STATE OF MICHIGAN
37TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF MICHIGAN CITY OF WARREN, BUILDING AND ZONING DIVISION
Case numbers: T003166W / T003167W
DATE: 10/13/2010 (EVERETT MURPHY) Plaintiff, VS.
DEFENDANT¶S MOTION TO JEFFERY DEAN SAXON, DISQUALIFY JUDGE
(an obvious fictional person of the State created by the STATE and not real party of interest ³Jeffery-Dean: Saxon´) Trustee ± Sui Juris Defendant in error,
DEFENDANT¶S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE
Pursuant to MCR 2.003(B), et al. 1
Comes now Defendant in error, Jeffery-Dean: Saxon, a sovereign free white man over 21 years old, who has the rights to which all free men are entitled, who is not under the power of another, such as the implied jurisdiction of any Corporation or Government to move the court to disqualify Judge John M. Chmura per the rules laid out in MCR 2.003(B).
It has been and remains the position of the defense that this court surrendered jurisdiction through due process violations and structural errors. However, in order to seek the intended relief, this court must hear this Motion, at arm¶s length and by special appearance, by the Defendant. Furthermore, the Defense does not wave, nor has it ever waved these violations or errors. The Defense stands fast.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. The Defendant, Jeffrey Dean: Saxon, is not learned counsel. 2. The Defendant, Jeffrey Dean: Saxon, is not schooled in law. 3. The Defendant, Jeffrey Dean: Saxon, appeared before Judge John M. Chmura on September 29th, 2010. 4. Judge Chmura summarily dismissed Defendant's Petition to Set Aside and Dismiss the Complaint and Summons without reading it. 5. Judge Chmura allowed the prosecution to proceed without answering the Defendant¶s Petition. 6. Judge Chmura found in favor of the State, but did not provide an account nor lawful backing for his findings.
From the Michigan Judicial Institute: The moving party has the burden of showing grounds fordisqualification. A party challenging a judge on the basis of bias or prejudicebears the burden of overcoming the heavy presumption of judicialimpartiality. Cain v Dep¶t of Corr, 451 Mich 470, 497 (1996), and In reForfeiture of $1,159,420, 194 Mich App 134, 151 (1992). One whochallenges a judge on the basis of the constitutional right to an unbiased andimpartial tribunal also bears a heavy burden. Cain, supra at 498±99 n 33. Pursuant to MCR 2.003(B), ³[a] judge is disqualified when the judge cannotimpartially hear a case.´ Michigan Court Rule 2.003(B) sets forth anon-exhaustive list of circumstances in which a judge is disqualified, includinginstances when a judge is personally biased or prejudiced against a party orattorney. MCR 2.003(B)(1). Bias or prejudice is defined as an attitude or state of mind belying an aversionor hostility of such a degree that a fair-minded person could not entirely set itaside when judging certain persons or causes. Cain, supra at 495. Forpurposes of disqualification, a judge¶s bias or prejudice must be actual andpersonal. Id. Unless the alleged bias or prejudice displays such deep-seatedfavoritism or antagonism that a fair judgment would be impossible, a judge¶sfavorable or unfavorable disposition must arise from facts or events outsidethe current judicial proceeding. Id. at 495±96, 513. The mere fact that a judgeconducted a prior proceeding against the defendant does not amount to proofof disqualifying bias. People v White, 411 Mich 366, 386 (1981), and Peoplev Koss, 86 Mich App 557, 560 (1978). A judge who sits as trier of fact andfinds the defendant guilty is not automatically disqualified from acting as trierof fact at the defendant¶s retrial after reversal on appeal. People v Upshaw,172 Mich App 386, 388±89 (1988). A judge who presides over a pleaproceeding, during which the defendant provides a factual basis for a 3
guiltyplea but then decides not to plead guilty, need not sua sponte disqualifyhimself or herself from conducting the defendant¶s subsequent bench trial.People v Cocuzza, 413 Mich 78, 83 (1982). Motions for disqualification may also be based on an alleged violation of thedue-process requirement that a decision maker be unbiased and impartial.Cain, supra at 497±98, and Crampton v Dep¶t of State, 395 Mich 347, 350(1975). It is only in the most extreme cases that a judge will be disqualifiedfor bias or prejudice on due-process grounds. Cain, supra at 497±98.Examples of instances in which the probability of actual bias may be too highto be constitutionally tolerable, and in which a judge may therefore bedisqualified notwithstanding the absence of a showing of actual bias, includesituations where a judge: 1) has a pecuniary interest; 2) has been insulted,slandered and vilified by a party; 3) has revealed deep prejudice against thedefendant¶s profession and has recently been a losing party in a civil rightslawsuit filed by the defendant; or 4) might have prejudged the case because ofprior participation in the case as one who personally conducted the initialinvestigation, amassed evidence, and filed and prosecuted the charges, or asone who made the initial decision which is under review. Crampton, supra at351±55, and Cain, supra at 497±502, 514. Due process is violated when full-time law enforcement officials, charged with responsibility for arrest andprosecution of law violators, sit as adjudicators in law enforcement disputesbetween citizens and police officers. Crampton, supra at 356± 58.MCR 2.003(C)(1) states as follows:³(1) Time for Filing. To avoid delaying trial andinconveniencing the witnesses, a motion to disqualify mustbe filed within 14 days after the moving party discovers theground for disqualification. If the discovery is made within14 days of the trial date, the motion must be madeforthwith. If a motion is not timely filed, untimeliness,including delay in waiving jury trial, is a factor in decidingwhether the motion should be granted.´ 4
The 14-day deadlines for filing a motion to disqualify are mandatory. Cain,supra at 493, and Dean & Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice (4th ed),§2003.8, p 55 (the 14-day deadlines in the subrule are mandatory, and the³untimeliness´ in the third sentence refers to time requirements other thanthose stated in the first two sentences of the subrule). ³Whenever a challengedjudge has denied a disqualification motion and a request for a hearing beforeanother judge comes after a trial or hearing has started[,] the challenged judgeshould have the option of proceeding with the trial or hearing unless a chiefjudge or a higher court orders that the trial or hearing be interrupted or delayedso that the disqualification motion may be considered by another judge beforethe trial or hearing is concluded.´ People v McDonald, 97 Mich App 425, 433(1980), vacated on other grounds 411 Mich 870 (1981). See also In reContempt of Steingold (In re Smith), 244 Mich App 153, 160±61 (2000) (thejuvenile court referee did not err in denying defense counsel¶s oral motion fordisqualification on the first day of trial, but the referee did err by not referringthe matter to the chief judge as required under MCR 2.003(C)(3)). The motion must be accompanied by an affidavit and must include all knowngrounds for disqualification. MCR 2.003(C)(2). The challenged judge decidesthe motion and, if the motion is denied and a party so requests, the challengedjudge must refer the motion to the chief judge (if the court has more than onejudge) or to a judge appointed by the state court administrator (if the court hasonly one judge or where the challenged judge is the chief judge) for de novodecision. MCR 2.003(C)(3).1
Monograph 6, Pretrial Motions Third Edition 5
In this case, the Defendant, Jeffrey Dean: Saxon, has chosen to stand up for his rights and has become the target of over-ambitious government agents who wish to persecute and subjigate him and deny him of protections afforded him by way of Consitutional law and its protections. From the inception of the United States, the framers and the judiciary understood that men were ³endowed by their creator´ certain protections and the Consitution was drawn up, not to give citizens their protections, but rather, to ensure the governments limitations on infringing on those protections. Further cases clarified exactly what those limitations were in order to better establish clarity. The intent, however, is still very much preserved in its entirety. To solidify these fundamental protections, the founders chose an adversarial system to advance the path of justice. In this system, noone should be prosecuted by a King or a judge, but by another party. In order to be successful, a party must meet the burden of showing: 1. 2. 3. The opposing party (in this case, the defendant) had a duty to perform. The opposing party did not meet that duty. The opposing party caused an articulatable harm, sometimes called corpus delicti.
In some cases, an element known as mens rea must also be shown to prove that there was intent., futher extending the corpus delicti argument. Fortunately for the citizens of Warren, the judiciary and its officers have expedited the process and no longer need to meet such troublesome burdens. City officials simply hand out tickets to political rivels and people they have characterized as dissedants to bring a steady monetary flow for its coffers in these troubled economic times. Should a defendant follishly contest such policies and try and seek out remedy, the judge argues the case for the prosecution. Also, the prosecution need not be burdened with the unforntunate task of replying to any annoying Motions or Petitions filed on behalf of the Defendant, because the case is a forgone
conclusion and noone will read them, anyway. This is the way of things in Judge Chmura¶s Court. The prosecution in Judge Chmura¶s court has no burden to bear; has no case to meet. When the prosecution speaks, it is regarded as gospel, despite evidence and statutes to the contrary. Justice cannot be had in Judge Chmura¶s court and it was not had in this case. Judge Chmura summarily dismissed the Defendant¶s Petition to Dismiss, without turning a page. Furthermore, Judge Chmura heard form the complaining party, who admitted to committing a crime to obtain evidence against the Defendant and proceeded, despite objections. Judge Chmura took the prosecutor, at face value, regarding a statue, despite a reference to that very same statute in the Defendant¶s Petition, which would have contradicted the prosecutions statement. However, Judge Chmura could not have known that the statute was referenced, because he did not read the petition. Furthermore, it must be assumed that Judge Chmura understands all laws and case law in this matter and knew exactly what he was doing, Screws et al. v. US., 325 U.S. 91 (1945), in the violation of the defendant¶s rights. The founding fathers anticipated corruption. They had faced adversities from the rule of King George. The laws are based on that principle; the principles of checks and balances. When these laws are ignored, corruption abounds. They must be adhered to inpara materia.If one element of the law is ignored or forgotten, then justice is lost. It cannot be left up to a king or a judge¶s state of mind or the outcome of a morning cup of coffee, but rather the strict adhesion to the laws and guidelines laid out in statutes and case law. The defendant believes that Judge Chmura has shown bias and this bias is fatal or irreparable and it will not allow a fair adjudication for the defense.
Failure to enforce the law does not change it. Lousville & N.R.R. v U.S., 282 U.S. 740, 759. 7
WHEREFORE, the defendant moves the Court to grant the motion for disqualification or to dismiss the citation with prejudice. If the Court denies this motion, the defendant moves the court to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law why this motion should be dismissed in accordance with MCR 2.613(C).
______________________ Jeffery-Dean: Saxon c/o JEFFERY DEAN SAXON ADDRESS Warren Michigan  PHONE Accused in Pro Per At Arms Length Restricted jurisdiction By special visitation - ³ special appearance´ To challenge jurisdiction of the Court
Notary Stamp Here
I, Jeffrey Dean: Saxon, do swear and affirm that all statements made herein are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, in all respects.
Jurat Signed and sworn before me ________________________________, on this day, the _____ day of _________, 2009. Notary Signature: ____________________________________