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SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, INC. VS SAN MIGUEL CORP.

EMPLOYEES UNION PTWGO


GR NO. 168569, October 5, 2007.

FACTS

On November 9, 1992, some employees of SMFIs Finance Department, through San Miguel Corporation
Employees Union PTWGO (the Union) represented by Edgar Moraleda, brought a grievance against
Finance Manager Montesa for discrimination, favoritism, unfair labor practices, harassment, promoting
divisiveness and sectarianism. At the grievance meeting, SMFI promised to address the grievance through
a work management review but the same was not fulfilled prompting the Union to file a complaint before
NLRC Arbitration Branch, against SMFI, its President Amadeo P. Veloso, and its Finance
Manager Montesa for unfair labor practice, unjust discrimination in matters of promotion and the violation
of the collective bargaining agreement under Article 248 of the Labor Code.

SMFI et al. filed a motion to dismiss contending that the issues raised in the complaint were grievance
issues and, therefore, should be resolved in the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. This case was
elevated to the Court of Appeals which held that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the complaint of
the Union, they having violated the seniority rule under the CBA. Hence, this present petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether or not the complaint is one for unfair labor practice (ULP) over which a Labor Arbiter has
jurisdiction

RULING

YES. Article 248(i), for violation of a CBA, is qualified by Article 261 of the Labor Code which provides
that “xxx violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall
no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations shall mean flagrant and/or malicious
refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.

As reflected in the allegations of the Union in its Position Paper, the Union charges SMFI to have violated
the grievance machinery provision in the CBA. The grievance machinery provision in the CBA is not an
economic provision, hence, the second requirement for a Labor Arbiter to exercise jurisdiction of a ULP is
not present. The Union likewise charges SMFI, however, to have violated the Job Security provision in the
CBA, specifically the seniority rule, in that SMFI appointed less senior employees to positions at its Finance
Department, consequently intentionally by-passing more senior employees who are deserving of said
appointment. Since the seniority rule in the promotion of employees has a bearing on salary and benefits,
it may, following a liberal construction of Article 261 of the Labor Code, be considered an economic
provision of the CBA.

It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or flagrant violation of the seniority rule under
the CBA, a ULP over which the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals having affirmed the
NLRC decision finding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the Unions complaint and thus
remanding it to the Labor Arbiter for continuation of proceedings thereon, the appellate courts said finding
may be taken to have been made only for the purpose of determining jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.


PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 168612, December 10, 2014

FACTS

Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and repairs
of high voltage transformers while PWU is a legitimate labor organization and the exclusive bargaining
representative of PHILEC’s rank-and-file employees. PHILEC and its rank-and-file employees were
governed by collective bargaining agreement providing for the steps in increasing the employee’s basic
salary in case of promotion. PWU members claimed that schedule of training allowance did not conform
to Article X of their CBA. For PHILEC’s failure to apply the schedule of step increases, PWU argued that
PHILEC committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.

PHILEC disputed PWU’s claim of unfair labor practice. According to PHILEC, it did not violate its
collective bargaining agreement with PWU when it implemented the "Modified SGV" scale. Even
assuming that it violated the collective bargaining agreement, PHILEC argued that its violation was not
"gross" or a "flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of [the collective
bargaining agreement]." PHILEC, therefore, was not guilty of unfair labor practice

PWU and PHILEC decided to settle their grievance to voluntary arbitration. PHILEC contends that they
applied Modified “SGV” pay grades to avoid salary distortion. However, Voluntary Arbitrator held that
PHILEC violated its CBA with PWU, therefore ordering the PHILEC to pay the PWU members allowance
based on their CBA. PHILEC filed a petition for certiorari on Court of Appeals (CA), alleging that
Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abused its discretion in rendering his decision, but the CA affirmed the
decision of Voluntary Arbitrator. PHILEC filed its petition before the SC for review on certiorari insisting
that they did not violate their CBA with PWU.

ISSUE

Whether or not Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abuse its discretion in directing PHILEC to pay the training
allowance based on CBA with PWU.

RULING

No, the Voluntary Arbitrator did not gravely abuse its discretion. The Voluntary Arbitrator correctly
awarded training allowances based on the amounts and formula of the CBA. A Collective Bargaining
Agreement is “a contract executed upon the request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees incorporating the agreement reached after the negotiations with respect to
wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting
any grievances or questions arising under such agreement.” A collective bargaining agreement being a
contract, its provisions “constitute the law between the parties” and must be complied with in good faith.
Therefore, the allowance of the members of the PWU must be computed based on Article X of their CBA.
Moreover, PHILEC allegedly applied the “Modified SGV” pay grade scale to prevent any salary distortion
within PHILEC’s enterprise. This, however, does not justify PHILEC’s non-compliance with the collective
bargaining agreement. This pay grade scale is not provided in the collective bargaining agreement. It could
have invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code, to incorporate the “Modified SGV” pay grade scale in its
collective bargaining agreement with PWU. But it did not. Therefore PHILEC cannot insist on the
“Modified SGV” pay grade scale’s application.
CELESTINO VIVIERO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 138938, October 24, 2000.

FACTS

Petitioner Vivero, a licensed seaman, is a member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union
of the Philippines (AMOSUP). The Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by AMOSUP and private
respondents provides that any grievance, dispute or misunderstanding concerning any ruling, practice,
wages or working conditions shall be brought to the attention of the grievance committee before either party
takes any action, legal or otherwise. It further provides that if the Committee fails to act on the dispute
within seven days, the same shall be referred to a Voluntary Arbitration committee.

On 01 August 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and pursuant to the CBA, grievance
proceedings were conducted; however, parties failed to reach and settle the dispute amicably, thus, on 28
November 1994, complainant filed a complaint with the POEA. While the case was pending, private
respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case
considering petitioner Vivero's failure to refer it to a Voluntary Arbitration Committee in accordance with
the CBA between the parties.

This case reached the Court of Appeals which held that the CBA "is the law between the parties and
compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law." Hence, petitioner should have followed
the provision in the CBA requiring the submission of the dispute to the Voluntary Arbitration Committee
once the Grievance Committee failed to settle the controversy. It further ruled that a case falling under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter as provided under Art. 217 of the Labor Code may be lodged instead with
a Voluntary Arbitrator because the law prefers, or gives primacy, to voluntary arbitration instead of
compulsory arbitration.

Vivero, in his petition for review, claims that his complaint for illegal dismissal was undeniably a
termination dispute and did not, in any way, involve an "interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreement" or "interpretation" or "enforcement" of company personnel policies. Thus, it should
fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and its Labor Arbiter, and not with a
Voluntary Arbitrator, in accordance with Art. 217 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE

Whether or not the NLRC is deprived of jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases whenever a CBA provides
for grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration proceedings

RULING

It may be observed that under Policy Instruction No. 56 of the Secretary of Labor, termination cases arising
in or resulting from the interpretation and implementation of collective bargaining agreements and
interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies which were initially processed at the various
steps of the plant-level Grievance Procedures under the parties' collective bargaining agreements fall within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Art. 217 (c) and Art. 261 of
the Labor Code; and, if filed before the Labor Arbiter, these cases shall be dismissed by the Labor Arbiter
for lack of jurisdiction and referred to the concerned NCMB Regional Branch for appropriate action towards
an expeditious selection by the parties of a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators based on the
procedures agreed upon in the CBA.
The instant case is a termination dispute falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter, and does not specifically involve the application, implementation or enforcement of company
personnel policies contemplated in Policy Instruction No. 56. Consequently, Policy Instruction No. 56 does
not apply in the case at bar. In any case, private respondents never invoked the application of Policy
Instruction No. 56 in their Position Papers, neither did they raise the question in their Motion to
Dismiss which they filed nine (9) months after the filing of their Position Papers. At this late stage of the
proceedings, it would not serve the ends of justice if this case is referred back to a Voluntary Arbitrator
considering that both the AMOSUP and private respondents have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter by filing their respective Position Papers and ignoring the grievance procedure set forth in their
CBA.

After the grievance proceedings have failed to bring about a resolution, AMOSUP, as agent of petitioner,
should have informed him of his option to settle the case through voluntary arbitration. Private respondents,
on their part, should have timely invoked the provision of their CBA requiring the referral of their
unresolved disputes to a Voluntary Arbitrator once it became apparent that the grievance machinery failed
to resolve it prior to the filing of the case before the proper tribunal. The private respondents should not
have waited for nine (9) months from the filing of their Position Paper with the POEA before it moved to
dismiss the case purportedly for lack of jurisdiction. As it is, private respondents are deemed to have waived
their right to question the procedure followed by petitioner, assuming that they have the right to do so.
Under their CBA, both Union and respondent companies are responsible for selecting an impartial arbitrator
or for convening an arbitration committee; yet, it is apparent that neither made a move towards this end.
Consequently, petitioner should not be deprived of his legitimate recourse because of the refusal of both
Union and respondent companies to follow the grievance procedure.

WHEREFORE, the case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter to dispose of the case with dispatch until
terminated considering the undue delay already incurred.
NYK-FIL SHIP MANAGEMENT, INCORPORATED vs. GENER G. DABU
G.R. No. 225142, September 13, 2017

FACTS

Petitioner NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc. hired respondent Gener G. Dabu to work as oiler for nine
months on board the vessel M/V Hojin. While in Sri Lanka, the respondent’s diabetes mellitus was poorly
controlled, hence he was declared unfit for sea duty. He was repatriated to Manila on April 12, 2013. Upon
his arrival, he was immediately referred to the company-designated physician who later on declared that
respondent's diabetes mellitus is not work-related. Respondent wrote letters to petitioner appealing for the
continuation of his treatment since his sickness was work-related taking into account his 23 years of
working in petitioner's various vessels. Respondent sought payment of disability benefits from petitioner,
but was denied. He requested for a grievance proceedings in accordance with the CBA, however, the parties
did not reach any settlement. He then filed a notice to arbitrate with the National Conciliation Mediation
Board (NCMB), and the parties were required to submit their position papers.

On November 28, 2014, the NCMB-Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA) rendered a Decision dismissing
the claim for lack of merits. Petitioner received a copy of the PVA decision on February 9, 2015 and filed
with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 on February 24, 2015 alleging that the PVA committed
serious errors in rendering its decision and sought to enjoin the PVA from enforcing its decision.
Respondent raised in his memorandum that the petition should be dismissed for being filed out of time.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed gross error in dismissing the Petitioner's appeal on the
ground that it was allegedly filed out of time.

RULING

Art. 262-A of the Labor Code provides that the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator becomes final
and executory after 10 days from receipt thereof. The proper remedy to reverse or modify is to appeal the
award or decision via a petition under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. And under Section 4
of Rule 43, the period to appeal to the CA is 15 days from receipt of the decision. Notwithstanding, since
Article 262-A of the Labor Code expressly provides that the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator
shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the decision by the parties, the
appeal of the VA decision to the CA must be filed within 10 days.

Furthermore, under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution, this court "shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights" in promulgating rules of procedure in courts. The 10-day period to appeal
under the Labor Code being a substantive right, this period cannot be diminished, increased, or modified
through the Rules of Court.

Anent petitioner's allegation that he had not obtained knowledge of the prescriptive period stated in the
PHILEC decision because of the proximity of time from its promulgation to the filing of the petition with
the CA, there was no proof presented that the decision had not yet been published in the court's website at
the time of the filing of the petition with the CA.

As the PVA decision is already final and executory when petitioner filed the petition with the CA, the CA
correctly dismissed the petition since it has no more appellate jurisdiction to review the decision.
ROGELIO BARONDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AND HIDECO SUGAR MILLING CO., INC.
G.R. No. 161006, October 14, 2015

FACTS

While employed as a mud press truck driver in Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (HIDECO), the petitioner
Rogelio Baronda hit HIDECO's transmission lines, causing a total factory blackout from 9:00 pm until 2:00
am of the next day. Thereafter, the management conducted its investigation, and, finding him guilty of
negligence, informed him of the decision to terminate his employment. The petitioner then filed in the
Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board in Tacloban City a
complaint for illegal dismissal against HIDECO.

Voluntary Arbitrator Antonio C. Lopez, Jr. handled the case and eventually rendered his decision on
January 13, 1999 by finding the petitioner's dismissal illegal, and ordering his reinstatement. Voluntary
Arbitrator Lopez, Jr. deemed the petitioner's separation from the service from June 16, 1998 to January 15,
1999 as a suspension from work without pay, and commanded him to pay on installment basis the damages
sustained by HIDECO from the May 1, 1998 incident he had caused

On May 17, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for execution praying that a writ of execution requiring
HIDECO to pay to him unpaid wages, 13th month pay and bonuses from January 16, 2001, the date when
his reinstatement was effected, until his actual reinstatement. The motion was granted by the Voluntary
Arbitrators. HIDECO then filed a petition for certiorari which averred that the Voluntary Arbitrator had
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. CA granted the petition.

ISSUES

Whether or not the CA erred in granting HIDECO's petition for certiorari despite its procedural flaws; and
whether or not the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision was executory pending
appeal.

RULING

The CA erred in granting HIDECO's petition for certiorari. The order issued on July 25, 2001 by the
Voluntary Arbitrator, albeit directing the execution of the award or decision, was a final order, as contrasted
from a merely interlocutory order, because its issuance left nothing more to be done or taken by the
Voluntary Arbitrator in the case. The proper remedy from such order was to appeal to the CA by petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Yet, HIDECO filed the petition for certiorari, not a petition
for review under Rule 43, and the CA liberally treated the petition for certiorari as a petition for review
under Rule 43. The Court held that such treatment by the CA was procedurally unwarranted.

To begin with, even if the error sought to be reviewed concerned grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Voluntary Arbitrator, the remedy was an appeal in due course by filing the petition for review within
10 days from notice of the award or decision. This was because certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, was
available only when there was no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. In other words, the justification for HIDECO's resort to the extraordinary equitable remedy
of certiorari did not exist due to the availability of appeal, or other ordinary remedies in law to which
HIDECO as the aggrieved party could resort.
Although the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration or of an appeal forestalls the finality of the
decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator, the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's
decision or award remains executory regardless of the filing of such motion for reconsideration or appeal.
This immediate reinstatement of the employee pending the appeal has been introduced by Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6715, which amended Article 223 of the Labor Code, to wit: “In any event, the decision
of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal.” There is no reason to obstruct the
reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator, or to treat it any less than the reinstatement that is
ordered by the Labor Arbiter. The reinstatement order by the Voluntary Arbitrator should have the same
authority, force and effect as that of the reinstatement order by the Labor Arbiter not only to encourage
parties to settle their disputes through this mode, but also, and more importantly, to enforce the
constitutional mandate to protect labor, to provide security of tenure, and to enhance social justice.
TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP.
GR No. 170007, April 7, 2014.

FACTS

After several meetings between the company Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and its Union Tabangao
Shell Refinery Employees Association, the company proposed the declaration of a deadlock and
recommended that the help of a third party be sought. The union filed a notice of strike in the NCMB,
alleging bad faith bargaining on the part of the company. The NCMB immediately summoned the parties
for the mandatory conciliation mediation proceedings but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
The DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute of the parties. The Secretary ruled that the
company is not guilty of bargaining in bad faith and also proceeded to decide on the matter of the wage
increase and other economic issues of the new CBA.
The union contended that the Secretary erred in
assuming jurisdiction over the CBA case because the case was all about unfair labor
practice in the form of bad faith bargaining and that the controversy
is not the subject matter of the notice of strike. For its part, the company argues that the Secretary of Labor
and Employment correctly assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the parties. The company
claims that it is engaged in an industry that is vital to the national interest, and that the evidence on record
established that there was already a full-blown labor dispute between the company and the union arising
from the deadlock in CBA negotiations. The company insists that the alleged bad faith on its part, which
the union claimed to have prevented any CBA deadlock, has no basis.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s assumption of jurisdiction is limited to the subj
ect of strike.

RULING

No. The labor dispute between the union and the company concerned the unresolved matters between the
parties in relation to their negotiations for a new CBA. The power of the DOLE-
Sec to assume jurisdiction over this dispute includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising
from the said dispute, such as, but not limited to the union’s allegation of bad faith bargaining. It also incl
udes and extends to the various unresolved provisions of the new CBA such as compensation, particularly
the matter of annual wage increase or yearly lump sum payment in lieu of such wage increase, whether or
not there was deadlock in the negotiations.

As there is already an existing controversy on the matter of wage increase, the DOLE-
Sec need not wait for a deadlock in the negotiations to take cognizance of the matter. That is the significa
nce of the power of the DOLE-
Sec under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely t
o cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. Article 263(g) is both an e
xtraordinary and a preemptive power to address an extraordinary situation – a strike or lockout in an indus
try indispensable to the national interest. This grant is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of stri
ke or lockout that may have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or
lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the term “assume jurisdiction” connotes, the inte
nt of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave
rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout; it includes and extends to all questions and controversi
es arising from or related to the dispute, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdic
tion.
NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES, INC., Vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
GR Nos. 158190-91, June 21, 2006

FACTS

A labor dispute between Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. (Nissan Motors) and BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-
KMU triggered by a collective bargaining deadlock resulted in the filing of four notices of strike on the
ground of alleged unfair labor practice, stemmed from the suspension of about 140 company employees,
following the November 15, 2000 disruptive protest action arising from the employees demand for payment
of the 2nd half of their 13th month pay. The Department of Labor and Employment issued an order assuming
jurisdiction over the dispute. In it, the DOLE Secretary expressly enjoined any strike or lockout and directed
the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that might exacerbate the situation, and for the Union
to refrain from engaging in any disruptive activity. Eventually, the DOLE Secretary issued a decision which
contained names of union officers and members whom Nissan Motors dismissed for defying the directives
contained in the assumption order.

The DOLE Secretary subsequently issued a resolution affirming with modification its previous decision.
The modification consisted in the deletion from the list of dismissed Union officers the names of three (3)
employees previously identified. The CA, acting on the separate petitions for certiorari of Nissan Motors
and the Union, effectively affirmed the aforementioned decision, as modified, of the DOLE Secretary.

For its part, the Union claims that the appellate court erred in sustaining the finding respecting the concerted
work slowdown. As argued, no overt act has been shown to prove the fact of concerted work slowdown, let
alone the participation of each of its members thereon. Far from establishing such deplorable practice,
the Union maintains that the facts would tend to show that it was Nissan Motor which is guilty of unfair
labor practices acts against the Union and its members, pointing to their dismissal which was allegedly
effected without due process of law.

ISSUES

Whether or not the decision of CA in reinstating some union members after their previous dismissal is valid.

RULING

Yes. The Union engaged in work showdown which under the circumstances in which they were undertaken
constitute illegal strike. The company is therefore right in dismissing the subject Union officers in
accordance with Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, for participating in illegal strike in defiance of the
assumption of jurisdiction order by the Labor Secretary. However, the members of the Union should not be
as severely punished. Dismissal is a harsh penalty as surely they were only following orders from their
officers. Besides, there is no evidence that they engaged or participated in the commission of illegal
activities during the said strike. They should thus be reinstated to their former positions, but without back
wages.
YSS EMPLOYEES UNION vs. YSS LABORATORIES, INC.
GR No. 155125, December 4, 2009

FACTS

In order to arrest escalating business losses, YSS Laboratories implemented a retrenchment program which
affected 11 employees purportedly chosen in accordance with the reasonable standards established by the
company. Of the 11 employees, nine were officers and members of YSSEU, the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of YSS Laboratories.
Claiming that YSS Laboratories was guilty of discrimination and union-busting in carrying out the said
retrenchment program, YSSEU decided to hold a strike. The Secretary of Labor deemed that the
continuation of the labor dispute was inimical to national interest hence it certified the labor dispute to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly, all striking
workers were thereby directed to return to work within 24 hours from their receipt of the said Order, and
YSS Laboratories to accept them under the terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.

YSSEU moved that YSS Laboratories be cited for contempt for refusing to admit the workers back to
work. In addition, YSSEU prayed for the award of backwages in favor of these employees who were not
permitted by YSS Laboratories to return to their respective stations despite the Secretary of Labors
directive.

ISSUES

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor gravely abused its discretion in certifying the labor dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration and whether or not the retrenched employees should be excluded from
the operation of the return to work order.

RULING

When the Secretary of Labor directed YSS Laboratories to accept all the striking workers back to work, the
Secretary did not exceed his jurisdiction, or gravely abuse the same. It is significant at this point to point
out that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that the assailed orders were issued in an arbitrary or despotic manner. The Orders
were issued by the Secretary of Labor, with the end in view of preserving the status quo ante while the
main issues of the validity of the retrenchment and legality of the strike were being threshed out in the
proper forum. This was done for the promotion of the common good, considering that a lingering strike
could be inimical to the interest of both employer and employee. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain
industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to interfere with the
managements rights but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute.