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THE RWS QRA MODEL FOR ROAD TUNNELS

November 2006 Jelle Hoeksma Centre for Tunnel Safety Rijkswaterstaat, Ministry of Transport the Netherlands

1 Introduction

To calculate the risks in tunnels for road traffic, the Centre for Tunnel Safety has developed a model for quantitative risk analysis: ‘the RWS QRA model for road tunnels’. ‘QRA’ stands for Quantitative Risk Analysis. This document describes the RWS QRA in broad outline.

Paragraph 2 describes the how, what and why of the quantitative risk analysis and the RWS QRA model. Paragraph 3 deals with the structure and delineation of the RWS QRA model. Paragraph 4 describes the probability model (event tree), paragraph 5 the consequences model and paragraph 6 the risk calculation. Paragraph 7 deals with the inputs and outputs of the calculation programme. In addition, based on an example, an indication is given of how the risks are presented.

2 Quantitative risk analysis

Risk analyses for tunnels became required by law this year (2006). In the Netherlands they involve a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) and a scenario analysis (SceA). Together these analyses give a good insight into the failure and resilience of the tunnel system and thus support decision-making. Both the QRA and the SceA are still under development. It has therefore been decided to include the safety criteria not in the law, but in a guide, the ‘Tunnel Safety Risk Analysis Guide (Methods, models and safety criteria for quantitative risk analysis and scenario analysis)’. For the same reason it has been decided to evaluate the range of tools in 2008.

To portray the process of possible causes and consequences of an incident use is often made of the ‘bow-tie’ model, see Figure 1. In this model the incident being considered (the knot in the centre) is central. The possible causes that can lead to the incident under consideration are shown in the fault tree, to the left of the knot. Given the incident being considered, different circumstances will lead to different consequences; this is shown in an event tree (to the right of the knot). The figure below gives the boundary of these trees.

P Causes Prevention Mitigation Self-rescue Emergency response Lines of defence Safe outcome Unsafe outcome
P
Causes
Prevention
Mitigation
Self-rescue
Emergency response
Lines of defence
Safe outcome
Unsafe outcome

Figure 1: The Bow-tie model

Safety measures (the lines of defence in the figure) affect the causes and/or consequences of incidents. For the risk analysis it is important to know how large this effect is. In the QRA the probabilities of ‘all’ types of relevant incidents and ‘all’ their possible consequences are considered. In the SceA a few of the many scenarios are considered in detail.

Features of QRA

In a QRA ‘all’ the relevant scenarios are considered.

For each scenario both the probability of the scenario and the consequences of that scenario are included in the calculation. Risk = Probability * Consequence.

This method lends itself well to comparing variants and making the effects of measures clear.

Emergency response is not taken into account explicitly, but is implicitly (it is assumed that injured people are taken care of in a timely way).

Many items of data are needed for probabilities and effects. Where possible, validated data sources (for example, recognized databases) are used. Where no data are available from the literature, assumptions must be made (based on estimates by experts).

Many assumptions have also been made in the RWS QRA model. Where substantiation cannot be given or can only be given with difficulty, usually a conservative assumption is made; that is, the probability and/or the consequence is assessed in such a way that the risk is calculated at a (too) high level.

Version 1.0 of the RWS QRA model was presented in June 2006. Version 1.0 is a spreadsheet model. Work is currently in progress on version 2. This document discusses version 2. The RWS QRA model has yet to be discussed with experts (emergency services, experts in the area of risks of failure, etc.) to arrive at a sound set of assumptions for the model. The

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model must then be put forward for recognition as the standard by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

The following risk standard for mortality at an individual and collective level have been formulated in the Guide as safety criteria for the QRA:

Personal risk per passenger kilometre: 1.10 -7

Group risk (for N 10) per kilometre per year: 0.1/N 2 where N is the number of victims of one accident. These values are guides, values which can be deviated from (if substantiation is provided). Laying down these criteria implies that the risks calculated using the RWS QRA model must be used in an absolute sense. The power of the model is mainly in its use in a relative sense (comparing variants). The personal risk is the probability of becoming a (fatal) victim per kilometre travelled. The group risk gives the probability of a particular number of (fatal) victims at one time as a result of a risky activity (in this case driving through a tunnel).

3 Structure of model and delineation

The RWS QRA model has been developed to calculate:

the risks to the road users in the tunnel;

the material damage as a result of tunnel incidents (option).

The RWS QRA model consists of a QRA model and a QRA programme (see Figure 2):

RW S Q RA

RW S Q RA

QRA-model

QRA-model

EV , FN -curve

EV , FN -curve

PR

PR

X X v(X) v(X)
X X
v(X)
v(X)

U

U

= r(v( X ))

= r(v( X ))

U U
U
U
N ( U ) N ( U )
N ( U )
N ( U )

invoerinput

invoer

m odelleren

mmodellingodelleren

outputuitvoer uitvoer

input

rekeninvoer

rekeninvoer

calculation rekenhart rekenhart

calculation

rekenhart

rekenhart

rekeninvoer calculation rekenhart rekenhart broncode broncode out p ut rekenuitvoer rekenuitvoer

broncode

broncode

output

rekenuitvoer

rekenuitvoer

QRA-programma

QRA-programma

QRA-programme

Figure 2 Impression of the RWS QRA model.

Two documents are being drawn up:

The background document which gives a step-by-step description of the QRA model. Aspects described include:

the model assumptions and how the model works;

the input variables X (such as accident frequencies) to be collected by the user;

a number of preliminary calculations v(X) carried out in the program (calculating the values of variables used later in the calculations);

the r formula by means of which the variables calculated in advance are passed on;

the output variables U: the expected value (EV) of the expected average number of victims per annum and the group risk shown in a FN curve (FN=Frequency Number);

the output N(U) worked out later in the program (called in the document user output), such as the calculated PR=Personal Risk;

the limitations of the QRA program.

The user manual includes a brief description of the QRA model and a description of the possibilities of the QRA program and how it works, the input variables to be collected by the user, and the (user) output.

The model is made up of:

the probability model based on an event tree analysis for calculating the probability of an accident scenario occurring; all the known relevant (undesirable) events which determine the risk are included in the event tree;

the consequences model: using this, an effect is calculated for each accident scenario;

a model for calculating the risk;

a description of the inputs and outputs.

The model comprises only an event tree, not a fault tree as far as the causes of the occurrence of an accident, fire or outflow of dangerous substances are concerned. This choice has been made because:

the model would otherwise become much more sizeable;

sufficient data are known on the accident frequencies in (existing) tunnels.

Specific information about incidents involving dangerous substances in tunnels is available to only a very limited extent. To calculate the risks resulting from the release of dangerous substances in tunnels, therefore, great use is made of the studies in the area of (the quantitative risk analyses for) external safety.

Delineation of RWS QRA model The risks calculated in the model relate only to those resulting from the use of the tunnel. Risks resulting from external influences, such as falling anchors, sinking ships, earthquakes, etc., are not included in the model.

The model calculates the risks for internal safety (road users), not external safety (people living nearby). Safety during construction of the tunnel, social safety and safety at work (of tunnel staff and emergency services) are not considered. The model is only suitable for calculating tubes with one-way traffic with or without mechanical longitudinal ventilation.

4 Probability model (event tree)

The probability model in RWS QRA consists of a single event tree. Using the event tree, all the scenarios relevant to the risk are depicted. This event tree has the structure of 21 successive sequential events or conditions, in this document called events for short.

For ease of understanding a simplified representation of this structure now follows. Figure 3 shows an example with two notional 1 sequential events (a collision and a fire after a collision) and one condition (the type of vehicle involved in the collision followed by fire). In this example five possible courses of the series of events (scenarios) have been indicated (in this case the ‘no’ branches have not been split.

collision

fire

involvement

Series of events

 

car

collision, fire, car

 

yes

lorry

collision, fire, lorry

yes

 

other

collision, fire, other

 

no

collision, no fire

no

no collision

Figure 3: Example of event tree structure.

For each scenario (series of events) the probability is determined for one motor vehicle kilometre (mvkm). For example, the series of events ‘collision, fire, car’ has a probability of occurring which consists of the product of the probability of a collision (P collision ), the probability of a fire given a collision (P fire ) and the subsequent probability that the vehicle involved is a car (P car ). At each node on the tree the branchings must include all the events, exclusive of each other; this means that at each fork the sum of the partial probabilities is 1. Figure 4 states the probabilities of the example given in Figure 3.

collision

fire

involvement

Scenario probability (per mvkm)

P car

P collision * P fire * P car

 

car

 
 

P

fire

P lorry

fire

lorry)

 
 

P

collision

 

1-

P

car

-

P lorry

collision

no fire

other

 

1/mvkm

1- P fire

 

no collision

P collision * P fire * P lorry

1 ‘Notional’ means that this simple example has little to do with the actual RWS QRA model!

P collision * (1 - P fire )

P collision * P fire * (1 - P car - P lorry ) )

1- P collision

1- P collision

5

Figure 4: Example of an event tree structure with probabilities.

For the actual RWS QRA model – wholly in line with the simplified notional example just described – the probability of the occurrence of each scenario consists of the multiplication of a series of 21 conditional probabilities associated with the 21 events.

Events in RWS QRA:

1 Incident: type of incident, subdivided into: breakdown, accident with material damage only, injury accident, and no incident.

2 Period: period of 24 hours, subdivided into: peak, day and night. This split has been

made because owing to the difference in intensity the potential number of people present in the tunnel and the probability of tailbacks vary greatly. The number of peak hours and the number of night hours must be input, each with the associated percentage

of the 24-hour intensity per hour.

3 Vehicle: vehicle involved in the incident, subdivided into: car, bus, lorry with no load or

a nonflammable load, lorry with flammable load, lorry with explosives and tanker

containing dangerous substances.

4 Class of substance: substance classes for tankers containing dangerous substances, subdivided into: flammable liquids (LF), flammable liquefied gases (GF), toxic liquids (LT) and toxic liquefied gases (GT).

5 Outflow: size of the outflow for (liquefied) gases: instantaneous outflow as a result of heating, instantaneous outflow as a result of impact, continuous outflow to the rear, continuous outflow forwards, ‘non-relevant’ outflow to the rear, ‘non-relevant’ outflow forwards, no outflow or outflow < 100kg; size of the outflow for liquids: instantaneous outflow, large continuous outflow, small continuous outflow, no outflow or outflow < 100kg. The risk of the outflow of dangerous substances was modelled after the occurrence of an injury accident. In practice outflows of dangerous substances also occur in the case of non-injury accidents. In 1994 the probability of an outflow of dangerous substances was studied. In the first instance the probability of a, relevant, outflow per vehicle kilometre was determined. This probability was then split by the frequency of injury accidents and the associated probability of outflow given an injury accident. The probability of outflow given an injury accident was calculated using a model in which the vehicle speed played an important role. The probability of an outflow calculated in this way was determined for a number of road categories. For each road category the frequency of injury accidents can therefore be used as a variable in future. It is thus assumed that if the frequency of injury accidents doubles, the number of outflows of dangerous substances will also double. The probabilities of outflows of dangerous substances from tanks are stated in the Road Transport Safety guides, as also are the sequential probabilities of ignition. These probabilities are given for both transport in tanks at atmospheric pressure (flammable and toxic liquids) and transport in pressure tanks (flammable and toxic liquefied gases such as LPG).

6 Vehicle fire (does not apply to tankers), subdivided into: fire, extinguished and no fire. The probability of a vehicle fire must be input; the national average of the probability of fire is approx. 2 per hundred million vehicle kilometres.

7 Tanker fire: only in the case of tankers; ignition or no ignition of the substance which has flowed out, subdivided into: immediate ignition, delayed ignition and no ignition. For dangerous substances the ignition probabilities from the ‘Road Transport Safety’ guides have been used.

8 Size of fire: size of fire classified into: 5 MW, 10 MW, 25 MW, 50 MW, 100 MW and 200 MW.

9

Downstream tailback: whether there is or is not a tailback (virtually stationary traffic) downstream of the incident. This variable is very important when calculating the consequences. Usually the traffic downstream will be able to drive out of the tunnel in the event of a fire. Upstream a tailback will form in which those present are protected by the longitudinal ventilation in the direction of travel. If traffic is stationary downstream from a fire, some road users will always be present in the threatened area.

10

Tailback upstream: there is or is not a tailback upstream of the incident.

11

Speed detection: there is or is not speed detection.

12

Reporting: an incident is or is not reported by a road user.

13

Fire detection: there is or is not fire detection.

14

Delayed detection: there is or is not delayed detection of a serious incident not noticed initially.

15

Ventilation: the ventilation is or is not available.

16

Unlocking: the escape doors can or cannot be unlocked.

17

Closing off: a means of closing off the tube is or is not available.

18

Auto start: automatic responses from the control system after detection, or no automatic responses.

19

Operator: action taken or no action taken by the operator (split into four different possible moments after the incident), subdivided into: activating the emergency button, manual operation including unlocking the escape door, manual operation without unlocking the escape door, and no action. The emergency button is a group command involving a number of measures taken simultaneously.

20

Blocking: an escape door is or is not blocked. The blocking of an escape door results in longer escape distances for people in the vicinity of that door.

21

Location: the location of the incident in the tube, subdivided into: in the middle of the ascending section, in the middle of the horizontal section, in the middle of the descending section and in the tailback (only in the case of a tailback downstream of the incident). This subdivision into the downward, horizontal and upward sections has been made firstly because the accident frequencies can differ and secondly because the consequences of outflows of flammable liquids differ (on a slope the liquid flows to one side). This also produces a better spread of the consequences in the calculation.

5

Consequences model

In relation to the number of road users who die as a result of the incident, three types of victim are distinguished:

the ‘immediate’ victims: the ‘normal’ road deaths. It is assumed that the effect of the tunnel on the number of victims, given an injury accident, is negligible. The tunnel does, however, affect the probabilities of injury accidents!

the ‘extra’ victims: those trapped in a confined space and/or seriously injured in the vehicles immediately involved in a fire and who cannot be freed in time and consequently perish. It is assumed that, in the tunnel, the task of freeing people from vehicles will be hindered compared to the open road.

the ‘low-probability-major-consequences’ victims: the road users not directly involved in the incident who as a result of the effects of fire and/or the outflow of dangerous substances cannot escape in time and consequently perish. Here the effect of the tunnel on the number of victims is very great.

The number of ‘immediate’ victims is calculated using the frequency of injury accidents and the average number of fatalities per injury accident.

The number of ‘extra’ victims is only calculated for injury accidents with fire. It is the product of the average number of injured people in each injury accident, the probability that those injured will be confined in a small space or seriously injured (for the time being a figure of 10% has been used), and the probability that a person confined in a small space or seriously injured will die as a result of the fire (for the time being taken as 100%). This is a pessimistic assumption as, in deriving the average number of deaths per injury accident, the deaths of people confined in a small space and/or (seriously) injured in vehicle fires have already been taken into account. Calculating the number of ‘extra’ victims thus assumes that the tunnel adversely affects the probability of being able to free people confined in a small space and/or seriously injured in time, compared to the open road.

low-probability-major-consequences’ victims To calculate the effects of incidents with fire and/or outflow of dangerous substances, it is necessary to know the physical effects of the scenario and the reaction of the road users (the escape process).

Physical effects The effect models for calculating the physical effects of fires are based on the results of CFD calculations made using the ‘Fire Dynamics Simulator (version 4)’ computer program of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the USA. Using this program, the temperature, smoke density, visibility, radiation, O 2 content, etc. are calculated according to time and place in the tube. A number of fire tests made in the Benelux Tunnel have been calculated retrospectively using this program; the results of the calculations correspond reasonably well with the measurements in the fire tests. Using the program, calculations were made for the six sizes of fire for long (3km) and short (400m) tubes. The calculations were made for ‘breakdown fires’ and ‘injury fires’ each with or without mechanical longitudinal ventilation. ‘Breakdown fire’ means the slow development of a fire caused by technical defects, overheating, etc. ‘Injury fire’ means the rapid development of a fire caused by an accident. Figures 5 and 6 show the development of the size of the fire against time. The maximum duration of a fire has been arbitrarily set at 30 minutes. Depending on the energy content of the burning vehicles, two fire developments are possible. In the case of relatively small fires (5 and 10MW), soon after the maximum size of the fire has been reached the fire will gradually be extinguished owing to lack of fuel (the dotted line in the figures). Larger fires, however, will still not have put themselves out after 30 minutes; it has been conservatively assumed that the power of these fires will not decrease until 30 minutes has passed.

For a ‘breakdown fire’ the following has been assumed: during the first five minutes the flames remain within the vehicle. Then the fire spreads out of the vehicle and in a further five minutes will grow to its maximum power (see Figure 5).

100% 1% 300 600 1800 Time [s] Fire size
100%
1%
300
600 1800
Time [s]
Fire size

Figure 5: development of a ‘breakdown fire’

For an ‘injury fire’ it has been assumed that fire breaks out immediately. Thereafter the fire will grow to its maximum severity in 2 minutes (see Figure 6).

100% 120 1800 Time [s] Fire size
100%
120
1800
Time [s]
Fire size

Figure 6: development of ‘injury fire’

Assumptions regarding the ventilation are:

The speed of air movement, generated by the traffic, is initially 2m/s.

The maximum ventilation speed is achieved 2 minutes after the start of the ventilation (measurements taken in the Coen Tunnel show that this is feasible in practice).

The size of the fire affects the ventilation speed because of the resistance generated by the fire. The following values are employed for the maximum ventilation speed: 5m/s for fires of 5, 10 or 25MW, 4m/s for 50MW, 3m/s for 100MW and 2.5m/s for 200MW.

The air movement generated by the traffic decreases to 0 in 2 minutes.

In a ‘breakdown fire’ the ventilation is started after 5 minutes (the moment that the fire spreads outside the vehicle); until that moment the speed of air movement is 2m/s. After 7 minutes there is thus maximum ventilation or a ventilation speed of 0, see Figure 7.

In an ‘injury fire’ the ventilation is started after 2 minutes (at that moment the fire has thus developed to its maximum); until that moment the speed of air movement is 2m/s. After 4 minutes there is thus maximum ventilation or a ventilation speed of 0, see Figure 8.

Ventilation speed [m/s]

Ventilation speed [m/s]

Maximum ventilation 2 m/s 300 420 1800 Time [s]
Maximum ventilation
2 m/s
300
420 1800
Time [s]

Figure 7: ventilation in a ‘breakdown fire’

Time [s] Figure 7: ventilation in a ‘breakdown fire’ Maximum ventilation 120 240 1800 Time [s]

Maximum ventilation

7: ventilation in a ‘breakdown fire’ Maximum ventilation 120 240 1800 Time [s] Figure 8: ventilation
7: ventilation in a ‘breakdown fire’ Maximum ventilation 120 240 1800 Time [s] Figure 8: ventilation
7: ventilation in a ‘breakdown fire’ Maximum ventilation 120 240 1800 Time [s] Figure 8: ventilation

120

240

1800

Time [s]

Figure 8: ventilation in an ‘injury fire’

Escape process It has been assumed that those present in the tube will start to escape as soon as they are called on to do so by the operator or as soon as they themselves recognize the danger. Clear signals are required if they are to recognize the danger themselves. In the case of fire, the moment at which this occurs has been taken as the moment at which very limited visibility at the ceiling is reached, since it gets dark as a result. There are not necessarily any effects noticeable at eye level at that moment. In the case of the outflow of a dangerous substance the time we have taken is that at which the effects become noticeable. For the time at which, arithmetically, exposure to the danger begins, we have taken the time at which the temperature at eye level has risen by 5 o C. These times (which depend on the distance to the fire) are determined for each fire scenario using the CFD calculations.

For the purposes of modelling the effect the tube is divided into six numbered mutually exclusive subareas, see Figure 9. This division has been chosen because the effects of the various scenarios differ or can differ from one subarea to another.

IInncciiddeenntt 1 2 3 4 5 6 Outlying area Secondary area Outflow area Secondary area
IInncciiddeenntt
1
2
3
4
5
6
Outlying area
Secondary area
Outflow area
Secondary area
Outlying area
Upstream
Downstream

Figure 9: Subareas for the incident location on the horizontal portion of the tube

First a distinction is made between areas upstream and downstream from the incident, since if there is longitudinal ventilation, then if the ventilation is sufficient those upstream from a (vehicle) fire will be protected from the smoke gases. Each of the areas upstream and downstream from the incident is further subdivided into an area in the tube and an area outside, since with some scenarios in the tube, such as explosions, there can also be victims outside the tube; these are included when calculating the number of victims of this scenario. Each of the areas in the tube is in turn further divided into an outflow area and a secondary area. The outflow area only applies in the case of an outflow of dangerous substances; this is the area which is occupied by the pool of liquid, jet or flame. The secondary area is the area between the outflow area and the end of the tube.

For each scenario we determine whether there is a tailback (virtually stationary traffic) upstream and/or downstream of the incident. If so, the length of the tailback is determined. The length of the tailback in each of the subareas is then determined.

Because the time for which the tunnel users remain in the tunnel depends on the presence of and distance to escape doors, the following three situations are distinguished, see Figure

10:

Situation 1: tunnel without (available) escape doors. This situation occurs if the tunnel has no escape doors or if the escape doors are not available (locked, or unlocked too late).

Situation 2: the incident takes place between 2 escape doors.

Situation 3: the incident blocks an escape door. If the incident blocks an escape door, road users must cover an additional difference to reach the (next) door.

incident
incident

Tunnel without escape doors

iinncciiddeenntt
iinncciiddeenntt

Tunnel with escape doors, incident between the doors

iinncciiddeenntt
iinncciiddeenntt

Tunnel with escape doors, incident blocks door

Figure 10: Schematic representation of position of escape doors relative to incident

The following are then calculated for each situation:

The length of the ‘safe area’ (the white sections in Figure 10): in each of these areas there are no victims because (it is assumed that) everyone in this area can escape in time. In the case of unlocked escape doors this area is located on both sides of each escape door; in tunnels without escape doors (or if the escape doors are not unlocked), the area is located at the tunnel entrance and/or tunnel exit. The length of this area is calculated using the available time until the effects are noticeable and the average escape speed.

The length of the ‘effect area’ (the light-grey sections in Figure 10): in this area those present are at risk of death, the level of risk depending on the scenario.

The length of the ‘extra area’ (the dark-grey section in Figure 10). This area is only distinguished if an escape door is blocked by the incident (situation 3). Those present in this area are at extra risk of death because they have to cover a longer distance to an escape door.

For each scenario the average risk of death in each of the areas where effects occur is determined on the basis of the ‘dose’ received (the temperature effects and the exposure to smoke gases during the time the people are in the tube). Here the following formula has been used for the lethal injury fraction in fires:

injuryfrac tion =

t

60 exp

(51849 , 0 , 0273 ( T 273))

Here t is the exposure time in seconds and T the temperature in K. By stating that this formula (which is intended for temperatures above 60 o C) also applies to temperatures below 60 o C, a percentage of victims is also calculated for temperatures between 25 o C and 60 o C. This takes account of people’s presence in – relatively cold – smoke gases.

Using conversion factors (the number of people per linear metre), a conversion is made from length to number of people.

From the length of the ‘effect area’, the ‘extra area’, the length along which there is still moving traffic, the average risk of death in each of these areas and the conversion factors, the number of ‘low-probability-major-consequences’ victims is calculated.

6 Risk calculation

The risk is calculated for a single tube. For a tunnel with more than one tube the risk must therefore be calculated for each tube and the risks for each tube added together.

Calculation of the risk consists of a compilation of each scenario risk per vehicle kilometre and the associated effects of the scenario concerned. Finally the risk is multiplied by the number of vehicle kilometres per year. In this way the expected value (the expected average number of victims per year) and the group risks per year can be determined. The group risk is usually depicted by the frequency by which accidents with N or more fatal victims are exceeded in a double-log graph, the so-called FN curve; see example in Figure 11.

Group risk whole tunnel

1,E-02 1,E-03 1,E-04 1,E-05 1,E-06 1,E-07 1,E-08 1,E-09 1,E+00 1,E+01 1,E+02 1,E+03 1,E+04 frequency
1,E-02
1,E-03
1,E-04
1,E-05
1,E-06
1,E-07
1,E-08
1,E-09
1,E+00
1,E+01
1,E+02
1,E+03
1,E+04
frequency [/tunnel/year]

N [fatalities]

Figure 11: Example of FN curve

7 Inputs and outputs

Important variables for the internal safety of a tunnel include the geometry of the tunnel (length, width, height, slope), the facilities in the tunnel and the intensity and composition of the traffic. As far as facilities are concerned, consideration needs to be given to those facilities in the tunnel which contribute towards determining the effects of incidents. The values of these variables must be input by the user. The input variables are classified under the following headings:

geometry;

facilities;

motor vehicles;

period and traffic intensities;

composition of traffic;

downstream tailback;

incident frequencies;

other default values.

As far as possible the values to be input must be determined on the basis of data obtained in actual situations!

Example An example is given below of calculations made for a 1-km-long underwater tunnel using the old model, version dated 27 June 2000. The most important input data are:

Length: 1000m of which 400m horizontal. 30 million vehicles per year (82,000 per day), of which 1% buses and 12% lorries.

Dangerous substances (number of vehicles per year): petrol 7000, toxic liquids 300, LPG

3000.

Accident frequency: 1.10 -6 ; frequency of injury accidents: 1.10 -7 per vehicle kilometre.

Every working day tailbacks in the tunnel during peak hours. In these calculations the values of a number of parameters have been varied.

Results:

Expected value (EV):

EV

Tunnel section descending horizontal

ascending

tunnel

Low probability major consequences extra (confined in fire) ‘normal’ fatalities

2.87E-02

3.83E-02

3.74E-02

0.1044

1.35E-02

1.80E-02

1.35E-02

0.0449

1.04E-01

1.39E-01

1.04E-01

0.3468

sum

0.1462

0.1950

0.1549

0.4961

Group risk (FN curve):

Group risk

1.00E+01 1.00E+00 1.00E-01 1.00E-02 1.00E-03 1.00E-04 1.00E-05 1.00E-06 1.00E-07 1.00E-08 1.00E-09 1.E+00
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
1.00E-01
1.00E-02
1.00E-03
1.00E-04
1.00E-05
1.00E-06
1.00E-07
1.00E-08
1.00E-09
1.E+00
1.E+01
1.E+02
1.E+03
1.E+04
N [fatalities]
frequency

Descending section Horizontal section Ascending section Whole tunnel average per km

Variation of the distances between the escape doors gives the following picture.

Group risk whole tunnel

1,E+01 1,E+00 1,E-01 1,E-02 1,E-03 1,E-04 1,E-05 1,E-06 1,E-07 1,E-08 1,E-09 1,E+00 1,E+01 1,E+02 1,E+03
1,E+01
1,E+00
1,E-01
1,E-02
1,E-03
1,E-04
1,E-05
1,E-06
1,E-07
1,E-08
1,E-09
1,E+00
1,E+01
1,E+02
1,E+03
1,E+04
frequency [/tunnel/year]

N [fatalities]

100m cat 0 60m cat 0
100m cat 0
60m cat 0

250m cat 0

Standard

Effect of tailback in the tunnel.

For a tunnel with distances between the escape doors of 250m the probability of a tailback in the tunnel varied as follows:

- Each working day a tailback during the peak (in the morning in one tube and in the evening in the other) and in the daytime a tailback frequency which is ten times lower (=100%).

- A halving of the probability of a tailback (=50%).

- A reduction in the probability of a tailback by a factor of 10 (=10%).

Group risk whole tunnel

1,E+01 1,E+00 1,E-01 1,E-02 250m tailback 100% 250m tailback 50% 1,E-03 250m tailback 10% 1,E-04
1,E+01
1,E+00
1,E-01
1,E-02
250m tailback 100%
250m tailback 50%
1,E-03
250m tailback 10%
1,E-04
1,E-05
1,E-06
Standard
1,E-07
1,E-08
1,E-09
1,E+00
1,E+01
1,E+02
1,E+03
1,E+04
frequency [/tunnel/year]

N [fatalities]

Admission of traffic carrying dangerous substances. For a category 0 tunnel no restrictions apply regarding the transport of dangerous sub- stances. For a category I tunnel restrictions apply; the most important difference compared to a category 0 tunnel is that the transport of flammable gases in bulk (such as LPG) is prohibited. A prohibition also applies for toxic gases, a number of flammable solid substances, certain very toxic liquids and certain corrosive substances. Category II tunnels are subject not only to the restrictions applying to category I tunnels but also to those for highly flammable substances such as petrol (but not for diesel oil, etc.).

Group risk whole tunnel

1,E+01 1,E+00 1,E-01 1,E-02 100m cat 0 100m cat I 1,E-03 100m cat II 1,E-04
1,E+01
1,E+00
1,E-01
1,E-02
100m cat 0
100m cat I
1,E-03
100m cat II
1,E-04
1,E-05
1,E-06
Standard
1,E-07
1,E-08
1,E-09
1,E+00
1,E+01
1,E+02
1,E+03
1,E+04
frequency [/tunnel/year]

N [fatalities]