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Pasei vs Drilon aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or

branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper
(PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving,
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and
challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and
Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail
character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1)
against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject
3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. The concept of police of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the
power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections
an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to
an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
assuring the greatest benefits." 6 self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and
active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does illimitable.
not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and
eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and b. Limitations on police power. —
sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in
to whom the expression has been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the following provisions of our Constitution:
the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal
own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of
defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the
individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to
public good.
citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (
measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department
c. The, equal protection clause. —
Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well- The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute
law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
equally to all members of the same class. 16 treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
Ichong vs Hernandez
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or not.
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of
d. The due process clause. —
the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation
engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a
to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably
with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a
therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask
and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and when the due process test is applied.
industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation
due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. may be made the implement of the state's police power.
Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist.
The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable Lozano vs Martinez
means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short),
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that
April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision.
would mean license and anarchy.
The question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to
These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses
be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the
under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to
alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials,
quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not
clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly
constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional.
through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not
only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks,
kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of
sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange
for something of value.
Lutz vs Araneta
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check
This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not
Occidental to test the legality of the taxes imposed by Commonwealth
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act.
of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
Promulgated in 1940, the law in question opens (section 1) with a dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
declaration of emergency, due to the threat to our industry by the would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The
Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30
position in the United States market"; wherefore, the national policy days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of
was expressed "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed
the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of the court. 3
its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the
of the export taxes."
maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or
Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this
Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates
Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the
as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
1949-1950; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the
levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which date of the check. 5 To mitigate the harshness of the law in its
in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise
constitutioally levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor,
of First Instance, the plaintifs appealed the case directly to this Court the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by
(Judiciary Act, section 17). the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.

This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing
one of the great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or
position among its export products; that it gives employment to dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed
thousands of laborers in fields and factories; that it is a great source of by the state because of the injury it causes to t public interests.
the state's wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange
Before the enactment of BP 22, provisions already existed in our
needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime
statute books which penalize the issuance of bouncing or rubber
committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection
checks. Criminal law has dealth with the problem within the context of
and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.
crimes against property punished as "estafa" or crimes involving fraud
Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general
and deceit. The focus of these penal provisions is on the damage caused
welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in turn;
to the property rights of the victim.
and in the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could
provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most
its components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in serious is the alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional
taxes that it had to sustain. provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the
statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states,
Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of
"No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax."
the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the
16 Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is
Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary
consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check
for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative
when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt
discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of
law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-
reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in
payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed,
section 6 of the law (above quoted) bear no relation to the objective
is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under
pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are
the threat of penal sanction.
alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not
"The 'debt' intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty has a only to those who have initially proved their competence and
well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from preparation for a medical education.
imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent commitment of
debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu The There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice
inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the
delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
from any contract entered into between the parties but are imposed require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.5
criminal proceedings as punishments for crime."

t "one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the
part of the employers who hire laborers or employees without paying
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus causing them
financial difficulties. "The law was viewed not as a measure to coerce While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have
payment of an obligation, although obviously such could be its effect, a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in
but to banish a practice considered harmful to public welfare. which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer
the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
that will best promote the common good while also giving the
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce
individual a sense of satisfaction.
a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not
offense against property, but an offense against public order. be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his
entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize
promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing,
a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu But certainly it is
however appropriate this career may be for others.
within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not
not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the
considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.6
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can
do this in the exercise of its police power. The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way
to those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may
DECS vs San Diego still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools,
there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person
and found wanting.
who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
is entitled to take it again. Restituto Ynot Vs IAC
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that- On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT.
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of
After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to
E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
take the NMAT for the fourth time.
constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained
a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.1 When petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court
he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of
Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his
power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting
constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education.
the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, court said that The reasonable connection between the means
1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition
deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
exercise of the police power. 3 indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
reversed. there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the
NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive
act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six
was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
heard, thus denying due process. corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
Quezon City vs Ericta
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the
void. city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian
CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and
THEREOF" provides: challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after
performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to
are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling,
prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could
The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother
open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air,
of the application. beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid
invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for
a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of
further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related
charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice
this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was
the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon
owner of all beneficial use of his property. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765,
payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian
May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to
reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing
regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in
the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted.
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive
memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance,
Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing
'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or
the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.'
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p.
50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657.
outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands
promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since
recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced
thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they
essential of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they
one of the least limitable of the powers of government want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim
to belong to a different class.1
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico) expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for
more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use
(PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5)
valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under Manila Memorial Park vs DSWD
the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation. Before us is a Petition for Prohibition2 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioners Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners Paz-Sucat, Inc., domestic corporations engaged in the business of
may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay providing funeral and burial services, against public respondents
averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money Secretaries of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
and not in bonds. (DSWD) and the Department of Finance (DOF).

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act
power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of (RA) No. 7432,3 as amended by RA 9257,4 and the implementing
both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as these
of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to
transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in senior citizens as a tax deduction.
exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the
power being exercised was eminent domain because the property Factual Antecedents
involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
citizens the following privileges:
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens
be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such shall be entitled to the following:
property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the
power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments
compensation to the owner. relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar
lodging establishment[s], restaurants and recreation centers and
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of purchase of medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private
the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;
and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property
without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees
public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses,
The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;
use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner.
The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely c) exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: Provided,
prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount That their annual taxable income does not exceed the property level as
rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
— as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions — (NEDA) for that year;
the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free
to enjoy his property as heretofore. d) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs
undertaken by the OSCA as part of its work;
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s]
just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to anywhere in the country, subject to guidelines to be issued by the
expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also Department of Health, the Government Service Insurance System and
acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may the Social Security System;
be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same
unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered benefits and privileges given by the Government Service Insurance
by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, as the
to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the case may be, as are enjoyed by those in actual service.
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 02-94 was issued
the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the to implement RA 7432. Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 provide:
supreme law.
Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS. – For purposes of these regulations: i. Tax
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by Credit – refers to the amount representing the 20% discount granted to
no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is a qualified senior citizen by all establishments relative to their
found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant establishments, restaurants, drugstores, recreation centers, theaters,
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. cinema houses, concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) places of culture, leisure and amusement, which discount shall be
public use and (2) just compensation. deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for
income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is other percentage tax purposes. x x x x Sec. 4.
compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the
RECORDING/BOOKKEEPING REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATE Facts:1. Petitioner was the governor of Rizal, filed a petition assailing
ESTABLISHMENTS. – Private establishments, i.e., transport the validity of R.A. 920 which contains an item providing for an
services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants, appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction and repair of a feeder
recreation centers, drugstores, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, road in Pasig. The said law was passed in Congress and approved by
circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture[,] leisure and the President.
amusement, giving 20% discounts to qualified senior citizens are
required to keep separate and accurate record[s] of sales made to senior 2. The property over which the feeder road will be constructed is
citizens, which shall include the name, identification number, gross however owned by Sen. Zulueta. The property was to be donated to the
sales/receipts, discounts, dates of transactions and invoice number for local government, though the donation was made a few months after
every transaction. The amount of 20% discount shall be deducted from the appropriation was included in RA 920. The petition alleged that the
the gross income for income tax purposes and from gross sales of the said planned feeder road would relieve Zulueta the responsibility of
business enterprise concerned for purposes of the VAT and other improving the road which is inside a private subdivision.
percentage taxes.
3. The lower court (RTC) ruled that the petitioner has standing to assail
FACTS: RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), the validity of RA 920, due to the public interest involved in the
granting senior citizens 20% discount on certain establishments. appropriation. However, he does not have a standing with respect to
the donation since he does not have an interest that will be injured by
To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance said donation, hence it dismissed the petition.
and the DSWD issued its own Rules and Regulations.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the standing to file the petition
Hence, this petition.

Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior

citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction YES.
scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and
1. Petitioner has standing. He is not merely a taxpayer but the governor
regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.
of the province of Rizal which is considered one of the most populated
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, biggest provinces during that time, its taxpayers bear a substantial
Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that: "private property portion of the burden of taxation in the country.
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
2. Public funds can only be appropriated for a public purpose. The test
Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
exercise of the State’s police power. whether it is used to promote public interest. Moreover, the validity of
a stature depends on the powers of the Congress at the time of its
ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed
an exercise of police power or eminent domain. subsequent thereto, unless it is an amendment of the organic law.

RULING: The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything
power. but a public purpose

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
governmental act is an exercise of police power or eminent domain. revenue for anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential
The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and effects character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine
of the challenged governmental act and decide on the basis thereof. its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to
be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited
who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results
to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
purchasing basic commodities. It serves to honor senior citizens who enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public
presumably spent their lives on contributing to the development and money
progress of the nation.
In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for
In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the public purposes only, discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by
profitability of a private establishment. taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the
advantage of private individuals. (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; emphasis
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control
laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures. Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum
The subject regulation differs there from in that (1) the discount does
not prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution,
their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all public funds may be used only for public purpose. The right of the
customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and,
citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of this under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public
case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the
category of price regulatory measures which affect the profitability of devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds
establishments subjected thereto. On its face, therefore, the subject can be made for other than for a public purpose.
regulation is a police power measure.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest,
as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although
each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.
Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila [G.R. No. L-4817, May among others, that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish
26, 1954] priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or juridical person
known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he
This suit was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by should not be liable for the donee's gift tax. It was also asserted that the
two lawyers, a medical practitioner, a public accountant, a dental assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church,
surgeon and a pharmacist, purportedly "in their own behalf and in would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the provisions
behalf of other professionals practising in the City of Manila who may of the Constitution.
desire to join it." Object of the suit is the annulment of Ordinance No.
3398 of the City of Manila together with the provision of the Manila Tax Exemptions
charter authorizing it and the refund of taxes collected under the
ordinance but paid under protest. It is a cardinal rule in taxation that exemptions from payment thereof
are highly disfavored by law, and the party claiming exemption must
The ordinance in question, which was approved by the municipal board justify his claim by a clear, positive, or express grant of such privilege
of the City of Manila on July 25, 1950, imposes a municipal occupation by law
tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes
non-payment of the tax "by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos The phrase "exempt from taxation" as employed in Section 22(3),
or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or by both such fine Article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, should not be
and imprisonment in the discretion of the court." Among the interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. Statutes
professions taxed were those to which plaintiffs belong. The ordinance exempting charitable and religious property from taxation should be
was enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 18 of the Revised construed fairly though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to
Charter of the City of Manila (as amended by Republic Act No. 409), the main intent of the lawmakers.
which empowers the Municipal Board of said city to impose a
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts
municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on persons
from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents,
engaged in the various professions above referred to.
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used
Having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the
National Internal Revenue Code, plaintiffs, upon being required to pay payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property
the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance, paid the same under taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the present case,
protest and then brought the present suit for the purpose already stated. what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was
not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general
We do not think it is for the courts to judge what particular cities or ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon
municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes in the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties (Phipps vs.
addition to those imposed by the National Government. That matter is Com. of Int. Rec. 91 F 2d 627). Manifestly, gift tax is not within the
peculiarly within the domain of the political departments and the courts exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a
would do well not to encroach upon it. Moreover, as the seat of the property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by
National Government and with a population and volume of trade many way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used
times that of any other Philippine city or municipality, Manila, no exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment
doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, of the Constitution. As well observed by the learned respondent Court,
so that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a the phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in the Constitution
higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces. (supra) should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such
Double Taxation privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the exemption herein must be
The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one
tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city (1 Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely recognized that
there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license Abra Valley College is an educational corporation and institution of
fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or higher learning in Bangued, Abra. In 1974, the CFI ordered for the
activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof seizure and sale of the subject school property for non-payment of real
estate taxes and penalties. Private respondents stated that the college
Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue lot and building in question are not only used for educational purposes
of the college, but also as the permanent residence of the President and
Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated
Director, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his family including his in-laws
P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of
and grandchildren; while the ground floor of the college building is
Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner, for
being used and rented by a commercial establishment.
the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total
amount was actually spent for the purpose intended. Abra Valley College vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988]
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds
tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner application in the case at bar is Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of
of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee's gift tax against the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly grants
the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and parsonages
petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15, improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational
1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return. purposes ...
Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470
withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for reconsideration as amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the
presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The Assessment Law, provides:
petitioner appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals on November 2, 1960.
In the petition for review, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc claimed,
The following are exempted from real property tax under the praphrase a recent decision, taxes being the lifeblood of the
Assessment Law: government, their prompt and certain availability is of the essence. 12

(c) churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all Limitations
lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific or educational purposes. The power to tax moreover, to borrow from Justice Malcolm, "is an
attribute of sovereignty. It is the strongest of all the powers of of
Taxation and Incidental Use government." 13 It is, of course, to be admitted that for all its plenitude
'the power to tax is not unconfined. There are restrictions. The
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for Constitution sets forth such limits . Adversely affecting as it does
charitable or educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually properly rights, both the due process and equal protection clauses may
indispensable' therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430), but properly be invoked, all petitioner does, to invalidate in appropriate
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary cases a revenue measure. if it were otherwise, there would -be truth to
for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of the 1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that "the power to tax
hospitals, "a school for training nurses, a nurses' home, property use to involves the power to destroy."
provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors, superintendents,
and other members of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for . It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a
student nurses, interns, and residents' taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution.
An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power. It then
purposes mentioned in the Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City becomes the duty of this Court to say that such an arbitrary act
Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil, 547 [1941]). amounted to the exercise of an authority not conferred. That properly
calls for the application of the Holmes dictum. It has also been held
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal
that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction of the
and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for
state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute
educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section 22,
is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process
paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis
grounds. 19
has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the equal protection.
main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot
for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by The applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a denial of this
jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the
building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and police power or the power of eminent domain is to demonstrated that
his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose—educational, attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility,
the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons
incidental to the purpose of education. under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the
same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
Sison vs. Ancheta conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
The success of the challenge posed in this suit for declaratory relief or
security shall be given to every person under circumstances which if
prohibition proceeding 1 on the validity of Section I of Batas Pambansa
not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
Blg. 135 depends upon a showing of its constitutional infirmity. The
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
assailed provision further amends Section 21 of the National Internal
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
Revenue Code of 1977, which provides for rates of tax on citizens or
binding on the rest." 20 That same formulation applies as well to
residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net income,
taxation measures remedies. The Constitution does not require things
(c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though
and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and
they were the same." 21 Hence the constant reiteration of the view that
from trust fund and similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of
classification if rational in character is allowable. As a matter of fact,
individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted
in a leading case of Lutz V. Araneta, 22 this Court, through Justice
gross income. 2 Petitioner 3 as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof,
J.B.L. Reyes, went so far as to hold "at any rate, it is inherent in the
"he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher
power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and
rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession
it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a
vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried
singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe
individual taxpayers. 4 He characterizes the above sction as arbitrary
no constitutional limitation.'"
amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character
5 7. Petitioner likewise invoked the kindred concept of uniformity.
According to the Constitution: "The rule of taxation shag be uniform
Power to Tax
and equitable." 24 This requirement is met according to Justice Laurel
Chief Justice Makalintal thus: "The areas which used to be left to in Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco,25 decided in 1940, when the
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called tax "operates with the same force and effect in every place where the
upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to subject may be found. " 26 He likewise added: "The rule of uniformity
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is
of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to hardly attainable." 27 The problem of classification did not present
be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its itself in that case. It did not arise until nine years later, when the
sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of Supreme Court held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that
the times." 11 Hence the need for more revenues. The power to tax, an all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed
inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the performance of at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable
vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. To and natural classifications for purposes of taxation, ... . 28 As clarified
by Justice Tuason, where "the differentiation" complained of 6) The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
"conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity” Inc., and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining
in bad faith. The PBMEO’s motion for reconsideration was
Taxpayers may be classified into different categories subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed
two days late.
There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by
eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the Issue:
applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be classified into different
categories. To repeat, it. is enough that the classification must rest upon Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not
substantial distinctions that make real differences. In the case of the against the employer, as a violation of freedom expression in general
gross income taxation embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, the, and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances
discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to
the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of
all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition of the
applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation employers
income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead
expense, these taxpayers are e not entitled to make deductions for
income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or 1) Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the
to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and
indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang
Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before
compensation income, while continuing the system of net income Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
taxation as regards professional and business income. against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
Phil. Blooming Mills Employees v. Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc 51 expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for
SCRA 189 redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the
1) The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for
(PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of
their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent
Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and
harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private
Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for,
PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang
its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.
2) Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
2) To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence
alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers
a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches
second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is “a potent
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company
means of inhibiting speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
of their proposed demonstration.
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of
3) The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the peaceful assembly and of petition.
leaders of the PBMEO after learning about the planned mass
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of
demonstration. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations,
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the union that the
in effect imposes on the workers the “duty … to observe regular
demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in factual
working hours.” The strain construction of the Court of Industrial
exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of
Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to
expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and
4) The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should
interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the not be predicated on such a slender ground.
loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
5) A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners
appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor
plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic
eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3
clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right “to engage
in concert activities for … mutual aid or protection”; while Section 4(a- * The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi
1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
Section Three. substantially such.

The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of * DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is
Industrial Relations. The Supreme Court also directed the re- always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by
instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be
the date of their separation from the service until re-instated, minus one affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
day’s pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other condemnation and sale.
sources during their separation from the service.
FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged
Simon v. CHR GR No. 100150, Jan 5, 1994 various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-
Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on
G.R. No. 100150 January 05, 1994 January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The
mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant
Facts :Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further
is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The
hearing and investigating "demolition case" on vendors of North
Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not
Constitutional Issue : Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement.
decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila,
the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The
Ruling : Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction
the CHR to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this
civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the
carenderia cannot fall within the compartment of "human rights confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as
violations involving civil and political rights". administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the
applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The
humanity and are the same in all parts of the world. basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom; rights
of the accused to due process of law), political rights (right to elect ISSUE: * Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the
public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political defendant and the subject matter of the action
associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education,
employment and social services. * Whether or not due process of law was observed

Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from RULING: On Jurisdiction:The word “jurisdiction” is used in several
the sheer fact of his humanity...Because they are inherent, human rights different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the
are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to
by it. administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the
court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and the litigation.
cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or
human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable. jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the
relief it may grant.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not
connected with the organization or administration of the government. How Jurisdiction is Acquired: Jurisdiction over the person is acquired
by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process
in the establishment or administration of the government. exerted over the person.
Section I Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may
Procedural Due Process result either from a seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result
Judicial Proceedings from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though
at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918 into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by
actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property
is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its
which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of
progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual
illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found
custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal
in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power
registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical
ogfdcsxazf the court over the property is recognized and made
control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person
claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could
and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world. be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing
thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage dismissal of the original three informations but the filing of four new
is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an
that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there
that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, would obviously have been no cause for the instant petition.
in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses
proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases
as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid
are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in presentation of their real position.
the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations
therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All and the consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected their
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want
the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so
other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise
judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence
parties. of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended
informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom difference considering that where a capital offense is charged and the
publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under
action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the either an amended or a new information.
proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi
in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing
principles governing actions in rem. does not divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the
motion. It has been held that—“The order of the court granting the
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994 motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of
service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot
Facts:On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the
deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still
incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo
retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of
Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and
the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or
two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin
the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the
Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and
complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.”
Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
State Prosecutors v. Muro 236 SCRA 505
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned,
respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Facts:
Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted by
Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of
considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the
petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves
of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms. the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation
of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on
jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the
3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres.
January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The
to quash. respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported
announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners
repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction
before Judge Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by
to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.
Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by
He further contends that the announcement of the President as
petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of the original informations, and
published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that
setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. On
is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary
said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the
on his part.
meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated
January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners’
motion to quash filed for the new informations. As earlier stated,
respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of
February 18, 1994, hence this petition. The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking
judicial notice on matters he purported to be a public knowledge based
Issue: Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the Pres. has
informations is null and void on the ground that there was no notice lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also an act of inexcusable
and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the prosecutors who
Court. were already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby depriving the
government the right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse
Held: No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of of discretion by taking judicial notice on the published statement of the
the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the
Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been officially Petitioner further maintains that he was denied due process when he,
in force and effect of the law. as an applicant in a land registration case, was not able to take the
witness stand. According to petitioner, even his counsel hardly
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of participated in the proceeding except to propound clarificatory
discretion in taking judicial notice on the statement of the president questions during the examination of Engineer Silverio Perez of the
lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as Land Registration Authority
basis for dismissing the case?
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process of law
HELD: No. While petitioner claims that he was denied due process
The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross because he was unable to take the witness stand. The court ruled that
ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his assertion that there is the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the
no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the denial of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process.[19] In this
basis of the President’s announcement in the newspaper, believing that case, petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and
the public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is he did present three. However, petitioner did not invoke his right to
immediately effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge take the witness stand even when the trial court ordered the submission
which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a of the parties’ memoranda which signified the termination of the
mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the termination of the case, he
in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the forfeited his right to take the witness stand.
President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent
admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus Perez v. Estrada AM. No. OI-4-O3-SC June 29, 2001 and Sept. 13,
it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is 2001
merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public
knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of. FACTS: On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and
For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent
present: a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of
the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order
"to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr.
Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and,
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
court. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally
filed the petition.
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such
notoriety that such fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not ISSUE: Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial
judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does to the public.
not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge
HELD: No. In Estes v. Texas, US SC held that television coverage of
contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must
judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights
come from the knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary
of the criminal defendant: "Witnesses might be frightened, play to the
experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves
cameras, become nervous. They are then subject to extraordinary out-
unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the information he
of-court influences that might affect their testimony. Telecasting
obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge
increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered
defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental
the dismissal of the case without giving the prosecution the right to be
harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts
heard and of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of the
him from an effective presentation of his defense. Finally, the
judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or
discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in
inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the
exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are
hearsay and groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times. The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras
be installed in the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less
Carvajal v. CA 280 SCRA 351
distracting, degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a
FACTS: Petitioner allegedly acquired portions of the parcel of land by life is at stake, and the due process rights of the accused shall take
inheritance from his father Felix Carvajal who came to possess the precedence over the people's right to information. The accused has the
unregistered land in 1938, continuously, openly, adversely and right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make,
peacefully in the concept of an owner up to the time of his death. because it is his life and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is
not the same as a publicized trial.
The latter court upheld the trial court LRC Case No. 414(-A), LRC
Record No. N-60084 filed before Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City, IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness
Branch 71. In dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title intended to ensure a fair trial...could allow the 'hooting throng' to
of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. The Court recognized respondent arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the
Solid Homes, Inc. as the registered owner of a parcel of land covered accused...will not subserve the ends of justice, but will only pander to
by TCT No. N-7873, situated in Antipolo City. the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers."

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the application for Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to
registration, and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. chance forthwith the life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use
Hence, this recourse to this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the
concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing
to pay. for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

Perez v. Estrada ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a
new trial.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with
petitioners’ request for permission to televise and broadcast live the the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial
trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected
motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said
there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts
right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already
of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media existing).
coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts
as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests. The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although
not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies,
objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground due process can be complied with by observing the following:
that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his
experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only
pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger
massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested
render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
right of the people to information may be served through other means thereof.
less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
ISSUE: Whether or not television and radio coverage of plunder case but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
be allowed.
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
HELD: No. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of attached.
nine (9) to six (6) of its member, the Court denies the motion for
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence
of eight (8) Justices, has resolved to order the audio-visual recording as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
of the trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices vote against
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
the audio-visual recording of the trial. Considering the significance of
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the
importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that
there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision arriving at a decision.
in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and The administrative body should, in all controversial questions,
Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
law. can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil. 635 . authority conferred upon it.
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company OCA v. Pascual 259 SCRA 604
which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of
leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. Before any member of the Judiciary could be faulted, it should be only
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence
validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off derived from direct knowledge, especially since the charge is penal in
were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union character.
National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that
NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting Administrative Case against JUDGE FILOMENO PASCUAL
- One CEFERINO TIGAS wrote a letter, addressed to OCA
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio of SC, charging that irregularities and corruption were being
and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking committed by the RESPONDENT Presiding Judge of MTC
its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
- Letter was referred to NBI for “discreet investigation” of Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process was violated
respondent. as well as his right to security of tenure.

o Proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted
Tigas, the letter writer but realized was a fictitious character. by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

o Proceeded to the residence of CANDIDO CRUZ, an accused HELD: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the
in respondent’s sala. waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded
a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an
- In affidavit, Cruz declared that he was the accused in a absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
criminal case for Frustrated Murder. proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the
case at bar, Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in criminal
o Respondent judge decided that the crime he committed was
proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own
only physical injuries
choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime. The
o Cruz made to understand that, in view of such action, Cruz investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose of
was to give him P2,000 determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law
for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not
Respondent judge also believed to be a drunkard indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the
- NBI entrapped Respondent judge with help of Cruz, for
which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante “. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a
delicto. non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and
that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such
- Result of investigation and Respondent referred to the proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due
Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and process clause such that without the participation of its members, the
prosecuted for Bribery (Art. 210 RPC) safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not
that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer
o Executive Judge NATIVIDAD G. DIZON submitted report at his side.”
and recommendation that Respondent judge be penalized for violation
of Canons 2 and 3 of Code of Judicial Conduct (A Judge should avoid In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities and a opportunity to explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the
judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s
and diligence). appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.
ISSUES AND HOLDING The Supreme Court also emphasized that the constitutional provision
on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. Public office is a
1. Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge public trust. It is not a property guaranteed of due process. But when
Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to convict him. No the dispute concerns one’s constitutional right to security of tenure,
Respondent was not afforded right to open trial wherein respondent however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited
can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked.
defense. Only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute especially
consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the when it was proven, as in this case, that the public officer (Lumiqued)
respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of did not live up to the Constitutional precept i.e., that all public officers
the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. Before any and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
member of the Judiciary could be faulted, it should be only after due efficiency.
investigation and after presentation of competent evidence derived Fabella V. CA 282 SCRA 256
from direct knowledge, especially since the charge is penal in
character. On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-
work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE IS DISMISSED outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to
Lumiqued v. Exevea 282 SCRA 125 October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of
13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress.
Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against
charged by Jeannette Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The
due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they
he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in
unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on
complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of
after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the
10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation
hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence;
to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their
but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for
had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the
resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a
of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate
Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued. dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

HELD: YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been Torcita, upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City,
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect Rosario were.
a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally
or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed
one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.The 12
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. The Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish that
legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation
for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative took place between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took
proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal
expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’ search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was
administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened,
of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty
provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the (for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty)
division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same
to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not period of time.
include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the
provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9
Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the
of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no
appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were
necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial
or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the
of a teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of
ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss,
given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any which was denied.
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the
basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive
minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of
with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers simple irregularity in the performance of duty.
Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their
respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to
authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the
Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that
possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition
included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the
director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there ISSUE: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for
is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as breach of internal discipline, when the original charges against him
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search,
authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of
committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific HELD: NO. Notification of the charges contemplates that the
law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. The
to harmonize them. absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually
Summary Dismissal vs Torcita found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be
no short-cut to the legal process. While the definition of the more
FACTS: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt
Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly
with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the
owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo rudimentary requirements of due process. Herein, the 12
Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or
Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk
Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a while in the performance of official duty. There is no indication or
vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was
proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of
congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The
reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of
confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the
identified himself but the same had no effect. cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed
breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance
PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring
that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular
for back-up. performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or
smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman committed grave injustice for not
on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor because he was on a considering the evidence presented by respondent in her Motion for
private trip fetching his wife. Hence , the decision of the petitioners Reconsideration.
Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction. Petition
dismissed. HELD: YES. The SC find the evidence presented by the complainant
insufficient to support his serious charge that she was dishonest.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Coronel
The original Decision of the ombudsman was not supported by the
FACTS: Respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting evidence, but was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
Processor B with Salary Grade 10 of the Linamon Water District, conjectures. The evidence of the prosecution consisted merely of the
Lanao del Norte. On September 26, 1997, the Board of Directors of original Official Receipt (OR) No. 0736, and a photocopy of the
Linamon Water District, by virtue of Resolution No. 056[,] Series of original duplicate of that receipt. The first was a bill for P1,213; and
1997, designated [respondent] as Officer-in-Charge, effective October the latter, for P213. Both pieces of evidence refer to one and the same
1, 1997 until a General Manager shall have been appointed. Official Receipt; yet, they contain different amounts. Obviously, one
of them was falsified. Unfortunately, Complainant Sausal, Jr., failed to
In the morning of October 14, 1998, respondent called for a meeting prove that it was indeed respondents receipt that was falsified. As it
the officers of the different Water Districts in Lanao del Norte and stands, we do not know for certain if the number 1 was inserted in OR
Lanao del Sur, as well as their advisors from the Local Water Utilities No. 0736 or was deleted from the unauthenticated photocopy of the
Administration (LWUA). Since it was nearing lunchtime, the group original duplicate. The evidence is equivocal. Besides, given that there
opted to continue their meeting at Marvillas Store at Barangay Bunu- were 8 to 10 attendees in the luncheon meeting, a bill of P1,213 for
un, Iligan City. The luncheon meeting, attended by more or less ten meals was not entirely improbable, even in 1998.
(10) persons, was presided over by Advisor Rhodora Gumban of the
LWUA. As the host of the said meeting, [respondent] paid for the lunch In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding
in the amount of One Thousand Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos of guilt is substantial evidence; that is, such relevant evidence that a
(P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In
1998. the instant case, the complainant did not present evidence to support
his theory that the photocopy of the original duplicate reflected the true
On November 13, 1998, respondent claimed for reimbursement of her amount, or that OR No. 0736 had indeed been falsified. That oversight
expenses covered by Voucher No. 98-11-23, chargeable against the was fatal to the discharge of his burden of proof. A reasonable mind
representation and entertainment account of her office. That very same will not carelessly jump to the conclusion that respondent is the guilty
day, the voucher was approved and [respondent] got her party.
reimbursement in the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred Thirteen
Pesos (P1,213.00). On November 17, 1998, Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was The complainants evidence to prove falsification consisted of an
appointed General Manager of Linamon Water District. On February unauthenticated photocopy of the original duplicate. He could have
1999, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn obtained an affidavit from the restaurant proprietor or employee who
letter-complaint against herein [respondent] for dishonesty. The case had issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due execution and
was docketed as Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM 99-044. The complaint authenticity. Absent any proof of due execution and authenticity, the
alleges that [respondent] falsified the cash invoice she submitted for alleged photocopy of the original duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not
reimbursement by making it appear that the luncheon bill was for One convince us that it is an accurate reflection of the actual bill incurred.
Thousand Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P1,213.00) when in fact,
it was only Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P213.00), as reflected in While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of
the photocopy of the original duplicate of cash invoice No. 0736 dated proceedings before administrative agencies, it also consistently
October 14, 1998. requires some proof of authenticity or reliability as a condition for the
admission of documents. Absent any such proof of authenticity, the
On November 27, 2000, Grace H. Morales, Graft Investigation Officer photocopy of the original duplicate should be considered inadmissible
I of the OMB-Mindanao, Davao City, rendered a decision holding that and, hence, without probative value. Given the flimsy charge and the
respondent CARMENCITA D. CORONEL is guilty of paucity of the evidence against respondent, there is no need for her to
DISHONESTY and is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with present additional evidence to vindicate herself. The Office of the
forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits, pursuant to Ombudsman should have dismissed the Administrative Complaint
Section 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules against her in the first place. Clearly, her guilt was not proven by
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She is substantial evidence.
disqualified from re-employment in the national and local
governments, as well as in any agency, including government-owned Thus, Respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby EXONERATED
or controlled corporations. of the charge against her for lack of substantial evidence.s

Respondent filed for MR to the Graft Investigation Officer and such Sec. of Justice vs Lantion
motion was granted. Herein, petitioner Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
FACTS: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
DISAPPROVED the above order with a marginal note, the original
issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
decision stands.
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
The appellate court reinstated the decision of the Graft Investigation Country".
Officer where it nullified petitioner Ombudsman’s Disapproval Order.
On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
The appellate court said that the OMBs disapproval was tainted with representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed
grave abuse of discretion. First, petitioner ombudsman did not consider in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
the credible evidence presented by respondent in her Motion for Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States
Reconsideration. Second, he did not give any justification for his of America.
disapproval of the investigating officers ruling. This shortcoming was
The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the
in contravention of the constitutional mandate that all decisions, even
ratification of the said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
if rendered by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, should clearly
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which they are based.
admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing
upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of
requested state resident in the Requesting State). the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a HELD: NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused
request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. guaranteed in the Constitution should take precedence over treaty
Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the rights claimed by a contracting party, the doctrine of incorporation is
warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation
Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. where there is a conflict between a rule of the international law and the
constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the
Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of provisions so as to give effect to both but if the conflict is
irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld. The fact that
(a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
United States, 2 counts),
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over the municipal
(b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), law in the municipal sphere. In states where the constitution is the
highest law of the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if
(c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), they are in conflict with the constitution.

(d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and
present danger of loss of property or employment but of liberty itself,
(E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts). which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land.
The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the extradition
On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily
designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and comprehensible.
to handle the case.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction,
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed
(on 1 July 1999 requested copies of the official extradition request of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
from the US Government, as well as all documents and papers pronouncements.The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not
submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondents due
the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are
The Secretary denied the request. protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the
organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees
against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with
On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a
l for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him evidence.
an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and
thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); Gov’t of USA v. Puruganan

l certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July FACTS: Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon.
1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from Lantion”. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of
considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter
petition in court; a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting
evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it
l and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the
NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA,
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the
RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order
The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to
for certiorari before the Supreme Court. prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition,
Mr. Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for
the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez
of the,extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
evidence. amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After
IN SUMMARY: The Department of Justice received from the
he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the United States for the
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No.
1609 prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who have Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
committed a crime in a foreign country. Jimenez requested for copies of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant
of the request and that he be given ample time to comment on said for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash
request. The petitioners denied the request pursuant to the RP-US which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local
Extradition Treaty. jurisprudence to guide lower court.
the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter
be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.

i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or ii. Yes.
excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a
potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of
PD No. 1069
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of Constitution, as well
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption
Regional Trial Court of of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it. unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the
presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the
i. YES. By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys
Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even
that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. From
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” finds
the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is
application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.”
sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest
and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable
cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are
documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the
prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for
The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing the extradition court.
every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at
this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending
to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest
Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule
and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to
nor the Law could have intended. judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail
may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked
convincing showing
by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance 1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a
of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination danger to the community; and
under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may
produce.1 2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty
Extradition Cases in extradition cases therein
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible,
a prima facie finding whether Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and
since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and
a) they are sufficient in form and substance fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law

c) the person sought is extraditable

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won
a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his
documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences
of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his
facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him
of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case bail.
is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant
for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance
Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to
grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he
Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed will be extradited.
to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and,
while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose. proceedings involve a full-blown trial.

c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case

requires proof “beyond reasonable doubt” for conviction while a
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean fugitive may be ordered extradited “upon showing of the existence of
that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our a prima facie case”
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the
Petition for Extradition. d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon
being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may
adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him.
iii. NO.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored
fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The ultimate
fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty,
given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition and whether the person sought is extraditable.
court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard
and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary
nature of extradition. 4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in obligations
that country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state;
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a
yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
position to deliver the
Other Doctrines:
accused, should it be found proper
Five Postulates of Extradition

1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused
an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein
isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there; and
2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting
state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are
By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have
reposed its trust

in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its Extradition is Essentially Executive
treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility
to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and
to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government
has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Gov’t of Hongkong v. Olalia

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all

the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine
with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused
agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him
Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. criminal law of the requesting state or government."

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is
respondent. The RTC issued an Order of Arrest against private merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to
the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations,
the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed,
not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to
which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard
petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying for the grant is satisfactorily met.
the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting
bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight
risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the
there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show
case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered
denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.
into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and
defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
ISSUE: mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process.
More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion Philippines is a party. This Court should not, therefore, deprive an
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard
the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. for the grant is satisfactorily met.

HELD: An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof

required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which
based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In
Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
granted bail. termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail
in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower
than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing
the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a
prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.

Ocampo vs. Abando

FACTS:A mass graveyard was found at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay records were transmitted to RTC Manila. Echanis and Baylosis
Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte by the43rd Infantry Brigade containing 67 continued to seek relief from the Supreme Court in response to Judge
skeletal remains of those believed to be victims of “Operation Venereal Abando’s orders. Echanis also prayed for his release.
Disease (VD)” by the Communist Party of the Philippines/ New
People’s Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the Both Ocampo and Echanis were granted provisional release by the
Philippines. This was done to purge their ranks of suspected military Supreme Court under cash bonds.
As to Ladlad’s Motion to Quash, it was denied by respondent judge
Members of the Scene of the Crime Operation team conducted forensic and the same happened to his Motion for Reconsideration. Ladlad
crime analysis to identify the bodies by way of DNA sample. The sought to annul the latter’s orders by way of special civil action for
initial report of the PNP Crime Laboratory on their identities remained certiorari under Rule 65.
inconclusive, but, in a Special Report, the Case Secretariat of the
As to their bail, Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail whereas
Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group came up with
Baylosis filed a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail which were
ten names of possible victims after comparing the testimonies of
granted, with no opposition from the OSG (bec. they’re consultants of
relatives and witnesses.
the NDFP negotiating team, then having talks with the GRP peace
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden and Staff Judge Advocate panel).
Captain Allan Tiu sent undated letters to Pros. Vivero, requesting for
ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners’ right to due process was
legal action on the twelve attached complaint affidavits. These were
from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD who all swore
that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the HELD:NO. Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary
CPP/NPA/NDFP. investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
Charging them with murder, the affidavits were directed to 71 named A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to
members of the group, including the petitioners. Namely, the protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of
petitioners were Ocampo, Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad who were all a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation before
pointed out to be members of the Central Committee that ordered the trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and
campaign to be carried out in 1985. a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.
On this basis, Pros. Vivero issued a subpoena requiring them to submit In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process
their counter-affidavits and Ocampo complied. However, Echanis and of law entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an
Baylosis did not do so because allegedly they were not served the copy opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to
of a subpoena. As for Ladlad, though his counsel made formal the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide
appearance during the preliminary investigation, he also did not submit whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a
for the same reason as the two. crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who
committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss
Pros. Vivero, in a resolution, directed the filing of information for 15
the complaint.
counts of multiple murder against the 54 named members, including
the petitioners. He also caused some respondents to be used as state "The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and
witnesses for their testimony is vital to the prosecution. Said submit evidence in support of one's defense." What is proscribed is
information was filed before RTC Hilongos, Leyte branch 18 presided lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a
by Judge Abando. chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of
due process.
Prior to receiving the resolution, Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to
Set Case for Clarificatory Hearing. Judge Obando found probable As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis that they were
cause and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with denied due process, we quote the pertinent portion of Prosecutor
no recommended bail. Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
Ocampo went to the Supreme Court by way of special civil action for In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 and asked for the Criminal Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and served with
abovementioned order and the prosecutor’s resolution to be annulled. Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their counter-
He said that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others was then affidavits and that of their witnesses.
already pending before RTC Makati and so, the crime of murder was
absorbed by the rebellion in line with the political offense doctrine. Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits
because they could no longer be found in their last known address, per
The Court ordered the Solicitor General to comment on the issue and return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo Satur,
also ordered the parties to submit their memoranda. From the oral Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their
arguments, the Court found that the single Information charging them Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem
all of 15 counts of murder was defective. The prosecution moved to failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
admit amended and new information, but Judge Abando suspended the appearance by their respective counsels.
proceedings during the pendency of the case before the Court.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero
Meanwhile, Echanis was arrested and he, along with Baylosis, filed a to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a
Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present
Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant, but it was dismissed by Judge countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.
Abando. Around this time, Ladlad filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a
with the RTC Manila. respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.In this case, the
Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on
Echanis and Baylosis moved to reconsider but it was not acted because,
the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient
as per request of the DOJ Secretary to change the venue of the trial, the
for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer
be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-
of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due
process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which
Moreover, Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his counsel’s formal preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent
entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b),
preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to participate. Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c),
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel
supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the
should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await
Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the
the outcome of their case."106 Having opted to remain passive during
respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits
the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot
and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is
now claim a denial of due process, since their failure to file a counter-
issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the
affidavit was of their own doing.
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states,
As to Ocampo’s claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have
reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching
to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be pointed thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents,
out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt
to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no
resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section
is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not
on Appeal: the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits
of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the
days from receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which
reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15) denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.
days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied) Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
Vivero on 12 March 2007,108 the former had until 27 March 2007 determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a
within which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the latter part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand
or an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-
chose to file the instant petition for certiorari directly before this Court examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a
on 16 March 2007. respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted
by procedural law.
Estrada vs Ombudsman
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for
FACTS:Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to
served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably
complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence
and 14 March 2014. now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient
to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary
with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as
Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in
have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there
and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of exists prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).” commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
subject of the present certiorari case. Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who
ISSUE:WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be
HELD:NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
right to due process. application of the evidentiary rules.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not
a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co- akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the
respondents. landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed
The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the
Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,”
ready reference. while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare
suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.”
In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable will render all past and present preliminary investigations invalid for
cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this: violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for
reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we the country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law
deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and designates a public officer, outside of the prosecution service, to
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is judgment would have to be released from prison because their
accordingly correlative to what must be proved. conviction violated constitutional due process.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum
as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence shopping.
is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary
investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and C. Academic Discipline
does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However,
in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally Guzman v. NU
adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot
Facts: Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel
rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is
Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to
not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence
this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's
excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay
"continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their
evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in
petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for
GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of
preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged
evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of
that they were denied due process due to the fact that they were active
likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.
participants in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the
Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished University.
Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’ failure
whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some
to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to
of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the
their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their
Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for
constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his
reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five
academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of
days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond
classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges for malicious
to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully
mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection
complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even
with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The
accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules required. Thus, the
petitioners have “failures in their records, and are not of good
Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since
scholastic standing.”
this is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. Issue: WON the petitioners were denied due process.
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, Held:Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment
as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary investigations and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted
which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-
A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the
the constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang university premises, conducted without prior permit from school
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated
investigations do not comply and were never intended to comply, with acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University
adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages
administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman,
GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or
substantial evidence for a decision against the respondent in the debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of
administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by
probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor
GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of scholastic standing.
evidence required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an
administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has The school had violated the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses that “no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as
against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such defined in the manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
rights. promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been
Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial and cannot be the fact- There are standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In procedural due process; and these are, that
preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the
investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and any accusation against them; SMBIW NCAT
supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or
Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare the assistance of counsel, if desired; RTA CA WAC
that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; SBI EAT
fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary investigations
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been more than
and RAE ITOB sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have
committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would
decide the case. EMDC BTIC only further aggravate the strained relations between the students and
the officials of the school which necessarily resulted from the heated
Non v. Dames legal battle.
Facts: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano,
ADMU vs Capulong
Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba,
Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner
Daniel Torres, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General
Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez
year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center. Petitioner Dean
against the school in the preceding semester. They thus filed a petition Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a
readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of
the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A motion for Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit
reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24 their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt.
February 1989; stating that they waived-their privilege to be admitted Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice,
for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, they failed to file a reply. In themeantime, they were placed on
and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988- preventive suspension. The Investigating Committee found a prima
89. In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the
abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I
am enrolled." Hence, the affected students filed the petition for Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to
certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear
Supreme Court. the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent
students guilty of violating Rules on Discipline which prohibits
Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of
when the cause for the action taken against them relates to possible unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of
breaches of discipline. dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of
Held: The contract between the school and the student is not an
dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the
RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted.
high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the
A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del
State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing
institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student
against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to
on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has
be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the
already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the
Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which
admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the
alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the
academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning. The
students was ordered.
right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards,
however, cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural
Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford due process. The Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and
its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to required respondent students to submit their written statement on the
pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested
discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of
forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices.
discretion of university authorities. Excluding students because of Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a The Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner
of fair play. Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some cannot university herein, thus:
be considered marked academic deficiency. Neither can the academic
(1) the students must be informed in WRITING of the nature and cause
deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of the school due to
of any accusation against them;
insufficiency of information. Herein, the students could have been
subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them
actions, but with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
offense committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements
of procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145, (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). But this matter of and
disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative
sanctions have become moot and academic; as the students have been (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
refused readmission or re-enrollment and have been effectively committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of
which they are categorized into brackets. To further insure the integrity
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data
met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia indicated in a student's application form is undertaken. Among
del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required those who applied for STFAP benefits for School
respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four
hours their written statement on the incident, the records show that Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College
instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their of Law. A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo
counsel, copies of the charges. While of the students mentioned in the Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms.
February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team
failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship
February 18, 1991 to file their statements . Indubitably, the nature and Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's
cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of
notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted that the the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the
February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial
Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was Assistance. In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella
addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed
notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been
respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but
in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them. also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio
and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start Committee had reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4),
of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty- Student retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the
Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of
put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates."
students. Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his
registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were
transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be
not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements
referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further
which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they
investigation. commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would
were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied
mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding
such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the
of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case
observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students
might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further
need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An
investigation. Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING conducted to investigate
that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her
students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to
attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March
find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." U.P. charged
2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as
Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he
being summary in nature and that respondent students have no righ t to
committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately
examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our
withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living
previous ruling in Alcuaz . Respondent students' contention that the
abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such,
investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from
the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the
the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it
University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had
was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the
received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be
testimonies of several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's
"effected” by the University thru outside legal action. The SDT
resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March
decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive
2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to answer
Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P.
clarificatory questions.
Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified
UP v. Ligot-Telan the penalty from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective
immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the
Facts: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly STFAP, with legal interest. However the BOR also decided against
the University of the People, U.P. administration conceptualized and giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. Nadal forthwith
implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next
BOR meeting Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material
the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), importance" of the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a
popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de
consultations with the various university constituencies, U.P. Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by
President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a
April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it student there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio
was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records to
allocated a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed
the program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State that Nadal falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would
University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which be a clear case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even
include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that
assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter.
earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University. Applicants are U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered
required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state by stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece
the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would
and personal properties and special circumstances from which the ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception
from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and the Lao Gi v. CA
reviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a
certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a Facts: Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of
scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice. However, this was revoked
at a special meeting, according to Regent Carpio, in executive when his father’s citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and
session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty." However, on April 22, 1993, misrepresentation. Charges of deportation were filed against the Chias.
Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for Charges also alleged that they refused to register as aliens and that they
mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary committed acts of undesirability. The Chias said that the CID has no
restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. authority to deport them which was denied by the CID. They filed a
Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of preliminary injunction
Caoili. which was dismissed for lack of merit. Their MFR was also denied.
Earlier, Manuel Chia’s case of falsification of public documents in
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He was alleged to have done this for
process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges the sale of real property. The trial court acquitted him by saying that
against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting. Opinion 191 was res judicata and cant be contravened by Opinion 147.
The CID set the hearing for the deportation case against the Chias and
Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent told them to register as aliens. The Chias tooks further action. Their
considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process" petition for injunctive relief was denied by the CFI of Manila. They
inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias was denied.
of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due
process," the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They
meeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to argued that they weren’t subject to immediate deportation, the
equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CA’s overstepping of appellate
March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didn’t make a ruling that the
require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are petitioner entered the Philippines by false pretenses.
included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of
students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Issue: Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the deportation?
Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent
Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine if
complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and
they are really aliens. Section 37 of the Immigration act states:
special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Counsel
for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not given due SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant
process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated
was again convicted was not the same as the original charge. by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
March 28. Whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, charged against the alien:
Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was
"exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income (1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this
of Nadal's mother. It should be stressed that the reason why Regent Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection
Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of
at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry. (As
yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought additional amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ...
insights into the character of Nadal through the information that
would be obtained from the AdeMU. The Court in this regard find There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged,
such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July, particularly illegal entry into the country. Only after the hearing can
12, 1991 certification aforementioned, the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive finding from the
CID that they are aliens before compelling them to register as such.
Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" This power is the police power to protect the state from undesirable
who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but aliens injurious to the public good.
that she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help
of another son. The court constitutes this as a sufficient admission that Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed.
Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly and In the same law, it is provided that:
irregular, of his mother. The court also sighted that respondent aspires
to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at all No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific
costs so that justice may prevail. In those who exhibit duplicity in their grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules
student days, one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. With this the court The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary
ruled that it sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act language for the person to be informed and for the CID to make a
of dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst must be in accordance
his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules with the rules on criminal procedure.
and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner
University, the latter's inherent power and authority to impose On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is
disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised. the sole concern of the state. There is no justification for a private party
Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadal’s right of due to intervene.
process. The lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the
petition for mandamus.
Domingo v. Scheer On June 11, 2002, the respondent's counsel filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a
FACTS: Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a German, was given permanent prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
status to reside in the Philippines on July 18, 1986. He married a injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the
Filipina and have 3 children. He also opened a restaurant in Puerto respondent's deportation.
The respondent (petitioner therein) alleged, inter alia, that his arrest
One day, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) received and detention were premature, unjust, wrongful, illegal and
information that Scheer was wanted by the German Federal Police that unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and without
a warrant of arrest had been issued against him. jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. He asserted that there
was no speedy remedy open to him in the ordinary course of law and
The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation against Scheer.
that his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary
In issuing the said order, the BOC relied on the correspondence from Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been resolved despite the
the German Vice-Consul on its speculation that it was unlikely that the lapse of more than six years.
German Embassy will issue a new passport to the respondent; on the
The respondent averred that he was a fully documented alien, a
warrant of arrest issued by the District Court of Germany against the
permanent resident and a law-abiding citizen.
respondent for insurance fraud; and on the alleged illegal activities of
the respondent in Palawan. The BOC concluded that the respondent CA issued a status quo order restraining the petitioner from deporting
was not only an undocumented but an undesirable alien as well. the respondent on a bond of P100,000.00.
When the respondent was apprised of the deportation order, he BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution dated June 14, 2002, pendente lite
forthwith aired his side to then BID Commissioner Leandro T. denying the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Motion
Verceles. The Commissioner allowed the respondent to remain in the for Bail/Recognizance.
Philippines, giving the latter time to secure a clearance and a new
passport from the German Embassy. On August 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor
of the respondent granting his petition for certiorari and prohibition
Respondent filed an MR. However, the BOC did not resolve the and permanently enjoining the petitioner from deporting the
respondent's motion. The respondent was neither arrested nor respondent.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Board of Commissioners is an indispensable
Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing party.
rendered a Decision dismissing the criminal case against the
respondent for physical injuries. The German Embassy in Manila, 2. WON the the Non-joinder of an Indispensable Party is a Ground for
thereafter, issued a temporary passport to the respondent. the Dismissal of the Petition

In a Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed 3. WON The CA had Jurisdiction Over the Petition for Certiorari,
Commissioner Verceles that his passport had been renewed following Prohibition, and Mandamus
the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his request for the
cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, HELD: 2. YES. The BOC is an Indispensable Party. We agree with the
1995, and the restoration of his permanent resident status.[19] petitioner's contention that the BOC was an indispensable party to the
Subsequently, on March 12, 1996, the German Embassy issued to the respondents' petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the
respondent a regular passport, to expire on March 11, 2006. Court of Appeals. The respondent was arrested and detained on the
basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The petitioner
The BOC still failed to resolve the respondent's Urgent Motion for caused the arrest of the respondent in obedience to the said Deportation
Reconsideration. Commissioner Verceles did not respond to the Order. The respondent, in his Memorandum, prayed that the CA annul
respondents March 1, 1996, Letter. not only the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC but also the
latter's Omnibus Resolution, and, thus, order the respondents
The respondent remained in the Philippines and maintained his immediate release. The respondent also prayed that the CA issue a writ
business in Palawan. On March 20, 1997, the Department of Labor and of mandamus for the immediate resolution of his Urgent Motion for
Employment approved his application for Alien Employment Reconsideration. The said motion had to be resolved by the BOC as
Registration Certificate as manager of the Bavaria Restaurant in Puerto the order sought to be resolved and reconsidered was issued by it and
Princesa City. not by the petitioner alone. The powers and duties of the BOC may not
be exercised by the individual members of the Commission.
In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T.
Domingo assumed office. She wrote the German Embassy and 2. NO. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires
inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police. On April indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The
12, 2002, the German Embassy replied that the respondent was not so joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of
wanted. indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain
real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment
At about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID agents
rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders
apprehended the respondent in his residence on orders of the petitioner.
all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack of authority to
He was whisked to the BID Manila Office and there held in custody
act not only of the absent party but also as to those present. The
while awaiting his deportation. Despite entreaties from the
responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the
respondent's wife and his employees, the petitioner refused to release
the respondent.
However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for
Shocked at the sudden turn of events, the respondent promptly
the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court
communicated with his lawyer. The latter filed with the BID a motion
on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
for bail to secure the respondent's temporary liberty.
and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter
may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure
to comply therefor.The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to satellite system and ground terminal or terminals” in the Philippines.
be indispensable. In this case, the CA did not require the respondent PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe
(petitioner therein) to implead the BOC as respondent but merely relied Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
on the rulings of the Court in Vivo v. Arca, and Vivo v. Cloribel. The
CAs reliance on the said rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from
subject of the petition in the two cases were those of the Immigration the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service
Commissioner and not those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a Commission later known as the National Telecommunications
necessary nor even an indispensable party in the aforecited cases. Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later
promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the
3. YES. The settled rule is that the authority to exclude or expel aliens jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire
by a power affecting international relation is vested in the political permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its
department of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by an existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however
act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based
according to the regulations so established, except in so far as the its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is
required by the Constitution to intervene. The judicial department PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis
cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom or the justice of Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO
the measures executed by Congress in the exercise of the power 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service
conferred on it, by statute or as required by the Constitution. Congress communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were
may, by statute, allow the decision or order of the Immigration constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation of
Commissioner or the BOC to be reviewed by the President of the legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC.
Philippines or by the courts, on the grounds and in the manner PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546,
prescribed by law. providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers,
nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC,
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested judicial power in can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of
the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the Court of Appeals, its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently
as established by law. Although the courts are without power to clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a
directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires
are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that an express conferment by the legislative body.
of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve
questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to
department violates the law or the Constitution. In Harvy Bridges v.
fix rates is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
I.F. Wixon, the United States Federal Supreme Court reversed an
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than
Order of Deportation made by the Attorney General for insufficiency
satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.
of evidence and for improper admission of evidence. In Nging v.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be
Nagh,the United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit Court) held that
sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is
conclusions of administrative offices on the issues of facts are
provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has
invulnerable in courts unless when they are not rendered by fair-
prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
minded men; hence, are arbitrary. In Toon v. Stump, the Court ruled
that courts may supervise the actions of the administrative offices Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this
authorized to deport aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must
evidence to sustain them. When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature;
agency are involved, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power
in the Court of Appeals as provided by law or by the Rules of Court, becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power,
as amended. the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable
In this case, the respondent alleges that the petitioner acted arbitrarily,
and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an
contrary to law and with grave abuse of discretion in causing his arrest
express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
and detention at a time when his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
the BOCs Summary Deportation Order had yet to be resolved. There
was no factual or legal basis for his deportation considering that he was However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was
a documented alien and a law-abiding citizen; the respondent, thus, done without due process since no hearing was made in ascertaining
prayed for a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner, the the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
Chairperson of the BOC, to resolve the said motion. The petition
before the CA did not involve the act or power of the President of the Globe Telecom vs NTC
Philippines to deport or exclude an alien from the country. This being
so, the petition necessarily did not call for a substitution of the FACTS: On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public
Presidents discretion on the matter of the deportation of the respondent respondent NTC,praying that NTC order the immediate
with that of the judgment of the CA. interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks. Smart alleged
that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts
Philcomsat vs Alcuaz request for the interconnection of SMS.
180 SCRA 218 Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999,
interposing grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smarts failure
Facts: By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine to comply with the conditions precedent required in Section 6 of NTC
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted Memorandum Circular 9-7-93,19 and its omission of the mandatory
the authority to “construct and operate such ground facilities as needed Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
to deliver telecommunications services from the communications
On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present appeal/petition and lifted said order, stating, through Assistant
petition. Both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, that the PPA-
lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required AO (i) merely implements PPA Charter, (ii) issuance is an act of PPA,
for interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the situation not of its General Manager, (iii) merely regulates, not forbids practice
into the present impasse. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely of the profession, recognizing that such exercise is property right, and
within the definition of value-added service or enhanced-service given (iv) sufficiently complied with the requirement in the PD to consult
3333 only with relevant Government Agencies and (d) finally finding
affirmative relief with Manila RTC Br. 6. Court, which ruled that (i)
in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) their said PPA-AO is null and void (ii) PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction
implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory.The NTC also with grave abuse of discretion and (iii) imposed a permanent
declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without restraining order on PPA on its implementation.Assistant Executive
authority from it. Secretary Corona thus filed petition for review [of the Manila RTC
Decision] to the Supreme Court.
Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have acted in excess of
taking any further action in the case. Globe reiterated its previous jurisdiction.
arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to
comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum shopping Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate
rule.They claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that respondents’ right to exercise their profession and their right to due
it had no authority to render SMS, pointing out that the matter was not process of law.
raised as an issue before it at all.They alleged that the Order is a patent
nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which HELD:
neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
of their right to due process. The CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999.
In its Memorandum, Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction
NTC decision regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and
special feature and does not require the prior approval of the NTC. arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92
including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
ISSUE: Whether or not the NTC’s order is not supported by
substantial evidence. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and
Orders are declared null and void;
HELD: There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum
circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA
any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda,
should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity Circulars and Orders.
with the PTA; the assailed Order violates due process for failure to
sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being No costs. SO ORDERED
unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation to, and
issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the absence of due NPC vs. Zozobrado
notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to
present evidence on its behalf. FACTS: Agustin A. Zozobrado, herein respondent, is a permanent
employee of petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) assigned as
CORONA VS. UHPAP Pilot in the aviation group, received a letter from NPC President
Frederico C. Puno, informing him that he was being dropped from the
FACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created through PD rolls.
505, as amended by PD857 to “control, regulate, supervise pilots and
the pilot age profession”. Zozobrado filed an appeal before the CSC questioning NPCs
implementation of dropping him from the rolls.
After hearing from relevant government agencies, pursuant to said
charter, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued CSC dismissed Zobrado’s appeal and MR.
Administrative Order 04-92 [PPA-AO 04-92] and corresponding
Memorandum Order in 1992, stating that all existing regular Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
appointments which have been previously issued shall remain valid up Certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and was granted.
to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot Petitioner filed for MR but was denied.
positions in all pilot age districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term
of one year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or Respondent had been dropped by petitioner from the rolls due to
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.
performance” to regulate and improve pilot services by instilling
discipline and give better protection to port users. PPA-AO 04-92 CA ruled in favor of herein respondents finding that the separation was
replaces PPA-AO 03-85 which succinctly provides that, aspiring pilots made with utter lack of due process.
must have a license and train as probationary pilots, and only upon
satisfactory performance, are given permanent and regular ISSUE: WON due process was followed in dropping respondent from
appointments by the PPA itself and to exercise harbor pilot age until the rolls.
they reach the age of 70.Upon learning of PPA-AO 04-92 only after
HELD: NO. Both the substantive and procedural aspect of due process
publication in the newspaper, the United Harbor Pilots Association of
were violated by petitioner in dismissing respondent.
the Philippines: (a) questioned said PPA-AO twice before the DOTC,
which Secretary Garcia said twice that only the PPA Board of As to the procedural aspect, not even one requisites laid down by
Directors [as governing body] has exclusive jurisdiction to review, Memorandum Circular No. 12 has been complied with. Respondent
recall or annul PPA-AOs, (b) appealed to the Office of the President, was never notified in writing of his Unsatisfactory rating within 30
which first issued a restraining order to the PPA on the implementation
of the PPA-AO, and after PPA’s answer, then dismissed the
days from the end of the semester when the Unsatisfactory rating was Petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case against respondent and
given. likewise submitted an affidavit recanting his Sworn Statement before
the CIS.
Respondent was never warned in writing that a succeeding
Unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner.
service. Even the allegation of the oral notice itself (that petitioner
claims and respondent categorically denies) is clearly an afterthought, Private respondents appealed to the NLRC and reversed the LA’s
having been utilized for the first time in the Motion for decision.
Reconsideration of the assailed Court of Appeals decision and was
Petitioner’s MR was denied.
never used as an argument in the administrative proceedings. The proof
of such notice, a self-serving affidavit of the very individual who Hence, this petition.
unilaterally gave the apparently groundless rating, deserves scant
consideration. ISSUE: WON petitioner’s dismissal was legally justified.
As to the substantive aspect, evidence shows that petitioner never HELD: NO. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for
denied that respondents unsatisfactory rating was due to respondents the lawful dismissal of an employee by his employer are two-fold: the
testimony in court concerning the graft charges against NPC substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a
employees. On the day respondent was supposed to testify in court valid or authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 279, 281, 282-
under pain of contempt, Gen. Lagera suddenly sent him to fly the NPC 284, New Labor Code), but the rudimentary requirements of due
President despite the fact that another pilot was assigned to such process — notice and hearing — must also be observed before an
mission. employee may be dismissed. One does not suffice; without their
concurrence, the terminate would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.
Moreover, Gen. Lagera’s ill motive is further proved by the fact that
respondent was kept in the dark as to the status of his employment even As to the LA’s finding, petitioner was terminated without the benefit
though the same had already been terminated two months earlier. It of due process of law. The respondents' initial act in convening their
appears that the sad news was relayed to respondent only on his natal Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC) to
day affair. We can see no reason for the two months delay other than investigate complainant (after the CIS experience) would have
the devastation Gen. Lagera expected to cause by imparting the complied with the demands of due process had complainant been given
shocking news on respondents birth anniversary, during a celebration the opportunity to present his own defense and confront the witnesses,
and in front of other people. if any, and examine the evidence against him. But as the records clearly
show, the complainant was denied that constitutional right when his
As further found by the Court of Appeals, when respondent brought to subsequent request refute the allegations against him was granted and
the Grievance Committee the matter of his unsatisfactory ratings, the a hearing was set "without counsel or representative.
Grievance Committee recommended a review thereof to take into
account respondents quantity of flying hours. Pilots have traditionally The investigation of petitioner Salaw by the respondent Bank'
been rated by the number of flying hours spent in their career, and investigating committee violated his constitutional right to due
respondent had more than double the flying hours of the two other process, in as much as he was not given a chance to defend himself, as
pilots of the Aviation Group combined. However, Gen. Lagera blocked provided in Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
such review, claiming that he had already considered the same, albeit Regulations of the Labor Code governing the dismissal of employees.
minimally. This is a clear indication that Gen. Lagera really wanted to Section 5 of the said Rule requires that "the employer shall afford the
take it upon himself to solely give the Unsatisfactory ratings to worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
respondent, in violation of the approved Performance Appraisal assistance of his representative if he so desires."11 (Emphasis
System (PAS) of the NPC. supplied.) Here petition was perfunctorily denied the assistance of
counsel during the investigation to be conducted by the PDIC. No
Salaw v. NLRC reasons preferred which vitiated the denial with irregularity and
FACTS:Espero Santos Salaw was a credit investigator-appraiser of
hxerein respondent Associated Bank. As aptly observed by the labor arbiter, the respondents premised their
action in dismissing the complainant on his supposed admission of the
His duties included inspecting, investigating, appraising, and
offense imputed to him by the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) in
identifying the company's foreclosed assets; giving valuation to its real
its interrogation in November 1984. The said admission was carried in
properties and verifying the genuineness and encumbrances of the
a three-page Sworn Statement signed by the complainant. Aside from
titles of properties mortgaged to the respondents.
this Statement, other evidence was presented by the respondents to
Salaw and a fellow employee were alleged to have conspired in selling establish the culpability of the complainant in the fraudulent sale of
twenty (20) sewing machines and electric generators which had been respondents' foreclosed properties. Even the minutes of proceeding
foreclosed by the respondent bank from Worldwide Garment and L.P. taken during the investigation conducted by respondents were not
Money Garment, for P60,000.00, and divided the proceeds thereof in presented. ... This is a glaring denial of due process.
equal shares of P30,000.00 between the two of them. The Criminal
Considering further that the admission by the petitioner which was
Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary extracted
extracted from him by the Criminal Investigate Service of the
Sworn Statement from them without the assistance of a counsel.
Philippine Constabulary (National Capital Region) without the
Rollie Tuazon, the bank manager, requested petitioner to appear before assistance of counsel and which was made the sole basis for his
the bank's Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC) dismissal, cannot be admitted in evidence against him, then, the finding
which petitioner attended and 3 months after, his termination became of guilt of the PDIC, which was affirmed by the public respondent
effective for alleged serious misconduct or willful disobedience and NLRC; has no more leg stand on. A decision with absolutely nothing
fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on him by the private to support it is a nullity.
Significantly, the dismissal of the petitioner from his employment was
characterized by undue haste. The law is clear that even in the
disposition of labor cases, due process must not be subordinated to
expediency or dispatch. Otherwise, the dismissal of the employee will SEC. 9. Preventive suspension. Pending investigation, the respondent
be tainted with illegality. may be preventively suspended without pay for a period of not more
than six (6) months, if, in the judgment of the Ombudsman or his
Castillo Co vs Barbers proper deputy, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against
such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or gross
FACTS: Petitioner Josie Castillo-Co is a Governor of Quirino.
misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, (b) the charge
Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents
Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. xxx
Virgilio Ringor for alleged fraud against the public treasury and
malversation. (Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Under these provisions, there cannot be any doubt that the Ombudsman
Practices Act, as amended, and Articles 213 and 217 of the Revised or his Deputy may preventively suspend an officer or employee, where
Penal Code.) appropriate, as indicated by the word or between the Ombudsman and
his Deputy. The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation
Congressman Cua charged that the equipment purchased was
and independence of one thing from each of the other things
reconditioned instead of brand new as required by resolutions of the
enumerated. The law does not require that only the Ombudsman
provinces Sanggunian authorizing such purchase. Other irregularities
himself may sign the order of suspension.
claimed to have been committed included overpricing, lack of public
bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment prior to delivery in 2. NO. A preventive suspension, however, can be decreed on an
violation of Section 338 of the Local Government Code, and an attempt official under investigation after charges are brought and even before
to cover up such irregularities. the charges are heard since the same is not in the nature of a
penalty,[13] but merely a preliminary step in an administrative
A week after the complaint was filed, Governor Castillo-Co and
Provincial Engineer Ringor were placed under preventive suspension
for a period of six (6) months. In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his
answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the
Said order was signed by Emilio A. Gonzalez III, Director, and
suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty
approved by Jesus Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. A
Petitioners thereafter filed separate motions for reconsideration. Both suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If
motions were denied in a Joint Order signed by Director Gonzales and after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
approved by Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero. investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing
Petitioner file for special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before
a prayer for temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction, the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity to prove
seeks to nullify the Order of the Deputy Ombudsman directing her his innocence.
preventive suspension and claiming that the Deputy Ombudsman has
no authority to issue the preventive suspension against them. The fact that the said order was issued seven days after the complaint
was filed did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. The immediate
ISSUE: WON the Deputy Ombudsman has authority to issue the issuance of such order is required in order to prevent the subject of the
preventive suspension suspension from committing further irregularities. Such prompt action,
moreover, is in consonance with Section 15 of RA 6770 which exhorts
WON petitioner was denied due process because she was not afforded the Ombudsman to:
the opportunity to controvert the evidence against her before the order
of preventive suspension was issued. xxx give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government
officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints
HELD: 1. YES. Petitioner claims that under Republic Act No. 7975, involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of
only the Ombudsman has the authority to sign the order placing money and/or properties.
officials with a 27 salary grade or above, like petitioner-governor,
under preventive suspension. In this case, the suspension order was American Inter-Fashion v. OP
neither signed nor approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Rather,
said order was signed by Director Emilio Gonzales III and approved Facts: Glorious Sun Fashion was found guilty by Garments and Textile
by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus Guerrero. Export Board GTEB of dollar salting and mis-declaration of
importations. As a result, its export quotas were cancelled. After GTEB
There is nothing in RA 7975, however, that would remotely suggest rendered its decision, Glorious filed with the Court a petition for
that only the Ombudsman, and not his Deputy, may sign an order certiorari and prohibition contending that its right to due process of law
preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as was violated and that GTEB decision was not supported by substantial
grade 27 or above. evidence. The Court then issued a resolution ordering GTEB to
conduct further proceedings. However, on July 25, 1984, Glorious
Moreover, Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 9, Rule filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition. The Court
III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman similarly granted the motion for withdrawal. Glorious filed another motion to
provides: dismiss with prejudice which the Court duly noted.
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. -- The Ombudsman or his Deputy After two years, Glorious filed with GTEB a petition for restitution of
may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority its export quota allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the
pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984. Glorious once again alleged that
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves the charges against them were not supported by evidence. Moreover,
dishonesty, oppression or gross misconduct, or neglect in the it alleged that the GTEB decision cancelling its export quota was
performance of duty; or (b) the charge would warrant removal from rendered as a result of duress, threats, intimidation and undue influence
the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer
prejudice the case filed against him. Xxx Glorious export quotas to “Marcos crony-owned” corporations.
Glorious further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to
withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 67180 and to enter into joint venture
agreements paving the way for the creation of De Soleil Apparel and The Supreme Court said that the fact that the other members would not
AIFC. agree that there was pressure from Ongpin does not mean that Puno
was not telling the truth. Mr. Puno stated that he was pressured. He did
On Sept. 4, 1987, GTEB denied the petition of Glorious. An appeal not state that the members of the investigating panel were pressured.
was then taken on Oct. 5, 1987 to the Office of the President. AIFC Mr. Puno was the Chairman of the Investigating Panel. Hence, it is
filed its opposition to Glorious’ appeal claiming that the GTEB plausible that in view of his position he was the one pressured by
decision dated April 27, 1984 has long been final. The Office of the Minister Ongpin. There is every reason to suspect that even before
President ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded the case to GTEB Glorious Sun was investigated, a decision to strip it of its quotas and
for further proceedings. The motion for reconsideration of AIFC was to award them to friends of their administration had already been made.
subsequently denied. Hence, this petition.
The Supreme Court also held that although factual findings of
Issue: 1. W/N the previous GTEB decision constituted res judicata to administrative agencies are generally accorded respect, such factual
the instant case on the ground that the former decision was a final findings may be disregarded if they are not supported by evidence;
judgment on the merits. – NO where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular;
2. W/N Glorious was accorded due process in relation to the 1984
when palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion
GTEB decision. – NO
arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.
Held:The petitioner contends that in entertaining the appeal of private
Contrary to the petitioners posture, the record clearly manifests that in
respondent Glorious, the Office of the President “had unwittingly
cancelling the export quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated
made itself a tool in a cunning move to resurrect a decision which had
the private respondent’s constitutional right to due process. Before the
become final and executory more than three years earlier. The
cancellation in 1984, Glorious had been enjoying export quotas
petitioner asseverates resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was res
granted to it since 1977. In effect the private respondent’s export quota
judicata on the matter.
allocation which initially was a privilege evolved into some form of
The Supreme Court said that one of the requirements for a judgment to property right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and
be a bar to a subsequent case is that the it must be a judgment on the without due process only to hurriedly confer it on another.
merits. A judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration
The motion for reconsideration was GRANTED. The instant petition
of the law as to the respective rights and duties of the parties, based
upon the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and
evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective United States v. Toribio 15 Phil. 85
of formal, technical or dilatory objection or contentions. Certainly, the
dismissal of G.R. No. 67180 cannot be categorized as a judgment on Facts: Sometime in the 1900s, in the town of Carmen, province of
the merits. The action in 1984 did not resolve anything. In fact, when Bohol, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered.
the court heard the parties during the oral arguments, GTEB was not His request was denied because his carabao is found to be fit for
able to present any showing of mis-declaration if imports. The motion agricultural work. Even so, he still slaughtered his carabao for the
to withdraw te petition arose from the fears of Mr. Nemesio Co that purpose of human consumption. The trial court of Bohol found that the
not only Glorious Sun but his other businesses would be destroyed by respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without
the martial law regime. The resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality, in violation
based solely on the notice of withdrawal by the private respondent. The of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
dismissal of the petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits
than on the merits of the petition. Hence, it cannot constitute res the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft
judicata. purposes for human consumption.

With regards to the second issue, the Petitioner contend that Glorious The counsel for appellant contended that the provisions of Act No.
Sun was not denied due process. Although AIFC admits that the 1984 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without
GTEB decision failed to disclose to Glorious vital evidence used by a permit of the municipal treasure if the slaughtering of large cattle
GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that Glorious was guilty of dollar- happened outside the municipal slaughterhouse. They said that the
salting, it contends that the subsequent disclosure in 1987, where prohibition and penalty is limited only to the large cattle slaughtered at
relevant documents were given to Glorious and that the latter was the municipal slaughterhouse for the prohibition contained in section
given an opportunity to comment thereon, cured the defect. This 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 stated only the phrase “at the
contention by AIFC, the court holds, is MISLEADING. The SC municipal slaughterhouse”.
recognized that the instant petition involves the 1984 resolution of the
GTEB. AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the They also contended that the act constitutes a taking of property for
evidence used by the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984 public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without
GTEB resolution. The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and
process when GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them
a resolution against Glorious. Moreover, the documents disclosed to of the enjoyment of their private property.
Glorious by GTEB in 1987 enhanced the charge that the former was
Ruling: The extent and limits of what is known as the police power
denied due process.
have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of
Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit, wherein Puno, the nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include
Chairman of the Investigating Panel created by the Ministry of Trade everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to
and Industry admitted that he was pressured by Minister Ongpin to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of
look for ways and means to remove the quotas from Glorious. AIFC whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it
claims that it is an inconsequential matter in that the GTEB Board did has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling
not give credence to it and also, none of the members of the committee to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers‐by; the
would agree that there was any pressure or instruction from Minister demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter
Ongpin. of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food;
the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways
and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial
grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, easier to kill them there
beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene
publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive
houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process
it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned
require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once
U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public heard, thus denying due process.
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
though police power was invoked by the government in this case for
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the reason that the present condition demand that the carabaos and the
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on
individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the
them for energy needs, it does not however, comply with the second
public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
requisite for a valid exercise of the said power which is, "that there be
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other
a lawful method." The reasonable connection between the means
words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of
measure is missing.
the court.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the
the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
To justify the State in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the
particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos
public, it must be:
for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on 1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the a particular class, require such interference;
services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the 2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
the community may be measurably and dangerously affected. individuals.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. Churchill v. Rafferty 32 Phil. 580
(27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police power of the
State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and Substantive due process -- whether an act of government has su
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity fficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or propert
of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no y.
question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever
can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned." FACTS: This is an appeal of a judgement rendered perpetually res
training defendant and his deputies from collecting and enforcing ag
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, ainst plaintiffs and their property the annual tax prescribed in section
1987] 100 of Act No. 2339, from destroying or removing any sign on the
property of the plaintiffs for the sole reason that it may be offensive
FACTS: Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat to sight, and cancelling the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were issuance of the preliminary injunction granted after the comme
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo ncement of the action. The Act allows the Collector of Internal Re
for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the slaughter of venue to decide whether a sign or billboard displayed to the public is
carabaos except under certain conditions. Petitioner sued for recovery, offensive to sight or is otherwise a nuisance and empowers hi
and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of m to order its removal. Plaintiffs billboards are posted on privat
a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand pesos (P 12, 000.00). After e lands in Rizal. The Act also expressly forbids the use of an i
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation njunction to stay the collection of any internal revenue tax, and prov
of the said carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ides a remedy for any wrong in connection to such taxes. This reme
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on dy was intended to be exclusive, thereby precluding the remedy by
the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of injunction which should not issue as of course, but is granted only
authority and also for its presumed validity. upon the oath of a party and when there is no adequate remedy at la
w. These sections take away the preventive remedy of injunction,
Issue: Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional. leaving ordinary remedial actions available to taxpayers.
The Attorney-General contends that there is no provisions of the
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police
paramount law which prohibit such a course, while the plaintiff
power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting
s urge that the two sections are unconstitutional because they att
the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme
empt to deprive aggrieved taxpayers of all substantial remedies for
court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned the protection of their property, depriving them of it without due proc
measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition ess.
of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, ISSUES: 1.Whether or not portions of section 100 of Act No. 2
with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, 339, empowering the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove bil
lboards as nuisances if objectionable to sight, is unconstitutional Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used
as it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. for urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation
and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
HELD: 1.No. Offensive noises and smells have been for a long tim
e considered susceptible of suppression in thickly populated districts An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it
. “Ostensibly located on private property, the real and sole value of can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond
the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares. Hence, regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.
we conceive that the regulation of billboards and their restriction i
s not so much a regulation of private property as it is a regulation The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares.” The inquir
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. —
y is limited to the question of whether the enactment assailed by the
The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following
plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Go
discretionary powers:
vernment, for all property is held subject to that power. The Court s
tates that the exercise of police power belongs to the Legislature, a xxx xxx xxx
nd that power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those
principles which are the foundation of all republican forms of g (c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of
overnment, and where the Act is reasonably within the proper consi buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue
deration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be
not be disturbed by the courts. determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than
two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit
People. v. Fajardo 104 SCRA 443 issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall
accrue to the municipal school fund.
Facts: Aug. 15, 1950 - Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines
Sur. During his term the municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7 Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal
which prohibited the construction or repair of any building without a council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set
written permit from the mayor prior to construction or repairing. standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or
repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is
1954 - Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardo’s son-in-law) applied for a
clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the
permit to construct a building adjacent to their gas station, still on
express authority of sec. 2243 (c)
Fajardo’s private land, separated from public plaza by a creek.
Ermita-Manila Hotel 7 Motel Operator v. City of Manila 20 SCRA
Jan. 16, 1954 – request denied because it would destroy the view of
the public plaza. 849

Facts: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one

o Applicants appealed but were turned down again on Jan. 18, 1954.
of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of
Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even without a permit Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
because they claimed that they needed a residence badly due to a
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila
typhoon destroying their previous place of residence
City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its
Feb. 26, 1954 – Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged
court of Baoo for violating Ordinance no. 7 ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and
violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00
o CFI – Affirmed license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill
 CA forwarded the case to the SC because “the appeal attacks up a form specifying their personal information.
the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.”
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such
Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional? hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from
city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for
Held: No, petition granted. The ordinance doesn’t state any standard being vague.
that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and
unlimited conferment. The law also classified motels into two classes and required the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry.
purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being
favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have arbitrary.
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion. It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to
permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking
of appellants property without just compensation. The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the
license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare,
and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
the aesthetic appearance of the community.
Issue:Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society
of the due process clause? and the general well-being.

Held: No. Judgment reversed. Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
Ratio:"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there and order and happiness for all.
is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation. The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
principle, unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
scope of police power. As underlying questions of fact may condition government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of affected with public interest.
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.” liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measure is wider.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the
particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the maintenance of establishments, and the “full rate of payment”-
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common
increase "the income of the city government." sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."

Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the 20, 2009
people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into
must not be unreasonable or violative of due process. law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses,
standard to which the governmental action should conform in order Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila”
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be (the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than
as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect
on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply
of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much paying for a 12-hour stay,
wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from
applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a
must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate
liquors. the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
police power. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila
Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a
the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since
to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty'
it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an
as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time
interference in their business. access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The
rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from
not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is are necessary for the common welfare,
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful
method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
constituents in general. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC. deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
of the State. An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in
Held: No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise
with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance
of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate require an interference with private rights and the means must be
Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no
case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive
the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be
prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole
day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates”
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent
than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police for motel rooms and even apartments.
power as conferred on local government units by the Local
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to
Government Code through such implements as the general welfare
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution. Balacuit v. CFI 163 SCRA 182

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an Facts:Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of
ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the ticket
the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-
sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of 600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment
the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
prevent the law from being enforced. The respondent court entered its medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
decision declaring the law valid. senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of
senior citizens;
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.
640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police Ÿ The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f),
power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or
power of’ the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be
15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that
can only fix license fees for theaters and not admission rates. the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be
invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National
cited law. Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
Issue:W/N Ordinance 640 – prohibiting payment on theater tickets for Ÿ The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the
children below seven (7) is constitutional? Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article
8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of the tax
Ruling: NO, because it infringes theater owners’ right to property.
deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by
There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children
the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores
and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate
Association of the Philippines wanted a clarification of the meaning of
businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a
tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction scheme,
profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in
the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together
charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person
with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses
is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on
before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income.
the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances.
On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts
Such ticket represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due
be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is amount.
clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also,
Ÿ The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent
necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the
discount shall include both prescription and non-prescription
absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he
medicines, whether branded or generic. It stated that such discount
obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he
would be provided in the purchase of medicines from all
pleases and at such price as he can obtain. So that an act prohibiting
establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of the senior
the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than
the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the state
constitution securing the right of property. Ÿ Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting
the discount would result to loss of profit and capital especially that
For the assailed ordinance be held constitutional it must pass the test
such law failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate the discount.
of police power. To invoke the exercise the police power, it must be
for the interest of the public without interfering with private rights and ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is
adoptive means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation and the equal protection clause
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that
of Article 3 Section 1.
such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be HELD: The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use
calling subject of regulation. The right of the owner to fix a price at or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners
which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just
property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s
property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the
most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the
could stay away. equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.
Carlos Superdrug v. DSWD GR No. 166494, June 29 2007
Ÿ The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for
FACTS:Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and
medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees;
proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for
admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals,
preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of
and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded
domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and
Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257,
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and
amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria
purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section
citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business
4(a) of the Act states:
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
be entitled to the following:
Ÿ The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police
relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet AgustIn v. Edu 88 SCRA 195
all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest Facts: President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential, states that all owners, users or drivers shall have at all times one pair
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any source
the great public needs.” It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature by depending on the owner’s choice. The Letter of Instruction was
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of assailed by petitioner Leovillo Agustin to have violated the
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu, Land
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the national Defense, Hon. Juinio, Minister of Public Works,
subjects of the same.” Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of
Public Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the Rules and Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a period of 6
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary because
because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as
general welfare.[ a warning device. Also petitioner contest that the letter of instruction
violates the delegation of police power because it is deemed harsh,
National Development Corporation v. PVB 192 SCRA 257 oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of
EWD will become instant millionaires because of such law.
Facts: The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No.
1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Issue: Whether or not Petitioner’s contentions possess merit.
Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development
Company. The law outlined the procedure for filling claims against the Held: Petitioner’s contentions are without merit because the exercise
Agrix Companies and created a claims committee to process these of police power may interfere with personal liberty or property to
claims. Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Also,
section 4(1) thereof providing that “all mortgages and other liens such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is
presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations indeed a rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in a
are hereby extinguished.” Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present
executed in favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of
estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land situated instruction. In cases where there is absence in the factual foundation,
in Los Baños, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, Agrix it should be presumed that constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos
went bankrupt. It was the expressed purpose of salvaging this and the on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for
other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by the implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna
President Marcos. A claim for the payment of its loan credit was filed Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with
by PNB against herein petitioner, however the latter alleged and the standards given as stated in our Constitution that “the Philippines
invoked that the same was extinguished by PD 1717. adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as part
of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also
Issue: Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an
still entitled for payment without prejudice to PD 1717. EDW. They can personally create a EWD provided that it is in
accordance to the specifications provided by law. Petitioner’s
Held: Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract
allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is
and so comes under the protection of Bill of rights so do interests on
deemed to be an unfounded speculation. Wherefore, the petition is
loans, as well s penalties and charges, which are also vested rights once
dismissed. The restraining order regarding the implementation of the
they accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one
Reflector Law is lifted making the said law immediately executory.
person and given to another without just compensation and any known
public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under Magtajas v. Pryce Properties 234 SCRA 255
the constitution.
Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help
contract between Agrix and the private respondent without centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land
justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco
impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract is v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this Court
so related to the public welfare that it will be considered congenitally sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits
susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of greater of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-
number. earner in the government.
Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by
power, not being in conformity with the traditional requirements of a leasing a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage Corporation Inc. for its casino.
and other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the
legitimate creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due process of On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted
law, and this is compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and
to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using
protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation
nor controlled by the government, should have been created only by of a casino.
general and not special law. And in so far as the decree also interferes
with purely private agreements without any demonstrated connection On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the
with the public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefore.
obligation of the contract.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by
PAGCOR as intervenor.
The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for Board of Directors of the PGH Foundation, who had participated in the
to prohibit their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition collective acts, thereby singling Petitioner and her companion for
for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. discriminatory prosecution, in violation of her right to Equal Protection
of the Laws, which violation existed from the filing of the information
Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the and cannot be cured by post hoc proceedings.
establishment of casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance
or resolution. E. The questioned Decision is a nullity, because of the participation
therein of Mr. Justice Garchitorena, whose long-standing bias and
Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally hostility towards President Marcos and Petitioner Imelda R. Marcos
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in prevented him from having the requisite cold neutrality of an impartial
the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, judge, in violation of her right as an accused person to Procedural Due
for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own Process of Law.
discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow F. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Petitioner was denied
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. of her Constitutional Right to counsel.

Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units 1. Facts of record showing that Petitioner was deprived of and denied
are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, “gambling and her Right to Counsel.
other prohibited games of chance.”
2. Under the circumstances of record, the absence of counsel resulting
Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments from imposition of suspension from the practice of law upon her
are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise retained counsel, constituted deprivation of or denial of the Right to
only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national Counsel.
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. 3. Facts of record showing legal representation of Petitioner Imelda
Marcos was not adequate.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the G. The questioned Decision is premature and had disregarded the
following substantive requirements: CUOPDPRGCU constitutional right of the Petitioner to present evidence in her behalf.
Her right to testify in her own behalf is a guaranteed right, the exercise
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. of which is her personal choice alone, and which counsel had no
authority to waive in her behalf. Besides, counsel being suspended, he
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. could not have made a waiver. This constitutional right to be heard by
himself and counsel she is invoking now, as part of her right to due
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
process (Sec. 14 (1) and (2), Bill of Rights).
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
H. The questioned Decision is a nullity for it was rendered in
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. derogation of Petitioners subsisting right to be heard and to submit
evidence in her defense. The finding of waiver is a prejudicial error.
6) It must not be unreasonable. The evidence thereof on the record is tenuous. A waiver by an accused
person of the right to be heard in her defense, including her right to
Dans v. People 285 SCRA 504 testify in her own behalf must be indubitable, and is valid only if
personally exercised through her own manifestation in open court.
While respondent Court was duty-bound to be just and impartial, it
failed to give petitioner a fair trial, who was thereby denied due process I. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the crime charged was
of law. Respondent Court was plainly biased against, if not downright not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the presumption of
hostile to, petitioner; it unfairly allied itself with the prosecution, which innocence was not overcome, which is required by Due Process.
made it prosecutor and judge at the same time.
Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31
VII. Aside from the foregoing, the appealed decision is flawed by fatal
infirmities which have effectively denied petitioner due process of law. FACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created through PD
505, as amended by PD857 to “control, regulate, supervise pilots and
G.R. No. 126995 the pilot age profession”.
A. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Section 3 (g) of the After hearing from relevant government agencies, pursuant to said
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) is charter, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued
unconstitutional for being, on its face, void for vagueness. Administrative Order 04-92 [PPA-AO 04-92] and corresponding
Memorandum Order in 1992, stating that all existing regular
B. The questioned Decision is a nullity because Section 3 (g) of the appointments which have been previously issued shall remain valid up
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) is to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot
unconstitutional for being a rider. positions in all pilot age districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term
C. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the Informations in SB of one year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or
Criminal Cases Nos. 17450 and 17453 did not state all the essential cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
facts constituting the offense but instead stated conclusions of law, performance” to regulate and improve pilot services by instilling
thereby denying the Petitioner her constitutional right to be informed discipline and give better protection to port users. PPA-AO 04-92
of the nature and the cause of the accusation against her (Sec. 14 (2), replaces PPA-AO 03-85 which succinctly provides that, aspiring pilots
Bill of Rights). must have a license and train as probationary pilots, and only upon
satisfactory performance, are given permanent and regular
D. The questioned Decision is a nullity because the Information in said appointments by the PPA itself and to exercise harbor pilot age until
SB Criminal Cases Nos. 17450 and 17453 charged only two of the total they reach the age of 70.Upon learning of PPA-AO 04-92 only after
number of members in the Board of Directors of the LRTA and the publication in the newspaper, the United Harbor Pilots Association of
the Philippines: (a) questioned said PPA-AO twice before the DOTC,
which Secretary Garcia said twice that only the PPA Board of The trial found the accused-appellant guilty of beyond reasonable
Directors [as governing body] has exclusive jurisdiction to review, doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale.
recall or annul PPA-AOs, (b) appealed to the Office of the President,
which first issued a restraining order to the PPA on the implementation ISSUE: WON Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment
of the PPA-AO, and after PPA’s answer, then dismissed the and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process
appeal/petition and lifted said order, stating, through Assistant clause.
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, that the PPA-
HELD: NO. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code is not a vague provision.
AO (i) merely implements PPA Charter, (ii) issuance is an act of PPA,
not of its General Manager, (iii) merely regulates, not forbids practice As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
of the profession, recognizing that such exercise is property right, and comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
(iv) sufficiently complied with the requirement in the PD to consult necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
only with relevant Government Agencies and (d) finally finding repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
affirmative relief with Manila RTC Br. 6. Court, which ruled that (i) process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
said PPA-AO is null and void (ii) PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
with grave abuse of discretion and (iii) imposed a permanent unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an
restraining order on PPA on its implementation.Assistant Executive arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Secretary Corona thus filed petition for review [of the Manila RTC
Decision] to the Supreme Court. The court cannot sustain the Appellant argument that the acts that
constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have acted in excess of merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted
jurisdiction. of illegal recruitment.
Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate Evidently,appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt
respondents’ right to exercise their profession and their right to due quoted above out of context. The Court, in Panis case, merely
process of law. bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the
meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding,
HELD: the Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in
the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso
stark disregard of respondents' right against deprivation of property
by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language
without due process of law. The Supreme Court said that In order to
and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly
fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur,
vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso
namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done
therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by
without proper observance of due process. As a general rule, notice and
proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.
hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process,
are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi- An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of
judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect is such
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of
need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this connection we
cannot permit reference to the rule that legislation should not be held
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature
invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable
of a property right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92
construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be
unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession
declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no
before their compulsory retirement
adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of
People v. De la Piedra 350 SCRA 163 common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all
the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of
FACTS:Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra was charged of illegal those entrusted therewith.
recruitment in large scale by promising an employment abroad Maria
Lourdes Modesto y Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers
Baez y Timbol, a job to Singapore without having previously obtained as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a license (referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a
or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas placement of prospective employer) does not render the law over broad. Evidently,
workers. In fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the appellant misapprehends concept of over breadth.
amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the
A statute may be said to be over broad where it operates to inhibit the
promised employment which did not materialize. Thus causing
exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the
damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum.
Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally
Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be
Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that
woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the
a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos. An entrapment was then constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible
planned by the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) headed by Capt. applications of the statute
Mendoza and successfully arrested the accused-appellant.
In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,for instance, we
Later on, in the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that struck down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting
Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol of election propaganda in any place including private vehicles other
dela Piedra. than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We
held that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the
At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie vehicle the use of his property but also deprived the citizen of his right
Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta to free speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore,
and Lourdes Modesto and all of them positively testified that the was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights
accused offer them a job to Singapore. and, hence, void for over breadth.
In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what (5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
recruitment and placement that would render the same constitutionally intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
over broad.
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
Estrada vs Sandiganbayan connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder Republic of the Philippines.
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder), as amended by RA 7659. Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
of pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described
or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at
and the Republic of the Philippines. least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime
of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
prosecutions considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten
wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
under The Revised Penal Code. thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime
Informations against petitioner. of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was denied. indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. supplied).
26558 finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to ISSUE:
justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558
on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an HELD:
indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that
Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied. would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/
4 of the Plunder Law which states that: reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the
petitioner is alleged to have committed.
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property,
business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or will confuse petitioner in his defense.
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
means or similar schemes: statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key
phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
public funds or raids on the public treasury; unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any process.
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public office A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general
concerned; terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them.
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at
corporations and their subsidiaries; its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
or undertaking; arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective.
which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of
that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
the area of free speech. appointee or delegate of the legislature.

ABAKADA v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1 The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of
Facts: Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, place and in like circumstances.”
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain Rulings: R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue
a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate
the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to
January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950
satisfied, to wit: amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise
taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied: There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do
(2 4/5%); or it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that
is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous forward.
year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of
abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of
taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to
Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the
exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of
customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They
also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the GSIS V. Monteclaros 434 SCRA 441
conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent.
Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to FACTS:Nicolas Montesclaros, a 72-year-old widower married
how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They Milagros Orbiso, who was then 43 years old, on 10 July 1983. Nicolas
claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of filed with the GSIS an application for retirement benefits under the
Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977.
is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President
In his retirement application, he designated his wife as his sole
who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
beneficiary. GSIS approved Nicolas’ application for retirement
Issues: Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump sum payment of annuity
Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the for the first five years and a monthly annuity after.
Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power for survivorship pension under PD 1146 but was denied the claim
in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution. because, under section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no
right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the
Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution. qualified for the pension.

Discussions: Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date
law, but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to of retirement on 17 February 1984. Milagros filed with the trial court
“originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of
the power not only to propose amendments, but also to propose its own Sec. 18 of PD 1146.
version even with respect to bills which are required by the
Constitution to originate in the House. the Constitution simply means The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills survivorship pension and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local including interest. Citing Articles 115and 117 of the Family Code, the
application must come from the House of Representatives on the trial court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and through monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are retirement benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor,
such benefits are conjugal property. The trial court held that the
prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within
inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been
retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights. contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension
The trial court held that Section 18 of PD 1146 was repealed by the
Family Code, a later law. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is
which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this appeal. probably the reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No.
8291 (RA 8291), otherwise known as the Government Service
In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD
has accepted GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse
survivorship pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing who married the member immediately before the members death is still
the case. However, the Court will still resolve the issue despite the qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that
manifestation of Milagros because social justice and public interest the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the
demand the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso. benefit.
ISSUE:Whether the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is constitutional. Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted
within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham
HELD:NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional.
marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present
Under Section 18 of PD 1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from
GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the
receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the
surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
three years before the members retirement or death. The law
pension. The Court holds that such proviso is discriminatory and
acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the
denies equal protection of the law.
marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that
which provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
the equal protection of the laws.
Wherefore, the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146
The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent is void for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due
spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse process and equal protection of the law.
contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited
Mirasol v. DPWH 490 SCRA 318
FACTS:Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse
judgment with application for temporary restraining order and
without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
injunction. It seeks the declaration of nullification of administrative
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act
comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act) which was enacted in 1957.
government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness,
Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH issued on
disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.
June 25, 1998 Dept. Order no. 215 declaring the Manila Cavite
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The
Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are:
petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; administrative issuances. Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an
administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the toll
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to
provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and plying the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not
designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.
law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
class from another. to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along
NLEX, SLEX, Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) toll Expressway under
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The DO 15.
proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts
marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner RTC, after due hearing, granted the petitioner’s application for
qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent preliminary injunction conditioned upon petitioner’s filing of cash
spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the bond in the amount of P100, 000 which petitioners complied.
pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive
survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with engine
before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the (toll ways).
means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not
provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding Judge Cornejo, both the
the proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not see why petitioners and respondents were required to file their Memoranda.
the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the
pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner
died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions.
The court issued an order dismissing the petition but declaring invalid purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
DO 123.The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid being violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution FACTS: Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member
of the non-Christian tribe was found guilty of violating sections 2 and
ISSUE:Whether RTC’s decision is barred by res judicata? 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of
gin) which is not a native wine.
Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulation contravene RA 2000.
Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who
Whether AO 1 is unconstitutional. is a member of the non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any
intoxicating liquor other than their so-called native wines.
HELD:1. NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the
Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.
RTC’s Order granting their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Since petitioners did not appeal from that order, the petitioners Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the
presumed that the order became a final judgment on the issues. grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the
laws, violative of the due process and it is an improper exercise of
The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits of
police power.
the case that would trigger res judicata. A preliminary injunction does
not serve as a final determination of the issues, it being a provisional ISSUES: Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection
remedy. clause?
2. YES. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s rules RULING: No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection
and regulation issued under them unduly expanded the power of the clause.
DPWH in sec. 4 of RA 2000 to regulate toll ways.
Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
They contend that DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like reasonable classifications. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must
redesigning curbings or central dividing sections. rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must
They claim that DPWH is only allowed to redesign the physical
apply equally to all members of the same class.
structure of toll ways and not to determine “who or what can be
qualifies as toll ways user”. The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the
are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain classification rests on real and substantial distinctions. The non-
expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a way to the
which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines of a
regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related low grade of civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure
activities. Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The experience of the
relative to transportation, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) cannot past and the lower court observed that the use of highly intoxicating
derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing liquors by the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and
limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or crimes, which hamper the efforts of the Government to raise their
function which it does not possess in the first place. standard of life and civilization. Third, the said act is intended to apply
for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature understood that
3. NO. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then Department
civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it
of Public Works and Communications had issued AO 1 in February
must go measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies
1968, as authorized under Section 3 of Republic Act 2000, prior to the
equally to all members of same class.
splitting of the department and the eventual devolution of its powers to
the DOTC. Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]
Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of law, AO Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
1 enjoyed the presumption of validity and constitutionality. The burden residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
to prove its unconstitutionality rested on the party assailing it, more so provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, “An Act to Regulate the Retail
when police power was at issue and passed the test of reasonableness. Business,” filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
The Administrative Order was not oppressive, as it did not impose unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the
unreasonable restrictions or deprive petitioners of their right to use the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
facilities. It merely set rules to ensure public safety and the uninhibited without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed
flow of traffic within those limited-access facilities. or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international
and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
traversing a tollway. Petitioners were free to access the tollway as
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
much as the rest of the public. However, the mode in which they
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using the tollway, was a
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and
subject that could validly be limited by regulation. There was no
Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
absolute right to drive; on the contrary, this privilege was heavily
regulated. Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection
of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
People v. Cayat 68 Phil. 12
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
on reasonable classification. The classification to be reasonable, (1) the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e.,
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.) G.R. No. 79744

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the
enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without
public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably due process or just compensation.
necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature’s purpose; is it not
G.R. No. 78742
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask above-quoted decree.
when the due process test is applied.
Held: The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also
due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly,
Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the
The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian
means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own.
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the
would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of requisites of a valid classification have been violated.
life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and
persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things
is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other
is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it
been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and and discriminatory.
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process
of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the
and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument
— as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be
necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its
the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be of Rights. It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the
agreement. lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of
the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class
Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means
Reform [G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989] employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal,
As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by
including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several
the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been
measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation
satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method
No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
G.R. No. 79777
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the
on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts.
79310 There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the
most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will
G.R. No. 79310 excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to
say that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of
Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional
who would deny him that right. guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. One class can be treated differently from another class.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need
the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms for new blood” in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of
the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for being violative of the
without just compensation. constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
“Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel
employed or engage or participate in any position or occupation or (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according
business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground
Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect,
void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a
this case. person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges
have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on
protection rule of the Constitution. the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed
in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the
Held: The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence
among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).”
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based on real and And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and
the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time
collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from
permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
a highly paid executive him.

Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty
guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body
where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between
up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged,
purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a
upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the judicial determination.
issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an
undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of
activity per se lawful. nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable
from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Dumlao v. COMELEC 96 SCRA 392 Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang
Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal 52 is hereby declared valid and that portion of the second paragraph of
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and
provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official who void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 guaranteed to an accused.
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City L-23794; Feb 17 1968
local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4,
provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan
imposing "on any and all productions of sugar milled at petitioner's,
Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which
municipal tax of 1% per export sale. Petitioner paid but were under
states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the
State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices Petitioner filed before the CFI contending that the ordinance is
covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: unconstitutional for being in violation of the equal protection clause
provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be and the rule of uniformity of taxation, aside from being an export tax
conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact. which Ormoc City its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, or the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; that it also
Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate
violates RA 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of
the Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void
ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is valid. If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be
overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have
Held: A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
ordinance does not meet them (requisites of classification), for it taxes
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way;
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and
central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, 2651).
for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company
is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly Binay v. Domingo 201 SCRA 508
points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council,
levied upon.
approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to
Basco v. PAGCOR 197 SCRA 52 bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed
P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated
Facts: A TV ad proudly announces: “The New PAGCOR – available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila
Responding Through Responsible Gaming.” But the petitioners think Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal
otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the
the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit
morals, public policy and order, and because – disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the
implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution
a. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc.
right recognized by law. It waived the Manila city government’s right of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed
to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law; for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause
since it will only benefit a few individuals.
b. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceeding paragraph,
the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local Issues:1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police
taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally power under the general welfare clause
enshrined principle of local autonomy;
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
c. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR – conducted gambling, while most other forms of 3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices; Held: 1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It
d. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from the is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing
privatization. the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

HELD: Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations.
protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must
— conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo). repository of the inherent powers of the State.

We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare
petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such
"equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such
under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety,
arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property
No. 89572, December 21, 1989). therein.

The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from 2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies
not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
827). conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been
violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide
The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to
lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation
under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a
the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional. wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with
whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general
welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to "b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year
deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest of the effectivity of this Act.
welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general
prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of "c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year
comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed of the effectivity of this Act.
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely
"d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year
indicate the limits of police power.
of the effectivity of this Act."
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally
Respondents added that the term "INP" includes both the former
benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the
members of the Philippine Constabulary and the local police force who
Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare
were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP) by
legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social
virtue of PD 765 in 1975.
services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition
generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has period provided in Section 89 applies only to the local police forces
long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the who previously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in the
common good. ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher, while the retirement age for
the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed by
Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, a writ of injunction. He declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of
is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving the PNP Law includes all members of the present
rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer
from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of the
No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of present members of the Philippine National police before its creation
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government and establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall become operative
towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of after the lapse of the four-year transition period. Thus, the preliminary
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is injunction issued is made permanent. Moreover, he observed, among
a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be others, that it may have been the intention of Congress to refer to the
financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very local police forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to define who
words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in or what constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the court is to trace
life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be the source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on
taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal the same subject and to investigate the antecedents involved
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs
for motives political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all
92389, September 11, 1991) members of the present

NPC v. De Guzman 229 SCRA 801 Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of its
present members and that
FACTS: RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Section 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to petitioners only after
Interior and Local Government", took effect on January 2, 1991. the lapse of the four-year

RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP members. transition period.
Section 39 reads:
HELD: From a careful review of Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it
"SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory retirement, for appears that the use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC.
officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform
(56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of chief reference to the members of the whole Philippine National police
superintendent, director or deputy director general, the Commission (PNP) for retirement purposes and not just the INP. The law itself
may allow his retention in the service for an unextendible period of one distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that "INP"
(1) year. as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.

Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that “the law failed
private respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine to define who constitutes the INP”, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact
Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-six. defined the same. Thus,

Private respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer "SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. — Upon the
for the issuance of an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction effectivity of this Act, the present National police Commisdion and the
before the RTC of Makati. They aver that the age of retirement set at Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since
they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides: National police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary,
which is the nucleus of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
"Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the National police shall cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces
transition period of four (4) years following the effectively of this Act, of the Philippines. The Integrated National police, which is the civilian
the following members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily component of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police,
retired: shall cease to be the national police force and lieu thereof, a new police
force shall be establish and constituted pursuant to this Act."
"a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of the
effectivity of this Act. It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed
to define who the members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no
moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict the 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission
application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully
the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-six (56). National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education,
belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for
if confronted with such a situation, courts are not without recourse in Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
determining the construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985),
they may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test
body. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of
meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines,
be adopted. Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the
of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent. taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates
of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT
89 of R.A. 6975 is applicable only to the local police force is clear. The
as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the
question now is whether the classification is valid. The test for this is
petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied
reasonableness such that it must conform to the following
said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to
set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance
(2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law; of a writ of preliminary injunction.

(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS Order
which provides that "the cutoff score for the successful applicants,
Himagan v. People 237 SCRA 538 based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by
FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association
City. He was charged for the murder of and attempted murder. of Philippine Medical Colleges." (Underscoring supplied)It infringes
Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that
pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a 1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established
member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this
law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious".
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case Held: Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated
shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such
the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score
Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He established the preceding year; the number of places available in
claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is medical schools during the current year; the average score attained
contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during
constitutional right to equal protection of laws. the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year,
guaranteed by the Constitution. may well result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in
MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the
HELD: No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to
differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or meet circumstances as they change.
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical
them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is imposition.
reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the Lim v. Pacquing 240 SCRA 649
witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and
thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in FACTS:The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on
uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).
90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring
the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games
Tablarin v. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730 and Amusements Board (GAB).
Facts:Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila
Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An Ordinance
medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated
take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-
(NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And
administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On For Other Purposes.”
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
President Marcos. The decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers and Constitution.
Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or
Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from
Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of contesting ADC’s possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule
Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if
franchises and permits issued by local governments. any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 209 SCRA 90)
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to
operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement Philippine Judges Association v. Prado 227 SCRA 703
Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which
Facts: Section 35 of RA 7354, the law creating the Philippine Postal
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
Corporation, withdraws the franking privileges from the judiciary,
forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments.
along with certain other government offices. he Philippine Postal
ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs,
protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain
other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory
HELD:NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional. becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it
retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines,
On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC,
clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The
not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more importantly, respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is
a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection
power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police clause.
power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of
police power for the public welfare. Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

In RCPI v. NTC (150 SCRA 450), we held that: Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of
due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements
A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate
prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject." This definition was clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore
given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by every specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
authority since . . . Today, a franchise being merely a privilege from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon
of its police power through its administrative agencies. to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What
privilege because jai-alai, when played for bets, is pure and simple
the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according
gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise for the operation of a
to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared
public utility, such as public transportation company, is to trivialize the
unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar
great historic origin of this branch of royal privilege.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the
As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise
franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the
under the provisions of PD No. 771. and yet, the purpose of PD No.
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to the national
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises. Thus,
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why
all franchises then existing were revoked but were made subject to
it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of
reissuance by the national government upon compliance by the
the Judiciary for such privilege.
applicant with government-set qualifications and requirements.
Sison v. Ancheta 130 SCRA 654
There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause
since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments Facts: Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 1 of Batas
without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the Pambansa Blg. 135. It amended
equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by
the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which
not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable
too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes, and
constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as early as other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other
1975, almost twenty 920) years ago. monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and
similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of individual partner in
RATIO:Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted gross income.
record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance Petitioner as taxpayer alleged that "he would be unduly discriminated
(when the executive still exercised legislative powers). against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising
from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers." He characterizes
of ADC’s franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 the above section as arbitrary amounting to class legislation,
was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court’s First oppressive and capricious in character.
Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect
of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En
For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. They do
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the not relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions of policy
rule requiring uniformity in taxation. arising out of specific difficulties, addressed to the attainment of
specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The Constitution does
Issue: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in
income derived from business or profession than on compensation is law as though they were the same.
constitutionally infirm.
Lutz v Araneta- it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to
(WON there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
uniformity in taxation) taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
Held: No. Petition dismissed Petitioner- kindred concept of uniformity- Court- Philippine Trust
Company- The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity
Ratio: The need for more revenues is rationalized by the government's
or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable
role to fill the gap not done by public enterprise in order to meet the
needs of the times. It is better equipped to administer for the public Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or
welfare. kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The
taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure
classifications for purposes of taxation
the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of
public funds. There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for
all that is required is that the tax "applies equally to all persons, firms
The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and the strongest power
and corporations placed in similar situation" There was a difference
of the government. There are restrictions, however, diversely affecting
between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a
as it does property rights, both the due process and equal protection
broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items
clauses may properly be invoked, as petitioner does, to invalidate in
and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate.
appropriate cases a revenue measure. If it were otherwise, taxation
would be a destructive power. The discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the
income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible
items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax
The petitioner failed to prove that the statute ran counter to the rates to be applied to all of them. As there is practically no overhead
Constitution. He used arbitrariness as basis without a factual expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for
foundation. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or
where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, less.Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, apart as a class.
there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to
On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their
such a conclusion.
calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses
It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to
taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and
An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of
confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power. gross income.

It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the There was a lack of a factual foundation, the forcer of doctrines on due
jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a process and equal protection, and he reasonableness of the distinction
retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack between compensation and taxable net income of professionals and
on due process grounds. businessmen not being a dubious classification.

For equal protection, the applicable standard to determine whether this Telebap v. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337
was denied in the exercise of police power or eminent domain was the
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
presence of the purpose of hostility or unreasonable discrimination.
Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio
It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all and television broadcasting companies. Section 92 of Batas Pambansa
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated (BP) Blg. 881, as amended, reads as follows:
in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue
television time to be known as “Comelec Time” which shall be
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection
allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area
and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which
of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the
if not identical are analogous. If law be looks upon in terms of burden
franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge,
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
during the period of the campaign.
binding on the rest.
Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process
The equal protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept
clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking
of approximating the ideal of the laws's benefits being available to all
airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations without
and the affairs of men being governed by that serene and impartial
payment of just compensation. 1) have taken properties without due
uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law.
process of law and without just compensation; (2) it denied the radio
The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;
disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the equal and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the Comelec to regulate
the operation of media communication or information during election
period. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio recent failure of interested parties to have the law repealed or at least
and television stations is the sale of airtime to advertisers and that to modified.
require these stations to provide free airtime is to authorize a taking
which is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the Tiu v. CA 301 S `1CRA 278
use of private property.” According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA
Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free airtime of one (1)
hour every morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President,
Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in passed into law RA 7227. This was for the conversion of former
this year’s elections, it stands to lose P58,980,850.00 in view of military bases into industrial and commercial uses. Subic was one of
COMELEC’s requirement that radio and television stations provide at these areas. It was made into a special economic zone.
least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time.
In the zone, there were no exchange controls. Such were liberalized.
Held:Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether There was also tax incentives and duty free importation policies under
by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. this law.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended Order No. 97 (EO 97), clarifying the application of the tax and duty
by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any incentives. It said that
such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so On Import Taxes and Duties. — Tax and duty-free importations shall
requires." apply only to raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in
by business enterprises into the SSEZ
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by
amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations On All Other Taxes. — In lieu of all local and national taxes (except
and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been import taxes and duties), all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be
thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11 required to pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.
of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the
common good." What better measure can be conceived for the Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order
common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-
candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that duty-free privilege was operative.
they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-
paramount." free area in the SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and individuals
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to
that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and consumer items
there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on tax and duty-free.
broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly
of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws. This was
expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to due to the limitation of tax incentives to Subic and not to the entire area
give free air time to candidates in an election. of Olongapo. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same
they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.
temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere
privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to
with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the "secured area" and not to
include the "entire Olongapo City and other areas mentioned in Section
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The 12 of the law.
television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be
simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners Hence, this was a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach Court.
of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the
airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying Issue: Whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A confining
susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental the application of R.A. 7227 within the secured area and excluding the
capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive residents of the zone outside of the secured area is discriminatory or
speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the not owing to a violation of the equal protection clause.
vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed
work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, Held. No. Petition dismissed.
and reject the utterance.[30]
Ratio: Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ
Petitioners assertion therefore that 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic
equal protection of the law has no basis. In addition, their plea that 92 in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval
(free air time) and 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on paid political ads) Base. However, they claimed that the E.O. narrowed the application to
should be invalidated would pave the way for a return to the old regime the naval base only.
where moneyed candidates could monopolize media advertising to the
OSG- The E.O. Was a valid classification.
disadvantage of candidates with less resources. That is what Congress
tried to reform in 1987 with the enactment of R.A. No. 6646. We are Court- The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not
not free to set aside the judgment of Congress, especially in light of the absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before
apply to all those belonging to the same class. the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the
Inchong v Hernandez- Equal protection does not demand absolute cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. “principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the
be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal”
conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249,

including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all
RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
reservations into productive uses. This was really limited to the approval hereof.
military bases as the law's intent provides. Moreover, the law tasked
the BCDA to specifically develop the areas the bases occupied. Issues: (1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the
petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong
Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within Baleleng case.
the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income
tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign (2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto
exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, statute.
and (6) the grant of resident status to certain investors and of working
visas to certain foreign executives and workers. The target of the law (3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the
was the big investor who can pour in capital.e Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether
Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s
"secured area" are not likely to have any impact in achieving the jurisdiction.
purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to
productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. Hence, there RULING: Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of
was no reasonable basis to extend the tax incentives in RA 7227. R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too
shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every
territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party
differences between territories, there is no violation of the who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The
constitutional clause. classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following
concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be
Besides, the businessmen outside the zone can always channel their germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
capital into it. conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class; all of which are present in this case.
RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial,
commercial, financial and investment center”. There will really be Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases
differences between it and the outside zone of Olongapo. involving” certain public officials and under the transitory provision in
Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner
The classification of the law also applies equally to the residents and and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to
businesses in the zone. They are similarly treated to contribute to the the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
end gaol of the law. cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
Lacson v. Executive Secretary 301 SCRA 298 There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,
Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not
Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that
ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors. define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law,
the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of
was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of
Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been a program of payment as soon as possible. The trial court granted her
committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the prayers in an order dated August 15, 1994. Petitioner was once again
office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance ordered to submit his program of payment. Petitioner instead filed a
of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the motion for reconsideration explaining that he did not receive any notice
information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the of the order dated June 20, 1994. His counsel received a copy of said
Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended order on June 23, 1994 but failed to notify petitioner. Thus, the latter
information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting failed to comply with said order.
of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested in contempt of court for his failure to comply with its orders of June
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994. The court likewise revoked the grant of
custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such probation to petitioner and ordered that he be arrested to serve the
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the sentence originally imposed upon him.
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not
Petitioner avers that to require him to satisfy his civil liability in order
to continue to avail of the benefits of probation is to violate the
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the constitutional proscription against unequal protection of the law. He
charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of says only moneyed probationers will be able to benefit from probation
official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in if satisfaction of civil liability is made a condition.
the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
Held: Contrary to his assertion, this requirement is not violative of the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Note that payment of the
civil liability is not made a condition precedent to probation. If it were,
Soriano v. CA, GR 123936, March 4, 1999 then perhaps there might be some basis to petitioners assertion that
only moneyed convicts may avail of the benefits of probation. In this
Facts: Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of case, however, petitioners application for probation had already been
Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made a requirement
and damage to property on December 7, 1993.[2] His application for before he could avail of probation, but was a condition for his
probation was granted on March 8, 1994, and among the terms and continued enjoyment of the same.
conditions imposed by the trial court were the following:[3]
The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of
"x x x x x x x x x civil liability as a condition for probation, as petitioner suggests. This
is not an arbitrary imposition but one required by law. It is a
7. He shall meet his family responsibilities. consequence of petitioners having been convicted of a crime,[12] and
petitioner is bound to satisfy this obligation regardless of whether or
8. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not
not he is placed under probation.
change employment without prior notice to the supervising officer;
and/or shall pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training. We fail to see why petitioner cannot comply with a simple order to
furnish the trial court with a program of payment of his civil liability.
He may, indeed, be poor, but this is precisely the reason why the trial
xxxxxxxxx court gave him the chance to make his own program of payment.
Knowing his own financial condition, he is in the best position to
formulate a program of payment that fits his needs and capacity.

11. He is to indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the Loong v. COMELEC 305 SCRA 832
amount of P98,560.00 as ordered by the Court.

Automated elections were held in arm, however the ballots failed to

xxxxxxxxx correctly read the ballots in pata thus a manual count was ordered by
the Comelec. After the manual count was made, Tan was proclaimed
as governor-elect and Loong was 3rd and Jakiri was 2nd. Loong and
Jakiri questioned the results and claimed denial of due process and the
On April 26, 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a illegality of the manual count in light of RA 8346. They seeked special
motion to cancel petitioners probation due to his failure to satisfy his re-elections.
civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and a supplemental motion
alleging petitioners commission of another crime for which at that time Issue:w/n a re-election may be held
he was awaiting arraignment. The Zambales Parole and Probation
Office filed a comment recommending that petitioner be allowed to Ruling: NO. it cannot be held. Under the Omnibus code a special
continue with his probation and that he be required instead to submit a election can only be ordered upon special circumstances such as force
program of payment of his civil liability. majeure, terrorism, fraud and the like which only the COMELEC can
decide on. In the case at bar the people of Sulu were able to cast their
Thereafter, probation officer Nelda Da Maycong received information votes fairly and freely. A special election would also violate the equal
that petitioners father, who owned the vehicle involved in the accident protection of Tan. The records show that all the elected officials were
which killed Daluyong, received P16,500.00 as insurance payment. now discharging their duties and that they were proclaimed on the
This amount was not turned over to the heirs of Daluyong and Da same basis of the manually counted votes. If manual counting is illegal
Maycong considered this a violation of the terms and conditions of the then those who were discharging their duties cannot hold office.
probation. She submitted a manifestation to the trial court praying that
petitioner be made to explain his non-compliance with the courts order
of June 20, 1994, or that he be cited for contempt for such non-
compliance. Da Maycong also asked that petitioner be made to submit
Intemational School v. Quisumbing 333 SCRA 13

FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal
both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying protection clause.
the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
HELD:No. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the
In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing
local-hires including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not
home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% more than local violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”
Lutz vs. Araneta: "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to
The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all adhere to a policy of all or none".
faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires. This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid
classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC
The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be
School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that
salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be
sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of
ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily,
clause to justify its claim of parity. under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest
officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or
RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions
municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such
impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal
officials, large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly
truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
be carried out.
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under
similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. The petition is dismissed and upheld the constitutionality of Section 44
of RA 8189.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. If the Dimaporo v. HRET , GR 158359, Mar. 23, 2004
employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that
employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive DIMAPORO V. HRETFACTS:
more. That would be adding insult to injury.
This is a petition brought by Congressman Dimaporo seeking tonullify
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is the twin Resolutions of the HRET which denied his Motion for
no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or Technical Evaluation of the Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in
effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and theVoters Registration Records and Motion for Reconsideration of
responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. ResolutionDenying the Motion for Technical Examination of Voting
Records.Pursuant to the 1998 HRET Rules Congressionalcandidate
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by Mangotara Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam) seeking thetechnical
respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of examination of the signatures and thumb the protested precinctsof the
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara alleged
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires thatthe massive substitution of voters and other electoral
and local-hires. irregularitiesperpetrated by Dimaporo’s supporters will be uncovered
and proven. Fromthis and other premises, he concluded that he is the
De Guzman v COMELEC, GR 129113,. July 19 2000
duly-electedrepresentative of the 2ndDistrict of Lanao del
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent Norte.Noting that “the Tribunal cannot evaluate the questionedballots
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and because there are no ballots but only election documents toconsider”
temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of HRET granted Mangotara's motion and permitted the latter toengage
Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters an expert to assist him in prosecution of the case, NBI conductedthe
Registration Act of 1996". technical examination.

SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer ISSUE:

shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four
1. W/N Dimaporo was deprived by HRET of Equal Protection whenthe
(4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval
latter denied his motion for technicalexamination.2. W/N Dimaporo
of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years
was deprived of procedural due processor the right to present scientific
in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by
evidence to show themassive substitute voting committed in counter
the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional
protested precincts.
Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were
reassigned to different stations by the COMELEC. 1.
Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it Resolution of HRET did not offend equal protectionclause. Equal
violates the equal protection clause guaranteed by the 1987 protection simply means that all persons and thingssimilarly situated
Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election must be treated alike both as to the rights conferredand the liabilities
Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the imposed. It follows that the existence of a valid andsubstantial
same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain distinction justifies divergent treatment.
that there is no substantial distinction between them and other
COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to According to Dimaporo since the ballot boxes subject of hispetition
justify the objective of the provision of law under attack. and that of Mangotara were both unavailable for revision, hismotion,
like Mangotara’s, should be granted.The argument fails to take into from further implementing the last proviso in Sec. 15, Art. II of the
account the distinctionsextant in Mangotara’s protest New Central Bank Act (i.e., the exemption from the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) of all employees with salary grade of 19
vis-à-vis and the non-exemption of those having a salary grade under 19). They
alleged its constitutionality for being an invalid “class legislation”.
Dimaporo’s counter-protest whichvalidate the grant of Mangotara’s
motion and the denial of Dimaporo’s. Petitioner’s Contentions:
First. The said proviso violates equal protection clause because only the
officers of the BSP (those holding the salary grade of 19 and up) are
The election results in SND were the sole subjects of Mangotara’s
exempted from the SSL.
protest. The opposite is true with regard to Dimaporo’scounter-protest
as he contested the election results in all municipalities Those belonging from 19 and up and those 19 below do not really
butSND.Significantly, the results of the technical examination of the differ from one other in terms of the nature of work and expertise.
election recordsof SND are determinative of the final outcome of the
election protestagainst Dimaporo. The same cannot be said of the Other GFIs, which are the same as the BSP, exempt all their rank-
precincts subject of Dimaporo’s motion. and-file personnel from SSL without any distinction.

It should be emphasized that the grant of a motion for technical BSP’s contention:
examination is subject to the sound discretion of the HRET.In this case,
the Tribunal deemed it useful in the conduct of therevision proceedings The proviso is not unconstitutional as it can stand the constitutional
to grant Mangotara’s motion for technicalexamination. Conversely, it test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the
found Dimaporo’s motion unpersuasiveand accordingly denied the same law, such as the mandate of the Monetary Board to “establish
same. In so doing, the HRET merely actedwithin the bounds of its professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound
Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all,the Constitution confers principles of management.”
full authority on the electoral tribunals of theHouse of Representatives
Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary:
and the Senate as the
The proviso is not unconstitutional as the classification is based on
sole judges
actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated
of allcontests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their policy of the new SB Act to establish professionalism and excellence
respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national
2. Anent Dimaporo’s contention that the assailed
Issue: WON the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of equal
Resolutions protection clause.

denied him the right to procedural due process and to present evidence Held: YES, the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the
tosubstantiate his claim of massive substitute voting committed in equal protection clause.
thecounter-protested precincts, suffice it to state that the HRET itself
mayascertain the validity of Dimaporo’s allegations without resort to Equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from
technicalexamination. To this end, the Tribunal declared that the establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
ballots, electiondocuments and other election paraphernalia are still shall operate – so long as the classification is not unreasonable.
subject to its scrutinyin the appreciation of evidence.It should be noted Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
that the records are replete with evidence,documentary and operation on persons themselves, but on persons according to the
testimonial, presented by Dimaporo. Dimaporo’sallegation of denial of circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
due process is an indefensible pretense.The instant petition is rights.
DISMISSED for lack of merit
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the
Central Bank Employees vs Bangko Sentral, G.R. No. 148208, exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended
December 15 2004 to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate
Doctrines: against the rank-and-file and the resulting discrimination or distinction
has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary
Elements of valid class legislation: (1) must rest on substantial in the legislative sense. However, in the subsequent passages of the
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must amendment on the charters of other GFI, the surrounding
not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all circumstances of the case changed.
members of the same class
The subsequent amendments of the other GFIs’ charter (i.e., express
Relative Constitutionality. The fact that a statute is constitutional at authorization to determine and institute its own compensation and
first does not mean it is constitutional forever. The subsequent changes wage structure, and explicit exemption – without distinction as to
in the original circumstance surrounding the law would affect its salary grade or position – all employees of the GFI from the SSL)
validity. resulted to the oppressive results of Congress’ inconsistent and unequal
policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFI.
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption
Facts: The new Central Bank Act took effect and gave way for the from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven
creation of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Other Governmental GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP
Financial Institutions (GFIs) also amended their charters. rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of
the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only
After almost 8 years following the amendment of the GFIs’ charters, superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions
BSP’s employees, through petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven
against the BSP and the Executive Secretary to restrain the respondents other GFIs.
The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs petitioner’s “[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month,
and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees of the fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay =
exemption from SSL breached the latter’s right to equal protection. US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and dismissed.
liabilities enforced.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s
Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Service, G.R. No. 167614, March 24 computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing
2009 the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because
R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which
FACTS: should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation
leave pay.
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he
Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC
Employment with the following terms and conditions: denied the motion.
Duration of contract 12 months Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. After initially
Position Chief Officer
dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00 course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution which granted
the petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable
Overtime US$700.00 per month salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA,
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was petitioner brings his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be a way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court
made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages
equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief of limiting it to three (3) months.
Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was
repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998. Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and vacation pay
from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his
repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and salary.
seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9)
months and twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the
respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money extreme importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73.

The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the

dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to ISSUES:
Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to
declaring that the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the
petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal
respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents
are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary
severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange basis in the computation of his monetary award
prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of
representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months of the petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the
unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment. salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.

The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00
covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of
based his computation on the salary period of three months only — US$4,200.00.
rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of
petitioner’s employment contract – applying the subject clause. Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner
However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC
and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of Second Issue
US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and
23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract
of US$2,590.00.31 periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms
of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal
Arguments of the Petitioner dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of
computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in portion of their employment contracts.
the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,
violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a
their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally
process. dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process
singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion
The Arguments of Respondents of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage
of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months
Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be
or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while
entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal
sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the
before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he
latter’s unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term
effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired employment.
petitioner’s 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
of the minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the
petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive
matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.
due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
The Court’s Ruling:
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his
First Issue salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of
his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on
Labor as protected sector? Third Issue

The answer is in the affirmative. Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of
the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due Petitioner is mistaken.
process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the law. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave
pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33,
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers,
of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime,
protection of their rights and welfare. leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation
for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight hours, and
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated
constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all rest days and holidays.
monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar
category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired
equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during
is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like the actual service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
labor,” the Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004
classification prejudicial to OFWs. Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of
it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per
subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious month.
impact on OFWs
Dlmayuga vs OMB 495 SCRA 461
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R.No. 203335, February 18 2014
petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive
due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the
Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law Administrative Code of 1987.
merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system. (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
Held: Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even
as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
Section 4(a)(6) provides: may be indictable.
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of
in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive petitioners and argued that:
others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include
registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
domain name registration; faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No.
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than
9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
the registrant, in case of a personal name; and
form such bodies.
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds
equal protection clausein that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause already appropriated by Congress.
a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the
aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other
functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding
literary device.
body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
registering the same.1
ISSUES:1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the
Hence, valid and constitutional.
petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 193036, 2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
December 7 2010
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth public offices, agencies and commissions;
Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President DOJ;
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous RULING:The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot be the very lis mota of the case.
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law. 1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that: thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power
of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,
operation. powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in
does not include the power to create an entirely new public office danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.” implementation of E. O. No. 1.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it
vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests
question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in equally to all members of the same class.
interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the obligations imposed.
plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer. and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do
precedents not make for a valid classification.

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated
to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the
private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws
obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
being unconstitutional.
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President
is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the Garcia vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25 2013
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
the laws of the land. Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband,
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence
of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation
provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of
funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there
is no impropriety in the funding. The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with
the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed
commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the
before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA
9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal invalid law.”
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the 1987 Constitution. The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however,
denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly attack on said law.
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by petition is filed.
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state’s duly constituted authorities. Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that
the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the
valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. law.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA Section 2 - Searches and Seizures
9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection
clause. Valmonte v. General de Villa, 178 SCRA 211 and 185 SCRA 665

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and
policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and
power to Brgy. Officials. order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority
and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of Petitioners aver that because of the institution of said checkpoints, the
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to Velanzuela residents are worried of being harassed and of their safety
consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if the military manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and
not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups
raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal. especially at night or at dawn without a search warrant or a court order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC
laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
for ignoring and/or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
fired in the air.
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela,
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative,
not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital
member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of
favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the
the Senate extends its protection. respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable Held: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
impugned as violative of the right to due process. facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified.
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated
unreasonable search.
the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
compromise. territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
consistent with their duty executive function. warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of

abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the None of those arrested has apparently been charged and none of those
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within affected has apparently complained.
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community. The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out
subversives and criminal elements particularly because of the blatant
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements
supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction conducted.
to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public
respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution which denies the
Drives" in Metro Manila. authority of the Chief Executive, to order police actions to stop
unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "areal target activities.
zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional. Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or
military may go in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences
The alleged acts committed during the raid are the following: or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny
or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without
1. Petitioners alleged that there is no specific target house to search and
violating the Bill of Rights.
that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served.
The Constitution grants the Government the power to seek and cripple
2. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without
subversive movements which would bring down constituted authority
nameplates or identification cards.
and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a
3. The residents were rudely roused from their sleep by banging on the matter of policy in the name of security of the State.
walls and windows of their houses.
People vs. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
4. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded
FACTS: On 14 August 1987, appellant Andre Marti and his common-
like cows.
law wife went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export
5. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to Forwarders to send four (4) packages to a fiend in Zurich, Switzerland.
examine their tattoo marks. When asked if the packages could be examined and inspected,
appellant refused, assuring that they were simply gifts of books cigars,
6. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing and gloves. The packages were then placed in a box and was sealed
their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money with masking tape for shipment.
and valuables had disappeared after the operation.
As a standard operating procedure before delivering packages to the
7. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings, and Bureau of Customs and/or Burueau of Posts, the proprietor of the
maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and forwarding agency opened the box for final inspection. A peculiar odor
physical torture to extract confessions and tactical information. emitted therefrom and he found dried leaves inside. He brought
samples to NBI, and informed them that the rest of the shipment was
l The respondents said that such accusations mentioned above were still in his office. Agents of the NBI went to his office and found the
total lies. shipment containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves, some of which
were packed inside the gloves and neatly stocked underneath
l Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to the government tabacalera cigars. Thereafter, an information was filed against the
the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the appellant in violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), for which
maintenance of peace in the state. he was found guilty. Appellant assailed the decision, claiming that the
l The aerial target zoning was intended to flush out subversives and evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives unreasonable search and seizure, and further, that the court erred in
were conducted. admitting in evidence the illegally searched and seized packages.

l Respondents averred that they have intelligently and carefully ISSUE:May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and appellant’s constitutional rights be invoked against the State?
foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event. HELD:No. As the Court held in several other cases, the liberties
ISSUE:WON the areal target zoning and the saturation drive is legal guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State in
the absence of governmental interference. This constitutional right
HELD:YES. The conduct of areal target zoning or saturation drive is a (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of
valid exercise of the military powers of the President. one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government; and the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the
According to the Supreme Court, everything stated before them government and its agents, not upon private individuals. In the present
consists only of allegations. According to petitioners, more than 3,407 case, it was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made
persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the petition. search/inspection of the packages and the contraband came into
No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, possession of the Government without the latter transgressing
Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the appellant’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure. The NBI
Manila International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one. Thus, the
persons treated in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the alleged act of the private individual in violation of a constitutional right
petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial court to cannot be invoked against the State.
present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover,
there must have been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were NB:The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested. seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, against unreasonable
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. searches and seizures.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must The petition for Certiorari, prohibition and Mandamus are granted.
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared
However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the null and void.
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, RATIONALE:
the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked
Personal examination by the Judge of the complainant and the
for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
existence of a probable cause, the determination of whether or not a
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the
absence of any rule to the contrary.
Bache and Co. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 323 (1971)
In this case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by
Fact: Respondent Commissioner, wrote a letter to respondent Judge respondent Judge of the complainant and his witnesses.
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to
violation of the Sec. 46 (a) National Internal Revenue Code, in relation
the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to
to all other pertinent provisions thereof, and authorizing a Revenue
the stenographer’s readings of her notes to a few words of warning
Examiner to make and file the application for search warrant which
against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the
was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day,
complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal
respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Logronio, went to the
examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and
Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following
his witness, it was one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court
papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application for
search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Section 4 (Examination of the Applicant):
Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before
respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent The Judge or Justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant,
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet personally examine on oath or affirmation the complaint and any
subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and
unsigned by respondent Judge. At that time respondent Judge was attached them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to
hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy him.
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and
Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
informed that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the government,
stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Respondents-Judges — issued on different dates a total of 42 search
Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which
found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the
perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following
was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued. Three days personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records,
later, the BIR agents served the search warrant petitioners at the offices vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
of petitioner corporation. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets
attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) as "the
search which yielded six boxes of documents. Petitioners filed a subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of
petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory committing the offense," which is described in the applications
and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter
answer to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books
respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants,
petition for dissolution of the search warrant. Hence, Petitioners came were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
to this Court. against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed
Held: A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were
as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of
to such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It in accordance with law, the said petitioners filed with the Supreme
can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
against unlawful discrimination. we are of the opinion that an officer injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
of a corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from
its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the lacks a sufficiently particularized description of the person or thing to
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners be seized or the place to be searched.
herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court,
the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated Probable Cause
under the search warrants in question.
Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the contested
● The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only
search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
the applicant and the witnesses he may produce.
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality
of the aforementioned searches and seizures. ● It is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate
the applicant or a complainant in cases where the latter has personal
ISSUE: WON the search warrants issued are valid.
knowledge of the facts.
HELD: With regard the search issued in the corporation – valid; with
● A detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the
regard the search in the houses – void.
articles to be seized is necessary, but where, by the nature of the articles
RATIO: As regards the first group(In the offices), we hold that to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required
petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for warrant could issue.
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
Facts: Mariano Almeda, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
Usury Board, applied for a search warrant and presented to Judge
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas an affidavit alleging
of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
that according to reliable information, petitioner Alvarez kept in his
therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure
house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-
thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10
oath at the end of the affidavit, Almeda stated that his answers to the
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from
not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the
the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since
facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.
the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs
On the basis of such affidavit, Judge David issued a warrant ordering
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
the search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night, the
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the
them in their individual capacity.
immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with
Second in their houses: Indeed, the same were issued upon applications the law.
stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the
committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
petitioner’s store and residence at 7:00 pm and seized articles such as
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
internal revenue license, ledger, journals, cash bonds, check stubs,
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of lading,
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.
credit receipts, correspondence, receipt books, promissory notes and
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against Alvarez filed a petition praying that the search warrant be declared
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific illegal and that all the articles in question be returned to him. He
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter claimed that the search warrant was illegal for the following reasons:
of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific (a) it was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of personal knowledge of the facts of probable cause; (b) it was not
the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant; (c)
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised it authorized its execution at night; (d) lack of an adequate description
Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — of the books and documents to be seized; and (e) it was issued for the
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws. the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the
warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to criminal proceedings that might be instituted against him for violation
all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the of the Anti-Usury Law.
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the
of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has
described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby
elimination of general warrants. he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal
proceeding or proceedings.
Notes: SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT- It is a warrant of arrest that is
issued for more than one offense. It is void for the law requires that a The CFI ruled against the Alvarez and upheld the validity of the search
warrant of arrest should only be issued in connection with one specific warrant.
Issues:1. Is the search warrant illegal when the affidavit is based on
GENERAL WARRANT- A general warrant refers to a warrant hearsay?
providing a law-enforcement officer with broad discretion or authority
to search and seize unspecified places or persons. A general warrant
2. Is there a need for affidavit of another witnesses to support the in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it
application for search warrant? makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of
the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused
3. Can the search warrant be executed at night? to testify against himself. Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen
of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them
4. Did the search warrant satisfy the particularity of description as
as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or
required by the law?
proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant
5. Is fishing evidence is valid? issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.

6. Did Alvarez waived his constitutional right to question the validity 6. No. The petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because
of the search warrant or the proceedings when he offered a compromise the offer of compromise or settlement attributed to him, does not mean,
or settlement of the case? if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the search and seizure. The
waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the
Held: 1. Yes. The provisions of the constitution require that there be petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles
not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested
the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient
oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath inventory furnished him by the agents.
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose Notes: Probable Cause (Search Warrant)- Probable cause for a search
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in are in the place sought to be searched.
such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
liable for damages caused.
Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on
It appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the
December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court
search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the
of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as No. 19,
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan
books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way
Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and
warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.
office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
2. No. It is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
corroborate the applicant or a complainant in cases where the latter has distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
personal knowledge of the facts. However, when the applicant's or documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor
of the judge to require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the
determine whether probable cause exists. search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the
further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
3. Yes. The search be made at night when it is positively asserted in discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a
the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before
to be searched. In this case, it does not appear positively in the affidavit impugning the validity of the same before this Court. Respondents also
that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place assail the petition on ground of laches (Failure or negligence for an
indicated; hence, the search and seizure could not be made at night. unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
4. Yes. A detailed description of the person and place to be searched negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
and the articles to be seized is necessary, but where, by the nature of warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
the articles to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is abandoned it or declined to assert it). Respondents further state that
not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean since petitioner had already used as evidence some of the documents
that no warrant could issue. The only description of the articles given seized in a prior criminal case, he is stopped from challenging the
in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are validity of the search warrants.
being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and
other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money- Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned
lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." warrants:
Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is
clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have 1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or
been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the
description of the contents thereof. The description so made above-quoted constitutional provision as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of
substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the Rules of Court.
the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be
enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
the former abovementioned address.
5. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it
3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although
clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized
the warrants were only directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later
use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the 4. Real properties were seized.
petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The
seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the
purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person
5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants the request of military authorities to sequester the property seized from
were issued, from the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could petitioners. The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure
not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause is contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our fundamental
upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with Section law. The search warrants are declared null and void.
3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Personal determination
Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on
the ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394 (1988)
Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes
Facts: Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid
sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive
under her bed during a coup d' etat. The case at bar is a petition raised
activities against the government in accordance with implementing
by one of the petitioners, Beltran, who wants to call for an
rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and
The petitioner assailed that his constitutional right was violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
Held: In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
initially filed to the lower court, this Court takes cognizance of this determine probable cause.
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional
Beltran's interpretation of the words "determined personally"
Issue raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search
convinced him that the judge is solely responsible to personally
of the "We Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and
examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power
to suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed a grave abuse of
petitioners gave an explanation evidencing that they have exhausted discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the warrant
other extra-judicial efforts to remedy the situation, negating the of arrest was issued.
presumption that they have abandoned their right to the possession of
the seized property. HELD: No. The Court did not find any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent
On the enumerated reasons: judge.
1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983,
that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
intended for one and the same place. things to be seized.
3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the DOCTRINE:What the Constitution requires is that the issuing judge
property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the must satisfy himself first with the criteria in finding probable cause.
search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. And to satisfy himself doesn't mean to he is required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Constitution mandates
4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building
that he shall:
on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground, remain (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or(2) if on the basis
5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
conclusions of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Deficient of such particulars as would justify a finding of the and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent
judge to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court Silva vs. Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros
ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within
the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the FACTS:
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, l RTC judge Nickarter Ontal issued a search warrant filed by M/Sgt.
of the existence of probable cause." Another factor which makes the Ranulfo Villamor, chief of the PC NARCOM Detachment in
search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, to be served against Petitioner
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The description of the Nicomedes Silva.
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question are l The application was accompanied by “deposition of witness”
too general. executed by Arthur Alcoran and Pat. Leon Quindo.
With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence l The search warrant stated that “You are hereby commanded to make
of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister an immediate search at any time of the day (night) of the room of Tama
of National Defense. Furthermore, President Marcos himself denies Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to open aparadors, lockers,
cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith seize and take possession of Lim v. Felix, G.R. No. 94054-7, February 19, 1991
the following property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and
bring the said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law FACTS:l Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr., together with his
directs.” security escorts were attacked and killed by a lone assassin at the
airport vicinity in Masbate.
l During the raid, the officers seized money belonging to Antonieta
Silva in the amount of P1,231.40. l Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr.
survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot
l Petitioners alleged that the enforcement of the search warrant was wound.
illegal because it was issued on the sole basis of mimeographed and
the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witness by l Herein petitioners were alleged to be behind the crime of multiple
searching questions and answers. murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.

l Antoinette Silva also filed a motion the return of the said amount l After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an
because her name is not included in the search warrant. Thus, her order finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of
belongings shouldn’t be subject of the warrant. herein petitioners.

l Acting on the said motion to return the money, Judge Ontal issued an l In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and
order stating that the court “holds in abeyance the disposition of the recommended the amount of P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional
said amount pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection liberty of each of the accused.
with the search warrant.
l Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to
l RTC’s new judge, replacing judge Ontal, ruled against petitioners. review the case containing 261 pages.

l MR was likewise denied by Judge Cruz (new judge). l Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a
prima facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation
l Hence, this special civil action for certiorari. of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only
be charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a
ISSUE: WON the search warrant is validly issued by then Judge Ontal case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four victims and a
physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of
HELD: NO. In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the
Dante Siblante."
questioned search warrant as well as the "Application for Search
Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal l MR’s of the petitioner’s Lim was also denied.
failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and l Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4)
answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The separate information of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a
joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. recommendation of no bail.
Quindo, which was submitted together with the "Application for
Search Warrant" contained, for the most part, suggestive questions l Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified
answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided petition for change of venue and was granted to avoid a miscarriage of
thereon. justice. (from Masbate to Makati RTC)

The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was l The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge
also very broad. The questions propounded to the witnesses were in Nemesio S. Felix.
fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was
l Petitioners questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest because it
already mimeographed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in
was not personally determined by the judge as he relied solely on the
their answers on the blanks provided.
certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with exists.
the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must determine the
l RTC dismissed their petition upholding the validity of the arrest
existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and
his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His
failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by
discretion. simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation
that a probable cause exists.
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their
authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is HELD: NO. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the
highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are
as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause.
of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The
the search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a) constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits
subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of a grave abuse of discretion.
committing an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or
embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, the then The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the
presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal
the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants
seized money. of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent
Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence
of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated
by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired
in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the
respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of
the records on the ground that the mere certification and Particularity of description
recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists
is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest. 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. CA, 164 SCRA 655 (1988)

Hence, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and THE FACTS:Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought
investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the the assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and seizures in
complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner
questions when the circumstances of the case so require. alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films
Mata v. Bayona , 128 SCRA 388 (1984) in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).

FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3)
Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the
“selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search
from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the
government authorities concerned.” Mata claimed that during the video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants.
hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the
said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and
connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from release the seized properties, which was granted by the lower court.
the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court.
K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, “it is The CA affirmed the trial court.
with the court”. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who
II. THE ISSUE:Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he
attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash
issued earlier?
and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized,
citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the III. THE RULING:[The Court DISMISSED the petition and
Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the CA.]
March 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation
and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.
Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police
District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the
and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D.
attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the application for
moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter
documents are to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion for of their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of
reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to piracy by the private respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who
the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among was also a witness during the application stated that he had personal
others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner.
Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of
as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the petitioner’s counsel did not have much credence because the master
matter. tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during
the application.
ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from
may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the
the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him? validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession
the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the
HELD:YES. Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not
responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot
produce”. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced
constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before from master tapes that it owns.
issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted
affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized
produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of
existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted
perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia
record, rendering the search warrant invalid. Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had
been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place
at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises
were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for
were seized. questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to
get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his
at Aguilar-Roque’s leased residence allegedly an underground house passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection
of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of the stuff toy contained also hashish.
subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s
office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right
subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the against unreasonable search and seizure
evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search
warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the
sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search Rules of Court provides:
and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private
for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
HELD: NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search
has committed it; and
Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
place to be searched and the things to be seized. being transferred from one confinement to another”
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited
seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he
It is an all- embracing description which includes everything was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal
conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of
National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available
to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an
the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection
giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes. When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling
from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug,
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to
be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, G.R. No. L-69803, January 30, 1987
description were considered null and void for being too general.
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia
Valid Warrantless searches Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had
been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place
People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991) at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises
were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes
Facts:Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional were seized.
command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to
set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint at Aguilar-Roque’s leased residence allegedly an underground house
was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s
information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of
had in his possession prohibited drugs. subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the
evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search
members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established
During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.
Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked
for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused Held: The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner
failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was Mila Aguilar- Roque's) arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon Street,
that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and Quezon City could have been searched, even without a warrant, for
when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious evidence of rebellion" is patently against the constitutional
looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas
a derivative of marijuana. amply discusses this in the dissenting portion of his separate opinion.
Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting CSG Group themselves
knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void warrant
in question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a 2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely the right to be where they are
limited to his person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the 3. The evidence must be immediately apparent
commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot
4. There was no need for further search
be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this case, petitioner
Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on board a public vehicle on “Stop and frisk”
the road (at Mayon and P. Margall Streets). To hold that her dwelling
could "later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
sanction an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Facts: Officer McFadden observed two men outside of a store walking
up to the window then away several times. A third man met up with
Plain view doctrine the initial two and engaged in conversation. The plainly clothed officer
developed suspicion that the men may be planning to rob the store.
People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993) McFadden approached the men and after identifying himself as an
officer asked what they were doing. The men mumbled back a
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was
response. McFadden then grabbed Terry, turned him around and patted
engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani
him down to determine if he was armed. The search revealed a gun in
was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a
Terry’s coat pocket. After conducting the same search on the second
surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani
man, another gun was revealed. Once at trial, the officer testified he
to Musa’s house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy
thought the men may have been armed.
one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
Procedural History: An Ohio trial court convicted Terry with carrying
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand
a concealed weapon. Terry appealed to the Supreme Court of the
if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the
United States.
house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100
meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Issues and Holding: May a police officer detain an individual on the
Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said street absent probable cause and conduct a limited search to find
he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. weapons? Yes.
Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper
wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He Judgment:Officers may conduct a search limited for weapons when
raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the they observe unusual conduct leading them to reasonably suspect
latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked criminal activity is afoot and the individual(s) involved is/are armed.
Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to
his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the An officer may identify himself as the police and make initial inquiries.
kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at This conduct is proper when the officer observes conduct leading him
the corner of the kitchen.’ They asked Musa about its contents but to develop reasonable suspicion that a crime is occurring or about to
failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana occur. If the officer believes a threat to himself of others still exists
leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest. after such an inquiry, a limited search may be performed to find
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana
inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence. The Court held that an individual is seized when stopped by a police
officer on the street because he is not free to walk away. As a result,
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may the Fourth Amendment protections prohibiting unreasonable searches
not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an and seizures apply. The Court also stated that a “pat down” of outer
incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of clothing constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has The Court held that the constitutionality of the search depended on
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure whether or not the scope of the search was reasonable in light of the
and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is usually circumstances. The test used to determine reasonableness is that the
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the interest in officer safety must outweigh the suspect’s Fourth
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating Amendment right to privacy.
object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ The Court held that an officer’s interest in the safety of himself and
of the object. others outweighs an individual’s Fourth Amendment right. In addition,
when an individual is stopped on the street, the police may conduct a
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the proper search for weapons if based on the facts and circumstances, the
police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into officer reasonably believes the person is armed.
the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic
bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not Here, considering the circumstances, it was reasonable for the
immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object. experienced officer to suspect the two men were planning a robbery.
In addition, the government’s interest in law enforcement trumps any
Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized minimal invasion of privacy each may have experienced when
illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III approached by the officer. The Court also determined the pat-down
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. was reasonable as the officer’s initial concerns were not abated as a
result of the responses given. The officer stated that the pat down was
Notes: Plain view Doctrine Requisites: conducted under the belief either men could have been armed.
1. There must have been a prior valid intrusion based on the As a result, it was proper for the officer to conduct a searched for
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the weapons, as the interest in the safety of the officer and the public
pursuit of their official duties
outweighed any privacy right the individuals had under the 4th The prosecution should have presented a certification from the
Amendment. Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police that
accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996) would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
FACTS:l SPO3 Nio and his team of CAFGU went to Brgy.
Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran to conduct an investigation regarding Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997)
reports on the presence of armed men roaming around barangays of
Caibiran. Facts:Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand
grenade after he was searched by a group of policemen when he was
l Upon arriving in Brgy. Onion, the agents became suspicious to the said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging around Plaza
group of Solayao because the accused-appellant himself is drunk and Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking
wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. What’s more suspicious men. When the policemen approached the group of men, they scattered
is when they noticed the team of SPO3 Nio, the group fled leaving in all directions which prompted the police to give chase and petitioner
behind Solayao, herein accused-appellant. was then apprehended and a search was made on his person.
l According to Solayao, he’s not aware that he is carrying a “latong” He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the
(49-inch firearm) wrapped in dried coconut leaves. He thought that it’s present petition wherein petitioner contended that the lower court erred
only a torch which Hermogenes Cenining gave to him and that he is in holding that the search made on him and the seizure of the hand
not aware that there’s a concealed weapon inside. He further claimed grenade from him was an appropriate incident to his arrest and that it
that this was the third torch handed to him after the others had been erred in admitting the hand grenade as evidence since it was admissible
used up. because it was a product of an unreasonable and illegal search.
l Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the RTC of Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
Biliran, with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
defined and penalized under PD No. 1866. Held:The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that
a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. 31 The
l The lower court found that accused-appellant did not contest the fact Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and
that SPO3 Nino confiscated the firearm from him and that he had no seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32
permit or license to possess the same. It hardly found credible accused- subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
appellant's submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
accident and that upon reaching Barangay Onion, he followed four reads, in part:
persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie
Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not know Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or
his companions. a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

HELD:NO. There was no error on the part of the trial court when it (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
admitted the homemade firearm as evidence nor violation of the personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. has committed it; and

The SC ruled that the search and seizure conducted in this case be (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
likened to the Posadas case where the suspicious conduct of Posadas
himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was a A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under
probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while
made. that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.

In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:
away, the former identified himself as a government agent.[16] The (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of
peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental
committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with to a lawful arrest;34 and (6) a "stop and frisk.’
verifying the report that there were armed men roaming around in the
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a
barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably
"stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two
drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not
types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum
have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-
of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
and seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this
circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
procured a search warrant first.
search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom,
However, the prosecution failed to produce evidence that the accused- assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of
appellant has no license to carry the firearm by merely relying on the the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon
lone witness’ (SPO3 Nio) testimony that accused-appellant admitted or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found
to them during the time he was apprehended that he has no license to which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
carry such weapon. crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish
the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop- Held: No, The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant
and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police
weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus: authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter,
pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said “dwelling
his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer judge or justice of the peace. The court view, therefor, that except in
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without
under the Fourth Amendment . . a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. the court defined
the difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
in a movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
search warrant. In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a
before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original
two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
petition, and amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and
and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. But even
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
instant case. he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer
seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a
to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship,
be used against the police officer.
motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not
Search of moving vehicles practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968) sought.

Facts: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter- Emergency circumstances

intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a
reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a People v. De Gracia 233 SCRA 716 (1994)
certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
Facts: The records show that in the early morning of December 1,
undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs
1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital
zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders
Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car
of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly
conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at EDSA,
deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at
together with his team and was conducted pursuant to an intelligence
gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about
report received by the division that said establishment was being
4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-
occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command
intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the
post. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from
Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting
the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team drew
of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions
their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding
of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership
of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was
of the goods and showed to the policemen a “Statement and Receipts
able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were
of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501”, issued by the
afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As
Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the
team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and
two trucks and their cargo, Private Respondents filed with the Court of
confiscate contrabands inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain
First Instance of Manila a petition “for mandamus with restraining
Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. On
order. That the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police
February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment found him guilty
Department without search warrant issued by a competent court;
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of
Respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte
firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the
restraining the petitioners from opening the nine bales in question, and
penalty of reclusion perpetua. That judgment of conviction is now
at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary
challenged before us in this appeal.
injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining
order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been Issue: Whether in a state of emergency circumstances exist, the arrest
opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of of the accused involved in rebellious act is valid without securing a
officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a arrest and search warrant.
representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Held: Yes, Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered
Issue: Whether a warrant issued by a competent court is required to opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the
search and seize a moving cargo or vehicle. prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men
the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
be dispensed with. While it is true that the officers were not armed with brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum
a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
then and there committing a crime. Probable cause has been defined as warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet should prevail.
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
but is resolved according to the facts of each case. inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
Checkpoints reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
Valmonte v. De Villa G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990
Aniag v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections,
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on
defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations,
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and
establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio
Petitioners aver that because of the institution of said checkpoints, the Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote
Velanzuela residents are worried of being harassed and of their safety petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to
the military manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by
especially at night or at dawn without a search warrant or a court order. Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then
was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that
for ignoring and/or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was
fired in the air. not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued
Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela,
petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,
Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s
and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from
Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the
Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative,
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that “gunrunning,
they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital
using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and other acts
Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate
mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the
guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No.
the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the
2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner
respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without
from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
for a seat in Congress in the elections.
Held: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car
facts of each case.
Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
unreasonable search.
is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within his reach, as they were
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with
specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the particularity, in the search warrant. Neither may it be maintained that
search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed,
from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any accused-appellant's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm,
proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible in evidence.
informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. The Constitution expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence of
Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation illegally seized articles.
of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City
Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Umil vs. Ramos [G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990]
Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot
Facts: on 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit
be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet
of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential
the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself
information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation
a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the
squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in
PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that
be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.
the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie
Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation
Warrantless arrests squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day
before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558 (1998) Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
Facts: Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988,
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the
pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol
person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car.
identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was
yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and
had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the
tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in
headquarters where he was charged of possession of prohibited drugs. Authority.” The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-
30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the
Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible
information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified. As
of Court provides: to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in
the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified. However, Rolando Dural was arrested
When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense . . . “ subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said
Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy bust operation conducted rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,
by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw petitioner connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are
handling over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they in the nature of continuing crimes
searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His arrest
was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of marijuana seized Issue: Whether an arrest and search warrant is required for the crimes
were admissible in evidence, being fruits of the crime. of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
People vs. Del Rosario [G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994] connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State.
A raiding team was organized to buy shabu from appellant and after Held: No, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested
buying from appellants’ house, the raiding team will implement search illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of
warrant. PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to appellant's house insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
to implement the search warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
Rosario and appellant witnessed the search at appellant's house. They furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
found black canister constaining shabu and a paltik .22 caliber. At connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all
police station, the seized items were taped and initialed. In addition, in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the
the search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
the search and seizure of shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the
and no other. herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing
ISSUE: Whether or not police officers can seize items not mentioned jurisprudence in our jurisdiction. The arrest of persons involved in the
in search warrant. rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing
non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
RULING: NO. The Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and the capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion,
Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the investigation.
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt ISSUES:1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its
acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with
but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or the crime of rape and homicide
capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves
2. Whether or not respondent Jud”””ges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted
abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the
essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case 3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right
of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any to due process during their preliminary investigation
of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. In this case,
whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains 4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial
that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information
March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read as an accused.
to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and
in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. HELD:1. NO.
Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him personally before
the court, he could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or 2. NO.
now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him 3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were
we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not given all the opportunities to be heard.
sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint and after a trial free from error. 4. NO.
Webb v. De Leon 247 SCRA 652 REASONS:1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the
Hubert Webb was one of the accused in the high-profile case Vizconde petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
massacre. Preliminary investigation was provided by NBI and the case that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
was raffled to Judge Zosimo Escano who inhibited himself from the committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear
case for being employed with NBI before. His pair Judge Escano and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
issued warrant of arrest to defendants. The case was re-raffled to beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new absolute certainty of guilt.
warrants of arrest. Webb and the others voluntarily surrendered. They
files before the court petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. 2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their
They contend that (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime
gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it.
preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an
them: (2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the
holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners
rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination
right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4) the of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed
to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused. 3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in
their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more
FACTS: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) fully.
filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty
six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function,
N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative
Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their
headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).
conduct the preliminary investigation.
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica
ARGUMENTS: Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained
probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made
inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies to distort the truth.
between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They
criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just
them without conducting the required preliminary examination. rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of
the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing
Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They
People vs. Sucro [G.R. No. 93239, March 18, 1991] for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him
and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic” later identified as marijuana
Facts: On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters
Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station and made a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized
Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused.
appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried
that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no
said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house of a authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found positive
certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences
Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of
Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to
turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found reclusion perpetua.
inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the
same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to Issue: Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.
the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group
of persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Held: The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the
Seraspi and reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. accused failed to meet the qualification that the suspected drug dealer
Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person
Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual
Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant. At exchange. Said raid also violated accused’ right against unreasonable
that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances
the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant,
Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves
P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have
Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation
seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the
turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had
readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant (Edison it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because
Sucro) in front of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the
police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited
inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante, The teabags of drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant:
marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant
Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens were all found
sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag.
positive of marijuana.
Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor,
Issue: Whether the police officer can arrest the accused without any what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter
arrest and search warrant when the latter committed the crime in front utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following items:
of the former.
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Held: Yes, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting
provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered
tops contained inside a transparent plastic bag.
lawful. The rule states that arrest without warrant, when lawful. Is
when a peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and
person (a)When in his presence, the person to be arrested has seeds contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then
arrested has committed it; When an offense is committed in the further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. seventeen grams.

The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe.
Quimpo Street to monitor the activities of the accused who was earlier
reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away from Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated
Regalado’s house. Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of Rodrigueza’s father.
Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to some The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana
persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs.
things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was being Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the
monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti
P/Lt. Seraspi. of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with
certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the
People vs. Rodrigueza [G.R. No. 95902, February 4, 1992] cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside and
accused is acquitted.
Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining
information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs Go. vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992]
in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated
with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked Facts: Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way
street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car,
shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which turned out to be
shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued. registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not,
however, constitute “personal knowledge.”
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest
he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. 2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that
by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants
setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because
Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such “without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a
situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, preliminary investigation.”
falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or
procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He
had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and
because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot
which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of
had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested. petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking
Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly
eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the recognized that petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a
“personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless legitimate one.
arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to Posadas vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990]
the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of
While conducting a surveillance, the two policemen spotted petitioner
Issue/s:Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by
carrying a “buri” bag and acting suspiciously. He attempted to flee
the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;
when the policemen approached him and identified themselves but his
Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary attempt was thwarted. Found inside the “buri” bag were one (1) caliber
investigation .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2)
rounds live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. Petitioner failed to show
Held:1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions
detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of found in his possession. He was subsequently prosecuted for and found
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions
provides as follows:
ISSUE(S):Whether or not there was probable cause to justify the
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a warrantless search and arrest of the petitioner.
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
RULING:YES. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and
it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992
has committed it; and
Facts: a telephone call was by Western Police district that here were
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or Bay Boulevard in Tondo Manila. A surveillanve team of
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place. They saw two men “looking
being transferred from one confinement to another. from side to side” one of whom is holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen,
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused was found
Rule 112, Section 7.” with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in
the chamber. His companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken
Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of
from them.
Maguan. The “arresting” officers obviously were not present, within
the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Issue: Whether or not the accused constitutional right against
Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the unreasonable search and seizure is violated
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected “when [the shooting had]
in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Ruling: The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules
Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal of court requires that a person be arrested 1 After he has committed or
knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been offense 2 In the presence of the arresting officer.
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the
at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused was merely prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
“looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There was
apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being Rules 113 and 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their
presence. Section 3 - Privacy of Communication and Correspondence

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 93833, September 28 1995]

Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s no less stringent
requirements have not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging
that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the private respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office,
that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious
that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In
committed. support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of
People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)
litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests
Facts: The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript
one of their informers that the accused was on board a vessel bound for on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of
Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. the confrontation made by petitioner.
Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached
him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed at
him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the
found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin. Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
Wilcon 9 The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC
two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later
granted the Motion. From the RTC’s order, the private respondent filed
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified
a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous
referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order
Drugs Act was filed against him. However, and it is Aminnudin’s
null and void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute
claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the
an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a
marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence
MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.
against him under the Bill of Rights.

Issue: Whether the accused was caught in flagrante delicto hence

justifies the warrantless arrest Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the
consent of both of the party is a violation of R.A. 4200.
Held: No, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a
crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and
warrantless arrest allowed under the Rules of Court. The present case Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
presented no such urgency. It is clear that they had at least two days Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it shall be
within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by
was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication
determined on his own authority that a “search warrant was not to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
necessary.” In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as
like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person)
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator.
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, therefore
Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the
the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. While this is not to say that communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words distinguish.
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that
he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 107383, February 20 1996] policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the
headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of
Facts: the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his
words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made
husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while
by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked
he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of
the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified.
diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph,
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording
private respondents between her Wife and his alleged paramours, by
he had made of the heated discussion at the police station between the
means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed
accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was
the papers for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for
taken without the knowledge of the two.
disqualification from the practice of medicine against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers
and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of ISSUES:
Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin,
declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described 1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in
in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in the view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person
acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin
and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal,
or threat on the part of the offended party and lack of intention to
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of the accused.
Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and
4200, which prohibits wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed
from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding
by the voice recording he had made.
marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of

private communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange between petitioner Navarro and
constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it
Tape Recording in the present case is not prohibited
is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity,
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
enforced. by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
however otherwise described:
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall
each owes to the other. not be covered by this prohibition.
Navarro vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. NO. 121087, August 26, 1999] ....
FACTS: SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by
Lucena City wnet to the police station to report alledged indecent show any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not
in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the station, a be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused administrative hearing or investigation.
"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions
Authentication of a voice recording of the Bill of Rights, viz:[34]

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated.

A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness "Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
(1) that he personally recorded the conversation; of the laws.
(2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and

(3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
claimed to belong. papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
presented by the prosecution.
things to be seized.
Ople vs. Torres {GR No, 127685, July 23, 1998]

FACTS: A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on

x x x.
December 12, 1996 for the Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. It was published in four newspapers
of general circulation on January. Petitioner filed the instant petition
against respondents, on the grounds that: Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of
provided by law.

ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as

enshrined in the Bill of Rights. x x x.
HELD: The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right
to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public
constitutional protection. and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the
burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
is predicated on two considerations:

1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws.
to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity,
providers and other government instrumentalities and ;
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. meddling and prying into the privacy of another.[35] It also holds a
public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages
It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person,[36] and
the issuance of the said order. The broadness, vagueness, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our communications.[37] The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the
people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger. In the case at bar, violation of secrets by an officer,[38] the revelation of trade and
the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the industrial secrets,[39] and trespass to dwelling.[40] Invasion of privacy
people to surrender their privacy by giving information about is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law,[41] the
themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act[42] and the Intellectual Property
services. Code.[43] The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information.[44]
Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to
Doctrines: Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights: privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence,
it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified
by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a
No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate
our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact court. Hence, this petition.
business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally Issue: WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his
seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are constitutional right to privacy
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what
Ruling: The search conducted on his office computer and the copying
is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O.
of his personal files was lawful and did not violate his constitutional
No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in
clear and present danger.
Ratio Decidendi: In this case, the Court had the chance to present the
The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a
cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.
two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held
society recognizes as reasonable.[67] The factual circumstances of the that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation
case determines the reasonableness of the expectation.[68] However, made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his
other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the
a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed
expectation.[69] The use of biometrics and computer technology in booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth
A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of
of privacy.[70] As technology advances, the level of reasonably Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior
expected privacy decreases.[71] The measure of protection granted by decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has
the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second,
more widely accepted.[72] The security of the computer data file that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on reasonable (objective).
the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No.
308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154
expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be (1968),thus “recognized that employees may have a reasonable
inferred from its provisions. expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.”
Pollo vs Constantino-David G.R. No. 181881, October 18 2011 O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically
declared that “[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights
Facts: Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an merely because they work for the government instead of a private
anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly taking place in the employer.” In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs”
Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-
issued a memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which
computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal government interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable
divisions.” expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither
probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard
disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson
David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos.
Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in 157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427,
the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA
and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, 141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate
were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding,
Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable
petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.
or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of
accused the CSC Officials of “fishing expedition” when they the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer. its inception and scope.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November
Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from
having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a
of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. government-issued computer, hence government property the use of
which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the
petitioner’s answer to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner Doctrines: Existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a
and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be
proceeded ex parte. one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the the correct analysis has two steps: first, because some government
CA which was dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable, a court must consider [t]he the two questions together.[44] Thus, where the employee used a
operational realities of the workplace in order to determine whether an password on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers and
employees Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where kept the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and
an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employers any search of that space and items located therein must comply with
intrusion on that expectation for noninvestigatory, work-related the Fourth Amendment.[45]
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct,
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he
On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
privacy in their workplace, OConnor teaches: government-issued computer which contained his personal files.
Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which
x x x Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and
and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he
sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from
procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The employees accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in
expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have
employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people,
entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a
invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by trivial request. He described his office as full of people, his friends,
fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for unknown people and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, his functions at the PALD, he is personally assisting incoming clients,
it is the nature of government offices that others such as fellow receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of
employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public accomplishment report,
may have frequent access to an individuals office. We agree with
JUSTICE SCALIA that [c]onstitutional protection against in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of
because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence
its capacity as employer, x x x but some government offices may be so of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.
open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees
is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work environments in
on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they
the public sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable
create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC
expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated
In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be
for law enforcement make theprobable-cause requirement done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
impracticable, x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory legitimate business purposes.
intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A
One of the factors stated in OConnor which are relevant in determining
standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of
whether an employees expectation of privacy in the workplace is
government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation of
reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy policy
the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of
public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions Vivares vs. St. Theresa's College G.R. No. 202666, September 29
on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government 2014
employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the FACTS:Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school
standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in
reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party
intrusion must be reasonable: they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others,
took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.
inquiry: first, one must consider whether theaction was justified at its
inception, x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school
actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place, x x x pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only
in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the
Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and
justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for Julienne, among others.
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their
noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the
file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne
and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the [misconduct] along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider
include (1) the employees relationship to the item seized; (2) whether Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access
the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined
seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any
privacy in the item. These factors are relevant to both the subjective Facebook user.
and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
were barred from joining the commencement exercises. information

Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering,
petition for habeas data on the following grounds: collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity
Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data. To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It
The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of
as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party
STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal
or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of
purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules
regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a
on discipline.
personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all,
ISSUE:Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said
violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the person or entity.
minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to informational privacy
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like
in online social network activities of its users?)
HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check
Right to informational privacy
the ruling at the latter part)
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
information about themselves. Several commentators regarding
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or millions of OSN users, “in this Social Networking environment,
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of underlying question now is: Up to what extent is the right to privacy
the aggrieved party. protected in OSNs?

It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the Facebook Privacy Tools
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court recognized this
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in
ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so with
order to achieve unlawful ends.
this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes
every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are
not foolproof.”
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and
comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a accessibility of digital images (photos), posted on his or her personal
procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by
information age.” selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their
friends can view the photo;
An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least substantial Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged networks of the Facebook user; and
unauthorized access to information about a person.
Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed
killings and enforced disappearances
to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s
enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to
informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as
can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of to “when and to what extent to disclose facts about themselves – and
the database or information or files in possession or in control of to put others in the position of receiving such confidences.”
respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data
LONE ISSUE:NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not
may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and
violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital
enforced disappearances.
photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s
public at large. friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the Doctrines: The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the
images were visible only to the five of them, and without their three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of
the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational
scant consideration. privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.23

Alejano vs. Cabuay G.R. No. 160792, August 25 2005

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn
account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,”
showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only
goes to show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly
private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it
Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by
is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at
Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”). The soldiers
disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive
devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly
renounced their support for the administration and called for the
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet
can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with
positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their
informational privacy. barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a
directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took
precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the
imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident. Government
Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC against
have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself. the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident. the CA rendered its
decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission
regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the
is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the
rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations
public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and
The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The appellate court
or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an
longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does
source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does
content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with corpus proceedings.
the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged,
the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set Issue: Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the
at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with detainees is an infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights.
visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so automatically,
be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’ argument.

No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors

Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the
pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were Held: No, the SC do not agree with the CA that the opening and reading
posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the of the detainees’ letters violated the detainees’ right to privacy of
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same
the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of
minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the contraband. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP
students who showed the images to Escudero. authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their
lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees
Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom” Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’
personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
to the original uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials
the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are
through the “Custom” setting, the result may have been different, for marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open
the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. The right involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military
to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By
the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted Rules on Habeas Data
prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. The
Section 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available
detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
soldiers in committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the
Articles of War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other
high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must
give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing Sec. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the
the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and
is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by: chanrobles
the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA virtual law library
members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the
security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by
the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,
Doctrines: The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP namely: the spouse, children and parents; or chanrobles virtual law
authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their library
lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees
personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved
for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or chanrobles
of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are virtual law library
marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open
the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
Sec. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which
citizens privacy rights[62] is a guarantee that is available only to the has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is
public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. chanrobles
right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, virtual law library
as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees
and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy
rights. The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data
In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities files of government offices.
that are alleged to infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees
and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts balance the guarantees of the
Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators.[63]
Sec. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a
The deferential review of such regulations stems from the principle
Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before
such court or judge.
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an
inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability
to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of
intractable problems of prison administration.[64] its justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice
thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading
or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place
300 soldiers in committing coup detat, a crime punishable with
where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.
reclusion perpetua.[65] The junior officers are not ordinary detainees
but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed
takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of
the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be
are subject to the Articles of War.[66] returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court
of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent
from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations information is gathered, collected or stored.
in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better
position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior
officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members.
Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Sec. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the
respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court,
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of
from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docked service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent,
and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent the rules on substituted service shall apply.
submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from
the filing of the petition. chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written
return together with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days
Sec. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by
should contain: the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things,
contain the following:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets,
privileged communications, confidentiality of the source of
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how information of media and others;
it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
chanrobles virtual law library
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information subject of the petition;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data
or information;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the
nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data
or information, if known; (ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security
and confidentiality of the data or information; and chanrobles virtual
law library
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information
or files kept by the respondent. (iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining (c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
the act complained of; and

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

Sec. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with
Sec. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by making
justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who
its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.
the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from
the issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may
issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer
or person serve it. Sec. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in
chambers may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense
that the release of the data or information in question shall compromise
national security or state secrets, or when the data or information
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged
petition which shall not be later than ten (10) work days from the date character.
of its issuance. chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings

Sec. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of and motions are prohibited:
court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized
person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court,
justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary
actions. chanrobles virtual law library (a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any
position paper and other pleadings; chanrobles virtual law library lawful officers as may be designated by the court, justice or judge
within five (5) working days.

(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;

Sec. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final
judgment shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a
verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the
database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated,
rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim; respondent.

(f) Third-party complaint; The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and
complied with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties
regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ.
(g) Reply;

Sec. 18. Hearing on Officer-s Return. - The court shall set the return
for hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly.
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default; chanrobles virtual law library

(i) Intervention; Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or
order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise
questions of fact or law or both. chanrobles virtual law library
(j) Memorandum;

The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief notice of the judgment or final order.
orders; and

The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any amparo cases.
interlocutory order.

Sec. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for

Sec. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal,
the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, civil or administrative actions.
granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless
the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.
chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to
the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with
the criminal action.
Sec. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be
summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a
preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated
chanrobles virtual law library with the criminal action.

Sec. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to
days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction,
or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other
relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege Sec. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action
of the writ shall be denied. has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed.
The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by
motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the well. These purposes would be defeated if the card were to be mutilated
reliefs available under the writ of habeas data. or destroyed.

Sec. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. The purpose of
modify substantive rights. Congress is not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional.
Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as enacted.
Section 4 - Freedom of Expression
Doctrines: Warren wrote that when a regulation prohibits conduct that
US v. O’Brien 391 US 367 (1963) combines "speech" and "nonspeech" elements, "a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, O’Brien (Defendant), was
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms". The
convicted for symbolically burning his draft card under a federal
regulation must 1) be within the constitutional power of the
statute forbidding the altering of a draft card. His conviction was
government to enact, 2) further an important or substantial government
upheld after the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)
interest, 3) that interest must be unrelated to the suppression of speech
found the law constitutional.
(or "content neutral", as later cases have phrased it), and 4) prohibit no
more speech than is essential to further that interest. The Court ruled
that § 462(b)(3) satisfied this test.[10]
Synopsis of Rule of Law. First, a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government. Schenck v. US 249 US 47 (1919)
Second, if it furthers a substantial or important governmental interest.
Facts: During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth
Third, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth
free expression. Fourth, if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. The leaflets
Amendment constitutional freedoms is no greater than is essential to
urged the public to disobey the draft, but advised only peaceful action.
the furtherance of that interest.
Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of
1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to
obstruct recruitment. Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating
Facts. The Defendant was convicted under Section:462(b)(3) of the this law and appealed on the grounds that the statute violated the First
Universal Military Training and Service Act (UMTSA) of 1948, Amendment.
amended in 1965 to include the applicable provision that made it an
offense to “alter, knowingly destroy, knowingly mutilate”� a Issue: Did Schenck's conviction under the Espionage Act for criticizing
Selective Service registration certification. Defendant knowingly the draft violate his First Amendment right to freedom of speech?
burned his draft card on the front steps of the local courthouse. The Ruling: The Court held that the Espionage Act did not violate the First
Court of Appeals held the 1965 amendment unconstitutional as a law Amendment and was an appropriate exercise of Congress’ wartime
abridging the freedom of speech. authority. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes concluded that courts owed greater deference to the
government during wartime, even when constitutional rights were at
Issue. Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to stake. Articulating for the first time the “clear and present danger test,”
Defendant because his act of burning the draft card was protected Holmes concluded that the First Amendment does not protect speech
“symbolic speech”� within the First Amendment? that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil
that Congress has power to prevent. Holmes reasoned that the
Whether the draft cards are merely pieces of paper designed only to widespread dissemination of the leaflets was sufficiently likely to
notify registrants of their registration or classification, to be retained or disrupt the conscription process. Famously, he compared the leaflets
tossed into the waste basket according to the convenience of the to shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theatre, which is not permitted under
registrant? the First Amendment.

Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because United States vs. Bustos [G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918]
it was intended to “suppress freedom of speech?”
Facts: In 1915, numerous citizens of Pampanga assembled, and
Held. No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. It cannot be prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary (privileged
accepted that there is an endless and limitless variety of conduct that communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and
constitutes “speech”� whenever the person engaging in the conduct five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of
intends to express an idea. However, even if the alleged the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in
communicative element of Defendant’s conduct is sufficient to bring office and asking for his removal. The petition transmitted by these
into play the First Amendment of the United States Constitution attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizensThe specific charges:
(Constitution), it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a
draft card is constitutionally protected activity. First, a government o Francisca Polintan asked for money and kept her in the house for
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power four days as a servant and took from her two chickens and twelve
of the government. Second, if it furthers a substantial or important "gandus;"
governmental interest. Third, if the governmental interest is unrelated
o Valentin Sunga asked for P50
to the suppression of free expression. Fourth, if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional freedoms is no o Leoncio Quiambao: Punsalan gave him P30 and his complaint was
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The 1965 shelved.
Amendment meets all these requirement
Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was
s. Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as applied to false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.
Issue: WON accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. Although the initial of his right to free speech and free press.
purpose of the draft card is to notify, it serves many other purposes as
Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a
right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in
public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking
who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. the usual case
wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that
those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The
plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as
Doctrines: The interest of society and the maintenance of good the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable
government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Completely cause will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845],
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case 3 How., 266
of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.
intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course,
criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the People vs. Alarcon [G.R. No. 46551, December 12, 1939]
individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for
As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of first Instance
the common good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to
of Pampanga in criminal case No. 5733, The People of the Philippines
the Chief of Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or
vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al., convicting the accused therein — except
all the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the
one — of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory
constant source of liberty and democracy.
letter, signed by Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to the
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of herein respondent, Federico Mañgahas who, as columnist of the
vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot the letter in an article published by him in the issue of that paper of
criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public September 23, 1937. The objectionable portion is inserted in the
officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted following petition of the provincial fiscal of Pampanga, filed with the
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be Court of First Instance of that province on September 29, 1937
tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a
Ruling: Elements of Contempt by Newspaper Publications
judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert
his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well defined
On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the by the cases adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. Newspaper
State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the
courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the
republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede,
or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of author of the publications should be held for contempt. What is thus
grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is
assume responsibility for the charges made. the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision
of a pending case.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court has come
inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it.
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that
the letter complained of was published after the Court of First Instance
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy,
of Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in
'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice,
band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of
though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs.
National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.) The fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of
the accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we
important consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or
are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest
modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case,
a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule
and could not have been influenced by the questioned publication.
is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
Lagunzad vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has FACTS
a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production
without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" portraying the life of
Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had
Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental and for whose murder, the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises
Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression,
and his men were tried and convicted. The emphasis of the movie was indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil
on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt liberties." It is not, however, without limitations. One criterion for
with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press is the
of his mother, Maria Soto, private respondent herein, and of one "balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to take
"Auring" as his girl friend. Padilla’s half sister, for and in behalf of her conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
mother, Gonzales, objected to the "exploitation" of his life and observable in a given situation or type of situation."
demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in
the movie. After some bargaining as to the amount to be paid Lagunzad In the case at bar, the interest’s observable are the right to privacy
and Vda. de Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement" whereby the asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked
latter as LICENSOR granted Lagunzad authority and permission to by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, and
exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement
of producing the picture for consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to
paid Vda. de Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are
movie was shown indifferent theaters all over the country. Because reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private
petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the concern
Agreement, Vda. de Gonzales instituted the present suit against him
Ayer Productions PTY Ltd. vs. Capulong [G.R. No. L—82380,
praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the
April 29, 1988]
balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest from of the Complaint; and
2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty there from, among others. Petitioner production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in
contended in his Answer that the episodes in life of Moises Padilla 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international
depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and occurred release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The
at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a public proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was
figure; that private respondent has no property right over those endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted.
incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.
consideration and constitutes an infringement on the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and of the press; and that he paid private
respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only because of the coercion and
threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
nullification of the Licensing Agreement, Both the trial court and the presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters
CA ruled in favor of Vda. deGonzales. interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage
as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright
ISSUES and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an
American historian have developed a script.
Whether or not the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an
intrusion upon his right to privacy notwithstanding that he was a public
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation,
Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property right reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any
over the life of Moises Padilla considering that the latter was a public member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or
figure. other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners
acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an infringement movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press. picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating
HELD any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based
on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the
YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in appeal.
toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade as person's privacy
to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or
novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he
or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted
efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it,
it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.

YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom
As held in Schuyler v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures
relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the
exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
the deceased." disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to
exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the be published about him constitute of a public character. Succinctly put,
respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and
look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of dissemination of matters of public interest.
any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public
interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage
in the history of the country.
The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right
to be free

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of 1. from unwarranted publicity,
public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place,
2. from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs
Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have
lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy. 3. and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of
legitimate public concern.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case

between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and Tests for Permissible Limitation
the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that
the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its 1. The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger
presentation of events. rule is such a limitation.
Doctrines: Freedom of Speech and of Expression includes the freedom 2. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of
to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures speech and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media
as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing of interest test"
Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed
expression the Court would once more stress that this freedom includes consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation
the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such or type of situation"
motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our
day and age, motion pictures are a univesally utilized vehicle of
communication and medium Of expression. Along with the press,
radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present
mass communication for information, education and entertainment danger test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court
believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The
production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture
"The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case,
Motion Pictures constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the
communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Borjal vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999]
Their effect on the perception by our people of issues and public
officials or public figures as well as the pre cultural traits is Facts: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the
considerable. Nor as pointed out in BURSTYN V. WILSON is the court against Borjal and Soliven for writing and publishing articles that
Importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened are allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao,
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform' . attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a
There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and conference to be launch concerning resolving matters on transportation
what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there is a crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however
diminution of the basic right to free expression. was never named in any of the articles nor was the conference he was
organizing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the
Monetary profit is not a disqualification private respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the SC contending that
This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to
private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the subject of
foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore, the
the published articles.
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
In our community as in many other countries, media facilities are Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of
owned either by the government or the private sector but the private petitioners for libel.
sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by
being devoted in whole or in part to revenue producing activities.
Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities
available in our country and hence to exclude commercially owned and
operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected om of
speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of
such constitutional liberties in our country.

The Right to Privacy is not an Absolute Right

The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not
privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person denial of the permit is a violation of the constitutional right of the
could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These freedom of speech and expression.
requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The element
of identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he
was the organizer of said conference and had he not done so the public
would not have known.

Whether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to hold a

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom
peaceful protest rally in front of the US Embassy
of the press and that privileged communications must be protective of
public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or
slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and Ruling
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his The Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy
public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such to protect the exercise of the rights to free speech and peaceful
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must assembly and on the ground that there was no showing of the existence
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on denial of the permit. These rights are not only assured by our
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be constitution but also provided for in the Universal Declaration of
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. Human Rights. Between the two generally accepted principles of
diplomatic relations and human rights, the former takes higher ground.
The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the The right of the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly is highly
declared objective of the conference, the composition of its members ranked in the scheme of constitutional values.
and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded
no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public Miller v. California 413 US 15 (1973)
interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure and even In 1971, Marvin Miller, an owner/operator of a California mail-order
otherwise is involved in a public issue. The court held that freedom of business specializing in pornographic films and books, sent out a
expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the brochure advertising books and a film that graphically depicted sexual
reminder among media members to practice highest ethical standards activity between men and women. The brochure used in the mailing
in the exercise thereof. contained graphic images from the books and the film. Five of the
A privileged communication may be either: brochures were mailed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California.
The owner and his mother opened the envelope and seeing the
1. Absolutely privileged communication à those which are not brochures, called the police.[3]
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is
found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a Miller was arrested and charged with violating California Penal Code
member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the 666.2(a) which says in part, "Every person who knowingly sends or
Congress or in any Committee thereof. causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for
sale or distribution, or in this state possesses, prepares, publishes,
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications à those containing produces, or prints, with intent to distribute or to exhibit to others, or
defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been who offers to distribute, distributes, or exhibits to others, any obscene
made without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong matter is for a first offense, guilty of a misdemeanor."[4] California
"private communications" and "fair and true report without any lawmakers wrote the statute based on two previous Supreme Court
comments or remarks." obscenity cases, Memoirs v. Massachusetts and Roth v. United
Reyes vs. Bagatsing [G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983]
Miller was tried by jury in the Superior Court of Orange County. At
Facts the conclusion of the evidence phase, the judge instructed the jury to
evaluate the evidence by the community standards of California, i.e.,
Retired Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, as defined by the statute.[6] The jury returned a guilty verdict.
sought for a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march
and rally on October 26, 1983 starting from Luneta to the gates of the Miller appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court,
United States embassy. The objective of the rally was to peacefully arguing that the jury instructions did not use the standard set in
protest the removal of all foreign military bases and to present a Memoirs v. Massachusetts which said that in order to be judged
petition containing such to a representative of the Embassy so it may obscene, materials must be "utterly without redeeming social value".
be delivered to the United States Ambassador. This petition was to Miller argued that only a national standard for obscenity could be
initially compel the Mayor of the City of Manila to make a decision on applied.[7] The appellate division rejected the argument and affirmed
the application for a permit but it was discovered that a denial has the jury verdict. Miller then filed an appeal with the California Court
already been sent through mail. It also included a provision that if it be of Appeal for the Third District, which declined to review. Miller
held somewhere else, permit may be issued. The respondent mayor applied to the Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted. Oral
alleges that holding the rally in front of the US Embassy is a violation arguments were heard in January 1972.[7]
of the resolutions during the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations adopted in 1961 and of which the Philippines is a signatory. Issue: Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail
In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines has to comply with protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee?
such generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land. The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the Ruling: No. Judgment of the lower court vacated and remanded for
further proceedings. In determining whether speech is obscene, the
basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as
person, applying contemporary community standards” would find the obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of sex, (b) immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, charged as being obscene may fall
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy, artistic, Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
political, or scientific value. The Supreme Court of the Untied States circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be
(Supreme Court) does not adopt as a constitutional standard the decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community
“utterly without redeeming social value” test. If a state law that reached by it." (Kottinger)
regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or construed, First
When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be
Amendment constitutional values are adequately protected by the
said to be offensive to human sensibilities?
ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review
of constitutional claims when necessary. The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither
been drawn nor divided.
Pita vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989]
Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila to prurient interest."
Police, seized and confiscated from dealers along Manila sidewalks,
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the
magazines believed to be obscene. These were later burned. One of
sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of
the publications was Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.
the work, rather than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger
He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him (although both cases are agreed that "contemporary community
from confiscating more copies of his magazine and claimed that this standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak
was a violation of freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show undertook moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially
cause. He then filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary a judicial question and as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion
restraining order against indiscriminate seizure. Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.

Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California,
obscence reading materials but admitted that these were surrendered which expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic
by the stall owners and the establishments were not raided. guidelines," to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying
contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a whole,
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or
answer. describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the
question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what
(sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the
per se or not". courts to recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem.

On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included
from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has
dismissing the case for lack of merit allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon
arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society.
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of
the press is not without restraint. In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the
legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is
In the SC, the petitioner claimed that: smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists
it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt
1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any
to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of
court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on
civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not
the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
necessarily repulsive to the present generation.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended)
and, in effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its
matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of
merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for
men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather
resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of
than resolved it.
preliminary injunction.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of
free expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases,
Issue: Was the seizure constitutional? this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right,
barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State
interference and action. But the burden to show this lies with the
Held: No. Petition granted
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural,
proof of the existence of such clear and present danger."
Ratio: As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery
of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be
said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not
danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and
to justify State action to stop the speech. expression.

The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown
the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First
of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the
Held: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with
said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out
presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to
a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act
Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called
Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
conclude that the fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's
sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
disregard of due process. The PD’s don’t give the authorities the religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race or religion. The
permission to execute high-handed acts. respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions
by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is
judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against
challenge. an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often
at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the
There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the
of Court but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot
an incident to a lawful arrest and it must be on account fo a crime censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it
committed. attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most
numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is
The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor
freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
legal provision which would free the accused of all criminal
marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably
responsibility because there had been no warrant, and there is no
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and
"accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished".
welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may
Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes
warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened
committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be
executioner rolled into one. justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive
and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA [G.R. No. 119673, July 26 1996] danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of
speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless
Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the
Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot
Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not
beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside
other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function
Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board
program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly
series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.
and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 147571,
of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which May 5, 2001]
allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A.
Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision Facts : Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private
of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in
protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social
and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan
Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information
x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and including election surveys Petitioners brought this action for
128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4
No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: Surveys affecting
Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it seven (7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes
outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections
petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition. both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results
of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to
publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on
May 14,2001
Issue : WON §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press. and right to information of public concern be given more weight than
the fundamental rights of the accused.

Ratio: The petition is denied.

HELD : What test should then be employed to determine the
constitutional validity of §5.4? The United States Supreme Court,
through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A]
Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's
or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the
expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of
of that interest. This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer
content-based from content neutral regulations and is said to have diminution in its constitutional proportions.
"become canonical in the review of such laws." is noteworthy that the
O 'Brien test has been applied by this Court in at least two cases First.
Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until
connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual
such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the
prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence
possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting
election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while dignity and calm ambiance is demanded."Television can work
allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."The
by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the
theorists, and other opinion takers Even if the governmental interest testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated
sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or
resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4 innocence to yield to it.
nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely, that
the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that
governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be
of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly
"junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized
of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who
the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
speechbecause of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of
such evils To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants
direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report
such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental what they have observed during the proceedings.
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression. Ruling: WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be
Re: Request for TV Coverage of the Trial of President Estrada made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29 2001] conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such
portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b)
Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and
coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual
Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be
press, the constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted
of public concern which could only be recognized, served and satisfied