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Executive Cases

52. 250 SCRA 581 (1995) People vs. Salle, Jr. 250 SCRA 581 , December 04, 1995
53. 251 SCRA 709 (1995) In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres 251 SCRA 709 , December 29, 1995
54. 170 SCRA 190 (1989) Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr. 170 SCRA 190 , February 09, 1989
55. 202 SCRA 252(1991) American Home Assurance Co., Inc. vs. NLRC 252 SCRA 202 , January
24, 1996
56. 202 SCRA 844 (1991) Llamas vs. Orbos 202 SCRA 844 , October 15, 1991
57. 202 SCRA 378 (1991) Drilon vs. Court of Appeals 202 SCRA 378 , October 03, 1991
58. 152 SCRA 272 (1987) Torres vs. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272 , July 23, 1987


FACTS: Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The
appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court accepted the
appeal. On 6 January 1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal. They were granted a conditional pardon that with their acceptance of the
conditional pardon, the appellants will be released from confinement, the appellants impliedly
admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be dismissed.
They were discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993. Atty. La’o further
informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his province without consulting her.
She then prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it
withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion to
withdraw his appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mengote’s conditional pardon is valid?

RULING: No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect
until the person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final and Mengote
has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. – “WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant
Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to
secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The
conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the
grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his
custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine
National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.”
In re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong-Torres;
G.R. No. 122338; 25 Dec 1995; 251 SCRA 709

Wilfredo Torres was convicted of two counts of estafa and sentenced to serve a prison term up
to November 02, 2000. He was granted pardon on the condition that he will “not again violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippines.” Such conditional pardon was later cancelled on the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole after he was charged of multiple counts of

Whether or not a convict who breached his conditional pardon may avail of the writ of habeas

NO. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person’s liberty has been judicially
adjudged as illegal or unlawful. The incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were
it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof,
the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence
for his final conviction until November 02, 2000.

Petition for habeas corpus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Monsanto vs. Factoran


The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of

Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was
sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the
decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she
was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the
rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon,
petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post
as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the
Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity
of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and
therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she
should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary
Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and
that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.


1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled
to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?

3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the


1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does
not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords
no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government
any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in
force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can
be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of
the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. (Monsanto
vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)
Not sure if related sa Executive Department ang Case

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. and/or LESLIE J. MOUAT, President, petitioners,

LIBO-ON and ROMEO F. DE LEON, respondents.

On June 6, 1991, private respondents Virgilio Malinao, Rosemilo Gacusan and Dominador
Loriaga filed a Complaint for regularization, sick leave pay, vacation leave pay and night shift
differential pay against petitioners American Home Assurance Company and/or Leslie Mouat
before the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss insofar as private
respondents Malinao and Gacusan were concerned. The motion alleged that petitioner and
private respondents Malinao and Gacusan have settled the case by way of a compromise
agreement.chanrob private respondents Malinao and Gacusan filed an Opposition to the Motion
to Dismiss. They averred that petitioners, using "undue influence and trickery considering their
educational backgrounds," deluded them into signing the compromise agreement. A
Supplemental Opposition was subsequently filed by said private respondents on September 2,
1991. Petitioners argue that respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in giving due course to the Motion to Admit Motion
for Reconsideration which was already filed out of time, and in ordering the hearing on the
merits of the case despite the presence of supervening events, both in violation of the
constitutional rights of herein petitioners.lesvirtua


Respondent NLRC gravely erred in reinstating the case below with respect to the claims of
respondent Gacusan despite the fact that the latter never filed either a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal from the order dismissing his complaint. There is nothing to
indicate that he sought relief from the order of dismissal. It was, an error for respondent NLRC
:to order for respondent NLRC to order the labor arbiter to continue with the hearing of
respondent Gacusan’s complaint. In addition thereto, petitioner had already paid Gacusan the
amount P50,000.00 as financial assistance by reason of which the latter executed a General
Release and Settlement Agreement. However, Gacusan did not amend his complaint for unpaid
wages and other benefits, the receipt of payment and execution of quitclaim by respondent
Gacusan effectively extinguished petitioners’ liability to him and this necessarily barred the latter
from foreteller pursuing his case which is limited to money claims against the former Gacusan’s
indifference in the prosecution of his case before the labor arbiter is made evident by his failure
to file an opposition to the first Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioners. The opposition he filed to
the second Urgent Motion to Dismiss could, at most, be considered as a mere afterthought, the
reinstatement of the case with respect to the claim of respondent Loriaga is totally baseless and
completely irregular. On his own initiative and upon his own motion, respondent Loriaga’s
complaint against herein petitioners was dismissed by the labor arbiter without prejudice to the
refiling of the same. Respondent Loriaga never made an appeal either from the Order
dismissing the case with prejudice or from the Order which dismissed his claim without
prejudice, upon motion of said respondent himself. Respondent NLRC, in blatant insourciance
for the rule mandating strict compliance with the reglementary period for appeals, decided to
take cognizance of the motion for reconsideration belatedly filed by respondent Malinao on the
basis of "substantial justice," which does not exist in this case. The supposed extreme poverty
of the client is not a justifiable excuse for the failure of his counsel to file the motion for
reconsideration on time under the circumstances.
FACTS: Raul Paredes and Rodolfo Ganzon were charged with double murder; the military
promulgated a decision acquitting Raul Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo Ganzon to life
imprisonment. Paredes was thereupon released from custody. President Marcos gave a
conditional pardon of Ganzon's release after six years of imprisonment; although as
condition, Ganzon shall remain under house arrest but apparently, he was free man, he was
free to move in and out of his residence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ganzon’s sentence effectively commuted to six years?

RULING: Yes. Commutation does not have to be in any specific form. The fact that he was
released after six years and the fact that the house arrest is not a penalty
leads to the
conclusion that the penalty had been shortened. – The Court is of the opinion that if Ganzon's
sentence had been commuted, he has therefore served his sentence and if he has served
his sentence fully, he can no longer be reinvestigated, or be made to "complete the service
of his sentence." He was supposed to have remained under house arrest, not
as a
continuation of his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos' vast arrest and commitment powers
during martial rule.

Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other
complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft
and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence
his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III
returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without
completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They
say that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal
cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has
been “convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because the word “conviction” refers only
to criminal cases.

ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.

Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or
administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by
the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive
clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide
for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not
necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the court’s considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in
the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence
required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.

In 1979, Wilfredo S. Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa (two
counts) and was
sentenced to an aggregate prison term and to pay an indemnity. On 18 April 1979, a
pardon was granted by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will
be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional
pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On 4 June 1986, the respondent
Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the Philippines informing her of the Resolution of
the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner
who charged with 20 counts of estafa. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled
conditional pardon of the petitioner. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice
issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner.
Torres claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon. He was accordingly arrested and
confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. But the President has
chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code. The petition is dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs

1) Whether or not the President determines whether the condition has been violated?
2) Whether or not Torres violated the condition of his pardon?

1) Yes, only the President alone. The current doctrine holds that, by virtue of Section 64(i) of
Revised Administrative Code, the President may in his judgment determine whether the
condition of the pardon has been violated. That choice is an exercise of the President's
executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. The convict’s acceptance of the
conditional pardon carries with it acceptance of the President’s authority.

2) No. Even though Torres is facing a long list of criminal charges, as many as such charges
may be, none of them so far has resulted in a final conviction, without which he cannot be
recommitted under the condition of his pardon. An allegation merely accuses the defendant of a
crime: it is the conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a person is considered to
have committed a crime only if he is convicted thereof, and this is done not by his accuser but
by the judge. A "judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime" is
necessary before he could properly be adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.