You are on page 1of 16

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF CLIENT, NOT A VALID JUSTIFICATION. — A


GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and
Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that since
C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads. "lawyers are administrators of justice, oath- bound servants of society, their
first duty is not to their client, as many suppose, but to the administration of
SYLLABUS justice; to this, their client's success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct
ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; STATUS AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT; DUTY
OF RESPECT AND OBEDIENCE. — As categorically spelled out in Sec. 20 (b), 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO ABSTAIN FROM OFFENSIVE PERSONALITY AGAINST A
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, lawyers should observe and maintain respect PARTY OR WITNESS. — A lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first canon of legal ethics with the dignity of the legal profession. It is the duty of a member of the bar to
provides that "it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." It is incumbent cause with which he is charged.
upon them to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. The
attorney's oath solemnly binds them to a conduct that should be "with all good 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS; POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT
fidelity . . . to the courts." The duty of an attorney to the courts can only be TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS MOTU PROPRIO. — That the Solicitor General or
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial his assistants may not be considered as offended parties in this case, is
office which he is bound to uphold. unavailing as a defense. The Supreme Court may motu proprio start
proceedings of this nature. For, inherent in courts is the power "to control, in
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY NOT TO PROMOTE DISTRUST IN THE ADMINISTRATION furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other
OF JUSTICE. — A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is like the court itself, an persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the appertaining thereto."
dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY NOT TO MISLEAD THE JUDGE; USE OF DISTORTED
disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the QUOTATIONS, IMPROPER. — The act of intentionally omitting the qualification
liberties of the people. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to the rule quoted is not proper. Canon 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to
misquote."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE; CASE AT BAR. — The
language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO COUNSEL TO MAINTAIN SUCH ACTIONS OR
Court as a "civilized democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would suggest that PROCEEDINGS ONLY AS APPEAR TO BE JUST. — A lawyer has control of the
it is not; in his motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court's decision as "false, proceedings. Whatever steps his client take should be within his knowledge and
erroneous and illegal" and accusing two justices for being interested in the responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics provides that "a
decision of the case without any basis in fact; asking the other members of the lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and prevent his clients from doing
Court to inhibit themselves for favors or benefits received from any of the those things which the lawyer himself ought not to de, particularly with
petitioners including the President — constitute disrespectful language to the reference to their conduct towards Courts, judicial officers, jurors and
Court. It undermines and degrades the administration of justice. witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should
terminate their relation."
the court in the performance of his official duties and under Sec. 3(d) of the
9. REMEDIAL LAW; CONTEMPT OF COURT; INDIRECT CONTEMPT; IMPROPER same rule for improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of
CONDUCT TENDING TO DEGRADE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE; USE OF justice. Such language is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a
IMPROPER LANGUAGE IN MOTION TO INHIBIT. — Where counsel, in his litigant. It offends the court before which it is made.
motion to inhibit, called petitioners as "vulturous executives" and spoke of the
Supreme Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would 12. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR CONTEMPT; FACT OF BEING A NON-LAWYER IS
suggest that it is not; categorized its decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, NO DEFENSE. — A person who admitted having prepared the motion for
erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner; warned the Court that loss of reconsideration which contained contemptuous language is guilty of contempt.
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to The fact that he is not a lawyer is no defense.
happen in our country "although the process had already begun"; mentioned
"unjudicial prejudice" against respondent and "unjudicial favoritism" for 13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SIGNING A CONTEMPTUOUS PLEADING WITHOUT
petitioners, and that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits READING IT IS NO EXCUSE. — Counsel's insistence that he had nothing to do
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board — with the contemptuous motion for reconsideration and had not even read it
petitioner, or their agents or principals, including that President" should inhibit does not excuse him. As counsel of record, he has control of the proceedings.
themselves, which accusations have no basis in fact and in law, he is guilty of
indirect contempt for use of language tending to degrade the administration of RESOLUTION*
justice. The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is
easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of SANCHEZ, J p:
justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to
create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur
International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY DELETION OF IMPROPER LANGUAGE; statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy,
EFFECT OF. — The deletion of paragraph 6 which contained disrespectful Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the
language did not erase the fact that it has been made. The explanation that the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21,
deleted portion was included in the motion filed in Court only because of mere 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.
advertence, does not make much of a distinguishing difference. It erects no
shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the
appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; MISBEHAVIOUR OF AN OFFICER OF THE COURT AND "a. `They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false,
IMPROPER CONDUCT TENDING TO DEGRADE THE ADMINISTRATION OF ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts
JUSTICE; USE OF DISRESPECTFUL LANGUAGE IN PLEADINGS. — Where against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called
counsel, in his pleadings, accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous `scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27,
and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
MacArthur"; describing such efforts as "scattershot desperation" and the
proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face," laying bare "the immortal b. `Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and
and arrogant attitude of the petitioners"; and charging petitioners with arrogant attitude of the petitioners.' (Respondents' Supplemental
opportunistically changing their claim and stories not only from case to case Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13,
but from pleading to pleading in the same case, he is guilty of indirect contempt 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page).
under Sec. 3(a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for misbehaviour as an officer of
c. `The herein petitioners . . . opportunistically change their claims and stories wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which,
not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case.' according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that
(Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p. 17, sixth, seventh and "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial
eighth lines from bottom of the page)." favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. follows:
Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala
and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the "(a) said decision is in violation of the law; which law has not been declared
following statements: unconstitutional.

"d. `. . . ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the (b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above entitled case.
misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel.' (Last sentence,
par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to
adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.
e. `. . . Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous (d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel
just plain fraud . . . and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law — but only
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable served to delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party.
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a
most absolute manner.' (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for (e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968)." destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a
reason, not for no reason at all.
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment herein was
rendered — and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for (f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which
Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.
Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from
considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof (g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous
retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the decisions, and the main issue `right to reject any or all bids' is being treated on a
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.
is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January
31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above- (h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows
entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests.
before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat
the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a (i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short by said decision — without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn
time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The all the facts through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary."
appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys.
makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in Writing pointed out to this
Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on
out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable. judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of
Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was July 31, 1968.
stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client
would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October
the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the
of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of
the said motion, which in full reads: the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps
(sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."
"6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities
believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say
before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and
truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the admission,
incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be though, that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient
the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a basis for a finding that Section 20 (f), Rule 138, had been violated.
party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to
proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto.
totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the
involved - and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the
criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4
cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not
Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by law; and that the
many of our government officials are just amoral?" Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended
party or witness."
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further sub-paragraphs (f) and (h) of
paragraph 7 thereof. We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2,
1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither
with this Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14,
motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services,
making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He further which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in
elaborated on his explanations made on November 21, 1968. this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional
competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to
already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in
rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence. any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other
document in connection with this case.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur,
registered an amended motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his aide of the case. In brief, he
Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21,
1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1,
1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty.
gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice
pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence. hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court."

Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 8, 1969. On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanito M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that
the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate
MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request twice on
appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration the ground that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of
without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were
and contained the following paragraphs: subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the
background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton
"4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there way nothing wrong with the motion
Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so
Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above- signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially
entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — the oral argument allegedly made in the case.
Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: `Justices; who may take part. — . . . only those
members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling. this Court, on August 4,
part in its consideration and adjudication . . .' This requirement is especially 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in
significant in the present instance because the member who penned the writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to
decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not
or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and . . . to
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo. direct that the three, Atty. Juanito M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and
Morton Meads, personally appear before this Court on Thursday, August 27,
xxx xxx xxx 1969, at 9:80 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them
will be heard by this Court."
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons
its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He
inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1960, required by the Nickel Law to Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day
determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court of Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or to the who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago)
United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on mentioned Atty. Caling; he thereupon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling
the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never
Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law — prepared the motion and that he never even read it.
and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid
and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, On August 15. 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On
amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for
compensation is made." reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the motion
and in fact began to make some changes in pencil in the first or second decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed
paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant
Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time
They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he
introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the
Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority] by the
motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim
therein. The motion was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create
entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the period that favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the
elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be
about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes. less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause
or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it
quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not
reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their
precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above
that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the
Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country,
Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the "although the process has already begun."
World Court.
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been
Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt made. He explained that he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which
incident. paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere
inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing
We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim. difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also
because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are,
speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them
would suggest that it is not. as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or
pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first
1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral
prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?"
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in
the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro because his brother Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial
is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism"
for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts `can only be
benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial
9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a office which he is bound to uphold.'"
sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or
benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President", should agency to advance the ends of justice." 1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and
also inhibit themselves. authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." 2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity
and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." 3 Thus has
Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board- regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."
petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president." The absurdity 4
of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are
appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was
received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an
every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always
not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of
machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as
system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success
this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously
on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court. observant of law and ethics." 5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his
well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or
discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial
Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an position. 6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be
atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful
have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater
follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over
Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may
thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the
spells out one such duty: `To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly
of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which administration of justice." 7
pronounces that `[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section
against `unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the
binds him to a conduct that should be `with all good fidelity . . . to the courts.'
administration of justice 8 — is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of
contempt of court. We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under
Section 3(a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under Section
pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses 3(d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration
petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as
"scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as corrupt 3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was
on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty.
He charges petitioners with opportunity changing their claims and stories not Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala insist
only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not
language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did
towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is
say that these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines exonerated.
surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of
offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language 4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of
should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." 9 It is Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also
Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged."
10 5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth
motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where
counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made
language in his brief: "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a why this has been done.
poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in
his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in Second. It lifted Section 1, Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1
exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. — . . . only those members
that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its
palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, consideration and adjudication . . .." However, the provision in its entire thought
protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that should be read thus —
"[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."
"SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for
not be considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members
start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of of the division of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for
this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not
courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its present at the date of submission; however, only those members present when
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration
case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11
and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to
in writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission." 12 pleadings contemptuous in character.

Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain 7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion
this point. for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him
even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation
came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS", which is a 8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to
common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the
reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of
specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced
misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations
lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship
There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads
intentionally omitted. states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and
even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with
Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago
respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.
this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected.
More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably . . . Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this
raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the case. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the
bidding of May 12, 1965; . . . to the World Court" and would invoke "the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have
Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to
than fifty million dollars annually . . ." prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not
to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing
case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied the lawyer should terminate their relation."
in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the
move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet. it infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The
would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is
effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice
explanation. should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to
think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be a court of justice.
exempted from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer
of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration 9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason,
before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case against
respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur
did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN,
will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company respondents.
[MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not
require the admit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond, Ruperto G. Martin and Donardo R. Paglinawan for petitioner.
contrary to the instructions to bidders. is not entitled to any consideration.
Jose V. Marcella for private respondents.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a
unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had SYNOPSIS
not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the result would have
been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed. Petitioner is the transferee of a lot subject of a complaint for quieting of title
and declaration of nullity between private respondents and Central Dyeing and
For the reason given, this Court hereby finds: Finishing Corporation. A notice of lis pendens was annotated on Petitioner's
title. Judgment was rendered in favor of private respondents. It was affirmed by
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. When a writ of
Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, possession/break open order was issued by the trial court, petitioner opposed
and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and the same contending that it was a buyer in good faith and not impleaded as
Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and party. The motion, however, was granted. Petitioner went to the Court of
Appeals in a petition for certiorari which rendered judgment dismissing the
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads petition as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration. Its appeal to this
and Atty. Juanito M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Court was denied and attained finality. When an alias writ of execution was
Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meals, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. issued subsequently by the court, petitioner again filed a petition for certiorari
Caling. P200. with the Court of Appeals arguing among others that it was not a party to the
case, that the decision of the trial court in said case never mandated Central
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private respondents; and
Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against that private respondent's title is being questioned in another case. The Court of
Morton F. Meads who is an alien. Appeals dismissed the petition on ground of finality of judgment of the lower
court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, again this
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor recourse by petitioner. In the meantime the alias writ of possession and alias
General, for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or writ of execution was duly implemented by the Sheriff. cSITDa
suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M.
Caling. Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the
parties are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end.
the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and
Juanito M. Caling. So ordered. Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the
necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-
||| (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27072 9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued
(Resolution), [January 9, 1970], 142 PHIL 1-23)
by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the
purpose of taking possession of the subject realty. Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was
Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if,
petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private
already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the
had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make
in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition
respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment.
supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make
petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition 4. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; PETITION RENDERED MOOT AND
was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment. ACADEMIC WHERE WRIT OF EXECUTION HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED. — Be
that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and
the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been
and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," dated March 31,
implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," dated March 31, 1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" indicating therein that private
1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the subject property.
respondents took possession of the subject property. aCHDST
5. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; BOUND TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO
SYLLABUS ASSIST IN SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — While
lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; IN A FINAL JUDGMENT, defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the
ALL ISSUES ARE DEEMED RESOLVED. — It is a settled rule that once a court court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the
related to the controversy litigated come to an end. execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. ISEHTa

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALL NECESSARY AND LOGICAL EFFECTS OR CONSEQUENCES DECISION
INCLUDED THEREIN. — Placing private respondents in possession of the land
in question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in MARTINEZ, A.M., J p:
Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As
correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not have to institute This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
another action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty. has come to this Court assailing the execution of the judgment dated August 24,
SEAHID 1989, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-
9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner, considering that the
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY PENDENCY OF ANOTHER ACTION FOR issues raised in this second petition for review are but mere reiterations of
ANNULMENT OF TITLES BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC AND PREDECESSOR. — previously settled issues which have already attained finality. We now write
finis to this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
we ruled in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City: 1 for an Immediate Writ of Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was
opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
". . . litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is
essential to the effective administration of justice that once a judgment has completely unaware of the suit between private respondents and Central
become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of the lot having bought the
the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against any same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.
scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public policy On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents' motion. Another
and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the
courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. judgment was binding on petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of
Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium." defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Revised
Rules of Court.
The facts:
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the
and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing petition, excerpts of which read:
Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration
of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of "We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling reason to
said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial disturb the same. Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property
Court of Caloocan City. cdphil from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-
9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, 2 the dispositive Judge. cdtai
portion of which reads:
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the
judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void. original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee." 5

Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs." The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on
February 18, 1993. 6
The aforesaid decision was affirmed 3 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. On further appeal to this Court, petitioner's petition for review on certiorari,
No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March 5, docketed as G.R. No. 109076, was denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. 7
1992. 4 Upon finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated
October 21, 1993. 8
The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents
moved for execution which was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a
of execution of the decision was issued. second writ of execution before the trial court which was granted in the Order
of July 20, 1994.
writs of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully, putting the
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioner's motion legal battle of this case to rest." (Emphasis ours.)
was initially granted 9 on August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo
Romero. However, upon motion of private respondents, the said order was The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996. 13
reconsidered on December 19, 1994 10 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who
succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued: Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in essence the
same line of arguments espoused in their petition before the respondent Court
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed of Appeals.
a petition for certiorari 11 with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be executed The petition must fail.
against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision
of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues
possession of the property to the private respondents; that certain facts and between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial
circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy litigated come
execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed to an end.
writ of execution violates the lot buyers' freedom of religion and worship; and
that private respondents' title is being questioned in another case. Petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred
(100) memorial lot owners to surrender and/or deliver possession of the
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment 12 property in dispute on the ground that they were never parties to the case
dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the lower court's between private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by
decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. It ruled, respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled:
thus: Cdpr
"Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central
"This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent Court's decision Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297,
in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. The respondent petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge.
court's writs of execution and possession could have been implemented a long
time ago if not for the series of legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. . . "Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite
. Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop the execution of a final does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the
judgment by raising issues which actually have been ruled upon by this Court in judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the
its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee." 14
petition is a mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs,
although prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a final judgment in their The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109076 and
favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting attained finality on October 21, 1993. There is, therefore, no need for us to
the assessment of double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of belabor the same issue here.
the Revised Rules of Court)
Further, petitioner's contention that a determination of the issue of possession
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, the should first be resolved before the issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.
instant petition has already become moot and academic as the property in
question was already turned over by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the
necessary and logical effect or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-
9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And should it
by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be placed in
purpose of taking possession of the subject realty. LLpr possession of the subject property, due to defendant-petitioners' arguments
that the same have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances transpired after incumbent for the defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the plaintiff-
the finality of judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297 which will render the respondents for payment in cash of the property subject of their complaint to
execution of the said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency or avoid demolition or desecration since they benefited from the sale of the burial
Civil Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by lots." 15
the Republic of the Philippines against private respondents for nullification of
22 titles which include the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was given, to wit:
the pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification why execution LLjur
of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of possession of the subject property
should be permanently stayed or at least held in abeyance until after the final "The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the plaintiffs and
resolution of the case. as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a small portion
of the fence so that they can have access to the property. But as to the
We do not agree. demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could be made by the defendant with
the former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement be made." 16
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the
Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order dated July 20,
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the 1994, imposed the following limitation on the writ of execution, as follows:
petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was
already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment "Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within the Eternal
had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, Gardens have been sold to so many persons who now have buried their beloved
in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private ones in the grave lots adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the interest
respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the of justice and equity, that the enforcement of the writ of possession and break
supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make open order should be applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial
petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where the
was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment. factory of the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the
resting souls over the graves spread over the parcels of land within the said
Finally, petitioner's fear that the grave lots will be disturbed, desecrated and memorial park." 17
destroyed once the execution of the judgment proceeds is more imagined than
real. A perusal of the Orders of the trial court with regard to the execution of From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to the status
the judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have been of the burial lot owners has been properly addressed.
taken into account by the trial court when it took steps and made suggestions
as to how their rights could be amply protected. In its Order dated February 13, Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of
1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated: the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994
and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been
"The defendant-petitioner are(sic) however not completely without recourse or implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," 18 dated March
remedy because they can still go after the original party-defendant or 31, 1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" 19 indicating therein that
transferor of the property in question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing private respondents took possession of the subject property.
DIGEST
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION,
for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the petitioner, vs.
meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and
has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the JOSESEELIN,
whole lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for respondents.
private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of FACTS
justice. cdrep : Judgment was rendered against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey the
cemetery to the rightful owners, private respondent sps. Seville. Despite the
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients final decision of the SC, petitioner was able to prevent the execution for filing
and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they petitions for certiorari arguing that the judgment cannot be executed against
are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297;that the decision of the
efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession
of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the of the property to the private respondents; that certain facts and
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. 20 In Banogan et al. vs. circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render
Cerna, et al., 21 we ruled: the execution highly unjust,illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the
assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers' freedom of religion and
"As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper worship; and that private respondents' title is being questioned in another
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless case to the cause that the case to be pending for 17 years, and thus render
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, the judgment ineffectual. They filed several petitions and motions
which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law for reconsideration with the trial court and the CA despite the fact that
should advise them when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed it would never prosper as the trial court’s decision had longbecome final
to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance before the said petitions were filed.
the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of HELD:
merit do not deserve the attention of the courts." Petition denied. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of the
clientand zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they are also officers of
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. the court, bound toexert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
SO ORDERED. They should not misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the
ends of justiceor unduly delay a case, impede the execution
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ ., concur. of a judgment or misuse courtprocesses.
The facts and the law should advise them that a case such as this should
notbe permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial
dockets. They donot advance the cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts. The mere continuation of petitioners’ dilatory tactics
to that the respondents will notbenefit from the final judgment. The fear
of the petitioner regarding the disturbance of thegrave lots was more
imagined than true because in the writ of execution, the presiding judge
imposed that
the enforcement of the writ of possession and break open order should be
applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side
nearest to the parcel of land in question where the factory of the
defendant(Central Dyeing) is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace
of the resting souls over the graves the parcels of land within the said memorial
park
.It has been known that the petition of the private respondents has been
moot and academic and that they had took possession of the lot. To the end
that:

This case delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17)years
to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner
has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot haslong
been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole
lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private
respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice