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Geotechnical Risk and Inadequate Site Investigations: A Case Study

Article · June 2000

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GEOTECHNICAL RISK AND INADEQUATE SITE INVESTIGATIONS:
A CASE STUDY

Mark Jaksa
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
The University of Adelaide S.A. 5005 Australia

Abstract: The University of Adelaide has recently commenced an upgrade of existing facilities at its
main city campus. The project, with a total budget of $A41 million, incorporates the construction of two
new buildings. This paper examines the geotechnical investigation conducted for this project and
highlights inadequacies associated with geotechnical engineering practice in South Australia, and Australia
in general. This situation is not uncommon to other parts of the world.

1. INTRODUCTION

The University of Adelaide has recently embarked on a development of its North Terrace
Campus. Known as the Lower Level Site Development (LLSD), the project has a total
budget of $A41 million and incorporates a new, five-storey building for the Faculty of
Engineering, Computer and Mathematical Sciences, and a new six-storey building for the
Faculty of Science. The budget for the two new buildings is approximately $A24 million.
In addition, the project includes refurbishments to a number of the Campus’s existing
buildings, fire and life safety upgrading, landscaping, and upgrades to several of the
precinct’s services. A general site plan of the LLSD is shown in Figure 1. This paper
focuses on the geotechnical investigation carried out for the new buildings and describes the
problems that occurred with installation of the piles for the Engineering Building.

The author, in his role as Associate Dean (Facilities) is the Client Representative for the
Faculty of Engineering, Computer and Mathematical Sciences on the Project Team, whose
task is to manage the design and construction phases of the LLSD. The Project Team
consists of the Project Manager (a professional project manager external to the University);
a University Liaison Officer (who liases with the various administrative sections of the
university); three Client Representatives (one from Engineering and two from Science, who
liase with their respective units); one interstate and two local architects; a services
engineering consultant; a landscape architect; and the Construction Site Manager.

2. EXPERIENCE FROM ABROAD

It is clear from several international sources that ground engineering risk is one of the
largest elements of technical and financial risk in civil engineering and building projects
(Institution of Civil Engineers, 1991; Littlejohn et al., 1994; Whyte, 1995). This is due to
the fact that the engineering properties of soil and rock often exhibit significant variability
from one location to another (i.e. spatial variability).

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Figure 1. General site plan of the Lower Level Site Development at the time of the
geotechnical site investigation (November, 1996).

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Expenditure on geotechnical site investigations varies considerably, sometimes as low as
between 0.1 and 0.3% of the total project cost. Projects from abroad, whilst not indicating
a direct relationship between low site investigation expenditure and increased construction
costs, have demonstrated that low levels of investigation result in large uncertainties
(Whyte, 1995). Furthermore, in order to reduce the level of ground uncertainty, the
National Research Council (1984) recommended that at least 3% of the total project cost be
dedicated to site investigation. Littlejohn et al. (1994) suggested, however, that there is no
universal yardstick that gives the cost of inadequate site investigation as a percentage of
construction cost. Nevertheless, one would expect the extent of a site investigation to vary
according to the published or perceived spatial variability of the ground. That is, as the
variability increases, so too does the extent and cost of the site investigation.

3. GEOLOGY OF THE LLSD SITE

The LLSD site is known to lie within an ancient buried valley of the River Torrens and its
uppermost soil layer, known as the Torrens Alluvium, consists of sandy gravels overlain by
a sequence of silts and clays (Selby and Lindsay, 1982). From the material published on this
stratum, and by the nature of its formation, the Torrens Alluvium exhibits far greater spatial
variability than that of other soil profiles commonly encountered within the central business
district of Adelaide. As a consequence, it would be expected that site investigations carried
out in the Torrens Alluvium would involve more detailed sampling and testing than would
generally be the case for typical sites in Adelaide.

4. DETAILS OF THE GEOTECHNICAL INVESTIGATION

Tenders for the geotechnical investigation were organised by the structural engineering
consultant on behalf of the Project Team. Three tenders were sought and the geotechnical
engineering consultants were requested to define the scope of the investigation. The tender
prices varied from 0.025% to 0.04% of the $A24 million budget. When compared with
published site investigation costs quoted above, these tenders are extremely low. However,
from the author’s experience, they are not inconsistent with the amount of resources
traditionally directed to site investigations in Adelaide.

The extent of each of the proposed geotechnical investigations varied between tenderers, as
is usually the case, with the maximum depth of borehole drilling and sampling varying
between 10 and 22 metres. To their credit, the Project Team did not automatically
recommend the cheapest tender but, in each case, examined the scope of the proposed
investigations and their associated cost. The successful tenderer was, in fact, the most
expensive proposal and was chosen because of the extent of the proposed investigation and
the depth of the proposed boreholes, which were seen to be more thorough than the other
submissions.

The geotechnical investigation that was performed for the LLSD site, which included the
sites for both new buildings consisted of the following:

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• 3 × deep washbored boreholes to approximately 22 metres depth which included
standard penetration tests and undisturbed soil sampling. (An additional deep borehole
was available from previous site investigation at a nearby site);
• 6 × shallow dynamic-push boreholes to 6 metres depth;
• 6 × electric cone penetration test soundings to depths between 7 and 11 metres ;
• 1 × groundwater monitoring borehole;
• 9 × unconsolidated undrained triaxial tests;
• 2 × shrink/swell tests;
• 1 × equivalent CBR test;
• chemical analysis of a single sample of groundwater (total dissolved solids, metals, pH,
conductivity and sulphate/chloride content).

The borehole location plan of the geotechnical investigation is given in Figure 2. The
locations of the boreholes were governed by the proximity of nearby buildings, in particular,
the Fisher Building, the location of which is shown as a dashed outline in Figure 3. The
scope of the site investigation appears to be consistent with standard practice in South
Australia and one could argue that the scope is extremely good value for money.

The geotechnical engineer’s report summarised the investigation by proposing geotechnical


models for both the Engineering and the Science Buildings. In addition, the geotechnical
engineer’s report examined a number of footing options: shallow (pad and raft) and piles.
The report recommended that both buildings be founded on piles, since the pad and raft
options may yield unacceptably high total and differential settlements. Whilst piles were
recommended, the report stated that bored piles were “unlikely to be viable” because “due to
the relatively weak nature of the alluvial soils between depths of about 4 and 9 m, the
presence of sandy lenses and groundwater seepage, construction difficulties would be
expected with uncased bored piles and temporary or sacrificial liners would most likely be
required to provide support for the shaft and control of groundwater seepage.” As a
consequence, the geotechnical engineer recommended driven piles; driven cast-in situ with
enlarged bases; or Atlas screw piles.

5. EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE GEOTECHNICAL INVESTIGATION

In early 1997, cost estimates of the preliminary design of the Engineering Building revealed
significant cost overruns, which prompted a major review of the scope of the building. In
early 1998, it was decided to modify significantly the scope of the Engineering Building
which included the removal of the lower level computer suites; relocating the footprint of
the building approximately 20 metres to the west; and completely redefining the layout and
specification for the internal space within the building. Despite the geotechnical engineer’s
recommendation not to use the site investigation report when “the size, elevation, or
configuration of the proposed structure is altered” or “when the location or orientation of
the proposed structure is modified”, no additional advice sought nor investigation
undertaken. However, informal advice was sought from the geotechnical engineering
consultant in relation to a number of design issues, but this did not include a review of the
proposed pile system.

As a consequence of the modifications to the Engineering and Mathematics Building, the


project team commissioned the structural consultant to investigate alternative foundation

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Figure 2. Borehole location plan of the geotechnical investigation carried out for the
Lower Level Site Development.

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options. These included a pad footing and a raft system. The consultant concluded that
these options were inappropriate, as the predicted settlements were unacceptably large.

As a result, tenders were sought for the construction of pile foundations, based upon the
tenderers nominating their own piling systems. Due to the proximity of the new structure to
existing buildings, and the perceived sensitivity of the users to moderate ground vibrations,
it was decided not to adopt a construction technique that involved pile driving of any sort.
As a consequence, the successful tender was for a bored pile option. In addition, the
geotechnical engineering consultant, commissioned by the contractor to design the bored
piles, based the design on data obtained from the original site investigation report.

6. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING CONSTRUCTION

After some initial trials to investigate construction difficulties, which yielded positive
results, the installation of the bored piles commenced in mid 1998. However, load testing
performed on some of these initial piles indicated large and unacceptable settlements. The
piling contractor’s geotechnical engineering consultant then conducted additional site
investigation, at previously undrilled locations. This second site investigation indicated that
the geotechnical engineering properties were somewhat different from the original site
investigation, although the degree of difference is debatable, particularly because, in the
original investigation, boreholes in this region were shallow, as a result of the now
abandoned basement computer suites.

The serviceability failure of the bored piles led to a reassessment of the foundation
alternatives. It was subsequently determined that a relatively new technique, previously
untried in Australia, would be adopted. The foundation system, known as G-Piles, consists
of hydraulically forcing a series of precast concrete piles into the ground, as shown in
Figure 4. The technique relies on the kentledge of the pile installation rig, which has a
maximum jacking capacity of 6000 kN.

The consequences of the modification to the foundation system were the addition of
approximately $170,000 to the construction budget (2.4% of the construction budget for
the Engineering Building) and an anticipated extension of between 4 and 6 weeks to the
construction period, which caused some inconvenience to the University.

It is the author’s opinion that the problems associated with the pile foundations stem from a
number of factors which include:
1. A minimalist approach to geotechnical engineering investigation and testing which is not
out-of-step with standard practice in South Australia, but is inappropriate from a risk
perspective, and particularly so in highly variable soil profiles;
2. Not seeking additional geotechnical engineering advice once the building location had
altered;
3. Not keeping the geotechnical engineering consultant involved in all stages of the
project; and

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Figure 3. General site plan of the Lower Level Site Development at the time of the
geotechnical site investigation (Mid 1997 – Present).

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Figure 4. The components and operation of the G-Pile system.
(Civil Engineers Australia, 1998).

4. Not enough attention, by the geotechnical consultant, to emphasising, perhaps in-


person, key issues in the report.

It should be noted that these factors are not peculiar to this particular project. Rather, one
could argue that they are a common feature of the majority of civil engineering construction
projects (ASFE, 1996). In addition, it is the author’s view, that not enough attention is
paid, by the geotechnical engineering profession as a whole, to the item 4. Finally, it needs
to be emphasised that the author is making these interpretations with the enormous benefit
of hindsight.

7. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, several lessons can be learnt from this project:

1. Ground is an extremely variable and, hence, uncertain material. The potential for
incurring financial and time losses is great if the properties of the soil and rock are not
adequately quantified. This can only be achieved by carrying out an appropriate site
investigation. It has been recommended by some, that an appropriate level of resources
for a site investigation is of the order of 3% of the total project budget. However,

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money is not the whole picture. An appropriate site investigation must be carried out
with adequate time resources and the quality of the investigation is perhaps more
important than the cost.

2. In this case, 3% of the budget equates to $720,000, which is unrealistically high for a
geotechnical site investigation for this particular project. It would seem reasonable that
an investigation, whose total resources were somewhere in the range of 0.1% to 0.3%
of the project budget, would be more appropriate.

3. Ultimately, the decision of the scope of the geotechnical investigation rests with the
geotechnical engineering consultant, the project team and the client. It is incumbent on
the geotechnical engineer to bring to the attention of the project team and client the
risks associated with a minimalist approach to geotechnical investigations.

4. In order to reduce the likelihood of ground related problems, it is recommended that the
geotechnical engineering consultant be involved throughout the life of the project: from
site investigation, to preliminary design, detail design, construction and through to after-
construction monitoring;

5. It is recommended that site investigations be carried out in two stages: preliminary,


followed by a detailed investigation. Such a two-stage process is not uncommon in
other areas of ground and civil engineering; e.g. the investigation of contaminated sites;
structural engineering; and the assessment of ore bodies. Such an approach would
enable the geotechnical engineer to be less conservative with the recommended values
for geotechnical design parameters which result in more conservative and, hence, costly
foundations.

6. It is recommended that the uncertainty associated with the recommended design


parameters be expressly stated; e.g. confidence limits. This would enable any other
engineer utilising these values, as well as the client, to appreciate the uncertainty
associated with the parameters and, hence, appropriately account for them in the design
process.

7. It is suggested that the Australian Standard for Geotechnical Site Investigations,


AS 1726-1993, provide advice for minimum recommended levels of site investigation.

8. It is recommended that geotechnical engineering reports be written in such a way that


ambiguities and the use of jargon are minimised. In addition, it is recommended that
key aspects of the report be drawn to the attention of the project team; perhaps in some
form of oral presentation.

As stated by Institution of Civil Engineers (1991), it is important to remember that:

“You pay for a site investigation whether you have one or not.”

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8. REFERENCES

ASFE (1996). Case Histories of Professional Liability Losses: ASFE Case Histories 1–65,
ASFE: Professional Firms Practicing in the Geosciences, Maryland.
Civil Engineers Australia (1998). Pile System Dispenses With Pile Driver, Civil Engineers
Australia, Inst. of Engineers, Aust., p. 19.
Institution of Civil Engineers (1991). Inadequate Site Investigation, Thomas Telford,
London, 26 pp.
Littlejohn, G. S., Cole, K. W. and Mellors, T. W. (1994). Without Site Investigation
Ground is a Hazard. Proc. Instn. Civil Engrs. Civil Engrg., Vol. 102, May, pp. 72–78.
National Research Council (1984). Geotechnical Site Investigations for Underground
Projects. US National Committee on Tunnelling Technology, Vol. 1, National Academy
Press, Washington.
Selby, J. and Lindsay, J. M. (1982). Engineering Geology of the Adelaide City Area. S.A.
Dept. Mines and Energy Bulletin 51, Adelaide, 94 pp.
Whyte, I. L. (1995). The Financial Benefit From Site Investigation Strategy. Ground
Engineering, Oct., pp. 33–36.

9. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank the Project Manager, University Liaison Officer and various
members of the project team, including the geotechnical and structural engineering
consultants, for their valuable comments and contribution to this paper.

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