and related documents when they
were sent to the OCJ, to which he (Del Rosario) answered in the negative.
EVALUATION
The committee finds that the photocopying of the Gilbert copy occurred between July 15, 2008, before it
was brought to the OCJ or after it was retrieved on July 16, 2008 from the OCJ, and July 25, 2008, when the
Office of Justice Reyes caused the preparation of the new cover page of the Gilbert copy to reflect that it
was agendaed as Item No. 66 in the July 29, 2008 En Banc session, because the cover page of the photocopy
in the possession of Biraogo, as well as the cover page of Justice Reyes's new copy, still bore the agenda
date "July 15, 2008" and Item No. 52.
The committee likewise finds that the leakage was intentionally done. It was not the result of a copy being
misplaced and inadvertently picked up by Biraogo or someone in his behalf. The committee notes that none
of the offices to which the Gilbert copy was brought (OCJ and the Office of Justice Nachura) and which
acquired control over it photocopied ponencias in Gilbert form and released photocopies thereof to party
litigants. In any event, as earlier reflected, page 1 of the Gilbert copy that was sent to the OCJ and Justice
Nachura's Office and page 1 of Biraogo's photocopy differ.
To reiterate, the Gilbert copy bearing the signatures of 14 Justices was photocopied and that a copy thereof
was intentionally leaked directly or indirectly to Biraogo. As will be discussed below, the committee FINDS
that the leak came from the Office of Justice Reyes.
It bears reiterating that the leak did not come from the OCJ even if the Gilbert copy stayed therein from
3:30 p.m. on July 15, 2008 up to 4:00 p.m. on July 16, 2008. This is clear from the fact that page 1 of the copy
in Biraogo's possession differs from page 1 of the Gilbert copy which was forwarded to the OCJ. Thus, on
page 1 of the Gilbert copy which contains the names of the Justices of the Court, there appear asterisks after
the names of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna and Justice Dante O. Tinga. These asterisks have corresponding
footnotes stating that Justice Azcuna was on official leave per Special Order No. 510 dated July 15, 2008
and Justice Tinga was likewise on official leave per Special Order No. 512 dated July 16, 2008. In
contrast, page 1 of Biraogo's copy and Justice Reyes's new copy, glaringly contain no such asterisks and
footnotes, which indicates that page 1 of Biraogo's copy was photocopied from page 1 of the draft prepared
by Justice Reyes before it was finalized on Gilbert paper.
The leak also could not have come from the offices of the other associate justices, contrary to Justice Reyes's
insinuation. Justice Reyes insinuated that because all the Justices were furnished with advance copies of
the draft ponencia before the session of July 15, 2008, anyone from those offices could have leaked the
decision. An examination of the copy in Biraogo's possession readily shows that every page thereof - pages
1 to 36 - contained Justice Reyes's authenticating initials while none of the advance copies furnished to the
Justices was similarly authenticated.
Advance copies of a draft given to the justices as a working basis for deliberations are not initialed by the
justice who prepares it. And they do not contain the signature of any of the Justices, except the one who
prepared the draft, precisely because the Justices have yet to go over it and deliberate on it. As standard
procedure, it is only after a draft decision has been adopted by the Court that it is finalized-printed on
Gilbert paper and every page thereof is authenticated by the ponente, and circulated for signature by the
other Justices.
It need not be underlined that there was no opportunity for anyone from the offices of the Associate Justices
to photocopy the ponencia as none of said offices acquired possession of the document, except the Office
of Justice Reyes and the Office of Justice Nachura. But based on testimony, the unpromulgated ponencia
stayed in the Office of Justice Nachura only for less than five minutes, which did not suffice for it to be
signed by Justice Nachura and to be photocopied. Again, and in any event, page 1 of the photocopy in
Biraogo's possession does not match the same page of the Gilbert copy.
Furthermore, except for Justice Reyes, the Associate Justices took hold of the Gilbert copy only briefly when
they signed it at the En Banc conference room. At no other time did any of them hold the document long
enough to photocopy it. Pursuant to standard procedure, only the ponente, Justice Reyes in this case, and
his staff, took custody of the ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices before it was sent to the OCJ.
But who from the Office of Justice Reyes leaked the unpromulgated ponencia? While the evidence shows
that the chain of custody could not rule out the possibility that the Gilbert copy was photocopied by Del
Rosario who had control and possession of it, and while there is no direct evidence as to the identity of the
perpetrator of the leakage, the committee FINDS that based on the circumstantial evidence reflected above,
particularly the evident undue interest of Justice Reyes to circulate a draft ponencia of the case
soonest even before the memoranda of all the parties fell due, and to withhold the information to Atty.
Evangelista and Del Rosario that the promulgation of the ponencia was put on hold and, instead, allow the
immediate promulgation after lunch despite his admission that the decision to hold the promulgation was
arrived at at lunchtime, it was Justice Reyes himself who leaked a photocopy thereof.
Recall that the Court gave due course to the petition on April 8, 2008 and the first memorandum was filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General only on June 16, 2008. The other parties, namely, Olivia Paras, Speaker
Nograles, et al., and Biraogo subsequently filed their respective memoranda only on July 1, 2, and 24, 2008.
Even before the En Banc session of June 10, 2008, however, Justice Reyes had already circulated a draft
decision.
Further, still later or on June 12, 2008, Justice Reyes circulated, via transmittal letter of even date printed on
his memo pad and signed by him, a Revised Draft, copy of which transmittal letter, as well as the Revised
Draft, also came into the possession of Biraogo (Annex "B" to Biraogo's Compliance).
Furthermore, even after the Justices had, at lunchtime of July 15, 2008, unanimously decided that the
promulgation of the Gilbert copy would be put on hold - -and this was, it bears repeating, admitted by
Justice Reyes - -, Justice Reyes, after partaking lunch at the dining room and before 1:00 p.m., instead of
advising his Chief of Staff Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that the promulgation was put on hold, still
instructed them to reprint the second signature page (page 36) and to have the reprinted page immediately
brought to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature; and before Justice Reyes left for the session hall for
the oral arguments of that case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day, Justice Reyes still followed up the case by
asking Manabat if Justice Nachura had already signed the Gilbert copy.245
When confronted with the incontrovertible evidence of his undue interest in the case and haste in having
the Gilbert copy promulgated, Justice Reyes was notably evasive. On January 16, 2009, Justice Carpio
Morales asked Justice Reyes if he would admit that he prepared a draft of the decision even before the first
memorandum was submitted on June 16, 2008. Justice Reyes stated that he could not admit that fact.246 Such
fact is documented, however, and it would not have escaped him as the records of the Limkaichong case
were with him and yet he already prepared and caused the circulation of a draft of the decision on June 12,
2008.
Justice Reyes also gave conflicting accounts on when he gave the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario after the En
Banc session of July 15, 2008 was adjourned. During the proceedings of the committee on December 15,
2008, Justice Reyes categorically stated that pursuant to standard operating procedures, he gave the signed
Gilbert copy to Del Rosario after the Chief Justice noted that seven Justices had concurred "in the
result."247 It bears recalling that the Chief Justice confirmed noting such fact during lunchtime. However,
the following day, during the December 16, 2008 proceedings, Justice Reyes implied that pursuant to
standard operating procedures, his staff got his folders including the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc
session. Hence, so he reasoned, as the agreement to put on hold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy and
to hold oral arguments on the case was arrived at only after lunch which followed the adjournment of the
En Banc session, his staff did not know about such agreement.248 But even Del Rosario, whose testimony
he credits more than any of the other members of his staff, categorically stated that Justice Reyes gave him
the Gilbert copy after he (Justice Reyes) had taken his lunch and while he (Del Rosario), Justice Reyes and
Atty. Evangelista were, before 1:00 p.m., on their way to Justice Reyes's office, and that, at that instant,
Justice Reyes instructed Atty. Evangelista to have the signature page 36 reprinted and have Justice Nachura
(who was not participating in the oral arguments scheduled that afternoon) sign.
During the January 22, 2009 hearing, when asked to explain why the top cover of the new copy which he
brought with him and which he claimed to have been photocopied from the committee's copy, did not
match the top cover of the committee's copy (or the original Gilbert copy) but matched the top cover of
Biraogo's copy, Justice Reyes offered no explanation. Neither did he account for the other dissimilarities
between page 1 of his new copy and the same page 1 of Biraogo on one hand, and page 1 of the Gilbert
copy, viz: page 1 of the new copy, like page 1 of Biraogo's copy, does not have asterisks after the names
of Justices Tinga and Azcuna and the corresponding footnotes, which the Gilbert copy has.
Justice Reyes, despite his professed desire to bring out the truth, refused to submit his new copy to the
committee and questioned the committee's request that he place his initials on the questioned pages of his
new copy. Later, while the committee was discussing other points in his Notes, Justice Reyes tried to hide
his new copy. Justice Corona had to pry it out of Justice Reyes's files.ςηαñrοblεš νιr�� υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
As Justice Reyes repeatedly said that he was not submitting his new copy to the committee ("Why should
I"), the committee members were prompted to photocopy his new copy, but only after they affixed their
signatures and date (January 22, 2009) on the first 5 pages thereof.
To the members of the committee, the foregoing proven facts and circumstances constitute more than
substantial evidence which reasonably points to Justice Reyes, despite his protestations of innocence, 249as
THE source of the leak. He must, therefore, be held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
Effect of Justice Reyes's Retirement
The subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding
of any administrative liability to which he is answerable. 250
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or
no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and
academic, despite Justice Reyes's retirement.
Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions may no longer be imposed, there are other penalties
which may be imposed if one is later found guilty of the administrative offenses charged, including
the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.251
The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce a respondent official innocent of the charges or declare
him/her guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications. For, what remedy would the people have against a civil servant who resorts to
wrongful and illegal conduct during his/her last days in office? What would prevent a corrupt and
unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully
well that he/she would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune from all administrative
penalties?cralawred
If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of
the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are
inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, a
respondent official merits vindication of his/her name and integrity as he leaves the government which
he/she served well and faithfully; if guilty, he/she deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a
penalty proper and imposable under the situation.252
The Court cannot over-emphasize the importance of the task of preserving the confidentiality and integrity
of court records. A number of rules and internal procedures are in place to ensure the observance of this
task by court personnel.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct253 provides that confidential information acquired by justices and
judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose not related to their
judicial duties.254 The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel likewise devotes one whole canon on
confidentiality, to wit:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential information
acquired by them while employed in the judiciary, whether such information came from authorized or
unauthorized sources.
Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record relating to pending
cases, as well as information not yet made public concerning the work of any justiceor judge relating to
pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda,
records of internal deliberations and similar papers.
The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution or order
shall remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is made public.
SEC. 2. Confidential information available to specific individuals by reason of statute, court rule or
administrative policy shall be disclosed only by persons authorized to do so.
SEC. 3. Unless expressly authorized by the designated authority, court personnel shall not disclose
confidential information given by litigants, witnesses or attorneys to justices, judges or any other person.
SEC. 4. Former court personnel shall not disclose confidential information acquired by them during their
employment in the Judiciary when disclosed by current court personnel of the same information would
constitute a breach of confidentiality. Any disclosure in violation of this provisions shall constitute indirect
contempt of court.255 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Ineluctably, any release of a copy to the public, or to the parties, of an unpromulgated ponencia infringes
on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court. It is settled that the internal deliberations of the
Court are confidential.256 A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of
those tasked to exercise judicial power.257
In Mirasol v. De La Torre, Jr.,258 the Court stated that "[c]ourt documents are confidential documents. They
must not be taken out of the court without proper authority and without the necessary safeguards to ensure
their confidentiality and integrity." Thus, the Court found the clerk of court guilty of gross misconduct.
Moreover, the case enunciates that acts of gross misconduct destroy the good image of the judiciary so the
Court cannot countenance them nor allow the perpetrators to remain in office. This same pronouncement
was reiterated in Betguen v. Masangcay.259 Though both cases involve indiscretions of clerks of court, it is
but logical that a higher standard of care be imposed upon magistrates of the Court.
PAGCOR v. Rilloza,260 in fact, commands persons who routinely handle confidential matters to be
confidential employees. They are thus expected to be more careful than an ordinary employee in their day
to day business. They are reposed such trust and confidence that a breach of their duty would mean breach
of trust. As applied to the case of Justice Reyes, the breach of duty amounts to breach of public trust as
the committee believes that the leak was motivated by self-interest.
The fact that Justice Reyes was not formally charged is of no moment. It is settled that under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their
face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct. 261
In People v. Valenzuela,262 which deals with the administrative aspect of a case brought on certiorari, the
Court dispensed with the conduct of further hearings under the principle of res ipsa loquitur and proceeded
to consider critical factors in deducing malice and bad faith on the part of the judge, after it did not accept
at face value the judge's mere denial. In that case, the judge ordered the return of the peso equivalent of the
foreign currency to the accused despite its forfeiture as dutiable goods and even after the finding that the
accused had nothing to do with the mailing thereof.
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr.,263 where the Court took into account glaring circumstances in
the proceedings of the case in concluding that the judge acted with bad faith, the judge was similarly found
guilty of grave and serious misconduct when he unjustly declared the defendant in default and awarded
outrageously exorbitant damages. l
Prudential Bank v. Castro264 was an administrative case spawned by a party's complaint, wherein the
Court, in light of the surrounding circumstances, found that the judge committed serious and grave
misfeasance because the issuance of the orders and ill-conceived summary judgment showed the judge's
partiality to, or confabulation with the plaintiff and its lawyers.
In Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano,265 the Court proceeded in adjudging the attendant
circumstances as tainted with bad faith and questionable integrity to call for the exercise of the Court's
disciplinary powers over members of the judiciary. In that case, the Court found the submissions of the
judge unacceptable and clearly inadequate to overcome the cumulative effect of the highly questionable
actuations' taking cognizance of a claim for damages arising from an attachment, instead of having it
litigated in the same action where the writ was issued - as evincing gross ignorance of the law and active
bias or partiality.
The Court, in Cruz v. Yaneza,266 perceived the judge's persistent pattern of approving bail bonds and issuing
release orders beyond its territorial jurisdiction as evincing a modus operandi that flagrantly flaunts
fundamental rules.
In De Los Santos v. Magsino,267 the Court again applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when a judge
irregularly approved a bail bond and issued a release order of an accused whose case was pending in
another province, in palpable disregard and gross ignorance of the procedural law on bail.
The principle was also applied to discipline court personnel and suspend members of the Bar from the
practice of law.
The Court, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Pardo,268 found the clerk of court guilty of gross discourtesy
in the course of official duties when he failed to accord respect for the person and rights of a judge as can
be gleaned from a mere reading of his letter to the Executive Judge.
In Sy v. Moncupa,269 the Court found the evidence against the clerk for malversation of public funds
eloquently speaks of her criminal misdeed to justify the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
clerk admitted the shortage in the court funds in her custody and pleaded for time to pay the amount she
had failed to account for.
In maintaining an earlier Resolution,270 the Court, in In re Wenceslao Laureta,271 also declared that nothing
more was needed to be said or proven and the necessity to conduct any further evidentiary hearing was
obviated. In that case, the Court found that the letters and charges leveled against the Justices were, of
themselves and by themselves, malicious and contemptuous, and undermined the independence of the
judiciary.
Meanwhile, in Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Dioneda,272 it was held that it was
reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the respondent committed an
infringement of ethical standards by his act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in a case
and subsequently failing to render such service. The Court found the respondent liable for disloyalty to his
client and inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to him.
The Court, in Dizon, clarified the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, viz:
In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the face of the assailed decisions, an inexplicable grave
error bereft of any redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring about an unjust decision, or a
manifestly deliberate intent to wreak an injustice against a hapless party. The facts themselves, previously
proven or admitted, were of such a character as to give rise to a strong inference that evil intent was
present. Such intent, in short, was clearly deducible from what was already of record. The res ipsa
loquitur doctrine does not except or dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference
of evil intent is based. It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts
are admitted or are already shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would negative the
strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to support a judgment
as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary.273(Underscoring and emphasis supplied.)
The apparent toning down of the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule was further amplified in at least
two cases. In Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Villanueva,274 the Court ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturdoes not
apply to cases of knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment, and even if the doctrine is appreciable,
complainant still has to present proof of malice or bad faith.
Then came Fernandez v. Verzola,275 where it was held that failure to substantiate a claim of corruption and
bribery and mere reliance on conjectures and suppositions cannot sustain an administrative complaint. In
dismissing the complaint, the Court rejected as untenable the reasoning that the decision itself is evidence
of corruption per doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It upheld the rule that rendering an erroneous or baseless
judgment, in itself, is not sufficient to justify the judge's dismissal from the service.
The supposed tempering of the principle of res ipsa loquitur in Dizon only bolstered and solidified the
application of the doctrine in cases not only of gross negligence but of serious misconduct as well, since it
speaks of "inference of evil intent."
As explained in Louis Vuitton, the familiar rule in administrative cases is that the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, and that he cannot be subjected to civil, criminal
or administrative liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good
faith. The rule adds that the proper remedy is via judicial recourse and not through an administrative
action.ςηαñrοblεš νιr�� υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
It must be pointed out that Louis Vuitton involves gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment. In cases of leakage or breach of confidentiality, however, the familiar rule obviously
does not apply. While the injured party is the Court itself, there is no judicial remedy available to undo the
disclosure. Moreover, the premature disclosure does not spring from the four corners of the assailed
decision or resolution nor can it gleaned on the face of the issuance itself. Indeed, one need not dwell on
the substance of the decision since that in itself is inherently insufficient. In unearthing the misdeed, it
becomes not only desirable but also necessary to trace the attendant circumstances, apparent pattern and
critical factors surrounding the entire scenario.
In Macalintal v. Teh,276 the Court pronounced:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle
in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title
he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave
abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order.ςηαñrοblεš νιr�� υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ
After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of
the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.277 (Underscoring supplied.)
The same norm equally applies in the breach of the basic and essential rule of confidentiality that, as
described in one case, "[a]ll conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are
arrived at only after deliberation [and c]ourt personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case
because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one of them being present. 278
As Dizon declared, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not dispense with the necessity of proving the facts
on which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely expresses that absent a credible explanation, it is
clearly sound and reasonable to conclude a strong inference of evil intent on the basis of facts duly admitted
or shown by the record. In fine, jurisprudence allows the reception of circumstantial evidence to prove not
only gross negligence but also serious misconduct.
Justice Reyes is Likewise Liable for Violating his Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility
For leaking a confidential internal document of the En Banc, the committee likewise finds Justice
Reyes administratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he may be disbarred or suspended per Section 27, 279 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. It is likewise
provided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the said canon that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct and that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Here, the act of Justice Reyes not only violated the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, it also infringed on the internal deliberations of the Court and impeded and degraded the
administration of justice. The act is rendered all the more pernicious considering that it was committed by
no less than a justice of the Supreme Court who was supposed to serve as example to the bench and bar.
That Justice Reyes was an impeachable officer when the investigation started is of no moment. The rule
prohibiting the institution of disbarment proceedings against an impeachable officer who is required by
the Constitution to be a member of the bar as a qualification in office applies only during his or her tenure
and does not create immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violations of the Code
of Judicial Conduct or other supposed violations.280 Once the said impeachable officer is no longer in office
because of his removal, resignation, retirement or permanent disability, the Court may proceed against him
or her and impose the corresponding sanctions for misconduct committed during his tenure, pursuant to
the Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the bar. Provided that the requirements
of due process are met, the Court may penalize retired members of the Judiciary for misconduct committed
during their incumbency. Thus, in Cañada v. Suerte,281 this Court ordered the disbarment of a retired judge
for misconduct committed during his incumbency as a judge.
However, pernicious as Justice Reyes's infractions may have been, the committee finds the imposition of
the supreme penalty of disbarment unwarranted. In the determination of the imposable disciplinary
sanction against an erring lawyer, the Court takes into account the primary purpose of disciplinary
proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to the Court's
sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity
or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity
and independence of the bar. Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. Under the circumstances of this case, the committee finds the penalty of indefinite
suspension from the practice of law sufficient and proper.
Liability of Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista
The Committee finds that Atty. Evangelista, Justice Reyes' Judicial Staff Head, was remiss in his duties,
which includes the supervision of the operations of the office, particularly with respect to the promulgation
of decisions. While it is incumbent upon him to devise ways and means to secure the integrity of
confidential documents, his actuations reflected above evinced "a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference."282
Atty. Evangelista was admittedly unmindful of the responsible safekeeping of draft ponencias in an
unlocked drawer of a member of the staff. He failed to make sure that the unused portion of confidential
documents like the second signatory page of the ponencia in Gilbert form had been properly disposed of
or shredded. He was not on top of things that concerned the promulgation of ponencias, for he failed to
ascertain the status and procedural implication of an "on hold" order after having been apprised thereof by
his subordinate, Del Rosario, on July 17, 2008. Despite his awareness that the Limkaichong case would
eventually be called again, he admitted that he was not privy to the preparation of the copy of the ponencia
for the subsequent session on July 29, 2008.
With these findings, the Court finds him liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY.
Liability of Armando Del Rosario
The committee likewise finds Del Rosario administratively liable for failing to exercise the required degree
of care in the custody of the Gilbert copy. Del Rosario admittedly kept the Gilbert copy in an unlocked
drawer from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008 when he should have known that, by the nature of the
document in his custody, he should have kept it more securely. His carelessness renders him
administratively liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY, defined as the failure to give proper attention
to a task expected of an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference. 283
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court officials and
employees are mandated to carry. They are constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety,
misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. The Court will never
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice
which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the people's faith in the judiciary.
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, (simple) neglect of duty
is punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Under Sec. 19,
Rule XIV of the same Rules, the penalty of fine (instead of suspension) may also be imposed in the
alternative.284 Following the Court's ruling in several cases involving (simple) neglect of duty, 285 we find
the penalty of fine on Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario in the amount of P10,000 and P5,000, respectively,
just and reasonable.
RECOMMENDATIONS
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Investigating Committee respectfully recommends that
(1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) be found liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his oath as a
member of the Bar and the Code of Professional Responsibility and be meted the penalty of INDEFINITE
SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar;
(2) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) also be found liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential
internal document of the Court and be FINED in the amount of P500,000, to be charged against his
retirement benefits; andcralawlibrary
(3) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario be held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF
DUTY and be FINED in the amount of P10,000 and P5,000, respectively.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
(Sgd.)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Chairman
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Member Member
The Court finds the above-quoted report well taken. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
this per curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court En Banc by a unanimous decision of
all the members of the Court except for two (2) Justices who are on official leave.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS thefindingsand APPROVES WITH
MODIFICATION the Recommendations of the Investigating Committee as follows:
(1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential
internal document of the Court and he is FINED P500,000.00,to be charged against his retirement benefits,
and disqualified to hold any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government
including government-owned or controlled corporations; furthermore, Justice Ruben T. Reyes is directed
to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision why he should not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar in light of the aforementioned findings.
(2) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario are held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF
DUTY and are ordered to pay the FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. Nos. 979 and 986 December 10, 2002

RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS,
MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. Like many others he was directed
"to submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from
the last day of the examinations."
Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a Resolution dated 13 April 2000 the Court disqualified
him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null and void on two
(2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar review
course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations; and (b) He committed a
serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a member of the Philippine Bar when he
made it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course at
the Philippine Law School (PLS) when, as certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not
offered such course since 1967.
Petitioner explained that there was typographical error when his friend erroneously typed "Philippine Law
School," instead of UST, on the space provided for the school where petitioner attended his pre-bar review
course.
Issue:
The foremost question to be resolved is whether petitioner did enrol in and complete his pre-bar review
course in UST as he herein avows.
Held:
Considering petitioner’s explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, at the very least,
petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and be allowed to take his oath.
The Court is well aware of instances in the past when ,as a measure of compassion and kindness, it has
acted favorably on similar petitions.
At this juncture it may be well to note the Court’s growing concern over the apparent laxity of law schools
in the conduct of their pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has been observed that the attendance of
reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some reviewees are able to comply with the requisite with
minimal attendance. Enrollment and completion of pre-bar review course is an additional requirement
under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those who failed the bar examinations for three (3) or more times.
For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for the moon but it can be done. We just
have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or idle ceremony; it is intended to ensure the
quality and preparedness of those applying for admission to the bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, as recommended by the Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report and
Recommendation dated 7 November 2002, the prayer in Bar Matters Nos. 979 and 986 is granted and
examinee MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA who passed the 1999 Bar Examinations is now allowed to
take the Lawyer’s Oath and be admitted to the Philippine Bar. He is further allowed to sign the Roll of
Attorneys upon payment of the required fees.
SO ORDERED
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC

OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO. Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 12, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is concerned with charges that, in preparing a decision for the Court, a designated member
plagiarized the works of certain authors and twisted their meanings to support the decision.
The Background Facts
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all members of the Malaya Lolas
Organization, filed with the Court in G.R. No. 162230 a special civil action of certiorari with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the
Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General.
Petitioners claimed that in destroying villages in the Philippines during World War II, the Japanese army
systematically raped them and a number of other women, seizing them and holding them in houses or cells
where soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them.
Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the Executive Department, represented by
the respondent public officials, requesting assistance in filing claims against the Japanese military officers
who established the comfort women stations. But that Department declined, saying that petitioners
individual claims had already been fully satisfied under the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan.
Petitioners wanted the Court to render judgment, compelling the Executive Department to espouse
their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court
of Justice and other international tribunals.
On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners action.Justice Mariano C. del
Castillo wrote the decision for the Court. The Court essentially gave two reasons for its decision: it cannot
grant the petition because, first, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative under the
Constitution and the law to determine whether to espouse petitioners claim against Japan; and, second, the
Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse their claims.
On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Courts decision. More than a
month later on July 18, 2010, counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced in his
online blog that his clients would file a supplemental petition detailing plagiarism committed by the court
under the second reason it gave for dismissing the petition and that these stolen passages were also twisted
to support the courts erroneous conclusions that the Filipino comfort women of World War Two have no
further legal remedies. The media gave publicity to Atty. Roques announcement.
On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion for reconsideration that Atty. Roque
announced. It accused Justice Del Castillo of manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism [1] when he
wrote the decision for the Court and of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources to suit the
arguments of the assailed Judgment.[2] They charged Justice Del Castillo of copying without
acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign articles:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale
Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University
Press (2005).
Petitioners claim that the integrity of the Courts deliberations in the case has been put into question
by Justice Del Castillos fraud. The Court should thus address and disclose to the public the truth about the
manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism[3] that resulted in gross prejudice to the petitioners.
Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for reconsideration generated, Justice Del
Castillo circulated a letter to his colleagues, subsequently verified, stating that when he wrote the decision
for the Court he had the intent to attribute all sources used in it. He said in the pertinent part:
It must be emphasized that there was every intention to attribute all sources,
whenever due. At no point was there ever any malicious intent to appropriate anothers
work as our own. We recall that this ponencia was thrice included in the Agenda of the
Court en banc. It was deliberated upon during the Baguio session on April 13, 2010,
April 20, 2010 and in Manila on April 27, 2010. Each time, suggestions were made which
necessitated major revisions in the draft. Sources were re-studied, discussions modified,
passages added or deleted. The resulting decision comprises 34 pages with 78 footnotes.
xxxx
As regards the claim of the petitioners that the concepts as contained in the
above foreign materials were twisted, the same remains their opinion which we do not
necessarily share.[4]
On July 27, 2010, the Court En Banc referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, chaired by the Chief Justice, for investigation and
recommendation. The Chief Justice designated retired Justice Jose C. Vitug to serve as consultant of the
Committee.He graciously accepted.
On August 2, 2010, the Committee directed petitioners to comment on Justice Del Castillos verified
letter. When this was done, it set the matter for hearing.
In the meantime, on July 19, 2010, Evan Criddle wrote on his blog that he and his co-author Evan
Fox-Descent (referred to jointly as Criddle-Descent) learned of alleged plagiarism involving their work but
Criddles concern, after reading the supplemental motion for reconsideration, was the Courts conclusion
that prohibitions against sexual slavery are not jus cogens or internationally binding norms that treaties
cannot diminish.
On July 23, 2010, Dr. Mark Ellis wrote the Court expressing concern that in mentioning his work,
the Court may have misread the argument [he] made in the article and employed them for cross
purposes. Dr. Ellis said that he wrote the article precisely to argue for appropriate legal remedy for victims
of war crimes.
On August 8, 2010, after the referral of the matter to the Committee for investigation, the Dean of
the University of the Philippines (U.P.) College of Law publicized a Statement from his faculty, claiming
that the Vinuya decision was an extraordinary act of injustice and a singularly reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The statement said that Justice Del
Castillo had a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors work, and that the Courts decision
amounted to an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive. [5]
On August 18, 2010 Mr. Christian J. Tams wrote Chief Justice Renato C. Corona that, although relevant
sentences in the Courts decision were taken from his work, he was given generic reference only in the
footnote and in connection with a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to
the passages taken from his work. He thought that the form of referencing was inappropriate. Mr. Tams
was also concerned that the decision may have used his work to support an approach to erga omnes concept
(obligations owed by individual States to the community of nations) that is not consistent with what he
advocated.
On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the parties submissions in the summary manner of
administrative investigations. Counsels from both sides were given ample time to address the Committee
and submit their evidence. The Committee queried them on these.
Counsels for Justice Del Castillo later asked to be heard with the other parties not in attendance so
they could make submissions that their client regarded as sensitive and confidential, involving the drafting
process that went into the making of the Courts decision in the Vinuya case. Petitioners counsels vigorously
objected and the Committee sustained the objection. After consulting Justice Del Castillo, his counsels
requested the Committee to hear the Justices court researcher, whose name need not be mentioned here,
explain the research work that went into the making of the decision in the Vinuya case. The Committee
granted the request.
The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation how the attribution of the lifted
passages to the writings of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice
Del Castillo, were unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her grievous mistake and
grief for having caused an enormous amount of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family. [6]
On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to the researchers explanation, counsel
for petitioners insisted that lack of intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for a
writer to acknowledge that certain words or language in his work were taken from anothers work. Counsel
invoked the Courts ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy
William Margaret Celine,[7] arguing that standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more
force to the judiciary.
After the hearing, the Committee gave the parties ten days to file their respective memoranda. They
filed their memoranda in due course. Subsequently after deliberation, the Committee submitted its
unanimous findings and recommendations to the Court.
The Issues
This case presents two issues:
1. Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, Justice Del Castillo plagiarized
the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.
2. Whether or not Justice Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors to make it appear that such works
supported the Courts position in the Vinuya decision.
The Courts Rulings
Because of the pending motion for reconsideration in the Vinuya case, the Court like its Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards will purposely avoid touching the merits of the Courts decision in that case
or the soundness or lack of soundness of the position it has so far taken in the same. The Court will deal,
not with the essential merit or persuasiveness of the foreign authors works, but how the decision that
Justice Del Castillo wrote for the Court appropriated parts of those works and for what purpose the
decision employed the same.
At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from
(another) and pass them off as ones own.[8] The passing off of the work of another as ones own is thus an
indispensable element of plagiarism.
The Passages from Tams
Petitioners point out that the Vinuya decision lifted passages from Tams book, Enforcing Erga
Omnes Obligations in International Law (2006) and used them in Footnote 69 with what the author thought
was a mere generic reference.But, although Tams himself may have believed that the footnoting in this case
was not an appropriate form of referencing,[9] he and petitioners cannot deny that the decision did attribute
the source or sources of such passages. Justice Del Castillo did not pass off Tams work as his own. The
Justice primarily attributed the ideas embodied in the passages to Bruno Simma, whom Tams himself
credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned, apart from Simma, Tams article as another source of those
ideas.
The Court believes that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the
footnoting standards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of
writing. The statement See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005) in
the Vinuyadecision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit than
he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off the challenged
passages as his own.
That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the introductory phrase cited in rather
than the phrase See would make a case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of manifest
intellectual theft and outright plagiarism. If the Justices citations were imprecise, it would just be a case of
bad footnoting rather than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would be target of abuse for
every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination, and for every technical detail of form.
The Passages from Ellis

and Criddle-Descent
Petitioners also attack the Courts decision for lifting and using as footnotes, without attribution to
the author, passages from the published work of Ellis. The Court made the following statement on page 27
of its decision, marked with Footnote 65 at the end:
We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally
reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. 65 xxx
Footnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the lengthy passages in that footnote came
almost verbatim from Ellis article,[10] such passages ought to have been introduced by an acknowledgement
that they are from that article. The footnote could very well have read:
65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case Western

Reserve Journal of International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said: The concept of rape as an
international crime is relatively new. This is not to say that rape has never been historically
prohibited, particularly in war. But modern-day sensitivity to the crime of rape did not
emerge until after World War II. In the Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not
mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but
rape was not mentioned by name. (For example, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce
between Prussia and the United States provides that in time of war all women and children
shall not be molested in their persons. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Between his
Majesty the King of Prussia and the United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-
Pruss., 8 TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS OF THE U.S. 78, 85. The 1863 Lieber
Instructions classified rape as a crime of troop discipline. (Mitchell, TheProhibition of Rape
in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J.
COMP. INTL. L. 219, 224). It specified rape as a capital crime punishable by the death
penalty (Id. at 236). The 1907 Hague Convention protected women by requiring the
protection of their honour. (Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907. General Assembly
resolution 95 (I) of December 11, 1946 entitled, Affirmation of the Principles of
International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nrnberg Tribunal; General Assembly
document A/64/Add.1 of 1946; See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
Article 6(c) of the Charter established crimes against humanity as the following:
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the Jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any reference to rape and rape was not
prosecuted. (Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals
Crime and Punishment in the International Arena,7 ILSA J. INTL. COMP. L. 667,
676.) However, International Military Tribunal for the Far East prosecuted rape crimes,
even though its Statute did not explicitly criminalize rape. The Far East Tribunal held
General Iwane Matsui, Commander Shunroku Hata and Foreign Minister Hirota
criminally responsible for a series of crimes, including rape, committed by persons
under their authority. (THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST445-54 (1977).
The first mention of rape as a specific crime came in December 1945 when Control
Council Law No. 10 included the term rape in the definition of crimes against
humanity. Law No. 10, adopted by the four occupying powers in Germany, was
devised to establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war criminals in German courts.
(Control Council for Germany, Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette
Control Council for Germany 50, 53 (1946))
The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was
the first modern-day international instrument to establish protections against rape for
women. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force Oct. 20, 1950)
[hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].Furthermore, the ICC, the ICTY, and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have significantly advanced the
crime of rape by enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a war crime, and a crime
against humanity.
But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction was missing

from Footnote 65.
Next, petitioners also point out that the following eight sentences and their accompanying
footnotes appear in text on pages 30-32 of the Vinuya decision:
xxx In international law, the term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to
norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and
custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international
norms of equivalent authority.71
Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,72 but peremptory norms
began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's
influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law.73 The recognition of jus
cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILCs preparation of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).74 Though there was a consensus that certain
international norms had attained the status of jus cogens,75 the ILC was unable to reach a
consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms.
After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded
ruefully in 1963 that there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to
identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens.76 In a
commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated that the prudent
course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State
practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.77 Thus, while the existence
of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its
substance,77 beyond a tiny core of principles and rules. 78
Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including their footnotes, from Criddle-Descents
article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens.[11] Criddle-Descents footnotes were carried into
the Vinuya decisions own footnotes but no attributions were made to the two authors in those footnotes.
The Explanation
Unless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be
construed as plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillos researchers, a court-employed attorney, explained
how she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of her report to
him, which report eventually became the working draft of the decision. She said that, for most parts, she
did her research electronically. For international materials, she sourced these mainly from Westlaw, an
online research service for legal and law-related materials to which the Court subscribes.
In the old days, the common practice was that after a Justice would have assigned a case for study
and report, the researcher would source his materials mostly from available law books and published
articles on print. When he found a relevant item in a book, whether for one side of the issue or for the other,
he would place a strip of paper marker on the appropriate page, pencil mark the item, and place the book
on his desk where other relevant books would have piled up. He would later paraphrase or copy the
marked out passages from some of these books as he typed his manuscript on a manual typewriter. This
occasion would give him a clear opportunity to attribute the materials used to their authors or sources.
With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained, most
legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in
internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items that
were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord
plate of materials that she thought she might need.The researchers technique in this case is not too far
different from that employed by a carpenter. The carpenter first gets the pieces of lumber he would need,
choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has in mind, say a table.When ready, he would
measure out the portions he needs, cut them out of the pieces of lumber he had collected, and construct his
table. He would get rid of the scraps.
Here, Justice Del Castillos researcher did just that. She electronically cut relevant materials from
books and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted these to a main manuscript in her computer that
contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used the Microsoft Word
program.[12] Later, after she decided on the general shape that her report would take, she began pruning
from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of those
that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions
with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that
computer-literate court researchers use everyday in their work.
Justice Del Castillos researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in
the Vinuya case and these included the passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of
Ellis with proper attributions to these authors. But, as it happened, in the course of editing and cleaning up
her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the attributions.
First Finding
The Court adopts the Committees finding that the researchers explanation regarding the accidental
removal of proper attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the
Microsoft program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to sources of research
materials is not remote.
For most senior lawyers and judges who are not computer literate, a familiar example similar to
the circumstances of the present case would probably help illustrate the likelihood of such an accident
happening. If researcher X, for example, happens to be interested in the inalienable character of juridical
personality in connection with an assignment and if the book of the learned Civilist, Arturo M. Tolentino,
happens to have been published in a website, researcher X would probably show interest in the following
passage from that book:
xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of
persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or renounced.15
xxx
_____________________________
15 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.
Because the sentence has a footnote mark (#15) that attributes the idea to other sources, it is evident that
Tolentino did not originate it. The idea is not a product of his intellect. He merely lifted it from Von Tuhr
and Valverde, two reputable foreign authors.
When researcher X copies and pastes the above passage and its footnote into a manuscript-in-the-making
in his computer, the footnote number would, given the computer program in use, automatically change
and adjust to the footnoting sequence of researcher Xs manuscript. Thus, if the preceding footnote in the
manuscript when the passage from Tolentino was pasted on it is 23, Tolentinos footnote would
automatically change from the original Footnote 15 to Footnote 24.
But then, to be of use in his materials-gathering scheme, researcher X would have to tag the
Tolentino passage with a short description of its subject for easy reference. A suitable subject description
would be: The inalienable character of juridical personality.23 The footnote mark, 23 From Tolentino, which
researcher X attaches to the subject tag, serves as reminder to him to attribute the passage in its final form
to Tolentino. After the passage has been tagged, it would now appear like this:
The inalienable character of juridical personality.23
xxx
_____________________________
23 From Tolentino.
The tag is of course temporary and would later have to go. It serves but a marker to help researcher
X maneuver the passage into the right spot in his final manuscript.
The mistake of Justice Del Castillos researcher is that, after the Justice had decided what texts,
passages, and citations were to be retained including those from Criddle-Descent and Ellis, and when she
was already cleaning up her work and deleting all subject tags, she unintentionally deleted the footnotes
that went with such tagswith disastrous effect.
To understand this, in Tolentinos example, the equivalent would be researcher Xs removal during
cleanup of the tag, The inalienable character of juridical personality.23, by a simple delete operation, and the
unintended removal as well of the accompanying footnote (#23). The erasure of the footnote eliminates the
link between the lifted passage and its source, Tolentinos book. Only the following would remain in the
manuscript:
_____________________________
As it happened, the Microsoft word program does not have a function that raises an alarm when
original materials are cut up or pruned. The portions that remain simply blend in with the rest of the
manuscript, adjusting the footnote number and removing any clue that what should stick together had just
been severed.
This was what happened in the attributions to Ellis and Criddle-Descent.The researcher deleted
the subject tags and, accidentally, their accompanying footnotes that served as reminder of the sources of
the lifted passages. With 119 sources cited in the decision, the loss of the 2 of them was not easily detectable.
Petitioners point out, however, that Justice Del Castillos verified letter of July 22, 2010 is
inconsistent with his researchers claim that the omissions were mere errors in attribution. They cite the fact
that the Justice did not disclose his researchers error in that letter despite the latters confession regarding
her mistake even before the Justice sent his letter to the Chief Justice. By denying plagiarism in his letter,
Justice Del Castillo allegedly perjured himself and sought to whitewash the case. [13]
But nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false testimony. Justice Del Castillo merely
explained that there was every intention to attribute all sources whenever due and that there was never
any malicious intent to appropriate anothers work as our own, which as it turns out is a true statement.He
recalled how the Court deliberated upon the case more than once, prompting major revisions in the draft
of the decision. In the process, (s)ources were re-studied, discussions modified, passages added or
deleted. Nothing in the letter suggests a cover-up. Indeed, it did not preclude a researchers inadvertent
error.
And it is understandable that Justice Del Castillo did not initially disclose his researchers error. He
wrote the decision for the Court and was expected to take full responsibility for any lapse arising from its
preparation. What is more, the process of drafting a particular decision for the Court is confidential, which
explained his initial request to be heard on the matter without the attendance of the other parties.
Notably, neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a motive or reason for omitting
attribution for the lifted passages to Criddle-Descent or to Ellis. The latter authors are highly respected
professors of international law. The law journals that published their works have exceptional
reputations. It did not make sense to intentionally omit attribution to these authors when the decision cites
an abundance of other sources. Citing these authors as the sources of the lifted passages would enhance
rather than diminish their informative value. Both Justice Del Castillo and his researcher gain nothing from
the omission. Thus, the failure to mention the works of Criddle-Decent and Ellis was unquestionably due
to inadvertence or pure oversight.
Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material in committing plagiarism since all that a writer
has to do, to avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge the
sources from which these were taken.[14] Petitioners point out that the Court should apply to this case the
ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret
Celine.[15] They argue that standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the
judiciary.
But petitioners theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to
deceive is inherent. Their theory provides no room for errors in research, an unrealistic position
considering that there is hardly any substantial written work in any field of discipline that is free of any
mistake. The theory places an automatic universal curse even on errors that, as in this case, have reasonable
and logical explanations.
Indeed, the 8th edition of Blacks Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the deliberate and knowing
presentation of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as one's own. [16] Thus, plagiarism
presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious effort to steal anothers work and pass it off as ones own.
Besides, the Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that would indicate that an intent to pass
off anothers work as ones own is not required in plagiarism. The Court merely affirmed the academic
freedom of a university to withdraw a masters degree that a student obtained based on evidence that she
misappropriated the work of others, passing them off as her own. This is not the case here since, as already
stated, Justice Del Castillo actually imputed the borrowed passages to others.
Second Finding
The Court also adopts the Committees finding that the omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent
and Ellis did not bring about an impression that Justice Del Castillo himself created the passages that he
lifted from their published articles. That he merely got those passages from others remains self-evident,
despite the accidental deletion. The fact is that he still imputed the passages to the sources from which
Criddle-Descent and Ellis borrowed them in the first place.
This is best illustrated in the familiar example above. After the deletion of the subject tag and,
accidentally, its footnote which connects to the source, the lifted passage would appear like this:
_____________________________
Although the unintended deletion severed the passages link to Tolentino, the passage remains to
be attributed to Von Tuhr and Valverde, the original sources that Tolentino himself cites. The text and its
footnote reference cancel out any impression that the passage is a creation of researcher X. It is the same
with the passages from Criddle-Descent and Ellis. Because such passages remained attributed by the
footnotes to the authors original sources, the omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis gave no
impression that the passages were the creations of Justice Del Castillo. This wholly negates the idea that he
was passing them off as his own thoughts.
True the subject passages in this case were reproduced in the Vinuyadecision without placing them
in quotation marks. But such passages are much unlike the creative line from Robert Frost, [17] The woods
are lovely, dark, and deep, but I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep, and miles to go
before I sleep. The passages here consisted of common definitions and terms, abridged history of certain
principles of law, and similar frequently repeated phrases that, in the world of legal literature, already
belong to the public realm.
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels,[18] while the academic publishing model is based on the
originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages
courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not
expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the soundness
and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from.
Third Finding
Petitioners allege that the decision twisted the passages from Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. The
Court adopts the Committees finding that this is not so. Indeed, this allegation of twisting or
misrepresentation remains a mystery to the Court. To twist means to distort or pervert the meaning
of.[19] For example, if one lifts the lyrics of the National Anthem, uses it in his work, and declares that Jose
Palma who wrote it did not love his country, then there is twisting or misrepresentation of what the
anthems lyrics said. Here, nothing in the Vinuya decision said or implied that, based on the lifted passages,
authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis supported the Courts conclusion that the Philippines is not under
any obligation in international law to espouse Vinuya et al.s claims.
The fact is that, first, since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were accidentally deleted,
it is impossible for any person reading the decision to connect the same to the works of those authors as to
conclude that in writing the decision Justice Del Castillo twisted their intended messages. And, second, the
lifted passages provided mere background facts that established the state of international law at various
stages of its development. These are neutral data that could support conflicting theories regarding whether
or not the judiciary has the power today to order the Executive Department to sue another country or
whether the duty to prosecute violators of international crimes has attained the status of jus cogens.
Considering how it was impossible for Justice Del Castillo to have twisted the meaning of the
passages he lifted from the works of Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis, the charge of twisting or
misrepresentation against him is to say the least, unkind. To be more accurate, however, the charge is
reckless and obtuse.
No Misconduct
On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to use quotation
marks, inadvertently omitted necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in every
case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption, or malice are subject of
disciplinary action.[20] This is not the case here. Justice Del Castillos acts or omissions were not shown to
have been impelled by any of such disreputable motives.[21] If the rule were otherwise, no judge or justice,
however competent, honest, or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an
unblemished record.[22]
No Inexcusable Negligence
Finally, petitioners assert that, even if they were to concede that the omission was the result of plain
error, Justice Del Castillo is nonetheless guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. They point out that he has
full control and supervision over his researcher and should not have surrendered the writing of the decision
to the latter.[23]
But this assumes that Justice Del Castillo abdicated the writing of the Vinuya decision to his
researcher, which is contrary to the evidence adduced during the hearing. As his researcher testified, the
Justice set the direction that the research and study were to take by discussing the issues with her, setting
forth his position on those issues, and reviewing and commenting on the study that she was putting
together until he was completely satisfied with it.[24] In every sense, Justice Del Castillo was in control of
the writing of the report to the Court, which report eventually became the basis for the decision, and
determined its final outcome.
Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney, the equivalent of a law clerk in the
United States Supreme Court, is standard practice in the high courts of all nations. This is dictated by
necessity. With about 80 to 100 cases assigned to a Justice in our Court each month, it would be truly
senseless for him to do all the studies and research, going to the library, searching the internet, checking
footnotes, and watching the punctuations. If he does all these by himself, he would have to allocate at least
one to two weeks of work for each case that has been submitted for decision. The wheels of justice in the
Supreme Court will grind to a halt under such a proposition.
What is important is that, in this case, Justice Del Castillo retained control over the writing of the
decision in the Vinuya case without, however, having to look over his researchers shoulder as she cleaned
up her draft report to ensure that she hit the right computer keys. The Justices researcher was after all
competent in the field of assignment given her. She finished law from a leading law school, graduated third
in her class, served as Editor-in Chief of her schools Law Journal, and placed fourth in the bar examinations
when she took it. She earned a masters degree in International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious
university in the United States under the Global-Hauser program, which counsel for petitioners concedes
to be one of the top post graduate programs on International Law in the world. Justice Del Castillo did not
exercise bad judgment in assigning the research work in the Vinuya case to her.
Can errors in preparing decisions be prevented? Not until computers cease to be operated by
human beings who are vulnerable to human errors. They are hypocrites who believe that the courts should
be as error-free as they themselves are.
Incidentally, in the course of the submission of petitioners exhibits, the Committee noted that
petitioners Exhibit J, the accusing statement of the Faculty of the U.P. College of Law on the allegations of
plagiarism and misinterpretation, was a mere dummy. The whole of the statement was reproduced but the
signatures portion below merely listed the names of 38 faculty members, in solid rows, with the letters Sgd
or signed printed beside the names without exception. These included the name of retired Supreme Court
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a U.P. professor.
Because the Committee declined to admit a mere dummy of Exhibit J, it directed Atty. Roque to
present the signed copy within three days of the August 26 hearing. [25] He complied. As it turned out, the
original statement was signed by only a minority of the faculty members on the list. The set of signatories
that appeared like solid teeth in the dummy turned out to be broken teeth in the original. Since only 37 out
of the 81 on the list signed the document, it does not appear to be a statement of the Faculty but of just some
of its members. And retired Justice V. V. Mendoza did not sign the statement, contrary to what the dummy
represented. The Committee wondered why the Dean submitted a dummy of the signed document when
U.P. has an abundance of copying machines.
Since the above circumstances appear to be related to separate en bancmatter concerning the
supposed Faculty statement, there is a need for the Committee to turn over the signed copy of the same to
the en banc for its consideration in relation to that matter.
WHEREFORE, in view of all of the above, the Court:
1. DISMISSES for lack of merit petitioner Vinuya, et al.s charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited
materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano C. del Castillo;
2. DIRECTS the Public Information Office to send copies of this decision to Professors Evan J.
Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Dr. Mark Ellis, and Professor Christian J. Tams at their known addresses;
3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to provide all court attorneys involved in legal research and
reporting with copies of this decision and to enjoin them to avoid editing errors committed in
the Vinuya case while using the existing computer program especially when the volume of citations and
footnoting is substantial; and
4. Finally, DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to acquire the necessary software for use by the Court that
can prevent future lapses in citations and attributions.
Further, the Court DIRECTS the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards to turn over to the en
banc the dummy as well as the signed copy of petitioners Exhibit J, entitled Restoring Integrity, a statement
by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law for the en bancs consideration in relation
to the separate pending matter concerning that supposed Faculty statement.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 3135 February 17, 1988

MIGUEL CUENCO, complainant,
vs.
HON. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
Complainant Cuenco, who had represented a group of heirs in the Vito Borromeo intestate estate
proceedings, makes the following allegations in his complaint for disbarment
1. That Mr. Justice Fernan, appeared as counsel for the three (3) instituted heirs and despite having already
accepted his appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court, "continues to be counsel for the instituted
heirs;'
2. That Mr. Justice Fernan "had exerted personal efforts to take away from the Supreme Court en banc, the
First and Second Divisions of the Tribunal, the Vito Borromeo proceedings to his Office as Chairman of the
Third Division to enable him to influence the decision or the outcome of the Vito Borromeo proceedings "
3. That Mr. Justice Fernan "has operated his Office in Cebu City as a Star Chamber to fabricate fake and
fictitious heirs of Vito Borromeo,"
4. That Mr. Justice Fernan has 'practically abolished and crippled the legitimate functions of the Court of
Appeals, knowingly (sic) that the claims for attorney's fees of movant Miguel Cuenco and Judge Fernando
Ruiz are pending in the Court of Appeals,'
5. That Mr. Justice Fernan's strong and unyielding determination to collect big sums of money in payment
of his legal services rendered to his clients' had induced the Honorable Justice, as Chairman of the Court's
Third Division, to unduly influence the Members thereof into dismissing Atty. Cuenco complaint
6. That Mr. Justice Fernan "had wilfully, persistently, stubbornly and systematically violated his Oath of
Office as a lawyer which imposes upon him the duty not to delay any man for money or malice."
Issue: whether he is guilty
Held:
1. We have found nothing in the record of the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings — and complainant
Cuenco has failed to point to anything therein — to indicate that Mr. Justice Fernan had appeared as
counsel in such proceedings representation of instituted heir and claimant Fortunato Borromeo, who was
represented in those proceedings, as early as 19 January 1953, by Atty. Juan Legarte Sanchez. Mr. Justice
Fernan did enter his appearance on 7 August 1965 as counsel, in collaboration with Atty. Crispin Baizas,
for claimants Tomas and Amelia Borromeo in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 1 The record, however,
reveals that Mr. Justice Fernan withdrew as such counsel as early as 19 February 1968. 2 The records of this case
are bereft of any suggestion that Mr. Justice Fernan had represented any of these instituted heirs in any
other case or proceeding arising from or related to Special Proceedings No. 916-R. Complainant Cuenco
has submitted nothing at all to support his accusation that Mr. Justice Fernan "continues to be counsel for
the instituted heirs." It is entirely clear that Mr. Justice Fernan's professional involvement in Special
Proceedings No. 916-R had ceased long before his appointment to this Court in April of 1986.
2. Prior to the appointment of Mr. Justice Fernan to the Court, the aforementioned five (5) consolidated petitions
had already been assigned for preliminary study to Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., the ponente of the
disputed Decision in G.R. Nos. L-41171, 55000, 62895, 63818 and 65995 and a Member then of the Court's
First Division. The subsequent designation of Mr. Justice Fernan as Chairman of the Court's Third Division
and the assignment of Mr. Justice Gutierrez along with three other Members of the Court to said Third
Division, after the 1987 Constitution went into effect, were determined and carried out by the Chief Justice
in accordance with the time-honored procedures followed by the Court in those matters and were, thus,
circumstances of pure coincidence. Mr. Justice Gutierrez brought the Vito Borromeo estate cases (and all
other pending cases previously assigned to him) along with him to the Third Division of the Court when
the third Division was organized in accordance with procedures agreed upon by the Court en banc. Mr.
Justice Fernan inhibited himself from participating in the deliberations on the Vito Borromeo estate cases and, in fact,
did not take part in the resolution thereof; this was made explicit by the annotation appearing beside his
signature: "No part — I appeared as counsel for one of the parties". This express statement on the record
has been totally ignored by complainant Cuenco. Thus, not only has complainant Cuenco failed to submit
anything at all to support his accusation that Mr. Justice Fernan 'had exerted personal efforts' to have the
Vito Borromeo estate cases assigned to the Third Division "to enable him to influence the outcome" thereof;
complainant Cuenco is simply and clearly wrong in charging that Mr. Justice Fernan had anything to do
with the assignment of those estate cases to the Third Division of the Court. The record is bare of any
suggestion that complainant Cuenco made any effort to inform himself on the procedures followed by this
Court in constituting itself into three (rather than two) Divisions, before making his accusation.
3. The principal opposing parties in the Vito Borromeo intestate estate proceedings are, on the one hand,
the group of heirs instituted under the will (i.e., Fortunate, Tomas and Amelia, an surnamed Borromeo)
and, on the other hand, the group of heirs — a number of whom are represented by complainant Cuenco
— declared as such by the trial court subsequent to the declaration of nullity of said will. One of the main
reasons that said proceedings had dragged on for such a long period of time is that the three (3) instituted
heirs had sought, as early as 1954, the exclusion, from the inventory of the late Vito Borromeo's estate, of
thirteen (13) parcels of land over which the three claimed rights of ownership, and which rights continued
to be asserted against the other heirs- claimants. As far as the records show, there are no other persons
claiming successional rights adverse to those of either of the two major groups of heirs in the intestacy
proceedings.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, Mr. Justice Fernan could not have, as claimed by complainant Cuenco,
"fabricate[d] fake and fictitious heirs Vito Borromeo." The Court is unable to see how Mr. Justice Fernan,
whose involvement in the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings began on 7 August 1965 and ended on 19
February 1968, could have had any control or influence over the actions of the instituted heirs (Fortunate,
Tomas and Amelia Borromeo) either in 1952 when Special Proceedings 916-R for probate of the will was,
or in 1954 when said heirs claimed rights of ownership over the aforementioned thirteen (13) parcels of
land and sought to exclude them from the estate of the decedent. We think it clear, that complainant Cuenco
was here making, once again, a totally baseless accusation which he made no effort to support as he could
not support it.
4. The dispositive portion of our Decision in the consolidated estate cases states in part:
... The lawyers should collect from the heirs-distributees who individually hired them,
attorney's fees according to the nature of the services rendered but in amounts which
should not exceed more than 20% of the market value of the property the latter acquired
from the state as beneficiaries.
It is evident that the "legitimate functions" of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 08093 — where
complainant Cuenco has filed a claim for payment of attorney's fees — have not been abolished and
crippled" by the mere fact that the maximum amounts, expressed in a percentage of the market value of
the distributive shares received from the estate, of attorney's fees had been determined and set by this
Court. This is a matter well within the competence and authority of the Court. Furthermore, the Court is
unable to see how payment of complainant Cuenco's attorney's fees for services rendered in the Vito
Borromeo estate case has been "rendered impossible;' while final settlement of the decedent's estate may
have to be awaited, payment of such fees may nevertheless be expected in due course.
5. In Administrative Matter No. R-593-RTJ, complainant Cuenco charged Judge Francisco P. Burgos, former
trial judge in the Vito Borromeo intestate estate proceedings, with "gross incompetence and manifest
negligence" for allegedly having intentionally delayed settlement of the estate of the late Vito Borromeo. In
an En Banc Resolution dated 19 November 1987, tills Court, having found that the delay complained of
was caused by several factors beyond the control of respondent judge, dismissed that complaint for lack of
merit. The Court is completely unable to understand the claim of complainant Cuenco that dismissal of
administrative Matter No. R-593-RTJ, has "resurrected, rejuvenated and reinvigorated the claims of the
three (3) instituted heirs (Fortunate, Tomas and Amelia Borromeo) over the aforementioned thirteen (13)
parcels of land. The Court is also baffled by complainant Cuenco's assertion that such dismissal "has a great
money value in itself" and would result in the big increase of assets of the Vito Borromeo Estate." As pointed
out above, complainant Cuenco's complaint in A.M. No. R-593-RTJ was dismissed by a Resolution of the
Court en banc, not of the Third Division as Cuenco apparently believes. In any case, the Members of the
Third Division of the Court expressly reject complainant Cuenco's assertion or insinuation that they were
unduly influenced by any consideration other than the simple lack of merit of the complaint in A.M. No.
R-593-RTJ.
6. There is no in the record, other than the undocumented assertions of complainant Cuenco, that would
suggest that Mr. Justice Fernan has violated his oath of office as a lawyer either during the time when he
was collaborating counsel for Tomas and Amelia Borromeo in the proceedings below or thereafter, and
since joining this Court. Complainant Cuenco has offered not a shred of evidence to support his serious
accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Indeed, complainant Cuenco is either unaware of the seriousness
of the charges he made against Mr. Justice Fernan, or complainant Cuenco, if he is aware of the nature of
the charges he has brought, has acted with bad faith.
Of his own accord, Mr. Justice Fernan made a statement to the Court en banc and embodied that in a
Memorandum given to the Members of the Court on 17 December 1987. In this Memorandum, Mr. Justice
Fernan invited attention to his written Appearance and Motion to Withdraw as Counsel (already referred
to above) and stressed that he had ceased a long time ago to act as counsel for the two Borromeos mentioned
earlier and that he did not in any way take part in the deliberations and decision of G.R. Nos. 41171, etc.
By a telegram dated 6 January 1988, complainant Cuenco asked for leave to file a "Clarificatory
Memorandum based on official court records already filed in Supreme Court before and after Honorable
Fernan was appointed Justice of the Supreme Court — " by 24 February 1988. By a Resolution dated 14
January 1988, the Court granted complainant Cuenco leave to file a "Clarificatory Memorandum" within a
non-extendible period of ten (1 0) days from notice thereof. Complainant Cuenco received a copy of
Resolution of the Court on 26 January 1988. To date, no memorandum has been filed by complainant
Cuenco. On 5 February 1988, the Court received the following telegram from complainant Cuenco:
Received UST Hospital to [sic] resolutions S.C. En Banc co a first resolution giving me
February five file Clarificatory memorandum and second setting February twenty-four file
memorandum stop aye prefer February twenty-four file memorandum paragraph
memorandum affects Salud Borromeo and Asuncion Borromeo signers Judge Laya's order
of August 15 1969 which is res judicata comma died long time ago paragraph Marcial
Borromeo signer Judge Laya's order died long time ago comma by agreement of parties
approved by judge Gomez substituted by heirs of Marcial Borromeo semicolon Cosme
Borromeo one of Marcial Borromeo's heirs reported dead living children stop aye cannot
remember names of one of two daughters of Marcial Borromeo stop am confident Supreme
Court En Banc exercising inherent power can order substitution new parties give them due
process stop it can also issue proper orders have correct names of Marcial Borromeo
daughters aye cannot remember stop my preferences for February 24 deadline is due aye
had not typist during January 18 election long holidays stop my hospitalization also delays
my legal work stop many thanks.
From the above quoted telegram (to the extent the Court can understand it), it appears that complainant
Cuenco believes that he is preparing a memorandum addressing, not the administrative charges he has
preferred against Mr. Justice Fernan, but rather the merits of the consolidated petitions in G.R. Nos. L-
41171, etc. There appears no reason therefore why the Court should entertain this second request of
complainant Cuenco.
The Court could have dismissed outright the complaint of Mr. Cuenco, since the Court could have simply
taken judicial notice of the record of the consolidated petitions filed before the Court and since the other
charges made relate to matters peculiarly within the knowledge of Members of the Third Division of the
Court. The Court has, nevertheless, gone into substantial detail in dealing with the accusations so freely
made by complainant Cuenco, apparently in his concern over the amount of the attorney's fees he can hope
to claim and collect from some of the distributees of the Vito Borromeo Estate. The Court has done so
precisely because the person charged is a Member of this Court. The record of this case suggests strongly,
however, that those accusations were not only instituted without any basis but were also made recklessly
without regard for the good name and reputation of Mr. Justice Fernan. Indeed, those charges fly in the
face of the record itself, which complainant has casually chosen to ignore.
There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the
Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and
may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for
disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent
and hence to ran afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from
office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution.
Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation
to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in
relation to Article XI [2], id.), and the members of the Commission on audit who are not certified public
accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the
Philippine Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISCUSS the charges made by complainant Cuenco against Mr.
Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit.
The Court, further, Resolved to REQUIRE complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan within
ten (10) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.
MARY JANE VALLENTOS JAMIN, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1616

Complainant, (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1781-MTJ
Present:
PUNO, C.J.
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 17, 2007
JUDGE MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, MCTC,

JAGNA and GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, BOHOL,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The instant administrative case stemmed from a complaint for rape filed by herein complainant Mary Jane
Vallentos Jamin (Jamin, for short) against Judge Manuel A. de Castro of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Jagna and Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol.
In her affidavit-complaint[1] dated April 1, 2005 which she filed with the Bohol Provincial Prosecutors
Office and where it was docketed as I.S. No. 05-1625, complainant Jamin narrated the rape incident which
allegedly occurred in the early evening of March 29, 2005 at the bodega of a videoke bar located at the public
market of Guindulman, Bohol where she was then employed as a waitress. Her narration:
a) When I was changing my clothes in the bathroom of our videoke house, [respondent]
Manuel de Castro followed me and opened the door of the bathroom without my
permission;
b) After our supper, I was attending to said Manuel A. de Castro and his six companions
as they were drinking . After an hour more or less of serving them, this Manuel A. de
Castro was acting like an uncivilized person . He kissed and hugged us including my co-
worker Agnes. Then he touched me in the different parts of my body against my will. I
even threatened him to be policed when he showed lascivious acts but he continued doing
lasciviousness by putting his hand on the delicate parts of my body . I shouted for help
and cried while he slowly brought me to the bodega of the videoke house but nobody
helped me but instead they shouted in loud voices saying: Sige dad-a na didto ug iyota. In
english , Go ahead, bring that lady there and fuck her. I only know those people in faces.
In the dark area of that bodega, that Judge Manuel A. De Castro successfully raped me as
being a big man held my two hands in his one hand and the other hand undressed me.
That man having superior strength and me a fragile woman, , I became helpless.
c) I became so weak of what that Judge Manuel A. de Castro has done to me, of inserting
his penis to my vagina. xxx.
Agnes A. Ybaez, (Ybaez) a co-worker of complainant at the videoke bar, likewise executed before a
public prosecutor a sworn AFFIDAVIT dated April 8, 2005.[2] In her corroborative affidavit,
Ybanez stated, inter alia:
7. That later, I noticed that Judge de Castro dragged Mary Jane [Jamin] towards the
bodega and a certain Baby Olaer, a companion of Judge de Castro helped in pushing Mary
Jane to go with him while Mary Jane refused and I told them not to force her if it is against
her will and yet they continued with their act and when Mary Jane and Judge de Castro
was (sic) inside the bodega, Baby Olaer closed and locked the door of the bodega;
8. xxx;
9. That, later, I noticed Judge de Castro came out from the bodega already sweating and
his shirt was even wet with his sweat and when Mary Jane came out, she confessed to me
that she was forced by Judge de Castro to have sexual intercourse with her and the judge
really succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her against her will;
In his counter-affidavit[3] dated April 21, 2005, respondent judge denied the charge of rape and described
the filing thereof as a malicious attempt by some people who had been harassing him to destroy his
reputation and image as a judge. While not denying his presence at the videoke bar on the night of March
29, 2005, respondent judge explained that he went to the place not to drink or sing, but only to see the
interior lay-out of the newly constructed bar owned by his junior process server and the latters wife. He
admitted, however, having teased and hugged both Jamin and Ybaez, but in the spirit of fun.
To support his profession of innocence and the falsity of the charge, respondent judge likewise submitted
an Affidavit of Retraction and Withdrawal[4] of complainant dated April 21, 2005 and a similar affidavit
executed by Ybaez on the same date. Submitted likewise was the affidavit[5] dated April 21, 2005 of Cecile
Bersabal who expressed her intention not to testify for Jamin, given the latters disinterest in pursuing her
case against the respondent judge.
Complainant, in her affidavit of retraction and withdrawal, stated that the case was filed hastily upon the
advice of some of her friends.
By a Ist Indorsement dated April 26, 2005, Bohol Provincial Prosecutor Toribio S.
Quiwag forwarded the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), noting that only the
Court can take proper administrative action against judges and court personnel.
Meanwhile, or on October 27, 2005, the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol issued a
Resolution[6] dismissing, without prejudice, the criminal aspect of Jamins complaint against the respondent
judge.
On November 8, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution[7] treating this matter as an administrative
complaint against the respondent judge, and requiring the latter to submit his comment thereon within
fifteen (15) days from notice.
In his Comment[8] dated December 19, 2005, the respondent judge, without refuting the allegations
in the affidavit-complaint, nonetheless urged the dismissal of the complaint which he tagged as without
leg to stand on, noting that the complainant and her witnesses had already executed affidavits of retraction,
prompting even the Bohol Provincial Prosecutors Office to dismiss the criminal complaint. Attached to
the Comment, as Annex 5 thereof, is the complainants Supplemental Affidavit[9] dated December 12,
2005 wherein she states that it is not true that Judge De Castro raped me in the evening of March 29, 2005.
And at this time around, complainant described what transpired on that fateful night, in the following
wise:
xxx That in the evening of March 29, 2005, at about 8:00 oclock , Judge de Castro
entered our newly constructed Videoke Bar and while glancing on the interior design of
the bar, he was offered a drink by one of [his] friends and the said Judge obliged; and after
drinking the offered shot of wine, he went near our cashier Agnes Ybaez and teased her
about her scant dress , then stole a kiss on her cheek I witnessed these happening while
staying at the entrance of the bar letting salt water drip off from my wet body as I have just
gone sea bathing. Then I entered the bar and upon passing them, Judge de Castro noticed
me and turned his jokes on me by following me and kissing me on the ear from behind
and attempted to enter the bathroom also while his friends were laughing and urging him
to enter. I threatened Judge de Castro to have him arrested by the Police if he will not leave
me alone, while still laughing, judge de Castro left and I heard him thanking his friends x
x x (Word in bracket added.)
By Resolution of January 24, 2006, the Court en banc referred the case to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In another Resolution dated May 3, 2006,[10] the Court required the parties to manifest,
within ten (10) days from notice, if they were willing to submit this case for resolution based on the
pleadings already filed. In his reply-letter of June 14, 2006, the respondent judge so manifested his
willingness. Complainant would later acknowledge receipt of the resolution adverted to but has, to date,
not filed the desired manifestation
Meanwhile, the OCA submitted a Report, styled as Memorandum[11] dated April 7, 2006. In it, the OCA,
while expressing its inability to pin down the respondent judge for rape, nonetheless found the latter guilty
of gross misconduct and immorality, acting as he did beyond the tolerable bounds of decency, morality
and propriety. The report thus recommended that the respondent judge be dismissed from the service with
the usual accessory penalties attached to dismissal. Disbarment, after due proceedings, was also
recommended.
The OCA would later submit a supplemental Report[12] dated October 23, 2006 to inform the Court that the
complainant personally came to the office of Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao to
report, under oath, the threat made by the driver of Judge de Castro, a certain Awe Tubig, should she
pursue the rape case against the respondent judge which may ultimately result in the denial of his
retirement benefits. The OCA also informed the Court that the complainant, when asked, confirmed the
veracity of the allegations in her affidavit-complaint filed against the respondent judge with the Bohol
Provincial Prosecutors Office.
Subsequent developments saw the complainant addressing a letter [13] to Senior Deputy Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elapao. Therein, she stated her disinclination to pursue the case against the
respondent judge for fear that the judge might get back at her and send her to prison.
The findings and recommendation of the OCA in its Report, as supplemented, are well taken, the
affidavits of retraction adverted to earlier, notwithstanding. Substantial evidence, circumstantial and
testimonial, obtain to hold the respondent judge liable for gross misconduct and immorality.
The Court notes, to start off, that respondent did not ascribe to the complainant, then trying to earn
a living waiting on tables and, night after night, putting up with the boorishness of drunks, any plausible
motive for her to accuse him of rape, except to vaguely point to some people as instigating the charge for
the purpose of harassing him. He failed, however, to show why, how and by whom the harassment was
done. Notably, respondent did not categorically deny, let alone traverse, the serious allegations of the
complainant and her witness, Ybanez. He simply claimed in his Comment[14] that the criminal complaint for
rape against him, upon which the administrative aspect thereof was based, had been dismissed by the
Prosecutors Office of Bohol.
And lest it be overlooked, respondent did not present an affidavit of any individual or any of his
friends who were with him at the bar attesting to his innocence, or refuting the allegations against him. His
junior process server and the latters wife who owned the videoke bar who, in the natural order of things,
would side with him did not make any declaration, much less execute a sworn statement to vouch for his
innocence.
As it were, the respondent judge, by submitting, as Annex 5 of

his Comment,[15] complainants Supplemental Affidavit,[16] is presumed to have admitted the allegations in
said supplemental affidavit. Among the allegations is that he was at the videoke bar in the evening of March
29, 2005 where he made sexual advances and committed what amounted to lascivious acts not only as
against complainant but also against Ybaez in full view of other drinking individuals in a public place. In
particular, he is deemed to have admitted teasing Ybanez about her scant dress, kissing Ybanez on the
cheek and the complainant behind the ear, to the delight of his friends. Also deemed admitted by the
respondent judge was his attempt to enter the bathroom while complainant was inside it, with his friends
egging him on, but was foiled when the complainant threatened to have him arrested by the police if he
would not leave her alone. These peccadilloes, apart from the morality aspect of the acts, in themselves
translate into a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as they reflect upon the respondent judges
utter disregard of public opinion of the reputation of the judiciary which he represents.
Time and again, the Court has adhered to the exacting standards of morality and decency which
every member of the judiciary is expected to observe.[17] As a dispenser of justice, a magistrate is judged
not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are
externalized.[18] He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity,
for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man. We said so in a slew of cases, notably in Castillo
v. Calanog,[19]thus:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also
to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave withpropriety at all times a judges official life can not simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely

and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public

service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of his
official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
Respondent judge has made much of the affidavit of retraction and withdrawal[20] of complainant
upon which the Prosecutors Office of Bohol predicated its dismissal of the underlying complaint for rape. It
should be stressed, however, that recantation is viewed with suspicion. For a recantation is exceedingly
unreliable inasmuch as it is easily secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation
or for monetary consideration.[21] And going by the social standing and economic status of the complainant,
and as the records tend to indicate, the mix of both factors seem to explain why complainant affixed her
signature to the recanting affidavit.
At any rate, the Court is not bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter related to
its disciplinary power. As we stated in Molina v. Paz: [22]
xxx The Court does not dismiss administrative cases against members of the Bench
merely on the basis of withdrawal of the charges. Desistance cannot divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint against respondent judge. Public
interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary.
The program and efforts of the Court in improving the delivery of justice should not be
frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between the parties.
On the whole, all roads logically lead to the conclusion that the respondent judge has indeed failed
to behave in such a way that will promote confidence and respect for the judiciary. He deported himself in
a manner most unbecoming a judge as a model of moral uprightness. We need not repeat the narration of
the lustful acts committed by him, in order to conclude that he is indeed unworthy to remain in office. The
audacity under which the same were committed and the seeming impunity with which they were
perpetrated shock ones sense of morality.
Gross misconduct and immorality, under Section 8 (3) (8), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, are
classified as serious offenses punishable by any of the sanctions enumerated in Section 11 of the same Rule,
to wit:
SEC.11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge any of the

following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as

the Court may determine and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government or controlled
corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in
no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office with salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
As a final consideration, the Court invites attention to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC[23] prescribing that if an
administrative case against a judge involves an offense which likewise constitutes a ground for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and/or the Canons of Professional Ethics, the administrative case shall also be considered
a disciplinary action against the respondent judge as a member of the Bar. Thus, the respondent judge
should also be required to show cause why he should not likewise be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
proceeded against, as a member of the Bar.
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge

MANUEL A. DE CASTRO of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna and Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from
performing any official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this Decision. Lastly,
respondent Judge is REQUIRED to SHOWCAUSE why he should not be disbarred as a member of the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

G.R. NO. 118910. July 30, 1993
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C.
CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,
CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S.
DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the
PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:
1. GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the provision
in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries through a
collaboration, association, or joint venture.
2. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and
accessories on January 25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:
4. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual
rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
5. Rent is computed bi-weekly.
6. Term is 8 years.
7. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
8. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M.
3. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because:
4. It is the same as the old contract of lease.
5. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
6. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the President and
it is not most advantageous to the government.
4. PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
0. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract.
1. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301.
2. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO.
3. Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
4. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
5. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.
2. Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an online lottery is valid.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.
1. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved.
2. LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present
case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling
cannot be in any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”. The parties are the same but the cases
are not.
3. RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot still apply. An issue actually and
directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any
future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not
apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second
proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the
one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an
independent examination of the legal matters at issue.
4. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioner’s standing.
5. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved.
The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‘real parties of interest’.
6. Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are
bound either principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract.
7. Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of
public contracts maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
2. Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
1. It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now bears all losses because the operation of
the system is completely in its hands.
2. Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not inclined
to review.
3. Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is
discussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.)
4. In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioners state that this
would allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the claim
is speculative. In any case, in the construction of statutes, the resumption is that in making
contracts, the government has acted in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not
a reason for denying power.
5. It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the power to enter into any
contract which would involve it in any form of “collaboration, association, or joint venture” for the
holding of sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that PCSO is prohibited from investing in
any activities that would compete in their own activities.
6. It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not compete with their own
activities. The Court held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that the
transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited association with
the PGMC.
7. O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials
and equipment and not on the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases are only for privately-
owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government owned buildings or spaces for
private use.
Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The motion for reconsideration of petitioners is
DENIED with finality.
FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, G.R. No. 179895

Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE NACHURA,
SANDIGANBAYAN
GREGORY SANTOS ONG and THE REYES,
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
GENERAL,
BRION, JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:
December 18, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks, in the
main, to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities
of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
It will be recalled that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,[1] the Court, by Decision of July 3, 2007, enjoined
Ong from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming
the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed all
necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship. [2]
On July 9, 2007, Ong immediately filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the
amendment/ correction/ supplementation or annotation of an entry in [his] Certificate of Birth, docketed
as S.P. Proc No. 11767-SJ, Gregory Santos Ong v. The Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, et al.[3]
Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-Request/Complaint[4] of September 5, 2007, implored respondent

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the
latters capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Invoking paragraph 1, Section 7,
Article VIII of the Constitution[5] in conjunction with the Courts Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation
v. Ermita,[6] petitioner points out that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as
member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement from the time
of his appointment as such in October 1998.
The OSG, by letter of September 25, 2007, informed petitioner that it cannot favorably act on [his] request
for the filing of a quo warranto petition until the [RTC] case shall have been terminated with
finality.[7] Petitioner assails this position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside
from Ongs continuous discharge of judicial functions.
Hence, this petition, positing that:
IN OCTOBER OF 1998, RESPONDENT WAS NOT DULY-QUALIFIED UNDER THE FIRST

SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1, SECTION 7, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, TO BE
APPOINTED AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, MERELY ON THE
STRENGTH OF AN IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION AND A 1ST INDORSEMENT DATED 22 MAY 1997 ISSUED BY THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, RESPONDETS BIRTH
CERTIFICATE INDICATED THAT RESPONDENT IS A CHINESE CITIZEN AND
BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, THE RECORDS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
DECLARED THAT RESPONDENT IS A NATURALIZED FILIPINO
CITIZEN.[8] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner thus contends that Ong should immediately desist from holding the position of Associate Justice
of the Sandiganbayan since he is disqualified on the basis of citizenship, whether gauged from his birth
certificate which indicates him to be a Chinese citizen or against his bar records bearing out his status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen, as declared in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita.
Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita did not annul or declare null his
appointment as Justice of the Supreme Court, but merely enjoined him from accepting his appointment,
and that there is no definitive pronouncement therein that he is not a natural-born Filipino. He informs that
he, nonetheless, voluntarily relinquished the appointment to the Supreme Court out of judicial
statesmanship.[9]
By Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss of January 3, 2008, Ong informs that the RTC, by Decision
of October 24, 2007, already granted his petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen. The Decision
having, to him, become final,[10]he caused the corresponding annotation thereof on his Certificate of
Birth.[11]
Invoking the curative provisions of the 1987 Constitution, Ong explains that his status as a natural-
born citizen inheres from birth and the legal effect of such recognition retroacts to the time of his birth.
Ong thus concludes that in view of the RTC decision, there is no more legal or factual basis for the
present petition, or at the very least this petition must await the final disposition of the RTC case which to
him involves a prejudicial issue.
The parties to the present petition have exchanged pleadings[12] that mirror the issues in the pending
petitions for certiorari in G.R. No. 180543, Kilosbayan Foundation, et al. v. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., et al, filed with
this Court and in CA-G.R. SP No. 102318, Ferdinand S. Topacio v. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., et al.,[13] filed with the
appellate court, both of which assail, inter alia, the RTC October 24, 2007 Decision.
First, on the objection concerning the verification of the petition.
The OSG alleges that the petition is defectively verified, being based on petitioners personal
knowledge and belief and/or authentic records, and having been acknowledged before a notary public
who happens to be petitioners father, contrary to the Rules of Court[14] and the Rules on Notarial Practice
of 2004,[15] respectively.
This technicality deserves scant consideration where the question at issue, as in this case, is one purely of
law and there is no need of delving into the veracity of the allegations in the petition, which are not disputed
at all by respondents.[16]
One factual allegation extant from the petition is the exchange of written communications between
petitioner and the OSG, the truthfulness of which the latter does not challenge. Moreover, petitioner also
verifies such correspondence on the basis of the thereto attached letters, the authenticity of which he
warranted in the same verification-affidavit. Other allegations in the petition are verifiable in a similar
fashion, while the rest are posed as citations of law.
The purpose of verification is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition or complaint
have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply
a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render it
fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement. [17]
In the same vein, the Court brushes aside the defect, insofar as the petition is concerned, of a notarial act
performed by one who is disqualified by reason of consanguinity, without prejudice to any administrative
complaint that may be filed against the notary public.
Certiorari with respect to the OSG
On the issue of whether the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a
petition for quo warranto, the Court rules in the negative.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [18]
The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring
action on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A
decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees
with it.[19]
The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials
or agents. In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the
government is upheld within the limits set by law.[20]
The pertinent rules of Rule 66 on quo warranto provide:
SECTION 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation

of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippineswithout
being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. ─ The
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines,
or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified
in the preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such action.
SEC. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with
permission of court. ─ The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission
of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request
and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first
require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved by
and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and upon whose relation
the same is brought. (Italics and emphasis in the original)
In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an
action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons.[21] Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez,[22] the Court
ruled:
Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in
choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already
started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or
compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other
party. Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may
just drop it without any legal and valid reasons, for the discretion given him is not
unlimited. Its exercise must be, not only within the parameters get by law but with the
best interest of the State as the ultimate goal.[23]
Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of
the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt
not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the
national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand.[24]
It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-litigating the same issue of
Ongs citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the consequent
risk of forum-shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it merely advised
petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.
Certiorari and Prohibition with respect to Ong
By petitioners admission, what is at issue is Ongs title to the office of Associate Justice of
Sandiganbayan.[25] He claims to have been constrained to file the present petition after the OSG refused to
heed his request to institute a suit for quo warranto. Averring that Ong is disqualified to be a member of any
lower collegiate court, petitioner specifically prays that, after appropriate proceedings, the Court
. . . issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition against Respondent Ong, ordering
Respondent Ong to cease and desist from further exercising the powers, duties, and
responsibilities of a Justice of the Sandiganbayan due to violation of the first sentence of
paragraph 1, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution; . . . issue the writs of certiorari and
prohibition against Respondent Ong and declare that he was disqualified from being
appointed to the post of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan in October of 1998,
considering that, as of October of 1998, the birth certificate of Respondent Ong declared that
he is a Chinese citizen, while even the records of this Honorable Court, as of October of
1998, declared that Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino; x x x[26]
While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature
of a quo warranto proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare null and void his
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the petition
professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a quo warrantoaspect of the
petition.[27]
Being a collateral attack on a public officers title, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition must be
dismissed.
The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warrantoproceedings; and it cannot
be assailed collaterally,[28] even through mandamus[29] or a motion to annul or set aside
order.[30] In Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,[31] the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the
validity of the appointment of a public officer.
x x x [T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or other
judicial officers, cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warrantoor be rightfully called upon
to perform any of the functions of the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the
title to the office and the right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder
takes possession of a judicial office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a
writ of prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial acts,
since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by which to determine the title
to an office.[32]
Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto, the petition is, just the same, dismissible.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public
office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. [33]It is brought against the person who is alleged to have
usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office,[34] and may be commenced by the
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. [35]
Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor,[36] reiterated
in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin,[37]that for a quo warranto petition to be successful,
the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere
preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action. [38]
In the present case, petitioner presented no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office
of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.He in fact concedes that he was never entitled to assume the
office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. [39]
In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto is filed by an individual in his own
name, he must be able to prove that he is entitled to the controverted public office, position,
or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a right to the undisturbed possession
thereof. In actions for Quo Warranto to determine title to a public office, the complaint, to be
sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to the office. In Garcia v. Perez, this
Court ruled that the person instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to show that he is entitled to
the office in dispute. Without such averment or evidence of such right, the action may be
dismissed at any stage.[40] (Emphasis in the original)
The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial functions, cannot be questioned
by any merely private suitor, or by any other, except in the form especially provided by law. [41] To uphold
such action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable
mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machine. [42]
Clearly then, it becomes entirely unwarranted at this time to pass upon the citizenship of Ong. The Court
cannot, upon the authority of the present petition, determine said question without encroaching on and
preempting the proceedings emanating from the RTC case. Even petitioner clarifies that he is not presently
seeking a resolution on Ongs citizenship, even while he acknowledges the uncertainty of Ongs natural-
born citizenship.[43]
The present case is different from Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, given Ongs actual physical possession
and exercise of the functions of the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, which is a factor
that sets into motion the de facto doctrine.
Suffice it to mention that a de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and is discharging its
duties under color of authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election or
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. [44] If a person
appointed to an office is subsequently declared ineligible therefor, his presumably valid appointment will
give him color of title that will confer on him the status of a de facto officer.[45]
x x x A judge de facto assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative of sovereignty, and
the legality of that assumption is open to the attack of the sovereign power
alone. Accordingly, it is a well-established principle, dating back from the earliest period
and repeatedly confirmed by an unbroken current of decisions, that the official acts of a de
facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure judge, so far as the public or
third persons who are interested therein are concerned.[46]
If only to protect the sanctity of dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates
from the State, and without ruling on the conditions for the interplay of the de facto doctrine, the Court
declares that Ong may turn out to be either a de jure officer who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed
and qualified and whose term of office has not expired, or a de factoofficer who enjoys certain rights, among
which is that his title to said office may not be contested except directly by writ of quo warranto,[47] which
contingencies all depend on the final outcome of the RTC case.
With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the ancillary issues raised by the
parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC

ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED
IN THE COLUMNS OF MR. Present:
AMADO P. MACASAET
PUBLISHED IN MALAYA PUNO, C.J.,
DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, QUISUMBING,
20 AND 21, 2007 YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 8, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
FREEDOM of the press and judicial independence (kalayaan ng pamamahayag at

kalayaang panghukuman) two constitutional values which unfortunately clash in this case for indirect
contempt of court have to be weighed and balanced against each other.
The Antecedents
The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in the Business Circuit column of Amado P.
Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation of which he is the publisher. The articles,
containing statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court, came out
in four (4) issues of the newspaper on September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007, reproduced as follows:
September 18, 2007
Bribery in the Court
A lady justice (I have not been told whether she is from the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals) did not report for a day last week.
Her secretary received a gift-wrapped box about the size of two dozen milk cans.
Believing that the gift might be something perishable, she opened the box.Indeed, it was a
gift estimated at P10 million. Posthaste, the secretary informed the magistrate about the
gift. She thought she was doing her job. The lady justice fired her instead.
She would not have anybody catch her accepting a bribe. But she practically did.
The stupidity here is that the bribe-giver what else would we call him or her did not check
whether the lady justice was in the office or not. Better still he or she could have the box
full of money delivered to her home. But then her family would get to know about and ask
who was the kind soul that was so liberal with money a boxful of it.
The Supreme Court cannot let this pass. A full investigation should be conducted. The
magistrate who was sent the bribe should be impeached.
The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This time, the lady
justice is with a higher court.
The court is like a basket of apples. There a few which are rotten that makes the whole
basket rotten.
The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved from suspicions they
are thieves.
Heres the clue
The Court employee who was fired by the lady jurist is a niece of another lady justice who
earlier retired. The worker was inherited by the incumbent lady justice.
My problem with this report is that while my source is definite about the employee
opening a gift-wrapped box that contained at least P10 million, he wont confide to me the
identity of the jurist.
Unless the employee who was fired talks against her boss and she should as a matter of
duty we will never know who this justice really is. The members of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan are all called justices.
The head of the Office of Government Corporate Counsel is also honored by being
addressed as such. So is the head of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Since the employee was fired for opening the box which she thought contained perishable
goods but turned out there was an estimated P10 million in it, she should be loyal to her
duty of telling the truth.
That way, she would have rendered a great service to the justice system. Without her
talking, every lady with the title of Justice is suspect. There are more than a dozen of them
in different courts but only one was caught red-handed taking a bribe. Her name should
be known so that the Supreme Court can act swiftly on a clear case of bribery.
Otherwise, this case becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or is that the reason
the employee would not talk, that her former boss could spill the beans on her peers?
September 19, 2007
The Bribe Giver
I learned from some lawyers that the bribe money given to a lady justice came from a
Chinese-Filipino businessman who has been criminally charged.
It is funny that the delivery of five boxes of money (I said only one earlier) coincided on
the day the lady justice, obviously acting as ponente, acquitted the prospect.
The secretary of the lady justice who took the bribe made five trips to the guardhouse to
pick up the boxes.
Incidentally, this secretary is a namesake of her aunt, a deceased associate justice of the
Supreme Court.
I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady justice is a member
of the Supreme Court. The late justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma is the only lady justice I know
who retired and died at a ripe old age and left behind a reputation of decency and integrity.
We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice shamed her court.She should
resign or be impeached.
That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored.
September 20, 2007
Cecilia, please save the court

I have established the lady justices secretary who opened one of the five milk boxes
containing bribe money is a niece of the late, respected and honorable Associate Justice
Cecilia Muoz Palma from Batangas.
The secretary is a niece of the late justice and a namesake.
Cecilia, you have a duty to honor the memory of your aunt, who, during her stay in the
court, was known for having balls.
More important than that, you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme
Court.
Cecilia, you must tell the Court en banc everything you know about the money that was
sent in five boxes to your boss.
Not in retaliation for your dismissal, but for no other reason than as a duty to your country
and, I must again say, to honor the memory of your late illustrious aunt, a legal luminary
and staunch defender of the Constitution.
The other reason you must spill the beans is that if you do not, other lady justices are
suspects. That is not fair to them.
September 21, 2007
Wrong date, same facts
On verification, I discovered that the secretary of a lady justice of the Supreme Court who
was said to have accepted five milk boxes of money, was fired as early as March. Not last
week as I mistakenly reported.
It turns out that Cecilia Muoz-Delis from Bicol picked up the last five boxes several times
in March.
She never opened the first four boxes which she picked up from the guardhouse of the
Court.
She opened the last and saw the money because the lady justice was absent on that
day. Forthwith, she was fired. Cecilia, who is from Bicol, never opened any of the first four
boxes delivered on various dates (I have not been told when).She picked up all of them
from the Supreme Court guardhouse and left them with the lady justice. She wouldnt dare
open the first four because the lady justice was in her office. She opened the fifth one
because the lady justice did not report for work on that day.
Cecilia thought that the gift-wrapped box contained some perishables like food.What she
found was money instead. She was fired.
Whenever a gift for lady justice comes, she would order Cecilia to pick it up from the
guardhouse. So the fifth she picked up was one of those errands.
Where is Cecilia?
I cannot get any information on the present whereabouts of Cecilia. However, if the
Supreme Court has intentions to investigate what I have been saying, maybe the Chief
Justice himself should find out where she could be sent an invitation to appear before an
investigation group in the Court.
Better still, as I said, yesterday, Cecilia should disclose everything she knows regarding
the box before the Court en banc.
Farthest thing from my mind is to embarrass the lady justice whose identity I do not know
up to now.
It is my conviction that the Court should investigate reports of wrongdoing by any of its
peers. Justice is served that way.
The Chief Justice and the rest of the justices should not have a problem finding out who
she is.
It is a simple job of asking a clerk to go to personnel department of the Court and find out
who Cecilia worked for.[1]
The September 18, 2007 article, the first of the series of articles, caught the attention of Assistant
Court Administrator (ACA) Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief of the Supreme Court Public Information Office,
in the course of his monitoring the daily news reports and columns in major newspapers. However, since
it was vague about which court was being referred to, whether the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax Appeals,[2]ACA Marquez opted to merely note it.[3]
The succeeding two articles, however, gave an indication that the supposed bribery happened in
the Supreme Court. Respondent Macasaet, in his September 19, 2007 article, wrote, among others, that I
dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady justice is a member of the Supreme
Court x x x. We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice shamed her court. She should
resign or be impeached. That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored.
Similarly, in his September 20, 2007 article, respondent said that Cecilia had a duty to save the
sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.
Also on September 20, 2007, at around 6:00 p.m., Marites Daguilan-Vitug, Editor in Chief
of Newsbreak, faxed a letter to Supreme Court Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago asking for three
things
1. In (sic) April 13, 2007, you concurred with a decision penned by Justice Romeo Callejo,
Sr. ruling that the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion by finding probable cause against Henry Go. However, five months later
(September 3, 2007), acting on Gos motion for reconsideration, you reversed yourself
and ordered the dismissal of the graft case against Go. Please explain the
circumstances that led to this reversal.
2. We have gathered from three sources that you received a cash gift of P10 million after
you issued the decision early September. Please comment.
3. Were checking if this is accurate. Your secretary, who opened the gift-wrapped box
thinking that it contained perishable items, found cash instead. It was after this
incident that you removed her.[4]
Upon receipt of the faxed letter, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called for ACA Marquez, showed
him the letter of Daguilan-Vitug, and requested him to tell Daguilan-Vitug that she (Mme. Justice Ynares-
Santiago) had been consistent on her position in the Go case, that she never reversed herself, that she never
received a cash gift, and that no secretary was terminated for opening a gift-wrapped box containing
money. Accordingly, ACA Marquez went back to his office, called up Daguilan-Vitug and told her what
Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago told him.[5]
That same evening, at around seven, Daguilan-Vitug faxed the corrected version of the earlier
letter
1. On April 13, 2007, you dissented against the decision penned by Justice Romeo Callejo,
Sr. ruling that the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion by finding probable cause against Henry Go. The vote was 3-2 in favor of
Callejas (sic) decision. Five months later (September 3, 2007), acting on Gos motion for
reconsideration (by that time, Callejo had already retired), you ordered the dismissal
of the graft case against Go. I understand the exchanges were bitter and the
deliberations long. Please explain the contentious issues.
2. We have gathered from three sources that you received a cash gift of P10 million in
March 2007 in the midst of deliberations on the case. Please comment.
3. Were checking if this is accurate. Your secretary, who opened the gift-wrapped box
thinking that it contained perishable items, found cash instead. It was after this
incident that you removed her in March 2007. [6]
The following day, September 21, 2007, respondent Macasaet, in his column, named the supposed
secretary who was forthwith x x x fired allegedly after opening the box of money: It turns out that Cecilia
Muoz Delis from Bicol picked up the last five boxes several times in March.
From the foregoing series of articles, respondent Macasaet has painted a clear picture: a Chinese-
Filipino businessman who was acquitted of a crime supposedly left P10 million in five different boxes with
the security guard at the Supreme Court guardhouse, which was picked up by Cecilia Muoz Delis who was
forthwith fired for opening one of the boxes.
Upon the request of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago, the Chief Justice instructed ACA Marquez to
have the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st September 2007Business Circuit columns of respondent Macasaet included
in the September 25, 2007 agenda of the Court En Banc,[7] which case was docketed as A.M. No. 07-09-13-
SC. (Re: In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. A.P. Macasaet Published
in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007).
On September 24, 2007, Daisy Cecilia Muoz Delis, accompanied by the Clerk of Court En Banc,
Hon. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, went to see Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago and gave the latter copies of her
letter to respondent Macasaet and her affidavit. Delis, in her letter to respondent Macasaet, described his
articles as baseless reports. In other words, she wrote respondent Macasaet, the scenario you painted and
continue to paint is improbable and could only have emanated from a polluted source, who, unfortunately,
chose me to be a part of this fictional charge. She clarified that she was a Judicial Staff Officer, and not a
secretary as the articles claimed she was; that she voluntarily resigned from office and was not fired; that
as a matter of procedure, she would not have been tasked to receive boxes, as such was a duty assigned to
their utility personnel; that it was highly unlikely for something as blatant as [a] bribery attempt to have
been done right in the doors of the Court.[8] Delis ended her letter to respondent Macasaet with a plea
My family and I have been suffering ever since your article came out last Tuesday,
because I was being alluded to. This suffering has increased because the name of my
beloved aunt x x x has been drawn into a controversy that should not have involved me or
any member of my family in the first place.
And so, I ask you, Sir, to please cease from mentioning my name or any of my
relatives, living or deceased, in order to promote your tabloid journalism.If your source is
as reliable as you believe, I suggest you practice better judgment and journalistic
responsibility by verifying your data before printing anything and affecting the lives of
innocent people. If this is some kind of war you are waging against the lady justice, we do
not want to be collateral damage.[9]
In her affidavit, Delis stated that she had nothing to do with, nor did x x x have any knowledge of such
alleged attempted bribery,[10] and that she executed her affidavit to allow Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
to defend her honor,[11] and for the purpose of correcting the erroneous information of Mr. Macasaet. [12]
That same morning, too, despite the prior telephone conversation between ACA Marquez
and Daguilan-Vitug, Newsbreak posted an on-line article written by Danguilan-Vitug herself and Aries
Rufo, which was regularly updated, entitled Supreme Court Justice Suspected of Accepting Payoff
(update)[13] with the picture of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago
We pieced the story of the alleged bribery from accounts of various sources within
and outside the Supreme Court who have requested not to be named because of their
sensitive disclosures.
In March this year, Ynares-Santiago fired her staff member, Cecilia Delis,
supposedly after the latter opened a gift-wrapped box delivered to their office, thinking
that it contained perishable items. Delis, however, found wads of peso bills instead. The
amount, two sources say, is estimated at P10 million.[14]
Later that morning, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called ACA Marquez to her office and gave him
copies of her written statement categorically deny(ing) the accusations and insinuations, all malicious and
unfounded, published in Malaya and in Newsbreak; and underscoring that these are blatant lies clearly
aimed at smearing and maligning my character and person, and the integrity of the Judiciary which (she
has) been faithfully serving for 34 years now.[15] Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago also gave ACA Marquez
copies of Delis letter to respondent Macasaet and her affidavit, which Delis herself had brought to Mme.
Justice Ynares-Santiago earlier that morning.[16]
In the afternoon of September 24, 2007, ACA Marquez held a press conference and released to the
media copies of Delis letter to respondent Macasaet, her affidavit, and the written statement of Mme. Justice
Santiago.[17]
On September 25, 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution stating
Upon evaluation of the columns Business Circuit of Amado P. Macasaet in

the September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 issues of the Malaya, it appears that certain
statements and innuendoes therein tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice, within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, Amado P. Macasaet is ORDERED to EXPLAIN why no sanction
should be imposed on him for indirect contempt of court in accordance with Section 3(d),
(Rule 71) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, within five (5) days from receipt
hereof. Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.[18]
The following day, September 26, 2007, Newsbreak posted its on-line article entitled Supreme Court
Orders Malaya Publisher to Explain Stories with a banner headline, This is not meant to chill the media.
On October 16, 2007, the Court En Banc noted respondent Macasaets Explanation dated October 1,
2007,[19] and directed the Clerk of Court to include in the records of the case the affidavit of Delis
dated September 24, 2007. The High Court also created an investigating committee composed of retired
Supreme Court justices, namely, Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as Chairperson; and Justices Vicente V.
Mendoza and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., as members, to receive the evidence from all parties concerned. The
Committee may, on its own, call such persons who can shed light on the matter. It shall be endowed with
all the powers necessary to discharge its duty. The Committee was likewise directed to submit its report
and recommendation within thirty (30) days from the start of its hearing. [20] Retired Justices Mendoza and
Callejo, however, both begged off and were eventually replaced by retired Supreme Court Justices Jose C.
Vitug[21] and Justo P. Torres.[22]
The Investigation
From October 30, 2007 to March 10, 2008, the Investigating Committee held hearings and gathered
affidavits and testimonies from the parties concerned.
The Committee invited respondent Macasaet, Daguilan-Vitug, Delis, and ACA Marquez to a
preliminary meeting, in which they were requested to submit their respective affidavits which served as
their testimonies on direct examination.[23] They were then later cross-examined on various dates:
respondent Macasaet on January 10, 2008, Daguilan-Vitug on January 17, 2008, Delis on January 24, 2008,
and ACA Marquez on January 28, 2008. The Chief of the Security Services and the Cashier of the High
Court likewise testified on January 22 and 24, 2008, respectively.
According to the Committee
AMADO P. MACASAET testified on January 10, 2008 but, as expected, he

invoked his right under R.A. No. 53, as amended by R.A. No. 1477 to refuse to disclose the
source/s of his story regarding the rumored bribery of a Lady Justice (later identified as
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago) of a high court (later revealed as the Supreme Court)
who allegedly received Php 10 million contained in a gift-wrapped Carnation carton
box (later changed to five [5] gift-wrapped boxes), for deciding a criminal case in favor of
a rich Chinese-Filipino businessman. (Pls. see columns of September 18 and 19, 2007)
The pay-off was allegedly discovered when Cecilia Muoz-Delis (not the Lady
Justices secretary but a judicial staff officer V of the PET or Presidential Electoral Tribunal)
who is a niece and namesake of retired Supreme Court Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma,
allegedly opened the last box (according to his column of September 21, 2007 titled Wrong
date same facts); but the first(according to his testimony on January 10, 2008, pp. 71, 89,
92, 125, tsn).
By his own conclusion, the boxes of money were delivered on different

dates because I dont think a bribe giver will deliver five boxes at the same time (87,
tsn, January 10, 2008).
Macasaet testified that his source is not a relative of his, nor a government
employee, certainly not an employee of the judiciary, and, that he (Macasaet) has known
him for some 10 to 15 years (12-20, tsn, January 10, 2008).
Significantly, in his column of September 19, 2007, Macasaet revealed that he did
not have only one source, but several sources, i.e., some lawyers, who told him that the
bribe money given to a lady justice came from a Chinese-Filipino businessman who has
been criminally charged.
He emphatically declared on the witness chair that he trusts his source with my
heart and soul and believes his word as coming straight out of the Bible (94, 113,
tsn, January 10, 2008; 14, tsn, January 17, 2008). But because this source did not have direct
knowledge of the bribery (26, tsn, January 10, 2008), he allegedly tried to verify from other
sources the information he had received, but I could not get confirmation (29, tsn, January
10, 2008).
Notwithstanding the lack of confirmation and the paucity of details as to the

identity of the Lady Justice and of the High Court where she sits, Macasaet believes that
the bribery had actually taken place because I trust my source with my heart and soul (93-
94, 113, tsn, January 10, 2008).
He decided to go ahead and publish the story because he thought that eventually
my effort at consistently x x x exposing the alleged bribery, one day sooner or later
somebody will come up and admit or deny (it). And I think that (was) what really
happened (29, tsn, January 10, 2008).
He found out that the Lady Justice involved is Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
of the Supreme Court, after he received a letter dated September 21, 2007 from Cecilia
Muoz-Delis, the Cecilia mentioned in his columns, denying any knowledge of the alleged
bribery or boxes of money for she had already resigned (not dismissed) from the Court
on March 15, 2007, six (6) months before the alleged bribery supposedly occurred a week
before Macasaet wrote about it in his column of September 18, 2007. (Annex A, Letter
dated September 21, 2007 of Cecilia Delis to Macasaet)
So, when did the bribery happen? The date was never made certain, for in his first
column of September 18, 2007, Macasaet stated that the gift-wrapped box of money was
delivered to the office of the Lady Justice, a day last week when the Lady Justice did not
report for work. That must have been sometime on September 10-14, 2007 the week
before September 18, 2007.
However, the next day, September 19, 2007, he wrote in his column that the
delivery of five boxes (not just one box) of money, coincided on the day that the Lady
Justice, acting as ponente, dismissed the criminal case against Chinese-Filipino
businessman Henry T. Go in the Sandiganbayan. That must be September 3, 2007 because
the Resolution in G.R. No. 172602 Henry T. Go versus The Fifth Division,
Sandiganbayan, et al. was promulgated on that date.This he affirmed when he testified
on January 10, 2008 (46, 74, tsn, January 10, 2008).
However, when he returned to the witness chair on January 17, 2008, after going
back to his informant (on his own request) to ascertain the dates when the boxes of money
were delivered to the Office of Justice Santiago, so that the Investigating Committee could
subpoena the relevant logbooks of the Security Services of the Court to verify the truth of
the alleged deliveries, Macasaet again changed his earlier testimonies on date/dates of the
deliveries. He informed the Committee that, according to his informant, the deliveries
were made between November 2006 and March 2007; before Cecilia Delis resigned or was
dismissed from the Court.[24]
On March 11, 2008 the Investigating Committee submitted to the Office of the Chief Justice
its March 10, 2008 Report and Recommendation,[25] with the following findings of facts on the subject
columns
The following statements in Macasaets columns appear to the Supreme Court to

be innuendoes (that) tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice, within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
1) From the column of Tuesday, September 18, 2007
The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are
dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a higher court.
The court is like a basket of apples. There (are) a few which are
rotten. That makes the whole basket rotten.
The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved

from suspicion that they are thieves.
Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can act swiftly on
a clear case of bribery. Otherwise, this case becomes one where the pot
calls the kettle black. Or, is that the reason the employee would not talk,
that her former boss could spill the beans on her peers?
2) From the column of Wednesday, September 19, 2007
The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be

impeached. That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest
Court could be restored.
3) From the column of Thursday, September 20, 2007
Cecilia x x x you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme
Court.
Inasmuch as Macasaets snide remarks about the courts,

particularly the Highest Court, and about the justices being suspected as
thieves, appear to have [been] provoked by the rumored bribery in the
Court, the Investigating Committee was constrained to find out how true
the accusations were and whether the columnist had exercised due care
and diligence in checking out the credibility of his informant and the
veracity of the derogatory information fed to him before he published it
in his columns in the Malaya.[26]
Additional observations and conclusion were submitted, like the following
The Committee finds that neither Macasaets columns in Malaya, nor Ms. Vitugs
story in Newsbreak, about the pay-off of Php 10 million to Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago for rendering a Resolution favorable to Henry T. Go in his petition against the
Sandiganbayan (according to Macasaet), or, a decision favoring Barque against Manotok
in a big land case (according to Ms. Vitug), have a leg to stand on. As Justice Vitug has
observed during the last hearing before the Committee, everything that has been heard
thus far would appear to be hearsay. Ms. Vitug admitted there is no paper trail to support
the charge of bribery against Justice Santiago, for although her sources had pointed to
Cecilia Muoz Delis as the root source of the story, the information she received was second-
hand or may be third-hand because none of her sources had talked with Delis herself (70,
72 tsn Jan. 17, 2008). Delis had refused to be interviewed by her, and had emphatically
denied in her letter and affidavit any knowledge of the alleged bribery because she was no
longer working in the Court when it supposedly happened.
Macasaets sources likewise fed him double hearsay information from a source
that refused to reveal the identity of the Lady Justice nor a high court but alleged that the
Php 10 million bribe was discovered by her secretary named Cecilia, a niece and namesake
of the late Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma, who was fired from her job on account of it.
The Committee observed that Macasaets story about the bribery and of Cecilias
role in supposedly discovering it, is full of holes, inconsistencies, and contradictions,
indicating that he did not exercise due diligence, patience, and care in checking the
veracity of the information fed to him, before giving it publicity in his columns. Nor
was he bothered by the damage that his columns would inflict on the reputation of a
member of the Highest Court and on the Court itself. In fact, he was happy that he wrote
the columns (103 tsn Jan. 10, 2008). Even if he failed to get confirmation of the bribery, one
day sooner or later, somebody would come up and admit or deny it. He did not care that
he smeared the whole Judiciary to fish her out, because after she is fished out, the
suspicion on the rest would be removed (29-30 tsn Jan. 10, 2008).[27] (Emphasis supplied)
The Committee likewise noted the inconsistencies and assumptions of Macasaet, betraying lack of veracity
of the alleged bribery
1. For instance, he said that he could not get confirmation of the bribery story given to him
by his source. Later, he said that his sources told me they had personal knowledge
but would not reveal the name of the Lady Justice (65, tsn, January 10, 2008).
2. His allegation that the Lady Justice (later identified as Justice Santiago) did not report
for work last week, i.e., the week before his first column came out on September 18,
2007, was refuted by the Courts Public Information Officer (PIO) Atty. Midas
Marquez, who testified that no Lady Justice was absent that week.
3. The date when the gift-wrapped box of money was allegedly opened by Cecilia is also
uncertain because of Macasaets conflicting allegations about it. Macasaets first
column of September 18, 2007, stated that it happened last week, i.e., sometime in the
week of September 10-14, 2007.
The next day, September 19, 2007, he, however, wrote in his column that the five boxes
(not one) of money were delivered on the day (September 3, 2007) when the Lady
Justice, acting as ponente, acquitted the accused Henry T. Go.
But again, because his story about Cecilias role in the discovery of the bribery in September
2007, was contradicted by the record of Cecilias resignation from the Court on March
15, 2007 (Annexes D and D-1, Cecilia Delis Letter of Resignation & Clearance),
Macasaet, after consulting his source again, changed his story when he testified
on January 17, 2008. He said that, according to his source, the boxes of money were
delivered, not any one time in September 2007, but on different dates in November
2006 up to March 2007, before Cecilia resigned or was fired from the office of Justice
Santiago (5-6, tsn, January 17, 2008).
That allegation is, however, refuted by the logbooks of the Security Services for the
period of November 2006 to March 2007 which contain no record of the alleged
deliveries of boxes of money to the office of Justice Santiago.Danilo Pablo, head of the
Courts Security Services affirmed that in his ten (10) years of service in the Court, he
has not received any report of boxes of money being delivered to any of the Justices
(45-46, tsn, January 22, 2008).[28]
The Committee further wondered which of the five (5) boxes was opened and yielded money. It found
1. x x x In his column of September 21, 2007, Macasaet alleged that Cecilia picked up the
five boxes of money several times in March (not last week as I mistakenly reported),
and she never opened the first four boxes x x x she opened the last and saw the
money because the Lady Justice was absent on that day.
But when he testified before the Committee on January 10, 2008, Macasaet alleged that it
was the first one that was opened according to his source (71, 89, 92, 125, tsn, January
10, 2008).
2. Contradicting his published story that five (5) boxes of money were delivered on the day
the Lady Justice acquitted Henry Go, Macasaet testified at the investigation that they
were delivered on different occasions according to my source (70, tsn, January 10,
2008).
But no sooner had he attributed that information to my source than he admitted that it was
only my own conclusion x x x I assumed that the giver of the money is not so stupid
as to have them delivered all in one trip. As a matter of fact, I even wondered why
said boxes were not delivered in the home of the Lady Justice (72, tsn, January 10,
2008).
3. The amount of the bribe is also questionable. For while in his own column of September
18, 2007, Macasaet stated that the gift was estimated at Php 10 million, he later
testified on January 10, 2008 that the amount was my own calculation because I
talked to people, I said this kind of box how much money in One Thousand Pesos
bills can it hold, he told me it is ten (million).So that was a calculation (77, tsn, January
10, 2008).
He also merely assumed that the money was in one thousand pesos bills (78, tsn, January
10, 2008). No one really knows their denomination.
He said he was told that the size of the box where the money was placed was this milk
called carnation in carton (79, tsn, January 10, 2008). But, at the final hearing
on February 1, 2008, he denied that said that, I never said carnation boxes; I said milk
boxes that should make a lot of difference (84, tsn, February 1, 2008).
4. Since only one gift-wrapped box of money was opened, Macasaet admitted that he has
no knowledge of whether the four (4) other boxes were also opened, when and where
they were opened, and by whom they were opened (90, tsn, January 10,
2008). Therefore, no one knows whether they also contained money.
That the five (5) boxes contained a total of ten million pesos, is just another assumption of
Macasaets. It is a calculation based on estimates obtained from friends and how much
five boxes can hold in one thousand peso bills, more or less ten million, he explained
(91, tsn, January 10, 2008).
The sin of assumption which is a cardinal sin in Newsbreaks Guide to Ethical Journalistic
Conduct was repeatedly committed by Macasaet in writing his story about the bribery
of a Lady Justice of the Supreme Court. (Annex E, page 1, Newsbreak Guide to Ethical
Journalistic Conduct).[29]
Consequently, the Committee concluded
In view of its tenuous underpinnings, we find the bribery story in Macasaets

columns of September 18-21, 2007, and in Ms. Vitugs Newsbreak issue of September
25, 2007, unbelievable. Why should five boxes supposedly containing a total of Php
10 million as bribe money be delivered to the office of a Lady Justice in the Supreme
Court, where it would have to pass examination by the security guards and the
quizzical eyes of her own employees? Why not to her home? Or at some agreed
meeting place outside the Court and her home? Or why not quietly deposit it in her
bank account? And why was she absent from her office on the day of the presumably
agreed date for the payment of the bribe? If the bribe was for dismissing the
information against Henry Go in the Sandiganbayan, why was it paid prematurely in
November 2006-March 2007 when the case of Henry Go was still up in the air and, in
fact, was decided against him on April 13, 2007? The favorable resolution on his
motion for reconsideration, penned by Justice Santiago, was promulgated
on September 3, 2007, almost one year after the pay-off, if there was such a pay-off?
xxxx
The Committee considers this case not just another event that should pass
unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the allocated ramparts of free
speech. Needless to say, that while we espouse the enjoyment of freedom of expression by
media, particularly, it behooves it to observe great circumspection so as not to destroy
reputations, integrity and character so dear to every individual, more so to a revered
institution like the Supreme Court. Everyone deserves respect and dignity.[30]
Finding sufficient basis to hold respondent Macasaet in indirect contempt of court, the
Committee recommended
The Committee finds that the statements of respondent Amado P.

Macasaet about the Supreme Court in his Business Circuit columns in the September 18-
21, 2007 issues of the newspaper Malaya, maligning and degrading the Supreme Court
and tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice, to be utterly unjustified.
WHEREFORE, the Committee believes there exist valid grounds for this
Honorable Court, if it is so minded, to cite Amado P. Macasaet for indirect
contempt within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
Our Ruling
IN view of respondents invocation of his right to press freedom as a defense, it is essential to first examine
the nature and evolution of this preferred liberty, together with the countervailing interest of judicial
independence, which includes the right to due process of law, the right to a fair trial, and the preservation
of public confidence in the courts for the proper administration of justice.
Nature and History of Press Freedom
Freedom of expression, which includes freedom of speech and of the press, is one of the hallmarks
of a democratic society. It has been recognized as such for centuries.
The history of press freedom dates back to the English Magna Carta, promulgated in 1215, which
established the principle that not even the lawmaker should be above the law. Through the years, many
treatises on press freedom arose in reaction to various measures taken to curtail it.
In the 17th Century, John Milton wrote Areopagitica, a philosophical defense of the right to free
speech. It was a reaction to the Licensing Order of June 14, 1643, which declared that no book, pamphlet,
paper, nor part of any such book, pamphlet, or paper, shall from henceforth be printed, bound, stitched or
put to sale by any person or persons whatsoever, unless the same be first approved of and licensed under
the hands of such person or persons as both, or either of the said Houses shall appoint for the licensing of
the same. Miltonadvocated that a written work should not be suppressed before publication.Writers of
treacherous, slanderous, or blasphemous materials should first be tried according to law. Only after it has
been established that their writings are of a treacherous, slanderous, or blasphemous nature should they
be subsequently punished for their wrongful acts.
Sir William Blackstone, 19th Century English jurist, in his still widely cited historical and analytical
treatise on English common law, aptly described the twin aspects of press freedom:
x x x Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes
what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own
temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done,
both before and since the Revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices
of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in
learning, religion and government. But to punish as the law does at present any dangerous
or offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be
adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good
order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty. Thus, the will
of individuals is still left free: the abuse only of that free will is the object of legal
punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry:
liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad
sentiments destructive to the ends of society, is the crime which society
corrects.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
In the United States, press freedom was first put into organic law with the First Amendment to its
Constitution, declaring that Congress shall make no law x x x abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. This set in stone the basis for virtually all contemporary laws and jurisprudence on the subject of
press freedom.
Our Constitutions and jurisprudence are no different. Section 4, Article III, 1987 Constitution,
which in part provides that [n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press x x x x, is a provision found in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions.[33]
Media and Its Multiplying Roles in Democracy
Due to their preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, the freedoms of speech, of expression, and
of the press have progressed dramatically. As early as 1942, even before the advent of television, the
distinguished U.S. appellate court Judge Learned Hand had already observed that [t]he hand that rules the
press, the radio, the screen, and the far-spread magazine, rules the country. He concluded that medias
power was an unchangeable fact of life: Whether we like or not, we must learn to accept it. There is much
truth today in those statements.
One of the notable features of recent years is the accelerated development of the media. They have
grown from strength to strength, and have substantially influenced people, either favorably or
unfavorably, towards those in government.The use of information technology has firmed up the media
networks hold on power. Traditional media for mass communication newspapers, magazines, radio, and
standard television have been joined by satellite and cable television, electronic mail, short messaging and
multi-media service, and the internet, giving rise to new opportunities for electronic news and information
companies to even intensify their influence over the general public.
Studies show that people rely heavily on the media for their knowledge of events in the world and
for impressions that form the basis for their own judgments. The media exert a strong influence on what
people think and feel.Certainly, the power of Philippine media is of no small measure
The power of the press to influence politics is proven. Policy issues and the
implementation of government programs requiring greater public discussion are
sometimes displaced in the government agenda by matters that have been given more
importance in the news. Public officials are obliged to attend to media queries even if these
are not necessarily the most important questions of the day. Nowhere in Southeast
Asia are government officials so accessible to the press. Cabinet ministers are available
from the earliest hours to answer questions from radio show hosts on the news of the day
involving their responsibilities.
Furthermore, television news programs have spawned media celebrities whose

popularity with the masses has catapulted their entry into politics. Medias focus on
celebrity has infected the political culture with exaggerated concern for personality and
color, and the kind of impact associated with sports and entertainment. Political parties
have tended to recruit popular figures from these fields to assure they have winners in the
race for seats in Congress.[34]
The reach of Philippine media is quite extensive
In the Philippines radio has the biggest audience among all the mass media (85
percent), followed by television at 74 percent, and print, 32 percent.Print, however, has an
82 percent reach in Metropolitan Manila, which has a population of some 10 million and
is the countrys business, political, and cultural center. Print may thus be surmised to be as
influential in the capital as television, which has a reach of 96 percent among residents. [35]
The mass media in a free society uphold the democratic way of life. They provide citizens with
relevant information to help them make informed decisions about public issues affecting their
lives. Affirming the right of the public to know, they serve as vehicles for the necessary exchange of ideas
through fair and open debate. As the Fourth Estate in our democracy, they vigorously exercise their
independence and vigilantly guard against infringements. Over the years, the Philippine media have
earned the reputation of being the freest and liveliest in Asia.[36]
Members of Philippine media have assumed the role of a watchdog and have been protective and
assertive of this role. They demand accountability of government officials and agencies. They have been
adversarial when they relate with any of the three branches of government. They uphold the citizens right
to know, and make public officials, including judges and justices, responsible for their deeds or
misdeeds. Through their watchdog function, the media motivate the public to be vigilant in exercising the
citizens right to an effective, efficient and corrupt-free government.
Open Justice and Judicial Independence
Closely linked with the right to freedom of speech and of the press is the public right to scrutinize
and criticize government. The freedom to question the government has been a protected right of long-
standing tradition throughout American history. There is no doubt that the fundamental freedom to
criticize government necessarily includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and
decisions. Since the drafting of their Constitution over 200 years ago, American judges have anticipated
and sometimes even encouraged public scrutiny of themselves, if not of the judiciary as a whole.[37]
This open justice principle, which is as fundamental to a democratic society as freedom of speech,
has been an accepted doctrine in several jurisdictions. It is justified on the ground that if the determination
of justice cannot be hidden from the public, this will provide: (1) a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness
or idiosyncrasy, and (2) the maintenance of the publics confidence in the administration of justice. [38]
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. [39] Many types
of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary.
The debate over the independence of the judiciary is nothing new. More than 200 years ago, the
Founding Fathers of the American Constitution engaged in heated arguments, both before and after the
Constitutional Convention, focusing on the extent and nature of the judiciarys role in the newly-formed
government.[40] The signers of the Declaration of Independence, well aware of the oppressive results of the
unchecked political power of the King of England who established absolute tyranny over American
colonies, recognized the importance of creating a stable system of justice to protect the people.
Cognizant of the need to create a system of checks and balances to ensure that the rule of law shall
rule, the resulting Constitution provided for a three-tiered system of government, so structured that no
branch holds limitless power.
The judicial branch is described as the least dangerous branch of government. [41] But it holds a
special place in the tripartite system, as it is primarily responsible for protecting basic human liberties from
government encroachment. It completes the nations system of checks and balances. It serves as an arbiter
of disputes between factions and instruments of government.
In our constitutional scheme and democracy, our courts of justice are vested with judicial power,
which includes the duty x x x to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. [42] The present
judicial system allows the people to rely upon our courts with substantial certainty; it encourages the
resolution of disputes in courtrooms rather than on the streets.
To accomplish these tasks, an independent judiciary is very vital. Judicial independence is the
backbone of democracy. It is essential not only to the preservation of our justice system, but of government
as well. Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has observed that judicial
independence encompasses two distinct but related concepts of independence.[43]
One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks
to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this
kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it
seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second
concept is institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch
of government and protects judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved
- wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public
accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an
independent Third Estate.
For sure, judicial criticism can be constructive, uncovering and addressing a problem that merits
public attention. Public awareness, debate, and criticism of the courts ensure that people are informed of
what they are doing that have broad implications for all citizens. Informed discussion, comment, debate
and disagreement from lawyers, academics, and public officials have been hallmarks of a great legal
tradition and have played a vital role in shaping the law.
But there is an important line between legitimate criticism and illegitimate attack upon the courts
or their judges. Attacks upon the court or a judge not only risk the inhibition of all judges as they
conscientiously endeavor to discharge their constitutional responsibilities; they also undermine the peoples
confidence in the courts.
Personal attacks, criticisms laden with political threats, those that misrepresent and distort the
nature and context of judicial decisions, those that are misleading or without factual or legal basis, and
those that blame the judges for the ills of society, damage the integrity of the judiciary and threaten the
doctrine of judicial independence. These attacks do a grave disservice to the principle of an independent
judiciary and mislead the public as to the role of judges in a constitutional democracy, shaking the very
foundation of our democratic government.
Such attacks on the judiciary can result in two distinct yet related undesirable
consequences.[44] First, the criticism will prevent judges from remaining insulated from the personal and
political consequences of making an unpopular decision, thus placing judicial independence at
risk. Second, unjust criticism of the judiciary will erode the publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as
an institution. Both judicial independence and the publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as an
institution are vital components in maintaining a healthy democracy.
Accordingly, it has been consistently held that, while freedom of speech, of expression, and of the
press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy, these
freedoms are not absolute.For, if left unbridled, they have the tendency to be abused and can translate to
licenses, which could lead to disorder and anarchy.
Thus, in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,[45] this Court ruled that [f]rom the language of the
specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right (to free expression) is not susceptible of any
limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in
a complex society preclude, however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not absolute. It
would be too much to insist that, at all times and under all circumstances, it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.[46]
In Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales,[47] it was held that while the right of freedom of expression
occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, it is not without limitations. As the revered
Holmes once said, the limitation on ones right to extend ones fist is when it hits the nose of another.
Indeed, freedom of speech cannot be absolute and unconditional. In legal, political, and
philosophical contexts, it is always regarded as liable to be overridden by important countervailing
interests, such as state security, public order, safety of individual citizens, protection of reputation, and due
process of law, which encompasses not only the right to a fair trial, but also the preservation of public
confidence in the proper administration of justice.
As early as 1930, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice George Malcolm, declared that [a]s
important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzledpress and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is
the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.[48]
In Zaldivar v. Gonzalez,[49] the Court said that freedom of speech and expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to
and accommodated with requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of
viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.
As Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter put it:
x x x A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an

independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are
indispensable to a free society.
The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through

which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for
assuring judges their independence is a free press.[50]
Even the major international and regional human rights instruments of civil and political rights the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), [51] the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR),[52] the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),[53] and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR)[54] protect both freedom of expression and the administration of
justice. Freedom of expression is protected under Article 19 of the ICCPR
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
his choice.
However, Article 19 of the ICCPR is made subject to Article 14(1), which guarantees the right of
individuals to be equal before the courts and tribunals and be entitled to a fair x x x hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal, where [t]he press and the public may be excluded from all or part of
a trial for reasons of morals, public order (order public) or national security in a democratic society, or when
the interest of the private lives of the Parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of
the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice x x x.
Article 10(2) of the ECHR goes further by explicitly mentioning the maintenance of the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law and necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)
Judges have an affirmative duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary. The courts need to be able to sanction those who obstruct their processes. The judiciary itself
must continue to be a voice that explains and preserves its own independence. The respect accorded to
judges is an adjunct of the social-contract necessity for impartial judges in the creation of a civil society. In
the words of the great political philosopher John Locke
The great and chief end, therefore, for mens uniting into commonwealths, and
putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property, to which in
the state of nature there are many things wanting x x x there wants an established,
settled, known law x x x there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to
determine all differences according to the established law x x x there often wants power
to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. [55] (Emphasis
supplied)
A Survey of Philippine Jurisprudence
The very first case decided by the Supreme Court, In the matter of the proceedings against Marcelino
Aguas for contempt of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,[56] was a contempt proceeding. Before, as it is
now, this Court had to use this power to impress upon contemnors the legal theory and constitutional
premises of judicial legitimacy complementing popular sovereignty and public interest. Writing for the
Court, Mr. Justice James Smith stated that contempt proceedings against a contemnor were against
someone who had done an act or was about to do such act which was disrespectful to the court or offensive to
its dignity.[57]
Through the years, the Court has punished contemnors for a variety of offenses that have
attempted to degrade its dignity and impeded the administration of justice.
In 1916, Amzi B. Kelly was fined P1,000 and sentenced to six months in prison for contempt of
court after he published a letter to the editor of The Independent criticizing the Court for its decision to hold
him in contempt for having published a book stating that various government officials, including the
members of the Supreme Court, were guilty of politically assassinating General Mariano Noriel, who was
executed for the killing of a political rival in 1915.[58]
In 1949, Atty. Vicente Sotto was fined P1,000.00 for publishing a statement in the Manila
Times objecting to one of the High Courts decisions, citing that such decision by the majority was but
another evidence of the incompetency or narrow-mindedness of the majority of its members and called for
the resignation of the Courts entire membership in the wake of so many mindedness of the majority
deliberately committed during these last years.[59]
In 1987, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre,[60] in almost identical letters dated October 20, 1986 sent to four (4) Justices
of the Supreme Court (all members of the First Division), stated among others
It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of (case cited) by an untenable minute-
resolution x x x which we consider as
an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the First Division of the
Supreme Court of which you are a member.
We consider the three minute-resolutions x x x railroaded with such hurry/promptitude

unequalled in the entire history of the SC under circumstances that have gone beyond the
limits of legal and judicial ethics.
There is nothing final in this world. We assure you that this case is far from finished by a
long shot. For at the proper time, we shall so act and bring this case before another forum
where the members of the Court can no longer deny action with minute resolutions that
are not only unjust but are knowingly and deliberately promulgated x x x.
Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice under the
law. We intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who participated in the
promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in question x x x.
In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid having injustice to anyone, particularly the
members of the First Division, providing that they had no hand in the promulgation of the
resolution in question. x x x If, however, we do not hear from you after a week, then we
will consider your silence that you supported the dismissal of our petition. We will then
be guided accordingly.[61]
The letter to one of the Justices further stated
We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation x x x. Please do not take
this matter lightly. x x x The moment we take action in the plans we are completing, we
will then call a press conference with TV and radio coverage.Arrangements in this regard
are being done. The people should or ought to know why we were thwarted in our quest
for plain justice.[62]
These letters were referred by the First Division en consulta to the Court en banc.
True to her threats, after having lost her case before the Supreme Court, Ilustre filed on December 16,
1986 an affidavit-complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging, among others, some Justices of both the
Supreme Court and the CA with knowingly and deliberately rendering unjust resolutions.
On January 29, 1987, the Supreme Court en banc required Ilustre to show cause why she should not be held
in contempt for her foregoing statements, conduct, acts, and charges against the Supreme Court and/or
official actions of the justices concerned which, unless satisfactorily explained, transcended the permissible
bounds of propriety and undermined and degraded the administration of justice.
In her answer, Ilustre contended, inter alia, that she had no intention to affront the honor and dignity of the
Court; that the letters to the individual justices were private in character; that the Court was estopped,
having failed to immediately take disciplinary proceedings against her; and that the citation for contempt
was a vindictive reprisal against her.
The Supreme Court found her explanation unsatisfactory. The claim of lack of evil intention was
disbelieved in the face of attendant circumstances. Reliance on the privacy of communication was likewise
held as misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices in connection with the performance of their
judicial functions become part of the judicial records and are a matter of public concern for the entire
Court. (Underscoring supplied)
The Court likewise stated that it was only in the exercise of forbearance that it refrained from immediately
issuing a show-cause order, expecting that she and her lawyer would realize the unjustness and unfairness
of their accusations.Neither was there any vindictive reprisal involved. The Courts authority and duty
under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks
of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.
In resum, the Court found that Ilustre had transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice: (a) in her letters addressed to the
individual Justices, quoted in the show-cause Resolution, particularly the underlined portions thereof; (b)
in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted in the same Resolution; (c) in her
statement, conduct, acts, and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the Justices
concerned and her description of improper motives; and (d) in her unjustified outburst that she could no
longer expect justice from the Court.
The fact that said letter was not technically considered pleadings nor the fact that they
were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the
gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right
to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. [63]
Ilustre was fined P1,000.00 for contempt, evidently considered as indirect, taking into account the penalty
imposed and the fact that the proceedings taken were not summary in nature.
In Perkins v. Director of Prisons,[64] the Court had an occasion to examine the fundamental
foundations of the power to punish for contempt: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts; its existence is essentialto the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement
of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the due administration of justice. [65]
The Court there held that the exercise of this power is as old as the English history itself, and has
always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Being a common-law power, inherent
in all courts, the moment the courts of the United States were called into existence they became vested with
it.It is a power coming to us from the common law, and, so far as we know, has been universally admitted
and recognized.[66]
After World War II, this Court reiterated it had an inherent power to punish for contempt, to
control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and
all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. [67] This power to punish for
contempt is necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due administration of
justice x x x. It is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties-litigant.[68] These twin principles
were to be succinctly cited in the later case of Zaldivar v. Gonzales.[69]
Of course, the power to punish for contempt is exercised on the preservative principle. There must
be caution and hesitancy on the part of the judge whenever the possible exercise of his awesome
prerogative presents itself.The power to punish for contempt, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Malcolm
in Villavicencio v. Lukban,[70] should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power to retain that respect without which
the administration of justice must falter or fail. But when called for, most especially when needed to
preserve the very existence and integrity of no less than the Highest Court, this principle bears importance.
In the 1995 case People v. Godoy,[71] the Court, citing In Re: Vicente Sotto,[72] had the opportunity to
define the relations of the courts and of the press. Quoting the statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S.
v. Sullen,[73] the Court said:
The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and
distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the
courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of
the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its
jurisdiction. x x x In a clear case where it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial
business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality
of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the Court will not
hesitate to exercise undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be
permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from
outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted
upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right
of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.[74] (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, while the Court in Godoy agreed that our Constitution and our laws recognize the First Amendment
rights of freedom of speech and of the press, these two constitutional guaranties must not be confused with
an abuse of such liberties. Quoting Godoy further
Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the
courts has been described as an abuse of the liberty of the speech or the press such as will
subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court.[75]
Finally, in the more recent 2007 case Roxas v. Zuzuarregui,[76] the Court en banc in a
unanimous per curiam resolution imposed a P30,000 fine on Atty. Romeo Roxas for making unfair and
unfounded accusations against a member of this Court, and mocking the Court for allegedly being part of
the wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice. We found the letter of Atty. Roxas full of contemptuous
remarks that tended to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode public confidence that should be
accorded to it. We also said that his invocation of free speech and privacy of communication will not,
however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that
impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements
directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted
attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot
be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence
therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean,
ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. Accordingly, Atty. Roxas was found
guilty of indirect contempt of court and fined P30,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of a similar act
would warrant a more severe penalty.
Application of Existing Jurisprudence to the Case at Bar
In determining the liability of the respondent in this contempt proceeding, we weigh the conflicting
constitutional considerations respondents claim of his right to press freedom, on one hand; and, on the
other hand, ensuring judicial independence by upholding public interest in maintaining the dignity of the
judiciary and the orderly administration of justice both indispensable to the preservation of democracy and
the maintenance of a just society.
The apparently conflicting constitutional considerations summed up by a distinguished former

Judge of the Supreme Court of India, Justice H.R. Khanna, bears a hand in resolving the issue
There are one or two matters to which I would like to make pointed reference in
the context of the freedom of the press. One of them relates to the danger of trial by the
press. Certain aspects of a case are so much highlighted by the press that the publicity gives
rise to strong public emotions. The inevitable effect of that is to prejudice the case of one
party or the other for a fair trial. We must consider the question as to what extent are
restraints necessary and have to be exercised by the press with a view to preserving the
purity of judicial process.At the same time, we have to guard against another danger. A
person cannot x x x by starting some kind of judicial proceedings in respect of matter of
vital public importance stifle all public discussions of that matter on pain of contempt of
court. A line to balance the whole thing has to be drawn at some point. It also seems
necessary in exercising the power of contempt of court x x x vis--vis the press that no hyper-
sensitivity is shown and due account is taken of the proper functioning of a free press in a
democratic society. This is vital for ensuring the health of democracy. At the same time,
the press must also keep in view its responsibility and see that nothing is done as may
bring the courts x x x into disrepute and make people lose faith in these institution(s). One
other matter which must not be lost sight of is that while comment is free, facts are
sacred.[77]
We have no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in our decisions, judicial
reasoning, or even how we run our public offices or public affairs. They should even be constructive and
should pave the way for a more responsive, effective and efficient judiciary.
Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent Macasaet are not of this genre. On the contrary,
he has crossed the line, as his are baseless scurrilous attacks which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of
press freedom. They leave no redeeming value in furtherance of freedom of the press. They do nothing but
damage the integrity of the High Court, undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary,
and threaten the doctrine of judicial independence.
A veteran journalist of many years and a president of a group of respectable media practitioners,
respondent Macasaet has brilliantly sewn an incredible tale, adorned it with some facts to make it lifelike,
but impregnated it as well with insinuations and innuendoes, which, when digested entirely by an
unsuspecting soul, may make him throw up with seethe. Thus, he published his highly speculative articles
that bribery occurred in the High Court, based on specious information, without any regard for the injury
such would cause to the reputation of the judiciary and the effective administration of justice. Nor did he
give any thought to the undue, irreparable damage such false accusations and thinly veiled allusions would
have on a member of the Court.
The Investigating Committee could not have put it any better when it found respondent feigning
his highest respect for this Court
Macasaets diatribes against the Court generate public distrust in the

administration of Justice by the Supreme Court, instead of promoting respect for its
integrity and honor. They derogate his avowal of highest respect for this Court (10, tsn, Jan.
10, 2008); his declaration that he has always upheld the majesty of the law as interpreted
by the Court (96, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); that his opinion of the Court has actually been elevated
ten miles up because of its decisions in the cases involving Proclamation No. 1017, the CPR,
EO 464, and the Peoples Initiative (97, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); that he has done everything to
preserve the integrity and majesty of the Court and its jurists (84-85, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008); that
he wants the integrity of the Court preserved because this is the last bastion of democracy
(32, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008).
These tongue-in cheek protestations do not repair or erase the damage and injury
that his contemptuous remarks about the Court and the Justices have wrought upon the
institutional integrity, dignity, and honor of the Supreme Court.As a matter of
fact, nowhere in his columns do we find a single word of respect for the Court or
the integrity and honor of the Court. On the contrary, what we find are allegations of
pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty, suspicions that the jurists are thieves, that the
Highest Court has a soiled reputation, and that the Supreme Court has a sagging
reputation.
He admitted that the rumor about the courts being dirty referred specifically (to)
the Supreme Court (100, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008) and was based on personal conclusion which
(was), in turn, based on confidential information fed to me. It is in that respect that I
thought that I have (a) duty to protect and keep the Honor of this Court (98, tsn, Feb. 1,
2008).
He unburdened his heretofore hidden anger, if not disgust, with the Court when
he clarified that the word dirty x x x is not necessarily related to money(101, tsn, Feb. 1,
2008). It is my belief that lack of familiarity with the law is x x x kind of dirty referring to
then Associate Justice Artemio Panganibans support for, and Chief Justice Hilario Davide,
Jr.s act of swearing into office then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as Acting
President of the Philippines even while then President Joseph Estrada was still in
Malacaang, which Macasaet believed to be quite a bit of dirt (102-106, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008).[78]
To reiterate the words of the Committee, this case is not just another event that should pass
unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the allocated ramparts of free speech. [79] To allow respondent
to use press freedom as an excuse to capriciously disparage the reputation of the Court and that of innocent
private individuals would be to make a mockery of this liberty.
Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme Court a court of thieves and a basket of
rotten apples. These publications directly undermine the integrity of the justices and render suspect the
Supreme Court as an institution.Without bases for his publications, purely resorting to speculation and
fishing expeditions in the hope of striking or creating a story, with utter disregard for the institutional
integrity of the Supreme Court, he has committed acts that degrade and impede the orderly administration
of justice.
We cannot close our eyes to the comprehensive Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Committee. It enumerated the inconsistencies and assumptions of respondent which lacked veracity and
showed the reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery was false or not. [80]
Indeed, the confidential information allegedly received by respondent by which he swears with
his heart and soul[81] was found by the Investigating Committee unbelievable. It was a story that reeked of
urban legend, as it generated more questions than answers.[82]
Respondent Macasaets wanton disregard for the truth was exhibited by his apathetic manner of
verifying the veracity of the information he had gathered for his September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 articles
concerning the alleged bribery of a Lady Justice. His bases for the amount of money, the number of boxes,
the date of delivery of the boxes, among other important details, were, by his own admission founded on
personal assumptions. This nonchalant attitude extended to his very testimony before the
investigating committee
Justice Aquino: You did not endeavor to verify the information given by
your source before publishing the story about the
bribery?
Mr. Macasaet: I tried, I could not get confirmation, I thought that
eventually my effort at consistently trying or exposing
the alleged bribery one day sooner or later somebody
will come up and admit or deny.
xxxx
Justice Vitug: Do you confirm the fact of authorship of the columns

of September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007?
Mr. Macasaet: On a stack of Bible, I confirm it.
Justice Vitug: Does that mean that you also confirm the accuracy of those
information that were said?
Mr. Macasaet: I am not confirming the accuracy of the information and I
think that is precisely the reason for this hearing, I
must repeat that the purpose is to fish [the Lady
Justice] out so that the rest of the Lady Justices in all
the Courts suspicion can be removed from them. I
failed in the sense that one denied, she felt alluded to
and said she is not involved.[83]
Respondent thus admits to having written his articles as means to fish out the Lady Justice involved
in an alleged bribery fed to him by his source, with reckless disregard of whether or not such bribery indeed
took place. It defies reason why any responsible journalist would go on to publish any material in a
newspaper of general circulation without having ascertained even the five Ws and one H of the story. [84]
That he could not, through his extensive network of informants, confirm the approximate date
when the alleged bribery took place, the identities of the persons involved, or any other important detail,
before he began his series of articles only leads to the rational conclusion that he did not care whether or
not the story he published was true. His aim, as he admits, was to go on a fishing expedition to see if
someone would confirm or deny his now clearly baseless accusations. This practice of fishing for
information by publishing unverified information in a manner that leads the reading public to believe such
is true cannot be tolerated.
Aggravating respondents affront to the dignity of the Court is his unwillingness to show any
remorse or repentance for his contemptuous acts. In fact, as he made clear in his testimony before the
Investigating Committee when asked what his thoughts were about his having published the instant
articles, he replied that he was happy in the sense that [he] did a job in [his] best lights and the effort ended
up in the creation of [the investigating panel].[85]
However, such assertions of having acted in the best interest of the Judiciary are belied by the fact
that he could have caused the creation of an investigating panel to look into such allegations in a more
rational and prudent manner. In the words of the Investigating Committee
If he had no malice toward the Court, if, as he professes, the purpose of his
columns was to save the integrity and honor of the Court, Macasaet should, and could,
have reported the rumored bribery directly to the Chief Justice and asked for its
investigation. He should have refrained from calling the Court names, before giving it a
chance to act on his report and on his suggestion to investigate the matter. Since he knew
the name of the Court employee who allegedly discovered the bribe money, the Court
could have begun its investigation with her to ascertain the identity of the nameless Lady
Justice and the veracity of the rumored bribery. His disparaging remarks about the Court
and jurists in conjunction with his unverified report on the alleged bribery were totally
uncalled for and unjustified.[86]
It is precisely because of his failure to abide by the tenets of responsible journalism that we accept
the findings of the Investigating Committee in holding respondent Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of
court. He must be made accountable for his complete failure to exercise even a single vestige of responsible
journalism in publishing his unfounded and ill-thought diatribes against the Judiciary and the honorable
people who serve it.
Respondent also asserts that the subject matter of his articles is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Congress. He cites Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which partly states that x x x members of
the Supreme Court x x xmay be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of x x xbribery
x x x and Section 3(1), Article XI, which provides that [t]he House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all case of impeachment.
We cannot agree. What Macasaet conveniently forgets is that no impeachment complaint has been filed
against Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago. Thus, his cited constitutional provisions do not come into play.
Respondent claims that there is a violation of his right to due process. From the time his articles were
published, no formal charge has been filed against him as required under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respondent fails to see, however, that under Section 4 of the same Rule, proceedings for indirect
contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed, by an
order or any other formal charge requiring respondent to show why he should not be punished for
contempt. Our Resolution dated September 25, 2007 satisfies the Rule. He cannot validly claim that such
resolution is vague. He cannot feign ignorance of the contents of his September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007
articles in the Malaya.
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pertinently provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt.
xxxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
xxxx
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank,
he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x(Underscoring supplied)
We are not unaware of the vigorous dissent of then Associate Justice, now our Chief
Justice, Reynato S. Puno, in an earlier case,[87] in which he so lucidly argued for the right to journalistic
shield, behind which the Dissenting Opinion of an esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Carpio, and
respondent Macasaet, take full refuge. While we hold his thesis in high regard, the case at bar does not fall
within his erudite defense of press freedom. The critical issues then were the right of newsmen to refuse
subpoenas, summons, or invitations to appear in administrative investigations, and not to reveal their
confidential sources of information under R.A. No. 53, as amended. None of these are the issues at hand. Be
that as it may, elementary decision-making teaches that we cite the majority opinion as precedent, not
lonely dissenting opinions.[88]
In his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio assails the Committee proceedings as fatally
defective for patent denial of due process[89] becausewhen the witnesses the Committee summoned
testified, the Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to the witnesses, denying
to Macasaet such right.[90] He continues to say that [w]ith the procedure the Committee
adopted, Macasaet was reduced to a passive participant, unable to subject the testimonies of adverse
witnesses to rigorous probing under cross-examination. As matters stand, Macasaet will be subjected to
punitive sanctions based on evidence he had no opportunity to scrutinize.[91]
We disagree on triple grounds.

First, the proceedings of the Committee are presumed to be regular. Thus, the onus probandi to
prove otherwise rests on Macasaet, not on the Committee.Suffice it to say that the Dissenting Opinion
which cites People v. Godoy as to the criminal character of a contempt proceeding,[92] fails to state
what Godoylikewise instructs
Strictly speaking however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even
though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been
characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal
proceeding, but really constituting neither.In general, criminal contempt proceedings
should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal
cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt
proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions
apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of
the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes
governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not
required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are
preserved.[93]
Second, assuming arguendo that Macasaet was not able to cross-examine his witnesses, this does
not necessarily mean that his right to due process of law was violated.
The right of an accused to cross-examine the witnesses against him, although an adjunct of the
Constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face,[94] can be waived when not timely asserted. In the
case of Macasaet, never did he assert his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him despite the
opportunity to do so. During the entire course of the proceedings in the Committee, respondent was
vigorously represented by counsel de parte.Respondent or his counsel could have moved to cross-examine
the adverse witnesses. Respondent had every opportunity to do so. Lamentably, he failed to exercise the
said right.
Interestingly, during the last hearing date, counsel for respondent requested that respondent be
allowed to say something, which the Committee granted. Respondent then proceeded with a lengthy
discourse, all of 45 pages, on everything and anything, except his right to cross-examination.[95] Verily, it
cannot be validly claimed now that his right to cross-examine was violated.
Third, the Court is bereft of any power to invoke the right to cross-examine the witnesses against
respondent, for and in his behalf. Otherwise, the Court will be acting as his counsel, which is absurd.
Just a Word More
A free press is regarded as a key pillar of democracy. Reporters must be free to report, expose, and hold
government officials and agencies including an independent judiciary accountable. Press attention
surrounding the judiciary ensures public accountability. Such publicity acts as a check on judicial
competence and integrity, exposes inefficiencies and irregularities, keeps vigil over various public interest
cases, and puts pressure on responsible judicial officials. This freedom has been used and has benefited the
cause of justice. The press has become an important actor a judicial watchdog in the ongoing judicial
transformation. When properly validated, its acts are protected speech from an accepted function.
Freedom, however, has not guaranteed quality journalism. The press has been vulnerable to a host of
legitimate criticisms such as incompetence, commercialism, and even corruption. By disproportionately
informing the public about specific court processes, or by spreading unsubstantiated allegations about
corruption and other forms of judicial misconduct, the press dramatically undermines the publics faith in
the courts and threatens the very foundation of our democratic government.
Oftentimes, journalists writing about the judiciary and court cases lack basic knowledge of the law and
judicial procedures, on the basis of which they draw faulty conclusions which they pass on to their readers
as gospel truths. Trial by publicity also influences the independence of judges as the public is fed with
partial information and vocal opinions, and judges are pressured to decide in accordance with the public
opinion. Faith in the judiciary is undermined when judges rule against the expectations of the public which
has been brainwashed by dramatic reports and graphic comments. In some cases, unchecked rumors or
allegations of irregularities are immediately published because journalists lack professional competence to
verify the information, or are simply eager to break the news and attract a wider readership.
The role of the press in relation to the judiciary needs to be regulated. This can be done through
voluntary codes of conduct on the part of the press and through judicial policies, such as the rule
on sub judice and contempt of court rulings. The absence of clear voluntary codes developed by the press,
as its self-regulator, strengthens the need for the Court to use its power in the meantime to cite critics for
contempt. This is necessary in cases where such criticism is obviously malicious or in violation of
the sub judice rule, or where there is an evident attempt to influence the outcome of a case. Judges have the
duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. They should sanction those
who obstruct or impede the judicial processes. The effective administration of justice may only be realized
with the strong faith and confidence of the public in the competence and integrity of the judiciary, free from
political and popular pressure.
Criticism at every level of government is certainly welcome. After all, it is an essential part of the checks
and balances in our republican system of government. However, criticisms should not impede or obstruct
an integral component of our republican institutions from discharging its constitutionally-mandated
duties.
As the Court said in In Re: Almacen:[96]
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizen whom it is
expected to serve.
xxxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism,
on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. x x x[97]
All told, illegitimate and uninformed criticisms against the courts and judges, those which cross
the line and attempt to subvert the judicial process, must be avoided. They do a great disservice to the
Constitution. They seriously mislead the public as to the proper functioning of the judiciary. While all
citizens have a right to scrutinize and criticize the judiciary, they have an ethical and societal obligation not
to cross that too important line.
Senator Ernesto Maceda, the seasoned politician who has graced both the executive and the legislative
departments in various capacities, in a Privilege Speech, once appealed for voluntary self-restraint with
respect to this Court
There are proper procedures for dealing with instances of official misdemeanor without
setting an entire institution on fire. Arson is not the best means for pest-control.
In case of possibility of corruption in the Supreme Court, one possible means is the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against specifically identified justices.A move for
impeachment, of course, requires much sobriety and solid evidence.Whatever charges are
brought forward must be substantiated. Those who dare prosecute must come into the
open and append their names to the accusations they make, with courage and
conviction. This is the manner civil society conserves its civility x x x.
The ends of justice are not served by heckling nor by crude insinuation or by irresponsible
reporting. The house of democracy is never strengthened by those who choose to throw
rocks under the cover of darkness and anonymity. The institutions of our liberty are never
enriched by the irresponsible accusations of the uninformed. The bedrocks of our Republic
are not reinforced by those who evade responsibility under the veil of freedom. [98]
During interpellation, he went on to say
x x x And in the context of what I have just said, I think that all newspapers, all media are
welcome to do their worse, criticize the members of the Executive Department, Members
of the Senate, and any other agency of the Government.But I am just suggesting that when
it comes to the judiciary, and specifically to the Supreme Court, that a different policy, one
of more caution, should be adopted precisely because x x x people may lose faith in the
Executive or the President; they may lose faith in Congress, the Congressmen and the
Senators, but as long as they have their faith unshaken and complete in the last bulwark of
democracy x x x which is the Supreme Court, then our democracy will survive. [99]
Each of us has important responsibilities in a constitutional democracy.We, judges, will continue

to discharge our judicial functions with fairness. We urge all and sundry to abide by theirs. We need to
respect each other. As the golden rule goes let us not do to others what we do not want others to do to
us.Igalang natin ang isat-isa. Huwag nating gawin sa iba ang ayaw nating gawinnila sa atin.
Given the gravity of respondent Macasaets improper conduct, coupled with the recalcitrant
manner in which he responded when confronted with the reality of his wrongdoing, a penalty of fine in
the amount of P20,000.00 would be right and reasonable.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the Court declares respondent Amado P. Macasaet GUILTY of indirect contempt
of court and sentences him to pay a fine of P20,000.00, in accordance with Sections 3(d) and 7, Rule 71 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA

CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-
G.R. SP NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al.
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et Present:
al.]
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 9, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic institutions, is vested by the
Constitution with the power to settle disputes between parties and to determine their rights and obligations
under the law. For judicial decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be credible instruments in
the peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts, our courts must be perceived to be and, in fact be,
impartial, independent, competent and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that members of the
Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the strictest code of ethics and
the highest standards of propriety and decorum. Indeed, it is unfortunate that one of the countrys second
highest courts, the Court of Appeals, should be presently embroiled in scandal and controversy. It is this
Courts bounden duty to determine the culpability or innocence of the members of the Judiciary involved
in the said controversy and to discipline any one whose conduct has failed to conform to the canons of
judicial ethics, which uphold integrity, independence, impartiality, competence and propriety in the
performance of official functions.
The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated August 1, 2008 of Court of Appeals
Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding Justice Vasquez), referring to this Court for
appropriate action the much publicized dispute and charges of impropriety among the justices of the Court
of Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 entitled Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, et al.
To assist in its investigation of this sensitive matter, the Court in its Resolution dated August 4, 2008
constituted a three-person panel (the Panel of Investigators) composed of retired Justices of the Court;
namely, Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero and Mr.
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as Members. The Panel of Investigators was tasked to investigate the (a) alleged
improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V.
Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.); and (b) alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr.
Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.
A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the Investigating Panel, follows:
On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice Reyes), then Chairperson of the Ninth
Division of the CA, filed an application for leave from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.[1]
In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Justice
Jose C. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) was designated by the Raffle Committee as Acting Chairman of the
Ninth Division during the absence of Justice Reyes. Apart from his duties as regular senior member of the
Fifth Division, Justice Mendoza was authorized to act on all cases submitted to the Ninth Division for final
resolution and/or appropriate action, except ponencia, from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008 or until Justice
Reyes reports back for duty. The said office order likewise applied to the other Division(s) where Justice
Reyes had participated or took part as regular member or in an acting capacity.[2]
On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez, Felipe B. Alfonso, Jesus P. Francisco,
Christian S. Monsod, Elpidio L. Ibaez, and Francis Giles B. Puno, as officers, directors and/or
representatives of the Manila Electric Company (hereinafter to be collectively referred to as Meralco), filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Commissioner Jesus Enrique G. Martinez, Commissioner Hubert B. Guevarra, and the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). [3] Aside from the application for immediate issuance of a
TRO, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction that should thereafter be declared
permanent, as well as a declaration of nullity of the cease and desist and show cause orders issued by the
SEC through Commissioner Martinez. The petition was received by the CA at 10:49 a.m. on May 29,
2008 and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48 a.m. an urgent motion for a special
raffle. Presiding Justice Vasquez granted the motion in a handwritten note on the face of the urgent
motion,[4] and CA-G.R. No. 103692 was raffled to Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas). [5] At 3:10 p.m.,
the Office of Presiding Justice Vasquez received a letter from Atty. Estrella C. Elamparo (Atty. Elamparo),
Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS, requesting the re-raffling of the case in the presence of the parties in the
interest of transparency and fairness.[6] At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS filed an ex-parte motion to defer
action on any incident in the petition pending the resolution of their motion for the re-raffle of the case.[7]
Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also of the GSIS Law Office, personally
filed the urgent motion to defer action on the petition pending the resolution of their motion to re-raffle the
case. Since the receiving clerk of the Court of Appeals could not assure them that the motion would be
transmitted to the Court of Appeals Division, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar allegedly went to the office of
Justice Roxas for the sole purpose of personally furnishing him a copy of the motion. [8] They initially talked
to a male clerk who referred them to one of the lawyers, who, however, told them that it was not possible
for them to personally hand a copy of the motion to Justice Roxas. Thus, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar left
a copy of the motion to the staff but no one wanted to sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy. [9]
On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the extension of his leave until June 6, 2008.[10] In the
meantime, Justice Mendoza, who had been designated to replace Justice Reyes during the latters absence,
informed Justice Roxas through a letter that he (Justice Mendoza) was inhibiting from the case on the
ground that he used to be a lawyer of the Meralco. [11] Hence, in an Emergency Request for Raffle, Justice
Roxas informed the Raffle Committee about the inhibition.[12]
Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division by
raffle, in lieu of Justice Mendoza.[13] At 11:30 a.m., the office of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal (Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal) received a notice of emergency deliberation with the new Acting Chairman of the
Special Ninth Division, apparently sent by Justice Roxas, stating that her presence and that of Justice Sabio,
Jr. were indispensable on account of the national interest involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.[14]
Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo received a telephone call from somebody who did not identify herself but
(who) said that she had important information regarding the Meralco case. The unidentified caller told
Atty. Elamparo that a TRO was already being prepared and that certain Meralco lawyers had in fact been
talking to Justice Roxas. The caller warned Atty. Elamparo against Justice Roxas who had administrative
cases and was very notorious, but when prodded, the caller would not disclose more details. [15]
At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio received a telephone call in his chambers from his
older brother, Chairman Camilo Sabio (Chairman Sabio) of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG).[16]Chairman Sabio informed his brother that he (Justice Sabio) had been named the
third member of the division to which the MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled. Justice Sabio was
surprised as he had not yet been officially informed about the matter. Chairman Sabio likewise informed
him that a TRO had been prepared. Chairman Sabio then tried to convince Justice Sabio of the rightness of
the stand of the GSIS and the SEC, and asked his brother to help the GSIS, which represents the interest of
the poor people. Justice Sabio told his brother that he would vote according to [his] conscience and that the
most that he could do was to have the issuance of the TRO and the injunctive relief scheduled for oral
arguments, at which the respondents must be able to convince him that the TRO indeed had no legal basis.
In his signed testimony,[17] which he read before the Panel of Investigators, Chairman Sabio narrated the
circumstances of this call to his brother on May 30, 2008. It appears to have been prompted by a call from
a member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. To quote from Chairman Sabios testimony:
Last May 30, 2008 I was in Davao City Airport with my wife, Marlene, waiting for our 1:25
P.M. PAL flight to Manila. xxx xxx xxx.
As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty. Jesus I. Santos, a Member of the Board
of Trustees of GSIS. We had known each other and had become friends since before Martial
Law because as Chief Counsel of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) we were opposing
counsel in various cases in Bulacan.
Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute between the GSIS and MERALCO was now
in the Court of Appeals; and, that as a matter of fact, my brother, Justice Sabio, was chair
of the Division to which the case had been assigned. Being a Trustee, Attorney Santos
requested me to help. I readily welcomed the request for help and thanked him. There was
no mystery about his having known of the results of the raffle because the lawyers are
notified thereof and are present thereat. As a Trustee, Attorney Santos should be concerned
and involved. As such it is his duty to seek assistance for the GSIS where he could
legitimately find it. He was right in seeking my assistance.
I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and MERALCO. In essence this was in
fact a controversy between the long suffering public and the mighty financially and
politically controlling owners of MERALCO. MERALCO is not only a public utility but
also a monopoly. Fortunately, GSIS had taken up the cudgels for the long suffering public,
who are at the mercy of MERALCO.
x x x x x x x x x.
Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due to the noise I could not hear him. So
I waited until we would arrive in Manila.
As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch with Justice Sabio. After, he confirmed
that he was in fact in the Division to which the petition of MERALCO had been raffled. I
impressed upon him the character and essence of the controversy. I asked him to help GSIS
if the legal situation permitted. He said he would decide according to his conscience. I said:
of course.
x x x x x x x x x.
On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte motion to inhibit Justice Roxas from
CA-G.R. No. SP 103692.[18] The Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received a copy of the motion
at 11:58 a.m.[19]
Claiming that the TRO was issued to pre-empt the hearing scheduled in the afternoon of that day
before the SEC, the GSIS Law Office, through Atty. Marcial C. Pimentel, Jr., set forth its reason for the
motion for inhibition as follows:
3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent GSIS that the Honorable ponente has
been in contact with certain lawyers of MERALCO and has in fact already prepared a draft
resolution granting the TRO without affording respondents even a summary hearing. The
records of this case was (sic), per information, immediately transmitted to the Honorable
ponente upon his instructions. The worries of the respondent were exacerbated when it
learned that there are supposedly two administrative cases pending against the Honorable
ponente, both of which involve allegations of bias and prejudice.
It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not yet been officially notified by the
Raffle Committee that the case was raffled to him.[20]Moreover, contrary to the allegation of Atty. Elamparo
that the raffle was rigged, Justice Roxas had no hand in the raffle proceeding, which was handled by the
Division chaired by Justice Mariano del Castillo with the use of a fool-proof Las Vegas tambiolo, like the
lotto machine.[21]
Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the latters signature, the TRO which he had prepared,
already signed by himself and Justice Dimaranan-Vidal. Convinced of the urgency of the TRO, Justice Sabio
signed it on condition that the case will be set for oral arguments.
Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008,[22] the Special Ninth Division composed of Justices Sabio, Roxas, and
Dimaranan-Vidal, issued the Resolution granting the TRO prayed for by the petitioners and directing the
respondents to file their respective comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition within ten days from
notice, with the petitioners given five days from receipt of that comment within which to file their
reply. The Special Ninth Division also set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction for 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. In the same Resolution, parties were directed
to file their respective memorandum of authorities in connection with the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction together with their comments/reply. After the parties had filed their memorandum
of authorities relative to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the prayer for the said writ
would be considered submitted for resolution forty five (45) days from promulgation of this
Resolution. The SEC received a copy of the Resolution at 4:03 p.m. on that day.[23]
For Justice Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an implied denial of the motion for inhibition filed
against him. There was no need to put in writing the action on the motion for inhibition. [24]
At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received the Urgent Motion to Lift
Temporary Restraining Order and To Hold Its Enforcement in Abeyance filed by the GSIS. [25] Justice Roxas
did not act on the Urgent Motion because he did not consider it meritorious. [26]
On May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call from Mr. Francis De Borja (Mr. De Borja), a
person he had lost contact with for almost a year already. [27] Mr. De Borja greeted him with: Mabuhay ka,
Justice. When Justice Sabio, Jr. asked Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him that the Makati
Business Club was happy with his having signed the TRO, to which Justice Sabio retorted, I voted according
to my conscience.
On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated June 2, 2008 of Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr. informing GSIS Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Elamparo, that the Court of Appeals could not
grant her request for the re-raffling of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 in the presence of the parties in the interest
of transparency and fairness, as the case had been raffled in accordance with the procedure under the
IRCA.[28]
On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to work. [29]
On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,[30] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appearing for the SEC,
filed a manifestation and motion praying for the admission of the comment (to the petition) attached
thereto, as well as the advance and additional copies of the memorandum of authorities.
On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its comment/opposition to the petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692,[31] as well as its memorandum of authorities.
On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita Custodio (Atty. Custodio), delivered
to Justice Reyes the cartilla of the Meralco case, and informed him that a hearing on the prayer for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction had been scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. [32]However,
on the same day, the Division Clerk of Court came back to retrieve thecartilla upon instructions of Justice
Sabio. Justice Reyes instructed his staff to return the cartilla and when he asked the Division Clerk of Court
why she was retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio demanded that it be returned back to him. Personally
affronted by the domineering and superior stance of Justice Sabio, Justice Reyes read and re-read Secs. 1,
2(d) & 5, Rule VI (Process of Adjudication) until he was satisfied that he should sit as Division Chairman
in the Meralco case.[33]
On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 from Justice
Roxas so that he could study the case before the hearing.[34] Justice Roxas asked him whether Justice Reyes
would preside over the hearing. Justice Sabio explained the reason why he, not Justice Reyes, should
preside. Justice Roxas promised to instruct the Division Clerk of Court to send the rollo over to Justice
Sabio. The next day, the Division Clerk of Court told Justice Sabio that the rollo was with Justice
Reyes. When the rollo was eventually transmitted to Justice Sabio, the Division Clerk of Court asked him
whether the rollo should be with Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio explained why the rollo should be with him.
On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension of five days or until June 23,
2008 within which to file their consolidated memoranda of authorities and reply to the comment of the
SEC.[35]
On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation together with their reply to the
comment of the GSIS.[36] Meanwhile, Justice B. L. Reyes asked Atty. Custodio to report on what transpired
between her and Justice Sabio when she returned the cartilla. Teary-eyed, Atty. Custodio begged off from
making a report.[37]
Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice to avoid an ugly confrontation with the
Justices on the highly politicized case involving giants of the Philippine society. He explained to the
Presiding Justice his understanding of the relevant IRCA rules and the actual practice in similar situations
in the past. The Presiding Justice promised to talk with Justice Sabio and, for the sake of transparency and
future reference, Justice Reyes requested permission to write an inquiry on the matter. [38]
On the same day, Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice Vasquez a letter[39] calling the attention of
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (Justice Cruz), Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, to the dilemma as to who
between him and Justice Sabio should receive CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. Justice Reyes posed these questions
before the Presiding Justice:
Will the case remain with Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as Acting Chairman of the Special
9th Division and who participated in the initial Resolution of the case?
Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with the undersigned as Chairman?
For Justice Reyes, the dilemma was engendered by this provision of Section 2 of Rule VI of the
IRCA:
(2) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of these actions or proceedings,
namely: (1) giving due course; (2) granting writ of preliminary injunction; (3) granting new
trial; and (4) granting execution pending appeal have been taken, the case shall remain
with the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report and the Justices who
participated therein, regardless of their transfer to other Divisions in the same station.
The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction having been scheduled for June 23 and 24, 2008,
Justice Reyes considered it necessary that the issues be resolved before that date. Moreover, the referral of
the controversy to the Presiding Justice would give him sufficient time to seriously study the case before
the hearing.[40]
On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the letter of Justice Reyes to Justice Cruz,
Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, noting some urgency involved as the hearing of the case is
on Monday, June 23, 2008.[41]
On that same day, Justice Cruz wrote Justice Reyes a letter[42] quoting Section 2 (d), Rule VI of the
IRCA and stating that the [i]ssuance of a TRO is not among the instances where the Justices who
participated in the case shall remain therein. Hence, Justice Cruz opined that [n]otwithstanding the
issuance of the TRO (not writ of preliminary injunction), the case reverted to the regular Chairman (Justice
Reyes) of the Ninth Division upon his return. Justice Reyes received a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz in
the afternoon of that day.[43]
During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his opinion before the Panel. He opined
that the motion to lift the TRO is not a motion for reconsideration because Rule 52 of the Rules of Court
states that a motion for reconsideration may be filed with respect to a decision or a final resolution. A TRO
is not a final resolution but an interlocutory order. Moreover, since the subject of the hearing on June 23,
2008 was on the application for preliminary injunction, Justice Sabio had no right to participate in the
hearing because as an Acting Chairman, his authority was only to act on the motion to lift the TRO. Under
the IRCA, the position of Justice Sabio invoked the exception to the general rule in the IRCA. However, the
settled principle is to construe a rule strictly against the exception. The participation of Justice Sabio in the
hearing on June 23, 2008 was a passport to participation in the decision-making process, in violation of the
IRCA.[44]
Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding Justice referred the matter to Justice Sabio
who in turn, opined that a temporary restraining order is part of the injunctive relief or at least its initial
action such that he should be the one to chair the Division. [45] In his office after that consultation with the
Presiding Justice, Justice Reyes found that the Division Clerk of Court had given him a copy of
the cartilla just in case he would preside over the hearing. In the evening, the Presiding Justice called up
Justice Reyes to inform him that Justice Sabio insisted that he would preside over the hearing of the case,
and that the opinion of Justice Cruz, who was junior to Justice Sabio was no better than his own opinion.[46]
It turned out that, upon receipt of a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz, Justice Sabio told the Presiding
Justice by telephone that he disagreed with the opinion of Justice Cruz because he did not sign in an official
capacity as Chairman of the Rules Committee, but in his personal capacity and hence, the opinion of Justice
Sabio was as good as his, as in fact I (Justice Sabio, Jr.) am even more senior than he. [47] Justice Sabio told
the Presiding Justice that he smelled something fishy about the move to transfer the case to the Ninth
Division especially because Justice Reyes did not inform him about it despite the fact that they were seated
together on three occasions.
Justice Sabio smelled something fishy because a couple or so weeks ago, he attended a
Chairpersons meeting regarding the leakage of the ponencia of Justice Bato, with Justice Reyes as
Chairperson and Justice Jose Mendoza as senior member. The meeting was called because prior to the
promulgation of the decision of Justice Bato, the losing party already filed a motion for the inhibition of
the ponente. According to Justice Sabio information on the decision could not have been leaked by Justice
Bato but by a member of the Division.[48]
The Presiding Justice did not do anything anymore to prevent an unpalatable situation at the
scheduled June 23, 2008 hearing, notwithstanding the conflicting opinions of Justices Reyes and Sabio. The
personal view of the Presiding Justice was at the time with Justice Cruz but Justice Sabio had a different
interpretation. Neither did the Presiding Justice suggest that the Rules Committee be convened because the
Committee then had only two members. He felt that it would be better if Justices Reyes and Sabio could
settle it between themselves. The Presiding Justice was seeing the Justices practically everyday because he
did not want these things to blow up. However, neither did it enter the mind of the Presiding Justice that
the hearing on June 23 could be reset. Had he known that there was a motion to inhibit Justice Roxas, he
would have changed his position that it should be the Sabio group. [49]
Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to conduct a power-point presentation during
the hearing.[50] Likewise the SEC, through the OSG prayed that it be allowed the use of Microsoft
Powerpoint Application at the June 23 and 24, 2008 hearings. [51] Justice Roxas did not act on the motions.
On June 21, 2008, Justice Sabio came to know that it was the Division chaired by Justice Reyes that
would handle the case on account of the opinion of Justice Cruz. [52]
In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with Justice Martin Villarama, Jr. (Justice
Villarama) who advised him, in no uncertain terms, that his stand was correct and that he should remain
in the case.[53] Justice Villarama said that the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division regardless
of the transfer of the ponente to the Eighth Division because of the pending motion to lift TRO, which the
Special Ninth Division should resolve following the general rule that when a decision or resolution is
rendered by a division, a motion for reconsideration thereof should be acted upon by all the Members of
that division, whether regular or special, which participated in the rendition of the decision or resolution,
except in case of death, retirement or resignation of such Member. [54]
That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama. The latter told the former that since
there was a motion to lift the TRO, Justice Roxas should first rule on the motion. He also advised Justice
Roxas to inhibit himself from the case, as there might be a problem (mag-inhibit ka baka magka-
problema). Justice Roxas told Justice Villarama that he would follow his suggestion. [55]
Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to tell him of his strong conviction that the
issuance of a TRO is not among the instances provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI when the case shall remain
with those Justices who participated in the case regardless of their transfer to other division(s). Justice
Villarama told Justice Reyes that per his understanding and interpretation of said provision, x x x the case
should remain with the Special Ninth Division.[56]
At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called Justice Reyes to inform him that the
parties and their counsels were already in the hearing room. Justice Reyes informed the caller that he could
not preside as Justice Sabio had apparently hardened his position and he wanted to avoid an ugly spectacle.
His name plate was displayed in the hearing room but Justice Sabio moved to another hearing
room.[57] Allegedly, the removal of the nameplate of Justice Reyes was the talk of the Court of Appeals for
weeks.[58]
Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance as counsel for Meralco. [59] At the
hearing, Justice Sabio presided with Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal in attendance. Justice Roxas,
the ponente, did not ask a single question.[60] Not one of the Justices in attendance brought up the motion
for inhibition filed by the GSIS against Justice Roxas.[61] In open court, the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692
agreed to submit, within 15 days, simultaneous memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed for by the
petitioners, after which the application for preliminary injunction would be deemed submitted for
resolution.[62]
On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate conversations of Justice Villaram with
Justices Sabio and Reyes, the Presiding Justice also consulted Justice Villarama about the letter-queries of
Justices Roxas and Reyes on which Division should resolve the matter of injunctive relief or issue the
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. [63]
The Presiding Justice issued Office Order No. 196-08-CMV reconstituting the Committee on Rules
and designating Justice Cruz as the Chairperson, with Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, Reyes, Hakim
Abdulwahid, and Noel G. Tijam, as members.[64] The Committee on Rules was tasked to propose
amendments to the IRCA on or before August 15, 2008 for submission and adoption of the Court en
banc. (The office order was later amended by Office Order No. 196-08-CMV on August 4, 2008 to include
as members Justices Mario L. Guaria III, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores.[65]) The Rules
Committee used to be composed of only three members, namely: Justices Cruz, Abdulwahid, and Roberto
Barrios, now deceased, as members, with Justice Cruz as chairperson. [66]
It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez issued Office Order No. 200-08-CMV
stating that, in view of the retirement of Justices Enrique Lanzanas, Lucenito N. Tagle, Agustin S. Dizon,
and Rodrigo Cosico, and the appointments of Justices Ruben C. Ayson and Edgardo L. delos Santos, the
Divisions would have a new composition effective July 4, 2008.[67] Under that office order, Justice Sabio
became the Chairman of the Sixth Division, with Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a member. Justice Reyes
became the Chairman of the Eighth Division, with Justices Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. (Justice
Bruselas) as members.
On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of absence to use a business class airplane
ticket to Sydney, Australia that he had won in an APT Golf Tournament in January 2008. He was still on
official leave when the reorganization of the Court of Appeals took place on July 4, 2008.[68]
On July 1, 2008, Justice Roxas told Justice Sabio that he did not attend the Access to Courts (sic)
summit on June 30 and July 1, 2008 at the Court of Appeals Auditorium because he was busy with the
Meralco case. Justice Sabio was taken aback because at that time the parties had not yet submitted their
memoranda.[69]
That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, seeking to meet with him for an
important matter. Because Justice Sabio had 6-8 p.m.classes at the Ateneo Law School, they agreed to meet
after his classes but not for long because his wife and his daughter, Atty. Silvia Jo Sabio who is an Attorney
VI in the Office of the Chief Justice,[70] would be waiting for him.[71]According to Justice Sabio, the
conversation at that meeting with Francis de Borja went as follows:
17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De Borja was already waiting for me at
the Lobby Lounge of the 3rd Floor of the Ateneo Law School. His first words to me
were: Alam mo Justice kung sino ang kasama ko sa kotse? Si Manolo Lopez. Then he said: Noong
tinatawagan kita at sinabi kong Mabuhay ka Justice, si Manolo Lopez ang katabi ko noon. Nasa
Amerika siya, kaya ako na lang ang pumunta dito para makiusap sa yo. Alam mo, itong kaso na ito
is a matter of life and death for the Lopezes. And alam mo naman what the Marcoses did to them,
which is being done now by the Arroyos.
At that point he mentioned the impasse between Justice Bienvenido Reyes and
myself. He said: Alam naming may problema kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa
chairmanship.
I was surprised how he came to know about it, as this was an internal matter of
the Court of Appeals which only happened fairly recently and many associate
justices of the CA were not even aware of this. Just the same, I explained my stand
and why I could not relinquish the chairmanship to Justice Reyes.
He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang opinion dito ni Nonong Cruz ay i-challenge ang
stand mo. Kaya lang, mayroon namang nagsabi na it might become messy.
Then he bragged to me: Ako din ang responsible sa pag-recommend at pag-hire ng
Villaraza Law Firm.
Then he explained that he was there to offer me a win-win situation.
He said: Justice, mayroon kaming P10 million. Ready. Just give way to Justice Reyes.
Then I said: Bakit ganun. Nakasisiguro sila sa kanya, sa akin hindi?
He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa kanya.
At that point, I was shocked that he had a very low regard for me. He was treating
me like there was a price on my person. I could not describe my feelings. I was
stunned. But at the same time, hindi ko rin magawang bastusin siya because I had
known him since 1993 and this was the first time that he had ever treated me like
this, or shown that he believed I could be bought.
So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in conscience agree to that.
His answer was: Sabi ko nga sa kanila, mahirap ka talaga papayag. Kasi may anak iyang
Opus Dei. Numerary pa.
At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I told him I could not stay long. I told him
my wife and lawyer daughter were waiting.
Even then, he was already insistent. His parting words before I left were: Just
think about it, Justice.[72]
At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a sealed brown paper bag, which he was handling as if
something important was inside. However, Justice Sabio did not know if the bag contained P10 million. [73]
In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia Jo, about the offer of Mr. De Borja for
Meralco.[74]
In his affidavit submitted to the Panel of Investigators, Mr. De Borja describes himself as a
businessman, a deal maker, and project packager. On July 1, 2008, he invited Justice Sabio for dinner to
touch base and for chismis about the MERALCO-GSIS case. As the latter would have evening classes at
the Ateneo Law School, and his wife and daughter would be waiting in their car after his classes, they just
agreed to meet at the lobby-lounge of the School.What Mr. De Borja knew about the MERALCO case
allegedly came from news reports but he was interested in the news because he is a confirmed free-
enterpriser. Moreover, De Borja thought that there was [n]othing like hearing things directly from the
horses mouth.[75]
When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja averred he was indeed carrying a bag, not
an expensive looking luggage. After parking his car at the Rockwell basement, he took the escalator,
intending to walk out of the mall. On his way, he passed by the Kenneth Cole shop and, since it was still
early, he looked in and saw a T-shirt he liked. He bought the T-shirt, which he brought before the Panel of
Investigators in the grey Kenneth Cole Reaction bag. The photographs of the bag and the T-shirt costing
P1,650.00 are marked Exhibits A-De Borja and A-1-De Borja and attached to the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-
CA, while the photograph of the receipt issued by the Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked as Exhibit A-2-De
Borja, shows that the purchase was made on July 1, 2008 at 19:47. He stressed the bag did not contain P10
million.
Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De Borja brought during the hearing was
not the bag that Mr. De Borja was carrying when Justice Sabio saw him on July 1, 2008. What Mr. De Borja
allegedly brought with him to the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag with paper
handle about 2/3 (of the Kenneth Cole bag) in size. Justice Sabio was told by the Panel that it could be the
subject of rebuttal evidence but he did not present such evidence.
According to Mr. De Borja, Manolo Lopez (Mr. Lopez), the owner of MERALCO whose wife was
a member of Marthas Vineyard just like Mr. De Borjas wife, was also an acquaintance of Mr. De Borja at
the Ateneo grade school. Mr. Lopez did not ask him (Mr. De Borja) to contact Justice Sabio. At a party
where Mr. De Borja met Mr. Lopez, Mr. De Borja informed him that he knew Justice Sabio but Mr. Lopez
did not say anything.
Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice Sabio. Instead, he claimed that Justice
Sabio informed him that the government has offered him (Justice Sabio) money and a promotion to the
Supreme Court to favor GSIS. When Mr. De Borja asked what would it take for Justice Sabio to resist the
governments offer, Justice Sabio allegedly replied: Fifty Million.[76] He alleged that it was Justice Sabio who
called up after that July 1, 2008 meeting to feel his reaction to the P50 million solicitation. Justice Sabio
asked him: O, ano, kumusta, ano ang nangyayari.
Mr. De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice Sabio, some 15 years ago, as a balato because
he came to value the friendship of Justice Sabio that developed while the latter was helping the Roa family
in a business transaction. Mr. De Borja earned more than P25 million although he received only P3 million
as down payment out of the sale of 100 hectares of the Roa property. He gave the balato of 10% of the P3
million to Justice Sabio in cash at the Roa-owned bank in Cagayan de Oro. Since the Roas had a lot of legal
problems, Justice Sabio rendered advice and consultation at the time that he was an RTC judge in Cagayan
de Oro. After the promotion of Justice Sabio to the Court of Appeals, Mr. De Borja invited him for dinner.
They would see each other at get-togethers of the Roas with whom Mr. De Borja is related, even at a
gathering in the house of Mr. De Borjas mother.[77]
On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice Vasquez that he (Justice Sabio) was
offered a bribe (which he rejected) to have him ousted from the Meralco case. The news allegedly shocked
the Presiding Justice. Justice Sabio also went to Justice Villarama who was both shocked and amused.
Justice Sabio. did not tell them who the offeror was. However, a day or two later, Justice Sabio found out
that Mr. De Borja had called their mutual friend, Mrs. Evelyn Clavano, who was also shocked that Mr. De
Borja had the gall to ask her to convince Justice Sabio to accept the bribe. [78]
Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer of P10 million to a Justice was, in
the words of Justice Sabio, bastusan na ito, and he knew that bribing a Justice is a criminal act, the Presiding
Justice did nothing because he could not advise a fellow Justice on what to do the Justice would know what
he should do. Neither did he think of consulting Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal on the chairmanship
impasse.[79]
On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with phone calls and text messages, Justice
Sabio called up Mr. De Borja who told him: Mabuti naman Justice tumawag ka, kasi malapit na ang deadline ng
submission ng memorandum. Pinag-isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer namin? Kasi sayang din kung di mo
tatanggapin, Kasi kahit aabot itong kaso sa Supreme Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang yung P10 million. Baka
sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. Shocked by what he heard, Justice Sabio said No. Since Mr. De Borja did not
seem to understand why he kept saying No, Justice Sabio explained to him: If I accept that, my conscience will
bother me forever. How can I face my wife and two daughters? One a lawyer and the other a Numerary member of
Opus Dei? And besides, how can I reconcile my being a member of PHILJAs Ethics and Judicial Conduct Department;
being a lecturer of the MCLE; and being a pre-bar reviewer of the Ateneo Law School on Legal and Judicial Ethics? Mr.
De Borja retorted: Wala naman kaming pinapagawa sa iyo na illegal, eh. Then he added: You know Justice, after
two or three weeks, makakalimutan na ito ng mga tao. Meron naman diyang mga Atenista na tumatanggap. Justice
Sabio said: I dont know about them, but I am different. Mr. De Borja then said: Well, if you will not accept, we will
be forced to look for other ways. To this, Justice Sabio said: But they will have to contend with me. In parting, Mr.
De Borja said: Justice, no matter what, saludo talaga ako sa iyo.
Mr. De Borja admitted that Justice Sabio called him up, but denied the above conversation with
Justice Sabio.
On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals became effective and brought Justices
Reyes, Roxas and Bruselas to the Eighth Division. Justice Reyes went to see the Presiding Justice about the
urgent motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Division, which shows on its face that the Urgent
Motion dated July 10, 2008 was received by the Court of Appeals at 2:08 p.m. on July 10, 2008 and by Atty.
Teresita C. Custodio on July 9, 2008. Justice Reyes expressed to the Presiding Justice his apprehension that
should he fail to assume the chairmanship, he would face administrative liability for nonfeasance or
dereliction of duty. The Presiding Justice suggested that the respondents in the case be required to comment
on the Urgent Motion in a resolution to be issued by the former 9th Division of Justice J.L. Sabio, Jr. since to
allow the new Division of Justice B.L. Reyes to issue the resolution x x x would render moot and academic
the same motion. Justice Reyes agreed and told the Presiding Justice that he would be sending over the
records to him so that the Presiding Justice could place a note thereon as to what had been agreed upon.
However, the records of the case did not reach the Presiding Justice. [80]
For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was mandatory and the Meralco case followed
him as its ponente to the Eighth Division. By the reorganization, Justice Sabio was moved from the
disbanded Special Ninth Division to the Sixth Division, as the reorganization did not spare any
Justice.[81] Moreover, the IRCA does not require that the Justices that issued a TRO be the same Justices that
will render the decision.[82] This is because the TRO does not appear in Section 2 (d), Rule VII of the IRCA.
Accordingly, only the issuance of a preliminary injunction could be an exception to the July 4,
2008reorganization of the CA.[83] He believes the IRCA does not require that the Justices who heard the case
should also decide it because the CA is a court of record and Justices may rely on the transcript of
stenographic notes.[84] And so, once the three Justices have signed the decision, the ponente has the pressing
duty to promulgate the decision.[85]
Since July 4, 2008, Justice Bruselas alleged that he acted on all the ponencias of Justices Reyes and
Roxas, just as they had acted on his ponencias.[86]
On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum.
On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father, sought the advice of Atty. Jose Midas
Marquez (Atty. Marquez) regarding the bribery attempt. Atty. Marquez advised that Justice Sabio should
write the Chief Justice about the incident, detailing not only the bribery attempt but all that has transpired
relative to the chairmanship issue. Atty. Silvia Sabio immediately called her father and relayed Atty.
Marquezs advice. Later that date, Justice Sabio handed his daughter, Silvia, a handwritten letter for her to
deliver to the Chief Justice.[87] The handwritten letter, in essence, requested permission for Justice Sabio to
unburden himself before the Chief Justice on the Meralco case. [88]
At around 2:30 p.m., Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio. The conversation between them, as
recalled by Justice Sabio, was as follows:
As soon as he came in, I said: Why did you stab me behind my back? He said, Why, what did I
do? I asked him Why is it that you have to resort to that strategy of seeking the opinion of Ed Cruz,
in his personal capacity, when we could have discussed the matter with the PJ?
I reminded him that we were seated three times near each other on different occasions
only recently and he never mentioned to me about the plan to oust me.
He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have talked to you.
I told him, that all the while I thought we were friends. Why did you have to do these things behind
my back and not discuss the matter with me face to face?
Then he said it just came about due to the urgent motion; that he was afraid Meralco would
take action against him for nonfeasance for not doing his job.
It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was offered 10M for me to give way to you?
I further asked him the following: In the first place, how was the Meralco emissary able to know
that there was an impasse between you and me when that was supposed to be an internal matter?
→ If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship after I told you of the 10Million offer, what
will I think of you?
→ Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I think you are part of this whole scheme or
shenanigan?
→ Does not the timing alone stink of corruption? After they failed to convince me of their offer, now
they will use you to oust me? Is it because they are certain of your loyalty and they are uncertain
with mine?
→ And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to assume? In my nine years in this court, I
have never seen such an animal as this. This is a cowardly act, and whoever advised this stupid
motion is also stupid. Why do you have to dignify such a foolish motion? They should file a
motion for me to inhibit or recuse myself.
→ Why is it that Meralco actively participated in the hearing on the 23 rd and never raised any
question on the alleged irregularity of my having presided over the hearing?
→ Why do you insist on assuming the case? Are you not aware that several days after the issuance
of the TRO, respondents filed a motion for inhibition of Justice Vicente Roxas and a motion to
lift the TRO. Who then had the right to resolve such motion?
→ Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo? Ano ang tingin ko ngayon sa iyo?
His feeble answer was: you. He then said he did not know of those pending motions.
(Incidentally, these motions were never resolved.) He also said, wala talaga akong interest
dito kundi ayaw ko lang ma charge ng non-feasance for failing to do my duty.
I answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance. Hindi ito nonfeasance. I taught the subject for many
years and this is not one of them.
So I told him, I have made my decision on the matter. Bahala ka na. Then I stood up to
show him to the door. He was silent after that and before he left, he put his arm around
me.
For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: Wala talaga ako dito, wala akong interest kung di yun lang hindi
ako ma non-feasance. Justice Sabio thought otherwise.
Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the final decision on the
MERALCO case bearing his signature, which he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for concurrence/dissent.
According to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the rationale for his conclusion.
Justice Roxas went out for a while and returned with an expensive looking travelling bag from where he
pulled out the purported final decision. Before the close of office hours, Justice Roxas returned to the
chambers of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had signed his decision. When she
replied that yes, he had signed it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it up the next day. [89]
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding that on July 8, 2008 the Court of Appeals had
been reorganized because she believed that the Special Ninth Division was still existing on account of its
having issued the TRO.[90] She also concurred with the portion of the decision recommending
administrative sanctions against the GSIS lawyers because she believed the OSG or the OGCC should have
appeared for the GSIS.[91]
Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he had advised Justice Reyes to lay off the case
and allow Justice Sabio to continue and to resolve the urgent motion for Justice Reyes to assume the
chairmanship. Justice Villarama recalled that Justice Reyes repeatedly said: Wala talaga ako dito Jun, Wala
akong personal interest dito.
After a careful and judicious study of the more than 56-page decision of Justice Roxas, Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal signed it. True to his word, Justice Roxas personally picked up the decision that day
purportedly for the action of the Acting Chairman, Justice Sabio, who was then on leave of absence
until July 11, 200.[92] Notwithstanding the fact that the parties had not submitted their respective
memoranda, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the convincing ponencia, including three copies of the
signature page, because Justice Roxas was insistent of the urgency of the signing of the decision due to the
impending lapse of the TRO on July 29, 2008.[93] Justice Sabio thought otherwise.[94]
However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was the final
decision. He denied that he gave it to her for her signature. He said it was only for her to read because she
asked to read it. He said it was a mere draft as everything was unofficial there was no rollo or logbook with
it, it was not placed in an envelope, and it did not have the special seal of Justice Roxas. It allegedly was
thrown in the garbage can.
On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.
On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that Justice Reyes assume the
chairmanship of the Division,[95] alleging the reasons for the urgent motion as follows:
5. At the scheduled oral arguments on 23 June 2008 in the instant case, the parties were
first directed to one of the Hearing Rooms of the Court of Appeals. At the said room, the
name plate of Justice Reyes was already placed on the table for the justices. Thus,
petitioners were of the impression that the leave of absence of Justice Reyes was over and
that he would be presiding over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Ninth Division of
the Honorable Court.
6. However, when the parties were directed to transfer to another Room of the Court of
Appeals for the oral arguments in the instant case, petitioners saw that the name plates on
the table for the justices included that of Justice Sabio, Jr., together with that (sic) of Justices
Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal. Thereafter, Justice Sabio presided over the oral arguments as
Chairman of the Special Ninth Division of the Honorable Court. Petitioners were, thus, of
the impression that the regular Chairman of the Ninth Division, Justice Reyes, was still on
temporary leave of absence.
7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the petitioners that Justice Reyes has already
returned from his temporary leave of absence and has resumed his duties as Chairman of
the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Justice Sabio, Jr. should now refrain
from acting as the chairman of the Division hearing the instant case as he is already
disqualified from acting as such upon the return of Justice Reyes.
8.1. With due respect, Justice Reyes cannot shirk from his bounden judicial
responsibility of performing his duties and functions as Chairman of the Ninth
Division of the Honorable Court.
8.2. Specifically, under Section 3 (d), Rule IV of the 2002 Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals, a case can remain with the justices who participated therein
only when any of the following actions have been taken: (a) giving due course;
(b) granting of a writ of preliminary injunction; (c) granting of a new trial; or (d)
granting of execution pending appeal:
x x x x x x x x x.
9. None of the foregoing instances apply with respect to Justice Sabio, Jr.s
continuing hold on the case. Although Justice Sabio, Jr. was one of the Justices who issued
the temporary restraining order in favour of the petitioners in the instant case, this
circumstance is not among the grounds as above-quoted, when a justice of the Court of
Appeals may remain in the Division.
10. As above-quoted, the rule is categorical that it is not the grant of a temporary
restraining order but rather the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction that sanctions a
justices remaining with the Division. Thus, the continued participation of Justice Sabio, Jr.,
in the instant case, considering the clear Rules of the Honorable Court, is not only irregular
but may lead one to conclude that he is exhibiting undue interest in the instant case.
On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip to Australia.[96]
On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice Roxas called him up for a meeting to
discuss the case. Justice Sabio told him that he needed ample time to read the memoranda of the parties.
Justice Roxas promised to sendto Justice Sabio the memoranda immediately. [97]
At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division Clerk of Court a copy of Meralcos
Urgent Motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Ninth Division.
On Monday, July 14, 2008 at the flag ceremony, Justice Sabio requested Justice Roxas to meet with
him as he had by then read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas initially agreed to the meeting but
he later informed Justice Sabio that he had another matter to attend to; neither was he available in the
afternoon. Justice Roxas had become scarce. Justice Sabio learned that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was also
looking for Justice Roxas.[98]
Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the reconsideration of the TRO and informed
Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted to discuss it with them. The resolution he prepared
never saw light.[99]
At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought the rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 103692 to Justice
Reyes, and told the latter that he and Justice Bruselas would be coming over to deliberate on the case. Ten
minutes later, the Eighth Division deliberated on the case. [100] After a cursory examination of
the rollo, Justice Reyes found that the decision had been signed by Justices Roxas and Bruselas but Justice
Reyes asked for more time to study the case.[101]
A transcript of the Final Deliberation on July 14, 2008 is attached to page 1926 of Volume III of
the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 and marked as Exh. 2- Roxas on page 279 of the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-
11-CA. According to Justice Roxas, it was he who prepared the transcript from memory to lend credence
to the certification of Justice Reyes at the end of the decision pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution.[102] Justice Reyes denied having seen it or having authorized its transcription. Justice Bruselas
did not sign any transcript of the deliberation as he was not aware that a transcript was being taken. There
was no stenographer present, as only the three of them, Justices Reyes, Roxas, and Bruselas were present
at the deliberation. Neither was there a recording machine. Justice Roxas admittedly prepared the
transcript from memory.[103]
The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that there were previous deliberations
were really meetings, which they had twice, in the office of Justice Reyes, according to Justice Roxas. [104]
On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty. Silvia Sabio testified that she handed
her fathers letter to the Chief Justice through his private secretary, Ms. Jasmin Mateo. [105] A few days later,
however, Presiding Justice Vasquez told Justice Sabio that the Chief Justice would no longer meet with
him, as the Presiding Justice had apprised the Chief Justice about the matter.[106]
According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office of the Presiding Justice informed him
that Justice Sabio was waiting for him in his office. As soon as Justice Reyes was seated, Justice Sabio
berated him and accused him of orchestrating matters. Justice Sabio told him that an emissary of
MERALCO had offered him P10 million to drop off the case, hence, he asked that if he was offered that
much, how much could have been offered to the principals?[107]
On July 17, 2008, Justice Reyes went back to the office of the Presiding Justice and informed him of
the episode in the office of Justice Sabio. He also went to ask Justice Villarama for his opinion as to who
was the rightful claimant to the chairmanship of the Division that should decide the Meralco case. Justice
Villarama allegedly replied that they were both correct.
On July 18, 2008, at the pre-launching meeting for the CA-CMIS, Justice Villarama had a brief chat
with Justice Bruselas. The former told the latter that both Justices Sabio and Reyes are correct in the sense
that one (1) [of] them can properly assume chairmanship either under the exception provided in Sec. 2 (d),
Rule VI of the 2002 IRCA depending on the final disposition of the prayer for injunctive relief, or pursuant
to the general rule enshrined in Sec. 7 (b), Rule VI.[108]
On July 21, 2008, Justice Roxas personally filed with the Presiding Justice [109] an Interpleader
Petition[110]praying that Presiding Justice Vasquez decide which division Chairman (Justice Sabios Former
Special 9th Division or Justice B. L. Reyes 8th Division) should sign the Preliminary Injunction or
Decision.[111] Justice Roxas averred that [t]he impasse between two Chairmen from two Divisions has to be
resolved much earlier than July 30, 2008 because July 30, 2008 is the expiration date of the TRO issued by
the Special 9thDivision (signed by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Justice Vicente Q. Roxas [ponente] and Justice
Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal). He opined that the two Chairpersons differed in the interpretation of Sections 1
and 2 (d) in relation to Section 5 of Rule VI on Process of Adjudication of the Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals (IRCA).[112] His stand was that the IRCA should be strictly applied because [w]hen the provisions
are clear, there is no room for interpretation.
Justice Roxas endorsed his Interpleader Petition to Justice Reyes for his signature or dissent to the
finalized MERALCO Decision, which had been in Justice Reyes possession since July 14, 2008.[113] He also
gave the rollo of the case to Justice Reyes.[114]
Presiding Justice Vasquez allegedly told Justice Roxas that as Presiding Justice, he had no authority
to rule on the Interpleader Petition, which is not an administrative concern over which the Presiding Justice
must intervene. Nevertheless, to avoid further discussion, the Presiding Justice told Justice Roxas that he
would study the matter.[115]
On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice a letter on what was discussed between
us last 17 July 2008 at around 3:30 p.m.[116]Apparently the Presiding Justice had suggested to endorse the
case and have the Special Ninth Division direct the respondents to file their simultaneous comments on the
petitioners Urgent Motion (For Honorable BIENVENIDO L. REYES to Assume Chairmanship of the
Division in the Instant Case) dated 10 July 2008.
Justice Reyes expressed doubts that the suggestion was most prudent, as the dispute revolves
around the correct interpretation of the IRCA. He believed that since the question was purely internal, the
CA should not seek enlightenment from the litigants for it would only be construed against its competence.
He shared Justice Cruzs and Roxas interpretation of the IRCA. Hence, he urged the Presiding Justice to
decide the matter; otherwise, he would interpret the rules according to his best lights and act accordingly.
On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for the rollo of CA G. R. No. SP No. 103692 so he
could properly submit the requested opinion. It was then that he came across the unresolved motion
praying for the inhibition of Justice Roxas and the pending urgent motion to lift the TRO or to hold its
enforcement in abeyance. The Presiding Justice considered the latter as a motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution issuing the TRO.[117]
Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet received any reaction from the
Presiding Justice, he signed the decision as well as the Certification. It was promulgated on the same day.
The decision was promulgated without waiting for the Presiding Justices opinion on whether it
was the Eighth or Special Ninth Division that should decide the case. Justice Roxas alleged that he did not
expect the Presiding Justice to answer or resolve the matter anyway.
On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply to Justice Reyes letter and Justice Roxas
Interpleader-Petition. The Presiding Justice claimed having doubts on whether he possessed the authority
to decide the subject conflict simply because under the IRCA, the Presiding Justice has control and
supervision only over administrative affairs of the Court. The controversy was certainly not an
administrative matter but Section 11 of Rule VIII of the IRCA provides that the Presiding Justice has the
authority to act on any matter not covered by the Rules although such action should be reported to the
Court en banc.
The Presiding Justice expressed in his letter the view that the (Special Ninth) Division that issued
the temporary restraining order should continue resolving the injunctive prayer in the petition because it
was the Division that issued the Resolution granting the TRO and setting the hearing on the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, aside from the fact that the parties did not contest the
authority of Justice Sabio as Division Chairman at the time, although Justice Reyes had reported back to
work. Moreover, the motion for inhibition and the urgent motion to lift the TRO have a bearing on the
application of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA, especially because Section 7 (b) of Rule VI [118] points to the
retention of the case by the Special Ninth Division. Furthermore, the new Division headed by Justice Reyes
may not be allowed to resolve the pending incidents because two of its members, Justices Reyes and
Bruselas did not participate in the hearing on June 23, 2008. He did not believe that Justice Reyes would be
charged with dereliction of duty should he not assume the chairmanship. The Presiding Justice ended his
letter with the hope that the matter would be laid to rest and that whoever would be dissatisfied with its
outcome may elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding Justice that a decision had been
promulgated in the Meralco case the previous day. The Presiding Justice was surprised because Justices
Roxas and Reyes had asked him to resolve the impasse on the Division chairmanship. Upon inquiry, the
Presiding Justice found that the decision had indeed been promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on July 23, 2008.[119]
It was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal received a call from Justice Sabio,
informing her that Meralco had offered him a bribe of P10 million in exchange for his voluntary stepping
out from the Meralco case in order to give way to Justice B. L. Reyes, and that the decision in the Meralco
case had been promulgated by the Eighth Division.[120] Shocked that Justice Roxas did not inform her as a
matter of judicial courtesy of the scrapping of the decision which she signed on July 8, 2008, Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal wrote a letter to the Presiding Justice dated July 24, 2008,[121] bringing to his attention the
apparent and obvious irregularities in the handing of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, and complaining about
Justice Roxas lack of judicial courtesy in discarding for reasons she would not know, his purported final
Decision that he had asked her to sign and which she signed after a judicious study of the records
and rollo thereof. Justice Roxas gave the lame excuse that he had to incorporate therein some ten pages
which he forgot to include in his Decision.
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed surprise and consternation when she learned on even date that
a Decision in the case had been promulgated on July 23, 2008 by the Eighth Division chaired by Justice
Reyes, with Justices Roxas and Bruselas as members. She said:
My deepest regret is that the undersigned who already signed the supposed final
draft of the Decision in the instant case which bears the signature of the ponente, was not
even informed by the latter as a judicial courtesy at least, of the hurried easing out of the
undersigned from the case. This inevitably posed even to an unprejudiced mind the
following questions: under what basis was the case suddenly transferred to the 8th Division
and why is it that neither the undersigned nor the Acting Chairman Justice SABIO, of the
Special 9th Division not consulted thereof? and, foremost, what happened to the Decision
which the undersigned signed after devoting her precious time and effort in carefully and
laboriously examining the voluminous records and rollo of the case?
Sad to say the circumstance obtaining herein constitute a flagrant violation of the provision
of Canon 5 particularly Sections 2 and 3 thereof of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC).
On July 25, 2008, Justice Bruselas wrote the Presiding Justice a letter,[122] which was prompted by a
disturbing telephone call he received from Justice Sabio in the morning of July 24, 2008. Justice Sabio
informed Justice Bruselas that, after the injunction hearing on June 23, 2008, Meralco offered him P10
Million to either favor them or yield the chair to Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he
had informed the Presiding Justice of the bribery incident and that he was disgusted over the turn of events
because he should have remained chair of the Special 9 th Division that issued the TRO on the case. Justice
Bruselas informed Justice Sabio that it was the first time that he heard of the matter and that he had
participated in the deliberation on the case and concurred with the ponencia of Justice Roxas without such
information ever being taken up. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he would not leave the matter as it
is because he would bring it up in the open, to media, etc. Justice Sabio asked Justice Bruselas that if P10M
was offered to him, how much would have been offered to the others.
Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the Presiding Justice where Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal, who had received the same call from Justice Sabio, joined them. After that meeting with
the Presiding Justice, Justice Bruselas called up Justice Reyes who confirmed that he had heard about the
bribe offer but that he did not reveal the same to Justice Bruselas as it escaped his mind. The effort of Justice
Bruselas to get in touch with Justice Roxas proved futile.
Allegedly prompted by the manner by which the decision x x x was arrived at, and how the decision was
promulgated, and that unless an immediate and thorough investigation thereon be undertaken by the
Court of Appeals, both the individual and institutional integrity of the justices and of the Court of Appeals
would undoubtedly be tarnished, Justice Sabio wrote on July 26, 2008 a letter [123] to the Presiding Justice,
which precipitated the present investigation.
On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer carried an account of the letter of Justice Dimaranan-
Vidal to the Presiding Justice, without her knowing how her confidential letter to the Presiding Justice
leaked out.[124]
Before Justice Bruselas delivered his letter to the Presiding Justice, he received a copy of the letter
of Justice Sabio and, through a telephone call, reiterated his full agreement with his desired investigation.
The Presiding Justice called the Court of Appeals to an emergency en banc session at 10:00
a.m. on July 31, 2008 at the Session Hall to elicit the reaction of the Court and on the possible effect on the
decision rendered. The session was also called in order that the predicament experienced in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692 could be deliberated upon by the Committee on Rules with a view to amending the IRCA on
the reorganization of the Court of Appeals. The Executive Justices of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro, Justices
Antonio L. Villamor and Romulo V. Borja, respectively, were instructed to attend the en banc session to
report to the other Justices in their stations what transpired at the session, and to collect the personal
reaction, comment or view of the Justices on the matter.[125]
In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, after a torrid discussion of all the issues, the
Court of Appeals decided, as follows:
(1) Refer the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned to the Supreme
Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator;
(2) Leave the matter regarding the validity of the decision rendered in the above-
entitled case to the parties for them to take whatever legal steps they may deem
appropriate in the usual course of procedure; and
(3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation of our Internal Rules to the Committee
on Rules of the Court of Appeals in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar
situation.[126]
After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed in a letter for the Presiding
Justice[127] her strong reaction to the paper of Justice Roxas falsely imputing to her grandstanding before
the media or resorting to media-recourse instead of just filing an administrative complaint before the
Supreme Court, and taking exception to the equally outrageous, revolting and baseless accusation that she
is allegedly clinging to the case. She asserted that she never leaked a copy of her letter to the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, as her letter was only intended to bring to the attention of the Presiding Justice the impropriety
done by Justice Roxas in the MERALCO case that resulted in her having been eased out of the case
notwithstanding that she carefully and judiciously examined the ponencia with more than 50 pages, after
devoting her precious time to such study, and affixing her concurrence thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
reiterated her prayer for an investigation of the matter.
Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit admitting that he was the businessman
referred to by Justice Sabio, Jr. in his letter to Presiding Justice Vasquez. Mr. De Borja publicly claimed
having learned from the news that Justice Sabio was one of the justices in the case arising from the order of
the SEC to nullify the proxies issued in favor of the MERALCO management. He also alleged that Justice
Sabio told him about the blandishments coming from the government side, that he was being offered a
promotion to the Supreme Court and money to favor the GSIS position. Mr. De Borja asked Justice Sabio,
Jr., What would it take for you to resist the governments offer? and that the response of Justice Sabio, Jr.
was Fifty Million.
Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to hold a press conference the next day
on account of the publicized affidavit of Mr. De Borja. The Presiding Justice told Justice Sabio that this is a
matter of self-defense on his part, hence, the Presiding Justice cannot stop him from doing so.
Justice Sabio issued a signed statement as an initial response to the affidavit of Mr. De Borja,
vehemently denying that Mr. De Borja asked him what it would take for him to inhibit from the case, and
that he never asked for money from him.[128]
On August 1, 2008, Justice Sabio called the press conference to read a signed statement entitled My
Reaction to Mr. Francis De Borjas Affidavit dated July 31, 2008 on the Meralco-SEC Case.
Expressing anger at the filthy lie of Mr. De Borja, Justice Sabio decided to narrate almost word for
word his conversations with Mr. De Borja.
In an affidavit dated August 1, 2008, which Evelyn Clavano[129]executed in Davao City, she stated
that -
Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone number of Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr.
He related that because he was very close to the Lopezes of Meralco, he wanted to call him
regarding his possible inhibition in a certain Meralco case, wherein he was designated as
a substitute member of the division vice a justice who was temporarily on leave by reason
of sickness. He further said that the Lopezes desire that the same Justice, with whom the
Lopezes are more comfortable, to sit in the division.
So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of Justice Jose. L. Sabio, Jr. through
business card.
x x x x x x x x x.
On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court constituted the Panel of Investigators to investigate (1)
alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692
(Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.) and (2) the alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed
respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.
The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August 8 to 23, 2008. Affidavits were
submitted to the Panel to serve as the parties direct testimonies upon which they were cross-
examined by the Panel and the other parties.
On September 4, 2008, the Panel of Investigators submitted its Report of even date to the
Court en banc.
According to the Report, the investigation has revealed irregularities and improprieties committed
by the Court of Appeals Justices in connection with the MERALCO case, CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, which
are detrimental to the proper administration of justice and damaging to the institutional integrity,
independence and public respect for the Judiciary.[130]
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Vicente Q.
Roxas
Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of motions of the

parties prior to the promulgation of the Decision.
As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were not resolved or acted upon by Justice
Roxas. These were enumerated in the Report as follows:
(a) The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any Incident of the Petition
Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle filed by GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this case
was filed on that date (Rollo, pp. 185-186).
b) GSIS Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit Justice Roxas, which was filed on May 30,
2008. As the motion raised a prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have
resolved it before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never
did (Rollo, pp. 220-223).
(c) GSIS Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 187-210)
(d) GSIS Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be allowed to use Power point at the
hearing on June 23, 2008 . On June 20, 2008, the SEC filed a similar motion. Both
motions were not acted upon by Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-621,)
(e) Meralcos Motion for Extension of Time to file their Consolidated Memorandum of
Authorities and Reply to Repondent SECs Comment filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo,
pp. 981- 987).
(f) Meralcos Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes to Assume
Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case, which was filed on July 10,
2008 (Rollo, pp. 1262-1274).[131] (emphasis supplied)
We agree with the Panel of Investigators that by ignoring or refusing to act on the motion for his inhibition,
Justice Roxas violated Rule V, Section 3, third paragraph of the IRCA, which provides that he should
resolve such motion in writing with copies furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding
Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court. The pertinent portion of the said provision
states:
Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. x x x

xxx
A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted upon by him alone in writing,
copy furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle
Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.
This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas proposition that the issuance of the TRO constitutes an implied
denial of the motion to inhibit since under IRCA the obligation of the Justice to act on such a motion is
mandatory.
Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panels finding that Justice Roxas failure to act on the
other motions of the parties violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct (which applies
in a suppletorymanner to the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) providing that:
Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.
Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that [j]udges shall perform
all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness. Thus, it has become well-settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the resolving
pending motions or incidents within the reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes
gross inefficiency.[132] With more reason, this Court finds suspicious and reprehensible the failure of Justice
Roxas to act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been cited administratively for failure to
resolve pending incidents in cases assigned to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-
46-J, this Court imposed a P15,000 fine on Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving two motions
for reconsideration in another case and sternly warned him that future commission any act of impropriety
will be dealt with more severely.
Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.
Apart from Justice Roxas inexcusable inaction on pending incidents in the Meralco case, the Panel
of Investigators found that he had been dishonest and untruthful in relation to the said case. The Court
adopts the following findings of the Panel:
2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.
(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the Transcript of Final Decision, which is supposed
to be a transcript of the deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the Eighth Division on the final
decision in the Meralco case was not a true transcript of the minutes of the meeting, but
purely a transcript from memory because no notes were taken, no stenographer was
present, and no tape recorder was used. It was in fact a drama which he composed from
my recollection to comply with Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which requires that minutes of
the meeting, i.e., deliberation, shall be kept. The so-called transcript is
a fabrication designed to deceive that there had been compliance when actually there was
none -- with the prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation among the
members of the Division must precede the drafting of a decision.
(b) The statement in the transcript that it was a recap from our previous
deliberations was another falsehood because there had been no previous deliberations.
(c) The reference in the transcript to a Final Report of Justice Roxas was
also false for Justice Roxas admittedly did not submit a report as ponente, as required by
Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14, 2008. The
Final Report which he submitted was admittedly the decision itself which he and Justice
Bruselas, Jr. had already signed. The Final Report was merely the title of the page that
served as the cover of the decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes supposed closing statement
in the transcript that -- We have covered every angle of the Final Report of Justice Roxas
extensively is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes testified at the investigation that he had not seen
the transcript until the copy in the rollo was shown to him by Justice Callejo, Sr. during his
cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26, 2008.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Justice Roxas testimony that when he brought the Meralco decision to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was only a draft for her to read, because she asked if
she may read it, not for her to sign it, is completely false.This testimony was labelled by
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a lie, and she called Justice Roxas a liar, because she did not
ask to borrow the decision for her reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally brought
it to her office for her to sign as a member of the Special Ninth Division. After poring over
it the whole night, she signed it, as well as three (3) additional signature pages which were
to be attached to three (3) other copies of the decision. [133]
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred to the Panel in
explanation/justification of his questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated that he lacks the
qualification of integrity and honesty expected of a magistrate and a member of the appellate court.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that may warrant the
penalty of dismissal from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty of
dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the Court has had the occasion to rule that:
dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of
dismissal from service upon the commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions,
the Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on employees found guilty
of these offenses.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government
service. Dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.[134]
Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his colleagues in
the Court of Appeals.
The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:

xxx xxx xxx
(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a colleague and a lady at that,
when he unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned the decision that Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly forgot that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already been reorganized out of the Special Ninth Division as of
July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he should have explained to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why he was not promulgating the decision which she
had signed.
The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had consulted Justice Villarama, Jr.
on which Division should decide the Meralco case, may have been convinced that it should
be the Special Ninth Division. That is why he brought his decision to Justice Dimaranan-
Vidal for her signature. However, somehow, somewhere, during the night, while Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his decision, Justice Roxas was persuaded to
bring his decision to the Eighth Division (to which he and Justice B.L. Reyes belong after
the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the Court), it may have dawned on him that if the case
remained in the Special Ninth Division, Justice Sabio, Jr. might dissent, requiring the
Presiding Justice to constitute a special division of five. If he (Justice Roxas) should fail to
obtain a majority of the Division on his side, he would lose his ponencia; someone else
would become the ponente (perhaps Justice Sabio, Jr.). That may be the reason why he
junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and Dimaranan-Vidal (even if the latter concurred with his
decision) because he was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He chose to cast his lot with his
companions in the Eighth Division -- Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr. -- with whom he
and Meralco were comfortable.
(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. whose ruling on
his Interpleader Petition he sought on July 21, 2008, but he promulgated the Meralco
decision two (2) days later, on July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding Justice Vasquez,
Jr.s ruling which came out on July 24, 2008, only three (3) days after the Interpleader
Petition was filed by him, and two (2) days after Justice B.L. Reyes also reiterated in writing
his request for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to resolve the same chairmanship issue raised
in the Interpleader. Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was embarrassed and humiliated by
Justices B.L. Reyes and Roxas lack of courtesy and respect for his position as head of the
Court.
xxx xxx xxx

There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If judges and justices are
expected to treat litigants, counsels and subordinates with respect and fairness, with more reason, that
judges and justices should give their fellow magistrates the courtesy and professional regard due to them
as their colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges
are expected to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the
parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that Justice Roxas, in his apparent haste
to promulgate his decision in the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the Court of Appeals. It behooves
the Court to remind all magistrates that their high office demands compliance with the most exacting
standards of propriety and decorum.
Justice Roxas questionable handling of the Meralco case demonstrates

his undue interest therein.
In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in fact began drafting his decision even
prior to the submission of the parties memoranda. As discussed in the Report:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the hearing on June 23, 2008, or
up to July 8, 2008, to simultaneously submit their memoranda and memoranda of
authorities, and actually submitted:
On July 7, 2008 GSISs 39 page- memorandum
On July 9, 2008 SECs 62 page-memorandum
On July 10, 2008 MERALCOs 555 page- memorandum (by messenger) with
memorandum of authorities
Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their memoranda
in the case and submitted it to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature on July 8,
2008. His rush to judgment was indicative of undue interest and unseemly
haste, according to J.Romero.
He cheated the parties counsel of the time, effort, and energy that they invested in
the preparation of their ponderous memoranda which, as it turned out, neither he nor the
other members of the Eighth Division bothered to read before signing his decision. He
made a mockery of his own order for the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their
compliance a futile exercise.
xxx xxx xxx
(underscoring supplied)
We agree with Mme. Justice Romeros observation that the rush to judgment (even before the filing of the
parties memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas undue interest and unseemly haste, especially when
taken together with other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving the case on the merits is
likewise apparent in Justice Roxas failure to resolve the several pending incidents and instead jumping
ahead to deciding the case on the merits; his rushing of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing his draft
Decision on July 8, 2008 when the parties memoranda have not yet all been filed with the CA; his precipitate
transfer of the case to the Eighth Division for promulgation of decision, without notice to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal of the Special Ninth Division who had already signed his draft Decision and despite the
unresolved Chairmanship dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio which he (Justice Roxas) even
submitted to the Presiding Justice for appropriate action, just a few days before the promulgation.
We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice, judges are expected to conduct
themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only
maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. This standard applies not only
to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.[135] This Court will not hesitate
to sanction with the highest penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue interest in their assigned
cases.[136]
In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct
constitute grave misconduct, compounded by dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, which warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio,

Jr.
In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed improprieties in relation to the Meralco
case.
The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to his brother

Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to uphold the standard of
independence and propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the
appellate court.
In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up Justice Sabio on May
30, 2008 from Davao City, in response to a resquest for help from a member of the Board of Trustees of
Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the rightness of the
GSIS cause and asked him to help GSIS and that Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act
in accordance with his conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibilityfor lawyers, which provides that:
A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the Court.
As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court how the brothers can
justify their improper conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel observed in its Report:
Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilos effort to
influence his younger brothers action in the Meralco case, because both believe that our
Filipino culture allows brother-to-brother conversation, even if the purpose of one is to
influence the other, provided the latter does not agree to do something illegal.[137]
For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, which provide that
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x free from
extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence
by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be
free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
In the Investigators mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of Meralco contrary to
his brothers advice, Justice Sabios unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco case, seemed to indicate
that he may have been actually influenced by his brother to help GSIS. In arriving at this conclusion, the
Panel noted the following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of
the Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman, Justice Reyes had returned to duty on June 10,
2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a chore for the ponenteJustice V.
Roxas to perform), requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralcos Motion for Justice B. Reyes to
Assume the Chairmanship of the 9thDivision, which he probably intended to delay the decision on the
preliminary injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the
GSIS.
Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice Sabio had been influenced by his
brother by speculating that he would have favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which rendered
the decision in the Meralco case. However, we do find that it was improper for Justice Sabio to hold on to
the chairmanship of the Ninth Division the despite the return of Justice Reyes, when Justice Sabios
designation as acting chairman was clearly only for the duration of Justice Reyes leave of absence. We
likewise note with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation of the IRCA and hostile,
dismissive attitude towards equally well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper interpretation
of their rules. Such conduct on the part of Justice Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift and amicable
resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but rather fanned the flames of resentment between them. We
deem this sort of behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.
Justice Sabios conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper and

indiscreet.
On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the Report:
Knowing the nature of De Borjas profession, Justice Sabio, Jr. should have been
wary of the former. He should have foreseen that De Borja had the Meralco case on his
mind when he called Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja mentioned the Meralco case
and congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr. for having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.
But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear from De Borja. A month
later, after Justice Sabio, Jr. had presided at the hearing of Meralcos prayer for preliminary
injunction on June 23, 2008, and the case was ripening for decision or resolution, De Borja
again called up Justice Sabio, Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner to chit chat about the
Meralco case.
Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not, talk about the
Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo
Law School after his evening class in Legal Ethics in said school.
Justice Sabio Jr.s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was
highly inappropriate and indiscreet. First, in talks with his brother; the second time in
conversation with De Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that covers
the disposition of cases in the Court in order to preserve and protect the integrity and
independence of the Court itself. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary that: Judges shall exhibit and
promote high standards of judicial conduct (and discretion) in order to reinforce public
confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial
independence.
It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law
School, that De Borja allegedly offered him P10 million, in behalf of Meralco, to step out of
the case and allow Justice Bienvenido Reyes to assume the chairmanship of the Special
Ninth Division because Meralco was not comfortable with him (Justice Sabio, Jr.). He
rejected the bribe offer because he could not in conscience accept it.
Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja would think
that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or bought. The Panel is, however, honestly
perplexed why in spite of his outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De Borja
two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja to stop pestering him with his calls. The
Panel is nonplussed because, normally, a person who has been insulted would never want
to see, much less speak again, to the person who had disrespected him. He could have just
shut off his cell phone to De Borjas calls. De Borja denied that he reiterated his offer of P10
million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying that even if the case should go up to the
Supreme Court, GSIS would still lose, hence, saying lang yung P10 million; baka sisihin ka pa
ng mga anak mo. He testified that his reply to Justice Sabio, Jr.s call was deadma or
indifference. Justice Sabio, Jr. blamed that call of his to a lapse in judgment on his part.
Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible Justice Sabio, Jr.s
story about De Borjas P10 million-bribe-offer on behalf of Meralco, than De Borjas denial
that he made such an offer. Why does the Panel believe him, and not De Borja?
First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected bribe offer to CA
Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the next day a fact admitted by Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr.
Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the bribe-offerors name in
both his verbal and written reports to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr., De Borja identified
himself to the media as the person alluded to.
Third, De Borjas allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50 million, not P10
million, is not believable, for, if Justice Sabio, Jr. quoted P50 million as his price, he would
not have reported the P10 million bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. He would
have waited for Meralcos reply to his counter-offer.[138]
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on the part of Justice Sabio is not
credible. Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after
the latters rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part of Justice
Sabio who should have acted in preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which
he belongs.
Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabios indiscreet and imprudent conversations
regarding the Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship
dispute with Justice Reyes constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court
of Appeals which warrant the penalty of two (2) months suspension without pay.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Bienvenido L.

Reyes.
As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding Justice Vazquez in a letter dated July
22, 2008, reiterating his (Justice Reyes) request that the Presiding Justice render an opinion which Division
of the Court of Appeals the Eighth Division with him as chairman, or the Special Ninth Division chaired
by Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco case. This was in conjunction with an Interpleader filed by
Justice Roxas on the same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the fact that the Presiding Justice
informed Justices Reyes and Roxas that he would study the matter, Justices Reyes and Justice Roxas,
together with Justice Bruselas, promulgated the decision in the Meralco case on July 23, 2008. Justice Reyes
and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their request for a ruling nor did either of them advise the Presiding
Justice beforehand of their intention to proceed with the resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when the
Presiding Justice issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute on July 24, 2008, he was unaware of the
promulgation of the Meralco decision on July 23, 2008, under the aegis of Justice Reyes Eighth Division. As
found by the Panel, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was completely taken aback when he learned about it
on July 24, 2008, the same day that he issued his opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had
become functus oficio. He felt belittled and humiliated by the discourtesy of the two justices to him.
It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges
are mandated to show the appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues in the Judiciary.
Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find Justice Reyes guilty of simple
misconduct, which is mitigated by the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his
request to rule on the conflicting interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be
reprimanded for taking part in the decision of the subject case without awaiting the ruling of the Presiding
Justice.
Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-

Vidal
The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel of Investigators, to wit:
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself to be
rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco decision on July 8, 2008, without reading the
parties memoranda and without the deliberation among members of the Division required
by the IRCA. She knew that the TRO would not expire until July 30, 2008 some three (3)
weeks away from July 8, 2008 yet she allowed herself to believe Justice Roxas
misrepresentation that signing the decision was urgent. Her compliance with certain
dissembling practices of other justices of the Court, in violation of the IRCA, showed
weakness and lack of independence on her part. [139]
The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are instructive in this regard:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law,
free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues
in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from established procedure constitutes conduct
unbecoming a justice for which Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect
in the performance of her judicial duties.
Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado M.

Vasquez
It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez failed to provide the leadership
expected of him as head of the Court of Appeals. The following quote from the Report summarizes the
perceived lapses on the part of the Presiding Justice:
Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in dealing with the
turmoil arising from the Meralco case. He vacillated and temporized on resolving the
impasse between Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the chairmanship of the
Division that should hear and decide the Meralco case. He failed to take action on the
reported bribe-offer by Meralco to J. Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his leadership of the
Court even when the parties repeatedly urged him to lay down the rule for them to follow.
Was he hampered by the fact that he has relatives two daughters employed in the GSIS,
and a sister who is a consultant thereof? He pleaded lack of authority. Was he not aware
then, or did he discover too late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of the IRCA, he is in
fact authorized to act on any matter involving the Court and its members? That Rule
provides:
Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is authorized to
act on any matter not covered by these Rules. Such action shall, however, be
reported to the Court en banc.
He should have convened the Court en banc as soon as the alleged bribery attempt
on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to him, for it was an attempt to corrupt a member of the
Court, calling for the protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes
of the Court, hence, an administrative matter cognizable by the Court en banc. Section 5 (c),
Rule I of the IRCA, provides:
Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The Court en banc

shall, inter alia:
(a) xxx
(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures, and policies
for the protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes, x x
x.
Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his lapses in judgment.[140]

In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the view that much of the trouble
now being faced by the Court of Appeals could have been averted by timely, judicious and decisive action
on the part of the Presiding Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode in failure to act in the
early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has indelibly impressed upon him what is required of him as
leader of the second highest court in the land. Nevertheless, Presiding Justice Vasquez is hereby severely
reprimanded for his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as required of him by the
IRCA.
Findings regarding other personalities involved in the Meralco

case
Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1, 2008 only referred to this Court the propriety
of the actions of the Justices concerned in the Meralco case, we cannot simply turn a blind eye to the facts
brought to light during the investigation that relate to potential liabilities of other personalities in the
Meralco case.
With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to discipline members of the Bar and his attempt
to influence a member of the Judiciary, his brother at that, should be referred to the Bar Confidant for
appropriate action.
With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this Court reason to believe that Mr. De
Borja may be criminally liable for his attempt to bribe a magistrate of the Court of Appeals. This matter
should be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam decision was reached after
deliberation of the Court en banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3) members of the Court to recuse
themselves was denied by the Court. Except for two members of the Court who were allowed to inhibit
themselves from the case, the Justices voted as follows: Twelve Justices voted for the dismissal from service
of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension from the service for six (6)
months. Ten (10) Justices voted for two (2) month suspension from service without pay of Associate Justice
Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month suspension, one (1) for reprimand only as he should be credited
for being a whistle blower and one (1) for his dismissal from the service. Eight (8) Justices voted to
reprimand Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and five (5) for his suspension from the service for one
(1) month. As to the rest, the voting was unanimous.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:
(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations of the canons of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and is DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued
leave credits if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government
including government-owned and controlled corporations;
(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming
of a justice of the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to act
promptly and decisively in order to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the Court of Appeals,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of simple misconduct with mitigating
circumstance and is REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
warrant a more severe penalty;
(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice of
the Court of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial duties.
(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabios act to influence the judgment of a member of the Judiciary
in a pending case is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;
(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.s charge against Mr. Francis R. De Borja for attempted bribery of a
member of the Judiciary is hereby referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
BEN D. MARCES, SR., complainant, vs. JUDGE PAUL T. ARCANGEL, Presiding Judge, Branch 12,
Regional Trial Court Davao City, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Respondent was, at the time material to this case, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, at Davao City.[1] He is charged with serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority, harassment,
and immorality.
The complaint alleges the following:
(1) Complainant is a 61-year old retiree, married to Ruth Jovellar, by whom he has five children,
namely, Farley, Lydia, Ben Jr., Nikki and Allan. Complainant and the members of his family are residents
of the BRC Village, Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City.
In 1984 the spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Caas moved into complainants neighborhood. They
became the nearest neighbors of the complainant, their houses being only 45 meters apart. In that year, a
domestic helper of the Caases sought complainants help for alleged maltreatment she had received from
her employers.Complainant, who was the incumbent Purok leader, referred the matter to the barangay
authorities. The dispute was resolved, but the relation of the Marces and the Caas families became strained.
On September 27, 1990, Mrs. Flordeliza Caas had an exchange of words with Mrs. Ruth Marces and
the latters daughter, Lydia, during which they hurled invectives at each other. The incident was triggered
by a relatively minor matter involving a fight between the turkeys owned by the two families but which,
because of the bad blood between them, became a major issue.
The following day, September 28, Mrs. Caas, together with her sister and a neighbor, boarded a
passenger jeepney despite the fact that there were no more seats available because complainant was riding
on that vehicle. It turned out that Mrs. Caas had intended to cause the complainants arrest, because as the
jeepney neared the police station, Mrs. Caas asked the driver to stop the vehicle. Mrs. Caas then got off and
called a policeman and had the complainant Ben D. Marces arrested.
The arrest was made on the basis of alias warrants of arrest handed to the policeman by Mrs. Caas. The
warrants had been issued by MTCC Judge Edipolo Sarabia in three criminal cases against the herein
complainant for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Complainant was detained for one night without the
knowledge of his family, a fact of which Mrs. Caas allegedly boasted in the neighborhood.
The following day, complainant saw Judge Sarabia and explained that the criminal cases against him,
in connection with which the alias warrants were issued, had long been amicably settled. Judge Sarabia
told the complainant that he really did not know anything about the cases and that he had only been
requested by respondent Judge Paul Arcangel to issue the warrants.
(2) As a result of the September 27, 1990 shouting incident, Mrs. Caas also filed a complaint with the
Barangay Captain against complainants wife and daughter, Lydia.Mediation conferences between the two
families were conducted on October 27, 1990 and on November 3, 1990. Although he had not been asked
to, respondent Judge Arcangel attended the conferences. It is alleged that respondent judge
disturbed the proceedings by walking in and out of the Barangay Hall where the conferences were being
held;
introduced himself as the Executive Judge of the RTC of Davao City in an obvious attempt to influence the
Barangay Officials; and
accompanied Mrs. Caas and acted as the baby-sitter of the latters daughter.
During the October 27, 1990 conference, respondent judge allegedly confronted the complainant,
accusing him of sending the judge a death threat by means of a letter which purported to have been sent
by the New Peoples Army.
The barangay officials failed to amicably settle the dispute. It is averred that Mrs. Caas showed
arrogance and callousness at all times as if to prove that she is protected by a hard rock and impregnable
when she is with the judge.
(3) The feud between the Marces and Caas families worsened. On December 29, 1990, there was a
violent confrontation between members of the two families. Some of the parties were injured as a result of
hacking. Investigations were conducted by the police during which, according to complainant, he saw
respondent Judge Arcangel talking to the policemen.
(4) On the night of January 2, 1991, armed men in uniform arrived in two military vehicles and arrested
members of the complainants family and took them to the Davao Metrodiscom Headquarters. The arrests
were made on orders of a certain Col. Nelson Estares. A summary inquest was conducted which
complainant laments to be irregular as the arrests were pre-arranged and the complaint sheet was
fabricated. Complainant avers that the illegal issuance and service of the warrant (i.e., so-called Arrest
Orders) by the Commander of the Davao Metrodiscom can only be done by a person with a strong
connection, power and influence, such as respondent judge, considering his high position in the
government and close relations with the Caas family.
(5) In a resolution dated May 11, 1991 the investigating prosecutor, Albert Axalan, found probable
cause and filed charges of attempted murder against complainant Ben D. Marces, his wife and his son,
Farley. Complainants countercharges were dropped.Three days after, warrants of arrest were issued by the
RTC against complainant, his wife Ruth and son Farley respectively. Complainant alleges that respondent
Judge Arcangel, taking advantage of his position, influenced the conduct of the preliminary investigation.
(6) Subsequently, complainants son, Farley, was arrested. He was handcuffed and taken to the Ma-a
City Jail. It is alleged that respondents Toyota car, with plate number LBT 555, followed the car of the
arresting policemen as if to make sure that the evil plan allegedly authored by Judge Arcangel is well
followed and executed. To add insult to injury, it is alleged that while the applications for bail bond of
complainant, his wife and Farley were being processed at Branch 8 of RTC of Davao City, respondent Judge
Arcangel arrived and questioned the validity of the bond posted, telling the representative of the bonding
company, Hindi puwede ito, who gave you the authority to issue? He then removed the receipts and
arrogantly left with the receipts.
(8) Because of these events, complainant started asking why a judge should have a special interest in
his familys feud with the Caas family. All he knew before was that the judges car was often parked in front
of the house of Mrs. Caas, especially when Mr. Caas was away working overtime.
In his Comment submitted in compliance with the resolution of this Court, respondent judge alleges
(1) that the charges against him are not only false and malicious but utterly baseless; (2) that the same were
filed merely to gratify complainants personal spite and animosity against him; and (3) that the complaint
was filed in anticipation of the cases which the respondent intends to file against the complainant for
slander and threats.
Respondent judge further avers:
Anent the charge of causing the issuance of warrants of arrest against the complainant and the handing
of the same to Mrs. Caas for enforcement, it was Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs. Flordeliza Caas who
obtained the warrants. He only requested Judge Sarabia of the MTCC of Davao City to issue
them.[2] Respondent judge claims the warrants were valid, having been issued in connection with pending
cases and that there were other warrants against complainant which could not be served because of
complainants close connections with the officers of the warrant section. [3]
As to the allegation that he disturbed the barangay conciliation proceedings in the case between the
Marces and Caas families and allegedly acted as an escort of Mrs. Caas and baby-sitter of her daughter,
respondent judge denies he acted as escort and baby-sitter and claims that he could not have disturbed the
proceedings because none were held on November 3, 1990. He claims that he went to the barangay hall
because he filed his own complaint against Ruth Marces and her daughter Lydia. Apparently, respondent
judge is referring to the incident on September 27, 1990 during which Mrs. Marces and daughter Lydia
allegedly called Mrs. Caas kabit, kabit, kabit sa abogado (paramour, paramour, paramour of a
lawyer).[4] The judge probably felt alluded to.
Respondent judge likewise denies that he pressured the police officers and the prosecutors to file
charges in court as a result of the December 29, 1990 hacking incident.
Respondent vehemently denies having illicit relations with Mrs. Caas and that he went to the house
of the Caas family whenever Mr. Wilfredo Caas was away.Respondent claims that he has known the Caas
family since 1983, when he was still a City Judge. According to him, in 1989 he used to go to the Caas
residence on request by Mrs. Caas to mediate in the latters family problem. After this was settled, he
continued going there because he and Mr. Caas had business interests in the manufacture of appliance
protectors.
Finally, it is alleged that complainant is actually a fugitive from justice, who has a string of criminal
cases[5] and is notorious in the community. Respondent further discusses the merits of the December 29,
1990 hacking incident pointing to complainant, his wife and son as the felons and the guilty parties.
On February 27, 1992, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation. A Reply was subsequently filed by the complainant, alleging
harassment by respondent judge, as follows: (a) respondent judge wrote the Administrator of the Social
Security System, pretending to be interested in purchasing an acquired asset consisting of a house and lot,
which happens to be the residence of the complainant; (b) the management of the Philippine Airlines was
asked by a fictitious person to revive the criminal cases against the complainant; (c) the respondent judge,
together with a certain Fiscal Dumlao, had been visiting witnesses to the December 29, 1990 hacking
incident; (d) the respondent judge filed an administrative case with the Professional Regulations
Commission against Nikki Marces, daughter of the complainant who had just passed the Nursing Board
Examinations; and (e) respondent still visited the house of Mr. and Mrs. Caas.
Complainant further avers that the criminal cases against him are all business-related, being cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and for estafa arising from the issuance of bouncing checks. He calls
attention to the fact that respondent judge discussed in his pleadings the merits of the December 29, 1990
hacking incident and contends that this is improper and unethical.
On May 26, 1992, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice Luis Javellana of the Court of Appeals
for investigation, report and recommendation. Unfortunately, Associate Justice Javellana suddenly died on
August 25, 1993. The case was thereafter reassigned to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima, but the reception
of the evidence was assigned to Executive Judge Romeo D. Marasigan of Branch XVI, RTC-Davao City. On
September 18, 1993, Judge Marasigan forwarded the records of the case, together with the evidence
adduced before him, to this Court. The records were later transmitted to Justice Purisima.
In his Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 1994, Associate Justice Purisima recommends
dismissal of the charges against respondent judge for insufficiency of evidence, except the charge that
respondent judge attended mediation conferences between the feuding families and tried to intervene. As
to this charge the Investigating Justice finds that the evidence establishes the same. Justice Purisima
recommends that respondent judge be admonished and sternly warned that repetition of the acts of
impropriety by respondent will be dealt with more severely. The pertinent portions of Justice Purisimas
report states:
The charge concerning the frequent visits by respondent Judge at the residence of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas in
Barangay Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, and allusion that the former has illicit relation with the latter are
utterly devoid of sufficient substantiation. The mere suspicion on the part of the complainant and members
of his family that the respondent Judge has an affair with Mrs. Flordeliza Caas has been completely effaced
and reduced to nothing reprehensible or censurable by the unequivocal and straightforward testimonies
of Flordelizas husband and parents that the respondent Judge is just a family friend whose visits did not
have any immoral implication. According to these knowledgeable witnesses, the latter was their frequent
visitor in 1990, when respondent Judge and Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas, were engaged in the manufacture of
appliance protectors.
Obviously, Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas, the lifetime partner of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas, day and night, should be
in the best position to observe her. Whether or not his wife is unfaithful to him is a matter within the sphere
of the husband to detect. Here, Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas having given his wife clean slate, We can do no
less. A different conclusion and ruling could ruin families, which society cherishes and protects (Article
215, New Civil Code; Article 149, Family Code).
....
So also, respondent Judge cannot be held administratively liable for the handcapping [sic] of a son of
complainant, who was allegedly handcapped [sic] and brought to the Ma-a jail, while working at the Davao
Light and Power company. Absent any admissible evidence that the respondent Judge was the one who
caused such malfeasance to happen, he is not answerable therefore
....
But the charge that the respondent Judge was present during the mediation conference between the Marces
family and Caas family on October 27 and November 3, 1990, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of Catalunan
Pequeo, Davao City, and that during such conference, respondent Judge was in and out of the conference
room, trying to interfere with the proceedings, and to wield influence as Regional Trial Court Judge, is
firmly anchored on Complainants evidence, which has not been effectively traversed and negated by
respondents evidence.
From the evidence on hand, it is clear that on October 27, 1990, the respondent Judge arrived at the
Barangay Hall of Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, in the company of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas, and the latters
small child. During the said mediation conference between the Marces family and Caas family, respondent
Judge entered the conference room and made it known to all and sundry that he is the Presiding Judge of
Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao. Such actuation was indiscreet and improper because the
disputes and controversies between the two warring families could develop into a litigation before any of
the courts of Davao.
All things studiedly considered, with due regard to the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced,
pro and con, before Honorable Executive Judge Romeo D. Marasigan of the Regional Trial Court, Davao
City; the ineluctable conclusion is that on October 27, and November 3, 1990, the respondent Judge intruded
into the conference room, and interfered with a mediation conference then being held between the family
of the herein complainant and the Caas family, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of Catalunan Pequeo, Davao
City, and while inside said room, tried to influence barangay officials thereat, by identifying himself as the
Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Davao Regional Trial Court; a misbehavior and an improper actuation
under the premises.
Equally anemic of evidentiary support is the charge that the respondent Judge influenced the prosecutors
and police authorities of Davao City to harass the family of complainant.
The Court finds the conclusions of the investigator that respondent judge is guilty of improper conduct
to be fully supported by the evidence in the record. It only needs to be added that the claim of respondent
judge that he was at the mediation conference held on October 27, 1990 because he had himself filed a
complaint against Ruth Marces and the latters daughter, Lydia, is belied by the fact that respondent judges
complaint was filed only on November 3, 1990.
The report of the Investigating Justice fails to consider other serious allegations in the complaint, of
which there is also sufficient evidence in the record, to wit:
(1) That respondent judge caused the issuance of alias warrants of arrest by requesting another
judge, before whom the case against the complainant was pending, to issue the warrants; and
(2) That the arrest of the members of the Marces family on January 2, 1991 would not have been
made without the intervention of respondent judge.
These charges have not only been proven by substantial and convincing evidence, but have actually
been admitted by respondent judge. Thus, complainant alleges that he was informed by Judge Sarabia that
the warrants had been issued by him upon the request of respondent judge. This allegation is supported
by a handwritten note (Exh. E) of respondent judge, which reads:
Judge Edipolo Sarabia
Br. 3, City Trial Court
Davao City
Dear Ed:
If these cases (Cr. Case Nos. 9-C-M, 10-C-M & 11-C-M) are still pending, please issue another alias warrants
as the accused is now in town.
Thanks,
(Sgd.) Paul Arcangel
In addition, complainant presented a certification by the Clerk of Court[6] of the MTCC-Davao City, Branch
3, stating the following:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that according to the records of this Court, the three (3) Estafa Cases against MR.
BEN MARCES under Criminal Cases Nos. 9-CM, 10-CM and 11-CM has been in archive since December
28, 1983 due to non-arrest of the accused and an alias warrant of arrest was issued against the accused.
That its discovery and revival was made possible upon the request for verification of its status and
information by Judge Paul T. Arcangel that accused is back in town and that ultimately resulted to the
dismissal of the three (3) cases on March 11, 1991, without which verification the said cases would have
remained pending to date.
Instead of being delivered to the warrant officer, the warrants were actually given to Mrs. Caas. The
entry in the Daily Record of Events of the Ulas Police Substation[7]stated that [e]lements of this unit led by
P/Cpl. VA Secretaria arrested with alias warrant of arrest one BEN MARCES Y DOMANILLO. . . who was
charge[d] with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with Criminal Case No[s]. 9-CM, 11CM, duly signed by
Judge Edipolo Sarabia this 28th of September 1990 at Davao City. The warrant was given by one
FLORDELIZA CAAS Y Pelegrino, 26 years old, married, housewife. . . .
To cap it all, respondent judge himself admitted in his Comment, dated December 27, 1991, that Mrs.
Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs. Flordeliza Caas requested him to have the warrants renewed, thus, he
requested Judge Sarabia for the issuance of the new warrants[8] against the complainant.
Respondent judge justifies his intervention on the ground that complainant Ben D. Marces had been
able to evade service of the warrants because of connections with the warrant officers of Davao City. Even
if this had been the case it would not excuse respondent judge in using his own influence.
Indeed this is the same excuse given for respondent judges interceding with the Metrodiscom
authorities for the issuance of a so-called order of arrest as a result of which complainant Ben D. Marces,
his wife Ruth and his children Farley, Lydia, Nikki and Allan were arrested on January 2,
1991. Respondents own witness, Wilfredo Caas, stated that he was accompanied by respondent to Col.
Nelson Estares. It was Col. Estares who ordered the arrest of complainant and members of his family. Thus,
in his affidavit dated August 23, 1991, Wilfredo Caas stated:
13. That when my wife and mother-in-law were attacked and hacked by Ben Marces and his family
within the premises of our house on December 29, 1990, I called Judge Arcangel for assistance because Ben
Marces was trying to manipulate the case by making it appear that they were the victims....
14. That when I followed up the case at the Talomo Police Station and at the Tugbok Police Station, I
was given a run around by the police authorities and I sensed that a ranking police officer was interceding
in behalf of Ben Marces and his family;
15. That when the police authorities could not come up with a report of the incident after more than
three days, I sought the assistance of Judge Arcangel, who accompanied me to Metrodiscom Chief Col.
Nelson Estares, to whom I explained the entire incident and treatment I received from the police who was
investigating the case;
In addition, Wilfredo Caas testified in the investigation and affirmed that it was because of the help
of respondent judge that he was able to talk with Col. Estares, thus:[9]
[JUDGE ARCANGEL conducting examination:]
Q: In connection with the hacking of your wife and mother-in-law, what action did you take?
A: I tried to follow up the complaint to the police station about the hacking incident. I even went to
the Tugbok police station.
Q: What action was taken at the police station?
A: The police station did not entertain my complaint and they tried to pass me around.
Q: When no action was taken in your complaint by the police station, what did you do?
A: Sensing that there is no hope (to go to the) police, I asked Judge Arcangel to accompany me to Col.
Estares.
Q: When Judge Arcangel accompanied you to the Office of Col. Estares, what did you do?
A: He introduced me to Col. Estares and I told Col. Estares that my wife and my mother-in-law were
attacked by the Marces family and they were hacked and I requested Col. Estares to help me
because the police did not take any action and I even sensed that somebody was supporting the
Marces family.
With the above-cited charges having been duly proven, in addition to the factual findings of Justice
Purisima, it is clear that (1) respondent judge intervened in the feud between the complainants family and
the Caas family and (2) such interference was not limited to the barangay mediation proceedings but
extended as well to the various stages of the conflict. These acts of respondent judge must be viewed not
as single, isolated actuations but in their totality and in the context of the enmity between the two feuding
families. Thus viewed we find the actuations of respondent judge improper and censurable.
Respondent is, as we have so often said, the visible representation of the law,[10]the intermediary
between conflicting interests,[11] and the embodiment of the peoples sense of justice.[12] Unless it was a case
filed with his court, it was improper for him to intervene in a dispute or controversy. The Code of Judicial
Conduct provides:
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.[13]
He should not suffer his conduct to create the impression that any person can unduly influence him
or enjoy his favor.[14]
Respondent judge allowed himself to be dragged into what was a purely private matter between feuding
families. In attending, at the request of Mrs. Caas, the barangay conciliation proceedings and introducing
himself there as the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in an obvious demonstration of support
for Mrs. Caas, respondent lent the prestige of his office to a party in a case.
Respondents request to the judge of a lower court to issue warrants of arrest against the complainant
is no less censurable. As the Court had occasion to state in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor:[15]
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in
mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the bench in pending
suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the
independence of the judiciary but also undermines the peoples faith in its integrity and impartiality.
Respondent judge also acted improperly in accompanying Wilfredo Caas to Col. Nelson Estares who
ordered the arrest of complainant and members of the latters family. It would have been impossible for the
Caas family to procure the arrest of complainant and of members of his family by the Davao Metrodiscom
were it not for the intervention of respondent judge.
Wilfredo Caas claim that he had to seek the help of respondent judge because even after three days
the police still had not made a report on the incident on December 29, 1990 cannot justify respondents
intervention in the quarrel. The possibility that the incident could become the subject of litigation in his
court should have deterred him from getting involved in the feud.
Nothing can bring courts into disrepute more than the failure of the occupants thereof to be ever
scrupulous in their conduct. Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics cautions judges in pending or
prospective litigation before him [to] be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend
to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in
determining his judicial course. It cannot be overemphasized that a judges official conduct should be free
from appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of official duties but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach.[16]
For the foregoing reasons, we find respondent judge guilty of improper conduct.We do not agree with
complainant, however, that respondents misconduct justifies his dismissal from the service. While in some
cases involving similar acts the penalties imposed on the erring judges were dismissal, there were in those
cases other grounds warranting the imposition of such drastic disciplinary penalty. For example, in Ubarra
v. Mapalad,[17] respondent, aside from pressuring complainants to drop criminal charges against the
accused, likewise refused to inhibit herself when she knew it was improper to decide the case, and was
guilty of delay in deciding the case. On the other hand, in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor[18] the respondent was
found guilty of attempting to influence another judge to acquit the accused in a criminal case and, in
addition, of making untruthful statements in the certificate of service.
In the case at bar, there is no other charge against respondent judge. This is his first administrative
case. On the other hand his record as City Judge of Davao City, from 1975 to 1983, and as Regional Trial
Court Judge in the same city since 1983 is otherwise exemplary. In the circumstances of this case, the
penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely, should suffice to accomplish the purpose of disciplining an erring member of the
judiciary who has not shown himself to be beyond correction. As the Book of Proverbs says, A single
reprimand does more for a man of intelligence than a hundred lashes for a fool. (17:10)
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that commission of similar
acts of impropriety on his part in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are hereby
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460

Petitioner,
- versus -
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.,

Respondent.
x------------------------x
Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
x------------------------x
LUZ ARRIEGO, A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
Petitioner,
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)
Present:
- versus - PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., CALLEJO,
Respondent. AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 31, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives.
Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran[1]
THE CASES
The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological
evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed (e)vidence of ego
disintegration and developing psychotic process. Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his
application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems
with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit
to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared
favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch
73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.[2]
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported
its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own
report/memorandum[3] to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending,
among other things, that his report be considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and
that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator
Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration
of the investigation against him.
In a Resolution[4] dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA,
docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the following acts or
omissions as reported by the audit team:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements

regarding qualifications and for announcing in open court during court session his
qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;

(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36,
Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-
accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule
5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the
private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme
Court and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on
the scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance
filed by the accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding
questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of
settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the
accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering
the mental and physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the
accused is mahina ang pick-up;
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued
in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly
criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court
proceedings;
(m) For violation of Circular No. 13[5] dated 1 July 1987.

Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals Justice
Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from
receipt. Judge Floro was directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject
himself to an appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by the proper office of the
Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution. In the same breath, the Court
resolved to place Judge Floro under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation of the
administrative charges against him. He was barely eight months into his position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both affirmative
and negative defenses[6] while he filed his Answer/Compliance on 26 August 1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure to
prosecute.[7] However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted
by Justice Ramirez.[8]Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a Petition for
Inhibition/Disqualification against Justice Ramirez as investigator [9] which was denied by Justice Ramirez
in an Order dated 11 July 2000.[10] Judge Floros motion for reconsideration[11] suffered the same
fate.[12] On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the question of Justice Ramirezs inhibition/disqualification
to this Court.[13] On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. [14]
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on Judge
Floros motion to dismiss,[15] recommended that the same should be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001.[16] The day after, Justice Ramirez came out with a
Partial Report recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office by reason of insanity which renders
him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73. [17]
In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even after Justice
Ramirez came out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been
indiscriminately filing cases against those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999preventive suspension follows:
1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura,

Team Leader, Judicial Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator [18]
2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 72, Malabon City[19]
3. AC No. 5286 against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge

Benjamin Aquino, Jr.[20]
4. AC No. CBD-00-740 against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office, Atty.
Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the
Office of the Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of
Court, Branch 73, Malabon[21]
5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) against former Court Administrator Justice
Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator[22]
6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez[23]
7. A.C. No. 6050 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez[24]
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be
dismissed.[25] On 14 February 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss. [26]
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge h in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: (f)or using/taking
advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for
frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor. The
complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July
2001. On 31 July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21
August 2001. On 5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while Atty. Galang testified against
him on 4 October 2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this case. [27]
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May
1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines,
Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner.The resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and
the reconsideration of the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary
Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S. Narvasa, the
petitioners counsel.[28] The OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made the following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition and declared it
as null and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to
inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to have the case be
assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued hearing
and taking cognizance of the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case anew
as this violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the
1987 Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:
8. Raffle of Cases:
xxxx
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application

of the interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and
only upon a finding by the Executive Judge that unless the special raffle is
conducted, irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The
special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala
station.
xxxx
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a
case since such is only allowed upon a verified application of the interested party seeking
a provisional remedy and only upon the Executive Judges finding that if a special raffle is
not conducted, the applicant will suffer irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.s
order is contrary to the above-mentioned Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his resolution
that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It
is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks highly of a padrino (who helped him get his
position). Such remark even if made as an expression of deep gratitude makes the judge
guilty of creating a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such
flaunting and expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge
shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion for
reconsideration are judicial matters which this Office has no authority to review. The
remedy is judicial, not administrative.[29]
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle of the case in
violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of the subject resolution that Justice
Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x.
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the
OCA.[30] Judge Floro, through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 1999[31] which was noted by
this Court on 7 December 1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which
this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and
recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this case as well as in the
second case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed
Judge Floro as well as the other parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether or not they are
willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings
filed and the evidence so far submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided
ahead of the two. On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,
manifested its willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the pleadings and the
evidence submitted therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this
Court, in a Letter dated 28 February 2006, her willingness to submit her case for decision based on the
pleadings already submitted and on the evidence previously offered and marked.On the other hand, on 3
March 2006, Judge Floro manifested his preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M.
RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated cases, we resolve
to render as well a consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge Floros alleged
mental illness and its effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out
whether Judge Floro is indeed psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator
appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our sphere of competence, involving as it does a purely medical
issue; hence, we will have to depend on the findings of the mental health professionals who
interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant
and the irreverent in order to determine once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges
against him. If the evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the next issue is to determine the
appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or because of a
psychological or mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the applicability of equity.
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges (c and g, h and j, e and f) will be jointly
discussed as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. These charges involve common facts
and to treat them separately will be superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal against Judge
Floro
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-

laudatory statements regarding qualifications AND for
announcing in open court during court session his
qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons
of Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name as the Presiding
Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he is a bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)
and with full second honors from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B. [32] The audit team
likewise reported that: (b)efore the start of court session, Judge Florois introduced as a private law
practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de Manila University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during
the 1983 Bar Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible,
particularly the Book of Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were
given the opportunity to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions were asked; hence the
session commenced.[33]
Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, [34] the use of professional cards
containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not improper and that the word title
should be broad enough to include a Judges legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even
his Law School. Moreover, other lawyers do include in their calling cards their former/present
titles/positions like President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw the
line? Finally, Judge Floro argues that his cards were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens
to close friends or by reciprocity to other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not
allowed by law to seek other professional employment.
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it
was his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court
session, she would briefly announce his appointment with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating
and law practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the introduction was done only during the first week of
his assumption into office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that a judge should
not seek publicity for personal vainglory. A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found
in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting
standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their
wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, (i)f lawyers are prohibited from
x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their
qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should
judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or
actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity.[35]
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card, did Judge Floro
violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.,[36] we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card
by lawyers is permitted and that the card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law
firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.In herein
case, Judge Floros calling cards cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the
honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the
norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just given by him as
tokens and/or only to a few who requested the same. [37] The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the
matter reveals otherwise. An eye-witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated
these cards.[38] Worse, Judge Floros very own witness, a researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that
Judge Floro gave her one of these cards.[39]
As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured against
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being more favorable to respondent
Judge Floro. Rule 140, before its amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross
misconduct, which is a serious charge, or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious
charge or it may simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.
Misconduct is defined as wrong or improper conduct while gross connotes something out of all
measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful. [40] For serious misconduct to exist, the
judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules.[41]
With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards
containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02
of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive
but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for
recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be
human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking
publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of
the code they swore to observe.
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open
court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for
announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might
interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice
confident, competent and true.And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his
capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers approval, definitely erodes public confidence
in the judiciary.
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week, Judge Floro is
guilty of simple misconduct only.
(b) Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping

quarters
The audit team observed that inside Judge Floros chamber[s], there is a folding bed with cushion
located at the right corner of the room. A man, who was later identified as Judge Floros driver, was
sleeping. However, upon seeing the audit team, the driver immediately went out of the room. [42]
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit team saw
sleeping on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floros aide or alalay whom he allows to rest from time
to time (in between periods and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was
not sleeping during that time that the audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the
members thereof.
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge Floro having
allowed another person to use his folding bed for short periods of time during office hours and while there
is no one else in the room.The situation would have been different if there had been any allegation of misuse
or abuse of government funds and/or facilities such as in the case of Presado v. Genova[43] wherein Judge
Genova was found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
when he and his family used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying
for the electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his aide as
this becomes fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro should have
been aware of and attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were understandably uncomfortable with the
uncommon arrangement of a judge allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed.
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in

violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for
Release on Recognizance filed by the accused without the
presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding
questions in the form of examination of the custodian of
the accused
The memorandum report reads:

c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the trial
prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still proceeded with the hearing of the following matters:
(c-1) Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos.
20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442 entitled People vs. Luisito Beltran, People vs. Emma Alvarez, et
al., People vs. Rowena Camino, and People vs. John Richie Villaluz, respectively. In the hearing
of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a form of direct examination)
to the custodian of the accused without the accused being sworn by the administering
officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place
the accused under oath prior to the start of his questions. However, COC Dizon
refused). The hearing on the aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein
the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge
Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused that they are qualified to apply for
probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft the application in
behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance will immediately be
heard and be consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached
herewith as Annexes 3 to 6), the custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad,
barangay tanod or a member of the lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order
granting the motion for release on recognizance is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since
according to him neither rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written
order. Instead, after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign
the minutes of the session. Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and 20371-MN are hereto attached as Annexes 3 to 5.
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-

MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion without issuing a written order. Copies of
the minutes are hereto attached as annexes 6 to 7.[44]
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of procedure with
respect to the cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to final
and not interlocutory orders. Only final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered
and entered.
xxxx
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein respondent
faithfully complied with the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the
applications for release on recognizance, thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as MOTION

FOR RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968,
a Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken cognizance of

by respondent, if on its face, the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the
Office of the City/Public Prosecutor.
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts), especially
in RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from
1985-1998 almost 14 years), [and especially the practice of former Judge A. V.
Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the
chambers, regarding his being a responsible member of the community where the
accused reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the form of direct and
even cross examination questions.
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since there is no
such requirement. All that is required, is to inform the accused regarding some
matters of probation (optional) such as whether he was sentenced previously by a
Court, whether or not he has had previous cases, etc.
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on application

for release on recognizance, respondent, for caution in most of the applications,
included the interview/hearing on the applications for release on recognizance,
during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial prosecutor is available; at other
times, the hearing is held in the chambers.[45]
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules on probation
under Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the
release of an accused on recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the
applicant. Under the Probation Law,[46] and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares,[47] it is incumbent upon
the Judge hearing the application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a disqualified offender as
(p)utting the discharge of the accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the
request for provisional liberty.
Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem that he completely did away with the
requirement for an investigation report by the probation officer. Under the Probation Law, the accuseds
temporary liberty is warranted only during the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation
report on the application for probation and the resolution thereon. [48] As we explained in Poso v.
Judge Mijares[49]:
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case
study prior to action on application for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely
to underscore the interim character of the provisional liberty envisioned under
the Probation Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is
effective no longer than the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report and
the resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish
the case study and report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for
the trial judge to resolve the application for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty
of the accused even before the order to submit the case study and report, respondent
Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the detriment
of the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance
need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus
v. Court of Appeals[50]wherein we held that no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical
existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to
the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation. Obviously, then, Judge Floro was
remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance
of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, People v. Luisito Beltran, People
v. Emma Alvarez, et al.,People v. Rowena Camino, and People v. John Richie Villaluz.[51] From his explanation
that such written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to
inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of probation cases. First, he
ordered the release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving
the latter of any opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first
requiring the probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the
order granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance, as well as his
eventual probation, was already a done deal even before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took
up the cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff to draft the application for probation. This,
Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter
of policy, had been approving applications for release on recognizance hastily and without observing the
requirements of the law for said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward in
favor of the accused; in fact, this is a salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein
case, however, we cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as the unsolicited fervor to release the accused
significantly deprived the prosecution and the private complainants of their right to due process. [52]
Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.[53]
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it
conscientiously.[54] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply
it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. [55] True, not every judicial error bespeaks
ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanctions. [56] To
hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of
rendering infallible judgments.[57] This rule, however, admits of an exception as good faith in situations of
fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the
issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of
error.[58] Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held
administratively liable.[59]
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared
that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule
2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always
pro-accused particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay
for the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty.
Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and
other bonded accused whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned
to his sala. He narrated as well to Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in
the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February
1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof
submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he sided with the accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under oath that
Judge Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his
Public Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them
especially those under detention as he, himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so
many unfounded offenses.[60]
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially since it is
corroborated by independent evidence,[61] e.g., Judge Floros unwarranted eagerness in approving
application for release on recognizance as previously discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: A judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. This means that a judge whose
duty is to apply the law and dispense justice should not only be impartial, independent and honest but
should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest as well. [62] Like Caesars wife, a
judge must not only be pure but above suspicion.[63] Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO
lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and
judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not
to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness.Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes
public confidence in the judiciary.[64] His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and
measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.[65]
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent judiciary

is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct
as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the publics trust in his ability to
render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan[66]:
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to
everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to
indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding
to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging
matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to
feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and
predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the
traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience and
understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not
necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to
hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that
casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial
ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral

ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise
of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the
private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor.
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies
from that which he issued in open court in Criminal Case
No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN

entitled: People vs. Nenita Salvador, Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor
and considering that the private complainant was not being represented by a private
prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private complainant
to settle and eventually cause the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect
by making the private complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the signed
stenographic notes is hereto attached as Annex 8).
xxxx
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated
homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put on record the manifestations of the private complainant and
the accused relative to their willingness to settle the civil aspect of the case. In the same
order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement until after the public
prosecutor has given his comment.However, per report of the court employees in Branch
73, the aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a deviation from the original order
given in open court. Actually, the said criminal case was already settled even without the
presence of the public prosecutor. The settlement was in the nature of absolving not only
the civil liability of the accused but the criminal liability as well. It was further reported
that the private complainants signed the compromise agreement due to the insistence or
persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic
notes (unsigned draft order) and the revised order (signed). Copies of the stenographic
notes and the revised order are hereto attached as Annexes 8, 13, and 14. (Note: the
stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz
Arriego, filed an administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In
her Affidavit Complaint[67]dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro forced them
to settle her daughters case against the accused therein despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When
the parties could not agree on the amount to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred by
complaining witness, they requested respondent that they be given time to study the matter and consult a
lawyer to which Judge Floro replied that the case be settled immediately, uttering, ngayon na! ngayon na!
Moreover, Judge Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the accused against
the complaining witness would likewise be dismissed, so they agreed to settle the case. However, the
written Order issued by respondent Judge did not reflect the agreement entered into by the parties in open
court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by Mrs. Arriego,
maintaining that the hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the Rules of Court but was also
beneficial to the litigants concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their
differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties suggested that they would file
the necessary pleadings in due course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated
Order could be reduced to writing. Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and
Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an
offer of compromise in criminal cases is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases. With
this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the hearing on even date was superseded by the revised written
Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventuras stance that he has no power to revise an
Order, courts have plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally dictated order in substance and
in form even motu proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals[68]wherein we declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until
and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge
to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed,
even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly
served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or
judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft
thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party.
In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after service
on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court rendering it indisputably has
plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any
party or even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the
same has not attained finality. (Emphasis supplied)
In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court ostensibly a
judicial approval of a compromise agreement which was amended or revised by removing the stamp of
judicial approval, the written order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the
manifestations of the parties to enter into a compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have
submitted its comments thereto.[69]
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per
the Echaus ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for
the charge of dishonesty (under paragraph j of the complaint).
Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case,
by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence
of the trial prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The controversial settlement never came
to pass. It was not judicially approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego
actually had no cause for complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did not
reflect the agreement reached during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was
reached under duress at the instance of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical
examination of the accused based on the ground that the
accused is mahina ang pick-up
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347-MN,
Judge Floro motu proprio ordered the physical and mental examination of the accused by any physician,
over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is mahina ang pick-up.[70]
In refutation, Judge Floro argues --
In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the accused
NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E.
Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J.
Diaz, thus:
a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a plea of
not guilty;
b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he
appeared trembling and stammering;
c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that accused

is nauutal, has difficulty of reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;
d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind
regarding the plea, from not guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;
e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the

Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28
(Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135,
Rules of Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to justice), manifested
orally that the accused is mahina ang pick-up;
f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER OF

MENTAL EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that
the court may order a physical or MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or
mental condition is material to the issues involved. (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107,
id.).[71]
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro.He testified that he moved
for the suspension of the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his
mental fitness for trial.[72] As reflected in the Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge
Floro himself in his Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused is mahina ang pick-up.
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu proprio and
over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor. It must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment
took place in February 1999 when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time
thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental

condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination
and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by
the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees
that the suspension be made upon motion by the proper party.[73] Thus, it was well within the discretion of
Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the
situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found
that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense. [74] As we underscored
in People v. Alcalde[75]:
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently
in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the
matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid
of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings
and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered.
x x x.
xxxx
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey
to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense. At the
bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of
mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the
proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial
with the assistance the law secures or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accuseds mental fitness for
trial is already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution which, under the
circumstances of the case, is not an actionable wrong.
(e) Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case

No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch
83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07,
Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from
engaging in the private practice of law
(f) Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without
prior authority from the Supreme Court and without
filing the corresponding applications for leaves of
absence on the scheduled dates of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:
i. Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before the
lower courts in Bulacan. He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some
of these cases, is just signing the pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as
collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted
that he does not file an application for leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case
in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial
Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that in these cases, he is appearing and filing
pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and even indicating in the
pleadings that he is the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a
pending case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as
Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: In Re: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus Jesie V. Floro and
Benjamin V. Floro. In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission wherein he signed as
the petitioner and at the same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch
73, Malabon, Metro Manila. Court stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos,
Bulacan confirmed this information. Judge Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking
and his picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid pleading.
Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto attached as Annex 9.
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of the
Court Administrator, to appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases
(except the above-mentioned case) pending before lower courts.[76]
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of
law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: No judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as
member of the bar or give professional advice to client. Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
on the other hand, provides that: A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law.
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers to attend to his
personal cases.[77]
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro
having appeared as counsel in his personal cases after he had already been appointed Judge except that he
prepared a pleading (Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or
Judicial Admission) jointly with his counsel of record in connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against
his brothers for the custody of their mild, mentally-retarded brother. He explained, however, that he
prepared the said pleading in the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that
case.[78] He likewise explained that the pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he
had rectified the same by filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. [79] Finally, during the
hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he filed the subject pleading as petitioner and not as counsel. [80]
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound public policy, thus:
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are
inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and
privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to
their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private
interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their
functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote
the public interest.[81]
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by private practice
is more than an isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. [82] In herein
case, save for the Motion for Entry of Judgment, it does not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed
other pleadings or appeared in any other court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe
to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floros act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated
case and does not in any wise constitute private practice of law.Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that
Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as
defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with
a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was
obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge
and is thus in the right.[83] Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge
shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another
court or administrative agency. By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a
very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has been attending
the hearing of his personal cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests
the charge as untrue, it was incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that
although administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence, the liberality of
procedure in administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement
of due process.[84]
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the
Philippine justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate

language during court proceedings
The memorandum report reads:

In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge Floro,
Jr. conducts court proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to
obtain a tape-recorded proceeding conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript
of the proceedings (Annex 15). The tape record of the court proceedings is also submitted
along with this report as Exhibit A.
xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde was
appearing for the plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the
defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were guiding
Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:
Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi
nila maayos ang Rules of Court natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law
of California on Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh dahil sa kanila
maraming nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming eh ako wala
akong pinagkopyahan yan but ginawa ko lang yon Sabi ko si
Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan
talo na sa akin except na hindi papayag kasi marami diyang
In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of

holding trial, discussed, in open court, the case involving his brother.He even condemned
the Philippine justice system and manifested his disgust on the unfairness of the
system. Thus, he said:
Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng

eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko napakayaman, ako walang pera.
He continued:
Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang.Bawal

kasi; yung kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In memory of my brother, Robert
Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako,
ganun ganun Sabi ko paano komakikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon
ang nangyari di Judge naako, hindi ko pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di
ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala
akong nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming
pera. Alam ko naman kung ang isang court eh parehas o may kiling
eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sanahindi naka-record
eto (laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito.[85]
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all hearsay fabrications
supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives
(i.e., to allegedly cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which
were all unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine judicial system,
Judge Floro contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire
Tapping Law (Republic Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions
thereof. They also made it appear that the conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, this
was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were submitted to the
OCA sans the yellow notes and the official transcribed copy thereof.[86] This means that the transcribed copy
that was submitted by the audit team as Annex 15 is but an unofficial copy and does not, by itself, prove
that what was being recorded was a court proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes, without concrete
proof that they were taken officially during a court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the
unauthorized recording of a private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200.[87]
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with only Judge
Floros word against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath as to Judge Floros
alleged propensity to criticize the judiciary and to use intemperate language. Resolving these particular
charges would therefore depend upon which party is more credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when
he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the
alleged kabulukan ng hustisya. Time and again he said the Rules of Court is of no
use. He said that since theory and the practice of law are very different, the Rules
of Court does not always apply to different cases. Not only the justice system did
he criticize but likewise Judges and Justices.He told us . . . and I quote Dyan sa
Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na Judges . . . Sa Court of
Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababanglagayan diyan.
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now
serving? Where is his respect to the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he
uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself did not believe in the justice
system?
xxxx
Q What can you say about charge letter L which reads for the use of highly improper and
intemperate language during court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court
Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters
regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady
lawyer, he said, Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan and then he would call even not
during court session, but during office hours our Court Interpreter malandi, luka-
luka, may fruit of the sun. So, it did not surprise us one time when during a pre-trial
conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN Lopez v. Reyes and
Mercado, he uttered offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the
transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court
Administrator. It was the content of the tape he sent the Court Administrator.
Actually, for consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in
open Court, before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the
lawyer and the defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether or not to
attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the actual transcription of the
proceedings because it contained offensive languages against the justice system,
against a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda,
against people he is disgusted with. In fact, instead of discussing the merit of the
case or the possibility of the amicable settlement between the parties, he integrated
this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion
whether or not to advise the stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the
same in the record because it contained offensive languages highly improper and
intemperate languages like for example, putang ina, words like ako ang anghel ng
kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera.[88]
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and candid declarations
of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are consistent
with Judge Floros claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated with several honors from the
Ateneo School of Law and having placed 13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the
judicial system on account of his perception of injustice in the disposition of his brothers case are not far
removed from his reactions to what he perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA and
by the persons who were either in charge of the cases against him or had some sort of participation
therein. Consequently, although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have
said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of
crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules
of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct.Verily, in administrative cases,
the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [89] In this case, there is ample and
competent proof of violation on Judge Floros part.
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his
personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that [a] judge shall maintain order
and proper decorum in the court. A disorderly judge generates disorderly work. An
indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to maintain order and
proper decorum in court. When the judge respects himself, others will respect him
too. When he is orderly, others will follow suit.Proceedings in court must be conducted
formally and solemnly. The atmosphere must be characterized with honor and dignity
befitting the seriousness and importance of a judicial trial called to ascertain the
truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere must be avoided. And the
judge is supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for any detraction therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987provides

that trial of cases should be conducted efficiently and expeditiously.Judges should plan
the course and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.
Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and
movements. He must always keep in mind that he is the visible representative of the law.
Judge Floro, Jr.s claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain
and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen little friends
are manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity
to carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge
Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to remain
in the judiciary.[90]
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would suggest,
it merely sets the guidelines in the administration of justice following the ratification of the 1987
Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13 charges are
inextricably linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit
to continue discharging the functions of his office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation that
Judge Floro proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to
people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen little friends in determining the transcendental
issue of his mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed for the
seven of the 13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or
another, of seven of the 13 charges against him. Thus:
1) Charge a - simple misconduct
2) Charges c and g gross ignorance of the law
3) Charge d unbecoming conduct
4) Charge e unbecoming conduct
5) Charges k and l unbecoming conduct
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended, a judge
guilty of a serious charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but
not exceeding P 40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In herein case, considering that
Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience
is to be taken in his favor. And, considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad
faith or with corrupt motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in
the maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct
as aggravating circumstances.[91]
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling condition
of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office
As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations in
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for
him to undergo an appropriate mental or psychological examination and which necessitated his suspension
pending investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the functions of
his office notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of
dismissal from the service against Judge Floro.
The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter applied for
judgeship (which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in September 1995. The
psychological report, as prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and
Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He was
argumentative and over solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of marked
suspiciousness. He centered on his academic excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of
the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He emphasized his
obsessive and compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of
whether it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and graduated
Law as second honor, he calls this self-discipline and self-organization. He expressed
dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To
emphasize his ultra bright mind and analytical system, he related that, for the past 3 to 5
years, he has been experiencing Psychic vision every morning and that the biggest secret
of the universe are the unseen things. He can predict future events because of power in
psychic phenomenon as when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights in the sky
no. 13-1, and he got the 13th place. He has been practicing parapsychology seeing plenty of
dwendes around him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are prominent
findings, both in the interview (conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious
level).[92]
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the Supreme Court
Clinic when he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and
Celeste P. Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista
observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in
this. During the interview, he was quite reluctant to reveal information about his family
background and would rather talk about his work and academic achievements. However,
he failed to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with
the various tasks that he undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a
tendency to vacillate with decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to
mood swings with the slightest provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality and level
of functioning as a lawyer in private practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of
social and interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills and showed discomfort with
close social contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of others motives as well as
perceptual distortions were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68) which
is below the expected cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic
background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have problems with
decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and
preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his
role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in
dispensing justice.Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually and emotionally
equipped to hurdle the responsibilities of a judge and he may decompensate when
exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden situation.[93]
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro to seek a second
opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and
psychological capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999specifically
ordered Judge Floro to submit to appropriate psychological or mental examination.
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, [94] the Court clarified that the
appropriate psychological or mental examination being adverted to in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to
be conducted by the SC Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to submit himself to the SC Clinic
for psychological or mental examination, within ten (10) days from notice. [95] Judge Floro sought
reconsideration which was denied by the Court on 22 February 2000.[96]
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic was reiterated
by the Court on 17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge Floros failure to do so would result in
appropriate disciplinary sanctions.[97]
On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October 2000 Resolution with a
conjunctive special motion for him to undergo psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical
and/or mental institution.[98] This was denied by the Court on 14 November 2000.[99]
On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or
disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic doctors[100] andpsychologist[101] with a manifestation that he filed
cases against them for revocation of licenses before the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the
Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and the PAP[102] for alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable
conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics.[103]
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator Benipayo, moved that
Judge Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17
October 2000resolutions. According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floros filing of administrative cases with the
PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et al., is an indication of the latters intention to disregard and disobey the legal
orders of the Court.[104] The Court en banc agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was
ordered to submit to psychological and mental examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he shall
be ordered arrested and detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x. [105]
Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000.[106] He likewise sought the
services of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge
Floro on 3 January 2001.[107]
Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December 2000, this
time in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460.Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief
Judicial Staff Officer reported that (o)ver all data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with movement in
the paranoid direction. Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that:
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and
suspicious individual with a compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu.
Despite his status, cognitive assets and impressive educational background, his current
functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his test
protocol is characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing
which is an indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to make an objective assessment
and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to misconstrue signals from his environment
resulting to perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such
that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of
healing have become incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system,
that it has interfered and tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is
found to be unfit in performing his court duties as a judge.[108]
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior Chief
Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially

supported by evidence. Based on the three [3] psychological tests and evaluation of the
two [2] psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend that
Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective
immediately.
Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological
evaluations conducted by several mental health professionals which were all favorable to him. The first
three evaluations were in connection with his application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought
about by him having failed the examination given by the Supreme Court Clinic.The report dated 04
September 1998 by staff psychologist, Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa
Gustilo-Villasor of the Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part:
I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with everyday demands.
He is able to handle both concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to details, he
has a logical approach in evaluating the relationship between things and ideas.
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can consider solid facts to
arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize procedures and
details so as to get things done correctly and on schedule. He uses conventional standards
to determine personal progress. Set in his views, he may not readily accept others ideas
and contributions especially if these oppose his own.
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of FFJ. Generally, he
prefers to control his emotions and does not let this get in the way of his judgment and
decisions.
II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his undertakings.
Achievement-oriented, he sets high personal standards and tends to judge himself and
others according to these standards. When things do not develop along desired lines, he
may become restless and impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and can
be expected to comply with conventional social demands. [109]
Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-examination that
psychologically speaking, Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge.Thus:
JUDGE AQUINO:
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on every
available records of the proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed with
Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the interview. Would you consider
his failure to tell you about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here
when we were cross-examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in
the course of our cross-examination. Would you consider his failure to tell you
about his power of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his
psychological outlook?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Fatal [flaw]?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of being in
a trance?
A: He did not.
Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?
A: He did not.
xxxx
Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing
or making pronouncement concerning his psychic powers.Is this not correct?
xxxx
A: Yes sir.
Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of having
trances in the course of his private activities and even in the course of the
performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree with that?
A: I agree with you, Sir.
Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning
tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha naman na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng
ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng ibat iba pang
bagay at the same time. Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.
xxxx
Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.[110]
Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the Makati
Medical Center, stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro
[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to discuss
a wide variety of topics intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational,
logical and reality based. He is well oriented, intelligent, emotionally stable, with very
good judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological disturbances.[111]
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998, who stated
in his report that
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with
graying hair. When interviewed he was somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times
approximate in his answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative and articulate
in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual disturbances. Stream of thought was
logical and goal-directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency to be argumentative
or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of associations
or neologisms.Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and appropriate but mood
was anxious. There were no abnormal involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is
good. Cognition is intact. Judgment, insight, and other test for higher cortical functions did
not reveal abnormal results.
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro,
Jr. do not contradict his nomination and appointment to the post he is seeking.[112]
On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floros witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified that the
interview had its limitations[113] and he might have missed out certain information left out by his
patient.[114] The following exchange is thus instructive:
JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little unseen,
unheard friends known as duwendes?
DR. JURILLA: He did not.
xxxx
Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his claim
to be the number five psychic in the country?
xxxx
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena?
A: He did not.
xxxx
Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4)
kilometers apart, he used to ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse?
A: Not during our interview.
xxxx
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed
some information or it is possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told
us everything.
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did
not admittedly tell you in the course of the interview, your opinion of the patient
would be altered a little?
xxxx
A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your
Honor in the absence of any corroborative contradiction.
Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview, would
that be correct?
A: The interview has its limitations.
Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed by
events that transpired after the interview, would you not say you have more
reason to have your evaluation altered?
A: Yes.
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been
proclaiming himself as the number five psychic in the country [where] no one has
called him as a psychic at all?
xxxx
Q: Would it be really more altered?
A: I would say so.
xxxx
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are
confirmations of what Judge Floro did not tell you during the interview, would
your finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you that he is
capable or possessed of the power of bilocation?
xxxx
A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floros mental and
psychological x x x?
A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there was
abnormality in the person of Judge Floro?
A: Given the data.
Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your
evaluation favorable to Judge Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on
record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is capable of typing a
letter?
xxxx
A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically
altered.[115]
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D., [116] dated 3
January 2001, the relevant portions of which state:
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought did not
reveal delusional thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his profession
and expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are handling
his pending administrative cases. He was observed to be reality-oriented and was not
suffering from hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with
respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired.Judgment and decision-making
capacity were adequately functioning.
xxxx
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26, 2000. He
talked about his family and academic achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift
for prophecy and a gift of healing. He also talked about a covenant made during a dream
between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and Angel. He reported that the
first part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal and
alleviate sufferings/pain from disease.
A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28, 2000. The
battery of test consisted of the following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA
Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language Test (4) Sacks Sentence Completion Test and (5)
Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an individual with an Above
Average Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive person who is
meticulous to details and strive for perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-
oriented and is deemed capable of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as
professional decisions. Confusion with regard to sexual identification, was further
observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, respondent
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-
oriented and is not suffering from any major psychotic disorder. He is not deluded nor
hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making sound
decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs further
studies/work-ups.
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge Floro
was unfit to be a judge.[117] The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino are hereunder
reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall
claim that he is possessed with power of [bi-location]?
xxxx
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one
time.
Q: And that something must be wrong?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the course
of his testimony and in this very case that while [he] was so testifying there is
another spirit, another person, another character unseen who is with him at the
same time or in tagalog sumapi sa kanya.
xxxx
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion sumapi to me is unbelievable.
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion?

xxxx
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?
A: Both are on the same footing.
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness about
hallucinatory matters would turn out to be fit to become a judge?
xxxx
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder
like schizophrenia or an organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from
hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge, however, there is, this
symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and
delusions could be transient and short in duration.
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with
psychiatry.
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or

administrative proceedings particularly in the course of his testimony that while
he was doing so, he was under trance normal.
xxxx
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the Philippines as
part of a culture bound syndrome and it could also be an indication Basically the
phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of organic mental disorder. It is also
common in culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of
concentration in a particular settings or situations so that a person or a judge
hearing a case in court would [lose] concentration and would not be able to follow
up testimony of witnesses as well as arguments given by the counsel for the
defense and also for the prosecution, so I would say that there is this difficulty in
manners of attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge
experience trance as in the case of Judge Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing
of lights and he might not be able to rationalize or to control expressions or as well
as physical when he is in a trance.
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in a
trance?
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will call
that person not a normal person.
A: Maybe weird.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in these
cases held on October 10, 2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the
question of Atty. Dizon. Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you tell us? Are you in
trance at this very precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: Nakalakip sila. I call it
a trance, but I distinguished not the trance that you see the nag-sa-Sto., Nino,
naninigas. Thats a trance that is created by the so called Because Fr. Jaime
Bulatao, multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind projection. He is
correct in a sense that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind projection
or the hypnosis do come, and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the
person. But in my case I never was changed physically or mentally. Only the lights
and heat will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this very
moment, Mr. witness, meron kayong kalakip ngayon? Ngayong oras na ito?
JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? JUDGE
FLORO, JR.: They cannot be seen but ATTY. DIZON: No, can you see them? To
point to us where are they in this room?, Now that you have read and seen this
portion wherein Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of his testimony
in these cases he was in a trance, would you still consider him at least insofar as
this claim of his to be a normal person?
A: No.
Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I will
show to you the transcript of stenographic notes later have claimed that he had,
always had and still had a socalled counter part, his other side, other self, what
can you say to that claim, would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound
person?
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as judge?
xxxx
A: Yes.[118]
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves
Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because
of insanity to remain in office as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that
President Estrada would not finish his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to
state in his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar
topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name Colonel Reynaldo
Cabauatan who was involved in a coup detat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use
of his alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is
improper and grandiose of him to express superiority over other judges in the course of
hearings he is conducting and for him to say that he is very successful over many other
applicants for the position he has been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to distribute
self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer,
amusing, irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is
unfit to be one. So is he who gets into a trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in
court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine
and conclude that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit or insane and should
not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty
and property of the litigants in the court presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence,
it is imperative that he is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to
continue discharging the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which
renders him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73,
respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from such office. [119]
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because of the
findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office. We hasten to
add, however, that neither the OCA nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is insane as,
in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on his case have never said so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due to
insanity, he was apparently using the term in its loose sense.Insanity is a general laymans term, a catchall
word referring to various mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical term [120] as this
is the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and
2000 psychological evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of the
people.[121] An honorable, competent and independent judiciary exists to administer justice in order to
promote the stability of government, and the well-being of the people.[122] Carrying much of the weight in
this daunting task of administering justice are our front liners, the judges who preside over courts of law
and in whose hands are entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts
will only succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent and
independent.[123]
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man.And, in fact, in our
disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or
corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross
deficiency in competence and independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in psychic visions, of foreseeing the future
because of his power in psychic phenomenon. He believes in duwendes and of a covenant with his dwarf
friends Luis, Armand and Angel. He believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen
by several people to have been in two places at the same time. He has likened himself to the angel of death
who can inflict pains on people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of
Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own
witness testified that Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his
psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All
these things validate the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floros uncommon beliefs and
that such beliefs have spilled over to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system.However, such beliefs, especially
since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our
judicial system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply
only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge
Floros reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco,
Jr.[124] sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the
prosecutions principal witness by concluding that the testimony was a fairytale or a fantastic story.[125] He
then went to state that psychic phenomena was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who
transcribed the testimony of the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floros decision is quoted
hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the

incident) NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding
minor points), ergo, the court concludes that due to several indicia of fraud/perjury
(flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of belief,
assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative
is hereby declared a FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is
acceptable only for SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of the
foregoing conclusion:
a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and

Raul Ineria were sinalubong by Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at
alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he saw the nagpambuno between Raul
and Ando, and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO LONGER THERE,
but he still saw the nagpambuno; MORE IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE
NOTICED the ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie,
having been asked to submit false testimony); for how could have he witnessed
the stabbing by accused when he NOTICED him the following day? (TSN
dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN was incorrect due to
typographical error, or maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo might
have been SLEEPING during the testimony, so that the word DAY should have
been corrected to another word SUITABLE to Normandys FAIRY TALE, still, the
Court had synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found
no reason that the seeming error DAY should be corrected; the Courts
sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES
cooperated by PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in having
BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS
FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.);[126] (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro[127] we held that
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not
mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please.There are both
implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role.Implicit limits include
accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law. [128]
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He
is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He
is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic
sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed
by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the
primordial necessity of order in the social life.[129]
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks
leaves much to be desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment
and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness
and seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though
not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary
role as a judge in dispensing justice. x xx[130]
Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as RTC judge,
indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government.Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself with
large components of the judges role. Especially if he has aspired to a judges status, he is
likely to have conducted himself, more or less unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is
said to have the judicial temperament. He is likely to have displayed the kinds of behavior
that the judges role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the bench develop
and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture and of
court procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing appearance of
some court buildings serve to emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most
unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes his position to a thoroughly corrupt
political organization must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected of him as a
judge.[131]
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other public
officials. Judges are seen as guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves with the law to
an even greater degree than legislators or executives.[132]
As it has been said, [j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some abstract ideas
of right and justice, but according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its
sanctions. The function of the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the exercise
of a creative art, whether we call it legislative or not, which requires great ability and objectivity. [133] We,
thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt

demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that ones own
views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But these are
precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the qualities
society has a right to expect from those entrusted with judicial power.
xxxx
The judicial judgment must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice
and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. [134]
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of
competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as judge for to
do so might result in a serious challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a period of three (3) years.
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the judiciary as RTC
judge. However, we have assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally
responsible for such major and unfortunate faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for judgeship. He went
through the entire gamut of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his
scholastic achievements. As to having failed the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must
be pointed out that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge Floros submission of psychiatric
evaluations conducted by mental health professionals from the private sector and which were favorable to
him. Nowhere is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a second opinion
of his mental and psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by
the Constitution which prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other requirements,
persons of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. [135] It was only on 18 October
2000 when it promulgated JBC-009, the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, that the JBC put down in
writing guidelines or criteria it had previously used in ascertaining if one seeking such office meets the
minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the
Judiciary.[136] Rule 6 thereof states:
SECTION 1. Good health. Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and
emotional condition of the applicant play a critical role in his capacity and capability to
perform the delicate task of administering justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. The applicant shall submit to
psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or
by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the evaluation of a private
psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC.Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the
psychological evaluations of mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli. What awaits us now is
the seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros
almost seven years of suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension
of seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts.[137] The Constitution limits this power through the admonition that
such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.[138]
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative cases against
judges. Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively
suspended pending investigation. This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC which took effect on 1 October 2001.
The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.[139] This power -- consistent with the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the
Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension resolved to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against
him within ten (10) days from notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez,
Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report and
recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for appropriate psychological or mental examination to be
conducted by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical
and/or mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective

immediately under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of
the administrative charges against him.[140]
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floros suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the
duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the
time of receipt by the investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that (t)he
investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its
commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant[141] and, (w)ithin thirty (30) days
from the termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme
Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation. [142]
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire
period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for
the 30 days that it would take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the
Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the
administrative case against him or her.[143] This is because
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a
serious offense warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon
expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may preventively
suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the administrative case especially where
there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the
measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may
be caused by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to
protect the courts image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts
settled and justice solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an
exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in
the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as the
embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and
oppression.[144]
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of the serious charge
of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much
longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to
Judge Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that not only did Judge Floro move for several re-
settings of the hearings of his cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself
to the appropriate psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out as single case against him
ballooned into 10 cases which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and law.[145] All
in all, Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived had connived to remove and/or suspend
him from office, the last of which he filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez.[146]
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case considering
that the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court,
are amorphous at best. We have ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under
preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to the payment of back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive
suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the
peculiar circumstance in which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court
until further orders.
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13 months, during
which period he was not paid his salaries, allowances and other benefits.Except for a
teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake pending resolution of the
administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred
several loans to provide for his familys basic needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances
and other economic benefits for the entire period that he was preventively suspended. As
we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive suspension pending investigation is
not a penalty but only a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to conduct
an unhampered formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time to
conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the
preventive suspension is no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of determining the extent
of back salaries, allowances and other benefits that a judge may receive during the period
of his preventive suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v.
Court of Appeals, should likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond

ninety (90) days and such may not be entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in
such a situation, it would be unfair to withhold his salaries and other economic benefits
for the entire duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution
of the case was not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative
charge, his preventive suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes
without basis and would indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that
his subsequent acquittal completely removed the cause for his preventive suspension in
the first place. Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and equitable
grounds.[147]
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the
payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at the receiving end of a rule
peculiar to judges who find themselves preventively suspended by the Court until further orders or, as this
case, for the duration of the investigation. Judge Iturraldes suspension of 13 months even pales in
comparison to Judge Floros suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this entire excruciating period
of waiting, Judge Floro could not practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his
brothers largesse. And, though he was given donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously,
these could not compensate for his loss of income as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of suspension
exceeding 90 days should be the basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a matter of
equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period
corresponding to three of his almost seven years suspension. We cannot apply the ruling in Gloria that any
suspension served beyond 90 days must be compensated as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floros
propensity to delay the resolution of his case through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases
against those he perceived connived to oust him out of office. In Judge Iturraldes case, the investigation
was not delayed through any fault of his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent,
thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess of 90 days was already in the
nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced precisely because, being innocent, he cannot be
penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as already discussed, contributed to the delay in the
investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent
of all the 13 charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the reach of
equity. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are
wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where
courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards
the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.[148]
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the resolution
of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to award him back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits for a period corresponding to three years. This is because Judge Floros separation from
the service is not a penalty as we ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon
Judge Floro out of necessity due to a medically disabling condition of the mind which renders him unfit,
at least at present, to continue discharging the functions of his office.
The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As discussed, if
we were to give him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding
him for his role in delaying the resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only
dismissed on 14 February 2006 at his own bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less
than three years then the same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years suspension he had to
live through with Damocles sword hanging over his head and with his hands bound as he could not
practice his profession.
Judge Floros separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re:
Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v.
Judge FlorentinoV. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the service renders moot the complaint in A.M. No.
99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the
Courts decision to separate Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and
academic.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
Considering that this case is a replica of charge h in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge h is
without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of
merit.
Judge Floros separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor
disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such separation does not carry
with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other
public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding of
mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering government
service for positions that do not require him to dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings
in Judge Floros favor that the Court cannot overlook in all fairness as they deserve equal
consideration. They mention Judge Floros assets and strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor
modification of work environment. Thus:
a. High intellectual assets as a result of self-discipline and self- organization.[149]
b. (I)mpressive academic achievements with no drastic change in his personality

and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice. [150]
c. (C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with

paranormal and psychic phenomena not detrimental to his role as a lawyer. [151]
d. Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate

proficiency . His concern for the details that make up a total field represents his
attempts at being systematic and cautious.[152]
e. (E)quipped with analytical power.[153]
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive
nature of said position, he may still be successful in other areas of endeavor.
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floros current
administrative and medical problems are not totally of his making.He was duly appointed to judgeship
and his mental problems, for now, appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice
not because of any acts of corruption and debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically disabling
condition.
Finally, if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary to genetics [154]and/or adverse
environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we cannot condemn
people for their faulty genes and/or adverse environment factors they have no control over.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND
(P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;
2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a
medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions
of his office, effective immediately;
3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances
and other economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years;
4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro,
Jr.) for LACK OF MERIT; and
5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40603 July 13, 1978

PALMARIN Q. HURTADO, petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL G. JUDALENA and HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, in his capacity as Judge in the CFI of Ilocos
Norte, Batac branch, respondents.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to annul the order of April
2, 1975, issued by the respondent Judge Arsenio M. Gonong in Civil Case No. 485-IV of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, upon the ground that the said order was issued in violation of Section 1, Rule 137
of the Revised Rules of Court, the respondent judge being the brother of the private respondent Isabel G.
Judalena.
The record shows that on March 14, 1975, the private respondent Isabel G. Judalena filed a complaint
against the petitioner Palmarin Q. Hurtado before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte which was
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 485-IV. The substance of the complaint is that Isabel G. Judalena had
sold a portion, containing an area of 75 square meters of her parcel of land to Palmarin Q. Hurtado, with
the condition that the latter shall cause a subdivision survey of the portion sold in order to segregate said
portion from the bigger portion, after which the said Palmarin Hurtado shall construct a concrete fence
between the two lots, but that the said Palmarin Hurtado contrary to their agreement, built a concrete fence
much beyond the 75 square meters portion and started construction of a house on the encroached portion.
Isabel Judalena prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Hurtado from construction the house
mentioned on the controverted parcel of land.1
On March 31, 1975, the petitioner Palmarin Q. Hurtado filed his answer thereto, denying the claim of
Judalena that he had encroached on the property, claiming that they are the owners of the property on
which they are constructing their house. 2
On April 2, 1975, the respondent Judge Arsenio Gonong, his close relationship with Isabel G. Judalena
notwithstanding, and despite the prohibition imposed by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of
Court, 3 issued an order, ex-parte. directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing
of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00. On April 4, 1975, Isabel G. Judalena filed the required bond and a
writ of preliminary injunction was issued, ordering Palmarin Q. Hurtado, his father, and other persons
acting on his behalf to refrain and desist from constructing a house on the land in controversy and stop
disturbing in any other manner the possession of Isabel G. Judalena. 4
The next day, April 5, 1975, the respondent judge issued an order voluntarily disqualifying himself from
hearing the case in view of his close relationship with the plaintiff therein and directed the transmittal of
the records of the case to the incumbent Executive Judge for proper assignment to the other judges of the
court.5
On April 10, 1975, Palmarin Q. Hurtado filed a motion for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary
injunction in order to preserve the status quo until the designation of another judge to try the case, with a
prayer that the respondent judge hear the motion to give him an opportunity to rectify the mistake error
he had committed in taking cognizance of the case and in granting, ex-parte, the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. 6
The respondent judge, however, denied the motion on April 21, 1975. 7
Hence, the instant petition. On May 12, 1975, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, to stop the
respondent judge from enforcing his orders on April 2, 1975 and April 21, 1975. 8
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates without ambiguity the cases in which any
judge or judicial officer is disqualified from acting as such. 9 The said section, in no uncertain terms,
expressly prohibits a judge or judicial officer from sitting in a case where he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguity or affinity. This is mandatory. 10 In the case at bar, it is not denied that the
respondent judge is the brother of the respondent Isabel G. Judalena and their close relationship
notwithstanding, and despite the prohibition mentioned above, the respondent judge took cognizance of
the case and issued the controversial order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, after
which he inhibited himself from sitting on the case for the same reasons. Such action, to our mind, is
reprehensible as it erodes the all important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby granted and the order of April 2. 1975, issued in Civil Case
No. 485-IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, is hereby annulled and set aside. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. With costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
RE: SUSPENSION OF CLERK OF COURT ROGELIO R. JOBOCO, RTC, BRANCH 16 NAVAL,

BILIRAN
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
This is a series of complaints and counter-complaints between Judge Bonifacio S. Maceda, then Acting
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 16, Naval, Biliran (now RTC Judge in Las Pias, Metro
Manila) and Atty. Rogelio R. Joboco, then Branch Clerk of Court of the same Regional Trial Court (now
Assistant Prosecutor in Samar).
Judge Maceda charges Atty. Joboco of (1) Infidelity in the Custody of Case Records, (2) Dishonesty,
(3) Sabotaging Judicial Reforms, (4) Grave Misconduct, Usurpation of Judicial Authority, Tampering of
Subpoena, (5) Insubordination, (6) Falsification of Accomplishment of Certificate of Service, and (7)
Agitating Workers to go on Mass Leave and Notorious Undesirability.
Atty. Joboco, on the other hand, alleges (1) Oppression, (2) Continuing Oppression, (3) Gross
Ignorance of the Law, (4) Abuse of Position, (5) Gross Abuse of Discretion Using his Position, and (6)
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.
This controversy between the judge and the clerk of court began when a suspension order dated
September 3, 1993[1] was issued by Judge Maceda against Atty. Joboco for Infidelity in the Custody of Case
Records.[2] The said order was based on an administrative complaint[3] filed by a certain Atty. Gabino A.
Velasquez against Clerk of Court Joboco following the latters admission that the records in certain civil
cases were missing and could not be accounted for.
Atty. Joboco denies personal liability for the loss of such records. He claims that Judge Maceda and
Mr. Amante, a court personnel, had similar access to the records.He related that Judge Maceda borrowed
the said records from him in order to conduct an inventory of the cases and then never returned the same
to him.[4] He also alleges that Mr. Amante borrowed the keys to the office to finish typing the transcript of
stenographic notes.[5]
He advances the theory that the complaint against him may have vindictive designs as complainant
Atty. Velasquez is a law partner of then Judge Adriano Villamor, who was dismissed from the service in
an administrative case where he (Atty. Joboco) was one of the witnesses.
Judge Maceda, on the other hand, contends that as Clerk of Court, Atty. Joboco was personally liable
for the missing case records and the responsibility thereto cannot be passed on to other court personnel
who were his subordinates. He further states that Atty. Joboco, having misplaced case records in the past,
should have taken precautionary measures to prevent its recurrence as he was so advised by this Court in
A.M. No. P-87-83 and A.M. No. B-87-89.[6] He added that when he assumed as Acting Presiding Judge, he
required Atty. Joboco to account for all case records but the latter kept on evading the directive so much so
that he was forced to conduct an inventory by himself which, unfortunately, he was unable to complete.[7]
Maria P. Mercolita, Clerk III of the same court, filed a Manifestation and Motion [8]explaining that as
court clerk, she conducts the actual inventory of case records and that from such inventory came her
knowledge of the missing records. She further states that every time she would remind Atty. Joboco of the
missing case records, he would simply ask Court Aide Tirso Sabinay to look for them.
On September 9, 1993, Atty. Joboco filed with this Court a motion to lift/annul the suspension
order[9] alleging inter alia that it was issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution which
states that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof.
Before it was resolved, Judge Maceda motu proprio issued an order setting aside the preventive
suspension, submitting the matter to this Court for resolution. Despite the withdrawal, this Court set
aside/revoked it[10] on the ground that the same is not within the ambit of Judge Macedas administrative
authority.
Judge Maceda alleged in his formal comment that the 60-day preventive suspension was issued
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 6[11] which reads:
"To recommend to the Supreme Court the imposition upon erring employees of such disciplinary sanctions
as may be necessary and proper; and pending the administrative investigation or its review by the Supreme
Court, to place respondent under preventive suspension in accordance with Civil Service rules and
regulations furnishing the Supreme Court a copy of the order of suspension and grounds therefor without
unnecessary detail.
He likewise denied that he was vindictive and that he holds a grudge against Atty. Joboco as he was
merely fulfilling his duties under Rule 3.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides to wit:
A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for
unprofessional conduct which the judge may become aware of.
On September 16, 1993, Judge Maceda issued a second suspension order[12]against Atty. Joboco for
Dishonesty. This time, it was for failure to disclose to the court information relative to the absence of an
accused and his counsel at a hearing of Criminal Case No. 1582.
Atty. Joboco questioned the second suspension order saying that the same is based on his failure to
disclose the fact that he met the accused by chance on August 18, 1993. He contends that due notice of
hearing was served the accused through counsel as corroborated in a motion for reconsideration[13] filed by
the counsel of accused. He also avers that he failed to inform the court of the chance meeting with the
accused because he was merely asked whether due notice was served the accused to which he answered
in the affirmative. He further states that due notice was given to accuseds counsel and the bondsmen as
required by the rules.
Judge Maceda, on the other hand, insisted that dishonesty and non-disclosure were intentional on
Atty. Jobocos part. He asserts that Atty. Joboco knew that the information was vital and that without it the
court would eventually issue a warrant of arrest. He cited Atty. Jobocos lack of candor and honesty
expected of a lawyer and officer of the court as evidenced by his failure to disclose the aforementioned
encounter with accused. Likewise, Judge Maceda alleges that the notices were erroneously served to
counsel and bondsmen but not to accused.[14]
Atty. Joboco also claims that he was ill-treated by Judge Maceda when the latter harshly scolded him
and called him names like dull and good for nothing in the presence of the accused in the case of People
vs. Geraldo.[15]
Judge Maceda, in turn, charges Atty. Joboco for alleged sabotaging of judicial reforms [16] he (Judge
Maceda) introduced, like the orderly approval of property bonds, which resulted in his approval of
irregular bail applications.
Atty. Joboco, in his Answer, denied the allegation, stating that he learned that accused had complied
with all the requirements when he ushered him and his bondsmen inside the chambers of Judge
Maceda. He narrated that on September 1, 1993 he gave the accused a list of requirements to be
accomplished for posting a property bond. As he was attending court sessions that day, the accused was
referred to a court clerk for assistance, with the instruction to come back after accomplishment of the
requirements. At about noon of the following day, the accused arrived and thinking that the requirements
were already verified by the clerk. Atty. Joboco ushered said accused inside the chamber of Judge
Maceda. It was then that the latter scolded and berated him in a loud voice. [17]
Judge Maceda disputes the allegation that he was overbearing with his court personnel. He mentioned
the search for outstanding court employees which he initiated in Antique and the award given to him by
the Antique court employees as proof of his harmonious relationship with his subordinates. [18]
We now look into the respective culpability of the clashing parties on the foregoing charges.
On the charge of Infidelity in the Custody of Case Records, we find Atty. Joboco guilty thereof. As
Clerk of Court, his positive duties include conducting periodic docket inventory and ensuring that the
records of each case are accounted for. It is likewise his duty to initiate and cause the search of missing
records. His failure to perform his duties despite a previous reminder by this Court that he should be
vigilant as court custodian of records, constitutes manifest negligence which cannot be countenanced.
It is incumbent upon the Clerk of Court to ensure an orderly and efficient record management in the
court and to supervise the personnel under her office to function effectively. [19] The fact that other court
employees had access to the records does not exculpate him. As Clerk of Court, he is also the supervisor
and hence, renders him accountable for the actions of his subordinates. His contention that the records
were left inside the chamber of the judge does not absolve him considering that he could have continued
and completed the inventory himself.
Jobocos reliance on alleged political harassment as a defense is likewise without merit for the motive
behind the administrative complaint has no relevance to the undisputed fact that the records were in fact
missing while in his custody.
Atty. Joboco was remiss in his responsibility as custodian of records and as officer of the court which
is evidenced by his neglect to take precautionary measures to prevent loss or remedial steps to recover the
missing records. Clerks of Court are the administrative officers of courts and have inter alia control and
supervision over all court records.[20]
As to the charge of Dishonesty, we hold that Atty. Joboco is not liable therefor. His manifestation that
the accidental meeting with the accused bears no significance to the scheduled hearing should be accorded
credence. It is not within the province of his functions to volunteer information which is irrelevant and
unsolicited. He is under no obligation to plead for the accused and justify an absence on mere speculation
or for any reason not on record.
For a court employee to be held liable for non-feasance, he should first have a positive duty to perform.
In this case, Atty. Joboco was not bound to disclose information relating to the chance meeting especially
when the same is not borne out by the records. The fact that notice was duly served the parties affirms the
proper performance of his duty and negates the necessity of further proffering information.
With regard to the charge of Sabotaging Judicial Reforms, we find no culpability on the part of Atty.
Joboco there being only an isolated case of erroneously implementing an approval of property bond
application. Absent any showing of a blatant, malicious and deliberate effort to undermine or compromise
such judicial reforms, he is deemed to have acted in good faith in carrying out the duties of his office.
The above-mentioned suspension orders and alleged harsh treatment by Judge Maceda form part of
Atty. Jobocos charges of Oppression and Continuing Oppression.In this respect, we do not find any
patently oppressive scheme or design on the part of Judge Maceda to weigh down Atty. Joboco. Although
the second order of suspension for Dishonesty may have been erroneously and unjustly issued by Judge
Maceda, this alone will not establish a contemptuous predisposition against Atty. Joboco upon which the
charge of Oppression may be founded.
Judge Macedas actuations were undertaken in the context of enforcing disciplinary measures in his
court and untainted with any palpable bad faith on his part. As such, he may not be held administratively
liable therefor. The acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
power, unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption and bad faith.[21] It is a matter of
public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. [22]A judge may not be
held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders, and it is only when the
error is gross or patent, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative
sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme Court. [23]
Likewise, while scolding an employee in front of litigants may not have been the most appropriate
course of action, it is well within the ambit of Judge Macedas judicial prerogative to discipline his staff for
negligence and/or mistake. Judge Maceda should, however, not make a habit of showing fits of temper
and resorting to verbal abuse against erring employees. He should be mindful of the need to maintain
professional and harmonious relations with his court personnel with a view to the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
On October 15, 1993, a third suspension order[24] was issued by Judge Maceda against Atty. Joboco for
Grave Abuse of Discretion, Usurpation of Judicial Authority to cancel hearing and Tampering of Subpoena
in Criminal Case No. 1536.
Atty. Joboco claims that he was unjustly suspended for the third time because he added the words
this cancels September 9-10, 1993 setting on the subpoena.According to him, he added the words to clarify
and guide the witnesses in the readjusted schedule of hearing and not to usurp judicial authority, much
less to confuse the parties. Moreover, it was supposedly the counsel for accused who requested that the
trial date be moved from September 9-10, 1993 to September 3, 1993 on account of prior appointments. [25]
In his formal comment,[26] Joboco manifested that he was instructed by then Judge Asis to adjust the
trial calendar as the latter was going on leave. On August 9, 1993 he was informed through a memorandum
that Judge Maceda was again detailed to the sala of Judge Asis. The following day, counsel for accused in
Criminal Case No. 1536 requested that the scheduled hearing on September 9 and 10 be moved to
September 3, 1993. Accordingly, he directed a clerk to prepare another notice to which he added the
assailed inscription.
For his part, Judge Maceda contended that Atty. Joboco issued the order under the authority of Judge
Asis (former judge of said court) even if he (Judge Maceda) had already assumed the position therein. He
added that the resetting of the case to September 3, 1993, caused undue confusion on the part of the accused,
who came to court on said date, thinking that his case would be heard. He further maintained that the
resetting unduly caused delay in the administration of justice. [27]
A fourth suspension order,[28] dated November 23, 1993 was issued by Judge Maceda for alleged
Insubordination arising from Atty. Jobocos non-compliance with his order to turn over documents, exhibits
and keys to the designated Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Atty. Joboco appealed the questioned order to this Court, claiming that he filed a motion to defer
compliance of the order pending consultation with this Courts Chief Attorney and Court
Administrator. He waited for the resolution of said motion, thinking that Judge Maceda would desist from
issuing the suspension order.
In his formal comment,[29] he manifested that he already turned over the exhibits, office supplies and
keys to Officer-in-Charge Eamiguel and that the door keys are allegedly still in the possession of RTC Aide,
Mr. Sabinay.
We find Atty. Joboco liable for the charge of Grave Abuse of Discretion, Usurpation of Judicial
Authority and Tampering of Subpoena by acting on an oral motion for postponement. By his act of giving
due course to the informal motion for resetting despite being notified of the reassignment of Judge Maceda
to Naval, he arrogated unto himself the authority to exercise judicial discretion which is clearly beyond the
pale of his prerogative. The Branch Clerk of Court is the administrative assistant of the presiding judge
whose duty is to assist in the management of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not involving
the discretion or judgment of the judge.[30] Clearly, Atty. Joboco overstepped the boundaries of his function as
such by undertaking the aforementioned act which falls squarely within the discretion or judgment of the
Presiding Judge.
With regard to the allegation of Insubordination, we take note of the compliance by Atty.
Joboco. There being substantial compliance and well-grounded deferment of compliance to the order of
Judge Maceda, the charge of Insubordination is dismissed for being moot and academic.
The charges of Gross Ignorance of the Law, Abuse of Position and Grave Abuse of Discretion Using
his Position in connection with the two preceding suspension orders are hereby dismissed for lack of factual
and legal basis. However, Judge Maceda is directed to be more circumspect in the issuance of preventive
suspension orders to ensure that the administrative/supervisory authority of this Court is not encroached
upon.
Judge Maceda is also charged with Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge[31] as Atty. Joboco points out the
formers closeness and dependence on the Governor of Biliran, which he said do not give a good image of
the independence of the RTC and the judiciary in general.
Sworn statements of Biliran residents were submitted manifesting that Judge Maceda was seen asking
money from the Governor of Biliran Province before dancing the kuratsa in a social gathering. He was also
allegedly using the vehicle and leased house of the latter. [32]
In his formal comment,[33] Judge Maceda denies the charge saying that the same is fabricated,
malicious and unfair and is a sinister effort to discredit him. He also countered that the affiants have
retracted their statements, claiming the affidavits were prepared by Atty. Joboco. According to the judge,
the vehicles being used are a necessity to alleviate the inconvenience of rugged land travel and to enable
him to cope with his work in two salas, RTC Branches 11 and 16, which are situated at Calubian and Naval,
respectively.
Moreover, Judge Maceda justifies his use of the vehicle via the Revised Administrative Code which
provides that it is the duty of the local government to afford facilities for the court. He likewise mentioned
that the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), Section 484, Par. 1 (XI) requires local governments
to provide judges additional allowances and other benefits.
The congenial relationship of the Governor and Judge Maceda does not in itself tarnish the image of
an independent judiciary. Neither does the support extended by the former to the latter impinge on such
judicial independence. In the absence of any showing that their close relationship formed basis for the
achievement of corrupt ends and/or anomalous undertakings, the charge of conduct unbecoming of a
judge should be dismissed for lack of merit.
In addition to the charges of infidelity in the custody of case records, dishonesty, sabotaging judicial
reforms, grave misconduct, usurpation of judicial authority and tampering of subpoena as discussed above,
Judge Maceda filed other administrative charges against Atty. Joboco.
Judge Maceda alleges that Atty. Joboco committed falsification of his certificate of service [34] by
omitting to state therein that he was absent for one-half (1/2) day on August 31, 1993 and submitting a
second certificate of service for the same month of August, but making it appear that it was prepared on
September 21, 1993 when in fact the same was executed much later. [35]
Atty. Joboco denied the charge saying that the irregularity came about when he executed a second
certificate reflecting his 1/2 day absence for August 31, 1993 because Judge Maceda refused to sign the first
one he made. He further explained that a court clerk was directed by Judge Maceda instructing him (Atty.
Joboco) to execute another certificate of service reflecting his 1/2 day absence which resulted in the
discrepancy between his original and subsequent certificates of service. [36]
Atty. Joboco's contention that he was compelled to execute a second certificate of service to correct his
omission respecting his 1/2 day absence in the first certificate of service is untenable. The uncontroverted
fact remains that he incurred a half-day absence but did not reflect the same in the first certificate of
service. Regardless of the subsequent execution of the second certificate of service, the omission in the first
certificate of service already constituted the consummation of the falsification. The second certificate of
service only served to expose the irregularity and was not the cause from which the administrative offense
arose. As such, Atty. Joboco is liable for falsification in the execution of his certificate of service.
Another allegation against Atty. Joboco involves the Agitation of Workers to Go on Mass
Leave.[37] Judge Maceda claims that even before he assumed office, Atty. Joboco met with the court
personnel and urged them to go on mass leave to protest his (Judge Maceda's) assignment thereat.
Atty. Joboco vehemently denies the charge,[38] contending that he merely presented the idea of going
on mass leave to the court employees for the purpose of soliciting their sentiments on the matter of
designating judges away from their regular stations.
In a sworn statement, Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. admits that he was the one who suggested the
idea to Atty. Joboco in connection with the resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Biliran
Chapter, expressing concern and opposition to the irregular designation of judges in said court.
Although Atty. Jocobo may not be held liable for Agitating Workers to Go On Mass Leave, considering
the foregoing, he is nonetheless liable for Misconduct for attempting to recruit the court employees in the
furtherance of the cause of the IBP, Biliran Chapter. The court employees have no involvement and should
not be thrown into the controversy concerning alleged irregularities in the designation of judges. Atty.
Joboco should have drawn the line between his duty as Clerk of Court and as an officer of the local IBP.
Judge Maceda, alluding to the series of aberrations committed, also charges Atty. Joboco of being
Incorrigible and Notoriously Undesirable.[39] There being only a broad and generalized allegation,
uncorroborated by pertinent particulars, the same is dismissed for want of factual and legal basis.
As an incident to the foregoing matters discussed, Atty. Joboco brings to the attention of this Court
his request for the release of his salary covering his attendance for the period covering August 1993 to
January 1994. He claims that his salary and RATA were withheld in view of Judge Maceda's refusal to sign
his certificates of service on the ground that the entries therein could not be confirmed. He further avers
that his certificates of service remain unsigned because of the pending charge of falsification against him.[40]
In answer to Judge Maceda's refusal to sign his certificates of service for alleged lack of proof of actual
service, Atty. Joboco filed a pleading denominated "Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief." [41] He
contended that Judge Maceda could not certify attendance for lack of sufficient knowledge since from
August 1-7, 1993 he was not yet detailed at RTC Naval. He manifested that his rights and interests are
adversely affected as his salary and other emoluments have been withheld from him.
In a Memo dated 23 December 1993,[42] Judge Maceda designated Atty. Joboco Officer-In-Charge of
the Office of the Clerk of Court for Branch 16 Naval, Biliran and Branch 37 Calibiran. Furthermore, he
directed the latter to report to the office arranged for his use in the Provincial Capitol Building of Naval,
Biliran.
Judge Maceda filed an "Addendum to Comment"[43] clarifying his charge for falsification of certificates
of service and application for leave against Atty. Joboco. He maintained that he was acting within the scope
of his authority when he refused to sign Atty. Joboco's certificate of attendance and application for leave of
absence as he had no way of certifying their veracity. Atty. Joboco allegedly failed to prove his strict
compliance with office hours by his neglect, if not outright refusal, to register his "ins" and "outs" in the
attendance logbook of court employees.[44] Likewise, Atty. Joboco purportedly did not show any proof that
he regularly reports to work. Judge Maceda also claims that Atty. Joboco has other sources of income to
support the financial needs of his family and that the latter deliberately caused his salaries to be withheld
to draw sympathy unto himself at his expense.
The unwarranted refusal to sign the certificates of service of his Clerk of Court constitutes abuse of
authority on the part of Judge Maceda. The allegation of falsification and recommendation for the dismissal
of an employee are not valid and reasonable grounds for refusal to certify the attendance of such employee
and thereby cause the withholding of his salary.
His contention that he could not account for Atty. Joboco's attendance so much so that he could not
certify the latter's certificate of service is untenable. It is worth noting that it was Judge Maceda himself
who assigned Atty. Joboco to the Capitol Building to which the dubious attendance record may be
attributed. Having arranged for Atty. Joboco's detail therein, he should have foreseen the difficulty of
attendance verification and devised means by which he could monitor attendance effectively.
While it may be true that Atty. Joboco's attendance could not be accounted for, this does not justify
inaction on the certificates of service for it is not disputed that Judge Maceda himself caused the transfer of
Atty. Joboco to a place away from the courthouse where it would be difficult to monitor attendance. It
would be an undue burden to any court employee, to be required to report to two places thrice every day,
that is, to report to the courthouse before going to Biliran Provincial Capitol Building in the morning, then
do the same at lunch break to "time in" his afternoon atttendance and one more time late in the afternoon
to register his "time out" before going home.
Upon careful review of the certificates of service, Atty. Joboco should be considered Absent Without
Official Leave (AWOL) for his absences: (a) pending application for leave of absence; (b) during the appeal
on the suspension orders and (c) unaccounted absences on August 16 and 31, 1993; September 8-10 and 15-
17, 1993; October 25-29, 1993; November 1-5, 8-12, 15-19, 22-23, 24-26 and 29, 1993;and December 1-3, 6-10,
13-17, 20-22 and 27-29, 1993. As a court employee, Atty. Joboco should have secured first the approval of
his leave application before going on leave and should have immediately resumed his work after serving
the period of the suspension order.
Although we are inclined to impose the penalty of suspension on Atty. Joboco, his subsequent
appointment as 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor of Calbayog City has made the aforesaid sanction
impracticable. The diversity and multiplicity of Atty. Joboco's transgressions clearly reflect his defiant
demeanor and contumacious character which cannot be countenanced in the judiciary. Such recalcitrant
attitude manifested by Atty. Joboco in his capacity as Branch Clerk of Court not only diminishes his
integrity as an officer of the court but degrades the dignity of the judicial system as well.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we find Atty. Rogelio R. Joboco GUILTY of the following
charges: Infidelity in the Custody of Court Records, Usurpation of Judicial Authority, Grave Misconduct
and Tampering Subpoena in Criminal Case No. 1536, Falsification of Certificates of Service, Misconduct for
attempting to utilize the court employees for the ends of the local IBP and Absence Without Official Leave
(AWOL). He is hereby FINED in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). All other charges against
him are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The charges against Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is,
however, ADMONISHED for having abused his authority by unjustly refusing to sign the certificates of
service of his Clerk of Court which resulted in the withholding of the latter's salary. He is likewise
ADVISED to exert care and consideration in his dealings with his office staff in order to avert any future
repetition of these administrative misdemeanors.
SO ORDERED.
LUCILA TAN, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563

Complainant, (Formerly A.M. OCA
IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)
Present:
Puno, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - *Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
Promulgated:
Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE,
Respondent. September 8, 2004
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting Presiding Judge,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila, [1] for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 59440 and
Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and pending before
Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by respondent judge.Before
the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to complainant. They
met at Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff member
told her that respondent was asking for P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was
shown copies of respondent judges Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, both still unsigned,
dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told that respondent judge would reverse the
disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded. The staff member allowed
complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440.Complainant, however, did
not accede to respondents demand because she believed that she had a very strong case, well supported
by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by respondent judge.[2]
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead stated that it was
complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision. She even tried to delay and
to derail the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120. Complainant also
sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain judgment in her favor. Mayor
Estrada allegedly talked to him several times to ask him to help complainant. The former even called him
over the phone when he was in New Zealand, persuading him to hold in abeyance the promulgation of the
Decisions in said cases. But he politely declined, telling him that there was no sufficient evidence to convict
the accused, and moreover, he had already turned over the Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation.
Respondent further stated that complainant kept bragging about her close relations with Mayor Estrada
who was her neighbor in Greenhills, San Juan, and even insinuated that she could help him get appointed
to a higher position provided he decides the suits in her favor. Respondent judge also claimed that
complainant offered to give cash for the downpayment of a car he was planning to buy. But he refused the
offer. Finally, respondent judge denied that a member of his staff gave complainant a copy of his draft
decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that he had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions in
Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before he left for New Zealand on study leave. Thus, he asserted that
it was impossible for him to thereafter change the resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for
any member of his staff to give complainant copies of said Decisions. [3]
In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for investigation, report and recommendation. [4]
First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the administrative case. Only
complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side. She presented as documentary evidence the copy of the
unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 dated February 23, 2001 which was allegedly handed to her
by a member of respondent judges staff.[5] Respondent judge, on the other hand, presented four (4)
witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando B. Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad Hernandez.
His documentary evidence consists of the affidavits of his witnesses, [6] copy of the Motion for
Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440,[7] and various documents composed of the machine copy of
the Order of Arrest in Criminal Case No. 117219, machine copy of the letter dated December 29, 1997,
machine copy of Certification dated Nov 13, 2000, front and dorsal sides of Check No. QRH-0211804, Bank
Statement dated March 31, 1998, Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998, Current Account Inquiry, and
Transaction Record, which documents were allegedly given by complainant to respondents witness,
Fernando B. Espuerta.[8]
The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
COMPLAINANTS VERSION:
1. LUCILA TAN
Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent Judge because she had a case
in Branch 58, MeTC, San Juan, Metro Manila. She alleged that, in September 1998, she filed
two cases involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the Prosecutors Office in Pasig. After
resolution, the cases were filed in the MeTC, San Juan.One case went to Branch 57 and the
other one went to Branch 58, where Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding
Judge. Judge Quilatan was the Presiding Judge of Branch 57. Upon advise of a friend, she
moved for consolidation and the two cases were transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch
57. Subsequently, in view of the Motion for Inhibition filed by Complainants lawyer, Judge
Quilatan inhibited himself and the two cases were transferred to the sala of Respondent
Judge Rosete (TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After several hearings, the Clerk
of Court, named Joyce, called up the Complainant and advised her to talk to San Juan
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to seek for (sic) assistance. Joyce gave her the phone number of the
Office of the Mayor (TSN, pages 17-18, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant then
called up the Office of the Mayor but her call was intercepted by Josie, the Mayors
Secretary. When she told Josie why she called, the latter asked her if she wanted to meet
the Judge and when Complainant answered in the affirmative, Josie made arrangements
for Complainant to meet the Judge (TSN, pages 19-21, Hearing of March 3,
2003).Complainant called up the Office of the Mayor sometime in November or late
October 2000 and she met the Judge on November 10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge
met at the Cravings Restaurant in Wilson, San Juan (TSN, page 22, Hearing of March 3,
2003). During the meeting, Complainant told the Judge regarding this matter, how this
happened and that he will convince the Accused to pay me as soon as possible (TSN, page
23, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When she went to the restroom for a few minutes,
Respondent Judge and Josie were left alone. After she came back, they went home. On the
way home, Josie told her to give something to [the] Judge, Sabi niya magbigay tayo ng kaunti
para bumilis iyong kaso mo (TSN, page 24, Hearing of March 3, 2003). At first, Josie did not
mention any amount but when the Complainant asked her how much, the former
mentioned Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). Complainant asked for a lesser amount,
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) (TSN, page 25, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When
Josie agreed, she sent the amount of P20,000.00 to Josie through her driver after two
days (TSN, pages 26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie received the money, the
Clerk of Court, Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that date. The Clerk of Court asked
her if she sent money. At first, Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court said that Josie
went there and there was money in the drawer (TSN, pages 28-29, Hearing of March 3,
2003). After that, several hearings were on-going, and before the resolution, Joyce called
up the Complainant again around February 2001. Complainant was in Baguio when Joyce
called saying that she had an important thing to tell to (sic) the Complainant. After
Complainant got back to Manila, Joyce called her again and said that she will show
Complainant something. When they were in Complainants car in San Juan, Joyce showed
Complainant two unsigned Decisions of the case[s]. After reading the Decisions,
Complainant saw that the cases were dismissed and that it will be dismissed if she will not
accede to Joyces request (TSN, pages 30-33, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant
claimed that Joyce asked for Php 150,000.00 for each case. Sabi niya it [was] for Judge daw,
kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving at that time(TSN, page 34, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant identified the copy of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 for
Other Deceits, dated 23 February 2001, which was marked as Exhibit A for the
Complainant (TSN, pages 35-38, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further
alleged Sabi niya, if I will accede to that request of P150,000.00 for each case then they will (sic)
going to reverse the Decision and Si Judge daw will reverse the Decision. Complainant met
with Joyce around February 2001 (TSN, page 39, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant
further claimed that Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he is a friend of the
Judge. Complainant went again to the Office of the Mayor to seek the Mayors help and she
met the Mayor at his Office in San Juan.The Mayor called up the Judge but he was not
around so the Clerk of Court, Joyce, was called. Joyce went to the Office of the Mayor and
when she arrived, she said that the Judge was out of the country (TSN, pages 40-41,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Mayor asked for the phone number of Respondent Judge
Rosete, which Joyce gave. Mayor Estrada was able to get in touch with the Judge. While
the Mayor was talking in (sic) the phone with the Judge, Complainant was in front of the
Mayor (TSN, pages 42-43, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant heard the Mayor
because his voice is very loud. He said, Judge, Saan ka? Sabi niya New Zealand. When were
you coming back? I do not know what is the answer and then he said, you help my friend naswindler
siya, pabilisin mo ang kaso niya para matapos na kasi matagal na iyan(TSN, page 43, Hearing of
March 23, 2003). After that they left the Office of the Mayor and Complainant was not able
to approach Mayor Estrada again. Since the Complainant was still carrying the Decision,
and being afraid that it will be promulgated already, she sought the advi[c]e of her friends.
The Complainant showed the decision to the Prosecutor in San Juan at that time (TSN,
pages 44-45, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Prosecutor told the Complainant that she is
going to meet with the Judge when he comes back from New Zealand. Complainant
testified that, sometime in April, in Sangkalan, Quezon City, a night life restaurant, she
met Respondent Judge Rosete. She was with two (2) Prosecutors. When she arrived at
Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the evening, Judge Rosete was already in the company of several
men whom she got to know as Fernan and Buboy (TSN, pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3,
2003). After eating and drinking, the Complainant left at around 10:30 in the
evening. While they were inside, Complainant claimed that she did not say anything at all
and it was the Prosecutor who talked in her behalf. She was the one who paid all the bills
which amounted to Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00). When Complainant left, only they,
three (3) girls, left while the Judge and his company were still there drinking. While
Complainant was waiting for her car outside, a man came over from behind (TSN, pages
49-50, Hearing of March 3, 2003).Complainant did not know him but she asked the
Prosecutor later after the man left. The Complainant said that the man asked if he could
have an advance, which she understood as a payment, and she told the
Prosecutor. Complainant heard the Prosecutor say that she already talked to the
Judge. The man left and went back inside the restaurant (TSN, page 51, Hearing of March
3, 2003).Complainant said that when she did not give the money she was still scared
because there will already be a promulgation and she did not know whether it will be in
her behalf (sic) or not. Complainant did not give anything aside from the P20,000.00
because her case was very strong and she had all the papers and evidence and that she
promised them that she will give them after she was (sic) able to collect all the
debts. Complainant did not know the actual date of the promulgation but somebody from
the Office of Respondent Judge called her up in her house and told her not to go to the
promulgation. When Complainant asked why, Sabi niya baka mapaiyak daw ako kasi alam na
daw nila ang decision. Sabi niya ako na lang ang magdedeliver ng case ng promulgation. She
received the decision when she sent her driver to pick it up. The caller said that the decision
was unfavorable to her (TSN, pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
RESPONDENTS VERSION:
1. JOSEFINA RAMOS
She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, the former
Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, since he was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In 2000 and 2001,
she was already the Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy (TSN, page 7, Hearing of September 9,
2003). She met Lucila Tan when the latter went to the Mayors Office together with Tita Pat,
the sister of President Estrada, but she could no longer remember the year. Lucila Tan went
to the Office, together with Tita Pat, and they were seeking the help of Mayor Jinggoy
because they have a case. She did not know the case because they were talking to Mayor
Jinggoy. She could no longer remember how many times Lucila Tan went to the Office of
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. She did not know what Lucila Tan wanted from Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada or how close Lucila Tan was to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9,
2003). She denied that she met Lucila Tan at the Cravings Restaurant and that she
suggested to Lucila Tan to give Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to speed
up or facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for only Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00). She claimed that she did not know what Lucila Tan was talking about
regarding the money. There was no occasion that she suggested or even intimated to Lucila
Tan the idea of giving money to Judge Rosete. She denied that she met with Lucila Tan
and Respondent Judge at Cravings Restaurant along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro
Manila. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003, which was
marked as Exhibit 1 (TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She denied that
Lucila Tan gave anything to her (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 9, 2003).
2. RODOLFO CEA
He testified that his acquaintances usually call him Buboy and for about two years or more
he had no occupation. Two years before, he was a Clerk III at Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 58, San Juan.He knows Lucila Tan because, when he was still working as Clerk in
San Juan, she approached me and asked if I can introduce her to Judge Rosete and
eventually asked for a favorable decision against her case. He could not remember
anymore when that was because it was a long time ago (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). It was when he was still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro
Manila. He met Lucila Tan at the corridor of the Metropolitan Trial Court when she
approached him and asked if he can introduce her to Judge Rosete. He agreed to introduce
Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete but he was not able to actually introduce Lucila Tan to Judge
Rosete because aside from the introduction, she wants me to ask Judge Rosete for a
favorable decision against (sic) her case and I told her that Judge Rosete dont (sic) like his
staff (to) indulge on that kind of transaction (TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of September 22,
2003). As far as he knows, the meeting he had with Lucila Tan in the corridor of the Court
in San Juan was the first and the last time. When asked about the claim of Lucila Tan that
he approached her and demanded from her a sum of money to represent an advance
payment for a favorable decision in her cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he
answered I dont know about that, sir. (TSN, page 10, Hearing of September 22, 2003.) He
identified the Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 6, 2003, and confirmed and
affirmed the truthfulness of the contents of the Affidavit, which was marked as Exhibit
2 (TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He denied that he met the
Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant around 8:30 in the evening of an unspecified
date (TSN, page 13, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA
He testified that he is a government employee employed at the Supreme Court with the
position Budget Officer III since November 9, 1981. His first job was Casual and he became
Budget Officer in 1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He recalled having
met Lucila Tan sometime just before Christmas in October or November 2000. The first
time he saw Lucila Tan was in a restaurant in Quezon City where she was introduced to
him by Fiscal Reyes. He went to the restaurant alone. He was invited by Judge Rosete
because they had not been together for a long time and they were long time friends. They
ate at the restaurant. When he arrived, Judge Rosete and Buboy were already there. They
stayed in the restaurant until 11:00 [eleven] oclock in the evening (TSN, pages 47-49,
Hearing of September 22, 2003). He met Lucila Tan in that restaurant when Fiscal Reyes
pointed him to Lucila Tan as Fernan of the Supreme Court. When he arrived there, Buboy
and Judge Rosete were already there. Later, the three (3) girls arrived, namely: Fiscal
Reyes, Lucila Tan and the sister of the Fiscal (TSN, page 50, Hearing of September 22,
2003). They ordered and ate but they were in a separate table. He recalled that Judge Rosete
paid for their bill because he saw him get a credit card and sign something. He did not
know about Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to the waiter. The incident
where he met Lucila Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City came before the incident when
she went to his Office (TSN, pages 51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He could not
remember the month when Lucila Tan went to his Office but he remembers that it was
nearing Christmas in 2000. Pumunta siya sa akin parang may ipinakiusap siya sa akin,
katunayan nandito po dala ko. Lucila Tan asked him to help her in her case with Alfonso
Sy. Meron siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi bibigyan niya ako ng three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) para iabot kay Judge Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang aking
kaibigan. Matagal na kaming magkaibigan niyan noong nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko sa
kanya. He told Judge Rosete about that and the latter got mad at him. In their second
meeting, Lucila Tan gave him papers. He presented a Motion for Reconsideration in
Criminal Case No. 59440, which was marked as Exhibit 3 (TSN, pages 53-56, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). He presented the papers actually given to him by Lucila Tan.He
claimed that the xerox copy was the exact same document given to him by Lucila Tan when
she went to his Office. The other documents that Lucila Tan gave to him when she went to
his Office were marked as Exhibit 4 and submarkings (TSN, pages 57-63, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan told him the contents of the documents and how the case
against Alfonso Sy came about.When Lucila Tan asked him, he answered her that his
friend (Respondent Judge) was not like that and they had been together for a long time
and it is not possible. When he told Judge Rosete about that, the latter got mad at
him. Lucila Tan also mentioned to him that she knew the son of the Chief Justice (TSN,
pages 64-66, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan was insisting that he give Judge
Rosete so that her case will win but he answered that his friend was not like that (TSN,
pages 67-68, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ
She testified that she was a government employee connected with the Judiciary at the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. She knew Complainant
Lucila Tan because in the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She first came to know
Lucila Tan when the latter went to their Office with Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk of Court
of Branch 57, who introduced Lucila Tan to her. Ellen Sorio said, may kaso ito sa inyo,
pinapasabi ni Mayor kay Judge (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She did
not say anything but Lucila Tan asked may tumawag na ba sa Mayors Office? and she said
yes, maam. After that there was a hearing and the sister of former President Estrada went
to their Office looking for Judge Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was on a hearing
and the former told her to tell Judge Rosete about the case of Lucila na pinakikiusap ni
Mayor (TSN, page 12, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She told Judge Rosete about the
things that the sister of the former President told her and that Judge Rosete said
nothing. She denied the testimony of Complainant on March 3, 2003 that, sometime in
November 2000, she (Joyce Hernandez) called up Lucila Tan by telephone and said that
she saw money stuffed inside the drawer of the Respondent in his Office and that she asked
the Complainant whether the latter was the one who sent the money stuffed inside the
drawer. What she remembers is that Lucila Tan called her and asked if Josie went to their
Office and she told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She also denied that
she called up Lucila Tan sometime in February 2001 and claimed that Lucila Tan was the
one who called her up and told her that she (Lucila Tan) was going to show her
something. Lucila Tan showed her a copy of the Decision and she was surprised when the
former showed her the copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan got the copy, the latter did
not answer and said that Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to her (TSN, pages 13-16, Hearing
of September 29, 2003). She immediately went to the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan
and Mayor Jinggoy talked to her. The Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete was and she
answered that he was in New Zealand on study leave. When the Mayor asked if she knew
the telephone number of the Judge, she gave him the telephone number in New
Zealand. She was present when the Mayor called up Respondent Judge and talked to
him (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 29, 2003). He said Pare ko, ano na itong kaso na
pinakikiusap ko sa iyo? I dont know what was your answer(ed) [sic] to him, you were talking
and then he said ganun ba? then Mayor Jinggoy said o sige, okay na and then we left the
Office. She denied that she gave two advance copies of the Decisions in Complainants two
cases inside the latters parked car in San Juan, Metro Manila and claimed that Complainant
was the one who showed her the copy in their Office. She likewise denied the testimony
of the Complainant that she allegedly demanded Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases
then pending before Branch 58, which were decided by Respondent Judge, in return for a
favorable decision (TSN, pages 18-21, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She claimed that it
was the Complainant who offered to her. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed
and sworn to on February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit 5, and confirmed and
affirmed the truthfulness of all the contents thereof (TSN, pages 22-25, Hearing of
September 29, 2003).[9]
The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story. Complainant claims that respondent
judge, through his staff, required her to pay the amount of P150,000.00 for him to render judgment in her
favor in the two criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe Sy. Respondent judge, on the other hand, asserts
that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him by offering to pay for the downpayment of the car he
was planning to buy, and she even sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to
persuade him to rule for the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of the credibility of the parties
evidence.
After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence
presented by both parties, we find the complainants version more trustworthy. Not only did she testify
with clarity and in full detail, but she also presented during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft
decision of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of his staff. Said
documentary evidence supports her allegation that a member of complainants staff met with her, showed
her copies of respondent judges draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, and demanded,
in behalf of respondent judge, that she pays P150,000.00 for the reversal of the disposition of said cases. It
would be impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a judges draft decision, it being highly
confidential, if not through the judge himself or from the people in his office. And an ordinary employee
in the court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a cases disposition if not assured by the judge who
drafted the decision.
The respondents evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note that the testimonies
of two of respondents witnesses contradict each other.Fernando Espuerta confirmed complainants claim
that she met respondent judge and his two companions, Espuerta himself and Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), at
Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand, denied that he met complainant at
Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never went out with respondent judge in non-office functions. The
Investigating Judge observed:
Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the Respondent Judges
two witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and Fernando B. Espuerta, regarding the incident at Sangkalan
Restaurant in Quezon City where Complainant claimed that she met Respondent Judge, a
certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two Prosecutors.Fernando B. Espuerta
testified that he was at Sangkalan Restaurant with Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo
Cea), while the latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan
Restaurant.[10] (citations omitted)
Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainants version that she met with respondent judge and his
companions at Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April 2001.
We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as regards the dates
when he went to New Zealand and when he came back to the Philippines. Respondent asserts that he was
already in New Zealand at the time when complainant claims that he met with her. However, the evidence
he presented only shows his New Zealand visa and the dates when he entered said country. [11] He did not
show to the investigating body the dates when he left and returned to the Philippines. Apparently, he
entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4, 2001 and May 1, 2001. We may therefore infer that
complainant was in the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is consistent with complainants testimony,
as well as that of Fernando Espuerta, that she met with respondent judge and his companions, Fernando
and Buboy in April 2001.
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must
be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only
be pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from
judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because
the peoples confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and
the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral
uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law
which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a
judges personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any
appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.[12]
Respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his draft
decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the
standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross
misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDEDfrom office without salary and
other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No R-281-RTJ August 26, 1986

PONCIANO A. ARBAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MELECIO B. BORJA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Naga City, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
On March 21, 1985, Ponciano A. Arban, the then District Engineer for Camarines Sur, Ministry of Public
Works and Highways, filed the instant administrative case for grave misconduct against Judge Melecio B.
Borja, Presiding Judge of Branch XX, Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region of Naga City.
The petition alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Last February 23, 1985, at about l:10 p.m., at the Cindy's Restaurant in downtown Naga
City, in the presence of people taking their lunch and others, the said respondent, without
any justification whatever, hit with the pistol he was carrying the herein petitioner on the
left side of his head, sending him sprawling to the floor and rendering him momentarily
unconscious.
3. Still not satisfied with his display of violence in public, the respondent also threatened
with his said gun the companions of the petitioner.
4. Minutes before his pistol-whipping of the petitioner, the respondent fired his gun in the
balcony of the apartment he is lodging in, from where he followed the petitioner to the
said restaurant.
5. As soon as it was possible, the petitioner reported the said incidents to RTC Executive
Judge Juan B. Llaguno, who advised the petitioner to seek the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and avoid the worse scandal of reporting to the police
station, which advice was followed.
6. The NBI investigated the petitioner and his witnesses, copies of whose statements, duly
sworn to, on said acts of respondent are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D, E & F. The
NBI later forwarded the case to the City Fiscal of Naga, where it is now pending
preliminary inquiry, delayed now for 3 weeks due to repeated requests for postponement
by the respondent.
7. More than the physical injuries suffered by the petitioner was the black eye inflicted by
the respondent on the administration of justice, the judiciary in particular, considering the
affront to the public's sensibility to what the media called acts' 'associated only with
hoodlums and hooligans.'
8. Precisely because no judge in Naga City or Camarines Sur has ever been known to have
resorted to similar barbarous acts, the same received much coverage by the print and
broadcast media, whose reactions are best exemplified by the editorial, editorial cartoon
and news story of 'Handiong,' one of the most respected newspapers in the Bicol region,
hereto attached as Annexes G, H & I hereof.' (pp. 16-17, rec.).
We referred the case to Justice Bienvenido B. Ejercito of the Intermediate Appellate Court for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In his Answer, Judge Borja denied the charge against him.
The complainant together with his witnesses and counsel appeared at the scheduled hearing on June 19,
1985. Judge Borja appeared but without counsel. Borja moved for the resetting of the case. The motion was
granted. Neither the complainant nor his counsel appeared at the subsequent scheduled hearings. Instead,
the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw the Petition, to wit:
MOTION TO WITHDRAW PETITION
COMES NOW the petitioner, assisted by counsel and respectfully states that:
After a more mature deliberation on the various aspects of this case, the undersigned has
come to the conclusion that the filing of the petition was caused by a misunderstanding by
the petitioner of the motives of the respondent.
Further, after the public apology by the respondent, the petitioner believes that the scandal
caused on the public by the act of the respondent has been duly appeased.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, Justice Ejercito recommended the dismissal of the case.
In our Resolution dated December 17, 1985, we resolved to — (a) transfer the case to Justice Nathanael de
Pano of the Intermediate Appellate Court for further investigation, report and recommendation, and (b)
require counsel for petitioner to appear before said Justice-Investigator for hearing of this case. We stated
that his failure to do so will subject said counsel to strict disciplinary measures.
In accordance with our Resolution, Justice de Pano conducted further hearings of the case. In his Report
and Recommendation submitted to this Court, Justice de Pano summarizes the events that transpired in
the course of his investigation as follows:
A new hearing of this case was set for July 8, 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. The
complainant did not personally appear at the hearing, but his counsel, Atty. Luis General
Jr., did appear in his behalf. The respondent and his counsel were present. The respondent,
through counsel, moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of evidence. Upon
the prodding of the undersigned, Atty. General averred that the complainant no longer
resides in Naga City; apparently, he had been transferred from Naga to the Office of the
Ministry of Public Works and Highways in Cavite City, in consequence of which, counsel
had been unable to confer with the complainant. The hearing was transferred to August 8,
1986 to enable Atty. General to contact and confer with the complainant.
On August 8, 1986, at 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon, again, the complainant did not
personally appear although his counsel Atty. Luis General, Jr., did appear, as well as, the
respondent Judge, Melecio Borja, who appeared in his own behalf. Atty. General revealed
that he had conferred with the complainant, who did not wish to proceed further in the
case since his personal honor and good name had already been vindicated by the
respondent's public apology. Counsel informed that he had filed a written manifestation
to this effect. The complainant's verified 'Second Reiteration of Motion to Withdraw,' dated
July 29, 1986, signed by both the complainant personally and his counsel, states as follows:
1. The respondent made a public apology to the petitioner for doing the
specific act upon which the petition was based, which apology, after its
being given full publicity, satisfied the petitioner as far as his personal
interests in this case were concerned.
2. The respondent further assured the petitioner that he would not return
to the Bicol region and his transfer to Makati was already in the works and
was being impeded only by the pendency of this case, thus, such transfer
would appease the scandal caused by the said act of the respondent.
3. With his personal interests already satisfied, it would be pointless for
the petitioner to pursue this case, and incur further heavy expenses on his
part, considering that when this case was first set for investigation last
June 19, 1985, the petitioner spent no less than P5,000.00 attorney's fees
and travelling expenses to Manila and back to Naga City, with 3 of his
witnesses and counsel.
It is respectfully submitted that, with this reiteration of the said motion to
withdraw, there is nothing more the complainant can do to complete the
records upon which the honorable Supreme Court may act one way or
another.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the said motion be granted.
(p. 325, rec.)
The complainant's 'Second Reiteration of Motion to Withdraw,' indeed, reiterates the
complainant's previous 'Explanation of Non-Appearance' dated July 31, 1985 which,
incidentally, was signed also by both complainant and his counsel under oath (pp. 119-
120, rec.). Annex B of this document, captioned 'Apology,' dated June 25, 1985 signed by
the respondent judge, Melecio B. Borja, in the presence of two witnesses, reads as follows:
I, MELECIO B. BORJA, hereby sincerely and wholeheartedly apologize to
District Engineer PONCIANO A. ARBAN for what I did to him last 23
February 1985 at the Cindy Restaurant in Naga City, which act of mine
inflicted on him physical injuries on the left side of his face.
As proof of my sincerity, I hereby give him the permission to cause the
publication of this apology in an media outlets. (p. 122, rec.).
The February 23, 1985 incident involving Judge Borja and the complainant generated nationwide publicity.
The February 25 — March 1, 1985 issue of VOX BICOL, a local newspaper and the March 2, 1985 issue of
TEMPO in the column "BULLSEYE" of Mr. Ruther Batuigas, a Manila based newspaper, reported that
Judge Melecio Borja of the RTC Branch XX, Naga City, allegedly pistol-whipped MPWH District Engineer
Ponciano Arban inside the "Cindy's Restaurant" in Naga City, Saturday, February 23, 1985. On March 4,
1985, through Deputy Court Administrator Romeo Mendoza, we sent a telegram to Judge Borja for the
latter to come immediately for a conference and explain the alleged pistol whipping of Engineer Arban as
reported in the newspapers.
We designated the then Acting Court Administrator Arturo Buena to investigate the matter.
Based on the memorandum of Acting Administrator Buena, stating that a prima facie case of the reported
pistol whipping of Engineer Ponciano Arban by Judge Borja has been established, although lacking in
details, we issued a resolution dated March 19, 1985 and resolved to refer this matter to Associate Justice
Bienvenido B. Ejercito of the Intermediate Appellate Court for investigation, report, and recommendation
This Court also suspended Judge Melecio Borja effective immediately from office until further orders.
This action was taken even before Engineer Arban filed the present petition considering our responsibility
to discipline erring members of the bench and bar and to preserve the integrity of the judiciary.
Hence, the fact that the complainant filed a motion to withdraw his complaint and the fact that the public
apology of Judge Borja satisfied the petitioner as far as his personal interests in the case were concerned is
not very material nor controlling. The truth is what is important. Did the respondent Judge commit an act
of serious misconduct, one which degrades the integrity of the judicial office and serves as a demoralizing
example to the public?
Justice de Pano aptly stated in his Report:
The complainant's avowal that his 'personal interests' have been 'already satisfied,' is not
all there is to this case. There is the matter of the public interest involved in the case. The
respondent is not just an ordinary citizen, but a highly visible member of the judicial
branch of the Government, particularly, an incumbent judge of the Regional Trial Court
stationed in Naga City. The complainant is, himself, an official of the government — an
engineer of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways. The fact that the incident was
accorded with widest possible publicity in both regional and national newspaper attests
to the very sensitive position occupied by the respondent. There is, thus, not only the
complainant's private interests involved, but also the public interest involved in the act of
an official whom position carries with it great responsibility and which position demanded
the highest norm of conduct from the incumbent both in his public and private capacities,
whether in court or out of it.
Even a mere cursory reading of Judge Borja's "apology" in relation to the "petition" or complaint clearly
indicates that Judge Borja admits the commission of the act charged.
The respondent admits in his public apology that he inflicted physical injuries on the left side of the face of
District Engineer Ponciano A. Arban while they were at Cindy's Restaurant in Naga City, a public place.
We are not persuaded by the explanation of the respondent Judge in his March 12, 1985 letter to then Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando that Mr. Arban tried to hit the respondent with a fist blow and that while
parrying that blow, Judge Borja wildly swung with his right hand and happened to hit the complainant's
face.
There is no doubt in the mind of the Court from the records of this case, inspite of the cover-ups and the
sudden loss of interest of the complainant to vigorously pursue his complaint, that the physical injuries
inflicted on Mr. Arban were caused by a pistol-whipping.
Media reported that the incident was caused by jealousy over a woman, who, with two other women, was
with Arban's group, then left Arban to join the Judge, but later decided to again join Arban's group. While
the explanation of the respondent admits the presence of three ladies and three other men with Engineer
Arban and the fact that one of the ladies, a certain Mrs. Evelyn Yu, asked to ride with the respondent in his
car so she could be dropped off at the Overland Express office where she works, we resolve any doubts in
favor of the Judge and give credence to his statement —
that it is not also true that the motive was jealousy over a woman as I have no love
relationships with any woman other than my wife.
Whatever the motive may have been, the violent action of the respondent in a public place constitutes
serious misconduct and the resultant outrage of the community in Naga City is a blow to the image of the
entire judiciary. Judge Borja violated the established norm for judicial behavior that "a judge's official
conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior not only upon the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach (Sec. 3,
Cannon of Judicial Ethics)
This Court ruled in De la Paz v. Inutan (64 SCRA 540), that:
The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From
him, the people draw their win and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an
intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests, specially in the station of
municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and direct contact with the
people before anybody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he
must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. He
should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.
While the Investigator-Justice recommended a penalty of suspension for two (2) years, it is the consensus
of this Court that the serious nature of the offense and the best interests of the . judiciary warrant the penalty
of dismissal. Moreover, this Court frowns upon prolonged suspension of judges or court personnel as a
penalty, even assuming that it is deserved.
WHEREFORE, Judge Melecio B. Borja is found guilty of grave misconduct and is hereby ordered
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in
any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. However, he shall be paid any
back salaries or accrued leaves which are due to him as of this date. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
FERNANDO DELA CRUZ, complainant, vs. Judge JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, RTC, Branch 166, Pasig
City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a Verified Complaint[1] filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by complainant who
identified himself as a concerned citizen, respondent was charged with the Violation of R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and the Code of Judicial Conduct The case stemmed from three (3) criminal cases
assigned to respondent, namely:
a.] Criminal Case No. 11309 against Roberto Agana y Borja, for violation of Section 16, Article III,
R.A. 6425, as amended;
b.] Criminal Case No. 4275-D against Roberto Agana y Borja for violation of P.D. No. 1866; and
c.] Criminal Case No. 4276-D against Sarah Resula y Puga for violation of Section 16, Article III
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
The complaint, in sum, alleges that respondent as the presiding judge in whose sala the above-
enumerated cases are pending, gravely abused his discretion and exhibited evident partiality by: 1.]
socializing in posh restaurants particularly in Marios Restaurant, Quezon City and the Shangri-la EDSA
Plaza with then Congresswoman Venice Agana, mother of the accused Roberto Agana, together with their
counsel, Atty. Narciso Cruz; 2.] issuing unreasonable orders for postponement which unjustly delay the
administration of justice; and 3.] allowing the two accused, Roberto Agana and his live-in partner, Sarah
Resula, to submit to a drug test thereby postponing the trial of the cases indefinitely.
The OCA thereafter recommended that the case be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals or to any OCA consultant for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days
from notice.[2]
In a Resolution dated February 16, 2000,[3] the Court designated Associate Appellate Court Justice
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis to conduct an investigation, report and recommendation on charges against the
respondent within ninety (90) days from notice.
Pursuant thereto, Justice Vidallon-Magtolis thereafter proceeded with the investigation of the
case. The complainant did not appear at the hearing. Despite this, Justice Vidallon-Magtolis, bearing in
mind that even a desistance of the complainant is of no moment in an administrative case such as this,
proceeded with the investigation by examining the records of the criminal cases involved which
respondent had brought along. She subsequently submitted a Report containing the following findings and
recommendations:
At this point it must be pointed out that, had the supposed complainant appeared to substantiate his
charges, his testimony could only have been admitted as to the alleged socializing acts of the respondent
with the congresswoman-mother of the male accused granting that he was an eyewitness thereto and was
familiar with the judge and the congresswoman as well as the defense counsel, Atty. Cruz. However, as to
the alleged partiality of the respondent in granting postponements, his testimony could only be in the form
of opinions which would have been inadmissible, considering that he is not party to the criminal cases,
neither does he appear to be involved therein in any other capacity. As a matter of fact, his real identity
remains to be a question, since he did not actually furnish his real address in his complaints, both with the
Ombudsman and with the Court Administrator.
At any rate, lest the undersigned be perceived as one shirking from responsibility, she opted not to dismiss
the case outright, in view of settled rules that only the Supreme Court can dismiss administrative cases
against judges,[4] and considering further that the bulk of the allegations in the complaint are verifiable
from the records. Thus, she proceeded on with her investigation, giving the respondent an opportunity to
clear his name
From the documentary evidence submitted by the respondent and the record of the three criminal cases as
well as the respondents answers to the clarificatory questionings of this investigator, the following facts
appear:
1. The arraignment of both accused were postponed for three (3) times, all upon motion of the
defense counsel, formerly Atty. Joel Aguilar, the reason being:
(a) unexplained absence of the accused in Court[5]
(b) the intended attendance of Atty. Aguilar at the 6th National Convention for Lawyers[6]
(c) absence of both accused who were reportedly in Tagbilaran City[7]
2. After the arraignment, the accused appeared but once in the three (3) successive settings for
trial on the merits. Their counsel, now Atty. Narciso Cruz, never appeared at all, but only filed
motions for postponement which were invariably granted even over the objection of the
prosecution.[8]
3. Despite the successive absences of the accused, the respondent never issued a warrant of arrest,
nor even asked them to explain their absences. According to the respondent, he considered
their absences as waiver of appearance. Yet, in the two instances that the prosecution was
ready,[9] he (respondent) did not proceed with the hearing which should have been done if
there was a waiver of appearance.
4. When the respondent acted on the Voluntary Submission to Confinement, Treatment and
Rehabilitation of both accused, he did not give the prosecution an opportunity to file comment
or opposition thereto.[10]
5. The respondents order of January 26, 1998, allowing the confinement, treatment and
rehabilitation of the accused was not officially sent to the Dangerous Drugs Board. His
directive in the second paragraph of the order, to wit: The pertinent report must be submitted
to the Court soonest[11] is rather vague in that it did not state who should make the report nor
the limit of the period given for its submission.
6. The respondent never checked with the Dangerous Drugs Board whether or not the two
accused had indeed submitted themselves for confinement, treatment and rehabilitation with
said office. This gives the impression that the respondents order of January 26, 1998 was made
merely to enable him to suspend the proceedings, including the case for violation of P.D. [No.]
1866, which is not subject to such suspension under R.A. [No.] 6425, as amended.
7. When the respondent issued the order of September 18, 1998,[12] where he appears to have motu
proprio set the case anew for hearing on November 12, 1998, there was already a case filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman[13] on January 30, 1998.[14] Likewise, this
administrative complaint was already filed on February 2, 1998 with the Office of the Court
Administrator, and the latter had already directed the respondent on September 9, 1998, to
file his comment to such complaint.[15] Obviously, he was stirred to action by the filing of such
complaints and not because of his diligent performance of his duties and responsibilities.
8. The respondent denied that he knew of the fact that accused Roberto Agana is the son of then
Congresswoman Venice Agana of Bohol. According to him, he learned about it when Atty.
Narciso Cruz entered his appearance and then he said it was pro bono basis and the accused is
the son of a congresswoman.[16]When asked by this investigator whether that information was
made in open court or in chambers, he answered that he came to my chambers. [17]
9. Subsequently, after realizing through the statements of this investigator that a judge should
not allow lawyers and parties litigants with pending cases to see him in chambers,[18] the
respondent tried to redeem himself after resting his case on May 9, 2000, by explaining that
when Atty. Cruz saw him in chambers, the latter had not yet entered his appearance as
defense counsel. He did not, however, ask for the correction of the transcript of stenographic
notes of April 7, 2000.
10. The order of inhibition[19] was issued by the respondent long after this administrative case had
been filed against him. Hence, it could not be taken as a voluntary inhibition to show lack of
interest on the criminal cases.
Justice Vidallon-Magtolis thus found that:
All the foregoing are indications that the respondents official conduct had not been entirely free from the
appearance of impropriety, neither has the respondent remained above suspicion in his official actuations
in connection with the criminal cases involving Agana and Resula. He has fallen short of the requirements
of probity and independence.[20] A judges conduct should be above reproach, and in the discharge of his
official duties, he should be conscientious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial.[21]
Thus, in the case of Garcia vs. Burgood,[22] the Supreme Court held:
We deem it important to point out that a judge must preserve the trust and faith reposed on him by the
parties as an impartial and objective administrator of justice.When he exhibits actions that rise fairly or
unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded xxx.
Justice Vidallon-Magtolis recommended that respondent be fined the sum of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos with a stern warning that a repetition of the acts complained of will be dealt with more
severely.
The Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that respondents conduct was hardly exemplary in
this case.
The Court in a litany of cases has reminded members of the bench that the unreasonable delay of a
judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a
ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate.[23] Indeed, the Court has consistently
impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle that justice
delayed is justice denied.[24]
In the case at bench, the fact that respondent tarried too long in acting on the pending incidents in the
Criminal Cases Nos. 11309, 4275-D and 4276-D, hardly becomes open to question. If at all, respondent
judges foot-dragging in acting on the incidents in the said cases, which stopped only when administrative
complaints were filed against him with the Ombudsman and the OCA, is a strong indicia of his lack of
diligence in the performance of his official duties and responsibilities.
It must be remembered in this regard that a speedy trial is defined as one conducted according to the
law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays.[25] The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of the accused by
delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. [26] This purpose works both ways, however,
because it, likewise, is intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring judicial
tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions. [27]
At the risk of sounding trite, it must again be stated that Judges are bound to dispose of the courts
business promptly and to decide cases within the required period.[28] We have held in numerous cases that
failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.[29] If they cannot do so, they should seek extensions
from this Court to avoid administrative liability.[30] Indeed, judges ought to remember that they should be
prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to them, for justice delayed is often justice denied.
Certainly, Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the peoples faith in the judiciary.[31] It is for this
reason that this Court has time and again reminded judges of their duty to decide cases
expeditiously. Delay in the disposition of even one case constitutes gross inefficiency[32] which this Court
will not tolerate.[33]
With regard to the charge of partiality, the Court pointed out in Dawa v. De Asa[34]that the peoples
confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the
diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness
they are expected to possess.[35] It is towards this sacrosanct goal of ensuring the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:
RULE 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN
ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
CANON 3. A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY
AND DILIGENCE.
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not only
through his official acts but also through his private morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is
therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily
life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. [36] Only recently, in Magarang v.
Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr.,[37] the Court pointedly stated that:
While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly
mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial conduct and with existing administrative policies in
order to maintain the faith of the people in the administration of justice.[38]
Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.[39] A judges conduct must be above reproach.[40] Like Caesars wife, a judge
must not only be pure but above suspicion.[41] A judges private as well as official conduct must at all times
be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach. [42]
In Vedana vs. Valencia,[43] the Court held:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as a
private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private
morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a
judges official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of
a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
As stated earlier, in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.[44] A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must
also appear to be impartial.[45] Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct of judges.[46] Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.[47] It was, thus, held that it is
improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of the complainant. [48]Be that
as it may, credence can not be accorded to the indictment that respondent judge had been socializing with
the congresswoman-mother of one of the accused as well as accuseds counsel considering that complainant
neither testified nor produced any witness to corroborate this charge.
Viewed vis--vis the factual landscape of this case, it is clear that respondent judge violated Rule
1.02,[49] as well as Canon 2,[50] Rule 2.01[51] and Canon 3.[52] He must, thus, be sanctioned.[53] In this
connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu
City,[54] that:
Well-known is the judicial norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial.
Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if
the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and
impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and
integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the peoples sense of justice. Thus,
their official conduct should be beyond reproach.[55]
A review of past decisions reveals a wide range of penalties for cases of similar nature. These penalties
include mere reprimand,[56] withholding of salary,[57] fine,[58]suspension[59] and even dismissal.[60]
This is not the first time respondent has been sanctioned by the Court. In Cecilio Wycoco v. Judge
Jesus G. Bersamira,[61] respondent was initially admonished for absenteesim by the Court. Subsequently,
in Jose Oscar M. Salazar v. Judge Jesus G. Bersamira,[62] respondent was again sanctioned and fined Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) with the warning that a repetition of the same act would be dealt with more severely
for violating Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1983. Specifically, respondent intervened in a case which
he could not properly take cognizance of causing the complainant great prejudice resulting from the delay
of the execution of a decision in his favor in Civil Case No. 39608 of the MeTC of Makati.
It appears, however, that being chastised twice has not reformed the respondent with the filing of the
instant administrative complaint against him. Needless to state, such acts of respondent only further erode
the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any
impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary, which in recent times has
been the object of criticism and controversy.[63]
While the Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that respondents conduct warrants the
imposition of sanctions against him, the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the misdeed
committed. Given the prevailing facts of the case, a fine of P10,000.00 accompanied by a reprimand, with a
stern warning that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely, is a more
appropriate penalty.[64]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00). Further, he is REPRIMANDED and sternly warned that a repetition of similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE E. FERNANDEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE JAIME T. HAMOY, Regional Trial Court, Branch 130,
Caloocan City, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint against Judge Jaime T. Hamoy for Abuse of Authority, Dereliction
of Duty and Violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. [1]
Complainant Jose E. Fernandez is the counsel for plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3645 entitled, Hadji Adil
Musahari, Plaintiff versus Shop-O-Rama, et al., Defendants, and Civil Case No. 2744 entitled, Philippine
International Development, Inc., Plaintiff versus Associate Citizens Bank, Defendant, both of which were filed
with the Regional TrialCourt of Zamboanga City, Branch 15, then presided by respondent Judge. Despite
the lapse of more than ten years, respondent Judge failed to render judgment in the said cases. After
respondent Judge was transferred to the RTC of Caloocan City, complainant learned that he brought the
records of the subject cases to his new station.
On January 7, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to the Court Administrator seeking help in the speedy
disposition of his clients cases.[2] Senior Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez referred the letter
to respondent Judge for comment or appropriate action.[3]
When nothing was heard from respondent Judge, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo
directed respondent to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt. Again, respondent Judge
failed to comply.[4]
On April 3, 2001, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez sent a First Tracer to respondent Judge
reiterating the directive for him to file comment within five days from receipt. Still, respondent Judge failed
to do so.
For his repeated failure to comply with the directives of the Office of the Court Administrator, a
Resolution was issued requiring respondent Judge to show cause why he should not be held in contempt
for his failure to file comment; and to submit the said comment within ten days from notice. [5]
Respondent Judge finally filed an Explanation/Compliance, alleging that he simply forgot to submit
his comment; that he misplaced the records of Civil Cases Nos. 3645 and 2744; that his Utility Aide in
Caloocan City mixed up the records of the said cases with the records of cases assigned to the Caloocan
court; that the missing case records were found only when the old records were transferred to the newly-
acquired storage/filing cabinets; that he was unable to act on the cases notwithstanding the discovery of
the records because he had to attend to the many family-related cases, being then the only designated
Family Court; that his docket became more congested when the other courts forwarded to his sala cases
falling under the jurisdiction of the Family Court; and that he had no intention of disregarding the
directives of the Court Administrator or of this Court. [6]
Subsequently, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation that he had already decided Civil Case No. 2744
on July 11, 2003 and Civil Case No. 3645 on June 20, 2003.[7]
In compliance with the directive of this Court, respondent Judge manifested his willingness to submit
the administrative complaint against him for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. [8]
The Office of the Court Administrator, after evaluation, recommended that respondent Judge be fined
the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) for his failure to decide the subject cases within the
reglementary period, with warning that any further delay in the disposition of cases will subject him to a
more severe penalty of either suspension or dismissal from service.
We agree with the recommendation of the Court Administrator that respondent is administratively
liable for gross inefficiency, dereliction of duty and violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. However, we find the recommended penalty not commensurate to the gravity of the nonfeasance
and malfeasance committed.
In his Comment, respondent Judge attributes the delay in the resolution of Civil Cases Nos. 2744 and
3645 to the mix-up of the records with those of the other cases assigned to his court.
Such an excuse hardly merits serious consideration. Respondent Judge cannot be absolved from
liability for the inefficiency of his court personnel.[9] Judges are charged with the administrative
responsibility of organizing and supervising his court personnel to secure the prompt and efficient dispatch
of business, requiring at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. [10] Indeed,
he is ultimately responsible for ensuring that court personnel perform their tasks and that the parties are
promptly notified of his orders and decisions.[11] It is his duty to devise an efficient recording and filing
system in his court to enable him to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely
disposition.[12]
More importantly, judges have a duty to decide their cases within the reglementary period. On
meritorious grounds, they may ask for additional time. It must be stressed, however, that their application
for extension must be filed before the expiration of the prescribed period.[13] A close scrutiny of the records
does not disclose any attempt by respondent Judge to request for a reasonable extension of time to dispose
of the aforementioned cases. Not only did he consign the cases in limbo for an unreasonable period of 13
years, worse, respondent Judge brought the records of the unresolved cases to his new station without
clearance from the Office of the Court Administrator.Upon his transfer to another post, respondent Judge
should have asked the permission of the Court Administrator to bring the records of the cases to his new
assignment or should have apprised the parties of his action with respect thereto. This way, the Office of
the Court Administrator and the parties involved are aware of the progress of the cases instead of leaving
them in the dark. More importantly, this would dispel any suspicion that the respondent Judge was unduly
holding on to the records for corrupt or ill motives.
Members of the judiciary have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. A judge
who failed to do so has to suffer the consequences of his omission. Any delay in the disposition of cases
undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary.
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end to promote the ends of justice by administering it
speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over that court is the visible representation of
the law and justice. These are self-evident dogmas which do not even have to be emphasized but which we
always advert to when some members of the judiciary commit legal missteps or stray from the axioms of
judicial ethics.[14] More importantly, failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed
by law constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of
their cases.[15]
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:
Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
In line with this, the Court has laid down administrative guidelines to ensure that the mandates on
the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied with. Thus, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87
states, in pertinent part:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution
for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or
matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate
courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. . . (emphasis and italics
supplied)
A judges inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions. [16]A judge should, at all times, remain
in full control of the proceedings in his sala and, more importantly, should follow the time limit set for
deciding cases.[17]
Furthermore, respondent Judge should be held liable for his failure to obey directives from this Court
and the Court Administrator.
In his Comment, respondent Judge admitted that he received the directives from the OCA and from
this Court but that he forgot to comply.
Needless to say, judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, much more so this
Court from which all other courts should take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to
be construed as a mere request and should not be complied with partially, inadequately or
selectively.[18] Respondent Judges impious defiance of the directives of the OCA and of this Court borders
on contumacy which deserves no compassion. He cannot simply shrug off his non-compliance and pass
the blame to his faltering memory to justify his inaction. His explanation displays a cavalier attitude which
mocks the lawful authority of this Court.
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity.[19]Respondent Judge
must bear in mind that the exacting standards of conduct demanded of judges are designed to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the
transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect
for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.[20]
Aside from respondent Judges gross inefficiency, the records show that despite the pendency of the
cases subject hereof, he was able to collect his salaries upon his certification that he has no pending cases
to resolve. A certificate of service is an instrument essential to the fulfillment by the judges of their duty to
speedily dispose of their cases as mandated by the Constitution. A judge who fails to decide cases within
the prescribed period but collects his salary upon a false certificate is guilty of dishonesty amounting to
gross misconduct and deserves the condemnation of all right thinking men. [21] In view of the primordial
role of judges in the administration of justice, only those with irreproachable integrity and probity must be
entrusted with judicial powers.
In fine, the Court holds that respondent Judge committed gross misconduct and gross inefficiency
under Rule 140, Section 8(3) of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, which are classified as a serious
offense punishable by any of the sanctions enumerated in Section 11 of the same Rule, to wit:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office with salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or
It appears that this is not respondent Judges first offense. He had been previously admonished by the
Court in a Resolution dated March 20, 2002 for failure to decide motions and pending incidents within the
reglementary period, and was warned that any subsequent transgressions he commits would be dealt with
more severely.[22]
All told, respondent Judge failed to live up to the exacting standards of his office. The magnitude of
his transgressions, taken collectively, renders him unfit to don the judicial robe and to perform the functions
of a magistrate. Therefore, the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service is warranted.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 130, is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Respondent Judge shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any official act or
function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
JOSELITO RALLOS, JOSEFINA RALLOS VALLAR, SIMON RALLOS representing his deceased father
CARLOS RALLOS, TERESITA RALLOS YAP, and JOSELITO RALLOS, complainants, vs. Judge
IRENEO LEE GAKO JR., RTC, Branch 5, Cebu City, respondent. Jurismis
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484. March 17, 2000]
Executive Secretary RONALDO B. ZAMORA, complainant, vs. Judge IRENEO LEE GAKO JR., RTC,
Branch 5, Cebu City, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Partiality and dishonesty have no room in the administration of justice, for they contradict its very essence.
Indeed, like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure, but must also be beyond suspicion.
The Case
Two administrative cases were filed against Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 5. Filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, the first is a Letter-Complaint charging
him with ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority. Allegedly, respondent ordered the release of
25,000 sacks of imported rice to the claimants, notwithstanding the pendency of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings before the Bureau of Customs.
The second was an Administrative Complaint filed by Joselito Rallos, Simon Rallos, Josefina Rallos Vallar
and Teresita Rallos Yap. They assailed the respondents Order dated March 15, 1999, which had falsely
stated that complainants, who were petitioners in Special Proceedings Case No. 1576-R entitled "Intestate
Estate of Simeon Rallos," were present during the hearing on the said date.
After respondent filed his separate Comments to these two Complaints, the Court, in its September 1, 1999
Resolution, docketed the two cases as administrative matters and referred them to Deputy Court
Adminstrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada for investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting hearings, the investigator submitted his findings and recommendations to this Court in
a Memorandum dated January 4, 2000.
The Facts
The antecedent facts in the first case, as summarized by the investigator, [1] are as follows:
"On December 8, 1998, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of the
Bureau of Customs (BOC), the Philippine Coast Guard, and the Philippine National Police
(PNP) at the Port of Cebu withheld, for investigation, an estimated 25,000 sacks of rice
marked as Snowman on board the vessel, M/V Alberto. The sacks of rice allegedly came
from Palawan to be unloaded in Cebu. Likewise seized on the same date were nine cargo
trucks to be used for carrying the subject sacks of rice. Jjjuris
"The EIIB then wrote to the Bureau of Customs, Cebu, stating that upon further
verification, no proper voyage clearance to sail from Palawan to Cebu was issued to the
vessel, M/V Alberto. The EIIB then requested that a warrant of seizure and detention be
issued over the rice shipment.
"On December 9, 1998, the Bureau of Customs issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention
against: a) the vessel M/V Alberto used in the illegal transport of imported staple rice; b)
the imported staple rice consisting of 25,000 sacks, more or less, with the Snowman brand;
and c) nine (9) motor-vehicle trucks used and utilized in the illegal transport of the rice.
The warrant was also directed to the owner of the M/V Alberto, ANMA Philippine
Shipping Corporation, and the consignee of the rice shipment, Mark Montelibano.
"Thereafter, the claimants Mark Montelibano and Elson Ogario, on December 10, 1998,
filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction. The case, entitled Elson Ogario and Mark Montelibano vs. Bureau
of Customs, EIIB, Philippine Navy, Maritime Command, Philippine National Police,
Philippine Coast Guard and All Enforcement Agencies was docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB 23077 and assigned to Branch 5, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which is the sala
of respondent judge. The complaint alleged that the acts of defendants in intercepting the
subject sacks of rice [were] unlawful, illegal and merely based on suspicion. Thus, plaintiffs
prayed for the quashal of the warrant of seizure and detention (dated December 9, 1998)
issued by the Collector of Customs, and for the release of the goods.
"The Bureau of Customs filed a motion to dismiss on December 11, 1998, alleging that the
trial court ha[d] no jurisdiction over the complaint. x x x justice
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"The Bureau of Customs also pointed out that the appropriate seizure proceeding was
already instituted on December 9, 1998, by virtue of the issuance of the warrant of seizure
and detention. This had the effect of depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over the matter.
"On December 28, 1998, a hearing was held by respondent judge on both the motion to
dismiss of the Bureau of Customs and the complainants application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The parties presented evidence in support of their respective
positions.
"In a Resolution dated January 11, 1999, the respondent judge denied the Bureau of
Customs motion to dismiss and granted complainants prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"In the subject resolution, the respondent judge also ruled that the Bureau of Customs ha[d]
no jurisdiction because the goods involved [were] neither imported nor smuggled and
were apprehended outside the customs zone. As further basis, it was ruled that plaintiff
was able to present a certification issued by the National Food Authority that the subject
rice came from Palawan. Defendants, on the other hand, submitted no evidence that the
subject bags of rice were imported or smuggled. The issuance of the warrant of seizure and
detention being arbitrary and without probable cause, it did not divest the trial court of its
jurisdiction. Jksm
"The Bureau of Customs filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was subsequently
denied in the trial courts Order dated January 25, 1999. In this resolution, respondent judge
ordered the defendants to release the 25,000 sacks of rice without delay, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"The Bureau of Customs, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51051, assailing the
Resolutions dated January 11 and 25, 1999 of the respondent judge.
"In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, the District Collector of Customs of Cebu City rendered
a Decision in the seizure proceedings (Cebu Seizure Identification Case No. 17-98)
declaring the 25,000 sacks of Snowman rice as smuggled and ordering their forfeiture.
"On April 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision[2] denying the petition for
certiorari field by the Bureau of Customs and affirmed the questioned Resolutions dated
January 11 and 25, 1999 issued [by] respondent judge.
"In view of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent judge issued another Resolution
dated April 26, 1999 reiterating the release of the 25,000 sacks of rice, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"A petition for review was then filed by the Bureau of Customs before the Supreme Court
questioning the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Upon application, a Temporary
Restraining Order was subsequently issued by the Supreme Court on May 17, 1999,
enjoining the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 5,
Cebu City or any of his representatives and the respondents from enforcing or causing to
be enforced the questioned Resolution dated 11 January 1999, the Order dated 25 January
1999, and the Resolution dated 26 April 1999, as well as all subsequent orders issued by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-23077 entitled Elson
Ogario and Mark Montelibano vs. Bureau of Customs, et. al.
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"Respondent judge was required to comment on the administrative complaint. Lexjuris
1...........In his Comment dated July 21, 1999 (Exh. 8), the judge in essence, sought to justify
the issuance of the questioned orders on the following propositions:
a...........The Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Bureau of Customs of the Port
of Cebu on December 9, 1998 was based merely on a suspicion and not anchored on
probable cause. Hence, the issuance of the Warrant was not valid and, therefore, of no legal
effect.
b...........That the Bureau of Customs [of the Port of] Cebu x x x abused its authority or
function in seizing the '25 thousand bags of rice' on the basis of a suspicion that they were
smuggled goods or illegally imported. The issuance of the Warrant of Seizure and
Detention was arbitrary.
c...........That the Regional Trial Court Judge in the exercise of his jurisdiction, can issue an
injunction to stop or prevent a purported enforcement of a criminal law which is not in
accordance with an orderly administration of justice, and also to stop and prevent the
Bureau of Customs from using the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and arbitrary
manner."[3]
In the second case, Deputy Court Administrator Ponferrada summarized the facts as follows:
"On July 29, 1998, complainants, who are the legitimate children and compulsory heirs of
the late Simeon Rallos, filed a motion to remove and/or replace [the] administrator of the
estate[,] Atty. Juan T. Borromeo. In an Order dated February 10, 1999, respondent judge
did not categorically rule on the motion, and instead scheduled a hearing on March 17,
1999. x x x
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"Atty. Borromeo, on March 10, 1999, filed a motion to defer [the] hearing set for March 17,
1999. He scheduled the hearing of the motion on March 15, 1999 at 2:30 p.m. On the said
hearing date, Atty. Borromeo appeared but complainants and counsel were not present.
Respondent judge then issued the subject order (dated March 15, 1999) stating: Jlexj
When this case was called for hearing, only the administrator and his
counsel appeared. The oppositors and their counsel [were] also around.
The administrator and his counsel called the attention of the court that
their Supplemental Inventory, including the opposition thereto, ha[d] not
been resolved yet and the favorable resolution of the court is very
important for them so they can move further for the settlement of the
estate.
WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Inventory, including the opposition
thereto, is considered submitted for the resolution of the court.
The administrator and his counsel are notified of this order in open court,
including the oppositors and their counsel.
SO ORDERED.
"On the other hand, on March 17, 1999, complainants and their counsel, Atty. Expedito
Bugarin, Jr. went to Branch 5 to attend the hearing, only to be informed that the case was
not calendared. Upon further inquiry from the staff of respondent judge, they learned that
[the] hearing of the case was conducted on March 15, 1999. They obtained a copy of the
Order of March 15, 1999 of respondent judge which stated that 'oppositors (referring to the
complainants) and their counsel are also around', and this was also stated in the transcript
of records.
"The complainants, on the basis of the Order dated March 15, 1999, filed the instant
administrative complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator. Respondent judge
was required to comment on the complaint.
"In his Comment, respondent judge admitted that the inclusion of the sentence 'the
oppositors and their counsel [were] also around' was mere error on his part. He points out
that the sentence is inconsistent with the first sentence only the administrator
appeared. Courtx
"Nevertheless, he admits his error and states that it was not done intentionally, but was
due to mental lapse and fatigue, considering that he heard numerous cases on said date.
He further alleged that complainants filed the instant administrative complaint because he
did not act on their motion to remove and/or replace the administrator; that he could have
rectified his error if only the complainants informed him of the same; that 'there was no
malice on his part since he does not know personally the oppositors and the administrator;
and that he is not a personal friend to their counsel; that the subject order pertains only to
the submission of the supplemental inventory and the opposition thereto for resolution of
the court, so no damage or prejudice was done to the herein complainants; that he has not
even resolved the said incident because he is still reading the voluminous court records.
Respondent judge also stated that he already voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing
the case."
Investigators Recommendation
In his Memorandum, Deputy Court Administrator Ponferrada recommended that respondent be
suspended for six months without pay for the first case and fined in the amount of P5,000 for the second.
In justifying the penalty for the first case, the investigator ratiocinated as follows:
"Well-settled is the rule that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the property subject of
the warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Bureau of Customs. In the case of Mison
vs. Natividad,[4] the Honorable Supreme Court held that:
'The court a quo has no jurisdiction over the res subject of the warrant of
seizure and detention. The respondent judge, therefore, acted arbitrarily
and despotically in issuing the temporary restraining order, granting the
writ of preliminary injunction and denying the motion to dismiss, thereby
removing the res from the control of the Collector of Customs and
depriving him of his exclusive original jurisdiction over the controversy.
Respondent judge exercised a power he never had and encroached upon
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. By express
provision of law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the
Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof
or stifle or put it to naught.
"The Office of the Court Administrator also issued Circular 68-94 dated November 3, 1994,
which reiterated the provisions of Circular No. 13-93.Es m
"The aforesaid circulars were again reiterated in Administrative Circular No. 07-99 dated
June 25, 1999 issued by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide informing judges of the lower courts
to exercise utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in the issuance of temporary
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunctions to avoid any suspicion that its
issuance or grant was for considerations other than the strict merits of the case. x x x" [5]
In the second case, respondent judge was found guilty of grave abuse of authority. The investigator
explained:
"Based on the evidence presented during the investigation, respondent judge appeared to
be biased and prejudiced against the complainants, as shown by the following:
"a).....On July 29, 1998, complainants filed a Motion to Remove and /or Replace
Administrator. The respondent judge required the administrator to file a comment or
opposition within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order. Complainant's counsel was
also required to file [a] reply thereto, after which the incident [would be deemed]
submitted for resolution.
In his Order dated February 10, 1999 respondent judge did not categorically rule on
complainant's motion while the Order stated that the "relationship between the heirs and
the administrator can no longer see eye to eye with each other, then it's about time for the
Administrator to give [way] so as not to further delay the distribution of the estate." The
respondent judge chose to give priority to the administrator's compensation, and thus
deferred a categorical ruling on the motion. However, it may be stated that the matter of
compensation can be pursued by the administrator as a claim against the estate, and
satisfaction thereto is not a pre-condition to the administrator's removal as such. The
reason given by the respondent judge has no basis in law. It appears as a ploy to delay
further the ruling on the petition of the heirs to change the administrator. With this
actuation, the respondent exposed his bias in favor of the administrator. He became a true
picture of what a judge ought not to be.
"b).....The administrator, on March 10, 1999, filed a Motion to Defer the hearing of March
17, 1999 and set the hearing on March 15, 1999. In the Order of respondent judge dated
March 15, 1999, there was no pronouncement on whether the hearing on March 17, 1999
was cancelled. Instead it discussed the issue of the inventory of the properties of
complainants by the administrator. Es msc
As to the Motion to Defer the hearing of March 17, 1999, respondent judge should have
observed the procedure laid down under Rule 15 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that "[e]very written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least
three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice." And the "good cause" required was not even stated when the
respondent judge advanced the hearing to March 15 1999, instead of March 17, 1999 as
originally scheduled. The only visible reason why it was transferred earlier to March 15,
1996 [was] because it appear[ed] as the date suggested by the administrator.
"The respondent judge evidently, did not consider the rights of the heirs of the late Simeon
Rallos, who appear[ed] persistent in seeking x x x the removal of the administrator. With
the confusion occasioned by such a blunder committed by the respondent even on a simple
motion to transfer hearing, it creates an impression that it was done deliberately to stall
the possible removal of the administrator upon petition by the heirs of a deceased person.
Such unwelcome act coming as it does from the judge certainly erodes the confidence and
integrity of the judiciary.
"Another [point] to be observed is that the hearing must specify the time and date which
must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. This was not followed by
the administrator. Complainants' copy of the motion was sent by registered mail on March
10, 1999, and it was not received by the complainants in time for the March 15, 1999
hearing. In spite of this, respondent judge heard the case on March 15, 1999 even without
the presence of complainants and their counsel, and despite the lack of proof that the latter
were notified of the hearing on that day. Worse, he made it appear in his Order that the
complainants in this administrative matter were present. When in truth they were not.
"C......Based on the testimony of Atty. Nollara, Ms. Estella was transferred to another
Branch after she testified against respondent judge. This [was] clearly an act of retaliation
against Ms. Estella for her "unfavorable" testimony.
"The evidence show[s] that the "March 15, 1999 Order" [was] not a "mere oversight" as
respondent judge would like to make it appear. The court stenographer testified that she
had already prepared a draft of the order stating that the complainants and their counsel
were not around, but respondent judge modified this and made it appear that
complainants and their counsel were present. Esmm is
"Moreover, it was not proper for respondent judge to push through with the March 15,
1999, hearing being requested by the administrator, since there was no proof that
complainants were notified of the requested change in the hearing date. At the least,
respondent judge should have heard the case on March 17, 1999.
"The acts of respondent judge are therefore, contrary to the Code of Judicial Conduct which
states:
"Canon 1 - a judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. A judge
should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. A judge should
administer justice with impartiality and without delay."
The Courts Ruling
The first case should be held in abeyance, pending the resolution by this Court of the Petition for Review
assailing the Orders that are the very subject of this administrative case. In the second case, we believe that
the fine recommended by the investigator should be increased.
The First Case
Pending before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari[6] is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
respondent judges Orders dated January 11, 1999, and January 25, 1999 the same Orders that are the
subjects of the present Complaint for gross ignorance of the law. In view of the present peculiar
circumstances, the disposition of this administrative case should be held in abeyance. We must, however,
emphasize that this action is motivated solely by considerations of the smooth and orderly disposition of
the cases, for a decision on the merits of the Complaint herein would preempt the disposition of the Petition
for Review.
In so ruling, we are not in any way implying that an administrative case cannot proceed independently of
the main one.[7] In light of the facts of the present case, though, the Petition for Review constitutes a
prejudicial question to the resolution of the Complaint of Secretary Zamora.
The Second Case Esmso
Complainants attribute partiality to the respondent judge based on three points. First, he failed to resolve
complainants Motion to remove the administrator. Second, he arbitrarily changed the date of hearing from
March 17, 1999 to March 15, 1999 without properly notifying the complainants. Worse, he made it appear
in his March 15, 1999 Order that they and their counsel were present. Third, he retaliated against Daisy
Estella, the stenographer who had testified unfavorably against him.
On the first point, considering that the case had been pending before the trial court for a long time, [8] it was
improper for the judge not to resolve the complainants Motion to remove or replace the
administrator.[9] Moreover, the reason he proffered was wrong. The Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) was correct in pointing out that the compensation of the administrator was not a precondition for
his removal.[10] Indeed, the complainants Motion raised several legal grounds, but these were ignored by
the respondent.[11]
However, by itself, this lapse was merely an error of judgment and does not merit disciplinary action
against the respondent judge. Not every error or mistake he has committed in the performance of his duties
would render him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an
injustice.[12]
As to the second point, we must clarify at the outset that complainants are not questioning the resetting of
the scheduled March 17, 1999 hearing to March 15, 1999. [13] What they are stressing, and rightly so, is the
apparent dishonesty of respondent judge in making it appear that they were present during the March 15,
1999 hearing. We are not convinced by his claim that his Order was merely a harmless error caused by
mental fatigue. The phrase "[t]he oppositors and their counsel [were] also around" refers to a substantial
matter that cannot be overlooked, considering that it is inconsistent with the first sentence of the questioned
Order. Notably, the last sentence was also edited by respondent judge to make it appear consistent with
the statement that the complainants were present.
Finally, regarding the third point, we agree with the OCAs conclusion that the transfer of Daisy Estella
from the sala of respondent judge was prompted by her unfavorable testimony against the latter. Indeed,
the branch clerk of court[14] also testified that the judge scolded Estella after she testified, and that her
testimony was the reason for her transfer.
These three points, taken together, paint a picture of bias or partiality that calls for disciplinary sanction.
Worse, respondent manifested dishonesty when he altered his Order and made it appear that the
complainants were present during a hearing that they had not in fact attended.
Respondent judge violated Canon 1[15] and Rule 1.02,[16] as well as Canon 2[17] and Rule 2.01[18] of the Code
of Judicial Conduct. Thus, he must be sanctioned.[19] In this connection, we have said:
"Well-known is the judicial norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also
appear impartial. Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like
notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a
partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions,
but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and
integrity.
"This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial
court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct
contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests
and the embodiments of the peoples sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should
remain free from any appearance of impropriety and should be beyond
reproach."[20] (Footnotes omitted) Ex sm
A review of past Decisions shows a wide range of penalty for cases of similar nature. These penalties
include mere reprimand,[21] withholding of salary,[22] fine,[23]suspension,[24] and even dismissal.[25] This
court feels that the P5,000 fine recommended by the OCA is inadequate, considering the dishonesty
displayed by respondent. Under the circumstances, we believe that a fine in the amount of P10,000 is
appropriate.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and partiality
aggravated by dishonesty for which he is ordered to PAY a FINEof P10,000. He is sternly warned that a
commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The Complaint filed by Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora is hereby held in abeyance.
SO ORDERED.
FLORIDE DAWA, NORALIZ L. JORGENSEN, FEMENINA LAZARO-BARRETO, complainants,

vs. Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan
City, respondent.
[A.M. No. MTJ-98-1148. July 22, 1998]
Clerk of Court MONA LISA A. BUENCAMINO, complainant, vs.Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan City, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Armando C. de Asa, the presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting executive judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Caloocan City, was charged with sexual harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness in a letter-
complaint[1] dated August 15, 1997, filed by Floride Dawa, [2] Feminina Lazaro-Barreto[3] and Noraliz L.
Jorgensen.[4] In view of the allegations in the Complaint, this Court, in a Resolution dated December 10,
1997, placed respondent judge under preventive suspension; and referred the case to retired Justice Romulo
S. Quimbo, a consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator, for investigation, report and
recommendation.[5]
Meanwhile, Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino,[6] who assisted the aforementioned complainants, also
filed, on September 5, 1997, an affidavit-complaint[7] against Judge Armando C. de Asa, for sexual
harassment under Republic Act No. 7877/acts of lasciviousness, grave or serious misconduct, and [for]
violation [of] the high standard of moral[s] demanded by judicial ethics x x x. In our Resolution dated
March 18, 1998,[8]we resolved to consolidate her Complaint with the earlier one and to refer it likewise to
Justice Romulo S. Quimbo for inclusion in his investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting a thorough investigation, the investigating officer submitted his Report, dated March
16, 1998, which contained the following exhaustive and detailed summary of the testimonies of the
witnesses for both the complainants and the respondent:
1. Floride Y. Dawa is a 24 year-old single girl employed as a stenographic reporter in Branch 52 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC for brevity) of Caloocan City. She affirmed under oath the sworn
statement (Exhibit A, Record, pp. 2-3 of the Record) she executed August 15, 1997. She related that on
August 8, 1997, while on her way to the ladies toilet, she had seen respondent, Judge Armando C. de Asa,
talking with a man at the backdoor of his chamber. Out of respect for respondent, being the Acting
Executive Judge of the MeTC, she had nodded to him before entering the ladies comfort room. When she
emerged from the same, she saw that respondent was still at the backdoor of his office although this time
he was alone. Upon seeing Dawa, respondent casually asked her whether the toilet was clean. She
answered that it was dirty. Respondent called her and she approached him. When she neared the
respondent, the latter put his arm on her shoulder and led her into his chamber. Once inside and while she
was standing near the edge of respondents office table, he placed his arm around her shoulder and
suddenly held her jaw and kissed her on the lips.
Dawa was taken by surprise and was shocked by the act of the respondent. Before she could recover herself,
respondent once again held her shoulder and chin and kissed her on lips. She forcibly pushed the
respondent away. Respondent asked her where she lived and with whom but she hurriedly left
respondents office.
Upon Dawas return to the staff room of Branch 52, Maria Teresa Carpio, who also works in Branch 52 asked
her what the matter was because she noticed that Dawa looked dazed (tulala).She first said that nothing
was the matter but upon [Carpios] insistent questioning, she haltingly related her harrowing experience in
respondents office.
That same day, she related the incident to Judge Delfina Hernandez-Santiago, the presiding judge of Branch
52 who, although [she] was then on leave, had gone to her office on the invitation of Danilo Silverio, one of
her coworkers in Branch 52, who was celebrating his birthday. Judge Santiago, after listening to Dawas
story, advised her to go home and relate the incident to her parents before deciding to do anything
further. Dawa went home but did not tell her parents who were sickly. Instead, she told her sister.
The next Tuesday (she had absented herself on Monday), Dawa went to see Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino,
the Clerk of Court, and related her story. She was told that she was not respondents first victim but that
Noraliz Jorgensen and the Clerk of Court herself had been objects of respondents amorous advances.
Dawa saw Noraliz Jorgensen. The latter assured her that if Dawa would file a complaint, she would follow
suit.
Dawa and Jorgensen decided to file charges against the respondent. Upon the advice of Atty. Buencamino,
the two complainants saw Atty. Calalang, a city councilor. The latter advised them to go to the police and
have their complaints entered in the police blotter. Calalang brought them to the office of Councilor
Manlapig, a former police colonel. The latter called for a police investigator and SPO2 Rey Domingo came
and interviewed them. That same afternoon, the two complainants went to the police station to have their
complaints recorded in the police blotter (Exhibits 7 and 7-A; Record, pp. 16-17).
Dawa came to the Supreme Court with Atty. Buencamino, Noraliz Jorgensen and Femenina Lazaro-Barreto
where they filed the letter-complaint (Exhibit X).
Respondent personally cross-examined Dawa. She insisted on her story although she admitted that
respondent had gone to Branch 52 that same day.
2. Noraliz L. Jorgensen is 28 years old and married to a policeman. She affirmed under oath her sworn
statement (Exhibit C, pp. 6-7 of the Record). The following is her story:
Jorgensen was and still is a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor of Caloocan City and detailed to the
Office of the Clerk of Court, (OCC for short), MeTC, Caloocan City. Among her duties was the preparation
and follow up of the payrolls for RATA and gasoline allowances of the Metropolitan Trial Judges. Upon
the approval of said payrolls, it was her duty to receive the cash from the cashier and deliver them to the
individual judges.
Sometime on January 3, 1997, at about 10:00 oclock in the morning, she had gone to the office of respondent
Judge Armando C. de Asa, who presides Branch 51 of the Court, for the purpose of securing his signature
on the payroll for the judges allowances. Upon entering the respondents office, the latter approached her
and suddenly kissed her on the cheek. Jorgensen immediately left respondents office after having secured
his signature on the payroll.
Again, on March 31, 1997, at about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, Jorgensen had returned to the respondents
office to deliver the cash representing his allowances for the months of January, February and March. Upon
entering the respondents office, the latter immediately stood up, held her two arms, and suddenly kissed
her and licked her left ear, saying I love you. Jorgensen was surprised and afraid. She asked respondent,
Judge, what is this, at the same time endeavoring to free herself from his hold but she could not because
his grip was strong. Respondent then said, Dont make noise lest we be heard outside. At the same time,
respondent held her jaw and kissed her on lips. He said, Open your mouth as her continued to hug and
kiss her while she tried to free herself. He did not heed her pleas although she was then trembling with
fear.
On May 26, 1997, Jorgensen again entered respondents office to secure his signature on the payroll for
June. Again he kissed her before he signed it. After he had signed the payroll, respondent invited Jorgensen
to eat with him at the Max Restaurant on EDSA the next Saturday.When she asked him why he was inviting
her, he answered, You are no longer a child, you ought to know.
Jorgensen could only cry. She asked Atty. Buencamino not to send her again to the respondent and she told
Buencamino of what had happened to her. Atty. Buencamino told Jorgensen that if she wanted to complain,
Buencamino would support her. Jorgensen was afraid that nothing would come out of any complaint
because respondent was a Judge and powerful.
On August 4, 1997, having delivered the allowances of all judges except the respondent, Jorgensen tried to
look for someone who could deliver the money to him but she could find no one. So she waited until she
knew that someone else was inside respondents office. At about 3:00 oclock, while Roderick Corral was
inside respondents office, she entered but respondent immediately threw to Corral the paper he had
brought for his signature, in effect dismissing him. Corral immediately stepped out leaving Jorgensen alone
in respondents chambers. When they were alone, respondent stood up and held Jorgensens jaw kissing her
on her lips at the same time saying Open your mouth. Jorgensen immediately left respondents office in
tears.
On August 8, 1997, Jorgensen learned that Floride Dawa, a stenographer in Branch 52, was the latest victim
of the respondent. Jorgensen reported her experience to Judge Santiago, the Executive Judge, and she
informed the good judge that she was ready to file a complaint against respondent in order to obtain justice.
Respondent personally cross examined Jorgensen who admitted that before August, 1997, she had gone to
respondents office with Baby Mapue in response to his call and while there they were shown an anonymous
letter (Exhibit 2) which mentioned [the] alleged misconduct on her part.
3. Femenina Lazaro-Barreto is a thirty-year old married woman who is a Court Stenographer II in Branch
53 of the Caloocan City MeTC. During her direct examination by Atty. Roberto Abad, she identified her
sworn statement (Exhibit E found on pp. 4-5 of the Record).
On July 22, 1997, she was assigned to Branch 51 because Judge Romanito Amatong of Branch 53 was on
leave. While attending the session at Branch 51, respondent dictated an Order in open court. Her
stenographic notes are found in Exhibit F. She transcribed these notes (Exhibits F-1) and left them with the
Branch Clerk Gina Amatong. When she returned after lunch, Gina told her there were some corrections so
she again typed and submitted Exhibit F-2. After typing one more draft (Exhibit F-3), she brought the final
draft (Exhibit F-4) to respondents office for his signature. After respondent signed the Order, he stood up
and while Barreto was looking at the Order, he held her chin and kissed her. Barreto asked, What are you
doing? Respondent kissed her again and tapped her shoulder saying, Sigue na, Nina. Okay na, dismissing
her. Barreto went out of the office and wiped her lips with her hand. Margo, a stenographer in Branch 51
saw her.She did not relate the incident to her husband but he learned about it from the newspapers.
4. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino is an unmarried forty-year-old lawyer who is presently the Clerk of
Court of Caloocan City MeTC. Her first appointment was on June 18, 1987 as Branch Clerk of Court for
Branch 51, presided by Judge Filemon Mendoza, now retired. After she became a lawyer in 1996, she was
promoted to her present position as Clerk of Court.
Buencamino is acquainted with the three complainants. She first came to know Jorgensen when she
assumed office as Clerk of Court because Jorgensen was detailed to her office. She had known Barreto since
1992 or 1993 and she personally came to know Dawa when the latter, accompanied by Jorgensen,
approached her on August 12, 1997 and related her harrowing experience in the office of
respondent. Jorgensen herself related similar experiences.Buencamino advised the two ladies that she
would refer that matter to Judge Santiago, the executive judge, who was then on leave. She reasoned that
being a woman and the executive judge, Judge Santiago would understand the complainants
situation. Dawa and Jorgensen told Atty. Buencamino that they had already seen Judge Santiago and the
latter had advised them to consult their families before taking any step. They further told the Clerk of Court
that they had consulted their families and were decided to file an administrative case against respondent
judge. At this juncture, sheriff Noli Calalang informed the complainants Dawa and Jorgensen that his
brother, Councilor Gil Calalang, was willing to help them.
On August 13, 1997, at about 1:30 oclock in the afternoon, complainants Dawa and Jorgensen were advised
that Atty. Gil Calalang was in his office. Buencamino and the two complainants proceeded to Calalangs
office who, after hearing their stories, advised them to report the matter to the police. Atty. Calalang was
willing to handle their case provided permission was obtained from Mayor Malonzo. Buencamino and the
two complainants were brought to the office of Councilor Manlapig, a former police colonel, and there they
were interviewed by SPO2 Santiago. The latter asked what cases could be filed against the judge and Atty.
Buencamino answered that a case for violation of the new Anti-Sexual Harassment Law or for Acts of
Lasciviousness under the Penal Code could be filed against respondent. At 5:30 oclock that same afternoon,
Dawa and Jorgensen repaired to the Caloocan Police Station to have their complaints logged (Exhibits 7
and 7-A; Record; pp. 46-47).
On August 14, 1997, Feminina Lazaro-Barreto, accompanied by her sister, saw Atty. Buencamino and told
her that she, too, was one of respondents victims. Ms. Barreto decided to file an administrative charge
against respondent and requested David Maniquis, the deputy clerk of court, to accompany her to the
police station to have her complaint recorded. (Exhibits 7-B and 7-C, Record, pp. 48-49).
Buencamino admitted that she had accompanied the three complainants to the Office of the Court
Administrator to file the present case. Upon request of Atty. Perez of the Office of the Court Administrator,
she had administered the oaths of the three complainants and had signed the original complaint.
5. Cielito M. Mapue, 33 years old, married and employed as Clerk III, OCC, MeTC, Caloocan City, took
the stand for the complainants to corroborate their testimonies. She declared that --
She was in charge of releasing the cash bonds to the bondsmen when they were no longer needed. In this
connection, she had to prepare the vouchers and the breakdown of checks and she had to go to the office
of the respondent in order to secure his signature. In 1997, she remembers having been requested once by
Jorgensen to bring a payroll for the signature of respondent. After respondent signed the documents she
had brought to him, respondent stood up, went around his table and abruptly kissed her. She immediately
left with Emily Rose Clemente, staff member of Branch 51 and never again went to see respondent
alone. Mapue admitted that she and Jorgensen had been called by respondent in relation to a complaint of
Judge Santiago. Asked by respondent where he had kissed her, she retorted in the vernacular, Sa bibig,
hindi mo ba natatanda-an? Made to explain why she had not complained, she answered that she did not
want anyone to know. As a matter of fact, her husband did not know of the incident even as she was
testifying.
6. Maria Teresa G. Carpio, 37 years old, married, a casual employee of the City Mayors office and detailed
to Branch 52 of the MeTC had the following to say:
She had known Floride Dawa to be a happy girl. On August 8, 1997, she was rather in good spirits because
it was the birthday of one of their officemates and there was some sort of a party.At about 10:00 oclock that
morning, Dawa had gone to the womens comfort room. When Dawa returned a few minutes later, Carpio
noticed that she was pale and fidgety. She kept wringing her hands and was on the verge of tears. Carpio
asked her what the matter was but Dawa answered that nothing was the matter. After some prodding,
Carpio asked Dawa to go with her to the court room and there asked what really the matter was as she was
no longer her gay self.Dawa cried and told the story of how the respondent had twice kissed her on the
lips.
At lunch time, Judge Delfina H. Santiago, the presiding judge of Branch 52, came to join the birthday
party. She was told by Esper Cabiling, another stenographer in Branch 52, that Floride Dawa wanted to see
her in private. Judge Santiago brought Dawa to her private chambers.
On cross examination, Carpio admitted that respondent appeared at Branch 52 and asked if everything was
okay, at which juncture, Dawa, accompanied by Rowena Martin, went to the courtroom.
7. David Maniquiz, deputy clerk of court, Caloocan City MeTC, declared that on August 14, 1997, he had
been requested by Femenina L. Barreto, to accompany her to police headquarters to lodge a complaint
against the respondent. Noli Calalang, Joselito Bedana, Noraliz Jorgensen and Floride Dawa were with
them in the police station.
8. Ma. Victoria Soriano-Cruz, an interpreter in respondents court, was originally reluctant to testify. She,
however, appeared in the afternoon of February 18, 1998, to give testimony. She declared that she knew
the complaints and that she [was] directly under the respondent who preside[d] Branch 51. On August 12,
1997, she learned from others that Floride Dawa was kissed by the respondent. She also learned that
Jorgensen had also been kissed by respondent.She admitted that the respondent has the inclination for
imposing fines on employees who were late or made mistakes. She identified Exhibit G as an order where
[sic] requiring her to pay a fine.
9. Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago the presiding judge of Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City, was the last witness to testify for the complainants. The following is her story:
She had been sick and had been on leave since March of last year. For this reason, the respondent, who had
been designated Vice Executive Judge, had to act in her stead.
Judge Santiago affirmed the contents of a verified eight-page letter (Exhibit I, I-1 to I-7; Record, pp. 17-24)
which she had sent to the Court Administrator. This was submitted as her direct testimony.
In her letter, Judge Santiago stated that five ladies had unburdened themselves to her not only in her
capacity as executive judge but because she was a woman. On Friday, August 8, 1997, she had gone to her
office because she had been invited to lunch by birthday celebrants, Danilo Silverio and Esperancilla
Kabiling. Upon her arrival, Ms. Kabiling had approached her and told her that Floride Dawa, one of her
stenographers, urgently wanted to tell her something in confidence. Dawa entered the judges office red[-
]eyed, red-faced and with a shiny nose. She kept clasping and unclasping her hands and could not stand
still. She spoke in an incoherent and shaking voice which Judge Santiago could scarcely understand. She
asked Dawa to sit down and compose herself. Dawa sat down and began to cry, so that her story could
hardly be understood. Between sobs, the judge was able to piece out the fact that Dawa had been embraced
and forcibly kissed twice on her lips by the respondent sometime that morning.
Dawa sought Judge Santiagos help to transfer to another court and she wanted her to talk to the respondent
in order that the incident would not be repeated. Judge Santiago could not promise Dawa but she advised
her to go home as she obviously was not herself. She further advised Dawa to think the matter over during
the weekend and to talk to her parents about it. Judge Santiago promised to talk to Dawa again the next
week.
After Dawa had left, Judge Santiago learned that Noraliz Jorgensen, a casual employee detailed to the OCC
had had the same experience. To verify the truth, the judge went to the Office of the Clerk of Court and
bluntly asked Noraliz Jorgensen whether it was true that she had been kissed by the respondent. Noraliz
blushed and became red[-]eyed and told the judge of the several instances that the respondent had forcibly
embraced and kissed her on the lips.
Judge Santiago sought out Judge Belen Ortiz who presides Branch 49. She related the stories of Dawa and
Noraliz and asked Judge Ortiz whether she know of anyone from her branch who may have undergone
the same experience. Judge Ortiz asked Jean Marie Lazo and the latter told them that there was one instance
when she and Zenaida Reyes, another employee of the court, were seated on a bench near the door of their
court and respondent sat between them and placed his arms on their shoulders and kissed them both on
the cheeks. Jorgensen informed Judge Santiago that if Dawa would complain, she too would file a
complaint. Judge Santiago advised her to seek the counsel of her parents and her husband and to see her
again the next week.
In the afternoon of August 13, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, a court stenographer in Branch 53,
accompanied by her sister, Jean Marie, came to see Judge Santiago. Femenina confessed to Judge Santiago
that she, too, had been kissed and embraced by the respondent twice. In between sobs and with her
handkerchief almost torn to shreds by her shaking hands, she related how she had harbored her shame in
silence and her guilt at not being able to tell her husband.
That same week, Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino also related her own story to Judge Santiago how she was
forcibly embraced and kissed on the lips by the respondent.
Mrs. Maria Victoria Cruz was the last one to tell Judge Santiago about the instances that the respondent
had kissed her on her cheeks. Mrs. Cruz sought the assistance of Judge Santiago to transfer to another
branch to escape the respondent."[9]
The investigating justice summarized the testimonies of respondents witnesses in this wise:
1. Arniel Apostol, is 38 years old, married and the sheriff in respondents branch. He affirmed the contents
of his sworn statement (Exhibits 9 and 9-A; Record, pp. 56-57). He declared that he had been with the MeTC,
Caloocan City, since 1980. In 1995, he was detailed to Branch 51 and later became its permanent sheriff.
In his sworn statement, Apostol declared that the respondent was an official who was faithful to his job. He
observed office hours religiously. He was friendly and helpful to his personnel and was very approachable
whenever they needed anything. The workers in his branch were free to enter his office, it being always
open. It [was] not soundproof such that if anything improper happened inside, it could be heard outside.
Apostol further declared that since the respondent assumed office as judge, he had not heard of him being
guilty of any improper conduct. On the other hand, he was the object of praise in his work even as a lawyer
and as a fiscal.
Apostol continued saying he was surprised to learn that the respondent had been charged administratively
by Nina (Femenina Barreto), Nora (Noraliz Jorgensen) and Flor (Floride Dawa) because he had not seen
the respondent do anything indelicate to the three women.Whenever Nina came to Branch 51 to see the
respondent, she would greet him with a Hello Judge, I am sexy now. On the other hand, whenever Noraliz
brought in documents for respondents signature, she was always smiling going in and coming out of
respondents office.Apostol declared that he had seen Floride Dawa go to respondents office only once and
she was in company with other employees of Branch 52.
On cross examination, Apostol admitted that respondents office ha[d] a back door and the same [was]
locked with a main lock and two barrel bolts. It was his daily chore to open this back door from the inside
by unlocking the barrel bolts. After he had done this he would go down to the street to await the arrival of
the respondent.
2. Liza Moreno, 47 years old, married, was respondents second witness. She is a court stenographer in
Branch 51 presided by respondent. She had been with the MeTC since January 2, 1969. She affirmed the
sworn statement consisting of two pages (Exhibits 10 and 10-A) which she had jointly executed with Lina
V. Cara, a clerk in the same branch who had been in the service for 17 years.
She said that during the almost five years that she had been under the respondent, no one had charged him
administratively. She described him as friendly and helpful to those working under him. His office was
always open to his subordinates. The same is not sound proof such that if anything untoward happened
inside or [if there was] any loud conversation [it] would be noticed by those in the staff room.
During these past days she was stunned to learn that Judge de Asa had been charged [with] sexual
harassment by Nina, Nora and Flor because she had not seen the respondent do anything indecent to these
three women. Everytime Nina saw the Judge, she would smilingly greet him with such remarks as Hi,
Judge or sometimes Hello, Im sexy now.
She learned about the charges on August 8, 1997 when she [went] to the Office of the Clerk of Court to fetch
Fe Apostol. She [was] told by the employees thereat about the incident. She said that she [went] up to
Branch 51 [o]n the third floor to ask her coworkers whether they had heard the news that the respondent
had kissed someone. Those who were still in replied that they had not.
Moreno further declared that Barreto used to come to Branch 51 to have papers signed by respondent and
sometimes she came to cut the hair of certain employees, including the respondent himself. On the other
hand, she had seen Dawa only once when she came with her co-employees at Branch 52 to have their daily
time records signed.
3. Mario Muncal, respondents third witness is 47 years old and single. He affirmed the contents of his
sworn statement (Exhibit 11; Record, p. 53).
Muncal stated that on August 7, 1997, he had gone to see the respondent about a job in the MeTC. When
he entered respondents office, Atty. Buencamino was with him. De Asa introduced Muncal to Buencamino
telling her about his application for a job in the court. Atty. Buencamino told Muncal to wait for her at her
office. When Muncal saw Buencamino, the latter told him that he would have to undergo an observation
period of one to two weeks. She further told him that although he had been recommended by respondent,
she would be his direct superior and he was admonished not to relate anywhere else whatever he heard or
saw in her office.
Muncal was taken aback by this admonition knowing that respondent, as executive judge, was her superior
and was entitled to know everything that happened in the clerk of courts office. He left after Buencamino
had told him to return on August 11 to begin his observation period. He returned to the respondent to
thank him for his assistance.
Muncal learned that Atty. Buencamino had another candidate for the vacant position so that he had second
thoughts about returning to her. However, on August 16, 1997, after reading in the papers that respondent
was being charged with sexual harassment upon the instigation of Atty. Buencamino, he decided to see
respondent and relate to him what had happened on August 11, 1997.
4. Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, took the stand in the afternoon of February 24, 1998. He affirmed
his nine-page answer to the present charges (Exhibit 12; Record, pp. 37-45).
Respondent declared that while there [was] a back door to his private office, the same [was] locked from
the inside with two barrel bolts besides a main lock. Every day, he would use this door for entering his
office as well as going out of it in order to avoid ambush talks with people.It was the duty of Arnel Apostol
to draw the barrel bolts before respondent arrived at his office so that when he came, he could open the
main lock with his key and have no difficulty in entering the said office. Whenever Apostol was absent, it
was Fernandez who did the opening for respondent.
In his written answer to the charges, respondent claimed that all these charges were obviously instigated
and altogether orchestrated. He accused the Clerk of Court, Atty. Mona Liza Buencamino, as the prime
mover of this cabal and that aside from her there were other people behind the conspiracy who ha[d] yet
to be uncovered.
Respondent further claimed that the complaints were set up, hatched and designed, to destabilize and
destroy the good image of the undersigned created in the minds of party litigants, government, local as
well as private concerns, in Caloocan City. Although, known to be strict [in] fining lawyers, litigants, court
personnel and even himself, for unsatisfactory and unexpected justifications for violations of court rules
and procedures, he had gained respect and admiration for his reasonable, well[-]balance[d], compassionate
and well[-]meant application of the rule of law.
As a possible reason for the animosity of Atty. Buencamino toward him, the respondent stated in his
Answer, the following:
Accordingly, as acting executive judge, work concerns and attitudes, were honed up if not altogether
dramatically changed. Misconceptions have been straightened up. It was emphasized that the Office of the
Clerk of Court [was] not an independent body. It must be the secretariat or unit that should serve and cater
not only to its own concern, but that of all the administrative as well as functional requirements of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, thereat. Not because, it is called the Office of the Clerk of Court, would mean
that the clerk of court installed, is a co-equal of the judges thereat. It was made clear that it was for this
reason why an Executive Judge/Vice Executive Judge is designated, to fill up this impasse. Further, as clerk
of court, functionally, such a position is under the direct control and supervision of all judges
thereat.Accordingly, except those as provided for under the rules and applicable circulars, when a clerk of
court can act independently, any action, movement, process and exercise, taken, with national, local as well
as private agencies must bear the imprimatur of the executive Judge. This directive apparently was not
observed. Either it was misunderstood, taken lightly, seriously resisted or even disregarded. But its non-
observance cannot be excused or countenanced.
Monthly meeting[s] with all clerks of court were scheduled and designed to update and enhance their
working knowledge on assigned task[s]. Important concerns and problems of their offices [were] supposed
to be taken up.
Hours of work were strictly implemented, loitering/roaming around during office hours was prohibited,
time records of the Clerk of Court. Clerks of Court of branches including its [sic] personnel, with presiding
judges on leave or vacant, must after, its being authenticated, must [sic] be signed by the Executive Judge.
Reports of immoral acts and loose moral values were received, specifically in the office of the clerk of
court. Ms. Buencamino was apprised and directed to closely monitor such problem.Before the staging of
this hatchup, the undersigned received reports of its unabated occurrences.However, either these were
treated with tolerance or viewed with blind eyes.
Most importantly, for purposes of effective control, an installation of an office for the Executive Judge was
conceived. This project was apparently disliked. It was about the last week of July or first week of August,
1997, that Judge Santiago informed the undersigned, that we ha[d] to implement such a scheme. The plan
was to get the room of Atty. Buencamino, to house the Executive Judge[s] office, as its perimeter, appeared
easily organizable with least renovation and expense, for a conference room and a library, folded into
one. Buencamino, in turn, would take the room of David Maniquis, deputy clerk of court, who should
occupy the executive table used by the former, located outside, along with OCC personnel for proper
monitoring and active control of the affairs in the office.
As related to me by Judge Santiago, she told Mona Lisa about it and insinuated to her, to follow first before
talking with me, have the room vacated, place pertinent documents/papers, to be signed and attended to,
locked [sic] it, if the Executive Judge, [was] not around. Atty. Buencamino approached me in disgust,
proposing an alternative. She submitted a plan for renovation, as she insisted in maintaining her present
location. She suggested to move the Executive Judge[s] office in the middle, the end part, housing the office
of Maniquis, [to] be the one to be converted as conference room and library. For her to occupy David
Maniquis[] office was bad punsoy (feng shui). However, Judge Santiagos directive was firm. Mona Lisa
must have to comply first. The matter of renovation, to be further studied. The suggested sketch plan with
scribblings from Judge Delfina Santiago dated August 6, 1997, is likewise hereto attached as annex 7. Mrs.
Buencamino vacated her office, refused David Maniquis room and stayed [at] her table outside with the
OCCs personnel.
Also during the occasion, as there was a vacancy for the position of a sheriff in the said office, the
undersigned recommended one Mario Muncal, Jr. y de Castro, telling Ms. Buencamino that for the more
than four (4) years that he stayed in the office, he was not given the privilege of appointing one of his own
choice. She retorted to try Muncal as an understudy for about one (1) to two (2) weeks. The undersigned
acceded. Mr. Muncal followed Ms. Buencamino to her office where he was interviewed, advised and
instructed by the latter. He came back before he left and informed me of the developments but he never
showed up at the designated time. He reappeared after reading the accounts in the newspapers about the
complaints lodged against me, with revealing statements why he gave a second thought [about] returning
or not. His affidavit is attached as Annex 8 (pp. 3-5, Exhibit 12; pp. 39-41 of the Record). (Underscoring
supplied).
Considering the above, respondent believed that Ms. Mona Lisa Buencamino, took all my actions, with
disdain, suspicion, more so, with resistance. On her face, she regretted the fact of my designation as Acting
Executive Judge. She is not used to being controlled. She would want to maintain her madrina and
godmother (i.e. influential, wealthy, etc.) image not only among the employees but also among the judges
as well. Thus, these pathos, comics. (p. 5, Exhibit 12, Record, p. 41).
On the witness stand respondent vehemently denied the story of Floride Dawa. He stated that on
August 8, 1997, he had come to work between 9:30 and 10:00 oclock in the morning. Neither Apostol nor
Fernandez met him. He found that his back door was still closed and could not be opened with his key. For
this reason he had to enter through his courtroom. He said he did not see Floride Dawa near the comfort
room that morning. He saw her at 11:45 when he made his rounds as executive judge.
The above testimony is also in respondents Exhibit 12 where he stated that:
The Floride Dawa story, that she was seen by the undersigned after coming from the public toilet located
along the third floor hallway obliquely facing the backdoor exit of the undersigneds chamber, asking her
whether said comfort room was cleaned, to which she retorted in the negative, thereafter calling her up,
placing the judges arm around her shoulders, led her to his room and twice kissed her, to which she
reportedly resisted. Afterwards, conversing with him, answering questions, as the latter sat comfortably at
his seat, as though nothing had transpired. This is quite indeed a long process to lend credence to such
prevarication. Aside from the fact, that the backdoor of the undersigneds office was not shown to have
been closed on the date the alleged sham had happened, a verification of the site where the reported
incident took place would show that the backdoor of the undersigneds office leads to a wide public hallway
fronting directly the stairs servicing the second and third floor[s] of said building, where people come and
go. The circumstances of persons, time and place cannot fit under such a frame set.[] (pp. 6-7, Exhibit 12;
pp. 42-43 of the Record).
As regards the charges of Noraliz Jorgensen, he expressed surprise that Buencamino believed her
story. The following is what he said:
[]Surprisingly, Mona Lisa coddled Noraliz L. Jorgensen, a casual employee, x x x detailed at the office of
the Clerk of Court, and believed her story. Ms. Jorgensen is reportedly separated from her husband. Her
credibility throughout the courts environs appears highly questionable, especially among her staff in the
Office of the Clerk of Court. In fact, an unsigned letter was sent not only to the undersigned but also with
Judge Santiago, divulging, her unchaste relationship with a co-employee, also assigned in the office of the
Clerk of Court. x x x Ms. Buencamino, as her immediate superior, was advised, to closely monitor on [sic]
this. Despite thereof [sic], the illicit relationship appeared to have continued. Nonetheless, she was
convinced by Buencamino to execute and swear to a statement, which [was] maliciously and boldly
concocted. x x x. Be that as it may, the story of victim Noraliz borders the realm of illusion and fiction. In
no less than three (3) occasions, the dates of which, to lend credibility, were fixed to coincide when the
allowances were allegedly released and given to the respective judges, she claimed to have been licked at
her ear, her mouth forced open, and kissed by the undersigned. If one was indeed a victim of such sexual
harassment or lascivious conduct, why would she, after the first incident (January 31, 1997) return for the
second (May 26, 1997) and third time (August 4, 1997) and allow herself to suffer the same fate[?] This
indeed, is preposterous. It does not have the rings of truth to it. Her lame excuse, that no one could do her
assigned chore, does not have any legal as well as factual leg to lean on. As far as the undersigned can
remember, there was Roderick Corral (Odi) who can do it. One Baby Mapue had occasion to do the same
chore. Even others in the OCC can perform such feat. Such signing is not the exclusive affair of Noraliz L.
Jorgensen. Even the August 4, 1977 incident, would not dissuade [sic] a person in her right mind, that she
will still allow herself to be left behind by a co-employee (Roderick Corral) whom she saw ahead of her
inside the judges office and be subjected to the same alleged indignant act. This is plainly ABSURD. (pp. 5-
6, Exhibit 12, pp. 41-42 of the Record).
Regarding the story of Femenina Lazaro, respondent said the following:
[]Lastly, the Femenina Lazaro Barreto account appear[s] to be a mere patch up. Under the principle that in
numbers there is strength, they blended another scenario consistently claiming that they were kissed, their
mouths forcibly opened. In Barretos version, she claimed that she went to the office of the undersigned to
have an order signed as their Presiding Judge was then, on leave. Immediately thereafter, the judge stood
up, approached her and kissed her. This was allegedly repeated[,] she reportedly resisted. Then she left.
The size and arrangement of the undersigneds chamber, would rule out such hallucination. The
undersigned ha[s] developed the attitude of transparency, in his dealings with the public and his
personnel. His room [is] always open. Everybody come[s] and go[es]. His staff can go inside, any time they
wish, without even knocking at his door, [get] cold water and even [use] his private comfort room. How
then could this be possible.
In all these instances, nothing unusual was seen or heard, much less substantiated, except the self serving
narrations of the alleged offended parties themselves. If there was really any commotion or resistance that
occurred, the same could not escape the ears of my personnel, whose tables are constrictedly [sic] placed
and immediately outside. In fact, even the dates alluded to, were even tailored to fit and coincide, just to
give credence, to the presence of the complainants, in the alleged places of incident.[] (p. 7, Exhibit 12; p.
43, Record)."[10]
After evaluating all the pieces of evidence presented by the parties, Justice Romulo S. Quimbo arrived
at a conclusion, the salient portions of which are reproduced below:
1. There is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that respondent committed the acts he is charged
with. The testimonies of the three complainants were not in any manner emasculated by the lengthy and
thorough cross examination personally conducted by the respondent.Incidentally, the undersigned had to
recess the investigation several times to give complainants time to compose themselves as they invariably
broke down in tears as they were required to relate the repeated violations of their persons and their honors
by respondent.
Complainants declarations were also fully corroborated by the persuasive testimony of Judge Santiago who
had the opportunity of hearing Dawas story soon after it had occurred and the uninhibited retelling by the
other complainants. Judge Santiago, on her own accord, wrote a verified letter to the Court Administrator
(Exhibits I, I-1 to I-7; Record, pp. 17-24), wherein she narrated all that she knew of the different incidents. x
x x.[11]
xxxxxxxxx
2. Respondent has not proven any vicious motive for complainants to invent their stories. It is highly
improbable that the three complainants would perjure themselves only to accommodate Atty. Buencamino
who may have had some real or imagined resentment against respondent.Moreover, the reason given by
respondent for the ill will that Atty. Buencamino felt against him is too superficial to genuinely cause such
malevolence, specially because it was Judge Santiago who insisted on the relocation of Atty. Buencamino
so that her office could be used by the executive judge.[12]
xxxxxxxxx
The fact that respondent was strict in requiring the employees of the court to perform their duties and to
observe office hours and his prohibition against loitering and idleness in the premises of the court is not
enough to motivate [the] three women into exposing themselves to ridicule and chastisement, not to
mention criminal prosecution, by relating false stories that would also be derogatory to them.
Jorgensen may have entertained some hostility at respondents calling her attention to an anonymous letter
which mentioned her indiscretions with another employees of the OCC who was also married. We are not
convinced that this would move her into fabricating a story as shocking as the one she related under oath.
x x x.[13]
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent may have committed an error of judgment when he misjudged the young Floride Dawa to be
fair game. Feeling perhaps that the nod Dawa gave him, when she saw him as she was about to enter the
comfort room, was an invitation, he took advantage of the young maiden and forced himself on
her. Perhaps because Dawa was nave and innocent, she panicked and became near hysterical prompting
Carpio to question her. This broke the dam, so to speak.When it became known that Floride Dawa was
going to file a case against respondent, a slew of indignant women surfaced also wanting to file charges
against respondent for his many indiscretions. How many more remain who prefer to suffer their
humiliation in silence, we can only speculate.[14]
3. Respondents denials cannot overcome the probative value of the positive assertions of complainants and
their witnesses. This is elementary. Neither were the negative observations of respondents witnesses
sufficient to belie the complainants declarations. All his witnesses could attest to was that they had not seen
respondent do anything obscene to the complainants nor to others. The fact that they did not see such lewd
acts is not proof that they did not occur specially so because they were all done in the privacy of
respondents chambers.[15]
xxxxxxxxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED and in line with the decisions in Junio vs. Rivera, Jr., supra and Talens-Dabon
vs. Arceo, supra, we regretfully recommend that respondent be dismissed from the service for gross
misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment
in any branch of the government, including government owned or controlled corporations. [16]
The Court reviewed the entire record of the instant administrative case and found the findings,
conclusion and recommendation of the investigating justice to be adequately substantiated by the evidence
presented by the parties and anchored on applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus, with no need to rehash
the reprehensible indiscretions of the respondent judge, we adopt the conclusion and recommendation of
the investigating justice.
The peoples confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and
moral uprightness they are expected to possess.[17]More than simply projecting an image of probity, a judge
must not only appear to be a good judge; he must also appear to be a good person. [18] It is towards this
sacrosanct goal of ensuring the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates the following:
CANON 1
A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.
RULE 1.01. -- A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
xxxxxxxxx
CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.02. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides: A judges official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not only
through his official acts but also through his private morals, as reflected in his external behavior. It is
therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily
life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. [19] For this reason, [t]he Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times.[20] This mandate has special import for municipal and metropolitan trial court judges, like herein
respondent, since they are the front-liners of the judiciary who serve more people at the grass-roots level
of society.[21]
In the present case, we find totally unacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge in subjecting
herein complainants, his subordinates all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of
lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for members
of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large. His
severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual
harassment because they necessarily x x x result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for
the employee[s].[22] Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over
complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer.
In view of the stature of respondent judge, as well as his authority and official responsibility over the
complainants, who were his subordinates in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, the Court
concludes with moral certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and propriety and
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a place for persons like him. His gross misconduct
warrants his removal from office.[23] In resolving this administrative matter, we deem it apt to iterate our
pronouncement in Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, viz.:
Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has behaved in a manner unbecoming
of a judge as a model of moral uprightness. He has betrayed the peoples high expectations and diminished
the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.
x x x x x x x xx
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that the complainant is one of his subordinates
over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his
position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires.Instead of being in loco
parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage
of his superior position.[24]
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa is hereby DISMISSED from the service for
gross misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANGELITO C. TEH, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter, dated 01 April 1996, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal related to the Court the actuations of Judge
Angelito C. Teh, Executive Judge and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario,
Batangas, relative to Election Case No. R-95-001.
It would appear that Judge Teh issued a resolution adverse to the client of Atty. Macalintal in the
aforenumbered election case. Atty. Macalintal questioned the resolution, via a petition for certiorari, before
the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC"). While the case was pending at the COMELEC, Judge Teh
actively participated in the proceedings by filing his comment on the petition and, still later, an urgent
manifestation. Complainant lawyer forthwith filed a motion to prevent respondent Judge from further
acting on Election Case No. R-95-001. Instead of acting on the motion for inhibition, Judge Teh hired his
own lawyer and filed his answer before his own court, with the prayer:
"1. That Judgment be rendered dismissing the Motion for Inhibition for lack of sufficient factual
and legal basis;
"2. Ordering the movant to pay the undersigned respondent in the amount of P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees and expenses for litigation;
"3. Cost of this suit.
"Respondent respectfully prays for such other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed just and
equitable in the premises."[1]
In its resolution of 19 August 1996, the Court required respondent to comment on the letter-complaint.
In his comment, dated 20 September 1996, respondent Judge admitted that he had filed his own
pleadings with the COMELEC out of respect and in deference to the order of 16 November 1995 of the
COMELEC En Banc requiring respondents to comment on the petition. The urgent manifestation he filed
was meant to rectify the assertion of complainant that he had erroneously cited Section 8, Rule 35, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Attached to his comment before this Court was his resolution, dated 31 July 1996,
where respondent Judge, ruling on the motion for inhibition, held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby rendered this
resolution on the pending incidents to wit:
"1. The protestee's unverified Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Out Opposition
are hereby DENIED for lack of sufficient legal and factual basis;
"2. The Motion for Inhibition is likewise DENIED for lack of sufficient legal and factual
basis;
"3. And for compelling the respondent Judge to engage the services of counsel who
prepared the Answer to the Motion for Inhibition, the Protestee's counsel, Atty.
Romulo B. Macalintal is hereby ordered to pay P100,000.00 as Attorney's Fees and
litigation expenses incident to his Motion for Inhibition.
"SO ORDERED."[2]
In its resolution, dated 12 March 1997, the Court resolved to:
"(a) DIRECT Judge Angelito Teh to ACT on the motion for inhibition in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court;
"(b) TREAT the letter dated April 1, 1996 of complainant as an administrative complaint against Judge
Angelito Teh and docket accordingly;
"(c) CONSIDER the comment dated September 20, 1996 of Judge Teh filed in compliance with the resolution
of August 19, 1996 as comment on the complaint; and
"(d) require the parties to MANIFEST within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof whether they are willing
to submit this case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed herein."[3]
In his manifestation, dated 29 April 1997, respondent Judge expressed his willingness to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of his comment which he repleaded and reproduced. He also made his
observation that the complaint of Atty. Macalintal had not been under oath.
In his compliance, dated 24 April 1997, complainant informed the Court that his letter of 01 April 1996
was not intended as an administrative complaint but that he was leaving the matter of treating it as such
to the discretion of this Court in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over the members
of the judiciary. He likewise manifested his willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings already filed. He, in passing, informed the Court that the resolution of 31 July 1996 issued by
respondent judge was found by the COMELEC to be "irrational."
While Rule 140 of the Rules of Court requires that complaints against Judges should be sworn to, the
Court deems it proper to dispense with the requirement since the letter of Atty. Macalintal, upon the
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, has heretofore been treated as an administrative
complaint and considering, further, that respondent Judge, in his comment, practically admitted all
pertinent allegations of complainant. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its
authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance
of the law or misconduct.[4]
Section 5, Rule 65, of the Rules of Court[5] provides:
"Sec. 5. Defendants and costs in certain cases. - When the petition filed related to the acts or
omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner shall join, as parties defendant with such court or
judge, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be
the duty of such person or persons to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in
behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings, and costs awarded in such proceedings
in favor of the petitioner shall be against the person or persons in interest only, and not against
the court or judge."
Evidently, the active participation of respondent judge, being merely a nominal or formal party[6] in
the certiorari proceedings, is not called for. In Turqueza vs. Hernando,[7] the Court has explained:
"x x x (U)nder Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge whose order is challenged in an
appellate court does not have to file any answer or take active part in the proceeding unless
expressly directed by order of this Court. It is the duty of the private respondent to appear and
defend, both in his/her behalf and in behalf of the Court or judge whose order or decision is at
issue. The judge should maintain a detached attitude from the case and should not waste his time
by taking an active part in a proceeding which relates to official actuations in a case but should
apply himself to his principal task of hearing and adjudicating the cases in his court. He is merely
a nominal party to the case and has no personal interest nor personality therein."[8]
Respondent's folly did not stop there. When complainant filed a motion for respondent's inhibition in
Election Case No. R-95-001, the latter, instead of acting thereon in accordance with Section 2, Rule 137, of
the Rules of Court, hired his own lawyer, filed his answer to the motion and forthwith denied the same,
ordering, at the same time, Atty. Macalintal to pay P100,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and litigation
expenses "for compelling the respondent Judge to engage the services of counsel who prepared the Answer
to the Motion for Inhibition." Respondent Judge, in fine, acted both as a party litigant and as a judge before
his own court.
In the Court's resolution of 12 March 1997, respondent was directed to act on the motion for inhibition
in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 2, Rule 137, [9] of the Rules of Court. Respondent
Judge either misunderstood or chose to misunderstand the directive for, in his order, dated 17 April 1997,
he granted the motion for inhibition "in compliance with the resolution" of the Court. Clearly, the Court,
in its resolution of 12 March 1997, merely required respondent Judge to act on the motion for inhibition in
accordance with the Rules, i.e., "to either proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with
his determination of the question of his disqualification." Certainly, he was not directed by the Court either
to grant or deny the motion.
Respondent judge should be reminded that decisions of courts need not only be just but must be
perceived to be just and completely free from suspicion or doubt both in its fairness and integrity.[10] Judges,
being the visible representation of the law and, most importantly, of justice, [11] should be the embodiment
of independence, competence, and integrity.[12] Once again, the Court would also wish to say that a member
of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments and show
acquaintance with statutes, procedural rules and authorities doctrines. [13] Not for a moment, indeed, does
the learning process in law cease.
In the case before us, respondent's gross deviation from the acceptable norm for judges is clearly
manifest. In Castaos vs. Escao, Jr.,[14] the Court has had occasion to state:
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle
in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title
he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave
abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the
administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot
justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles." [15]
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Angelito C. Teh guilty of gross ignorance of the law, the
Court hereby dismisses him from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any other branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations.
Judge C. Teh is hereby enjoined upon his receipt hereof to cease and desist from performing any and
all acts pertaining to his office.
This decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the records of Judge Angelito C. Teh with this Court.
SO ORDERED.
RE: COMPLAINT OF MRS. ROTILLA A. MARCOS AND HER CHILDREN AGAINST JUDGE
FERDINAND J. MARCOS, RTC, BR. 20, CEBU CITY
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a hand written letter dated December 9, 1996[1] addressed to the Honorable Andres Narvasa, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos, the wife of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, and their
children Joshua A. Marcos and Hazel Faith Marcos Barliso complained against Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 at Cebu City, alleging that ever since Ferdinand J. Marcos was
appointed judge of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City, Branch 20, his family had never seen nor took
hold of his cheques; that they have only been receiving a minimal amount which was insufficient for their
education and for their sustenance; that they were made to believe that he was only receiving a small
remuneration as an RTC Judge; that it was only in August 1996 when they got hold of his RATA, JDF and
basic salary cheques; that these were not even enough to pay his obligations with the CFI Community
Cooperative and other private persons; that he was enjoying his extra-ordinary allowance, local and city
allowances, bonuses, amelioration pays, and 14th month pays; that he even got his second quincena of
November direct in Manila when he was enjoying his one-week leave of absence with his mistress.
Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children Joshua and Hazel prayed that all the remuneration due Judge
Marcos from the Supreme Court be directly released to Mrs. Marcos at the school where she has been
serving for 20 years (the Abellana National School) to prevent his mistress from getting them. They added
that Judge Marcos was still receiving local and city allowances and a salary from the Southwestern
University where he teaches in the College of Law. They likewise stated that it would be advisable for him
to resign from the bench, as reassigning him to other judicial regions would eventually deprive them of
support for he will definitely take along his ambitious mistress, or she would follow him and might
pressure him to go into graft and corruption.
In the resolution, dated March 18, 1997, the Court required Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos to file his
comment on the complaint.[2]
In his comment, dated May 15, 1997,[3] Judge Marcos denied his failure to support complainants and
alleged that during the first few months of assuming his job on the bench, he faithfully and regularly gave
to his wife the total amount of P15,000.00; that he alone spent for their daily transportation and for the daily
miscellaneous expenses of their son, Joshua A. Marcos, a medical student at the time, notwithstanding the
fact that his wife also earns a salary as a public school teacher; that the amount he gave to his wife was
sufficient for her and their family's needs; that the loan contracted with the CFI Community Cooperative
did not pose a serious problem to the financial standing of his family because it was made during his first
five (5) months in the judiciary when he had not yet received his salary; that most of the proceeds of the
said loan were for the tuition fee of their son Joshua; that said loan was payable in affordable monthly
installments and that he hoped it would be fully paid before the end of the year 1997; that he was not
indebted to any private person, not even when he was still a private law practitioner; that he had no idea
why his wife thought that he would be better off resigning from the judiciary; that even if he were
transferred to another sala his regular support to his family will continue; that the issue of his having a
mistress is not true as he has never been linked extra-maritally with another woman; that his wife and
children had already signed a letter withdrawing their letter/complaint against him; and he had signed a
letter of undertaking to give all the checks due him from the Supreme Court to his wife. He prayed among
other things, for the dismissal of the complaint against him as they were living in one roof as a family and
as this administrative case is becoming a wedge of hostility between them.
On July 29, 1997, this Court issued a resolution referring the matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.[4]
In his report dated October 17, 1997,[5] Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis
recommended that the complaint be considered closed and terminated, it appearing that the complaint
against Judge Ferdinand Marcos was already threshed out and there being no more compelling reason to
proceed against him. He based his report on the letter-withdrawal dated January 10, 1997 submitted by the
complainants and the letter of undertaking signed by Judge Marcos.
In their letter/withdrawal dated January 10, 1997,[6] the complainants stated that they wanted to
withdraw their letter/complaint against Judge Marcos as he had made an undertaking that Mrs. Rotilla A.
Marcos shall receive all the checks due him from the Supreme Court; and that the issue of the alleged
mistress grew out of unconfirmed reports and had already been thoroughly discussed by the family
council. They requested that the matter contained in their letter/complaint be treated as a closed matter.
On the other hand, Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, in his letter of undertaking, offered no objection to his
wife getting all the checks due him from the Supreme Court and gave her the authority to get them directly
from the Supreme Court or from the Clerk of Court of RTC, Cebu City. He strongly denied having any
relationship with any woman when he talked with his wife and children. His alleged relationship sprung
from unconfirmed reports from the media.[7]
As the report of DCA Abesamis was not approved by the Court Administrator and the latter did not
report the matter to the Court En Banc, the case remained suspended until the Honorable Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. reported to the Court En Banc on August 14, 2000, the scandalous incident he
witnessed at the Fun Run sponsored by the Philippine Judges Association held on August 11, 2000. Among
the RTC judges who attended and joined the Fun Run was Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos. A woman who was
reported to be his querida accompanied him. Judge Marcos and the querida joined the Judges at the
temporary place reserved for the Judges and during the latter's breakfast thereat were seated near each
other.
Chief Justice Davide pulled Judge Marcos aside to validate the facts about the latter's illicit relationship
with the woman. Judge Marcos admitted, among other things, that he had been living with the woman,
Mae Tacaldo, for three (3) years already, and that he was separated from his wife. Judge Marcos was the
one who supplied the name of the woman.
In view of this admission, the Chief Justice recommended the referral of the case for investigation to
OCA Consultant, Justice Pedro Ramirez, and the suspension from office of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos.
Adopting the recommendation of the Chief Justice, the Court issued a resolution on August 15, 2000
ordering the suspension of Judge Marcos from office until further orders from this Court, in view of the
confirmed continuing illicit and scandalous relations between him and a certain Mae Tacaldo and the
referral of the case to Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator, for
investigation, report and recommendation. But because Justice Ramirez had to leave for the United States
of America, the matter was referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, Consultant, Office of the Court
Administrator.
Justice Quimbo issued notices to the parties that the case will be heard at the Office of the Executive
Judge in Cebu City from November 13 to 15, 2000. [8]
On November 13, 2000, the case was called in the private chambers of the Executive Judge of Cebu
City. Only the respondent and his counsel appeared because the notices did not arrive soon enough in
Cebu City. For that reason, the Process Server of RTC, Cebu City, Branch 18, was requested to serve the
notices on the complainants.
The next day, November 14, 2000, both parties appeared at the office of the Executive
Judge. Complainant Rotilla Marcos came alone while respondent appeared with his counsel.Complainant
manifested that her counsel was unavailable due to previous commitments.Counsel for the respondent
begged to be excused as he also had personal commitments. Thus the case was reset for the next day.
On November 15, 2000, complainants presented Judge Meinrado Paredes of Branch 13, RTC, Cebu
City. After he was discharged, complainant Rotilla Marcos took the stand herself.Since her testimony
(direct examination) was not completed the hearing was continued the next day. Her direct testimony was
completed on November 16, 2000 but her cross-examination was deferred to December 5, 6, and 7, 2000.
On December 5, 2000, respondent appeared without his counsel and personally cross-examined the
complainant. After her testimony, complainants introduced four other witnesses, namely: Maximo Abing,
Orencio Tarongoy, Leoncio M. Balangkig, and Lerma Eguia, all of whom appeared in obedience to
subpoenas issued by the hearing officer-designate. These witnesses were presented principally to identify
certain documents that were marked and later formally offered in writing.
Complainants' documentary evidence consisted of Exhibits "A" -picture of Maydelane Tacaldo, the
alleged mistress of the respondent; "B" -the letter/complaint received by the Court on December 12,
1996;[9] "C" -RCPI telegram directing respondent to attend a PJA stay-in seminar on June 20-22, 1996 in
Mandaluyong; "D" -Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996; "D-1" -address of respondent at 615
ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City; "E" -handwritten letter of one Mrs. E. Dandan, dated October 3,
1995 addressed to respondent demanding payment of the account of May in the sum of P11 ,400; "E-1" -a
portion thereof; "F" -RCPI social telegram addressed to respondent purportedly from Mae Tacaldo; "F-1" -
a portion thereof; "G" -Bankard Statement of Account dated September 10, 1997 addressed to respondent;
"G-1 " -page 2 thereof; "H" -unsigned Certification of Tenant; "I" -Invoice issued by Paramount General
Insurance Corporation (Paramount, for brevity) for a "Toyota Revo" Model 1999 allegedly owned in
common by respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo; "I-1" -portion showing the names and addresses of the
insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J. and Tacaldo, Maydelene B. of Rodriguez St., Zosa Compound, Capitol
Site, Cebu City"; "I-2" -particulars of the vehicle insured; "J" -Order issued by respondent on January 24,
2000, in Civil Case No. CEB- 19070; "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", and "J-4" -portions thereof; "K" -October 28, 2000 issue
of "THE FREEMAN"; "K-1" and "K-2" -portions thereof; "L" -October 20, 2000 issue of the "SUN STAR
CEBU"; "L-1", "L-2", and "L-3" -portions bracketed; "M" -SUN STAR SUPER BALITA issue of October 20,
1996; "M-1" and "M-2" -portions thereof; "N" -October 28, 1996 issue of SUN STAR SUPER BALITA; "N-1"
and "N-2" -portions thereof; "O"-SUN STAR issue of December 18, 1996; "O-1" and "O-2" -portions thereof;
"P" -Affidavit of Bienvenido O. Marcos; "P-1" -paragraph 7 thereof; "Q" -Affidavit of Anacleta Marcos; "Q-
1 ", "Q-2", and "Q-3" -portions thereof; "R" -Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated August 15,
2000 in the present administrative matter[10]; "R-1" -portion thereof; "S" -Petition filed by respondent in Civil
Case No. CEB- 25511 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to complainant Rotilla C. Ares; "T" -
Marriage Contract of complainant and respondent dated December 31, 1971; "U" -Subpoena Duces Tecum
issued to PCI Leasing and Finance Inc.; "V" -Certificate of Registration No.15676143 issued on August
4,2000 in the name of respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at Capitol Site, Cebu City; "V-1" -
portion thereof; "W" -copy of Certificate of Registration of a "Toyota Revo" in the name of respondent and
Maydelane Tacaldo with address at B. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; "W-1 " -portion showing
owners' names; "X" - Motor Vehicle Inspection Report re: "Toyota Revo"; "X-1" -portion regarding
ownership; "Y" -Deed of Sale of one "Toyota Revo" executed by one Leticia Cabanes; "Y-1 " -portion showing
vendees being respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "Y-2" -date of execution; "Z" -PNP Motor Vehicle
Clearance Certificate; "Z-1 " -portion showing purpose of certificate; "AA" - Subpoena Duces Tecum issued
to Paramount; "BB" -Invoice No.135580 covering a "Toyota Revo"; "BB-1 " -name and address of respondent
as insured; "CC"-policy schedule; "CC-1" -name and address of respondent; "CC-2" - Private Car Policy No.
CEB-PC-25687; "CC-3" -signature of Paramount's Cebu Service Office Manager; "DD" -Paramount's
Memorandum showing change of mortgagee; "DD-1 ", "DD-2", and "DD-3" -portions of the same; "EE" -fax
message received by Paramount re: inclusion of Maydelane Tacaldo as one of the insured; "FF" -Chattel
Mortgage executed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "FF-1" -page 2 thereof; "FF-2", "FF-3", "FF-4",
"FF-1-A", and "FF-1-B" - portions thereof; "GG" -Motion for inhibition of respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-
19070; "GG-1", "GG-1-A", and "GG-2", -portions bracketed; "HH" - Comment of Atty. Francis Zosa on the
motion for inhibition; HH-1" and "HH-2" - portions of the same; II" -Deed of Sale jointly executed by
respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying a "Toyota Revo"; II-1" and "II-2" -portions thereof; JJ" -
correction made by Paramount as to who are the assured in CEB- PC-25687; "JJ-1" -the assured were the
respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "KK" - Counter-Affidavit of complainant on the charge of adultery
filed against her by the respondent; KK-1" to "KK-10" -pages 2 to 11 thereof; "KK-11 " to "KK- 23" -annexes
to Exhibit "KK"; "LL" -opposition to motion to disqualify Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu as counsel for
Mrs. Marcos in Civil Case No. CEB-25511; "LL-1 " -page 2 thereof; "LL-1-A" and "LL-2" -portions of the
same.
From the evidence presented it appears that complainant Rotilla A. Marcos is married to the
respondent. Their marriage was celebrated on December 31, 1971 at the First Baptist Church, Cebu City
and was officiated by Asclepiades Curro, a Minister of the Gospel.[11] When they got married, Judge Marcos
was waiting for the results of the Bar exams and did not have a job.Since she was already working as a
teacher in Catmon she supported Judge Marcos. They stayed in the house of her grandparents. They have
two children: Joshua who is now 28 years old and Hazel Faith who is 26 years old.
When he became a lawyer he did not go into private practice right away so she supported him and
the children. In fact, he stayed home and looked after the children.
Judge Marcos became a member of the Judiciary in June 1993. He was appointed presiding judge of
Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City. After his appointment, she noticed a change in his
conduct towards her. He became cold and no longer performed the usual acts of a husband, referring to
sexual relations, because he was very busy. What's more they no longer slept in one room. In March 1996,
they were living in San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.
In June 1996 she was informed through an anonymous letter written in the Cebuano dialect, about her
husband's infidelity. While she could no longer produce the letter at the time of the trial, she could still
remember its contents. In English it read: "You are a stupid wife. Until now, you have not learned that your
husband has a mistress. If you don't believe me, go to the office of the RTC, Branch 20, right now. You go
there-to Branch 20. Ask the people there if there is a convention in Manila to be participated in by RTC
judges. He already bought two plane tickets."
Immediately she went to Branch 20 to inquire about the judges' convention in Manila. She found a
telegram in Judge Marcos' attache case from a Mario Umali designating respondent as a participant in a
"stay-in" seminar sponsored by PJA to be held at the Mandaluyong Justice Building on June 20 - 27, 1996.[12]
She inquired from Atty. Monalila Tecson, the Clerk of Court of Branch 20, about the convention
(seminar). Atty. Tecson asked her if she was not informed of the convention to which she replied in the
negative. Atty. Tecson told her to ask her husband if he was going. She asked Judge Marcos that night. He
told her that he was going and that it was exclusively for the judges. She told him not to go, as she was
afraid he was going to take along another woman. He replied that he would not go. But, at dawn, he told
her that he must leave as he had to get the supplies and equipment that would be distributed in the
Supreme Court.
She never dared to find out if her husband was indeed with a woman when he went to attend the
convention but she was sure there was a woman.
Complainant found other incriminating documents in the office of respondent. Somebody in Branch
20 gave her a Statement of Account from Islacom.[13]
The Islacom Statement of Account was dated June 3, 1996. It was addressed to Ferdinand J. Marcos at
615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City, and not to San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu, where
he and his family lived. They have never resided at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City, nor had
they any telecommunication facility with Islacom. Judge Marcos neither has a cell phone nor a telephone
line with Islacom.
Complainant searched for the address given in the Statement of Account. It took her two months to
find it. She discovered that Maydelane (Mae) Tacaldo and er parents were living in that house. A Mrs.
Jennylind Enriquez gave her the information. Mrs. Enriquez, one of her co-teachers, lives next door to the
Tacaldos.
She confronted her husband in his office over the Islacom bill. He told her to stay for a while in the
office, as he will go out for 20 minutes. She wanted to go with him but he refused to take her as the place
was only near the office. He would consult somebody. When he came back, he told her that they would go
to Islacom and declare that the cell phone was lost.
She insisted on a confrontation between her, Maydelane Tacaldo and her parents. The confrontation
took place in the Social Hall of the Capitol. Maydelane, her parents, her brother and his wife, Rotilla
Marcos, her mother, her brother Jerry and his wife, and her sister were all present then. Rotilla Marcos
asked Maydelane why the cell phone was in the name of Ferdinand J. Marcos but the billing address was
that of the Tacaldos, and why she was using the cell phone of Judge Marcos. The latter said that they were
friends. The latter did not reply when asked why Judge Marcos paid P9,000.00 for the cell phone's bill
when they were only friends.
Complainant found inside respondent's attache case that was in his office a yellow sheet of paper,
dated October 3, 1995, addressed to respondent. It was a bill for the payment of P11,400.00 for "May's Acct."
As she and Judge Marcos were still living together at the time, she kept her discovery a secret because
she already had an inkling that he had a relationship with another woman.
She found a birthday card/social telegram [14] addressed to Judge Marcos inserted between the pages
of a law book on a table in the latter's office. It read, among other things, "MT cares a lot, you know," and
"It's wonderful to share my life with you." She discovered it two weeks after his birthday, which was July
7, 1996. She kept it with the other evidences. She did not show him the card, as it would precipitate another
quarrel.
Further proof of her husband's infidelity was the Statement of Account issued by Bankard dated
September 10, 1997.[15] One of the credit purchases was made at the Agencia Nina and Jewelry. She never
saw the item purchased in the said shop. Neither was it given to her daughter. One of the "purchases"
reflected in the Statement of Account was made at Cafe Laguna. There was no occasion when she dined at
Cafe Laguna with her husband. Another item in the Statement of Account was groceries bought at Gaisano
Metro. The groceries purchased at Gaisano Metro were not for their house, as respondent was no longer
going home in 1997.Respondent judge left the conjugal home in 1997 and has not returned since then.
Rotilla Marcos found out where Judge Marcos was staying: at the Zosa compound located at Don
Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City. She went to the apartment he was renting.She saw Maydelane
Tacaldo there but not Judge Marcos because she did not go inside.Maydelane Tacaldo left the apartment,
in a car. She drove their (the Marcos) family car and the station wagon, at times.
She suspected that he lives there because she saw outside one of the rooms respondent's slippers, and
empty water dispenser of a brand similar to what they have at their own place, and the laundered clothes
(pants and polo shirts) of Judge Marcos hanging.
She asked the building administrator if her husband was living in the apartment she went to, and the
latter replied in the affirmative. Judge Marcos and Maydelane were using aliases as the room was
registered in the name of a Victorino Timol. She obtained a Certification of Tenant from the
Zomer Development Company.[16] It was dated May 18, 1998, and showed that a Mr. Victorino Timol was
an occupant and tenant of Amville-1 Bldg. located at Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol
Site, Cebu City from May 8, 1996 to October 14, 1997. Ma. Theresa Zosa, the General Manager of the said
company, refused to sign it as she wanted to avoid trouble.
The matter of the illicit relationship between Judge Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo was even
published in the newspapers.
Complainant offered as exhibits certain clippings from local newspapers (Exhibits "K", "L", "M", "N",
and "O") where the affair of respondent with Maydelane Tacaldo was mentioned. In Exhibit "K" (October
28, 2000 issue of The Freeman) former Executive Judge Priscila Agana was quoted as saying that respondent
was not even discreet about his alleged illicit relationship and that other Judges were complaining of his
behavior. In Exhibit "L" (October 28, 2000 issue of the Sun Star Cebu) Judge Agana was once more quoted
as having said that she had warned respondent that his affair was going to destroy him and that the latter
never kept his relations with the law student a secret.
After the complainants wrote a letter to the Supreme Court about Judge Marcos failure to give them
support, the latter executed an authority for them to collect his salary from January 1997 up to January
1998. But he revoked the authority in February 1998. Since then they no longer received any support from
him.
Complainant did not know that the reason why Judge Marcos stopped her authority from getting the
checks was because he allegedly discovered that she had a paramour. She verbally complained to Judge
Priscila Agana (former Regional Trial Court Executive Judge) about the stoppage of the checks. She did not
complain to the Supreme Court because he told her that she was just an ordinary classroom teacher with a
small salary and that he would use his power as a judge against her.
Mrs. Rotilla Marcos no longer lives in their conjugal home. The reason why she left was because
respondent judge threatened to kill her.
Judge Meinrado Paredes, when called to testify, admitted knowing Maydelane Tacaldo, upon seeing
her picture. He had seen her twice: the first time during the wake of the late Sandiganbayan Justice German
Lee, and the second time at the convention of the Philippine Judges Association held in a hotel in Manila
(Hyatt Regency) sometime in June, 1999. Both times he did not see her with a companion.
At the hotel lobby of the Hyatt Regency he saw her approaching a gathering of wives of some RTC
judges. He knew her to be a law student. He did not think that she was a member of the Judiciary, the wife
of a judge, or an employee of the court.
Complainants presented other witnesses who appeared and identified copies of documents, the
originals of which were in their possession.
Maximo Abing, an account officer of the PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI, for short), brought a
photocopy of the certificate of registration (Exhibit "V") of a Toyota Revo with Motor No. 7K-0279834 issued
by the Land Transportation Office in favor of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo, with
residence at Capitol Site, Cebu City as joint owners.
Orencio Goles Tarongoy, an employee of the Land Transportation Office (LTO, for brevity), Cebu City,
brought to the hearing and identified the following documents: (1) the office copy of Certificate of
Registration No.59442704 (Exhibit "W") issued by the LTO in the names of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and
Maydelane Tacaldo with address at P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (2) a Motor Vehicle Inspection
Report (Exhibit "X") regarding a Toyota Revo owned by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo
of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (3) a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "Y") executed by one Leticia R.
Cabanes on July 27, 2000 in favor of Judge Ferdinand Javier Marcos and Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying
a Model 1999 Toyota Revo; (4) a PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate (Exhibit "Z") covering a 1999
Toyota Revo owned by Leticia Cabanes, for the purpose of transferring the ownership thereof to Judge
Ferdinand Javier Marcos and Maydelane B. Tacaldo.
Leoncio M. Balangkig, an employee of Paramount General Insurance Corporation brought to the
investigation copies of certain documents which he identified, to wit: Exhibit "BB" as the invoice for the
insurance coverage of a Toyota Revo issued in favor of Ferdinand Marcos with residence at P. Rodriguez
St., Zosa Comp., Capitol Site, Cebu City; Exhibit "C" as the Policy Schedule forming part of the policy which
was also issued in favor of the insured Marcos, Ferdinand of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City;
Exhibit "DD" as an endorsement (No.2603748 dated October 4, 2000) of the aforementioned policy No. CEB-
PC-25687 that included the name of Maydelane B. Tacaldo as an insured party. An earlier endorsement
(Exhibit "JJ," No. 2603400 dated July 25, 2000), gave the insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J., and Tacaldo,
Maydelane B." According to the witness, this change was made upon the advice of PCI Brokers. On cross-
examination the witness reiterated that the change was occasioned by a verbal order they received from
the PCI Brokers. He further admitted that he had no knowledge as to whether respondent was notified of
the change.
The Chattel Mortgage of the same Toyota Revo (Exhibit "FF") executed and signed by respondent and
Maydelane B. Tacaldo, both residing at Zosa Cmpd., P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City, in favor of
PCI Leasing was likewise presented as evidence.
Lerma Eguia of PCI Equitable Insurance Broker, formerly PCI Broker, identified the Deed of Sale
(Exhibit II) of the same Toyota Revo in favor of Amina G. Advincula. The same document appeared to have
been signed by the respondent and Miss Tacaldo, and acknowledged by them before Notary Public
Rolando C. Grapa, who entered it in his Notarial Register as Document No.385, Page No.78, Book No.220,
Series of 2000. Another document this witness identified was Exhibit " JJ" which was an endorsement issued
by Paramount indicating therein the assured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J., and Tacaldo, Maydelene B".
Upon the other hand, respondent offered his oral testimony and identified and marked Exhibits "1"
(affidavit of desistance executed by the complainants); "2" (letter of respondent directing the Clerk of Court
to deliver all his checks to complainant); "3" to "3-Y" (savings account remittance slips to respondent's son
Joshua); "4" (electric bill); "5" (PLDT bill); "6" (credit application submitted to PCI Leasing); "6-A" (address
indicated therein); "6-B" (stamp of "closed account"); "7" to "7-TT" (postdated checks issued by Maydelane
Tacaldo ); "8" [representative (sic) complaint for adultery together with affidavits]; "9" (reply-affidavit filed
with Provincial Prosecutor); "10" (amended complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage); "11" (Order
dated February 22, 2000); "11-A" and "11-B" (portions thereof); "12" (promissory note dated August 22,
2000); "12-A" and "12-B" (portions thereof); "13" (original complaint for declaration of nullity in Civil Case
No CE8-25511 ); "13-A" (portion thereof); "14" (letter/complaint to Provincial Prosecutor); "14-A", "14-B",
and "14-C" (affidavits supporting his complaint) and "15" (certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla). These
documents, however, were not formally offered nor transmitted to Justice Quimbo.
Respondent declared that, contrary to complainant's testimony, he was never remiss in the support of
his family. He alleged that he had supported her and their children, except at the time that she abandoned
the conjugal home in March 1998; that he was giving her P22,000.00, more or less, monthly; that the reason
why Mrs. Marcos filed the letter/complaint against him was because she suspected that he was not giving
her the correct amount since he did not show her the checks from the Supreme Court; that he revoked his
undertaking to give to his wife all the checks due him from the Supreme Court because he discovered that
she had a paramour, his cousin Mariano Marcos; that he alone supported their children and her daughter's
family from 1998 until the time he was suspended; that he spent for the maintenance of their home by
paying their electric and phone bills.
He presented evidence regarding the transmittal of funds to his son Joshua who was a medical student
(Exhibits "3" to "3- Y"). While assigned in Toledo City, he stated that he was remitting to Joshua, a medical
student, the sum of P12,000.00 monthly. When his son found a job in the year 2000, he reduced his monthly
support to P4,000.00. To his daughter Hazel Faith, he gave P1,500.00 weekly while he was in Toledo City;
but when he was transferred to Cebu City, he increased her weekly support to P2,000.00.
He averred that the jewelry he purchased at Agencia Nina in the amount of P5,000.00 was given to his
daughter Hazel Faith Marcos as a birthday gift. The groceries bought at Gaisano Metro were bought and
brought to their house in Talisay, Cebu, especially for his granddaughter. It was his practice, even when he
was still a private practitioner, to purchase all the groceries for the needs of his family.
He never received any birthday card/social telegram because his Clerk of Court screened all his
communications. As to the birthday card found tucked between the pages of a law book in his chambers,
he denied that it came from Maydelane Tacaldo as her name did not appear in the card -only the initials
M.T. His Clerk of Court, Monalila Tecson also has the initials M.T. but as his Clerk of Court, he didn't expect
Monalila Tecson to send him a card with the dedication "M.T. cares a lot, you know", and "It's wonderful
to share my life with you."
He disclaimed any knowledge of the note found in his office requesting payment of May's account by
a Mrs. Dandan. He replied that he did not know any Mrs. E. Dandan, nor the Bebot to whom the payment
should be given. He had never incurred any unsettled account with anybody when he was still with Branch
20. He believed the note to be spurious and manufactured by his complainant-wife, it being undated and
because he didn't recognize the penmanship. However, he admitted that the note was not in his wife's
handwriting but surmised that it could have been the penmanship of the person who was asked by
complainant-wife to write it.
He denied living in Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City, as he has
always lived in Talisay, Cebu where his conjugal home was situated. As to the claim that his slippers and
empty plastic water container were found outside one of the rooms in the Zosa Compound, he contended
that he usually didn't wear slippers and, if he did, his slippers were always left at home and in his
chambers. There were many consumers of mineral water in the province of Cebu: not only in Talisay but
also in Cebu City. He denied having any dealings with Techie (Ma. Teresa) Zosa of the Zosa Compound
and using the alias Victorino Timol.
With regards to the news item [17] wherein Judge Agana was quoted to have said that he was not even
discreet about his alleged illicit relationship, he believed this to be not true because Judge Agana had never
investigated him for any wrongdoing.
He denied that he was the one referred to in the news item that came out in the Sun Star Super
Balita.[18] He likewise denied that he and Maydelane Tacaldo lived together in Toledo City where he was
transferred from July 1997 to September 1999. When he had to stay overnight in Toledo City he usually
stayed in the house of his Process Server, an Arthur Camonggan.
The Tacaldo family purchased the motor vehicle, Toyota Revo, as they wanted to have a "for-hire"
motor vehicle plying Cebu City and Toledo City. The Tacaldos requested him, being a close friend, to have
his name included in the registration of the motor vehicle. Since he was a judge in Toledo City, he could
help the Tacaldos get a slot in the Coop Multi-Purpose, a cooperative that accepts motor vehicle units for
plying the Toledo, Balamban, and Cebu City routes.
As the registered owner of a motor vehicle, he was aware that if the vehicle figured in an accident or
there was a damage caused to a third party, he as the owner would be held responsible. He averred that he
felt safe because the vehicle was insured. Though the car was insured it did not cover damages to third
parties. He was likewise aware that if there would be a foreclosure of the chattel because the chattel
mortgage was not sufficient, or if the promissory note was not paid, he would be held liable. He put himself
at risk because he wanted to accommodate the Tacaldos because they are very close family friends.
The down payments for the purchase of the motor vehicle came from the Tacaldos. The address at P.
Rodriguez, Zosa Compound, Cebu City was the address of Miss Tacaldo. In some of the documents, like
the credit application submitted before PCI Leasing and the promissory note he executed with the same
company, he gave his address as San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.
The address in the Deed of Sale over the Toyota Revo, Model 1999, was that of Miss Tacaldo, not
his. He and Maydelane Tacaldo did not jointly own the motor vehicle, although it appears on paper that it
was registered in both their names but he had no hand in the preparation of the insurance policy nor of the
policy schedule. Thus, he was not aware that his address was shown to be at Zosa Compound, Capitol Site,
Cebu City. He did not have it changed as it was only during the hearing that he first saw the insurance
policy.
The name of Miss Tacaldo appeared in the documents as a guarantee that the Tacaldos have invested
in said motor vehicle. In fact, Miss Tacaldo issued several checks to guarantee payment of the balance of
P300,000.00.
The plan to have the motor vehicle unit ply Toledo, Balamban to Cebu City was aborted because after
his suspension, the vehicle was shown on television. The Tacaldo family was afraid that the motor vehicle
might be involved in a case between him and the complainants.
He denied having an illicit relationship with Miss Tacaldo. He stressed that his wife had a paramour
as early as March 1998 and he had told her that he would file the corresponding adultery cases once he had
sufficient evidence against her and her paramour. And this he did.He filed 13 counts of adultery cases
against his wife with the Municipal Trial Court of Balamban, Cebu and 21 counts of adultery before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. All these cases, including the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, were
filed only after the Court suspended him on August 15, 2000.
He denied maltreating his wife. If he had beaten her, she would have been hospitalized, as he has a
bigger build than her.
He was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus, Type II, and he was already insulin-dependent.He was
diagnosed with diabetes in 1992. As a diabetic, most of his vital organs were affected, especially his sexual
capacity. He was already sexually impotent as early as 1993, when he was first appointed to the
Judiciary. His sexual impotency was complete and he could not have sex anymore. He was being treated
for diabetes and sexual impotency. A medical certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla, dated December 6,
2000, stated, among others, that Judge Marcos had been under his (Dr. Tornilla) medical professional care
since September 15, 1995 up to that time, and he has been diabetic since 1992, and was on maintenance
medication.
His wife was upset with his physical condition but he could not do anything about it because his
diabetes caused his sexual impotency.
In Civil Case No. CEB-19725, a motion for inhibition was filed which was denied. In his order dated
February 22, 2000, he denied the motion for reconsideration because it was not true that he was living in
the property of Atty. Zosa.
While Maydelane Tacaldo was present during the Fun Run in Cebu City, she was not with him. Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. confronted him and asked him whether Maydelane Tacaldo had a job and
whether he had a child with her. He replied that he didn't know if she had a job and that he didn't have a
child with her. The Chief Justice told him, "That is bad for the judiciary." Before he was able to explain the
Chief Justice had already left. The Chief Justice did not ask him whether that woman who went there was
with him.
He did not see Maydelane Tacaldo at the convention in June 1996. He first met her at a seminar of
Judges at the penthouse of the San Miguel Corporation in Mandaue City. She was then the secretary of
Judge Vestil.
He was a friend of Maydelane Tacaldo's father. The Tacaldos lived somewhere near Aznar Coliseum
but he had never visited their house.
The Islacom Statement of Account was mistakenly sent to him, as it should have been sent to a certain
Urgello. He didn't have an account with Islacom. Neither did he have a cell phone although he had, at one
point, entertained the idea of buying one. When he went to the Islacom office regarding the allegedly
erroneous billing, he did not ask as to who the real account holder was. All he did was to execute an
Affidavit of Loss, per advice of Islacom.
Respondent admitted that a confrontation occurred between him. Maydelane Tacaldo, the parents of
Maydelane, his wife, and the brothers and sisters of his wife because of the Islacom Statement of
Account. He didn't know if Maydelane Tacaldo used the cell phone because during the confrontation, Miss
Tacaldo denied she had a cell phone. The father of Maydelane also said he did not see his daughter with a
cell phone. Miss Tacaldo expressly denied having any relationship with him. He also told the group during
the confrontation that he was not related to her, in any way. Complainant-wife instigated the confrontation.
He never received the amount of more than P500,000.00 from the sale of the Toyota Revo.The buyer
paid P300,000.00 loan to PCI and P250,000.00 to the Tacaldos.
We agree with and therefore uphold the findings and conclusions of Justice Romulo Quimbo, as
contained in his Report. We find the details of his findings amply supported by the evidence on record
leaving us no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo (a.k.a. Mae Tacaldo) -that their illicit relationship started even before he
separated from his wife Rotilla Marcos in 1997.
Consider the following evidence:
The Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996 was addressed to Judge Marcos not in his
conjugal dwelling at San Jose village, Lawaan 3, Talisay Cebu, but at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Ext., Cebu City
that Mrs. Marcos later discovered to be the residence of Maydelane Tacaldo. While Judge Marcos denied
owning a cell phone there is an improbability that Islacom would send a phone bill to him if he were not
the real owner thereof.
Service providers like phone companies rely on the information given by the applicant desirous of its
services. Islacom would not have sent Judge Marcos a Statement of Account if he did not apply for a phone
line nor sent it to an address he did not furnish them.
If he did not really own the cell phone was it not expected of him, being a judge and all, to have stood
his ground and insisted that as he did not own nor lose a cell phone, it is preposterous of him to execute an
Affidavit of Loss.
Moreover, we find it hard to believe that he would have been satisfied with an explanation that the
bill was erroneously sent to him without raising hell, so to speak, in finding out the identity of the Islacom
employee who was at fault, especially so when this Statement of Account was the catalyst in the
confrontation between him, his wife Rotilla and Ms. Tacaldo.
Someone with the initials M.T. sent Judge Marcos for his birthday on July 7, 1996, the social
telegram/birthday card, but was delivered on July 5, 1996. This person could be Maydelane Tacaldo or
Monalila Tecson. Although Judge Marcos' Branch Clerk of Court has these initials we, as well as Judge
Marcos, do not believe that she would send Judge Marcos a card with the greeting -"It is wonderful to share
my life with you." -and ending it with -"MT cares a lot, you know." Only a person who is truly intimate
with Judge Marcos would send such a card.
We do not put any trust in Judge Marcos's denials that he had never seen said card. The book was
found tucked between the pages of a law book lying on top of his office table. He is the most logical person
to have inserted said card in the law book.
The Bankard Statement of Account dated September 10, 1997 reflected that Judge Marcos bought,
presumably, jewelry/ies at the Agencia Nina & Jewelry, and groceries at the Gaisano Metro, and dined at
Cafe Laguna.
Mrs. Marcos denied receiving jewelry/ies and dining out with Judge Marcos at the said
restaurant. She testified that her daughter also did not receive jewelry/ies from her father. They also did
not receive any groceries from Judge Marcos, as he was no longer going home then.
Complainant Mrs. Rotilla Marcos declared that she searched for the apartment where her husband
was staying. When she found it she saw her husband's slippers and laundered clothes outside the
place. Having been married to him for about 26 years she would have known her husband's preferences as
to wearing apparel and personal items, and would have been able to recognize them upon seeing them.
In Civil Case No. 19070, a motion for respondent to inhibit himself was filed based on the fact that he
was residing in one of the units in the Zosa Compound that belonged to Atty. Zosa, counsel for one of the
parties. Atty. Zosa, in his comment, did not categorically deny the allegation. Neither did respondent, in
his Order denying the motion, categorically deny the allegation.
Although the Certification of Tenant was unsigned and did not cite Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo as
one of the tenants at Zosa Compound, the fact that they lived together was apparent in the different
documents they executed pertaining to the Toyota Revo, for the address they both gave for these
documents was Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City. Zosa Compound, by the way, is located at
Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City.
We are not swayed by the denials made by respondent judge that he and Ms. Tacaldo were the owners
of a Toyota Revo.
Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo jointly bought a motor vehicle -a Toyota Revo -and had it registered
in their names as co-owners. They obtained insurance for the same vehicle with them as joint
beneficiaries. They executed a chattel mortgage over the same in favor of PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. and
when they finally sold the same vehicle on September 18, 2000 to Amina Advincula, they both signed the
Deed of Sale as joint owners. These actions clearly indicate that they were the joint owners of the Toyota
Revo.
We are likewise not persuaded by the averment made by Judge Marcos that he accommodated the
Tacaldos in their desire to get a slot in the cooperative because they are very close family friends. If they
are indeed close, it is surprising to hear that he had never been to the house of the Tacaldos. In fact, he was
not even sure as to the exact location of the Tacaldo residence.
Respondent judge wanted us to believe that if his name was put in the motor vehicle's registration,
the Tacaldos' entry in the cooperative's business of running public utility vehicles would be assured. He
went to extraordinary lengths to help the Tacaldos by having the vehicle registered in his and Ms. Tacaldo's
names.
There is nothing in the records to show that it was essential for respondent to be registered as an owner
in order that the motor vehicle could ply the Toledo City -Cebu City routes. A simple phone call/oral
request by Judge Marcos to the cooperative officers would have been sufficient, to our mind, to allow the
Tacaldos' entry to the cooperative business of transporting passengers.
Respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse nor even mitigate
his actions. It is respondent's private action that is being investigated not his wife's.
We cannot gloss over the incident that happened during the Fun Run as recounted by Chief Justice
Davide. Judge Marcos candidly and frankly admitted to the Chief Justice that he had been living with Ms.
Tacaldo for the last three years as he was already separated from his wife.Bringing Ms. Tacaldo to public
functions was not in good taste considering that Judge Marcos was still very much married even if he and
his wife Rotilla were already living separately. He had no right to flaunt Maydelane Tacaldo as if she was
his wife. This conduct is certainly unbecoming of a judge whose conduct must at all times be beyond
reproach.
As held in GALANG VS. SANTOS,[19] the personal behavior of a judge should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
"The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety
not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and
as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private
morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained,
a judge's official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus: Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify judicial integrity and
exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties
and in private life should be above suspicion."[20]
In LEYNES VS. VELOSO,[21] it was held that if good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more
reason is the requirement exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to observe
irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency. [22]
Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to possess the
highest standard of morality and decency. If a judge fails to have high ethical standards, the confidence
and high respect for the judiciary diminishes as he represents the judiciary.
Jurisprudence is rich in cases where the Court has inflicted on judges the punishment of dismissal for
immorality especially when it is committed openly and flagrantly, causing scandal in the place where his
court is situated.
"In Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar (102 ISCRA 493 [1981]), the Court laid down
the rationale why every judge must possess moral integrity, thusly:
"The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must be beyond reproach and above
suspicion. The faith and confidence of the people in the administration of justice can not be maintained if
a judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity and if he
obtusely continues to commit affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a
necessity in the judiciary.[23]
No position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that
his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him
as the epitome of integrity and justice.[24]
The Court once again reminds all those who don judicial robes to maintain good moral character and
at all times observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency.[25]
Herein respondent cannot find comfort in the "affidavit of desistance" signed by his wife and children.
"Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as
an afterthought xxx. As held in People v. Ubina[26]: It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject
testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them
later on changed their mind for one reason or another; for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery
and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witness(es)."[27]
Again, in the case of IMBING VS. TIONGSON,[28] the Court once more held that:
"The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against herein respondent
judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court
may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the
complaint. The Court has an interesting the conduct of members of the Judiciary and in improving the
delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the complainants
desistance from further prosecuting the case he or she initiated.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has violated
the code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity,
and independence and to avoid the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The charge of immorality proven against respondent judge demonstrates his unfitness to remain in
office and continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent must be meted out the severest form of
disciplinary sanction - dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is DISMISSED from the service, with prejudice to his reinstatement or
appointment to any public office including government owned or controlled corporations, and forfeiture
of his retirement benefits, if he is entitled to any.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGBILARAN, represented by the City Administrator and Special

Counsel, complainant, vs. JUDGE AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, JR., Presiding Judge of Branch
1, MTCC of Tagbilaran City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In a complaint filed on 29 May 1997 with the Office of the Court Administrator, complainant charges
respondent Judge Agapito Hontanosas, Jr., Presiding Judge, Branch 1, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Tagbilaran City,* with (1) open defiance of a lawful order of a superior court directing respondents
inhibition from a case; and (2) open, notorious, and habitual gambling in the casinos of Cebu and in the
cockpits of Bohol.
On the first charge the complainant alleges as follows:
In two criminal cases filed by the City Government against BARBARA ONG, for her habitual refusal to pay
the correct amount of amusement taxes, the City asked for the inhibition of Judge Hontanosas. Respondent
refused to inhibit himself, so the City of Tagbilaran filed a petition with the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
of Tagbilaran to compel inhibition.
The RTC Branch I issued an Order requiring Judge Hontanosas to relinquish the cases. Instead of obeying
the order of the Superior Court, Judge Hontanosas forced the Fiscal to rest the case, even before the
prosecution could cross-examine the defense witnesses. Thereafter, Judge Hontanosas rendered a
judgment of ACQUITTAL in favor of BARBARA ONG and all her other co-accused.
Incidentally, Barbara Ong is the wife of the richest Chinese-Filipino businessman in Bohol, FREDERICK
ONG.
...
This is not IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. This is an open, premeditated and willful DEFIANCE OF THE
LAW and all the accepted norms of judicial conduct. We can only surmise on the millions of reasons which
motivated respondent Judge Hontanosas to act in such manner. If only the Bank Secrecy Law could be
lifted, we would be able to determine the exact number of reasons behind the blatant, open, public,
malicious, premeditated and despicable conduct which has completely eroded the publics perception of
the judiciary in Tagbilaran City.
Anent the second ground, complainant alleges, thus:
It is a matter of common knowledge among lawyers in Bohol and the general public in Tagbilaran that
Judge Hontanosas goes to Cebu on the afternoon fast boat (90 minutes travel time) and comes back on the
early trips from Cebu to Tagbilaran. He does this 3 to 4 times a week. He goes to the Casinos in Cebu and
spends the whole night in the casinos, before going to Cebu pier to take the early trip back to Tagbilaran,
arriving in Tagbilaran at 6:00 a.m. or 7:00 a.m.
Every Sunday, and in every so-called Derby cockfights, Judge Hontanosas is seen in the cockpits
of Tagbilaran and the nearby towns.
We have talked to several lawyers and litigants who have appeared before Judge Hontanosas, and they
have informed us that for as little as P500 and P5,000, you can secure a decision in your favor. Surely, none
of these litigants and lawyers will come out to testify against Respondent Hontanosas. But we are stating
this here in order to demonstrate the damage that Judge Hontanosas has done to the public perception of
the judiciary in Tagbilaran City.
Complainant prays that the complaint be scheduled for formal investigation; that pending
investigation respondent be suspended from office in view of the gravity of the charges; and that after
investigation respondent be ordered removed from office and his name stricken off from the roll of
attorneys.
The complaint was signed by Atty. Victor De la Serna, who designated himself as Special Counsel;
and verified by Arcadio Sarmiento, City Administrator.
In a 1st Indorsement dated 21 January 1998, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo required
respondent to answer the complaint.
Respondent filed his Answer on 10 March 1998. As to the first charge, he maintains that the
aforementioned order of the RTC was unlawful for lack of due notice and hearing and for failure
to implead the real parties-in-interest; besides, the said order merely advised him to inhibit. Moreover, that
order was issued in connection with a petition for certiorari which was a prohibited pleading, since the
cases were covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. As regards the second charge, he denies that he
gambles in the casinos of Cebu, but admits that he would sometimes go to Nivel Hills Casino in Cebu to
accompany his wife who want[ed] to have some excitement and recreation in said casino playing only the
slot machines. He also admits that he goes to the cockpits during Sundays and holidays and even gamble a
little on these occasions.
By way of affirmative defenses, respondent avers that the filing of the instant administrative complaint
was purely an act of vengeance on the part of Atty. De la Serna for the formers verdict in Criminal Cases
Nos. 7142 and 7143 which was unfavorable to the prosecution handled by the latter. Moreover, Atty. De la
Serna had no legal authority to sign the complaint in behalf of the City Government of Tagbilaranbecause
no resolution was ever passed creating said office and giving the Mayor the power to appoint a Special
Counsel; under the Charter of Tagbilaran City, it is the City Fiscal (now City Prosecutor) who is empowered
to represent the City in all civil and criminal cases.
In its resolution of 2 December 1998, the Court resolved to docket this case as a regular administrative
matter and required the parties to inform the Court whether they were willing to submit this case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed.
Respondent answered in the affirmative in his Manifestation dated 19 January 1999. On the other
hand, Atty. De la Serna and Mr. Sarmiento, in a Manifestation dated 21 January 1999, informed the Court
that they were no longer interested in pursuing this case because they felt that it would be futile to spend
any more time and effort and mailing cost on this case. The Court thereafter referred the latter
Manifestation to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation and report.
In his Memorandum dated 12 November 2001, the new Court Administrator, Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., points out that the Court does not, as a matter of course, dismiss administrative complaints
against members of the Bench on account of the withdrawal of the charges or desistance of the complainant
from prosecuting the complaint; otherwise its disciplinary power may be put to naught, thereby
undermining the trust character of a public office and impairing the integrity and dignity of the Court as a
disciplining authority. On the merits of the case, the Court Administrator recommended that the first
charge be dismissed not because of the desistance of the complainant but because of patent lack of merit
for the following reasons:
1. The inhibition of respondent from subject criminal cases is not mandatory under the
circumstances. Paragraph I of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides the instances
when a judge is under obligation to inhibit himself from sitting in a case.
Judge Hontanosas case does not fall under any of those mentioned in said provision. His case
therefore falls under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 which gives discretion to the
judge whether or not to inhibit himself from a case, provided there are just or valid
reasons therefor. Thus, the Regional Trial Court cannot interfere with
Judge Hontanosas exercise of his discretion. In this sense, therefore, the order of the RTC
cannot be said to be lawful one which respondent is duty-bound to obey;
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Inhibition, on which the RTC Order is based, did not cite any reason or
basis therefor. It merely stated: complainant and counsel does (sic) not believe that the
Presiding Judge can be impartial and dispassionate in hearing and deciding this case. As to
why the movant believes that Judge Hontanosascannot be impartial in the trial of this case,
the motion did not say. It absolutely failed to raise any ground or justification for the call to
inhibit;
3. Under Section 19(g) of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, a petition for certiorari
against any interlocutory order is a prohibited pleading. Hence, the RTC should not have
taken cognizance of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. This fact further affects the legitimacy
of the RTC Order being invoked by complainant;
4. Lastly, the subject Order neither required nor directed Judge Hontanosas to relinquish the
subject cases. The dispositive portion of the Order specifically declared: IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is the opinionof this court that for respondent judge to
hang on to hearing Criminal Case Nos. 7142 and 7143 against Barbara Ong is a step beyond
the accepted norms of judicial conduct already. Respondent judge is advised to remand the
cases to the Clerk of Court, xxx for assignment to Branch 2, MTCC, immediately. (Italics
supplied). Clearly, aside from issuing a mere obiter dictum, the Order did not categorically
impose upon Judge Hontanosas a duty to comply with the said order.
The Court Administrator, however, finds that for being present in casinos and for gambling in cockpits
respondent Judge violated (1) Supreme Court Circular No. 4 dated 27 August 1980, which prohibits judges
of inferior courts and court personnel from playing or being present in gambling casinos; and (2) Paragraph
3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which requires that the judges official conduct and personal behavior be
free from the appearance of impropriety. He then recommends that respondent Judge be directed to refrain
from frequenting casinos, cockpits and other gambling places.
The Court agrees in toto on the above findings and recommendation on the first ground of the
complaint. It partly agrees with the Court Administrator on the second ground. The Court cannot lend
credence to respondents claim that he would sometimes go to Nivel Hills Casino in Cebu to accompany
his wife who want[ed] to have some excitement and recreation... playing only the slot machines. Slot
machines are not placed in casinos for recreational purposes, but for gambling. A slot machine does not
work unless a coin, which is the bet, is inserted into it. The Court finds it incredible for respondent to travel
all the way from Tagbilaran City to Cebu City and spend his precious time just to watch his wife play the
slot machines. If he did just that, respondent must have more than the patience of Job. It is fair and
reasonable to conclude that respondent also gambled in the casino.
Circular No. 4 issued on 27 August 1980 by then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando reads as follows:
The attention of the Court has been invited to the presence of some judges in gambling casinos operating
under Presidential Decree No. 1067-B. This is clearly violative of Section 5(3-b) of said Decree. It reads as
follows:
(3-b) Persons not allowed to play -
(a) Government officials connected directly with the operation of the government or
any of its agencies.
In accordance with law and pursuant to the Resolution of the Court en banc in Administrative Matter No.
1544-0, dated August 21, 1980, judges of inferior courts and the court personnel are enjoined from playing
in or being present in gambling casinos.
Moreover, judges are likewise enjoined to keep in mind the Canons of Judicial Ethics, paragraph 3 of which
provides:
3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety. - - A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. (Italics supplied)
The prohibition imposed by the Circular refers to both actual gambling and mere presence in gambling
casinos. The bases for such prohibition are Section 5(3-b) of P.D. No. 1067-B; the Resolution of the Court en
banc in Administrative Matter No. 1544-0 dated 21 August 1980; and Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
Having earlier reached the conclusion that respondent gambled in a casino, we find him to have
violated Section 5(3-b) of P.D. No. 1067-B. Such transgression is also a violation of Paragraph 22 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, which provides: The judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid the
slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. Even granting arguendo that
respondent did not gamble or personally play the slot machine, his mere presence in a casino constituted
a violation of Circular No. 4 and, more specifically, Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Respondent is also administratively liable for going to cockpits and placing bets in cockfights. The fact
that the cockpits where he used to go were licensed and the cockfights were conducted on authorized days
will not absolve him. While such gambling was not illegal, he openly and deliberately disregarded and
violated Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics quoted in Circular No. 4. Verily, it is plainly
despicable to see a judge inside a cockpit and more so, to see him bet therein. Mixing with the crowd of
cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors is unbecoming a judge and undoubtedly impairs the respect due
him. Ultimately, the Judiciary itself suffers therefrom because a judge is a visible representation of the
Judiciary. Most often, the public mind does not separate the judge from the Judiciary. In short, any
demeaning act of a judge or court personnel demeans the institution he represents.
Hence, respondent deserves more than a directive to refrain from frequenting casinos, cockpits and
other gambling places, as recommended by the Court Administrator.
Under the amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a violation of a circular issued by this Court, such
as Circular No. 4, is a less serious charge (Sec. 4.4), while gambling in public is a light charge (Sec. 5). If
found guilty of a less serious charge the respondent may be punished with a penalty of fine of not less
than P10,000 but not exceeding P19,999 (Sec. 10-B.2); and for a light charge, he may be punished with a fine
of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P9,999 (Sec. 10-C.1). All told, the Court may impose on respondent
Judge a fine of P12,000.
The imposition of the foregoing sanction does not put an end to this case. The Court must look into
the act of Atty. Victor de la Serna in filing the complaint as special counsel and in manifesting that he and
City Administrator Arcadio Sarmiento were no longer interested in pursuing this case because they felt
that it would be futile to spend anymore time and effort and mailing cost on this case.
Atty. De La Serna failed to refute respondents affirmative defense that he had no legal authority to
represent complainant City Government of Tagbilaran as its special counsel because
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tagbilaran did not pass any resolution creating an office of Special
Counsel and under the Charter of the City of Tagbilaran it is the City Prosecutor who is empowered to
represent the city in all civil and criminal actions.
Even assuming that Atty. De La Serna had been duly authorized by the complainant to represent it in
this complaint, he has to explain why he, with the City Administrator, filed the aforementioned
manifestation, which in effect amounted to a withdrawal of the complaint without the consent of the
complainant.
Moreover, the ground relied upon in the Manifestation appears prima facie to be an indictment against
the capacity of this Court to render an impartial judgment in this case. As a lawyer, Atty. De la Serna is an
officer of the court; as such, he should be the first to protect its integrity.
It must be stressed that Atty. De la Serna succeeded in making the charges in the complaint appear to
be serious and grave by the strong language he used. He even imputed on respondent the commission of
graft and corruption. A lawyer who makes such serious accusation must be prepared to prove it. He even
owes it to the justice system, the public, and the legal profession to prove such accusation.
Atty. De la Serna should thus show cause why he should not be disciplined for the foregoing acts
which, prima facie, amount to misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby Resolves to (a) DISMISS, for want of merit, the charge against
respondent Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr., of open defiance of a lawful order of a superior court; and
(b) IMPOSE upon him a FINE of P12,000 for violation of Circular No. 4 dated 27 August 1980 and, more
specifically, for violation of Section 5(3-b) of P.D. No. 1067-B and Paragraphs 3 and 22 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. He is STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.
The Court further resolves to REQUIRE Atty. VICTOR DE LA SERNA to SHOW CAUSE, within ten
(10) days from notice of this Resolution, why he should not be administratively sanctioned for misconduct
or violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his aforementioned acts.
SO ORDERED.
EUGENIO K. CHAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City, Branch 23, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are complaints for non-feasance, impropriety, partiality, and inefficiency filed against
respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former[1] Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
23, General Santos City.
The Facts
In an undated letter, a concerned citizen charged respondent Judge Jose S. Majaducon (respondent
judge) with not wearing [a] black robe during court sessions and with being habitually tardy.[2]
In another complaint, dated 3 November 2000, complainant Eugenio K. Chan (complainant) charged
respondent judge with committing acts of improprieties [and] irregularities. Complainant alleged that
respondent judge
1. xxx starts his hearings at 10:00 oclock in the morning and 2:30-3:00 oclock in the afternoon.
2. xxx does not wear his robe despite the requirement of the Supreme Court xxx;
3. xxx entertains lawyer[s] in his sala despite the absence of the opposing lawyer[s];
4. xxx continued to hear cases despite obvious appearance of impartiality [sic]. He insist [sic] to
hear the case despite the fact that her [sic] daughter being [sic] involved in the defendant bank;
5. xxx was already reprimanded by the Honorable Supreme Court and he is a subject of adverse
write ups in the newspapers;
6. xxx does not prepare or study the cases. He reads the cases during the hearing time.[3]
The Court required respondent judge to submit his Comment on the complaints. In
his Indorsement dated 5 February 2001, respondent judge controverts the allegations against him as
follows:
1. On his refusal to wear the judicial robe during court sessions. Respondent judge states that upon his
doctors advice, he stopped wearing the judges robe during court sessions because doing so allegedly
triggers and aggravates his hypertension. He promised to resume wearing the robe once his blood pressure
had stabilized.
2. On conducting hearings behind schedule. Respondent judge admits that he takes breaks from court
sessions at 10 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. to take merienda or attend to personal needs. However, respondent judge
claims that he starts the hearings in his court on time and that his sessions sometimes even last for more
than eight hours in a day. According to respondent judge, if ever his hearings started late, it was either
because he had to attend to other equally pressing matters such as signing/revising Orders/Resolutions
or because the litigants and/or their counsels were late.
3. On entertaining counsels/litigants in his chambers. Respondent admits entertaining litigants and their
counsels with pending cases in his sala as his chambers two doors are always open. He claims, however,
that he never discusses with his visitors the merits of their cases and that he has never been influenced by
them.
4. On studying cases during hearings. Respondent judge explains that while he does consult the records
of cases during hearings, it is only to verify contested matters. He states that this is necessary, as he cannot
memorize all the details of cases, especially the voluminous ones that he had inherited from the previous
judge.
Respondent judge claims that complainant, who had sought his inhibition from a case, [4] may have
wanted to get back at him (respondent judge) for his refusal to inhibit himself. Respondent judge also
suspects that complainants counsel, a certain Atty. Fontanilla, is the concerned citizen who filed the
anonymous complaint against him. [5]
On 30 January 2001, complainant withdrew his complaint against respondent judge, stating that he
had realized that [respondent judge] is only rightly doing his job.[6]
On 16 May 2001, respondent judge informed the Court that since February 2001, he had resumed
wearing the judicial robe as his blood pressure had stabilized.[7]
In his Memorandum of 27 February 2003, respondent judge reiterated the reasons for his earlier refusal
to wear the judicial robe during court sessions.
The OCAs Report and Recommendation
In its Report of 11 March 2002 (Report), the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
respondent judge liable for violation of Administrative Circular No. 25 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. However, the OCA recommends the dismissal of the other charges against respondent judge for
lack of merit. The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined P5,000. The Report reads:
Complainant herein accuses respondent Judge of starting the hearings late at 10:00 oclock in the morning
and 2:30-3:00 oclock in the afternoon. In his comment, respondent Judge denies the same contending that
he conducts hearings [for] four (4) hours, mornings and afternoons. In view of the absence of proof in
support of the accusation against him, respondent Judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty.
As regards the non-wearing of a black robe during trials, respondent Judge should be reminded of
Administrative Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 19[8]9 Re: Use of Black Robes by Trial Judges xxx.
Based on the aforecited circular, trial judges are enjoined to wear the black robe during court sessions. In
the instant case, prudence dictates that respondent Judge should have informed the [C]ourt, through the
Office of the Court Administrator, of his health problems and requested exemption from said
circular. Admittedly, he took it upon himself to dispense with the wearing of a black robe due to
hypertension. Although his reason may be considered in his favor, it could not entirely exculpate him from
administrative responsibility for clear violation of the circular.
As to the charge that respondent entertains lawyers in his sala despite [the] absence of the opposing lawyer,
respondent candidly admits the same by saying that for purposes of transparency he allows lawyers and
litigants to freely enter his chambers to ask about their cases without however discussing the merits
thereof. This is [a] highly xxx improper practice. In-chambers sessions without the presence of the other
party and his counsel must be avoided (Capuno vs. Jaramillo, 243 SCRA 213). The prohibition is to maintain
impartiality. Judges should not only be impartial but should appear impartial (Fernandez vs. Presbitero,
79 SCRA 60). The court should administer justice free from suspicion of bias and prejudice; otherwise,
parties-litigants might lose confidence in the judiciary and destroy its nobleness and decorum
(Nestle Phils., Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542).
The charge that respondent continues to hear cases despite obvious appearance of partiality must fail as
complainant failed to specify the cases being alluded to and in what manner respondent appeared to be
partial.
Finally, as to the charge that respondent does not prepare for or study the cases and merely reads the cases
during trial, we find his explanation thereon satisfactory because referral to court records are at times
unavoidable.
In sum, respondent is found to have violated Circular No. 25 xxx, but the fact that he had been suffering
from hypertension shall be taken in his favor. He is also found to have violated Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct for his act of allowing in-chamber sessions without the presence of the other party and
his counsel. [8]
The Ruling of the Court
Except for the recommended penalty, the Court finds the Report well taken.
On Respondent Judges Refusal to Wear
the Mandated Judicial Robe
Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, (Circular No. 25) provides:
Pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Article [VIII] of the Constitution and in order to heighten public consciousness
on the solemnity of judicial proceedings, it is hereby directed that beginning Tuesday, August 1, 1989, all
Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts shall wear black robes during sessions of their respective Courts.
Respondent judge admits violating Circular No. 25. Nevertheless, he seeks exculpation from administrative
liability for his non-compliance because of his illness. Respondent judges plea is futile.
The wearing of robes by judges during official proceedings, which harks back to the 14 th century,[9] is
not an idle ceremony. Such practice serves the dual purpose of heighten[ing] public consciousness on the
solemnity of judicial proceedings, as Circular No. 25 states, and of impressing upon the judge the exacting
obligations of his office. As well put by an eminent jurist of another jurisdiction:
[J]udges [are] xxx clothed in robes, not only, that they who witness the administration of justice should be
properly advised that the function performed is one different from, and higher, than that which a man
discharges as a citizen in the ordinary walks of life; but also, in order to impress the judge himself with the
constant consciousness that he is a high priest in the temple of justice and is surrounded with obligations
of a sacred character that he cannot escape and that require his utmost care, attention and self-
suppression.[10]
Consequently, a judge must take care not only to remain true to the high ideals of competence and integrity
his robe represents, but also that he wears one in the first place.
While circumstances, such as the medical condition claimed by respondent judge, may exempt one
from complying with Circular No. 25, he must first secure the Courts permission for such exemption. He
cannot simply excuse himself, like respondent judge, from complying with the requirement. Neither does
the fact that respondent judge, if he is to be believed, has resumed wearing the robe exculpate him from
liability. Such does not alter the fact that at the time the complaints in the present case were filed,
respondent judge was openly violating Circular No. 25. Respondent judges medical condition and his
subsequent compliance serve only to mitigate his liability.
On Respondent Judges Practice of Entertaining Lawyers
and Litigants with Pending Cases in his Sala
The Code of Judicial Conduct (Code) provides:
Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN
ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. A judge should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
The Court cannot emphasize enough the pivotal role lower court judges play in the promotion of the
peoples faith in the judiciary. Unlike the appellate court justices, they are the so-called front-liners who
give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those
who do business with the courts.[11] The admonition in Canon 2 that judges must not only avoid
impropriety [but also] the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to them. [12] It is in this light
that the Court frowns upon the holding by trial court judges of in-chamber meetings with litigants or their
counsels without the presence of the adverse party.[13]
Instead of taking heed of this ethical prohibition, respondent judge readily admitted transgressing it.
Worse, he reveals his ignorance of the prohibitions purpose by claiming that his in-chamber dealings are
above-board as nothing illegal or improper transpires during those meetings. Respondent judge should
have realized that his very conduct of entertaining litigants and their counsels in his chamber without the
presence of the adverse party or his counsel constitutes an impropriety. While judges are not expected to
shun the world, neither are they supposed to make themselves freely accessible under such circumstances
as to invite suspicions of impropriety if not bias.Respondent judge should have borne in mind and all those
in the bench who are similarly disposed as him are reminded that:
[N]o position is more demanding as regards xxx uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench
xxx. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high
price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner
that his conduct, xxx can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome
of integrity and justice. In insulating the Bench from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic
way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesars wife, should be above suspicion.[14]
On the Other Charges Against Respondent Judge
The Court subscribes to the OCAs finding that complainant failed to substantiate the other charges
against respondent judge. Mere allegation that respondent judge was habitually tardy or had shown
partiality in a case, without more, does not suffice to hold respondent judge administratively liable. On the
other hand, there is nothing improper in consulting case records during hearings to clarify contested
matters. It is usual for judges to do so, especially for lower court judges who, in addition to their heavy
caseloads, have to conduct marathon hearings and thus need to consult the records of each case more
frequently.
On the Appropriate Penalty to be Imposed Against Respondent Judge
The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined P5,000. However, in Gallo v. Judge
Cordero,[15] the Court imposed a fine of P10,000 on a judge for impropriety in meeting with a litigant in his
office and for other irregular conduct. Under the circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to impose
similarly a fine of P10,000 on respondent judge.
Neither complainants desistance nor respondent judges retirement precludes the Court from holding
respondent judge liable and imposing on him the penalty of P10,000 fine. A complainants desistance from
an administrative complaint against a member of the bench will not, by itself, warrant the dismissal of the
case.[16] This is especially true in the instances where, as in the present case, the respondent judge admits
some if not all of the material allegations in the complaint. [17] Similarly, the Court is not ousted of its
jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to
be in office during the pendency of his case.[18]
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, General Santos City guilty of violating Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, Rules 1.01 and 2.01
and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent Jose S. Majaducon is ordered to pay a fine
of P10,000, the same to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he is entitled.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. R-351-RTJ September 26, 1986

ABRAHAM L. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent.
LIWAYWAY B. SAMSON, complainant,
vs.
VICTORIA TORRES, complainant,
vs.
ESPERANZA LAZARO, complainant,
vs.
JESUS ALBA, complainant,
vs.
A.M. No. 86-4-9987-RTC September 26, 1986
DESIGNATION OF AN ACTING JUDGE IN BRANCH CXXI, RTC, CALOOCAN CITY.
Bognot, Toledano & Associates counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. 359-RTJ.
Romulo T. Santos counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. R-684-RTJ.
Conrado A. Leaño counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. 687-RTC.
PER CURIAM:
Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXX, stands
charged in six separate complaints of various forms of misconduct in the performance of her official
duties. The details are as follows:
I. Administrative Matter No. R-351-RTJ. —
This originated as G.R. No. 71179, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on June 29, 1985 by Deputy
Sheriff Abraham L. Ramirez of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to secure his release from the
Caloocan City jail. Ramirez was ordered arrested on June 27, 1985 by respondent judge for direct
contempt of court consisting in his alleged disobedience to the writ of preliminary injunction dated
January 21, 1985 issued in Civil Case No. 8682 enjoining him from demolishing the improvements of
the intervenors in said case.
Deputy Sheriff Ramirez had previously been directed by Judge Socorro Tirona-Liwag of Branch CXXIII
of the same court in an order dated January 11, 1985, to demolish the improvements of the defendants
in Civil Cases Nos. C-7380, C-7361, C-7362, C-7363, C-7364, C-7839, C-7841 and C-7842. Said defendants
are the intervenors in Civil Case No. 8682 on whose motion respondent judge issued the preliminary
injunction.
The immediate execution of the order of arrest was effected thru a handwritten note of respondent judge
addressed to then superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim. Upon orders
of this Court, however, Deputy Sheriff Ramirez was released from jail on July 2, 1985. Thereafter, the
court resolved to treat the petition as an administrative case 1 and to require respondent judge to comment
thereon. 2
Respondent judge denied having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in causing the arrest of Ramirez. She
justified the arrest as a means of preserving substantial justice so that any decision rendered in Civil Case
No. 8682 may not be rendered moot and academic and as a curative measure to preserve the greater interest
of social justice. The handwritten note, on the other hand, was explained as a means to preserve the
integrity of courts of justice in the enforcement of valid and lawful orders. She added that the writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by her in the exercise of her original jurisdiction, while the Order of
January 11, 1985 was issued by Judge Liwag in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which the latter should
not have done as she should have remanded the case to the court of origin for execution.
II. Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ. —
On September 28, 1984, complainant Liwayway B. Samson filed before the RTC of Caloocan City a
complaint for damages against Benecio Urgel, Roberto Exequiel, Shigiro Iwata and Remigio Pasion
docketed as Civil Case No. 11559 and assigned to respondent judge. The summonses were served on the
defendants on October 3, 1984. On October 18, 1984, defendants Urgel and Exequiel filed their answer with
cross-claim against their co-defendants Pasion and Iwata They likewise filed a motion for leave to file a
third party complaint against Imperial Insurance Co. This was granted on October 22, 1984. On November
12, 1984, within the extension given by the court, defendant Iwata filed his answer with compulsory
counter-claim and cross-claim and answer to cross-claim against defendants Urgel, Exequiel and Pasion.
The latter did not file any answer. Thus, on November 29, 1984, complainant thru counsel moved to declare
Pasion in default and to set the case for pre-trial On January 29, 1985, counsel for complainant filed an ex-
parte motion praying for the resolution of the motion of November 29, 1984. When no action was
forthcoming, counsel filed another motion on March 26, 1985, reiterating his prayer in the motion of
November 29, 1984. For alleged failure of respondent judge to act on the motions, the instant complaint
was filed on June 6, 1985.
Required to comment, respondent judge stated that the motion of November 29, 1984 was noted for study
on December 18, 1984 and was actually resolved on March 1, 1985, "well within the period even for the
court to resolved [sic] the same and prior to the receipt ... of the letter-complaint on July 2, 1985; " and that
the case could not yet be set for pre-trial on account of the existence of the third-party complaint. In
conclusion, respondent judge said that letter-complaint "is not only malicious but was intended to malign
the undersigned Presiding Judge 3 and should therefore be dismissed.
Complainant replied to the comment for the purpose of placing in issue respondent judge's allegation that
the motion dated November 29, 1984 was resolved on March 1, 1985. She averred that if this were true, why
is it that notice thereof was received by her counsel only on June 22, 1985 after the instant complaint had
been filed; and why is it that respondent judge failed to resolve the other motions? She concluded that the
only reasonable implication is that the order was antedated to show some color of performance of duties.
She likewise cites respondent judge for failure to order the service of summons and copy of the third-party
complaint on the third-party defendant.
It appears that due to the statement found in respondent's comment that "the letter-complaint is not only
malicious but was intended to malign the undersigned Presiding Judge complainant moved for
respondent's inhibition from Civil Case No. 11559 and its re-raffling to another sala. This motion was
denied.
Eventually, as manifested by respondent in her Rejoinder, she inhibited herself from hearing Civil Case
No. 11559, which has since been assigned to another judge and has been set for pre-trial In said rejoinder,
respondent judge characterized complainant's so-called implication respecting the order of March 1, 1985
as being founded on conjectures, assumptions and suppositions. Furthermore, she said that after the third
party complaint had been admitted, it was not her duty to order service of the summons on the third-party
defendant, but that of the counsel who espouses the cause of the client.
III. Administrative Matter No. R-621-RTJ. —
In the sworn letter-complaint dated April 28, 1986, Victoria L. Torres charged respondent judge with
ignorance of the law, graft or deliberate distortion of the law for pecuniary motives. She alleged that
respondent judge had indiscriminately issued restraining orders without conducting hearings on the
applications for the issuance of preliminary injunctions and had reiterated restraining orders after the lapse
of the mandatory twenty [20] days; that she issued restraining orders against the enforcement of the writs
of execution in ejectment cases decided by other RTC branches of Caloocan City which are of co-equal
jurisdiction; that she has cited for contempt lawyers and sheriffs of other branches whom she fancies to
have offended her, as in the case of Deputy Sheriff Ramirez [cf. Adm. Matter No. R-351-RTJ] who was
merely complying with the order of Judge Liwag and that she has been issuing restraining orders in
ejectment cases involving the so- called "Maysilo Estate" for undoubtedly suspicious considerations.
By way of compliance to the court's resolution dated June 19, 1986, respondent submitted her comment on
the letter-complaint on July 16, 1986, branding the allegations found therein as false accusations as it failed
to state specific facts on the matters complained of. She stated that she issued a temporary restraining order
in Civil Case No. 10526 entitled, "Arturo Salientes, et. al. v. Alexander Development Corp., et al." but denied
having issued an extension thereof. She claimed having issued a preliminary prohibitory injunction after
due hearing.
With respect to the second allegation, respondent explained the issuance of the restraining orders as a
method of maintaining the status quo so that the cases pending before her involving the issue of ownership
may not be rendered moot and academic by the execution of the decisions in the ejectment cases relating
to the same properties.
Respondent reiterated her explanation in Adm. Matter No. R-351-RTJ in connection with the Ramirez
arrest-incident and asserted that she has been acting on the Maysilo estate cases objectively on the basis of
the law involved and the evidence on hand.
It appears that while the instant complaint was pending evaluation by the Court, complainant Victoria
Torres, in her capacity as attorney-in-fact of Alexander Development Co. caused the implementation of the
writ of execution issued by the RTC of Caloocan, Branch CXXX in Civil Case No. 10645, entitled "Alexander
Development Co. v. Jose Chan." The writ of execution was enforced thru the demolition of a shanty being
claimed by Francisco Cruz, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 10526. Because of this, Torres was ordered
arrested for contempt of court by respondent judge in an order dated May 15, 1986. To challenge said arrest
order Torres instituted before the IAC a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition docketed as AC-
G.R. S.P. No. 09162-SP, wherein respondent judge was likewise required to comment. On June 5, 1986,
respondent judge issued an order recalling the arrest order for being moot and academic. This was
manifested in the comment submitted in AC-G.R. No. 09162-S.P.
IV. Administrative Matter No. R-684-RTJ. —
The gravamen of the complaint filed before this Court on July 7, 1986 is the alleged failure of respondent
judge to decide Civil Case No. C-9831 entitled, "Federico S. Cruz v. Esperanza Lazaro," despite the case having
been submitted for decision for more than 18 months. Complainant who is the defendant in Civil Case No.
C-9831, claims that the case was submitted for decision on October 2, 1984 with the filing of defendant's
memorandum. She further alleges that as respondent judge had been drawing her salary during the entire
time that the case was pending decision, respondent judge is likewise guilty of falsification in view of the
certification required of judges before they could draw their salaries to the effect that they have decided all
cases assigned to them on or before the end of three months counted from the time a case is submitted for
decision.
On July 16, 1986, counsel for complainant Romulo T. Santos, filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw
the complaint on the ground that "certain facts and conditions which heretofore were unknown to the
complainant and undersigned counsel have come to [their] knowledge ... which affect their resolution to
prosecute the complaint.4
Said manifestation, notwithstanding, the court by resolution dated July 24, 1986 required respondent judge
to answer the complaint.
In her answer filed on August 11, 1986, respondent judge states that nothing on the record shows that the
case has been submitted for decision; that defendant in said case [herein complainant] never appeared in
court during the hearing of the case nor during the series of conferences called by her for the purpose of
effecting an amicable settlement between the parties, as per manifestation of her counsel, complainant and
her husband were always abroad; that defendant in fact told the court interpreter that she did not want to
appear in court for the amicable settlement; that it was only after she received a telephone call from an
alleged close relative of an associate of a national official saying " If you don't decide the case in favor of
Mrs. Lazaro you will be removed, but if you decide in her favor then you will stay," that she looked into
the records of the case where she found the motion of Mrs. Lazaro, received by the court on March 12, 1986,
praying for the early resolution of the case; that because of the telephone calls and with the point in mind
that "this is a revolutionary government," she had no recourse but to decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro,
which she did in a decision dated July 18, 1986; that in view of complainant's manifestation dated July 7,
1986, the instant complaint is already moot and academic.
V. Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ. —
Jesus Alba charges respondent judge with gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering an
unjust decision. Complainant is the offended party in Criminal Case No. C-23527 [84] entitled "People v.
Cabel" for frustrated murder assigned to respondent's court. The decision acquitting the accused was
promulgated on June 10, 1986, allegedly in the absence of complainant and his counsel, so that complainant
learned about the decision only thru a neighbor. Complainant challenged the decision as erroneous for the
reasons that the testimony of the accused on the alleged self-defense was not convincing, respondent judge
erred in her appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution as well as in her
pronouncement that Cabel had no motive for stabbing complainant when lack of motive does not preclude
conviction.
Upon being required to comment, respondent explained in detail the reasons why she did not give credence
to the version of the prosecution. She ended with the conclusion that the decision in said criminal case is
just and in consonance with the evidence presented by the parties. She views the complaint as a means to
harass her in the wake of the judiciary reorganization.
VI. Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC. —
Civil Case No. C-12172 entitled, "Manchie Sabile Brozo v. Spouses Esmeraldo Quijano and Adelina Quijano," an
appealed case for an unlawful detainer was pending before Branch CXXI of the RTC of Caloocan City when
presiding judge thereof, Judge Salvador J. Baylen, was transferred to the RTC of Quezon City on November
15,1985. Said judge had previously required the parties to file their memorandum with. in 30 days from
notice of the order dated November 4, 1985, but only the plaintiff had done so at the time of his transfer.
On January 7, 1986, therein defendants-appellees moved for either the consolidation of Civil Case No. 12172
with Civil Case No. 11724, entitled "Esmeraldo Quijano, plaintiff versus Manchie Sabile Brozo, Defendant"
pending before Branch CXXX of the same court, or the re-raffle of Civil Case No. C-12172 to another judge
to avoid delay in its disposition; or if re-raffle is not proper, to effect the transfer of said case to the pairing
judge of Branch CXXI for further proceedings. Plaintiff-appellant opposed the motion.
On January 9, 1986, Executive Judge Oscar M. Herrera referred the motion to Judge Antonia Corpuz-
Macandog of Branch CXX, the pairing judge of Branch CXXI.
On February 19, 1986, Judge Macandog denied the motion of defendants- appellees. However, on March
13, 1986, she issued another order recalling, rescinding and setting aside the order of February 19, 1986 and
considering the case submitted for decision to her as pairing judge. Counsel for plaintiff-appellant, Atty.
Jose V. Marcella moved for a reconsideration of the order dated March 13, 1986 with a request that the
matter be referred to the Court Administrator for determination or ruling as to which judge-Judge Baylen
or Judge Macandog-should decide the case.
Meanwhile, on April 24, 1986, the Court En Banc designated Judge Domingo M. Angeles, RTC, Branch
CXXIX, Caloocan City as Acting Judge of Branch CXXI of the same court "in addition to his regular duties
without additional compensation, effective immediately and to continue until a regular incumbent is
appointed or until further orders from this Court." 5
On May 15, 1986, Judge Macandog rendered judgment in Civil Case No. C-12172 dismissing plaintiff's
appeal Copies of the decision and the order denying his motion for referral were received by counsel for
plaintiff on May 22, 1986. He forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of both the decision and the order.
Pending resolution thereof, he wrote the Court Administrator a letter on June 9, 1985, requesting for a
ruling on who, among the three judges; Baylen, Macandog or Angeles, has authority to decide the case and
who, between Judges Macandog and Angeles, should resolve the pending motion for reconsideration.
Acting on said letter, the Court En Banc resolved on July 8, 1986 to: "[a] DIRECT Judge Salvador J. Baylen
Regional Trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City, to decide Civil Case No. C-12172, considering that before
his transfer to another court of equal jurisdiction said case was already submitted before him for decision
and as such all proceedings were totally heard and tried by him and the greater interest of justice will be
better served if he will decide the same; [b] require Judge Antonia C. Macandog to EXPLAIN within
seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of notice hereof why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
taking cognizance of Civil Case No. C-12172 and deciding the same against the vigorous objection of the
plaintiff and [c] SET ASIDE and declare null and void the decision rendered by Judge Macandog for lack
of authority and the pending motion for reconsideration and to set aside the decision and the order denying
plaintiff's motion to refer the case to the Supreme Court be recalled and withdrawn." 6
In the explanation submitted on July 18, 1986, Judge Macandog stated that she took cognizance of Civil
Case No. 12172 by virtue of the note/order of Executive Judge Oscar Herrera appearing on the face of the
"Motion to Consolidate and/or to transfer case to the Pairing Judge dated January 7, 1986; which note reads:
"Refer to Pairing Judge, Br. 120" and signed, "Oscar M. Herrera 1/9/86;" that as the thirty-day period
granted to the parties within which to file their memorandum under the order dated November 4, 1985
expired at the earliest only on December 5, 1985, at which date the case would be deemed submitted for
decision, Judge Baylen could not decide the case, the same not having been submitted to him for decision
at the time of his transfer on November 15, 1985; that she has been authorized by this Court on September
16, 1982 to take cognizance of all kinds of cases in Branch XIV [now Branch CXXI, RTC, Caloocan City] and
that the resolution dated April 24, 1986 in A.M. No. 86-499-87, which impliedly revoked this authority came
to her knowledge only during the first week of June, 1986 when Judge Angeles started taking cognizance
of and began hearing cases in Branch CXXI.
Except for the charges of gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust decision in
Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ, which must be dismissed outright for lack of merit, the other charges
brought against respondent are indeed serious. Taken collectively, they cast a heavy shadow on
respondent's moral, intellectual and attitudinal competence to remain a member of the Bench.
The complaint in Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ is anchored primarily on respondent having given
credence to the exempting circumstance of self-defense offered by the accused in Criminal Case No. C-
23527. In Villa v. Llamas, 84 SCRA 277, where the complainant placed in issue the wisdom of the respondent
judge's decision in a civil case for having believed the testimony of the plaintiff, an alleged operator and
maintainer of houses of ill-repute, this Court ruled that said circumstance was not an indubitable ground
for penalizing a judge administratively. The reason, as previously stated in the case of Dizon vs. de Borja, 37
SCRA 46, is that "to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
unbearable.
Similarly, in the case of Vda. de Zabal vs. Pamaram, 39 SCRA 430, this Court had the occasion to pronounce
that 11 mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an influence
of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision [which circumstances do
not obtain in the case at bar], are irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him.
We further stated: "If in the mind of the respondent the evidence for the defense was entitled to more
weight and credence, he cannot be held to account administratively for the result of ratiocination." 7
Neither could respondent be held administratively liable for failing to notify complainant of the
promulgation of the decision in said criminal case. While it may be the better practice to notify the offended
party of such promulgation, the Rules of Court do not require a judge to do so.
The actuations of respondent judge in Administrative Matters Nos. R-351-RTJ and R-621-RTJ are, however,
administratively censurable. In both cases, she issued preliminary injunctions to stay the implementation
of writs of execution issued by courts of coordinate and co-equal jurisdiction, and issued arrest orders
against a deputy sheriff and an attorney-in-fact of a party who proceeded to enforce the writs of execution
despite said unjunctions. To effect the immediate execution of the order of arrest against deputy sheriff
Ramirez, respondent wrote a handwritten note to Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim requesting his assistance on the
matter.
To our mind, both orders of arrest were improvidently issued. Respondent judge should have been aware
that forcible entry and detainer cases do not interfere with a proceeding where ownership is at issue. Thus,
in Petargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, it was held that "the determination of the respective right of rival claimants
to public land is different from the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation
with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the
court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been
deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any illegal manner, can never be 'prejudicial
interference' with the disposition or alienation of public land." Besides, in the case of deputy sheriff Ramirez
respondent judge should have taken into consideration that his duty to enforce court orders and processes
is ministerial in character and that he has no authority to determine the validity of the order placed in his
hands to implement. Thus, whether Judge Liwag can, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, legally issue
the writ of execution is of no moment insofar as deputy sheriff Ramirez is concerned, and he should not
have been punished by incarceration for performing his official duty.
Moreover, the handwritten note of respondent judge to Brig. Gen. Lim is, to say the least, highly irregular
and improper. Her over-zealousness in implementing the order of arrest creates the impression that she
has taken an interest far and beyond that ordinarily expected of judicial officers with respect to cases
pending before them; which, in turn, puts her impartiality in question.
Respondent judge is of the impression that the release of Ramirez from jail and the recall of the order of
arrest against Victoria Torres had rendered the administrative cases against her moot and academic. Rather
than exonerate her, these facts instead serve to strengthen the charges against her. For one, the release order
issued by this Court only proves the impropriety of her act, while on the other, the recall order
demonstrates the impetuosity by which the arrest order was issued in the first place.
The same attitude is observed in respondent judge in connection with Administrative Matter No. R-684-
RTC which she wants this court to consider moot and academic for the reasons that she has rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 and that the complainant had moved for the withdrawal of said
complaint.
We said in the case of Vasquez v. Malvar, 85 SCRA 10, that a motion to withdraw and/or dismiss the
complaint by complainant, does not, by itself, warrant the dismissal of the administrative case against
respondent judge, because "to condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who
may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act, is to strip this Court of its supervisory power to
discipline erring members of the Judiciary."
And seriously blunder, respondent did.
While it appears that the complaint was filed under a misapprehension of facts, in that it was not
indubitably established that the case had been submitted for decision as alleged in the complaint, and
dismissal of the charge should have followed as a matter of course, the case had taken an unexpected twist.
In her answer, respondent judge admitted to have succumbed to pressure in deciding the case in favor of
herein complainant, Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro. Thus, "In order to promote peace so nobody would call me
again by telephone telling the same purpose, the respondent, then decided the case with the point in mind
that this [sic] a revolutionary government and she had nor [sic] recourse but to decide the case in favor of
Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro, [Decision dated July 18, 1986, see attached.]" 8
Even accepting for the nonce that there was this supposed pressure from a source twice removed from the
national official mentioned earlier, her confessed act of succumbing to this pressure on the telephone is a
patent betrayal of the public trust reposed on respondent as an arbiter of the law and a revelation of her
weak moral character. By her appointment to the office, the public has laid on respondent their confidence
that she is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they
expect her to be fearless in her pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or
power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in her office.
Regrettably, respondent has dismally failed to exhibit these qualities required of those holding such office.
In Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ, respondent judge failed to act with reasonable dispatch required
of judicial officers. There is reason to doubt the authenticity of the date shown on the order resolving the
motion of complainant to declare therein defendant Pasion in default. If it were true that the motion was
resolved as early as March 1, 1985, We do not think that service of the order upon counsel for complainant
at this office in Espana, Manila would take more than three [3] months, and most conveniently after the
present complaint has been filed.
Delay in the administration of justice is the most common cause of complaint and a judge should endeavor
to avoid it. It is thus incumbent upon a judge to manage his court with a view to the prompt and convenient
disposition of its business and he should not tolerate abuses, indifference or neglect by clerks, sheriffs and
other officers of the court. Hence, upon failure of her clerk to serve summons on the third party defendant,
it became incumbent upon her to remind said clerk of such failure.
The explanation given by respondent judge in Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC is unsatisfactory.
Par. VIII, Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974 of this Court provides:
VIII. PAIRING SYSTEM:
A pairing system shall be established whereby every branch shall be considered as paired
with another branch. In the event of vacancy in any branch, or of the absence or disability
of the judge thereof, all incidental or interlocutory matters pertaining to it may be acted upon
by that judge of the other branch paired with it. The latter may likewise conduct trials or
hearings on the merits in criminal cases with detention prisoners assigned to the other
branch, as well as in other kinds of cases, subject to the conformity of the parties. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Pursuant to the above-quoted internal procedure, the referral of Civil Case No. C-12172 to judge Macandog
was solely for the purpose of acting upon the motion to consolidate and/or transfer case to the pairing
judge. Such referral did not in any manner empower or authorize her to decide the case on the merits,
particularly in the light of the vigorous objection interposed by therein plaintiff. The power and authority
of one acting as a pairing judge are clearly defined and delineated by said paragraph and one acting beyond
its tenor certainly oversteps his authority.
Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties. 9 They are likewise
charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which relate to the scope of
their authority. They are dutybound to observe and abide by these rules and procedures, designed, as they
are, primarily to ensure the orderly administration of justice. Thus, confronted with a serious challenge to
one's authority, an ordinary prudent man would perceive the reasonableness, if not the wisdom, of the
suggestion/request that the question at hand be referred to this Court. The hasty and reckless attitude of
respondent judge in taking cognizance of and deciding Civil Case No. 12172 despite the strong objection
against her authority and the reasonable request for referral of the question to this Court, constitutes
misconduct in office warranting disciplinary sanction.
Anent respondent's averment that she was granted authority by this Court on September 16, 1982 to take
cognizance of all kinds of cases in Branch CXXI, suffice it to say that the same was revoked, not by our
resolution of April 26, 1986, but much earlier, by the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
on January 17, 1983.
Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be mentally and morally unfit to remain in her office.
Her removal must perforce be effected.
In view of the disclosure by respondent that the decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 was rendered under
undue pressure and influence, the party aggrieved thereby may take such remedial steps as may be
warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog is hereby ordered dismissed from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch
of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 137-J March 27, 1971

MARCIANA BUENAVENTURA, complainant,
vs.
HON. MARIANO V. BENEDICTO, respondent.
CASTRO, J.:
On January 9, 1969, Marciana Buenaventura (hereinafter referred to as the complainant), the offended party
in a criminal prosecution1 for forcible abduction with rape, and likewise the plaintiff in a civil action 2 for
annulment of marriage, filed with this Court a complaint against the Honorable Mariano V. Benedicto
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent judge) in whose sala both the aforementioned cases fell, seeking
his removal from office on the basis of verified charges.
Imputed to the respondent judge are: (1) serious misconduct in relation to the criminal and civil cases; (2)
immorality in Connection with both Cases; (3) gross inefficiency and incompetence in relation to the
criminal action; and (4) knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in the criminal case.
The factual incidents preceding the complainant's administrative action against the respondent judge are
not complicated.
On September 13, 1967, the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija, upon a complaints3 filed by a sister of the
complainant and after conducting the preliminary investigation required by law, charged Raymundo
Mariano and four others with the crime of forcible abduction with rape committed on the person of the
complainant. The court, with the respondent judge presiding, heard the case on the merits.
On October 21, 1967, the complainant filed an action against Mariano for annulment of marriage; this action
was docketed in the same court presided by the respondent judge.
On November 11, 1968, the respondent judge rendered judgment in the criminal case, acquitting the
defendants for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
On January 15, 1969, the complainant filed a petition with this Court, seeking to inhibit the respondent
judge from hearing the civil case still pending before the latter's sala. This petition was denied in a
resolution dated January 29, 1969.
Returning to the case at bar, on February 8, 1969, the respondent judge filed his answer, denying the charges
imputed to him by the complainant and alleging lack of factual or legal basis for the administrative
complaint. By a resolution dated February 13, 1969, this Court referred and assigned the administrative
case to the Honorable Carmelino Alvendia of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Subsequently, on May 6, 1969, this Court, upon the complainant's motion for reconsideration of this Court's
resolution dated January 29, 1969 denying the said complainant's petition seeking to inhibit the respondent
judge from taking further action on the civil case, expressed the view of the propriety of the said respondent
judge desisting from hearing the civil action to better subserve the ends of justice. In compliance with the
aforesaid resolution, the respondent judge, on May 14, 1969, issued an order inhibiting himself from
hearing the civil case and from further proceedings in the criminal action against another defendant not
tried with the others.
On December 19, 1969, after proceedings and investigation duly conducted on the administrative
complaint, the Honorable Justice Alvendia submitted his report wherein he states that the complainant
failed to prove the charges against the respondent judge, with four exceptions, to wit:
1. The respondent judge allowed his clerk-messenger, Isauro Tuazon, to promulgate decisions in criminal
cases, in violation of the provisions of section 6 of Rule 120 4 of the Rules of Court.
2. The respondent judge formed a committee to solicit contributions and/or donation of steel filing
cabinets, electric fans, and other office equipment from private parties for his court in contravention of the
spirit of section 245 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics;
3. The respondent judge, considering that the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by the complainant
against one of the defendants in the criminal action remained pending before his sala, imprudently received
the said complainant in his chambers prior to the promulgation of his decision in the criminal action; and
4. The respondent judge failed to resolve a notion filed by the prosecution for the suspension of the hearing
of the criminal case until after trial and resolution of the civil case (on the ground that the latter raised a
prejudicial question), in violation of the provisions of section 5, Republic Act 296, as amended. 6
1. Anent the first recusation of serious misconduct the Honorable Justice Alvendia found only one among
the acts alleged by the complainant as constituting the charge proved and, therefore, demanding attention
by this Court — that the respondent judge allowed his clerk-messenger, Isauro Tuazon, to promulgate
decisions in criminal cases. In this connection, the investigator also found that Tuazon on those occasions
when the deputy clerk of court delegated to him the promulgation of the respondent judge's decisions in
criminal actions, promulgated only decisions of acquittal.
Tuazon, the report reveals, even testified during the investigatory proceedings that the deputy clerk of
court entrusted to him the promulgation of the decision in the criminal case involved herein. This testimony
remains unrebutted on record. Furthermore, the investigator found that Tuazon, in this particular instance
"went to the extent of assuming the prerogative of postponing the promulgation of the decision which,
according to the evidence, was not even delegated by the respondent judge to the deputy clerk of court."
All these indicate laxity on the part of the respondent judge in the supervision of his employees states the
investigator. Continuing, he says that this practice contravenes the provisions of section 6 of Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court and may lead to incidents "liable to involve, rightly or wrongly, the integrity of the Court
and/or undermine the people's faith in the judiciary."
In reply, the respondent judge asserts that the documentary and testimonial evidence show that he
entrusted his decision to Tuazon for delivery to the clerk of court and not for promulgation by the said
clerk-messenger. With regard to the decision in the criminal action involved herein, he explains that he
placed the same in an envelope and sealed it before entrusting it to Tuazon for delivery to the clerk of court
and that he ordered the promulgation of the said decision by the clerk of court. If Tuazon himself read the
dispositive portion of the decision, then he did so upon the instruction of the clerk of court and not upon
his authorization, the respondent judge adds.
Section 67 of Republic Act 296, as amended, provides two grounds for the removal of judges: serious
misconduct and inefficiency. The complainant seeks the removal of the respondent judge on the first
ground and enumerates a number of facts allegedly constituting the imputed charge of serious misconduct,
five of which acts the Honorable Justice Alvendia found unsupported by evidence. The remaining one —
that the respondent judge sanctioned the practice of his deputy clerk of court of delegating to the clerk-
messenger the promulgation of decisions of acquittal in criminal cases — fails to fit into the accepted
definition of serious misconduct. "Serious" means "important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling,"7 and
"misconduct" refers to "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer."8 "Misconduct" also implies "a wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment.9"
In the face of the denial by the respondent judge that he authorized Tuazon to promulgate his decisions
plus his explanation why the act complained of created the false impression that he tolerated the practice
of allowing the clerk-messenger to promulgate his decisions, we have no solid support to hold that the said
respondent judge either acted in wanton disregard of or intended to violate the provisions of section 6 of
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. We find no reliable evidence on record to demonstrate that the act
complained of was influenced by malice or induced by an intention to violate the law or spurred by a desire
to debase the integrity of the court.
Nevertheless, on this count, although the act charged does not constitute serious misconduct on the part of
the respondent judge as to warrant the severe administrative penalty of removal from the Bench, we believe
that this act manifests the insouciance of the respondent judge in the supervision of the attendants of the
court who aid him in the performance of his judicial functions. Assuming as true that the clerk messenger
read the dispositive portion of the decision in the criminal case involved herein upon order of the clerk of
court, the respondent judge should have, upon notice and knowledge thereof, called the attention of the
clerk of court and taken appropriate disciplinary measure against those who committed the disservice,
instilling in them the sense of propriety and probity required of those who assist in the performance of
judicial functions.
We find the inclination of the respondent judge to leniency in the administrative supervision of his
employees an undesirable trait. Oftentimes, such leniency provides the court employees the opportunity
to commit minor transgressions of the laws and slight breaches of official duty ultimately leading to vicious
delinquencies. The respondent judge should constantly keep a watchful eye on the conduct of his
employees. He should realize that big start small. His constant scrutiny of the behavior of his employees
would deter any abuse on the part of the latter in the exercise of their duties. Then, his subordinates would
know that any misdemeanor will not remain unchecked. The slightest semblance of impropriety on the
part of the employees of the court in the performance of their official duties stirs ripples of public suspicion
and public distrust of the judicial administrators.lâwphî1.ñèt The slightest breach of duty by and the
slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and employees detract from the dignity of the courts
and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary.
2. Count two surfaced only in the course of the investigation conducted by the Honorable Justice Alvendia.
The complainant bases the second challenge on the ground that the respondent judge, using his official
position and power, formed a committee to solicit contributions and donations of office equipment for his
court from private parties, in contravention of the provisions of section 24 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
The respondent judge vigorously refutes this, denying that he participated, directly or indirectly, in the
fund-raising or in the solicitation of donations.
In his proffered explanation, the respondent judge states that when he assumed office in Branch V of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, he found the court premises in a deplorable "state of disarray" —
most of the records laid out or placed on the floor, and the rest kept inside unlocked cabinets. He also found
no available law books at hand. Clerk and employee of the court shared and occupied one table. Twice, the
respondent judge tried to obtain financial assistance for the improvement of the court premises — first,
from the provincial treasurer, then, from the Department of Justice — but he received none. Then, the
presidents of the bar associations of Nueva Ecija and other practicing lawyers of the province approached
him and offered suggestions. Thereafter the lawyers decided to create a committee to raise funds and solicit
donations. The respondent judge merely appointed the members of the committee.
The committee, according to the respondent judge, conducted the campaign with the knowledge, if not
with the tacit approval, of the Department of Justice. In fact, at the end of the campaign, certificates of
appreciation were given to those who assisted the committee and contributed to the success of the
undertaking which bore the official notation of the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice.
Eventually, the committee turned over the books and office equipment to the District Judge through the
clerk of court, who, in turn, officially turned them over, to the provincial government as to form part of the
property of the province.
A careful reading of section 24 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics shows that the said section dwells mainly
on the prohibition against the use by a judge of his official power and prestige to persuade others to
participate or contribute to the success of business promotion or campaigns for charity. Briefly, section 24
requires a judge to refrain from private business ventures or charitable enterprises so as not to give occasion for
any suspicion that he utilizes the power of his office or the influence of his name for the success of such
undertakings or to give rise to any situation wherein his personal interest might conflict with the impartial
performance of his official duties. Section 24 thus appropriately and accurately applied, the act of the
respondent judge in appointing the members of the campaign committee does not fall within its
contemplation. To hold otherwise would countenance an interpretation unduly strained.
Be that as it may, we can not simply ignore the act of the respondent judge and state that we find nothing
objectionable at all in his conduct. True, his well-intentioned desire to provide the court premises with the
necessary equipment motivated him to accept the suggestion of the lawyers of Nueva Ecija and, then, to
appoint the members of the committee for the campaign. However, for reasons of extreme probity and
delicacy, he should have declined to assume the appointing prerogative to avoid the slightest hint of
involvement, personal or official, in the campaign.
To our mind, although the act of the respondent judge in taking part in the appointment of the members
of the campaign committee constitutes no serious breach of judicial ethics, such act nevertheless could
engender several misinterpretations likely to cause doubt that he enjoys no more than normal social
relations with those whom he appointed to the campaign group. The respondent judge should have
avoided any act giving rise to any suggestion calculated to impair the image of impartiality and
independence of the courts.
We, however, find it disenchanting that the respondent judge had to turn to the private sector for the
essential needs of his court when the obligation is the Government's to provide him the necessities required
by the complexity of court work. Circumstances compelled the respondent judge to do so. The Government
paid no heed to his perfervid pleas for financial assistance in the acquisition of the equipment necessary
for the efficient and productive business of the court. The Government gave him no support. We, therefore,
find no cogent reason to blame the respondent judge in accepting the help offered by the lawyers in Nueva
Ecija to provide the court with facilities of great utility to the convenient dispatch of court work.
3. On the third charge, the complainant assails as imprudent the conduct of the respondent judge of
receiving her in his private chambers and of allegedly discussing with her the merits of the criminal action,
considering that at that time the civil case filed by the complainant still remained unresolved before his
sala. The respondent judge admits that he met with complainant when the latter requested an audience
with him but disclaims that he discussed the criminal case with her. In fact, the respondent judge alleges
that when the complainant tried to start a discussion on the merits of the criminal ease, he told her to refer
to his decision on the said case which he ordered promulgated earlier that day. 10 The respondent judge
further claims that it is his practice not to allow any of the parties to confer with him on any case pending
before his sala without the presence of the other party.
In the case at bar, he admits that he made an exception and agreed to receive the complainant, then
accompanied by her sister, sister-in-law, a court employee and a court helper, in his chambers. He states
that he wanted, to soften, as much as possible, the impact of her defeat in the criminal case. Moreover, he
sought to find out whether the complainant contemplated withdrawing the civil, action or was determined
or continuing the same.
We take note of the laudable practice of the respondent judge of not discussing with the interested parties
any case pending before him. We also take note of the fact that the respondent judge, in making an
exception re the case at hand, agreed to meet with the complainant in his chambers only upon the latter's
request and insistence. Although we are inclined to believe that the respondent judge received the
complainant in his chambers not to discuss the merits of the criminal case but to assuage whatever
emotional ache and distress she felt as a result of the decision of acquittal in the criminal action and to find
out what course of action she contemplated to take on the civil case in view of the turn of events, we
nonetheless feel that the respondent judge should have precluded any mention whatsoever of the civil
action for the was then pending before his sala. This conduct of the judge indicates lack of reasonable
discretion. Such conduct, too, more often than not, party-litigants misconstrue as personally motivated.
Many the inferences are, that may be drawn by suspecting minds from acts of judges over zealously
accommodating to interested parties.
On the other hand, we believe that the complainant was not entirely without fault. For reasons we do not
know, for reasons we cannot surmise, she endeavored with utmost persistence to see the respondent judge
in his private chambers not only once but twice.
We might add here, en passant, that the complainant, in her administrative complaint, also imputed to the
respondent judge acts of immorality allegedly committed when the said respondent judge met with her
again in his private room. She claimed that the respondent judge tried to grab her breasts on the pretext of
looking for contusions. This charge the Honorable Justice Alvendia discounted as incredible — without
any factual basis. For on, that alleged occasion, the respondent judge felt weak and weary to receive visitors
so much so that he refused to see another caller, municipal judge Sergio Denoga of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. At
that time, too, the respondent judge's wife was in his chambers, attending to his needs. Furthermore, the
complainant's own witness, the court stenographer, whom she claimed brought her to the respondent
judge's chambers, denied having done so. All these compelled the investigator to disbelieve the charge of
immorality against the respondent judge.
4. The fourth and final charge relates to the respondent judge's alleged failure to resolve a motion filed by
the prosecution to suspend the hearing of the criminal case until after final disposition of the civil action
for annulment of marriage. In his explanation, the respondent judge states that when the prosecution raised
to possibility of the existence of a prejudicial question and asked for the suspension of the proceedings, he
suggested it would be better for him to continue hearing both the criminal and civil cases. In effect, the
respondent judge alleges, such ruling constituted a denial of the motion for suspension. In fact, he continue
the prosecution construed the same denial of the motion for suspension and, the fiscal neither raised the
question again in the subsequent hearings on the criminal action nor made any reference thereto in his
memorandum.
The record reveals that the respondent judge made an earnest effort to act on the motion for suspension of
the hearings on the criminal action, In his honest belief that the civil case posed no prejudicial barrier, he
decided to continue hearing the criminal case. The only error, if error it may be called, the respondent judge
committed consisted of not denying the motion for suspension, in clear and categorical terms so as not to
leave any room for misinterpretation and controversy. The respondent judge should have made a formal
ruling on the motion to enable the parties to know the reason or ground for such ruling and to provide the
party aggrieved by the action on the motion sufficient opportunity to avail of the necessary action for relief
from the ruling.
In the case at bar, however, if the respondent judge really failed to act on the motion as the complainant
points out, then, the subsequent hearings on the criminal case afforded the prosecution all the opportunity
to ask the respondent judge to make a definitive ruling on the matter. Yet, the prosecution proceeded to
the termination of the trial, filed its memorandum, and submitted the case for decision without any further
mention of the question.
At this point, we pause to make an observation. We have examined the decision of the respondent judge
in the criminal case involved herein; the same prima facie appeared to be correct. This decision of sixty-six
pages includes a complete statement of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and by the defense, a
painstaking analysis of the said evidence and of the applicable law, and the reasons why he entertained
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
Upon the foregoing dissertation, we find that the respondent judge:
1. Has been remiss in the supervision of court employees by failing, upon learning that the deputy clerk of
court on three occasions had entrusted to the clerk-messenger the promulgation of decisions of acquittal,
to take corrective action and to discipline the erring court employees;
2. Had involved himself in a program to furnish his court, ill-equipped at the time of his assumption of
office, as Presiding judge thereof, with the necessary facilities, by appointing the members of the campaign
committee which solicited donations and contributions;
3. Failed to exercise requisite care and discretion by receiving the complainant in his private chambers,
considering that the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by the said complainant (against one of the
accused in the criminal action) was yet pending before his sala; and
4. Failed to resolve in explicit unmistakable terms the prosecution's motion for suspension of the criminal
action based on the ground that the civil action for annulment of Marriage constituted a prejudicial
question.
All told, the respondent judge, to our mind, is not guilty of serious misconduct or inefficiency. We
nevertheless are of the considered view that the acts of commission as well as of omission properly
imputable to him, while not warranting the imposition of any disciplinary sanction, clearly demonstrate
the need for greater care, prudence and discretion in his future actuations.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court admonishes the respondent Judge Mariano V. Benedicto (a) to exercise close
and remitting supervision over his subordinates, and (b) at all times to adhere to the full intendment of
each and all of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
CARMEN P. EDAO, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974 Complainant, (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2226-RTJ)
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
- versus - QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
JUDGE FATIMA G. ASDALA, CARPIO MORALES,
RTC Br. 87, Quezon City, and AZCUNA,
STENOGRAPHER MYRLA DEL TINGA,
PILAR NICANDRO, RTC Br. 217, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Quezon City, GARCIA,
Respondents. VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 26, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative complaint was initiated by a handwritten complaint to the Supreme Court, through
Assistant Court Administrator Antonio H. Dujua dated March 28, 2005, by the complainant Carmen P.
Edao charging Judge Fatima G. Asdala, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87, of grave
abuse of discretion and authority, and of conduct unbecoming of a judge. A complaint was also lodged
against Myrla Nicandro, a stenographer detailed in the same RTC branch, for usurpation of authority,
grave misconduct and unauthorized solicitations. Upon receipt of the complaint, we referred it to Court of
Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo for investigation in order to ascertain the veracity
of the complainants accusations and grievances.[1]
The complaint stemmed from a civil case for Support with a prayer for Support Pendente Lite[2] filed by the
complainant on behalf of her two minor children, Carlo and Jay-ar, against George Butler, who denies
paternity of the children.Then pairing judge, Teodoro A. Bay, issued an Order dated November 12, 1999,
directing defendant Butler to provide support pendente lite in the amount of P5,000 per month to be
delivered to the mother (the complainant herein) within the first five (5) days of each month.[3] A writ of
execution was subsequently issued which included the garnishing of rental payments for the apartments
in Cubao, Quezon City, which are being managed by defendant Butler. It was at this juncture that
respondent Judge Asdala took cognizance of the case.
Due to the failure of defendant Butler to comply with the November 12, 1999 Order of the trial court, despite
several reprimands and orders to implement, complainant Edao moved to cite defendant Butler in
contempt. On November 23, 2004, respondent Judge Asdala found defendant Butler guilty of indirect
contempt and sentenced him to four (4) months imprisonment and a P30,000.00 fine. Subsequently a Bench
Warrant was issued against defendant Butler.[4]
On January 25, 2005, after privately meeting with defendant Butler in her chambers, respondent
Judge Asdala issued the following ex-parte Order:
Following his knowledge of Bench Warrant against him, defendant George Butler,
personally appeared before the Presiding Judge and pleaded that the contempt fine
imposed against him be reduced to P5,000.00 and that the Bench Warrant be recalled.
The matter will be taken under advisement.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The following ex-parte Order was also issued by respondent Judge Asdala:
In the highest interest of justice, the October 7, 2004 and November 26, 2004[6]Order finding
the defendant guilty of indirect contempt is hereby reconsidered.As such, the fine is
reduced to P5,000.00 and the corresponding order of imprisonment is set aside.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On February 1, 2005, defendant Butler paid the P5,000.00 fine.[8] On March 22, 2005, respondent Judge
Asdala dismissed complainant Edaos suit on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.[9] The case is now
pending before the CA after the appellate court ordered the trial court to give due course to the
complainants notice of appeal.
In the complainants letter-complaint, she laments the fact that without notice, much less consent,
respondent Judge Asdala met privately with defendant Butler in her chambers to discuss the finding of
indirect contempt against the latter without any hearing or minutes of the proceedings and without her or
her counsels participation. As a result of the said private meeting, the fine was reduced from P30,000
to P5,000, the order of imprisonment was deleted, and the Bench Warrant was recalled. The complainant
likewise alleges that respondent Judge Asdala forced her to file a complaint for neglect of duty against her
own counsel, Atty. Rowena Alejandria, with the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), as respondent Judge
Asdala had a grudge against Atty. Alejandria. She likewise claims that she was given P1,000 by respondent
Judge Asdala for her silence.The complainant also faults respondent Judge Asdala for ordering the
support pendente lite to be deposited with the Office of the Clerk of Court instead of being directly given to
the complainant and for applying the money thus deposited to the payment of the P5,000 fine instead of
being given to the complainant. Further, she questions the dismissal of the civil case for support on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, alleging that the basis of the findings is the testimony of Butler which
was already stricken off the record as of January 28, 2001.
As against respondent Myrla Nicandro, the complainant alleges that the former subtracted certain amounts
from the P10,000 deposited by defendant Butlers daughter, Cristy, before turning over the money to
her. Allegedly, the amounts subtracted were given to the respondents. The complainant likewise questions
respondent Nicandros discharge of the functions of Officer-in-Charge (OIC)/ Acting Branch Clerk of Court
when the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), did not approve her
designation as such.
In her defense, respondent Judge Asdala avers that the recall of the bench warrant and the reduction of the
fine are matters of judicial discretion. She insists that, after the representation of Mr. Butler of his financial
inability to pay the original fine, the amendment to her previous orders was more in keeping with justice
and fairness. Respondent Judge Asdala likewise denies the charges that she instigated a complaint against
Atty. Alejandria. She points to the fact that the complainant herself wrote a letter of apology
dated November 19, 2004to Atty. Alejandria withdrawing her complaint and retracting the statements
made therein. As for the designation of respondent Nicandro as OIC for administrative services in Branch
87, respondent Judge Asdala avers that the same was with the knowledge of the Executive Judge of Quezon
City; and that as presiding judge of Branch 87, she has the discretion and the authority to appoint whoever
has her trust and confidence. With regard to the decision to dismiss the civil case for support, respondent
Judge Asdala maintains that the proper remedy is to elevate the matter to the appellate court and not to
file an administrative case against her.
Respondent Nicandro, for her part, denies misrepresenting herself as OIC. She avers that she was acting
under the designation made by respondent Judge Asdala, with the knowledge of the Executive Judge. As
for the other accusations made by the complainant, respondent Nicandro insists that the same are blatant
lies. She denies soliciting money from the complainant, and avers that it was in fact the complainant who
would frequently go to Branch 87 and borrow money from the court personnel who, out of pity, would
oblige to lend her small amounts from time to time. She maintains that at the time the complainant claimed
the P10,000 deposited by Butler, respondent Nicandro reminded her of her debts to a number of court
personnel P400 to process server Lito de la Cruz, P100 to Sheriff Victor Yaneza, and P100 to court
stenographer Elenita Ribaya.Respondent Nicandro allegedly reminded the complainant that she owed
respondent Judge Asdala P500 which the latter gave as payment for Sheriffs fee.The payment, however,
was no longer accepted by the respondent judge who, instead, directed respondent Nicandro to use the
same to buy snacks for the court staff. The same was corroborated by respondent Judge Asdala.
As stated in the Investigation Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice, the act of a judge
done within his judicial discretion, such as the reduction of fine for indirect contempt, should not be subject
to disciplinary action. In the instant complaint, however, the exercise of discretion by the respondent is not
impugned. Rather, it is the conduct of respondent Judge Asdala in meeting with defendant Butler without
notice or knowledge, much less the presence, of the complainant or her representative that is assailed. The
meeting was not an innocuous one for it resulted in the cancellation of the bench warrant, the revocation
of the order of imprisonment and the significant reduction in the amount of fine from P30,000.00
to P5,000.00. Respondent Judge Asdala does not deny the private meeting, much less explain its
circumstances. As rightly observed by the Investigating Justice, the private meeting was improper, to say
the least. It deprived the complainant of her right to be heard on matters affecting her vital interests. The
secret meeting cannot but invite suspicion, for no minutes or stenographic notes of the meeting have been
presented, if any existed.Respondent judge cannot feign ignorance of the fact that our courts are courts of
record.
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct
themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial
system.[10] The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary[11] mandates that judges must
not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance
of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality,
as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office,
but also to the personal demeanor of judges.[12] This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also
to the process by which the decision is made.Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ensure
that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable
observers. Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality have been
observed by judges and reflected in their decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so
observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system.[13] Thus, judges
must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of justice. To
further emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states:
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows:
In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the Office of the Court Administrator
that judges have been meeting with party litigants inside their chambers, judges are hereby
cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party and his counsel
present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they only
act impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper.[14]
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself
but also to the process by which the decision is made.[15] As such, judges must ensure that their conduct,
both in and out of the court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. [16] In the same vein, the Code of Judicial
Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities,
as such is essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge in order to maintain the trust and
respect of the people in the judiciary.[17]
In the case at bar, respondent Judge Asdalas actions as above discussed put into question the impartiality,
independence, and integrity of the process by which the questioned amended orders were reached. Her
actions miserably fell short in the discharge of her duty as an officer of the court and as a living embodiment
of law and justice.
Further, respondent Judge Asdala, in insisting on the designation of respondent Nicandro as OIC, blithely
and willfully disregarded the Memorandum of this Court, through the OCA, which approved the
designation of Amy Soneja alone -- and not in conjunction with respondent Nicandro -- as OIC.[18] While
the presiding judge, such as respondent Judge Asdala, can recommend and endorse persons to a particular
position, this recommendation has to be approved by this Court. Again, the respondent judge ought to
know that the Constitution grants this Court administrative supervision over all the courts and personnel
thereof. In the case at bar, despite the Courts approval of Amy Sonejas designation, the respondent judge
allowed, if not insisted on, the continued discharge of the duties of OIC by respondent
Nicandro. Respondent Judge Asdala even had the gall to insist that as presiding judge she has the authority
and discretion to designate anyone who works under her, as long as that person enjoys her trust and
confidence.[19] Coming from a judge, such arrogance, if not ignorance, is inexcusable. The memorandum
from the OCA regarding the designation of court personnel is no less an order from this Court. Court
officials and personnel, particularly judges, are expected to comply with the same. Respondent judges
gross insubordination cannot be countenanced.
This is not the first time that respondent Judge Asdala has been disciplined and penalized by this
Court. She has been found guilty of various administrative complaints in at least four (4) other
occasions.[20] In 1999, in Dumlao, Jr. v. Asdala,[21] respondent Judge Asdala was admonished for
partiality. A year later, in Bowman v. Asdala,[22] she was fined P2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion in
nine (9) cases when she deliberately withheld and did not attach a copy of her order of inhibition which
resulted in the non-transmittal of the records of the criminal cases. In 2005, in Manansala III v.
Asdala,[23] she was likewise ordered to pay a fine of P40,000.00, the highest fine that may be imposed for
serious offenses committed by judges and justices,[24] for gross misconduct after she interfered with a case
of a German national who was then detained at the police station awaiting inquest investigation. In the
said case, respondent Judge Asdala requested the German nationals release from custody and asked for
the amicable settlement of the case against the latter.Compounding her transgressions, respondent Judge
Asdala likewise ordered her courts sheriff to engage the assistance of policemen in order to retrieve the
German nationals car so that it may be turned over to her custody. Just last year, in 2006, in Request of
Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala, RTC-Branch 87, Quezon City, for Extension of the Period to Decide Civil
Case No. Q-02-
46950 & 14 Others,[25] this Court once again imposed a fine of P11,000.00 on respondent judge for her
repeated and unjustifiable failure to render decisions within the prescribed period. Each penalty imposed
on her in the said cases came with a stern warning that the subsequent commission of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent Judge Asdala has time and time again blatantly
disregarded this stream of warnings. Such repeated infractions and heedless transgressions can no longer
be countenanced by this Court. As we have repeatedly stressed, there is no place in the judiciary for those
who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. [26]
Be that as it may, the accusation that respondent Judge Asdala instigated the complainant to file a complaint
against Atty. Alejandria must be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Similarly, we agree with the
Investigating Justice that the dismissal of the civil case for support cannot be a ground for administrative
complaint as the matter is on appeal with the CA and appeal is the appropriate remedy of the aggrieved
party.
Respondent Nicandro, on her part, has been accused of usurping the functions of OIC. While she acted on
the strength of the memorandum of respondent Judge Asdala designating her as such, it is undeniable that
she is aware of the memorandum of this Court, through the OCA, approving Amy Sonejas designation as
OIC/Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Nicandros continued exercise of the functions of OIC after the
disapproval of her designation is a clear defiance of the instruction of this Court.
As to the charge of unauthorized solicitation, it is clear that respondent Nicandro, at the very least, acted
as collection agent of the
office staff with regard to the alleged amounts owed by complainant. Such action on the part of respondent
Nicandro lacks the propriety and proper decorum expected of a court personnel. This is not the first time
that this Court had censured respondent Nicandros behavior in dealing with party litigants. Early this year,
on February 12, 2007, she was fined for gross insubordination for her willful failure and indifference to the
orders of this Court despite having been found in contempt for her refusal to comply with the said
orders. She was also reprimanded for willful failure to pay a just debt despite repeated demands from the
complainant therein.[27] Such infractions are conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
This Court has repeatedly stressed its unbending policy not to tolerate or condone any act or
omission that falls short of the exacting norms of public office, especially on those expected to preserve the
image of the judiciary.Again, this Court will not shirk from its responsibility of weeding out those who
stain the integrity and dignity of the judiciary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Respondent Judge Fatima G. Asdala is found GUILTY of gross insubordination and gross
misconduct unbefitting a member of the judiciary and is accordingly DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave credits to which she may be entitled.
2. Respondent Myrla Nicandro is found GUILTY of insubordination in assuming the position and
discharging the functions of OIC/ Branch Clerk of Court without and in defiance of proper authority and
is accordingly SUSPENDED from the service for a period of sixty (60) days, without pay, commencing on
the day immediately following her receipt of a copy of this Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The period of suspension shall not be chargeable
against her leave credits. Respondent Nicandro is likewise ordered to immediately cease and desist from
discharging the functions of OIC/Branch Clerk of Court and from representing herself as such.
Respondent Nicandro is likewise REPRIMANDED for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and ordered to abstain from transacting with party litigants other than for official purposes.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-39516-17 January 28, 1975

ROSARIO CASTILLO and SONIA VILLASANTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE CELESTINO JUAN, respondent.
Castillo and Morales Law Offices for petitioners.
Respondent Judge in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:
In this certiorari proceedings, petitioners, two young maidens who are the offended parties in two rape
cases, assail the actuation of respondent Judge and seek his disqualification on the ground of bias and
prejudice. What was done by him, according to their strongly-worded petition, was in disregard of the
highly-prized ideal in adjudication, likewise a due process requirement, that a litigant "is entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."1 Briefly, on two separate occasions on August 15 and
27, 1974, in the secrecy of his chambers he informed petitioners of the weakness of their cases, the likelihood
of a verdict of acquittal in favor of the accused, and impressed upon them that it would be to their
advantage to settle, as the most he could do on their behalf was to have such accused indemnify them. This
move, according to him, would assure their being spared from the embarrassment occasioned by suits of
this character, clearly prejudicial to their future. These conversations took place even before the prosecution
had finished presenting its evidence, one of the petitioners not having testified as yet. Respondent Judge
could not very well deny that he did invite them to confer with him, but he would impress on this Court
that their version should not be let credence and that he was prompted to act thus from the best of motives,
"as an act of charity" and as a "clear attempt to humanize justice."2 With the problem thus laid bare and the
essentials exposed to view, it is obvious that the petitions are impressed with merit. Respect for a number
of decisions, most of them recent in character, yields no other conclusion.
Petitioners are entitled to the remedy sought. Respondent Judge must be disqualified from further hearing
the cases.
1. In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are
crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or
even to give the appearance of catering to the at times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is
to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself
open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own
sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the
traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep
the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked
proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he
should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartially. What has been said is not merely a matter of
judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance. As set forth in Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz:3 "It is now
beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part
of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge
who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon:
"It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
Judge.""4 The above excerpt is from the leading case of Gutierrez v. Santos.5 The Villaluz decision is only one
of a number of cases where Gutierrez was cited with approval. 6 In Geotina v. Gonzales,7 a judge, according
to Justice Castro, the ponente, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A
judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity." 8
It is in line with the above due process requirement that the Rules of Court provide for disqualification of
judge 9outside of the instances referring to their pecuniary interest, relationship, previous connection, or
his having presided in an inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review. 10 The 1964
amendment contains this additional paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above." 11 An
excerpt from the Villaluz opinion is again relevant: "Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench
that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for
adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling
for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or predilections
are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such should make its appearance and prove difficult
to resist, the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood.
His reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of an
impartial administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is due process vindicated." 12 What is more, in the
event that a judge may be unable to discern for himself his inability to meet the test of the cold neutrality
required of him, this Court has seen to it that he should disqualify himself. 13 From what has been set forth,
this certainly is another one of such cases.
2. This is not to discount in its entirety the submission of respondent Judge, who argued on his own behalf,
that his final decision would be dependent on the evidence that could be presented by petitioners. What
cannot be denied, however, is that after such conferences, they could no longer be expected to have faith
in his impartiality. Even before they had been fully heard, they were told that their cases were weak. They
could very well conclude then that there was a prejudgment. Under the circumstances, the fact that he
acted as he did because any monetary settlement would benefit petitioners, considering their straitened
financial circumstances, was of no moment. Even if it be admitted that, according to his best lights,
respondent Judge acted from a sense of sympathy or "charity", his conduct cannot be said to be consonant
with the exacting standard of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The administration of justice would
thus be subject to a reproach if there be a rejection of the plea for disqualification.
3. It is to be made clear, moreover, that nothing said in this opinion has reference to the merits of the two
prosecutions for rape. That is not a matter before us. The controversy passed upon is whether respondent
Judge should continue to preside at such trial. The decision reached goes no further than that he should
not. That accomplished, the hearings should continue, with the outcome dependent on an appraisal,
according to law, of the evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense. .
WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petitions for certiorari, and respondent Judge is ordered to desist from
further conducting the trial of the two prosecutions for rape, Criminal Cases Nos. 733 and 734 of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, respectively entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernesto
de Villa and People of the Philippines v. Ernesto de Villa. No costs.
DIMO REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC. AND LUZ M. DIZON, petitioners, vs. LEONARDO P.
DIMACULANGAN, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated March 20, 1997 and the Resolution[2] dated October 10, 1997, both
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40963, Dimo Realty & Development Inc., and Spouses
Gregorio and Luz Mojares Dizon vs. Hon. Pedro T. Santiago, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 101, and Leonardo P. Dimaculangan.
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
On February 14, 1995, Leonardo P. Dimaculangan, respondent, filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, a complaint for specific performance against Dimo Realty & Development, Inc.
(Dimo Realty) and spouses Gregorio and Luz Mojares Dizon, petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. Q95-
23006.
The complaint alleges that sometime in 1967 to 1968, petitioners engaged the services of respondent
as geodetic surveyor to subdivide (into subdivision lots) two (2) parcels of land situated in Barrio Namuco,
Rosario, Batangas covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) Nos. T-25972 and T-24294 of the Registry
of Deeds of that province. As payment for respondents services, petitioner agreed to give him one (1)
subdivision lot (Lot 19, Block 17 covered by TCT No. T-25972) at Villa Luz Subdivision and pay
him P9,200.00 in cash. After the completion of respondents work, petitioners paid him P9,200.00 in
installments and delivered to him possession of the lot.However, despite respondents demands, petitioners
failed to deliver the title of the lot, prompting him to file with the RTC a complaint for specific performance
and damages.
Instead of filing an answer, petitioners, on March 27, 1995, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the following grounds: (1) the cause of action has prescribed or is barred by the statute of limitations; (2)
venue was improperly laid considering that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject property
situated in Batangas; (3) the claim is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and (3) the
complaint fails to state a sufficient cause of action.
On June 27, 1995, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint for improper venue.
Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for inhibition.
In an Order dated July 11, 1995, the trial court granted the motion for inhibition, hence, the case was
re-raffled to Branch 101 of the same RTC at Quezon City. On August 21, 1995, this Branch issued an
Order granting respondents motion for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the complaint, thus:
A close scrutiny of the allegations in the complaint indubitably show that the above-captioned case is one
for specific performance, and therefore, a personal action. The complaint seeks not the recovery of the lot
as plaintiff is already in possession thereof, but the peaceful delivery of the title covering said lot. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff likewise seeks the recovery of real property, this is,
however, merely an incident to the principal personal action which is for the enforcement of the agreement
between the parties.
Hence, the above-captioned case being a personal action, the court in the place where the plaintiff resides,
i.e. Quezon City, is the proper venue of the action.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff being impressed
with merit is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
From the said Order, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
Meanwhile, petitioner Dimo Realty filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) at Rosario, Batangas
two (2) separate complaints for unlawful detainer and forcible entry against Jose Matibag and spouses
Benjamin and Zenaida Dela Roca (lot buyers), docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 796 and 797, respectively. This
prompted respondent to file with the trial court (Branch 101) a motion for issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction against petitioner Dimo Realty and the MTC of
Rosario, Batangas. Acting thereon, the trial court, in an Order dated October 2, 1995, issued a TRO and
subsequently, a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner and the MTC from proceeding with
Civil Cases Nos. 796 and 797 pending hearing x x x.
Immediately, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to lift the TRO and the writ of preliminary
injunction and an urgent motion for inhibition, but were denied in an Order dated October 20, 1995.
On October 30, 1995, petitioners filed consolidated motions for reconsideration and for resolution but
were denied in an Order dated June 5, 1995. In the same Order, the trial court set the case for pre-trial on
July 3, 1996.
As a consequence, on June 18, 1996, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus (with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction) seeking (1) to
nullify the trial courts Order dated August 21, 1995 granting respondents motion for reconsideration; Order
of October 20, 1995 denying petitioners motion to lift the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction and
motion for inhibition; and Order dated June 5, 1996 denying petitioners consolidated motions for
reconsideration and for resolution; (2) to prohibit the trial court from hearing Civil Case No. Q95-23006;
and (3) to dismiss the complaint for improper venue.
On March 20, 1997, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the following orders are hereby ordered PARTIALLY NULLIFIED:
1. October 20, 1995 Order only insofar as it ordered the issuance of the temporary restraining order, and
subsequently, the preliminary injunction;
2. June 5, 1996 Order only insofar as it ordered the setting of the case for pre-trial;
Consequently, as an incident to item number 2 above, the respondent judge is hereby ordered to DESIST
from further proceedings with Civil Case Q 95-23006, except to ISSUE an order directing the petitioners
herein to file their answer to the complaint. Until then, or after such time for filing the answer has expired,
the respondent judge may not as yet proceed with the case.
On the other hand, the rest of the petitioners prayers are hereby ordered DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated as follows:
After a careful study of the orders assailed in this petition, we conclude that the respondent judge did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion insofar as the order dated August 21, 1995 is concerned. Thus, we
agree with his findings that the case filed by Dimaculangan is a personal action involving as it does the
mere delivery of the title to Lot 19, Block 17, which he, undisputably, already holds possession thereof. It
does not, in any way, involve the issue of ownership over the particular property, as this is not disputed
by the petitioners, that the same property belongs to Dimaculangan.
In an attempt to put in issue the ownership over the particular property, the petitioners continuously rely
on the doctrine in the case of Espineli v. Santiago. In Espineli, the issue is, who as between Mrs. Ramirez, on
the one hand, and the Espinelis on the other, has a better right to the aforementioned Lot 34. Clearly, the
ownership over the property has been put in issue.However, in the case at bar, the petitioners do not deny
the fact that Dimaculangan is already in possession of the property. Thus, Espineli is somewhat
misplaced. The case at bar is one for specific performance for the delivery of the title to the property. As
such, it is a personal action.Consequently, venue has been property laid in the court of Quezon City, it
being the residence of Dimaculangan.
Likewise, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge when he issued
the October 20, 1995 Order, at least insofar as the issue of inhibition is concerned.
Verily, a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself voluntarily from sitting in a case,
but it should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and valid reasons. It is not enough
that a party throws some tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge.No less than imperative is that it is
the judges sacred duty to administer justice without fear or favor.
However, we find that insofar as he ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction in the October 20,
1995 Order, the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction. It must be noted that the injunction was
directed against DIMO Realty and any other persons acting in their behalf, as well as the MTC, Rosario,
Batangas, Fourth Judicial Region, enjoining and restraining them from proceeding with Civil Cases 796 and
797 pending before the MTC, Rosario, Batangas, Fourth Judicial Region, pending hearing and resolution
on whether a preliminary injunction should issue. On the other hand, the regional trial court where the
judge sits is located in Quezon City, and as such, properly belongs to the National Capital Judicial
Region. This being the case, it is clear that the respondent judge has exceeded his jurisdiction because an
injunction issued by him may only be enforced in any part of the region. Consequently, the temporary
restraining order, and subsequently, the preliminary injunction issued by the respondent judge are hereby
ordered nullified, having been issued in excess of his jurisdiction.
But such error of the respondent judge does not necessarily warrant his inhibition in the case. At most, it is
only correctible by certiorari, as in this particular petition.
Similarly, we do not find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge insofar as he denied
in his Order of June 5, 1996, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses and DIMO Realty. As we
mentioned in the earlier part of this decision, we agree with the findings of the respondent judge insofar as
it ruled that the case filed by Dimaculangan is a personal action.Hence, the respondent judge did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied the Motion for Reconsideration. We therefore uphold
the validity of this Order.
With regard to the order of the respondent judge setting the case for pre-trial, we find that the same was
issued in grave abuse of his discretion. We agree with the observation made by the petitioner that the issues
have not yet been joined as the petitioners herein have not yet filed an answer. On this score, the writs
prayed for must be granted. The respondent judge must order the petitioners herein to file their
answer. Until then, or after such time for filing the answer has expired, the respondent judge may not as
yet proceed with the case.
From the said Decision, both parties filed their motions for reconsideration but were denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
For our resolution are the twin issues of whether the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding that
respondents complaint is a personal action; and (2) in sustaining the trial courts Order denying petitioners
motion for inhibition.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law
and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. In Deltaventures Resources, Inc. vs. Cabato,[3] we held:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein a
matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based
on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.[4]
Let us examine respondents allegations in his complaint. The pertinent allegations are quoted as
follows:
xxx
2. Sometime in 1967 to 1968, the services of plaintiff as geodetic surveyor was hired by the defendants to
subdivide into subdivision lots parcels of lands located at Rosario, Batangas, in the name of defendant
spouses which is covered by TCT T-25972 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas and TCT T-24294 in the
name of Ruperto Rodelas x x x:
xxx
3. It was the agreement of the parties that plaintiffs services will be paid with one (1) lot of the subdivision
now called VILLA LUZ SUBDIVISION and originally covered by TCT T-25972, designated as Lot 19, Block
17 of the subdivision plan plus the additional amount of P9,200.00 to be paid in cash with the understanding
that upon accomplishment of the subdivision plan and full payment of the agreed price, the corresponding
title to said lot already transferred in the name of the plaintiff be delivered to the plaintiff.
xxx
4. On several occasions from 1968 to 1975, plaintiff paid the additional amount of P9,200.00 by installments.
xxx
5. Plaintiff has been making verbal demands upon defendants, every now and then, for the delivery of the
title to Lot 19, Block 17 of the subdivision already named VILLA LUZ SUBDIVISION but defendant spouses
have been giving the plaintiff a runaround.
xxx
8. Verbal demands have been made upon defendants to deliver the title of the lot in question but defendants
refused and continued to refuse to deliver said lot to the plaintiff without any valid reason at all.
x x x.
From the above allegations, it can easily be discerned that respondent is asserting that petitioners
violated the contract of services by refusing to deliver the title of the subject lot to him and is thus
demanding that they comply with their obligation.
It bears emphasis that respondent does not allege in his complaint that he is seeking to recover the lot
from petitioners. This is because he has been in possession thereof. In fact, petitioner Dimo Realty even
filed with the MTC of Rosario, Batangas two (2) separate complaints for unlawful detainer and forcible
entry against respondents buyers. It is thus clear that what is being claimed by respondent is simply the
delivery of the title to him as payment for his services.
It follows that the complaint below is not a real action, but a personal action.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:
SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
x x x.
SECTION 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or
in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. [5]
Considering that respondents complaint, being one for specific performance, we agree with the Court
of Appeals that the venue is in the RTC of Quezon City since respondent (then plaintiff) resides at No. 8
Cavite Street, West Avenue, Quezon City.
Petitioners further claim that the Appellate Court should not have sustained the trial courts denial of
petitioners motion for inhibition.
Suffice it to state that whether judges should inhibit themselves from a case rests on their own "sound
discretion." Otherwise stated, inhibition partakes of voluntariness on the part of the judges
themselves. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. [6] In a catena of cases, we
held that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be
proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not
suffice. These cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred obligation of judges whose
oaths of office require them to administer justice without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor
and the rich.[7]
Here, petitioners merely alleged the arbitrary issuance of a temporary restraining order without
however showing bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. In fact, the Court of Appeals held that
such error of the respondent judge does not necessarily warrant his inhibition in the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 20, 1997 and the
Resolution dated October 10, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 40963 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LEONARDO NUGUID y MAYAO, appellant.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision[1] dated 16 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 00-179698. The trial court found Leonardo Nuguid y Mayao
(appellant) guilty of the crime of serious illegal detention with rape and imposed on him the death penalty.
The Charge
The Information charging appellant with the crime of serious illegal detention with rape reads:
That on or about January 1, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private
individual and without authority of law, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally detain (sic)
ROWENA RIANZARES Y MIRANDA by then and there taking and locking her inside his room located at
1932 Firmeza Street, Sampaloc, this City, and preventing her from going out of said room for a period of
three (3) hours, more or less, thereby depriving her of her liberty and during the said period of time, said
accused by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by poking a knife, threatening to kill her
should she resist and choking her, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in
having carnal knowledge of her, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
Arraignment and Plea
When arraigned on 14 February 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea
of not guilty.[3]
The Trial
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented four witnesses: (1) complainant Rowena Rianzares (Rowena); (2) Dr.
Mirasol Pangan of the U.P. Philippine General Hospital Obstetrics and Gynecology Department, who
examined the complainant; (3) Eldee Eusebio; and (4) Dante Magat.
The Solicitor General summarized the prosecutions version of the incident in the Peoples Brief as
follows:
On December 31, 1999, about 7 oclock in the evening, appellant and his companions (names not on record)
were having a drinking spree outside the house of Jun Rianzares xxx. (p. 5, TSN, May 22, 2000).
About 2 oclock in the morning of the following day or right after the New Years eve celebration, Jun
Rianzares left their house to see a friend. His wife, Rowena Rianzares, was left behind sleeping inside the
room of their house with their daughter [six (6) years old] and son [three (3) years old] (pp. 3-4, ibid.).
After a while, Rowena Rianzares heard a knock at the door of their room. Consequently, she rose from the
bed and partially opened the door to look [at] who was knocking. It was appellant. Appellant tried to push
open the door, telling Rowena Rianzares that her husband was asking for money to buy liquor. Rowena
Rianzares got suspicious because her husband had money at that time and he would not ask money from
her. Rowena Rianzares thus closed the door (pp. 3-5, ibid.)
Thereafter, Rowena Rianzares went back to sleep. A few minutes later, she heard appellant upstairs
repeatedly shouting that her husband was very mad because he did not have money to buy liquor. When
she heard appellant say that her husband was allegedly mad, she opened the door of their room and went
out. She went inside appellants room which was located in front of their room to confront him. She told
appellant: Bakit hihingi ng pera si Kuya Jun mo may pera naman siya? Immediately thereafter, appellant rushed
to her back and placed his left arm around her neck with his right hand holding a kitchen knife, about
twelve (12) inches long (pp. 5-6 and 12, ibid.).
Rowena Rianzares got surprised and, consequently, pushed appellants left arm. In the process, Rowena
Rianzares got off balance and fell down xxx the stairway screaming. She asked for help shouting her
husbands name (p. 11, ibid.)
Appellant immediately went after Rowena Rianzares and upon catching up with her, appellant held her
hair and left arm. He then dragged her upstairs towards his (appellants) room (pp. 5-6, ibid.)
Inside the room, appellant asked Rowena Rianzares to undress while pointing the knife he was holding at
her right rear side of the body. He threatened to kill Rowena Rianzares if she did not undress herself. Out
of fear, she was forced to undress herself.
Then, appellant kissed the different parts of her body. Rowena Rianzares struggled and resisted. She
grappled for possession of the knife and succeeded in holding its bladed portion causing her injury on the
right palm. She persisted in grappling for possession of the knife but failed. In the process, she sustained a
further injury on her left arm. Instead of relenting, appellant pulled her and slapped the back of her head.
Thereafter, appellant dragged and forced her to lie down on the lower portion of the double [deck] bed
located inside appellants room (pp. 6-13, ibid.).
While Rowena Rianzares was xxx lying down xxx with her legs spread apart, appellant placed himself on
top of her. He placed his left foot under Rowena Rianzares left leg and his right foot on Rowena Rianzares
right leg. While in that position, appellant forced his private organ into Rowena Rianzares private part.
Rowena Rianzares continued to shout for help but appellant poked the knife at the left side of her body.
While appellant was raping her, he pointed the knife at Rowena Rianzares private part and told her that
he wanted to get [a] thrill out of it because he could not get a full erection since he was under the influence
of shabu. Rowena Rianzares pleaded [with] appellant to stop and assured him that she would help him get
out xxx but appellant remained unmoved (pp. 13-17, ibid.).
About ten (10) minutes after Rowena Rianzares was dragged by appellant to his room, somebody knocked
at appellants door and shouted: Bernie ano ba ang ginagawa mo dyan? Appellant answered back: Umalis kayo
kundi papatayin ko ito. (pp. 18-19, ibid.).
Eldee Eusebio, a neighbor of spouses Jun and Rowena Rianzares at Firmeza Street, Sampaloc, Manila (p. 7,
TSN, May 30, 2000), testified that on January 1, 2000, about 2:15 in the morning, he went to the house of
his Kuya Jose Jun Rianzares because he was summoned by the latter (p. 4, TSN, May 30, 2000). When he
was about to enter the house, Eldee Eusebio heard Rowena Rianzares shout. Immediately, Eldee Eusebio
kicked the entrance gate of the house to open it. He then hurriedly went upstairs and saw Rowena
Rianzares using her feet in trying to prevent the door of appellants room from closing. After the door was
closed, he immediately knocked at the door. Appellant, however, shouted, telling him to leave and nobody
should go up; otherwise, he would kill Rowena Rianzares (pp. 4-5, ibid.).
Consequently, Eldee Eusebio went outside the house to look for Jun Rianzares because he did not see him
inside the house. When he found Jun Rianzares, he told him that there was a problem in his house (p. 5,
ibid.).
About thirty (30) minutes later, Rowena Rianzares husband arrived. Jun Rianzares knocked at appellants
door and asked appellant what was he doing to his wife. Appellant pounded the floor, using the handle of
the knife and shouted. He asked Jun Rianzares to leave him alone; otherwise, he would kill his wife (pp.
18-19, May 22, 2000).
Thirty (30) minutes thereafter, Barangay Councilor Nida Magat, together with her husband, Dante Magat,
arrived. She and her relatives negotiated for Rowena Rianzares release. However, appellant told them to
leave; otherwise, he would kill Rowena Rianzares. While they were negotiating for Rowena Rianzares
release, appellant was still on top of her (Rowena Rianzares) (pp. 19-20, ibid.).
After more than an hour of failed negotiations by Barangay Councilor Nida Magat, the policemen took
over (pp. 2-4, TSN, July 11, 2000).
The policemen (names not on record) forcibly opened the door and immediately, thereafter, they got hold
of appellant. Before they could get hold of appellant, however, he (appellant tried to stab Rowena Rianzares
but the latter was able to evade the thrust. Instead, she was hit on her left arm. Then a certain Colonel
Castro pulled Rowena Rianzares and immediately covered her with a blanket (p. 20, TSN, May 22, 2000).
xxx
Dr. Mirasol Pangan testified that she was the one who physically examined Rowena Rianzares. She testified
that she examined Rowena Rianzares body from head to foot. She found the following injuries on her body:
1. one (1) hematoma on the right neck;
2. two (2) abrasions at the left lower hip approximately 0.5cm.;
3. one (1) abrasion at the left forearm;
4. one (1) abrasion hematoma-circular at the left lower arm;
5. multiple abrasion hematoma at the volar aspect of the second, fourth digits of right hand
and under the nose;
6. one (1) hematoma at the back and the anterior tract the largest of which measures 6 x1
cm.;
7. one (1) stab wound at the left forearm; and
8. one (1) hematoma measuring two cm. at the right labia minora of the genitalia. [4]
Version of the Defense
Appellant Leonardo Nuguid was the sole witness for the defense. The Public Attorney summarized
the defenses version of what transpired, as follows:
Leonardo Nuguid testified that he knew the victim because he worked in the latters Manila K-9 college as
their dog trainer. He had been working with the Rianzares [spouses] for five (5) years. (TSN, September 11,
2000, pp. 1-4)
On December 31, 1999 at about 10:30 p.m., Rowena Rianzares entered his room. He asked her what she
wanted but Rowena did not answer and instead she kissed him on the lips. He had sex with Rowena and
the latters husband arrived. Jun called up for Rowena but the latter told her husband that she was in the
accused-appellants room talking with the latter. Jun left at around 11:00 pm and Rowena stayed in his room
until the police called by her husband arrived. He told Rowena to go out of the room but the latter refused
to do so. The police kept on convincing them to go out of the room but Rowena told them that they were
just talking and they would go out soon. The police kicked the door open and he was arrested. He was
brought to the police station wherein he was mauled and was forced to confess that he raped Rowena. The
first time he had sexual intercourse with Rowena was the middle of 1998 when they went to Bulacan.
Rowena told her then that she saw in him what was lacking in her husband. Rowenas husband was an
alcoholic and a drug user. He does not know why she filed [t]his serious illegal detention with rape [charge]
against him. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 1-15)
He testified that he had worked with Rianzares from 1995-2000. There was a time he had an argument with
Jun so he was asked to leave the Rianzares house. (TSN, September 11,2000, pp. 15-16)
The first time he had sexual intercourse with Rowena was when they went to Bulacan to get rice from
Rowenas parents. Prior to January 1, 2000, he had several sexual intercourse (sic) with Rowena. Rowena
gave him several lovenotes but he lost them all. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 15-16)
On January 1, 2000, he did not notice that Rowena was bleeding when she emerged from the room. He was
holding a knife when the police arrested him because he was forced to fight back at the police who were
mauling him inside his room. He had a kitchen knife inside his room because Rowenas husband told him
to bring the kitchen knife inside him (sic) room so that he could easily open the box of firecrackers in case
anybody came to buy. (TSN, September 11, 2000, pp. 24-30)[5]
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court considered the testimonies of Rowena and the other prosecution witnesses to be
straightforward and credible. The physical injuries Rowena suffered, confirmed by the examining
physician and observed by the trial court, corroborated her version of the events.
On the other hand, the trial court found dubious appellants story that he and Rowena were
sweethearts. The trial court held that:
The accuseds sweetheart defense is of doubtful nature and undeserving of credence. Firstly, the accuseds
version of the incident is unnatural and contrary to common human experience. If it was true that the
complainant was in the accuseds room on the second floor at 11:00 p.m., when her husband called her from
the ground floor, she would surely had quickly gotten out of the room, instead of coolly telling her husband
that she was with the accused in the latters room. Secondly, the accuseds declaration is contradicted not
only by the straightforward, convincing and believable testimonies of the complainant and prosecution
witnesses Eusebio and Magat, but also by the physical evidence of the injuries sustained by the
complainant on the occasion of the commission of the crime, Exhibits F and F-1 .[6]
The trial court ruled that the acts of the appellant in locking up Rowena against her will in his room
for three hours, threatening to kill her and then sexually assaulting her, constituted the crime of serious
illegal detention with rape. The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision of 16 May 2001 reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Leonardo Nuguid y Mayao, is hereby convicted of the crime of serious illegal
detention with rape under Article 267 of the Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death
by lethal injection and accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is also sentenced to pay the complainant, Rowena Rianzares y
Miranda, moral and nominal damages in the respective sums of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, with interest
thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Hence, this automatic review.
The Issues
Appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction by contending that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH
RAPE WHEN THE LATTERS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[8]
Appellant, arguing through the Public Attorney, alleged that the trial court erred in rejecting his
sweetheart defense, which was not unlikely since he spent most of his time with Rowena. In the alternative,
appellant claims he is liable only for simple rape because the prosecution failed to show that his primary
purpose was to detain Rowena, thus:
xxx It is undeniable that the accused-appellants primary purpose was to have carnal knowledge of Rowena
Rianzares. The accused-appellant immediately ordered Rowena Rianzares to undress and raped her. As a
matter of fact, even at the time the police forcibly opened the door, Rowena and the accused-appellant were
still both naked and the accused-appellant was still positioned on top of Rowena.[9]
The Solicitor General agreed that appellant is only liable for simple rape under Article 335[10] of the
Revised Penal Code because: (1) it necessarily follows from the Courts ruling in People v. Lactao[11] that
there is no complex crime of illegal detention with rape; [12] and (2) appellant did not release Rowena after
the rape only because her husband and the police were outside appellants room.
In the Reply Brief, the Public Attorney raised as an additional ground for reversal the presiding judges
alleged lack of impartiality in deciding the case.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court shall first discuss the Solicitor Generals contention that there is no complex crime of serious
illegal detention with rape. In People v. Lactao, the Court ruled as follows:
It may be worth to mention at the outset that there is no complex crime of rape with serious illegal
detention. If the purpose is to deprive the offended party of liberty, the crime committed is illegal
detention. And, if during the course of the illegal detention, the offended party is raped, a separate crime
of rape is committed; in this instance, two independent crimes are committed. However, if the objective of
the offender is to rape the victim only, and in the process, the latter had to be illegally detained, only the
crime of rape is committed since illegal detention is deemed absorbed in rape.
Hence, in People v. Ching Suy Sionga, Sionga was found guilty of two independent crimes, i.e., serious illegal
detention and acts of lasciviousness, because the two acts did not come within the purview of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code which applies to complex crimes, for certainly, one cannot be considered as a means
to commit the other. xxx[13] (underscoring supplied)
The decision in Lactao, promulgated on 29 October 1993, explained the rules on the treatment of
serious illegal detention and rape at that time. Prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659)
on 31 December 1993,[14] when the person kidnapped or illegally detained was raped, two independent
crimes of kidnapping and rape were committed.
RA 7659, however, amended the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on serious
illegal detention and kidnapping to read:
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Under this provision, when the person kidnapped or illegally detained is raped, the offense committed
is the special complex crime of serious illegal detention or kidnapping with rape, punishable with the
maximum penalty of death.[15] The last paragraph of Article 267 applies only to instances where the person
illegally detained or kidnapped is raped. It does not provide for a complex crime of rape with serious
illegal detention. As the Court ruled in Lactao, there is no complex crime of illegal detention with rape
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. There is also no complex crime of kidnapping with attempted
rape under Article 48 because there is no single act which results in two or more grave or less grave
felonies. Neither is illegal detention a necessary means for committing rape. [16]
Nonetheless, the Court concurs with the Public Attorney and the Solicitor General that the crime
committed in this case is not serious illegal detention with rape. Rather, appellant is guilty of rape qualified
by the use of a deadly weapon.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code[17] are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in
the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d)
the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.[18]
The essence of illegal detention is the deprivation of the victims liberty. The prosecution must prove
actual confinement or restriction of the victim, and that such deprivation was the intention of the
appellant.[19] The accused must have acted purposely or knowingly to restrain the victim because what
constitutes the offense is taking coupled with intent to restrain.[20]
We agree with the Public Attorney that the facts in the present case indicate that appellants principal
objective was not to deprive Rowena of her liberty. We quote from the findings of the trial court:
xxx Caught by surprise, the complainant struggled to free herself from the hold of the accused and ran
down the stairway, but in her haste she stumbled and fell down. The accused followed her down; held her
hair and left hand and dragged her upstairs to his room, while she shouted for help. Once inside the room,
the accused forced the complainant to undressed (sic) and then he kissed all the parts of her body. The
complainant tried to resist and in the process, she sustained a wound in her left arm and a knife wound in
her right palm, Exhibit F. The accused forced the complainant to lie on a bed and placed himself on top of
her and at the same time position his knees between her legs and forced them to separate. After which he
proceeded to rape her, and while doing so, he remarked to her, Weng (complainants nickname), pasensiya
ka na. Nakabato kasi ako. (Please forgive me because I am high on drug[s]). He further told her that he would
insert the knife he was holding in her vagina to enhance his excitement. xxx Finally, at around 5:00 a.m.,
the police officer forced open the door and barged inside the room, and subdued the dumbfounded
accused who was then on top of the complainant.[21](Emphasis supplied)
From this narration, it is clear that appellants real aim was to have carnal knowledge of
Rowena. Appellant took Rowena no further than to his room - which was only across the hall from
Rowenas room - where he immediately forced her to undress. In fact, appellant was so intent on raping her
that he was still naked and on top of her when the police broke into the room.[22] Taken together, these
circumstances engender doubt that the intention of appellant was to detain Rowena. The detention was
merely incidental to the real objective of appellant.
It is true that appellant kept Rowena inside his room for more than an hour while the police tried to
negotiate with him. However, this does not constitute illegal detention in light of the fact that appellant
was on top of Rowena raping her even while he was shouting at the police and other people outside. This
is borne out by Rowenas testimony:
Q: Could you tell us what was the position of the accused when the policemen forcibly opened
the door?
A: He was on top of me.
Q: For how long [did] the accused stayed (sic) on top of you?
A: Almost two hours from the very start.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant maintained this position until the police barged into the room and subdued him.[24] Given these
facts, appellant is not liable for the crime of serious illegal detention with rape.
However, appellant is still liable for the crime of rape. When the information charges a complex crime
and the evidence fails to support one of the component offenses, the defendant is still liable for the other
offense supported by the evidence.[25]Thus, in People v. Oliva,[26] the Court found Carlito Oliva guilty of
statutory rape even if the information charged him of kidnapping with rape.
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353, provide:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. - Rape is Committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
xxx.
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court held that appellant, with the use of a knife, succeeded in raping Rowena in the early
hours of 1 January 2000. The trial court found the testimonies of Rowena and the other prosecution
witnesses straightforward, convincing and believable and supported by the evidence of the injuries
sustained by Rowena.[27]
The weighing of the testimonies of witnesses is best left to the trial court since it is in the best position
to discharge that function.[28] The trial judge has the advantage of personally observing the conduct and
demeanor of witnesses, an opportunity not available to an appellate court.[29] Absent compelling reasons,
we will not disturb on appeal the trial courts findings on the credibility of a witness.
The Public Attorney argues that Judge Laguio was biased against appellant, and that it was clear from
the judges remarks that he had already concluded that appellant was lying before appellant had finished
presenting his evidence, to wit:
PROS GURAY:
Q: You mean to tell the court that the husband on December 31, 1999 in the evening he left the
house?
A: After we have a drinking spree he left the house.
xxx
THE COURT:
Q: What time was that?
A: I cannot remember.
Q: Was it past 11:00?
A: I cannot remember the time.
Q: You do not know what time the husband left the house?
A: I cannot remember.
xxx
Q: But you said that it was around 10:30 when Rowena entered your room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So how did you know the time? [Y]ou h[a]ve a wristwatch?
A: In my room there was a wall clock.
Q: So you know that the husband of Rowena went out or left the house before 10:30?
A: Yes, sir. Before he left we were drinking together.
Q: Yes. And you said that it was after the two of you drank together that he left?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then you, went up in the room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how many minutes after you entered your room did Rowena entered (sic) your room?
A: 10:30 ho.
Q: Ilang minuto ang nakaraan pagpasok mo sa kuwarto mo na pinasok ka ni Rowena. Huwag ka ng
magmamaangmaangan eh. Nagtatanga-tangahan ka pa eh. O Ilang minuto ang lumipas?
Hindi ka naman mukhang tanga eh. Mukha ka ngang intelihensiya eh.
A: Hindi ko na ho alam eh.
Q: Kaya nga huwag ka ng magtangatangahan. Pagkapasok mo sa kuwarto ilang minuto ang lumipas
bago pumasok sa kuwarto mo si Rowena
A: 10 minutes, sir.
Q: That means that you knew that the husband of Rowena left the house before 10:30 p.m.?
A: (Witness cannot answer)
THE COURT:
Make it on record that the witness cannot answer. Alam mo yung mga taong nagsisinungaling
ganyan hindi makasagot pag nakokorner. People who tell a lie they cannot usually answer
when they are cornered. I dont think there is a need to further cross-examine this
witness.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
Aside from these admittedly deplorable comments, the Court finds no other indications of partiality
or bias in the records of the case. The subject remarks were made after appellant was subjected to extensive
direct and cross-examination.[31] The examination of appellant was no more rigorous than that of Rowenas,
in which Judge Laguio also frequently intervened by posing clarificatory questions. The trial court did not
prohibit appellant from presenting additional evidence or witnesses, although appellant chose not to do
so. At the request of appellants counsel, Judge Laguio ordered a continuance for the defense to continue its
presentation of evidence after appellants testimony.[32]
Further, contradictions and inconsistencies marred appellants testimony. Appellant initially stated
that at 1:00 oclock in the morning on 1 January 2000 he was helping in the house doing household chores
like cleaning the plates and cleaning the house.[33]This conflicts with his narration that Rowena entered his
room at 10:30 oclock in the evening on 31 December 1999 and stayed with him until the police arrived and
kicked his door open.[34] Appellant also stated that he had never gone out with Rowena in the 5 years that
he had worked for her husband.[35] However, appellant later testified that he accompanied Rowena to her
parents house in Bulacan in 1998, where they had sexual intercourse for the first time. [36] Likewise,
appellant originally claimed that he and Rowena had two sexual encounters in 1998 - once in Bulacan and
3 weeks afterwards in the house of Rowena and her husband.[37] He changed this later to many times, more
than 20 times, and then to about 50 times in 1998.[38] Finally, appellant failed in four instances to answer the
questions propounded to him during cross-examination.[39]
We stress that this does not excuse the assailed remarks of Judge Laguio. More circumspect conduct
is expected from a judge of our courts. It is the duty of all judges not only to be impartial but also to appear
impartial.[40] In the future, Judge Laguio should adhere more closely to the rule that a judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. [41]
Nevertheless, after a thorough review of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the
assailed Decision insofar as it found appellant to have raped Rowena. The testimony of Rowena,
corroborated by the results of the medical examination and the testimonies of other witnesses, establish
beyond reasonable doubt that: (1) appellant forcibly succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Rowena on
1 January 2000; and (2) that appellant committed the crime with the use of a deadly weapon, a knife.
In contrast to appellants erratic testimony, Rowena was candid and steadfast in her claim that
appellant raped her, thus:
Q: And what did you [do] after the accused uttered Ate Weng galit na sa iyo si Kuya Jun?
A: I opened the door and went out of our room and I asked Bernie Bakit hihingi ng pera si Kuya
Jun mo may pera naman siya.
THE COURT:
Q: At that time where was the accused?
A: When I talked to him he was inside his room and all of the (sic) sudden he was at my back.
THE COURT:
Continue.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: And what did [he] do after that?
A: He placed his left arm around my neck and his right hand which was holding a knife (stop)
and I saw his right hand holding a knife.
Q: And how did you react when the accused placed his left hand [on] your neck and you saw
him holding a knife?
A: I was surprised. (Nagulat po ako.)
Q: And what did you do?
A: And at the same time I pushed the left area of the accused and in the process I fell to the
stairway all the way down.
Q: And what did the accused do after you fell down?
A: He immediately went down as he held my hair and my left arm and he dragged me upstairs.
Q: And to what place upstairs did the accused drag you?
A: To his room.
Q: By the way, how far is his room [from] your room?
A: The room of the accused is in front of my room.
xxx
Q: When he succeeded in dragging you inside his room what happened next?
A: He asked me to undress.
Q: And did you oblige?
A: He poked the knife he was holding at me and he threatened me. He threatened to kill me.
THE COURT:
Q: So what did you do?
A: I undressed.
Q: While he was poking his knife at you and threatening to kill you. What exactly [were] the
words uttered by him?
A: Sige, maghubad ka. Kung hindi papatayin kita.
Q: And what was he doing with his knife while he was uttering those words?
A: He was poking his knife at the right rear side of my body.
Q: And how did you feel at that time?
A: I was very frightened. And I was trembling.
Q: Now, you said that he was poking a knife at your back. Did you sustain injuries?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you still have scars up to the present?
A: Yes, sir.
PROS. GURAY:
May I be allowed, Your Honor to (interrupted)
THE COURT:
We will have a lady staff to look [at] the scars. xxx (At this instance the court interpreter, Ma.
Elena Arcenal, accompanied the complainant inside the chambers of the presiding judge to
take a look at the scars sustained by the complainant xxx)
xxx
THE COURT:
Later the court interpreter informed the court that the complainant [had] 2 scars, one is on the
middle right side of her body and the other one is on the upper left side of her back.
PROS. GURAY:
Upper right side.
THE COURT:
Yes, upper right side.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: Now, by the way when you fell on the stairs and you were grabbed by the accused did you
shout?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you shout?
A: I shouted Jun, tulungan mo ako.
xxx
Q: xxx Now after you removed your dress what did the accused [do]?
A: He kissed all the parts of my body.
Q: And what did you do after that?
A: I struggled and resisted.
Q: What did the accused do?
A: I grappled with him for the possession of the knife he was holding.
Q: Were you able to grab possession of the knife?
A: I was able to hold it but in the course of our grappling my left arm sustained (stop) the handle
of the knife forcefully hit the left portion of my arm. (Witness showing to the court slight
visible scar)
THE COURT:
Will the defense and the prosecution confirm the observation of the court?
ATTY. GARCIA:
Yes, Your Honor.
PROS. GURAY:
It is very apparent.
xxx
Q: You also mentioned that you also sustained injury on your right hand. What cause[d] the
injury on your right hand?
A: Because I was able to get hold of the bladed portion of the knife and it sliced my right palm.
Q: By the way, will you please describe to the court the knife that was used by the accused in
threatening or intimidating you?
A: The bladed portion of the knife is about 12 inches more or less and the handle is about 6 inches
more or less.
xxx
Q: So when you were not successful in grappling the knife from the accused what did the accused
do next?
A: He pulled my hair and slapped the back of my head.
Q: And what else did he do?
A: He dragged me and forced me to lie down on the double bed.
xxx
Q: And after he dragged you to the lower bed what else did you do?
A: Yung pong paa ko eh ginanoon niya po sa paa nya. Kinross niya po.
THE COURT:
Q: You mean doon sa pagitan ng ano mo!
A: Yuong d[a]lawa ko pong paa ginanyan nya po yung paa ko.
Q: Sige i-demonstrate mo.
A: Inangkla po.
Q: Kaya nga pinagitan nya yong sa paa niya sa side mo?
A: Hindi po. Ganito po. Yung paa niya ginanyan po niya.
Q: Kaya nga. Di nakabuka yung paa mo.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: Di ba nakabukhang ganyan?
THE COURT:
Oo.
PROS. GURAY:
Tapos yung paa niya nakaganoon.
A: Opo.
PROS. GURAY:
Pareho.
A: Opo.
PROS. GURAY:
I do that myself so I know. (Atty. Garcia laughs)
ATTY. GARCIA:
Very incriminating. (laughs)
THE COURT:
Witness demonstrating by opening her legs and then pointing out that the accused placed his
left foot under the left leg of the complainant and then locked it by raising his left leg of the
accused and the same thing was done on her right leg.
THE COURT:
Q: So you were unable to move both your legs when the accused did that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And at that juncture at that time you did not have anymore underwear?
A: I did not have anymore underwear.
xxx
PROS. GURAY:
xxx
Q: Now what did the accused do next after placing his two legs in between your legs?
A: He raped me.
Q: When you said he raped you, you mean his private parts were forced into your private part?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what did you do when the accused inserted his penis into your private part?
A: I continued struggling and resisting but he poked the knife he was holding at the left side of
my body. And I was so frightened.
Q: And after that what happened?
A: He did everything to me. He kissed me, he inserted his fingers in my sex organ. Everything.
THE COURT:
Q: After he satisfied his lust on you what did the accused do?
A: He did not allowed (sic) me to leave the room.
PROS. GURAY:
Q: What else did he do with that knife to you?
A: While he was in the act of raping me the accused at one time pointed the knife he was holding
at my private part and he said that he would insert it in my private part to get [a] thrill out
of it because he was high on shabu. Because he could not have a complete or full erection
because he was under the influence of shabu (Bato).
THE COURT:
Q: But despite the fact that he was not able to have a complete or full erection he succeeded in
penetrating you with his sex organ?
A: Yes, sir.[42]
Rowenas account of her resistance and struggle with appellant was consistent with the results of the
physical examination. Dr. Mirasol Pangan, the examining physician, testified on the gynecologic
emergency sheet[43] of Rowena dated 1 January 2000 and discussed the findings, as follows:
Q: Could you tell us your findings on the victim?
A: Theres the hematoma at the right neck, two abrasions at the left lower lip approximately 0.5cm.
Theres abrasion at the left for[e]arm, an abrasion hematoma circular at the left lower arm,
multiple abrasions at the volar aspect of the second ... fourth digits of right hand, under the
nose, hematoma at the back and the anterior tract the largest of which measured 6x1 cm.
Theres a stab wound at the left forearm. In the examination of the genitalia, theres the two
cms. hematoma at the right la[b]ia minora.
Q: How about the organ of the victim, did you ... (interrupted)
A: Yes, the last part I read was the genitalia, that referred to the organ of the victim, the right
la[b]ia minora have two cms. abrasions hematoma. In reference to the vagina, the cervix, the
uterus and the ovary which have no significant findings.
xxx
Q: You have a note here at the lower portion of the report Sexual and Physical abuse on the victim,
was this your conclusion based on the physical examination?
A: Based on the areas involved, the findings that we have, the arm and the trunk aside from the
findings on the genital organ.
xxx
Q: Could normal intercourse cause such injuries to the organ of the victim without use of
violence?
A: No, sir.
xxx
PROS. GURAY:
Q: xxx you stated, Doctor that the kind of injuries in the genitalia of the victim could not have
been caused by a normal sexual intercourse. [M]y question is, could it be the result of
forceful and unwelcome penetration by a firm penis?
A: Yes, sir, it could be caused.
Q: It could be caused by a forceful thrust of a human finger?
A: Yes, sir, it could also be caused.[44]
Appellants claim that he and Rowena had consensual sex was contradicted not only by Rowena but
also by neighbor Eldee Eusebio, who testified that: (1) he heard Rowena scream for help; (2) he saw her
trying to sandwich her feet against the door to keep the door to appellants room from closing; and (3)
appellant shouted papatayin niya lahat ng tao sa loob when he knocked on the door.[45] Together with the
physical injuries sustained by Rowena - which appellant said he did not even notice[46] - these statements
belie appellants assertion of consensual sex.
The sweetheart defense employed by appellant also deserves scant consideration. Aside from being
inherently weak, it was uncorroborated by any evidence other than the self-serving testimony of appellant.
Appellant admitted that he had no notes, letters, gifts or any other item to show for an affair that had
allegedly been ongoing since 1998.[47]
The Information specifically alleged the use of a deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of the rape
and the prosecution proved that appellant used such a weapon. Under Article 266-B, the use of a deadly
weapon qualifies the rape and the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since reclusion perpetua to death are two indivisible penalties, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
applies. Article 63 provides:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the
lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts
shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the
purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation.
In rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the presence of an aggravating circumstance increases the
penalty to death.[48] In the present case, appellant raped Rowena in her dwelling, which is an aggravating
circumstance under Article 14 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. [49] However, the Information did not
specifically allege dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. In People v. Gallego,[50] the Court ruled that
where the information did not allege the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, dwelling could not raise
the penalty to death. The Court held:
xxx The accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating
circumstance that would spell the difference between life and death in order for the Court to properly
exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties evidence. This, the accused can do only if he is appraised
of the aggravating circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating
circumstance must be alleged in the information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death
sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or
keenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him. [51]
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now require the complaint or information to state the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances attending an offense. [52] When the law or rules specify certain
circumstances that can aggravate an offense, or circumstances that would attach to the offense a greater
penalty than that ordinarily prescribed, such circumstances must be both alleged and proved to justify the
imposition of the increased penalty.[53]
Further, the circumstance of dwelling could not be considered in the present case even if it were
properly alleged in the Information. Where the offender resided in the same house as the victim when the
offense was committed, dwelling could not be considered as an aggravating circumstance. [54] It is
undisputed in this case that appellant was a live-in dog trainer and that he stayed in the Rianzares house
in a room across Rowenas room. Therefore, the penalty imposable on appellant is reclusion perpetua.
A word on the examination of Rowena. A rape victim is physically, socially, psychologically and
emotionally scarred, resulting in trauma which may last a lifetime. [55] It was thus highly inconsiderate for
the prosecutor and the defense counsel to trade quips at the precise time Rowena was reliving her
harrowing experience.[56] Courts are looked up to by people with high respect and are regarded as places
where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.[57] Levity has no place
in the courtroom during the examination of a victim of rape, and particularly not at her expense.
The trial court awarded moral and nominal damages but failed to award indemnity ex delicto. An
award of indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of guilt in rape cases.[58] We thus award P50,000
to Rowena as civil indemnity. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of moral damages is
reduced to P50,000. The award of nominal damages is deleted for lack of legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 16 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in
Criminal Case No. 00-179698, is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONARDO NUGUID y MAYAO is adjudged
guilty of RAPE, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Rowena Rianzares
P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
SALVADOR SISON, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., Presiding Judge, and TEODORO
S. ALVAREZ, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Las Pias City, Branch 253, respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The instant administrative complaint arose when Salvador Sison, a Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcer, filed a verified Complaint [1]dated October 12, 1999, charging Judge
Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. and Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 253,
with grave abuse of authority.
In turn, the complaint stemmed from an Order[2] dated September 15, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 99-
002[3] which the respondent judge issued, requiring the complainant to appear before him to explain a
traffic incident involving his son and the complainant. The said Order reads, thus:
Per information from the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court on September 8, 1999, at
about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of said date, said authorized driver, while on board the official car of the
undersigned on an official errand was flagged by the accused along the Epifanio delos Santos Avenue while
he was positioning the car he was driving to the right lane as he was then to make a right turn; that after
he stopped, he was told by the accused that swerving to the right lane was prohibited when it appeared
that the sign therefore was still far off and not readily visible to the naked eye; that nonetheless, he
introduced himself as the authorized driver of the undersigned, his son in fact, and showed to the accused
the calling card of the undersigned with a notation in (sic) the dorsal portion thereof introducing the bearer
of the card and requesting for assistance from law enforcers, and accordingly begged that he be allowed to
proceed on his way considering that there was no danger to limb, life and property occasioned by his
alleged traffic violation; that notwithstanding such introduction and plea, the accused confiscated the
drivers license of the authorized driver, even bragging in the process that he did the same to somebody
who introduced himself as a lawyer the day before.
The aforementioned actuation of the accused, if true, is not only indicative of his arrogance and deliberate
disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation accorded to a court of law and/or its
representative but is one constitutive of indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, specially considering that the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this
Court was then on official errand.
WHEREFORE, within a non-extendible period of twenty-four (24) hours from receipt hereof, the accused
is ordered to show cause why he should not be cited as in contempt of court and dealt with accordingly.
The Branch Sheriff of this Court is authorized and ordered to serve a copy of this Order upon the accused
immediately and to make a return of his proceedings thereon. After receipt of this Order, the accused is
ordered to personally file his comment in Court, within the period allowed him herein.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Because of the complainants failure to appear before the respondent judge as directed, the latter, after
verifying that the said order was duly served on the complainant, issued another Order [5] dated September
22, 1999 for the complainants arrest and commitment, and for the latter to appear for hearing before
his sala on September 29, 1999. The respondent sheriff then served the order on the complainant. On the
scheduled hearing, the complainant appeared and executed an affidavit [6]admitting to the court that he
made a mistake and that it was all a misunderstanding.The respondent judge, thereafter, lifted
the September 22, 1999 Order.[7]
In his complaint, the complainant alleged inter alia the following:
6. That on September 28, 1999, at around 6:00 P.M., the undersigned complainant was greatly surprised
when respondent TEODORO ALVAREZ came and arrested him without any warrant of arrest, only on
orders of the respondent Judge, and he was ordered to board a motor vehicle and was brought to the
respondent Judge in Las Pias City who ordered him detained in the Las Pias City Jail. When he was
arrested, he was not able to call his family to inform them where he was because he failed to return home
in the evening;
7. That the next day, September 29, 1999, respondent Teodoro Alvarez informed him that there will be a
hearing of his indirect contempt charge before the sala of the respondent Judge in Las Pias City. During the
hearing, the complainant was made to admit by the respondent Judge that he made a mistake in
apprehending his driver-son[,] conscious that he committed the gravest abuse of his authority, and perhaps
in anticipation of the legal action the undersigned complainant may take against him after he is discharged
from detention. Thus, after the complainant admitted his mistakes under duress, and upon appeal by his
counsel assuring the respondent Judge that the same incident may not be repeated, the complainant was
ordered discharged from detention at around 3:30 P.M. on September 29, 1999;
8. That the undersigned complainant did not know of any offense he had committed, except for his issuing
a traffic violation receipt to the driver-son of the respondent Judge which he is tasked by law to do so for
those found violating traffic rules and regulations;
9. That if the act of issuing a traffic violation receipt for a traffic violation within the city limits of
Mandaluyong City by the complainant is considered by the respondents as an offense, then complainant
should be tried for the said offense in Mandaluyong City, and not in Las Pias City where the respondent
judge has no jurisdiction;
10. That to the ordinary and lowly understanding of the undersigned complainant, the acts of respondents
in arresting him without any warrant of arrest before a charge of indirect contempt is heard constitute the
gravest ABUSE OF AUTHORITY ever committed by the respondents; and
11. That the manner the respondents are administering justice in Las Pias City is despotic and barbaric in
the sense that they take the law into their own hands without due regard for the rights of the others. [8]
The complainant, thus, prayed that the respondents be summarily dismissed from the service.
In his comment, the respondent judge vehemently denied the accusations against him, contending
that he was merely preserving the dignity and honor due to the courts of law. The respondent narrated
that on September 8, 1999, he ordered his son, Jose R. Caoibes III, to go to the Pasig City Regional Trial
Court to secure certain records. While on his way there, he was flagged down by the complainant for an
alleged traffic violation. Caoibes III explained to the complainant that he was on an errand for his father,
the respondent judge, to which the complainant reportedly uttered, Walang Judge, Judge Caoibes sa akin;
kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko.
The respondent judge also alleged that he initiated the complaint for contempt pursuant to the
following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court: a) Section 3(d) and Section 4 of Rule 71; b) Section 5(c)
of Rule 135; and, c) the last paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 71.
According to the respondent judge, the complainants allegation that he failed to contact any relative
is belied by the fact that during the hearing of September 29, 1999, the complainant was assisted by Atty.
Eduardo P. Flores of the MMDA, as evidenced by the transcript of stenographic notes [9] taken during the
proceedings. The respondent prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of legal or factual
basis.
For his part, the respondent sheriff admitted that he personally served copies of the respondent judges
orders on the complainant, but averred that he was merely performing his duties as deputy sheriff of the
court. As such, he did not commit grave abuse of authority in the performance of his functions.[10]
Thereafter, the complainant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagbawi ng Reklamo dated November
26, 2002, where he indicated that he was no longer interested in pursuing the administrative complaint
against the respondent judge. The complainant recanted his earlier claim, averring that the respondent
judges son did not in fact enter a one-way street and that he was standing by the September 29, 1999
Affidavit he executed during the hearing. He then requested that his complaint be duly withdrawn.[11]
Pursuant to the recommendation[12] of the Court Administrator, the Court, in a Resolution[13] dated
April 2, 2003, resolved to (a) dismiss the instant administrative complaint against Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez
for lack of merit; and (b) refer the matter against respondent Judge Caoibes, Jr. to the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals for raffle among the Associate Justices of the Court, and for investigation, report and
recommendation. The case was raffled to Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin. The Investigating Justice,
thereafter, submitted his Sealed Report dated February 26, 2004.
According to the Investigating Justice, although the complainant never appeared to prove the charges
against the respondent judge, the facts averred in the complaint appear to be substantially correct and
true. Thus, the respondent judge abused his authority to charge and punish any person for indirect
contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[14] The Investigating Justice recommended that the
respondent be admonished and warned, pursuant to Section 10(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
Section 11(c) of the same rule.
The respondent judge anchors the justification of his acts against the complainant on Section 3, Rule
71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act
of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of
any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order
or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an
inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the
court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior,
offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. [15] Indeed, the power of
contempt is power assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect
or interference with the courts orderly process by exacting summary punishment. The contempt power
was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as respect for the
courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to the good order of society, is as
necessary as respect for the laws themselves.[16] And, as in all other powers of the court, the contempt
power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly.[17] A judge should never allow
himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. [18]
At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in holding the complainant for
contempt, due to the latters refusal to comply with the judges Order of September 15, 1999. However, it is
not lost upon this Court that the complainant was not a party to any of the cases pending before the RTC,
Branch 253. What triggered the contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving the
respondent judges son. Furthermore, the record shows that when the complainant filed his reply to the
charge as required by the respondent judge, the same was refused by some staff member in the
latters sala.[19]
In Cortes v. Bangalan,[20] we held that a judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing
concern on the judges impartiality through a motion for voluntary inhibition, even if the latter may have
felt insulted therein. The Court also declared, thus:
[W]hile the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold due administration of justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt
powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their
contempt powers for correction and preservation not for retaliation and vindication. [21]
We agree with the Investigating Justice when he opined that the respondent judge should have
refrained from ordering the arrest and detention of the complainant, since the incident involved his own
son, and the matter was very personal to him. The fact that the respondent judge insisted that the
complainant personally file his comment in court gives rise to doubts as to the motive behind it; as the
Investigating Justice puts it, the requirement of personal filing was deliberately inserted so that the
respondent could confront and harass the complainant.[22]
We also agree with the following ruminations of Justice Bersamin:
[T]he respondent judge obviously resented the refusal of Sison to let off Caoibes III from the traffic violation
apprehension. The refusal of Sison was apparently aggravated by the sons reporting to the father that Sison
had supposedly made the remarks of Walang judge, judge Caoibes sa akin; Kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko.
...
The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the act and remarks of Sison as thereby displaying
arrogance towards and deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation due to a
court of law and its representative. First of all, the refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should not
cause resentment on the part of the respondent Judge (whom Sison most likely did not yet know at the
time) because he knew, as a public official himself, that Sison was only doing his duty of
enforcing evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving into a one-way street from the wrong
direction, regardless of the office or position of the violators father. Secondly, the respondent Judge should have
had the circumspection expected of him as a judge to realize that the remarks of Sison were invited by
Caoibes IIIs attempt to bluff his way out of the apprehension because he was the son of an RTC judge. Hence,
the respondent Judge would have no grounds to cite Sison for contempt of court. And, thirdly, the
respondent Judge and his son should have challenged the issuance of the traffic violation receipt pursuant
to the pertinent rules if they did not agree with the basis of the apprehension and also administratively
charged Sison for any unwarranted act committed. Since neither was done by them, but, on the contrary,
both ultimately accepted the validity of the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of the drivers license
after September 29, 1999 by paying the fines corresponding to the traffic violation, then it follows that the
respondent Judge had the consciousness that his son was at fault, instead of Sison.
[T]he respondent Judge claimed at the hearing that his son was at that time working with (sic) me as my
personal driver; and that his errand was to secure some papers from the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City
involved in a personal case which the respondent Judge had filed against a bank for specific performance
and damages, and since I just suffered a mild stroke at that time, specifically on June 10, 1999, and the
incident took place (sic) September, I could not at that time personally go to Pasig to secure the documents
I needed for the next hearing of the case so I had to send my son.
The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had no legitimate basis by which to consider Sisons
apprehension of his son as indirect contempt. As indicated earlier, the act complained against must be any
of those specified in Sec. 3, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; otherwise, there is no contempt of court,
which requires that the person obstructed should be performing a duty connected with judicial functions.
As such, the respondent Judge acted oppressively and vindictively.
Parenthetically, it is odd that the respondent Judge would even propose herein that Caoibes III, already 25
years at the time of the apprehension, was serving his father as the latters personal driver, albeit not
officially employed in the Judiciary. Most likely, therefore, Caoibes III might not be doing anything for his
father at the time of his apprehension but was in the place for his own purposes. [23]
The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which smacks of retaliation, as
in the case at bar, is appalling and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates
that a judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.[24] The very delicate function of administering justice demands that a judge should conduct
himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people,
for he is the visible representation of the law.[25] The irresponsible or improper conduct of judges erodes
public confidence in the judiciary; as such, a judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance
thereof.[26]
We do not agree, however, that the respondent judge should be merely reprimanded for his
actuations. The Court has not been blind to the improper use by judges of the erstwhile inherent power of
contempt which, in fine, amounts to grave abuse of authority. The penalty imposed by the Court in such
cases ranges from a fine of P2,500;[27] one months salary;[28] suspension from the service without pay for a
period of three months;[29] and even the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service.[30]
Furthermore, we take judicial notice that the respondent judge was previously sanctioned by the Court
for violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, where he was meted a fine of P20,000. [31] He was
found guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge, for delivering fistic blows on a complainant
judge. To our mind, the instant case falls under similar conduct, which the Court avowed would be dealt
with more severely if repeated, and of which the respondent was duly warned. The respondent was,
likewise, found guilty of gross ignorance of procedural law and unreasonable delay in the issuance of an
order of execution, where he was meted a fine of P30,000; [32] and delay in resolving a motion to dismiss in
a civil case pending before his sala where he was, likewise, fined P40,000. [33]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Regional Trial Court of Las Pias
City, Branch 253, GUILTY of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge for violating Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, and is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government or any of
its instrumentalities including government-owned and controlled corporations.
This decision is immediately executory. The respondent is ORDERED to cease and desist from
discharging the functions of his Office. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents personnel
records.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27934 September 18, 1967
CONSTANTE PIMENTEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINO C. SALANGA, respondent.
Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.
Constante P. Pimentel for and in his behalf as petitioner.
Respondent Judge for and in his behalf as respondent.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Challenged here in an original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition is the right of respondent judge of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV) to sit in judgment in cases where petitioner, a practicing
attorney, appears as counsel. Petitioner's petition recites the facts that follow:
Petitioner is counsel of record in cases pending before respondent judge, viz:
(1) Civil Case 21-C, entitled "Pablo Festejo et al., petitioners, vs. Marciano Cabildo et al.,
respondents," a special civil action for mandamus to compel payment of salaries of elective and
appointive municipal officials; petitioner is counsel for principal respondent, Acting Mayor Brigido
Vilog;
(2) Criminal Case 4898 and C-5, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Constante Anies,
accused," for frustrated murder; petitioner is the private prosecutor therein;
(3) Criminal Case C-93, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Romeo Pimentel, accused,"
for frustrated homicide; petitioner is defense counsel therein;
(4) Election Case 2470, entitled "Avelino Balbin, protestant, vs. Clemente Abaya, protestee," an
election protest involving the office of mayor of Candon, Ilocos Sur; petitioner is counsel for
protestant therein.
Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact that he is complainant in an administrative case he himself
lodged in this Court on May 12, 1967, against respondent judge upon averments of "serious misconduct,
inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence." 1 Petitioner seeks in the complaint
therein to have respondent judge immediately suspended from office, and, after due notice and hearing,
removed therefrom. The judge's return traversed the factual averments. Whereupon, this Court, on July 13,
1967, referred the administrative case to Mr. Justice Eulogio Serrano of the Court of Appeals "for
investigation, report and recommendation." That case is still pending.
On July 31, 1967, petitioner moved in the court below to have respondent judge disqualify himself from
sitting in Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case 2470 aforesaid. He there prayed
that the records of those cases be transferred to another sala, either at Narvacan or Vigan, both of Ilocos
Sur.
On August 1, 1967, respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. He stood his ground with the
statement that the administrative complaint against him is no cause for disqualification under the Rules of
Court; that Civil Case 21-C and Electoral Case 2470 "are now on the final stages of termination" and transfer
thereof to another sala "would only delay their final disposition, make the parties suffer [from] further
efforts and expenses", and "would be violative" of Administrative Order 371 of the Department of Justice
defining the court's territorial jurisdiction; and that he is "sworn to administer justice in accordance with
the law and the merits of the cases to be heard and decided by him." Civil Case 21-C was then calendared
for August 10 and 11, 1967.
A move to reconsider the foregoing resolution failed of its purpose. Civil Case 21-C was rescheduled for
hearing from August 10 and 11, 1967 to August 22 and 23, 1967.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner makes his exercise along the following lines: Immediate resolution of the problem of
disqualification "is a matter of profound importance, particularly on his career and potential as a
practitioner of law; his cases "may fall by the accident of raffle into the sala of respondent Judge" and he
cannot "resign from an accepted case every time it falls" therein; his clients will have "the natural hesitation
to retain as counsel one who is sort of unacceptable to the presiding judge." Petitioner winds up with a
prayer that respondent judge be stopped from further sitting in or otherwise trying or deciding the cases
heretofore mentioned. He asks for the issuance forthwith of a writ of preliminary injunction ex
parte.1awphîl.nèt
We now resolve the petition.
Is a judge disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for one of the parties is his
adversary in an administrative case said counsel lodged against him?
The answer is to be sought within the terms of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, 2 which reads in full:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or
his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consaguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which be has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Petitioner says that, arguably, his case comes within the coverage of the second paragraph of the rule just
quoted. The theory advocated is that the present (1964) rules for the first time provide a broad policy-
oriented ground for disqualification of judges. It is his submission that a judge may now be barred from
the bench in specific cases for reasons other than those enumerated in the law. He stresses that respondent
judge, in the factual environment presented, did not make use of his sound discretion when he refused to
disqualify himself from acting in the cases referred to.
Before the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules, came into being, law and early
jurisprudence gave no room for a judge, on objection of a party, to disqualify himself, absent any of the
specific grounds for disqualification set forth in the law. The following from People vs. Moreno [1949], 83
Phil. 286, 294, is expressive of the rule: "To take or not to take cognizance of a case, does not depend upon
the discretion of a judge not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. It is his duty not to sit in its trial and
decision if legally disqualified; but if the judge is not disqualified, it is a matter of official duty for him to
proceed with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility without the risk of being
called upon to account for his dereliction."3 Then came Del Castillo vs. Javelona, L-16742, September 29, 1962,
from which sprang the added second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, aforequoted. In Del Castillo, the
judge inhibited himself from the case because the lawyer of the party defendant was his first cousin. 4 The
judge felt that if defendant should win, his blood relationship with defendant's lawyer might cast some
suspicion on his integrity; but, if defendant be the defeated party, it might bring unpleasant consequences.
Plaintiff protested the judge's posture. In upholding the judge, we declared:
. . . Obviously, Rule 126 [of the old Rules] enumerates the grounds for disqualification of a judge
upon being challenged and under which he should disqualify himself. The rule, however, has never
been interpreted to prohibit a judge from voluntarily inhibiting himself, in the absence of any challenge by
either party, due to his close blood relationship with counsel for one of said parties. Considering the
spirit of the Rule, it would seem that cases of voluntary inhibition, based on good, sound and/or ethical
grounds, is a matter of discretion on the part of the judge and the official who is empowered to act upon
the request for such inhibition.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In other words, while Rule 126 provides for disqualification, it does not include nor preclude cases
and circumstances for voluntary inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned.5
The Del Castillo opinion made the pointed observation that the cases cited by plaintiff are instances where
the judge was challenged — not cases of voluntary inhibition. Indeed, as early as 1931, clear intimation
there was that voluntary inhibition upon sound grounds may be recognized, when this Court said in one
case:6". . . It is true that if Judge Garduño had abstained from trying the case at bar, there would have been less
susceptibility to suspicion. But, as a matter of law, the grounds for the motion of recusation do not
constitute a legal cause for the disqualification of a judge."
Thus, the genesis of the provision (paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137), not to say the letter thereof, clearly
illumines the course of construction we should take. The exercise of sound discretion — mentioned in the
rule — has reference exclusively to a situation where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes forward
with the case.7For, the permissive authority given a judge in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137,
is only in the matter of disqualification, not otherwise. Better stated yet, when a judge does not inhibit
himself, and he is not legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as
it has been — he has to continue with the case.1awphîl.nèt
So it is, that the state of the law, with respect to the situation before us, is unaffected by the amendment
(paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137) introduced in the 1964 Rules. And it is this: A judge cannot be
disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer for grounds other than those specified in the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137.
This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved. If a litigant is denied a
fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or prejudice, we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if
necessary, in the interest of justice. Such was the view taken by this Court in Dais vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 897,
902-904. In that case, we found that the filing of charges by a party against a judge generated "resentment"
or the judge's part that led to his "bias or prejudice, which is reflected in the decision." We there discoursed
on the "principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge" which "is as old
as the history of courts." We followed this with the pronouncement that, upon the circumstances obtaining,
we did not feel assured that the trial judge's finding were not influenced by bias or prejudice. Accordingly,
we set aside the judgment and directed a new trial.8
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are
not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approach to this ideal. It ill
behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party
litigant happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line
that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or
conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent
judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him. 9 We have had occasion to rule in a
criminal case that a charge made before trial that a party "will not be given a fair, impartial and just hearing"
is "premature."10 Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation
under his oath to administer justice "without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the
rich."11 To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter
of conscience.
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to
appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously
comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited
from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor
of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he
reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the
judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may
be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not
altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great
care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is
involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and
where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his
decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of
the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his
motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and
substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls
miscarriage of justice.
In the end we are persuaded to say that since respondent judge is not legally under obligation to disqualify
himself, we may not, on certiorari or prohibition, prevent him from sitting, trying and rendering judgment
in the cases herein mentioned.12
Upon the premises, the petition herein for certiorari and prohibition is denied. So ordered.
G.R. No. 163155 July 21, 2006

ALFREDO HILADO, MANUEL LACSON, JOSE MA. TUVILLA, JOAQUIN LIMJAP LOPEZ SUGAR
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE AMOR A. REYES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH
21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition is one for mandamus and prohibition.
Julita Campos Benedicto (private respondent), the surviving spouse of the deceased Roberto S. Benedicto,
filed on May 25, 2000 a petition for issuance of letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 00-97505, "Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto" (the case), before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 21 presided by Judge Amor A. Reyes (public respondent).
Private respondent was, by Order1 of August 2, 2000, appointed Administratrix of the estate of Benedicto
(the estate), and letters of administration were thereafter issued in her favor.
Herein petitioners, Alfredo Hilado, Manuel Lacson, Jose M. Tuvilla, Joaquin Limjap, Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation had, during the lifetime of Benedicto, filed before the
Bacolod City RTC two complaints for damages or collection of sums of money, docketed as Civil Case No.
95-9137 and Civil Case No. 111718, against Roberto Benedicto et al.2
In the initial inventory of the estate which private respondent submitted on January 18, 2001 3 in the case
before the Manila RTC, she listed, among other liabilities of the estate, the claims of petitioners subject of
the above-said Bacolod RTC cases as follows:
LIST OF LIABILITIES
DESCRIPTION AMOUNT
xxxx
A claim of several sugar planters which is presently the subject of Civil Case P136,045,772.50
No. 95-9137 entitled Lacson et al. v. R.S. Benedicto et al., pending before [at P50.00 per US $1.00]
Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City
A claim filed by various sugar planters which is presently the subject of Civil P35,198,697.40
Case No. 11178 entitled Lopez Sugar Corporation et al. v. R.S. Benedicto, et [at P50.00 per US $1.00]
al., pending before Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City.4
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From January 2002 until November 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC allowed
petitioners through counsel Sedigo and Associates to regularly and periodically examine the records of the
case and to secure certified true copies thereof.
By December 2003, however, Atty. Grace Carmel Paredes, an associate of petitioners' counsel, was denied
access to the last folder-record of the case which, according to the court's clerical staff, could not be located
and was probably inside the chambers of public respondent for safekeeping.5
Petitioners' counsel thus requested public respondent, by letter6 of January 15, 2004, to allow Atty. Paredes
to personally check the records of the case. Acting on the letter, the Officer-In- Charge/Legal Researcher of
Branch 21 advised petitioners' counsel in writing that "per instruction of the Hon. Presiding Judge[,] only
parties or those with authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case
pending in this Court," and that they may be "allowed to go over the records of the above-entitled case
upon presentation of written authority from the [administratrix]." 7
On February 2, 2004, petitioners' counsel was served with a notice of hearing of the case on February 13,
2004.8Petitioners' counsel thus attended such scheduled hearing during which he filed a Motion for
Inhibition9 of public respondent on the ground of gross ignorance, dereliction of duty, and manifest
partiality towards the administratrix. Public respondent, noting that an error was committed in the service
to petitioners of the notice of hearing, ignored the motion of petitioners' counsel. 10
Intending to compare the list of properties in the estate's inventory all of which properties were appraised
at a fair value of P100 million with the list of assets valued at P1 Billion said to have been ceded in 1990 to
the decedent under his Compromise Agreement with the Presidential Commission on Good
Government,11 petitioners' counsel sent the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC a
letter12 requesting to be furnished with certified true copies of the "updated inventory."
By still another letter,13 petitioners' counsel requested to be furnished with certified true copies of the order
issued by the court during the hearing of February 13, 2004, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes
taken thereon.14
By Order15 of March 2, 2004, public respondent indicated why petitioners had no standing to file the Motion
for Inhibition as well as to request for certified true copies of the above-indicated documents. Read the
Order of March 2, 2004:
Perusal of the motion shows that the movant is asking this Court to act on their motion despite the
denial of their Omnibus Motion to Intervene which to date remains pending resolution with the
Court of Appeals.
As correctly pointed out by the Administratrix, said motion is filed by persons/entities who have
no legal standing in the above-entitled case, hence they cannot ask anything from this Court, much
more for this Court to act on pleadings filed or soon to be filed.
For the record, the Court received two (2) letters dated February 17 and 27, 2004 addressed to Atty.
Maria Luisa Lesle G. Gonzales, the Branch Clerk of Court…asking that he be furnished with
certified true copies of the updated inventory and Order issued by this Court on February 13, 2004
hearing as well as the corresponding transcript of stenographic notes within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of said letters.
Considering that the movants were not allowed to intervene in the proceedings per order of this
Court dated January 2, 2002, copies of all pleadings/orders filed/issued relative to this case may
only be secured from the [Administratrix] and/or counsel. 16 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thus filed on April 30, 2004 before this Court the present petition for mandamus and prohibition
to compel public respondent to allow them to access, examine, and obtain copies of any and all documents
forming part of the records of the case and disqualify public respondent from further presiding thereover.
In their petition, petitioners contend that the records of the case are public records to which the public has
the right to access, inspect and obtain official copies thereof,17 recognition of which right is enjoined under
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 135 and Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioners further contend that public respondent manifested her arbitrariness, malice and partiality
through her blatant disregard of basic rules in the disposition and safekeeping of court records, and her
denial of their right to access the records suffices to bar her from presiding over the case; 18 and public
respondent's incompetence, malice, bad faith and partiality are underscored by her failure to enforce for
more than three years the requirement of the Rules of Court on the prompt submission by the
administratrix of her final inventory and the filing of a periodic accounting of her administration.19
By Comment20 filed on September 21, 2004, private respondent submits that the petition is fatally defective
since petitioners failed to disclose in their certification of non-forum shopping that they had earlier
instituted an administrative complaint against public respondent which prayed for the same reliefs21 — for
the disqualification of public respondent from presiding over the case and for the court docket to be opened
for examination.
Private respondent further submits that the petition for prohibition should be dismissed since petitioners
are not parties to the case, hence, they have no personality to file a motion for inhibition. 22
As to the alleged denial of petitioners' right to examine court records and participate in the proceedings,
private respondent submits that this is not unqualifiedly true for petitioners must have secured a copy of
the inventory of the assets and liabilities of the estate, they being aware of the declared fair value of the
estate and their counsel was present during the February 13, 2004 hearing. 23
For consideration then are the following issues: (1) whether the present petition is fatally defective for
failure of petitioners to disclose in the certificate of non-forum shopping that they had priorly instituted an
administrative complaint against public respondent which prays for the same reliefs; (2) whether a writ of
mandamus may issue to compel public respondent to allow petitioners to examine and obtain copies of
any or all documents forming part of the records of the case; and (3) whether a writ of prohibition will issue
in favor of petitioners, who are not parties to the case, to inhibit public respondent from presiding over the
case.
As reflected above, petitioners had, before the filing of the present petition, filed an administrative
complaint before this Court against public respondent, "Alfredo Hilado, Lopez Sugar Corporation and First
Farmers Holding Corporation v. Judge Amor A. Reyes, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21," docketed as
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1910.
Petitioners subsequently filed a supplemental24 and a second supplemental administrative
complaint25 praying for 1) the imposition of appropriate disciplinary sanctions against public respondent
for, among other things, denying them their right to access the docket of the case, and 2) the disqualification
of public respondent from presiding over the case, which latter prayer was, however, subsequently
withdrawn in a motion26 filed on April 30, 2004, the same day that the present petition was filed.
Denying the existence of forum shopping, petitioners argue that it "exists only where the elements of litis
pendenciaare present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other."27
It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and
not to the exercise of administrative powers.28
The non-existence of forum shopping notwithstanding, this Court proscribes the filing of an administrative
complaint before the exhaustion of judicial remedies against questioned errors of a judge in the exercise of
its jurisdiction.
Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies are prerequisites for the taking of, among other measures, an
administrative complaint against the person of the judge concerned. So Atty. Flores v. Hon.
Abesamis29 teaches:
x x x [T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed
by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or
irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission
of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle)
include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for
new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or
neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or
a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
x x x Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the
corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against
the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only
after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have
spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability
may be said to have opened, or closed.
x x x Law and logic decree that "administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof" Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance
of their duties and functions; x x x30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
It is thus only after a questioned action of a judge in a pending case has been judicially resolved with finality
that the door to an inquiry into his or her administrative liability may be said to have opened.
Parenthetically, during the pendency of the present petition or on April 15, 2005, the Second Division of
this Court rendered a decision31 on the above-said administrative complaint filed by petitioners against
public respondent.
On the merits of the petition for mandamus, Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted constitutional provision guarantees a general right – the right to information on matters
of "public concern" and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to "official records" and the like. The
right to information on "matters of public concern or of public interest" is both the purpose and the limit of
the constitutional right of access to public documents.32
Insofar as the right to information relates to judicial records, an understanding of the term "judicial record"
or "court record" is in order.
The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the
courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all
processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony33 which took place
during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for
purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book,
other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporter's notes, transcript, data
compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law
or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it has
received in a case.34
In determining whether a particular information is of public concern, there is no right test. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance as it relates to or affect the public.35
It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its right to transparency in the administration of
justice, to the end that it will serve to enhance the basic fairness of the judicial proceedings, safeguard the
integrity of the fact-finding process, and foster an informed public discussion of governmental affairs. Thus
in Barretto v. Philippine Publishing Co.,36 this Court held:
x x x The foundation of the right of the public to know what is going on in the courts is not the fact
that the public, or a portion of it, is curious, or that what is going on in the court is news, or would
be interesting, or would furnish topics of conversation; but is simply that it has a right to know
whether a public officer is properly performing his duty. In other words, the right of the public to
be informed of the proceedings in court is not founded in the desire or necessity of people to know
about the doing of others, but in the necessity of knowing whether its servant, the judge, is
properly performing his duty. x x x
The case in Cowley vs. Pulsifer (137 Mass. 392) is so pertinent to the questions presented for our
decision in the case at bar that we cannot refrain from quoting extensively therefrom. x x x
x x x "The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public more
than counterbalances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the
subject of such proceedings." x x x
"The chief advantage to the country to which we can discern, and that which we
understand to be intended by the foregoing passage, is the security which publicity gives
for the proper administration of justice. x x x It is desirable that the trial of causes should
take place under the public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another
are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer
justice should act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should
be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is
performed."
From this quotation it is obvious that it was not the idea of the supreme court of Massachusetts to
lay down the proposition that simply because a pleading happened to be filed in a public office it
becomes public property that any individual, whether interested or not, had the right to publish
its contents, or that any newspaper was privileged to scatter the allegations contained therein to
the four corners of the country. The right of the public to know the contents of the paper is the basis
of the privilege, which is, as we have said, the right to determine by its own senses that its servant,
the judge, is performing his duties according to law. x x x37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these are the
authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is
charged with knowledge.38 Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions of judges
and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest
knowledge of these from the public.39Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas,40 this Court found a judge to
have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of his decision in a
criminal case of which they were even the therein private complainants, the decision being "already part of
the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize."
Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case need
not be matters of public concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon
which the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests.
In thus determining which part or all of the records of a case may be accessed to, the purpose for which the
parties filed them is to be considered.
In intestate proceedings, the heirs file pleadings and documents for the purpose of establishing their right
to a share of the estate. As for the creditors, their purpose is to establish their claim to the estate and be paid
therefor before the disposition of the estate.
Information regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his death and the manner by which
his private estate may ultimately be settled is not a matter of general, public concern or one in which a
citizen or the public has an interest by which its legal rights or liabilities maybe affected. Granting
unrestricted public access and publicity to personal financial information may constitute an unwarranted
invasion of privacy to which an individual may have an interest in limiting its disclosure or dissemination.
If the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or interest, denial of access thereto does not
violate a citizen's constitutional right to information.
Once a particular information has been determined to be of public concern, the accessory right of access to
official records, including judicial records, are open to the public.
The accessory right to access public records may, however, be restricted on a showing of good cause. How
"good cause" can be determined, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Republican Company v.
Appeals Court teaches:41
The public's right of access to judicial records, including transcripts, evidence, memoranda, and
court orders, maybe restricted, but only on a showing of "good cause." "To determine whether good
cause is shown, a judge must balance the rights of the parties based on the particular facts of
each case." In so doing, the judge "must take into account all relevant factors, 'including, but not
limited to, the nature of the parties and the controversy, the type of information and the privacy
interests involved, the extent of community interest,and the reason for the request.'"42 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
And even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and protective powers of every court over its
own records and files.43
The Supreme Court of Canada, expounding on the right of the court to exercise supervisory powers over
materials surrendered into its care, held:
It follows that the court, as the custodian of the exhibits, is bound to inquire into the use that is to
be made of them and, in my view, is fully entitled to regulate that use by securing appropriate
undertakings and assurances if those be advisable to protect competing interests. x x x
In exercising its supervisory powers over materials surrendered into its care, the court may
regulate the use made of it. In an application of this nature, the court must protect the respondent
and accommodate public interest in access. x x x In an application of this nature the court must
protect the respondent and accommodate the public interest in access. This can only be done in
terms of the actual purpose, and in the face of obvious prejudice and the absence of a specific
purpose, the order for unrestricted access and reproduction should not have been
made.44 (Underscoring supplied)
In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion45 and subject to the supervisory and
protective powers of the court,46 after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access
is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. In the exercise of such discretion, the following
issues may be relevant: "whether parties have interest in privacy, whether information is being sought
for legitimate purpose or for improper purpose, whether there is threat of particularly serious
embarrassment to party, whether information is important to public health and safety, whether sharing of
information among litigants would promote fairness and efficiency, whether party benefiting from
confidentiality order is public entity or official, and whether case involves issues important to the public." 47
By the administratrix-private respondent's own information, petitioners are the plaintiffs in two complaints
(against Roberto Benedicto et al.) for damages and/or sums of money, Civil Case No. 95-9137 and Civil
Case No. 11178, filed before the Bacolod RTC. She contends, however, that "if the motion to dismiss [these
RTC Bacolod cases is] granted, . . . petitioners would have absolutely no interest of any kind [over] the
[e]state of the [d]eceased Roberto S. Benedicto."48
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records — to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules
governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and
appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting 49 — appears
legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto et al., they
have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under
Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court reading:
Rule 135, SEC. 2. Publicity of proceedings and records. – x x x x The records of every court of justice
shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person, at all
proper business hours, under the supervision of the clerk having custody of such records, unless
the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of morality or
decency. (Underscoring supplied),
entitled to be informed of the inventory as well as other records which are relevant to their claims against
Benedicto.
As long then as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court records and
pays court fees,50 a court may not deny access to such records. Of course as this Court held in Beegan v.
Borja,51precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration must be observed:
We are not unaware of the common practice in the courts with respect to the photocopying or
xeroxing of portions of case records as long as the same are not confidential or disallowed by the
rules to be reproduced. The judge need not be bothered as long as the permission of the Clerk of
Court has been sought and as long as a duly authorized representative of the court takes charge of
the reproduction within the court premises if warranted or if not, the said court representative
must bring along the case records where reproduction takes place and return the same intact to the
Clerk of Court.52
In fine, this Court finds the petition for mandamus meritorious, petitioners being "interested persons" who
have a legitimate reason or purpose for accessing the records of the case.
Respecting the prohibition aspect of the petition, the same fails.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which govern disqualification of judges provide:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which
he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he was presided in
any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent
of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
SECTION 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is
disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing,
file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon
proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question
of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other
papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor
of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Since petitioners are not parties to the case, they may not seek public respondent's inhibition, whether
under the first paragraph of above-quoted Section 1 which constitutes grounds
for mandatory disqualification, or under the second paragraph of the same section
on voluntary disqualification.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent is ORDERED to allow
petitioners to access, examine, and obtain copies of any and all documents-part of the records of Special
Proceeding No. 00-97505 bearing on
the inventory of assets and liabilities of the estate and the hearing conducted by the trial court on February
13, 2004, subject to precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration thereof.
The petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PEDRO MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANCISCO MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellee.
Carlos Ledesma, for Appellant.
Felipe Calderon, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. GUARDIANSHIP; PRODIGALITY. — In order to render a person legally unfit to administer his own
affairs his acts of prodigality must show a morbid mind and a disposition to spend or waste the estate so
as to expose his family to want or to deprive his forced heirs of their inheritances.
2. ID.; ID. — Courts will not go further to restrain donations than to enforce the express limitations imposed
by law as required by public policy.
DECISION
COOPER, J. :
This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir, against Francisco
Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father.
The allegations in the complaint are substantially: That Don Francisco Martinez, owing to his advanced
age, is dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations to his second wife, Doña Anastacia
Ilustre, and to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has given over the
administration of this estate to the management of his wife; that the defendant has a propensity for
litigation and has instituted groundless actions against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the
property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and her relatives.
In a supplementary prayer plaintiff asked the court to direct that the complaint be entered in the property
register of the province, which was done by order of the court.
The defendant in his answer denies the allegations in the complaint and sets forth a state of facts quite
inconsistent with those alleged in the complaint.
Among other things, it is stated that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of attorney
under which the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several years; that the plaintiff has
caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the estate, to be registered in his own
name without the consent of the father and is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the property
of the estate, which caused the defendant to revoke the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the
suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding
the fact that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an account of his administration.
The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and adjudged the costs against him.
The plaintiff has appealed to this court.
The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of applying
general rules to the varying circumstances of the case and the different situations of persons.
The declaration of prodigality must be made in an ordinary action (en juicio contradictorio). (Art. 221 of
the Civil Code.)
The proceedings must be instituted by the consort or the forced heirs. (Art. 222 of the Civil Code.)
Under our law it may be inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a
disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want
of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate.
Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All persons who can
contract and dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.)
Donations may comprise all the actual property of the donor, except such as is required for the support of
the donor in a condition corresponding to his circumstances. (Art. 634 of the Civil Code.)
And with further limitation that no person can give by a donation more than what he can give by
testament.
A donation is considered inofficious in all that exceeds such limits. (Art. 636 of the Civil Code.)
Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed upon the owner, but
a law which would impose restrictions further than such as are required by public policy may well be
regarded unjust and tending in a contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to acquire property, and
as subduing the generous impulse of the heart.
Beyond these limitations the law does not attempt to adjust claims to generosity.
There were a number of witnesses introduced both by the plaintiff and by the defendant whose testimony
it is unnecessary to recount.
The testimony on the part of the plaintiff was wholly insufficient to support the allegations of his complaint.
It was vague, indefinite, and of an inconclusive nature.
The father’s estate consisted of city property in Manila; of farms and of certain vessels, two of which are
steamships. There is no evidence offered to show any transfers by sale or mortgage of these properties. This
could have been easily done if such existed. Donations of real property must be made in a public deed (Art.
633 of the Civil Code), and the acquisition of vessels must also be included in a written instrument, and
produces no effect with regard to third persons if not recorded in the Commercial Registry. (Art. 573 of the
Code of Commerce.)
There is no proof that there was any money belonging to the estate, or other personal property, the transfer
of which could not be easily traced.
The son has been in possession of a greater part of the estate since November, 1897, collecting the revenue
from the ships and rents from the city property.
The farms have been nonproductive on account of the disturbed conditions of the country, and the revenue
from even these has been in part collected by the son.
While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased since her marriage,
there is no evidence whatever to show that there has been any perceptible diminution of the defendant’s
property. This can be accounted for only on the grounds that the father, so far from being a prodigal, is still
in the full exercise of his faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the
accumulation of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother of the plaintiff, to one-half
of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the mother.
A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff himself possesses
that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to his father.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed and costs of suits in both courts is adjudged against
the plaintiff.
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERMELINDO C. ANDAL, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, 11th Judicial
Region, With Station at Tandag, Surigao del Sur; The Republic of the Philippines, The National
Treasurer of said Republic; The Commission on Audit of said Republic; And such other persons or
entities of the Government as may be required by the Honorable Court to be included as parties or
nominal parties, respondents.
Lolito G. Aparicio for and in his own behalf.
RESOLUTION
SARMIENTO, J:
Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are the orders ** of the
respondent judge dated October 11 and 12, 1988 in Criminal Cases Nos. 1371, 1439, 1475,1480, and 1476
and Civil Cases Nos. 742 and 755, denying the petitioner's Motion for Inhibition.
Textually, the Motion for Inhibition reads:
COMES NOW, the Movant to this Honorable Court respectfully states:
(1) that the Movant has just received the letter from the Supreme Court through its Deputy
Court Administrator, hereto attached to the original of this Motion only, same being
covered by confidentiality as for its internal operation only, issued in connection with my
Petition for inhibition, also annexed to the original only of this Motion, inhibition by the
Honorable Presiding Judge of this Court, to inhibit himself from trying, hearing or in any
manner acting on all cases, civil and criminal, in which the Movant is involved and
handling.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in view of the letter of the Deputy Court Administrator of the Honorable
Supreme Court, undersigned Attorney is compelled to request the Honorable Presiding
Judge of this Court to inhibit himself from trying, hearing or in any manner acting in any
of the cases in which the undersigned Attorney is involved and is handling or will be
involved, either as Complainant or otherwise.
Madrid, Surigao del Sur, Philippines.
September 26, 1988.
Respectfully submitted without argument:
(SGD.) ATTY. LOLITO
G. APARICIO
Madrid
,
Surigao
del Sur
IBP No.
172531
and
PTR
No.
8798243
, all for
1988 1
Considering the aforecited motion, Judge Andal issued the substantially identical orders assailed herein.
The focal issue is whether or not Judge Andal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he denied the petitioner's Motion for Inhibition in the several criminal and civil cases
subject thereof and in thereafter continuing to take cognizance of said cases and all the other cases pending
before him. Concomitant thereto is the question of whether or not Judge Andal can be held civilly liable for
damages under Art. 32 of the Civil Code in relation to the constitutional provision that all public officers
must at all times be accountable to the people.
The petitioner maintains that there is between him and Judge Andal an existing state of hostility 2 sparked
off by the filing by him of petitions for certiorari and administrative cases against the latter before this Court,
prior to the filing of the Motion for Inhibition, which was, as earlier stated, denied by Judge Andal. He
avers that although the Motion for Inhibition did not explicitly state on its face the valid grounds relied
upon to support his motion, such grounds were known to Judge Andal. 3 He theorizes that the Judge in
refusing to inhibit himself from the cases subject of the Motion for Inhibition and in all the other cases
pending before him in which the petitioner is acting either as counsel or a party litigant, Judge Andal
violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection of the law, access to the court and speedy
disposition of cases, making Judge Andal civilly liable under Art. 32 of the new Civil Code. 4He asserts that
because of Judge Andal's refusal to inhibit himself, he (petitioner) and his family suffered mental anguish
and incurred expenses for which they must be compensated. 5
On the other hand, Judge Andal maintains that the motion for inhibition did not cite any valid grounds to
justify his inhibition.6 He submits that when he denied the motion for inhibition, he was not aware that
A.M. No. RTJ-88-245 was filed against him as it was only on November 4, 1988 when he received a
resolution of this Court directing him to comment thereon, that he first came to know about it. 7 He
describes as a mere gratuitous assumption the petitioner's assertion that in denying the Motion for
Inhibition he was motivated by rancor and resentment because of the certiorari and administrative cases
earlier filed against him. 8 In this score, he asseverates that he does not normally resent the filing of
certiorari cases against him as he has neither the reason nor the luxury of time to entertain such a feeling.
Moreover, he is so preoccupied with his case load to even think of it. 9 He further stresses that he has
nothing personal against petitioner, as he does not know the latter personally. 10
On the claim for damages, he submits that the same is without basis and is purely imaginary and
speculative.
Rule 137, Section 1 of the new Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Disqualification of Judges — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting ill a
case for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
It must be observed that the Motion for Inhibition, as correctly stated by Judge Andal in his orders denying
the same, cited no valid ground, which fact was confirmed by the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel for the
accused in the criminal cases and the defendants in the civil cases. There is, therefore, no doubt that the
denial of the said motion was not whimsical or capricious nor was the said denial intended to spite the
petitioner, as the petitioner would want this Court to believe, but was done in the valid and judicious
exercise of his function and duty as judge.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the state of hostility being pressed by the petitioner is purely
imaginary. 11Indeed the petitioner had not presented any evidence to support his conclusion that the filing
of the petition for certiorari docketed as UDK 8748 and UDK 8822 and the administrative cases adverted
to, caused the displeasure of Judge Andal as to affect his impartiality in trying petitioner's cases. In fact,
such allegations were refuted by Judge Andal when he categorically stated that he does not normally resent
the filing of certiorari cases before this Court where he is impleaded as a mere nominal party, 12 after all,
when still a practitioner he too filed certiorari cases. Moreover, as a judge, he knows he has neither the
reason nor luxury of time to entertain such a feeling, preoccupied as he is with the many cases assigned to
him.. 13
A circumspective analysis of the assailed orders belies the petitioner's charge of bias or prejudice and
hostility, as all of the said orders appear to have been issued in accordance with law and nowhere was there
a showing of any outward manifestation of the supposed state of hostility between Judge Andal and
petitioner as to warrant the inhibition or disqualification of the former. And having denied the Motion for
Inhibition, Judge Andal acted within his jurisdiction when he continued to take cognizance of all the cases
pending before him, there being no writ of injunction or a restraining order issued, enjoining him to cease
and desist from acting on the said cases. It must be noted that it was only on February 16, 1989 that a
restraining order was issued by this Court. 14 The Court has held that mere pendency of a special civil action
for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before the lower court, does not interrupt the course
of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. 15 Likewise, "the mere filing of an
administrative case against respondent judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case,
for if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either stop the proceedings in
order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the
judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps
there would not be enough judges to handle all the cases pending in all the courts. The Court has to be
shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be
branded the stigma of being biased or partial, 16 and on this regard the petitioner failed.
In Pimentel vs. Salanga, 17 we rationalized:
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring
appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a
speculative approval to this Ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased
or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him. As
applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality and
impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of
his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what
respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him. We have
had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a party "will not
be given a fair, impartial and just hearing is "premature." Prejudice is not to be presumed.
Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without
respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich." To disqualify or not to disqualify
himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience. (Emphasis
supplied).
On his claim for damages against Judge Andal in these same proceedings, the petitioner-lawyer invokes
Art. 32 of the Civil Code which provides in part:
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx
8) The right to the equal protection of the laws
xxx
16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in his behalf:
xxx
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
xxx
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from the judge unless his act or omission constitutes
a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
In Aberca v. Ver, 18 we postulated thus: "The purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction
to the deeply cherished rights and freedom enshrined in the constitution. Its message is clear; no man may
seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity." Under said article judges are excluded from liability,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code and other penal
statute. 19 As we have earlier stated, the acts of Judge Andal in denying the motion for inhibition and in
thereafter proceeding with the trial of the different criminal and civil cases pending before his court were
done in a regular manner and were considered as his official acts, thus, he is not answerable for damages.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 20 this Court, adopting the concurring opinion in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco
and Crossfield, 21 stated thus:
... whenever and wherever a judge of a court of superior jurisdiction exercises judicial
functions, he will not be personally liable in civil damages for the result of his actions, and
the test of judicial liability is not jurisdiction, but such liability depends wholly upon the
nature of the question which is being determined when the error complained of is
committed by the court. If such question is one the determination of which requires the
exercise of judicial functions, the judge is not liable, even though there is in reality an
absolute failure of jurisdiction over the subject matter ... .
An important point that should not be overlooked in this case is petitioner's audacious propensity of filing
certiorari and administrative cases against the respondent judge based on flimsy and unfounded charges
he can conceive. Thus, it behooves us to remind the petitioner of his basic duty "to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers to conduct himself with "all good fidelity to the
courts;" to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance that his duty to render respectful
civility, without fawning, to the courts is indeed essential to the orderly administration of justice. Thus, he
should be courteous, fair, and circumspect, not petulant, combative, or bellicose in his dealings with the
courts; and finally, that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements
by an attorney in his pleading or motion is not only a violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression of
the cannons of professional ethics, but also constitutes direct contempt of court for which a lawyer may be
disciplined. 22
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby admonished to be more prudent in his dealings with the court and its
judicial officers.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Restraining Order
dated February 16, 1980 is lifted and set aside. Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby REPRIMANDED for
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the court with a WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely.
LEOVIGILDO U. MANTARING, complainant, vs. JUDGE MANUEL A. ROMAN, JR., RTC, Branch 42,
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro; and JUDGE IRENEO B. MOLATO, MTC, Bongabon, Oriental
Mindoro, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; NEW TRIAL; REMEDY AVAILABLE TO PARTIES DENIED OF A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL TRIAL. - There is a remedy available to the party seeking the disqualification of the
judge. If he is denied a fair and impartial trial, caused by the judges bias or prejudice, he can ask for a
new trial in the interest of justice which will be granted if that is really the case.
2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; WARRANT OF ARREST; BASIS FOR
ISSUANCE. - The issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the showing of
probabilities as to different facts. In the case of search warrants, the determination is based on the
finding that (1) the articles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity and (2) they are found in
the place to be searched. It is not necessary that a particular person be implicated. On the other hand,
in arrest cases, the determination of probable cause is based on a finding that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it.
3. ID.; ID.; WARRANT OF ARREST; REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUANCE. - It is now settled that in
issuing warrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must: (a) have
examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and
answers; (b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and (c) that there is a need to place the respondent
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato is the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bongabon,
Oriental Mindoro. On January 7, 1993, an administrative complaint was filed against him and Judge
Manuel A. Roman, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 42, by Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr., who charged them with conduct unbecoming of members of
the judiciary. On February 21, 1994, after the parties had filed their respective pleadings and supporting
documents, this Court dismissed the complaint against the two for lack of merit. The motion for
reconsideration filed by complainant was subsequently denied.
What is before us now is the Supplemental Complaint filed by Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr. against
Judge Ireneo B. Molato, which charges him with harassment. It is alleged that because of the filing of the
first complaint against him, respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato should have inhibited himself from
conducting the preliminary investigation of a criminal case considering that the respondents in that case
were complainant and his son. Instead, it is alleged, he took cognizance of the case and ordered the arrest
of complainant and his son, Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., out of hatred and revenge for them because of the
filing of the first case by the complainant.
The Supplemental Complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator which, in a
Memorandum dated 25 November 1994, recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of
merit. Nonetheless, the Court required the respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato to comment.
In his Comment dated July 6, 1995, respondent judge denies the allegations against him. He avers that
on the application by SPO4 Pacifico L. Fradejas, he issued a search warrant which resulted in the seizure
from a certain Joel Gamo of a home-made gun, a hand grenade, five live ammunitions for Cal. 38 and three
live ammunitions for 12 gauge shotgun; that on August 25, 1993, a complaint for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition was filed against Joel Gamo in which the herein complainant Leovigildo, Sr.
and his son, Leovigildo, Jr., were included; that finding that the house in which the firearms and
ammunition had been found was owned by complainant and his son, he concluded that there was probable
cause to believe that complainant and his son were guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
and accordingly ordered their arrest. Respondent judge claims that he inhibited himself from the case after
he was ordered by the Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.
In his Reply complainant contends that as the search warrant was issued only against Joel Gamo and
Mantaring, Jr. it was wrong for respondent judge to find probable cause against him on the theory that, as
owners of the house in which the firearms and ammunitions were found, they had constructive possession
of the same.He likewise contends that respondent judge did not inhibit himself until after the preliminary
examination was terminated and the warrant of arrest issued, and only after complainant had filed a
petition for inhibition which the Executive Judge found to be well taken.
On October 16, 1995, this case was referred to the OCA for reevaluation, report and recommendation.
On January 12, 1996, the OCA submitted a Memorandum, recommending dismissal of the supplemental
complaint for lack of merit, for the following reasons:
(1) It is erroneous for herein complainant to equate the application for the issuance of search warrant with
the institution and prosecution of criminal action in a trial court. (Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA
249). Complainant cannot insist that since his name was not included in the search warrant, the house
designated to be searched did not belong to him, and that he was not present at the preliminary
investigation of witnesses preparatory to the issuance of the questioned warrant of arrest, there was no
basis for respondent judge to order his arrest.
(2) No taint of irregularity attended the issuance by respondent judge of the warrant of arrest against
complainant and his son. Neither was the charge that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent judge
in the spirit of anger, hatred or harassment purposes substantiated.
To begin with, it cannot be contended that complainant Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. could not be
proceeded against simply because he was not included in the search warrant issued against Gamo and
Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., who is apparently his son.The determination of probable cause in preliminary
investigations is based solely on the evidence presented by the complainant, regardless of whether or not
the respondent in that case is named in the proceedings for a search warrant. As correctly pointed out by,
the OCA,[1] the issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the showing of probabilities
as to different facts. In the case of search warrants, the determination is based on the finding that (1) the
articles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity and (2) they are found in the place to be searched. It
is not necessary that a particular person be implicated. On the other hand, in arrest cases, the determination
of probable cause is based on a finding that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
In this case, the arrest of herein complainant and his son, together with Joel Gamo, was ordered on the
basis of respondents finding that the place from where the guns and ammunitions were seized belonged
to complainant Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. and the testimonies of witnesses presented by SPO4 Fradejas. Of
course complainant denies that the house in which the firearms and ammunition were found belonged to
him and claims that at the time of the search he was in Manila. The provincial prosecutor subsequently
dismissed the case against complainant on precisely these grounds, i.e., that the house did not belong to
complainant and he was in Manila at the time the search and seizure were conducted. But to say this is not
to say that respondent acted arbitrarily or that he abused his powers so as to give ground for administrative
disciplinary action against him. It is only to say that he committed an error of judgment for which
complainants remedy is judicial.
What we think requires serious consideration is the contention by the complainant that respondent
judge should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation of the criminal case,
considering that the respondent was the present complainant, who had earlier filed an administrative case
against the judge and another one.
We are not unmindful of the cases in which it was stated that the mere filing of an administrative case
against a judge by one of the parties before him is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing a
case.[2] An examination of these cases reveals, however, that the administrative cases were filed during the
pendency of the cases, and it is evident that the administrative cases were filed only to force the judge to
inhibit himself from the consideration of the case before him. As this Court held, if on every occasion the
party apparently aggrieved were allowed to stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on
the desired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being
so charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges left
to handle all the cases pending in all the courts.[3] On the other hand, there is a remedy available to the
party seeking the disqualification of the judge. If he is denied a fair and impartial trial, caused by the judges
bias or prejudice, he can ask for a new trial in the interest of justice which will be granted if that is really
the case.[4]
But, in the case at bar, an administrative complaint against respondent and Judge Manuel A. Roman,
Jr. had previously been filed and it was paramount that respondent was free from any appearance of bias
against, or hostility toward, the complainant. The impression could not be helped that his action in that
case was dictated by a spirt of revenge against complainant for the latters having filed an administrative
disciplinary action against the judge. The situation called for sedulous regard on his part for the principle
that a party is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
This circumstance should have underscored for respondent the need of steering clear of the case
because he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. For his judgment
must not be tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceived interest in order to
preserve at all times the faith and confidence in courts of justice by any party to the litigation. [5]
Indeed prudence should have made respondent judge heed the admonition that a spotless
dispensation of justice requires not only that the decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge
rendering it must at all times maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. [6]
Moreover, we think it was improper for respondent judge to have issued the warrants of arrest against
complainant and his son without any finding that it was necessary to place them in immediate custody in
order to prevent a frustration of justice. It is now settled[7] that in issuing warrants of arrest in preliminary
investigations, the investigating judge must:
(a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions
and answers;
(b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and
(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice.
In this case, respondent judge justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest on the following ground:
In view of the above considerations [referring to the antecedent facts], it is the honest belief and finding of
the Court that there is sufficient probable cause that the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition was committed and that the named three (3) accused Joel Gamo, Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr.
and Leovigildo Mantaring Jr. are the ones probably guilty thereof for which reason Warrant of Arrest was
issued by undersigned against them.
He thus ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest solely on his finding of probable cause, totally omitting
to consider the third requirement that there must be a need to place the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The framers of the Constitution confined the determination of probable cause as basis for the issuance
of warrants of arrest and search warrants to judges the better to secure the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Respondent judge failed to live up to this expectation by refusing to inhibit himself
even when his very impartiality was in question and worse by issuing a warrant of arrest without
determining whether or not it was justified by the need to prevent a frustration of the ends of
justice. Parenthetically, the records show that the criminal complaints against herein complainant and his
son were eventually dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor, but not without the following parting words:
It cannot be gainsaid that respondents Mantarings were greatly prejudiced and suffered damages as
a consequence of their inclusion in the criminal complaint. The unfortunate incident could have been
avoided had the Honorable Municipal Trial Judge exercised the necessary prudence and judicial perpecuity
[sic] expected of an impartial Judge in the conduct of preliminary investigation before issuance of warrant
of arrest.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge Ireneo B. Molato is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that
commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are dismissed
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-91-657 June 21, 1993

LOURDES PRESADO, complainant,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MANUEL C. GENOVA, respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-91-704 June 21, 1993
DOMINADOR SIA, complainant,
vs.
A.M. No. RTJ-91-721 June 21, 1993
JOSE DE JESUS, complainant,
vs.

A.M. No. RTJ-91-746 June 21, 1993
MANUEL O. ZURBITO, complainant,
vs.
A.M. No. RTJ-91-767 June 21, 1993
DELFIN RICARTE, complainant,
vs.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-816 June 21, 1993
DEBORAH PERINO, complainant,
vs.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-823 June 21, 1993
RIZALINA Q. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.

PER CURIAM:
Seven (7) administrative complaints against respondent Judge Manuel C. Genova ("respondent Judge"),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate, were filed with this Court and
subsequently consolidated and referred to Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras of the Court of Appeals for
investigation of, and report and recommendation on, the charges therein. 1
On 29 July 1992, Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras ("Investigating Justice") commenced formal investigation
proceedings, giving notice to all the complainants and to respondent Judge, and issuing the
necessary subpoenaeto the persons who could have information relevant to the charges filed against
respondent Judge. To facilitate the investigation proceedings, depositions were taken, by authority of this
Court, at Masbate, Masbate, before Judge Florente A. Cirpres, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46.
On 29 January 1993, the Investigating Justice, after holding multiple hearings where the several parties
concerned were present, submitted to the Court a Report and Recommendation of five (5) of the seven (7)
consolidated administrative cases against respondent judge, namely, A.M. No. RTJ-91-657; A.M. No. RTJ-
91-721; A.M. No. RTJ-91-746; A.M. No. RTJ-91-767; and A.M. No. RTJ-92-816. 2 The Report and
Recommendation on the two (2) remaining administrative cases against respondent Judge, namely A.M.
No. RTJ-91-704 and A.M. No. RTJ-92-823, were submitted to the Court on 8 February 1993. 3
I
Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-657 (Lourdes Presado v. Judge Manuel C. Genova) for "Violation of Sec. 3 [b] R.A. No.
3019 [Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act])."
Lourdes Presado, in her verified complaint dated 26 March 1991, averred that: 4
a) Sometime in 1990, after a petition for adoption of Norlin Mondoniedo was filed by one
Phoebe Dizon before the respondent Judge's sala, respondent's wife Emerenciana Genova
allegedly demanded and received from the adopting parents the aggregate amount of
P15,000.00 through one Mrs. Celeste Asilum;
b) Sometime in 1990, respondent Judge, through his wife Emerenciana, received an
undetermined amount from one Adela Du, who also had a pending case with respondent;
c) On another occasion, respondent Judge allowed his wife to receive the amount of
P20,000.00 from one Aida Valencia, who then had a pending case before his sala;
d) Sometime in December 1989, a certain Emma Diaz Hao, who was a party to a case
pending before respondent judge, at the instance of respondent's wife Emerenciana,
treated both respondent Judge and wife to a very sumptuous meal, after which the
unconsumed food was wrapped up and given to respondent and wife, at the prodding of
the latter;
e) Respondent Judge is permitting his employee Amy Gaballo to front for his wife's
usurious loan transactions, to the direct or indirect benefit of respondent Judge.
Respondent judge filed an answer alleging: 5
a) that neither he nor his wife could have made any demands, financial or otherwise, in
the petition for adoption of Norlin Mondoniedo considering that the petition was resolved
without any opposition. Attached to the Answer were the affidavit adopting parents
denying the allegation of having paid respondent judge or his wife, and of Celeste Asilum
denying any participation with the said adoption proceedings;
b) that neither he nor his wife demanded or received any monies from one Adela Du.
Attached to the Answer is the affidavit of Adela Du stating that she "never paid any
amount to" respondent judge nor his wife;
c) that he never allowed nor had his wife ever received from Aida Valencia, a party-litigant
in Civil Case No. 2999 an action for partition, the amount of P20,000.00. That Civil Case
No. 2999 was affirmed by the court of Appeals only shows that the decision was decided
on the merits. The affidavit of Aida Valencia in support of respondent Judge's denial was
attached to the Answer;
d) that the alleged "sumptuous meal" was not arranged by one Emma Diaz Hao" for
respondent Judge and his wife Emerenciana, but was in fact an ordinary meal hosted by
Presiding Judge Silvestre Aguirre of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mandaon-Balid
on the occasion of the judicial visit if the then Presiding Judges of Masbate, including
respondent Judge;
e) that the allegation that his wife Emerenciana has been engaged in usurious loan
transactions is false. That while his wife may have lent money to his employees, the same
was interest free, and in fact, complainant herself and her relatives have benefited from
such "loans" which to date have remained unpaid.
At the investigation proceedings, complainant Presado filed two (2) Manifestations, dated 10 August
1992 6 and 9 September 1992, 7stating that she had lost interest in prosecuting the present complaint and
other administrative complaints against respondent Judge due to financial constraints, filial
obligations, 8and "change of heart." In her second Manifestation, complainant stated that she had become
associated with certain charismatic organizations of the Catholic Church prompting her to "condone all
those who wronged her", including respondent Judge and his wife.
In the meantime, evidence for respondent Judge consisting of testimony from persons mentioned in the
present complaint, was presented before the Investigating Justice.
The Investigating Justice submitted the following recommendation in respect of Presado's complaint: 9
Considering that in the instant administrative case, there is no evidence to prove the
charges alleged therein in view of the lack of interest of the complainant to prosecute her complaint,
and [that] the persons who allegedly paid or gave money or served [the] sumptuous meal to the
respondent or his wife, in consideration of a judgment by the respondent judge in their favor in
their respective cases, were presented before the undersigned Investigator, and had affirmed
the statements in their respective affidavits that no such money was ever paid nor a
sumptuous meal served to the respondent judge or his wife [in effect, testifying to the falsity
of the charges alleged by the complainant] THE UNDERSIGNED RECOMMENDS THAT THE
COMPLAINT IN THIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. RTJ-[91-] 657 BE DISMISSED.
(Emphasis supplied)
As a rule, the Court does not, as a matter of course, dismiss administrative complaints (especially those
charging offenses as serious as those here charged) against members of the Bench on account of withdrawal
of the charges or desistance of the complainant from prosecuting the complaint. The Court, however, in the
complaint at bar, has very little choice save to adopt the recommendation of the Investigating Justice to
dismiss A.M. No. RTJ-91-657; the desistance of the complainant, for reasons satisfactory to herself, 10left the
charges against respondent judge unsubstantiated. 11
II
Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-704 (Dominador Sia v. Hon. Judge Manuel C. Genova) for "Serious Misconduct,
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service."
Dominador Sia, in his verified complaint dated 25 July 1991, charged respondent Judge with "Serious
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service" committed as
follows: 12
That in 1989, prior thereto and subsequent thereafter, Judge Manuel C. Genova of Regional
Trial Court of the province of Masbate, Masbate, motivated by bias and moved by personal
gain, repeatedly refused to allow herein complainant to present his documentary evidence,
consisting of: [a] the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals and that of the Honorable
Supreme Court in Civil Case No. 163, in favor of herein complainant and for which reason,
Civil Case No. 321, involving the same property, subject of Civil Case No. 163 was decided upon
by respondent in favor of intervenors Heirs of Marcelino Aguirre, represented by Judge Silvestre
Aguirre, brother-in-law, Mrs. Emma Diaz Hao, cousin and town-mate of respondent judge
who hails from Magallanes, Sorsogon, [b] that Mrs. Emerenciana Genova, acting as conduit
for her husband [respondent herein,] solicited gifts and goods in kind from Mrs. Emma Hao in
exchange/consideration for a favorable decision in said Civil Case No. 321. That it is only now
that this complaint is filed before this Honorable Court, in view of he sworn statement of
Miss Lourdes Presado [complainant in AM No. RTJ-91-657] who was privy to all these
facts, she being a relative of respondent judge and the latter having stayed in the house of
the former for quite sometime during which all these unbecoming acts of serious
misconduct and dishonesty took place. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court required respondent Judge to file a Comment, and he did. In his Comment, dated 17 January
1992, respondent Judge averred 13that the orders assailed by the complainant, in connection with Civil Case
No. 321, i.e.(i) Motion to Submit their Formal Offer of Evidence; (ii) Notice of Appeal; and (iii) Motions for
Reconsideration, were denied because they were either filed out of time or lacked any merit. Respondent
Judge explained that he had denied complainant's Formal Offer of Evidence because it was filed beyond
the period granted by the court a quo; the notice of Appeal was likewise denied because the decision had
in the meantime attained finality; that the first Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit,
and the second was rejected pursuant to the prohibition against second motions for reconsideration in B.P.
Blg. 129. Respondent Judge called the Court's attention to the fact that in CA-G.R. SP No. 16299, his decision
in Civil Case No. 321 was affirmed en toto by the Court of Appeals.
The Investigating Justice summarized the proceedings relevant to Civil Case No. 321 as follows: 14
[I]n the hearing of November 21, 1986 (in Civil Case No. 321). defendant Dominador Sia
[complainant herein] identified a number of documentary exhibits marked as Exhibits 1 to
12, after which his counsel was granted by respondent judge five (5) days within which to formally
submit documentary exhibits in writing which, however, the latter failed to do so for the alleged
reason that the defendant brought along with him the exhibits when he went to Manila to
follow up the pending case before the Court of Appeals.
On January 30, 1987, after the conclusion of the testimony of rebuttal witness in Civil Case
No. 321, the respondent judge issued an Order directing the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
It was only on August 28, 1987 that counsel for the defendants filed a Motion to Admit
Exhibits which motion was opposed by the plaintiff and the plaintiff-intervenor.
The respondent judge denied said motion in his Order of September 17, 1987 as he found the
delay in filing the same inexcusable.
On November 18, 1987, respondent judge rendered his Decision in Civil Case No. 321 (Exh.
"H", Sia) declaring plaintiff and the Intervenor owners of the property in question. The
decretal part of the decision (Exh. "H-1" to "H-3", Sia) reads:
xxx xxx xxx
For failure of the defendants to make a timely appeal, the foregoing decision became final
and executory. Upon motion of the plaintiff and the plaintiff-intervenor, the respondent
judge issued the corresponding writ of execution, and denied the defendants' motion for
reconsideration of his order granting such issuance of the said writ.
Thus, the defendants [complainants herein] in a petition for certiorari and prohibition and
preliminary injunction (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 16299) sought before the Court of Appeals
the setting aside of the (1) Order of September 17, 1987 denying their motion to admit
documentary exhibits; (2) decision of November 18, 1987; and (3) orders granting execution
and denying the defendants' motion for reconsideration.
The then Eighth Division of this Court [of Appeals] in its decision dated September 14, 1989
in said CA-G.R. SP No. 16299 found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
judge in issuing the questioned orders and decision, and dismissed the petition for lack of
merit as It Ruled:
1) Re: The Order Refusing Admission of Petitioners' Belated Formal Offer
of Documentary Exhibits:
The refusal to admit petitioner's formal offer of exhibits being one which
was essential to the rendition of the judgment is deemed to have been
finally settled with the finality of the judgment that was rendered in relation
thereto.
2) Re: Decision in Favor of the Petitioners in Civil Case No. 163-II:
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the petitioners [complainant and privies], they never invoked the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 163 as a defense in Civil Case No. 321 against the
intervenor despite the judgment in their (petitioners) favor as early as
October 2, 1972. On the contrary, it was the other way around. Civil Case
No. 321 was pleaded by the petitioners in abatement of Civil Case No. 163.
When judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners in Civil Case No.
163 on October 2, 1972, they did not amend their answer to the complaint
in intervention in Civil Case No. 321, which was then pending to invoke
the judgment in their favor in Civil Case No. 163, but instead went on full
steam ahead in Civil Case No. 321. Significantly, the Formal Offer of
Exhibits by petitioners in Civil Case No. 321 does not include the judgment in
Civil Case No. 163 or even made any reference thereto. Pronouncement of
a judgment in a former case would not necessarily preclude relitigation of the
issues in a second case if res judicata is not invoked, since res judicata is a
matter of defense and does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to act on a
second suit between the parties on the same subject matter (Kidpalos vs. Baguio
Gold Mining Company, 104 SCRA 913, 917) Defenses and objections not
raised in an answer or a motion to dismiss [are] deemed waived (Section 2, Rule
9, Rules of Court) This is what happened in the present case.
When the petitioners as defendants submitted the merits of their claim to
the land in question in Civil Case No. 321 and evidence in support thereof
was adduced, they may be deemed to have waived the benefits of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 163 and agreed instead to relitigate in Civil
Case No. 321 the merits of their claim to the land in question. It was only
after an adverse decision was rendered against them in Civil Case No. 321 and
after the judgment had became final, that petitioners invoked for the first time the
judgment in Civil Case No. 163. The rule is settled that if the doctrine of res
judicata is not set up as a defense or ground of objection seasonably, it is deemed
waived and cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal (Alvarez, Jr. vs. Court
of Appeals, 158 SCRA 401).
3) Re: Orders Relating to the Execution of the Judgment in Civil Case No.
321.
Since the judgment in said Civil Case No. 321 has become final and
executory, the issuance of the writ of execution became a ministerial duty
compelled by mandamus (Aguilar vs. Blanco, G.R. No. 32392, August 31,
1988)
On October 6, 1989, the aforesaid Court of Appeals decision became final and executory.
(Emphasis supplied)
Evaluating the allegations and counter-allegations of complainant and respondent Judge, as well as the
available evidence on record, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice to
exonerate respondent judge from any liability arising from his Order denying complainants' Formal Offer
of Evidence in Civil Case No. 321 in view of complainant's tardiness in filing the Formal Offer of Evidence
and of complainant's failure to raise as a matter of defense, in a seasonable manner, the decision in Civil
Case No.
163-II.
On the second charge, respondent Judge avers that his wife neither intervened in any case nor received
gifts from any litigants before Branch 44, of which he is the Presiding Judge. He does not remember having
attended any "victory" party in reference to Civil Case No. 321; but recalls attending a luncheon gathering
hosted by Municipal Trial Circuit Court Presiding Judge Aguirre on the occasion of a judicial visit to
Mandaon in 1990 by several Regional Trial Court Judges, including himself. It was apparently at this
occasion when Judge Aguirre introduced to respondent Judge a certain Ms. Emma Diaz-Hao as his town-
mate and schoolmate; but respondent Judge denies ever having confirmed any blood relation with said
Ms. Emma Diaz-Hao.
Considering that the complainant herein had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the
second charge of his complaint, and presented no competent evidence thereof, 15the Court is left
without any alternative but to accept the recommendation of the Investigating Justice to dismiss
administrative complaint A.M. No. RTJ-91-704 for lack of evidence.
III
Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-721 (Jose de Jesus, Jr. v. Judge Manuel C. Genova) for "Serious
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Unbecoming and Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service."
In a verified complaint dated 1 August 1991, Jose de Jesus charged respondent Judge with "Serious
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Unbecoming and Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service"
committed in the following manner: 16
That on May 1991 and subsequent thereafter, Judge Manuel C. Genova of Regional Trial
Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44, moved by personal gain without justifiable reason
in scandalous manner and in an act debasing the dignity of the exalted position of an RTC
Judge, did then and there, together with his wife, Emerenciana Genova, stayed and resided
at his chambers, second floor of the Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Masbate, Masbate, utilizing
the same as his and his wife's living and residential quarters, with the provincial government paying
their electric bills thereby inviting public criticisms and as a matter of fact, such actuation of
the respondent and his wife were seriously criticized in a local tabloid "Panahon", copy of
which is hereto attached, marked as Annex "A" and denounced in a rally held in front of the
Hall of Justice on July 22, 1991 as evidenced by pictures, hereto attached, marked as
Annexes "B", "C", "D", and "E", (Emphasis supplied)
In his affidavit attached to his complaint, Jose de Jesus stated, among other things, that he knew for a fact
that respondent Judge and his wife were using his chambers as living and residential quarters since May
1991 and up to the time of execution of said affidavit on 25 July 1991. While respondent Judge denied this
charge, he presented during the hearing before the Investigating Justice a written permit from the Governor
of Masbate allowing respondent Judge to stay overnight at the Bulwagan ng Katarungan "while he is
working and as long as he remains the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate,
Masbate." 17The Investigating Justice found that they had "permanently stayed" in the Bulwagan, quoting
from the testimony of respondent Judge himself:
Court:
xxx xxx xxx
What can you say about this charge of de Jesus that you were living at the
Bulwagan ng Katarungan?
Witness (of respondent Judge):
You know, your Honor, with the peace and order
condition in Masbate that it is very fearsome to be
walking at night, it is a little bit alright now but
previously you cannot even find a tricycle or a trimobile
at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, that you have to walk and
expose to the elements and so I tried to request the
Governor of Masbate who is the caretaker of the
Bulwagan sometimes in the month of March, 1991,
requesting that I be allowed to stay overnight if I am
writing my decisions, thinking that if I have to go home
and walk alone without bodyguards, just like what other
judges in Masbate do, and the good Governor issued to
me a permit to stay at the Bulwagan but previous to this
although I would not like to place it on the record, with
the permission of the Justice, when Justice Bellosillo was
the Court Administrator, I asked permission.
COURT:
You also asked permission.
Yes, he permitted me, verbally.
Court:
Verbally.
Verbally together with Justice Fernan. But when this case
was filed, these 2 people (Justices) called for me and told
me not to stay at the Bulwagan . . . . So, from the time on I
was not permanently staying . . . (tsn, pp. 28, 29, Sept. 21,
1992)" 18 (Emphasis supplied)
The Investigating Justice concluded:
It need not be stated that government property is for official use only and not for the personal
use of the official. The permit issued by the Provincial Governor of Masbate did not confer on the
respondent judge the right to utilize his chambers as his living and residential quarters. The permit
was only for those occasions where the respondent judge had to work overnight in
connection with his official work.19(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Judge did not try to prove his assertion that he had been given oral permission to use his
chambers as his family and residential quarters.
The Court agrees with the above conclusion reached by the Investigating Justice and finds the respondent
judge guilty of serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
IV
Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-746 (Marthie O. Zurbito v. Regional Trial Court Judge Manuel C.
Genova) for "Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Discretion and Dishonesty."
In her verified complaint, complainant Marthie Zurbito charged respondent Judge as follows:
That on August 20, 1991, in the Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the respondent, being the Presiding Judge of Branch
44 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Fifth Judicial Region, and knowing fully well that
the accused Adonis Francisco, in Criminal Case No. 6184 for the Murder of Manuel Zurbito,
complainant's husband, had pleaded guilty to the offense charged but had invoked only the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and, therefore, under the law and in a long
line of Supreme Court decisions, should have been convicted, instead, in gross ignorance of
the law with deliberate abuse of discretion and dishonesty for making up or manufacturing
"facts" which were not found in the records, knowingly, willfully and feloniously rendered a
decision of acquittal, thereby inflicting irreparable injustice to herein complainant and her
family. 20(Emphasis supplied)
In its Resolution of 30 January 1992, the Court required respondent Judge to comment on the above
complaint. In his Comment, 21he contended:
(i) that at the arraignment of the accused Adonis Francisco on 23 January 1991 in Criminal
Case No. 6184 entitled People vs. Francisco, defense counsel moved to enter a plea of
"guilty" for the accused, but the latter, with "tears" in his eyes, uttered "I killed him because
he boxed me". Arraignment was thence postponed for 29 January 1991;
(ii) that at the rescheduled arraignment on 29 January 1991, a new defense counsel entered
a plea of "guilty". When asked by the trial court, accused admitted having killed the victim,
but reasoned that the victim repeatedly boxed him. A plea of "guilty" was nonetheless
entered in the Minutes of the arraignment proceedings and Certificate of Arraignment;
(iii) that prosecution merely presented circumstantial evidence which, unfortunately, was
not sufficient to support the conviction of the accused;
(iv) that the defense, without any objection from the prosecution, presented evidence to
support the statement of the accused that he killed the victim in self-defense;
(v) that weighing the evidence of the prosecution and of the defense, he gave credence to
the self-defense proposition of the accused and ordered, on 5 August 1991, the acquittal of
the latter of the charge in Criminal Case No. 6184.
(vi) that he is invoking the principle of judicial immunity, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of his judicial functions, and that the error, assuming one was made, was
one of judgment made in good faith.
Basically, complainant Marthie O. Zurbito charges that although the accused Adonis Francisco in Criminal
Case No. 6184 for the murder of Manuel Zurbito, complainant's husband, had pleaded guilty to the charge
of murder, respondent Judge nonetheless acquitted the accused.
As a general rule, a plea of guilty is sufficient to sustain a conviction without need of introduction of any
further evidence, save such evidence as may be necessary to enable the court to fix the proper
penalty. 22Where the offense charged is a capital offense, the Rules of Court (Rule 116, Section 3) require the
trial court to conduct "a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability."
The decision rendered by respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 6184 was examined in detail by Deputy
Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad who found the charges of Marthie O. Zurbito against respondent
Judge to be meritorious. The Investigating Justice declared herself in agreement with the following findings
of Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad:
xxx xxx xxx
Three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense and
this rule is mandatory (PP vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637). Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to a capital offense, reception of evidence. — When the
accused pleaded guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequence of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence
in his behalf.
Admittedly, respondent judge failed to observe the first requisite although he complied
with the second and third. Trial courts must exercise meticulous care in accepting a plea
of guilty in a capital offense (PP v. Gonzaga, 127 SCRA 158).
Complainant refutes respondent's allegations in his assailed Decision that Atty. Amador
gave the information that the accused surrendered to the police and that the doctor
testified that the victim was bigger than the accused. As to the first allegation, respondent's
stand is tenable that he did not state that Atty. Amador testified in court. As regard the
second, nowhere does it appear on record that the doctor testified to that effect. Prudence
dictates that respondent should have ascertained the veracity of his factual findings in his
decision, especially in the questioned criminal case involving as it does a judgment of
acquittal in a murder case.
What is more deplorable is that in the said decision, respondent acquitted the accused for
the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite his
plea of guilt, corroborated by the testimony of prosecution witness Jasmin Quintal. He even
appreciated complete self-defense in favor of the accused although the facts of the case do not
establish such a justifying circumstance. The two (2) essential requisites thereof, namely
unlawful aggression and reasonableness of the means employed to repel it are not present. When
an accused claims self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if the
latter's evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself admitted the
killing (PP v. Rey, 172 SCRA 149). Besides, even if it was established that the accused stabbed
the victim thrice at the back, he [respondent Judge] still asserts that the former had no intent to kill
the latter.
Respondent's judge's defenses of judicial immunity and error of judgment made in good
faith are unavailing. His unsubstantiated factual findings, non-observance of Sec. 3, Rule 116
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, and misapplication of the theory of self-defense which
is elementary in criminal law are far too glaring to ignore.
Judges may be excused only for occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, particularly
when incurred on complex points of law or mitigated by hourly difficulties of increasing
appellate decisions. Judges are expected to show more than a cursory acquaintance with
elementary rules covering procedure and preliminary investigations and well-settled
authoritative doctrines (Daplas vs. Judge Arquiza, 99 SCRA 141). 23
The Court has examined the decision rendered by respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 6184 dated 5
August 1991. The pertinent portion of respondent Judge's decision reads as follows:
During the presentation of the defense evidence, the accused and his wife testified.
According to the accused, that morning he was going to the Magallanes Gate wherein he
remembered that there was an Anonang Tree. He was going to get a bark of that tree which
he will use as a medicine for his wife who has just given birth. That while walking towards
the place and passing by the public market he saw [the victim] Manuel Zurbito.
Remembering that the latter was his manager at the Masbate Water Works District, he
approached him for a loan of P100.00 which he will use to buy the medicines for his wife.
That instead of giving him what he was requesting, Manuel Zurbito got angry and boxed
him. He was hit on the face. At that time, he was bringing a knife in order to get the
anonang bark and pulled it out. Seeing that the knife was pulled out, Manuel Zurbito [i.e. the
victim] tried to run away but he was overtaken by the accused. With the stroke of the knife, he hit
him in the spinal column causing [Zurbito's] death. According to him, he made three (3) stabs
and then the victim fell down. Later on, he heard somebody shouting and this made him
recover his senses that's why he started to run.
xxx xxx xxx
During the cross-examination, the prosecution made the accused reveal that he was a
plumber of the Masbate Water Works District. That he was employed there for his father
was relieved because of his illness [sic]. He was made to continue his father's work as a
plumber. That while working, his services was terminated and it was through the order of
Manuel Zurbito that he was terminated. According to the accused, he did not actually
receive the memorandum. In fact, what he received was a notice of suspension. He denied
that he harbored any bad feelings against Manuel Zurbito. In fact during that morning, he
tried to make a loan and it was only that the deceased got angry so he tried to stab him.
xxx xxx xxx
Was the accused justified in stabbing Manuel Zurbito? The weapon used and submitted as
an exhibit has a blade of around four inches in length and it is not a weapon which is used
purposely to commit crime. It appears that it has been used for a long time in the service
of the kitchen. It is eroded on its blade and not even sharp. The edge of the weapon shows
that it has been used for quite sometime. It is stained with dirt, showing that it is not only
dirty but it is almost black. This only shows that the accused did not purposely bring the
knife in order to attack somebody.
xxx xxx xxx
Analyzing the foregoing, it shows that the accused did not actually mean to kill Manuel
Zurbito. If his purpose was to kill him, he should have been stabbed in another part of the
body. The testimony of the doctor was very clear that the knife was not really fully embedded. It
had only a depth of two inches. The wound at the back explains that the victim was running
away.
xxx xxx xxx
From this presentation, nobody saw that really happened except what the accused says. The Court
believes that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and for insufficiency
of evidence, the case against the accused should be dismissed. The accused prove exculpatory
evidence which must result to his acquittal even if he pleaded guilty. 24(Emphasis supplied)
After examination of the decision rendered by respondent Judge and the record of Criminal Case No. 6184, this Court,
like Deputy Court Administrator Bernad and the Investigating Justice, is convinced that the prosecution's evidence
against the accused Adonis Francisco constituted proof beyond reasonable doubt, that the acquittal of the accused by
respondent Judge was rendered in gross ignorance of the law and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
A claim of self-defense is, in principle, an admission that he had inflicted a fatal blow on the person of the victim, but
that the injuries so inflicted were justified under the circumstances. It is incumbent, therefore, upon the accused to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the unlawful unaggression on the part of the victim; the reasonableness of the
necessary means he employed to prevent or repel the initial aggression of the victim; and the absence of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused that could have precipitated the aggression by the victim. Even if the evidence
of prosecution be "weak," the accused cannot escape criminal liability on that ground alone since he has the burden of
justifying by clear and convincing evidence what would otherwise be a felonious act on his part. 25
After a thorough review of the facts obtaining in Criminal Case No. 6184, the Court is unable to see how respondent
Judge could have reasonably ruled that the accused Adonis Francisco, in killing the victim, acted in self-defense. The
bare allegation of the accused that it was the victim, and not himself, who had provided provocation, was obviously
self-serving. The only corroboration of that allegation was provided by the wife of the accused who could not be
expected to be unbiased witness and whose evidence was clearly hearsay in character since she did not see the incident
herself but merely testified on what the accused had told her after the killing. Moreover, the testimony of the wife was
offered merely to prove voluntary surrender on the part of the accused.
Moreover, even if the respondent Judge had found that the victim Zurbito had "boxed" the accused Adonis Francisco,
the response of the accused against the victim was obviously excessive and unnecessary, considering that the victim
fled from the accused who nonetheless chased him and inflicted three (3) stab wounds on the victim, the last one
penetrating the back and the spine of the victim two (2) inches deep. The Forensic Examiner Dr. Artemio Capelan
testified that he had difficulty extracting the knife from the body of the victim because it had been embedded through
the vertebral column deep enough to have penetrated the back lateral and lower portion of the heart of the victim. 26he
accused must have delivered the stabbing blow with great force. There is here an obvious and total misapplication of
the law on self-defense. The rule on self-defense is an elementary norm of law of which respondent Judge seemed totally
unaware.
For the acts of respondent Judge in this case, the Investigating Justice recommended that he be suspended from office
without pay for one (1) month.
V
Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-767 (Delfin Ricarte v. Hon. Judge Manuel C. Genova) for "Incompetence,
Grave Abuse of Discretion and Gross Ignorance of the Law"
In his verified complaint, Delfin Ricarte stated that he was the father of Edgar Ricarte, the murder victim in Criminal
Case No. 5739 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Sonny Baruelo;" that the accused Sonny Baruelo was acquitted
by respondent Judge for alleged failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; that in rendering
that acquittal, respondent Judge was partial to the accused, considering that the defense had failed to discredit Bernito
Alvarez, the prosecution eye-witness; that respondent Judge had discredited the prosecution eye-witness Alvarez by
making assumptions in favor of the accused for which no factual basis had been established during the trial; that
respondent Judge relied solely on his personal notes in deciding the case, disregarding completely the transcript of
stenographic notes taken; that if respondent Judge had referred to the transcript, he would have found out that the
defense witnesses had contradicted each other in their testimony in material respects; that the testimony of defense
witness Ben Betonio contradicted that of the accused and his wife, but partly confirmed the testimony of prosecution
eye-witness Alvarez that the victim had been killed outside of the house after having been overtaken by accused.
The Court required respondent Judge to file a Comment and there he stated that Criminal Case No. 5739 was a simple
case where the accused had proved self-defense; that the victim who lived for sixteen (16) days after he was stabbed did
not execute any affidavit; that the fact that defense counsel was his former Clerk of Court was not sufficient reason for
respondent Judge to inhibit himself from deciding the case.
The Investigating Justice examined in detail the decision rendered by respondent Judge in the Baruelo case and the
evidence submitted to the trial court. After such examination, the Investigating reached certain conclusions which
may be summarized in the following terms:
(1) There are statements in the assailed decision of respondent Judge that "are not in accordance
with the evidence adduced during the trial." 27
(2) There were inconsistencies on "very substantial matters" between the testimony of defense
witness Betonio on direct examination and his testimony on cross-examination; consequently, the
credibility of his testimony was "questionable; 28and that the testimony of that defense witness had
at least partially corroborated the testimony of prosecution eye-witness Alvarez that he saw the
accused come from inside the house and stab the victim Edgar Ricarte who was walking in front of
the accused's house.
(3) The claim of the accused of self-defense had not been convincingly proved:
The number of stab wounds, 5 at that, inflicted on the victim by the
accused [Sonny Baruelo] as well as the location of the same shows that it was
more than mere repelling the alleged attack on the person of the accused Sonny
Baruelo that caused him to stab the victim 5 times. Also, there was no physical
proof of the alleged blows by Edgar Ricarte on the face, forearm and
stomach of the accused;
The knife which the victim allegedly tried to stab the accused, with, was not
produced before the court. It may be said that except for the self- serving
testimony of the accused himself which was corroborated only by his wife, there
is no clear and convincing evidence of the claim of self-defense. 29
The basic conclusion reached by the Investigating Justice was that:
While malice does not appear to have attended the inaccuracies found in the questioned
decision, there certainly was misappreciation of the evidence and non-application of the settled
rules on the matter by the respondent judge. There is no dispute that the respondent judge failed
to draw up his decision with care and failed to make certain that the contents of his decision truly
and accurately reflect what is on record. Thus, the respondent judge may be said to be grossly
negligent
which amounts to ignorance of the law in the rendition of the questioned
decision. 30(Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the Investigating Justice found respondent Judge guilty of gross negligence "which amounts
to ignorance of the law," for which she recommended the penalty of suspension without pay for one (1)
month.
After careful examination of the decision of respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 5739 as well as the
underlying records of that case, the Court agrees with the findings of fact of the Investigating Justice. There
is in this case the same gross ignorance on the part of respondent Judge of the very basic substantive rules
of self-defense that were obvious in A.M. No. RTJ-91-746 (Zurbito v. Genova) which law students in their
first year in law school. There is also failure on the part of respondent Judge to take account of the facts as
shown by the evidence made of record during the trial, such that some of the conclusions reached by the
respondent Judge found no basis in the evidence of record.
VI
Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-816 (Deborah Perino v. Judge Manuel C. Genova, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate) for "Ignorance of the Law."
The sworn complaint here relates, once again, to a decision rendered by respondent Judge in a criminal
case for murder — Criminal Case No. 442 — where, in a decision dated 17 December 1991, two (2) of the
accused, Nicomedes Estorum and Joel Estorum, were acquitted of the charge of murder and that acquittal
was rendered, according to complainant Perino, notwithstanding the strong evidence against both accused
and notwithstanding the fact that one of them, Joel Estorum, had not even been subjected to the jurisdiction
of the trial court.
Respondent Judge was required by the Court to file a comment on the complaint, and in that comment, he
maintained that his decision in Criminal Case No. 442 was based on the merits; that while it was true that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Joel Estorum, Joel was acquitted because of
insufficiency of evidence and because, "in the interest of justice," the case against Joel Estorum "who [was]
wrongly accused [should] be terminated," instead of being archived and serving as a sword of Damocles
over the head of Joel Estorum. 31In his memorandum, respondent Judge invokes the decision of the
Supreme Court in People v. Fernandez, 32where the Court held that when "the crime is not successfully
proven, the judgment of acquittal affects the co-accused who jumped bail."
In Criminal Case No. 442, the evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following as facts: that
about 3:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 August 1989 at Barrio San Marco, Placer, Masbate, prosecution witness Marcos
Perino and his son Elpidio Perino (victim in Criminal Case No. 442) where at the store of Sitas Estorum;
that the victim Elpidio was invited by the accused Nicasio Estorum to join their group consisting of two (2)
other Estorums and another person; that when the victim went along with Nicasio, the latter stabbed the
victim at the back, while Joel Estorum stabbed the victim above the right waistline; that almost
simultaneously, Nicomedes Estorum shot the victim on the right abdomen; that all three (3) accused
Estorums fled after the slaying of Elpidio Perino; that only Nicomedes and Nicasio were arrested and later
arraigned on 8 October 1990 and 14 August 1991, respectively; that co-accused Joel Estorum was never
arrested and has remained since then a fugitive from the law.
The story presented by the defense in Criminal Case No. 442 was the following: that in the mid-afternoon
of 24 August 1989, the victim was at the store of Sitas Estorum where the accused Nicomedes' wife Florita
was selling "tuba"; that the victim Elpidio Perino, appearing to be drunk, wanted to purchase some "tuba"
on credit; that Florita refused to sell any to him on credit until the victim Elpidio shall have paid his
previous debt of P80.00; that the victim Elpidio then pulled the hair of Florita; that Nicomedes, coming
from behind the store, confronted the victim and demanded that he release his wife; that Elpidio then
pulled out a gun and pointed it at Nicomedes; that accused Nicomedes then tried to wrest the gun from
the victim; that co-accused Nicasio, seeing the commotion between his brother Nicomedes and the victim,
and attempting to help his brother Nicomedes, pulled out a bolo; which the victim had on a scabbard on his
side and thereupon stabbed the victim with the bolo; that almost simultaneously, while Nicomedes and the
victim Elpidio were wrestling for the possession of the latter's gun, the gun went off the bullet hitting
Elpidio; that both Nicomedes and Nicasio subsequently escaped from the scene of the crime.
After trial, respondent Judge found Nicasio guilty of homicide with the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense of his brother (co-accused) Nicomedes. Nicomedes was acquitted upon the ground of
defense of relative (his wife) and the ground that gunshot wound was inflicted accidentally. Accused Joel
Estorum, although never arraigned before the trial court, was acquitted because of lack of evidence against
him.
In her Report, the Investigating Justice made the following observations:
In the criminal case a quo, evidence is clear that the victim suffered two stab wounds. Logic
dictates that since accused Nicasio testified that he stabbed the victim only once (tsn., p. 9; p. 12,
October 8, 1991) someone else must have inflicted the second stab wound. There is therefore
[a] need of determining how the second stab wound came about. The case as against accused Joel
Estorum should thus not have been dismissed under the circumstances.
Witness for the prosecution, Marcos Perino, testified that after Nicasio Estorum stabbed the
victim, the latter was also stabbed by Joel Estorum (tsn., p. 4, Nov. 7, 1990) and the Municipal
Health Officer Pio V. Corpus of Masbate testified that the victim suffered two stab wounds
and 1 gunshot wound (tsn., p. 3, Jan. 14, 1991).
In the light of the foregoing, the respondent judge may be said to have been too precipitate
to relieve accused Joel Estorum of any criminal liability.
xxx xxx xxx
The version recited by accused Nicomedes Estorum and Zaldy Francisco in their
testimonies and which version was believed by the respondent judge is completely
different from that appearing in their affidavits.
Such grave inconsistency and very substantial at that, between the statements of accused
Nicomedes and the defense witness Zaldy Francisco in their respective affidavits (which are
part of the record) and their testimonies at the witness stand, should have cautioned the
respondent judge in lending credenceto the testimonies of the said witnesses. A judge should
exercise due care in analyzing conflicting statements on record but also to reassure the litigants of
his being fair and just.
For the aforesaid gross negligence which amounts to ignorance of the law committed by the
respondent judge, the undersigned Investigator recommends the . . . . " 33(Emphasis supplied)
We think that once again, in Criminal Case No. 442, respondent Judge showed unusual ignorance
of the law concerning self-defense and defense of relatives as well as failure to examine the evidence
presented during the trial with sufficient care.
Respondent Judge's invocation of People v. Fernandez > 34as basis for his acquittal of Joel Estorum, appears plainly
unjustified. Even cursory examination of the decision of the Court in Fernandez shows that the co-accused Josefino
Fernandez after having been admitted to bail, jumped bail, such that the trial court had already acquired jurisdiction
over Fernandez's person when it convicted him and when the Supreme Court found the evidence against both accused
insufficient and accordingly acquitted both. In the present complaint, Joel Estorum was never arrested nor arraigned,
so that, as admitted by respondent judge, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction of his person. Moreover, the
evidence against Joel Estorum, as shown by the Investigating Justice, was very substantial and should have been more
than sufficient to restrain respondent Judge's eagerness to acquit Joel Estorum.
The Investigating Justice found respondent Judge guilty of "gross negligence which amounts to ignorance of the law"
and recommended the penalty of suspension from office without pay for one (1) month.
VII
Re: A.M. No. RTJ-92-823 (Rizalina Q. Valencia v. Judge Manuel C. Genova, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate) for "Accepting Bribe Money."
In her sworn statement, complainant Rizalina Q. Valencia stated that she is the legal spouse of Melchor Valencia, one
of the defendants in a case entitled "Pedro Valencia et al. v. Melchor Valencia, et al.", Civil Case No. 2999, Regional
Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44, presided over by respondent Judge; that said case was a complaint for
judicial partition; that a decision dated 2 June 1989 was rendered by respondent Judge in favor of plaintiffs Pedro
Valencia, et al. which, among other things, allowed the heirs of the late Marcelo Valencia to share in the estate of the
late Severino Valencia, and included certain heads of large cattle in the estate of Severino Valencia although the same
was separate conjugal property of some of the defendants, and declared defendants non-suited; that decision was
tainted with "bias and irregularity;" that after the said decision was rendered, complainant Rizalina discovered that
respondent Judge received from Aida Valencia, one of the children of Marcelo Valencia — one of the plaintiffs — the
following amounts: (1) P2,000.00 — on 13 February 1989; and (2) P5,000.00 on 27 July 1989. Complainant attached
xerox copies of two (2) vouchers of AVECO Company.
The xerox copies were described by the Investigating Justice 35in the following manner:
Exh. "F" is a xerox copy of a voucher entitled in bold prints "GENERAL VOUCHER." All in
handwriting are (1) "Feb. 13, (19)89" (date); (2) "Payment for Judge (EXPLANATION OF
TRANSACTION); (3) P2,000 (AMOUNT); (4) "Aida Valencia" (signature); (5) Cash Feb. 13
(19)89 (Check No.)"; (6) Aveco (Received from); and (7) TWO THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (the
sum of).
Exh. "G" is a xerox copy of a voucher also entitled in bold prints "GENERAL VOUCHER." All in
handwriting are (1) "July 27, 1989" (date); (2) "Judge Manuel Genova" (appearing on the
uppermost left hand corner of the voucher); (3) "Payment for legal fees for the case"
(EXPLANATION OF TRANSACTION); (4) P5,000 (AMOUNT); (5) "Aida Valencia"
(signature); (6) "Professional Fee" (ACCOUNT); (7) "Petty Cash fund" (CREDITS); (8) "Cash"
— 7-27 (19)89 (CHECK NO.); (9) "Aveco Company" (Received from); and (10) "Five Thousand
Pesos Only" (the sum of). 36
In his comment on the complaint, respondent Judge denied receiving the amount of P7,000.00 from Aida Valencia.
He also stated that the decision he rendered in civil Case No. 2999 had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a
decision rendered on 29 September 1991 which was brought to the Supreme Court on petition for review; that the
petition for review was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit. Respondent Judge also stated that the
vouchers attached to the complaint were fake and not the genuine vouchers of AVECO Company.
In respect of the vouchers showing the total amount of P7,000.00, the complainant testified before the Investigating
Justice that she was given those vouchers by Evelyn Posadas, an accountant of Aida Valencia who had asked Evelyn
to prepare the vouchers for respondent Judge. 37
Evelyn Posadas, after initial failure to attend the hearings, did appear before the Investigating Justice and stated that
her failure to attend the earlier hearings was due to "the respondent Judge threaten[ing] to file a case against her before
the Professional Regulatory Commission." 38The testimony of Evelyn Posadas was summarized by the Investigating
Justice in the following manner:
[Evelyn Posadas] testified that since July 29, 1992, in the residence of Aida Valencia, in Palmera
Heights Subd., the respondent judge had threatened to file such administrative charge against her
if she appears before the Investigator; that during the proceedings of this administrative case, the
respondent judge told her to hide in the house of Aida Valencia in order that the process server could
not serve on her subpoena for the said hearings; that Aida Valencia told her that if ever she would
testify, it would only cost Aida Valencia P100,000.00 — P50,000.00 for the judge and P50,000.00
for the police; that she (Evelyn Posadas) got the original copies of the said vouchers from the files of
Aveco Export Co., had them photocopied and returned the original copies; that when she saw the
said vouchers and asked Aida Valencia about them, the latter said that she used them "sa paggapang
sa Kaso ko sa lupa"; that the signatures in the said xerox vouchers are the genuine signatures of
Aida Valencia for Evelyn Posadas is familiar with the same as Aida always sign in her presence;
that sometimes, Evelyn prepared the checks for the professional fees and Aida Valencia signed them;
that Aida Valencia gave her mother, Flora Guadayo, a Rolex wrist watch for the latter to appear in
this administrative case in favor of the respondent judge and she (Evelyn Posadas) was a given a
Rolex wrist watch in order not to appear as the complainant's witness in the present administrative
case; that her mother failed to attend the September 21, 1992 hearing because she went to Masbate
for the hearing of a land entitled "Valenzuela, et al v. Guadayo" before the sala of Judge Genova;
that she appeared in this administrative case because she was already sick and tired of the grave
threats against her by Aida Valencia and for public interest; that Aida Valencia made her sign a
prepared affidavit in September 1992 right after the publication in the "Panahon" of the bribery case
involving the respondent judge; that when she stayed in the house of Aida Valencia with the
respondent judge and his wife, he would ask money from Aida Valencia for transportation and other
ordinary expenses, and the latter would put in his pocket, a P1,000.00 denomination bill; and that
she filed administrative cases for bribery against the judge and the Justices who rendered the
decisions against her in civil cases she filed before their respective courts (tsn, pp. 3-38, October 7,
1992, 1:30 p.m.). 39(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent judge contended that the testimony of Evelyn Posadas should not be believed considering that she was
mentally ill, being a schizophrenic and being in and out of the mental hospital several times. In support of this
assertion, Dr. Cecilia Alvaran of the National Center for Mental Health was presented and testified that Evelyn
Posadas had been confined a number of times in that hospital with the diagnosis of "schizophrenia paranoid-type."
and "schizophrenia undifferentiated-type." The Investigating Justice, however, noted that a court report dated 20
October 1992 by the National Center for Mental Health prepared by Carmelito Erespe and approved by Dr. Cecilia
Alvaran contained the following recommendation:
At present she (Evelyn Posadas) is deemed to be free of psychotic symptoms and is deemed fit to
stand witness in court. 40
Aida Valencia appeared as a defense witness at the investigation and there said that she never gave any money to
respondent Judge nor prepared any vouchers for him; that the signatures on the xerox copies of the vouchers were not
her signatures; that she would not pay respondent Judge legal fees because she had a lawyer, one Atty. Apaya; that
she had indeed employed Evelyn Posadas as auditor of the company (AVECO) from 1990-1991 until Evelyn Posadas
became a "mental case."
In the portion of her "Second Report dealing with this complaint, the Investigating Justice stated that she was not
convinced "that bribery took place between Aida Valencia as the giver and the respondent judge as the receiver. 41The
Investigating Justice submitted two (2) reasons for this conclusion: firstly, the Investigating Justice believes that
Evelyn Posadas had a "fixation" that "every court victory has been attended by a bribe received by a judge from the
winning litigant;" 42and secondly, the Investigating Justice felt that the xerox copies of the vouchers did not constitute
sufficient evidence of a bribe. She said:
The xerox copies for the two vouchers in question likewise are not sufficiently convincing of the
bribe alleged in this administrative case. In the first place, they are mere xerox copies and as such
could easily be subject to insertions, additions or changes of matters not found in the original.
Secondly, the data contained therein do not support the dishonest act involved. In Exhibit F, while
there is the phrase "payment for judge" the name of the judge is not indicated. It does not necessarily
follow that because Aida Valencia is an heir of one of the plaintiffs in a case before the respondent
judge, such payment was made to him.
In Exhibit G, the data contained therein regarding explanation of transactions and account are
contradictory. While at the top, there are the words "Judge Manuel Genova", in the box for
"Explanation of Transaction" is written "payment for legal fees for the case" and in the box for
account is written "Professional fee." Certainly, if the explanation of the transaction is payment for
legal fees, then such payment is legitimate." 43
While apparently dismissing the complaint of Rizalina Q. Valencia for lack of sufficient evidence, the Investigating
Justice took respondent Judge to task for certain improprieties:
An observation of the Investigator is that the respondent judge has utilized Flora Guadayo, a litigant
in a civil case before his sala, as his witness in this administrative case, and that despite the fact that
she has already testified for him, he has not inhibited himself from presiding over her case as of the
date of the last hearing of this administrative case on November 11, 1992.
The Investigator is of the view that under the circumstances, the respondent judge has displayed
lack of sound discretion for he has placed himself in a situation where the so-called cold neutrality
of a judge can no longer be said of him for the litigant, Flora Guadayo, has done him a favor.
Also, on one occasion when the respondent judge went to the office of the stenographers in these
administrative cases in order to have a copy of the transcript, it was Aida Valencia who paid for the
transcript, although according to him, he paid her after. Such payment by Aida Valencia (although
paid later by the respondent judge) is an act of impropriety considering that she won a case in his
sala. If may be mentioned that a copy of the transcript could be send to him even if there was no
prior payment as was done with the transcript of the proceedings on October 7, 1992.
Furthermore, the respondent judge, as shown in the earlier part of the proceedings, was trying to
make it appear to the Investigator that Evelyn Posadas could not be a witness in this administrative
case as she was allegedly so mentally sick and confined at the mental hospital (tsn. p. 65, Aug. 18,
1992, a.m.) when in fact, on the day she was supposed to appear, he knew that she would not appear
as instructed by Aida Valencia. 44
Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the evidence submitted against respondent Judge on this
bribery charge is not insubstantial. The testimony of Evelyn Posadas cannot be disregarded as the meaningless babble
of a mad woman, considering the certification issued by the National Center for Mental Health, and considering the
clear and coherent manner in which she testified. Aida Valencia contradicted the testimony of Evelyn Posadas; that
was, of course, to be expected. Considering all the testimony and other evidence submitted in this case, the balance of
evidence appears to the Court to be just about at equipoise. The vouchers submitted by the complainant were
photocopies only. The record does not show that efforts were made by complainant to secure production of the original
vouchers by subpoena duces tecum. Photocopies could be faithful reproductions of the originals. Respondent Judge
sought to suggest that the amounts indicated in the photocopies of the vouchers may have been amounts paid to the
commissioners appointed in the partition case. This effort was not convincing. At the same time, however, the
photocopied vouchers do not unequivocally state that the sums there set out were given to respondent Judge. Upon
the other hand, if those sums had indeed been given to and received by respondent Judge, he would not, in realistic
expectation, have given a receipt for them; to require submission of such a receipt in order to hold respondent guilty
would be unreal and unreasonable. Finally, we note that if, in fact, one of the vouchers (Exhibit "G") was "payment
for legal fees," such payment would not have been legitimate if made to respondent Judge; for he, an incumbent judge,
obviously could not have legally practiced law and charged legal fees for legal services.
We hold that, on balance, and not without hesitation, the evidence submitted against respondent Judge in this seventh
administrative case is not sufficient basis for finding him guilty of bribery.
Taking now a global view of all the seven (7) cases against respondent Judge, and considering more particularly the
conclusions we reached in respect of the fourth, fifth and sixth cases (A.M. No. RTJ-91-746; A.M. No. RTJ-91-767;
and A.M. No. RTJ-91-816) above, in conjunction with our conclusion in the third case (A.M. No. RTJ-91-721), the
Court concludes that respondent Judge has been shown to be unfit to remain in the Judiciary and must accordingly,
in the interest of the service, be removed from the service. In the fourth, fifth and sixth cases above, respondent Judge
exhibited ignorance about basic principles of criminal law so gross and appalling as to compel the conclusions that he
could not have been acting in good faith; that he is grossly incompetent as a judge; and that to allow him to remain a
judge is to impose an intolerable risk of letting loose on our hapless society more persons who have committed crimes
as serious as murder and who should be behind prison bars. In the third case, respondent Judge demonstrated that he
is capable and willing to devote government property to private and family purposes, a demonstration which reinforces
the Court's conviction concerning respondent Judge's unfitness to remain in the Judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the respondent Judge for gross ignorance of the law amounting to
gross incompetence and misconduct in office, and in the best interest of the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
privileges and benefits he might otherwise be entitled to, except accrued earned leave privileges or the money value
thereof. This Resolution is immediately executory and respondent Judge shall vacate his position forthwith.
SO ORDERED.
DR. EDGARDO ALDAY, MERCEDES FAVIS, MARNA VILLAFUERTE, and CHRISTOPHER

GARCIA, complainants, vs. JUDGE ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ, JR., Branch 58, Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Complainants seek the dismissal of respondent judge allegedly for threatening them with a gun
during a traffic incident.
In their verified complaint,[1] complainants alleged that on May 6, 1999, the van they were riding was
about to exit the Cityland Condominium at Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City. When they reached the
entrance/exit ramp, respondent arrived in his car and blocked the ramp. As a result, neither vehicle could
move. Respondent alighted from his car and went over to the van. He shouted Putang ina ninyo, anong gusto
ninyo mangyari?, while brandishing a gun and pointing it at the occupants of the van.
On June 14, 1999, the OCA required respondent to comment.[2] Respondent admitted that there was a
traffic altercation. However, he claimed that it was complainants van which blocked the ramp. He said that
he merely alighted from his car to vent his ire at the inept security guard who did not even help them
untangle the traffic snarl. He categorically denied any gun-poking incident.
The complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to Office of the Court
Administrator Consultant, Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, for investigation, report and recommendation. [3]
During the hearing, the parties presented conflicting versions of the incident. These are succinctly
summarized by the OCA Consultant, and we present both sides for better appreciation of the facts.
On one hand, complainants testified as follows:
1. Dr. Edgardo S. Alday, 67 years old, a physician by profession, identified and affirmed the truth of the
sworn statement (Exhibit A, Rollo, pp. 5-6) he executed at the Eastern Police District Headquarters on May
7, 1999. Said statement was submitted as part of his direct testimony. In said statement, Dr. Alday declared
that on May 6, 1999, and he and several companions were aboard his Mercedes Benz van. As they were
leaving the parking area of the Cityland Condominium (Cityland for brevity) at Pioneer St., Mandaluyong
City, shortly after noon, a car with Plate No. 16 NCR 58 met them blocking their way out. At this juncture,
the security guard motioned to them to back up so that the incoming vehicle could enter. While the van
was slowly backing up, the respondent who was driving his car was going forward almost pushing the
van and at the same time pointing a gun at them through the cars windshield. Upon respondents car
coming alongside and parallel to the van, respondent stopped his car, alighted and with his gun pointed
at the occupants of the van, shouted three times saying Putang ina ninyo, anong gusto ninyo
mangyari. Examined further by his counsel, Dr. Alday declared that prior to the incident, he did not know
the respondent not having ever met him.
On cross-examination by respondents counsel, Dr. Alday insisted that what he related in his statement was
what actually happened. He gave a more detailed description of the happening.Asked to specify the
firearm respondent allegedly used to point at them, Dr. Alday insisted that it was black automatic pistol
not a chrome-plated revolver which the cross-examiner suggested.
2. Ms. Marna Villafuerte-Judan, 32 years old, businesswoman, was the second complainant to testify. She
identified and affirmed Exhibit B (Rollo, pp. 9-10) as the sworn statement she gave at the Eastern Police
Headquarters on May 7, 1999. The same was offered as her direct testimony. She declared that shortly after
noon on May 6, 1999, she was in a Mercedes Benz van with Dr. Edgardo Alday and his wife, Dr. Mercedes
Favis. The said van was being operated by Dr. Aldays driver. As the vehicle was about to leave the parking
area of Cityland on Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City, a red car driven by a man in a business suit who they
later found out was respondent Judge Escolastico Cruz, blocked their way. The security guard on duty
motioned Dr. Aldays driver to back up. As they were backing up, the respondent was advancing and
almost pushing the van. She saw Dr. Alday, who was seated in front next to the driver, open his window
and inform the respondent, who was inside his car, that we were just going out but the respondent berated
(nagmura) Dr. Alday saying that he did not care but he was coming in.When respondents car came
alongside their van, she saw the respondent point his firearm at them. After that the respondent went his
way. She saw that respondents car had Plate No. 16 NCR. Asked additional questions by their counsel, Ms.
Judan declared that she had not met respondent before the incident which occurred on May 6, 1999. She
only found out his identity at the police station when she learned that Plate No. 16 is issued only to judges.
Answering the undersigned, Ms. Judan stated that she was a resident at Cityland. She admitted that
although she is not related to either Dr. Alday or his wife, she is close to them and she addresses them tito
and tita.
Cross examined by respondents counsel, complainant Judan admitted that after she boarded the van next
to Dr. Favis, she was engrossed in conversation with her that she did not notice the arrival of respondents
car near the tali, which she described as the rope slung across the driveway. She first noticed the respondent
after he had already crossed the tali. She said she did not notice respondent alight from his car as she only
became aware of the incident when the red car was already in front of her. She stated further that there was
an exchange of words between Dr. Alday and respondent and that immediately after they left the area,
they had proceeded directly to the police. Although there was a police station nearer Cityland than the one
to which they had repaired, it was a spot choice they made at that moment to go to the Eastern Police
District Headquarters on Meralco Avenue.
3. The third and last complainant to testify was Dr. Mercedes A. Favis, 66 years old, also a physician. She
identified and affirmed the truth of the sworn statement (Exhibit C, Rollo, pp. 7-8) she executed on May 7,
1999, at the Eastern Police District Headquarters. Answering additional questions posed by their counsel,
she stated that she did not know nor had she ever encountered the respondent before May 6, 1999. In
Exhibit C which was submitted as her direct testimony, Dr. Favis declared that they had gone to the police
headquarters to file a complaint against Judge Escolastico Cruz who was identified to them by the security
guard. In the same statement she declared that on May 6, 1999, between 12:10 and 12:15 in the afternoon,
she, together with her husband, a guest and their driver were engressing from the parking area of the
Cityland, at Pioneer St., Pasig City, aboard their Mercedes Benz van when they were suddenly confronted
by a red automobile driven by a man dressed in a dark business suit. The driver of this automobile was
repeatedly shouting curses saying Putang ina ninyong lahat, ano ba ang gusto ninyong mangyari, at the
same time pointing a firearm towards the passengers of the van.The driver of the red car alighted and
confronted her husband and their driver with a gun which he pointed at them. After the driver of the red
car had finished bad mouthing them, he drove away. They, in turn, left and immediately went to a police
station to make a report. Their guest was able to get the plate number of the red car which was 16 NCR 58
which she knew was issued to a judge.
On cross examination, Dr. Favis admitted that Exhibit C was made the day after the incident because after
they went to report to the police on the day of the incident, the latter accompanied them to the Cityland
Condominium and later they had gone to the IBP and it was already late in the afternoon when they
returned to the police station. The investigators suggested that they return the next day to have their
statements taken. She further testified that while they were backing up, the red car driven by the
respondent was jerkily pushing them. She described how respondent was pointing the gun at them in a
swaying motion and that the weapon being brandished by the respondent was not a revolver. [4]
On the other hand, respondent did not testify but presented his witnesses who testified as follows:
1. Atty. Alex Tan identified and affirmed the truth of the statement he executed before Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Rizalina T. Capco-Umali of Rizal (Exhibit 1, Rollo, pp. 58-59). The same was submitted by
respondent as an annex to his comment in this administrative matter. This sworn statement was submitted
as his direct testimony. In said statement, Atty. Tan relates that on May 6, 1999, he had invited respondent
(his classmate at San Beda College) and his wife to lunch at the Kamayan Restaurant at EDSA. He had gone
to respondents office at Makati City at half past 11:00 oclock. They proceeded to Cityland in Mandaluyong
City with Judge Cruz driving his Honda Civic while he followed aboard his white Corolla. When
respondent judge turned right towards the parking lot, he had to stop because his way was blocked by a
Mercedes Benz van which was parked in the middle of the driveway. Respondent sounded his horn but
the vans driver instead moved forward until the van was only a meter away from the hood of respondents
car. An old man seating beside the driver of the van signaled to respondent to move back but respondent
responded that he could not because Atty. Tans car was right behind his and following Atty. Tans car was
a taxicab. He saw Judge Cruz alight from his car and immediately go to the security guard on duty berating
the latter saying, Ano ba ang ginagawa mo dito, bakit hindi ka mag traffic? Ano ka dito, dekorasyon? Kung
hindi mo kayang mag traffic, mag resign ka na.
Atty. Tan continued saying that he saw the security guard approach the driver of the Mercedes Benz van
and signaled the latter to move back so respondent was able to proceed to the parking area. He further
testified that he never saw Judge Cruz point a gun to anyone that noon of May 6, 1999, much less alight
from his car carrying any handgun. He finally stated that had he seen the respondent point a gun at anyone,
he would have been the first to prevent and/or stop him.
During his testimony, Atty. Tan identified another sworn statement (Exhibit 1-C) where he described what
happened in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, at the Hall of Justice in Mandaluyong City where he was
accosted, threatened and cursed by three people, namely: complainant Dr. Edgardo Alday, a certain Bong
Villafuerte and their driver, Christopher Garcia.He speculated that he was mistaken by these three people
for the respondent Judge Cruz.
On cross examination, Atty. Tan admitted that he was a classmate of the respondent in the San Beda College
of Liberal Arts; that he had known the respondent since 1968; that he was a name partner in the law firm
of A. Tan, Zoleta and Associates; that his firm was counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 98-3064 entitled
SAAG Philippines, Inc. versus Hexagon Realty Corp., et al which was pending before Branch 58 of the
Makati Regional Trial Court presided by the present respondent; that exhibit D is a copy of the complaint
in said case; that on December 24, 1998, the respondent issued a temporary restraining order (Exhibit E) in
the said case as prayed for by them; and that the case was terminated in January 1999.
2. Respondents second witness was Aida F. Alba, of age, married and a resident of Cupang,
Muntinglupa. She identified and affirmed the truth of the statement (Exhibit 2, Rollo, pp. 64-65) which she
jointly executed with Jose Ignacio before Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, Rizal Asst Provincial Prosecutor. The
same statement was among those annexed to respondents comment in this administrative matter. The same
statement was offered as the direct testimony of this witness.
In Exhibit 2, Ms. Alba declared that on May 6, 1999, she had arranged a tripping with Anna B. Dianito to
see certain units of the Cityland located on Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City. She, together with Jose Ignacio,
Anna Dianito and one Jackielyn Sawit, arrived at the said place at past 11:00 oclock. After making a tour of
the condominium, she had seen a man dressed in a coat and tie alight from the red Honda, walk to the
security guard and berate him. The guard then approached the Mercedes van and directed its driver to
move the van back. After the latter had done so, the Honda was able to continue on its way towards the
parking lot. She further stated that during the standstill of the cars, she saw no person holding a gun or
pointing the same at anyone. She and her companions were right on the landing pad and had a clear and
unobstructed view of the scene.
On cross-examination, she admitted that respondent Judge Cruz contacted Anna Dianito and the latter
called her to inform her that she was needed to make an affidavit regarding the incident.She had gone to
the office of a lawyer whose name she could not remember where she was interviewed. The lawyer then
prepared the statement which she and Jose Ignacio jointly swore to before the investigating prosecutor.
3. Respondents third witness was Annaliza L. Dianito, a thirty-year old real estate broker. She identified
and affirmed the truth of the statement (Exhibit 4, Rollo, pp. 62-63) which she executed before the Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor investigating the complaint of Dr. Alday.
In the said statement, the witness declared that she is a real estate broker and that she had arranged a
tripping with some of her clients on May 6, 1999; that she had met with them at the Goldilocks Bake Shop
on Shaw Blvd. and they arrived at Cityland on Pioneer Street at 11:10 oclock in the morning; that she had
shown her clients four units in the building and as it was almost noon, she showed them the several eateries
and convenience stores among which was Unit UG 16 which is located nearest the stairway leading either
to the driveway or the exit towards Pioneer Street; that as they approached the landing pad leading to the
stairs, their attention was called by the honking of horns from vehicles; that she saw a red Honda Civic, a
white Toyota Corolla and a taxicab in that order; that their way was blocked by a parked Mercedes van;
that they saw a man in coat and tie who turned out be respondent Judge Cruz, alight and approach the
security guard on duty and directed the latter to ease out the traffic snarl; that the security guard
approached the Mercedes van and motioned to its driver to move back; that the red Honda Civic of the
judge was finally able to proceed to its parking area; that during all the few minutes of traffic along the
driveway, she never saw Judge Cruz or any person for that matter, point a gun at anyone; that it was just
an ordinary day-to-day scene along the driveway of the condominium; that at about 12:30 oclock, she
parted ways with Ms. Cawit, Ms. Alba and Mr. Ignacio.
On cross examination, the witness admitted that when she and her companions arrived at the stair landing
the four vehicles a red Honda Civic, a white Toyota Corolla, a taxicab and the Mercedes Benz van were
already on the driveway. She further admitted that she did not leave her name or address with anybody
after the incident and that she had been interviewed by Atty. Cabangon at an office on Panay Avenue in
Quezon City. She had been brought to Atty. Cabangons office by Atty. Tan. She declared that she had been
acquainted with Judge Cruz since 1998 when the latter wanted to buy a 3 bedroom unit; that after the
incident of May 6, 1999, Judge Cruz had called her and asked her to go to his place at Cityland; that she
had gone to him and found Atty. Tan with him; that because he had seen her at the landing pad on May 6,
1999, Judge Cruz mentioned to her that he remembered having seen her with some companions; that she
took it upon herself to notify her three companions Jose Ignacio, Aida Alba and Jacklyn Cawit and bring
them to the Judge; that after being interviewed by the Judge, Atty. Tan brought the four of them to Atty.
Cabangon upon the request of Judge Cruz and that they were interviewed and their affidavits were made.
4. Respondents fourth and last witness in chief was Segundino Ellazo, the security guard on duty at the
Cityland on May 6, 1999. He identified his sworn statement (Exhibit 5 and also marked Exhibit G for
complainants, Rollo, pp. 33-34), as well as his signature (Exhibit 5-A). In said statement, Ellazo stated that
he was, on May 6, 1999, a member of the Airborne Security Service, Inc. and was on duty at the Cityland
from 8:00 oclock in the morning until evening; that at about 12:10 oclock in the afternoon of May 6, 1999,
he saw Judge Cruz, owner of a unit in the Cityland, arrive aboard his car with Plate No. 16 NCR 58; that
respondent judge was unable to immediately proceed to his parking slot because a Mercedes Benz van was
blocking the driveway; that the van backed up slowly because there were cars parked on the side; that
respondent was forcing his way as the van was backing up; that suddenly he saw respondent judge pull
out a gun and point the same through his windshield at the van; that when the vehicles were already
parallel to each other, respondent Judge Cruz alighted from his car and told Ellazo to assist in untangling
the traffic snarl and respondent immediately boarded his car and proceeded to his parking slot and the van
went out. He concluded his statement saying that he was not threatened by Judge Cruz nor did he have
any grudge against him.
Mr. Ellazo also identified a second statement dated July 31, 1999 (Exhibit 6) as well as his signature (Exhibit
6-A) thereon. (The statement appears to have been subscribed and sworn to before a Notary Public on July
31, 1999 and resubscribed before the Assistant City Prosecutor on August 2, 1999). Ellazo declared that he
had to correct what he had stated in his statement before the police. In Exhibit 6, the witness stated that on
May 6, 1999, at about 4:18 oclock in the afternoon, he had gone to the Eastern Police District Headquarters
at Meralco Ave., Pasig City where he executed Exhibit 5 (also marked Exhibit G); that when Judge Cruz
alighted from his car, he was not carrying any firearm and that he did not see him point the gun at anyone
because if he did, it is not possible he could not have seen it; that immediately after Judge Cruz approached
the witness and told him to arrange the traffic, he forthwith boarded his car and proceeded to his parking
slot; that at no time did Judge Cruz approach the van when it was in front of his car.
Ellazo executed a third statement (Exhibit 7) which he signed (Exhibit 7-A) and swore to before a Notary
Public on September 9, 1999. In the latter statement he declared that on May 6, 1999, he was forced to go to
the Eastern Police District at Meralco Ave., Pasig City in order to give a statement which was against his
will only because he was threatened by Col. Antonio B. Aguilar, Jr., through the Cityland Administrator
that he would be charged with obstruction of justice if he did not testify for Dr. Edgardo S. Alday and he
was given only up to 4:00 P.M. that day to comply; that because of his fear, as he was informed that the
Pasig police were looking for him, he gave a statement which was involuntary because it was made under
the fear that he might be arrested, charged and confined; that so everyone may know and for the sake of
the truth, he declared that it was not true that Judge Cruz had drawn a gun as he did not have a gun on
that day; that his description of the gun being small and black was based only on what Dr. Alday had said;
that as a matter of fact, Dr. Alday kept calling and calling the office where he was working in order to
convince him to testify against Judge Cruz; that he had sought advice from his family and his relatives and
he was advised to come out and tell the truth so that his conscience would not bother him; that because of
the pressure of the office where he was working, he had to look for another job and to transfer his
residence. Ellazo further declared that on May 6, 1999, at about 12:10 oclock P.M., when Judge Cruz entered
the driveway of the Cityland he was followed by the white car of Atty. Alex Tan; that he did note in his
blotter this fact because after Judge Cruz proceeded to the parking area, he did not allow Atty. Tan to follow
because the area was already full; that during that time there were many persons present among whom
were real estate broker Anna Liza Dianito who was in company with some prospective buyers/tenants;
that as a matter of fact, he was embarrassed when he was berated by Judge Cruz in the presence of Atty.
Tan and Ms. Dianito.
Continuing his direct testimony, Ellazo was asked to explain the discrepancy between his first statement
(Exhibit 5) and his second and third statements (Exhibits 6 and 7). He declared that on May 6, 1999, he had
just relieved the other security guard who had gone to eat when Judge Cruz entered driving his red car
and found his way was blocked by a Mercedes Benz van; that Ellazo had signaled the driver of the van to
move back but said driver was hardheaded and did not immediately comply; that Judge Cruz and Dr.
Alday, the passenger of the van exchanged shouts; that Judge Cruz alighted, approached and berated him
(Ellazo); that since he was outside his guard house at the time, he approached the van and assisted its driver
to move back so that Judge Cruz was able to proceed to his parking slot; that there were many people at
the top of the stairs one of them was Anna Dianito and companions whose names he did not know.
On cross examination Ellazo was confronted with his answers to questions propounded by the police
investigator contained in his statement marked Exhibit 5 (also marked Exhibit G). His attention was called
to Question No. 5 (Exhibit G-2) in Exhibit 5 where he was asked to describe what had happened and his
answer was that he had seen Judge Cruz pointing his gun at the Mercedes Benz van with Plate No. WBF
991. Ellazo stated that he did not give that answer but the same was only put there (gawa gawa lang) by
the police.
Ellazo was also asked about the answer he gave to Question No. 15 (Exhibit G-3) in Exhibit 5 where he
stated that when Judge Cruz arrived in his car with Plate No. 16 NCR 58 he could not immediately proceed
to his parking slot because his way was blocked by a van with Plate No. WBF 991 so that he (Ellazo)
signalled the driver of the van to back up; that Judge Cruz immediately followed the van as the latter was
backing up and at that moment he saw Judge Cruz pull out a gun which he pointed through his windshield
at the van; that when the two vehicles were side by side, Judge Cruz alighted from his vehicle and told him
to assist in arranging the flow of the traffic and after that Judge Cruz proceeded to his parking slot. Ellazo
explained that part of what was supposed to be his answer was actually his but the rest was just told to
him by the police.
Asked by the undersigned to indicate what part of Exhibit 5-B was his and what was not, Ellazo stated that
he never said that Judge Cruz pulled out a gun and pointed it at the Mercedes van (Exhibit 5-B-1) although
the rest of the answer was his.
On further cross examination, Ellazo admitted that he had Exhibit 6 made by neighbor who was a lawyer,
a certain Atty. Mabuti. The same affidavit was submitted at the preliminary investigation in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong at the instance of Atty. Alex Tan and Judge Cruz. He stated that a few
weeks after the happening, he had gone to Judge Cruz to apologize for what he had said in his first
statement which was taken by the police. He also told Judge Cruz that he was willing to execute another
affidavit in his favor. After that he had voluntarily gone to Atty. Mabuti to have his second affidavit
(Exhibit 6) made and after this was made, he was accompanied by Atty. Alex Tan to the prosecutors office
in Mandaluyong to submit Exhibit 6.
The witness further admitted that besides his going to the residence of Judge Cruz to see him, he had seen
respondent several times while he was on duty at Cityland; that it was Atty. Tan who picked him up at his
house and brought him to Mandaluyong City to submit the second affidavit (Exhibit 6) to the prosecutor
handling the preliminary investigation.
Anent his third affidavit (Exhibit 7), Ellazo admitted that he was told by Atty. Tan to go to the office of
Atty. Gayos to make the third affidavit in order to clarify certain matters contained in Exhibit 6. He insisted
that the respondent had no gun on that date.
Answering questions of the undersigned, Ellazo insisted that Question No. 5 (Exhibit G-2) as well as
Question No. 6 (Exhibits 5-B-2 & G-3) were never asked of him and neither did he give the answers found
in said exhibits.[5]
On June 19, 2000, respondent formally offered his evidence [6] and rested his case. Thereafter,
complainants formally offered their evidence.[7]
However, considering the apparent turnaround of Security Guard Segundino Ellazo, Justice Quimbo
allowed complainants to present rebuttal evidence. On June 19, 2000, complainants presented Police
Superintendent Antonio V. Aguilar, Jr. and SPO1 Joseph Amuyo, whose testimonies are as follows:
Police Superintendent Antonio V. Aguilar, Jr. declared that on May 6, 1999, he was already the Chief of
the District Criminal Investigation Group, Eastern Police District, National Capital Region. He identified
the statement (Exhibit 5) which Segundino Ellazo made at the Eastern Police District Headquarters on May
6, 1999. He further said that he had asked Ellazo whether he had executed it voluntarily and of his own
free will and whether he swore to its truth. It was only after Ellazo had answered affirmatively to his
questions that he administered his oath. He admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the answers
given by Ellazo to the investigator, but he insists that he would not have allowed any one of his
investigators to manufacture testimony.
SPO1 Joseph Amuyo, after taking oath, declared that on May 6, 1999, he was a police investigator at the
Eastern Police District. He was the one who took the sworn statement of Segundino Ellazo on that date. He
further declared that the statement given to him at the investigation room of the Eastern Police District was
free and voluntary; that he was asking the questions and Ellazo was supplying the answers which he
typewrote; that all the answers written on Exhibit 5 were of Ellazo; that as a matter of fact, Ellazo corrected
the Plate No. of the van as found in Questions No. 5 and 6; that the answer to Question No. 15 is also
Ellazos.
Cross examined by respondents counsel, Amuyo declared that Dr. Alday had reported an alleged grave
threats against him; that in company with Dr. Alday, SPO2 Emerito Escobido, PO1 Joseph Engero and PO1
Efren Tejada, he had proceeded to the place where the alleged threats were made; that upon reaching
Cityland, they had encountered OIC Dominador Novencio; that he had told Novencio to request Ellazo to
report to their office for questioning; that he did not make any threats against Ellazo nor did any member
of the PNP; that when Ellazo reported to them, he had taken his statement; that he took the statements of
the complainants the next day; that Ellazo gave his statement voluntarily and that it is not true that Ellazo
was at first reluctant to testify for as a matter of fact, he had gone to the headquarters with Dr. Alday.[8]
On June 26, 1999, respondent offered the same Security Guard Segundino Ellazo as sur-rebuttal
witness, who merely repeated his testimony in chief. After the sur-rebuttal evidence had been submitted,
the parties filed their respective memoranda.
On July 19, 2000, Justice Quimbo rendered his report. He found the version of complainants more
credible, considering that they had no possible motive to make a false accusation against respondent. He
gave credence to the positive testimonies of complainants over the negative testimonies of respondents
witnesses, particularly on whether respondent judge brandished a gun pointed at complainants. Justice
Quimbo explained that -
True they (Annaliza Dianito and Aida Alba) may not have seen respondents actual pointing of his gun at
the complainants but it is certainly possible that when their attention was called to the incident, it was too
late for them to catch the gun poking episode as described by the complainants. Or perhaps they were not
at such a vantage point as to be able to see the entire happening. The fact, however, that the three witnesses
(Alex Tan, Annaliza Dianito and Aida Alba) did not see the gun toting incident, is not conclusive proof that
it did not actually occur.[9]
Justice Quimbo further found Atty. Alex Tan a biased witness, being respondents classmate at San
Beda College, and having represented plaintiffs in a civil case before respondents sala wherein Tan
managed to obtain a TRO on their behalf. He also found the testimony of Security Guard Ellazo unreliable
because he recanted his original statement that he saw respondent poke a gun at complainants. Hence,
citing cases of gun-poking incidents,[10] Judge Quimbo recommended the dismissal of respondent judge
with forfeiture of all benefits due him and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government
or in any government-owned or controlled corporation.
The crucial issue herein pertains to the assessment of credibility of witnesses. What exactly transpired
on May 6, 1999, at the Cityland Condominium, Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City?
Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. This is particularly
true where complainants have no ill-motive in testifying against respondent.[11]Complainants had never
met respondent prior to the incident. They had no pending cases before him. Yet they pursued this case
with tenacity. They strongly believed they had been unjustly wronged and sought redress therefor.
Brandishing a firearm in public imperils the lives of people. The fact that this was done by a judge
outside the courtroom and during a traffic altercation does not justify respondents gross
misconduct. Judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge. It imposes a number of
restrictions thereon. It is but a small sacrifice to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the
administration of justice.[12] Irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge, needless to say, erodes public
confidence in the judiciary.[13]
In Marcelino v. Singson,[14] respondent judge was similarly involved in a traffic accident with the
complainant, a fish vendor. While complainant was slowly backing his passenger jeepney, respondents car
suddenly crossed his path, resulting in a minor impact. Respondent alighted from the car, approached
complainant and boxed him twice on the face. Respondent returned to his car, got a gun, poked it at the
face of complainant, and shouted Hayop Ka!. Respondent then tucked the gun on his waist and delivered
another blow on complainants face.He thereupon left the premises, taking with him complainants
license. Complainant filed criminal cases for Grave Oral Defamation and Damage to Property through
Reckless Imprudence against respondent. He also filed an administrative case against respondent. The
criminal cases were dismissed when complainant desisted, having apparently patched up things with
respondent. Complainant likewise desisted in the administrative case, but the Court nevertheless
admonished respondent and ordered him to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Based on the facts of the present case, we find respondents acts of confronting complainants and
threatening them with a gun during a traffic altercation constitutive of conduct grossly prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service is a grave offense
under Section 46, No. 27, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I of Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O.
No. 292), Section 23 (t), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, and Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 49-89, as incorporated in the Personnel Manual of the Supreme Court. The
penalty for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service is suspension for six (6) months,
one (1) day to one (1) year, for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense. This
being respondents first offense for which we find him liable, we deem it proper to impose upon him the
penalty of suspension for one (1) year without pay, and a fine of P50,000.00.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that [t]he assumption of office of judges casts upon the
incumbent duties in respect to his personal conduct which concerns his relations to the State and its
inhabitants, the litigants before him, the principles of law, the practitioners of law in his court, and the
witnesses and attendants who aid him in the administration of its functions. A judges personal behavior,
not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach,
for he is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible personification of law and of justice. [15]
Finally, it is not amiss to remind members of the judiciary that the Constitution exhorts that public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.[16]
WHEREFORE, we hereby find respondent judge GUILTY of conduct grossly prejudicial to the service,
and impose upon him the penalty of SUSPENSION without pay for one (1) year and to pay a fine
of P50,000.00, to take effect immediately, with a warning that a commission of a similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
JUDGE PABLO B. FRANCISCO, complainant, vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODRIGO V.

COSICO, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
For resolution is an administrative complaint for grave misconduct filed by Judge Pablo B. Francisco,
as Presiding Judge[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branches 24 and 25, Bian, Laguna, against Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, in the latters capacity as then Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.
The present controversy stemmed from the detail of one Ireneo S. Paz as Special Deputy Sheriff to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pedro, Laguna. [2]
It appears that in the early part of 1994, trial courts in San Pedro, Laguna were without a sheriff to
serve and execute court processes.[3] Judge Stella Cabuco Andres, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 31, then brought the matter to the attention of Executive Judge Cosico.
Acting upon the same, Executive Judge Cosico wrote a letter, dated March 1, 1994, to Ireneo S. Paz,
informing the latter of his detail as Special Deputy Sheriff, to wit:
In connection with your appointment effective March 1, 1994, you are hereby detailed at the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 31, San Pedro, Laguna, effective immediately to perform the duties of Special Deputy Sheriff
in accordance with Administrative Order No. 6 dated July 1, 1975 and other duties assigned to you by Hon.
Stella C. Andres until further notice.
Thus, Paz commenced performing the functions of Special Deputy Sheriff in the said Regional Trial
Court.
However, per Certification issued by the Human Resource Management Officer [4]of
the Municipality of Bian, at the time of the said detail, Ireneo S. Paz was employed as Laborer II by
the Municipality of Bian. This fact is confirmed by Paz in an Affidavit[5]where he states that, indeed, he was
employed as laborer in the Office of the Municipal General Services of Bian, Laguna.
Complainant Judge Francisco contends that Executive Judge Cosico usurped the power of the
Supreme Court to appoint court employees,[6] a brazen defiance of the Courts appointing power granted
under Article VIII, Section 5 (6) of the Constitution which states that the Supreme Court has the power to
appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law. [7]
For his part, respondent Executive Judge, now Associate Justice, Cosico avers that he did not appoint
but merely detailed Paz at the RTC. Such judicial act, according to respondent, may not be assailed
considering the authority given to the trial court judge under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
12,[8] paragraph 7 thereof, as well as under the powers and prerogatives delegated by the Supreme Court
to the Executive Judge.
Respondent adds that at the time he became the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Bian,
Laguna, there were already three municipal employees detailed at the RTC which he inherited from his
predecessor Executive Judge. In support of this averment, the Affidavit of Judge Cabuco Andres was
appended, wherein she states:
In November, 1991 when I first reported for work as judge in San Pedro, Laguna, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 31 was still part of the judicial station with seat in Bian, Laguna;
On the same date, I came to know Antonio Blancaflor, a municipal employee of Bian, Laguna detailed by
our Executive Judge[9] to my court to perform the duties and functions of a sheriff;
In the early part of 1994, Antonio Blancaflor was appointed permanent sheriff in
the RegionalTrial Court of Muntinlupa City by the Supreme Court;
Due to Antonio Blancaflors appointment, the San Pedro Courts were left without any sheriff to serve and
execute court processes;
Faced with this predicament, I brought the matter relative to the absence of a sheriff to the attention of then
Executive Judge Rodrigo V. Cosico;
Consequently, Executive Judge Rodrigo V. Cosico issued a letter dated March 1, 1994 to Ireneo Paz, also a
municipal employee of Bian, Laguna, detailing him to my court to perform the duties of Special Deputy
Sheriff.
Further, respondent Cosico also points out that in order that a judge may be held liable for serious
misconduct, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.[10] In
this case, respondent professes that he acted with the utmost good faith and in the interest of the exigencies
of the administration of justice.[11]
We now discuss these contentions.
Respondent invokes Administrative Circular No. 12 [12] addressed to all judges and clerks of court of
the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial courts in Cities. Specifically,
guideline no. 7 thereof allows judges to designate or deputize any person to serve court processes and writs
in remote areas in the absence of the regular sheriff thereat.
It is undisputed that at the time of the questioned detail, there was in fact a vacancy for the position
of sheriff at the RTC Branch 31. This fact is attested to by Presiding Judge Cabuco Andres. Upon being
informed thereof, Executive Judge Cosico answered the need by ordering the detail of Mr. Paz so that the
latter may be temporarily deputized as sheriff.
Under Administrative Circular No. 6,[13] an Executive Judges primary mandate is the administrative
supervision over the lower courts within his administrative area, with the end in view of providing a more
effective and efficient judiciary service. We need not emphasize how the absence of a sheriff could cripple
the administration of justice.
Thus, with regard to the question of whether respondent had the authority to cause the detail, we find
that said act was authorized under Administrative Circular No. 12 and that the same was in furtherance of
his duty as Executive Judge.
However, at the time of the questioned detail as Special Deputy Sheriff, Paz was already an employee
of the Municipality of Bian. Being thus employed, he was not qualified to be detailed as Special Deputy
Sheriff.
This Court, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Veneracion,[14] had occasion to state that a
non-judicial person has no place in the judicial service.[15] This is because the conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility[16] and to allow Paz to serve the judiciary while concurrently holding a post with the
municipality, would run the risk of compromising the lofty standards the nature of the job requires.
In the same case of OCA v. Veneracion,[17] where the person detailed was an employee of an agency
under the Department of Finance, we said:
Judge Veneracions outright disregard of the well-established separation of powers of the three great
departments of the government and his exercise of powers beyond his judicial competence and in defiance
of directives of the Supreme Court undermined the independence of the judiciary. Judge Veneracion can
not hide behind the authorizations issued by officials of the executive branch of the government, giving an
impression of legality of his actions. Administrative Circular No. 12, dated October 1, 1985, and
Administrative Circular No. 7, dated April 27, 1987 clearly provide for the implementation of the Supreme
Courts Constitutional power of appointment of judiciary employees, including sheriffs and the assignment
of acting deputy sheriffs to the courts. Judge Veneracion repeatedly violated, nay, defied these circulars. [18]
The facts in Veneracion show that when Judge Veneracion ordered the detail, no vacancy existed for
the position of sheriff. Furthermore, respondent Judge Veneracion made repeated and persistent acts in
blatant disregard of Supreme Court rules, in order to pursue his objectionable act.
In contrast, however, in the case before us against respondent Cosico, there was an existing vacancy
for the position and the detail was aimed at responding to the need at the time, in order not to hamper the
administration of justice. We find credence in respondents averment that the detail in question was meant
to be temporary and that he was in fact willing to revoke the detail if the same was found to be improper.
We reiterate that for serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.[19] The record
is bereft of any evidence to this effect.
This case was referred to Retired Supreme Court Justice Santiago M. Kapunan for investigation.
The Report and Recommendation of Justice Kapunan reads in part, as follows:
The facts seem to point that at the time Ireneo S. Paz was designated as acting deputy sheriff, there was
lack of sheriff to serve court processes not only at the Regional Trial Court at Bian and San Pedro, but also
at the Municipal Trial Courts of Bian, Santa Rosa and Cabuyao, which explains the detail of a temporary
sheriff to those courts.
No evidence has been adduced to establish that Justice Cosico was actuated by ulterior or wrongful motive
in making the designation complained of. It was a matter of necessity, it would appear, that prompted
Justice Cosico to act the way he did to avert delay in the service or execution of court processes.
Justice Cosico averred he acted in good faith and within the purview of the general powers, prerogatives
and duties of an Executive Judge as defined in Administrative Order No. 6 dated June 30, 1975,
Administrative Circular No. 12, dated June 30, 1975 and Administrative Circular No. 12 dated October 1,
1985, which provide pertinently:
Adm. Order No. 6
The Executive Judge
xxx
1. Basic Concept
The Executive Judge derives his powers and prerogatives through delegation thereof by the Supreme
Court. In virtue of the delegation, he shall exercise the following general powers, prerogatives and duties:
xxx
7. To exercise such powers and prerogatives as he may, in his judgment, be necessary or
incidental to the performance of his functions as a court administrator
June 30, 1975
Administrative Circular No. 12
For the purpose of streamlining the service and execution of court writs and processes in the reorganized
courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, and
to better serve the public good and facilitate the administration of justice, the court sets forth hereunder the
following guidelines:
xxx
7. The judge may be allowed to designate or deputize any person to serve court processes and
writs in remote areas in the absence of the regular sheriffs thereat.
October 1, 1985.
A careful scrutiny of the records and the evidence does not yield any reasonable basis for a disciplinary
action against Justice Cosico. Ireneo S. Paz was merely designated by Justice Cosico as acting deputy sheriff
upon the recommendation of Judge Stella Cabuco-Andres because according to her, the San Pedro courts
were left without any sheriff to serve and execute court processes. The administration of justice would have
been seriously hampered without any court personnel to discharge the functions and duties of
sheriff. Thus, Justice Cosico in making the questioned detail of Ireneo S. Paz as acting deputy sheriff did so
as a matter of extreme necessity and within the purview of Administrative Circular No. 12, dated October
1, 1985.
Consequently, the undersigned respectfully recommends his exoneration.
All things considered, we agree with the foregoing recommendation.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Executive Judge, now Court of Appeals Associate Justice, Rodrigo V.
Cosico, is hereby EXONERATED of the charge herein. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CYNTHIA RESNGIT-MARQUEZ, SHIELAH J. RAMOS, ROSALINDA L. ROQUILLAS and VICKY F.

RAMOS, complainants, vs. JUDGE VICTOR T. LLAMAS, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 56,
San Carlos City, Pangasinan, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A magistrate has to live by the example of his precepts. He cannot judge the conduct of others when his own
needs judgment. It should not be do as I say and not what I do. For then the court over which he is called to preside
will be a mockery, one devoid of respect.[1]
We are called upon to reiterate this dictum in the administrative matter before us.
In an affidavit-complaint[2] dated March 27, 1998, complainants court employees Cynthia Resngit-
Marquez, Shielah J. Ramos, Rosalinda L. Roquillas and Vicky F. Ramos charged respondent Victor T.
Llamas, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, with
immorality and gross misconduct. They alleged that respondent judge, though married, maintains an illicit
relationship with a married woman, Lourdes Muoz-Garcia, and both are living together as husband and
wife under one roof; that the court sala of respondent Judge, as well as the office of his personnel, have
been utilized as dancing halls and drinking wine rooms on office hours; that respondent Judge is drunk
almost everyday; that respondent Judge is living a highly immoral and disgraceful life, and this is of open
and public knowledge, and his mistress fondly calls him Daddy, thereby trumpeting their affair in open
view; that the complainant have been subjected to the intimidation and harassment by respondent Judge.
In his Answer[3], dated July 30, 1998, respondent Judge emphatically denied the accusations against
him.
In a Resolution dated June 16, 1999, the affidavit-complaint was referred to Associate Justice Romeo
A. Brawner of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
Justice Brawner, after conducting the necessary investigation, submitted his Report and
Recommendation dated September 14, 2001. Lengthy hearings were conducted on the case. Complainants
Cynthia Resngit Marquez and Shielah J. Ramos and their witnesses Angelito Dixon Dispo, Engr. Librado
C. Moises, Manuel Marquez, Atty. Leopoldo C. Tulagan, Sr., Atty. Omega Lacandola Moises and Mario
Resultan testified in support of the complaint. On the other hand, respondent Judge himself testified as
well as Lourdes Garcia, Angelica Muoz, Joseph Muoz, Gaudencio Sabangan, Benigno Abalos, Jr., Dolores
Daligdig, Maura Doctolera, Andrew Mapanao and Rica Cabaccan.
We reproduce the following findings of fact and conclusions of the Investigating Justice:
Complainant Cynthia Resngit-Marquez is the Court Interpreter of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos
City, Pangasinan, Branch 57 until she requested for a transfer sometime in 1994. The presiding judge of
Branch 56 at the time she was the Interpreter was respondent Judge. During that time, respondent Judge
already had a drinking habit that started sometime in 1991.
In February 1997, after his assignment in Dagupan City respondent Judge went back to San Carlos City. In
March 1997, she saw respondent Judge again resume his drinking habits and he was always seen with a
glass of wine in his hands roaming the Justice Hall premises even during office hours. He usually drank
with lawyers and litigants and he would force his staff to drink with them. Should his staff refuse to join
him, he would harass them. He loved drinking Carlsberg beer as he claims that it made him feel his young
urges again.
When complainants husband was in Saudi Arabia, respondent Judge would insinuate that it was better for
her to have an old car she could use everyday rather than a new car that she could not use. Aside from the
drinking, respondent Judge would also engage in singing and dancing in the courtroom even during office
hours. The complainant identified the pictures (Exhibits D, E, F and G) showing the recreation area behind
the Justice Hall and the corridor leading to the courtroom where respondent Judge conducted his drinking
sessions.
After respondent Judges return to San Carlos City, complainant saw Lourdes Muoz Garcia almost
everyday, as respondent Judge would drop her at her place of work at City Hall every morning. Lourdes
Muoz Garcia would usually appear again every lunchtime to join respondent Judge and would come back
again in the afternoon after office hours and they would leave walking side by side with their arms
sometimes touching each other. During the occasions that Lourdes Muoz Garcia was in the office of
respondent Judge, she would address him as Daddy or Masiken (Pangasinense for old man).
All the time that respondent Judge had been assigned in San Carlos City, he resided near the cemetery in
Karaengan, San Carlos City then near the school in Bulingit, San Carlos City and after his stint in Dagupan
City, he stayed at Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan. In all these places, respondent Judge lived with Lourdes
Muoz Garcia.
During her cross-examination, she admitted that a previous case was filed against respondent Judge
charging him for the same offenses as this present case. Although she states that she had nothing to do with
the case it appears that the Motion to Dismiss said case (Exhibit 14) was signed by her and her father, which
motion paved the way for the dismissal of Administrative Matter No. 95-3-88 (Exhibit 15).
Angelito Dixon Dispo is employed as Clerk III in the Office of the Clerk of the Regional Trial Court in San
Carlos City, Pangasinan since October 3, 1993. Almost everyday, part of his duties included buying liquor
for respondent Judge at the nearby grocery that the judge and some lawyers partook of in the courtroom.
Aside from his drinking, there was singing with the use of the sing-along machine in the courtroom of RTC
Branch 56 where the respondent Judge was presiding. Some private practitioners and prosecutors would
join in the merrymaking that happened as often as thrice a week in the courtroom of respondent Judge.
During these times, the noise emanating from his courtroom could be heard downstairs.
At that time, respondent Judge was residing at Barangay Kariinan, San Carlos City. There was a time that
the house of respondent Judge was flooded and Angelito Dispo was ordered to go there to pile sandbags.
At respondent Judges residence, he came upon Lourdes Muoz Garcia attired in shorts and undershirt
(sando) supervising the piling of sandbags.
On December 1, 1994, he was again at the house of respondent Judge butchering a goat in preparation for
the birthday celebration of Lourdes Muoz Garcia the following day. That afternoon, while he was washing
the dishes, respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz Garcia were embracing and kissing each other on the lips.
It was March 28, 1995 or a day before respondent Judges birthday party that found Angelito Dispo again
at his (Judge) residence where he was helping in the preparations for the birthday celebration. Again,
Lourdes Muoz Garcia was present and again she was attired in her shorts and undershirt without anything
beneath her shirt. He noticed that the respondent Judge and this woman were very sweet with one another.
He would always see Lourdes Muoz Garcia in the office of respondent Judge at RTC Branch 56 almost four
times every week and they would intimately refer to each other as Daddy and Mommy.
At the time he testified in this investigation on September 14, 1999, Angelito Dispo stated that respondent
Judge lives in Barangay Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan with Lourdes Muoz Garcia and the latters daughter.
On September 3, 1999, respondent Judge went to Angelito Dispos house and told him not to testify against
him (Judge) in this case. Angelito had this incident recorded in the police blotter (Exhibit B).
Engr. Librado C. Moises took up the tale and testified that sometime in December 1997, he went to the
house of respondent Judge in Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan to attend a party held there in honor of some
sisters of respondent Judge who had just arrived from the United States. He was with some court personnel
as Clerk of Court Atty. Omega Lacandola Moises is his wife. At the party, it was Lourdes Muoz Garcia,
attired in a housedress, who was attending to their needs and serving as hostess for respondent Judge.
When they left, Lourdes Muoz Garcia stayed behind.
Manuel Marquez testified that while he was in the employ of the Central Pangasinan Electric Company
from 1995 to 1998, he would often visit his wife, complainant Cynthia Marquez, in the court where she was
working and he would see respondent Judge singing and dancing with some of his female staff as early as
3:00 or 4:00 oclock in the afternoon for as many as 4 times a month. Pointing to the picture marked Exhibit
A and Exhibit 1, he described that the benches were moved towards the table of the Presiding Judge in the
courtroom thus creating more space for their dancing.
As stenographer of RTC Branch 57 in San Carlos City, complainant Shielah Ramos stated that she has
known respondent Judge since 1989 when she first entered the courts employ. Since 1996 she has seen
respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz Garcia together both in the old building housing the courtrooms as
well as in the new Justice Hall. She would see them eat their meals together at lunchtime and go home
together after office hours. During the singing and dancing sessions conducted by respondent Judge in the
courtrooms almost everyday and during special occasions, Lourdes Garcia would always be with
respondent Judge.
Sometime in January 1998, she saw them together at respondent Judges rented house in Gabon, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Respondent Judge was with his dog while Lourdes Garcia was dusting his car. Confronted
with pictures of the rented house, the two cars and the dog (Exhibits 3-A to 3-C), Shielah Ramos pointed to
the new car as the one being dusted by Lourdes Garcia when she happened to pass by.
Atty. Leopoldo C. Tulagan, Sr. took the witness stand and manifested that as law practitioner with an
office in San Carlos City, he knows respondent Judge ever since he came to preside over RTC Branch 56.
Sometime in 1995, there was what he called a happy hour every Thursday in the courtroom of respondent
Judge. Proceedings would be suspended and all lawyers then appearing would be invited to a drinking
spree right in the courtroom. The lawyers would contribute to buy wine and finger food. There would be
singing with even the court personnel participating. This practice stopped when respondent Judge was
transferred to Dagupan City. However, when he returned to San Carlos City in 1997, the drinking and
singing sessions resumed. This time there was even dancing and these all happened sometimes once or
twice a week.
On one birthday occasion of respondent Judge, a Vice-Governor Llamas of Tarlac was present. Two ladies
were requested to give a number and they were both introduced as Mrs. Llamas and Mrs. Llamas, one of
them was the lady companion of Vice-Governor Llamas and the other was Lourdes Garcia.
When respondent Judge went back to San Carlos City in 1997, Atty. Tulagan often saw Lourdes Garcia
going to his courtroom for as many as five or six times a week. Further, on several occasions, he saw them
together in respondent Judges car as the Judge would bring her to City Hall where she was employed and
fetch her again in the afternoon.
In an earlier case filed by Atty. Antonio Resngit and complainant Cynthia Marquez, Atty. Tulagan executed
an affidavit (Exhibit C) before the National Bureau of Investigation supporting the allegations of the
complainants.
Atty. Omega Lacandola Moises, another witness for the complainants testified that sometime in
November 1993, Lourdes Muoz Garcia fetched her and together they went to respondent Judges house in
Karaenan, San Carlos City. Again, during an office day in May 1994, she went to respondent Judges rented
house as there was a celebration of some sort and that was where she had lunch. Respondent Judge had
just arrived from the United States and Lourdes Muoz Garcia who was also there gave her pasalubong.
On December 2, 1994, she again went to respondent Judges house and had lunch there, as it was the
birthday celebration of Lourdes Muoz Garcia. Present during the occasion were the relatives of Lourdes
Garcia as well as her officemates and wife of former San Carlos City Mayor Douglas Soriano. Sometime in
June 1997, she, her husband and her brother went to respondent Judges house in Gabon, Calasiao as the
latter had just arrived from another trip to the United States and Lourdes Muoz Garcia was again at the
house.
In December 1997, she was invited to respondent Judges house, as it was the birthday celebration of
Lourdes Muoz Garcia as well as a welcome for respondent Judges brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces
who had just arrived from the United States for a visit. As they arrived early, Lourdes Muoz Garcia was
still in her housedress but she eventually changed into something suitable for the occasion. Pictures
(Exhibits N and O also Exhibits 18 and 19) of the persons present at the occasion were presented to her and
she identified them.
Another birthday party for Lourdes Muoz Garcia took place in an apartment rented by respondent Judge
and Lourdes Garcia in Bonoan, Dagupan City. Atty. Moises together with Atty. Geraldine Baniqued and
Geraldines husband were in attendance but as it was a workday, they only stayed long enough to finish
their lunch.
On the occasion of respondent Judges birthday on March 29, Lourdes Muoz Garcia fetched her at lunchtime
and brought her to that same rented apartment in Bonoan. She soon left after lunch but she went back
alone, Lourdes remaining behind to attend to the guests of respondent Judge.
Mario Resultan testified that as sheriff of RTC Branch 56 at San Carlos City presided by respondent Judge,
he is aware and knows that Judge Llamas and Lourdes Garcia have been living together as husband and
wife since 1990 up to the present. They first stayed at Valerio Hall, Mabini Street then they transferred to
Balingit Street, followed by Kareanan Street, all in San Carlos City. They also stayed together in Calasiao,
Pangasinan and Dagupan City.
In all these places of residence, Mario Resultan was usually invited by respondent Judge and they would
drink and sing. During these sessions, Lourdes Garcia would always attend to their needs, sometimes in
her street clothes but oftentimes in her house clothes.
On February 19, 1994, Mario Resultan went along with respondent Judge to Manila to confirm his flight as
Judge Llamas was leaving for the United States the following day. With them on this trip were Lourdes
Garcia and respondent Judges sister, Evelyn Llamas. They spent the night in the house of the brother of
respondent Judges sister-in-law. He slept in the living room while respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia
shared one room.
As he would be out of the country, respondent Judge executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of
Mario Resultan authorizing him to receive all his checks covering his salaries and allowances, encashing
these and delivering the money to Lourdes Garcia. He did what was asked of him and each time he would
deliver the money to Lourdes Garcia, he would indicate the dates and the amounts in his diary (Exhibit P).
Against all these evidence, respondent Judge denies the charge.
Judge Llamas claims that complainant Cynthia Resngit Marquez has an ax to grind against him for
objecting to her application as Legal Researcher of his court, RTC Branch 56, and instead endorsing Aldrin
Lee who was eventually appointed to the position. Because he did not accede to her request, complainant
and his father filed several charges against him ranging from immorality to harassment of court employees
to high-handedness and arrogance. However, these cases were eventually dismissed by the Supreme Court
(Exhibit 15) on motion of complainant Cynthia Marquez and her father, Atty. Antonio Resngit (Exhibit 14).
But the trouble between respondent Judge and complainant did not stop there as could be seen in several
cases filed by complainant against him before the Office of the Ombudsman. These cases were again
dismissed (Exhibit 20-A). He therefore considers this present charge as another form of harassment
employed by complainant in her avid desire to oust him from his present position.
Further, he denies ever drinking and dancing in his courtroom as he claims there are several restaurants
outside the office equipped with the necessary facilities for his pleasure. Besides if ever he drinks with a
visitor, it was part of his hospitable nature and it was always done after office hours.
As to the charge of immorality, he emphatically denied that he has an amorous relationship with Lourdes
Garcia. He is a married man and his family lives in Dagupan City. However, he is estranged from his wife
due to irreconcilable differences in the rearing of their children. This does not mean however that he
maintains an illicit relationship with Lourdes Garcia. He does admit that he knows the woman as she is an
employee at the City Legal Office and it is her responsibility to look into the status of cases filed by San
Carlos City pending in the courts.
Respondent Judge claims that all the testimonies of the complainants and their witnesses in so far as they
saw him and Lourdes Garcia always together on several occasions, either walking side by side or riding in
his car together or him dropping and fetching her at her place of work are all impossible and figments of
their fertile imagination. They did not live together in all the places mentioned and definitely he would not
be celebrating Lourdes Garcias birthdays for her in his own residence. If ever he was seen in the company
of the woman, it was on social occasions when they would either be guests or she was a guest at a party he
tenders.
His emphatic denial is supported by his witnesses, Lourdes Garcia, Angelica Muoz, Joseph Muoz,
Gaudencio Sabangan, Benigno Abalos, Jr., Dolores Daligdig, Maura Doctolera, Andrew Mapanao and Rica
Cabaccan.
Lourdes Garcia states that she first knew respondent Judge when she was detailed at the City Prosecutors
Office and it was her responsibility to get the court calendars for the guidance of the Court Prosecutors.
It was Gaudencio Sabangan who introduced respondent Judge to her formally on November 30, 1990
during the occasion of the birthday of Normida Sabangan, Lourdess niece and Gaudencio Sabangans
granddaughter. They were both guests at the party and from then on whenever they would see each other
they would engage in casual conversations.
Aside from this, it was respondent Judge who helped her get her permanent appointment as
Administrative Officer in the City Legal Office at San Carlos City. Respondent Judge being close with then
Mayor Soriano, he paved the way for her being detailed at that office where she was given a permanent
position.
In 1993 respondent Judge asked her whether she could recommend somebody to do his laundry. She
volunteered her mother and thus the relationship between her family and respondent Judge became closer.
When her mother became sick and could not do the laundry anymore, her younger sister and brother
stayed with respondent Judge and did the household chores for him in exchange for allowances and tuition
fee.
Lourdes Garcia further stated that she is a married woman who has stayed all her life in Barangay Roxas,
San Carlos City except for that year in 1982 when she went to live in Victoria, Tarlac, her husbands place
but when she was about to give birth, she went back to San Carlos City and has remained there. She
absolutely denies living with respondent Judge and states that the only time she went to respondent Judges
place was when she tagged along with her superior to attend the party given by the Judge in honor of his
nephews and nieces who arrived from the United States.
As for her presence at the Justice Hall, she admits going there but her visits are all in connection with her
work and since she has a lot of friends there, she drops on them for a chat before going back to the City
Hall where she has her office.
She states that she was likewise charged with immorality at the Civil Service Commission in May 1998 but
the case was dismissed in April 1999.
Her mother Angelica Muoz confirms her story and states that she did the laundry of respondent Judge but
subsequently turned it over to her younger daughter. Also, she says that indeed her daughter Lourdes
always stayed at their house and never lived with respondent Judge. She claims that her daughter is
married to a soldier but admits that her son-in-law does not stay with his family as in fact she has not seen
him for a long time now.
Amidst all these conflicting testimonies given by all those who took part in these very lengthy proceedings,
it behooves upon the Investigating Justice to determine whether or not the complainants have been able to
prove their charges against respondent Judge.
Respondent Judge is charged with Immorality and Gross Misconduct. According to the complainants and
their witnesses, his misconduct consists in his drinking, singing and dancing with lawyers and court
personnel in his courtroom during office hours almost everyday.
The Investigating Justice believes that indeed respondent Judge used his court to indulge his drinking,
singing and dancing habits to the detriment of the other courts within the building who were disturbed by
all the noise coming from his courtroom. This conduct unbecoming of a Judge deserves a reprimand but
this administrative misdemeanor may be relegated to the background in the face of the more serious charge
of Immorality.
The complainants and their witnesses all gave positive testimonies of how respondent Judge flaunted his
mistress in the eyes of the public. Bringing and picking her up from work, dancing and singing with her in
public, living with her in different places, celebrating her birthdays with parties in her honor, authorizing
her to receive his salaries and being seen around with her and behaving as if they were husband and wife
are all manifestations of how respondent Judge acted towards Lourdes Garcia as seen in the eyes of the
complainants and their witnesses.
What more proof would one need to show an immoral relationship other than these straightforward
statements of the complainants and their witnesses? Both respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia admit
being married to other persons but the way they behaved in front of the public is as if they were married
to one another.
Against these positive testimonies is respondent Judges denial. But it is axiomatic in the law of evidence
that positive statements prevail over negative statements.
A look at the denials of respondent Judge and his witnesses remain denials. Although they would attempt
to explain that the presence of respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia together on several occasions were
due to circumstances or plain coincidences, it would appear to the Investigating Justice that these
coincidences are one too many.
In his Memorandum, respondent Judge questions the motives of the complainants and their witnesses
stating that all of them had something against him and would lie through their teeth just to oust him out
of his position.
Respondent Judge claims that the testimony of Atty. Omega Moises Lacandola is biased and fraught with
exaggerations and distortions. He traces Atty. Lacandolas prejudice against him to the fact that she was
getting back at him for his act of filing an administrative case against Judge Bienvenido R. Estrada.
Judge Estrada was her Presiding Judge when she was a Branch Clerk of Court. Now that Atty. Lacandola
is the Clerk of Court, Judge Estrada is the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in San Carlos City.
Respondent Judge claims that as Judge Estrada and Atty. Lacandola have a very close working relationship,
the latter would go to all lengths to destroy him (respondent Judge) including fabricating stories against
him just because he filed an administrative case against Judge Estrada.
This theory is too far-fetched to be believed. First, the case filed by respondent Judge against Judge Estrada
came after this case had already been filed. If at all, it appears that respondent Judge in filing the case
against Judge Estrada after this case was filed was the one who was trying to even the score between him
and the latter.
Second, the testimony of Atty. Lacandola does not appear to be improbable or impossible despite what
respondent Judge believes. She testified on what she saw and observed and she may have been hostile and
stubborn at times but this does not mean that she was making up a story.
As far as the testimony of complainant Cynthia Marquez is concerned, respondent Judge in his
Memorandum claims that it was polluted by hate, desire for revenge, and for personal gain.
It appears that respondent Judge filed an administrative case against her for dishonesty and falsification of
daily time record in 1994 but he himself had it dismissed in 1995. Not only that.
Respondent Judge did not indorse Cynthia Marquez for the position of Legal Researcher of his court and
instead recommended somebody else. Her displeasure at respondent Judges actions and her desire to get
back at him motivated Cynthia Marquez to weave an incredible story against him.
But respondent Judges conclusion seems to be illogical. Since respondent Judge himself had the case
dismissed, why would Cynthia Marquez still be bent on getting back at him?
In fact, it is respondent Judge himself who got back at Cynthia Marquez by filing another administrative
case against her while this case was being heard. That case stemmed from the earlier case and this time
respondent Judge was charging Cynthia Marquez with falsification of her personal data sheet and
procuring her appointment as Interpreter under false pretenses.
As far as her non-endorsement is concerned, the Investigating Justice believes that this is not sufficient
ground to doubt the testimony of Cynthia Marquez. She gave her story replete with details and events that
showed the immoral acts of respondent Judge. If her testimony were contrived, she would be one great
storyteller.
Respondent Judge also states in his Memorandum that the reason why Atty. Leopoldo C. Tulagan testified
against him is because said lawyer wanted his pound of flesh as he lost several cases in respondent Judges
court. This is incredible. Following this reasoning we will come to the conclusion that all lawyers who lost
their cases before judges would readily testify against them at the expense of committing perjury. The
Supreme Court would be clogged with administrative cases against judges filed by lawyers who take
offense for the defeat of their cases.
All told, respondent Judge attacks all the testimonies of the complainants and their witnesses as improbable
and motivated by ill will and desire for revenge. He states that they could not have seen what they claim
to have seen because it was impossible to see through a closed window, the parking spaces for jeeps was
not located at a place where the Justice Hall or the City Hall could be seen, or that goats are not butchered
nor fishes cleaned a day before cooking.
But if we look closely at what respondent Judge calls impossible stories, these are minor, even
inconsequential details that do not detract from the truth of what the complainants and their witnesses saw
and testified on.
Not contented with accusing complainants and their witnesses as telling improbable stories, respondent
Judge states that all of them were prejudiced against him as they all had their respective reasons for wanting
to get back at him. This encompassing conclusion is more imagined than real. Respondent Judge would
like to portray that he is the victim of an elaborate plot concocted by the complainants to get him out of
office. But using as defense this delusion of persecution is not enough to overthrow the persuasive and
convincing evidence mounted against respondent Judge.
Respondent Judge readily concludes the motives of complainants and their witnesses as suspect. But could
not their motives also be the desire to tell the truth? Much as respondent Judge would like to portray them
all as pathological liars, their lies border more on the truth and appear to be more convincing than
respondent Judges bare-faced denials.
As the Investigating Justice heard this case personally from the beginning to its conclusion, he has observed
the demeanor of all those who swore to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth. And while this oath
may have appeared to be meaningless for some, it was clearly noticeable that the complainants and their
witnesses were the ones who valued its meaning and honored their oath to tell the truth.
From the evidence presented, there can be no denying that indeed respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz
Garcia are maintaining an illicit relationship. The details of such relationship are clearly and unequivocally
outlined by the complainants and their witnesses, who have nothing to gain by pitting themselves against
a powerful figure.
Moreover, Lourdes Garcia admitted herself that she owes her present position to respondent Judge who
helped her secure a permanent appointment at the City Legal Office in San Carlos City. Why would
respondent Judge do that for her if according to both of them they were merely casual acquaintances? What
motive would respondent Judge have in helping her get that position were it not for the fact that they had
an intimate relationship?
Admitting that he is estranged from his wife, respondent Judge himself has made possible the
circumstances that could have led to his present situation. He may be a judge but he is still a man with the
same feelings and urges as any other man. Lourdes Garcia is a married woman who appears to be also
estranged from her husband as nowhere in her testimony can be seen what happened to her husband except
for the testimony of her own mother who stated that she never saw her son-in-law for a long time now.
Hence, we have here a man and a woman both living away from their respective spouses and being thrown
together has brought out in them the fulfillment of their desires not to be alone. True it may be human
nature to feel needed and not be alone but in this case the man happens to be a Judge.
A judge is expected to be above himself, to transcend basic human urges if it is in conflict with the
responsibility he swore to uphold when he took his oath.
xxx xxx xxx
In his Memorandum, respondent Judge states that he has been previously charged with Immorality by
complainant Cynthia Marquez but she herself had it dismissed. Also, Lourdes Muoz Garcia had already
been charged with immorality before the Civil Service Commission in 1998 but the charges were dismissed
in 1999. Citing the case of Felicisimo San Luis, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80160, June 26, 1989,
respondent Judge now claims that the dismissal of the first case against him operated as a bar to this instant
case because of res judicata and that he would be twice in jeopardy of being convicted of the same offense.
The case cited by respondent Judge finds no application to his case. The fact that the previous charges were
dismissed against both him and Lourdes Garcia should not be taken to mean that they have been
exonerated entirely. Immorality is a continuing offense and the first charge should have at least warned
him to mend his ways. But he failed to do so and now that there is another charge he labels it an act of
persecution. Further, the complainants and their witnesses testified on acts of immorality of respondent
Judge from 1991 until this present charge was filed in 1998. Angelito Dispo even went to the extent of
stating that at the time he testified in this case on September 14, 1999, respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz
Garcia were living together under one roof in Barangay Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Thus, granting that there was a previous charge of immorality in 1994 but was dismissed in 1995, this
dismissal would only operate to absolve him of immoral acts until 1995. As this case was filed in 1998, it
shows that despite the dismissal in 1995, respondent Judge continued his illicit relations with Lourdes
Muoz Garcia for which he faces this present charge of Immorality.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Judge has shown that he is not worthy to don the robe of justice much less dispense justice
when he himself transgresses the law which he has sworn to uphold. His blanket denial of the charges has
not served to cause a dent in the positive evidence against him, neither has it portrayed him an innocent
victim of malicious persecution, as he would want the Investigating Justice to believe.
As the evidence presented definitely shows a lack of circumspection and delicadeza on the part of the
respondent judge in displaying before the public his immoral relationship, the extreme penalty of dismissal
is believed to be in order.
Immorality is a very serious charge that cannot be penalized by a mere fine or even suspension, as these
light penalties would be tantamount to a tacit approval of the immoral act.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Judge has failed to live up to these exacting magnitude of how a judge should behave. His
disregard for common decency and morality has made him unfit to discharge his present position and thus
his dismissal is in order. His retirement benefits should likewise be forfeited but his wife who has never
appeared on the scene should now be his saving grace against such forfeiture.
Indeed it is the wife of Judge Llamas who is the aggrieved party in the infidelity of her husband but she
was not the one who initiated this complaint nor did she participate in its prosecution. This factor should
be considered in respondent Judges favor and therefore he should be spared the forfeiture of his earned
benefits.[4] [emphasis supplied]
Justice Brawner thus recommended that respondent Judge be dismissed from service but without
forfeiture of his earned benefits.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. We find no room to
accommodate doubts on Justice Brawners findings of facts, which we find to be a result of a meticulous
and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainants and the respondent as well as their
respective witnesses. Thus, we adopt Justice Brawners recommendation of dismissal.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence.[5] He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,[6] and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities.[7] His personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside
the court, must be beyond reproach, for he is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible personification
of law and of justice.[8]
Regrettably, respondent Judge failed to live up to these standards. He brazenly flouted judicial ethics
and betrayed judicial standards by using his court to indulge his drinking, singing and dancing habits to
the detriment of the other courts within the building who were disturbed by all the noise coming from his
courtroom; and, especially, by maintaining an illicit relationship with Lourdes Muoz Garcia, a married
woman. A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office when he
labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time have a mistress in defiance of the
mores and sense of morality of the community.[9]
A judge traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for
occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. [10] No position is
more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the
Bench.[11] Thus, a judge ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness.
Certainly, keeping a mistress is not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to posses the highest
standard of morality and decency.[12]
Respondent Judge shamelessly mocked the dignity of his office and tainted the image of the entire
judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all time unsullied and worthy of the
peoples trust. Respondent Judge has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe and the place of honor
reserved for the guardian of justice in a civilized community. On this occasion, therefore, the Court metes
upon respondent Judge the severest of administrative penalties. He is hereby stripped of his judicial robe.
However, we are unable to agree with the reservation of Justice Brawner on the forfeiture of earned
benefits due respondent Judge based on the fact that respondent Judges wife was not the one who initiated
this complaint nor did she participate in its prosecution. The non-participation or non-appearance of the
wife in the administrative proceedings for immorality is not a factor in the imposition of penalty. Neither
should it be beneficial to respondent Judge.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of
Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross misconduct and immorality are classified
as serious charges, each of which carry with it a penalty of either (a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture
of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (b) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In Carina Agarao vs. Judge Jose J. Parentela, Jr., [13] we dismissed respondent judge on ground of
immorality and we ordered the forfeiture of one-half of all the retirement benefits of respondent Judge,
excluding the monthly equivalent of his accrued leave credits.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr. guilty of the charge of immorality, he
is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of 50% of all his retirement benefits excluding any
earned leave credits; and, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA, petitioner, vs. Judge PRUDENCIO A. YULDE, MTC, Mulanay,
Quezon, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Atty. Julieta A. Omaa filed a sworn letter-complaint dated October 4, 1998 charging Judge Prudencio
A. Yulde, Municipal Trial Court, Mulanay, Quezon with Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority,
Incompetence, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary together with her
Sworn Affidavit dated December 4, 1998 charging Judge Yulde with partiality in favor of the adverse party
and engaging in a drinking spree with lawyers who have pending cases in his sala.
Respondent Judge filed his Comment dated April 15, 1999.
The then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted to this Court his findings and
recommendation dated January 2, 2001, portions of which read as follows:
Complainant claims that respondent, instead of setting Civil Case No. 141 for hearing within the seventy-
two (72) hour effectivity of the TRO for the purpose of determining whether the same should be extended
or not, set the hearing beyond said period in violation of the Rules. In his comment, respondent neither
denies nor confirms this accusation. Although generally, we can consider respondents silence as an
admission, complainant however failed to supply the necessary documents in support of the claim. The
questioned TRO and order setting the summary hearing beyond the prescribed period were not
submitted. Given this failings, respondent has in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty.
On the claim of respondents alleged failure to act on the motions filed by complainant, respondents
explanation thereon is devoid of merit. He cannot justify his inaction on mere allegation that there are still
unresolved conflicting claims of facts raised by the parties. It is incumbent upon him to resolve motions
within the period of ninety (90) days from submission thereof. Delay in resolving motions and incidents
pending before a judge within the reglementary period of 90-days fixed by the constitution and the law is
not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency (Guinto[1] vs. Lucero, 261 SCRA 1, August 3, 1996).
Complainant also assails the validity of respondents Order of September 18, 1998 granting the Ex-Parte
TRO with twenty (20) day effectivity. Evidently, this is a judicial issue, hence whether said order was
validly issued or not must be raised on (sic) the proper judicial forum and not through the instant
administrative complaint. As held in Flores vs. Abesamis, 275 SCRA 382, 1997, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against judges are not complementary or suppletory of nor
a substitute for the judicial remedies which are available. Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies, as
well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceedings, are pre-requisites for the taking
of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative or criminal
nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have
spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be
said to have opened or closed, (Flores vs. Abesamis, 272 SCRA 382, 1997)
Relative to Criminal Cases Nos. 1949, 1951, 1956 and 1957, respondent informs that the preliminary
investigation thereon had been concluded and the records of the cases remanded to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Quezon on October 2, 1998. This negates the accusation that he has been acting on
the same.
The charge that respondent failed to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation in a criminal case for
frustrated murder must fail, not only because of want of evidence but more so because this matter calls for
judicial remedy which, as stated above, could not be substituted by the instant administrative case.
Anent the incident that happened during the scheduled pre-trial conference on November 24, 1998, we
agree with respondent that complainant should have notified the court that she was unavailable that
morning but intends to appear in the afternoon schedule. As alleged by complainant herself, the leeway of
scheduling the pre-trial conference both in the morning and afternoon sessions was intended for the
adverse parties who were not present when the same was motu-proprio reset by the court. When she did
not post any objection to the resetting, it is presumed that she agreed to attend the morning and afternoon
schedule. Her imprudence of not informing the court of her unavailability that morning should not be
blamed on respondent Judge.
However, respondent could not escape administrative responsibility for his admitted act of having a
drinking spree with a group of persons which includes Atty. Abcede who has pending cases with his sala,
especially that the same was done during office hours notwithstanding that the same was outside the
court. As a judge, he ought to avoid occasions where his partiality may be put to doubt or suspicion. One
who occupies an exalted position in the administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor
bestowed upon him, for his private as well as his official conduct must at all times be free from the
appearance of impropriety (Lugue vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165).
In sum, respondent judge should be held administratively liable for his failure to resolve motions within
the ninety (90) day reglementary period and for his indiscretion of having drinking sessions during office
hours with counsel who has pending cases with his sala.
RECOMMENDATION: respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our
recommendations that:
1. this case be RE-DOCKETED as an administrative matter; and
2. Judge Prudencio A. Yulde be required to pay a FINE of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.[2]
Per our Resolution dated February 12, 2000, parties were required to manifest if they are willing to
submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. [3]In compliance therewith, both parties
manifested that they agree to submit the case on the basis of the pleadings already filed in Court[4] which
we noted in our Resolutions dated June 18, 2001 [5] and August 6, 2002[6].
Based on the pleadings filed by the parties, we uphold the findings and recommendations of the then
Court Administrator Benipayo.
As to the charge that respondent scheduled a TRO beyond 72 hours the same must fail. Indeed,
respondent has in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty when
herein complainant, who is a lawyer, failed to present the temporary restraining order and the order to
support her claim that respondent set the hearing of the application for the TRO beyond the 72-hour
effectivity thereof in violation of the Rules of Court. Despite the opportunity given to her by the Court, she
opted not to present evidence.
As to the issue on the validity of the Order dated September 11, 1998 granting the issuance of a TRO
the same should have been raised in the proper judicial forum and not through an administrative complaint
as done by herein complainant. As we have ruled in Tolentino vs. Camano, Jr., not all errors of a judge can
be the subject of disciplinary action, but only those tainted by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or malice [7], of
which none has been alleged and proven in the present administrative case.
As to the charge of complainant relative to the preliminary investigation mandated in Criminal Cases
Nos. 1949, 1951, 1956 and 1957 - there is no evidence to refute the information given by respondent in his
Comment that said cases were all remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Quezon on October
2, 1998 per records of the Court.[8] Despite receipt of a copy of respondents Comment, complainant not only
failed to contradict the same but also she opted to submit the administrative case on the basis of the
pleadings and did not present countervailing evidence against the claim of respondent.
As to the charge that respondent failed to conduct preliminary investigation in the criminal case for
frustrated murder complainant likewise did not present evidence in support thereof. Moreover, the matter
called for judicial remedy and not the filing of an administrative complaint. Our ruling in the
aforementioned Tolentino case likewise applies.
As to the charge of complainant that respondent dismissed Civil Case No. 141 for failure of plaintiff
and herein complainant counsel to appear for pre-trial conference in the morning of November 24, 1998
although the pre-trial is also scheduled at 2:00 in the afternoon - complainant has no valid reason to
complain against respondent as she admittedly failed to appear at the pre-trial conference scheduled in the
morning. There is no evidence showing that she had earlier advised the respondent of her unavailability
in the morning, or, that she had valid reasons justifying her absence therefrom.
As to the failure of respondent to resolve motions and for his indiscretion of having drinking session
during office hours with counsels who have pending cases in his sala respondent is guilty thereof and
should be penalized accordingly.
In her complaint, Atty. Julieta Omaa specifically alleged:
5. On May 27, 1998 the undersigned filed a Motion to Disqualify Counsel for defendants, Atty. Roberto
Avio, on the ground that he being the Provincial Attorney of Quezon Province is disqualified or prohibited
to engage in private practice of his profession which is deemed submitted after June 14, 1998. The motion
was not acted upon and remained pending until September 14, 1998 when new counsel entered his
appearance in lieu of the former counsel.
6. On June 9, 1998 Omnibus Motion was filed seeking for the resolution of the application for preliminary
injunction. The same was not acted upon, hence, on July 28, 1998, the undersigned filed a Motion to Inhibit
the Presiding Judge in handling Civil Case No. 141, on the ground that he is related to defendants counsel,
the reason why the case remained unacted upon and this Motion to Inhibit as of this date remained unacted
upon.[9]
Respondent Judge did not deny the same in his Comment. Respondent explains his inaction, thus:
x x x. The very question now is who really is in the actual possession of the fishpond in litigation and this
is the reason why the under-signed Acting Judge Designate of this Court was reluctant to issue the
necessary and proper ruling on the issues raised by both parties. [10] x x x if really the judge hearing these
cases has not made any ruling on the prayers of Atty. Julieta Omaa, it is all because of the conflicting facts
both alleged by the party litigants.[11]
which does not justify at all his failure to act on the pending incidents.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
Rule 3.05. A judge should dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.
We have consistently held that a judge should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in
the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer justice. [12]
In her Sworn Affidavit, complainant states:
8. That while waiting for the hearing in the afternoon of November 24, 1998, pursuant to the Court Order
dated October 21, 1998, an old man came to the Court and relayed to the Courts Staff, in my presence and
in the presence of my client, Mrs. Primitiva San Miguel, plaintiff in Civil Case No. 141 and defendant in
Civil case No. 139, that the Presiding Judge cannot anymore come to Court because he had a drinking spree
with Atty. Euclides Abcede, counsel of plaintiff in Civil Case No. 139 and allegedly counsel for defendant
Jun Sison in Civil Case No. 141, with Atty. Rogelio Cortez of Gumaca, Quezon, defendant in Civil Case No.
141 and with the old man, an informant. He said further the good Judge had already fallen asleep.
9. The informant further told the Court staff in my presence and in the presence of Mrs. Primitiva San
Miguel that they drunk the one litter bottle Fundador brought along with Atty. Abcede and latter he caused
to buy one more litter bottle of Fundador.[13]
While no other evidence was presented by complainant to corroborate or establish the information given
by the old man in her presence; and, no evidence was likewise presented that the respondent failed to
return to his court that afternoon, respondent Judge admitted in his Comment that on said date, he joined
a drinking spree with counsels with pending cases before his court, in this wise:
When your judge is about to leave the Court at almost 12:00 noon of that day, I was invited by a friend (Ex.
Mayor Buhay) in their place and when your judge arrived at the house of Ex. Mayor Buhay, the group of
Atty. Euclides Abcede; Atty. Rogelio Cortez and Public Prosecutor Ernesto Altamira, Jr. together with other
persons, were already there having a drinking spree. This Jun Sison is not there and the person who offered
one bottle of Fundador is Mr. Romeo Fuentes, the Supervising Inspector of the Superlines Transportation
Company. We never talked of anything there touching the Civil Cases handled by Atty. Omaa and Atty.
Abcede.[14]
Clearly therefrom, respondent Judge failed to conduct himself in the manner prescribed by Rule 2.01,
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.[15]
Members of the Judiciary are expected to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and
suspicion, and be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior not only in the
discharge of their official duties but also in their private capacities. [16]
As soon as respondent Judge had noticed the presence of lawyers who have pending cases in his sala,
he should have excused himself from engaging in a drinking spree. A judge should so behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.[17] Respondent Judge
should have avoided fraternization with lawyers in a drinking session or attending the party tendered by
the ex-mayor.[18] The conduct of a judge must be free from any whiff of impropriety not only with respect
to the performance of his judicial duties but also to his behavior outside his sala and even as a private
individual.[19]
In Masangcay vs. Aggabao[20], we emphasized the relevance of Rule 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
to wit:
Rule 30. Social Relations. - It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should
live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of
their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue
their interests in a or appearance at meetings of members of the bar. A judge should, however, in pending
or perspective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to
waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining
his judicial course.[21]
We note that respondent had reached the compulsory retirement age of 70 years on October 30,
2001. Cessation from office because of retirement does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against a judge while he was still in service. [22]Respondent has not received his retirement
benefits per his Second Motion for Early Resolution dated February 19, 2002 which was noted in our
Resolution dated April 3, 2002[23]. We also note that in Administrative Matter No. 01-3-51-Municipal Trial
Court, respondent is being made to explain the unresolved cases pending in the municipal trial courts
where he was designated Acting Judge.[24]
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Prudencio A. Yulde guilty of inefficiency and impropriety,
in violation of Rule 2.01, Canon 2 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. A fine of
P10,000.00 is imposed on him, to be deducted from his retirement benefits, subject to the final resolution of
A.M. No. 01-3-51-MTC.
SO ORDERED.
ALEXANDER B. ORTIZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE IBARRA B. JACULBE, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF DUMAGUETE CITY, BRANCH 42, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Alexander B. Ortiz against Judge Ibarra B. Jaculbe, Jr. [1]
In a verified letter-complaint[2] dated March 20, 2003, Ortiz averred the following: That he is a
respondent in a case filed before the sala of Judge Jaculbe; that Atty. Richard Enojo, who is the son-in-law
of Judge Jaculbe, represents the plaintiff in the same case; that a compromise agreement was entered into
by the parties; that pursuant to the compromise agreement, plaintiff filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution; and that the motion was hastily granted by Judge Jaculbe without holding a hearing to
prove the failure of defendants to comply with the compromise agreement.
Complainant cites Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which reads, as follows:
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
...
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel
within the fourth degree.
Complainant further claims that the relationship between Judge Jaculbe and Atty. Richard Enojo is
within the third degree of affinity and thus covered by the rule.
In his Comment,[3] Judge Jaculbe alleges that it has been his practice to voluntarily inhibit himself
when a case handled by his son-in-law is raffled to his sala or, alternatively, for his son-in-law to withdraw
his appearance. In support of his assertion, he attached as annexes to his Comment some orders of
inhibition he issued and some withdrawals of appearance filed by his son-in-law.
The Judge further claims that there is only one exception to his above-stated practice and that is the
case now subject of this complaint. He contends, however, that:
. . . there is no legal, equitable and reasonable necessity to inhibit himself and the case can be counted as a
disposal from his court, in view of the following cogent and valid grounds:
1. No factual and legal issue [had] been resolved by the undersigned in rendering the judgment
based on the compromise agreement, and, there was no issue being resolved by the
undersigned in issuing the order for the Writ of Execution, for which issue undersigned could
have possibly been biased in favor of his son-in-law;
2. Atty. Richard Enojo (son-in-law of undersigned) participated and appeared very much later
and ONLY AS ADDITIONAL COUNSEL for plaintiff, because, Atty. Jose Arbas since the start
of the case consistently appeared as the only counsel for plaintiff for several years;
3. During the FIRST court appearance of Atty. Richard Enojo, he immediately manifested that his
client is accepting and willing to sign the pending and proposed compromise agreement
already submitted by the defendants, which compromise agreement was eventually finalized
and submitted to the court for approval; therefore, the appearance of his son-in-law was
instead favorable to the defendants and [is] without [the] possibility of partiality and undue
influence by the judge;
4. The Judgment was rendered in accordance with the Compromise Agreement, no more[,] no
less;
5. The order for issuance of a Writ of Execution as a ministerial duty only of the court was in
accordance with the procedure of the Rules of Court, after hearing the same with no
opposition and no motion for reconsideration and/or other legal remedies availed of by the
defendants; and
6. The appearance of his son-in-law as additional counsel for plaintiff, has long been with the
express conformity and acquiescence by the defendants; therefore, the defendants are in
estoppel [and] thus cannot now question and complain as to the conduct of this Presiding
Judge.
In a Manifestation and Comment,[4] Judge Jaculbe likewise takes exception to the narration of facts by
the complainant, as follows
The apparent and deliberate misrepresentation of facts briefly states that: undersigned Judge x x x
immediately granted the motion and as a matter of fact, issued [a] writ of execution on April 29, 2002
without conducting a hearing xxx. Worst is the fact that Hon. Ibarra B. Jaculbe had ordered for the issuance
of a writ of execution not in conformity to its decision. [T]he only reason why the same was expedited by
the court is the fact that Atty. Richard Enojo, plaintiffs counsel is his son-in-law. Also, complainant falsely
alleged that undersigned Judge ordered for the issuance of a writ of execution not in conformity to its
decision.
Upon referral of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator made the following evaluation and
recommendation:
Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically provides that a judge should take no part
in any proceeding where the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Paragraph (d) of said
Rule provides [as an instance thereof] the following:
within the fourth degree.
Clearly, respondent violated the above canon by deciding Civil Case No. 12320 since his son-in-law, who
is related to him in the first degree of affinity, was a counsel for the plaintiff. At least respondent does not
pretend to be ignorant of the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and he can not deny that he had
violated the same. However, his excuse that his son-in-law was not an original counsel but had only entered
his appearance after the case had been pending for over a year and only to announce that his client was
ready to sign the compromise agreement is unacceptable. What he should have done the moment his son-
in-law entered his appearance was to forthwith disqualify himself and have the case reraffled to another
branch. His reluctance to let go of the case, according to him, was [due to] his desire to include the same
case among his disposals and considering that it was nearly finished he preferred not to unload it. This[,]
again, is a poor excuse for violating the clear injunction written in the Code.
Under Rule 140, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may be classified as simple misconduct which
is punished by suspension from office without salary for not less than one (1) month nor more than three
(3) months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended that this case be redocketed as a regular
administrative matter and considering that respondent had earlier been reprimanded in RTJ-97-1393, he
should be made to pay a fine [of] P11,000.00 for simple misconduct.[5]
As indicated by the Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Jaculbe does not dispute the fact that
Atty. Richard Enojo is his son-in-law and is, therefore, related to him by affinity in the first degree.
The prohibition against the Judges sitting in the case is found in the Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct as quoted above and in Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which states:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record.
The prohibition under the rules is clear. Therefore, Judge Jaculbes failure to inhibit himself when his
son-in-law appeared as counsel in a case he was trying is a patent violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Rules of Court. In Sales v. Calvan,[6]the Court found that Judge Calvan violated the rule on
disqualification of judges as set out in the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Court when he
conducted the preliminary investigation of a criminal case where his wife was the niece of the private
complainant. The Court articulated therein, as follows -
In Garcia v. De la Pea, we explained the rationale for this disqualification:
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the
respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the
salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it
in a manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively
presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him
and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned.
The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
The disqualification is mandatory, and respondent has no option other than to inhibit himself from the
criminal case. The appropriate step for respondent to take would have been to immediately desist from
hearing the case, even at the preliminary investigation stage. His failure to do so is a glaring violation not
only of the Rules of Court but also of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates in Canon 3, Rule 3.12:
Rule 3.12 A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
...
within the fourth degree;
...
Even in Perez v. Suller, which respondent cites in support of his arguments, we ruled that respondent Judge
Suller should have refrained from handling the preliminary investigation of the case involving his nephew,
a relative by consanguinity within the sixth degree and thus covered by the prohibition in Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court. We further held:
While conducting preliminary investigation may not be construed strictly as "sitting in a case," the
underlying reason behind disqualification under Rule 3.12 [of Canon 3] of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Section 1 of Rule 137 is the same.
We have time and again reminded judges of their obligation to keep the image of the judiciary unsullied
and worthy of the people's trust. Respondent clearly failed to uphold this duty.
In that case, the Court imposed a fine of P10,000 on Judge Calvan for violation of Section 1 of Rule 137
of the Rules of Court and of Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a violation of Supreme Court rules falls under
a Less Serious Charge. Section 11 of the same rule states that the following sanctions may be imposed for
Less Serious Charges: 1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
In the present case, since Judge Jaculbe was earlier reprimanded by the Court in RTJ-97-1393, the
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator to impose a fine of P11,000 is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, Judge Ibarra B. Jaculbe Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City, Branch 42, is found GUILTY of violating Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Rule 3.12 of
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and a FINE of P11,000 is hereby imposed on him.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
J. KING & SONS COMPANY, INC., Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1802

represented by its President, Richard L.
King, Present:
Complainant,
DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA, and
JUDGE AGAPITO L.HONTANOSAS, JR., Presiding CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.,
Judge of RTC, Branch 16,
Cebu City,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
September 21, 2004

x----------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a complaint filed by J. King & Sons Company, Inc., represented by its President,
Richard L. King, against Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Cebu City
(RTC for brevity).
Complainant alleges: It is the plaintiff in a case for Specific Performance with Damages with Prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Attachment, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-27870,[1] pending before the RTC
presided over by respondent.On July 2, 2002, respondent issued an Order granting the application for writ
of preliminary attachment upon applicants filing of a bond in the amount of P35,973,600.00. An urgent
motion to discharge and lift writ of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the respondent
on July 5, 2002 and on the same day, respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary
attachment. Said Order dated July 5, 2002 was issued sans proper notice and hearing as required by section
4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Respondent approved defendants counter-bond despite
knowledge that the bonding companys Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum net
retention of the bonding company had a deficiency of P22,541,463.69. At a meeting in his house, respondent
asked Rafael King to match defendants offer to pay P250,000.00 so that the Order of July 5, 2002 will be
reconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration is filed by complainant. Respondents favorite hang-
out is the karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he uses said
facilities gratis et amore.
In compliance with the directive of the Court Administrator, respondent filed his Comment, dated
August 22, 2002, wherein he vehemently denies soliciting money from the King brothers. He contends that
complainant is merely a dissatisfied litigant which cannot accept an unfavorable court ruling; and that the
questioned orders relative to Civil Case No. CEB-27870 were issued by him in the exercise of lawful judicial
discretion in accordance with the rules of procedure, the evidence on record, and with the dictates of justice
and equity.
Complainant then filed a Reply where it pointed out that respondent failed to squarely meet the
issues of the administrative complaint. It emphasized that there was actually no hearing on the motion to
lift the writ of attachment allegedly conducted on July 5, 2002.
Respondent filed a Supplemental Comment alleging that complainant has also filed a complaint
against him with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), attaching his counter-affidavit thereto. He
further claims that it is clear that Richard King and Atty. Renecio Espiritu sought another forum to further
expose him to public ridicule thru the print media and air waves thereby eroding public trust and
confidence of the people in the judiciary.
The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), had forwarded to this Court the complete records of King
vs. Hontanosas, pursuant to Section 23(2) of Republic Act No. 6670.
On September 8, 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the herein administrative matter to
Associate Justice Jose Reyes, Jr., Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigating Justice conducted hearings where complainant presented the testimonies of
witnesses, Richard L. King, Rafael L. King, and the waiters at complainants karaoke bar, namely: Antonio
Cabigon and Axel Reyes.
Richard King testified that he is the president of complainant corporation. He adopted the joint
affidavit executed by him together with Rafael King as part of his direct examination. In said joint affidavit,
Richard states as follows: He and Rafael are the President and Treasurer, respectively, of J. King and Sons
Co., Inc., the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-27870 pending before herein respondent. On July 2, 2002,
respondent issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the defendants in the aforementioned case
for specific performance. Thereafter, respondent approved the counter-bond despite knowledge of the fact
that the clearance was valid only until June 28, 2002, the maximum net retention of the bonding company
was only P13,432,136.31, thus, causing a deficiency of P22,541,436.69. On July 5, 2002, respondent lifted the
writ of preliminary attachment without notice and hearing in violation of Rule 13 and 15 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. The calendar of cases of the court showed that the motion to lift attachment filed by
defendants in the subject case was not scheduled for hearing on said date of July 5, 2002. The minutes
presented by respondent showing that there was a hearing held after 11 oclock and before 12 oclock of July
5, 2002, could be easily manufactured. Previous to the aforementioned incidents, respondent had been a
frequent visitor of the corporations music lounge where respondent would entertain himself, his guests
and friends for free; Rafael King would entertain respondent when he visited said music lounge; on July 5,
2002, Rafael received a telephone call from respondent, telling him to see him (respondent) at his residence.
Richard and Rafael King obliged but they were shocked when respondent asked them to equal the
defendants offer of P250,000.00 so he would reconsider his order lifting the attachment. The King brothers
told respondent they could not comply with said demand since they are suffering a financial crisis. Thus,
respondent denied the motion for reconsideration filed by J. King & Sons Company, Inc. [2]Richard King
further testified that they filed a motion to inhibit respondent from further hearing the subject case and
when said motion was granted, the case was re-raffled to a new judge who then reinstated the writ of
attachment against the defendants in the subject case.
On cross-examination, Richard testified: Respondent and his brother, Rafael, are friends. At the
behest of respondent, he and his brother went to the house of respondent at around 7 or 8 oclock in the
evening. Due to the fact that Rafael and respondent were friends, respondent frankly told Rafael that he
(respondent) needed money and if Rafael could match the offer of the opposing party and come up with
P250,000.00, respondent would reverse his order lifting the attachment upon complainants filing of a
motion for reconsideration. Their conversation lasted no more than twenty minutes and because Richard
and Rafael were shocked by respondents actuation, they immediately left respondents house. Richard King
further pointed out that he is a very busy businessman and by the filing of the present administrative case
against respondent, he has nothing to gain. [3]
Witness Rafael King likewise adopted the joint affidavit he executed with his brother, Richard
King, as part of his direct testimony. Rafael further stated that respondent had been his friend for 3 to 4
years and in that span of time, he had never asked for any favors from respondent regarding cases of
complainant corporation pending before the sala of respondent. Respondent did not ask for money from
him for the granting of the writ of attachment. However, after the order lifting the attachment had been
issued on July 5, 2002, at around 2 or 3 oclock in the afternoon, respondent called him up on the phone and
asked him to go to his (respondents) house. Since this was the first time that Rafael would go to respondents
house, it was even respondent who gave him (Rafael) directions on how to reach said house. Rafael denied
respondents claim that he was the one who called respondents son, Butch, to ask for a meeting with
him. Rafael admitted that he knows the wife of respondent since she often uses the music lounge owned
by complainant corporation. Before July 5, 2002, respondent had often called Rafael on the phone to tell the
latter that he and his family will use said music lounge. Upon the Investigating Justices questioning, Rafael
stated that they filed the present administrative case against respondent because it was an injustice for
respondent to demand money from them.[4]
Antonio Cabigon and Axel Reyes, corroborated each others testimonies.They testified that: they
work as waiters at the karaoke bar owned by complainant and they often saw respondent and his wife,
sometimes also with some of their friends, at said bar; respondent and his wife did not have to pay for the
use of the facilities of said bar, per instruction of the bars management;however, for record purposes, they
would still give the bill or order slips to respondent for his signature, but it was respondents wife who
signed the same in their presence.
Respondent, on the other hand, testified as follows: A hearing on the defendants motion to lift the
preliminary attachment was actually held on July 5, 2002 between eleven oclock in the morning and twelve
oclock noon as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes taken during said hearing. He held the
hearing because the motion was urgent in nature, and he did it in the spirit of equity and
justice. Furthermore, he asked from counsel for defendants whether counsel for complainant had been
notified of the hearing and the former assured respondent that counsel for complainant had been notified
of the hearing. With regard to the claim that he demanded P250,000.00 from the Kings, he denied ever
calling Rafael King or demand any money from the Kings; instead, it was Rafael King who called up his
(respondents) son Butch and asked that they be allowed to meet with him at his residence. While the Kings
were at his house, the Kings tried to bully him into reconsidering his Order dated July 5, 2002, but he told
them to just file a motion for reconsideration. Complainant filed the motion for reconsideration but after
hearing the same, he denied the motion in his Order dated July 17, 2002. He pointed out that at the hearing
on the Motion for Reconsideration, the defendants were able to present a Certification from the Supreme
Court that the authority of the bonding company was up to August 3, and so he denied the Motion for
Reconsideration. With regard to the claim that he frequently used complainants karaoke bar without paying
for said facilities, respondent insisted that his wife offered to pay but the bars management would not allow
her to pay.[5]
On June 14, 2004, the Investigating Justice submitted his Investigation Report together with his
recommendation which reads as follows:
RECOMMENDATION:
The complaint may be divided into four (4) issues. First, would be the alleged demand
for P250,000.0 in exchange for a favorable action regarding complainants motion for
reconsideration. The second, the use of complainants karaoke bar at the Metropolis Hotel
by respondent and his family for free. The third, the alleged impropriety regarding the
issuance of the Order of July 5, 2002, and lastly, the sufficiency of the counterbond.
A. AS TO THE ALLEGED DEMAND FOR P250,000.00
The investigating justice finds that the same had not been sufficiently
substantiated. Other than the bare assertion of Rafael and Richard King there was no other
evidence presented. Although the visit of the King brothers to the house of respondent in
the evening of July 5, 2002 is admitted, this by itself would not prove that a demand for
money was made.
However, the investigating justice finds that it was inappropriate for respondent
to have entertained a litigant in his home particularly when the case is still pending before
his sala. As held in De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison (355 SCRA 69 [2001]) patronizing with litigants
tarnishes the appearance of propriety, to wit:
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial;

he must also appear to be impartial. Hence, the judge must, at all times,
maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language, both
written and spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the best of
intentions be misconstrued.A judges conduct must be above
reproach. Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. A judges private as well as official conduct must at all times be
free from all appearances of impropriety and be beyond reproach.
Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. It was, thus,

held that it is improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused
without the presence of the complainant. (at 89-90)
B. AS TO THE USE OF COMPLAINANTS KARAOKE BAR AT THE METROPOLIS

HOTEL
The investigating justice notes that this was not denied by respondent but
interposes the defense that during the time he used the bar, his friends would pay the bill
(See: TSN, April 27, 2004, p. 29). He also claimed that at one time the owners of the karaoke
bar would not allow his wife to pay. He testified, thus:
Atty. Cortez:
Mr. Respondent, the complainant thru its witnesses Richard King and
Rafael King have accused you of taking advantage of the
amenities in their karaoke joint and according to them you were
not charged, what can you say to this? Did you abuse?
Witness:
I did not. Because that is an open place. I went there together with my wife
to entertain some judge friends and then my wife was suppose to
pay and the management did not allow my wife to pay. (TSN,
April 27, 2004, p. 20)
Although there is a question of whether or not respondent had used the facilities
free of charge, the investigating justice nevertheless finds that respondent judge should
have not frequented the place to prevent any appearance of impropriety considering that,
as admitted by respondent, there are at least three (3) cases filed by complainant which are
pending before his court. This is a violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Thus, it has been held time and again that the judges must avoid all appearances
of impropriety. In Calilung v. Suriaga (339 SCRA 340 [2000]), it was held:
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND

THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote

public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality and
the appearance must concur. Case law repeatedly teaches that judicial
office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a
number of restrictions thereon, which he has to pay for accepting and
occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice. The
irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in
the judiciary. It is thus the duty of the members of the bench to avoid any
impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the
judiciary.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal,

metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent,
because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the
litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting
interests and the embodiments of the peoples sense of justice. Thus, their
official conduct should remain free from any appearance of impropriety
and should be beyond reproach.
Given the factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court

does not hesitate to conclude that respondent Judge tainted the image of
the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it all times
unsullied and worthy of the peoples trust. A judge should conduct himself
at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and
confidence of the people for he is the visible representation of the law. (at
361-362)
C. AS TO THE ALLEGED IMPROPRIETY REGARDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE

ORDER OF JULY 5, 2002
For clarity, the undisputed facts leading to the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction are reiterated, thus: On July 2, 2002, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued. On July 5, 2002 defendants filed an urgent motion to lift writ of preliminary
injunction and on the same day an order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction was
issued.
...
Respondent on the other hand, countered in his testimony that he granted the
motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment because he thought that it was the most
equitable thing to do . . .
The investigating justice is not persuaded by respondents explanation. As held in the case
of Peroxide Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals (199 SCRA 882 [1991]) before a writ of
attachment may be lifted, a hearing and an opportunity to oppose the motion should be
given to the attaching creditor, to wit:
Now, it is undeniable that when the attachment is challenged for having

been illegally or improperly issued, there must be a hearing with the
burden of proof to sustain the writ of being on the attaching creditor. That
hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a
reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing parties and
meet them. The right to submit arguments implies that opportunity,
otherwise the right would be a barren one. It means a fair and open
hearing. And, as provided by the aforecited Section 13 of Rule 57, the
attaching creditor should be allowed to oppose the application for the
discharge of the attachment by counter-affidavit or other evidence, in
addition to that on which the attachment was made. (at 890)
In the present administrative case, no opportunity was given to complainant to
even oppose the motion to lift attachment. Respondent failed to persuade the investigating
justice of the alleged urgency to grant the motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment
as a justification for granting the motion without a full-blown hearing. It may also be said
that the July 5, 2002 Order may have been too hastily issued considering the fact that a
copy of the said motion was mailed only on July 3, 2002 (Exhibit 5). Hence, as argued by
complainant, the motion could not have been set for hearing earlier than July 6, 2002
without doing violence to the 3-day notice rule.
The respondent judge, having ignored settled jurisprudence, is GUILTY of gross

ignorance of law.
As held in Gozum v. Liangco (339 SCRA 253 [2001]):
When the law violated is elementary, the failure to know or

observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (at 259)
There could be nothing more basic under Philippine Law than the
aforementioned 3-day notice rule:
D. AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COUNTER-BOND
In this regard, complainant alleged that:
That there is no better evidence of the insufficiency of the counter-bond

submitted and lack of clearance from the Supreme Court on the date the
counter-bond was approved on July 4, 2002 than the Certification of the
Clerk of Court VII, Joeffrey S. Joaquino, Office of the Clerk of Court, Cebu
City, that the said counter-bond its (sic) Supreme Court Clearance was
valid up to June 28, 2002. That its maximum net retention is
only P13,432,136.31, but was issuing a counter-bond worth P35,973,600.00
to answer for damages to petitioner. What is material was the date the
counter-bond was approved not any other date thereafter. (Rollo, pp. 15-
16)
Respondent, upon the other hand, testified that he did not notice that the clearance had
already expired and that the bond was over the legal retention . . .
On this matter, the investigating justice finds that respondent judge was negligent. The
Indorsement issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Cebu dated July 5, 2002 contained
the following Information (Exhibit F).
a) The signature of the bonding officer is genuine as compared to his
specimen signature on file.
b) The companys Supreme Court Clearance is valid until June 28, 2002.
c) The companys Maximum Net Retention Per Subject of Insurance is
only THIRTEEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY TWO
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX & 31/100 PESOS
(P13,432,136.13), per its OIC Form No. 1 on file with this Office.
Had respondent carefully examined the aforesaid Indorsement it would have been
immediately apparent to him that the insurance companys clearance had already expired
and that the bond issued exceeded its net retention. Because of this negligence, damage
resulted to the litigant in the case. The position of a judge is a sensitive one, he should have
been more circumspect and careful in his actions, granting that his actions may have been
motivated with the desire to act equitably.
To recapitulate, the investigating justice finds that respondent judge is GUILTYof:
a). IMPROPER CONDUCT when he entertained the litigant in his residence as well as
when he used complainants karaoke bar;
b). GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW when he failed to hold a hearing regarding the lifting
of the writ of preliminary attachment as mandated in the case of Peroxide Philippines
Corporation v. Court of Appeals (supra) as well as when he heard the motion to lift the
writ of preliminary attachment in violation of the 3-day notice rule; and
c). NEGLIGENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY when he approved the

patently defective counter-bond.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that

respondent judge be SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay and be issued a
warning that a more severe penalty shall be imposed in case of another infraction. [6]
We do not fully agree with the evaluation and recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
On the alleged demand for P250,000.00.
The Investigating Justice finds that the charges of extortion had not been sufficiently substantiated
because other than the bare assertions of Rafael and Richard King there was no other evidence presented.
The following questions come to mind. May we, considering that we are not a trier of facts, review the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses? Should the testimonies of both Rafael and Richard King be
automatically disregarded simply because there is no other evidence presented by complainant? May the
testimonies of such witnesses suffice to establish the guilt of respondent?
It is a well-entrenched rule that the trial judges, in this case, the investigating justices findings of
facts and assessment of the credibility of witnesses are accorded finality. However, such rule is not without
exceptions.Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if
properly considered, would alter the result of the case. [7] Among the circumstances which had been held
to be justifiable reasons for the Court to reexamine the trial court or appellate courts findings of facts are,
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
and when the finding of fact of the trial court or appellate court is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record.[8]
In the present case, we find that such circumstances exist to make this case come under those
aforementioned exceptions. A re-assessment of the Investigating Justices ruling on the sufficiency of
evidence against respondent is warranted. We find that the Investigating Justices inference that the
evidence on record is insufficient to hold respondent liable is erroneous, a patent mistake.The Investigating
Justice seriously overlooked the fact that to require the King brothers to present evidence other than their
corroborating testimonies that respondent made such a demand would be unrealistic. Human experience
tells us that extortion would be done in utmost secrecy, minimizing possible witnesses.Hence, respondent
required the King brothers to meet him at his house, where everything would be under his control. In this
case, complainant is quite fortunate to even have two witnesses to corroborate each other. Verily, to require
that there be any documentary evidence or a paper trail of the commission of extortion would be quite
absurd for, naturally, respondent would not allow such incriminating evidence to exist. In Velez vs.
Flores,[9] we observed that being a trial judge, respondent is not expected to be careless enough to document
his extortion activities on paper. Therefore, the King brothers testimonies cannot be automatically
disregarded simply because there is no additional evidence presented by complainant.
It should be noted that the Investigating Justice did not categorically state that the King brothers
are not credible witnesses or that their testimonies are not worthy of belief. Thus, we closely examined the
testimonies of Richard and Rafael King and found the same to be very candid, forthright, unwavering, and
bereft of any material or significant inconsistencies. Furthermore, as aptly pointed out by Richard King,
they actually have nothing to gain from the filing of the present administrative case. If anything, their
having to appear at the hearings of this case was even a burden, as they had to squeeze in such hearings
into their already busy schedules. They even had to travel from Cebu City, where they reside, to Manila
just to give their testimonies before the Investigating Justice. Moreover, respondent failed to present
evidence that Richard and Rafael King had any ill motives in leveling such grave accusations of extortion
against him. Furthermore, respondents admission that he did entertain the King brothers at his home
bolsters the credibility of their averment that he demanded P250,000.00 from them for a favorable ruling
on the motion for reconsideration that they would file. Thus, we find the King brothers testimonies to be
entitled to full faith and credit and sufficient proof that respondent demanded P250,000.00 in exchange for
a ruling in their favor.
In Avancena vs. Liwanag,[10] we considered the mere testimony of complainant that respondent
judge therein was demanding P1,000,000.00 for a favorable judgment in her favor and the testimony of an
NBI agent that they tried to entrap respondent therein but their operation was unsuccessful, as sufficient
evidence to find respondent therein guilty of extortion. Imposing the penalty of dismissal on respondent
therein, we held that:
. . . in the instant proceeding, respondent is being held to account for serious
misconduct or malfeasance in office in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The quantum of proof required to
establish respondents misconduct in the administrative complaint is not proof beyond
reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Again, in Office of the Court Administrator vs. Morante,[11] we emphasized that:

. . . in administrative proceedings only substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conviction, is required. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary,
as the standard of integrity demanded of members of the Bench is not satisfied which
merely allows one to escape the penalties of criminal law.
In Villaros vs. Orpiano,[12] we found the testimony of complainant therein and his mother that
respondent Stenographer and Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija,
Branch 32, had solicited P1,500.00 from them, as sufficient evidence to hold him guilty of improper
solicitation, and held thus:
The Court finds the respondent administratively liable for improper solicitation
and thus imposes the penalty prescribed by prevailing rules and jurisprudence, which is
dismissal from service on the first offense.
Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials
involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is
circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict
propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the publics respect for
and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in
a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and uprightness.
The respondents act of demanding money from the complainant hardly meets the
foregoing standard. Improper solicitation from litigants is a grave offense that carries an
equally grave penalty.
In the present case, we likewise hold that the credible testimonies of the King brothers meet the
required quantum of evidence which justifies our conclusion that respondent indeed demanded
P250,000.00 from them. Such conduct is a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial conduct, which provide that:
Canon 1 A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary
Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and

independence.
Canon 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities
Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
On the Investigating Justices finding of gross ignorance

of the law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the
motion to lift attachment and for violating the three-day
notice rule.
We agree with the Investigating Justices finding that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment and for violating the three-day
notice rule.
Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. - . . .
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof
shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3)
days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.
A perusal of the motion to lift attachment shows that a copy of the same was mailed to plaintiffs
counsel only on July 3, 2002. The courts receiving stamp showed that said motion was filed in court only
at 11:02 in the morning of July 5, 2002, despite the fact that the notice of hearing for said motion stated that
said motion would be set for hearing at 8:30 in the morning of July 5, 2002. The proximity of the date of
mailing of the copy of the motion to the other party and the hearing date indicated in the notice of hearing
clearly shows that it is impossible for the other party to receive said motion at least three days before the
date of hearing. Evidently, the party filing the motion to lift attachment had already violated the three-day
notice rule. Such circumstances should have already warned respondent that plaintiff in the subject case
had not yet been apprised of the filing of such a motion, much less the holding of a hearing for said motion.
Yet, despite said patent defects in the motion, respondent consented to hold a hearing on the motion at
11:20 of the very same morning of July 5, 2002. Although Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the court, for good cause, may set the hearing on shorter notice, the rule is explicit
that notice of the hearing cannot be altogether dispensed with. In this case, common knowledge dictates
that it would be impossible for a copy of the motion, mailed only on July 3, 2002, to be delivered by
registered mail to counsel for the plaintiff on or before July 5, 2002. Obviously, therefore, the plaintiff had
no notice whatsoever of the filing of the motion and the hearing date for the same.
Section 12, Rule 57[13] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, also provides that the court shall, after
due notice and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files
a counter-bond executed to the attaching party with the clerk of the court where the application is made,
in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment.Although it is true that respondent
was able to present a transcript of stenographic notes[14] to prove that a hearing on the motion to lift
attachment was conducted on July 5, 2002, the same only highlighted the fact that respondent failed to give
herein complainant, the plaintiff and attaching party in subject case, due notice and the opportunity to be
heard, as mandated by the aforementioned rule. The transcripts of stenographic notes of July 5, 2002, in
fact shows that respondent already had strong suspicions that the plaintiff had not yet been notified of the
filing of the motion when he propounded the following questions to the counsel of defendants in the subject
case, to wit:
COURT:
Where is the proof that the counsel for the plaintiff received this?
ATTY. SENO:
It was mailed, Your Honor. Our basis that he received this is the registry receipt
which is the proof of mailing, and there is an explanation why no personal service could
be made because of time constrained (sic), Your Honor.As we can recall, we filed our
Answer last July 3, Your Honor, and it was about that time that we received the summons
and it was also about that time that we filed this motion, Your Honor. At any rate, this is
only a counterbond which is a mere ministerial procedure. It is just a matter of paying the
surety of the counterbond and to submit it to the Honorable Court to prove that there is
already a bond which may answer for any loss that the plaintiffs may suffer.
COURT:
But are you sure that Atty. Navarro was aware of that?
ATTY. SENO:
Yes, because we met him, Your Honor. He had a case here and we met at the
hallway. Before he left, I told him that I filed a motion and he was furnished a copy through
mail, Your Honor.
COURT:
You should have let him signed (sic) this pleading here as a copy furnished, since
you were already talking to him at that time.
ATTY. SENO:
Yes, Your Honor, precisely there is an explanation why no personal service could
be had. Under the rules, if no personal service could be had, then it should be mailed by
registered mail. But there is already an explanation why no personal service could be made
and we believe that is already sufficient, Your Honor.
COURT:
Because this is a very urgent motion and considering that the counsel for the
plaintiffs was around, you should have furnished him a copy and let him sign to prove
that he received a copy. At that time, was he willing to receive the copy?Perhaps, he was
not willing to receive a copy.
ATTY. SENO:
No, no, we had a talk, Your Honor. He may not be willing to receive the copy at
that time, but we have mailed to him already a copy and we believe that it is already suffice
(sic), Your Honor.
COURT:
But it was easy for you to serve him a copy personally. Why do you have to mail
it, when you could have serve (sic) it to him personally?
ATTY. SENO:
No, because my office, Your Honor, is in Mandaue City. The office of Atty.
Navarro is in Capitol and its so hard to travel from Mandaue to Capitol in just a matter of
30 minutes especially during school days, Your Honor. As a matter of fact, we can even
file an ex-parte motion, Your Honor.
COURT:
Anyway, the incident is now considered submitted for resolution.
Despite such misgivings on the lack of due notice on counsel for plaintiff in subject case, respondent still
conducted an ex-parte hearing on the motion and hastily considered the same submitted for resolution and
on the very same day of July 5, 2002, respondent approved the counter-bond. Complainant is not quite
accurate in stating that respondent approved said counter-bond on July 4, 2002.The stamp of approval of
the bond was affixed onto the bond without any date thereof. The date of execution by the President of the
bonding company was July 4, 2002; but this does not mean that respondent also approved said counter-
bond on the same date of July 4, 2002. The Indorsement of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City was dated July 5, 2002, thus, respondent could not have received subject counter-bond any
earlier than the date of said indorsement.
Just the same, respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing on the
motion to lift attachment filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in considering the same submitted
for resolution, and in issuing the order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment and approving the
counter-bond, all on the same day of July 5, 2002, without giving complainant the opportunity to be heard
on the matter. We agree with the Investigating Justice that respondents defense that he immediately heard
the motion even in the absence of counsel for the other party because of the urgency of the lifting of the
attachment, is not persuasive. The transcripts of stenographic notes for the hearing on July 5, 2002 shows
that counsel for defendants in subject case presented no argument whatsoever showing the urgency of the
motion.
It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous judgment of decision rendered by him in good faith, or in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption.[15] However, it has also been held that when the law violated is elementary,
a judge is subject to disciplinary action.[16] The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic that
respondents inability to accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be excused. In this case, we believe that
respondents actuations reek of malice and bad faith. Thus, we find respondent guilty of gross ignorance of
the law for violating the three-day notice rule and failing to give herein complainant due notice and the
opportunity to be heard on the matter as mandated by Section 12, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
On respondents negligence
in the performance of his duty
As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly failed to exercise due care in
examining the supporting papers therefor. The respondent should know the basic requirements before
approving a surety bond or a judicial bond such as counter-bond. In Mangalindan vs. Court of Appeals,[17] the
Court enumerated the requirements for accepting a surety bond as bail. Since surety bail bonds are closely
analogous to judicial bonds and counter-bonds required for the issuance of writs of attachment or the lifting
thereof, the respondent should know that the requirements for acceptance of said surety bail bonds are the
same for all other bonds such as acceptance bonds or counter-bonds except the requirement for
photographs of the accused. Said requirements are: (1) affidavit of justification, including a statement that
the company has no pending obligation demandable and outstanding in any amount to the Government
or any of its agencies as of the last day of the month preceding the date the bond is issued or posted; (2)
Clearance from the Supreme Court, valid only for thirty days from the date of issuance; (3) Certificate of
compliance with the Circular from the Office of the Insurance Commissioner; (4) Authority of the agent in
case the bond is issued through a branch office or through an agent; and (5) current certificate of authority
issued by the Insurance Commission with the financial statement showing the maximum underwriting
capacity of the company.[18] The Court imposed these requirements for very good reason, and that is, to
ensure that the bonding company has the capacity to pay whatever liability it may have under the bond it
issued. The bonding companys ability to pay is all too important in this case where the counter-bond it
issued is supposed to answer for whatever amount may ultimately be adjudged in favor of the party who
applied for the writ of attachment. It is, therefore, indispensable for a judge to review these documents
before he approves the bond.
Notably, among the requisites for the bond to be acceptable are a clearance from the Supreme Court and
the current certificate of authority showing the maximum underwriting capacity of the company.
The Clerk of Courts Indorsement dated July 5, 2002, clearly showed that the bonding companys Supreme
Court Clearance was valid only until June 28, 2002, and its Maximum Net Retention is only P13,432,136.31.
A simple perusal thereof would have alerted respondent that at the time the counter-bond was submitted
to him for approval on July 5, 2002, the bonding company did not have enough properties to answer for
the counter-bond it issued in the amount of P35,973,600.00. Thus, we agree with the Investigating Justice
that respondent acted negligently in approving the counter-bond.
On respondents improper conduct in entertaining
litigants at his home and using litigants karaoke bar for
free.
It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his home and to frequent
the karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free. Respondent thereby received
benefits from a litigant appearing in his court. Respondents defense that his wife offered to pay but the
management of the karaoke bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at said
bar are quite clear that respondents wife would sign the order slips, but no payment was ever given by
respondent or his wife.Respondent should have insisted on paying, especially considering that
complainant has a total of three cases pending before his court. Nothing on record shows that respondent
even exerted any effort to so insist. He appeared only too ready and willing to enjoy the facilities of
complainants karaoke for free. In Caeda vs. Alaan,[19] we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is
an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of
impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
[Respondents] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from
any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to
create an impression of indecorum.
.........
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one
has to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not
freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just
impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his
public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for
reproach. (Emphasis supplied),
By entertaining a litigant in his home and receiving benefits given by said litigant, respondent miserably
failed to live up to the standards of judicial conduct.
A judge must assiduously protect the image of his exalted office as we have previously emphasized
in Spouses Makadaya Sadik and Usodan Sadik vs. Judge Abdallah Casar,[20] to wit:
It must be borne in mind that courts exist to dispense and to promote

justice. However, the reality of justice depends, above all, on the intellectual, moral and
personal quality of the men and women who are called to serve as our judges. In a piece
written by Rosenberg, this point was emphasized, thus:
Justice is an alloy of men and mechanisms in which, as Roscoe

Pound remarked, men count more than machinery. Assume the clearest
rules, the most enlightened procedures, the most sophisticated court
techniques; the key factor is still the judge. In the long run, There is no
guarantee of justice except the personality of the judge. The reason the
judge makes or breaks the system of justice is that rules are not self-
declaring or self-applying. Even in a government of laws, men make the
decisions.
In the recent case of Jocelyn Talens-Dabon v. Judge Hermin E. Arceo, the Court
emphasized the importance of the role played by judges in the judicial system, thus:
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is
able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of
the community that the people who run the system have done justice. At
times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice
but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice,
indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people
who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be
proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but
more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives.
Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this
country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the
judicial system.
Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable qualifications for

judicial office reflect an awareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the damage
that can be done to the legal order by judicial corruption. The rationale for this was
succinctly put by Jones, thus:
If a physician or a professor or a businessman is discovered to be

a thief or an influence peddler, the disclosure will not put medicine, higher
education, or business into general disrepute. But judges are different and
more representative; revelations of judicial corruption create suspicion
and loss of confidence in legal processes generally and endanger public
respect for law.
Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of exceptional integrity

and honesty. The special urgency for requiring these qualities in a judge is not hard to
understand for the judge acts directly upon the property, liberty, even life, of his
countrymen. Hence, being in a position of such grave responsibility in the administration
of justice, a judge must conduct himself in a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted
office.[21]
Finally, it cannot be said that complainant is guilty of forum-shopping in filing a criminal complaint against
respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas). We held in Bejarasco, Jr. vs. Judge
Buenconsejo[22] that:
. . . it is a settled rule that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal

proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the latter charges. As the
disciplining arm of the judiciary, it is the Courts duty to investigate and determine the
truth behind every matter in complaints against judges and to mete the necessary penalties
therefor.
In sum, we find respondent guilty of the serious charges of two counts of Gross Misconduct in violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8(3) of Rule 140
of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, for demanding P250,000.00 from
complainant and using complainants karaoke bar and entertaining litigants at his home. Respondent is
likewise guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure under Section 8(9) Rule 140 of the same Rules
for failing to accord complainant the due notice and hearing it was entitled to under the rules. Lastly,
respondent is guilty of the less serious charge of Simple Misconduct under Section 9(7), also under Rule
140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, for his negligence in approving the subject counter-bond.
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be penalized as follows:
Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits.
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
while Section 11(B) of said Rule, dealing with sanctions that may be imposed on the respondent found
guilty of less serious charges, provide thus:
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions
shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
(1) or more than three (3) months; or
Consequently, we find the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent be

suspended for only three (3) months without pay to be inappropriate.
We note further that respondent had been previously administratively sanctioned in City
Government of Tagbilaran vs. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.[23] for violating Circular No. 4 issued on August 27, 1980,
enjoining judges of inferior courts from playing in or being present in gambling casinos. Thus, the fact that
respondent is guilty of three counts of serious offenses, i.e., two counts of Gross Misconduct and one count
Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure, and also of one count of Simple Misconduct, further aggravated
by the finding of guilt in a previous administrative case against him, justifies the imposition of the penalty
of dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of two
counts of Gross Misconduct, one count of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure, and, Simple
Misconduct. He is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except as to accrued leave
credits and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
This Decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge is further ordered to cease and desist
from discharging the functions of his Office upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy hereof be entered in
the personnel records of respondent.
Further, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which took effect on October 1, 2002, respondent is
required to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disbarred from the practice
of law for conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar.
SO ORDERED.
RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE EDMUNDO T. ACUA, REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 123.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On November 21, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a Letter [1] dated
November 3, 2003 from Concerned citizens of the lower court reporting the alleged practices of Judge
Edmundo T. Acua, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 123. According to the letter, the respondent
Judge conducted trials, signed orders and even sentenced accused while on official leave from August 15,
2001 to September 15, 2001. Among the decided cases were as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. C-63250 People v. Alex Sabayan;
2. Crim. Case No. C-63261-62 People v. Renato Simo;
3. Crim. Case No. C-61323 People v. Elizabeth Canaberal;
4. Crim. Case No. C-63238 People v. Narciso Asistio, et al.; and
5. Crim. Case No. C-63238 People v. Marlon Duritan.
The letter went on to question whether the respondent had authority to impose such sentences, issue
orders and conduct hearings. Aside from listing the respondents dialogues, his favorite expressions were
likewise listed, as follows:
1. Putris
2. Anak ng pating
3. Putang Ina
4. Pogi, beauty
5. Tulungan nyo naman ako, hirap na hirap na ko.
6. Mali ka na naman.
According to the unknown complainants, the respondent Judge also spends much of his energy
talking and loves to berate and embarrass people, not caring whether he speaks in open court, as long as
he has an audience. The complainants further stated that the respondents decisions usually take about
seven to ten drafts, as he changes his mind so many times. It was further alleged that the respondent loves
to glorify himself, and that his behavior was weird.
In his comment, the respondent averred that the writers of the letter were actuated by improper
motive, and sent the letter with no other purpose than to harass him. Furthermore, the allegations in the
letter were fabricated, exaggerated, or misquoted.
Anent the allegation that he conducted trials, signed orders and issued sentences while he was on
official leave, the respondent alleged that he was issued an Authority to Travel [2] dated August 14, 2001
duly approved and signed by then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida Elepao allowing him to travel to
Toronto, Canada to visit his brother, who unfortunately passed away before he could leave. As evidenced
by the entries in the daily time records/logbook,[3] he was not yet on leave from August 15, 2001 to August
21, 2001. As such, he had the right and duty to come to court and conduct trials, sign orders and issue
sentences. His application[4] for a thirty-day leave was from August 21, 2001 to September 21, 2001, duly
approved by Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez.
On the allegation that he exhibited weird behavior, he explained that he was still mourning the loss
of his eldest son who died of a fatal aneurism last December 21, 2002. His son, who was at the prime of his
life, had just taken the 2002 bar examinations and was employed at a law firm. The respondent Judge
surmised that the unknown complainants may have seen and observed him at the second phase of his
recovery, a time when he was depressed and angry.
As to the alleged humiliating statements that he made, the respondent Judge admitted having made
some of them while he was discussing the performance ratings of his staff. He insisted, however, that he
had been misquoted, and dismissed as mere fabrication some of the statements attributed to him. He
admitted, however, that putris, putang-ina, beauty and pogi were among his favorite expressions, but
clarified that he did not use them often, certainly not in open court.
In its Report dated September 17, 2004, the OCA recommended that the instant administrative case be
re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that the respondent be reprimanded for ignorance of a
policy on leave of absence expressed through the ruling of the Court in Paz v. Tiong,[5] where it was held
that a judge on leave of absence would have absolutely no authority to discharge his duties or exercise the
powers of a judge. The OCA made the following evaluation:
Official records culled from the OCA Office of Administrative Services indicate that Judge Acua had an
approved application for leave covering the period from 21 August 2001 to 21 September 2001. This
application for leave of absence was approved on 3 August 2001. In view of this approved application for
leave, it was a natural expectation that Judge Acua would cease from exercising his functions during the
said period.
However, per verification with the clerk-in-charge at RTC Branch 123, Caloocan City, respondent Judge
Acua presided over the following cases on 21 August 2001:
1. Criminal Case No. C-63250 entitled People v. Alex Sibayan;
2. Criminal Case No. 63261-62 entitled People v. Renato Simo; and
3. Criminal Case No. 61323 entitled People v. Canaberal.
In his Comment dated 19 January 2004, the respondent judge admitted reporting for work on 21 August
2001 and presiding over two (2) criminal cases. He even took pride in the fact that he did not go on leave
that day, pointing to the courts logbook as proof of his attendance.
The admission by Judge Acua confirms the allegation in the anonymous letter that he performed his
functions on a day when he was already on leave of absence. The reference made by the respondent judge
to the logbook only serves to establish that he indeed performed his duties on 21 August 2001 the first day
of his official leave. We state that not even his overzealousness to work can shield him from administrative
liability for ignorance of the consequences of his approved application for leave of absence. [6]
In a Resolution[7] dated December 8, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zearosa for investigation, report and recommendation. The respondent
manifested that he was going to file an extended comment, which the Investigating Justice allowed.
In his supplemental comment, the respondent alleged that he decided to defer his leave for another
week as his siblings who would be going with him to Canada had not yet secured their visas. The
respondent alleged that he was even uncertain if this could be done by amending his travel authority. Jenny
Rivera-Baliton, the clerk in charge of criminal cases in the respondents sala, informed him that this would
take another week or so. Ms. Rivera-Baliton executed an affidavit attesting to the veracity of the
respondents claim. Thus, the respondent decided not to defer his leave anymore, and no longer reported
for work beginning August 22, 2001. On the issue of hearing cases on August 21, 2001 despite his approved
travel authority and approved leave, the respondent claimed, thus:
I was not actuated by any evil or improper motive. Neither was I motivated by any monetary consideration
or otherwise except by my desire to discharge my sworn duty to administer justice expeditiously. I acted
in good faith and in the honest belief that I had the right to defer the effectivity of my leave chargeable
against the 30-day forfeitable leave benefit. I wish to reiterate at this juncture what I stated in my original
comment that the leave I applied for in 2001 was my first full availment of the 30-day forfeitable leave.
Previously, and even after 2001, I went on forfeitable leave only for several days and never consumed the
complete 30 days leave accorded to judges. In hearing cases on August 21, 2001, I did not receive any extra
remuneration for it. The public service was not prejudiced thereby. I had in mind only the interest of the
accused who were in detention. I had no intention of violating any rule, nor was it ever my intention to
prejudice anybody. On that day, as in the past, I had a heavy case load, involving detention prisoners as I
[my court is] a Drugs Court. (My court is also a commercial [law] and [Intellectual Property Law] Court,
the only branch in Caloocan City which is that). Had I not heard the cases of the accused who pleaded
guilty on that day, they would have waited for my return after 30 days.
If I committed any infraction of the rules on leave, in all sincerity, to reiterate, there was no intention at all
on my part to so disregard the rules. If I committed any infraction, I plead for the leniency of this Court
with a promise that I will not commit a repetition thereof anymore. [8]
The Investigating Justice thereafter submitted her Report, recommending that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit. She ratiocinated that while the respondent Judge admitted having performed
his functions on August 21, 2001, the date of the commencement of his approved leave, there was nothing
repulsive in deferring the date of his leave. Moreover, there was no showing that the respondent was
actuated by any ulterior motive other than to lessen his workload. According to the Investigating Justice,
the respondents decision to report for work that day appears to have been motivated by his honest belief
that he could defer his leave and make the necessary adjustments later; he had no clear intent to deliberately
ignore the rules regarding vacation leaves. The Investigating Justice further pointed out that nobody was
prejudiced by the respondents appearance during that day, and went on to state:
However, respondent should bear in mind that approved leaves are filed through official documents and
in the future, such act may obliterate the validity of the issuances he made while on official leave when his
orders, decisions and other promulgations reflect a date when he is already supposed to be on leave. Thus,
he should exercise utmost caution regarding these matters.
Therefore, in our consideration, the act of respondent does not constitute such a gross ignorance of the rules
that will warrant an administrative liability. In view of the lack of malice and improper motive in reporting
for work and discharging his functions and taking into account his desire to dispense justice promptly,
respondent cannot be said to have been grossly ignorant of the rules as to be deemed administratively
liable.[9]
As to the use of humiliating and insensitive expressions, the Investigating Justice agreed with the OCA
that the use of putris and putang ina were unfit expressions for men of the robe. It did not matter that they
were not directed to any person in particular, as they give the impression of a persons ill manners.
Considering that the respondent is not an ordinary citizen, such intemperate language detracts from how
a judge should conduct himself. The Investigating Justice made the following conclusion:
In sum, we find that the allegations in the anonymous complaint, some of which were admitted with
qualifications by the respondent, are not sufficient to warrant a penalty other than to remind him of the
rules regarding official leaves and of proper conduct of judges.
As a final note, respondent is reminded that as a judge, it is paramount that a judges official conduct should
be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the
performance of his official duties, but also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This includes
following simple rules as well as conducting himself in the most respectable and honorable manner
possible. Only through such kind of demeanor of the members of the judiciary that the institution earns
the respect and faith of our people in the administration of justice. [10]
The Court agrees with the Investigating Justices observation that the respondents use of such
expletives is improper for the extolled office of a magistrate of the law. By virtue of the very office he holds,
the public expects more of the respondent as he undeniably occupies an exalted yet delicate niche in the
administration of justice. Those who don the judicial robe and wield the judicial gavel ought to impress in
their consciousness that appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. [11] Thus, the respondents claim
that his favorite expressions were not directed at anyone in particular is unacceptable.
Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in
language.[12] Indeed, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.[13] Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.[14] We recognize, of course, that judges are also human beings,
with their own burdens and private affairs. However, having accepted the esteemed position of judge, the
respondent ought to have known that more is expected of him than an ordinary citizen. As subjects of
constant public scrutiny, personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen
should be freely and willingly accepted by a judge. In particular, he or she must exhibit conduct consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office.[15] Indeed, a judges personal behavior, not only while in the
performance of official duties, must be beyond reproach, being the visible personification of law and of
justice.[16]
Thus, while we commiserate with the respondent Judge for the loss of his brother and son, we cannot
spare him from the consequences of his unacceptable behavior.
In Ignacio v. Valenzuela,[17] a judge who heard a motion while he was on vacation was held guilty of
impropriety and was meted a fine of one months salary. To reiterate, a judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities.[18]Thus, in conducting hearings and promulgation of
decisions on the day when his official leave of absence was to commence, the respondent Judge was guilty
of impropriety. Considering, however, that no bad faith or ill motive can be attributed to the respondent,
the Court deems it proper to reprimand him for his actuations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Edmundo T. Acua is found GUILTY of impropriety and is
REPRIMANDED therefor. He is STERNLY WARNED that the repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. ANTONIO D. SELUDO, complainant, vs. Judge ANTONIO J. FINEZA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 131, Caloocan City, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety[1] and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every
judge.[2] A judge should be the last person to be perceived as petty, sharp-tongued tyrant. Sadly,
respondent judge failed to live up to such standards of judicial conduct.
In a complaint[3] dated July 24, 2003 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Atty.
Antonio D. Seludo charged Judge Antonio J. Fineza of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
131, with violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In his complaint, Atty. Antonio D. Seludo alleged inter alia that on June 28, 2003, respondent judge
filed with the same court (Branch 128), a complaint for revocation of notarial commission against him
(complainant), docketed as Revocation of Commission No. C-001-(2003).
During the hearing on July 8, 2003, respondent judge uttered vulgar and insulting words against
complainant, thus:
Court:
Do you have anything to say Atty. Seludo?
Atty. Seludo:
Yes, Your Honor. May we know also, under what authority is the complainant appearing in this
case, Your Honor? Is he going to prosecute this case?
Court:
He is appearing for himself as petitioner.
Atty. Seludo:
Under what authority, Your Honor?
Judge Fineza:
If the respondent knows how to read English, he would find in the petition itself that under the
rule, we are obligated to bring to the court any anomaly or dishonesty or dereliction in the
performance of a duty of a Court Officer. And may I point out and make it on record that
this time, despite the fact of respondents answer, last paragraph of page 1 states and I quote;
I think page 2, and I read: That the undersigned has taken steps to prevent a recurrence of
the lapses in the notarial registry. An informal inquiry made by this Judge this afternoon
from the Office of the Clerk of Court, the reply was that the respondent has not filed any
notarial report for the year 2003, x x x.
Court:
You want to put that on record?
Judge Fineza:
Not only to put on record . . . , and courtesy calls that when someone is speaking, a courtesy
should require. May I ask the Judge to remind him . . .
Court:
Let him finish first, Atty. Seludo.
Atty. Seludo:
Yes, Your Honor.
Judge Fineza: (continuation)
Before the Executive Judge or Investigating Judge finally inhibits himself, he should order the
Office of the Clerk of Court to issue a certification to the effect that for the year 2003, no
notarial report has been made by the respondent which is a ground for cancellation of his
notarial commission. Thats why I raised this, so that while the case is pending, he should be
suspended from the practice of . . . . and may I ask that he be declared in contempt for
laughing?
Court:
Judge Fineza, will you please stay calm.
Judge Fineza: (to respondent)
Putang-ina mo eh!
Court:
Please be just civil with each other, Judge Fineza.
Judge Fineza:
Why is he laughing? Let it be put on record that he has a moronic attitude. Thats why he was
laughing.
Court:
Judge Fineza, are you making an additional manifestation or additional charge against the
respondent because of the information that you got now from the Office of the Clerk of
Court?
Judge Fineza:
No, Your Honor. It is in accordance with my petition, that during the pendency of this case, the
respondent should be suspended.
Court:
He should be suspended because of the non-compliance?
Judge Fineza:
Yes, Your Honor. He promised in his answer, that he has remedied the situation.
xxx
Atty. Seludo:
Yes, Your Honor. I just want that all the manifestations of the complainant be put on record, Your
Honor.
Judge Fineza:
If Your Honor please, I dont know if this guy is really stupid. This is a court proceeding and
everything that is being taken is recorded. If you want to use that for libel, you cannot. This
is a Court proceeding, we should have privileged communication.
Court:
Judge Fineza, will you please refrain from calling the other person, who is a brother in profession?
Judge Fineza:
Im just telling the truth, Your Honor.
Court:
But I would like to ask you to use temperate words. You are brother lawyers. If you have nothing
more to say, I would like to adjourn this preliminary conference. I will indorse all the records
to the 1st Vice Executive Judge who will notify you of the schedule for the continuation of
the investigation.
continuation . . .
We will prepare the minutes and we will let you sign, Judge Fineza.
Judge Fineza:
Where is the minutes? This is not the prescribed form for minutes, Your Honor? Okay.
Court:
I have not yet adjourned, Judge Fineza? I hope you will be more civil to everybody here just like
anybody who is civil with you.
Judge Fineza:
Okay, okay. My apologies, Your Honor.
Court:
Accepted.
Judge Fineza:
And now you adjourn?
Court:
You are requesting for that? I will give you copy so that you can be satisfied. What do you say,
Atty. Basa? You are the collaborating counsel. Probably, you are being more civil with us.
Atty. Basa:
May we just ask for the adjournment of the session, Your Honor.
Judge Fineza:
You will give me the minutes now?
Court:
We will provide you including with the copy of the Order of the Court inhibiting itself. [4]
In his comment[5] dated September 8, 2003, respondent judge admitted that he uttered derogatory
words during the proceeding held on July 8, 2003. He, however, explained that he has been suffering from
a heart ailment and diabetes since November, 2002, causing him considerable anxiety and pain. This must
be the reason why he could not control his outburst. Besides, the incident was precipitated by the conduct
of the complainant and the Executive Judge. Complainant was unkind and impolite to him. He kept on
interrupting him. In fact, after his oral manifestation, complainant began to laugh and ridicule him.
Moreover, when he (respondent) asked the Executive Judge to cite complainant in contempt of court, the
latter stood up with clenched fists and acted in a menacing manner.
Respondent further admitted in his answer that he is aware that there is no justification for his use of
improper language, and for this, he is sincerely contrite and penitent. But as a member of the bench for
over twenty years, he expected the complainant to respect him, to treat him with politeness, dignity and
courtesy, and to give him his due as a magistrate.
On January 9, 2004, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint[6] on the ground that he is no
longer interested in pursuing the case since respondent has retired from the judiciary. [7]
In his Report and Recommendation,[8] Court Administrator Presbitero Velasco made the following
evaluation:
EVALUATION: We will dwell first on the issue of desistance of complainant to pursue instant complaint.
The settled rule is that the complainants withdrawal of his complaint, or desistance from pursuing the
same, does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of the administrative case. The outcome of an
administrative action cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who, for reasons of his
own, may condone what may be detestable. Certainly, complainants desistance cannot divest this Court of
its jurisdiction, under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, to investigate and decide complaints
against erring employees of the judiciary. Otherwise stated, such unilateral act does not bind this Court on
a matter relating to its disciplinary power.
As to the fact that respondent has already retired from the service, the Court has pointed out in several
cases that the retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of
any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.
Proceeding thereon with the issues, we find ourselves in accord with complainants observation that
respondent has indeed consciously ignored to heed the Courts advice and warning when he was
admonished for using intemperate language in A.M. No. P-01-1522. A careful scrutiny of the transcripts
taken on that unfateful day reveals that respondent has precisely uttered the following vitriolic
language against complainant:
a) Putang ina mo!
b) If respondent knows how to read English.
c) Let it be put on record, that he has a moronic attitude.
d) If Your Honor plese, I dont know if this guy is really stupid.
As shown by the records, respondents attention was called several times by the Investigating Executive
Judge to stay calm and be civil. In fact, his attitude was generally antagonistic not only to complainant
but also to the Executive Judge who dared to question his motives/oppose his view. Such, is a glaring
display of haughtiness and arrogance of respondent. His disgraceful behavior reflected adversely on the
good image of the judiciary and fell short of the standards expected of a magistrate of the law. His
justifications of provocation (which we found none), discourtesy of complainant and the various illnesses
he professed to be suffering should not be viewed to exculpate him from liability. As a member of the bench
he should have adhered to that standard of behavior expected of all those who don the judicial robe. His
choice of words, aside from being inflammatory and uncalled for, betrays a lack of judicial decorum.
The respect and dignity of the court has to be upheld hence, respondent should not have acted with anger
and shouted at complainant who must have suffered embarrassment in front of many people. He should
have maintained his composure for patience and courtesy are marks of culture and good-breeding.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of official duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. The Code dictates that a judge must behave with propriety at all times.
Because respondent has already retired from the service, dismissal or suspension is no longer feasible as a
penalty for the present charges. Therefore, we opine that a fine is appropriate under the circumstances.
Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct is classified as a serious chargeunder Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, the penalty of which is either dismissal, suspension for 3 to 6 months without salary and benefits or
a fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00. Considering that this is not the first offense
of similar nature committed by respondent, we believe a penalty of P20,000.00 is commensurate, to the acts
complained of, which amount should be taken from his retirement benefits.
Court Administrator Velasco recommended that (1) the instant administrative case be re-docketed as
an administrative matter; and that (2) respondent judge be fined in the amount of P20,000.00 for violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the amount to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
In our Resolution[9] dated June 21, 2004, we required the parties to manifest whether they are
submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and records filed.
On August 12, 2004, respondent submitted a Manifestation[10] requesting a formal hearing of this case.
In our Resolution dated September 20, 2004, [11] we denied his request for lack of merit.
For his part, complainant, in his Manifestation dated August 12, 2004, [12] stated that he is submitting
the matter to our sound discretion.
Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide:
Canon 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
xxx
Canon 3
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND
DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBLITIES
xxx
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into
the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
In ascribing the words "moronic attitude," "stupid", "if he knows how to read English" and putang
ina mo to complainant during the proceeding before the Executive Judge, respondent displayed a conduct
so unbecoming of a magistrate. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and outrageous. That
respondent was suffering from heart ailment and diabetes is not an excuse. He could have asked the
assistance of a lawyer to represent him in prosecuting the case. As correctly observed by the Court
Administrator, his disgraceful behavior tainted the good image of the judiciary he is expected to uphold at
all times.
We have admonished judges to observe judicial decorum which requires that they must at all times
be temperate in their language,[13] refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric[14] or from
resorting "to the language of vilification."[15] In the same vein, in Fidel vs. Caraos,[16] we held that although,
respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench
nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be
always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language.
Respondent judges behavior is incompatible with judicial temperament expected of him. He was
discourteous, not only to complainant, but also to the trial judge. His actuation constitutes palpable
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01, and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
This is not respondent's first offense. In A.M. No. P-01-1522,[17] we reprimanded him for failing to
exercise prudence and restraint in his language. Obviously, he has not reformed.
We thus find respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, this administrative offense is
considered serious,[18] punishable under Section 8, paragraph 1(3), and Section 11, paragraph A(3), thus:
Sec. 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate
proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
x x x.
Sec.11. Sanctions.- A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonio J. Fineza is hereby found GUILTY of gross violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00)
to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
RODRIGO JING N. VIDAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE JAIME L. DOJILLO, JR., Municipal Trial Court,
Manaoag, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
Before us is a complaint filed by complainant Rodrigo Jing N. Vidal against Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr.,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Manaoag,Pangasinan.
The antecedent facts, as accurately narrated in the report of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), are as follows:
The Hon. Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court at Manaoag, Pangasinan is here
charged with Misconduct. The charge stemmed from an Election Protest filed by the brother of Judge
Dojillo at the Municipal Circuit Trial Court stationed at San Fabian, Pangasinan to protest the proclamation
of herein complainant as Barangay Captain in the 2002 election.
Mr. Vidal [herein complainant] alleged that during the 29 and 30 July 2003 hearings of the Election Protest,
Judge Dojillo sat beside the counsel of his brother and actively coached, aided, assisted, and guided said
counsel by now and then saying something, handing piece of writing, reminding, and or stopping the
counsel from manifesting something to the court, and other similar acts.
Complainant continued that herein respondents assertive presence and display of partisan activities in full
public view could not have been ignored or unnoticed by the court a quo and would give the impression
and suspicion of partiality of the said court in favor of respondents brother.
Judge Dojillo admitted that he was present during the mentioned hearings but explained that he did not
sit beside his brothers lawyer but in the area reserved for the public; and that the main reason why he was
there was to observe how election protests are conducted as he has never conducted one. His other reason
was to give moral support to his brother.
This matter was referred for investigation and, in her report, the Hon. Tita Rodriguez-Villarin, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 46, Urdaneta City observed that:
From the evidence submitted by the parties, [the] undersigned noted that although the complainant and
his witness claim they saw the respondent talking to the lawyer and respondents brother and handing
notes they did not hear the alleged conversation and they did not state what were those notes. Neither did
they see respondent do other acts to interfere with the proceedings.
Considering that the presence of the respondent during the hearings of the election protest of his brother
was admitted by both parties, the only issue left is whether or not such presence constitutes misconduct.
In this respect, [the] undersigned further noted that the complainant, by himself or thru his lawyer, did not
call the attention of the court much less raised objection to the respondents presence. This is an indication
that during the hearings[,] respondents presence did not stir any impression or suspicion of intention to
influence [the] courts ruling. As declared by the complainant, he became suspicious and apprehensive he
lost the case even before receiving the decision when he was informed later that not having a brother judge
he was surely a loser.
The OCA then recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed but respondent
judge should be advised to be more circumspect in his actions in the future.
We do not agree with the OCA recommendation.
Respondent, in his defense, stated that he attended the hearing of his brothers election protest case
just to give moral support and, in the process, also observe how election protest proceedings are conducted.
Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a
judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity
of the entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only
impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities. Even if respondent did not intend
to use his position as a judge to influence the outcome of his brothers election protest, it cannot be denied
that his presence in the courtroom during the hearing of his brothers case would immediately give cause
for the community to suspect that his being a colleague in the judiciary would influence the judge trying
the case to favor his brother. The fact that neither complainant nor his counsel objected to the presence of
respondent during the hearing is immaterial. Respondent himself should have refrained from publicly
showing his seemingly active interest and participation in the case, for he does not deny that he whispered
and passed notes to his brothers lawyer during the course of the hearing. Thus, we emphasize our ruling
in Caeda vs. Alaan,[1] that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential
manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just
impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
[Respondents] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any appearance
of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of
indecorum.
...
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal trial court judges like respondent because they are
the judicial frontliners who have direct contact with the parties. They are the embodiments of the peoples
sense of justice. . . .
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for
occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial
duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner
that gives no ground for reproach. (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, respondent failed to live up to the degree of propriety required of him by the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
IN VIEW OF THE ALL THE FOREGOING, Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., is found GUILTY of violation
of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby REPRIMANDED with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
NORA C. PEREZ and ENGRACIA G. RONQUILLO, complainants, vs. JUDGE JOVEN COSTALES,
RTC, Branch 45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
This is an administrative complaint filed by Nora C. Perez and Engracia G. Ronquillo, professors of
the Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University, South La Union Campus (DMMMSU-SLUC), against
Judge Joven Costales of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City (Branch 45), charging him of
violating Canons 2 and 3, and Rules 2.04 and 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and for Harassment.
Complainants Perez and Ronquillo are two of the four professors accused by respondent Judges wife,
Perla F. Costales, of the crime of Estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2722-BG pending before RTC-
Branch 33, Bauang, La Union. Ronquillo is also an accused in a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
filed by Perla F. Costales, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4338. The following are the acts complained of
against respondent Judge:
1) On June 24, 2002, respondent Judge was with his wife during the hearing of Criminal Case No.
4338 (B.P. Blg. 22 case);
2) On October 15, 2002, respondent Judge testified in behalf of the prosecution in Criminal Case
No. 2722-BG (Estafa case);
3) Respondent Judge pressured and made follow-ups on the case with the public prosecutor;
4) Respondent Judge wrote a letter dated October 10, 2003, addressed to the President of the Don
Mariano Marcos Memorial State University, quoted as follows:[1]
I wish to call your attention regarding your four (4) professors, namely: ENGRACIA G. RONQUILLO,
MERCEDES V. TAVAS, CLARITA S. VALDEZ and NORA C. PEREZ, all of DMMMSU, South La Union
Campus, Agoo, La Union, who were convicted with the crime of ESTAFA/SWINDLING on July 22, 2003,
a xerox copy of the Decision is hereto attached and marked as Annex A.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed by the accused thru their counsel but was denied,
Annex B. Thru counsel, the 4 accused appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, Annex C.
Prof. Ronquillo is also charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (or the Bouncing Checks Law)
which case is pending trial before the Municipal Trial Court of Naguilian, Annex D and Annex E.
Incidentally, the complainant in these cases is my wife PERLA F. COSTALES.
.
It is unfortunate that you have 4 professors who are supposed to be the molders of the mind of the youth
and paragon of virtue, yet they have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, which is worst
than other crimes. What if the Court of Appeals affirms their conviction which is imprisonment from 4 to
20 years at the Womens Correccional, Manila.
We heard that the 4 professors are intending to apply for early retirement because of this. We have no
objection provided they have to pay first their money obligations to my wife.
We pity the professors that is why we held in abeyance the filing of administrative cases against them.
We are not to be blamed for this but the 4 professors themselves. We are only exercising our rights under
our laws.
May I know what course of action you would undertake considering that these 4 professors of your well-
known and prestigious university where innumerable graduates have shown excellence in their chose
endeavors, have been convicted with a crime involving moral turpitude?
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
JUDGE JOVEN F. COSTALES
Husband of the Complainant
Perla F. Costales
Required by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to comment on the complaint, [2] respondent
Judge denied the allegations. According to respondent Judge, there was no hearing held on June 24, 2002
in Criminal Case No. 4338 (B.P. Blg. 22 case), and granting that there was any hearing in which he attended,
he was there in his private capacity as he was a witness for his wife, although he was not presented
anymore. Respondent Judge stated that he filed a leave of absence and did not use his official time to attend
the hearings of the case. Respondent Judge also believed that there was no impropriety in his act of writing
a letter to the university officials. It was done with the consent of his wife, and he did not use his position
to influence the officials. He merely asked what course of action has been taken against the four professors
involved. Respondent Judge also denied that he pressured the public prosecutor and if ever he went to the
prosecutors office, it was on leave of absence.[3]
Per recommendation of the OCA, the case was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter,[4] with
the parties manifesting their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.[5]
In its Evaluation, the OCA found that respondent Judge should be reprimanded for having written
the university officials, thus:
3. Finally regarding the third alleged act of impropriety, that is, writing the universitys administrative
officials inquiring as to what actions have been taken or would be taken against the complainant, we find
enough basis for the charges of violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent ought to have known
that such a letter from one occupying the position of judge will not be treated as a mere ordinary inquiry.
Respondent should have realized that his letter can be regarded as tending to influence the outcome of the
investigation being conducted by the university about the matter. Said act of respondent is a clear violation
of Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that A judge shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency. Respondent in making the said letter had abandoned his duty that A judge should
be embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. That respondent opted to write the letter
himself instead of his wife indicates improper use of his judgeship. [6]
With regard to the other alleged acts of impropriety, it was the OCAs finding that respondent Judge
cannot be held administratively liable therefor for the following reasons:
In the present case, respondents participation in the criminal cases filed by his wife was limited to being a
witness. As can be deduced from the above-cited case, a member of the judiciary is not prohibited from
being a witness to a case. Note should be taken that respondent did not give an opinion nor participated
(sic) in any proceeding that could slant the evaluation and resolution of the case in favor of the party he
identifies himself with.
There is no clear act of impropriety or appearance of impropriety that can be imputed to the respondent.
Respondents act of assisting his wife in his private capacity, being privy to the transactions, does not
necessarily signify that he is using his authority in influencing the outcome of any proceeding or
investigation.
2. As to the second alleged act of impropriety, the act of the judge in going to the prosecutors office, which
respondent did not deny in his comment contending that the criminal case was regularly filed and
prosecuted, we find his presence in the said office insufficient basis for an administrative sanction. There
was no showing that the prosecutors office was pressured into having the said criminal cases prosecuted
in court. Nor was it shown that the respondents presence was intended to influence the action of the
prosecutors office on the matter.[7]
The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct decrees that a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. Specifically, Rule 2.01 mandates that a judge should so behave
at all times as to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. This includes a judges
behavior in the performance of his judicial duties, outside of it, and in his private capacity. [8]
The Court cannot find fault in respondent Judges appearance as a witness in Criminal Case No. 2722-
BG (Estafa case). He had personal knowledge of the events that led to the filing of the case, and he cannot
be blamed for protecting his wifes interests. He did not utilize official time and resources in doing so. There
is nothing on record, aside from complainants bare allegations, that respondent used his judicial position
to influence the proceedings before the trial court or the outcome of the case. Likewise, respondent Judges
presence in the office of the prosecutor, by itself, is not sufficient evidence to conclude that he exercised
any influence or pressure on the public prosecutor.
However, in writing to the administrative officials of the DMMMSU-SLUC, respondent judge
obviously sought to influence or put pressure on them with regard to the actions to be taken against the
four professors. His wife could have written the letter herself, as she is the complainant in the criminal
cases against the four professors. Instead, it was respondent judge who did, and he even used and stated
his judicial position in his letter, thereby insinuating that it should not be ignored or trifled with. It cannot
be gainsaid that respondent Judge is aware that his judicial position alone could exert influence or authority
over the university officials, and he took advantage of such authority.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as
a private individual. x x x. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary must behave with propriety at all times. (Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.,
199 SCRA 75, 83 [1991]) [O]ne who occupies a position of such grave responsibility in the administration
of justice must conduct himself in a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office. A judge's private as
well as official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond
reproach. (Dysico v. Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275, 283 [1996]). In the case at hand, the respondent judge has
failed to conduct himself in the manner prescribed by the provisions of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which Canon 2 directs the avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities. (Arcenio v. Pagorogon, 224 SCRA 247, 255 [1993]) [9]
WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge Joven F.
Costales of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City (Branch 45) is REPRIMANDED with warning that a
repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
VICTORIANO B. CARUAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE VLADIMIR B. BRUSOLA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Legazpi City, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On August 14, 1996, complainant Victoriano Carual filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn
complaint[1] against respondent Judge Vladimir B. Brusola, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Legazpi City,
for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The
complaint alleged that complainant's son, Francisco Carual, was the owner of a parcel of land measuring
3,607 square meters located at Barangay Fatima, Tabaco, Albay; that Francisco Carual gave complainant a
special power of attorney to represent him in the civil action for quieting of title involving said lot; that
complainant discovered that the house of Andres Bo had encroached a portion of said lot; that complainant
sought the assistance of Atty. Julian Cargullo who wrote Andres Bo ordering him to remove his house from
the lot; that Andres Bo engaged the legal services of respondent judge who, on June 11, 1995, wrote Atty.
Cargullo stating that the lot in question had been sold to Crispin and Ursula Bo, landlord of Andres Bo;
that respondent judge's act amounted to private practice of law, in violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Complainant also suspected that all the pleadings filed by Andres Bo in the civil case pending
before RTC Branch 16, Tabaco, Albay involving said lot were prepared by respondent judge as the style of
writing showed that they were drafted by a lawyer or judge. Complainant further alleged that respondent
judge violated RA 3019 by being partial and giving undue favor to a private individual.
On October 21, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman referred the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator.[2]
On February 5, 1997, the Court required respondent judge to comment on the complaint.[3]
In his Comment[4] dated April 11, 1997, respondent judge denied the charges against him.He argued
that a public officer or employee may be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 when he causes
any undue injury or gives any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. He said that he could not have given any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to either complainant or Andres Bo in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions as they had no pending case before his sala. Furthermore, he stated that since the civil case filed
by complainant against Andres Bo was pending before Branch 16, RTC, Tabaco, Albay presided by Judge
Caesar Bordeos and since the lot in question was outside his territorial jurisdiction, it was impossible for
him to favor a party in the performance of his official, administrative or judicial function.
Respondent judge likewise denied the charge of violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.He said that
Andres Bo did not approach him for legal assistance as he had his own counsel, Atty. Levi M. Ramirez. He
explained that he wrote the letter to Atty. Cargullo dated June 11, 1995 not as counsel for a party but in the
concept of an owner since he was the administrator of the property in question. He stated that he has been
the administrator of the properties of the heirs of Victor Bocaya since 1976, long before his appointment to
the Judiciary. Respondent judge submitted that his "management of the properties entrusted to him by his
principal and attending to transferees of these properties when the same is or are claimed by other persons
are x x x plain and simple acts of ownership and possession of any property owner."
Complainant filed a reply to respondent's comment on December 29, 1997. He reiterated his allegation
that respondent judge has been engaging in private practice of law by preparing pleadings in connection
with the cases involving the properties under his administration.[5]
On August 3, 1998, the Court referred the complaint to the Court of Appeals for investigation, report
and recommendation.[6] The case was assigned to Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
Justice Velasco conducted a hearing on May 7, 1999. He limited the investigation to the factual issue
of whether respondent judge is engaging or has engaged in private practice of law.
The complainant presented two witnesses: complainant himself and Rodolfo Buban. The respondent,
on the other hand, presented three witnesses: respondent himself, Judge Cesar Bordeos and Atty. Levi
Ramirez. Justice Velasco summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
"Complainant Victoriano Carual adopted his 'Sinumpaang Habla' dated August 14, 1996 as his direct
testimony, to wit: that he was given a Special Power of Attorney by his son, Francisco Bueno Carual, to
institute appropriate action involving a parcel of land located in Barangay Fatima, Tabaco, Albay, which
the latter owned; that the case was originally assigned to Judge Bordeos and later transferred to Judge
Cabredo in exchange for a criminal case from which the latter inhibited himself, (Ibid., pp. 37-42); that a
certain Andres Bo constructed a house on said land seven or eight years ago; that Victoriano Carual caused
said land to be surveyed and as a result thereof, it was shown that Andres Bo's house was actually
encroaching on Francisco Bueno Carual's land; that he consulted a lawyer, Atty. Julian C. Cargullo, who in
turn, wrote a letter to Andres Bo telling him to vacate the premises and that the latter would even be
provided with money to assist him in his transfer; that Andres Bo consulted Judge Vladimir B. Brusola of
Branch 6, City Court of Legazpi, Albay and the latter wrote a letter to Atty. Cargullo on June 11, 1995 and,
that the acts of Judge Brusola constituted a violation of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act) and Code of Judicial [Conduct] (Exh. 'B'; Rollo, pp. 2-3) This 'Sinumpaang Habla' was prepared in the
Office of the Ombudsman and complainant Carual was not assisted by Atty. Cargullo for reasons the latter
did not disclose. (TSN, May 7, 1999, pp. 31-32)
"Upon cross-examination of complainant Carual, it was established that the letter of Judge Brusola dated
June 11, 1995 preceded the institution of the complaint against Andres Bo. (Ibid., pp. 49-51) Carual also
admitted that he did not see who prepared the pleadings but he can see that they were made by an
intelligent person. Andres Bo could not have prepared the pleadings because he was neither educated nor
knowledgeable. (Ibid., p. 53) As to which specific documents were similar or were prepared by one person,
complainant Carual was referring to the letter of Judge Brusola dated June 11, 1995 and the Answer of
Andres Bo in the civil case.(Ibid., p. 56)
"Rodolfo Buban, complainant's witness, testified that respondent Judge Brusola was involved in a case
involving a parcel of land described as Lot 1656. A certain Araceli Bocaya Centeno was claiming ownership
over the same. Hence, a case was instituted to settle the dispute and the contending parties therein were
Domingo Buban, witness' father, Cecilia Centeno and Ursula Bo. In 1974, respondent Judge Brusola
represented Cecilia Centeno on said case. Presently, witness Rodolfo Buban is in possession of the land in
dispute. However, he claims that his possession was threatened by Judge Brusola by virtue of a letter
written by him on November 27, 1995. (Ibid., pp. 60-69) In this letter, Judge Brusola, as administrator,
advised Leoncio Buenconsenjo, Barangay Captain of San Roque, Tabaco, Albay, that the witness, Rodolfo
Buban, who was ejected from Lot 2367, is encouraging people to occupy Lot 1656 for a certain consideration
or price. (Exh. 'F'; Rollo, p. 95)
"On cross-examination, witness Rodolfo Buban testified that the case involving Lot 1656 was instituted in
1974; that a certain Vladimir Brusola, then practicing lawyer, represented the Centenos and the Bos in said
case; that a decision on said case was rendered in 1989 and the same was appealed to the Court of Appeals;
that respondent Brusola was not yet a judge in 1989 when the case was decided; that when respondent
Judge Brusola was appointed as a judge, another lawyer in the name of Aurora Benamira Parcia took over
the case; and that nothing in the letter dated November 27, 1995 would show that Judge Brusola was doing
any act of lawyering to the opponents of witness' father. (TSN, May 7, 1999, pp. 73-76) For the record, Judge
Brusola was appointed as a judge on March 23, 1990 and took his oath on April 2, 1990.(Ibid., pp. 74-75)
With respect to Lot No. 2367, witness Rodolfo Buban admitted that his wife owned a house thereon and
said house was caused to be demolished by Celia Bocaya Centeno, the former client of Judge Brusola. (Ibid.,
pp. 78-81)
"On re-direct examination, witness Buban testified that when the letter dated November 27, 1995 was
written, respondent Judge Brusola was already a judge and he represented himself as an administrator
when he was already occupying said position. (Ibid., pp. 81-82)
"For his defense, private respondent Judge Brusola presented Judge Cesar A. Bordeos, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16, and Atty. Levi Ramirez, counsel of Andres Bo, as
witnesses.
"Judge Cesar Bordeos adopted the Affidavit he executed on February 23, 1999 as his direct testimony which
stated that he is the judge of the court where Civil Case No. T-1815 is pending which is entitled 'Francisco
Carual vs. Andres Bo, et al.' for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession, Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and Damages; that the counsel of record for the defendant is Atty. Levi Ramirez; that he
personally knows Judge Brusola; and, that Judge Brusola did not approach him or talk to him about Civil
Case No. T-1815 nor any other case and that he (Judge Brusola) does not meddle in any of the cases pending
before him (Judge Bordeos). (Exh. '1'; Rollo, p. 130)
"On cross-examination, Judge Bordeos declared that he was already presiding judge in Civil Case No. T-
1815 when the 'Answer' was filed by Andres Bo. According to Judge Bordeos' testimony, upon finding out
that Andres Bo had no lawyer, he instructed his staff to get in touch with Andres Bo for him to hire one. In
his testimony, it was also noted that after the "Answer" was filed, several other pleadings were submitted
by Andres Bo, all of which were signed by Mr. Bo without the assistance of a lawyer. However, the filing
of the pleadings was a prerogative of Andres Bo which the court could not refuse. The witness later issued
an order to the defendant ordering him to submit pleadings signed by a lawyer, otherwise, he will be held
in contempt. (TSN, May 7, 1999, pp. 105-112) As to the highly technical contents of the pleadings, Judge
Bordeos testified that he did not know Andres Bo personally so he could not tell whether the pleadings
were prepared by him or another person. (Ibid., pp. 114-117)
"Respondent's second witness, Atty. Levi M. Ramirez also adopted his Affidavit executed on March 18,
1999 as part of his direct testimony. Said affidavit stated that he is the counsel of record for defendants
Andres Bo, et al. in Civil Case No. T-1815; that the pleadings filed by the defendants in said case were all
prepared or caused to be prepared by him as counsel for the defendants and no other; and, that he
personally knows Judge Brusola and that the latter did not interfere in the preparation or filing of any of
the pleadings and in the manner the case should be handled. (Exh. '2'; Records, p. 131)
"Atty. Ramirez also testified that he prepared the 'Answer' and the 'Comment on Plaintiff's Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents,' both of which were filed and signed by Andres Bo. He prepared
these pleadings without anybody's assistance, except that he elicited information from Mr. Bo. (TSN, May
7, 1999, pp. 121-125) He stated that he entered his formal appearance on December 4, 1996 as counsel of
Andres Bo only after the latter was able to make partial payments. Since the case was filed in Legazpi City
and considering the distance from Tabaco to Legazpi City, he needed such partial payment to ensure that
he would have money for his gasoline and initial appearance. Regarding the Answer filed by Andres Bo,
Atty. Ramirez said that the former asked him to file the Answer, otherwise, he would be declared in
default.This is the reason Atty. Ramirez accommodated Andres Bo. In the meantime, Andres Bo promised
Atty. Ramirez that he would make the partial payments and the latter told him that only after payment
will he formally enter his appearance as counsel. Atty. Ramirez personally knows Judge Brusola and has
two or three cases before his sala. Andres and Ursula Bo told him that Judge Brusola is the administrator
of the properties when he was still a practicing lawyer.
"On cross-examination, Atty. Ramirez reiterated that he was the one who prepared the pleadings signed
by Andres Bo. Moreover, he stated that he never talked to Judge Brusola regarding the case from the time
Ursula Bo went to his office up to the time he entered his appearance. The only occasion that he and Judge
Brusola discussed the case was when the latter informed him that an administrative case was filed against
him (Judge Brusola) regarding the preparation of the pleadings filed by Andres Bo. In response, Atty.
Ramirez told Judge Brusola that he would be willing to testify that he was the one who prepared all the
pleadings. (Ibid., pp. 142-143)
"Judge Brusola also submitted himself as his own witness and adopted his Affidavit executed on March 17,
1999 and his Comment to the Supreme Court as his direct testimony. He stated therein that he is the
presiding judge of Regional Trial Court Branch 6, Legazpi City and the respondent in his administrative
case; that neither Victoriano Carual nor Andres Bo has any case pending before his sala and he did not
cause undue injury or gave unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to either of these two individuals
in the discharge of his official functions; that the case between complainant Carual and Andres Bo is
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16 where Judge Cezar Bordeos is the
presiding judge; that he confirmed that he did not interfere in the preparation and filing of the pleadings
in Civil Case No. T-1815 nor did he render any legal assistance to any of the defendants therein, his interest
being limited to his being an administrator of the property subject of said case. (Exh. '3'; Rollo, pp. 132-133)
"On cross-examination, Judge Brusola admitted that he was engaged in the practice prior to his
appointment as a judge. As regards the administration of Bo's property, he did not find it necessary for him
to withdraw as administrator because this is not required by law. Besides, it does not conflict with his duties
and functions and the property is outside of his territorial jurisdiction. When he sent the letter to the
Barangay Captain referring regarding Lot 1656, he was acting as administrator of the lot, not as judge nor
a lawyer. Regarding Andres Bo's consultation with him, Judge Brusola explained that the former came to
him because Atty. Cargullo, then complainant Carual's counsel, was asking for documents which were in
his possession. He believed that it was within his prerogative as administrator of the property to contest
any claim against the property being administered by him. Lastly, Judge Brusola clarified that while
complainant Carual questions his involvement in the preparation of the pleadings filed in Civil Case No.
T-1815, the fact remains that the latter did not see him prepare any of those pleadings. (TSN, May 7, 1999,
pp. 149-150)[7]
After the hearing, complainant and respondent filed their respective memoranda.
After a thorough examination and evaluation of the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted
by the parties, we find that respondent judge violated Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
enjoins members of the bench to regulate their extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with
their judicial duties.
In his Comment to the administrative complaint, as well as in his testimony before the investigating
Justice of the Court of Appeals, respondent judge admitted that he has been the administrator of the
properties of the heirs of Victor Bocaya since 1976 and he did not resign from such position even after his
appointment to the judiciary on March 23, 1990. [8] This was affirmed by the testimony of Rodolfo Buban
that on November 27, 1995, respondent judge, signing as administrator, wrote the Barangay Captain of San
Roque, Tabaco, Albay to inform him that Buban had no right to lot 1656 of the Tabaco Cadastre. [9] This is a
clear violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides:
"Rule 5.06. A judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary,
except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the immediate family, and then only if such service
will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. "Members of immediate family" shall be
limited to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity. As a family fiduciary, a
judge shall not:
(1) serve in proceedings that might come before the court of said judge; or
(2) act as such contrary to Rules 5.02 to 5.05."
As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or
other fiduciary. The only exception is when the estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a member of his
immediate family, and only if his service as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will not
interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. The Code has defined who may be considered
as members of his immediate family and they are the spouse and relatives within the second degree of
consanguinity. It does not appear in this case that Victor Bocaya or his heirs are members of respondent
judge's immediate family.
We disagree with respondent's argument that the proscription refers only to judges acting as judicial
administrator. The Code does not qualify the prohibition. The intent of the rule is to limit a judge's
involvement in the affairs and interests of private individuals to minimize the risk of conflict with his
judicial duties and to allow him to devote his undivided attention to the performance of his official
functions. Judges have the duty to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. When a member
of the bench serves as administrator of the properties of private individuals, he runs the risk of losing his
neutrality and impartiality, especially when the interest of his principal conflicts with that of the litigant
who comes before his court.
We also find merit in complainant's contention that respondent's act of writing to Atty. Cargullo and
defending the right of Andres Bo to possess the lot in dispute amounts to private practice of law. The
letter[10] reads:
"June 11, 1995
"Atty. Julian C. Cargullo
Bishop Ariola Drive
Karanghan Blvd., Tabaco, Albay
"Dear July:
"This is in connection with your letter dated June 9, 1995 to Mr. Andres Bo of Fatima, Tabaco, Albay with
respect to his occupancy of lot no. 7 Tabaco Cadastre.
"Please be informed that Lot No. 7 was among those sold by Pantaleon Bueno and all his children to Victor
Bocaya before the Japanese war which was in turn sold by the heirs of Victor Bocaya to the spouses Crispin
Bo and Ursula Bo, landlord of Andres Bo and who instituted Andres Bo as the riceland tenant of their
nearby lot 1656 and his house on lot no. 7 had been there since 1950. A copy of the document of sale is in
my possession as the administrator of all the properties of the heirs of Victor Bocaya at San Roque, Tabaco,
Albay. A copy of the sale was shown to Victoriano Carual during their confrontation at the office of the
barangay captain of Fatima, Tabaco, Albay last Wednesday June 7, 1995.
"I do hope this will clarify the matters. Mr. Victoriano Carual has no right whatsoever to lot no. 7 and his
documents if any could not have been secured if not by fraud. The truth is that Mr. Victoriano Carual has
never set foot on any portion of lot no. 7 yet even up to now. His documents are reminiscent of the late
'Flores documents and titles.'
"My best regards.
Very truly yours,
(sgd.)VLADIMIR B. BRUSOLA"
The tenor of the letter shows that respondent, as representative of Andres Bo, was defending the
latter's rights over the disputed property. Respondent's act of representing and defending the interest of a
private individual in the disputed property constitutes private practice of law. It has been ruled that "the
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court proceedings but also
includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, giving advice to clients or persons
needing the same, etc."[11]
Under Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, judges are prohibited from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. This is reiterated in Rule 5.07 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. As in Rule 5.06, this rule is also based on public policy because the rights, duties,
privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official
functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their
full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own
private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest.[12]
Respondent's pretext that he wrote the letter as administrator of the property is belied by the
records. It appears that the property in question was originally owned by a certain Pantaleon Bueno. Before
the Japanese War, Bueno sold the land to Victor Bocaya who was later succeeded by his heirs -- Cecilia
Centeno, Victoria Jocson and Antonio Bocaya. The property was later transferred to Crispin and Ursula Bo
who instituted Andres Bo as their tenant. On March 20, 1976, Cecilia Centeno appointed respondent judge
who was then a practicing lawyer as administrator of their properties.[13] It is therefore clear that at the time
respondent judge wrote to Atty. Cargullo, the land in dispute was no longer under his administration as
ownership thereof had already been transferred by the heirs to the Bo spouses. The terms of the General
Power of Attorney provide that respondent's office as administrator shall extend only over authority to
interfere in the dispute between complainant and Andres Bo unless he did act as counsel and representative
of Andres Bo.
Nonetheless, it has not been proved that respondent judge has regularly engaged in private
practice. Although complainant suspects that it was respondent who prepared the pleadings filed by
Andres Bo and Ursula Bo in connection with the civil case for quieting of title pending before the RTC of
Tabaco, Albay, such suspicion has remained a suspicion and was not proven to be a fact. There is no direct
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to show that respondent judge prepared said
pleadings. Complainant admitted during the hearing that he did not see who prepared the pleadings and
he merely presumed based on their content and appearance that they were prepared by an intelligent
person.[14] Neither did he present any witness to testify that respondent judge authored these
pleadings. Complainant's documentary evidence consists of respondent's letter to Atty. Cargullo dated
June 11, 1995,[15] respondent's letter to Mr. Leoncio Buenconsejo dated November 27, 1995, [16] Answer
signed by Andres Bo and filed in relation to the civil case, [17] and Comment on Plaintiff's Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents[18] also signed by Andres Bo and filed in relation to the civil
case. Although it appears that these documents were written by one who has knowledge and training in
the law, they do not conclusively show that it was respondent judge who prepared them. These documents
do not show any distinctive style of writing peculiar to respondent judge. Even the similarity in the type
of print used in these documents do not prove complainant's allegation for it is of judicial notice that
computers do produce the same types of print.
As regards the charge of violation of RA 3019, the records show that complainant did not adduce any
evidence to show that respondent judge has been partial to a party or has given any unwarranted benefit
or favor to a party in the exercise of his judicial functions.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) is hereby imposed upon
respondent judge for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, with warning that the commission of
similar or other offenses shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent judge is further ordered to cease
from serving as administrator of the properties of private individuals except those allowed by the Code.
SO ORDERED.
NELIA A. ZIGA, complainant, vs. JUDGE RAMON A. AREJOLA, respondent.

DECISION
This is a complaint filed by Nelia A. Ziga against Judge Ramon A. Arejola of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), Daet, Camarines Norte, for appearing as counsel in a land registration case without permission
from the Supreme Court and asking for attorneys fees for his legal services.
Nelia Arejola-Ziga and Judge Ramon Arejola are two of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola. By virtue of
inheritance, they and eight others became owners in fee simple of a 19,664 sq. m. land in Calauag, Naga
City owned by Fabiana. On January 23, 1995, while respondent was employed as an attorney in the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO) of Naga City, he filed in behalf of his co-heirs, an application for registration of title
of the lot, docketed as Land Registration Case No. 95-142.[1]
In its decision dated October 25, 1996, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City, granted the
petition and ordered the imperfect title of the heirs to the property confirmed and registered in the name
of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola, flee from liens and encumbrances of any kind whatsoever. [2] Subsequently,
a substantial portion of the lot, or 17,894 sq. m., has been agreed to be sold in favor of the City of Naga, as
evidenced by a Deed of Conditional Sale.[3] The remaining portion of 1,770 sq. m. is subject of a dispute
between the heirs of Fabiana Arejola and Josefina Vda. De Segarra. [4]
On June 9, 1997, respondent was appointed judge of the MTC of Daet, Camarines Norte. He took his
oath on August 1, 1997.
Despite his appointment, respondent Judge continued to appear in the land registration case. On
October 31, 1997, he was requested by the court hearing the land registration case to submit his written
authority from the Supreme Court to appear as counsel in the said case.[5] This order was reiterated on June
15, 1998.[6]
On April 6, 1998, respondent Judge wrote the City Mayor of Naga City, insisting (1) that the amounts
due under the contract of sale of the property of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola should be paid by individual
checks drawn out in equal proportionate amounts in favor of each heir, and (2) that his claim for contingent
attorneys fees and agents fees be segregated and paid to him in an amount equivalent to 30% of the gross
selling price before any payment is made to the heirs. He further added that unless his demands are met,
no contract for the absolute sale of the property would be finalized.[7]
In the present complaint, Nelia Arejola Ziga alleges that respondent should be disciplined for
appearing before a court as counsel without securing the permission of the Supreme Court and for asking
contingent attorneys fees and agents commission amounting to 30% of the gross selling price of the
property subject of the land registration case.
In his Comment dated August 24, 1998, respondent argues: He does not need to ask permission from
the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) or from the Supreme Court since he has every right to appear before the
lower court as co-heir. According to him, he has been appearing in the land registration case as
representative of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola and not as counsel. Respondent explained that being one of
the heirs of the late Fabiana Arejola, he is a party-litigant and therefore a party-in-interest in the land
registration case. He filed the application for the confirmation of land title in his own behalf and in
representation of his co-heirs. Hence, he had every right to appear and prosecute the case. The permission
of the PAO was not required. Respondent further explains that since he alone actively participated in the
case, he has every right to demand contribution from the other heirs who benefited from his work, to be
taken from the proceeds of the sale of the property. He believes that this case was filed to harass him
because of the misspelled name of the complainant in the RTC decision on the registration of land title. [8] He
further claims that complainant is shown to have a disturbed mind and to be suffering from manic
depression.[9]
Pursuant to the Courts Resolution on June 30, 1999, the complainant and respondent manifested their
willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings. [10]
On October 2, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Daet, Camarines Norte, for investigation, report and recommendation.
On August 13, 2001, Executive Judge Jose G. Dy submitted his report recommending that respondent
be warned for using intemperate and unkind language towards complainant. Anent the alleged
unauthorized practice of law, Executive Judge Dy opines that the same is without any basis. He finds that
since the complainant did not question the act before the Department of Justice where PAO is a line agency,
and considering that the RTC trying the case did not insist on the inhibition of respondent, the actions of
the latter in appearing on his own behalf and that of his co-heirs in the land registration case is not
malicious.
After the investigation report of Executive Judge Dy was noted, the Court, in a Resolution dated May
29, 2002, referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In its Memorandum dated August 20, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) disagreed
with the findings of the Executive Judge and recommended that respondent judge be found guilty of
violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly be suspended for a period of three months without
pay.
The report of OCA reads:
We do not agree with the findings and recommendation of the investigating judge. It must be pointed out
that Judge Dy arrived at his findings and recommendation on the basis only of the records at hand. He did
not conduct any investigation but merely evaluated the pleadings and evidence submitted by the parties.
Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically provides that: No judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as
a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. Further, Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states that: A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law.
....
Contrary to the findings of the investigating judge, the facts of this case clearly show that respondent Judge
Arejola violated the foregoing rules prohibiting judges from engaging in private law practice.
Records disclose that respondent was appointed to the Judiciary on 9 June 1997. He assumed office on 1
August 1997. Yet, he still submitted, on 9 June 1998, a Motion for Reconsideration dated 5 June 1998 of an
Order of the court in subject land registration case. Again, on 28 July 1998, Judge Arejola filed a
Manifestation dated 24 July 1998 in the aforesaid case. Further, he appeared as counsel in the hearing
conducted on 12 August 1998. All this he did without the required permit from the Supreme Court and
despite having been required, in at least two (2) occasions, by then Judge Ernesto A. Miguel, RTC, Br. 23,
Naga City, before whom the case was pending, to secure the necessary permission to appear as counsel.
No less than respondent himself admitted in his comment that he indeed appeared as counsel in the land
registration case but sought to justify his act by alleging that he did so to protect his rights as one of the
heirs to the disputed land. He went as far as saying that as such, he need not request permission from the
Supreme Court and that it was incorrect for Judge Miguel to require him to secure a permit to appear as
counsel.
Time and again, the Court has imposed sanctions on judges who engage in the practice of law without first
securing a permit therefor. In the case of Judge Arejola, his offense is aggravated by the fact that he
stubbornly continued to appear as counsel in the land registration case despite having been twice required
by the court to first apply for permission to do so.
Under Sec. 22, Rule XIV of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the offense of engaging in the private
practice of a civil servants profession without the necessary authorization is punishable by suspension for
six (6) months to one (1) year, for the first offense.
Also, under Sec. 3, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are serious
offenses which, under Sec. 10 of the said Rule, are punishable by, among others, suspension for three (3) to
six (6) months without salary and benefits.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned most respectfully recommends that Judge Ramon A. Arejola,
MTC, Daet, Camarines Norte, be FOUND GUILTY of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and
accordingly SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months without pay.
The findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator are on the main well
taken except for the recommended penalty.
First. As the OCA correctly observed, no hearing was conducted by the Executive Judge when the
instant case was referred to him for investigation, report and recommendation. However, we find that the
requirements of due process have been met. Due process does not mean or require a hearing, but simply
an opportunity or right to be heard. A trial-type hearing is not always de rigueur in administrative
proceedings.[11] One may be heard not solely through oral presentation but also, and perhaps many times
more creditably and practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings, [12] for as long as the element of
fairness is not ignored.[13] In this case, respondent was afforded ample opportunity to be heard.
Based on the records of this case, he filed his comment to the complaint filed against him and he filed
a manifestation stating that he is willing to submit the instant case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed. In his comment, he justified his claim for payment from his co-heirs for his fruitful work.
That what he was asking is attorneys fees can be clearly gleaned from the Notice of Attorneys Lien,[14] dated
March 31, 1997, which he filed before the court hearing the land registration case, wherein he admitted to
being the attorney of the applicants and their lawful representative.[15] Although the notice was filed before
he was appointed municipal trial judge, he continued his practice of law after his appointment without
prior permission from this Court. In his letter, dated April 6, 1998, respondent Judge insisted on his claim
for attorneys fees.[16]
Also, respondent failed to refute the documents submitted by complainant stating that he signed as
counsel for the heirs.[17] Against these documentary evidence, the defense of respondent, that he merely
participated in the land registration case as a party-litigant and a co-heir, fails.
Second. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court
proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, giving
advice to clients or persons needing the same,[18]the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by
which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings. [19]
Based on the records of the instant case, the practice of law exercised by the respondent from the time
he was appointed MTC Judge on June 9, 1997 and took his oath on August 1, 1997 can be enumerated thus:
1. October 21, 1997 - Respondent signed an answer to the petition for relief from judgment filed
by Josefina De Segarra.[20]
2. October 31, 1997 - Respondent appeared for the applicants in the land registration case. He was
ordered by RTC Judge Ernesto Miguel to file his written authority
from the Supreme Court to appear as counsel in the said case. [21]
3. April 6, 1998 - Respondent wrote a letter to Naga City Mayor Jesse Robredo, asking for the
issuance of individual checks to the heirs of Fabiana Arejola, and
insisting on his claim for attorneys fees.[22]
4.June 5, 1998 - Respondent filed a motion to reconsider the order of the RTC directing the
suspension of the registration of the certificate of title in view of the
filing by an oppositor of a petition for relief from judgment.[23]
5.June 15, 1998 Respondent appeared in the land registration case, filing the motion for
reconsideration.[24]
6. July 1, 1998 Respondent requested permission from the Supreme Court, through the Court
Administrator, to appear as counsel in the Land Registration Case No.
95-142 in connection with the Petition for Relief from judgment filed
by an oppositor in said case.[25]
7. August 12, 1998 - Respondent appeared in the land registration case hearing on the petition for
relief from judgment and on his motion for reconsideration. [26]
8. January 25, 1999 Respondent wrote Naga City Mayor Sulpicio Roco, requesting that he be paid
partial advance payment of the balance on the sale of the lot. He also
admitted in his letter that he is the counsel of the heirs of Fabiana
Arejola in the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Petition for Relief from
Judgment filed by Josefina Segarra.[27]
9. February 8, 1999 Respondent signed as authorized representative and as counsel of the heirs
of Fabiana Arejola in a partial compromise agreement with the
oppositor, Josefina Cedo Vda. De Segarra, and the City of Naga. [28]
10. May 20, 1999 Respondent appeared in the land registration case, agreeing to submit pre-trial
brief in support of the motion to treat the petition for relief from
judgment as an ordinary action for reconveyance. He was ordered by
the court, through RTC Judge Corazon Tordilla, to submit his permit
to appear as counsel in the case.[29]
11. July 27, 1999 - He signed a pre-trial brief for the heirs of Fabiana Arejola.[30]
12.October 19, 1999 - RTC Judge Corazon Tordilla ordered respondent disqualified from
appearing in the land registration case in view of the latters failure to
submit to the court a permit to appear as counsel. All pleadings
submitted by him were not acted upon by the said court by reason of
such disqualification.[31]
His rationalization that he represented the heirs as a co-heir and not as counsel is hair-splitting. The
respondents act of writing pleadings and defending the rights of his co-heirs amounts to private practice
of law. The tenor of the letters and pleadings, taken with his acts of appearing, representing and defending
the rights of the heirs over the property, show that respondent, as representative of the heirs, was defending
the latters rights over the disputed property, and these constituted private practice of law.
It should be clarified that prohibited private practice of a profession is more than an isolated court
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.[32] It is evident that the instances when
respondent appeared and represented his co-heirs are not isolated, thus, constituting the private practice
of the law profession as contemplated by law.
Under Rule 138, Section 35 of the Revised Rules of Court, judges are prohibited from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. This is reiterated in Canon 5 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which enjoins members of the bench to regulate their extra-judicial activities to minimize
the risk of conflict with their judicial duties. Rule 5.07 of the Code in particular states:
A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless prohibited by the Constitution or law, a
judge may engage in the practice of any other profession provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with judicial functions.
These provisions are based on public policy for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges
and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official functions,
duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time
and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private
interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives
are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. [33]
Third. Respondent failed to obtain a written permission to appear as counsel in the land registration
case from the head of the Department, which is this Court, as required by Rule XVIII, Section 12 of the
Revised Civil Service Rules,[34] thus:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of
those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission
is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or
apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer
of the board of directors. (Emphasis ours)
As a Civil Service employee, he cannot engage in private practice without the written permission from
this Court. The public expects him to devote full time to his judicial work. As a general rule, the
appointment or election of an attorney to a government office disqualifies him from engaging in the private
practice of law. The reason for the disqualification is that a public office is a public trust, and a public officer
or employee is obliged not only to perform his duties with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency but also with exclusive fidelity. The disqualification is intended to preserve the
public trust in a public office, avoid conflict of interests or a possibility thereof, assure the people of
impartiality in the performance of public functions and thereby promote the public welfare. [35]
Also, Section 7 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A.
No. 6713) prohibits a public officer from undertaking certain business transactions or doing certain acts
which may compromise his position as a public official. This provision applies to judges. The said section
reads in part:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
(a). . . .
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
....
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or by law,
Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;. . .
There is no dispute that when respondent agreed to file the complaint in behalf of the heirs of Fabiana
Arejola, he was not yet a member of the judiciary. He was a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) in
Naga City. He claimed that he was authorized to engage in practice in behalf of his relatives but presented
no documentary authority.The Court takes judicial notice of PAO Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of
1998, amending Sec. 5, Art. II of the Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1997. It states thus:
Sec. 5-A. Other Persons Qualified for Assistance. -Immediate members of the family and relatives within the
4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of PAO lawyers may avail of his services regardless of
qualification under the indigency test, with the approval of the Regional Director, if the case is within his
region or the Chief Public Attorney, if the case is outside of his region and provided further that the lawyer
files a leave of absence on the day of the hearing.
Hence, while PAO lawyers may represent their family and relatives, they are required to get the
approval of either the Regional Director or the Chief Public Attorney. However, considering that
respondent filed the application for registration of title in behalf of his co-heirs in 1995 before he was
appointed to the Bench, said circular does not apply to him. Despite this, respondent is not exculpated from
liability.
While respondent insists that he performed the alleged acts of private practice before he joined the
judiciary, he failed to mention that even after he assumed office as a municipal judge on August 1, 1997, he
continued to act as counsel for the heirs.
Respondent was twice required by the RTC judge presiding over the land registration case [36] to
submit his written authority from the Supreme Court to appear as counsel, to which he did not comply.
On July 1, 1998, respondent requested the Court Administrator for authority to appear as counsel of
his co-heirs, in LRC Case No. 95-142.[37] On July 15, 1998, he was required by then Court Administrator
Alfredo Benipayo to furnish the Court with copy of the pleadings he filed, and to state the date of filing of
each, the stage of the proceedings and the background of the case. [38] Unfortunately, however, he did not
comply.
The fact that respondent made a request for authority to appear as counsel in the said case is an
admission not only that he was appearing as counsel but also that he was aware that he needed the
permission of this Court to do so.
The Court always emphasizes the importance of the role played by judges in the judicial system, thus:
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon
the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice. At
times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create
confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the
people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest
integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then
can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus
creating confidence in the judicial system.[39]
Under Section 9 (3) of the amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, which took effect on October 1,
2001, an unauthorized practice of law of a judge constitutes a less serious charge. Under Section 11, if a
judge is guilty of a less serious charge, he may be imposed either (a) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or (b) a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
The OCA recommended that respondent should be suspended for a period of 3 months without pay.
Considering that Rule 140 as amended took effect only in 2001 and this is respondents first offense [40], in
lieu of suspension, we find the imposition of fine amounting to P10,000.00, just and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ramon A. Arejola of the Municipal Trial Court, Daet, Camarines
Norte LIABLE for illegal practice of law, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Revised Rules of
Court, the Revised Civil Service Rules, and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. He is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts or omissions will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, complainant, vs. JUDGE RAMON B. REYES, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is an administrative complaint for malfeasance brought by the National Bureau of Investigation
against respondent Ramon B. Reyes, Presiding Judge of Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Mabini-
Tingloy, Batangas.
The facts are: Xlaw
On the evening of November 12, 1996, barangay officials of Barangay Majuben, Mabini, Batangas, arrested
Reynaldo Magday, Melvin Dalangin, Rex Cordero and primo Evangelista, who were caught using
methamphetamine chloride, popularly known as shabu, during a drug session. The four (4) were detained
a t the local police station and were charged of violating Section 16, in relation to Section 27, of Article III
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The corresponding
information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1817, was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Mabini-Tingloy, Batangas, presided over by respondent Judge Ramon B. Reyes.
On November 20, 1996, Nenita Dalangin, Marina Cordero and Nelia Evangelista, the mothers of the last
three (3) accused, approached respondent to plead for the release of their sons. For the sum of P240,000.00,
respondent allegedly promised to dismiss the case against all the accused. Since the mothers did not have
sufficient means, the amount was eventually lowered to P15,000.00, and the pay-off was scheduled on
November 28, 1996. However, respondent failed to report for work on the aforesaid date, so the exchange
was reset a week later to December 5, 1996. Xsc
Three (3) days before the pay-off, on December 2, 1996, Dalangin, Cordero and Evangelista reported the
alleged extortion to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at its Regional Office in Batangas City. After
the mothers executed separate sworn statements,[1] the NBI planned an entrapment. To accomplish this, it
prepared the amount of P3,000.00 consisting of two five-hundred peso bills and twenty onehundred peso
bills. These bills were individually marked "P-96-187, ATP/NMC, 12/3/96, FCD, NBI" using invisible ink
and dusted with yellow fluorescent powder.[2] The NBI also enlisted the services of Intelligence Agent
Josephine Cabardo to accompany the mothers to respondents office, and who posed as the lender of the
money.
On the appointed date, Dalangin, Cordero and Evangelista, together with Cabardo appeared at
respondents chambers. He gave Evangelista a piece of yellow pad paper on which to write a motion for
reconsideration to be filed with the Regional Trial Court. [3] Dalangin, on the other hand, on instruction of
respondent, entered the adjoining latrine and placed the envelope containing the marked money on top of
a rag mop placed above the latrine.[4] On re-entering the room, respondent told the women to leave the
room on the pretext that he was feeling a little warm. The women exited, and a few moments later, after a
pre-arranged signal was given, the NBI operatives entered respondents chambers. Sc
A slight complication developed, however. The agents were unable to locate the envelope. Ultraviolet
testing on respondents hands conducted by a forensic chemist yielded a negative result, although the rag
mop handle showed traces of the yellow fluorescent powder. Since the agents were not armed with a search
warrant, they instead asked respondent to accompany them to the regional office. During the questioning,
respondent confessed that he had taken the envelope containing the marked money using a handkerchief
and placed it inside his desk. Respondent returned to his office with the agents and opened the uppermost
left-hand drawer of his table where the envelope was found. When tested with ultraviolet light, the money
inside the envelope was found to be that previously marked and dusted by the NBI.
On December 9, 1996 an Information[5] was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondent for
violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Scmis
On January 20, 1997, the NBI referred the matter to us for appropriate action, via a letter[6] coursed through
the Office of the Court Administrator. Prior thereto, on January 9, 1997, respondent filed a letter [7] resigning
from his position, citing health reasons. He filed another letter dated January 15, 1997 [8] requesting that he
be allowed to work at the Judiciary Planning Development and Implementation Office (JPDIO) pending
action on his resignation and until his health improves. In due time, the Office of the Court Administrator
sent a letter dated February 7, 1997[9] to respondent directing him to submit his comment on the report filed
by complainant. Respondent complied, filing a letter dated February 17, 1997 [10] whereby he alleged that
he was not accorded his rights during custodial investigation under Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 7438. [11]
Thereafter, we issued a Resolution dated April 28, 1997 [12] referring the administrative complaint to
Executive Judge Mario Lopez of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City for investigation, report and
recommendation, and further directing him to designate an Acting Presiding Judge in the MCTC of Mabini-
Tingloy. In the meantime, we suspended respondent from his office and withheld action on his resignation
and request to be detailed at the JPDIO. He subsequently withdrew his resignation, [13]which was duly
noted per our Resolution of July 7, 1997. However, after Judge Lopez inhibited himself from the
proceedings, citing close personal ties to respondent,[14] we referred the matter to former Associate Justice
Pedro A. Ramirez of the Court of Appeals for investigation and report. [15]
After reception of the parties respective evidence, the Investigating Justice rendered his Report dated
August 12, 1998. The Investigating Justice disbelieved respondents defense and ruled accordingly: Missc
"Respondent Judge never denied that the money that was placed by Nenita Dalangin on
the floor mop atop the toilet bowl was the same money that was taken by him from the
drawer of his table in his chamber and was handed by him to the NBI agents. Neither did
he explain how the money happened to be in the drawer of his table in his chamber. It is
clear, however, that it was respondent Judge himself who took the money from his table
drawer and handed it over to the NBI agents. Indeed, the bribe money was in his
possession when he gave it up to the NBI agents. Having been in possession of the bribe
money that was given to him, there can no longer be any question as to his receipt of it. By
analogy the presumption in the rule of evidence "that a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act
x x x" (Section 3-k, Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court), is applicable against him. There can
be no question any more that respondent Judge is a bribe taker in this case." [16]
Consistent with his findings, he recommended that respondent be dismissed from service with forfeiture
of benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government including government-owned or
controlled corporations. He also recommended respondents disbarment. Misspped
In view of the aforesaid recommendation, we issued a Resolution on April 20, 1999 requiring respondent
to show cause why he should not be disbarred. He failed to comply within the period allowed him. Thus,
in our Resolution of September 14, 1999, we imposed upon him a fine of P2,000.00 payable within five (5)
days from notice, or imprisonment for five (5) days should he fail to pay the fine on time.
On October 1, 1999, respondent filed his "Compliance /Motion for Reconsideration," wherein he reiterated
the alleged infringement of his rights during custodial investigation, as guaranteed by the Constitution and
R.A. No. 7438. In addition, he averred that the private complainants were guilty of instigation. The
compliance/motion was duly noted but the motion for reconsideration was denied. [17]
Respondents account of the entrapment differs. In his counter-affidavit filed before the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, and which the parties agreed would constitute respondents direct examination, [18] he claimed:
"3. On or about November 20, 1996, three (3) women, who turned out to be Nenita
Dalangin, Nenita Evangelista and Marina Cordero, the mothers of the Accused in the
above case, asked to talk to me. Considering that Nelia Evangelista was an acquaintance, I
agreed to talk with the women in my chambers. Inside my chambers is a toilet which I and
the personnel of the Court and even lawyers and private individuals use. The door to my
chambers could be seen from the outside through open jalusie [sic] smoked glass windows
on the walls dividing my chambers and the area outside my chambers;
"4. The three (3) women pleaded to me that I dismiss the criminal complaint against their
sons. However, I told the women that I cannot accede to their request. I suggested that
they secure the services of counsel to represent their sons in connection with their case and
have their children post bail. When the women asked me how much was the bail for their
children, I told the amount as provided for in the guidelines issued by the department of
Justice. I never suggested to the women, and neither did I ever demand, that they give me
any amount in consideration for the dismissal for [sic] the criminal complaint against their
sons; Spped
"5. On November 27, 1996, I signed a 1st Indorsement to the Provincial Prosecutor, hereto
attached as Exhibit "2", endorsing the case to the latter and transmitting the records of said
case, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. On November 28, 1996, my
Clerk of Court transmitted the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor with a
covering letter, hereto attached as Exhibit "3";
"6. On November 27, 1996 in the morning, the three (3) women saw me in my chambers
and pleaded anew that I dismiss the criminal complaint against the children. However, I
told the women that I cannot accede to their pleas. I told them I had already signed earlier
that day an endorsement of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor and the transmittal of the
records against their sons to the Provincial Prosecutor. I suggested that they wait for the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor and for them to make
their representations with the Provincial Prosecutor in connection with said case. The three
(3) women never made any offer on said occasion to give me money in consideration for
the dismissal of the criminal complaint against their sons. Neither did they tell me that
they were coming back in the afternoon of said date to any reasons whatsoever. I never
could have agreed to dismiss the case against the sons of the three (3) women and to receive
money from the latter in consideration of said demand because I already decided to
endorse the case to the Provincial Prosecutor; Jospped
"7. On December 5, 1996, in the morning, the three women with another woman, arrived
in my chambers and again pleaded that I intercede in behalf of their sons with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor. The woman, who was with the three (3) mothers of the
Accused, who was a complete stranger to me was not introduced to me. I considered it
odd and suspicious that the three (3) women would be accompanied by another woman
when, on the other two (2) occasions that they talked to me, they were not accompanied
by any other person at all. However, I told the women that I cannot intercede for them in
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. However, I suggested to them to make inquiries
from the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor about the case of their sons if the charges had
already been filed against them with the court, for them (the three women) to prepare
money for the bail bonds of their sons. I suggested also that they write a letter to the
Provincial Prosecutor requesting for his help for the release of their sons from detention
after posting bail with this Court. The three (3) women then told me that they had the
money for the bail of their children and Nenita Dalangin showed to me an envelope. The
three (3) women then prepared the letter that I suggested. However, I went out of my
chambers and proceeded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for some official matters,
leaving the four (4) women in my chambers. When I returned to my chambers I saw the
three women had already prepared and signed the letter. Inexplicably, however, the three
(3) women, with their woman companion, stood up and placed the envelope on my table
and then prepared to leave hurriedly. I was perplexed by the odd behavior of the four (4)
women. Ominously, when I glanced outside my chambers, I saw some male persons, who
I later learned, turned out to be NBI agents, in the premises of the court. Sensing that the
three (3) women, with their companion, were up to something wrong, I told the women to
throw the envelope containing the money in the toilet trash. The three (3) women rsuhed
to the toilet and came out immediately. The four (4) women then rushed out of my
chambers. Suddenly, male persons, who later identified themselves as NBI agents, barged
in to my chambers and rushed to the toilet. When they emerged from the toilet, they
demanded that I go with them to their office. I was shocked by the sudden turn of events.
Nevertheless, I agreed to the demand of the NBI agents. I was tested for fluorescent
powder but was found negative of fluorescent powder;
"8. The NBI agents much later demanded that I return with them to my office and I agreed
to their demand. When we arrived in my chambers, one of the agents [sic];
"9. At no time did I ever tell the NBI agents that I got the money from inside the toilet with
the use of a handkerchief and placed the same in the drawer in my table in the chambers.
They did not open, right then and there, the drawer in my table. It was only in the
afternoon of that day when the NBI agents returned to my chambers, in my company,
when they took the money in the drawer of my table. From the time the NBI agents took
me to their office, I never left the NBI office. I could not have placed the money in my
drawer after I had left from my office in the company of the NBI agents. The money found
in the drawer of my table in my court chambers must have been the same money which
the NBI men found in the toilet in my chambers and which they took from the toilet. The
money which the NBI men took from the toilet had been in the possession of the NBI men,
all along until the money was found in the drawer of my table in my chambers. It is thus
impossible for me to have placed the money in the drawer of my table; [and] Sppedjo
"10. If as claimed by the NBI agents, I told them that I took the money from the toilet with
the use of a handkerchief and placed the money in the drawer of my table, for sure, they
would have found the handkerchief in my pocket and subjected the same for testing for
fluorescent powder. However, the NBI agents never did ask me to turn over to them my
handkerchief. They never submitted any handkerchief as evidence in the Office of the
Ombudsdman in connection with their complaint against me." [19]
We have reviewed the record and thereby conclude that the charge of bribery against respondent is well-
substantiated. Respondents disavowal of the events that transpired in his chambers cannot be given
credence. His assertion that his initial meeting with the private complainants was an accomodation borne
out of a casual acquaintance with Nelia Evangelista fails to persuade us. The fact alone that he conferred
privately with them in his chambers merits reproof. Judges have been admonished to refrain from
conducting in-chambers sessions in the absence of the opposing party and his counsel.[20] We note that these
"private" sessions occurred twice, on November 20 and 27, 1996. Miso
The testimony of Intelligence Agent Josephine Cabardo, in particular, shreds whatever credibility
respondents proferred defense has. Cabardo, a disinterested observer in addition to being a law
enforcement officer, corroborated the testimonies of the private complainants. She was a direct witness to
the entrapment operation, and equally important, respondent failed to present any reason why her
testimony should be disbelieved.
Nonetheless, respondent raises by way of defense the alleged deprivation of his right to counsel during the
investigation in the NBI Regional Office. Suffice it to state, however, that the alleged infringement of the
constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is relevant and material only where
an extrajudicial confession or admission from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction. [21] In the case
at bench, there is sufficient evidence on record, consisting principally of the testimonies of the witnesses
presented by complainant, to warrant the imposition of the proper penalty on respondent.
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
"CANON 2A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES. Nexold
Rule 2.01-A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
It is thus evident from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality and the appearancemust concur. As we
explained in Capuno v. Jaramillo, Jr.:[22]
"xxx It bears repeating that integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue; it is a
necessity. xxx Hence, the role of the judiciary in bringing justice to conflicting interests in
society cannot be overemphasized. As the visible representation of law and justice, judges
are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and
confidence of our people in the judicial system. They are particularly mandated not only
to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary but also to avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in their action. For judges sit as the embodiment of the
peoples sense of justice, their last recourse where all other institutions have failed."
Bribery is classified as a serious charge punishable by, inter alia, dismissal from service with forfeiture of
benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.[23] In the case at bench, we find sufficient bases in the charge
of malfeasance in office against respondent. On past occasions where we had the disagreeable task of
disciplining mulcting magistrates,[24] we did not hesitate to impose the penalty of dismissal. Conformably,
as he has demonstrated his unsuitability to remain a member of the bench, respondent is deservingly
dismissed from service with all its attendant consequences. For as we held in Haw Tay v. Singayao:[25]
"xxx The acts of respondent Judge in demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant
before his court constitutes serious misconduct in office. This Court condemns in the
strongest possible terms the misconduct of respondent Judge. It is this kind of gross and
flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of
administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes the respect
for law and the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears apart the
very bonds of our polity." Manikx
The Investigating Justice likewise recommends that respondent be disbarred. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3)
grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers
oath; (6) wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority. In The Court Administrator v. Hermoso[26] and Bautista v.
Guevarra,[27] we decreed the disbarment of judges, apart from their dismissal from service, who were
charged with bribery. The case at bar should be no different. All lawyers who desire to practice their
profession in this jurisdiction are required to take an oath of office whereby they undertake, among other
obligations, to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court xxx without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."[28] The practice of law is a privilege, and only those adjudged qualified
are permitted to do so. Respondents conduct falls short of the exacting standards demanded by the legal
profession, such that his malfeasance in office merits the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from our
esteemed brotherhood.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ramon B. Reyes is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Further, he is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar.
SO ORDERED. Maniks
A.M. No. 697-CFI October 30, 1975
IN RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT VERSUS JUDGE JUAN ECHIVERRI, respondent.
RESOLUTION
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
An undated anonymous letter signed "Ang Bagong Filipino" initiated this administrative proceeding
against Hon. Judge Juan Echiverri who at the time of the sending of said letter was presiding judge of
Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Although as a rule anonymous complaints are not
entertained, nevertheless, considering that among the matters complained of was that Judge Echiverri does
not hold sessions on Wednesdays and that there is a backlog of cases in his sala, the Court directed its
Judicial Consultant, Justice Manuel P. Barcelona, to conduct an investigation of the records of Branch IV.
A report of the investigation was submitted to the Court and by Resolution of April 30, 1974, a copy thereof
was furnished Judge Echiverri for his comment.1
According to the findings of the investigator of the Court, in the year 1973 and early part of 1974 no cases
were usually set for trial on Wednesdays and that on those Wednesdays where cases were scheduled for
trial, the minutes book of the court failed to show that a hearing was actually held. As to the condition of
the docket of Branch IV the report revealed that: (1) as of the time of the investigation there were 643
pending cases which was 106 less than the figure reported in the monthly report of the court as of December
31, 1973, which showed that no physical inventory was being made of the pending cases so as to reflect in
the monthly report to the correct figures; (2) that the actual input is more than the court's output for a 6-
month period preceding December, 1973, resulting in a general increase of pending cases; and (3) there
were instances when motions were left unacted upon for an unreasonable length of time. The report also
stated that Branch IV does not keep a court journal and that no entries are regularly made in the docket
books (criminal and civil), making it difficult to ascertain the true status of a particular case.
In his comment, respondent claims that the keeping of books is the work of the clerk of court, that Branch
IV has been hampered by inadequate personnel, and that the court's docket is inevitably clogged because
the territorial jurisdiction of Branch IV covers a population of around 199,130 which is much bigger than
that of the other branches not to mention the fact that when he assumed office there were already many
pending cases assigned to that particular sala. With respect to his activities on Wednesdays, respondent
gives the following explanation:
To ease the clogged dockets, or at least to ameliorate the situation, occasioned by the
foregoing facts and difficulties, undersigned adopted a rigorous program of hearings and
other judicial work from Mondays to Saturdays, mornings and afternoons, sometimes
until late in the afternoon or early evening, even during the fuel crisis. To catch his breath,
so to speak, in order to be more effective, a midweek pause is imperative. Wednesdays are
therefore set aside for minimum hearings to enable undersigned to conduct studies, draft
decisions, engage in internal affairs of the court and to follow up matters with this
Honorable Court such as appointments of personnel of his court.
... The clogged dockets and pressure of work demand overtime work just as his physical
condition and other judicial duties make imperative a mid-week pause, Wednesday ... (emphasis
supplied)
We cannot sanction the allegation of respondent that he needs a "mid-week pause" on Wednesdays. The
law regulating court sessions does not permit any "mid-week pause." Section 58 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, expressly provides:
Sec. 58. — Hours of daily sessions of the courts.-The hours for the daily session of Courts
of First Instance shall be from nine to twelve in the morning, and from three to five in the
afternoon, except on Saturday, when a morning session only shall be required; but the
judge may extend the hours of session whenever in his judgment it is proper to do so. The
Judge holding any court may also, in his discretion, order that but one session per day shall
be held instead of two, at such hours as he may deem expedient for the convenience both
of the court and the public; but the number of hours that the court shall be in session per day
shall be not less than five.2 (emphasis Ours)
Judges are duty bound to comply with the above to insure the maximum efficiency of the trial courts for a
speedy administration of justice. Daily trials at a minimum of five hours per working day of the week will
enable the judge to calendar as many cases as possible and to dispose with regular dispatch the increasing
number of litigations pending with the court. All other matters needing the attention of the judge are to be
attended to outside of this five-hour schedule of trial.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Echiverri is hereby admonished to comply strictly with Sec. 58 of the
Judiciary Act. As regards the other matters mentioned in the report of the Investigator, no action need be
taken thereon considering that Judge Echiverri no longer presides over Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan.
So ordered.
ENGR. EDGARDO R. TORCENDE, complainant, vs. JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Time and again the Court has reminded all those who don the judicial robe that a judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.[1] He should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, [2] and to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.[3] Along the same vein, judges are expected to be restrained and
sober in their speech. Restraint is, in fact, a trait desirable in those who administer justice. [4] Their language,
both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued.[5] Intemperate speech detracts from the equanimity and judiciousness that should be the
constant hallmarks of a dispenser of justice.[6]
The Court is once again called upon to reiterate these dicta in the instant administrative matter.
Complainant is the accused in two (2) criminal cases for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 3422[7] and 1010,[8] filed by Judith Duremdes. At the time of the filing of the
complaints, jurisdiction was vested in the regional trial courts. The accused was arraigned on October 11,
1993 for Criminal Case No. 3422 before Branch 24, and on November 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 1010
before Branch 25, both of the Regional Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato.When Republic Act No.
7691 took effect on April 15, 1994 expanding the jurisdiction of Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, Criminal Case No. 3422 was transferred to the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal,
South Cotabato presided by respondent Judge. At the three (3) consecutive hearings scheduled by
respondent, accused Torcende and counsel appeared but the private complainant, as well as the private
and public prosecutors did not. Meanwhile, the accused submitted a Motion to Quash on the ground that
the criminal case is violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. At the hearing
on February 29, 1996, the accused accompanied by a representative of his counsel arrived late. Respondent
ordered the arrest of the accused and the cancellation of his bail bond, and ordered his counsel to explain
in writing within five (5) days why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court, [9] for failure to
personally appear at the hearing. On an urgent motion by the accused, the respondent judge recalled the
warrant of arrest and reinstated the bail bond.[10] On March 20, 1996, respondent judge denied the Motion
to Quash.
At the scheduled hearing on May 9, 1996, the accused again appeared without his counsel. He filed an
Omnibus Motion to: (a) bar the appearance of a private prosecutor; (b) seek a reconsideration of the order
denying the Motion to Quash; (c) postpone the proceedings pending resolution of the motions. Respondent
denied the Omnibus Motion for lack of notice of hearing and imposed a fine on counsel for accused for
failure to appear and for violating the rule on motions. Accused Torcende was also ordered to reimburse
the expenses incurred by private complainants in attending the hearings. [11]
On May 21, 1996, accused filed with this Court an Affidavit-Complaint charging respondent judge
with serious misconduct, oppression, corruption, falsification of public document, violation of
constitutional rights and arbitrary detention. He further charged respondent with manifest partiality in the
discharge of his official functions by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to both the
private complainant and the prosecutors, in violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft
Law.[12] More specifically, complainant Torcende alleged that respondent did not actually conduct an
examination in writing and under oath of the private complainant and witnesses in the course of the
preliminary investigation, as required by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. He merely issued a
certification to this effect which became the basis for filing the informations; that he wrongfully and
unlawfully took cognizance of Criminal Cases Nos. 3422 and 1010; and that the Order dated May 9, 1996
was falsified because respondent Judge made it appear that the accused and his counsel violated the rule
on filing motions, when in fact they served a copy of the motion on the prosecution thirteen (13) days before
the scheduled hearing. Moreover, the order was oppressive in that defense counsel was fined One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for his failure to appear, while the accused was ordered to reimburse the
expenses of private complainant. The accused explained that he and his counsel were present at all previous
scheduled hearings, but they arrived late at the hearing on February 29, 1996 because their car had a flat
tire. Although his counsel failed to appear on May 9, 1996, he nevertheless sent a representative who filed
an Omnibus Motion.
Respondent was required to file a comment on the complaint.[13] In his Comment,[14] respondent
explained that he conducted an examination in writing under oath of complainant and witnesses, as borne
out by the written preliminary examination report submitted to the OCA; that Criminal Case No. 3422 was
remanded to his court from the Regional Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 24 pursuant to
R.A. No. 7691; that the order for the arrest of the accused and the cancellation of bail bond was recalled and
the bail bond reinstated upon urgent motion of the accused; that the order dated May 9, 1996 was neither
oppressive nor falsified but appropriate under the circumstances, considering that the omnibus motion
was filed on the scheduled day of hearing without service to the public prosecutors; that counsel for
accused had the perennial habit of filing motions on the very date set for trial but antedates them to make
it appear that they complied with the three-day notice rule; that he did not impose sanctions on the
prosecutors for their previous absences because their motions for postponement were properly filed; and
that the accused was not compelled to pay the fine and to pay the expenses incurred by private
complainant.
In a Resolution dated December 9, 1998,[15] respondent was required to manifest whether he is
submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings already filed. Thereafter, respondent judge filed a
Compliance manifesting his conformity to have the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed.
After evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent be fined
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) payable in four (4) monthly installments of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) each for having acted with bias, partiality and grave abuse of discretion in the performance of
his functions.
Before addressing the issue on respondents administrative culpability, it must be pointed out that he
cannot be faulted for taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 3422. The said case fell within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts with the passage of R.A. No. 7691 [16] which amended
B.P. Blg. 129 otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 by expanding the jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Section 2 of R.A. No.
7691 provides that-
SEC. 2.Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial courts. -
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdictions; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
The records disclose that pursuant to the provisions of the above-cited law, Criminal Case No. 3422
was remanded to the sala of respondent by the Regional Trial court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch
24 in an Order dated October 17, 1994.[17]
The manner in which respondent conducted the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3422, however,
leaves much to be desired. Indeed, the inordinate haste in which he denied outright the Omnibus Motion
of the complainant exposes him to suspicion. In denying complainants motion, respondent cited the
provisions of Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which provides that:
Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant on shall be served by the applicant to all parties
concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any
affidavits and other papers accompanying it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on
shorter notice, [e]specially on matters which the court may dispose on its own motion. [18]
The Omnibus Motion[19] filed by complainant sought: 1.] to bar the appearance of private prosecutor;
2.] for reconsideration of the courts order of March 20, 1996; and 3.] to postpone the initial hearing of the
case set for May 9, 1996. While it was served on the public and private prosecutors on May 9, 1996, the day
of the initial hearing itself, previous motions to bar appearance of the private prosecutor and for
reconsideration of the March 20, 1996 Order were served thirteen (13) days before the scheduled hearing,
which was way beyond the period required by the Rules.
Admittedly, complainants motion to postpone trial was filed on the very day of the hearing. The
prosecutors, however, had likewise earlier filed urgent motions for postponement on three (3) successive
hearings scheduled where they did not appear, which motions for continuance were all granted. These
incidents should have been considered by respondent together with the fact that the motion for
postponement was the first filed by the accused in court. Fundamental dictates of fairness should have
prompted respondent to give complainant the same measure of liberality he accorded the prosecution.
The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
which should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts
or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby. After all,
postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing
justice.[20]When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest with the
corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion
to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. [21] Unless grave abuse of
discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or appeal.[22]
With regard to the matter of contempt, it must be remembered that the power to punish for contempt
is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the
administration of justice.[23] The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are
impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they
exercise.[24] Thus, judges have time and again been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously,
sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. [25]
In the case at bar, the fine imposed on counsel for complainant as well as the order for him to reimburse
the expenses of private complainant are unjust because both he and his counsel were not given an
opportunity to explain their side. In short, respondent summarily imposed the sanctions on complainant
and counsel. Such conduct of respondent is highly improper and only too deserving of reproof for the
following reasons:
First, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.[26] Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the law he is
supposed to apply in a given controversy.[27]Indeed
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules;
it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and [be] aware of well-settled authoritative
doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the
personification of justice and the Rule of Law.[28]
The Court has repeatedly impressed on judges that they should be diligent in keeping abreast with
developments in law and jurisprudence as well as to regard the study of law as a never ending and ceaseless
process.[29]
In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles
governing contempt. Contempt is defined as [a] disobedience to the court by setting up an opposition to
its authority, justice and dignity.[30] Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the
court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. [31] On the other hand, direct
contempt consists of or is characterized by misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 71. [32]
There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt. [33] Section 3,
Rule 71, of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the mode of commencing proceedings for indirect
contempt, to wit:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. - After charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an office of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or judge. . . (Emphasis and italics supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Nazareno v. Barnes[34] interpreted a written charge to mean that either: 1.] an order requiring the person
to be charged with contempt to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, be issued by the
court; or 2.] a petition for contempt by way of a special civil action under Rule 71 be initiated in order for
contempt proceedings to prosper:
At the outset, let it be stated that the contempt proceeding against the petitioner was wrongly initiated. The
nature thereof being that of indirect contempt, a written charge is necessary pursuant to Section 7, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court. the written charge may partake of the nature of (1) an Order requiring the respondent
(not accused) to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having committed the
contemptuous acts imputed against him; or (2) a petition for contempt by way of special civil action under
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The first procedure applies only where the indirect contempt is committed
against a court or judge possessed and clothed with contempt powers. The second, if the contemptuous act
was committed not against a court nor a judicial officer with authority to punish for contemptuous acts.
Strict compliance with the afore-cited guidelines is mandatory considering that proceedings against a
person alleged to be guilty of contempt, as in this case, are commonly treated as criminal in nature. [35]
Strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to
be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes
governing them are to be strictly construed.[36]
Second, the degree of restraint respondent should have observed in the exercise of his judicial powers
was anything but exemplary, especially considering that the same bears with it the taint of personal
hostility and passion against the party to whom it is directed. Magistrates have been continuously
reminded that
...the salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised in on the preservative not vindictive
principle,[37] and on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment.[38] The courts and other tribunals vested
with the power of contempt must exercise the power for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that
power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. [39]
Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety[40] and self- restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.[41] A
judge should be the last person to be perceived as petty, sharp-tongued tyrant holding imperious sway
over his domain. Such an image is, however, evoked by the acts of respondent judge in this case as
underscored by the derogatory terms in which he described complainant and counsel in his comment, viz:
1.] On the charge of manifest partiality: It is purely the product of the senility and ghostly apparitions that
symbolizes the phantasmagoric mentality of Torcende and his counsel, and whose perturbed minds had
been distorted after numerous cases for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 had been filed against him.[42]
2.] On complainants claim in paragraph 20 of the affidavit-complaint that they waited more than an
hour: [i]s overwhelmingly a brazen lie and devastatingly a perversion of truth which should be cast
into the four winds of heavens that no remembrance thereof maybe (sic) had among men of moral values and
sense of fairness. xxx the complainant having the temerity of lying xxx, he and his counsel should be held
in contempt of court of the highest order (sic).[43]
3.] On complainants counsels filing of motions: [i]t is worthwhile mentioning that Atty. Occea has
that perennial habit of filing motions on the very day a case is set for trial but bearing ANTEDATED date
to make it appear as having [been made] in compliance with the 3-day notice required by the Rules.[44]
4.] On complainants counsels filing of motions on the day of the hearings: [c]onstrued by the court
and the prosecution as a feindish (sic) ploy designed to delay further the claims of complainants for
the unscrupulous issuances of bouncing checks by Torcende not to mention the fact that his
complainants xxx had been complaining of their agony regarding the usurious interest for the money
they borrowed to advance in the construction of the housing units constructed by them but was paid later
by Torcende with these worthless checks subject matters of the numerous criminal cases for violation B.P.
Blg. 22 against him.[45]
5.] On the allegation of complainant that respondent, the prosecutor and the offended parties
conspired in violating complainants constitutional rights: [is] but just a figment of Torcendes
fructuous creativity and the by-product of his hallucinations. No constitutional right of him (sic)
had ever been violated by anyone in the conduct of the numerous criminal cases against him. If by now he
greatly suffered the consequences of his very own act, he alone is to be blamed for indiscreminately (sic)
issuing numerous worthless checks. Consequently, in so doing, he had caused, and he still is causing, great
damage and prejudice to the payee of those checks.[46] (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience
and courtesy.[47] A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission
as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice[48] is expected to be a cerebral man who deliberately holds
in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences which he shares with his fellow
mortals.[49]Describing complainant and counsel as unscrupulous, senile men whose perturbed,
phantasmagoric minds are prone to hallucinations and who, as brazen liars who devastatingly pervert
truth, resort to fiendish ploys to delay the speedy disposition of the cases filed against them is hardly the
kind of circumspect words expected of a magistrate.
Judges have been admonished to observe judicial decorum which requires that a magistrate must at
all times be temperate in his language[50] refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric[51] or from
resorting to the language of vilification.[52]
In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that -
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced,
to litigants witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
Respondent judge needs to be reminded that government service is people-oriented.[53] Patience is an
essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. [54] Belligerent
behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and
civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. [55]
Third, a party-litigants right to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge has, at best,
become an empty and hollow rhetoric. To be sure, branding complainant as a brazen liar, [56] an
unscrupulous[57] and indiscriminate[58] issuer of bouncing checks[59] who charges usurious interest[60] even
before the contending parties have completed their offer of evidence is a damning indictment against his
impartiality and objectivity.
The instant case is not respondents first offense because he had previously been administratively
sanctioned by the Court in the following cases:
1.] Cabilao v. Judge Sardido,[61] an administrative case for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion and gross misconduct, where respondent judge was ordered to pay fine of Five thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) and sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more
severely.
2.] Almeron v. Judge Sardido,[62] an administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law, where
respondent judge was imposed a stiffer fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and sternly warned,
considering that this was the second time he was administratively sanctioned, the commission of the same
or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely including, if warranted, his dismissal from the
service.
Obviously being chastised twice has not reformed respondent. On the contrary, instead of learning
from his past mistakes he persisted in his errant ways. Indeed, it seems that respondent judge has remained
undeterred in disregarding the law which he has pledged to uphold and the Code which he has promised
to live by.[63] He appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he received[64] because the
records of the OCA, in fact, discloses that aside from this case, respondent Judge had six (6) other similar
administrative complaints[65] still pending against him.
Needless to state, such an unflattering record only further erodes the peoples faith and confidence in
the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect
the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and
controversy.[66]
Case law repeatedly teaches that judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and
imposes a number of restrictions thereon which he must pay for accepting and occupying an exalted
position in the administration of Justice. A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal
conduct beyond which he may not freely venture. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no
ground for reproach. The irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the
judiciary. It is thus the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect
the image and integrity of the judiciary.[67]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
of Koronadal City, South Cotabato, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct, and
accordingly orders his DISMISSAL from the service and the forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
Respondent Judge Sardido shall immediately vacate his position as Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Koronadal City, South Cotabato, as well as any position in the judiciary to which he may
be presently assigned, and desist from deciding or resolving any case or incidents therein upon receipt of
the notice.
SO ORDERED.
JOEL ALMERON and EVANGELINE ALMERON, complainants, vs.JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO,

Municipal Trial Court, Koronadal, South Cotabato, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOEL ALMERON and his wife EVANGELINE in a letter complaint dated 18 October 1996 alleged that
their twelve-year old daughter Jojielyn was raped sometime in April and again in September 1996 by one
Wilfredo Pino. As a result, two (2) criminal complaints for rape were filled with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Koronadal, South Cotabato, presided over by respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido. [1] However,
without conducting a hearing and without forwarding the records to the Office of the Public Prosecutor,
respondents Judge granted bail to the accused in the amount of P200,000.00 for each count of rape. The
amount upon motion of the accused was reduced to P120,000.00. In addition, complainant spouses alleged
that bail was posted using property of a person who has already been dead for seven (7) years.
On 22 January 1997 the Court directed Judge Sardido to answer the accusation which he did in
his Comment/Compliance dated 20 February 1997.
In his defense respondent Judge alleged that he initially wrote the words NO BAILon the face of the
criminal complaints; however before he could issue a warrant of arrest, Atty. Bonifacio Pagunsan, counsel
of the accused, engaged him in a legal argument inside his chambers about the feasibility of granting bail
to the accused; that according to the 1996 Bail Bond Guide of the Department of Justice rape not committed
with the use of deadly weapon, by two or more men or not resulting in the insanity of the victim, or in the
commission of a homicide by reason or on the occasion thereof, is penalized with reclusion temporal and
bailable in the amount of P200,000.00; accordingly he change No Bail to P200,000.00 and reduced it
to P120,000.00 after finding that the amount was excessive for the provincial folk; that he approved tha
property bond not knowing that the bondsman was already dead relying instead on the presumption of
regularity in the performance by the notary public of his notarial function.
On 30 April 1997 this case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation. In a Memorandum dated 11 August 1997 the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be fined P10,000.00 for granting bail to the accused charged with rape
on two (2) counts without a hearing thereby denying the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the
evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.
We adopt the foregoing recommendation. Any self-respecting member of the bench or bar knows, or
should know with little effort, that simple rape is punishable with reclusion perpetua as provided in Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code.[2] Likewise, as lucidly provided in Sec. 7, Rule 114[3] of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, no person charged with such an offense, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Hence a litany of cases emphasizes that
bail is discretionary and not a matter of right on the part of the accused. [4] In exercising such judicial
discretion, however, a judge is required to conduct a hearing wherein both the prosecution and the defense
present evidence that would point to the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt. [5] The discretion of
the judge lies solely in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the evidence presented during the
hearing but not in the determination of whether or not the hearing itself should be held[6] for such a hearing
is considered mandatory and absolutely indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position
to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong.[7]
Thus, when a judge grants bail to a person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
be reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without conducting the required hearing, he is considered guilty
of ignorance or incompetence the gravity of which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable
negligence.[8] This is because members of the judiciary are supposed to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules, [9] more so with legal principles and rules so
elementary and basic that not to know them, or to act as if one does not know them, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.[10]
In the instant case, respondents Judge does not deny that he granted bail without a hearing to a person
accused of two (2) counts of rape. He attempts to excuse himself by saying that he was misled by the 1996
Bail Bond Guide of the Department of Justice which provides that simple rape is punishable by reclusion
temporal and bailable at P200,000.00.[11] However, as already stated, ignorance of this type cannot be
excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence. [12] Besides, the fact that he was even misguided
only manifests his weakness and reinforces his gross ignorance. As early as in their freshmen year, aspiring
members of the legal profession are already taught that felonies are defined and their corresponding
penalties found in the Revised Penal Code, probably one of the most important codes in the legal
profession. Hence, respondent Judge should not have been mislead, purportedly at the prodding of the
counsel for the accused, that the 1996 Bail Bond Guide of the Department of Justice prevails over the explicit
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on rape, especially considering that the Guide is addressed and
intended for the guidance of all regional state prosecutors, city/provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
provides in its whereas clauses that bail shall not be recommended where the penalty is death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.[13]
In his ignorance respondent Judge not only deprived the prosecution due process of law by denying
it the opportunity to contest the application for bail[14] but likewise acted in a manner contrary to Rule 2.01,
Canon 2, of the Code of Judicial Conduct [15] in allowing counsel for the accused to engage him in a legal
discussion inside his chambers, without the presence of any representative of the prosecution, about the
possibility of granting bail to the accused.
Thus, respondent Judges disregard of an established rule of law (not conducting a hearing in an
application for bail) thereby depriving the prosecution the opportunity to prove the strength of the
evidence of guilt of the accused which amounts to gross ignorance of the law subjects him to disciplinary
action.[16]
In Cabilao v. Judge Sardido,[17] an administrative case for grave ignorance of the law, gross misconduct
and abuse of discretion, the same respondent Judge was fined the amount of P5,000.00 and sternly warned
against the commission of same or similar acts. Considering the foregoing and the seriousness of the
present offense which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith, respondent should be imposed a
stifferpenalty so that he would better grasp the importance of being proficient in both substantive and
procedural laws, particularly in this case, on the subject matter of bail.This could be achieved without need
for the Court to issue any bail bond guide, as respondent judge suggests, since the present Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedureand jurisprudence on the matter are clear and enlightening enough.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido is fined P10,000.00 payable in two (2) equal
monthly installments of P5,000.00 each, to be deducted from his monthly salary. He is sternly WARNED
that, considering that this is the second time that he is administratively sanctioned by this Court, the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely including, if
warranted, his dismissal from the service.
SO ORDERED
ARTEMIO SABATIN, complainant, vs. JUDGE EFREN B. MALLARE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT, NATIVIDAD-LLANERA, NUEVA ECIJA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative case arose when Artemio Sabatin, in an Affidavit-Complaint[1] dated
January 15, 2001, charged Judge Efren B. Mallare, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Natividad-Llanera, Nueva
Ecija, with gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, relative to Criminal Case No. 2751-N entitled People of
the Philippines v. Artemio Sabatin for illegal possession of firearms.
The complainant, the accused in the said criminal case, alleged that pursuant to Search Warrant No.
017-N-2000 issued by the respondent judge, elements of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of General
Natividad, Nueva Ecija under the command of P/Sr. Insp. Franklin Versoza Simon, entered his home and
conducted a search thereon without his consent. The complainant averred that the search warrant in
question was actually issued against his brother Pedrito Sabatin. When the complainant pointed this out to
the police, P/Sr. Insp. Simon merely instructed his men to erase the name Pedrito and replace it with
Artemio, making it appear that the warrant was, indeed, issued in the complainants name.
The complainant further alleged that he was arrested and brought by the policemen to their station
for investigation, but was later released. He then received a subpoena after a few days, and it was only then
that he learned that a criminal complaint had been filed against him for illegal possession of firearms. The
complainant, in turn, filed a complaint for illegal search, unlawful arrest, arbitrary detention and
falsification of public document against P/Sr. Insp. Simon and his men before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).
On August 5, 2000, the complainant filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 017-N-2000 before
the respondent judges sala. After several postponements, the preliminary investigation was again set for
November 8, 2001. The complainant narrated the events as follows:
17. Na bago dumating and araw na iyon ay nakatanggap ako ng MOTION TO DISMISS, petsang Oktubre
12, 2000, para sa mga demanda ko [sic] ilalim ng I.S. No. H-3275-78 sa Cabanatuan City, galing sa
inireklamo kong mga pulis, at kabilang sa mga UNANG PAGKAKATAON ay nahawakan ko ang kopya
ng SEARCH WARRANT NO. 017-N-2000, na maliwanag na nanggaling pala sa Branch 30 ng Regional
Trial Court ng Cabanautan City, pero ang nakapirmang hukom ay si Judge EFREN B. MALLARE, bilang
Acting Presiding Judge, gaya nang makikita sa kopya ng nasabing SEARCH WARRANT, na
minarkahang ANNEX K;
18. Sa pagka-diskubre naming ang Branch 30 ng Regional Trial Court ng Cabanatuan City ang nag-issue
ng pinalsipikang SEARCH WARRANT, ako, sa pamamagitan ng aking abogada, ay duon nag-file ng
MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT NO. 017-N-2000, kasabay ng kinakailangang i-file ko sa
2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court ng Gen. Natividad-Llanera, Nueva Ecija, ng aking OMNIBUS MOTION
TO WITHDRAW MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT NO. 017-N-2000 AND TO TRANSFER ITS
RECORDS TO BRANCH 30, RTC, CABANATUAN CITY, WITH ADDED MOTIONS TO SUSPEND
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE INSTANT CASE UNTIL RESOLUTION ON THIS PENDING
INCIDENT AND TO FURNISH ACCUSED OF ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS/EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION N ITS PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, parehong may petsang Oktubre 30, 2000. [2]
The complainant was surprised when Judge Federico F. Fajardo, Jr. of the RTC of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 30, issued the following Order on November 7, 2000, to wit:
This is a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 017-N-2000, dated July __, 2000 which appears to have been
issued by Judge Efren B. Mallare. Upon a careful examination of the said Search Warrant, the caption
thereof appears to be RTC-Branch 30, Cabanatuan City. However, the Presiding Judge of RTC, Br. 30 is the
undersigned presiding judge and not Judge Efren B. Mallare. Judge Mallare is the Acting Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of General Natividad and Llanera, Nueva Ecija.
The undersigned did not issue the questioned search warrant. He is not the Executive Judge who is the
only one authorized to issue search warrants for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The
Executive Judge of the RTC, Cabanatuan City is the Hon. Johnson Ballutay of RTC, Branch 25, Cabanatuan
City.
Further, the questioned search warrant is not at all connected with any case pending in this Court, and
therefore, this Court is not the proper forum for the quashing of the said search warrant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to quash search warrant is hereby returned to the accused
and his counsel, with the advise that it be referred to the Hon. Executive Judge, RTC, Cabanatuan City or
Judge Efren B. Mallare for appropriate action. [3]
The respondent judge thereafter issued an Order dated December 4, 2000, to wit:
After a careful perusal of the grounds relied upon by the accused in seeking for the quashal/dismissal of
this case, the Court noticed that the same appeared to be well taken as the records would readily show that
the Chief of Police, PNP, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija has applied for a search warrant against one Pedrito
Sabatin alias Boyet and this has been admitted by the then Chief of Police Franklin Versoza Simon as per
his comment dated 13 September 2000 (p. 27, rec.), although he misspelled the name Pedrito to Pablito by
advancing reason that an error was committed when said first name was typewrote (sic) and in order to
obviate any leakage thereof, a correction has been made from Pedrito/Pablito to Artemio Sabatin alias
Boyet which led to the filing of the instant case.
In short, the search warrant issued by this court against one Pedrito Sabatin alias Boyet, after it has
complied with the requisite for issuing search warrant (Sec. 3, Rule 126 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure), has not been fully implemented.
Furthermore, the case filed before this Court against one Artemio Sabatin y Miguel alias Boyet cannot be
entertained by this court for this court has never issued any search warrant against said accused; and, therefore,
any evidence taken from him maybe considered inadmissible for the search undertaken by the PNP of Gen.
Natividad, Nueva Ecija, is considered unlawful.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion To Quash/Dismiss Criminal Complaint meritorious, the same is hereby
granted and this case is hereby dismissed.[4]
According to the complainant, the respondent judge issued the questioned search warrant despite his
lack of authority to do so in order to protect P/Sr. Insp. Franklin V. Simon. He also alleged that the
respondent later on denied that he issued the questioned warrant in order to escape possible administrative
sanctions.
In his Comment, the respondent averred that the normal procedure in criminal cases was to set them
for preliminary examination in order to determine probable cause. However, in this case, the complainant
(accused therein) through counsel practically waived the early resolution of the preliminary examination
by filing several motions. Thus, the complainant cannot now question the delay in the early termination of
the criminal case, for had it not been for the filing of said motions, the preliminary examination could have
been terminated since September 2000 as provided for in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The respondent
further stated, thus:
To recapitulate; therefore, the undersigned believes that being an Acting Presiding Judge of the
2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Gen. Natividad-Llanera, N.E., he has performed and [is] still
performing, in good faith, the duties and responsibilities vested upon his office. In fact the records will
speak for itself, and being the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, he
has always been dedicated to his work and never committed any absence, and this fact can also be attested
by the records of that Court which also speak for itself. Lastly, if ever the undersigned committed an error,
the same had been committed in good faith and that the attached pertinent documents in the criminal case
filed against Sabatin will readily reveal that the undersigned did not commit the accusation lodged against
him in this administrative case.[5]
The respondent then prayed that the instant administrative case be dismissed for lack of merit.
Upon the Court Administrators recommendation that a formal investigation was necessary to resolve
the factual issues, the case was referred to Executive Judge Tomas B. Talavera, Regional Trial Court,
Cabanatuan City.[6] The Executive Judge made the following findings:
To this Court, it appears that the complainant is no longer interested in pursuing this case. If he still has
any interest in the prosecution of this case he should have notified this Court of his whereabouts by
furnishing his new address so that he could have been notified about the ongoing investigation. In this
regards (sic), this Court was not able to acquire any evidence that would substantiate the allegations of the
complainant in the present administrative case. It will be impossible for this Court to rule in favor of the
complainant lacking the latters evidence, whether oral or documentary, not to mention his un-cooperation
(sic) in the investigation of this administrative case.
Be it noted that it was the respondent who was religiously attending the investigation is borne out by the
record of the case. On the other hand, complainant did not appear even once though on April 24, 2003, he
was notified through his wife Vilma Sabatin evidencing his lack of interest to further prosecute this
administrative case.[7]
The Executive Judge apparently re-set the case for hearing for a total of four times, due to the
complainants repeated failure to appear.[8] It was, thus, recommended that the present administrative case
be dismissed for lack of evidence, as well as the complainants lack of interest to prosecute the case.[9]
We do not agree with the Investigating Judge.
The Court would like to stress that the dismissal or withdrawal of charges and the desistance of
witnesses does not automatically result in the dismissal of an administrative case.[10] The withdrawal of the
complaint does not have the legal effect of automatically exonerating the respondent from any
administrative disciplinary action. It does not operate to divest this Court with jurisdiction to determine
the truth behind the matter stated in the complaint.[11] Furthermore, the need to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities should not be made to
depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein. [12]
Pursuant to the foregoing, it was incumbent upon the Investigating Judge to delve into the matter
subject of the complaint, considering that the pleadings submitted by the complainant and the respondent,
as well as the annexes thereof, were forwarded by the OCA precisely for his perusal. The Court, in
numerous cases, has even acted upon administrative complaints filed by anonymous complainants on the
following rationale:
Although the Court does not as a rule act on anonymous complaints, cases are excepted in which the charge
could be fully borne by public records of indubitable integrity thus needing no corroboration by evidence
to be offered by the complainant, whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where the matter
involved is of public interest.[13]
The records in the instant case clearly show that the respondent is administratively liable. A perusal
of the questioned search warrant shows that although it was issued by Branch 30 of the RTC of Cabanatuan
City, the signatory therein was the respondent. Judge Federico F. Fajardo, Jr. then presiding judge of Branch
30, Cabanatuan City denied that the questioned warrant was issued by him. The respondent then made
a volte-face and denied that he ever issued any search warrant against the complainant in his Order dated
December 4, 2000, where he also granted the complainants motion to quash. Furthermore, in resolving the
complainants motion to quash almost four months after it was filed, the respondent violated Rule 3.05 of
The Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and to act,
one way or the other, on pending cases within the prescribed period therefor.[14] Undue delay in resolving
a pending motion constitutes gross inefficiency,[15] and constitutes a less serious charge, punishable under
Section 9 of Rule 140[16] of the Rules of Court.
Judges are duty-bound to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence at all
times.[17] The pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to
sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed on them and the institution they
represent.[18] Judges are also human, although they are expected to rise above human frailties. At the very
least, there must be an earnest and sincere effort on his part to do so. Considering that they are the visible
representation of the law and of justice, the citizenry expects their official conduct as well as their personal
behavior to always be beyond reproach.[19]
WHEREFORE, for gross inefficiency and dishonesty, the respondent Judge Efren B. Mallare is meted
a FINE of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000).
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57343 July 23, 1990

LUISA ECHAUS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EMILIO GONZALES and VIVIAN GONZALES, respondents.
Celso de las Alas for petitioner.
Mary Carolynn S. Que-Albay for private respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Luisa Echaus was duly served with notice of the judgment, and within the thirty-day period then
prescribed for taking an appeal, filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond, as well as a motion for extension
of time to file a record on appeal. 7 The respondent Judge denied the appeal it appearing, in his view, "that
the decision rendered in this case ... was based strictly on the admission, agreement and waiver made by
both parties at the previous pre-trial.." 8
Echaus promptly filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing her appeal. She also filed the
requisite record on appeal. About a week later, however, the respondent Judge ordered the issuance of
a writ of execution in favor of the plaintiffs, the Spouses Emilio Gonzales and Vivian Gonzales. 9
Echaus hied herself off to the Court of Appeals, praying for the issuance of writs of certiorari and
mandamus to annul the decision and orders of respondent Judge, and compel him to give due course to
her appeal. 10 Her action was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
SP-10149-R. Her plea for the writ of certiorari ("to set aside the decision .. in the stated Civil Case No. Q-
26572") was denied, but her plea for the writ of mandamus was GRANTED by the judgment dated February
18, 1980 of the Court of Appeals which accordingly ordered the Judge "to give due course to the appeal of
petitioner in the same said case." 11 The Gonzales Spouses' attempt to have this Court reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals was unsuccessful. Their petition for review on certiorari 12 was denied by
Resolution dated July 11, 1980 because filed late and having, in any case, no merit.
On December 9, 1980, Echaus filed with the Trial Court an "Urgent Motion to Transmit Record on Appeal
and other Pertinent Papers to the Appellate Court," which she set for hearing on December 15, 1980. 13 The
Gonzales Spouses also filed on the same date but apparently at an earlier hour, 14 a "Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal," which they set for hearing on December 18, 1980. 15 Echaus then presented an "Urgent
Supplemental Motion to Implement ... (Judgment) of Court of Appeals dated February 18, 1980" 16 — which
judgment, as aforestated, required respondent Judge to give due course to her appeal.
According to Echaus, at the hearing on December 15, 1980 of her aforesaid motion to transmit record on
appeal and other papers to the Court of Appeals, respondent Judge verbally approved the record on appeal
in open court, this allegedly being "evidenced by the calendar of Branch V .. (showing) the word
'APPROVED' written opposite the incident 'Urgent Motion to Transmit Record on Appeal, etc.,' with
crossed markings. " 17 What was subsequently released by the Court, however, under date of December 15,
1980, was an order signed by His Honor holding "approval of defendant's record on appeal .. in abeyance
until after the consideration and resolution of plaintiffs' .. Motion for Execution Pending Appeal' which is
set for hearing on December 18, 1980 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning." 18
On December 19, 1980 Echaus moved for reconsideration of the Order of December 15, 1980. Without
however waiting for its resolution, she filed on December 29, 1980 a motion in the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. SP-10149-R praying inter alia that the Trial Judge be required to comply with the decision of
February 18, 1980 and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for having thus far
refused to do so. 19
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals denied Echaus's motion for lack of merit, by
Resolution dated March 18, 1981. 20 It observed that "there was no wilful or deliberate refusal to comply
with the decision .. dated February 18, 1980;" that what respondent Judge had been commanded to do by
the decision was that he "should .. proceed to give due course to the appeal by considering and acting"
thereon, but immediate transmittal of said record could not be compelled in the premises "because the
correctness or accuracy .. (thereof) should be first passed upon and certified by the court a quo," even if
there were no opposition thereto. The Court also pointed out that deferment of approval of the record on
appeal had been ordered by the Trial Judge in keeping "with the proper and orderly procedure to the end
that all pending incidents .. before him be first resolved .. in order that said incidents be not rendered moot
and academic by the approval of said ... record on appeal;" and that, citing Laurilla v. Uichangco, et al., 104
Phil. 171 —
A verbal order or a mere notation in the minutes of the calendar of the court a quo ..
indicating approval of the .. record on appeal is, in our view, not yet the ultimate and
requisite formal order of approval of said record on appeal that would divest the court a
quo of its jurisdiction to act on pending incidents. Even a written order approving a record
on appeal may still be subject to a motion for reconsideration of an opposing party. If a
written order which has not acquired finality may still be reconsidered by the court, with
more reason can respondent judge modify his verbal order that has not been implemented
nor even made known to the other party in the case.
The Court of Appeals finally resolved that "as the motion for execution pending appeal is conceded to have
been filed by the plaintiffs before the court below had approved (but only verbally) petitioner's record on
appeal, the court a quo therefore still retained its jurisdiction to resolve the pending motion for execution
pending appeal."
Echaus subsequently asked the Court of Appeals to reconsider the Resolution. The Court of Appeals
refused. But in its Resolution denying reconsideration, dated June 22, 1981, 21 the Court declared that it was
prompted —
.. to enjoin the respondent judge to act upon and set for hearing and resolve at the soonest
time possible, the stated motion for execution pending appeal if this incident is still pending
before that Court, so that there will remain no further reason or cause for withholding his
resolution on the petitioner's record on appeal or such other pleadings and orders as may
be necessary for the perfection of petitioner's appeal. Then upon the formal approval of
the record on appeal the case can be transmitted to this Court, in compliance with the
judgment rendered in this case that the petitioner's appeal be given due course. All these,
respondent judge is strongly urged to act upon with promptness and dispatch.
These Resolutions-of March 18, 1981 and June 22, 1981 — are challenged in the appellate proceeding at bar,
initiated by petition for review on certiorari presented by Echaus.
In this Court, Echaus argues that it was reversible error for the Court of Appeals to have "ignored the fact
that .. (her) appeal had in fact been perfected when the Trial Judge (verbally) ordered the record on appeal
approved on December 15, 1980 and, in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Cabilao
et al. v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, 17 SCRA 992, any further action on the part of the
Trial Judge in the case, particularly on respondent spouses' motion for execution pending appeal is null
and void." 22
The argument is patently without merit and is here given short shrift. In line with the fundamental
principles set forth in the opening paragraph of this opinion, the oral order approving the record on appeal
had no juridical existence; to give it that existence it had to be reduced to writing and promulgated (i.e.,
Med with the clerk of court). 23 But even if it had been written and promulgated, indeed even if it had
already been properly served on the parties, it nonetheless was yet plainly within the power of the Judge
to recall it and set it aside. For every court has the inherent power, among others, to "amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice." 24 And this Court has had occasion
to rule that a trial court may set aside its order approving a record on appeal prior to the transmittal of the
record. 25 So, even conceding arguendo, efficacy to the oral order approving Echaus's record on appeal, the
respondent Judge nevertheless had the power to recall said order, or, as he actually did, hold approval
thereof in abeyance until after he had resolved other pending incidents. This Court thus perceives no error
on the part of the Appellate Court in giving its imprimatur to that act of the respondent Judge in the light
of the attendant circumstances.
To all intents and purposes, Echaus's record on appeal had never been approved. Now, the doctrine
prevailing at the time was that prior to the approval of the record on appeal, the Trial Court retained
jurisdiction to grant execution pending appeal, that approval being in fact the operative act denoting the
end of the court's power to grant execution pending appeal. 26 The respondent Judge, therefore, cannot be
deemed to have acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or to have gravely abused his discretion, in
deferring action on the record on appeal so that he might first resolve the motion for execution pending
appeal.
Of course, as is by now known to all, the rules for taking an appeal to the Court of Appeals, and for
execution pending appeal have since been altered and simplified. Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, appeals
from final judgments or orders of the Regional Trial Court are taken to the Court of Appeals simply by
filing a notice of appeal. 27 The requirement to file an appeal bond 28 or record on appeal has been done
away with, except in special proceedings or actions in which multiple appeals are allowed in which cases
a record on appeal is still needed. 29Under the same BP129, an appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfected upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by either party; and in the exceptional cases where
a record on appeal is still required, the appeal is perfected upon approval thereof. 30 It should however be
noted that a motion for execution pending appeal filed before perfection of an appeal by mere notice, may
still be acted upon and granted after such perfection but before transmittal of the record to the appellate
court. 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN BRANCH 34, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, IRIGA
CITY., A.M. No. 96-12-429-RTC, 2000 February 2, En Banc
DE LEON, JR., J.:
In view of a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases in Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Iriga City, the Court En Banc issued a resolution on January 21, 1997 directing Judge Jose S. Peñas, Jr. to
explain within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice why no administrative sanction should
be imposed on him for: (a) not having been resolute in promulgating his decision in Criminal Case No.
2922; (b) failure to decide within the 90-day reglementary period nineteen (19) cases1 [Nine (9) criminal
cases and ten (10) civil cases.] trial in each of which he completed , ten (10) cases2 [Two criminal cases and
eight (8) civil/other cases.] which he only partly tried, seven (7) cases appealed from the inferior courts,
one (1) special proceeding and two (2) land registration and agrarian cases, despite the submission of the
commissioners' reports; (c) failure to resolve matters pending in thirteen cases;3 [Six (6) criminal cases and
seven (7) civil cases.] (d) designating Sheriff Salvador Guevarra IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
RTC of Iriga City, as special sheriff in Civil Case No. 2176 in spite of the fact that Mr. Job C. Aril is the
regular sheriff assigned thereat; and (e) directing Sheriff Guevarra IV to implement the writ of execution
of the decision in Civil Case No. 2389 instead of Sheriff Aril whom he accused of absenteeism which was,
however, unfounded.4 [Verification from the Leave Section of this Court disclosed that seventeen (17) days
of vacation leave and ten (10) days of sick leave incurred by Sheriff Aril from January to July 1996 does not
constitute absenteeism.]
Judge Peñas ignored our directive. Instead, he filed a petition with this court on June 18, 1999 praying for
the payment of the monetary benefits and other privileges due him for his having compulsorily retired on
December 10, 1996. He claimed to have learned about our Resolution of January 21, 1997 from Acting
Presiding Judge Nilo Malanyaon who replaced him, only in February 1997.
Judge Peñas appealed for compassion to be relieved from having to comply with said resolution for reason
of failing health. He explained that in February 1994, he was diagnosed to have atherosclerotic
cardiovascular disease, ischemic heart disease and aneurysm of the aorta.5 [Medical certificate issued by
Dr. Efren S.J. Nerva marked as Annex "B" of Judge Peñas' Petition dated June 18, 1999.] Thus, he requested
for the designation of Judge Roberto Ranola of Branch 27 of the RTC of Naga City to be his assisting Judge.
While this was denied, a subsequent request for help was granted by the Court. Honorable Lorna
Bagalasca, a presiding Municipal Trial Court Judge in Iriga City was designated to assist Judge Peñas in
interlocutory matters. But Judge Bagalasca was able to lend her assistance only for a short period of time
because she was later appointed as RTC Judge in Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
The petition of Judge Peñas was noted in our Resolution dated July 20, 1999.
This is not the first time that Judge Peñas failed to comply with our orders. He was first fined in the amount
of P8,000.006 [Per a Resolution issued by the Third Division of this Court dated July 27, 1997 in A.M. No.
RTJ-97-1383.] for gross negligence, misconduct and insubordination. And then he was again fined in the
sum of P5,000.00 for serious misconduct and insubordination.7 [Decision in A.M. No. RTJ-97-1398 rendered
by the Second Division of this Court dated February 24, 1998.] To date, he has not yet paid the two (2) fines
in the total sum of P13,000.00. Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that:
1........Retired Judge Jose Peñas, Jr. be allowed to receive the benefits he deserves under the law subject to a
fine in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for non-compliance with the directives in the
Resolution dated January 21, 1997, deductible from said benefits;
2........The Financial Management Office, OCA be directed to deduct from the retirement benefits of Retired
Judge Jose Peñas, Jr. the total amount of Sixty Three Thousand Pesos (P63,000.00) representing the fines
imposed on him in AM RTJ 97-1383 (P8,000.00 - Third Division Resolution dated July 24, 1997), AM RTJ
98-1398 (P5,000.00 - Court 2nd Division Decision dated February 24, 1998) and the present administrative
matter (P50,000.00);
3........Hon. Mulry P. Mendez, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Iriga City be DIRECTED to
(a) DECIDE/RESOLVE all the cases and matters which were left undecided/unresolved by Retired Judge
Jose S. Peñas, Jr. within ninety (90) days after receipt of the records of the cases with complete transcripts
of stenographic notes; (b) take appropriate action for immediate disposition of Criminal Case No. 2922; and
(c) submit to this Court through the OCA within thirty days from notice, a report of his compliance with
the preceding directives; and
4........The Branch Clerk of Court, Wilmentita O. Zorilla, Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Iriga City be
further directed to (a) SUBMIT to this Court through the Office of the Court Administrator, within ten (10)
days from notice, a report of full compliance with the directives in the Resolution dated January 21, 1997
which were addressed to then Branch Clerk of Court Lelu P. Contreras; (b) make a listing of the cases
submitted for decision and the cases with unresolved matters indicating therein their present status and
the completeness of the transcript of stenographic notes (with regard to cases with lacking or incomplete
transcripts, the dates of proceedings and the stenographer who took down the proceedings should be
reflected); (c) submit to acting Presiding Judge Mulry P. Mendez the records of the cases submitted for
decision with complete transcript of stenographic notes for decision writing and (d) submit to this Court
through the OCA within fifteen (15) days from notice, a report of her compliance with the preceding
directives (b ) and (C).8 [Memorandum of the OCA dated October 5, 1999, p. 3.]
The Supreme Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for
decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the
parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.9 [RE: Judge Fernando P. Agdamag, 254 SCRA 644 (1996)]
Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason, constitutes
gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.10 [Celino
vs. Abrogar, 245 SCRA 304 at 310 (1995)] Respondent judge has not only miserably failed in his duties to
dispose of cases promptly and expeditiously but also remained resolute in not complying with the
directives of not just one (1) but three (3) resolutions issued by this court.
Granted that the resolutions were issued after his retirement from the judiciary, Judge Peñas, knowing that
his failing health had prevented a speedy disposition of his cases, should have at least exerted effort to
inform the Court of his predicament at the earliest opportunity. This, he had not even bothered to do until
a year and a half after his compulsory retirement.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the amount of the recommended fine is in order. Failing health, effectively
shown to have prevented a judge from disposing his cases efficiently, mitigates his liability.11 [Diputado-
Baguio vs. Torres, 211 SCRA 1,4 (1992); Re: Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., 247 SCRA 519, 525 (1995); Report on the
Judicial Audit in RTC, Br. 27, Lapu-Lapu City, 289 SCRA 398, 406 (1998)]
WHEREFORE the Court RESOLVES :
(1) to ALLOW Judge Jose S. Peñas, Jr. to receive the retirement benefits due him under the law; however,
he is FINED in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for non-compliance with our Resolution
dated January 21, 1997, deductible from said benefits;
(2) to AUTHORIZE the Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to deduct
from the retirement benefits of Retired Judge Jose S. Peñas, Jr. the total amount of Thirty Three Thousand
Pesos (P33,000.00) representing the fines imposed on him in A.M. RTJ-97-1383 (P8,000.00 - Court [3rd
Division] Resolution dated July 24, 1997), A.M. No. RTJ-98-1398 (P5,000.00 - Court [2nd division] Decision
dated February 24, 1998) and this Administrative Matter (P20,000.00);
(3) to DIRECT Hon. Mulry P. Mendez, Presiding Judge of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga
City to (a) DECIDE/RESOLVE all the cases and matters undecided/unresolved by retired Judge Jose S.
Peñas, Jr., within ninety (90) days after receipt of the records of the cases with complete transcripts of
stenographic notes; (b) to TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION for the immediate disposition of Criminal Case
No. 2922; and (c) SUBMIT to this Court through the OCA, within thirty (30) days from notice, a report of
his compliance with the preceding directives; and
(4) to DIRECT Branch Clerk of Court Wilmentita O. Zorilla, of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga
City, to (a) SUBMIT to this Court through the OCA, within ten (10) days from notice, a report of full
compliance with the directives in the Resolution dated January 21, 1997 which were addressed to then
Branch Clerk of Court Lelu P. Contreras; (b) MAKE A LISTING of the cases submitted for decision and the
cases with unresolved matters indicating therein their present status and the completeness of transcripts of
stenographic notes (with regard to the cases with lacking or incomplete transcripts, the dates of the
proceedings and the stenographer who took down the proceedings should be reflected); (c) SUBMIT to
Acting Presiding Judge Mulry P. Mendez the records of the cases submitted for decision with complete
transcripts of stenographic notes for decision writing; and (d) SUBMIT to this Court, through the OCA,
within fifteen (15) days from notice, a report of her compliance with the preceding directives (b) and (c).
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1337 August 5, 1998

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE WALERICO B. BUTALID,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City, respondent.
A.M. No. 97-8-242-RTC August 5, 1998
Re: Request for the Expeditious Resolution of Civil Case No. 92-07-117 Pending at RTC-Branch 9,
Tacloban City
PER CURIAM:
Respondent is Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City. These are two (2) administrative
cases filed against him for (1) serious misconduct, negligence, and inefficiency for failure to decide 96 cases,
within the 90-day reglementary period, and (2) falsification of public documents.
This case arose from respondent judge's request, for a 90-day extension within which to decide 40 criminal
and civil cases on the alleged ground that the transcripts of stenographic notes taken in the cases were
incomplete.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) discovered that earlier, on September 6, 1995, respondent
judge had been required by then Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Paño to report on the status of 50 cases
which had not been decided within the 90-day limit. Instead of complying with the directive, respondent
judge filed the aforesaid request for extension of time. The OCA found that 27 of the cases covered by
respondent judge's request for extension had already become due for decision in view of the 90-day
reglementary period and yet had remained undecided. Of the 27 cases, 15 had been submitted for decision
way back in 1994. The OCA found that although the transcripts of stenographic notes in some of these cases
were incomplete, the majority of the said cases had been entirely heard by respondent so that he had no
good reason for his failure to decide them on time. Verification made by the OCA of respondent judge's
certificates of service from July 1994 to December 1995 showed that respondent judge had misrepresented
that he had no criminal and civil cases which had not been decided within the 90-day period.
On January 23, 1996, respondent's request for extension of time to decide the cases in question was granted.
At the same time, he was required to comment on the charges of serious misconduct, negligence, and
inefficiency for the delay in deciding the cases, and falsification of his certificates of service.
In a letter dated February 21, 1996, 2 respondent judge explained that the unresolved cases were either
current or could not be decided because they were left by the judges before him without complete
transcripts of stenographic notes. He claimed that efforts were being made to require the stenographers
concerned to submit the transcripts.
With respect to the second charge, respondent alleged that the making of the certificates of service which
he had submitted was "merely routinary" and that he had no intention to falsify them because the fact was
that the true status of the cases was duly reflected in the monthly reports he had submitted to the OCA.
Respondent also averred that he had been suffering from diabetes for the past seven years and that his
failure to decide the 27 cases was due to his illness.
On March 12, 1996, the matter was referred to Associate Justice Arturo B. Buena of the Court of Appeals
for investigation, report, and recommendation. Although respondent had already commented on the
findings of the OCA pursuant to the Court's resolution of January 23, 1996, he was nevertheless required
to submit his answer to the formal administrative complaint subsequently filed against him.
On April 26, 1993, 3 respondent judge filed his answer in which he reiterated what he had said in his
comment. He further stated that if the charges against him were found warranted, he was willing to be
fined in an amount equivalent to his salary for one year, as the OCA had recommended, provided however,
he was allowed to retire under the optional or the disability retirement program.
On January 14, 1997, Associate Justice Buena of the Court of Appeals submitted his report, 4 the pertinent
portions of which state:
The case was set for hearing on July 10, 1996 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon at which both
parties were present. However, the counsel for the Complainant moved for the
postponement of the hearing to July 11, 1996 to afford them more time to study the case.
In the hearing on July 11, 1996, the respondent whom the undersigned investigator noticed
to be disoriented and had difficulty in speaking, manifested that there is no point in
heating the case since he is willing to pay a fine equivalent to one (1) year of his basic salary
as recommended by the OCA provided that he will be allowed to retire under optional or
disability retirement.
Since the respondent was not willing to proceed with the hearing, the undersigned
investigator directed him to submit a written manifestation within ten (10) days so that the
same may be attached to the records to form part thereof.
Respondent alleges [in his manifestation] that most of the undecided cases were inherited
cases from former Judge Gil Sta. Maria (deceased), Benjamin T. Pongos and Fortunato B.
Operario both of whom retired from the service. This could be a valid justification for
respondent's failure to decide these cases, if he did not hear them, in the absence of
complete transcription of the stenographic notes of the proceedings therein. However, he
did not identify said inherited cases in the list of cases for which he requested the Supreme
Court for the three (3) months extension to decide.
That respondent is sick of diabetes mellitus for the past seven years and that he suffered a
mild stroke causing his "slurred speech, body weakness, frequent dizziness and drawling
of saliva", which he cites in his Manifestation is verifiable from his medical record, hence
may be admitted subject to verification. As a matter of fact, the undersigned investigator,
noticed the respondent's physical condition and attributes the same to respondent's
unwillingness to proceed with the full blown investigation scheduled on July 10-11, 1996.
Still, the seriousness of respondent's illness cannot justify his failure to perform his duties.
As ruled in Impao vs. Makilala, 178 SCRA 541:
If indeed respondent found it difficult to discharge the functions of a
municipal judge, then he should have retired voluntarily instead of
clinging to his office at the expense of the litigants, his staff and the general
public.
Respondent further maintains that he is not liable for falsification of his certificates of
service as allegedly explained in his Answer that "them is no falsification of my certificates
of service because the same are submitted to the Supreme Court by the undersigned in
good faith . . . in the sense that the matter of the non-resolution of the 27 civil and criminal
cases beyond the 90-day reglementary period had been conspicuously and repeatedly
placed on record in each and every monthly report of his court without fail or fanfare' is
(sic) not acceptable. The respondent's certificates of service from July, 1994 to December,
1995 (Annexes "A" to "S"; pp. 18-68, Rollo), invariably certify that "all special proceedings,
applications; petitions, motions and all civil and criminal cases which have been under
submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety (90) days or more have
been decided on or before the end of each month.["] Considering that the aforecited
certification in his certificates of service is belied by the fact that there are cases submitted
for decision that have remained undecided for which reason respondent requested for a
three (3) months extension within which to decide them, he cannot escape liability therefor.
Anyway, the respondent was candid enough to admit in his Manifestation that
notwithstanding his explanations, he is of the firm belief that "the same will not exculpate
him from the charges levelled against him by the Office of the Administrator' (p. 3,
Respondent's Manifestation).
In view of the respondent's refusal to proceed with the hearing of this case before the
undersigned Investigator for reasons stated in his Manifestation dated July 26, 1996, no
testimonial evidence can be submitted with this Report. Under the authority of the decision
of the Supreme Court in Uy vs. Mercado, 154 SCRA 567, there is no need to conduct a formal
investigation of this case as the records sufficiently provide a clear basis for determination
of the judge's administrative liability. In addition, the respondent judge's distinct
manifestation that he does not interpose any objection to the recommendation of the Office
of the Court Administrator that he be fined the sum equivalent to his one year salary . . .
for us (sic) long as he is allowed to retire pursuant to the case of Secretary of Justice vs.
Legaspi, 107 SCRA 223, renders the conduct of a full blown investigation of his case
unnecessary.
RECOMMENDATION:
1. On the basis of the records, the respondent judge may be declared guilty of:
(a) delay in the administration of justice amounting to:
(a.1) serious misconduct, negligence and inefficiency
under Rule 140, paragraph 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act of 1948; and
(a. 2) violation of Section 15, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Rules 3.05, 3.08 and 3.09
of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and
(b) falsification of his certificate of service for the period July 1994 to
December 1995.
2. As to the penalty to be imposed upon respondent, it is respectfully recommended that
the penalty of fine equivalent to respondent's salary for one (1) year as recommended by
the OCA to which respondent interposes no objection provided he is allowed to retire, be
imposed upon respondent.
A.M. No. 97-8-242-RTC
This case originated from the letter, dated March 20, 1997, of a certain Alipio Repollo 5 requesting the
speedy resolution of Civil Case No. 92-07-117, entitled "Alipio Repollo v. Asia Copra, Inc., et al.," which had
been pending for decision by respondent judge since May 22, 1996. On August 26, 1997, 6 the Court
required respondent judge to answer.
In his comment dated October 9, 1997, 7 respondent judge informed the Court that he had rendered his
decision in Civil Case No. 92-07-117 on October 7, 1997. He explained that the delay in the decision of the
case was due to his suspension from November 10, 1996 to October 3, 1997 and to the fact that the transcript
of stenographic notes was submitted by the stenographers only on October 6, 1997. (Judge Butalid was
suspended by the Court in another administrative case against him, i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-98-1407, OCA vs.
Judge Walerico B. Butalid [formerly A.M. No. 96-10-372-RTC, Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted
in RTC, Branch 9, Tacloban City], for (1) gross dishonesty for misrepresenting to the Court that the reason
for his failure to decide cases was the fact that transcripts of stenographic notes were incomplete and for
altering the dates when seven (7) cases were submitted for decision to make it appear that they were
decided within the reglementary period; (2) gross insubordination for refusing to allow the audit team from
the OCA to conduct physical inventory of the records of cases pending in his sala as ordered by this Court;
and (3) gross inefficiency for failure to decide 71 other cases beyond the prescribed period.)
On December 4, 1997, Judge Frisco T. Lilagan submitted to the Court the list of cases pending before
respondent judge.
The Court then referred this matter to the OCA for evaluation.
On March 17, 1998, the OCA submitted a report 8 stating:
The aforestated decision rendered by Judge Butalid in Civil Case No. 92-07-117 renders
moot and academic the request of Mr. Repollo. What remains to be resolved is the plight
of cases still pending decision, to wit:
Criminal Criminal Civil Cases Civil Cases
Cases Nos. Cases No. Nos. Nos.
89-03-98 93-10-654 5034 93-10-183
89-03-98 93-12-772 6375 93-11-202
89-03-100 94-01-084 6995 93-12-243
90-04-142 94-01-085 7025 6902
90-02-52 94-03-163 7723 89-01-005
90-10-444 94-09-430 7050 92-08-005
90-12-576 94-09-445 7323 94-01-05
91-04-195 94-09-446 7545 94-08-141
91-10-676 94-09-452 89-06-084 95-05-46
91-10-681 94-10-470 89-11-190 95-10-155
92-01-43 94-12-532 90-01-014 95-11-149
92-01-44 94-12-553 89-12-214 96-04-44
92-03-132 95-01-15 90-08-139 96-08-101
92-03-133 95-02-44 90-10-176 96-08-109
92-09-435 95-02-522 90-10-180 96-09-113
92-09-437 95-08-292 90-09-156
92-09-438 95-08-294 92-07-130 LRC Case No.
N-311
92-09-439 95-07-260 93-01-13
92-06-243 95-09-448 93-03-37
93-06-378 95-11-557 93-02-31
93-06-388 95-12-583 93-05-82
93-07-438 96-05-165 93-08-37
93-08-529 93-09-177
Two matters have come about from Mr. Alipio's letter-request, to wit: (1) the resolution of
Civil Case No. 92-07-177; and (b) the information that there are many other cases pending
decision in Branch 9.
On the first, it is noted that Judge Butalid decided Civil Case No. 92-07-177 after notice of
request albeit delay was already incurred in terminating the case. May it be recalled that
the case was submitted for decision on May 22, 1996 per information of Mr. Repollo, while
Judge Butalid was placed under preventive suspension only on November 10, 1996.
On the second matter arising from this concern, it appears propitious to interject other
pending administrative matters involving undecided cases pending in Branch 9, to wit:
1. A.M. No. RTJ-96-1337 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Walerico B. Butalid)
where this Office recommended that respondent be FINED in the amount equivalent to
his ONE (1) YEAR SALARY for falsification of public documents land twenty-seven
unresolved cases beyond the reglementary period; and
2. A.M. No. 96-10-372-RTC (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City) where this Office recommended that respondent be
SUSPENDED for SIX (6) MONTHS for gross negligence and inefficiency amounting to
misconduct in office for several cases decided and pending beyond reglementary period.
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1337 covers twenty-seven (27) cases pending decision beyond the
reglementary period.
A.M. No. 96-10-372-RTC, on the other hand, particularly the second judicial audit spans
over ninety-four (94) cases decided or still pending decision after the lapse of the ninety-
four (90) day period. The number is reduced to seventy-one (71) if exclusive of the cases
already covered by A.M. No. RTJ-96-1337.
The instant A.M. No. 97-8-242-RTC. . . on the other hand, manifests seventy three (73) cases
pending decision, sixty-nine (69), excluding the cases falling under the aforementioned
administrative matters. Atty. Lagado failed to mention in his Memo Receipt whether these
cases are still within the reglementary period to decide. Efforts to verify the dates of
submission of the cases for dicision went to naught when verification of the monthly report
of cases submitted by Branch 9 for October 1997, particularly Item No. V [under the head
"LIST OF CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION BUT NOT YET DECIDED AT THE END
OF THE MONTH — Include Cases Previously Submitted For Decision That Are Still
Undecided"] shows "NONE" thereunder. It is noteworthy to mention likewise that Branch
9 failed to submit its semestral reports both for June 1997 and December 1997, hence, there
appears no means to secure the information needed.
This Office, however, respectfully makes its intelligent deduction that based on the following
premises, the due date of each case is well beyond the reglementary period:
a) Judge Butalid could not have ordered submitted (sic) for decision all the cases contained
in the list within the three month period prior to his preventive suspension on November
10, 1996 so that they could be considered still within the reglementary period when his
service was interrupted;
b) Judge Navidad, who assumed as acting presiding judge of Branch 9, could not have
ordered submitted (sic) for decision all the cases contained in the list within the almost
eleven month assignment at Branch 9; and
c) even between them they could not have accumulated the said number of cases submitted
for decision.
This Office is impressed anew of Judge Butalid's evident disregard of the constitutional
mandate to decide cases within the period provided. All the administrative matters pending
reflect at least one hundred (100) cases, more or less, submitted for decision which remain pending
decision and others decided well beyond the deadline.
Judge Butalid's conduct is clearly prejudicial to the service and not concordant with the
interest of justice. The number of cases pending decision in his sala defines the quality of
justice he serves. One can just imagine with sympathy the agonies of the litigants who
await that justice be served. As oft said "Justice delayed is justice denied." It is respectfully
advanced that on the merit of this observation, he has relinquished his prerogative and
fitness to remain in the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that: (a) A.M.
No. RTJ-96-1337 and A.M. No. 96-10-372-RTC be CONSOLIDATED with A.M. No. 97-8-
242-RTC; (b) Judge Butalid be DISMISSED from the service for utter failure to render the
quality of performance required of a member of the judiciary in all the three administrative
matters. (Emphasis supplied)
FINDINGS
Based on the reports of Associate Justice Buena, in A.M. No. RTJ-96-1337, and the OCA, in A.M. No. 97-8-
242-RTC, the Court finds respondent Judge Walerico B. Butalid guilty as charged.
First. Respondent failed to decide within the 90-day reglementary period a total of 96 cases which had been
submitted for decision, 27 in A.M. No. RTJ-96-1337 and 69 in A.M. No. 97-8-242-RTC. Section 15 of Article
VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate
courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
To implement the constitutional mandate, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides:
A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges — may it not be said without success — the need to
decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied.
Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. 9 Hence,
judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them. 10
The Court finds respondent judge's failure to decide 96 cases within the time required by law to be
inexcusable. He claims that some of these cases were left by his predecessors without complete transcripts
of stenographic notes. Respondent judge has not specified, however, which of the cases were "inherited"
by him. On the other hand, the OCA found that the majority of these cases had been entirely heard by
respondent judge so that there is really no reason why he was not able to decide them within the prescribed
period. The fact that the stenographic notes have not yet been transcribed is not a valid excuse for his failure
to decide the cases. As this Court has time and again emphasized, regardless of the availability of the
transcript of stenographic notes, the 90-day period for deciding cases should be observed by all
judges, 11 unless they have been granted additional time to dispose of cases.
Respondent judge claims that he has been suffering from diabetes for the last seven (7) years and that he
recently suffered a mild stroke which impaired his ability to dispose of cases. The demands of public service
cannot, however, abide his illness. Respondent judge could have followed the suggestion made in another
case to retire voluntarily instead of clinging to his post at the expense of the litigants and the public in
general if he found it difficult to discharge the functions of his office. 12 Or he could have asked for extension
of time to dispose of these cases instead of allowing the period for deciding to lapse. 13 He did neither. He
requested an extension of time only on November 16, 1995, that is, after he had already been required to
report on the status of 50 unresolved cases on September 6, 1995 and the period for deciding cases had
lapsed.
It is clear from the foregoing that respondent judge had no reason for not being able to decide cases on
time. The fact that, after being required by the Court to explain, respondent judge was able to decide the
27 cases in A.M. No. RTJ-96-1337 negates his claim that because of illness and the unavailability of the
transcripts of stenographic notes in some cases, he was not able to dispose of his cases on time. This fact
shows quite clearly that with due diligence, respondent judge could have decided the cases within the time
prescribed by law.
Second. Respondent judge contends that he considered the making of certificates of service to be "merely
routinary" and that although he stated in the certificates he submitted for the period July 1994 to December
1995 that he had no case submitted for decision within 90 days of the making of the certificates, he never
had any criminal intent to falsify. He cites the fact that the true status of the cases was faithfully reflected
in his monthly reports of cases submitted to OCA.
This contention makes a mockery of the certificate of service. As this Court has said, a certificate of service
is an instrument essential to the fulfillment by the judges of their duty to speedily dispose of their cases as
mandated by the Constitution. 14 A judge who fails to decide cases within the prescribed period but collects
his salary upon a false certificate is guilty of dishonesty and deserves the condemnation of all right thinking
men.
Respondent's assertion that the certificate of service is a mere routine requirement, and that in any event,
the Court has no basis for disciplining him because neither this Court nor Congress has provided for any
sanction for the failure of judges to decide cases submitted within the period prescribed by the Constitution
smacks of arrogance and defiance which warrant his dismissal from the service and the rejection of his offer
to be fined for his infractions provided he is allowed to retire either under the optional or the disability
program.
Under Section 6 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has administrative supervision of
all courts and the personnel thereof. The Court's power of supervision carries with it the power to discipline
and impose appropriate sanctions for the commission of administrative offenses. Indeed, this is the first
time the authority of the Court to discipline judges for failure to decide cases on time has been questioned.
To the contrary, in a case, 15 a judge was dismissed from the service for gross inefficiency for failure to
decide 91 cases beyond the prescribed period, and for falsification of his certificates of service. In the instant
case, Judge Butalid failed to decide 96 cases within the 90-day reglementary period, and falsified his
certificates of service from July 1994 to December 1995 in order to conceal his failure. The Court cannot
compromise on the enforcement of the duty of judges to decide cases on time. We have time and again said
that judges should be the embodiment of competence and integrity. 16Respondent judge failed to live up to
the honor and responsibilities of his office. His transgressions, taken in their totality, justify the imposition
of the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service. 17
THE PENALTY
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules implementing Book V of Executive Order 292, the
Administrative Code of 1987, gross negligence in the performance of duty, dishonesty, and falsification of
public document are considered grave offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is prescribed. Section 9
of the said Rule likewise provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of leave credits, and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for re-employment in the
government service. This penalty is without prejudice to criminal liability of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Walerico Butalid is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits and leave credits to which he may be entitled, and with prejudice to his re-
employment in any branch or agency of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
This decision is immediately executory and respondent judge is directed to cease and desist from
performing the functions of his office.
SO ORDERED
MOLINTO D. PAGAYAO, complainant, vs. FAUSTO H. IMBING, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Presiding Judge Fausto Imbing, was charged with (a) grave abuse of authority; and (b) gross ignorance
of the law.
respondent judge maintained that he did not err in crediting the two mitigating circumstances to the
accused and in sentencing him to only 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 6 years. The error in the dates of the
Orders he issued on September 6, 1989 granting the accused's application for probation and for temporary
liberty was committed by his clerk who inadvertently dated them September 4, 1989. An affidavit of Staff
Assistant II, acknowledging the mistake, was attached by the respondent judge.
HELD:
There is no evidence on record to show that the respondent acted in bad faith or with malice in issuing the
orders and the judgment complained of. In all probability, he simply committed an error of law without
the least intent to perpetrate an injustice or to give undue favor to the accused.
A judge is not administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision rendered provided he
acts in good faith and without malice. The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is not an administrative
charge against the judge but an appeal or petition for review of his decision. Where a judge good faith has
not been put in issue, the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties must be
conceded to him.
While we agree that judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional
mistakes or errors of judgment, it is, however, highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic
legal principles. Unfortunately, respondent judge was short of this standard. We find respondent judges
excuse of relaxing this basic rule unjustifiable.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Fausto H. Imbing is found GUILTY for Gross
Ignorance of the Law and is hereby FINED (P10,000.00)
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-88-184 October 13, 1989

CALI A. IMPAO, DANIEL M. ESPERAT and NENA E. HERRERA, petitioners, vs. JUDGE JACOSALEM
D. MAKILALA, respondent.
Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Maganoy,
Maguindanao and Designated Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ampatuan-
Sultan Sa Barongis, Maguindanao was charged in three separate complaints by the employees of the above
mentioned courts with gross misconduct, falsification, abuse of authority and neglect and irregularity in
the performance of duties.
It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free
from the appearance of impropriety. The behavior of respondent judge complained of and proven in this
case, i.e., his acceptance of a bribe, his holding office and conducting hearings at his residence, his
falsification of his daily time record, his failure to observe proper decorum in conducting court proceedings,
his intemperate language and threats against the personnel of his courts, and his use of physical violence
against Daniel Esperat, among others, shows beyond doubt his unfitness to occupy the position of a
municipal judge. Respondent judge violated the established norms for judicial behavior, and the best
interest of the judiciary demands that respondent be dismissed from the service.
WHERERORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala guilty of serious misconduct and
abuse of authority and is hereby DISMISSED from the service. Any retirement benefits due him are hereby
ordered FORFEITED to the government.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 2252-CFI January 18, 1982

RUFINO IGNACIO, complainant,
vs.
HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX,
Pasay City, respondent.
Respondent Manuel Valenzuela, stands charged of serious misconduct by Rufino Ignacio, a litigant in
respondent's sala. Capsulated, the charge is that the respondent took an undue personal interest in a case
by resolving favorably a motion to quash a temporary restraining order despite the fact that he was on
vacation.
the respondent heard the motion to quash the restraining order in his chambers wearing only a polo jacket
and on the next day he granted the motion. It should be noted that on both days the respondent was on
leave as stated in his certificate of service.
HELD:
As the Supreme Court held in Tan v. Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306, 315 (1976) 'judges should not only be impartial
but should also appear impartial . . . [and] while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they
can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such
a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality.
As already stated, the evidence does not warrant a finding that the respondent took undue personal interest
in the case before him. The legality of his order was in fact sustained by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, as recommended, the respondent judge is hereby ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his
salary for one month. He is further warned that misconduct on his part in the future will place him in grave
peril.
SO ORDERED.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE

PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG
PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO
ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), sent a letter [1] requesting this
Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." [2]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, expressed its own concern on the live television and radio
coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage can negate
the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal
trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice
system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto
themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable
only if popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but
will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so involving as they
do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's focal
points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events has
left a still divided nation. Must these events be invited anew and risk the relative stability that has thus far
been achieved? The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to, turn a blind eye to yet another
possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the business of the courts
in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the standing rule of the court
contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious.
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance
forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty to bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety
nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL
the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA
Network, Inc., relatives of the victims in Maguindanao Massacre,[1] individual journalists[2] from various
media entities, and members of the academe[3] filed a petition before this Court praying that live television
and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras,
tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable
guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. [4]
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners
correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass
the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.[24] and Estrada v. Desierto,[25] that the
right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per
se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not
tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the
impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the private complainants/families of the
victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom.
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the
interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right
itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it
takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent
limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC
VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. Melvin Mane v. Judge Medel Belen

Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant) charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (respondent), of demean[ing],
humiliat[ing] and berat[ing] him during a hearing in which he was counsel for the plaintiff.
The happening of the incident complained of by herein complainant was never denied by the
respondent judge. If at all, respondent judge merely raised his justifications for his complained
actuations.
The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not the statements and actions made by the
respondent judge during the subject February 27, 2006 hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of
a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
HELD:
. . . [A] judges official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free
from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A judge must at all times be
temperate in his language. Respondent judges insulting statements which tend to question
complainants capability and credibility stemming from the fact that the latter did not graduated
[sic] from UP Law school is clearly unwarranted and inexcusable. When a judge indulges in
intemperate language, the lawyer can return the attack on his person and character, through an
administrative case against the judge, as in the instant case.
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of
the courts for the litigants.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt
that his integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-
quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal
discourse.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge
and is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
Atty. Guazon v. Judge Rufon
Judge Anastacio C. Rufon was charged for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rule
on Gender-Fair Language, use of foul, or obscene and discriminatory language, discrimination against
women lawyers and litigants and unethical conduct.
HELD:
Judicial decorum requires a magistrate to be at all times temperate in his language,[3] refraining
from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting to language of vilification. [4] It is very essential
that they live up to the high standards demanded by Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary[5] which provides:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. x x x
In Fidel v. Caraos,[6] we held that although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language
to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and
out of the court.Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and
in language.[7]
Thus, we declare respondent judge guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct considered a light
charge under Section 10(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, punishable under Section 11(C) of the
same Rule, by:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00, but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure
3. Reprimand
4. Admonition with warning
WINNIE C. LUCENTE and ALICIA G. DOMINGO, complainants, vs.ATTY. CLETO L. EVANGELISTA,

JR., respondent.
Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. was charged with gross misconduct, deceit, malpractice and crimes involving
moral turpitude for falsification of public documents.
Complainants alleged that respondent is the son of the late Atty. Cleto Evangelista, who during his lifetime
notarized a Deed of Quitclaim and a Deed of Absolute Sale. That respondent Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. issued
certified true copies of the said instruments. On the basis of the certified true copies of the subject deeds, the Register
of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of Asuncion T. Yared.
HELD:
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to
act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general.[7] It must
be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. [8] For this reason, notaries
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.[9]
Complainants did not engage in forum shopping as defined in Administrative Circular No. 28-91 when they
filed the instant case. Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.
Neither does res adjudicata lie against the complainants. Similarly, the doctrine applies only to judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Courts administrative powers,[10] as in this case.
Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. is found guilty of gross misconduct. Consequently, he is
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately.

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A.M. No.

RTJ-92-802 July 5, 1993

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge ROLANDO A. FLORDELIZA is hereby HELD

SENA TE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE

AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.

In a subsequent Resolution dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment

Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.

14 G.R. No. 200242

15 G.R. No. 200242

EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 196231, 2014-01-28

[A.M. NO. 09-2-19-SC : February 24, 2009]

B.M. Nos. 979 and 986 December 10, 2002

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC

October 12, 2010

The Courts Rulings

The Passages from Tams

The Passages from Ellis

65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case Western

But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction was missing

The inalienable character of juridical personality.23

WHEREFORE, in view of all of the above, the Court:

A.M. No. 3135 February 17, 1988

MARY JANE VALLENTOS JAMIN, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1616

October 17, 2007

JUDGE MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, MCTC,

As it were, the respondent judge, by submitting, as Annex 5 of

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely

A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public

SEC.11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge any of the

1. Dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge

KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, G.R. No. 179895

December 18, 2008

Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-Request/Complaint[4] of September 5, 2007, implored respondent

Hence, this petition, positing that:

IN OCTOBER OF 1998, RESPONDENT WAS NOT DULY-QUALIFIED UNDER THE FIRST

First, on the objection concerning the verification of the petition.

Certiorari with respect to the OSG

The pertinent rules of Rule 66 on quo warranto provide:

SECTION 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation

Certiorari and Prohibition with respect to Ong

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC

REYES, R.T., J.:

FREEDOM of the press and judicial independence (kalayaan ng pamamahayag at

September 18, 2007

Bribery in the Court

Heres the clue

September 19, 2007

The Bribe Giver

September 20, 2007

Cecilia, please save the court

The secretary is a niece of the late justice and a namesake.

September 21, 2007

Wrong date, same facts

On September 25, 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution stating

Upon evaluation of the columns Business Circuit of Amado P. Macasaet in

According to the Committee

AMADO P. MACASAET testified on January 10, 2008 but, as expected, he

By his own conclusion, the boxes of money were delivered on different

Notwithstanding the lack of confirmation and the paucity of details as to the

The following statements in Macasaets columns appear to the Supreme Court to