Canon 14

1. Burbe vs. Magulta (A.C. No. 99-634; June 10, 2002)

2. Hilado vs. Judge David (G.R. No. L-961; September 21, 1949)
3. William Uy vs. Fermin Gonzales (A.C. No. 5280; March 30, 2004)
4. Mercado vs. Vitriolo (A.C. No. 5108; May 26, 2005)

Canon 15
1. Sta. Maria vs. Tuazon (A.C. No. 396; July 31, 1964)
2. Alcala vs. De Vera (A.C. No. 620; March 21, 1974)
3. People vs. Cawili (G.R. No. L-30543; August 31, 1970)
4. In Re: Hamilton (24 Phil 100)
5. Lim vs. Villarosa (A.C. No. 5303; June 15, 2006)
6. Pacana, Jr. vs. Pascual-Lopez (A.C.No. 8243; July 24, 2009)
7. Artulueza vs. Maderazo (381 SCRA 418)
8. Abragan vs. Rodriguez (380 SCRA 93)
9. Rabanal vs. Tugade (383 SCRA 484)
10. Pormento, Sr. vs. Ponteverda (454 SCRA 176)

Canon 16
1. Garcia vs. Manuel (395 SCRA 386)
2. Espiritu vs. Ulep (458 SCRA 1)
3. Lim vs. Magallanes (520 SCRA 1)
4. Rayos vs. Hernandez (515 SCRA 517)
5. In Re: Abad (98 Phil 899)
6. Yu vs. Tajanlangit (A.C. No. 5691; March 13, 2009)
7. Cordon vs. Bacalinta (390 SCRA 299)

Canon 17
1. People vs. Lagramada (388 SCRA 173)
Chapter IV. The Lawyer and the Client
CANON 14

Cases:
1. Burbe vs. Magulta (A.C. No. 99-634; June 10, 2002)
2. Hilado vs. Judge David (G.R. No. L-961; September 21, 1949)
3. William Uy vs. Fermin Gonzales (A.C. No. 5280; March 30, 2004)
4. Mercado vs. Vitriolo (A.C. No. 5108; May 26, 2005)

Provisions:
CANON 14 – A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.

Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter's race, sex, creed or
status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.

Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel de
officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for
rendition of free legal aid.

Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client if:
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a present client
and the prospective client.

Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the
same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.
Burbe vs. Atty. Magulta
Dominador P. Burbe vs. Atty. Alberto Magulta; A.C. No. 99-634; June 10, 2002

FACTS:
Burbe filed a disbarment case against Atty. Magulta. In connection to his business, Burbe was introduced to Atty.
Magulta who agreed to legally represent him in a money claim and possible civil case for breach of contract
made by opposing party. Atty. Magulta made a demand letter and legal documents, which Burbe paid for, but
there was no settlement of the dispute. Atty. Magulta drafted a complaint which cost 25,000 pesos, Burbe paid
for this, the latter was then informed that it was filed in court. Burbe was told to wait for notice of its progress.
After a few months, he received to notice and was repeatedly instructed to wait. Burbe went to the office of the
clerk of court with a draft of the complaint and discovered that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty.
Magulta, the latter continued to lie that it had already been filed. It was only when Burbe presented a
certification that Atty. Magulta admitted to his failure to file the complaint for having spent the money for the
filing fee for personal benefit. Atty. Magulta offered reimbursement by issuing 2 checks in the amounts of 12,000
and 8,000. Burbe now complains against Atty. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty, and oppressive
conduct.

Atty. Magulta alleged that he was introduced to Burbe in a kumpadre setting, that he only drafted the documents
as personal favors. He claimed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between them as Burbe never paid
him for the services rendered.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Magulta violated the CPR.

HELD:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client
never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability
in the prosecution or the defense of the clients cause. They must perform their duty with diligence and candor
to protect the interests of client and to serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain
the respect of the community for the legal profession. Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to
lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.

As to Atty. Magulta’s claim that there was no lawyer-client relationship, the Court does not agree. A lawyer-
client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice
regarding the formers business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid,
promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for
which his service had been sought. If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. It may be true that they have a lien upon the clients funds,
documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their
lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such
fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account
for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. In any event, they must
still exert all effort to protect their clients interest within the bounds of law.
Atty. Magulta is suspended for one year.
Hilado vs. Judge David
Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. Jose Gutierrez David
G.R. No. L-961; September 21, 1949

FACTS:
Hilado filed a complaint against Assad to annul deeds of sale of parcels of land. Atty Dizon represented Hilado,
while Atty. Ohnick represented Assad. After one year, Atty. Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad.
Four months later, Atty. Dizon filed for disqualification of Atty. Fransisco as he found out that the latter was
approached by Hilado to ask for a legal opinion on her case, for which he provided a legal opinion letter.

Atty. Francisco claimed that Hilado did not give him any material information and that he advised her that her
case will not win in court. Later, Hilado returned with a copy of the complaint made by Atty. Dizon, but Atty.
Francisco was not around, an associate in him firm, Atty. Agrava, attended to Hilado. Hilado left behind the legal
documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter stating that Hilado had no cause of action to file a
suit, such letter was signed by Atty. Francisco but he claimed that he did not read the letter.

Atty. Francisco claimed he was not paid for the advice, that not confidential information was relayed to him, and
that Hilado already waived her right to disqualify him as he already represented Assad in court for 4 months.

Judge David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the case.

HELD:
Yes. An attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco had already been established. Payment,
nor the taking up of the case after rendering legal advice, is necessary to establish an attorney-client relationship.

An attorney is employed or engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or when he is listening to his client’s
preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.

Materiality of the information relayed by Hilado

It does not matter if the information relayed is confidential or not. So long as the attorney-client relationship is
established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking other representations against the client.

Legal opinion letter not written by Atty. Francisco

It still binds him because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was the real author, was part of the same law firm. An
information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm,
his associates or his employers.

Four months to file for disqualification

It does not matter. The length of time is not a waiver of her right. The right of a client to have a lawyer be
disqualified, based on previous atty-client relationship, as counsel against her does not prescribe. Professional
confidence once reposed can nev5reser be divested by expiration of professional employment.
William Uy vs. Atty. Fermin Gonzales
A.C. No. 5280; March 30, 2004

FACTS:
Atty. Gonzales made and filed a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title for William Uy to be filed
with the RTC. When it was about to be filed, Atty. Gonzales went to Uy’s office demanding for an amount higher
than that agreed upon, he left after Uy reasoned with him so as not to demand for a higher amount. Uy later
discovered that instead of filing the petition, Atty. Gonzales filed a letter-complaint against him with the
provincial prosecutor for falsification of public documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and
circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title which was the subject matter of the petition which
Atty. Gonzales was supposed to file.

Atty. Gonzales claimed that he gave Uy a handwritten letter saying that he was to withdraw the petition he made
and that Uy should get another lawyer to file the petition, thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship
between him and Uy. He claimed that there was no longer any professional relationship between them when
he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document, that the facts and allegations were culled from
public documents procured from the register of deeds.

The IBP recommended 6 months of suspension for violating Rule 21.02 and Canon 21 of the CPR.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 21 of the CPR.

HELD:
No. The facts in the complaint for estafa thru falsification of public documents were obtained in the personal
capacity of Atty. Gonzales who volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the
land he redeemed from Uy. There was no lawyer-client relationship. The making of and the proposed filing of
the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.

Atty. Gonzales’ acts may not be equated with a misconduct lacking in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor to render him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would preclude any
lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal interests

Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Mercado vs. Atty. Vitriolo
Rosa Mercado vs. Atty. Julito Vitriolo
A.C. No. 5108; May 26, 2005

FACTS:
Rosa F. Mercado, the complainant, filed a disbarment case against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo. The latter was a
collaborating counsel of the complainant in her previous annulment of marriage case. The issue arose when the
respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the office of the City Prosecutor for violation
of Articles 171 and 172 of public document) of the Revised Penal Code.
Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children,
Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth
that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979,
when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11,
1978.Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document disclosed
confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo
as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claimed that,
in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential
lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred. On the other hand, respondent maintains that his filing of
the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule
on privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two
certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during
the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then
counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification
of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division
of CHED and are accessible to anyone.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated the client and lawyer privileged.

HELD:
No. The Court use the following factors in resolving the issue presented:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason
of this relationship that the client made the communication. Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer
are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain
the lawyer or the latter declines the employment.
The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without
fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to
obtain information from the prospective client.

(2) The client made the communication in confidence. The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise
a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. A confidential
communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. The communication made
by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking
legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted
by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. If the client seeks an accounting service, or
business or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed
for such purpose. Applying all these rules to the case at bar, the Court held that the evidence on record failed to
substantiate complainant's allegations. The Court noted that complainant did not even specify the alleged
communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked
specificity. She contended that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a
criminal action against her for falsification
of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment
then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant
must prove.

Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as
to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if
not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege
applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.
Canon 15
1. Sta. Maria vs. Tuazon (A.C. No. 396; July 31, 1964)
2. Alcala vs. De Vera (A.C. No. 620; March 21, 1974)
3. People vs. Cawili (G.R. No. L-30543; August 31, 1970)
4. In Re: Hamilton (24 Phil 100)
5. Lim vs. Villarosa (A.C. No. 5303; June 15, 2006)
6. Pacana, Jr. vs. Pascual-Lopez (A.C.No. 8243; July 24, 2009)
7. Artulueza vs. Maderazo (381 SCRA 418)
8. Abragan vs. Rodriguez (380 SCRA 93)
9. Rabanal vs. Tugade (383 SCRA 484)
10. Pormento, Sr. vs. Ponteverda (454 SCRA 176)

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the
matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the
prospective client.

Rule 15.02. - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed to
him by a prospective client.

Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.

Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator
in settling disputes.

Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable
results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body.

Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.

Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law
shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
Sta. Maria vs. Tuason
A.C. No. 396; July 31, 1964

FACTS:
Atty. Tuason represented Sta. Maria and the latters two partners Guanzon and Chincuanco in a civil case
involving a promissory note of 50,000 pesos. After winning the case, the respondent in the case was held liable
to pay Tuason’s clients. The amount was paid to the provincial sheriff of Pampanga. Tuason facilitated the
distribution according to the writ of execution issued. However, being in close personal relation with Sta. Maria’s
partners as a friend of Guanzon and as a nephew of Chincuanco, Atty. Tuason took more than the amount
designated to him. Sta. Maria then filed a disbarment case against him.

ISSUE:
1. WON Atty. Tuason acted with indiscretion, induced by his close relationship with Sta. Maria’s partners,
prejudicing Sta. Maria.
2. WON Tuason should be disbarred.

HELD:
1. Yes. Tuason placed his private and personal interest over and above that of his client constituting a
breach of the lawyer’s oath. The act is not conducive to a healthy growth of the legal profession.
2. No. Although Tuason withheld the amountfrr of 10,000 pesos, there is no evidence that he spent it. Also
that he may have felt justified in his acts as they were done with acquiescence of his clients. There was
amicable settlement of all the suits filed by Sta. Maria arising from the controversy. While it cannot be
said that the compromise agreement cannot affect the misconduct of Tuason, it cannot be denied that
Sta. Maria had also condoned his acts.

The penalty, instead of imposing a more severe one, is a reprimand for professional indiscretion, with warning
that a more severe penalty would be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar acts.
Alcala vs. De Vera
A.C. No. 620; March 21, 1974

FACTS:
In a civil case for annulment of sale of 2 lots filed by one Semenchuk against spouses Alcala on the ground that
one of the lots cannot be located or did not exist, De Vera represented sps Alcala. The RTC rendered judgment
rescinding the contract of sale on ground that Semenchuk was not able to take material possession of the lot in
question and that it has been occupied by one Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers for a number of years already.
Atty. De Vera received a copy of the decision but failed to inform his clients of the judgment against them. A
sheriff later came to Alcala’s house to serve a writ of execution issued in said case. Caught by surprise, Jose
Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court and inquired for the status of the case. The deputy clerk of court
informed Alcala that the case was decided already and that a copy of the decision was received by Atty. De Vera
and that since no appeal was taken, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court on motion of the plaintiff
Semenchuk. Spouses Alcala filed a case for damages against Atty. De Vera for failing to inform them of the
decision of the case and as a result, lost their right to appeal from said decision. The trial court denied the claim
for damages for failure to show that they indeed suffered damages.

ISSUE:
WON disbarment is proper.

HELD:
No. The court severely censured Atty. De Vera.

For indifference, loyalty, and lack of interest of De Vera in handling the defense of his clients
The evidence proving existence of a lot offered by spouses Alcala which De Vera allegedly failed to present was
rendered unnecessary for the appointed commissioner already reported that the lot existed but the same was
in the possession of other persons. The fact that spouses Alcala was not awarded any damages, attorney’s fees
and costs shows that De Vera exerted his utmost effort to resist Semenchuk’s complaint.

For gross negligence and malpractice for failing to inform his clients of the decision of the civil case
Spouses Alcala do not appear to have suffered any material or pecuniary damage by failure of De Vera to notify
them of the decision in the civil case since the decision rendered was fair and justified. It is no less true, however,
that in failing to inform his clients, De Vera failed to exercise such skill, care and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment.
The correctness of the decision in the civil case is not ground for exonerating De Vera from the charge but at
most will serve to mitigate his liability. While there is no finding of malice, deceit or deliberate intent to cause
damage to his clients, there is still proof of negligence and carelessness. Fortunately for De Vera, his negligence
did not result in any material or pecuniary damage to spouses Alcala and it is for this reason that he is not to be
disbarred.
The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment but is intended to protect the administration of
justice. His acts manifest a lack of total dedication or devotion to the interest expected of him under the lawyer’s
oath and the canons of professional responsibility His actions merit severe censure from the court.
People vs. Cawili
G.R. No. L-30543; August 31, 1970

The question before us is whether or not Hospicio O. Zapata, a member of the Philippine Bar, is to be subjected
to disciplinary action. He was, under our resolution of August 3, 1970, 1 given a period of ten days after receipt
thereof to explain why no such action should be taken against him in view of his failure to submit the brief as
counsel de parte within the reglementary period. He filed an explanation in a memorandum submitted to us on
August 22, 1970, admitting that he was remiss in his obligation to file said brief, but seeking to minimize such
failure on his part with the allegation that the accused, Rodrigo Cawili, was in a state of indigence resulting not
being paid but also in his partly assuming the expenses entailed in such defense. After invoking such
circumstances as the expenses incident on the printing of the brief being beyond the power of the wife of the
accused to bear and that he was not called upon to continue spending on behalf of such client, he would have
us overlook his failure to file the brief as in his opinion "the mere review of the record of the case will readily
show that the decision is contrary to law and the evidence adduced during the trial, . . ." 2 He did tender his
apology, coupled with a promise that an incident of such character will not be repeated in the future.

It cannot be denied that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary period is an offense
that entails disciplinary action. The recital of the circumstances on which counsel would seek to reduce its
gravity do not call for exculpation. He could have sought the permission to file a mimeographed brief, or, at the
very least, he could have informed us of the difficulties attendant on defending his client. For him to blithely
assume that a mere reading of the record would suffice to discharge an obligation not only to his client but to
this Court is to betray a degree of irresponsibility. It is not in keeping, even, with the minimal standards expected
of membership in the bar to be so lacking in elementary courtesy that this Court was not even informed of his
inability to comply with what was incumbent on him. His conduct was therefore inexcusable, although the
explanation he tendered and the difficulties under which he worked would, to a certain degree, invite less than
full punishment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Hospicio O. Zapata is hereby reprimanded for his failure to submit his brief within the
reglementary period, and admonished to be much more careful in the fulfillment of his obligations to his client
and to this honorable Tribunal.

Endnotes:
1. The resolution reads as follows: "In L-30543, People v. Cawili, this Court, after considering that the
accused, Rodrigo Cawili, requested to have counsel to defend him, his counsel de parte, Atty. Hospicio
Zapata, having failed to file his brief within the period which expired on June 11, 1970, and after taking
note of the explanation of such failure on the part of such counsel de parte which is far from satisfactory,
resolved to grant the request of the accused to have a counsel de oficio appointed for him and to require
Atty. Hospicio Zapata to explain within a period of ten days after receipt of this resolution why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for his failing to submit the brief for the accused within
the reglementary period."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Re: Porter Hamilton
24 Phil 100
G.R. No. L-7725; January 17, 1913

- Akala mo kayo, yun pala manloloko

Facts:
Double Cross
 Disbarment procedures instituted against L. Porter Hamilton for professional misconduct.
 Advised and counseled Andrada in regard to a claim he had with Alburo (attachment proceedings).
 Prepared the formal petition filed in court but was not named as Andrada’s counsel in the papers.
 Entered his appearance as counsel for Alburo.
 Court demanded an explanation and an investigation was held -> Fiscal was ordered to institute the
formal proceedings against Hamilton.
 Claims:
 did not act as attorney for Andrada, only as a favor.

Blackmail
 Wrote to Mr. Joseph, owner of Joseph Lumber Yard, “Take me as counsel or else an investigation will be
instituted for being shady supplier of Govt”
 Claims:
 letter was a privileged communication – BITCH NAH. Only client can invoke. But client rejected so
WHATCHU TALKIN BOUT??

PENALTY – According to Spanish Penal Code: unprofessional conduct = temporary disqualification from 6-12
years = 6 year suspension

BAD FAITH, CONFLICTING INTEREST, NO CONSENT

Notes:
Representing adverse interests and revealing client’s secrets in the absence of written consent on the part of
the clients concerned, a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests without being disciplined for such
misconduct. The reason is that the representation of conflicting interests not only constitutes malpractice but is
also a violation of the attorney-client relationship as well a lawyer’s duty to a court.
Lim vs. Villarosa
Lim (in behalf of penta resorts corporation/attorney in fact) of Jalandoni vs. Atty. Nicanor Villarosa
A.C. No. 5303; June 15, 2006

Lawyer’s Act:
Atty. Villarosa appeared for and in behalf of spouses Jalbuena and Delfin while concurrently representing
Jalandoni in a civil case. However, despite being fully aware that the interest of Jalandoni and the interest of the
PRC are one and the same, notwithstanding the fact that Jalandoni was still his client, Atty. Villarosa opted to
represent opposing clients at the same time.

Lawyer’s Defense:
He argued that no prejudice was suffered by Jalandoni as she was already represented by another lawyer from
the first hearing date. In fact, he contended that it was he who was not notified of the substitution of counsels.
He claimed Lim had not only violated the rule on civil procedure but he was not duly authorized to represent
PRC nor by Jalandoni to file his complaint against him. Neither was Lim a proper party to file this complaint. This
fact is an additional ground to have his case dismissed because Lim exceeded his authority granted as embodied
in a resolution and the SPA allegedly granted to him by complainants.

HELD:
Rule 15.01 – conflict of interest
Atty. Villarosa is suspended for one year. The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided but also those win which no confidence has been bestowed
or will be used.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquire in the previous employment. The first part of
the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients either in the same action or in a totally
unrelated case; in his former client in a matter which is related, directly or indirectly, to the present controversy.
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interest oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in a totally unrelated case. The cases here involved
parties connected to the PRC, even if neither PRC not Jalandoni was specifically named as a party in some of the
cases mentioned.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and receiving the confidences of the client,
he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his client and for whose interest is
adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter. The prohibition stands even if the
adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have been
honest.
The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in absence of the written consent of all the parties
concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which subject the lawyer to
disciplinary action.
Pacana, Jr. vs. Pascual-Lopez
A.C.No. 8243; July 24, 2009

FACTS:
Rolando Pacana, Jr. (complainant) filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez (
respondent) charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Complainant alleges that respondent commited acts constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty,
influence peddling, and failure to render an accounting of all the money and properties received by her from
complainant. Paacana worked for Multitel and earned the ire of investors after becoming the assignee of
majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty
Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Complainant sought the advice of respondent and a
lawyer-client relationship was established between the parties although no formal document was executed.
Complainant learned of the respondent’s clients in Multitel after receiving a demand letter from the latter.
Respondent continued to help complainant through the latter paying an amount and even transferring property
to the former on different occasions to be used in dealing with the latter’s liabilities. Complainant then went to
the US to avoid being arrested while respondent handles his liabilities. When complainant returned to the
Philippines, respondent informed him that he has been cleared by the NBI and the BID. Respondent continued
that she was willing to return an amount to complainant after all the accumulated legal fees the former had
earned from settling the liabilities of both complainant and the clients from Multitel. Complainant accepted the
offer of receiving amount but respondent failed to fulfill the promise. Soon, complainant noticed that
respondent began to avoid communicating with him. Complainant then wrote to respondent a letter formally
asking for a full accounting of all the money, documents and properties given to the latter but respondent failed
to provide a clear audited financial report of all the properties turned over by the complainant to the respondent.
Complainant filed an affidavit-complaint against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.

ISSUE:
Did the respondent violate Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility, representing
conflicting interests?

HELD:
Yes. Respondent Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for
engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Rationale:
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides: “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.”
Clearly, respondent established a lawyer-client relationship with the complainant while aware that respondent
also represents clients of Multitel, who are opposed to the liabilities of the complainant. Moreover, respondent
took advantage of the complainant’s situation by giving him advice, and later on, soliciting money and properties
from him which were used to satisfy clients of Multitel.
Artelueza vs. Maderazo
Lolita Artezuela vs. Atty. Ricarte Maderazo
A.C. NO. 4354. APRIL 22, 2002; 381 SCRA 418

FACTS:
Artezuela filed before the Supreme Court a verified complaint for disbarment against the respondent. She
alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties her lawyer in a damage suit and failed to represent her
interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when her case was scheduled for pre-trial conference,
respondent asked for its postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant’s
persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as
counsel without obtaining complainant’s consent.

Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While acting as her
counsel, respondent prepared Echavia’s Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even
printed in respondent’s office. Complainant further averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of
the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

HELD:
Yes. He is guilty of representing conflicting interests prohibited by Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be counsel-of-
record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor
make his efforts to advance the adverse party’s conflicting interests of record--- although these circumstances
are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand
in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his
original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most
obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
Abragan vs. Rodriguez
380 SCRA 93

Facts:
Sometime in 1986, complainants hired the services of the respondent to represent in a case before the MTCC of
Cagayan de Oro City. The case was won by the complainants. Subsequently, when the lawyer allegedly
surreptitiously dealt with the subject property with other persons, the petitioner severed the lawyer – client
relationship.
On August 1991, complainants filed a case of indirect contempt against Sheriff Fernando Loncion et al. Much to
their surprise, respondent represented the sheriff. Since the counsel employed by the complainants was a
former student of respondent, said counsel, egged by the suggestions of respondent withdrew the case without
the petitioner’s consent. That as a result of such withdrawal, subsequent events occurred to the prejudice of the
complainants.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rodriguez should be disbarred.

Held:
Yes.
In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.”
Rabanal vs. Tugade
383 SCRA 484
A.C. NO. 1372. JUNE 27, 2002

FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant spouses Cayetano and Lirio Rabanal against Atty.
Faustino F. Tugade. It is alleged that respondent, as counsel for complainant Cayetano Rabanal, did not file the
appellant’s brief in the Court of Appeals despite having been granted by the appellate court an extension of time
to file the same, as a result of which the appeal filed by Cayetano was dismissed and the decision of the then
Circuit Criminal Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan became final and executory.
Respondent claims however that he was not the counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal prior to the filing of
a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals and he could not be held responsible for the dismissal
of complainant’s appeal for failure of counsel to file the appellant’s brief.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lawyer should be disciplined

HELD:
Yes. The absence of a written contract does not preclude a finding that there was a professional relationship
which merits attorney’s fees for professional services rendered. A written contract is not an essential element
in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession. In this case, complainant sought and received legal advice from respondent Tugade, who admitted
that he agreed to sign the appellant’s brief to be filed and that he received P600.00 from complainant spouses.
It is therefore clear that a lawyer-client relationship existed between the two. He thus violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:

RULE 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
RULE 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Pormento, Sr. vs. Ponteverda
454 SCRA 176; A.C. No. 5128; 31 March 2005

The Case: Complaint against Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct with prayer for
disbarment

FACTS:
Respondent was the Pormento family’s legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The family’s relationship with
the respondent extends beyond the mere lawyer-client relations.
The rift between complainant and respondent began when the complainant’s counterclaim in a civil case filed
with the RTC of Bacolod City was dismissed. Respondent failed to inform complainant Pormento of the
dismissal of his counterclaim which resulted to the latter being deprived of his right to appeal. In order to
recover his ownership over a parcel of land, Pormento was forced to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra
refused to institute an action to recover the subject property.
In a separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at Negros Occidental. The Deed of Declaration
of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by respondent. Since there was another person
who claims ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he heeded respondent’s advice to build a small
house on the property and to allow his (complainant’s) nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for
complainant to establish his possession of the said property. Subsequently, complainant’s nephew refused to
vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case with the Municipal Trial Court of Escalante,
Negros Occidental. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainant’s nephew

HELD:
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
“A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.”
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection.

Another test to determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of
the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which
he appeared for the former client. Conversely, he may properly act as counsel for a new client, with full
disclosure to the latter, against a former client in a matter wholly unrelated to that of the previous employment,
there being in that instance no conflict of interests. Where, however, the subject matter of the present suit
between the lawyer’s new client and his former client is in some way connected with that of the former client’s
action, the lawyer may have to contend for his new client that which he previously opposed as counsel for the
former client or to use against the latter information confided to him as his counsel.
Canon 16
1. Garcia vs. Manuel (395 SCRA 386)
2. Espiritu vs. Ulep (458 SCRA 1)
3. Lim vs. Magallanes (520 SCRA 1)
4. Rayos vs. Hernandez (515 SCRA 517)
5. In Re: Abad (98 Phil 899)
6. Yu vs. Tajanlangit (A.C. No. 5691; March 13, 2009)
7. Cordon vs. Bacalinta (390 SCRA 299)

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME
INTO HIS PROFESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others
kept by him.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he
shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees
and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent
on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interest are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
Garcia vs. Manuel
395 SCRA 386; A.C. No. 5811

GARCIA v. MANUEL
FACTS:
A disbarment complaint filed by Maritess Garcia against respondent Atty. Manuel for gross misconduct for
ineffectively handling her case and failing to return to her money she gave him. Maritess Garcia divorced her
husband and approached respondent for legal advice concerning child support and her condo unit w/c husband
refused to vacate. A retainer agreement then was entered by complainant w/ respondent. Complainant gave
respondent P10k for the filing fees in the ejectment case. She, however, asked respondent as to why the fees
cost so much. Respondent replied that it is based on the percentage of the price of property and support for the
child prayed for. Several follow-ups were made by complainant but later found out that case has not been filed.
An altercation bet. them took place. After serious exchange of words, respondent RETURNED to complainant
ALL DOCS. No amount of money was returned by respondent despite the latter’s demand for its return.

HELD:
RULE 1.01
Counsel committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the complainant. He even
asked the complainant to raise the filing fee. After receiving the registry return card, he still did not file
the ejectment case.

RULE 18.04 (lawyer shall keep client informed)

The lawyer-client relationship being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be
adequately and fully informed of the devts of the case.

CANON 16, RULE 16.01 – The highly fiduciary and confidential nature of such relations requires that
the lawyer should properly account for all the funds received. It shall be returned to client
when became due or upon demand.

RULING: SUSPENDED FOR 6 MOS.

Espiritu vs. Ulep
458 SCRA 1

458 SCRA 1 – Legal Ethics – Canon 16 – Misappropriation of Client’s Money

FACTS:
In 1997, a compromise agreement was reached between Oscar Espiritu and Ricardo Maon whereby Espiritu
agreed to deliver P50k to Maon. Espiritu handed the P50k to Atty. Jaime Ulep, his lawyer, so that the latter may
deliver it to Maon. Ulep failed to deliver the money to Maon and thereafter he avoided talking to Espiritu.
Espiritu then sought the assistance of the local IBP chapter. Thereafter, Ulep was invited but he failed to appear
for five consecutive scheduled hearings. The IBP chapter then heard the case ex parte and subsequently
recommended Ulep’s suspension.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the recommendation is correct.

HELD:
Yes. Ulep violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should hold in trust all money
and properties of his client that may come into his possession. In the case at bar, Ulep failed to explain what he
did with the money. The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires
utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is
intended for the protection of the client. Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property
coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under
any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds
entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in
the legal profession. The Supreme Court suspended Ulep for 6 months and ordered him to pay the P50k plus
interest.
Lim vs. Magallanes
520 SCRA 1

Before us is an administrative complaint1 against Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes, presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 54, and Atty. Gia L. Arinday, clerk of court of the said branch.
The complaint, dated August 8, 2003, was filed by Humberto Lim, Jr., for and in behalf of Lumot Anlap Jalandoni.
Complainant Jalandoni was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 97-96802 assigned to Branch 54 of RTC
Bacolod City. Despite a period of over five years from the time it was submitted for decision, the case remained
unresolved as of the filing of the complaint3.
In a letter dated July 7, 20034 addressed to respondent clerk of court, defendants requested for copies of all
court pleadings and incidents on record pertaining to the civil case. Despite repeated follow-up,5 respondent
clerk of court failed to act on the request.
On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 02-24328 & 02-243296, and 02-24330 & 02-243317 (in which
complainant’s family corporation was a party) were also assigned to Branch 54 of RTC Bacolod City. In one of the
hearings, complainant noticed that respondent judge seated himself with the counsels of the opposing party
and engaged them in conversation. When complainant’s counsel arrived, respondent judge suddenly stood up
and took the bench.8
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required respondent judge and clerk of court to file their respective
comments.9 Both failed to comply. On December 8, 2003, tracers10 were sent to them reiterating OCA’s directive
to file their comments.
On January 6, 2004, respondent judge submitted his comment11 explaining that it was with deep regret that he
was unable to resolve and timely dispose of the case. He claimed he was suffering from "heart ailment and
hyperacidity" which made him easily exhausted, causing the delay in resolving the cases pending in his court.
His decision-making was further hampered when his stenographer suffered a stroke and became bedridden. He
also averred that he had explained his condition to the parties to the case and the latter understood his
predicament.
On the other hand, respondent clerk of court failed to submit her comment in continued defiance of the OCA’s
directives.
The OCA found the respondent judge’s explanation unmeritorious. While his condition was understandable, it
was only mitigating and could not exculpate him from liability. He should have asked the Court for an extension
of time within which to decide the case. The OCA recommended a fine of ₱11,000 with a stern warning that a
similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.12
As to respondent clerk of court, the OCA recommended that she be required to show cause why she should not
be administratively dealt with for her failure to submit her comment.
On March 18, 2005, however, complainant manifested her lack of interest in pursuing the administrative case.
After receiving the decision on the civil case, she became convinced that respondent judge was, after all,
"impartial." Moreover, respondent judge inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases, disproving any
personal interest in the cases. She likewise conducted her own investigation and was satisfied that respondent
clerk of court had no part in the refusal to furnish the requested documents since she was not present when the
requests were made. For these reasons, she moved to withdraw the complaint.13
On June 29, 2005, this Court denied the motion to withdraw the case and submitted the matter for resolution.
As for respondent clerk of court, she had been given two opportunities to comment on the complaint. Her refusal
was deemed a waiver of her right to do so.
A motion to withdraw an administrative complaint against a member of the judiciary cannot deprive this Court
of its authority to ascertain the culpability of a respondent and impose the corresponding penalty.14 This Court
has a great interest in the conduct and behavior of all officials and employees of the judiciary in ensuring the
prompt and efficient delivery of justice at all times. Its efforts to comply with its constitutional mandate cannot
be frustrated by any private arrangement of the parties15 because the issue in an administrative case is not
whether the complainant has a cause of action against the respondents but whether the latter breached the
norms and standards of the courts.16
Respondent judge admitted that he failed to resolve Civil Case No. 97-9680 for more than five years. This was a
violation of the Constitution which mandates that lower courts must dispose of their cases promptly and decide
them within three months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of
Court or by the court itself.17 It was also a violation of the Canon of Judicial Ethics18 and Code of Judicial
Conduct19 which required judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.20
A judge should be efficient in performing his judicial duties. He should decide his cases within the prescribed
period; failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency. The raison d’ etre of courts lies not only in properly
dispensing justice but also in being able to do so seasonably.21
Respondent judge could not use his health condition and the absence of his stenographer to justify his failure to
promptly resolve the civil case. Moreover, the fact that the parties to the case supposedly understood his
condition did not excuse him from complying with the period which he was mandated to observe in deference
to the Court’s policy of speedy disposition of cases. At the very least, he should have asked for an extension.
While this Court understands that judges cannot always abide by the prescribed periods, it is not for us to take
the initiative in offering an extension. In numerous cases, we have allowed extensions but always upon the
proper application by the judge concerned and on meritorious grounds. His failure to ask for an extension was
therefore inexcusable.
The eventual rendition of the decision notwithstanding, respondent judge should nevertheless be penalized for
having incurred undue delay. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, this is a less serious charge punishable by
either suspension from office for not less than one nor more than three months, or a fine of more than ₱10,000
but not exceeding ₱20,000. Considering the unreasonable delay of more than five years, the maximum fine of
₱20,000 should be imposed on him.
Regarding the charge of bias and partiality against respondent judge, there was no evidence to support the
allegation. The standard of substantial evidence required in administrative proceedings means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The records are bereft of
substantial evidence to hold him administratively liable for this. At best, the allegations were mere presumptions
which did not meet the mandated standard. Respondent judge should not be held responsible for allegations
which were not proven.
The Court has never hesitated to discipline lower court judges and court personnel found guilty of violations of
the law or the Canon of Judicial Ethics and Code of Judicial Conduct. But it has likewise never wavered in
exonerating them when the charges are baseless. Let the guilty be severely brought to book but let those who
are innocent enjoy merited exoneration to which they are entitled as a matter of justice.22
Lastly, respondent clerk of court was directed to comment on the complaint twice. Her refusal to controvert the
charges against her was in effect an admission of the same. In any case, the records are clear that complainant
sent her two written requests for the issuance of copies of the documents. Both demands were never heeded.
In an attempt, however, to exonerate respondent clerk of court, complainant later manifested that after
conducting a personal investigation, she allegedly "discovered" that respondent should not be made
accountable since she was "not present" when the requests were made.
We disagree. Respondent clerk of court was remiss in her duties.
Section 5 (a) and (d) of RA 671323 reads:
Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties, all public officials and
employees are under obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letters and requests - All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working
days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public.
The reply must contain the action taken on the request.
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Act immediately on the public’s personal transactions. - All public officials and employees must attend to
anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of their offices and must, at all times, act promptly and
expeditiously.
She violated the foregoing provisions. This constituted neglect of duty which cannot be countenanced. She
should be reminded of her sacred duty as an officer of the court to attend to the public’s queries. 24 Her alleged
absence when the requests were made cannot exculpate her.
Under Section 52 (C) (13) and (15), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
respondent clerk of court’s infraction is classified as a light offense.
Section 52. Classification of Offenses.1awphi1.nét
C. The following are light offenses with corresponding penalties:
xxx xxx xxx
13. Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen days from receipt xxx
1st Offense – Reprimand
2nd Offense – Suspension 1-30 days
3rd Offense – Dismissal
xxx xxx xxx
15. Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or act promptly and
expeditiously on public transactions.
1st Offense – Reprimand
2nd Offense – Suspension 1-30 days
3rd Offense – Dismissal
This being her first offense, respondent clerk of court is subject to reprimand with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. She is also admonished to
be more diligent in complying with the orders of the OCA. Her defiance to lawful orders does not speak well of
a court employee and a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Demosthenes Magallanes is hereby found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering
a decision and is FINED Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000). Respondent clerk of court Atty. Gia Independencia
Arinday is hereby REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let this order be entered in the records of Judge Magallanes and Atty. Arinday.
Rayos vs. Hernandez
515 SCRA 517

TOPIC: Contingent Fee arrangement

FACTS:
1. Rayos was a client of Atty Hernandez in Rayos vs NAPOCOR.

The story of the case:

On Oct 26-27, 1978, typhoon Kading hit Bulacan and concurrently, NAPOCOR imprudently opened three
floodgates of the spillway of Angat Dam which caused flooding of Angat River. Consequently, 10 relatives of
Rayos died and his family’s properties were destroyed. Rayos sued NAPOCOR. RTC dismissed the case for lacking
credible evidence. CA reversed the decision and awarded damages in favor of Rayos, which was also affirmed by
the SC.

Final and executory on Aug 4, 1993. The awards were as follows:

a. Actual damages - P520, 000
b. Moral damages – P500, 000
c. Litigation Expenses – P10,000.

2. The check issued by NAPOCOR was turned over to Atty Hernandez as he was the counsel of Rayos. Rayos
demanded the check from Atty H but Atty H refused

3. Rayos filed a motion with the RTC to direct Atty Hernandez to deliver to him the check. Despite the Court
Order, Atty H refused claiming that it was his means to ensure payment of his attorney’s fees.

4. Atty Hernandez deposited the amount of P502, 838. 79 to the bank account of Rayos.

5. Rayos filed a disbarment case against Atty H for his failure to return the remaining P557, 961. 21.

6. Atty H replied: Rayos allegedly agreed to a contingent basis fee on a 40%-60% (client-lawyer) sharing:
40% - attorney’s fees
20% - litigation expenses

7. The Court referred the case to Commission on Bar Discipline of IBP for investigation.
 Investigating Commissioner recommended the DISMISSAL of the case.
 IBP adopted and approved the same.

MAIN ISSUE:
Whether or not the contingent fee agreement is binding upon Rayos and Atty Hernandez.

DECISION:
YES, but with RESERVATIONS.

CONTINGENT FEE – the contingent fee is the amount agreed upon by the parties subject to the stipulation that
counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers.

YES: Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer
especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action but no means to pay for legal services, unless
he agrees to a contract of contingent fee. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee in
consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails.

RESERVATIONS: Contingent fee contracts should always be subject to the supervision of a court as to its
reasonableness. When the courts find that the stipulated amount is excessive or found to have been marred by
fraud, mistake, undue influence on the part of the attorney, public policy demands that said contract be
disregarded to protect the client from unreasonable exaction.

In the case at bar, Atty H collected 53% of the total amount due to Rayos.
 Rayos was unschooled and frustrated with the loss of his loved ones and the destruction of his family’s
properties. Given these facts, Rayos would easily succumb to the demands of Atty H regarding his
attorney’s fees.
 Taking note also of Atty H’s efforts in litigating Rayos’ case for 15 years and the risk he took in
representing Rayos on a contingent fee basis, a fee of 35% of the amount awarded to Rayos would be a
fair compensation for Atty H’s legal services.

Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish
the end desired. Thus, guided by previous rulings of the Court, Atty Hernandez’s SUSPENSION FOR 6 MONTHS is
justified in the case at bar.

-----------------------------------------------------
NB:
Factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
Rule 20.1 of CPR:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; 

c) The importance of the subject matter; 

d) The skill demanded; 

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he
belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
The professional standing of the lawyer.
In Re: Elmo Abad, successful bar examinee
98 Phil 899

Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing
law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to
admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the following lame explanation:

1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc dated
July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar Admission Fee in the
amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, ... paid his Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00
as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128793, ... and also paid his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown by Official Receipt No. 83740,... .

2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme Court, included
the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as shown by a Letter of Request
dated July 23, 1979, ...

3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn to take my Oath as a
member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice, the Honorable Enrique M. Fernando
wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The Honorable
Chief Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and for which reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was
further suspended. *

4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable Supreme Court
determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;

5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may take upon my Prayer to
determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the respondent of an Annual General Meeting together with
my Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981, ... .

6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's (Deceased)
Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my name in the Roll of Attorneys with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing, I paid my membership due and
other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt
No. 110326 and Official Receipt No. 0948, ... . Likewise respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown
by Official Receipt No. 058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685, ... .

7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter also included the name of
the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and directors for the year 1981-1982, ... .

8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981, Complainant
Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion with the Honorable
Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein respondent be allowed
to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;

9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982 membership due and
other assessment for which the undersigned paid as shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and Official Receipt
No. 3363, ... .
10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown by Official Receipt No. 3195776.

11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as a
Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to
the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)

The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)

WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten
(10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
Yu vs. Tajanlangit
A.C. No. 5691; March 13, 2009

FACTS:
An administrative complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant Avito Yu against respondent Atty. Cesar R.
Tajanlangit. Complainant had engaged the services of respondent as defense counsel in a criminal case that
resulted to his conviction. Complainant averred that respondent had violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR for failing to
return the bailbond to him in the amount P195,000.00 after having withdrawn the same. Respondent, however,
contended that complainant had authorized and instructed him to withdraw the cash bond in order to apply the
amount as payment for legal fees and reimbursement for expenses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR.

HELD:
The SC ruled in affirmative. It was not at all improper for respondent to have withdrawn the cash bonds as there
was evidence showing that complainant and respondent had entered into a special fee arrangement. But,
however justified respondent was in applying the cash bonds to the payment of his services and
reimbursement of the expenses he had incurred, the Court agrees with the IBP that he is not excused from
rendering an accounting of the same. The highly fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client
requires that the lawyer should promptly account for all the funds received from, or held by him for, the client.
The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney’s fees on the money in his hands collected for his client does
not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting.
Therefore, the SC admonished the respondent and held that commission of a similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
Cordon vs. Bacalinta
390 SCRA 299

FACTS:
Complainant Rosauro Cordon, the widow of Felixberto Jaldon, inherited properties which amounted to 21
parcels of land. The lawyer who helped her settle the estate of her late husband was respondent Atty. Jesus
Balicanta.
Respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to organize a corporation that would develop the said real
properties into a high-scale commercial complex with a beautiful penthouse for complainant, which led to the
establishment of Rosaura Enterprises. Balicanta was simultaneously the President/General Manager/Treasurer.
He made them sign a document which turned out to be a voting trust agreement plus an SPA to sell and mortgage
some of the parcels of land which he transferred the titles of to a certain Tion Suy Ong. Respondent never
accounted for the proceeds of said transfers. Using a spurious board resolution, he obtained a loan from Land
bank in the amount of 2.22M php secured by 9 of the parcels of land. The respondent ostensibly intended to
use the money to construct the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC, for brevity). Complainant later on found
out that the structure was made of poor materials such as sawali, coco lumber and bamboo which could not
have cost the corporation anything close to the amount of the loan secured. He failed to pay a single installment
on the loan and therefore LBP foreclosed. He did not attempt to redeem, and sold the rights to redeem said
property.
Complainant’s daughter discovered that their ancestral home had been demolished and that her mother was
detained in a small nipa hut. With the help of an attorney Lim she found her mother. They terminated
respondent’s services and threatened him with legal action.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be disbarred

HELD:
Yes. Respondent committed grave and serious misconduct that casts dishonor on the legal profession. His
misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal
benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society, the obligation to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Specifically, he is forbidden to engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession
and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should
also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. Thus, the requirement of good moral character is of much
greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Lawyers are
expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character
is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vast interests
are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s
property, reputation, his life, his all.
Good moral standing is manifested in the duty of the lawyer “to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.” He is bound “to account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.” The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in
nature. Thus, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their
clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.
Canon 17
1. People vs. Lagramada (388 SCRA 173)

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST
AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
People vs. Lagramada
388 SCRA 173

If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more reasonable explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the
test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a conviction.
The Case
Matias Lagramada appeals the August 23, 2000 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Morong, Rizal
(Branch 79) in Criminal Case Nos. 3158-M and 3159-M, finding him guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding the accused MATIAS LAGRAMADA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape for two (2) counts committed upon the minor JOSEPHINE LAGRAMADA, [this Court sentences him]
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, for each count of rape and to pay civil indemnity to [the] offended
party in accordance with recent jurisprudence, the amount of P75,000.00 also for each count.[2]
Two similarly worded Informations, both dated November 11, 1998,[3] charged him as follows:
That in or about the month of April, 1996, in the Municipality of Morong, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did, then and [there] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Josephine Lagramada,
a twelve (12) year old girl, against the latters will and consent.[4]
With the assistance of counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on March 16, 1999.[6] After trial
on the merits, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the prosecutions version of the facts as
follows:[7]
In April 1996, about 7:00 oclock in the morning, the victim Josephine Lagramada, 11 years of age, was sitting
inside the sala of her parents one-storey house located at San Guillermo, Morong, Rizal, when she was pulled
inside a 3 x 4 meter room by appellant Matias Lagramada (second cousin of the victims father) who threatened
her with bodily harm. The victim saw that appellant had a balisong tucked [in] his pants. Appellant pushed her
on the bamboo bed (papag), removed her shorts and thereupon lay on top of her as he removed his own
clothes.The victim felt pain when appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant gained carnal
satisfaction in a matter of three (3) minutes and left the room thereafter. The victim kept the incident to herself
because she was afraid of appellant who threatened her not to tell anyone about the incident. On September
15, 1996, about nighttime, appellant approached the victim who was sleeping on the lighted floor of their house
beside her younger sister, Anita Lagramada. Appellant took off her shorts and had sexual congress with her for
about three (3) minutes. Appellant left the scene, leaving the victim crying in despair.
On January 3, 1998, the victims father, Apolonio Lagramada, knew of another attempt by appellant to rape his
daughter, which prompted him to report to the police authorities. The victim, on the same day, underwent
medical examination by Inspector Dennis G. Bellin, Medico-Legal Officer, Camp Crame Crime Laboratory Group,
Quezon City, and she was found to have sustained a shallow healed laceration at 9:00 oclock position and that
the [s]ubject is in [a] non-virgin state physically. (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
In his Brief, appellant gave his version of the facts thus: [8]
Sometime in the morning of January 3, 1998 when accused was residing with his uncle, Apolonio Lagramada and
his daughter[s], Josephine and Anita[,] in their new residence at El Dorado, Antipolo City as said accused was
helping his uncle, Apolonio Lagramada in repairing their new residence at the said El Dorado, Antipolo City, the
latter requested the accused, to help him get a refrigerator he would repair for the chief of [police] of Baras,
Rizal. As requested, accused helped his uncle, Apolonio and went directly to the Municipal Hall of Baras, Rizal.
Upon [r]eaching Baras, accused was told by Apolonio to stay downstairs, but already being guarded by a
policeman right near the [d]esk [s]ergeant while he, Apolonio proceeded directly upstairs where the Office of
the Chief of Police is situated.
It did not take long[.] Apolonio went down with the chief of [p]olice and told accused that he would go home
while he (accused) shall stay with the [p]oliceman on duty, whose name is Pat. Jerry Fuliente, as he heard the
chief of [p]olice telling the [p]oliceman [to] take him inside the jail.
At about 8[:]30 [a.m.] the next day, January 4, 1998, Apolonio, with his daughters, Josephine and Anita appeared
and went directly to the Office of the Chief of Police and moments later, accused saw a policeman taking the
written statements of the two, Josephine and Anita. Likewise, accused saw his uncle, Apolonio handing the two
(2) documents, saying that the first one is a Request for Medico Legal and the other is an Initial Laboratory Report
on the medical examination of Josephine, and [b]oth dated January 3, 1998 of three (3) years after the alleged
rapes were committed.
While being interviewed by the investigators, Pat. Jerry Fuliente, who is his guard, used to tell him that he
(accused) must not worry about his situation, as he was allegedly requested by Apolonio to explain to him hi[s]
situation, in that he (accused) must not worry [about] his problem as for the amount of P35,000.00 his cases
would be dismissed as Apolonio told him to relay to him. Not only four times that Pat. Fuliente opened this
matter to the accused, so that, when his relatives like Francisco Lagramada visited him and gave him money for
his expenses while in jail, he relayed the same to him as he (accused) wont enter into such a stupid payment as
he did not commit any such rapes against his cousin when it was he who took care of her when she, Josephine
Lagramada got involved in an accident and hospitalized for about three (3) weeks at the Orthopedic Hospital.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimony of complainant. Noting that she was young and unmarried,
it held that she would never fabricate a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and
thereafter permit herself to be the subject of a public trial, if she was not motivated by an honest desire to have
the culprit brought to justice. The court a quo also held that her delayed reporting of the rape incidents did not
undermine her credibility, since the delay was supposedly grounded on appellants threats to her
life. Furthermore, it ruled that the minor inconsistencies in her testimony even bolstered her credibility and the
truthfulness of her story.[9]
The RTC did not give credence to the defense of denial interposed by the accused and ruled that it could not
prevail over the positive testimony of complainant. As between his denial and her positive identification of him,
the latter was given greater weight, especially because she had no motive to testify falsely against him.[10]
Hence, this appeal.[11]
Issues
In his Brief appellant alleged in a rather jumbled manner that, in convicting him, the court a quo had erred on
the following grounds:
1. No evidence was presented that it was accused who deflowered or virginized Josephine Lagramada, the
alleged victim or complainant in these cases.
xxxxxxxxx
2. The evidence presented by the prosecution calls for the dismissal of the two (2) cases on grounds that the
testimony of the complainant, Josephine Lagramada was said to be false and untrue by her witnesses, her father
and sister.
xxxxxxxxx
3. On records now, undoubtedly, Josephine, the complainant has been lying since the beginning, from the time
the accused-appellant helped her when she met an accident up to this time.
xxxxxxxxx
[4]. The very purpose of the father of Josephine, Apolonio Lagramada, who is a first cousin of the father (already
dead) of herein accused-appellant [was] to improve his living with his daughter, Anita and others as his earnings
[were] not enough.[12]
In short, he argues that the RTC erred in giving full faith and credence to complainants testimony despite its
inherent contradictions and implausibility.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has merit. The guilt of appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, this Court
cannot sustain his conviction.
Main Issue:
Complainants Credibility
In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation of rape
can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused -- though innocent --
to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where usually only two persons are involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.[13]
Moreover, when the issue is the credibility of witnesses and of their testimonies, the trial court is generally
deemed to have been in a better position to observe their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb its findings, unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[14]
After poring over the records of this case, especially the transcripts of stenographic notes, this Court is convinced
that the prosecution has not been able to prove appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Alleged First
Incident of Rape
In her testimony, complainant narrated the supposed first rape in this manner:
FISCAL RAMIREZ:
Now, when Matias Lagramada was pulling you, what did he say if any?
A Not to tell anyone.
Q And what was your reaction when he was pulling you?
A I was afraid, sir.
Q Now, where did he bring you?
A In the room, sir.
Q Now, this house of yours, how many rooms are there?
A Two (2), sir.
Q Is that a bungalow or a 2-storey house?
A 1-storey building, sir.
FISCAL RAMIREZ:
You mentioned that you were brought in a room[;] whose room [was] that?
A Our room, sir.
Q When you said our room, to whom are you referring x x x?
A I, together with my sister, sir.
Q What is the name of your sister?
A Anita, sir.
Q Now, how far is the sala from your room. Using as a point of your reference your seat?
A Two (2) meters, sir.
Q Now, that room wherein Matias Lagramada brought you, is there a door in it?
A There is no door, sir, but there is a curtain.
Q Now, when Matias Lagramada [pulled] you and brought you inside your room, did you have a premonition on
what will happen to you?
A None, sir.
Q Now, you mentioned that Matias Lagramada undressed you[;] what clothes were you wearing at that time?
A A white t-shirt, sir.
Q What did you do, if any, when Matias Lagramada started to undress you?
A When he was trying to remove my shorts I was pulling it up and I was frightened, sir.
Q Now, when Matias Lagramada was pulling your shorts down, you were facing each other, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you notice from his face when you attem[p]ted to pull up your shorts?
A His eyes were red.
FISCAL RAMIREZ:
And you mentioned that you were afraid, why were you afraid?
A Because of what he [would] do to me, sir.
Q Did he already threaten you at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he say to you?
A Not to tell anyone, sir.
Q And was he in possession of anything?
A A balisong was tucked in his hips.
Q When you said hips, will you kindly demonstrate to us?
A (Witness pointing to the hips).
Q So Matias Lagramada was able to remove your shorts?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what happened after that?
A He [lay] on top of me, sir.
Q So, he made you x x x lie down?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A [O]n our papag, sir.
Q By the way, how big is your room?
A Three by four (3x4).
Q Now, is there a window in your room?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was the window opened at that time?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL RAMIREZ:
By the way, how did it happen that you [lay] down?
A He pushed me, sir.
Q And after he pushed you to the bed, what did he do next?
A He [lay] on top of me as he removed my clothes.
Q And after he [lay] on top of you, what did he do?
A He removed my clothes and he also told me not to tell anyone about it.
Q And what did he do on top of you?
A [He placed] his organ to my organ, sir.
Q What did you feel, if any, when he was inserting his organ to your organ?
A I was hurt, sir.
Q While he was inserting his organ to your organ, what else did he do to you?
A No more, sir.
Q How long did he stay on top of you?
A Three (3) minutes, sir.
Q What did you notice if anything unusual on your body at that time?
A I [felt] pain on my organ and when I looked at my panty there [was] blood.
Q Did you see if something was expelled from the penis of Matias Lagramada?
A No, sir.
Q Now, after three minutes, what did Matias Lagramada do?
A He stood up where [sic] his brief and shorts, and left me inside the room.
FISCAL RAMIREZ:
What did he say or do while he [was] putting on his clothes?
A That not to tell anyone.
Q Will you describe his expression when he was making [these] things to you?
A His face was reddish, sir.
Q What was your feeling at the time when he told you not to tell this matter to anybody?
A I [was] afraid, sir.[15]
Anita Lagramada, complainants sister, gave her own version of the incident as follows:
PROSECUTOR RAMIREZ:
xxxxxxxxx
Q You mentioned that your Ate was pulled, where was she pulled?
A In a room, Sir.
Q Why do you know that she was brought in a room?
A I saw it.
Q How did you [see] it?
A When we were looking for her we saw that she was being pulled in a room.
Q You mentioned that Matias Lagramada removed the shorts of your Ate, what else did he do?
A After removing the shorts of my Ate my uncle [lay] on top of my Ate.
PROSECUTOR RAMIREZ:
While he was on top of your Ate what did he do?
A He was inserting his organ to the organ of my Ate.
Q [Did] you notice if he ha[d] x x x pants or shorts below his knees when on top of your Ate?
A None, Sir.
Q What else happened?
A While on top of my Ate he kissed my Ate.
Q Where did he kiss her?
A On her lips.
Q What [was] your Ate doing while Matias Lagramada was doing this?
A She was pushing him.
Q What else happened?
A No more, Sir.[16]
Substantial Inconsistencies
Between the Affidavits
and the Testimonies
This Court carefully perused complainants account of her alleged defilement and other records of the case. It
notes that both complainant and her sister drastically changed their stories on when, where and how the first
rape had occurred. Their versions, as related in their affidavits, substantially differed from those in their
testimonies.
It is true that minor variations between the affidavit and the testimony of the complainant are normally not
enough to cast doubt upon her credibility and truthfulness.[17] After all, errorless statements and testimonies
cannot be expected, especially when she is recounting details of a harrowing experience.[18] In accordance with
human nature and experience, there can be honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters, but these serve
to strengthen rather than destroy her credibility, especially when the crime is shocking to the conscience and
numbing to the senses.[19]Hence, she is ordinarily not deemed discredited by such discrepancies -- for example,
whether or not she was able to buy ice before the rape, or whether the accused held both of her hands or only
one of them.[20]
However, the inconsistencies in the case at bar are neither minor nor immaterial. In fact, they refer to relevant
and critical matters.
1. Substantial Discrepancy on Time
More often than not, it is the first incident of rape that is most remembered by a victim. Hence, this Court finds
it strange that when first questioned as to the alleged first rape, complainant related that she had been attacked
by the accused at night. But when questioned in open court, she alleged that the first rape had occurred at seven
oclock in the morning.
In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 4, 1998,[21] she related that appellant committed the rape in the
following manner:
05. T-: Kailan at saan naganap ang unang panghahalay sa iyo ng iyong tiyuhin na si Mateo Lagramada?
S-: Noon pong taong 1996 sa unang inuupahang bahay ng aking magulang sa Brgy. San Guillermo, Morong, Rizal
sa ganap ng ika 9:00 ng gabi.[22]
Also executed on January 4, 1998, the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Anita gave a very similar story:
04. T-: Kailan at saan naganap ang ginawang pang gagahasa sa iyong kapatid na si Josephine Lagramada nitong
si Mateo Lagramada[?]
S-: Noon pong taong 1996 sa ganap na ika-9:00 ng gabi humigit kumulang[;] habang kami po ng aking kapatid na
si Josephine ay natutulog na ay bigla po akong nagising dahil po sa may pumatong sa aking ate (Josephine) at
pilit hinuhubad ang kanyang damit at ito po ay nagsalita pa na hu[w]ag kayong sisigaw, papatayin ko kayo [a]t
nakita ko rin pong hinubad ang short ng aking ate sabay patong po.[23]
The above narrations of when the rapes were committed substantially changed during the testimonies of the
two sisters. In open court, complainant related that the first rape happened one morning in April 1996, after the
accused had pulled her into the house while she was just sitting alone. We quote from her testimony:
FISCAL RAMIREZ:
xxxxxxxxx
Q At around what time did this Matias Lagramada pull you?
A 7:00 oclock in the morning, sir.
Q Aside from you and Matias Lagramada, who were inside the house at that time?
A None, sir.
Q What were you doing before Matias Lagramada pulled you?
A None, sir. I was just sitting.[24]
Like her sister, Anita substantially changed her narration of when the first rape allegedly occurred. This time the
latter said the two of them were playing hide and seek when the former was pulled by appellant. Anita testified
thus:
PROSECUTOR RAMIREZ:
You mentioned that your sister was raped by Matias Lagramada. Do you recall when and where that incident
happened?
A April 4, 1995.
Q Where did that happen?
A San Guillermo, Sir.
Q In what town and province is that San Guillermo? located?
A Morong, Rizal, Sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Will you tell us how did that rape incident [happen]?
A We were playing hide and seek when my uncle arrived dr[u]nk. My Ate was inside the house and my uncle
pulled her.[25]
Aside from the radical change in the time -- from the Sinumpaang Salaysay to the court testimony -- there was
also an inconsistency regarding the date of the first rape. While complainant said that it occurred in April 1996,
her sister said it happened a year earlier -- on April 4, 1995. These two dates were never reconciled by the
prosecution. Thus, the testimonies were notably discrepant, not only with the affidavits, but also with each
other.
2. Substantial Discrepancies on Place and Circumstances
It is true that the exact time when the rape was committed is normally irrelevant. However, the testimonies of
both complainant and her witness were inconsistent with respect not only to the time, but also to the place and
the manner in which the first rape allegedly occurred. There is indeed a vast difference between being raped
while sleeping at night and being raped after being pulled into ones house in the morning.
In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, complainant said:
06. T-: Sa ikalilinaw ng aking pagsisiyasat maari mo bang isalaysay sa akin ang buong mga pangyayari?
S-: Noong pong taong 1996 sa Brgy. San Guillermo, Morong, Rizal sa bahay na inuupahan namin ako po ay limang
beses niyang ginahasa at ito po ay nagaganap tuwing kami ng aking kapatid na si Anita ay natutulog na. At nito
pong Disyembre 1996 kami po ay lumipat ng aking magulang kasama ang aking tiyuhin sa aming bahay sa EL
DORADO, Antipolo, Rizal at doon po ay limang beses din niyang hinalay/ ginahasa na nasaksihan po ng aking
kapatid na si Anita Lagramada. At ang huli po niyang pang-gagahasa sa akin ay noong pong ika 24 ng Disyembre
sa Boundary po ng Teresa at Baras, sa Sitio Aduas, Brgy. San Salvador, Baras, Rizal.[26]
In court, however, she testified as follows:
FISCAL RAMIREZ:
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, do you recall if there was an unusual incident that happened between you and Matias Lagramada in
your house in April, 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A He pulled me inside a room and removed my clothes. He also removed his shorts and brief and [lay] on top of
me, inserted his organ into mine and after that I again [wore] my shorts and my panty which I noticed [had blood
stain].
xxxxxxxxx
Q Where, inside your house or outside?
A Inside, sir.
Q Where in your house?
A At the sala, sir.
Q Now, you mentioned that Matias Lagramada pulled you, what did you do when Matias Lagramada pulled you?
A I was crying because I [felt] pain.[27]
Anita also substantially changed her narration, not only of when, but also of where and how, the alleged first
rape occurred. Again, we quote this relevant portion of her Sinumpaang Salaysay:
04. T-: Kailan at saan naganap ang ginawang pang gagahasa sa iyong kapatid na si Josephine Lagramada nitong
si Mateo Lagramada[?]
S-: Noon pong taong 1996 sa ganap na ika-9:00 ng gabi humigit kumulang[;] habang kami po ng aking kapatid na
si Josephine ay natutulog na ay bigla po akong nagising dahil po sa may pumatong sa aking ate (Josephine) at
pilit hinuhubad ang kanyang damit at ito po ay nagsalita pa na hu[w]ag kayong sisigaw, papatayin ko kayo [a]t
nakita ko rin pong hinubad ang short ng aking ate sabay patong po.[28]
But in her testimony, she said that she and her sister were playing hide and seek when the latter was pulled into
their house by the accused. When she peeped inside, she allegedly saw him raping complainant. Anita testified
thus:
PROSECUTOR RAMIREZ:
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Q You mentioned [that] you were playing hide and seek[;] with whom were you playing this game?
A I cannot remember the name but we ha[d] a playmate.
Q You mentioned that you two ha[d] a playmate. To whom are you referring [by] you two?
A Me and my Ate, Sir.
Q You are referring to Josephine Lagramada?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened after this Matias Lagramada pulled your sister Josephine Lagramada?
A After pulling my Ate he removed the shorts of my Ate.[29]
We note that while complainant said she was just sitting alone in their house when the accused pulled her, Anita
pointed out that she and complainant were playing hide and seek when the accused did so. Again, we find the
testimonies of the two sisters to be inconsistent not only with their affidavits, but with each other as well. As
will be discussed shortly, no credible explanation was given for such inconsistencies, giving way to serious doubts
about the credibility of the two girls.
This Court finds it disturbing that complainant gave in her affidavit a version that was vastly different from that
in her testimony as to the time and place as well as the attendant circumstances of the supposed first rape. It is
indeed disturbing that her sister who was also her witness also drastically changed her story, as if to make it fit
snugly into that of complainant.
Specific or piecemeal variations in narrations of the same event is normal and to be expected. In the present
case, however, the apparently synchronized shift from one set of facts (in the affidavits) to another set of facts
(in the testimonies) engenders the thought that the sworn statements and court testimonies of complainant and
her witness were probably coached in a vain attempt to make them seem fully consistent with each other.
3. Implausible Explanation
of Discrepancies
The prosecution attempted to explain the gaps in the testimony of complainant by alleging that she was severely
injured in a vehicular accident when she was seven years old. This far-fetched explanation was perhaps one of
the most damaging arguments against the prosecutions case, because it was an implicit admission that there
had indeed been gaping loopholes in the testimony of complainant, and not mere confusion in her juvenile mind.
Further reinforcing the view that there was an implicit admission of the gross inconsistencies on the part of the
prosecution was not just the attempt to give an explanation for them, but even the attempt to present evidence
for such explanation which, however, remained implausible and unsubstantiated. The Temporary Medical
Certificate[30] presented by the prosecution as evidence did not prove that the past injuries of complainant had
indeed caused her to be forgetful or absent-minded. It merely proved that, several years ago, she had sustained
injuries and was thereafter treated at the Philippine Orthopedic Center. It reads as follows:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
PHILIPPINE ORTHOPEDIC CENTER
MARIA CLARA ST., QUEZON CITY
TEMPORARY MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
Case No. 93327645
Name: JOSEPHINE LAGRAMADA Age: 7 Date: 1-27-93
Diagnosis: (1) CEREBRAL CONTUSION, MODERATE; (2) BASAL SKULL FRACTURE (L); (3)FRACTURE, CLOSED,
VISTAL 1/3, (L) TIBIA; (4) (L) CLAVICULAR FRACTURE
Remarks: The patients above-mentioned injuries are being managed at our institution. They were sustained
from a vehicular accident (1-26-93)
SGD.
A. REBOLLIDO M.D.
Physician
It is not proper to torture the minds of the members of this Court by placing them in the trying position of
running the risk of convicting an innocent man, all because of the prosecutions failure to do its duty of gathering
evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[31]
4. Long and Unexplained
Delay in Reporting
The silence of complainant -- specifically her failure to promptly disclose her defilement to the authorities or to
persons close to her would not normally warrant the conclusion that her charges are baseless, untrue or
fabricated.[32] However, the delay must be adequately and satisfactorily explained; otherwise, it would generate
doubt as to her credibility.[33] According to the present complainants version, the first rape allegedly occurred in
April 1996; and the second, on September 15, 1996. These were reported only on January 3, 1998 -- 21 months
after the alleged first rape, and 16 months after the second.
Complainant tried to explain that appellant had threatened to kill her if she reported the alleged rapes to
anybody. The prosecution, however, failed to explain why she nevertheless ignored those threats and later
reported the incidents to her aunt. At the time the father of complainant came to know of these allegations,
appellant was still living with her family.[34] Hence, the threat of death, if true, still hung upon her on the day
when she and her sister supposedly confided the mater to their aunt. The prosecution was not able to explain
what prompted complainant to finally report the crime after a period of more than a year and to disregard the
supposed death threats upon her and her family.
Duty of the Prosecution to
Establish Guilt Beyond
Reasonable Doubt
In a criminal prosecution, the law always presumes that the defendant is not guilty of any crime whatsoever,
and this presumption stands until it is overcome by competent and credible proof.[35]Where two conflicting
probabilities arise from the evidence, the one compatible with the presumption of innocence will be
adopted.[36] It is therefore incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused with moral
certainty or beyond reasonable doubt as demanded by law.
When a person cries rape, society reacts with sympathy for the victim, admiration for her bravery in seeking
retribution for the crime committed against her, and condemnation for the accused.However, being interpreters
of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at each rape charge sans the above proclivities and deal
with it with caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be
overprotective of every girl or woman decrying her defilement and demanding punishment for the abuser. While
they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice,
they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice in accordance with law.[37]
Hence, accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.[38] Before the accused in a criminal case
may be convicted, the evidence must be strong enough to overcome the presumption of innocence and to
exclude every hypothesis except that of the guilt of the defendant.[39] If the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice
to support a conviction.[40]
Duty of Defense Counsel to
Safeguard His Clients Rights
This Court notes that appellant was incarcerated on January 3, 1998 without a valid warrant. He was merely
invited by complainants father to accompany him to the police station, supposedly to pick up a refrigerator they
were to repair. Upon their arrival there, appellant was immediately taken in and locked behind bars. The two
Informations were filed against him only on November 11, 1998, ten months after the first day of his
incarceration. Appellants counsel, in the spirit of safeguarding his clients rights, should have taken the necessary
steps to correct this situation. However, he allowed his client to enter a plea during the latters arraignment on
March 16, 1999 without raising this matter. Thus, the former effectively waived his clients right to question the
validity of the arrest.
Lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their clients and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them.[41] They must also serve their clients with competence and utmost diligence.[42]More particularly, defense
counsels are expected to spare no effort to save the accused from unrighteous incarcerations.[43] They must
present, by all fair and reasonable means, every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permits. This
they must do so that their clients would not be deprived of life or liberty except by due process of law duly
applied.[44] Appellants counsel should have not only perfunctorily represented his client during the pendency of
the case, but should have kept in mind his duty to render effective legal assistance and true service by protecting
the latters rights at all times.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE. Appellant Matias Lagramada
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to release him from custody immediately, unless he is
being held for some other lawful cause, and to INFORM this Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof of the
date appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio.