You are on page 1of 304

Ivan Pokaz

“OLUJA” − ODGOVOR NA “STRATEGIJU REALNE PRIJETNJE”

(pregled i raščlamba vojne situacije u RH i BiH u razdoblju od 1991. do 1995.


u kontekstu operacije “Oluja”)
Izdavač:
Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, Zagreb

Za izdavača:
dr. sc. Ante Nazor

Urednici:
dr. sc. Ante Nazor
dr. sc. Julija Barunčić Pletikosić
Lektorica:
Julija Barunčić Pletikosić
Izrada kazala:
Domagoj Štefančić
Predgovor prevela na engleski:
Ana Perišić Mijić
Priprema i tisak:
Tiskara Rotim i Market
Naklada:
500 primjeraka / copies

Sva prava pridržavaju izdavači.

CIP zapis je dostupan u računalnome katalogu Nacionalne i sveučilišne knjižnice


u Zagrebu pod brojem 000899632.

ISBN 978-953-7439-61-3
EKSPERTNO IZVJEŠĆE
brigadnog generala u mirovini Ivana Pokaza
ZA PREDMET IT-60-09-T

“OLUJA”
− ODGOVOR NA “STRATEGIJU REALNE PRIJETNJE”

(pregled i raščlamba vojne situacije u RH i BiH


u razdoblju od 1991. do 1995. u kontekstu
operacije “Oluja”)

Zagreb, 2015.
Sadržaj
Riječ urednice/urednika........................................................................................10
Editor’s Note..........................................................................................................11
PREDGOVOR.......................................................................................................13
FOREWORD.........................................................................................................23
UVOD....................................................................................................................33
1. AGRESIJA NA REPUBLIKU HRVATSKU
– POKUŠAJ REALIZACIJE IDEJE „VELIKE SRBIJE“...................................39
Uvod.............................................................................................................................. 39
1.1. Pretvorba JNA u srpsku vojsku - od vojske „bez države”
do vojske iznad države......................................................................................... 42
1.1.1. O položaju JNA u sustavu obrane i jugoslavenskom društvu............. 42
1.1.2. O procesu pretvorbe JNA u srpsku vojsku............................................. 46
1.2. Potpora u održavanju uspostavljenog stanja okupacije................................... 54
1.2.1. Okupacija RH i uspostava Srpske vojske Krajine.................................. 54
1.2.2. Potpora koju je SRJ (VJ) davala „RSK“ (SVK)...................................... 57
2. “STRATEGIJA REALNE PRIJETNJE”
– POKUŠAJ OČUVANJA STANJA OKUPACIJE.............................................63
Uvod.............................................................................................................................. 63
2.1. “Strategija realne prijetnje” – strategija terorizma........................................... 64
2.1.1. Temeljna polazišta..................................................................................... 64
2.1.2. Podcjenjivanje drugih važna je značajka tvoraca i realizatora
ideje „Velike Srbije”.................................................................................... 66
2.2. Traženje odgovora primjerenog „strategiji realne prijetnje“.......................... 68
2.2.1. Izrada prve idejne zamisli napadajne operacije za oslobađanje
svih tada okupiranih područja RH......................................................... 68
2.2.2. Osposobljavanje sustava obavještajnog djelovanja za potporu
u operacijama............................................................................................. 73
2.3. Aktivnosti neprijatelja – provedba „strategije realne prijetnje“..................... 75
Uvod....................................................................................................................... 75
2.3.1. Početak preustroja SVK............................................................................ 77
2.3.2. Borbene aktivnosti.................................................................................... 81
2.3.3. Pokušaj popravljanja strateškog položaja zauzimanjem područja
zapadne Bosne........................................................................................... 82

5
3. NEUČINKOVIT MANDAT UNPROFOR-a NIJE BIO JAMSTVO
ZA MIRNU REINTEGRACIJU........................................................................91
Uvod.............................................................................................................................. 91
3.1. Uspostava UNPROFOR-a................................................................................... 92
3.1.1. Agresija na Hrvatsku i hrvatska nastojanja za uspostavu mira........... 92
3.1.2. Kronologija prihvaćanja Vanceovog plana i uspostave UNPA............ 93
3.1.3. Mandat UNPROFOR-a/UNCRO-a........................................................ 94
3.2. Neučinkovitost UNPROFOR-a/UNCRO-a...................................................... 97
3.2.1. Opstrukcije Vanceova plana i rezolucija Vijeća sigurnosti.................. 97
3.2.2. Nedostatak objektivnosti i neutralnosti u provođenju mandata....... 102
4. STANJE I AKTIVNOSTI VRS I SVK PRIJE POČETKA
OPERACIJE „OLUJA“....................................................................................109
Uvod............................................................................................................................ 109
4.1. Washingtonski sporazum – utjecaj na aktivnosti u BiH i RH...................... 110
Uvod..................................................................................................................... 110
4.1.1. Veza Washingtonskog i Zagrebačkog sporazuma............................... 110
4.1.2. (Ne)izravni učinci dva sporazuma........................................................ 114
4.2. Stanje i aktivnosti VRS i SVK početkom ljeta 1995. godine......................... 118
4.2.1. Opće značajke stanja............................................................................... 118
4.2.2. Indikatori strateški značajnih aktivnosti i promjena u SVK.............. 121
4.3. Početak operacije „Oluja“ uvjetovan je aktualnim stanjem
u zapadnim dijelovima BiH.............................................................................. 126
4.3.1. Plan izvođenja napadajne operacije na 5. korpus A BiH................... 126
4.3.2. Grupiranje snaga SVK za napadajnu operaciju................................... 128
4.3.3. Uvjeti i tijek izvođenja napadajne operacije SVK............................... 130
4.3.4. Operacija „Ljeto-’95“.............................................................................. 131
4.4. Ostali čimbenici koji su utjecali na izbor vremena početka
i načina izvedbe operacije „Oluja“.................................................................... 134
Umjesto zaključka...............................................................................................139
KRATICE.............................................................................................................273
PRILOZI..............................................................................................................277
POPIS PUBLIKACIJA I DOKUMENATA KOJI SU KORIŠTENI TIJEKOM
IZRADE I NA KOJE SE REFERIRA U TEKSTU EKSPERTIZE .......................142
KAZALO IMENA................................................................................................297
KAZALO MJESTA...............................................................................................299
O autoru...............................................................................................................303

6
Contents
INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................149
1. AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA – THE ATTEMPT
TO REALIZE THE IDEA OF THE ‘GREATER SERBIA’..............................155
Introduction................................................................................................................ 155
1.1. Transformation of the JNA to the Serb army
– from the Military ‘without a State’ to the military above the State......158
1.1.1. The position of the JNA in the system of defense
and the Yugoslav society......................................................................... 159
1.1.2. Process of transformation of the JNA into the Serb army................. 163
1.2. Support in maintaining the established status of occupation....................... 172
1.2.1. Establishing occupation and the ‘Serb Army of Krajina’................... 172
1.2.2. Support the SRJ (VJ) gave to the ‘RSK’ (SVK)..................................... 176
2. STRATEGY OF REAL THREAT –
ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN THE STATE OF OCCUPATION......................183
Introduction................................................................................................................ 183
2.1. The Strategy of Real Threat – the strategy of terrorism................................. 185
2.1.1. Basic starting point.................................................................................. 185
2.1.2. Underestimating others is an important characteristic
of the creators and realizers of the idea of the ‘Greater Serbia’.......... 187
2.2. In search of an appropriate answer to the strategy of real threat................. 189
2.2.1. Drafting the first conceptual idea of the offensive operation for the
liberation of all of the then occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia...
190
2.2.2. Training personnel for intelligence activity for support during
operations................................................................................................. 195
2.3. Enemy activities – implementation of the ‘strategy of real threat’............... 198
Introduction........................................................................................................ 198
2.3.1. Beginning of the reorganization of the SVK........................................ 200
2.3.2. Combat activities..................................................................................... 204
2.3.3. Attempts to improve the strategic position by occupying
the area of Western Bosnia..................................................................... 206
3. INEFFICIENT UNPROFOR MANDATE
WAS NO GUARANTY OF PEACEFUL REINTEGRATION........................217
Introduction................................................................................................................ 217

7
3.1. Establishment of the UNPROFOR.................................................................. 219
3.1.1. Aggression against Croatia and Croatian efforts
in establishing peace............................................................................... 219
3.1.2. Chronology of the acceptance of the Vance Plan and the
establishment of the UNPA areas.......................................................... 219
3.1.3. UNPROFOR/UNCRO mandate........................................................... 220
3.2. Inefficiency of the UNPROFOR / UNCRO.................................................... 224
3.2.1. Obstructions of the Vance Plan and the Security Council’s
Resolutions............................................................................................... 224
3.2.2. Lack of objectivity and neutrality in the implementation
of the mandate......................................................................................... 230
4. SITUATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE VRS AND SVK PRIOR TO
OPERATION „STORM“................................................................................237
Introduction................................................................................................................ 237
4.1. The Washington Agreement – effects on the activities in BiH and the
Republic of Croatia............................................................................................ 238
Introduction........................................................................................................ 238
4.1.1. The relation between the Washington Agreement and the Zagreb
Agreement................................................................................................ 238
4.1.2. In(direct) effects of the two agreements............................................... 242
4.2. The state and activities of the Serb Republic Army (VRS) and the Serb
Krajina Army (SVK) in early Summer 1995................................................... 247
4.2.1. General aspects of the situation............................................................. 247
4.2.2. Indicators of the strategically significant activities and changes within
the Serb Krajina Army (SVK)................................................................ 249
4.3. Beginning of Operation “Storm” conditioned by the latest developments in
the western parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina................................................ 256
4.3.1. Plan for the conduct of the offensive operation against the 5th Corps
of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (A BiH)............................... 257
4.3.2. Grouping of the SVK forces for the offensive operation.................... 258
4.3.3. Conditions and the course of the offensive operation of the SVK.... 261
4.3.4. Operation “Summer ‘95”........................................................................ 262
4.4. Other factors that determined the choice of the time for the commencement
and the modality of implementation of Operation “Storm”......................... 265
Instead of a conclusion........................................................................................271

8
Slobodna Dalmacija, 7. kolovoza 1995.
Riječ urednice/urednika
U knjizi je prikazan sadržaj ekspertnoga izvješća brigadnog generala u mirovini
Ivana Pokaza, izrađenog za „Predmet IT-60-09-T“, kao prilog obrani generala Ante
Gotovine u sudskom procesu na Međunarodnom kaznenom sudu za bivšu Jugosla-
viju u Haagu. Izvorni tekst na hrvatskom jeziku neznatno je preuređen u odnosu na
izvorni tekst koji je u lipnju 2009. pripremljen za suđenje u Haagu, a sadržaj engle-
skog izvornika nije promijenjen. Kao uvod u izvorni tekst, autor je za potrebe ove
knjige pripremio predgovor o organizaciji obavještajnog sustava u Hrvatskoj vojsci
i njegovoj djelatnosti u pripremi oslobodilačke operacije „Oluja“. Na kraju knjige
objavljen je popis dokumenata koje je autor koristio u izradi ovoga ekspertnog izvje-
šća, a koje je podrobnije opisao u navedenom predgovoru. Također, među prilozima
na kraju knjige objavljeni su pojedini zemljovidi na koje se autor u tekstu poziva,
preuzeti iz knjige Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict,
1990-1995, Volume I i II. (CIA, Washington DC, May 2002, October 2003), kao i ae-
ro-foto snimke pojedinih dijelova okupiranog teritorija Republike Hrvatske, koji se
navode u tekstu.
Izvori navedeni u ovoj knjizi potvrđuju da je „Oluja“ bila legitimna i legalno izve-
dena vojna operacija u skladu s načelima i doktrinom izvođenja borbenih operacija,
da se zbog isključive politike srpskog vodstva okupirano područje Republike Hrvat-
ske moglo osloboditi jedino vojnom operacijom, te da se zbog stanja u BiH, posebice
na bojištu oko Bihaća, „Oluja“ više nije smjela odgađati.

10
Editor’s Note
This publication presents the contents of the expert report of the retired Briga-
dier General Ivan Pokaz, made for the “Subject IT-60-09-T”, as a contribution to the
defence of General Ante Gotovina in the trial at the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. The original text in Croatian has been
slightly altered from the original text that was prepared for the trial in The Hague in
June 2009, and the content of the English original has not been changed. As an intro-
duction to the original text, for the purposes of this publication the author has pre-
pared the foreword on the structure of the intelligence system in the Croatian Army
and its activities in the preparation of the liberation operation “Storm”. At the end of
the publication a list of documents that the author used in the making of this expert
report was published, which were further described in the aforementioned foreword.
Also, among the contributions at the end of the publication several maps were pub-
lished that were mentioned in the text by the author, taken from the book Balkan
Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I and II
(CIA, Washington DC, May 2002, October 2003), as well as the aerial shots of certain
parts of the occupied Croatian territory, referred to in the text.
The sources listed in this publication have confirmed that the “Storm” was a le-
gitimate and legally conducted military operation in accordance with the principles
and doctrine of combat operations, that due to the exclusive policy of the Serbian
leadership the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia could be liberated only
by a military operation, and that due to the condition in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
especially on the battlefield around Bihać, “Storm” could no longer be delayed.

11
PREDGOVOR
Ekspertiza s naslovom „Pregled i analiza vojne situacije u RH i BiH u razdoblju
od 1991. do 1995. godine u kontekstu operacije ‘Oluja’“ izrađena je u skladu s potre-
bama odvjetničkog tima za obranu generala Ante Gotovine u sudskom procesu vo-
đenom pred Međunarodnim kaznenim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju u Hagu. Temeljni
cilj ekspertize bio je: analizom raspoloživih dokumenata, poglavito onih izrađenih ili
korištenih u Obavještajnoj upravi Glavnog stožera Oružanih snaga Republike Hrvat-
ske (ObU GS OSRH)1 u razdoblju na koje se ekspertiza odnosi, pokazati:
• da operacija „Oluja“ nije ni planirana ni izvedena kao zločinački pothvat,
kako je to tvrdilo Tužiteljstvo, nego je bila legitimna i legalno izvedena vojna
operacija u skladu s načelima i doktrinom izvođenja borbenih operacija;
• da je reintegracija tada okupiranih područja u državnopravni sustav Repub-
like Hrvatske bila realna i moguća jedino njihovim oslobađanjem uz prim-
jenu vojne sile, odnosno izvođenjem napadajne vojne operacije kakva je bila
vojno – redarstvena operacija „Oluja“;
• da bi odgađanje provedbe operacije „Oluja“ omogućilo okupaciju zapadne
Bosne od strane „srpskih vojski“, uz genocid i humanitarnu katastrofu ve-
likih razmjera te čvršćih veza između „Republike Srpske Krajine“ i Republike
Srpske, što bi Republiku Hrvatsku dovelo u vrlo nepovoljan položaj;
• da su stanje i aktivnosti „srpskih vojski“ na području RH i BiH bile međusobno
snažno korelirane i uvjetovane, osobito nakon potpisivanja Washingtonsk-
og i Zagrebačkog sporazuma, pa je i početak operacije „Oluja“ bio u velikoj
mjeri uvjetovan stanjem na području BiH.

Da bi se to pokazalo, bilo je potrebno objasniti stanje i aktivnosti „srpskih“ vojski


na okupiranim područjima RH i BiH, dakle stanje i aktivnosti Srpske vojske Krajine
(SVK) i Vojske Republike Srpske (VRS), i na temelju toga prosuditi namjere politič-
kih struktura samoproglašenih tvorevina kakve su bile Republika Srpska i „Republi-
ka Srpska Krajina“ u vezi uporabe vojne sile radi trajnog održanja stanja okupacije i
ujedinjenja uspostavljenih srpskih „država“ u zajedničku državu u skladu s idejom
„Velike Srbije“.

1 
 vdje se koristi naziv ObU GS OSRH iako se taj naziv tijekom vremena mijenjao, bilo da se mije-
O
njao naziv Obavještajne uprave (na primjer: Uprava za obavještajne poslove), bilo da se mijenjao
naziv Glavnog stožera (na primjer: Glavni stožer Hrvatske vojske – GSHV).

13
S obzirom na to da je istraživanje i poznavanje stanja i aktivnosti tih vojski, kao
i aktivnosti Vojske Jugoslavije vezanih uz stalnu i svakovrsnu potporu njima, te pro-
sudba njihovih mogućnosti i namjera bila stalna zadaća obavještajnih struktura
OSRH, na čelu s ObU GS OSRH, kao temelj za izradu Ekspertize korišteni su:
1) dokumenti izrađeni u Obavještajnoj upravi GS OSRH u razdoblju od 1992.
do 1995. godine
2) relevantni dokumenti SVK i VRS koji su bili na raspolaganju ObU GS OSRH
te
3) javno publicirani stavovi visokih vojnih dužnosnika SVK, VRS i Vojske Jugo-
slavije (VJ), odnosno JNA.2

Tri poglavlja Ekspertize (prvo, drugo i četvrto) odnose se upravo na prikaz stanja
i aktivnosti te na prosudbu namjera SVK i VRS. Od ukupno 99 referenci na koje se
u ta tri poglavlja poziva, da bi se dokumentiralo iznijete tvrdnje, 81 od njih pripada
u naprijed navedenu skupinu dokumenata. Od toga broja na pojedine kategorije od-
nosi se sljedeći broj referenci:
− obavještajni dokumenti izrađeni u ObU GS OSRH, kao što su dnevne
obavještajne informacije, tjedne raščlambe obavještajnih informaci-
ja, obavještajne raščlambe koje se odnose na specifične aktivnosti, stanja i
mogućnosti protivnika ili neprijatelja, obavještajne prosudbe namjera pro-
tivnika ili neprijatelja i drugi oblici obavještajnih proizvoda – ukupno 49;
− dokumenti zapovjedništava i stožera iz sastava SVK i VRS – ukupno 27;
− javno publicirani stavovi visokih dužnosnika VJ (JNA), SVK i VRS – ukupno 5.

Ovakav pristup u izradi Ekspertize, u kojem je potvrda postavljenih hipoteza te-


meljena na dokumentima od kojih je njih 50% izrađeno u ObU GS OSRH, dakle u
onoj upravi Glavnog stožera koja je bila zadužena za istraživanje i poznavanje nepri-
jatelja, a 25% su dokumenti kreirani upravo od strane tog neprijatelja, primijenjen je
iz sljedećih razloga:
− radi se o dokumentima koji se odnose samo na neprijatelja i na implikaci-
je koje njegove aktivnosti, mogućnosti i namjere imaju na proces traženja
rješenja za reintegraciju okupiranih područja;

2 
 okumenti navedeni pod 1) i 2) deklasificirani su i moguće ih je za potrebe istraživanja dobiti na
D
uvid u središnjoj pismohrani MORH-a, a sadržaj tih dokumenata, koji je izravno relevantan za Ek-
spertizu, naveden je u tekstu Ekspertize.

14
− Međunarodni kazneni sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKSJ) dobio je na uvid ve-
liki broj obavještajnih dokumenata izrađenih u razdoblju na koje se Eksperti-
za odnosi, od kojih se ni jedan ne odnosi na operaciju „Oluja“ i svi su izrađeni
prije početka operacije. Svaki od tih dokumenata potvrđuje neku konkretnu
tvrdnju ili zaključak iz Ekspertize, ali je sadržaj većine tih dokumenata znat-
no širi i odnosi se na brojne druge podatke, informacije, raščlambe ili pro-
sudbe o neprijatelju. Na taj način MKSJ je imao priliku uvjeriti se kako nigdje
nema nikakvog govora o nečemu što bi ukazivalo na možebitni zločinački
pothvat te kako se obavještajno djelovanje u odnosu na neprijatelja izvodilo
u skladu s recentnim doktrinama vojnog obavještajnog djelovanja i u skladu
s poznatim i priznatim načelima obavještajnog djelovanja, koja iz takvih dok-
trina proizlaze;
− na dokumente kreirane od strane zapovjedništava ili postrojbi SVK, odnos-
no VRS, poziva se kako bi se i na taj način potvrdila korektnost i utemeljen-
ost prosudbi koje je davala ObU GS OSRH u odnosu na namjere neprijatel-
ja, osobito u vezi s aktivnostima tijekom napadajnih operacija VRS i SVK
na područje zapadne Bosne, kao i u vezi s problematikom popune i ustroja
postrojbi SVK.

U Ekspertizi se na više mjesta poziva i na konstatacije iz publikacije Balkan Battle-


grounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I i II, koju je
u svibnju 2002. i listopadu 2003. objavila CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). Iako u
toj knjizi ima i ocjena koje se, blago rečeno, mogu smatrati dvojbenima, na tu knjigu
i osobito na zemljovide iz nje koji se odnose na borbena djelovanja tijekom operacija
koje su vodile postrojbe SVK i VRS radi osvajanja područja takozvane Autonomne
pokrajine Zapadne Bosne, poziva se da bi se usporedbom raščlambi i prosudbi ObU
GS OSRH izrađenih u vrijeme izvođenja tih operacija, sa stanjem i aktivnostima pri-
kazanim na spomenutim zemljovidima, pokazalo kako su potpuno vjerodostojne i
objektivne bile analize i prosudbe ObU GS OSRH. Pritom na umu treba imati i či-
njenicu da su ti dokumenti, rađeni u vrijeme izvođenja operacija, dakle u realnom
vremenu, s težištem na prosudbi budućih aktivnosti SVK i VRS, u nekim detaljima
precizniji, potpuniji i točniji od prikaza na zemljovidima iz knjige pisane i objavljene
nekoliko godina nakon završetka ratnih djelovanja u BiH.
U vezi poglavlja s naslovom „Neučinkovit mandat UNPROFOR-a nije bio jam-
stvo za mirnu reintegraciju“ (treće poglavlje Ekspertize) treba naglasiti, da je MKSJ u
Hagu tražio da se to poglavlje izdvoji iz Ekspertize. Braniteljski tim generala Gotovi-
ne složio se s takvim zahtjevom MKSJ-a, tako da se formalno – pravno gledajući, to

15
poglavlje ne smatra sastavnim dijelom Ekspertize. Međutim, ovdje se ono daje kao
sastavni dio teksta Ekspertize, kako bi čitatelji mogli sagledati cjelovitu ideju vodilju
u izradi Ekspertize.
Naime, u tom poglavlju objašnjava se uloga misije UNPROFOR-a, čija je neučin-
kovitost, odnosno neprimjerenost mandata doprinijela da izvođenje vojne operacije
s ciljem oslobađanja tada okupiranih područja RH ostane jedino primjereno rješenje
koje će omogućiti reintegraciju tada okupiranih područja RH u njezin državnoprav-
ni sustav. Taj dio Ekspertize nije temeljen na dokumentima ObU GS OSRH, nego
poglavito na dokumentaciji Ureda za vezu s UN-om i EZ-om Ministarstva obrane
RH, jer djelovanje obavještajnog sustava OSRH nije bilo usmjereno prema struktu-
rama UNPROFOR-a, koje nisu kvalificirane ni kao protivnik ni kao neprijatelj.
Kako je već istaknuto, pri izradi Ekspertize korištena je dokumentacija koja je
najvećim dijelom izrađena u Obavještajnoj upravi GS OSRH. Radi se o redovitim
obavještajnim proizvodima izrađenim u analitičkom odjelu ObU GS OSRH u raz-
doblju od 1992. do 1995. godine. U njihovoj izradi korišteni su podaci i informaci-
je pribavljene svim uobičajenim obavještajnim disciplinama (oblicima prikupljanja)
kojima je HV u tom razdoblju raspolagao, kao što su:
− SIGINT (Signal Intelligence), odnosno pribavljanje podataka i informacija
elektroničkim izviđanjem (presretanjem elektromagnetskih signala) radio i
radio-relejnih komunikacijskih sustava protivnika i sustava na području pod
okupacijom ili nadzorom protivnika;
− HUMINT (Human Intelligence), odnosno pribavljanje podataka i infor-
macija od ljudskih izvora, uključujući i izvidničke aktivnosti na bojišnici i u
dubini okupiranog područja;
− IMINT (Imagery Intelligence), odnosno prikupljanje slikovnih prikaza o
stanju i rasporedu elemenata borbenog rasporeda protivnika na zemljištu,
poglavito snimanjem iz zraka uz uporabu bespilotnih letjelica;
− OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), odnosno korištenje otvorenih izvora, po-
glavito tiskanih i elektroničkih medija s okupiranih područja RH i BiH.

Navedene oblike prikupljanja podataka i informacija provodile su specijalizirane


postrojbe HV-a (od taktičke do strategijske razine) iz stručne nadležnosti ObU GS
OSRH, te obavještajni odjeli zapovjedništava zbornih područja, HRZ-a i HRM-a,
odnosno obavještajni odsjeci postrojbi ranga brigade. Struktura obavještajnog sus-
tava OSRH tijekom razdoblja od 1992. do 1995. godine shematski je prikazana na
sljedećim slikama:

16
1) Na slici broj 1 dan je pojednostavljeni prikaz organizacijskog sastava HV-a,
pri čemu pojedine skraćenice imaju sljedeća značenja:
• GSHV – Glavni stožer Hrvatske vojske koji je u svojem sastavu imao
Obavještajnu upravu (ObU) kao stožerno tijelo, zaduženu za obavještajnu
potporu OS RH i kao najviše strukovno tijelo u OS RH odgovorno za
funkcioniranje cjelokupnog obavještajnog sustava u OS RH, pri čemu
su taj sustav činila obavještajna tijela u stožerima svih zapovjedništava i
postrojbe iz stručne nadležnosti Obavještajne uprave zadužene za priku-
pljanje obavještajnih podataka uz primjenu određenih obavještajnih dis-
ciplina;
• HRZ – Zapovjedništvo Hrvatskog ratnog zrakoplovstva, koje je u svojem
stožeru imalo Obavještajni odjel (ObO);
• HRM – Zapovjedništvo Hrvatske ratne mornarice, koje je u svojem
stožeru imalo Obavještajni odjel (ObO);
• ZP – Zapovjedništvo Zbornog područja (u početku rata bile su to Opera-
tivne zone), koje je u svojem stožeru imalo obavještajni odjel (ObO);
• gbr – gardijske brigade koje su u sastavu stožera imale obavještajni odsjek
(obod).3

2) Na slici broj 2 prikazana je načelna struktura postrojbi zaduženih za priku-


pljanje podataka izviđanjem na bojišnici i u dubini neprijateljskog rasporeda:
• IS – izvidničke satnije gardijskih brigada (i u drugim postrojbama ranga
brigade);
• vED - vod za elektroničko djelovanje iz sastava gardijskih brigada, koji je
u početku bio samostalna postrojba, a kasnije u sastavu izvidničke sat-
nije;
• IDS – izvidničko diverzantska satnija koju je u svojem sastavu, kao samo-
stalnu postrojbu, imalo svako zborno područje;
• IDS GSHV – izvidničko diverzantska satnija Glavnog stožera ko-
ja je, u skladu s prijedlogom ObU GSHV, dodjeljivana kao ojačanje u
obavještajnoj potpori zapovjedništvu ili postrojbi koja je bila nositelj iz-
vedbe neke operacije ili je bila na glavnom naporu.

3 
 adi bolje preglednosti na shemi nisu prikazane druge postrojbe razine brigade/pukovnije (pričuv-
R
ne brigade, domobranske pukovnije) kao ni postrojbe ranga bojne (samostalne ili iz sastava brigada/
pukovnija), koje su također imale svoje obavještajne organe i izvidničke postrojbe.

17
Slika broj 1: obavještajna tijela u Glavnom stožeru i u stožerima pojedinih
zapovjedništava i postrojbi.

Slika broj 2: izvidničke postrojbe gardijskih brigada i izvidničko diverzantske


postrojbe zbornih područja i GS HV-a.

18
3) Na slici broj 3 prikazano je mjesto i uloga postrojbe bespilotnih letjelica:
• VBL – vod bespilotnih letjelica Glavnog stožera OSRH, koji je u svojem
sastavu imao 3 desetine bespilotnih letjelica,
• BL – desetine bespilotnih letjelica teritorijalno raspoređene u Slavons-
kom Brodu, Sinju i Zagrebu.

VBL je imao središnji laboratorij za analizu snimaka u Zagrebu. Deseti-


ne BL bile su osposobljene za davanje potpore izviđanjem iz zraka u realnom
vremenu (Imagery) za potrebe djelovanja određenog operativnog zapovjed-
ništva ili postrojbe, a vod u cjelini bio je osposobljen za obavještajnu potporu
u planiranju operacija (IMINT) na operativnoj i strategijskoj razini. Bespilot-
na letjelica, uključujući i sustav upravljanja i vođenja te snimanja i prijenosa
slike u realnom vremenu, bila je proizvod djelatnika VBL. Ustroj postrojbe se
mijenjao, tako da je koncem rata prerasla u satniju bespilotnih letjelica.

Slika broj 3: Mjesto i uloga postrojbe bespilotnih letjelica Glavnog stožera OSRH.

19
4) Na slici broj 4 prikazano je mjesto i uloga postrojbi za elektroničko djelova-
nje, s težištem na Središnjici elektroničkog izviđanja:
• SEI – Središnjica elektroničkog izviđanja kao pristožerna postrojba GS
OSRH iz stručne nadležnosti ObU GS OSRH, namijenjena za pribavljan-
je podataka elektroničkim izviđanjem (SIGINT) radi obavještajne pot-
pore strategijskoj razini zapovijedanja;
• SED – Središte elektroničkog djelovanja, ustrojbena cjelina Središnjice EI,
namijenjena za provedbu zadaća elektroničkog izviđanja na određenom
dijelu teritorija RH u odnosu na neprijateljske radio i radio-relejne ko-
munikacijske sustave. Središta ED imala su zapovjedništva u Osijeku, Za-
grebu, Puli i Splitu;
• IPS – izdvojena prislušna skupina, kao temeljni prikupljački element
svakog SED-a, a broj IPS-ova u sastavu pojedinog SED-a ovisio je o kon-
figuraciji zemljišta, rasporedu objekata veze neprijatelja, uvjetima propa-
gacije elektromagnetskih valova u određenom frekvencijskom području,
planovima izvođenja operacija i dr.;
• Lab – laboratorij za multisenzorsko izviđanje koji je obavljao zadaće ana-
lize satelitskih snimaka, uzimanja i analize termovizijskih snimaka s plat-
forme kakav je bio helikopter MI-24, zadaće ELINT s platforme kakav je
bio zrakoplov AN-2;
• SatED GSHV – satnija za elektroničko djelovanje Glavnog stožera HV-
a bila je poglavito namijenjena za zadaće elektroničke borbe u potpo-
ri operacijama. Satnija ED uvijek se davala kao ojačanje zapovjedništvu
ili postrojbi koja je bila nositelj izvođenja posebno značajne zadaće.
Glede zadaća EI SatED bila je uvezana u sustav elektroničkog izviđanja
Središnjice EI posredstvom Središta ED u čijem području odgovornosti
se nalazila i u odnosu na to Središte ED imala je isti status kao bilo koja
IPS iz sastava tog Središta.
• vED – vod elektroničkog djelovanja iz sastava gardijske brigade, koji je
glede zadaća EI bio uvezan u sustav Središnjice EI, posredstvom teri-
torijalno nadležnog SED-a na čijem području odgovornosti se nalazila
raspoređena ili se planirala uporaba gardijske brigade kojoj je pripadao
vod ED. U odnosu na SED, vod ED se pojavljivao kao IPS.

20
Slika broj 4: Mjesto i uloga postrojbi za elektroničko izviđanje (SIGINT).

Sustav izvješćivanja unutar Središnjice EI išao je od IPS-a (vED, SatED) prema


teritorijalno nadležnom SED-u, od analitike SED-a prema analitici Središnjice EI-a.
Obavještajni proizvodi iz Središnjice EI-a dostavljani su u ObU GS OSRH, a proizvo-
di specifični za zrakoplovstvo dostavljani su u ObO HRZ-a.
Svi oni djelatnici koji su bili dio toga sustava, od izvidnika, elektroničkih izvidni-
ka i „bespilotnih“ izvidnika, do analitičara na svim razinama i u svim obavještajnim
disciplinama, dali su svoj doprinos stalnom i sustavnom istraživanju, upoznavanju i
razumijevanju neprijatelja, njegovih mogućnosti i namjera te tako doprinijeli uspješ-
noj provedbi operacija HV-a tijekom Domovinskog rata i omogućili dokumentiranje
tvrdnji i zaključaka iz Ekspertize.
U izradi Ekspertize izravno su svojim savjetima i prijedlozima, pomaganjem u
pronalaženju potrebnih dokumenata, ili svojim pisanim prilozima pridonijeli djelat-
nici MORH-a i OSRH, koji su u vremenu od 1991. do 1995. godine obnašali odgo-
varajuće dužnosti u Obavještajnoj upravi GS OSRH i u Uredu za UN i EZ MORH-a,
kao i djelatnici iz Tima za potporu obrani generala Ante Gotovine, a osobito pukov-
nik Budimir Pleština, satnik Goran Žugić, brigadir Braco Perić, kapetan bojnog bro-
da mr. sc. Željko Miše, pukovnik Anđelko Kozina, bojnik Zvonimir Rogić i pukovnik
mr. sc. Dario Klarić.

21
22
FOREWORD
The Expertise entitled “Review and analysis of the military situation in Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from 1991 until 1995 in the context of
the Operation “Storm” was made in accordance with the needs of the legal team for
the defence of General Ante Gotovina in a trial conducted before the International
Criminal Court in The Hague. The ultimate objective of the Expertise was: by ana-
lysing the available documents, especially those made by or used in the Intelligence
Administration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia
(ObU GSOSRH)4 in the period to which the Expertise relates, show that:
• The Operation “Storm” was neither planned nor executed as a criminal en-
terprise, as the prosecution claimed, but it was a legitimate and legally con-
ducted military operation in accordance with the principles and doctrines of
combat operations;
• The reintegration of the occupied territory into the state legal system of the
Republic of Croatia was realistic and only possible through its liberation with
the use of military force, that is, through carrying out offensive military op-
erations such as military and police operation “Storm”;
• The delay of the Operation “Storm” would have allowed the occupation of the
West Bosnia by the “Serbian armies”, with genocide and humanitarian catas-
trophe of major proportions and closer ties between the “Republika Srpska
Krajina” and the “Republika Srpska” of that time, which would result in put-
ting the Republic of Croatia in a very disadvantageous position;
• The status and activities of the “Serbian armies” on the territory of Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina were strongly correlated and conditioned, espe-
cially after the signing of the “Washington” and “Zagreb” agreement, so that
the beginning of the Operation “Storm” was largely conditioned by the situa-
tion in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

To be able to prove these statements, it was necessary to explain the status and
activities of the “Serbian” armies in the occupied areas of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, hence the status and activities of the “Serbian Army of Krajina” (SVK)
4 
 e title ObU GSHV is used here although this title has changed during time, either the Intelligence
Th
Department (for instance: the Directorate of Intelligence Affairs), or the General Staff (for instance:
the General Staff of the Croatian Army – GSVH). GSHV title is used here only in connection with
graphical displays.

23
and the “Army of the Republika Srpska” (VRS), and based on that judge the inten-
tion of political structures of the self-proclaimed entities such as “Republika Srpska”
and “Republika Srpska Krajina” regarding the use of military force in order to main-
tain the status of permanent occupation and unification of the established Serbian
“states” in a common state in accordance with the idea of the “Greater Serbia”.
Given that the research and knowledge of the status and activities of those armies,
as well as the activities of the Yugoslav Army related to the constant and all sorts
of support to them, and the judgment of their capabilities and intentions was the
continuous task of the intelligence structures of the GS OSRH, headed by the ObU
OSRH, as the basis for the Expertise the following were used:
1) the documents prepared in the Intelligence Administration of GS OSRH in
the period from 1992 until 1995 and
2) the relevant documents of SVK and VRS which were at disposal of ObU GS
OSRH and
3) the widely publicized views of senior military officials of the SVK and the
VRS and the Yugoslav Army (VJ), that is, “JNA”.5

Three chapters of the Expertise (the first, second and fourth) refer directly to the
display of the status and activities and the judgment of the intentions of the SVK and
VRS. From a total of 99 references stated in those three chapters in order to docu-
ment the expressed statements, 81 of them belong to the above mentioned group of
documents. Of this number, the following number of references refers to the follow-
ing categories:
− Intelligence documents created in the ObU GS OSRH, as well as daily intel-
ligence, weekly analysis of intelligence information, intelligence analysis per-
taining to specific activities, conditions and opportunities of the adversary
or enemy, intelligence judgments of its intentions and other forms of intelli-
gence products – a total of 49;
− Documents of the Command and Staff from the composition of the SVK and
VRS - a total of 27;
− the widely publicized views of senior military officials of the VJ (“JNA”), SVK
and VRS – a total of 5.

5 
 e documents listed under 1) and 2) have been declassified and it is possible for the purposes of
Th
research to gain insight into them in the central archives of the MORH, and the contents of these
documents, directly related to the Expertise, is indicated in the text of the Expertise.

24
Such an approach in the making of the Expertise, where the confirmation of the
set hypotheses is based on the documents out of which 50% was made in the ObU
GS OSRH, that is, in the very administration of the General Staff which was respon-
sible for research and knowledge of the enemy, and 25% of the documents were cre-
ated by that very enemy, was used for the following reasons:
− These are the documents that relate only to the enemy and the implications
of its activities, capabilities and intentions on the process of finding a solution
for the reintegration of the occupied territories;
− The International Criminal Court has received for review a large number of
intelligence documents prepared during the period to which the Expertise
relates to, none of which relating to the Operation “Storm” and all were made
before the start of the operation. Each of these documents confirms a partic-
ular argument or conclusion from the Expertise, but the content of most of
these documents is significantly broader and refers to a number of other data,
information, analyses or judgments about the enemy. In this way, the ICC
had the opportunity to see that there is no mention of anything that would
indicate eventual criminal enterprise and how the intelligence in relation to
the enemy was carried out in accordance with recent doctrines of military in-
telligence activities and in accordance with well-known and recognized prin-
ciples of intelligence activities that arise from such doctrines.
− The references are made to the documents created by the commands and
units of the SVK and the VRS, thus confirming the correctness and sound-
ness of judgment by ObU GS OSRH in relation to the enemy intentions, es-
pecially with regard to activities during the offensive operations of the VRS
and SVK on the territory of Western Bosnia, as well as in connection with the
issue of manning and organization of the SVK units.

In several places the Expertise calls on the findings contained in “Balkan Battle-
grounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I and II”,
published by the Central Intelligence Agency in May 2002 and October 2003. Al-
though this book contains some judgments that can be considered, to put it mildly,
questionable, this book and especially its cartography related to combat operations
during operations conducted by the units of the SVK and VRS in order to seize the
area of the so called Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia are called upon to
prove that, by comparing the analysis and judgment of the ObU GS OSRH made at
the time of performing of these operations with the situation and activities shown
in the above mentioned maps, the analyses and the judgment of the ObU GS OSRH

25
were completely credible and objective. In doing so, one must keep in mind the fact
that these documents, made in the run-time operations, that is, in real time, with
emphasis on the judgment of the future activities of the SVK and the VRS, are in
some details more precise, complete and accurate than the maps from the book writ-
ten and published several years after the end of the armed conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Regarding the chapter entitled “The ineffective UNPROFOR mandate was not a
guarantee for the peaceful reintegration” (chapter three of the Expertise) it should
be noted that the ICC in The Hague requested that this section be isolated from the
Expertise. The General Gotovina defence team agreed to such a request from the
ICC, so formally and legally speaking, this chapter is not considered an integral part
of the Expertise. However, here it is given as an integral part of the text of the Exper-
tise, so that the readers could have the complete guiding principle in the making of
the Expertise.
Specifically, this chapter explains the role of the UNPROFOR mission, whose
inefficiency or inadequacy of the mandate contributed that the performance of the
military operation in order to liberate the then occupied territory of Croatia re-
mained the only appropriate solution allowing for the reintegration of the then oc-
cupied territory of Croatia in its state and legal system. That part of the Expertise is
not based on documents of the ObU GS OSRH, but mainly on the documentation of
the Liaison Office of the Ministry of Defence with the United Nations and the Euro-
pean Union, because the activity of the intelligence system was not directed towards
the structures of the UNPROFOR.
As already stated, in making of this Expertise the documentation was used that
was mostly made in the Intelligence Administration of GS OSRH. These are regular
intelligence products made in the analytical department of the ObU GS OSRH from
1992 until 1995. In their making, the data and information were used that were gath-
ered by all regular intelligence disciplines (forms of collection) which the HV in this
period possessed, such as:
− SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) or the acquisition of data and information by
intercepting electromagnetic signals of radio and radio - relay communica-
tion systems of the adversary and the systems in the areas under occupation
or under control of the adversary;
− HUMINT (Human Intelligence), or obtaining data and information from
human sources, including reconnaissance activities on the battlefield and in
the depths of the occupied territory;

26
− IMINT (Imagery Intelligence), or the collection of graphics on the status
and distribution of elements of combat deployment of enemy units on the
ground, especially aerial photography using unmanned aerial vehicles;
− OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), or the use of open source, especially the
print and electronic media from the occupied areas of Croatia and Bosnia.

These forms of data collection and information were conducted by the special-
ized units of the HV (from tactical to strategic levels) from professional competence
of the ObU GS OSRH and the Intelligence Departments of the commands of the
Corps, HRZ and HRM, that is, the Intelligence departments of the troops in the rang
of a brigade. The structure of the intelligence system of the OSRH during the period
from 1992 until 1995 is schematically illustrated in the following images:

1) In Image No. 1 there is a simplified representation of the organizational


structure of the Croatian Army, where certain abbreviations have the follow-
ing meanings:
• GSVH – the General Staff of the Croatian Army which had in its composi-
tion the Directorate of Intelligence Affairs (ObU) as a central body respon-
sible for intelligence support to the Armed Forces (OS RH). It was the high-
est ranking professional body in the OS RH responsible for the functioning
of the entire intelligence system in the OS RH, where the system consisted
of intelligence bodies in the headquarters of all commands and units in the
professional competence of the Directorate of Intelligence Affairs respon-
sible for intelligence gathering with the use of appropriate intelligence disci-
plines;
• HRZ - Command of the Croatian Air Force, which had the Intelligence
Department (ObO) at its headquarters;
• HRM- Command of the Croatian Navy, which had the Intelligence De-
partment (ObO) at its headquarters;
• ZP - Command of the Corps (at the beginning of the war it was called the
Operational Zone), which had the Intelligence Department (ObO) at its
headquarters;
• gbr - guards brigades, which had the Intelligence Section (obod) at its
headquarters6.
6 
 ue to better transparency of the scheme, other units on the level of a brigade/regiment (reserve
D
brigades, defence regiments) are not shown on the scheme, as well as the units on the level of batta-

27
Reporting on data and
information from the
intelligence bodies from the
headquarters of the lower
commands towards ObU GSHV.

Reporting on data, information


and judgments from the
intelligence bodies towards
the competent headquarters,
commander/command.

Support with the data and


intelligence products from ObU
GSHV towards the intelligence
bodies of the commands and
units.

Image 1: The Intelligence bodies at the General Staff and in headquarters


of subordinated commands and units.

2) Image No. 2 shows the principal structure of the units responsible for data
gathering through reconnaissance on the battlefield and in the depth of the
enemy’s position:
• IS - reconnaissance company of the guards brigades (in other units at bri-
gade level as well);
• vED – EW/SIGINT platoon from the composition of the guards brigades,
which was originally an independent unit, and later a part of the recon-
naissance company;
• IDS - reconnaissance company each Corps had in its composition as an
independent unit;
• IDS GSHV - long range reconnaissance company of the General Staff,
which in line with the proposal of the OBU GSHV was allocated as a re-
inforcement in the intelligence support to the Command or units holding
the execution of an operation or in the main effort.

lion (either independent or forming part of a brigade/regiment), which also had their intelligence
organs and reconnaissance units.

28
Reporting on gathered data
and information by the
reconnaissance companies
towards the intelligence
department/section.

Image No. 2: Reconnaissance units of the Guards Brigade


and of the Corps and GS HV.

3) Image No. 3 shows the number and role of the unmanned aerial vehicle
(drone) unit:
• VBL - the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platoon of the General Staff,
which had three squads of the unmanned aerial vehicles in its composi-
tion,
• BL - squads of the unmanned aerial vehicles territorially distributed in
Slavonski Brod, Sinj and Zagreb.

VBL had a central laboratory for the analysis of images in Zagreb. The
squads of BL were trained for supporting aerial reconnaissance in real time
(Imagery) for the purposes of a certain operational command or unit, and
the platoon as a whole was trained for intelligence support in planning op-
erations (IMINT) at the operational and strategic level. The unmanned aerial
vehicle, including the system of image transfer in real time was a product of
the personnel of VBL. The structure of the unit has been changing over time
evolving into the UAV company towards the end of the war.

29
Reporting on data and
information gathered by aerial
reconnaissance (AFS) using UAVs
and the real time support by
assigning an UAV to the command
or unit that is preparing or
carrying out a combat task.

Image No. 3: The place and role of the UAV unit of the General Staff of the OS RH.

4) Image No. 4 shows the place and role of the SIGINT and EW units, with a fo-
cus on a SIGINT Centre:
• SEI - The SIGINT Centre as a unit of the GS OSRH from the professional
competence of the ObU GS OSRH, intended for intelligence support to
the strategic level of command;
• SED - SIGINT and EW Centre, organizational unit of the SEI intended to
implement the SIGINT tasks on a certain part of the territory of the Re-
public of Croatia there were altogether four territorial (regional) distrib-
uted SIGINT and EW Centres (SED).
• IPS – SIGINT site, a fundamental collection element of every SED. The
number of IPSs in any SED depended on the configuration of the terrain,
the arrangement of the enemy communication system, the conditions of
propagation of electromagnetic waves in a certain frequency range, op-
eration plans etc.

30
• Lab – the laboratory for multisensory surveillance, which performed
tasks of analysing satellite imagery, collection and analysis of thermal im-
aging shots from a platform such as MI-24 helicopter, ELINT tasks from
the platform such as AN-2 aircraft
• satED GSHV – the EW/SIGINT company of the General Staff of the HV
was especially designed for the tasks of EW in operations support. Re-
garding the SIGINT tasks, the company was bound in a system of SI-
GINT Centre through the SED to which area of responsibility it belonged
and in relation to the SED it had the same status as any IPS from the com-
position of that SED.
• vED - regarding SIGINT activities vED was involved, through territori-
ally competent SED in whose area of responsibility it was deployed. In
relation to the SED, the vED appeared as an IPS.

Image No. 4: The place and role of the SIGINT and EW units.

31
The reporting system within the SIGINT Centre went from IPS (vED, SatED) to
the territorially competent SED, from the analytics of the SED to the analytics of the
SEI. The intelligence products from the SEI were delivered to the ObU GS OSRH,
and products specific to the aviation were delivered to the ObO HRZ.
All those employees who were part of that system, from the members of recon-
naissance, EW, UAV and SIGINT units, to the analysts at all levels and in all in-
telligence disciplines, have contributed to the continuous and systematic research,
knowledge and understanding of the enemy, the enemy’s capabilities and intentions.
In this way they gave great contribution to the successful implementation of the Cro-
atian Army operations during the Homeland War and enabled the documentation of
the allegations and conclusions of the Expertise.
In making of the Expertise the numerous employees of the MORH and OSRH,
as well as the members of the team for support to defense of General Ante Gotovina,
have contributed directly with their advice and suggestions, assisting in finding the
required documents, or with their written contributions: Colonel Budimir Pleština,
Captain Goran Žugić, Colonel Braco Perić, Captain Željko Miše, Lieutenant colonel
Anđelko Kozina, Major Zvonimir Rogić and Lieutenant colonel Dario Klarić.

32
UVOD
Vojno-redarstvena operacija „Oluja“ planirana je, pripremana i provedena kao le-
galno, legitimno i opravdano rješenje koje je u tadašnjim uvjetima omogućilo rein-
tegraciju okupiranih područja u državnopravni sustav Republike Hrvatske. Naime,
po mnogočemu je bilo očito, da bi svako daljnje zadržavanje statusa quo, kako na
području RH tako i na području BiH onemogućavalo elementarno funkcioniranje i
daljnji razvoj Republike Hrvatske kao moderne europske države (vodilo bi, kako se to
kolokvijalno govorilo, „ciprizaciji“ RH), te bi potenciralo postojeće i proizvodilo nove
nestabilnosti kao i sigurnosne, ratne i humanitarne krize i ugroze u užoj i široj regiji.
Tadašnji status quo svodio se na činjenicu da su dijelovi teritorija Republike Hr-
vatske i BiH uporabom vojne sile (agresijom JNA) i paravojnih snaga (pobunom di-
jela lokalnog srpskog pučanstva) 1991. godine (u BiH tijekom 1992. godine) nasilno
okupirani i etnički (o)čišćeni, s namjerom da se taj dio teritorija odcijepi od matične
države i pripoji drugoj državi (SRJ ili nekoj drugoj, „projektiranoj“ srpskoj državi).
Pri tome su i ostali dijelovi teritorija RH bili izloženi borbenim djelovanjima, u na-
mjeri da se Hrvatskoj onemogući ili barem oteža organiziranje obrane svojega teri-
torija i sprječavanje ostvarenja ciljeva planirane velikosrpske politike.
U planiranju, organiziranju i provedbi pobune lokalnog srpskog pučanstva, agre-
sije na RH i okupacije dijela njezinog teritorija, ključnu ulogu je imala JNA. To je
samo po sebi moralo rezultirati primjenom vojnih sredstava u realizaciji ciljeva već
spomenute velikosrpske politike, te otvorenom agresijom na RH snagama JNA iz Sr-
bije i s područja tadašnje BiH.
Već općepoznati i javno dostupni članci i publikacije, kao što su Memorandum
SANU (Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti), javni nastupi Slobodana Miloševića,
knjiga Veljka Kadijevića Moje viđenje raspada (1993.), knjiga admirala Branka Ma-
mule Slučaj Jugoslavija (2000.), članci generala Radovana Radinovića, knjiga gene-
rala Milisava Sekulića Knin je pao u Beogradu (2001.), te knjiga Borisava Jovića Po-
slednji dani SFRJ (1996.), dakle iskazi i svjedočenja izravnih sudionika s agresorske
strane, pokazuju:
• da je pobuna lokalnih Srba tijekom 1991. godine:
− osmišljena, potaknuta i potpomognuta od tadašnje jugoslavenske (odnos-
no srbijanske i velikosrpske) politike i JNA,
− izvedena kao oružani i teroristički čin protiv Republike Hrvatske,
− bila dio plana (strategije) realizacije ideje i politike „Velike Srbije“;

33
• da je formiranje „Republike Srpske Krajine“
− bio ne samo rezultat, nego i temeljni cilj te politike,
− nužan korak na putu k ostvarivanju ideje „Velike Srbije“, u skladu s motom
te politike – „svi Srbi u jednoj državi“, što nije bilo moguće ostvariti bez
razbijanja Hrvatske, odnosno bez okupacije i odvajanja dijelova njezina
teritorija nasilnim putem, kao ni bez razbijanja BiH i okupacije najvećeg
dijela njezina teritorija;
• da je na okupiranim područjima RH formirana „Srpska vojska Krajine“
kako bi:
− nakon formalnog povlačenja JNA osigurala „obranu“ uspostavljenih
„granica RSK“, odnosno „zapadnih granica Velike Srbije“, a da
− ni njezino formiranje ni njezino održavanje (financiranje, popuna, raz-
voj, opremanje, obuka i djelovanje) nije bilo moguće bez svekolike i kon-
tinuirane potpore SRJ i VJ;
• da „RSK“ sa svojim vojnim, prirodnim, gospodarskim, ljudskim i inim resur-
sima, unatoč svakovrsnoj potpori iz SRJ (VJ) nije mogla osigurati
učinkovito izvršenje misije (odcjepljenje okupiranih dijelova teritorija), te je
radi toga i osmišljena „strategija odmazde“ ili „strategija realne prijetn-
je“ koja je, kako su to otvoreno tvrdili njezini kreatori, trebala Republiku
Hrvatsku dovesti u stanje „dugotrajnog umiranja u agoniji“;
• da je „strategija odmazde“ smišljena kako bi odvratila RH od bilo kakvog
pokušaja primjene vojnih sredstava radi oslobađanja i reintegracije svojih
tada okupiranih područja, pod prijetnjom nanošenja „neprihvatljivih gu-
bitaka“ djelovanjem topničko-raketnih sustava po gradovima i drugim civil-
nim ciljevima i objektima koji nisu bili vojni.

U takvim uvjetima ni nastojanja RH ni međunarodne zajednice nisu više davala


niti naslutiti da bi se tada okupirana područja RH mogla mirnim putem reintegrirati
u državnopravni sustav RH, a osobito ne u dogledno i racionalno prihvatljivo vrije-
me. U vezi s tim postalo je jasno:
• da ni mandat UNPROFOR-a, na način na koji je bio definiran i sredstvima te
metodama kojima je trebao biti realiziran, nije predstavljao nikakvo jamstvo
da će reintegracija okupiranih područja RH biti uspješno obavljena, jer za to
nisu bile ostvarene ni temeljne pretpostavke, kao što su:
− demilitarizacija UNPA (United Nations Protected Area – zaštićena zona
Ujedinjenih naroda),

34
− povratak prognanika na UNPA područja,
− uspostava hrvatske vlasti u takozvanim „ružičastim“ zonama,
− sprječavanje borbenih djelovanja s okupiranih područja RH prema za-
padnoj Bosni i po gradovima na slobodnom dijelu RH;
• da je stanje na okupiranim područjima RH bilo izuzetno snažno uvjetovano
stanjem na području BiH, jer je područje Republike Srpske:
− davalo potrebnu operativnu dubinu za učinkovitu obranu okupiranih
područja,
− omogućavalo povezivanje (prometno, teritorijalno, političko, gospodar-
sko, nacionalno) „srpskih zemalja“ bez čega nije bila moguća realizacija
ideje „Velike Srbije“,
− bilo jedan od čimbenika na kojem je bila utemeljena provedba „strategije
realne prijetnje“.

Nakon gotovo petogodišnje okupacije dijela hrvatskog državnog teritorija, ope-


racijom „Oluja“ oslobođen je veći dio tog područja te je tako omogućeno njegovo
integriranje u državnopravni sustav Republike Hrvatske.
Međutim, osobito je značajno istaknuti, da su tek vojne operacije koje su HV,
HVO i A BiH proveli na području BiH, bilo da su prethodile operaciji „Oluja“ ili bile
njezin logični nastavak, osigurale uvjete za prestanak rata u BiH i za poraz politike
koja je prijetila trajnom destabilizacijom regije.
To je u konačnici omogućilo:
• mirnu reintegraciju tadašnjeg UNPA sektora Istok u državnopravni sustav
RH,
• otklanjanje opasnosti od možebitne vojne ili terorističke ugroze iz zagraničnih
područja RH te
• prestanak rata u BiH i uspostavu „daytonske“ BiH.

Bez ulaženja u objašnjavanje drugih (relevantnih) konteksta u kojima se odvija-


la operacija „Oluja“, kao što su politički, nacionalni, vjerski, regionalni, diplomatski,
geostrategijski, povijesni itd., a sagledavajući poglavito vojnu dimenziju (vojne as-
pekte uzroka, razloga, uvjeta izvedbe i dosega), ova Ekspertiza pokazuje:
• da je vojno-redarstvena operacija „Oluja“ bila regularna i legitimna vojna
operacija, dugotrajno planirana i pripremana7 te na kraju izvedena s ciljem
7 
HMDCDR, 18., Referat, Stožerni brigadir Obradović, Zagreb, 19. rujna 1995.

35
oslobađanja i integriranja tada okupiranih dijelova RH u njezin državnopravni
sustav, uz primjenu vojnih sredstava, jer dotadašnja nastojanja Republike
Hrvatske i međunarodne zajednice da se reintegracija tih područja postigne
političkim sredstvima i na miran način, nisu dala očekivani i željeni rezultat;
• da je opcija vojnog oslobađanja okupiranih područja RH pripremana od
samih početaka agresije na RH, kao alternativa za slučaj da druge aktivnosti
koje su poduzimane radi reintegracije tada okupiranih područja RH mirnim
putem i političkim sredstvima, u razumnom roku ne daju željene rezultate, a
posebno su aktualizirane i intenzivirane nakon pojave „strategije realne pri-
jetnje“;
• da su vrijeme pokretanja i način izvedbe operacije „Oluja“ uvjetovani raz-
vojem ukupne situacije u širem i užem okružju Republike Hrvatske, a osobito
vojnim stanjem na području BiH i poglavito na području Bihaća i Graho-
va.

Tekst Ekspertize sadrži četiri poglavlja:

U prvom poglavlju se ukazuje na genezu (oružane) pobune srpskog etnič-


kog pučanstva u Hrvatskoj, usmjerene protiv stvaranja samostalne države
Hrvatske, a u funkciji ostvarenja ideje „Velike Srbije“:
• objašnjava se uloga JNA koja je bila odlučujuća za takav razvoj događaja,
kao i činjenica da se dotadašnja, barem formalno jugoslavenska vojska
transformirala u srpsku;
• ukazuje se na vezu između ideje i politike „Velike Srbije“ i realizacije te
politike kroz stvaranje, funkcioniranje i održavanje „Republike Srpske
Krajine“ i njezine „vojske“ kao jedinstvenog dijela „srpskih teritorija“,
odnosno „srpskih vojski“.

U drugom poglavlju je objašnjen značaj obznanjivanja „strategije realne pri-


jetnje“ kao poluge i pokušaja trajnog održavanja stanja okupacije:
• u prvom dijelu tog poglavlja težište je na objašnjenju teorijsko – doktri-
narnog značaja usvajanja i primjene „strategije realne prijetnje“;
• u drugom dijelu prikazana je geneza nastanka idejne zamisli operacije
„Oluja“ kao jedinog mogućeg odgovora na „strategiju realne prijetnje“;
• u trećem dijelu objašnjeno je stanje, aktivnosti i namjere neprijatel-
ja u razdoblju od usvajanja „strategije realne prijetnje“ pa do operacije

36
„Oluja“, kako bi se pokazalo da je ta strategija provođena u praksi i da
oslobađanje tada okupiranih dijelova RH i njihova reintegracija nije bila
moguća bez vojne operacije.

U trećem poglavlju objašnjeno je kako provedba mandata UNPROFOR-a


nije mogla biti nikakvo jamstvo da će se reintegracija okupiranih područja
RH obaviti mirnim putem, poglavito zbog nekooperativnosti srpske strane,
ali i zbog neodlučnosti pojedinih dijelova kontingenta UNPROFOR-a da pri-
moraju srpsku „stranu“ na kooperativan odnos.

Osim značaja aktivnosti koje je provodila SVK u vrijeme nakon operacije


„Bljesak“, u četvrtom poglavlju objašnjava se i značaj te utjecaj stanja i ak-
tivnosti zaraćenih strana na području BiH na završno planiranje i provedbu
operacije „Oluja“. Ukazuje se kako je operacija „Oluja“, iako od presudnog
značaja za oslobađanje tada okupiranih područja RH, bila i dio ukupnih voj-
nih aktivnosti, uključujući i one koje su joj prethodile i one koje su slijedile
nakon nje, a realizirale su ih snage HVO-a, HV-a i A BiH na području BiH,
koje su dovele do konačnog prekida ratnih djelovanja na području RH i BiH,
a u konačnici i do poraza politike koja je prijetila (dugo)trajnom destabiliza-
cijom područja jugoistoka Europe.

37
38
1.

AGRESIJA NA REPUBLIKU HRVATSKU –


POKUŠAJ REALIZACIJE IDEJE „VELIKE
SRBIJE“

Uvod
Dana 28. lipnja 1989. godine, u povodu obilježavanja 600. obljetnice bitke na
Kosovu, na Gazimestanu, nedaleko od Prištine, upriličen je veliki skup na kojem je
govorio predsjednik Srbije Slobodan Milošević, izgovorivši tada, između ostaloga, i
sljedeće riječi:
„Danas, šest stoljeća kasnije, opet smo u bitkama i pred bitkama. One nisu
oružane, premda takve još nisu isključene. Ali bez obzira kakve da su one,
bitke se ne mogu dobiti bez odlučnosti, hrabrosti i požrtvovnosti.“
Dakle, samo tri godine nakon objave Memoranduma SANU, u kojem je revitali-
zirana i aktualizirana, u 19. stoljeću rođena, ideja „Velike Srbije“, Milošević otvoreno
govori o vremenu pred bitke, pri čemu ni oružane ne isključuje. Radi se o bitkama koje
će u skladu s idejom „Velike Srbije“ i kao rezultat tvrdnje da su „Srbi povijesno, etno-
loški i antropogeografski najvrjednije stanovništvo i jezgra Balkanskog poluotoka, te
da imaju pravo u svoju državu uključiti sve zemlje gdje ima Srba i, dakako, vladati nji-
ma“8 te u skladu s tezom iz Memoranduma, da je „srpski narod nakon II. svjetskog rata
opljačkan, a svi Srbi izvan Srbije u drugim federalnim dijelovima SFRJ su ugroženi“, bi-
ti poduzete kako bi se oživotvorila spomenuta parola o „svim Srbima u jednoj državi“.9
8 
 iroslav Brandt, Bože Čović, Slaven Letica, Radovan Pavić, Zdravko Tomac, Mirko Valentić, Stanko
M
Žuljić, Izvori velikosrpske agresije, Zagreb, 1991., 328.
9 
Dijelovi „Memoranduma“ objavljeni su u Večernjim novostima, Beograd, 24. i 25. rujna 1986.

39
Vrijeme je to kada se već naslućuje raspad SFRJ, a jedinim „kohezijskim“ čim-
benikom jedinstvene SFRJ, koji može i mora osigurati realizaciju parole „svi Srbi u
jednoj državi“, (samo)proglašava se tadašnja Jugoslavenska narodna armija (JNA).
Spomenuti Memorandum i vodstvo tadašnje Socijalističke Republike Srbije stvo-
rili su podlogu za realizaciju namjere za dominacijom na 2/3 prostora bivše SFRJ.
Realizaciji te ideje postupno pristupa partijsko – političko vodstvo Srbije uz pomoć
tadašnje federalne vojske – JNA, koja se postupno pretvara u instrument (veliko)
srpske politike.
Ideja „Velike Srbije“ nije mogla biti realizirana ako prethodno nisu bili ispunjeni
određeni uvjeti. Na ispunjenju tih uvjeta sustavno je radilo političko vodstvo tadaš-
nje Srbije:
• redefiniranje Ustava SR Srbije, kojim je praktično ukinut autonomni status
Kosova i Vojvodine u okviru Srbije i SRJ, što je predstavljalo prvi korak pre-
ma stvaranju „Velike Srbije“,
• nasilno gušenje pokreta i protesta kosovskih Albanaca u njihovim nastojan-
jima za ostvarenjem autonomije,
• proširenje Srbije na teritorije nekadašnjih republika bivše SFRJ, poglavito na
dijelove teritorija Hrvatske i BiH.

Raspad SFRJ i nastanak novih država na području bivše SFRJ tumačen je od stra-
ne ideologa i realizatora ideje „Velike Srbije“ kao izravna ugroza srpskih nacionalnih
interesa pa je tu ugrozu trebalo spriječiti i oružanom silom - uporabom tadašnje
JNA. Tako je na poticaj i uz potporu SRJ te uz izravno angažiranje JNA, u agresiji na
RH sudjelovao značajan dio srpskog pučanstva u Republici Hrvatskoj koji nije želio
Hrvatsku kao svoju državu, nego je od matice zemlje pokušao odcijepiti dio hrvat-
skih područja, približno do crte Virovitica - rijeka Kupa – Karlovac - Karlobag, s ci-
ljem stvaranja „Velike Srbije“.
O tome vrlo „egzaktno svjedoči i knjiga generala Veljka Kadijevića10 Moje viđenje
raspada (Beograd, 1993.), u kojoj se između ostaloga kaže sljedeće:
„Glavne ideje iz osnovne zamisli na kojima su razrađeni planovi uporabe
JNA na cijelom jugoslavenskom prostoru su bile: poraziti Hrvatsku vojsku
potpuno, ako situacija dozvoli, obavezno u mjeri koja će omogućiti izvršenje
postavljenih ciljeva; ostvariti puno sadejstvo sa srpskim ustanicima u Srpskoj
krajini…“11
10 
 vrijeme raspada Jugoslavije general Veljko Kadijević obnašao je dužnost saveznog sekretara za
U
narodnu obranu, što je zapravo bila funkcija ministra obrane SFRJ.
11 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada – vojska bez države, „Politika“, Beograd, 1993., 134.

40
„Ideja manevra sadržala je sledeće osnovne elemente:
− potpuno blokirati Hrvatsku iz vazduha i sa mora;
− pravce napada glavnih snaga JNA što neposrednije vezivati za oslobađanje
srpskih krajeva u Hrvatskoj i garnizona JNA u dubini hrvatske teritorije. U
tom cilju ispresecati Hrvatsku na pravcima Gradiška – Virovitica; Bihać –
Karlovac – Zagreb; Knin – Zadar; Mostar – Split. Najjačom grupacijom ok-
lopno - mehanizovanih snaga osloboditi Istočnu Slavoniju, a zatim brzo nas-
taviti dejstvo na zapad, spojiti se sa snagama u Zapadnoj Slavoniji i produžiti
ka Zagrebu i Varaždinu, odnosno ka granici Slovenije. Istovremeno jakim
snagama iz rejona Herceg Novi – Trebinje blokirati Dubrovnik sa kopna i iz-
biti u dolinu Neretve i na taj način sadejstvovati snagama koje nastupaju na
pravcu Mostar – Split;
− nakon dostizanja određenih objekata, obezbjediti i držati granicu Srpske
Krajine u Hrvatskoj, izvući preostale dijelove JNA iz Slovenije i nakon toga
povući JNA iz Hrvatske (…)“12

Međutim, značajno je zapaziti da se na stranici 134., na kraju trećeg ulomka,


potpuno jasno kaže i sljedeće: „posebno voditi računa da će uloga srpskoga naro-
da u Bosni i Hercegovini biti ključna za budućnost srpskoga naroda u cjelini. Tome
prilagoditi lociranje snaga JNA.“
General Kadijević je tako na određeni način anticipirao ono što će se zapravo na
koncu i dogoditi: poraz velikosrpske politike u odnosu na Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Her-
cegovinu morat će se dogoditi u BiH. Naime, upravo u skladu s naprijed rečenim
„lociranjem JNA“, srpske snage u BiH su do 1994. godine okupirale (stavile pod svoj
nadzor) više od 70% teritorija BiH13 i tek u operacijama Armije BiH, HVO-a i HV-a,
vođenim na području BiH nakon operacije „Oluja“, stvoreni su uvjeti za vojni poraz
Vojske Republike Srpske (VRS), a time i za poraz velikosrpske politike.

12 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 135.
13 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict”, 1990-1995, Volume I, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Zemljovid „L“ (Prilog na str. 283.).

41
1.1. Pretvorba JNA u srpsku vojsku - od vojske „bez države”
do vojske iznad države
Pretvaranje Jugoslavenske narodne armije (JNA) iz oružane sile „svih naroda i
narodnosti“, kako je tadašnjim političkim rječnikom bilo uobičajeno govoriti, u voj-
sku jednog naroda ili srpsku vojsku14 (što će se kao pojam i naziv dalje rabiti), a što se
događalo tijekom osamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća, zaslužuje osobitu pozornost.
Potreba osobite pozornosti proizlazi iz nesporne činjenice da je upravo pretva-
ranje JNA u srpsku vojsku jedan od bitnih fenomena krize bivše SFRJ. Naime, taj fe-
nomen je političku krizu bivše države dijelom i proizvodio i dodatno komplicirao, a
nedvojbeno je imao ključnu ulogu u nametanju rata kao načina njezinog „raspleta“.
Radi se o tome, da je prvo prijetnja uporabom, a potom i uporaba oružane sile s
ciljem onemogućavanja ostvarivanja legitimnih težnji za osamostaljenjem iz okvira
SFRJ, a pod izgovorom „spašavanja države“, neizbježno vodila i dovela do rata na tlu
bivše Jugoslavije.

1.1.1. O položaju JNA u sustavu obrane i jugoslavenskom društvu


S više strana je položaj JNA u jugoslavenskom društvu bio osobit pa i neobičan
u odnosu na ustavnopravna određenja oružanih snaga modernih država druge po-
lovice prošlog stoljeća. Takve značajke njezina položaja upravo su došle do izražaja
tijekom 1980-ih godina, dakle u vrijeme pojačavanja i kompliciranja jugoslavenske
krize. Najvažnija je ta, da je JNA u jugoslavenskom društvu djelovala kao jedan od
značajnih političkih čimbenika i moglo bi se reći da su se kroz to pokazivale i sve
druge specifičnosti njezinog položaja. Ustavnopravno, JNA je bila određena kao „za-
jednička oružana sila svih naroda i narodnosti“ i „dio jedinstvenih oružanih snaga“,
koje je uz nju činila Teritorijalna obrana (TO). Namjena joj je bila da zajedno s TO
„štiti nezavisnost, suverenitet, teritorijalnu cjelokupnost i Ustavom utvrđeno druš-
tveno uređenje SFRJ“. Dakle, zadaća JNA je, po Ustavu, bila sastavljena iz dva dijela:
− obrana zemlje od vanjske agresije i
− zaštita Ustavom utvrđenog poretka.15

14 
 o dakako uključuje i sve druge koji su iz različitih pobuda prihvatili parolu „borbe za Jugoslaviju“,
T
iako je ona bila samo paravan za unitarističke velikosrpske ambicije.
15 
Ima mjesta tvrdnji da bi ustavnopravna ekspertiza pokazala da se uistinu radi samo o dvije
strane jedne iste zadaće, obrane od vanjske agresije, ali to nije predmet ovoga rada, već kakvo
je bilo uobičajeno tumačenje ustavnog određenja.

42
Temeljem takvog položaja u sustavu, JNA je politički tretirana prvo kao „važan
čimbenik unutarnje stabilnosti“, a kasnije, kako su odnosi u federaciji sve jače zapa-
dali u krizu, kao „jedan od najvažnijih“ integrirajućih čimbenika države, što je vre-
menom doseglo i epitet „jedinog preostalog pravog“ čimbenika jedinstva i teritori-
jalne cjelovitosti zemlje.
Bitna značajka položaja JNA sadržana je i u činjenici da je u njoj djelovala „Or-
ganizacija SKJ u JNA“, kao dio SKJ po svom položaju gotovo jednak položaju orga-
nizacija SK republika i pokrajina koje su činile bivšu SFRJ. Već je to, samo po sebi,
omogućavalo djelovanje na jugoslavenskoj političkoj sceni u ulozi stvarno osamosta-
ljenog, iako ne i formalno samostalnog političkog čimbenika. Moglo bi se reći da je
temeljem toga, osim što je bila „oružana sila svih naroda i narodnosti“, JNA u sustavu
objektivno imala i položaj „oružane sile partije“, ili „partijske vojske“. Razumije se,
ovo treba shvatiti u ideološko – političkom, a ne u funkcionalnom smislu.
To je generiralo značajne negativne posljedice, koje su se najdrastičnije manife-
stirale u političkim uzurpacijama vrha JNA, od kojih je najteža pretvaranje JNA u
srpsku vojsku te provociranje i nametanje rata za račun velikosrpske politike, a pod
izlikom „spašavanja Jugoslavije“. Spomenute uzurpacije političke uloge u jugosla-
venskoj krizi osobito postaju jasne kada se sagleda sustav zapovijedanja oružanim
snagama bivše države.
Treba podsjetiti da je na vrhu zapovjedne strukture oružanih snaga bivše SFRJ
bilo Predsjedništvo SFRJ, kao najviše kolektivno tijelo upravljanja i zapovijedanja. U
ime Predsjedništva, po Ustavu, vrhovno zapovijedanje ostvarivao je u danom trenut-
ku njegov aktualni predsjednik, koji je po propisanoj proceduri biran između člano-
va Predsjedništva na razdoblje od jedne godine. Nije nevažan detalj da je ova proce-
dura bila pokrenuta nakon smrti Josipa Broza Tita, pa je kasnije bila permanentna i
bio je unaprijed poznat redoslijed „izbora“ na tu dužnost.
Predsjedništvo SFRJ imalo je nadležnosti da, uz ostalo, utvrđuje postojanje izrav-
ne ratne opasnosti, da zapovjedi opću ili djelomičnu mobilizaciju i, ako to Skupština
SFRJ nije u mogućnosti, proglasi ratno stanje te shodno tome odobri planove upo-
rabe i zapovjedi uporabu oružanih snaga. Treba naglasiti, da je upravo bojna upora-
ba oružanih snaga, što znači postrojbi i drugih efektiva JNA i TO, bila u isključivoj
nadležnosti Predsjedništva SFRJ i nije se mogla prenositi na niže instance u sustavu
zapovijedanja.
Najviše upravno tijelo i ujedno stožerno tijelo vrhovnog zapovijedanja, službeno
nazivano i „štabom vrhovne komande“, bio je Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu obra-

43
nu (SSNO), na čijem je čelu bio savezni sekretar, a u sastavu SSNO-a je, uz ostale
dijelove, bio Generalštab JNA (GŠ JNA), kao najviše stožerno tijelo i operativno –
plansko tijelo SSNO-a.
Kao takav, iako u miru svestrano odgovoran za koncepcijska i doktrinarna pita-
nja razvoja i pripremanja oružanih snaga za obranu zemlje u slučaju agresije, u koju
svrhu je na njega bio prenesen niz ovlasti Predsjedništva SFRJ, kao vrhovnog zapo-
vjednika, SSNO nije imao ovlast odlučivanja o uporabi i zapovijedanja uporabe po-
strojbi JNA.
Što se tiče drugog dijela oružanih snaga bivše SFRJ, tj. TO republika i pokraji-
na, dostatno će biti spomenuti da je upravljanje i zapovijedanje bilo u nadležnosti
predsjedništava republika i pokrajina, koja su kao stručna operativno – planska tijela
imala (republičke, pokrajinske) štabove TO, koji su u operativnom smislu bili po-
dređeni zapovjedništvima JNA strateške razine, a vrhovno je zapovijedanje i nad tim
snagama, razumije se, ostvarivalo Predsjedništvo SFRJ. Očite dvojnosti i preplitanja
u ovom dijelu sustava za ova razmatranja nisu bitna.
Iako to po ovom sažetom prikazu najviše razine sustava možda i ne izgleda ta-
ko, sustav zapovijedanja oružanim snagama u bivšoj državi funkcionalno je bio vrlo
kompliciran i podložan blokadama, što znači i ranjiv. Ta njegova, po svemu temeljna
značajka proizlazila je iz samog karaktera države i njezinog društveno – političkog
sustava, što uključuje i ranije opisani osobit položaj JNA.
Događaji krajem 1980-ih i oružani sukobi početkom 1990-ih godina su to na
upečatljiv način pokazali. Tada je, treba podsjetiti, vrh JNA gotovo sasvim otvoreno
sebi uzurpirao ekskluzivno pravo arbitriranja u aktualnim političkim previranjima i
sukobima. Sukladno tomu, pokušavao je nametati svoja rješenja „u interesu svih“, a
s druge strane je opstruirao i odbijao sve inicijative i pokušaje drugačijih rješenja, pa
sve do manje ili više otvorenog iskazivanja neposlušnosti i autonomnog djelovanja,
tj. uporabe snaga JNA mimo svojih ovlasti, dakle protuzakonito. Na taj način doveo
se u položaj iznad države i neprekidno optužujući druge da to pokušavaju, objektiv-
no sâm blokirao sustav zapovijedanja na najvišoj razini.
Obilje je materijala i dokaza u prilog ovome dala i već spomenuta knjiga generala
Veljka Kadijevića Moje viđenje raspada.
Za ilustraciju će iz nje biti dostatno sljedeće:
• „… autori Ustava iz 1974. godine [su se] potrudili da obezbede da se na usta-
van način ruši (…) cjelokupnost jugoslovenske države, a da se istovremeno
na ustavan način to ne može spriječiti. (…) Oružane snage su bile dovedene

44
u situaciju da rade protuustavno… Tu se postavljalo još nekoliko krupnih pi-
tanja kao što su - koji to ustavni poredak štititi (…) i gdje je legitimitet takvog
postupka…“16
• „Druga krupna dilema je bila - da li će oružane snage svoju zadaću izvršavati
u okviru postojećeg pravnog sistema (…) ili mimo i protiv (…); ako u okviru
sistema, kako; odnosno, ako autonomno, kako.17
• „… kada je riječ o planiranju, izdavanju pisanih Direktiva, Odluka ili
Naređenja Vrhovne komande mi nismo mogli raditi kao što normalno rade
manje više sve armije na svijetu, jer bi svaki takav pisani dokumenat odmah
stigao u ruke neprijatelju. Zato smo bili primorani raditi na sasvim drugi
način.“18
• I sam autor konstatira da se radi o „rješavanju prvorazrednih političkih
pitanja“ i pita se „kuda bi to zaista odvelo u postojećim unutarnjim i
međunarodnim okolnostima“, ali kao što je poznato, nije ustuknuo pred tom
odgovornošću. Dapače, on samouvjereno naglašava da nikada ne bi slijedio
kao uzor sovjetsku armiju „koja nije prstom mrdnula a SSSR se kao država
raspao“.19

Kao što je vidljivo već i na temelju ovako djelomične raščlambe, položaj oružanih
snaga u društvu i sustav zapovijedanja omogućavali su razne deformacije, kao po-
sljedicu mogućih sukoba unutarnjih političkih suprotnosti, a kao izgledna, latentna,
bilo je upravo svrstavanje uz unitarističku, u biti velikosrpsku politiku i pretvaranje
u sredstvo za pokušaj uspostave njoj primjerene države.
Razumije se, njezin naziv je sporedan. Pri tome, dakako, ne treba ni spominjati
da je nacionalni sastav JNA bio temeljni preduvjet, jer je to samo po sebi jasno. S ove
distance gledano, a pogotovo poslije svega, može se reći da je bilo tek pitanje spleta
unutarnjih i vanjskih okolnosti kada će se to dogoditi.
Stoga valja razmotriti kako je teklo i kako se pokazivalo pretvaranje JNA u srp-
sku vojsku.

16 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 84.
17 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 87.
18 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 91.
19 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 150.

45
1.1.2. O procesu pretvorbe JNA u srpsku vojsku
Postupnu pretvorbu JNA u vojsku jedne, tj. unitarističke i velikosrpske političke
opcije, ili uvjetno jednog naroda, treba promatrati kao proces u okviru opće krize
bivše jugoslavenske države i društva, koja je počela ubrzano jačati nakon smrti Josipa
Broza Tita. Na ubrzavanje i kompliciranje te krize tijekom 1980-ih i njezino razbuk-
tavanje krajem 1980-ih djelovale su zasigurno i tadašnje međunarodne okolnosti, ali
to za ova razmatranja nije toliko značajno.
Kao spomenutu krizu, i proces pretvorbe JNA moguće je sagledavati na način da
se razgraniče, uvjetno, tri razdoblja ili faze:
1. od pojave „problema Kosovo“ 1981. do 1987. godine,
2. od 1988. do 1990. godine,
3. vrijeme zgusnutih događanja krajem 1990. do otpočinjanja otvorene agresije
na Republiku Hrvatsku u ljeto 1991. godine.

Prvo razdoblje pretvorbe


Prvo razdoblje započinje izbijanjem nemira na Kosovu u proljeće 1981. godine.
Nakon neuspješnih pokušaja smirivanja i normaliziranja stanja, državno vodstvo se
ubrzo odlučuje za proglašavanje izvanrednog stanja i primjenu mjera koje je takva
odluka, po Ustavu i tadašnjim zakonima, omogućavala i nalagala. Među njima je,
dakako, jedna od najznačajnijih bila uporaba postrojbi JNA. Tada se, po prvi put i
praktički, JNA pokazuje u ulozi sile koja je oružjem ne samo pripravna „štititi ustav-
ni poredak i jedinstvo zemlje“, već to i čini.
Postrojbe Prištinskog korpusa JNA, razmještene na prostoru AP Kosovo, dove-
dene su do razine ratnog ustroja i, iako se to formalno nije konstatiralo, djelatno su
provodile ulogu glavne snage za „normalizaciju“ stanja.
Vremenom, zapovjedništvo korpusa postaje „institucija“ čiji su podaci i ocjene o
stanju na Kosovu tretirani vjerodostojnim i objektivnim, tj. pouzdanim i točnim. To
čelnicima JNA imponira, a istupi tadašnjeg SSNO admirala Branka Mamule u Skup-
štini SFRJ ili drugim prigodama u Srbiji se počinju rabiti kao prvorazredni materijal
i poticaj za napade na ona rukovodstva u zemlji koja su drugačije gledala na uzroke,
posljedice i načine prevladavanja krize na Kosovu. U Srbiji ubrzo nadjačavaju one
političke snage kojima nije bilo do normaliziranja i smirivanja stanja u AP Kosovo,
koliko do manipuliranja tim problemom u cilju nametanja unitarističke, velikosrp-
ske koncepcije odnosa u državi.

46
Nakon Titove smrti, vrh JNA sve učestalije, manje ili više javno nastupa s pozicije
presuditelja i jedinog „nepristranog promatrača“ glede političkih problema, prisvaja-
jući „pravovjernost“ državi i društvu. Za priželjkivanu takvu ulogu i njima odgovara
„problem Kosova“ kao dobar i jak povod za sve otvorenije iskazivanje nezadovoljstva
„labavošću države“, osobito Republike Srbije, „prouzročene“ aktualnim Ustavom iz
1974. godine.
Kroz to vojni vrh vuče JNA na stranu onih snaga u Srbiji koje, rabeći Kosovo kao
povod i argument, započinju politički obračun sa „zapadnim republikama“, kako su
tada označavali Sloveniju i Hrvatsku, a s ciljem nametanja promjena Ustava suklad-
no spomenutoj unitarističkoj i velikosrpskoj koncepciji.
Ovo razdoblje, uz ostalo, označilo je i mijenjanje organizacije i sustava zapovi-
jedanja JNA na strateškoj razini, nametnuto od vojnog vrha, a koje je još ponekad
predmet sporenja i nagađanja glede motiva i političke pozadine.
Radi se o tome, da se do tada postojeća organizacija JNA uglavnom poklapala s
područjima republika i pokrajina, pa je svaka od njih imala „svoju“ armiju(e), što je
bio naziv strateško – operativne grupacije, odnosno Crna Gora i pokrajine „svoje“
korpuse. To je vojni vrh, naime, počeo ocjenjivati posljedicom „duha razgradnje sve-
ga federalnoga, pa i vojske“20 iz Ustava 1974. godine.
Kao „predmet najžešćih napada razbijača Jugoslavije“, kako tvrdi V. Kadijević,
sredinom 1980-ih proveden je preustroj, pa su umjesto dotadašnjih šest armija,
ustrojena tri vojišta (strateške grupacije: sjevero-zapadno, centralno i jugo-istočno),
čija je teritorijalna podjela zanemarivala granice republika i pokrajina. Uz to, štabovi
TO republika i pokrajina u operativnom su smislu podređeni zapovjedništvima vo-
jišta, što je osobito znakovito. Cilj je bio, prema mišljenju Kadijevića, narušiti „već
uhodanu kontrolu republika i pokrajina nad njihovom teritorijalnom obranom“ i
umanjiti „već legalizirani njihov utjecaj na JNA“.21
Prema tome, koliko god se tih godina (sredina 1980-ih) pokušavalo uvjeravati da
su razlozi vojne, tj. strateško – operativne prirode dominantno uvjetovali ove pro-
mjene, nema mjesta dvojbi da je pravi motiv bio politički i to izravno unitaristički,
bez obzira kako su ga njegovi stvaratelji označavali pa i doživljavali. Ocjena V. Ka-
dijevića, da je ovo bio „predmet najžešćih napada“, kao i činjenica da su naznačene
promjene uslijedile unatoč takvom protivljenju, čak i bez suglasnosti Slovenije, što je
bio presedan, donekle oslikavaju situaciju kako je vojni vrh miješanjem u političku
domenu uistinu i proizvodio i zaoštravao jugoslavensku krizu.
20 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 75.
21 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 78.

47
Razumije se, nimalo slučajno, ovo razdoblje je označila i „pojava“, tj. javno ob-
znanjivanje poznatog Memoranduma SANU, kojim je srpska intelektualna „elita“
pred javnost postavila „problem srpskog naroda u drugoj Jugoslaviji“.22
Uistinu je to bio politički događaj od osobitoga značenja za aktualne okolnosti, a
može se reći i događaj s dalekosežnim političkim učincima. Ipak, ovdje je bitno i do-
statno istaknuti da je pojava Memoranduma, za razliku od mnogih drugih događaja
neusporedivo manjeg značenja, izazvala vrlo mlaku reakciju JNA. Skoro bi se moglo
reći da je „prošla neopaženo“. To je, naravno, djelovalo zbunjujuće za protivnike, ali
što je važnije, ohrabrujuće za pristalice „memorandumskoga“ gledanja na tadašnje
političke i druge probleme u državi.
Na kraju treba spomenuti, da je sam „svršetak“ toga razdoblja označila uspostava
prevlasti birokratsko – nacionalističkih i unitarističkih snaga SK Srbije i pojava Slo-
bodana Miloševića na političkoj pozornici tadašnje države. Iza toga slijedi vrijeme u
kojem vojno vodstvo nastoji u javnosti održavati privid distanciranosti od Miloševi-
ćeve politike, a djelatno ju podupirati, ne samo stvaranjem uvjeta i „otvaranjem pro-
stora“ politički podudarnim traženjima i inicijativama, već i samim neprotivljenjem.
To će se u nastavku nastojati izravnije pokazati.

Drugo razdoblje pretvorbe


Drugo razdoblje (1988. – 1990.), kao logičan slijed prethodnoga, obilježilo je vrlo
intenzivno djelovanje JNA u političkoj domeni. Bilo je usmjereno na nametanje, čak
iznudu promjena u Ustavu koje bi, među ostalim, omogućile sigurnije financiranje
JNA pa tako i veću autonomiju u odlučivanju, ali i na ometanje i kompromitiranje
djelovanja onih političkih snaga u zemlji koje su sve snažnije tražile demokratske
promjene i uvođenje višestranačja.
Na inicijative iz Srbije i JNA, 1988. godine obavljene su i neke promjene u Ustavu
SFRJ. Međutim, kakve su prave nakane stajale iza tih inicijativa iščitava se iz sljedeće
ocjene V. Kadijevića: „Jedini ozbiljan pozitivni rezultat bile su one promjene Ustava
SFRJ koje su se odnosile na položaj autonomnih pokrajina (…) i koje su omogućile
da se promjenama u Ustavu SR Srbije stvori jedinstvena Republika Srbija.“23
Stvarno ukidanje dotadašnjih autonomija pokrajina vojni vrh ocjenjuje „kori-
snim“, ali i neuspjelim pokušajem „da se ustavnim promjenama 1988. godine save-
zna država koliko – toliko stavi na noge“. Pune tadašnje ambicije pojašnjava Kadije-
22 
 ečernje novosti, Beograd, 24. i 25. 9. 1986., u: Ante Nazor, Velikosrpska agresija na Hrvatsku 1990-
V
ih, Zagreb, 2011., 16-17.
23 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 104.

48
vić tek 1993. godine, kada javno kaže da se „vojno rukovodstvo“ još tada (1988./’89.)
„zalagalo za brzo stvaranje nove Jugoslavije“ od onih naroda „koji zaista žele da žive
u zajedničkoj državi“. Dakle, iz toga je vidljivo da je tobožnje principijelno stajalište:
„Da vojska ne donosi nikakve političke odluke ali da učestvuje u pripremi svih po-
litičkih odluka u čijem provođenju se ona angažira“,24 samo floskula, a da je još oko
ustavnih promjena 1988. godine vojska, sasvim izravno, iako ne i javno, stala na stra-
nu „onih“ za koje je ocjenjivala da „žele živjeti u zajedničkoj državi“.
Politička narav te odluke je sasvim jasna. Od tada vojni vrh bivše države defini-
tivno sebi uzurpira pravo političkog presuđivanja i etiketiranja na crti „za ili protiv
države“, dovodeći se tako, nezadovoljan postojećim, u položaj „vojske bez države“
(Kadijević), a zapravo – vojske iznad države.
Paralelno sa snažnim pritiskom u smjeru „popravljanja države“ po svojoj (i nji-
hovoj) mjeri, vojno je vodstvo provodilo vojno – stručno planiranje i pripremanje
uporabe oružanih snaga, sukladno aktualnoj prosudbi unutarnjih i međunarodnih
uvjeta, a shodno cilju stvaranja „nove Jugoslavije“. Planovi su modificirani i dorađi-
vani ovisno o razvoju situacije.
Za ilustraciju vrijedi spomenuti neka od opredjeljenja temeljne zamisli uporabe
oružanih snaga. Kadijević tako piše, da su planirali poduzimati „radnje i aktivnosti
koje će omogućiti da se zadaća izvrši funkcijom odvraćanja“. To, među ostalim, treba
tumačiti i kao „pokazivanje sile“, koja je u biti imala za posljedicu stalno podizanje
napetosti u društvu i poticanje „ratne psihoze“. Zatim, „svjesno dozvoliti da neprija-
telj prvi napadne tako da cijeli svijet jasno vidi tko je agresor i što hoće“.25
Ovo, dakako, samo naivni mogu tumačiti kao usmjerenost na pasivno čekanje,
jer je očito, a događaji su to potvrdili, da je uistinu bilo planirano provocirati sukobe,
kako bi se stvorio povod za intervenciju postrojbi JNA. Kroz ovo treba, djelomice,
sagledavati i uzroke srpske pobune protiv Republike Hrvatske.
I konačno, odrednica zamisli, čija je realizacija u javnosti dosta kontroverzno tu-
mačena, a radi se o sljedećem: „Teritorijalnu obranu maksimalno paralizirati u onim
dijelovima zemlje gdje bi ona mogla poslužiti kao baza za stvaranje vojske secesioni-
stičkih republika“. Tu Kadijević i dalje piše neistinu, da je „u tom cilju sva“ TO razo-
ružana, a odmah zatim se i sam demantira objašnjenjem da su „TO srpskih dijelova
u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini upotrijebili u djelovanjima zajedno s JNA“.26

24 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 89-90.
25 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 92-93.
26 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 93-96.

49
Kao što je odluka o oduzimanju oružja TO donijeta na Predsjedništvu SFRJ na-
kon silnih pritisaka vrha JNA, tako je i realizacija ostalih dijelova „zamisli“ uporabe
oružanih snaga predmnijevala uporno nastojanje da se to pravno legitimira. Zato je
kraj toga razdoblja bio obilježen nastojanjem, da se na raznovrsne načine isprovocira
i nametne odluka o proglašavanju izvanrednog stanja u zemlji, kako bi se „pokrile“
namjere i djelovanja na onemogućavanju započetih demokratskih promjena. Zapre-
ka na tome smjeru bio je nedostatak „prave države“ i „pravog vrhovnog komandanta
u licu Predsjedništva SFRJ“, ocjenjuje tadašnji čelnik JNA.27
Da bi otklonili ili bar ublažili taj „nedostatak“, vojno vodstvo je pokušalo instali-
rati Slobodana Miloševića na mjesto predsjednika Vlade (Saveznog izvršnog vijeća -
SIV), ali prijedlog nisu prihvatili Milošević i srbijansko rukovodstvo. No, bitno je da
„razlike nije bilo u ciljevima, ali jeste u načinu njihova ostvarenja“.28 Razumije se, ra-
dilo se samo o poznatoj Miloševićevoj pragmatičnosti. Znakovito je da se, inače, tih
godina Milošević skoro nikad u svojim istupima nije izjašnjavao u prilog, a pogotovo
ne pozivao na JNA. Bila je očito na djelu „tiha“ suradnja na zajedničkom „poslu“, jer
je vrijedilo i obrnuto - iz vojnog vrha prema srbijanskom vodstvu nije išla ni najma-
nja kritika, ali ni javna potpora.
Prvu polovicu 1990. godine, koja je uvjetno svršetak ovoga razdoblja, označili
su, osim spomenutog razoružavanja TO, pokušaji vrha JNA da preko Predsjedništva
SFRJ i SIV-a „progura“ odluke koje bi, faktično, tada onemogućile i odgodile više-
stranačke izbore u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj. Tada je, uz ostalo, učinjen i izravan pritisak
na rukovodstvo tadašnje SR Hrvatske, na posebno upriličenom sastanku u Zagrebu,
na inicijativu SSNO-a, mjesec dana prije višestranačkih izbora u RH. Kad ni to nije
uspjelo, pristupilo se djelovanjima koja prethode i izravna su priprema za potpuno i
otvoreno nastupanje u ulozi vojske koja „stvara novu državu“.

Treće razdoblje pretvorbe


Tako se ulazi u treće razdoblje ovoga procesa, znakovito po zgusnutom nizu do-
gađanja u relativno kratkom vremenu, snažnom psihološko-promidžbenom djelo-
vanju u smjeru kompromitacije višestranačja i, osobito, politike stranaka koje su iz-
borima došle na vlast, te provociranju „međunacionalnih sukoba“, kako bi se stvorio
povod za intervenciju JNA, bilo pod legitimitetom postupanja u izvanrednom stanju
ili na način neke od varijanti „vojnog udara“.

27 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 93-96.
28 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 106.

50
Sukladno tomu, provodi se i daljnja prilagodba planova uporabe postrojbi
JNA, a prema novodefiniranoj zadaći – „obraniti pravo naroda koji žele živjeti u
zajedničkoj državi Jugoslaviji“, što uistinu znači i ući u oružani sukob s onima koji
to ne žele.
Jasno je da takva odluka, u tada aktualnim uvjetima, ne može biti prihvaćena u
redovnoj proceduri i od svih, već je ona kao takva bila autonomna i rezultat uzurpa-
cije nepripadne političke, a još manje pravne uloge. Iz toga slijedi da je ta „obrana“
mogla biti i provođena jedino na način komplota ili zločinačkog pothvata. To, nada-
lje, podrazumijeva i primjerene, prikrivene i tajne aktivnosti specijaliziranih službi,
tj. dijelova sigurnosno – obavještajnog sustava JNA, uz oslonac na Službu državne
bezbednosti (SDB) Srbije i druge.
Za relativno kratko vrijeme pokazao se prvi veliki učinak takvog prikrivenog
djelovanja, u obliku poznate „Balvan revolucije“ na kninskom području i dijelovima
Like i Korduna pretežito nastanjenim Srbima, u kolovozu 1990. godine.
Od tada pa nadalje potiče se zaoštravanje izazvane napetosti i, u biti, upravlja
„kriznim stanjem“. To upravljanje oslikava tijek događanja, od kontinuiranog istica-
nja sve manje prihvatljivih političkih zahtjeva prema Republici Hrvatskoj kao državi,
do poznatih „incidenata“ oko uspostave novih policijskih postaja (Plitvice, Kijevo) i
„pobune“ policajaca (Pakrac, Glina).
Poseban smjer takvog djelovanja činilo je otkrivanje i praćenje priprema za obra-
nu od očekivane intervencije JNA u Republici Hrvatskoj, označavano kao ilegalno
naoružavanje i ustrojavanje paravojnih oružanih sastava. To je područje ocjenjiva-
no kao najpogodnije za svakovrsnu političku kompromitaciju nove vlasti Republike
Hrvatske, uključujući i realno izvediv pokušaj sankcioniranja po tadašnjem Zako-
nu o vojnim sudovima, kao kažnjivog djela „pripremanja oružane pobune“ i drugih
iz okvira „kontrarevolucionarnog ugrožavanja Ustavom SFRJ utvrđenog uređenja“.
Ujedno, kroz to se uočavala mogućnost novog snažnog pokušaja iznude odluke o
proglašenju izvanrednog stanja u državi.
Međutim, kad je i to propalo, na sjednici Predsjedništva SFRJ (12. - 15. ožujka
1991.) vojno vodstvo sve usmjerava na izazivanje oružanih sukoba. Osobito značaj-
na komponenta ukupnog djelovanja JNA tijekom ovoga razdoblja bila je sadržana u
poticanju i pomaganju vojnog organiziranja „obrane srpskog naroda u Hrvatskoj“.
Razumije se, radi se o naoružavanju srpskog pučanstva oružjem iz skladišta JNA, te
tajnom osposobljavanju postrojbi iz ratnog ustroja JNA i TO na područjima kasnije

51
proglašene „SAO Krajine“.29 Kako je to rađeno po „modificiranoj ulozi JNA u odno-
su na ulogu utvrđenu Ustavom“, prema pisanju Kadijevića, govori osnovna ideja „ge-
neralnog političkog cilja“, a taj je bio „zaštititi srpski narod u Hrvatskoj“ i omogućiti
mu vojničko samoorganiziranje za obranu... Zadatak izvršavati u okviru sprječava-
nja međunacionalnih sukoba, kako je to Predsjedništvo SFRJ formuliralo.30
Temeljem toga slijedi i „učvršćivanje vojničkog samoorganiziranja“, što znači
okrupnjavanja postrojbi putem ustrojavanja više razine zapovijedanja, dakako uz
kadrovsko popunjavanje i druge vojno – stručne aktivnosti iz JNA.
Sve je to bilo usmjereno na realizaciju temeljne i jedinstvene zamisli da se „zašti-
ta srpskog naroda u Hrvatskoj“ provede „na način što će se svi krajevi sa većinskim
srpskim stanovništvom osloboditi u svakom pogledu od prisustva hrvatske vojske i
hrvatske vlasti. (…)“31 Dakle, cilj je radikalan, a to je okupacija i otimanje dijelova
tuđeg teritorija.
Kakav je to plan bio, znakovito pokazuje ideja manevra „operativno – strategij-
ske napadajne operacije“ (čitati: agresije), kako je obznanjuje V. Kadijević, a što je već
objašnjeno na prethodnim stranicama.32
Ako se ima u vidu kada i kako je taj plan zamišljen i stvoren, a osobito posljedice
koje je njegova provedba proizvela, mora nestati svaka dvojba o tome da je uistinu
ključna odgovornost na vrhu JNA, i to za rat izazvan zločinačkim pothvatom.
Jednako tako, sasvim je jasno da definitivno u proljeće 1991. godine politikom
vojnog rukovodstva nestaju i zadnje natruhe jugoslavenskoga karaktera JNA, pa ui-
stinu ostaje samo prazan uobičajeni naziv „JNA“.
Ne pretendirajući na to da je fenomen pretvaranja JNA u srpsku vojsku dostat-
no cjelovito zahvaćen, prezentirani sadržaj upućuje na utemeljenost nekoliko bitnih
tvrdnji o toj problematici:
• pretvaranje JNA u srpsku vojsku jest jedna od posebnih i osobito značajnih
pojavnosti krize bivše SFRJ;
• takva deformacija JNA proizašla je iz karaktera samog društvenog i političkog
sustava u kojem je ona (JNA), kao sasvim ideologizirana i politizirana oružana
29 
 akve su sve podvale pokušavane, oslikava i činjenica da je na kninskom području u siječ-
K
nju 1991. godine, u sklopu „akcije razoružavanja paravojnih formacija“, uistinu bila „prikupljena
i predana“ stanovita količina oružja, što je trebao biti dokaz „jednakog“ pristupa JNA i „koopera-
tivnosti“ Srba.
30 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 134.
31 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 134.
32 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 135.

52
sila, po prirodi stvari, latentno težila miješanju i arbitriranju u političkoj, pa
čak i drugim društvenim domenama, razumije se, personalizirano u nastupu
i djelovanju osoba koje su u duljem razdoblju činile „vojni vrh“;
• tijekom jugoslavenske krize vojni vrh je postupno sve više uzurpirao sebi
nepripadno pravo političkog presuđivanja i etiketiranja na crti „za ili pro-
tiv“ Jugoslavije, te svojim djelovanjem komplicirao već postojeće i proiz-
vodio nove političke probleme i sukobe, a kako je u tome zlorabio „auto-
ritet“ oružane sile, uključujući i prijetnju njenom uporabom, objektivno nosi
najveću odgovornost za rat(ove) na prostoru bivše SFRJ. Ovo, i osobito zato
što je oružanu silu stavio u službu jedne politike i jednog naroda, neovlašteno
odlučujući da na taj način „stvori državu od naroda koji u njoj žele živjeti“;
• u završnom razdoblju krize djelovanje vojnog rukovodstva je bilo označeno
manevriranjem na samom rubu Ustava i zakona bivše države, a u prvoj po-
lovici 1991. godine dolazi do pripremanja i uporabe oružanih sastava mimo
i protivno zakonu i to, prvo, proizvoljnim tumačenjem odluka nadležnih, a
zatim i potpuno autonomnim djelovanjem;
• naznačena djelatnost po svemu je imala obilježja komplota i zločinačkog
pothvata, jer je provođena izvan i mimo postojećih institucija sustava, čak i
uz izravno i javno odricanje poslušnosti nadređenima, koji su „usput“ etik-
etirani „rušiteljima Jugoslavije“ i „mrziteljima srpskog naroda“, a inicijalne
dokaze o svemu sadrži spominjana knjiga V. Kadijevića. Njezina uvjerljivost
u tome smislu je velika, jer je nastala nedugo nakon događaja koje opisuje,
dok autor još ne uviđa da će „misija“ doživjeti krah, a uvjeren je da je „isprav-
no postupao“.

53
1.2. Potpora u održavanju uspostavljenog stanja okupacije

1.2.1. Okupacija RH i uspostava Srpske vojske Krajine


U skladu s glavnim idejama iz osnovne zamisli, JNA je svoje zadaće i obavila. O
tome je general Kadijević progovorio i u svojstvu svjedoka na suđenju generalu Vladi
Trifunoviću – zapovjedniku 32. (Varaždinskog) korpusa JNA, o čemu piše i beograd-
ski dnevnik „Borba“ od 18. svibnja 1993. godine:
„Da nije potpisan Vanceov plan išli bismo i u Zagreb“, tim riječima započeo je
svjedočenje u procesu generalu V. Trifunoviću, general armije Veljko Kadijević.
Prvi put pred krivičnim vijećem Vojnog suda od nekadašnjeg prvog čovjeka
JNA javno se čulo koji su bili zadaci Armije u Hrvatskoj. Formulacija Predsjed-
ništva SFRJ „sprječavanje međunacionalnih sukoba“ značila je zapravo „oslo-
bađanje srpskih krajeva, a zatim izvlačenje jedinica JNA na granice jedne bu-
duće Jugoslavije“. Ovaj prvi zadatak u potpunosti je izvršen, jer je 1/3 hrvatskog
teritorija ostala u srpskim rukama, kaže Kadijević. Osim toga, nastavio je, jed-
na armija uspjela je stvoriti tri vojske – Jugoslavije, Republike Srpske te je omo-
gućila stvaranje vojske u srpskim krajevima. Veljko Kadijević tvrdi da „s ovim
planom nije bilo upoznato cijelo Predsjedništvo SFRJ, a pred njega su iznošene
samo djelomične i početne ideje, dok su naređenja zapovjednicima korpusa
davana usmeno, kako za njih ne bi saznao neprijatelj“. Glavnim protivnicima
proglasio je „hrvatsku vojsku, indoktrinirani hrvatski narod, međunarodnu za-
jednicu i vrlo organizirani i sinkronizirani mirovni pokret pacifista i majki“.
Jedno od pitanja bilo je i to zašto poslije Vukovara JNA nije okupirala i Zagreb,
na što Kadijević odgovara: „Do Zagreba nismo išli jer je potpisan Vanceov plan
pa ga nismo htjeli prekršiti. Da to nije učinjeno išlo bi se u deblokadu naših je-
dinica.“ Na kraju dodaje kako zna da je u Hrvatskoj osuđen zbog ratnih zloči-
na i rušenja Osijeka, Dubrovnika, Vukovara…, no zaključuje: „Ja sam radio po
svojoj savjesti i opet bih isto učinio“.

U stvarnosti, general Kadijević je nakon pada Vukovara imao namjeru (želio)


produžiti djelovanje JNA u smjeru Zagreba (koridorom uz Savu) i Varaždina (kori-
dorom uz Dravu), ali takvo djelovanje nije dopustilo vodstvo države.33
JNA je praktično uspostavila i organizirala stanje okupacije na dijelovima teri-
torija RH, dajući kontinuiranu potporu svim aktivnostima, a osobito onima na us-
33 
“ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume II”, Central
Intelligence Agency, October 2003, 207-208.

54
postavi „srpske vojske“, na pretvorbi (organizaciji, popuni, ustroju, osposobljavanju)
Teritorijalne obrane u Srpsku vojsku Krajine (SVK), koja je formalno uspostavljena
u listopadu 1992. godine.34
Srpska vojska Krajine ustrojena je u 6 operativnih sastava (korpusa), različitoga
ustroja i jačine, raspoređenih po regionalnim cjelinama tada okupiranih područja
Republike Hrvatske (tadašnja tzv. RSK). To su:
• 11. istočnoslavonski korpus, sastava:
- 6 motoriziranih (pješačkih) brigada (35., 37., 39., 40., 43., 45.)
- 1 mješovita artiljerijska pukovnija (map)
- 2 bitnice srednjeg samohodnog raketnog puka (ssrp) PZO „KUB“
- i ukupne jačine: 10.000 do 11.000 ljudi35, 120 do 130 tenkova, 65 do 70 OT/
BVP, 120 do 130 topničkih oružja kalibra 105 mm ili većeg.
• 18. zapadnoslavonski korpus, sastava:
- 3 lake (pješačke) brigade (51., 54., 98.)
- 2 odreda (59. i 63.)
- i ukupne jačine: 4000 do 4500 ljudi, 25 do 30 tenkova, 20 OT/BVP, 50 do 55
topničkih oružja kalibra 105 mm i većeg.
• 39. banijski korpus, sastava:
- 4 pješačke (lake) brigade (24., 26., 31., 33.)
- 1 odred
- 1 oklopna bojna (okb)
- 1 map
- i ukupne jačine: 5000 do 6000 ljudi, 40 do 50 tenkova, 20 OT/BVP, 110 do
120 topničkih oružja kalibra 105 mm i većeg.

34 
 MDCDR, 26., kut. 6., Odluka Glavnog štaba TO RSK o preimenovanju u Glavni štab Vojske RSK,
H
Knin, 16. 10. 1992.
35 
Podaci o broju ljudi u korpusima i ostalim postrojbama SVK ne odnose se na ratnim ustro-
jem predviđen broj nego na prosječnu razinu popune, kakva je bila u vrijeme prije potpisivanja
„Zagrebačkog sporazuma“ krajem ožujka 1994. godine. Radi se poglavito o podacima iz prosud-
bi Obavještajne uprave GSHV-a („Prosudba stanja, mogućnosti i namjera neprijatelja“, 7. 11.
1993., odnosno „Obavještajna prosudba mogućeg razvoja događaja na vojno-političkom planu i
moguća ugroza RH u narednom razdoblju, osobito u varijantama angažiranja Hrvatske vojske“,
26. 3. 1994.). Brojno stanje bilo je nešto veće odmah nakon ustrojavanja SVK, o čemu svjedoči i
podatak iz izjave generala Mile Novakovića na svjedočenju pred Međunarodnim krivičnim sudom
za bivšu Jugoslaviju u Haagu (listopad 2000. i veljača 2001.), u: HMDCDR, 18., mapa 31. – Doku-
menti.

55
• 21. kordunski korpus, sastava:
- 4 lake brigade (3., 11., 13., 19.)
- 2 mješovita artiljerijska divizijuna (mad)
- i ukupne jačine: 4500 do 5000 ljudi, 45 do 50 tenkova, 20 OT/BVP, 65 do 70
topničkih oružja kalibra 105 mm i većeg.
• 15. lički korpus, sastava:
- 1 motorizirana brigada (9.)
- 4 pješačke (lake) brigade (18., 50., 70., 103.)
- 2 mad-a
- i ukupne jačine: 5500 do 6000 ljudi, 60 do 70 tenkova, 25 do 30 OT/BVP, 70
do 75 topničkih oružja kalibra 105 mm i većeg.
• 7. sjevernodalmatinski korpus, sastava:
- 2 mtbr (75. i 92.)
- 2 lake brigade (1. i 4.)
- 2 pješačke brigade (2. i 3.)36
- 1 map
- 1 laka topnička pukovnija (ltp) PZO
- 2 bitnice ssrp PZO KUB
- i ukupne jačine: 8000 do 9000 ljudi, 90 do 100 tenkova, 45 do 50 OT/BVP,
110 do 120 topničkih oružja kalibra 105 mm i većeg.
• 105. zrakoplovna brigada (Udbina), sastava:
- 1 eskadrila (12 – 16 zrakoplova „Jastreb“ i „Galeb“)
- 1 eskadrila (3 helikoptera „Gazela“, 4 „Ga-MA“ i 2 MI-8).
• 1 raketni divizijun R-65 „Luna“
• 4 višecjevna lansera raketa „Orkan“
• raketna brigada PZO-a
• 75. mabr
• ostale pristožerne postrojbe i institucije GŠ SVK.

Radi se, dakle, o vojsci u čijem sastavu je približno 40 do 50 tisuća ljudi, koja na
raspolaganju ima razmjerno i apsolutno veliki broj različitih oružja i oružanih susta-
va, koja stoga može predstavljati i predstavlja realnu ugrozu, iz koje je 1993. godine

36 
Treća pješačka brigada ustrojena je naknadno, u veljači 1994. godine.

56
izvedena i „strategija realne prijetnje“, zasnovana na barem tri čimbenika „odvraća-
nja“ od pokušaja možebitnog oslobađanja okupiranih područja RH vojnim sredstvi-
ma:
• ugroza koju sama SVK predstavlja svojom snagom i operativnim raspore-
dom,
• ugroza koju predstavlja topništvo (raketna i topnička oružja) SVK u čijem
dosegu se nalaze brojni veći (uključujući glavni grad Zagreb) i manji gradovi
u RH,
• mogućnost angažiranja dijela snaga iz sastava VJ i/ili VRS (zagranična
područja RH) kao operativnu ili strategijsku pričuvu, kao izravna ojačanja,
ili kao izravnu potporu.

Međutim, kako SVK ne bi mogla biti ni formirana bez svestrane i svakovrsne po-
moći i potpore JNA, jednako tako ni njezino kasnije djelovanje u funkciji održavanja
stanja okupacije dijela teritorija RH, na kojem je bila samoproglašena „Republika
Srpska Krajina“ (RSK), ne bi bilo moguće bez stalne potpore VJ.

1.2.2. Potpora koju je SRJ (VJ) davala „RSK“ (SVK)


Potpora koju je SRJ, odnosno JNA (VJ) davala „RSK“, odnosno SVK, može se po
svojem sadržaju promatrati u tri različita vremenska razdoblja:
• prije pobune
• od prvih naznaka pobune do uspostave „RSK“ i SVK
• od uspostave SVK do operacije „Oluja“, ali je cilj te potpore uvijek bio osigu-
rati uvjete za odvajanje tzv. „srpskih teritorija“ od matice Hrvatske i njihovo
pripajanje „jedinstvenom srpskom prostoru“ radi formiranja „Velike Srbije“
(nove Jugoslavije), a u sva tri razdoblja su prepoznatljive „dvije“ konstante:
- politička – uspostava „RSK“ i odvajanje od RH radi ostvarivanja ideje
„Velike Srbije“
- vojna – izravna potpora navedenoj politici, bez ograničenja glede načina
i sredstava realiziranja te potpore.

Različiti sadržaji i oblici vojne potpore (i suradnje), osobito u razdoblju nakon


formiranja SVK, jasno pokazuju jedinstvenost funkcioniranja VJ, VRS i SVK, što
nedvojbeno ukazuje na namjere ujedinjenja „srpskih prostora“ u jednu državu.37
37 
Jedinstvenost funkcioniranja odnosi se i na VRS, odnosno RS, s kojom je 1995. godine čak
potpisana deklaracija o ujedinjenju u jedinstvenu državu, ali se tu ne radi o uzročno-posljedičnim

57
Do uspostave SVK potpora JNA ogledala se poglavito u sljedećem:
− razoružavanje Teritorijalne obrane RH (preuzimanje skladišta) na područjima
s većinskim hrvatskim pučanstvom;
− raspoređivanje postrojbi JNA u područjima većih koncentracija srpskog
pučanstva;
− naoružavanje lokalnog srpskog pučanstva;
− sprječavanje intervencija hrvatske policije u žarištima pobune („tampon
zone“);
− pretvaranje postrojbi JNA (oprema) u postrojbe SVK;
− izravna borbena potpora u osvajanju pojedinih područja i naselja;
− izravne napadajne operacije radi okupacije pojedinih područja RH.

Nakon formiranja SVK, potpora iz SRJ, odnosno VJ postaje još intenzivnija


i raznovrsnija, a posebno je bila izražena kada je u pitanju popuna kadrovima,38 na
kom je području SVK i praktično funkcionirala kao sastavni dio VJ.39
Potpora koju je VJ (SRJ) pružala SVK („RSK“) može se svrstati u sljedeće katego-
rije, a zbog opsežnosti materijala koji tu potporu dokazuju, ovdje će referentni doku-
menti biti navedeni samo uz neke od navedenih kategorija:
Kadrovska potpora:
• popuna najvišim časničkim kadrom, koji se iz postrojbi VJ raspoređuje u
postrojbe SVK i obrnuto:
- general Dušan Lončar, do tada zapovjednik 37. užičkog korpusa VJ,
imenovan 4. travnja 1994. za zapovjednika 11. korpusa SVK;40
- general pukovnik Mile Mrkšić postavljen je na dužnost zapovjednika
SVK 18. svibnja 1995. godine41, nakon što je ostavku podnio dotadašnji
zapovjednik general bojnik Milan Čeleketić. Na tu dužnost general
Mrkšić došao je izravno s dužnosti pomoćnika načelnika GŠ VJ za speci-

vezama iste razine kao u slučaju veza sa SRJ. „Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od
14. do 21. veljače 1994.“, 21. veljače 1994. godine, MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-
06/1-94-453.
38 
HMDCDR, 41., kut. 5, „Podaci za analizu komandnog kadra“, Komanda 15. korpusa, 5. 1. 1995.
39 
HMDCDR, 2., kut. 5006., „Informacija jedinicama” (o govoru generala Mile Mrkšića u Skupštini
RSK), Komanda 2. pbr, 3. 6. 1995.
40 
Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje 4. do 11. travnja 1994. godine, 12. travnja 1994.,
MORH, klasa: 833-05/93-02/02, Ur. broj: 512-06-06/1-94-880.
41 
Služebni glasnik RSK, br. 3, 9. 6. 1995., 136.

58
jalne postrojbe. Treba napomenuti da je general Mrkšić početkom agresi-
je na RH bio sudionik napada na područje Srijema i Vukovara, kao za-
povjednik 1. motorizirane gardijske brigade.
- pukovnik Slobodan Tarbuk, od sredine 1992. godine zapovjednik 39.
banijskog korpusa SVK, a 1993. godine, na osobni zahtjev, premješten
u SRJ, na dužnost načelnika stožera kragujevačkog korpusa VJ; ponovo
je krajem svibnja 1995. imenovan na dužnost zapovjednika 39. korpusa
SVK,42 nakon što je pukovnik Žarko Gačić smijenjen s te dužnosti, jer je
zapovijed o djelovanju „Orkanom“ po Zagrebu dobio 1. svibnja u 13.00
sati, a djelovanje je odobrio tek 2. svibnja („ponašao se kukavički“, po
ocjeni časnika sigurnosti).
• popuna časnicima raznih nedostajućih vojnih specijalnosti (zrakoplovne,
oklopne, EI i PED, raketne, PZO): „Osloncem na kadrovsku i tvarnu pot-
poru VJ43 počelo je i ustrojavanje postrojbi ED u korpusima SVK te Centra
EI i PED SVK na Plitvicama. Na temelju zapovijedi načelnika GŠ VJ, u sastav
SVK upućena su i dva kompletna voda ED iz sastava VJ.“44
• popuna ljudstvom mobiliziranim na području SRJ (pričuvni kadar, ročnici):
tipičan primjer je akcija vođena tijekom lipnja i srpnja 1995. godine na
području SRJ pod kodnim nazivom „Oluja“, a o kojoj će više riječi biti u 4.
poglavlju;
• specijalistička obuka ročnika pojedinih specijalnosti,45 za koje se obuka
nije mogla organizirati u SVK: u izvješćima o brojnom stanju pojedinih
zapovjedništava SVK razvidno je da se određeni broj ročnika nalazio na obu-
ci u VJ i VRS;46
• školovanje kadeta na vojnim školama i akademijama: cjelokupno školovanje
budućeg časničkog kadra obavljano je na području SRJ, jer u SVK nije bilo
vojnih škola.

42 
„ Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje 22. do 29. svibnja“, 31. svibnja 1995. godine;
MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1362.
43 
„Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 16. do 23. svibnja 1994. godine“, 23. svibnja
1994., MORH, klasa: 833-05/93-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-1181.
44 
“Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 31. siječnja do 7. veljače 1994. godine“, 7. ve-
ljače 1994., klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-329.
45 
“Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 7. do 14. veljače 1994. godine“, 14. veljače
1994., klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-403.
46 
HMDCDR, 18., „Pregled popune jedinica 7. korpusa po RF“, Komanda 7. K, 28. 10. 1994.

59
Teorijsko – doktrinarna suradnja:
• definiranje strategije obrane: „strategija realne prijetnje“ izrađena je pod
vodstvom generala R. Radinovića;47
• izrada doktrine uporabe postrojbi: u SVK su rabljeni pravilnici iz VJ (Pravilo
službe, Strojevo pravilo48);
• pripreme preustroja i modernizacije: kada je dolaskom generala Mrkšića za
zapovjednika SVK pokrenuta inicijativa za ustroj specijalnih (manevarskih)
snaga na razini SVK i u korpusima,49 radi pružanja stručne pomoći u Slunj je
došla ekipa časnika - instruktora iz Korpusa specijalnih snaga VJ (KSS VJ),
na čelu sa zapovjednikom KSS VJ generalom Miodragom Panićem.50
• sigurnosno – obavještajna suradnja: uvezivanje i centralno vođenje djelovan-
ja obavještajnih službi VJ, VRS i SVK.51

„Dana 7. veljače 1994. godine u ObU GŠ VJ održana raščlamba rada postrojbi za


EI na kojoj su sudjelovali i predstavnici iz SVK.“52
• odlazak na konzultacije i „brifinge“ u GŠ VJ: „U Beogradu je 5. lipnja 1995.
godine održan jedan od redovitih sastanaka predstavnika SVK i VJ s glavnom
temom kako mobilizirati vojno sposobne osobe u SRJ za potrebe popune
SVK.“53

General Mile Mrkšić, zajedno s nekoliko časnika iz GŠ SVK te sa zapovjednikom


11. korpusa (general Dušan Lončar) bio je na sastanku s predsjednikom Srbije Slo-
bodanom Miloševićem (pitanje izbora ministra obrane) i s načelnikom GŠ VJ (ana-
liza realizacije zadaća i bojne spremnosti postrojbi SVK).54

47 
 tome će više govora biti u sljedećem poglavlju (br. 2).
O
48 
HMDCDR, 8., kut. 7, „Organizacija života i rada u 7. korpusu naređenje“, Komanda 7. k, 22. 6. 1994.
49 
„Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 14. do 21. lipnja 1995. godine“, 21. lipnja
1995. godine, MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1555.
50 
„Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 7. do 14. lipnja 1995. godine“, 16. lipnja 1995.
godine, MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1517.
51 
„Raščlamba…“, 16. lipnja 1995. godine, MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-
1517.
52 
„Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 14. do 21. veljače 1994.“, 21. veljače 1994. go-
dine, MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-453.
53 
“Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 30. svibnja do 6. lipnja 1995. godine“, od 7.
lipnja 1995. godine, MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1414.
54 
„Obavještajna informacija za 5. srpnja 1995. godine“, 6. srpnja 1995. godine, MORH, klasa: 804-
08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1666.

60
• međuvojna suradnja: 20. kolovoza 1993. general Ratko Mladić (zapovjednik
VRS) posjetio je 18. korpus SVK,55 a govorio je o zajedničkoj obrani srpskih
zemalja.

Na susretu Milana Martića i Radovana Karadžića 17. veljače 1994. godine „raz-
govaralo se o obvezama vojne suradnje (…) i drugim aktivnostima usmjerenim na
ujedinjavanje u zajedničku državu“.56
Koordinacija rada SVK i VRS u djelovanjima na području Dinare i Bosanskog
Grahova te zapadne Bosne.57

Logistička potpora:58
• opskrba streljivom različitih vrsta
• opskrba gorivom
• opskrba rezervnim dijelovima za različita borbena sredstva
• opskrba vojnim i policijskim odorama
• remont tehničkih sredstava SVK u SRJ
• ispomoć u ljudstvu za održavanje tehnike.

Ojačanja:
• topničke postrojbe do ranga divizijuna
• raketne postrojbe do ranga divizijuna
• tenkovske postrojbe do ranga bojne
• postrojbe EI i PED do ranga satnije.

55 
 MDCDR, 6., kut. 5, „Informacija potčinjenim jedinicama“, 20. 08. 1993.
H
56 
„Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 14. do 21. veljače 1994.“, 21. veljače 1994. go-
dine, MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-453.
57 
HMDCDR, 2-2. KK VRS, kut. 3, Dopis Komande 2. krajiškog korpusa Glavnom štabu Vojske Re-
publike Srpske, 27. 5. 1995.
58 
O tome govore sljedeći dokumenti: „Informacija o ojačanjima u tenkovima pristiglim na područ-
je sektora ‘Istok’“, 7. veljače 1994. godine, MORH, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-327; Informacija od 24.
rujna 1993. godine, MORH, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-93-3067; „Pokazatelji i značajke potpore SRJ pre-
ma ‘RSK’“, 30. ožujka 1995. godine, MORH, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-797; „Raščlamba obavještajnih
informacija za razdoblje od 3. do 10. listopada 1994. godine“, 11. listopada 1994. godine, MORH,
Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-2356; HMDCDR, 8., kut. 7, „Referat po pitanjima borbene gotovosti“, Ko-
manda 7. korpusa, 15. 4. 1994.

61
Opremanje i modernizacija:
• topnička i raketna oružja: na primjer, topnička i raketna oružja za formiranje
Korpusa specijalnih jedinica, o čemu će više riječi biti u nastavku;
• tenkovi: tijekom siječnja 1994. godine dopremljeno je 35 tenkova T-34 za
potrebe 11. korpusa SVK (u funkciji jačanja obrane), popuna tenkovima
M-84 iz sastava specijalne brigade (Niš) u lipnju 1995. godine, za potrebe
formiranja KSJ SVK;
• raketni lanseri,
• helikopteri,
• sustavi veze.

Značaj i opseg potpore osobito ilustriraju podaci o potpori koja je iz SRJ (VJ) do-
lazila u „RSK“ (SVK) nakon kolovoza 1994. godine, kada je SRJ uveden embargo na
svaku vrstu financijske, gospodarske i vojne pomoći usmjerene prema RS i „RSK“,59 o
čemu će više riječi biti u 3. poglavlju, ali i podaci o potpori neposredno prije početka
završne faze napadajne operacije na zapadnu Bosnu.60

59 
„ Podaci o potpori koju VJ pruža SVK“, 22. 6. 1995., MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-
06-06/1-95-1538.
60 
„Pregled ojačanja upućenih iz VJ u ‘RSK’ tijekom lipnja 1995.“, 28. 6. 1995., MORH, klasa: 804-
08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1598.

62
2.

“STRATEGIJA REALNE PRIJETNJE” –


POKUŠAJ OČUVANJA STANJA OKUPACIJE

Uvod
Nepunih osam godina od nastanka Memoranduma SANU, početkom 1994. go-
dine, kada se u vojnim strukturama „RSK“ razmišlja o preustroju (djelomičnoj pro-
fesionalizaciji) „Srpske vojske Krajine“, zahvaljujući vojnoj implementaciji ideje „Ve-
like Srbije“, tvorac vojne strategije „Republike Srpske Krajine“ general pukovnik VJ
Radovan Radinović61 u intervjuu listu „Vojska Krajine“62 očito opravdano tvrdi:
„Bez odlučujućeg poraza na bojnom polju upravo te vojske (misli na SVK) Hr-
vatska ne može računati na ostvarenje svog još nedosanjanog sna – na reintegraciju
RSK u svoj državno–pravni i teritorijalni poredak.“
Naime, do tada su na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije formirane tri „srpske države“ i u
njima odgovarajuće „srpske vojske“:
• Savezna Republika Jugoslavija (SRJ) i njoj pripadajuća Vojska Jugoslavije
(VJ),
• Republika Srpska (RS) i njezina Vojska Republike Srpske (VRS) te
• „Republika Srpska Krajina“ („RSK“) i njezina Srpska vojska Krajine (SVK).

61 
 eneral pukovnik prof. dr. Radovan Radinović bio je poznati vojni teoretičar u bivšoj JNA. U vri-
G
jeme objavljivanja „Strategije realne prijetnje“ nalazio se na dužnosti načelnika Uprave za strate-
gijske studije i politiku obrane MO SRJ. Radi se, dakle, o voditelju najviše specijalizirane državne
institucije, zadužene za znanstveno osmišljavanje uporabe vojske i drugih potencijala države, su-
kladno njezinoj politici.
62 
HMDCDR, 18., „Uzroci i ciljevi preustroja Srpske vojske Krajine“, Zagreb, travanj 1994.

63
Još ranije, u veljači 1993. godine, javno je obznanjena takozvana „strategija real-
ne prijetnje“ ili „strategija odvraćanja“, kako je još nazivana, koja je u biti predstavlja-
la kontinuitet velikosrpske vojne strategije. To je činjenica koju kreatori i propagatori
te strategije (prije svih general Radovan Radinović) nisu ni nastojali ozbiljnije prikri-
ti. Štoviše, naglašavanjem da bi „agresijom Hrvatske (misli se „agresijom“ na „RSK“)
faktički bio nametnut rat cijelom srpskom narodu“, ta činjenica se otvoreno rabi za
pojačanje dojma o „realnoj prijetnji“.
„Strategija realne prijetnje“ zapravo je rezultat evolucije velikosrpske vojne stra-
tegije – od „strategije oslobađanja“ (radi se zapravo o strategiji osvajanja s počet-
ka 1990-ih) do „strategije obrane“ (radi se o strategiji „realne prijetnje“ ili „odvra-
ćanja“), koja treba omogućiti očuvanje rezultata agresije, tj. do tada uspostavljenih
„granica Velike Srbije“.

2.1. “Strategija realne prijetnje” – strategija terorizma

2.1.1. Temeljna polazišta


Dok “strategija” ima svoja
• izvorišta u ideji „Velike Srbije“, a
• uporišta u sveukupnoj snazi srpskih zemalja,
oblici i metode njezine realizacije nedvojbeno spadaju u domenu terorizma.63

To se, bez svake sumnje, vidi iz teksta članka objavljenog u listu „Vojska Krajine“,
dvobroj 4-5 (srpanj – kolovoz 1993.), s nadnaslovom „Prednosti krajiške strategijske
pozicije“ i naslovom „Realna prijetnja na delu“ generala pukovnika Radovana Radi-
novića.
Očita je namjera redakcije, da upravo autoritetom autora pojača uvjerljivost po-
stavljenih tvrdnji i obrazloženja, kako bi se člankom ostvario psihološko promidž-
beni učinak, tj. kako bi se ohrabrile vlastite snage, što im je u tom trenutku bilo jako
potrebno. Takav zaključak sugerira i činjenica, da se tih dana u medijima u „RSK“
pojavljuje niz izjava s izravnim prijetnjama o napadu na Zagreb, kao odgovoru na
„možebitni napad HV na Knin”.64
63 
„ Izvorišta i bitne značajke vojne strategije RSK – informacija“, 11. listopada 1993. godine, MORH,
klasa: 833-05/93-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-93-3202.
64 
„Prosudba aktualnih grožnji neprijatelja o odmazdi po gradovima u R. Hrvatskoj“, 1. rujna 1993.
godine, MORH, klasa: 833-05/93-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-93-2845.

64
To „ohrabrivanje“ ima i sve naznake „oslobađanja“ od preostalih etičkih „kočni-
ca“ koje bi, moguće, priječile tipično terorističke „vatrene udare“ po civilnim objek-
tima, bez obzira radi li se o stambenoj zgradi, školi, sakralnom ili drugom objektu
kulture, ili pak bolnici i sličnom objektu. Jer, obrazlaže i dokazuje general, „odmazda
je osnova strategije obrane RSK“.
Sljedeći citat iz navedenog članka najbolje potvrđuje navedenu tvrdnju: „Područ-
je Zagreba s infrastrukturom i industrijskim kapacitetima nalazi se na 24 kilometra
od srpskih položaja, a to je daljina uspješnog dometa raketnih sustava i najkvalitet-
nijih sustava topništva za potporu koji su raspoređeni na kordunskom i banijskom
dijelu ratišta. U slučaju hrvatske agresije na Krajinu svi ti sustavi težišno bi se sručili
na Zagreb i njegovu najbližu okolicu. Nikakvih kalkulacija pri tome ne bi bilo, jer bi
svi Srbi bili svjesni da se radi o konačnom obračunu Krajine i Hrvatske, odnosno o
borbi za opstanak. Krajina, ustvari, ne bi imala drugog izbora, nego da se brani svim
dostupnim sredstvima i metodama. Zagreb bi bio izložen takvim razaranjima koja
bi život u njemu učinila za duže vrijeme nemogućim, a gubici civilnog stanovništva
bili bi ogromni.
Na teritoriju ‘Krajine’ nema takve urbane koncentracije, s izuzetkom Knina, pa je
preživljavanje ratnih udara jednostavnije nego što se to može osigurati u Hrvatskoj.
Ta prijetnja je realno ostvariva bez obzira na zamah i intenzitet hrvatskih udara, uk-
ljučujući i masovne raketne i zrakoplovne udare, za što sada Hrvatska nije spremna,
ali se u perspektivi i uz pomoć svojih moćnih mentora može osposobiti.“65
Autor jednako tako prijeti i Karlovcu koji bi „bio izložen razaranjima svih siste-
ma za podršku, bez ozbiljnijih mogućnosti Hrvatske da to efikasno spriječi“, kao što
i na „dalmatinskom frontu“ prijeti „efikasnom vatrom“ po gradovima „Sinju, Splitu,
Šibeniku, Biogradu i Zadru“ te „stavljanjem pod potpunu vatrenu kontrolu“ magi-
strale između Šibenika i Zadra, Novigradskog ždrila, Zračne luke Zemunik i HE Pe-
ruča.
General u članku nadalje tvrdi da je „strategija realne prijetnje djelovala veoma
uvjerljivo i tako će djelovati i ubuduće.“ Samo po sebi je jasno, da je objavljivanjem
članka „uvjerljivost prijetnje“ trebalo pojačati i tako dokazati „prednosti krajiške
strategijske pozicije“. Osobito i višestruko značenje ima i činjenica da sadržaj član-
ka, očito u pretjeranoj želji za postizanjem što boljih promidžbenih učinaka (s jedne
strane zastrašivanja, a s druge ohrabrivanja i podizanja morala), moguće za autora i
redakciju i neopaženo, razotkriva pravu, terorističku bit strategije. Pri tome je otkri-
vanje namjere za uporabom „svih dostupnih sredstava i metoda“ (znači i svih vrsta
65 
Vojska Krajine, broj 4-5, juli-avgust 1993., 7-9.

65
oružja), promaknuo i izravno navedeni zaključak da bi „gubici civilnog stanovništva
bili ogromni“. Uz to, gradovi i sve što oni jesu i znače, ponovo izričito spominjući
Dubrovnik, po ovoj strategiji su glavni „objekti vatrenih udara“, tj. odmazde.66

2.1.2. P
 odcjenjivanje drugih67 važna je značajka tvoraca i realizatora
ideje „Velike Srbije”
Za potpunije sagledavanje dosega „strategije“ zanimljivo je razmotriti i tekst is-
pod podnaslova „Geostrategijski kaos Hrvatske“. Već sam podnaslov dovoljno ilu-
strira način na koji razmišlja autor. Čak štoviše, nije mu dovoljno da geostrategijski
položaj Hrvatske u odnosu na „RSK“ ocijeni „krajnje nepovoljnim“, što je u određe-
noj mjeri točno, nego to još naglašava smišljanjem podcjenjivačke sintagme „geo-
strategijski kaos“, a svemu još dodaje i tvrdnju: „U Europi nema države koja ima tako
nepovoljno komponiran i oblikovan državni prostor kao Hrvatska... I za onoga koji
nije ni slova pročitao iz strategije nema dileme da je država (...) toliko ranjiva da je
njena efikasna obrana integralnog državnog prostora u ratu nemoguća, bez obzira na
to kakva i kolika joj vojna sila bude protivnik...“68
Razumljivo, iz takvog podcjenjivačkog prilaza niti ne može slijediti drugo osim
daljnje projekcije namjera, što je vidljivo i iz sljedećih tvrdnji: „Uspostavljanjem RSK
kao samostalne države Hrvatska je otjerana od Dunava koji predstavlja najznačajniju
vezu jugoistočne i središnje Europe. RSK faktički presijeca Hrvatsku na nekoliko di-
jelova... Eventualni pravci presijecanja Hrvatske na odvojene cjeline bili bi: Grubišno
Polje – mađarska granica, Karlovac – Metlika, i Maslenički most…“69
Strategija odgovara i na pitanje kako izvesti to „brzo cijepanje“ teritorija Hrvat-
ske „na četiri, pet pa i više dijelova“, što se sugerira kao strategijski odgovor na mo-
žebitnu odluku Hrvatske „da srpsko pitanje u svojim bivšim administrativnim gra-
nicama rješava vojnim sredstvima“. To je „moguće izvesti s relativno malobrojnim
snagama, pa čak i samo stavljanjem pod vatrenu kontrolu najosjetljivijih prostornih
objekata na navedenim pravcima“, tvrdi autor ne sustežući se napisati: „to Hrvatska
ničim i nikako ne može braniti“.
66 
 ojska Krajine, broj 4-5, juli-avgust 1993., 7-9.
V
67 
Misli se na pripadnike drugih naroda i nacionalnih manjina u okviru bivše Jugoslavije, ili dr-
žava nastalih na području na kojem je egzistirala bivša Jugoslavija.
68 
Vojska Krajine, broj 4-5, juli-avgust 1993., 7-9.
69 
Prepoznatljive su u tome i ambicije početne strategije agresije na Republiku Hrvatsku (vidi knjigu
generala V. Kadijevića Moje viđenje raspada), u čijem osmišljavanju je general Radinović, već pre-
ma svojoj dužnosti i funkciji imao značajnu, ako ne i glavnu ulogu, ali i razlozi za kasnije (1994.)
započetu ofenzivu na područje zapadne Bosne.

66
Na kraju, autor tvrdi: „U raspeću između dviju krajnjih solucija – odlučiti da Sr-
bima ne prizna državnu samostalnost i nemogućnosti da to vojnički podupre – Hr-
vatska je osuđena da kao država u dugoj agoniji umire...“70
Da „strategija realne prijetnje“ neće ostati samo puko teoretiziranje ili predmet
akademskih rasprava, pokazali su i događaji koje su slijedili i dokumenti koji su tre-
bali dovesti do njezine daljnje praktične primjene. Među takvim dokumentima je i
„Direktiva za djelovanje SVK“ koju je predsjednik „RSK“ odobrio u veljači 1995. go-
dine.71 Tražeći odgovore na možebitne vojne ugroze koje bi u odnosu na „RSK“ mo-
gle predstavljati različite inačice napadajnih djelovanja HV-a, Direktiva kao rješenje
ne nudi samo defenzivne aktivnosti SVK, nego podrazumijeva i napadajna (protu-
napadajna) djelovanja. Radi se o napadajnim djelovanjima koja bi za rezultat trebala
imati presijecanje državnog teritorija RH na već spomenutim smjerovima, ali i „oslo-
bođenje“ onih „srpskih područja“ koja trenutno nisu bila u sastavu „RSK“. Direktiva
uključuje, između ostaloga, i izbijanje na jadransku obalu.
O daljnjim osvajanjima i „presijecanjima“ govorio je i Milan Martić,72 kada je 25.
i 26. travnja 1995., zajedno sa zapovjednikom SVK generalom Milanom Čeleketi-
ćem, bio u posjetu zapadnoj Slavoniji. Govoreći o jačanju obrambenih sposobnosti
SVK, dakle i 18. (zapadnoslavonskog) korpusa, iskazuje i tvrdnju kako će taj korpus
biti sposoban za „oslobađanje trenutno okupiranih područja“.73
Nema nikakve dvojbe da je „strategija realne prijetnje“ rezultat nemoći s jedne,
te arogancije i podcjenjivanja s druge strane. Jednako tako je nedvojbeno, da je ta
strategija provođena u život i da je bila izraz i rezultat politike koja nije pristajala na
rješenja koja nisu podrazumijevala trajno odvajanje „RSK“ od RH.
Razumijevanje ovakvog pristupa bitno je za razumijevanje svega onoga što se
kasnije događalo,74 što ovdje neće biti razmatrano s ostalih aspekata osim s vojnog, a
što je neminovno dovelo do traženja vojnog rješenja za reintegraciju tada okupiranih
područja u državnopravni sustav RH.
70 
 ojska Krajine, broj 4-5, juli-avgust 1993., 7-9.
V
71 
HMDCDR, 18, „Direktiva za upotrebu Srpske vojske Krajine“, februar 1995.
72 
HMDCDR, 6., kut. 9, „Izvještaj o uzrocima i načinu pada Zapadne Slavonije“, Republika Srpska
Krajina, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje uzroka i načina pada Zapadne Slavonije, Knin, 11. 7.
1995.
73 
Istovjetne stavove Milan Martić iznio je i u svom izlaganju na “Referisanju o borbenoj gotovosti
SVK” 10. veljače 1995. u Kninu (HMDCDR, 6., kut. 3).
74 
Odbijanje Plana Z-4 (siječanj 1995.) od strane „mjerodavnih“ struktura “RSK”, koji je „Krajini“
nudio veću autonomiju u okviru RH nego što ju je realno „RSK“ imala u to vrijeme, posljedica je
činjenice da nisu bili spremni pristati na formulaciju iz Plana u kojoj se „Krajina“ definira kao dio
RH s praktično konfederativnim sustavom.

67
2.2. Traženje odgovora primjerenog „strategiji realne
prijetnje“
Značajan dio priprema za izvođenje napadajne operacije za oslobađanje tada
okupiranih dijelova teritorija RH odvijao se, prije svega, i na obavještajnom planu,
u sklopu ukupnih priprema Oružanih snaga RH. Pripreme vojnog obavještajnog se-
gmenta bile su cijelo vrijeme realizirane kroz praktično i konkretno istraživanje ak-
tualnog i realnog neprijatelja. Kao rezultat rada toga sustava, samo na razini Obavje-
štajne uprave GSHV-a do završetka operacije „Oluja“ izrađeno je:
- više od tisuću dnevnih obavještajnih informacija
- preko stotinu tematskih obavještajnih informacija
- 150 tjednih raščlambi obavještajnih informacija
- više desetaka obavještajnih prosudbi.

Intenzivnije obavještajne aktivnosti u funkciji obavještajne pripreme bojišta (IPB


- IPOE), radi izvođenja napadajne operacije s ciljem oslobađanja okupiranih područ-
ja RH, počele su s pojavom „strategije realne prijetnje“. Dakako, one tada nisu bile
usmjerene (izravno i samo) na pripremu operacije „Oluja“, ali su bile usmjerene na
istraživanje protivnika radi pronalaženja najučinkovitijih odgovora za neutraliziranje
štetnih učinaka „strategije realne prijetnje“ i na nalaženje rješenja za izvođenje napa-
dajne vojne operacije za oslobađanje tada okupiranih područja Republike Hrvatske.

2.2.1. I zrada prve idejne zamisli napadajne operacije za oslobađanje


svih tada okupiranih područja RH
„Obznana“ „strategije realne prijetnje“ i njezino dodatno tumačenje od strane
generala Radinovića nedvojbeno su pokazali da su izgledi za mirnu reintegraciju
tada okupiranih dijelova RH samo teoretski održivi. Bio je to dovoljan razlog da se
pristupi analizi utjecaja koji bi takva „strategija“ mogla imati na strategijska pitanja
obrane, odnosno integriranja cjelokupnog državnog teritorija RH u jedinstveni dr-
žavnopravni sustav.75
Rezultiralo je to i izradom prve vizije napadajne operacije, prezentirane u mate-
rijalu Obavještajne uprave GSHV-a, pod nazivom „Prilog razmatranju vojne strate-
gije RH“ i podnaslovom „Skica mogućeg modela ‘odgovora’ na primjenu ‘strategije
realne prijetnje RSK’“.
75 
HMDCDR, 18., „Prilog razmatranju Vojne strategije RH“, listopad 1993. godine.

68
Ovdje se ukazuje na glavne naglaske iz tog dokumenta. Kao prvo, postavlja se
pitanje nužnosti nalaženja konkretnih „odgovora“ na temeljne probleme (glavna pi-
tanja) koje nameće primjena „strategije realne prijetnje“:
• kako neutralizirati prednosti neprijatelja koje su proizlazile iz mogućnosti
korištenja „povoljnijeg geostrategijskog položaja“, a koje su mogle rezultirati
„otvaranjem fronta od Baranje do Prevlake“?
• koji je to dostatan odnos snaga za izvođenje munjevite ofenzive s ciljem
oslobađanja tada okupiranih područja i kako ga osigurati?
• na koji način izbjeći posljedice početnog udara (odmazde) i što prije
onemogućiti nastavljanje odmazde raketno - topničkim sredstvima?
• kojim načinom djelovanja i na kojim smjerovima iznenaditi neprijatelja i na-
nijeti mu udare koji će najbrže dezorganizirati njegov sustav obrane i osigu-
rati izbijanje na državnu granicu na tada okupiranim područjima te stvoriti
uvjete za razbijanje SVK?
• kako spriječiti dovođenje ojačanja ili uvođenje strategijske pričuve s područja
SRJ i RS, odnosno iz sastava VJ i VRS?

Budući da se neprijateljska strategija odmazde temeljila na uporabi raketno-top-


ničkih sredstava velikog dosega, koja su omogućavala udare po urbanim središtima i
gospodarskoj infrastrukturi na slobodnim dijelovima RH, model odgovora nužno je
morao uključivati kompleks aktivnosti usmjerenih s jedne strane na precizno utvr-
đivanje i praćenje vrsta, količina i razmještaja tog naoružanja, a s druge, na naoru-
žavanje postrojbi HV-a sredstvima za učinkovito otkrivanje položaja i uništavanje
spomenutih raketno-topničkih sustava neprijatelja.
Bitno je, dakle, bilo onemogućiti neprijatelja da potencijalnu strategijsku pred-
nost materijalizira realizacijom zamisli o nanošenju Hrvatskoj „neprihvatljivih raza-
ranja i gubitaka“, tj. bitno je bilo stvoriti uvjete koji će osigurati „prihvatljivu“ (racio-
nalnu) razinu razaranja i drugih gubitaka.
Budući da bi se na taj način eliminirala prednost na kojoj neprijatelj gradi cije-
lu strategiju obrane, to bi već samo po sebi osiguralo strategijski povoljniji položaj.
Nadalje, to bi omogućilo i relativno brzo ostvarivanje strategijske inicijative i drugih
preduvjeta za realizaciju zamisli razbijanja neprijatelja i definitivnog oslobađanja ta-
da okupiranih područja RH.
Glavni strategijski problem bilo je ispunjavanje temeljnog uvjeta za poduzimanje
napadajne operacije po načelima „doktrine munjevitog rata“. Treba podsjetiti da su
tvorci neprijateljske strategije također ispravno zaključivali da bi načela upravo ta-
kve doktrine Hrvatska morala primijeniti. Više je dokaza u prilog takvoj ocjeni, a u

69
ovom kontekstu izgleda dostatnim istaknuti samo sljedeće: ni jedna zamisao opera-
cije oslobađanja tada okupiranih područja koja se ne bi temeljila na ideji brzog pro-
boja odabranim smjerovima, radi rasijecanja snaga neprijatelja na manje dijelove, de-
zorganizacije sustava obrane i izbijanja na državnu granicu s ciljem onemogućavanja
pristizanja pomoći s područja BiH i iz Srbije, ne bi imala izglede za uspjeh. Dakako,
pri ovome se poglavito mislilo na područja Banovine, Korduna, Like i sjeverne Dal-
macije, koja je neprijatelj s razlogom tretirao kao „prostorno strategijsko težište“, iako
se prethodno jednako odnosilo i na dijelove zapadne i/ili istočne Slavonije i Baranje.
Nedvojbeno se javljala potreba ustrojavanja i svestranog pripremanja potrebnog
broja postrojbi odgovarajuće jačine te adekvatno naoružanih i uvježbanih, sposob-
nih za izvršenje zadaća nositelja ofenzive.
Iako bi tek dublje sagledavanje konkretnih zadaća kojima bi se općenito, i na
određenim smjerovima posebno pokazalo kakvi bi trebali biti njihov izgled i bitne
značajke,76 već tada se moglo ustvrditi da bi te postrojbe morale biti:
- združeno - taktičke razine,
- jačine 3 do 4 tisuće odabranih, profesionalno uvježbanih i visoko motivira-
nih ljudi,
- naoružane modernim oklopnim transporterima, sredstvima za snažnu au-
tonomnu vatrenu potporu, sposobnim za brzo premještanje te
- opremljene sredstvima za PO borbu i za zaštitu od napada iz zraka.

Očito je, naime, s obzirom na namjenu i glavne zadaće, da je njihova temeljna


značajka morala biti sposobnost:
• nanošenja snažnog udara i
• proboja bojišnice na odabranom smjeru te
• nastavljanja brzog prodora što dublje u neprijateljev raspored, a potom
• prijelaz u obranu radi osiguranja uspjeha i/ili poduzimanja napada na
odsječene ili okružene dijelove neprijatelja.

Bilo je posve izvjesno da opisane postrojbe, makar i vrhunski opremljene, ne bi


mogle obaviti svoje zadaće ako se prethodno ne bi osigurali i drugi uvjeti: prije svega,
misli se na poduzimanje planskih frontalnih bojnih djelovanja, najmanje sa svrhom
76 
 pravo takav pristup bio je jedan od bitnih kriterija pri donošenju odluke o uporabi postrojbi
U
Specijalne policije MUP-a u operaciji „Oluja“, na smjeru koji je s Velebita izvodio prema Gračacu i
Metku, jer je doktrina uporabe takvih postrojbi, a prema tome i njihova obuka i oprema bila
primjerena upravo takvoj zadaći, na takvom zemljištu.

70
razvlačenja i vezivanja snaga neprijatelja te onemogućavanja njihovog manevra duž
bojišnica, kako bi se zatvorili oni smjerovi na kojima bi se nanosio udar naših snaga
s ciljem proboja i prodora u dubinu. Razumije se, optimalno bi bilo aktivirati cijelu
bojišnicu („strategijsku frontu“), nanijeti neprijatelju što veće gubitke u početnom
rasporedu i, gdje god je moguće, potisnuti ga s utvrđenih položaja, narušavajući tako
raspored snaga i postupno dezorganizirajući njegov sustav obrane. Pod pretpostav-
kom postizanja iznenađenja, makar i na operativnoj razini, naznačeni način djelova-
nja doveo bi neprijatelja pred problem nametnutog „aktiviranja strategijskog fronta“.
Naime, na taj način bio bi preduhitren u namjeri da on otvori frontu „od Baranje do
Prevlake“. Time bi se osigurala strategijska inicijativa, kao bitan preduvjet za učinko-
vito djelovanje nositelja ofenzive i sveukupno plansko odvijanje operacije.
Međutim, težina problema onemogućavanja neprijatelja u ostvarivanju strategij-
ske zamisli o „aktiviranju fronte od Baranje do Prevlake“ upućuje na potrebu uka-
zivanja na još neke aspekte planiranja takve operacije. Naime, „strategija realne pri-
jetnje“ uključuje „odgovarajuće akcije RSK i RS na svim operativnim pravcima koji
vode od tih ‘republika’ na prostor Hrvatske“, u čemu se s razlogom moglo prepoznati
i „najavu“ sličnih „akcija s područja SRJ“. To je samo po sebi potenciralo niz pita-
nja u vezi snaga i njihovog načina djelovanja protiv neprijatelja na tada okupiranim
područjima zapadne Slavonije i istočne Hrvatske, zatim obrane Posavine od napada
iz sjeverne Bosne te zatvaranja operativnog smjera Šid – Vinkovci i smjerova prema
području južne Hrvatske (osobito Konavle), kojima bi, u najnepovoljnijoj varijanti,
napadale snage VJ iz SRJ.
Prosuđivano je, da bi ojačanja (strategijska pričuva) određene jačine mogla biti
uvedena na sljedeća područja i na sljedećim smjerovima:
• Istočna Slavonija i Baranja:
- 2 do 3 mbr
- 3 do 4 mad-a
- 2 mpoad-a
- smjerom Šid – Vinkovci i preko mostova kod Bogojeva i Batine;
• Banovina i Kordun:
- 2 mtbr
- 2 lpbr
- 2 mad-a
− smjerom Prijedor - Dvor (Glina ili Vrginmost) i
− smjerom Prijedor - Kostajnica - Dubica;

71
• Lika:
- 1 mtbr
- 1 lpbr
- smjerom B. Petrovac – Vrtoče – Kulen Vakuf – Donji Lapac – Udbina;
• Sjeverna Dalmacija:
- 1 mtbr
- 1 lpbr
- smjerom Bosansko Grahovo – Knin.

Uvođenjem naznačenog kompleksa pitanja u cjelinu razmatranja, brzo su se na-


metnula sljedeća dva zaključka (dvije prosudbe):
• ofenzivnom operacijom sa zadaćom oslobađanja okupiranih područja ne bi
bilo moguće odjednom obuhvatiti sva tada okupirana područja, i
• realna bi bila ona strategijska zamisao koja bi ofenzivu usmjerila na već
spominjano „prostorno strategijsko težište“ neprijatelja, dok bi se za osta-
la navedena bojišta predviđala jednovremena bojna djelovanja sa svrhom
onemogućavanja proboja neprijatelja, tj. izvođenje sklopa bojnih djelovanja
tipa „obrambene operacije“.

U nizu pitanja na koje je odgovore trebala dati vojna strategija, značajno mjesto
pripadalo je i izboru trenutka poduzimanja navedenih operacija. Pri tome je ukaza-
no na potrebu da bi radi izvođenja takve operacije bilo nužno uspostaviti suradnju s
Armijom BiH i HVO-om, kako bi se njihovim usklađenim djelovanjem vezivalo sna-
ge VRS, koje bi na taj način bile onemogućene u ostvarivanju svoje uloge strategijske
(u nekim elementima samo operativne) pričuve SVK.

„Strategija realno usklađivanih koraka“


U zaključku navedenog dokumenta konstatirano je:
„Budući da je, kako je već navedeno, u tijeku primjena neprijateljeve strate-
gije ‘realne prijetnje’, ‘odgovor’ na nju također mora početi odmah i sustav-
no. Uzimajući u obzir prethodno navedeno, očito je da se radi o čitavom
kompleksu aktivnosti i mjera, postupno i temeljito usklađivanih s realnim
mogućnostima i okolnostima, ali sustavno okrenutih konačnoj svrsi – oslo-
bađanju trenutno okupiranih područja i uspostavi hrvatskog suvereniteta i
na tim dijelovima, makar i ratom, kao jedinim preostalim legitimnim sred-

72
stvom. Imajući u vidu naznačeni sadržaj, izgleda da se samo po sebi nameće
kako ‘strategiji realne prijetnje’ treba suprotstaviti našu vojnu strategiju ‘real-
no usklađivanih koraka’.“
Dakle, već tada, u listopadu 1993., prosuđeno je kako „strategija realne prijetnje“
ne ostavlja nikakvu dvojbu glede odlučnosti „RSK“ da i uporabom SVK omogući
trajno odvajanje dijela teritorija RH radi njegovog pripajanja „srpskim zemljama“, te
da je vjerojatnost mirne reintegracije tada okupiranih područja RH praktično zane-
mariva. Točnost i opravdanost takve prosudbe potvrđena je kasnijim događanjima
koja su rezultirala nužnom primjenom vojne sile u cilju oslobađanja okupiranih di-
jelova RH.

2.2.2. O
 sposobljavanje sustava obavještajnog djelovanja za potporu
u operacijama
Izrada „Prosudbe mogućeg razvoja događaja na vojno-političkom planu i mogu-
ća ugroza RH u narednom razdoblju, osobito u varijantama angažiranja HV“77 (ožu-
jak 1994. godine) ukazuje na činjenicu da su namjere protivnika na vojnom planu
bile bitno uvjetovane mandatom UNPROFOR-a te da one, u konačnici, mogu rezul-
tirati dugotrajnim sukobima niskog intenziteta (slučaj da dođe do promjene manda-
ta UNPROFOR-a u skladu s prijedlozima RH), ili mogu dovesti do sukoba visokog
intenziteta, u slučaju da ne dođe do izmjene mandata UNPROFOR-a i da RH bude
dovedena u situaciju da vojnim sredstvima riješi problem integriranja tada okupira-
nih područja u svoj državnopravni sustav.
S vojnog gledišta je druga inačica (sukob visokog intenziteta) podrazumijevala
snažnu, pravovremeno uvedenu i učinkovito uporabljenu operativnu (strategijsku)
pričuvu iz sastava VJ i VRS. Nadalje, to je podrazumijevalo popunu i osposobljava-
nje postrojbi SVK, dobro inženjerijsko uređenje prvog i drugog pojasa obrane, te
elastičnu obranu prvog pojasa.
Kao najslabija točka prosuđeno je pravodobno uvođenje operativne pričuve (do
36 sati), što je rezultiralo zaključkom kako je potrebno sustavno i centralizirano
usmjeravanje obavještajnog djelovanja. Predloženo je:
• „Pojačati ofanzivno obavještajno prodiranje u operativnu i strategijsku du-
binu neprijatelja i tako osigurati sustavno obavještajno istraživanje sa svrhom

77 
„ Obavještajna prosudba mogućeg razvoja događaja na vojno-političkom planu i moguća ugro-
za RH u narednom razdoblju, osobito u varijantama angažiranja HV“, 26. ožujka 1994. godine,
MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-742.

73
pravodobnog otkrivanja i učinkovitog praćenja aktivnosti, koje bi ukazivalo
na pripreme iz oblasti ‘sivih’ operacija (sukob niskog intenziteta), ili na prom-
jene kojima bi se značajnije mijenjao odnos snaga, kako bi se na taj način
spriječilo iznenađenje;
• Uspostaviti jedinstven sustav prikupljanja obavještajnih podataka (uključiti
sve službe – SIS, SZUP, COB, Ured za vezu s UN i EZ, koje sada djeluju sa-
mostalno i ponekad pogrešno koriste vojne obavještajne podatke) kako bi se
Obavještajnoj upravi omogućila potpunija i svestranija raščlamba i temeljem
toga prosudba.“78

Slijedom takve prosudbe i danih prijedloga poduzet je niz mjera koje nedvojbe-
no spadaju u skup mjera obavještajnih priprema za izvođenje operacije.
Radi se o sljedećim mjerama:
Organizacija sustava prikupljanja podataka i izvješćivanja:
• horizontalno uvezivanje na razini države (zahtjev i prijedlog iz ObU) za us-
postavu koordinacije svih službi na razini države, kako bi se osigurala razm-
jena obavještajnih podataka;
• horizontalno, vertikalno i strukovno uvezivanje unutar vojnog sustava uprav-
ljanja i prikupljanja obavještajnih podataka, kako bi se osigurala pravodobna
raspoloživost podataka: ustroj i opremanje postrojbi iz stručne nadležnosti
ObU (posebno težište na bespilotne letjelice i vodove ED gardijskih brigada),
kako bi se omogućila primjena onih oblika prikupljanja obavještajnih po-
dataka koji neće dovoditi do provokacija na bojišnici, a koji bi zasigurno mo-
gli otežavati obuku postrojbi HV-a; izvođenje zadaća prikupljanja podataka
u skladu s mogućim inačicama izvedbe napadajnih operacija (angažiranje
obavještajnih resursa na pretpostavljenim područjima i/ili smjerovima
angažiranja u operaciji):
− sustavno AFS (aero-foto snimanje): cjelokupne crte razdvajanja
(bojišnice); smjerova koji izvode u dubinu; rasporeda elemenata primjene
„strategije realne prijetnje“; zapovjednih mjesta i središta veze; uređenja
drugog pojasa obrane (do 10 km); ukupno je snimljeno približno 6000
km2 površine teritorija pod nadzorom neprijatelja.

78 
„ Obavještajna prosudba mogućeg razvoja događaja na vojno-političkom planu i moguća ugro-
za RH u narednom razdoblju, osobito u varijantama angažiranja HV“, 26. ožujka 1994. godine,
MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-742.

74
2.3. Aktivnosti neprijatelja – provedba „strategije realne
prijetnje“

Uvod
Prosudbom aktualnog stanja79 (početak 1994. godine), jačine i rasporeda snaga
protivnika na okupiranim područjima RH, uključujući i moguća ojačanja i potpore
od strane VJ i VRS dolazi(lo) se do zaključka, da se radi o respektabilnim snagama
koje se nalaze u relativno povoljnom operativnom položaju.
Takav zaključak proizlazio je i iz činjenica:
• da je protivnik raspolagao zavidnom količinom snažnog oružja, poglavi-
to topničko-raketnog i oklopno-mehaniziranog, što je uključivalo i sustave
dalekometnog oružja („Orkan“, R-65 „Luna-M“, protubrodske rakete P-21 i
P-22 modificirane za gađanje ciljeva na kopnu) kojima je i prijetio odmaz-
dom po gradovima80 i civilnim objektima od vitalnog značaja,
• da je položaje snažno utvrdio i inženjerijski uredio81 te da mu je ljudstvo još
uvijek bilo relativno motivirano, čime se djelomično ublažavao vrlo izražen
problem nedostatka ljudstva, a realno je mogao računati na već spominjanu
svestranu pomoć iz SRJ i RS.

Ipak, operativni položaj protivnika postupno su oslabljivali sve brojniji i teži pro-
blemi. Osim konstanti sadržanih u činjenicama da se radi o vrlo dugačkoj bojišnici
na inače razdvojenim dijelovima „Krajine“, mjestimično vrlo male dubine, iz čega su
proizlazili skoro nerješivi problemi manevra snagama i osiguranja elastičnosti obra-
ne, sve je izraženiji postajao nedostatak ljudstva, kao i gospodarskih mogućnosti za
održavanje vojske.
Samo za osiguranje približno 900 km „granice“/bojišnice bilo je potrebno odvo-
jiti približno 50% ljudskog potencijala SVK (to bi bilo 18.000 ljudi, odnosno 20 po
kilometru), što objektivno nije bilo moguće, a svi podaci ukazivali su na angažiranje
maksimalno 1/3 ukupnog ljudstva.

79 
„ Obavještajna prosudba mogućeg razvoja događaja na vojno-političkom planu i moguća ugro-
za RH u narednom razdoblju, osobito u varijantama angažiranja HV“, 26. ožujka 1994. godine,
MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-742.
80 
HMDCDR, 18., AFS položaja za „Orkan“ (Prilog na str. 282, AFS paljbenog položaja, Markovine).
81 
HMDCDR, 18., AFS nekih uređenih obrambenih položaja na prvoj i drugoj crti (Vedro Polje –
Hrastovac; Veljun).

75
U vezi s potrebom rješavanja tog problema može se naći i jedan od uzroka za
preustroj brigada SVK, pokrenut početkom 1994. godine. Preustrojem je trebalo ri-
ješiti dva značajna problema:
− zaštitu „granice“, što je postalo značajno nakon potpisivanja Zagrebačkog
sporazuma (krajem ožujka 1994.) i
− manji i ujednačeniji sastav brigada, temeljnih združenih taktičkih postrojbi
kojih je bilo najmanje tri vrste.

U pokušaju rješavanja problema zaštite „granice“, odnosno osiguranja obrane na


bojišnici, ali i po dubini teritorija, u uvjetima izrazito ograničenih ljudskih i tvarnih
resursa, dolazi se do rješenja koja nemaju nikakvog utemeljenja u tadašnjoj vojnoj
praksi i teoriji. Naime, predloženo rješenje podrazumijeva da se odjeljenju dodjeljuje
pojas odgovornosti širine do 2 km, u kojem se raspoređuju tri grupe, svaka sastavlje-
na od tri vojnika.82 Ako se u obzir uzme normalna rotacija ljudstva, po principu 1/3
na bojišnici, 1/3 na odmoru i 1/3 na pripremi za zadaću, proizlazi da bi za obranu
ukupne bojišnice bilo angažirano svega nekoliko tisuća vojnika. Takvo stanje najbo-
lje ilustrira veličinu problema s kojim se susretala SVK i koja zbog toga nikada nije
ni mogla samostalno funkcionirati.
Problem održavanja ratne vojske predstavljao je i veliko opterećenje kako za an-
gažirano ljudstvo, tako i za gospodarstvo. U vezi s tim, odmah nakon potpisivanja
Zagrebačkog sporazuma izrađena je i privremena formacija koja je postojeće po-
strojbe svela na „granične“, pri čemu su granične satnije (po jedna iz sastava svake
bojne) predstavljale ujedno i mirnodopsku jezgru ratnih bojni.83 Broj graničnih sat-
nija po pojedinim korpusima i brigadama, s odgovarajućim odsjecima „granice“ pri-
kazan je u dokumentu „Sastav graničnih jedinica“.84
Ovakvo stanje održavano je praktično do proljeća 1995. godine, a postrojbama
je bilo zabranjeno angažiranje većeg broja ljudstva od dopuštenog,85 što je dovodilo
u pitanje normalno izvršavanje svakodnevnih zadaća. Radi ujednačavanja sastava i
borbenih mogućnosti brigada, u suradnji s GŠ VJ izrađen je prijedlog novog ustroja
„lake pješačke brigade“.86
82 
 MDCDR, 18., “Prelazak na novu organizacijsko-formacijsku strukturu 7. korpusa, naređenje“,
H
22. 04. 1994.
83 
HMDCDR, 18., “Privremena formacija Komande 7. korpusa“, 23. 04. 1994. (primjer za 3. pbr i 92.
mtbr).
84 
HMDCDR, 18., Sastav graničnih jedinica SVK po korpusima.
85 
HMDCDR, 41., kut. 5, „Dozvoljeno prosečno dnevno brojno stanje angažovanog ljudstva, Nare-
đenje“, 7. 2. 1995.
86 
“Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 31. svibnja do 6. lipnja 1994. godine“, 6. lip-
nja 1994. godine, MORH, klasa: 833-05/93-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-1280.

76
U vezi s tim, tijekom 1994. godine posebno je istraživano sljedeće:
− preustroj SVK i potpora iz SRJ i RS,
− borbene aktivnosti,
− promjene strategijskog položaja.

2.3.1. Početak preustroja SVK


Početkom 1994. godine u listu „Vojska Krajine“ intervjue daju predsjednik RSK Mi-
lan Martić i general Radovan Radinović.87 Martić iznosi glavne prioritete jačanja „RSK“
i njezinog određenja kao države, među kojima je na prvom mjestu: „Ostvariti učinkovit
i stabilan sustav obrane, kao preduvjet za ostvarenje proklamiranih političkih i drugih
ciljeva, za što su potrebne organizacijske, ustrojbene i kadrovske promjene“.88
General Radinović ističe kako je nedvojbeno da će „SVK imati najznačajnije
mjesto u borbi za stjecanje političke samostalnosti srpskog naroda“ te kako je upravo
iz tih razloga „potrebna njezina reorganizacija“, kojom se, između ostaloga, želi os-
posobiti SVK za zadaće „strategijskog odvraćanja na visokom stupnju rizika i prijet-
nji za napadača te učinkovit strategijski doček, uključujući i sposobnost strategijske
ofanzive na izabranim smjerovima“.89
Pokazuje se da „RSK“ zapravo nije ni imala alternative procesu preustroja, jer je
od svih atributa državnosti ta „država“ bila u stanju (koliko-toliko) materijalizirati
(ostvariti) samo jedan – vojsku.
Cilj vodstva „RSK“ bio je ustrojiti takvu vojsku koja će biti u stanju održati za-
tečeno stanje (stanje okupacije dijelova RH) do trenutka do kojeg će se možebitno
promijeniti odnos međunarodnih čimbenika prema problemu reintegracije tih po-
dručja (UNPA).90
S obzirom na ograničene resurse (ljudski, tvarni) i prostornu uvjetovanost susta-
va „obrane“, kao kompromisno rješenje (nužno zlo) predložen je kombinirani sa-
stav vojske, koji je podrazumijevao tri komponente:
• profesionalne postrojbe - kao prvi strategijski postroj,
• mirnodopske postrojbe (stajaća vojska) - kao drugi strategijski postroj i
• pričuvne postrojbe (narodna vojska) - kao treći strategijski postroj.
87 
 MDCDR, 18., „Uzroci i ciljevi preustroja Srpske vojske Krajine“, Zagreb, travanj 1994.
H
88 
Iste prioritete definira i Borislav Mikelić na prvoj sjednici Vlade nacionalnog jedinstva održanoj
22. travnja 1994. godine (HMDCDR, 4., kut. 11, „Zapisnik s 82. sjednice Vlade održane dana 22.
04. 1994. u Kninu sa početkom u 10,30 časova“).
89 
HMDCDR, 18., „Uzroci i ciljevi preustroja Srpske vojske Krajine“, Zagreb, travanj 1994.
90 
U tom intervjuu general Radinović iznosi tezu o nemogućnosti reintegracije „RSK” u RH bez od-
lučujućeg poraza na bojnom polju upravo te vojske (SVK).

77
Tako zamišljena organizacija vojske (i/ili sustav obrane) trebala je omogućiti os-
tvarenje nekoliko strategijskih zadaća:
• obranu svakog dijela teritorija, po cijeloj dubini i širini;
• relativno povoljan odnos snaga u početnom grupiranju za strategijsku ob-
ranu (do 50.000 ljudi u „prostorno strategijskom težištu“ „RSK“);
• brzo narastanje vojske do veličine predviđene ratnim ustrojem i mobilizacija
naroda za potrebe vođenja rata;
• strategijsko odvraćanje na visokom stupnju rizika i prijetnji za napadača;
• strategijski doček, uključujući i sposobnost strategijske ofenzivne aktivnosti
na više izabranih smjerova.

Profesionalne postrojbe
Činile bi brojčano manji dio vojske, ali po bojnoj spremnosti i opremljenosti tre-
bale su biti najučinkovitije. Bile bi temeljna snaga za sprječavanje strategijskog izne-
nađenja i za strategijske protuudare po ciljevima u dubini slobodnog teritorija RH,
dakle snaga strategijskog odvraćanja i strategijske odmazde. One bi trebale biti
sposobne uspješno se suprotstaviti strategiji „akcije ograničenih ciljeva“.91
Doktrina uporabe temeljila bi se na sljedećem:
• ostvarivanje „realne prijetnje“ na kojoj se temelji strategija „odvraćanja“, a
manifestira se djelovanjem topničko-raketnih sustava po važnijim gospodar-
skim objektima na slobodnom teritoriju RH;
• izvođenje napadajnih aktivnosti po postrojbama HV-a koje su se uklinile u
dubinu obrane, s ciljem ponovnog osvajanja izgubljenog područja.

Radilo bi se, dakle, o postrojbama koje bi predstavljale strategijsku pričuvu GŠ


SVK, koje bi bile opremljene modernim borbenim sredstvima i sustavima, raspore-
đene u dubini teritorija RSK, na jednom ili više smjerova djelovanja (uporabe), a koje
bi za manevar mogle koristiti unutarnje taktičke i operativne smjerove.

91 
 aziv koji se u SVK rabio za akcije HV-a koje su zapravo bile dio „strategije realno usklađenih ko-
N
raka“.

78
Mirnodopska vojska
Popunjavala bi se po sljedećem:
• u miru, časnicima u djelatnoj službi, a vojnički sastav bi u cjelini bio ročni;
• u ratu, pričuvnim vojnicima i časnicima, koji bi se u slučaju mobilizacije jav-
ljali u postrojbe.

Bojna spremnost ovih postrojbi osiguravala bi se i održavala povremenim pozi-


vanjem na vojne vježbe pričuvnog sastava, te redovnom obukom kod ročnog dijela
sastava. One bi bile uključene u sustav snaga za sprječavanje strategijskog iznenađe-
nja i za prihvat prvog strategijskog udara napadača. Mirnodopski razmještaj i ope-
rativni razvoj bio bi usklađen s vojno-geografskim i vojno-teritorijalnim podjelama,
geopolitičkim položajem i stanjem, dakle i u skladu s analizom ratišta, bojišta i ope-
rativnih smjerova.

Narodna vojska
Radi se o postrojbama koje bi predstavljale teritorijalnu (prostornu) komponen-
tu. Koristile bi se samo u slučaju rata, a trebale bi osigurati potrebnu gustoću obrane
na cijelom teritoriju „RSK“ i potreban brojčani omjer snaga.92
Glavni problem glede ustroja takvih oružanih snaga predstavljao je nedostatak
dva glavna resursa: ljudi i moderna (učinkovita) borbena sredstva. I dok je nedosta-
tak borbenih sredstava činio najveće probleme glede ustrojavanja manevarskih i spe-
cijalnih postrojbi, nedostatak ljudi odražavao se na ustroj sve tri sastavnice vojske.
Upravo na primjeru „manipuliranja“ tim resursom, a u cilju ustroja „ratne voj-
ske“, odnosno popune vojske po ratnoj formaciji, može se uvidjeti puni nesklad iz-
među onoga proklamiranog i onoga ostvarivog, pa dakle i sva iracionalnost jedne
politike koja je nastanak i opstanak „države“ temeljila na vojnim sredstvima.
O tome govore i sljedeći podaci:
• resursi za popunu SVK ljudstvom definitivno su bili ograničeni brojem
pučanstva, kojega je na području „RSK“ sredinom 1994. godine bilo približno
430.000, što bi uz maksimalna naprezanja i uz uvažavanje nekih u svijetu ust-
aljenih normi, omogućavalo formiranje ratne vojske od približno 50.000 do
60.000 ljudi;
92 
 reba napomenuti da su i vodstvo SVK, ali i veći dio pričuvnog sastava nekritički prihvatili
T
pozitivna „iskustva“ sustava Teritorijalne obrane iz vremena bivše države, prenoseći gotovo izravno
ta „iskustva“ o „naoružanom narodu“ u ustroj SVK, zanemarujući između ostaloga i činjenicu, da
ni ta „iskustva“ nisu bila u praksi provjerena.

79
• istovremeno, u dokumentima 7. korpusa SVK, na primjer, konstatira se
u srpnju 1994. godine,93 kako na području iz kojega se korpus popunjava
(sjeverna Dalmacija) živi približno 70.000 stanovnika, od kojih je za pop-
unu postrojbi 7. korpusa moguće angažirati 15.000 boraca, a ratnim ustro-
jem predviđeno je da korpus ima približno 17.000 ljudi. Računa se dakle na
angažiranje nešto više od 24% ukupnog pučanstva, što je potpuno neshvatlji-
va računica, čak i ako se zanemari nepovoljna dobna struktura pučanstva
koje je u to vrijeme živjelo na tom području;
• iz dokumenata zapovjedništva 7. korpusa vidljivo je i sljedeće: iako je po
ratnom ustroju predviđen sastav od 17.000 ljudi, za popunu po tom ustroju
predviđena su (pronađena su) 13.523 vojna obveznika, što je razina popune
od približno 80%. Kod popune časničkim kadrom stanje je još lošije, jer je od
1276 ustrojbenih mjesta osigurana popuna 693 ustrojbena mjesta;94
• zbog stalno prisutnog procesa iseljavanja, koji je osobito izražen kod mlađih
godišta, stanje glede popune se postupno pogoršava, što opet ilustriraju do-
kumenti zapovjedništva 7. korpusa iz tog vremena.95 Samo nepuna tri mjese-
ca kasnije, ratnim ustrojem predviđen broj ljudi je povećan na 17.355, a
planom popune osigurana je popuna samo 12.466 ustrojbenih mjesta, što
predstavlja realizaciju popune na razini od 72%.

Nedvojbeno je da se stanje glede mogućnosti popune domicilnim ljudstvom stal-


no pogoršavalo, što je bio slučaj i kod drugih korpusa razmještenih na području
„prostornog strategijskog težišta“, pa je očito da se u popuni postrojbi po ratnom
ustroju moralo računati na potporu iz RS i SRJ, ili se svjesno manipuliralo „snagom“
vojske, bilo radi dizanja morala vlastitog pučanstva, bilo s ciljem pokušaja odvraća-
nja hrvatskog vodstva od možebitnog poduzimanja vojnih akcija radi oslobađanja
okupiranih područja.
U skladu s takvim stanjem, jedina realna opasnost koja je mogla proizlaziti iz
preustroja SVK bila je povezana s mogućnošću ustroja manevarskih snaga i profesi-
onalnih postrojbi.

93 
 MDCDR, 8., kut. 7, „Zaključci iz mobilizacijske procene“, Komanda 7. korpusa, jun 1994.
H
94 
HMDCDR, 18., „Pregled popune po RF“, Komanda 7. korpusa, 9. 8. 1994.
95 
HMDCDR, 18., „Pregled popune jedinica 7. korpusa po RF“, 13. 10. 1994.

80
2.3.2. Borbene aktivnosti
Značajan „problem“ za „RSK“ ostaju nedefinirane „granice“ i u cilju njihovog
„utvrđivanja i konačnog definiranja“, uz uporabu snaga SVK, a koristeći aktivnosti
UNPROFOR-a na postavljanju nadzornih točaka, počinje izvođenje akcije pod na-
zivom „Granica-’94“.96 Cilj akcije bio je ojačavanje i utvrđivanje većeg dijela postoje-
ćih crta razdvajanja, koje bi nakon razmještaja nadzornih točaka UNPROFOR-a bile
označene kao „državna granica“. To dovodi do sustavne proizvodnje novih žarišta
sukoba, čije provociranje je posebno usmjereno na područja Like i sjeverne Dalma-
cije, za razliku od dotadašnjeg stanja, kada je težište takvih aktivnosti bilo na po-
dručju istočne Slavonije. Smisao izazivanja stalnih napetosti i sukoba niskog inten-
ziteta duž cijele „granice“ bio je u tome da se s jedne strane demonstrira sila koja bi
trebala biti čimbenik odvraćanja od možebitne namjere za poduzimanje napadajne
operacije, a s druge se željelo pokazati kako integracija okupiranih područja RH u
njezin državnopravni sustav nije moguća, što je za posljedicu trebalo imati produže-
nje tadašnjeg mandata UNPROFOR-a i zadržavanje nepromijenjenog statusa „Kraji-
ne“. U tom kontekstu logično je i prebacivanje težišta aktivnosti vojnog provociranja
na „prostorno strategijsko težište“.
Inženjerijski se nastoji još bolje utvrditi prvi pojas obrane, ali i organizirati obra-
nu po dubini, što bi trebalo upozoravati na organiziranje uporne obrane i također
odvratiti RH od možebitnog poduzimanja vojne operacije radi oslobađanja okupira-
nih područja. GŠ SVK izdaje zapovijed korpusima o sustavnom pristupu uređivanju
starih i izradi novih položaja za obranu, o zabrani pregovora i sklapanja primirja na
razinama lokalnih vojnih zapovjedništava, a na bojišnicama duž svih okupiranih po-
dručja povećava se broj „kriznih“ točaka i pojava izazivanja sukoba.
GŠ VJ donosi odluku po kojoj svi časnici iz sastava VJ koji su kao pomoć upuće-
ni u sastav SVK, ostaju trajno u sastavu SVK (ostvarivanje zamisli o jednoj vojsci), a
raznovrsna potpora iz VJ i dalje se intenzivira.
Provedba sporazuma o primirju (prva faza, izvlačenje topničkog oružja u dubinu
i izvlačenje ljudstva iz pojasa dubine 1 km od crte razdvajanja) sustavno se usporava
96 
 tome opširnije u: „Raščlamba djelovanja neprijatelja u razdoblju 15. veljače do 17. ožujka 1994.
O
godine, Specifičnosti provođenja strategije realne prijetnje“, 17. ožujka 1994., MORH, klasa: 833-
05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-670; „Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od
21. do 28. ožujka 1994. godine“, 29. ožujka 1994. godine, MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur.
br.: 512-06-06/1-94-761; „Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 21. do 28. veljače
1994. godine“, 28. veljače 1994., MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-513; „Oba-
vještajna informacija o tijeku realizacije operacije ‘Granica-94’“, 13. ožujka 1994. godine, MORH,
klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-9-616.

81
i opstruira, što zapravo predstavlja pokušaj realizacije zacrtanog plana o „uspostav-
ljanju i zaštiti granice“, kao glavne odrednice „državnosti“ „RSK“. Topništvo se ne
izvlači na definirane lokacije ili se čak ostavlja na položajima s kojih je trebalo biti
izvučeno, a ljudstvo se u civilnoj odjeći ili u policijskim odorama i dalje nalazi u „de-
militariziranom“ pojasu.
Svi zapovjednici korpusa i brigada SVK dobili su Odluku o formiranju sektor-
skih (regionalnih) i lokalnih (općinskih) komisija za određivanje i korekcije crte
razdvajanja, koje su za svoj rad odgovorne središnjoj „republičkoj“ komisiji, na či-
jem čelu je general Mile Novaković, savjetnik predsjednika „RSK“ za vojna pitanja.
Komisije imaju za cilj „tumačiti“ pojedine točke sporazuma kako bi se osigurala
izmjena dogovorenih crta razdvajanja ili ostanak topništva unutar zabranjenog po-
jasa.97

2.3.3. P
 okušaj popravljanja strateškog položaja zauzimanjem
područja zapadne Bosne
Nedvojbeno je da je područje zapadne Bosne, tada većim dijelom pod kontro-
lom snaga 5. korpusa Armije BiH, a manjim pod kontrolom snaga Narodne obrane
Autonomne pokrajine Zapadne Bosne (NO APZB),98 bio prostor od strateškog zna-
čaja za „RSK“, kako glede mogućnosti za održanje stanja okupacije zapadnih dijelova
„RSK“, tako i glede možebitnih aspiracija u vezi daljnje ugroze dijelova teritorija RH.
Takav značaj područja zapadne Bosne proizlazio je i iz činjenica da je to područje
(dok je pod kontrolom Armije BiH):
• narušavalo prometnu povezanost okupiranih područja Banovine, Korduna
i Like, a u dobroj mjeri i sjeverne Dalmacije s ostalim „srpskim zemljama“;
• bitno smanjivalo operativnu dubinu snaga 39., 21. i 15. korpusa SVK, bez
koje nije bila moguća ni kvalitetna obrana, a ni bilo kakva ofenzivna djelovan-
ja (u slučaju okupacije područja zapadne Bosne operativna dubina bi s aktu-
alnih 25-30 km bila povećana i na 100 km);

97 
„ Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 18. do 25. travnja 1994. godine“, 25. travnja
1994., MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-984.
98 
Paravojne formacije organizirane u Cazinskoj krajini, sastavljene od Bošnjaka lojalnih lokalnom
političkom vođi Fikretu Abdiću, koje su se borile protiv legalnih postrojbi Armije BiH (snage 5.
korpusa, pod zapovijedanjem generala Atifa Dudakovića), a za političku i teritorijalnu autonomiju
zapadne Bosne u odnosu na BiH. Ove snage su formirane uz pomoć i na inicijativu RS i „RSK“, ta-
ko da su one kolaborirale sa snagama SVK. Vidi: „Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the
Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljovid br. 23 (Prilog na str. 284.).

82
• vezalo znatan dio snaga spomenutih korpusa SVK, koje zbog toga nisu mo-
gle biti uporabljene na bojišnici prema HV-u, te snaga 2. krajiškog korpusa
VRS, koji je trebao imati funkciju strategijske pričuve SVK;
• priječilo učinkovitu obranu okupiranih područja RH (Banovina, Kordun,
Lika, sjeverna Dalmacija) u slučaju napadajne operacije HV-a.

U takvim uvjetima trebalo je očekivati poduzimanje napadajnih djelovanja zdru-


ženih snaga SVK i VRS na područje zapadne Bosne, s ciljem razbijanja snaga 5. kor-
pusa Armije BiH i stavljanja tog područja pod nadzor VRS. Napadajna operacija na
područje zapadne Bosne pokrenuta je u rujnu 1994. godine.

Tijek operacije u jesen 1994. godine


Tijek napadajne operacije „srpskih“ vojski na područje zapadne Bosne ovdje je
prikazan nešto detaljnije, kako kronološki, tako i po sadržaju i specifičnostima po-
jedinih aktivnosti, kako bi se njezin značaj u vezi s poduzimanjem operacije „Oluja“
potpunije sagledao.
Krajem kolovoza 1994. uspješno je završila napadajna operacija snaga 5. korpusa
Armije BiH,99 koja je dovela do razbijanja snaga NO APZB,100 te je tako osujećen ra-
niji plan „srpskih“ vojski koji je temeljen na prosudbi da će dugotrajnim i iscrpljuju-
ćim međusobnim borbama dviju muslimanskih (bošnjačkih) vojski oslabiti ukupna
snaga Bošnjaka na području zapadne Bosne, što bi srpskim snagama omogućilo lak-
še izvođenje operacije s ciljem stavljanja pod nadzor desne obale rijeke Une i unske
pruge, a potom i cijelog područja zapadne Bosne.
Istodobno, srpske „vlasti“ na okupiranim područjima Banovine i Korduna su-
očene su s velikim brojem izbjeglica, civila i pripadnika vojnih postrojbi lojalnih
Fikretu Abdiću (ukupno 19 do 20 tisuća ljudi), raspoređenih poglavito u području
Turnja i Batnoge.
Prosuđujući kako je operativni položaj snaga 5. korpusa Armije BiH vrlo nepo-
voljan, jer se
• nalaze u okruženju „srpskih“ vojski,
• angažirane su na vrlo dugačkoj bojišnici,
• smanjene su im mogućnosti popune ljudstvom zbog velikog broja izbjeglica
i sukoba s „abdićevcima“,
99 
HMDCDR, 18., „Aktivnosti i namjere snaga SVK i VRS glede snaga 5. korpusa A BiH“, 5. rujna
1994. godine.
100 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid br. 49 (Prilog na str. 285.).

83
• trajno su izložene nedostatku teškog topničkog oružja i tenkova,
• trajno im je otežana svakovrsna logistička potpora; zapovjedništvo 39. kor-
pusa SVK odlučilo je izvesti napad.

Za napad na smjerovima Bojna – Golubići i Žirovac – Bužim angažirane su 1.


rujna 1994. snage 24. (glinske) pbr, a cilj napadajne operacije bio je stavljanje sjever-
nog dijela zapadne Bosne pod nadzor srpskih snaga.101
Međutim, brzim i dobro organiziranim protunapadom snage 5. korpusa A BiH
su već 2. rujna zaustavile, a potom 2./3. rujna i razbile snage napadača te izbile na
granicu s RH. Tijekom napada, a prema izvješću zapovjednika 39. korpusa, 24. lbr
imala je 11 poginulih, 10 zarobljenih i desetke ranjenih pripadnika, dok su snage 5.
korpusa A BiH imale 7 poginulih.
Od tog razdoblja pa nadalje počinju pripreme snaga VRS i SVK za pokretanje
napadajne operacije širih razmjera na područje zapadne Bosne, s ciljem potpunog
razbijanja snaga 5. korpusa A BiH i spajanja (povezivanja) „srpskih zemalja“ (RS i
„RSK“). Međutim, zbog nedostatka operativne pričuve i snaga za manevar (aktivne
su i druge bojišnice u BiH pa VRS nema potrebne pričuve), ali i zbog prosudbe da
snage 5. korpusa A BiH neće poduzimati napadajna djelovanja širih razmjera, snage
VRS i SVK, a posebno one iz sastava 2. krajiškog korpusa VRS, neodlučno i sporo se
pripremaju za napadajnu operaciju.
Kako bi smanjile pritisak srpskih snaga koje, pripremajući se za napadajnu ope-
raciju, nesustavno i razmjerno neorganizirano (nekoordinirano) borbeno (poglavito
topnički) djeluju po snagama 5. korpusa A BiH, postrojbe 5. korpusa poduzimaju
tijekom rujna niz manjih (protu)napada, primoravajući snage 2. krajiškog korpusa
VRS da na području Grabeža i Otoke, a snage 39. banijskog korpusa SVK na područ-
ju Bojne i Žirovca, prijeđu u obranu te poduzimaju veći broj diverzantskih akcija u
zahvatu šireg pojasa bojišnice.102
Ovakva djelovanja snaga 5. korpusa A BiH nedvojbeno su usporila pripreme
združenih srpskih snaga za napadajnu operaciju, a dovele su do toga da snage 5. kor-
pusa postupno preuzmu sustavnu inicijativu na cijeloj bojišnici.

101 
„ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Ze-
mljovid br. 37 (Prilog na str. 286.).
102 
Treba napomenuti da su postrojbe 5. korpusa A BiH razvile posebnu doktrinu napadajnih djelo-
vanja, kojom su kompenzirale nedostatak topništva. Naime, djelovanjem brojnih diverzantskih
skupina u dubini neprijateljskog rasporeda, po ciljevima po kojima se inače djeluje topništvom,
postizali su čak i bolje učinke nego da su stvarno djelovali topništvom.

84
Generalno gledajući, to ipak nije bitno promijenilo operativni položaj snaga 5.
korpusa A BiH, koje su i dalje bile u okruženju, izložene iscrpljivanju zbog trajnih
borbenih djelovanja i otežane logistike te gotovo onemogućene popune ljudstvom.
Prosuđujući da u takvim uvjetima nije moguće dugotrajno održavati inicijativu, a s
obzirom na stalno očekivane pritiske i nešto usporenije ali i dalje prisutne pripreme
(ojačavanja) srpskih snaga za napadajnu operaciju, postrojbe 5. korpusa A BiH po-
duzimaju napadajnu operaciju na bihaćkom dijelu bojišnice.103
Operacija je počela 24. listopada,104 napadom na (glavnim) smjerovima:
• Grabež – Veliki Radić – Bosanska Krupa i
• Bihać – Ripač – Bosanski Petrovac (Kulen Vakuf).105

U napadajnim djelovanjima na grabeškom dijelu bojišnice probijene su crte


obrane 17. ključke i 15. petrovačke brigade 2. KK VRS te je presječena prometnica
Bihać – Bosanska Krupa u području Velikog Radića. Tijekom 25. listopada postroj-
be 5. korpusa A BiH uspjele su ovladati područjem do crte Grmuša – Veliki Radić
– Ripač – Lohovska brda. Tijekom 26. listopada nastavljena su napadajna djelovanja
uz angažiranje glavnine snaga na smjeru Ripač – Gorjevac – Vrtoče (Kulen Vakuf) i
manjim snagama na smjeru Grmuša – Kezlovac – Mali Radić.
Do kraja dana snage 5. korpusa A BiH su na južnom dijelu ovladale crtom Lo-
hovo – Račić brdo – Veliki Ljutoč – tt 707 – Gorjevac. Pritom su snage 5. korpusa A
BiH zarobile (zauzele su vojna skladišta) veće količine naoružanja i streljiva (3 tenka,
uništile 7 tenkova i zarobile divizijun haubica 105 mm).
Popuna streljivom i oružjem te raspad sustava obrane postrojbi VRS doveo je do
poduzimanja daljnjih napadajnih djelovanja, tako da su postrojbe 5. korpusa A BiH
28. listopada izbile na crtu Mali Radić – Vrtoče – Kulen Vakuf, a na sjevernom dijelu
su do 30. listopada uspostavile kontrolu nad prometnicom Bihać – Bosanska Krupa
te u okruženje dovele Bosansku Krupu.
Međutim, glavni cilj operacije – spajanje sa snagama 7. korpusa A BiH, koje su
napadale iz smjera Kupresa, nije uspio, a do 30. listopada snage VRS i SVK poduzele

103 
 čito je da se pri donošenju takve odluke imalo u vidu da su aktivne bile i druge bojišnice
O
(Posavina, Kupres), što je slabilo mogućnosti snaga angažiranih na bihaćkoj bojišnici, koje su do-
vođene u poziciju da čak moraju upućivati ojačanja na druga područja (Posavina).
104 
„Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 24. do 31. listopada 1994. godine“, 1. stude-
noga 1994. godine, MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-2549.
105 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid br. 38 (Prilog na str. 287.).

85
su niz mjera za zaustavljanje napada postrojbi 5. korpusa A BiH i za stvaranje uvjeta
za prijelaz u protunapad. Nedvojbeno je da je nesavladivu prepreku u vezi s nastav-
kom napadajnih djelovanja 5. korpusa A BiH predstavljala:
• nemogućnost uvođenja svježih snaga,
• duboki prodor (klin) u smjeru Kulen Vakufa bez mogućnosti osiguranja bo-
kova te
• nedostatna i otežana logistička potpora.

S druge strane:
• Radovan Karadžić je proglasio ratno stanje uz poziv svim vojnim obveznici-
ma da se u svoje postrojbe jave najkasnije do 30. listopada,
• na zapadnobosansku bojišnicu upućena su brojna ojačanja i dragovolj-
ci, među ostalima i iz sastava SVK (600 ljudi iz 11. korpusa, vod specijalne
policije iz Okučana, 1 bojna iz sastava 7. korpusa u područje Drvara, satnija
iz specijalne bojne RSUP RSK upućena je iz Plaškog na bihaćku bojišnicu i
dr.);
• u Bosanskom Petrovcu i Drvaru objavljena je opća mobilizacija, kojom su
obuhvaćeni obveznici od 18 do 55 godina;
• iz sastava Istočnobosanskog korpusa VRS upućena je na bihaćku bojišnicu
kao ojačanje specijalna bojna „Pantere“;
• iz svih korpusa VRS prikupljaju se dragovoljačke satnije i upućuju se na za-
padnobosansku bojišnicu;
• ustrojeno je operativno zapovjedništvo snaga VRS pod kodnim nazivom
„Pauk“, a za zapovjednika je postavljen načelnik Glavnog štaba VRS general
pukovnik Manojlo Milovanović.

Početkom studenoga 1994. godine počinje operacija združenih snaga VRS i


SVK106 i do 15. studenog praktično je bila realizirana 1. faza operacije, u kojoj su sna-
ge 2. KK VRS povratile glavninu područja izgubljenih tijekom prethodne operacije
snaga 5. korpusa i ponovo ovladale područjem grabeškog platoa te uz sudjelovanje
snaga iz sastava 15. ličkog korpusa ugrozile i sam Bihać (izbile na crtu Lohovska br-
da - Golubić - Ripač - Pritoka).107
106 
HMDCDR, 18., „Operativni položaj i prosudba namjera snaga VRS i SVK na području Zapadne
Bosne“, 13. studenoga 1994. godine.
107 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid br. 39 (Prilog na str. 288.).

86
Odmah zatim počinje 2. faza operacije uz angažiranje snaga 21. i 39. korpusa
SVK te snaga NO APZB.108 Cilj te faze operacije bio je povećati pritisak na kordun-
sko-banovinskom dijelu bojišnice, uz maksimalno korištenje pritiska izbjeglica za
vraćanje u Cazinsku krajinu.
General Milovanović tada izdaje proglas u kojem poziva snage 5. korpusa A BiH
na predaju, uz prijetnju da će u suprotnom „VRS biti prinuđena da goni pripadnike
5. korpusa, ma gdje se oni nalazili, što će veoma otežati razdvajanje krivih od neduž-
nih i dovesti do stradanja velikog broja nedužnog muslimanskog stanovništva“.109
S obzirom na izuzetno teško stanje na području zapadne Bosne, predsjednik Fra-
njo Tuđman obratio se 18. studenoga 1994. predsjednici Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a Ma-
deleine Albright. Obavijestio ju je o napadima pobunjenih hrvatskih Srba na Bihać.
U vezi s ovime zatražio je pomoć UN-a, odnosno zračne udare na srpske snage.
Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a 19. studenoga 1994. donijelo je Rezoluciju 958. U njoj se
podsjetilo na Rezoluciju 836, u kojoj je izražena zabrinutost zbog pogoršanja situaci-
je u Bihaću. Rezolucija je potvrdila teritorijalni integritet i suverenitet Republike Hr-
vatske, čime se očito željelo reći da Srbi iz UNPA područja ne smiju napadati Bihać.
U Rezoluciji je zaključeno da će se u cilju zaštite Bihaća primijeniti zračni udari, a da
se ti udari mogu primijeniti i na ciljeve u Hrvatskoj.
Istoga dana Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a je donijelo i Rezoluciju 959. U njoj je osuđe-
na bilo kakva povreda međunarodno priznatih granica Republike Hrvatske prema
Bosni i Hercegovini i zahtijeva se od svih strana u sukobu, a posebno od snaga kra-
jinskih Srba, da u potpunosti poštuju granice i suzdrže se od njihove povrede, što se
odnosilo na napade na Bihać.
Kako su postupno osigurani preduvjeti za 3. fazu operacije, tj. za pad zaštićenog
područja Bihaća i razbijanje 5. korpusa A BiH, NATO snage poduzimaju tijekom 21.
studenoga zračni napad na zračnu luku Udbina, a 23. studenoga i napad na ciljeve
VRS na području zapadnobosanske bojišnice.110
Iako na taj način nije u potpunosti zaustavljena napadajna operacija na područje
zapadne Bosne, bitno je smanjen njezin intenzitet, spriječena je humanitarna kata-

108 
„ Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 15. do 24. studenog 1994.“, 25. studenoga
1994., MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-2789.
109 
Raščlamba obavještajnih podataka za razdoblje od 24. studenoga do 5. prosinca“, 5. prosinca 1994.,
MORH, klasa: 833-05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-2905.
110 
„Operacija zračnih snaga NATO na području Zapadne Bosne (23. 11. 1994.)“, MORH, klasa: 833-
05/94-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-2779.; HMDCDR, 6., kut. 2, „Informacija Glavnog štaba Srp-
ske vojske, RSK“, 22. 11. 1994.

87
strofa do koje bi došlo padom Bihaća, a omogućena je i doprema humanitarne po-
moći za područje Cazinske krajine i Bihaća.
Ovakav ishod napadajne operacije nedvojbeno je ukazao na neke bitne slabosti u
njezinom planiranju i izvođenju:
• nedostatak manevarskih snaga i snaga za brze prodore u dubinu rasporeda
protivnika, što je snagama 5. korpusa A BiH omogućilo organiziranje obrane
na bojišnici, jer nije bilo potrebe za organiziranje obrane po dubini teritorija,
tako da se mogla osigurati kakva-takva pričuva za zamjenu snaga koje su bile
najviše iscrpljene bojnim djelovanjima;
• sporo (iz)vođenje operacije ostavilo je dovoljno vremena za reakciju
međunarodnih čimbenika, koji nisu mogli dopustiti izazivanje humanitarne
katastrofe velikih razmjera i veliki broj civilnih žrtava, do kojih bi sigurno
došlo, kako je to bilo najavljeno i u prijetnji generala Milovanovića;
• nedovoljno usklađeno djelovanje snaga VRS, SVK i NO APZB, po vre-
menu, po objektima i po oblicima;
• kroničan nedostatak ljudstva za popunu postrojbi SVK (i VRS) dovodio
je do prekomjernog iscrpljivanja angažiranog ljudstva, što je u kombinaciji s
nedostatkom motivacije i jačanjem osjećaja besperspektivnosti bitno sman-
jivalo moral i učinkovitost ljudstva i postrojbi.

Napadi na područje zapadne Bosne nastavljeni su s manjim intenzitetom i tije-


kom prve polovice 1995. godine, pri čemu su snage 5. korpusa A BiH uspjele ostvari-
ti određene pomake na jugoistočnom i istočnom dijelu bojišnice, u odnosu na snage
2. krajiškog korpusa, a izgubile su dio teritorija na sjeverozapadnom dijelu bojišnice,
gdje su napadale snage OG „Pauk“,111 sastavljene poglavito od pripadnika NO APZB,
koje su obučavali i kojima su zapovijedali instruktori SDB SRJ.
Od kolikog je značaja bilo zauzimanje područja zapadne Bosne vidi se i iz dopisa
koji je zapovjednik 2. krajiškog korpusa brigadir Radivoje Tomanić uputio 16. velja-
če 1995. godine Glavnom štabu VRS, osobno generalu Manojlu Milovanoviću.112 U
dopisu se izvješćuje o sastanku koji je predsjednik Republike Srpske Radovan Ka-
radžić 15. veljače 1995. godine organizirao u Grahovu, na kojem se susreo s pred-
stavnicima vlasti u općinama s područja odgovornosti 2. krajiškog korpusa i sa zapo-
vjednicima brigada iz sastava tog korpusa te s časnicima iz zapovjedništva korpusa.
111 
“ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid br. 55 (Prilog na str. 289.).
112 
HMDCDR, 18., Komanda 2. krajiškog korpusa, str. pov. broj 3-36 od 16. 2. 1995.

88
Informirajući GŠ VRS o sadržaju izlaganja Radovana Karadžića, Tomanić navodi
kako je rekao da „5. korpus Armije BH mora biti uništen, da je bio decidiran, a ne
da se prenose glasine kako je međunarodna zajednica i politički vrh spriječio zau-
zimanje Bihaća. (…) Istakao je da je Bihać ključ rata i zato traži da se s RSK riješi –
uništi 5. K A BiH“. Izvješće završava konstatacijom: „Predsjednik nije ništa posebno
zaključivao, izuzev što je rekao da će država nastojati da primirje iskoristi za osigu-
ranje streljiva i goriva za potrebe VRS, te da se 5. korpus A BiH mora razbiti, a da je
planirano osnivanje zajedničkog Savjeta za obranu RS i RSK“.113
O značaju Bihaća govori i konstatacija iz knjige „Balkan Battlegrounds“, u kojoj
se u Dodatku 62 o operaciji „Zima-94“, navodi: „Unatoč izrazitoj pobjedi na bojišni-
ci, operacija ‘Zima-94’ nije uspjela postići neposredni strateški cilj slabljenja pritiska
srpskih snaga na Bihać. To nije bio odraz strategije snaga HV/HVO, već rezultat svje-
sne odluke Glavnog štaba VRS da nastavi napadajna djelovanja na enklavu umjesto
da izdvoji snage za smanjivanje prijetnje ugroženom sektoru. To je odraz beskonačne
strateške dvojbe s kojom se Glavni štab VRS suočavao – nedostatak strateških i ope-
rativnih pričuva. Teška odluka nametnuta Mladiću i Milovanoviću u 1994. godini,
postala je još teža 1995.
Međutim, nemogućnost VRS da prebaci snage za pokrivanje područja Livna za-
sigurno je doprinijela uspjehu Hrvata u postizanju drugog ključnog cilja operacije.
Cilj HV-a bio je da oduzme dio srpskog područja u sektoru Dinara - Livno tako da
jedinice HV-a budu u mogućnosti da zauzmu položaje s kojih bi mogli lakše napasti
Knin, glavni grad krajiških Srba. Unatoč širini bojišta i ograničenim resursima, bra-
nitelji VRS-a uspjeli su se sakupiti u dovoljnom broju da uspore vješt napad HV-a i
zaustave snage HVO. Da je zapovjedništvo VRS moglo ili bilo voljno angažirati veći
broj jedinica u borbena djelovanja, pomaci HV-a mogli su biti još manji. Time bi bi-
lo još teže za HV da na vrijeme zauzme položaje za svoju ofenzivu sredinom 1995.
godine i porazi RSK.“114
Iako naprijed navedeno dovoljno ilustrira koliko je za Srbe bilo značajno razbiti
5. korpus A BiH, značaj razbijanja snaga 5. korpusa A BiH i zauzimanja toga pod-
ručja još bolje ilustrira hitan dopis koji je zapovjednik 2. korpusa Radivoje Tomanić
uputio u GŠ VRS, izravno zapovjedniku VRS-a Ratku Mladiću. Informirajući ga o
razgovoru s generalom Mrkšićem, s kojim se 22. svibnja 1995. sastao u Bosanskom
Grahovu, a tijekom susreta je konstatirano kako je „ovakvo ponašanje SVK i NO ZB

113 
 MDCDR, 18., Komanda 2. krajiškog korpusa, str. pov. broj 3-36 od 16. 2. 1995.
H
114 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume II”, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, October 2003, Dodatak 62, str. 547.

89
neodrživo“, jer se „taj muslimanski korpus u potpunom okruženju uspješno nosi s
tri korpusa SVK, 2. KK i pripadnicima NO ZB“, on moli zapovjednika GŠ VRS „da s
generalom Mrkšićem procijeni mogućnost i sačini hitno zajednički plan operacije za
razbijanje i uništenje 5. korpusa A BiH jer je to nužno i za RS i RSK (…) jer se postižu
strateški ciljevi u ovom prijelomnom i teškom vremenu.“115
A radi se o vremenu kada su hrvatske snage već izvele akciju „Skok-1“ i opera-
ciju „Bljesak“.

Novi list, 24. studenoga 1994.

115 
 MDCDR, 2-2. KK VRS, kut. 3, Dopis Komande 2. krajiškog korpusa Glavnom štabu Vojske Re-
H
publike Srpske, 27. 5. 1995.

90
3.

NEUČINKOVIT MANDAT UNPROFOR-a


NIJE BIO JAMSTVO ZA MIRNU
REINTEGRACIJU

Uvod
Dokumenti iz vremena u kojem je provođena misija UNPROFOR-a na području
Republike Hrvatske jasno pokazuju da temeljne zadaće iz mandata UNPROFOR-a
nisu obavljene na način na koji su trebale biti obavljene niti je bilo realno očekivati
da će u dogledno vrijeme biti obavljene. Može se potvrditi poznata činjenica, da je
UNPROFOR bio neučinkovit i da nije bilo nikakvih jamstava da će on omogućiti da
okupirana područja RH budu mirnim putem reintegrirana u državnopravni sustav
RH. Na neučinkovitost mandata UNPROFOR-a utjecali su brojni čimbenici, a među
najznačajnije sigurno spada nedostatak političke odlučnosti i suglasnosti najvažnijih
međunarodnih čimbenika da prepoznaju i zaustave projekt stvaranja „Velike Srbije“.
U takvim uvjetima, kao najveći problem pokazala se nespremnost srpskoga vod-
stva u Kninu da pristane na bilo kakav modus integriranja u državnopravni sustav
Republike Hrvatske, a UNPROFOR nije imao mandat koji bi ih na to primorao.
UNPROFOR nije nudio ništa više od statusa quo ili nadziranja brojnih neuspješnih
sporazuma o primirju ili razdvajanju sukobljenih „strana“.
Status quo bio je apsolutno neprihvatljiv Republici Hrvatskoj, jer je značio zau-
stavljanje svakog razvoja i funkcionalnog opstanka države, baš onako kako je to i u
pisanom obliku izrazio tvorac „strategije realne prijetnje“: „Hrvatskoj je bilo nami-
jenjeno dugotrajno umiranje u agoniji“. Uz to, daljnje vojno-osvajačke namjere „srp-
skih vojski“ bile su usmjerene i prema području zapadne Bosne, enklave koja je svo-

91
jim geografskim smještajem bitno priječila kvalitetno ujedinjenje „srpskih zemalja“
(„RSK“ i RS). Možebitni uspjeh zajedničke napadajne operacije SVK i VRS ne samo
da bi doveo do humanitarne katastrofe i novog genocida na području BiH, nego bi
„RSK“ doveo u značajno povoljniji geostrategijski položaj u odnosu na RH, što bi
izglednijim učinilo i provedbu daljnjih osvajačkih namjera, a manje izgledna bi po-
stala reintegracija UNPA u državnopravni sustav RH. Paralelno s time realizirale su
se i srpske osvajačke namjere prema enklavama u BiH, praćene etničkim čišćenjem
u cilju osiguranja etničke homogenosti zamišljene „Velike Srbije“.
Prema podacima koji su navedeni u dokumentu UN-ovog Komiteta za elimi-
naciju rasne diskriminacije, iz rujna 1993., navodi se da je iz UNPA područja u raz-
doblju od travnja 1992. do srpnja 1993. prisilno iseljeno 9998 osoba. Ove osobe su
iseljene pod pratnjom predstavnika UN-a. Bez pomoći UN-a, još je 13.470 osoba
protjerano iz UNPA područja i „ružičastih zona“, tako da je ukupan broj osoba koje
su protjerane nakon što je UN preuzeo odgovornost za zaštićena područja dosegao
23.470. U istom vremenskom razdoblju su na UNPA područjima ubijene 273 oso-
be.116
Iako su se ti procesi odvijali „pred očima“ UNPROFOR-a, s njegove strane ni-
je bilo nikakvih naznaka da će to zaustaviti. Može se ustvrditi da je neučinkovitost
UNPROFOR-a jedan od temeljnih razloga za donošenje odluke hrvatskog državnog
vodstva o primjeni vojnih sredstava radi oslobađanja tada okupiranih dijelova dr-
žavnog teritorija.

3.1. Uspostava UNPROFOR-a

3.1.1. Agresija na Hrvatsku i hrvatska nastojanja za uspostavu mira


Kako bi se zaštitila, Hrvatska je od početka agresije nastojala internacionalizirati
taj problem i pozvati mirovne snage. U tome nije uspijevala, između ostaloga i zbog
činjenice što još nije bila priznata kao samostalna država (samostalni međunarod-
ni subjekt) pa joj je za dolazak mirovnih snaga UN-a trebao i pristanak (suglasnost)
jugoslavenskih vlasti. To tada nije odgovaralo Jugoslaviji (Srbiji), jer su njezine vla-
sti računale kako će vojnim sredstvima poraziti obranu Hrvatske, koja je tek bila u
nastajanju, te kako će okupirati dijelove njezina teritorija koji su u skladu s idejom
116 
HMDCDR, 18., United Nations, International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/249, 17 September 1993, Committee on the Elimination of Ra-
cial Discrimination, Forty-third session.

92
„Velike Srbije“ trebali ući u sastav te tvorevine. Tek kasnije, nakon što je od strane
JNA i lokalnih paravojnih srpskih postrojbi okupirana skoro trećina hrvatskog dr-
žavnog teritorija i kada hrvatska vojna sposobnost počinje značajnije jačati, za dola-
zak mirovnih snaga UN-a počinju se zalagati i tadašnje jugoslavenske vlasti. Kao što
će događaji koji su slijedili jasno pokazati, prekid ratnih djelovanja i uspostava mira
u Hrvatskoj potrebni su bili i Srbiji kako bi rasteretila snage koje će biti uporabljene
za agresiju u Bosni i Hercegovini.

3.1.2. Kronologija prihvaćanja Vanceovog plana i uspostave UNPA


• 25. rujna 1991. Rezolucijom 713 uvodi se embargo na naoružanje svim re-
publikama SFRJ. JNA i Srbija koriste nadmoć u naoružanju i intenziviraju
otvoreni rat protiv Hrvatske.
• 26. listopada 1991. dovršeno je povlačenje JNA iz Slovenije.
• 18. - 20. studenoga 1991.: nakon što je grad topničkom paljbom razorila, JNA
zauzima Vukovar. Po okupaciji grada čini zločine: egzekucije civila te ratnih
zarobljenika i ranjenika.
• 23. studenoga 1991. u Ženevi se potpisuje sporazum o primirju i prihvaća
se Vanceov koncept mirovne operacije UN-a. Sporazum potpisuju Hrvatska,
Srbija i JNA.
• 2. siječnja 1992. potpisuje se Sarajevsko primirje kojim se operacionalizira
sporazum o prekidu ratnih djelovanja potpisan u Ženevi.
• 15. siječnja 1992. počinje proces međunarodnog priznanja Republike
Hrvatske kao samostalne i suverene države.
• 21. veljače 1992. Rezolucijom 743 Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a uspostavlja peace-
keeping misiju UNPROFOR-a i nalaže što brži početak mirovne operacije.
Vanceov koncept je proglašen peacekeeping planom misije UNPROFOR-a.

Već u vrijeme prije potpisivanja Sarajevskog primirja (2. siječnja 1992.), Hrvat-
ska je bila u znatnoj mjeri vojno organizirana i osnažena i na više mjesta je uspješno
provela akcije oslobađanja dijelova okupiranog teritorija. To je bilo posebno značaj-
no na području zapadne Slavonije gdje je, upravo zahvaljujući opredijeljenosti Hr-
vatske za nalaženje mirnog rješenja, zaustavljeno daljnje izvođenje uspješne operaci-
je Hrvatske vojske koja bi to područje vjerojatno već tada oslobodila.
Krajem lipnja i početkom srpnja 1992. godine, otprilike pola godine nakon pot-
pisivanja Sarajevskog primirja, dovršeno je razmještanje UNPROFOR-a po svim

93
UNPA sektorima. U to su vrijeme UNPA područja već gotovo sasvim etnički očišće-
na od Hrvata i ostalih stanovnika nesrpske etničke pripadnosti. Preostali stanovnici
nesrpske etničke pripadnosti koji su ostali na tim područjima bili su izloženi stalnoj
diskriminaciji, teroru i pritiscima za napuštanje tih područja.

3.1.3. Mandat UNPROFOR-a/UNCRO-a


Mandat UNPROFOR-a sastojao se od peacekeeping plana (Vanceov plan) i dru-
gih zadaća i dužnosti utvrđenih rezolucijama Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a.
Vanceov plan117 predviđao je, u najkraćim crtama, sljedeće:
• uspostavu i demilitarizaciju UNPA područja tako da sve oružane snage
osim UNPROFORA-a budu povučene i demobilizirane; razmještanje vojnih
promatrača (UNMO – United Nations Military Observer) u UNPA, kako bi
nadzirali i verificirali demilitarizaciju; povlačenje JNA iz svih područja Re-
publike Hrvatske;
• uspostavu Civilne policije (CIVPOL) sukladno etničkom sastavu prije izbi-
janja sukoba i nadzor CIVPOL-a nad radom lokalnih policijskih snaga radi
zaštite ljudskih prava i sprječavanja svakog oblika diskriminacije, bez obzira
na nacionalnost, vjeru i dr.;
• povratak svih prognanika i izbjeglica u svoje domove u UNPA područja i
zaštitu stanovništva u UNPA područjima od straha od oružanih napada.

Zaštitna funkcija koju su trebale provoditi međunarodne vojne snage UN-a pred-
viđala je razmještanje snaga u dubini UNPA područja, dok je na graničnim crtama
UNPA područja bila predviđena uspostava nadzornih kontrolno-propusnih punkto-
va na prometnicama. Predviđeno je da se zaštitna funkcija preuzima paralelno s pro-
cesom demilitarizacije. Razmještanje vojnih snaga UN-a između sukobljenih strana
bilo je predviđeno samo unutar UNPA, ali i na granicama područja UNPA. Smisao
prisutnosti zaštitnih vojnih snaga UN-a bio je u osiguranju uvjeta u kojima će UNPA
biti demilitarizirana i u sprječavanju međuetničkih konflikata nakon povratka pro-
gnanika nesrpske nacionalnosti.
Vanceov plan je predvidio da mandat UNPROFOR-a bude privremen, a da nje-
gova provedba ne prejudicira političko rješenje. Paralelno s mirovnom operacijom
UNPROFOR-a predviđao se i politički pregovarački proces. Ovaj proces je vođen

117 
 MDCDR, 18., “Concept for a UN peace keeping operation in Yugoslavia, Annex III”, November/
H
December 1991.

94
od strane ICFY-a (International Conference on Former Yugoslavia – Međunarodna
konferencija o bivšoj Jugoslaviji). Iako je planom bila predviđena uspostava 3 UNPA
područja, formirana su 4 UNPA područja koja su djelovala kao UN sektori Istok, Za-
pad, Sjever i Jug.118 Provedba mandata UNPROFOR-a bila je predviđena isključivo u
UNPA područjima.

Rezolucijom 762 od 30. lipnja 1992. godine odobrava se plan glavnog tajnika
UN-a sadržan u točci 16 njegovog izvješća od 26. lipnja 1992. godine, kojim se utvr-
đuje prioritetna reintegracija „ružičastih zona“ u sastav RH.119 Time se mandat UN-
PROFOR-a proširio i na „ružičaste zone“:
• JNA se mora povući u SR Jugoslaviju, a do kraja povlačenja sve teško
naoružanje mora se staviti pod nadzor snaga UN-a;
• Hrvatska vojska i ostale naoružane postrojbe moraju se izvući iz „ružičastih
zona“;
• angažira se UNCIVPOL, s ciljem ponovnog uspostavljanja hrvatske vlasti u
tim područjima;
• osniva se zajednička komisija pod predsjedanjem UNPROFOR-a koja će se
sastojati od predstavnika Vlade RH i od predstavnika lokalnih, srpskih „vlas-
ti“, uz sudjelovanje Europske zajednice koja će nadgledati proces vraćanja
hrvatske vlasti u „ružičaste zone“.

„Ružičaste zone“ su bile okupirana područja RH koja po Vanceovom planu ni-


su pripadala u sastav UNPA područja. Takvih prostora najviše je bilo u sektoru Jug.

Rezolucije 815 (1993.), 871 (1993.) i 947 (1994.) utvrđuju da se pregovaračko


rješenje za status UNPA područja treba tražiti u okviru reintegracije u RH. Navede-
no je izraženo i u „Deklaraciji o stanju na okupiranim područjima Hrvatske“, koju
je Opća skupština UN-a donijela 9. prosinca 1994. godine. SR Jugoslavija pozvana je
da poštuje teritorijalni integritet Hrvatske i da odmah prekine sve administrativne,
vojne i prometne mjere integracije UNPA područja u svoj sastav. Od SR Jugoslavije
zatraženo je da odmah prekine s vojnom i logističkom potporom samoproglašenim
srpskim vlastima u UNPA područjima, a zatraženo je i da se Hrvatska i SR Jugosla-
vija međusobno priznaju u međunarodno priznatim granicama.

118 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid „J“ (Prilog na str. 290.).
119 
HMDCDR, 18., Izvješće glavnog tajnika UN-a od 26. lipnja 1992.

95
Misija UNCRO-a (United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
– Operacija Ujedinjenih naroda za obnovu povjerenja u Hrvatskoj) uspostavljena je
Rezolucijom 981 od 31. ožujka 1995. godine. Kako UNPROFOR u tri godine nije us-
pio pokrenuti implementaciju Vanceova plana, RH je odlučila uskratiti suglasnost za
produženje mirovne misije. Pod diplomatskim pritiskom međunarodne zajednice, a
poglavito SAD-a, RH je pristala na produženje mirovne misije, ali s određenim pro-
mjenama. Prijedlog RH za promjenom peacekeeping plana nije usvojen, ali je usvojen
zahtjev za reorganizacijom i razdvajanjem mirovnih misija. Razdvajanje je naprav-
ljeno na zahtjev RH i Makedonije, dok se BiH suglasila tražeći promjene u načinu
funkcioniranja UNPROFOR-a.
Formirane su UNCRO misija za Hrvatsku, UNPROFOR misija za BiH i UN-
PREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force) misija za Makedoniju. Or-
ganizacijska struktura misija definirana je paragrafom 84 Izvješća glavnog tajnika
UN-a od 22. ožujka 1995. godine.120 Navedene misije su u Izvješću označene kao
UNPF-1, UNPF-2 i UNPF-3. U novoj strukturi značajno je sljedeće:
• misije će djelovati samostalno i svaka će imati civilnog šefa misije u rangu
pomoćnika glavnog tajnika UN-a i vojnog zapovjednika;
• radi smanjenja troškova, ali i povezanosti problema, sveukupno vođenje i za-
povijedanje s navedenim mirovnim operacijama bit će u rukama posebnog
predstavnika glavnog tajnika i vrhovnog zapovjednika UN snaga na ratištu;
• u Zagrebu će se formirati zapovjedništvo ratišta pod nazivom UNPF HQ u
sklopu kojeg će biti centralizirane funkcije logistike, administracije i javnog
informiranja.

Iako je Rezolucijom 981 nedvosmisleno postavljen zahtjev za razdvajanjem ope-


rativnih elemenata misija, to se u praksi nije provelo. Umjesto da se ograniči samo
na centralizaciju logistike, administracije i javnog informiranja, UNPF HQ je sebi
izravno podredio UNMO i CIVPOL, tako da njihova izvješća s terena nisu ni bila
upućivana u stožer UNCRO-a, već izravno u UNPF HQ.
Kako su sve ključne funkcije zapravo bile centralizirane u UNPF HQ, značaj šefa
misije UNCRO-a i vojnog zapovjednika misije UNCRO-a bio je marginaliziran i
minoran. Reorganizacija misije je rezultirala nepromijenjenim stanjem i dodatnim
gomilanjem administracije.

120 
HMDCDR, 18., Izvješće glavnog tajnika UN-a od 22 ožujka 1995.

96
Mandat UNCRO-a bio je sljedeći:
• peacekeeping plan i dalje je ostao isti (Vanceov plan),
• zadaće UN snaga definirane su sporazumom o prekidu vatre od 29. ožujka
1994. (nadzor i verifikacija razdvajanja snaga),
• verificirane su funkcije potpore provedbi Gospodarskog sporazuma od 2.
prosinca 1994.,
• nadzor prelaska vojnih snaga, opreme i naoružanja preko državnih granica
RH i BiH te RH i Jugoslavije,
• funkcije nadzora demilitarizacije područja poluotoka Prevlake preuzete od
misije UNMOP-a (United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka),
• potpora dopremi humanitarne pomoći za BiH preko teritorija RH,
• provedba svih prethodnih relevantnih rezolucija.

Rezolucija u točki 5 nedvosmisleno definira da se pregovaračko rješenje treba


tražiti u okviru reintegracije UNPA u sastav RH, uz poštivanje građanskih prava
svih zajednica. Temeljem poglavlja VII Povelje UN-a, UNCRO-u je bila dopušte-
na primjena vojne sile isključivo u svrhu samoobrane i osiguranja vlastite slobode
kretanja.

3.2. Neučinkovitost UNPROFOR-a/UNCRO-a


Provedba mandata UNPROFOR-a, a kasnije i UNCRO-a, nije bila utemeljena
na VII. poglavlju Povelje UN-a, što znači da UNPROFOR/UNCRO nije mogao pri-
mjenjivati silu u provedbi mandata. Uporaba sile je bila dopuštena isključivo u sa-
moobrani, a kasnije i radi osiguranja slobode vlastitog kretanja. Provedba mandata
ovisila je isključivo o spremnosti strana da poštuju potpisane sporazume i rezolucije
Vijeća sigurnosti. Međutim, i pored navedenog, UNPROFOR/UNCRO je imao zna-
čajnu mogućnost utjecaja na razvoj događaja.

3.2.1. Opstrukcije Vanceova plana i rezolucija Vijeća sigurnosti


Jedini provedeni element Vanceova plana bilo je povlačenje JNA iz RH, ali i to
samo formalno. Naime, JNA se na okupiranim područjima u dobrom dijelu samo
transformirala u „miliciju“, „teritorijalnu obranu“ ili Srpsku vojsku Krajine (SVK)
koja nikada nije ni prestajala djelovati bez potpore JNA, odnosno kasnije Vojske Ju-
goslavije (VJ).

97
Kako je temeljni cilj srpske pobune i agresije JNA na RH bio odcjepljenje okupi-
ranih područja od RH, kninske vlasti nisu pristajale na rješenja koja bi vodila prema
reintegraciji tih područja u RH, o čemu govore i sljedeće ocjene:
• David Owen, tada supredsjedatelj Međunarodne konferencije o bivšoj Jugo-
slaviji, u svojoj knjizi napisao je da su on i Cyrus Vance, drugi supredsjedatelj
iste Konferencije, 19. i 20. studenoga 1992. posjetili UNPA područja. „Posta-
jalo je jasno“, pisao je Owen, „da se Vanceov plan ne provodi“. „U sklopu toga
trebalo je obnoviti most na području Maslenice, kako bi kontinentalna Hrvats-
ka dobila vezu s Dalmacijom. No, na pregovorima u Kninu vodstvo krajinskih
Srba odbilo je pružiti potporu bilo čemu osim secesiji od Hrvatske, odnosno
postojanju nezavisne srpske republike na dijelovima hrvatskog teritorija“.121
• Glavni tajnik UN-a je u svome izvješću S/25777 od 15. svibnja 1993., u vezi s
mandatom UNPROFOR-a izrazio zabrinutost oko trenutne situacije u UN-
PA područjima i „ružičastim zonama“. Glavni tajnik UN-a tom je prilikom
utvrdio da UNPROFOR nije uspio provesti mirovni plan u Hrvatskoj zbog
odbijanja lokalnih Srba da prihvate načelo da je, kako se u izvješću navodi,
„jedina osnova za smirivanje njihovo prihvaćanje hrvatske suverenosti u za-
mjenu za jamčenje njihovih manjinskih prava“.122
• Voditeljica odjela civilnih poslova UNPROFOR-a u sektoru Jug, Jeannie Pe-
terson, u svom dopisu od 25. ožujka 1993. godine, upućenom zamjeniku šefa
misije i direktoru civilnih poslova Cedricu Thornberryju navodi: „Velika su bi-
la hrvatska očekivanja za povratak raseljenih osoba na područja što su ih Srbi
okupirali, a to nije ispunjeno. Hrvatska sada traži jednaku razinu odlučnosti
u traženju mirnog rješenja u Hrvatskoj, provedbom rezolucije VS i pod pok-
roviteljstvom Međunarodne konferencije o bivšoj Jugoslaviji, kao što je to
poduzeto glede Bosne. Predlažu produženje od šest mjeseci za pojačan UN-
PROFOR-ov mandat. Srpska strana je postala odlučna da stoljećima zadrži
teritoriju koju su okupirali i da dobije priznanje svoje države (RSK). Tvrde da
ta područja nisu nikada bila dijelom hrvatske države, te insistiraju na jedna-
kom pravu na samoodređenje kao i druge teritorije bivše Jugoslavije.“123
• Predsjednik RH u pismu124 glavnom tajniku UN-a od 21. ožujka 1995. traži
promjenu mirovnog plana jer se navedeni mirovni plan ne provodi niti post-
121 
 avid OWEN, Balkanska Odiseja, Zagreb, 1998., 106-107.
D
122 
HMDCDR, 18., Izvješće S/25777, 15. svibnja 1993.
123 
Dopis Jeannie Peterson od 25. ožujka 1993. upućen zamjeniku šefa misije i direktoru civilnih po-
slova Cedricu Thornberryju, MORH, klasa: 018-04/93-01, Ur. br.: 3101-93-202.
124 
HMDCDR, 18., Pismo predsjednika RH glavnom tajniku UN-a, 22. ožujka 1995.

98
oje pomaci koji bi ukazivali da pobunjeni Srbi pristaju na reintegraciju u sas-
tav RH. U pismu se navodi kako se tijekom trajanja misije UNPROFOR-a
na područja UNPA nije vratio niti jedan prognanik i kako je u razdoblju
UNPROFOR-ove nazočnosti u UNPA ubijeno još oko 600 osoba nesrpske
etničke pripadnosti, a njih 12.000 protjerano je s područja UNPA.

Nikakve rezolucije Vijeća sigurnosti nisu pokolebale kninske vlasti u namjeri da


na okupiranim područjima RH stvore i uz primjenu vojnih sredstava zadrže stanje
okupacije i svoju „državu“. Za njih su rezolucije predstavljale kršenje Vanceova pla-
na, a stav su temeljili na odredbi koja je govorila da UN misija neće prejudicirati ko-
načno rješenje. O tome govori i interni dopis ICFY-a od 14. veljače 1994. u kojem
McLeod informira Thorvalda Stoltenberga: „3. Vanceov plan je utvrdio da primjena
plana neće prejudicirati konačno političko rješenje, i to je element na kojeg se sada
poziva Knin. Pa ipak, Rezolucije 815 i druge specificiraju da su UNPA integralni dije-
lovi RH, što ide k prejudiciranju konačnog političkog rješenja. To je prvi problem“.125
Stav Vlade „RSK“ bio je da ona s Hrvatskom može pregovarati samo s pozicije
„nezavisne i suverene države“. U skladu s tim predmet pregovora ne može biti nije-
dan dokument Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a koji zahtijeva uključenje „RSK“ (UNPA) u
sastav Hrvatske. Mogu se voditi samo pregovori o primirju i razgraničenju „RSK“ i
Republike Hrvatske.
Stav Vlade „RSK“ prema rezolucijama Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a bio je:
Skupština „RSK“ je ovlastila Vladu „RSK“ da se izvrši revizija svih rezolucija čije
su odredbe suprotne postavci Vanceova plana po kojem on neće prejudicirati poli-
tičko rješenje. U tom smislu Vlada „RSK“ trebala je raditi na reviziji rezolucija 762,
769, 815 i 820. Skupština „RSK“ je ove rezolucije odbila na svom zasjedanju u Belom
Manastiru 10. listopada 1993. godine. Zato je Vlada „RSK“ obvezana da kod Vijeća
sigurnosti UN-a, supredsjedatelja Međunarodne konferencije o bivšoj Jugoslaviji i
UNPROFOR-a inzistira na promjeni tih rezolucija. Time bi iz Rezolucije 762 treba-
lo izbaciti pojam „ružičastih zona“, iz Rezolucije 769 trebalo je izbaciti postavku o
primjeni hrvatskih carinskih i drugih propisa na granicama UNPA područja prema
drugim državama, iz Rezolucije 815 trebalo je izbaciti odredbu o UNPA područji-
ma kao sastavnom dijelu hrvatskog teritorija, a iz Rezolucije 820 izbaciti postavku
da hrvatska strana treba dati dozvolu za promet roba u i iz UNPA područja. Kao što
se vidi, krajinski Srbi odbacivali su postavke relevantnih rezolucija Vijeća sigurnosti
UN-a.
125 
HMDCDR, 18., Dokumenti o novom mandatu UNPROFOR-a u Hrvatskoj, 23. veljače 1994.

99
Govoreći o potpisanim sporazumima na relaciji Zagreb – Knin, može se primijeti-
ti i sljedeće: Zagrebački sporazum o prekidu vatre i razdvajanju snaga potpisan je 29.
ožujka 1994. godine. Za hrvatsku stranu primirje je trebalo biti uvod u obnovu promet-
nih i infrastrukturnih veza s UNPA područjima, a to bi dalje vodilo u njihovu reintegra-
ciju u sklop Hrvatske. Međutim, srpskom vodstvu je odgovaralo primirje na „zapadnoj
granici“ prema RH zbog strateške prekretnice koja se dogodila u BiH. Jedanaest dana
ranije, 18. ožujka 1994., potpisan je Washingtonski sporazum kojim je uspostavljeno sa-
vezništvo između A BiH i HVO-a, što je bila izravna opasnost za srpske snage u cjelini.
No, osim navedenog, SVK nije poštovala temeljne odrednice Zagrebačkog spo-
razuma. Sporazum je, između ostaloga, predviđao i izvlačenje topničkih oružja (za-
visno od dometa) iz pojaseva određene dubine od crte razdvajanja te stavljanje tog
oružja na lokacije pod nadzorom UNPROFOR-a.
Ovdje se navode samo neki od primjera takvog kršenja sporazuma, pri čemu po-
sjedanje topničkih ili raketnih položaja uz samu crtu razdvajanja nedvojbeno govo-
ri o namjerama primjene „strategije odmazde“, a ni u kom slučaju ne o „potrebama
organiziranja obrane“.
• Dana 13. 2. 1995. godine snimljeni su uz pomoć bespilotne letjelice paljbeni
položaji topničke bitnice 130 mm (4 komada)126 nedaleko mjesta Draksenić
(na području BiH, na desnoj obali rijeke Une i Save, usmjereni prema teritoriju
Republike Hrvatske (vjerojatni ciljevi na području Novske odnosno Kutine).
• Dana 8. 5. 1995. godine snimljen je uz pomoć bespilotne letjelice paljbeni
položaj VLR „Orkan“,127 čiji raspored nedaleko (6 km zračne linije) od crte
razdvajanja (bojišnice) jasno ukazuje na namjeru djelovanja po „ciljevima“ u
dubini slobodnog teritorija RH, što je i učinjeno dana 2. svibnja 1995. godine,
tijekom operacije „Bljesak“, kada je s tog položaja djelovano po Zagrebu.
• U slučajevima kada je teško naoružanje i stavljeno pod kontrolu UNPRO-
FOR-a, postrojbe SVK koristile su različita opravdanja i povode kako bi to
naoružanje izuzeli izvan kontrole UNPROFOR-a.
• Podaci o pripremama, provođenju i ciljevima napadajne operacije na
područje zapadne Bosne iznose se u poglavlju 4 kako bi se pokazalo da se
radilo o aktivnostima koje zbog svojeg opsega, angažiranih snaga i vremena
trajanja nisu mogle prolaziti neopaženo za pripadnike UNPROFOR-a, a ako
su ipak prolazile neopaženo, onda je to dokaz nezainteresiranosti UNPRO-
FOR-a za izvršavanje zadaća iz svojega mandata.128
126 
HMDCDR, 18., AFS posjednutih paljbenih položaja, Draksenić, 13. 2. 1995.
127 
HMDCDR, 18., AFS paljbenog položaja, Markovine, 8. 5. 1995.
128 
“Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 18. do 25. srpnja 1994.“, 26. srpnja 1994.,
MORH, klasa: 833-05/93-02/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-94-1647.

100
Gospodarski sporazum između Zagreba i Knina potpisan je 2. prosinca 1994.,
a u skladu s njim 21. prosinca 1994. otvorena je za promet autocesta kroz zapadnu
Slavoniju. Taj sporazum trebao je predstavljati daljnji korak u reintegraciji okupira-
nih područja u sastav hrvatske države. Međutim, Gospodarski sporazum bio je od
izuzetnog značaja i za „srpske“ zemlje i vojske, kojima je bilo kakav oblik „popušta-
nja“ prema RH odgovarao zbog vođenja borbenih aktivnosti na području zapadne
Bosne. U prosincu 1994. združene srpske snage provodile su jednu od svojih najve-
ćih operacija na području zapadne Bosne. Bihać je bio pred padom, a RH je bila pred
odlukom o neposrednoj vojnoj intervenciji.
Zbog nepoštivanja preuzetih obaveza, RH je uputila UNPROFOR-u, a kasnije i
UNCRO-u, niz prosvjeda. Ovdje se, primjera radi, navode samo neki:

9. 8. 1992.
Dopis generala A. Tusa, načelnika GSHV-a, upućen generalu Satishu Nambiaru, za-
povjedniku UNPROFOR-a.129 Od UNPROFOR-a se traži da spriječi raketiranje Slavon-
skog Broda i drugih gradova i naselja te da UNPROFOR ponovo uspostavi svoj nadzor-
ni punkt u s. Donji Varoš, s kojega su se snage UNPROFOR-a povukle, a zatim su ga
zauzele snage pobunjenih Srba te s tog punkta otvaraju pješačku paljbu po selu Pivare.

9. 4. 1993.
Dopis ministra obrane Gojka Šuška upućen generalu L. E. Wahlgrenu, zapovjed-
niku snaga UNPROFOR-a.130 U dopisu se upozorava na kontinuirane napade srpskih
paravojnih snaga po područjima Zadra i Šibenika, a od UNPROFOR-a se traži da „po-
duzme potrebne korake za povećanje UNPROFOR-ovih snaga u sektoru Jug, osobito
uz bojišnicu i na lokalitetima grupiranja agresorovog topništva (...) kako bi se time,
u duhu potpisanog sporazuma u Ženevi, uspostavio nadzor nad agresorskim topniš-
tvom, što je preduvjet provedbe citiranog sporazuma i Rezolucija VS UN 815 i 802“.

8. 6. 1993.
Dopis ministra obrane Gojka Šuška upućen generalu L. E. Wahlgrenu, zapovjed-
niku snaga UNPROFOR-a.131 U dopisu se prosvjeduje zbog topničkog napada po-
129 
HMDCDR, 18., Dopis načelnika GSHV-a zapovjedniku UNPROFOR-a Satishu Nambiaru, 9. ko-
lovoza 1992.
130 
Dopis ministra obrane RH Gojka Šuška zapovjedniku UNPROFOR-a L. E. Wahlgrenu, 9. travnja
1993. godine, MORH, klasa: 018-04/93-01, Ur. br.: 512-01-93-780.
131 
Dopis ministra obrane RH Gojka Šuška zapovjedniku UNPROFOR-a L. E. Wahlgrenu, 8. lipnja
1993. godine, MORH, klasa: 018-04/93-01, Ur. br.: 3101-93-299.

101
strojbi „SVK“ po položajima HV-a na području Svilaje i Vrlike, pri čemu je ispaljeno
više od 50 granata različitih kalibara, gađani su i civilni ciljevi, a od UNPROFOR-a
se traži da ishodi prekid paljbe.

26. 4. 1994.
Dopis Hrvoja Šarinića, voditelja delegacije RH za pregovore sa Srbima i Držav-
nog povjerenstva za odnose s UNPROFOR-om, upućen Yasushiju Akashiju, poseb-
nom izaslaniku generalnog tajnika UN-a.132 U dopisu se navode podaci koji poka-
zuju da se ne provodi Sporazum o prekidu vatre od 29. ožujka 1994. godine, čije
provođenje opstruiraju pobunjeni Srbi, a UNPROFOR nije u stanju osigurati pro-
vedbu Sporazuma. Ukazuje se na činjenicu da je prigodom potpisivanja Sporazuma
postavljeno pitanje ima li UNPROFOR mogućnosti za provedbu Sporazuma, a od-
govor je bio, da u tom smislu neće biti nikakvih problema. Pokazalo se da ta tvrdnja
nije bila točna, a da je sumnja u mogućnosti UNPROFOR-a bila opravdana.

22. 12. 1994.


Izrađen je analitički materijal s nazivom „Pregled stanja i provedbe mandata
UNPROFOR-a s prilozima“.133 Razvidno je da je tijekom 1994. godine upućeno više
od 2000 prosvjeda.

3.2.2. Nedostatak objektivnosti i neutralnosti u provođenju mandata


Općenito uzevši, za gotovo sve postrojbe UN-a u RH može se konstatirati da su
pokazivale određenu pristranost, odnosno određenu dozu naklonosti prema srp-
skom pučanstvu na okupiranim područjima RH. Na takav stav nedvojbeno su utje-
cali i sljedeći čimbenici:
– socijalizacija u životnom okruženju, jer je najveći dio pripadnika UN-a živio
na okupiranim područjima RH (UNPA), gdje su Srbi predstavljali većinu, te
susjede i „domaćine“;
– predrasude o Hrvatima i hrvatsko-srpskim odnosima, koje su u vrijeme Ju-
goslavije od strane srpskog lobija sustavno stvarane nakon 2. svjetskog rata;
– nepoznavanje stvarnih uzroka sukoba na području bivše Jugoslavije i
prihvaćanje objašnjenja koja su davali lokalni stanovnici (Srbi), prema kojem
su oni bili žrtve napada „ustaša“.
132 
 MDCDR, 18., Dopis Hrvoja Šarinića Yasushiju Akashiju, 26. travnja 1994.
H
133 
„Pregled stanja i provedbe mandata UNPROFOR-a“, MORH, klasa: 018-04/94-01, Ur. br.: 512-
01-05/94-449.

102
Međutim, na takav stav utjecala je i želja većine pripadnika UN-a za što duže tra-
janje mandata, jer se ipak radilo o profesionalnim vojnicima koji su u misiji bili pu-
no bolje plaćeni nego u matičnim državama. Kako je upravo srpska „strana“ bila ta
kojoj je odgovaralo zadržavanje statusa quo, dok je Hrvatska stalno tražila rješavanje
statusa i prestanak mandata UN-a, donekle se mogu razumjeti simpatije usmjerene
prema Srbima, ali se one ne mogu opravdati. Politika zemlje iz koje je pojedina po-
strojba dolazila davala je također prepoznatljiv pečat ukupnom ponašanju i stavu.
Ključni propusti napravljeni su u radu UN-ovih sektorskih službi javnog infor-
miranja, koje su u potpunosti propustile objasniti lokalnom pučanstvu mandat UN
misije i smisao rezolucija Vijeća sigurnosti, tako da se na UNPA područjima formi-
rao jedan krajnje iskrivljeni oblik tumačenja Vanceova plana. Srbi na okupiranim
područjima RH smatrali su i vjerovali da će mandat zaštitnih snaga UN-a štititi i
čuvati njih „od Hrvata“, a UNPA (koje su kao „srpske autonomne oblasti“ i „srp-
ske oblasti“ 19. prosinca 1991. godine, dakle prije potpisivanja Sarajevskog primirja,
proglasili takozvanom „Republikom Srpskom Krajinom“) štititi od Republike Hrvat-
ske. Dominiralo je apsurdno tumačenje po kojem je mandat mirovnih snaga u UN-
PA bio zaštita etnički očišćenih prostora i lokalnih kninskih vlasti.
UNPROFOR/UNCRO u svojem je djelovanju bio jedini dio međunarodne za-
jednice koji je kod pučanstva „RSK“ stvarao privid državnosti. Pri tome su činjeni
ustupci bez presedana: kninske vlasti nisu htjele ni čuti da se UNPA područja nalaze
u RH, pa je UN vodio računa da se ime „Hrvatska“ ne spominje niti u nazivu misije.
Iz niže navedenih UN misija u razdoblju od 1991. do 2007. godine vidljivo je na-
čelo da se ime države stavlja u naziv misije, primjerice:
MINURSO - U  nited Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
(akronim naziva na francuskom jeziku);
UNOMIG - United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia;
UNMIK - UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo;
MONUC - UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Rep. of the Congo;
UNMEE - United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea;
UNMIL - United Nations Mission in Liberia;
UNOCI - United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire;
MINUSTAH - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti;
UNMIS - United Nations Mission in the Sudan;
UNMIT - United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste;
UNAMID - African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur;
MINURCAT - United Nations Mission in the Central African Rep. and Chad.

103
Analizom naziva svih misija čiji je početak bio u razdoblju od 1991. godine pa
do kraja 2007. godine, može se konstatirati da je u tom razdoblju otvoreno ukupno
45 misija. Kod svega njih 6 nije primijenjeno (nepisano) pravilo, da u nazivu bude
sadržano i ime države u kojoj se misija provodi. To su:
UNPROFOR - United Nations Protection Force;
UNCRO - United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation;
UNPREDEP - United Nations Preventive Deployment Force;
UNTAES - United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia;
UNMOP - United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka;
UNPSG - United Nations Civilian Police Support Group.

Znakovito je da je 5 misija (od navedenih 6) provođeno u Hrvatskoj. Jedina izvan


Hrvatske je UNPREDEP u Makedoniji, gdje je naziv države isključen zbog pozna-
tog spora s Grčkom oko naziva „Makedonija“. Glede misija provođenih na području
Republike Hrvatske, nedvojbeno je da je izostavljanje imena države Hrvatske u na-
zivu misije predstavljalo ustupak (lokalnim, pobunjenim) Srbima, kojima je svako
dovođenje okupiranih teritorija u vezu s Hrvatskom bilo neprihvatljivo. Do koje su
mjere kninske vlasti bile osjetljive na pitanje uporabe naziva „Hrvatska“ pokazuje
i problem nekadašnjeg zapovjednika UNPROFOR-ova zapovjedništva za Hrvatsku
(COCC), generala G. Tayyeba.134 Naziv njegove dužnosti, koji je sadržavao riječ „Hr-
vatska“, do te je mjere bio neprihvatljiv Srbima s okupiranog područja da ga je Zapo-
vjedništvo UNPROFOR-a namjeravalo promijeniti u „zapovjednik UNPA“. Prijed-
log za izmjenu pokrenuo je general Bertrand Sauville de la Presle.
Problem s nazivom „Hrvatska“ se nastavio i s misijom UNCRO-a tijekom 1995.
godine. Kninske vlasti nisu prihvatile niti naziv misije UNCRO, iako CRO nije zna-
čilo „Croatia“ nego „Confidence Restoration Operation“. No, zbog „CRO“ u nazivu
misije, Zapovjedništvo UNCRO-a u sektoru Sjever je službene dopise prema vlasti-
ma „RSK“ dostavljalo na memorandumima bez oznake misije, najčešće koristeći sa-
mo naziv „United Nations“. Njihovo viđenje neutralnosti je podrazumijevalo da su
takve memorandume koristili i za prepisku sa službenim tijelima hrvatskih vlasti.
Isti se problem ponovio i prilikom postavljanja na dužnost zapovjednika snaga
UNCRO-a generala Kamala Al Rodana.135 Komentirajući stav generala Janviera, za-
134 
HMDCDR, 18., Dopis koordinatora za civilna pitanja UNPROFOR-ova sektora Sjever Charlesa
Kirudje, 10. veljače 1994.
135 
HMDCDR, 42., kut. 5., “Zabeleška sa sastanka između komandanta snage UNPROFOR-a generala
Žanvijea i komandanta SVK general-potpukovnika Mrkšića”, Knin, 7. 6. 1995 .

104
pisničar na sastanku, pukovnik Žarko Novaković, bilježi sljedeće: „Očigledno je da
pokušava manifestirati i ublažiti naš decidan stav o neprihvatanju bilo kakvih razgo-
vora sa gen. Rodanom u kojima bi se on deklarisao kao komandant UNCRO man-
data UN koji je za nas neprihvatljiv“.
Unatoč potpuno jasnim stavovima kninskih vlasti iz kojih je razvidno da se kon-
cept reintegracije u sastav RH u potpunosti odbacuje, postoji zajednički interes Kni-
na i UN-a da se spriječi eventualno izbijanje ratnog sukoba između HV-a i SVK. Taj
zajednički interes je prisutan od početka, i tu je teško razlučiti u kojoj se mjeri nave-
deno poklapa s načelom UN-a o neutralnosti.
Međunarodni pregovarači ICFY-a pokreću pregovarački krug na relaciji Zagreb
– Knin, unaprijed znajući da on neće rezultirati nikakvim konkretnim dogovorom
koji bi vodio reintegraciji. Njihov je cilj samo otvaranje pregovaračkog procesa, kao
sredstva s kojim bi se preventivno onemogućilo uključenje HV-a u rat. Taj zajednič-
ki interes vidljiv je i iz zapisnika sa sastanka Martić – Bildt i Stoltenberg, održanog u
Kninu 4. srpnja 1995. godine:
„BILDT: Klizimo u novi rat između RSK i RH. Da bi ga prevenirali moramo
ići u novi ciklus mirovnih pregovora. RH želi da se uključi u integracione
procese u Evropi (Ugovor o trgovini i saradnji, Evropsko veće...). Prema za-
ključcima prošlogodišnjeg evropskog samita u Kninu, dinamika i intenzitet
te integracije biće u skladu sa kooperativnošću i poštivanjem opšte prihvaće-
nih normi ponašanja na unutrašnjem i spoljnom planu od strane Hrvatske.
Zapad je jasno stavio do znanja RH da ratna opcija i pretnje silom, kao alter-
nativa političkom rješenju krize, mogu biti kontraproduktivni.
MARTIĆ: Od puta u Ženevu nema koristi, to je put u prazno. Ako postoji
ijedan dogovor koji Hrvati nisu izigrali - pristajem na pregovore… Kad bi
Hrvati pokazali minimum dobre volje i povukli trupe sa Dinare, mogućnost
susreta u Ženevi postaje realna.
BILDT: Za početak ne treba govoriti o pregovorima, već razgovorima. Ukoli-
ko RH ponovno napadne, suočit će se sa ozbiljnim, dugotrajnim i štetnim po-
sljedicama vezano za njeno uključivanje u integracione evropske tokove.“136
Pomoć UNCRO-a u zaustavljanju moguće vojne operacije HV-a se operacionali-
zira na sastanku Martić – Akashi, održanom u Kninu 30. srpnja 1995. godine. Akashi

136 
 MDCDR, 42., kut. 5., “Zabeleška sa sastanka između predsjednika RSK M. Martića i kopredsjed-
H
nika MK VJ T. Stoltenberga i K. G. Bilta“, Knin, 4. 7. 1995.

105
o tome izvješćuje glavnog tajnika UN-a K. Annana 2. kolovoza 1995. godine. Iako je
potpuno jasno da nikakvi pozitivni rezultati na planiranom ženevskom sastanku ne
mogu biti postignuti, Akashi nudi Martiću pomoć UNCRO-a u sprječavanju/zaustav-
ljanju moguće vojne operacije HV-a, u zamjenu za prihvaćanje 6 točaka koje se odnose
na Bihać: „U zamjenu za navedeno, bio sam spreman na aktivno razmještanje UNCRO
snaga na očekivanim glavnim smjerovima potencijalnog prodora HV u Krajinu“.
Martić je rekao: „Mi ne možemo prihvatiti granice među nama, Srbima, Mr.
Akashi. Vi tražite da kapituliram. (...) Biti ću iskren, RSK je u vrlo teškom položaju i
mi želimo tražiti mirno rješenje. Ali, to bi bila kapitulacija. (…) Pojam UNPROFOR
je često korišten od strane naših sugovornika, ali pojam UNCRO niti jedan put“.137
Iz navedenog dokumenta moglo bi se zaključiti kako je razmještanje UNCRO-a
na prosuđenim glavnim smjerovima napada HV-a ponuđeno samo kao opcija, ali
već 24. srpnja 1995. je potpisana operativna zapovijed za navedenu operaciju pod
nazivom „Active presence“,138 koja je ICFY-u na znanje dostavljena 1. kolovoza 1995.
godine. Takva je zapovijed u izravnoj koliziji s temeljnim načelima peacekeepinga,
gdje bi mandat i razmještaj UN snaga morali biti definirani u suglasnosti sa sukoblje-
nim stranama. Naime, izloženost i ranjivost snaga UN-a koje bi se našle između dvije
vatre u zoni razdvajanja na početku sukoba, značajno bi ugrozile sigurnost vojnika
koji nisu bili ni opremljeni, a ni pripremljeni, pa ni poslani radi djelovanja u uvjeti-
ma otvorenog ratnog sukoba.
Netočna izvješća o navodnom uzimanju pripadnika UNCRO-a za taoce od stra-
ne HV-a139 tijekom operacije „Oluja“, svjedoče da se dio pripadnika UNCRO-a slu-
žio neistinitim izvješćivanjem kako bi se stvorila platforma za politički/diplomatski
pritisak kojim bi se zaustavila operacija HV-a.
Iz prosvjeda zapovjednika SVK, upućenog 4. kolovoza 1995. stožeru UNPF-a,
vidljivo je da je SVK izvor dezinformacije o navodnom uzimanju taoca od strane
HV-a. Iz strukture sadržaja vidljiva je namjera dezinformiranja, jer nije logično da
stožer SVK iskazuje veću brigu za sigurnost UN-ovih nego svojih postrojbi: „Obra-
ćamo Vam se po drugi put tokom dana, pošto još uvijek pokazujemo suzdržljivost i
ne vršimo odmazdu po dubini teritorije RH. Srpska vojska Krajine se u svemu pri-
država ‘ženevskih konvencija’, što nije svojstveno hrvatskoj strani. Hrvatska vojska i
dalje gađa isključivo civilne ciljeve na cjelokupnoj teritoriji Republike Srpske Kraji-
ne, a posebno Knin i druga gradska središta.
137 
 MDCDR, 18., Dopis Y. Akashija za K. Annana, 2. kolovoza 1995.
H
138 
HMDCDR, 18., UNCRO operation order „Active Presence“, 24. srpnja 1995.
139 
HMDCDR, 18., Izvještaj B. Janviera za K. Annana, 5. kolovoza 1995.

106
Kao što Vam je poznato, na udaru su neprekidno i pripadnici mirovnih snaga.
Posebno su uočljivi napadi na pripadnike mirovnih snaga u zonama razdvajanja,
gdje je po našim saznanjima Hrvatska vojska silom zauzela 7 punktova UN i u polo-
žaj talaca stavila 70 pripadnika mirovnih snaga.
Molim da upotrebite Vaš autoritet i preduzmete mjere za zaštitu civilnog stanov-
ništva i pripadnika Ujedinjenih nacija, angažujući pritom i snage NATO-a.“140
Stječe se dojam kao da su glavni ciljevi napada HV-a srpski civili i pripadnici
UN-a, što je apsurdno, jer je svaka incidentna situacija predstavljala značajan pro-
blem za HV i otvarala mogućnost diplomatskog pritiska radi zaustavljanja operacije.
Znajući navedeno, Glavni stožer HV-a je poduzeo niz preventivnih mjera kako bi se
navedeno izbjeglo ili smanjilo na najmanju moguću mjeru.
Poučeni optužnicom ICTY-a protiv Martića, u kojoj ga se teretilo za raketiranje
Zagreba, a koja je podignuta i javno objavljena neposredno pred početak ope-
racije „Oluja“, važan element kampanje dezinformiranja koju je poduzelo vodstvo
SVK, bili su i prosvjedi u kojima se lažno optuživao HV u vezi s topničkim djelova-
njima. Pokušavao se stvoriti dojam kako topništvo HV-a masovno djeluje po civil-
nim ciljevima, dok se SVK pridržava međunarodnog ratnog prava. Time su se isto-
vremeno pokušavali stvoriti uvjeti za poduzimanje „legitimnih“ raketnih udara po
gradovima RH, u skladu sa „strategijom realne prijetnje“.
U prosvjedu generala Mile Mrkšića, upućenom stožeru UNPF-a 4. kolovoza u
6.30 sati, navodi se da je Hrvatska vojska napala gotovo sva područja i ciljeve u nji-
ma. Već sama konstatacija da je topništvo HV-a u 5.00 sati napalo i ciljeve u istočnoj
Slavoniji, zapadnom Srijemu i Baranji nije točna, jer se radi o području UN sektora
Istok, gdje je HV organizirao obranu od možebitnog napada s područja UNPA i gdje
mu nije odgovaralo otvaranje fronta. U prosvjedu se kaže i sljedeće:
„Artiljerijska vatra iz dalekometnog oruđa počela je jutros, 4. avgusta, tačno
u 05:00 sati na sve civilne ciljeve u gradovima Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Dr-
niš, Vrginmost, Vojnić, Glina, Petrinja i većinu sela u zapadnom delu Krajine,
kao i na ciljeve u Istočnoj Slavoniji, Zapadnom Sremu i Baranji.
Zahtevamo da se poduzmu hitne mere kako bi se zaustavila agresija. Zahte-
vamo da se o ovome hitno obavesti Veće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih naroda, kao i
Generalni sekretar, g. Boutros Ghali. Ujedno vas obaveštavamo da Republika
Srpska Krajina nije pucala na civilne ciljeve u Republici Hrvatskoj.“141
140 
HMDCDR, 18., Prosvjedno pismo M. Mrkšića B. Janvieru, 4. kolovoza 1995.
141 
HMDCDR, 18., Prosvjedno pismo M. Mrkšića B. Janvieru, 4. kolovoza 1995.

107
Kampanja dezinformiranja je bila kontinuirana i sveobuhvatna. Cilj je bio pota-
knuti međunarodnu zajednicu na primjenu diplomatskih pritisaka radi zaustavljanja
operacije, a to je bila točka gdje je postojao zajednički interes snaga UN-a, SVK i di-
jela međunarodne zajednice koja je bila sklona politici Miloševića.

Večernji list, 19. ožujka 1994.

108
4.

STANJE I AKTIVNOSTI VRS I SVK PRIJE


POČETKA OPERACIJE „OLUJA“

Uvod
Na donošenje odluke o poduzimanju operacije „Oluja“, kao krajnjeg sredstva
u provedbi politike reintegracije tada okupiranih područja u državnopravni sustav
RH, utjecali su procesi naznačeni u drugom i trećem poglavlju, a koji se u sažetom
obliku mogu opisati ovako:
• odlučnost politike srpskih „vlasti“ na okupiranim područjima RH da i vo-
jnim sredstvima spriječi bilo kakav pokušaj reintegracije tih područja u
državnopravni sustav RH;
• nespremnost međunarodnih snaga, ali i najvažnijih čimbenika međunarodne
zajednice da snažnijim pritiscima na ukupnu „srpsku“ politiku osiguraju
provedbu onoga što je definirano relevantnim rezolucijama Vijeća sigurnosti
UN-a u vezi reintegracije okupiranih područja.
Na donošenje odluke o poduzimanju operacije „Oluja“, kao i na sam tijek i pro-
vedbu operacije utjecali su i procesi na području BiH, koji su prikazani u ovom po-
glavlju. Posebno se to odnosi na vojne aktivnosti koje su izvodile i u kojima su bile
angažirane snage VRS, u nekim slučajevima u zajedničkom djelovanju sa snagama
SVK, a koje se sažeto mogu definirati kao:
• kulminacija napadajnih borbenih djelovanja VRS radi osvajanja preostalih
bošnjačkih i bošnjačko-hrvatskih enklava, ili radi zadržavanja osvojenih teri-
torija u sastavu RS.

109
Iz ovog sklopa razmatranja ne može se isključiti ni utjecaj ukupnog stanja i ak-
tivnosti na području BiH, u prvom redu političkih i diplomatskih aktivnosti, zatim
aktivnosti međunarodnih snaga (UNPROFOR), gospodarsko i humanitarno stanje,
utjecaj Srbije itd., ali je utjecaj vojnih snaga i njihovih aktivnosti zasigurno bio izrav-
niji i transparentniji.

4.1. Washingtonski sporazum – utjecaj na aktivnosti u BiH i


RH

Uvod
Težište prikaza je na vojnom sustavu, poglavito na Vojsci Republike Srpske i na
utjecaju koji je taj sustav imao na planiranje i izvođenje operacije „Oluja“. Namjera
je pokazati kako su stanje i aktivnosti toga sustava bitno utjecali (izravno i neizrav-
no) na izbor smjerova napada, na strukturu angažiranih snaga, na vrijeme početka
operacije, ali i na planiranu i realiziranu dinamiku izvođenja te na definiranje gravi-
tacijskog središta operacije.
Kada se govori o stanju i aktivnostima VRS, odnosi se to poglavito na 1995. go-
dinu, ali je potpuno jasno da je to stanje bilo uvjetovano i onim što se događalo pret-
hodnih godina, prije svega 1994. godine. A 1994. godina je snažno obilježena potpi-
sivanjem Washingtonskog sporazuma koji je, kao važan politički događaj, izuzetno
važne reperkusije imao na planu vojnih odnosa: radilo se o promjenama odnosa
snaga i sadržaja te načina angažiranja snaga, što je bilo jasno primjetno te godine.

4.1.1. Veza Washingtonskog i Zagrebačkog sporazuma


Značaj Washingtonskog sporazuma
Washingtonskom sporazumu (preliminarni sporazum o stvaranju Federacije
BiH) potpisanom 1. ožujka 1994. godine, prethodili su susreti zapovjednika HVO-a
i A BiH sredinom veljače u Kiseljaku, a zatim 23. veljače u Zagrebu, kada je potpi-
san sporazum o primirju. Odmah nakon potpisivanja Washingtonskog sporazuma
(1. ožujka 1994.) slijedio je „Splitski sporazum“ od 12. ožujka, koji je dalje razradio
problematiku formiranja zajedničke vojske Federacije BiH.
Naime, Washingtonski sporazum je formalno uspostavio zajedničku Vojsku Fe-
deracije, ali je ona i nakon sporazuma iz Splita bila daleko od funkcioniranja kao

110
jedinstvena vojska. Glavno postignuće Washingtonskog sporazuma od 18. ožujka
1994. bio je prekid svih ozbiljnijih vojnih sukoba između (postrojbi) HVO-a i A BiH
te osiguranje kakve-takve koordinacije zajedničkog ili barem paralelnog (sinkronizi-
ranog) djelovanja u odnosu na zajedničkog protivnika – VRS.
Uspostava savezničkog odnosa A BiH i HVO-a omogućila je da se VRS od voj-
ske koja je krajem 1993. i početkom 1994. godine poduzimala ofenzivna djelovanja i
ostvarivala uspjehe na gotovo svim dijelovima bojišnice u BiH, do kraja 1994. godi-
ne dovede u poziciju u kojoj je trpjela značajne poraze te povremeno gubila ili trajno
izgubila dijelove teritorija osvojenih i držanih još od početka agresije JNA na BiH.
U vrijeme potpisivanja Washingtonskog sporazuma pod nadzorom VRS-a bile
su približno tri četvrtine teritorija BiH,142 pri čemu to nisu bila samo područja na ko-
jima su Srbi i prije rata bili apsolutna većina, nego je to bio i značajan dio teritorija
na kojem su prije rata apsolutnu većinu imali Bošnjaci ili Hrvati, te značajan dio teri-
torija na kojem prije rata ni jedan od bosanskohercegovačkih konstitutivnih naroda
nije imao apsolutnu većinu.143
Bio je to rezultat agresije i okupacije, koju je potpuno jasno anticipirala idejna
zamisao strategijske napadajne operacije JNA, o kojoj je general Kadijević u svojoj
knjizi izrijekom naveo da je podrazumijevala i sljedeće: „…voditi računa da će uloga
srpskoga naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini biti ključna za budućnost srpskoga naroda u
cjelini. Tome prilagoditi lociranje snaga JNA“.144
Ocjenjujući krajem 1995. godine pojedine sudionike rata u BiH, autori knjige
„Balkan Battlegrounds“ daju o VRS sljedeću ocjenu: „Generali VRS Mladić i Milo-
vanović pokazali su na kraju svoju sposobnost, izvodeći strategijske pokrete svojih
sastava. Manevar sedam glavnih sastava, unatoč teškim gubicima koje su pretrpjeli
njihovi zapovjedno-komunikacijski sustavi tijekom NATO zrakoplovnih udara, bio
je svojevrstan trijumf profesionalnosti i uvježbanosti GŠ VRS. (…) Brzo izvođenje
ozbiljnih protunapada također je pokazalo kako snažna je ostala VRS na kraju rata,
posebno u odnosu na A BiH“.145
Nadalje, govoreći o rezultatima NATO zračnih napada na postrojbe VRS (rujan
1995.), konstatira se: „Sposobnosti VRS bile su zasigurno smanjene (degradirane), ali

142 
„Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Ze-
mljovid „L“ (Prilog na str. 283.).
143 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid „D“ (Prilog na str. 291.).
144 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje…, 134.
145 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, 393.

111
ona je još uvijek funkcionirala kao koherentna vojna snaga na cijelom svojem opera-
cijskom području i bila je sposobna manevrirati po Bosni brojnim borbenim postroj-
bama ranga brigade, čak i u jeku najjačih zrakoplovnih napada NATO snaga“.146
Na sljedećoj stranici te knjige navodi se kako je general Milovanović ipak napra-
vio nekoliko pogrešaka, koje je VRS skupo platila. Pokušava se objasniti dvojbe s ko-
jima se on pritom sretao i koje je morao riješiti, osobito one po pitanju izbora težišta
uporabe, ili manevra snaga, ili upućivanja ojačanja.
Očito je da su kod davanja takvih ocjena autori knjige zaboravili, ili previdjeli
važnu činjenicu: počinjena je samo jedna jedina, ali zato najvažnija strategijska po-
greška – agresija i okupacija teritorija na koji bosanski Srbi nikako ni po kojoj logici
nisu imali pravo, koja je obavljena uz izravno i „svestrano“ angažiranje JNA. Tako
okupirana i etnički očišćena područja srpske snage nikako nisu mogle trajno obra-
niti (zadržati), a osobito ne nakon što su se organizirale, koliko-toliko naoružale i
u saveznički odnos stupile A BiH i HVO. Naime, sve dok su A BiH i HVO bili me-
đusobno sukobljeni, VRS je mogla uspješno braniti okupirana područja i voditi rat
bez ozbiljnijeg poraza. Sve dok VRS nije doživjela poraz tijekom operacija koje su
slijedile nakon operacije „Oluja“, srpska politika nije bila spremna na odustajanje od
osvajačkog rata za teritorij koji joj ne pripada.

Zagrebački sporazum - postoji uzročno-posljedična veza s Washingtonskim


sporazumom
Tijekom 1994. godine aktivne su bile brojne bojišnice na području BiH, ali u
kontekstu ovog prikaza najznačajnije je spomenuti one bojišnice i ona područja koja
su bila u izravnoj uzročno-posljedičnoj vezi s događajima na području RH u 1995.
godini. Bila su to sljedeća područja:
• koridor kroz Bosansku Posavinu, koji je bio od općeg značaja kako za VRS
tako i za SVK, jer je to bila jedina izravna veza „zapadnih srpskih zemalja“ s
maticom (Srbijom);
• zapadna Bosna (Cazinska krajina, Bihać), područje koje je bilo od posebnog
vojnog značaja za VRS i SVK, jer je onemogućavalo kvalitetno povezivanje
RS i „RSK“, bitno je smanjivalo operativnu dubinu teritorija „RSK“ i vezalo je
značajne snage VRS i SVK (dok je bilo pod kontrolom 5. korpusa A BiH);
• područje Kupresa, Glamoča i Livna, koje je predstavljalo strategijski značajno
zaleđe okupiranom području Kninske krajine, kako sa stajališta obrane toga
područja, tako i sa stajališta njegovog oslobađanja.
146 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, 395.

112
Iako navedena tri područja i njihovo zadržavanje pod srpskom kontrolom, od-
nosno stavljanje pod srpsku kontrolu u slučaju zapadne Bosne, nisu bila od jednakog
značaja i jednakog reda prioriteta za RS i „RSK“, bila su to područja s kojih su se sve
nestabilnosti i nesigurnosti reflektirale na obje „srpske“ „države“. Ona su im bila za-
jednički interes.
U tom kontekstu treba gledati i pristanak vlasti „RSK“ na potpisivanje Zagrebač-
kog sporazuma, koji je uz posredovanje specijalnog ruskog izaslanika Vitaliyja Chur-
kina sklopljen u Veleposlanstvu Ruske Federacije u Zagrebu 29. ožujka 1994. godine.
Bio je to sporazum koji je omogućio prestanak značajnijih borbenih djelovanja na
području RH u vrijeme kada su stvoreni uvjeti za intenziviranje borbenih aktivnosti
u BiH (Washingtonski sporazum).
Primirje na području Hrvatske moglo je koristiti i RS i „RSK“: snage SVK ostale
su slobodne za pomoć snagama VRS (u djelovanju na području zapadne Bosne), a
snage VRS su de facto abolirane od „akutne“ obveze operativne i/ili strategijske pri-
čuve SVK i mogle su se usmjeriti na „rješavanje“ vlastitih problema, iskrsnulih uspo-
stavom savezništva između HVO-a i A BiH.
Dva sporazuma imala su dva različita učinka u dvije države:
• Washingtonski sporazum je na području BiH vodio do intenziviranja bor-
benih djelovanja u kojima su snage A BiH HVO-a s vremenom postajale sve
veća opasnost za VRS, što je u jesen i zimu (studeni i prosinac) rezultiralo
dvjema operacijama: na području livanjsko – kupreške bojišnice, odnosno na
području zapadne Bosne, u kojima su snage VRS pretrpjele prve značajnije
gubitke teritorija;
• Zagrebački sporazum „inaugurirao“ je svojevrsnu klimu pregovaranja, koja
je u prosincu rezultirala Gospodarskim sporazumom između RH i „RSK“ i
otvaranjem prometa autocestom između Novske i Nove Gradiške. Međutim,
on je jednako tako omogućio da se na političkoj razini pokaže koliko su
udaljena stajališta dvije strane glede pronalaženja konačnog rješenja mirnim
putem te koliko su velike podjele unutar struktura „vlasti RSK“ po pitan-
ju dviju „opcija“: pregovaranje s vlastima RH (samo ako to ima koristi za
„RSK“ i ne uključuje razgovore o reintegraciji), ili a priori odbijanje svake
mogućnosti razgovora o integraciji u RH.

113
4.1.2. (Ne)izravni učinci dva sporazuma
Učinci na području BiH
Kada je u pitanju prvi učinak, VRS je u drugoj polovici listopada 1994. doživjela
prvi značajniji gubitak teritorija, kada su u napadu snaga 7. korpusa A BiH potisnute
snage 30. partizanske divizije, a u napadu snaga HVO-a dijelovi snaga 2. krajiškog
korpusa,147 tako da su snage HVO-a početkom studenoga ušle u grad Kupres i oslo-
bodile ga.
U to vrijeme u tijeku je već bila i napadajna operacija SVK na područje zapadne
Bosne, kako je to objašnjeno u poglavlju 2., točka 2.3.3. Iako je nakon zračnih udara
NATO snaga (21. i 23. studenoga) intenzitet operacije oslabio, opasnost od zauzima-
nja Bihaća i dalje je bila realna. Kako bi se oslabio pritisak srpskih snaga na 5. korpus
A BiH, a u napadu su najvećim dijelom bile angažirane snage 2. krajiškog korpusa
VRS, snage HVO-a i HV-a poduzimaju 29. studenoga operaciju „Zima-94“, napa-
dom na snage 2. korpusa u području Livanjskog polja i Dinare.
Do kraja godine bojišnica je pomaknuta dvadesetak kilometara prema sjeveroza-
padu,148 a VRS je izgubila približno 200 kvadratnih kilometara149 ozemlja u područ-
ju livanjsko-kupreške bojišnice i Dinare. Tijekom tih djelovanja do izražaja su došle
bitne slabosti VRS:
- nedostatak pričuvnih i manevarskih snaga (u konkretnom slučaju u sastavu
2. krajiškog korpusa),
- neodlučnost zapovjedništava u donošenju odluka o prioritetnim zadaćama
(treba li težište biti na obrani u Livanjskom polju ili u napadu na zapadnu
Bosnu), te
- zamor i gubitak motivacije kod ljudstva koje je bilo iscrpljeno dugotrajnim
borbama na brojnim bojišnicama u BiH.

Navedeni problemi bili su izraženi u svim sastavima VRS, ali su posebno bili
izraženi u 2. krajiškom korpusu koji se nalazio takoreći u uvjetima poluokruženja,
vodeći borbe na bihaćkoj, livanjskoj i kupreškoj bojišnici.
Istina, jedan od glavnih ciljeva operacije „Zima-94“ – slabljenje pritiska srpskih
snaga u napadu na Bihać – nije ostvaren izravno, ali je činjenica da VRS (2. krajiški
147 
“ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid br. 48 (Prilog na str. 292.).
148 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid br. 40 (Prilog na str. 293.).
149 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, 251.

114
korpus) nije uspjela razbiti snage 5. korpusa A BiH niti zauzeti Bihać (koji je branila
i 101. pukovnija HVO-a), što je zasigurno bila i posljedica nemogućnosti dovođenja
ojačanja i/ili svježih snaga koje bi bile u stanju operaciju na Bihać završiti s uspje-
hom.

Učinci na području RH
Kao što je već napomenuto, Zagrebački sporazum dao je mogućnost za odre-
đenu razinu sporazumijevanja, ali je jednako tako transparentnim učinio onaj dio
politike „RSK“ koji nije pristajao na sporazumijevanje s vlastima RH niti na bilo
kakvu integraciju u RH. Gospodarski sporazum kao izravna posljedica sporazuma
(Zagrebačkog) o primirju implicirao je i promijenjeni mandat UNPROFOR-a, na
koji pobunjeni Srbi nisu pristajali, a pogotovo nisu pristajali na otkazivanje manda-
ta UNPROFOR-a, što je tražila RH s obzirom na njegovu neučinkovitost. U takvim
uvjetima u strukturama vlasti „RSK“ dolazi do sve snažnijih podjela:
• s jedne strane su one snage koje traže radikalniji odnos prema RH i snažnije
vezivanje s Republikom Srpskom u BiH, snage koje stalnim provociran-
jem napetosti duž bojišnice žele pokazati kako je nazočnost UNPROFOR-a
neophodna, a njegov mandat treba ostati kakav jest. Pojednostavljeno gle-
dano, pripadnici te struje politički su vezani uz Martića, vojno uz generala
Čeleketića, teritorijalno uz „prostorno strategijsko težište“ područja „RSK“, a
programski nisu ni za kakve sporazume s RH, čak ni onda kada stanovništvo
na okupiranim područjima RH ima izravne koristi od toga;
• s druge strane su snage koje jesu za izvjesnu (gospodarsku) suradnju s RH,
koje su protiv bilo kakvog institucionalnog povezivanja s RS, a za povezivanje
sa SRJ, koje bi se, pojednostavljeno gledajući, moglo politički vezati uz Go-
rana Hadžića, programski uz predsjednika „Vlade RSK“ Borislava Mikelića,
teritorijalno uz okupirana područja istočne Slavonije, Baranje i Srijema. Te
snage ipak su računale kako vrijeme radi za njih i kako ishitreni potezi na vo-
jnom planu mogu biti samo kratkoročno korisni.

S obzirom na to da je prvima sve više bivalo otežano „komuniciranje“ sa SRJ,


osobito ako se ima u vidu embargo koji je toj državi nametnut u odnosu na BiH (RS),
realne vojne sposobnosti korpusa na „prostornom strategijskom težištu“ (7., 15., 21. i
39. korpus), uključujući i 18. korpus na području zapadne Slavonije, bile su izložene
stalnoj degradaciji.
Realna je ostala jedino „strategija realne prijetnje“, koja je to manje bivala realna
kako je snaga HV-a postajala realnija. Unatoč tome, Martićeva politika koja je stajala

115
iza takve strategije glatko je odbila i razgovore o planu Z-4 (siječanj 1995.), potvrdiv-
ši na taj način kako za nju ne postoji nikakva prihvatljiva mogućnost reintegracije u
RH.
S druge strane, vojne sposobnosti 11. korpusa nisu bile značajnije umanjene;
dapače, zahvaljujući sve čvršćem povezivanju s VJ, osobito sa zapovjedništvom 12.
korpusa VJ, te snage imale su osjećaj kako postaju sastavnim dijelom toga korpusa.
Značajan doprinos tome davao je i zapovjednik 11. korpusa SVK (general Dušan
Lončar), zasigurno jedan od kvalitetnijih časnika SVK, koji je programski bio sklon
predsjedniku „Vlade RSK“ Mikeliću, ali politički nije bio vezan uz Hadžića, što je
ostavljalo mogućnost za njegovo profesionalno potvrđivanje. Naravno, i gospodar-
ske mogućnosti toga dijela „RSK“ bile su ipak nešto veće, opet zahvaljujući snažni-
jem vezivanju uz SRJ.
Nastojeći na svaki način kompromitirati bilo kakvu suradnju s RH, Martićeva
politika je dovela do okolnosti u kojima je vodstvo RH odlučilo izvesti operaciju
„Bljesak“, kao jedini način da se prekinu opstrukcije postignutih sporazuma. Naime,
i kada je usvojen ostanak snaga UN-a s promijenjenim mandatom (UNCRO), koji
je podrazumijevao i kontrole UN-a na „graničnim“ prijelazima između BiH i „RSK“
te SRJ i „RSK“, vodstvo „RSK“ odlučilo je u znak protesta zatvoriti autocestu na di-
jelu na kojem ona prolazi kroz UNPA sektor Zapad, prvi puta 24. travnja, a zatim
ponovo 29. travnja. Znakovito je kako je tada, 29. travnja, autocesta ostala zatvorena
i 30. travnja, unatoč nastojanjima i upozorenjima od strane UNPROFOR-a. Odluku
o tome da se cesta ne otvori donijeli su zapovjednik 18. korpusa Lazo Babić i zapo-
vjednik GŠ SVK general Milan Čeleketić.150 Nisu uspjela ni nastojanja ministra obra-
ne „RSK“ Rade Tanjge, da se cesta otvori, kako je s predstavnicima UNPROFOR-a i
dogovoreno 30. travnja.
Znakovito je i to da su Martić i general Čeleketić boravili u posjetu zapadnoj Sla-
voniji u vremenu od 25. do 26. travnja, kada su najavili „da će se situacija oko auto-
ceste uskoro iskomplicirati“ te da je „SVK spremna da brani i obrani zapadnu Slavo-
niju, čak i da vrati dio okupiranog teritorija“.151

150 
 MDCDR, 6., kut. 9, „Izvještaj o uzrocima i načinu pada Zapadne Slavonije“, Republika Srpska
H
Krajina, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje uzroka i načina pada Zapadne Slavonije, Knin, 11. 7.
1995.
151 
HMDCDR, 6., kut. 9, „Izvještaj o uzrocima i načinu pada Zapadne Slavonije“, Republika Srpska
Krajina, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje uzroka i načina pada Zapadne Slavonije, Knin, 11. 7.
1995.

116
Iako se u knjizi „Balkan Battlegrounds“ tvrdi kako je „napad počeo bez gotovo
ikakvog upozorenja i ostavljajući im minimalno vremena da mobiliziraju pričuve“,152
očito je da to nije bilo tako i da su Martić i Čeleketić očekivali napad, jer su zapovje-
dili punu mobilizaciju, koja je i obavljena153 do 30. travnja 1995.154
Operacija „Bljesak“ pokazala je temeljne slabosti SVK, posebno izražene u obra-
ni koju su „organizirale“ snage 18. korpusa:
- neorganiziranost obrane, a osobito slabosti koje proizlaze iz popune postro-
jbi pričuvnim sastavom;
- nedostatak pričuvnih i manevarskih snaga, iako je u uvjetima obrane koju je
izvodio 18. korpus postojala takva mogućnost;
- nespremnost ostalih sastava SVK da upute ojačanja na područje zapadne Sla-
vonije;
- nespremnost GŠ VRS da na raspolaganje stavi operativnu pričuvu s kojom se
računalo u obrani zapade Slavonije;
- nemogućnost poduzimanja protunapada i/ili presijecanja relativno dubokih
klinova protivničkih snaga.

Činjenica je da su u to vrijeme snage 7. korpusa SVK bile značajnim dijelom an-


gažirane u borbama na području Dinare, a dio snaga 5., 21. i 39. korpusa bio je anga-
žiran na bojišnici prema zapadnoj Bosni.
Nadalje, za dovođenje tih snaga bilo je potrebno minimalno 24 do 36 sati, pri če-
mu bi njihovo uvođenje u borbu (protunapad) bilo strogo kanalizirano smjerom Sta-
ra Gradiška – Okučani, koji već drugog dana operacije nije imao dovoljan kapacitet
za prihvat snaga koje bi mogle izvesti uspješan protunapad.
Kada su u pitanju ojačanja ili operativna pričuva iz sastava VRS, pitanje je bi li
VRS i u slučaju da je postojala politička volja da se angažira u sukobu na teritoriju
RH, imala značajnije snage koje bi mogla izdvojiti radi upućivanja u zapadnu Slavo-
niju. Naime, u to vrijeme su snage 1. i 2. krajiškog korpusa bile angažirane u borbe-
nim djelovanjima na području grahovsko - glamočke bojišnice, zapadne Bosne, Do-
boja i Ozrena, Vlašića, koridora kroz Posavinu, a planirane pričuve nije bilo.
152 
“ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, 297.
153 
HMDCDR, 2., 39. korpus, kut. 26, „Informacija o padu Zapadne Slavonije (točka 1.)“, Glavni štab
SVK, Odelenje za informisanje, 4. 5. 1995. godine.
154 
HMDCDR, 6., kut. 9, „Izvještaj o uzrocima i načinu pada Zapadne Slavonije“, Republika Srpska
Krajina, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje uzroka i načina pada Zapadne Slavonije, Knin, 11. 7.
1995.

117
Glede primjene elemenata „strategije realne prijetnje“ pokazalo se kako Martić i
GŠ SVK ne odustaju od njezine primjene (primjerice, raketiranje Zagreba), a u tom
kontekstu može se tumačiti i dovođenje „udarnih oklopno mehaniziranih borbenih
skupina“ iz sastava 36. okbr, 12. mbr i 453. mbr u područja mostova na Dunavu te u
područje Šid – Tovarnik.155

4.2. Stanje i aktivnosti VRS i SVK početkom ljeta 1995.


godine

4.2.1. Opće značajke stanja


Vojno-političko stanje na okupiranim područjima RH („RSK“) i BiH (RS) po-
četkom lipnja 1995. godine bilo je pod snažnim utjecajem nekoliko međusobno za-
visnih procesa:
• slabljenje morala pučanstva i pripadnika postrojbi SVK na okupiranim
područjima RH;
• jačanje nastojanja i poduzimanje političkih koraka radi ujedinjenja „RSK“ i
RS u jednu državu.

Kada se govori o slabljenju morala pučanstva onda se može konstatirati da je to


bila posljedica činjenice da su „srpske vojske“ u prethodnom razdoblju doživjele ne-
koliko značajnih neuspjeha:
• neuspjeh operacije za proširenje koridora u Bosanskoj Posavini,
• neuspjeh napadajne operacije postrojbi VRS na područje zapadne Bosne,
• uvođenje embarga SRJ na ekonomske, financijske, vojne i druge oblike su-
radnje s RS i „RSK“,
• djelovanje NATO zrakoplovstva na z/l Udbinu i po objektima PZO na
području bosanske Krajine,
• neuspjeh snaga VRS, osobito 2. krajiškog korpusa, na livanjsko-kupreškoj i
glamočko-grahovskoj bojišnici,
• razbijanje 18. korpusa SVK i oslobađanje područja zapadne Slavonije u oper-
aciji „Bljesak“.

155 
„ Raščlamba obavještajnih podataka o tijeku i rezultatima operacije ‘Bljesak’ (poglavlje ‘Ojačanja iz
VJ’, str. 8)”, 10. 5. 1995., MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1177.

118
Takvo stanje imalo je za posljedicu:
• jačanje osjećaja besperspektivnosti i napuštenosti od strane Srbije kod
najvećeg dijela pučanstva u RSK;
• politička razmimoilaženja u najvišem „državnom“ vodstvu „RSK“ i neslag-
anja glede planiranih ujedinjenja „srpskih zemalja“;
• jačanje pritisaka na iseljavanje pučanstva u Srbiju;
• probleme u popuni postrojbi SVK ljudstvom svih kategorija (profesionalni
sastav, ročnici i pričuva).

Svi ovi procesi i problemi bili su značajno manje izraženi na okupiranom po-
dručju istočne Slavonije (ova konstatacija se ne odnosi na problem političkih razmi-
moilaženja, jer su ona bila najizraženija upravo na relaciji istočni dijelovi – zapadni
dijelovi „RSK“), gdje su najveći problemi nastajali zbog dolaska većeg broja izbjegli-
ca s područja zapadne Slavonije (problemi glede osiguranja smještaja) te zbog stal-
nih zahtjeva za slanjem ojačanja (ljudi i postrojbe) na područje RS (BiH) te na okupi-
rana područja Banovine, Korduna, Like i sjeverne Dalmacije (Republika Hrvatska).
Kada su u pitanju zahtjevi za ujedinjenjem, u slučaju zapadnog dijela „RSK“ oni
su bili, u prvom redu, usmjereni na ujedinjenje RS i „RSK“, dok su u slučaju istočnog
dijela bili usmjereni na ujedinjenje sa Srbijom (SRJ), a ujedinjenje s RS u potpunosti
je odbijano. Naime, u Kninu je 28. svibnja 1995. godine održana sjednica „Skupštine
RSK“ na kojoj je izglasano nepovjerenje Vladi Borislava Mikelića te je jednoglasno
donijeta odluka o ujedinjenju „RSK“ i RS.
Međutim, „Koordinacijski odbor“ za istočnu Slavoniju i Baranju, na čelu s Gora-
nom Hadžićem, bio je protiv ujedinjenja s RS, tvrdeći da su istočna Slavonija i Bara-
nja „prirodni dio Jugoslavije“ i najavio je odcjepljenje „istočnih dijelova“ od „RSK“
ako dođe do ujedinjenja s RS.
Nepovjerenje Vladi Borislava Mikelića izglasano je poglavito zbog činjenice da
je i on bio protiv ujedinjenja RS i „RSK“ te je, iako rodom s područja Banovine, više
bio naklonjen stavovima Hadžićevog „Koordinacijskog odbora“.156
Problemi preustroja i popune postrojbi bili su također bitno različiti u dva nave-
dena dijela „RSK“. Naime, zahvaljujući velikom broju izbjeglica s područja koje su
hrvatske snage oslobodile u zapadnoj Slavoniji, od kojih su mnogi bili vojni obvezni-

156 
 apravo, Mikelić je provodio politiku S. Miloševića, koji se želio prikazati mirotvorcem, kako bi
Z
SRJ (odnosno Srbiji) bile ukinute sankcije, pa stoga nije žurio za ujedinjenjem srpskih zemalja, ia-
ko mu je to bio krajnji cilj.

119
ci, problem popune postrojbi 11. korpusa SVK bio je puno manji nego kod ostalih
korpusa SVK. K tome je i izravna potpora u naoružanju i opremi, kao i suradnja s VJ
pri ustroju manevarskih korpusnih postrojbi, bila značajna prednost 11. korpusa u
odnosu na ostale korpuse SVK.
U vezi s tim je i zapovjednik 11. korpusa general Dušan Lončar bio od strane
Martića tretiran kao „Mikelićev kadar“ pa je razmatrana čak i mogućnost njegove
zamjene,157 iako se radilo o jednoj od najstručnijih vojnih osoba u sastavu SVK, a
koji nije pripadao „radikalnoj struji“ unutar najvišeg zapovjednog kadra i bez kojega
bi borbena sposobnost 11. korpusa zasigurno došla u pitanje. Zbog toga mu je nu-
đeno i mjesto zamjenika zapovjednika SVK, što je on odbio, zaprijetivši zahtjevom
za umirovljenjem. Problemi iseljavanja također su bili potpuno drugačije naravi i u
značajno manjoj mjeri izraženi na području istočne Slavonije, nego u zapadnim di-
jelovima „RSK“.
Takvo stanje dovelo je kreatore i realizatore ideje o ujedinjenju „srpskih zemalja“
u poziciju da moraju žurno poduzeti odgovarajuće mjere koje bi omogućile brže i
potpunije povezivanje „srpskih zemalja“ u jednu državu. Na tom putu, bez obzira na
to ostvarivalo se „ujedinjenje“ vojnim ili političkim sredstvima, problem je predstav-
ljao „neriješen status“ dva ključna područja (teritorija):
• koridor kroz Bosansku Posavinu, bez kojega nema kvalitetne veze „zapadnih
srpskih zemalja“ sa Srbijom i
• područje zapadne Bosne, bez kojega nema kvalitetne veze zapadnog dijela
„RSK“ s ostalim „srpskim zemljama“.

Kako je operacija za „proširivanje“ tzv. koridora završila neuspjehom, možebit-


ni (izgledni) vojni uspjeh združenih snaga SVK i VRS na području zapadne Bosne
nametao se kao imperativ. Od kolikog je značaja bilo zauzimanje područja zapadne
Bosne vidi se i iz dopisa koji je zapovjednik 2. krajiškog korpusa brigadir Radivoje
Tomanić uputio 16. veljače 1995. godine Glavnom štabu VRS, osobno generalu Ma-
nojlu Milovanoviću.158

157 
“ Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 30. svibnja do 6. lipnja 1995. godine“, od 7.
lipnja 1995. godine, MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1414.
158 
HMDCDR, 18., Komanda 2. krajiškog korpusa, str. pov. broj 3-36, 16. 2. 1995. godine.

120
4.2.2. Indikatori strateški značajnih aktivnosti i promjena u SVK
Obavještajni podaci pribavljani u vremenu nakon operacije „Bljesak“ ukaziva-
li su na to da su u tijeku pripreme zajedničkih snaga iz sastava SVK i VRS, te NO
APZB za novu (završnu) napadajnu operaciju na područje zapadne Bosne, odnosno
na snage 5. korpusa A BiH.
Uistinu, napadajna operacija združenih snaga SVK i VRS odvijala se cijelo vrije-
me, dakle i nakon intervencije NATO-a, ali se radilo o djelovanjima slabijeg intenzi-
teta (poglavito topnička djelovanja) i bez značajnijeg međusobnog usklađivanja dje-
lovanja na razinama dvije „vojske“, kao i bez značajnijih pomaka bojišnice.159
Međutim, radilo se i o drugim aktivnostima koje su u konačnici trebale rezulti-
rati jačanjem vojne moći „RSK“, dakle jačanjem sposobnosti SVK kao „garanta“ op-
stanka „RSK“. Bile su to sljedeće aktivnosti (indikatori):
• popuna postrojbi ljudstvom svih kategorija (profesionalni, ročni i pričuvni
sastav);
• početak ustroja Korpusa specijalnih jedinica;
• grupiranje snaga u skladu s planom napadajne operacije na područje za-
padne Bosne (formiranje taktičkih skupina i operativne skupine „Pauk“).

Dovođenje vojnih obveznika mobiliziranih na području SRJ


Odluka o mobiliziranju svih vojnih obveznika podrijetlom s tada okupiranih po-
dručja RH i BiH koji su, privremeno ili stalno, bili naseljeni na području SRJ, done-
sena je već 1. lipnja, a njezina operacionalizacija, pod kodnim imenom „Oluja“,160
počela je 5. lipnja 1995. godine. Od početka te akcije pa do sredine mjeseca lipnja na
okupirana područja Banovine, Korduna, Like i sjeverne Dalmacije dovedeno je pri-
bližno 4500 do 5000 vojnih obveznika, a do 5. srpnja bilo je planirano dovesti uku-
pno 8000 do 8500 vojnih obveznika.161
Dovođenjem tako velikog broja obveznika značajno se ublažavao problem po-
pune postrojbi SVK, osobito ako se ima u vidu da su uz mobilizirane obveznike
upućivani i časnici iz sastava VJ te dragovoljci različitih srpskih „političkih“ proveni-
jencija. Ojačanja su stizala u sve korpuse SVK, ali poglavito u 39. (banijski), 21. (kor-
dunski), 15. (lički) i 7. (kninski).
159 
“ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid br. 55 (Prilog na str. 289.).
160 
HMDCDR, 18., „Pripreme za napadnu operaciju združenih snaga ‘SVK’ i ‘VRS’ na područje Za-
padne Bosne“, 24. 6. 1995.
161 
„Pregled ojačanja upućenih iz VJ u ‘RSK’ tijekom lipnja 1995.“, 28. 6. 1995. godine, MORH, klasa:
804-08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1598.

121
U vezi s problematikom mobilizacije obveznika na području SRJ održan je 5. lip-
nja u Beogradu sastanak predstavnika MO SRJ i MO „RSK“, na kojem je razrađena
tehnologija procesa mobilizacije te prijevoza i prihvata mobiliziranih na području
„RSK“. Ustrojeni su prihvatni tabori u Batnogi i na Slunju te manji na području Like,
kao i sabirni centri u SRJ (Novi Sad, Bubanj Potok kod Beograda).
O tijeku mobilizacije svjedočila je i informacija u emisiji „Vijesti“ radiopostaje
„Petrova Gora“ (16. lipnja u 17.00 sati) prema kojoj „današnja ‘Politika’ prenosi (...)
kako u Krajinu stižu konvoji autobusa puni vojnih obveznika, koji dolaze u rodni
kraj da pomognu u obrani...“ te da će ti vojnici „popuniti vojne formacije“.162
Međutim, osim popune postrojbi SVK, značajniji je bio učinak koji je dolazak
mobiliziranih vojnih obveznika polučio u odnosu na sljedeće:
• jačanje morala pučanstva i pripadnika postrojbi SVK,
• otklanjanje osjećaja izoliranosti i prepuštenosti „samih sebi“ od strane Srbije
(SRJ),
• manifestiranje „skrbi“ i spremnosti Srbije (SRJ) za „obranu zapadnih srpskih
zemalja“ i
• djelomično usporavanje procesa odlaska pučanstva iz zapadnih dijelova RSK
u SRJ.

Zahvaljujući popuni vojnim obveznicima novačenim, mobiliziranim ili drago-


voljno prikupljenim na području SRJ, stanje popune u korpusima i drugim sastavi-
ma SVK značajno je poboljšano u odnosu na stanje u ožujku 1994.,163 tako da je nji-
hovo brojno stanje sredinom srpnja 1995. godine bilo sljedeće:
11. korpus (slavonsko-baranjski): ožujak ‘94.: 10.000 – 11.000
srpanj ‘95.: 12.500 – 13.000
18. korpus (zapadnoslavonski): ožujak ‘94.: 4000 – 4500
srpanj ‘95.: praktično ne postoji
39. korpus (banijski): ožujak ‘94.: 5000 – 6000
srpanj ‘95.: 9500 – 10000
21. korpus (kordunski): ožujak ‘94.: 4500 – 5000
srpanj ‘95.: 7000 - 7500
162 
HMDCDR, 18., „Pripreme za napadnu operaciju združenih snaga ‘SVK’ i ‘VRS’ na područje Za-
padne Bosne“, 24. 6. 1995.
163 
HMDCDR, 18., „Obavještajna prosudba mogućeg razvoja događaja na vojno-političkom planu i
moguća ugroza RH u narednom razdoblju, osobito u varijantama angažiranja Hrvatske vojske“,
26. 3. 1994.

122
15. korpus (lički): ožujak ‘94.: 5500 – 6000
srpanj ‘95.: 6500 - 7000
7. korpus (sjevernodalmatinski): ožujak ‘94.: 8000 - 9000
srpanj ‘95.: 9500 – 11.000
Korpus specijalnih jedinica: ožujak ‘94.: tada još ne postoji
srpanj ‘95.: 3500 – 4000
Ostale postrojbe SVK: ožujak ‘94.: 2500 – 3000
srpanj ‘95.: 2500 – 3500
Ukupno: ožujak ‘94.: 39.500 – 44.500
srpanj ‘95.: 51.000 – 56.000

Zahvaljujući tako organiziranoj popuni postrojbi SVK, snage te vojske raspo-


ređene na području „zapadnih dijelova RSK“ dostigle su ukupni broj od približno
43.000 ljudi. Ako se tom broju dodaju i ojačanja iz sastava 11. korpusa (razina 1 boj-
ne) te brojne i raznovrsne skupine „dragovoljaca“ s područja SRJ, onda je taj broj
krajem lipnja prelazio i 45.000 ljudi.
Treba pri tome uzeti u obzir i promjenu strukture ljudstva glede kvalitete i mo-
tiviranosti. Naime, posebno se to odnosi na popunu profesionalnim kadrom, čiji je
udio u ukupnom sastavu koncem srpnja bio porastao (približno 15%) u odnosu na
udio u ožujku 1994. godine (približno 10%). Uz to, udio profesionalnog sastava u
„zapadnim dijelovima“ bio je i 20%, jer je na tom području bio lociran i KSJ, popu-
njen profesionalnim sastavom do razine 40%.
U obzir treba uzeti i činjenicu da je popuna sastava bila kontinuirani proces koji
se intenzivno odvijao sve do samog početka operacije „Oluja“, tako da su se počet-
kom kolovoza u postrojbama SVK već pojavili problemi glede osiguranja potrebnog
osobnog oružja za pridošlo ljudstvo, što je vidljivo i iz zahtjeva zapovjednika 39. kor-
pusa koji traži automatske puške za 485 „novopridošlih boraca“ iz sastava nekadaš-
njeg 18. (zapadnoslavonskog) korpusa.164
Može se zaključiti, da je brojno stanje ljudstva u predmetnim sastavima SVK bilo
približno 50.000, što je odgovaralo procjenama koje je dao general Radinović, a ko-
je su se odnosile na broj ljudstva dostatan „za uspješnu obranu RSK od agresije“.165

164 
 MDCDR, 2., kut. 1041., “Naoružanje za borce pristigle iz 18. K”, Komanda 39. korpusa SVK, Pe-
H
trinja, 3. 8. 1995.
165 
Vojska Krajine, broj 4-5, juli-avgust 1993., 7-9.

123
Početak preustroja SVK i ustroj Korpusa specijalnih jedinica SVK
Dana 31. svibnja general Mile Mrkšić, zapovjednik GŠ SVK, održao je sastanak
s najvišim dužnosnicima GŠ SVK, zapovjednicima korpusa i zapovjednicima samo-
stalnih brigada (pukovnija), na kojem ih je upoznao s dvije važne zadaće:
− početak transformacije i profesionalizacije SVK te jačanje sustava obrane;
− predstojeći sastanak u MO SRJ, gdje će se pokrenuti pitanje mobilizacije i
novačenja na području SRJ (akcija „Oluja“), radi popune postrojbi SVK.166

Naime, iako je preustroj SVK pokrenut već početkom 1994. godine, tek dola-
skom generala Mile Mrkšića na dužnost zapovjednika GŠ SVK (svibanj 1995. godi-
ne) počeo je rad na njegovoj realizaciji. Osobito intenzivan rad odvijao se na ustroju
specijalnih manevarskih postrojbi na razini korpusa SVK,167 te na ustroju Korpusa
specijalnih jedinica (KSJ) na razini SVK.
Ustroj takvih postrojbi trebao je otkloniti glavne slabosti glede operativnih mo-
gućnosti SVK, kao što su:
• popuna profesionalnim kadrom, umjesto popune temeljene na pričuvi;
• opremanje naoružanjem koje omogućava veću paljbenu moć i veću
pokretljivost (manevar), umjesto onoga koje je prije svega namijenjeno
izvođenju obrambenih djelovanja;
• formiranje manevarske komponente SVK, kako bi se izbjegli nedostaci vo-
jske bazirane samo na teritorijalnoj komponenti;
• osiguranje operativne (na razinama korpusa), odnosno strategijske pričuve
(na razini SVK), kako bi se izbjegle slabosti koje ima obrana organizirana
samo na prvoj crti (u jednom borbenom postroju) i napad bez mogućnosti
uvođenja svježih i brzo pokretnih udarnih snaga.

Kada je u pitanju korpusna razina, radilo se o namjeri ustroja tzv. „udarnih oklo-
pno-mehaniziranih skupina“ približno ekvivalenta bojne (300 do 350 ljudi), ojača-
ne satnijom tenkova, satnijom oklopnih transportera, bitnicom samohodnih topova
(haubica), bitnicom samohodnih PZ topova, kakve su već bile ustrojavane i provje-
rene u borbenim djelovanjima na području BiH (poglavito u sastavu postrojbi Istoč-
nobosanskog i Drinskog korpusa VRS).
166 
“ Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 30. svibnja do 6. lipnja 1995. godine“, od 7.
lipnja 1995. godine, MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1414.
167 
Manevarska bojna ustrojena je samo u sastavu 11. korpusa, dok se od ustroja takvih korpusnih
bojni u drugim korpusima SVK odustalo, jer se pristupilo ustroju Korpusa specijalnih jedinica
na razini SVK.

124
Međutim, od te koncepcije se vrlo brzo odstupilo, pa su dvije takve postrojbe
ustrojene samo u sastavu 11. korpusa SVK, a glede ostalih korpusa je zaključeno ka-
ko je puno kvalitetnije rješenje ustroj manevarske postrojbe na razini SVK te se pri-
stupilo ustroju Korpusa specijalnih jedinica.
I na tom planu su opet do izražaja došle specifičnosti problema svih ostalih
korpusa SVK u odnosu na 11. korpus. Naime, iako je zbog ograničenih moguć-
nosti tzv. rokadnih prometnica u područjima odgovornosti 39., 21., 15. i 7. korpusa,
a s druge strane jasno kanaliziranih mogućih smjerova napada (obrane) bilo potreb-
no upravo tim korpusima osigurati operativnu manevarsku pričuvu, zbog ograniče-
nih ljudskih resursa to nije bilo izvedivo. Zbog toga je na razini SVK ustrojen Korpus
specijalnih jedinica, koji je u svom sastavu imao sljedeće borbene postrojbe:
• 2. gardijska brigada (motorizirana s dijelom snaga na OT)
• 2. oklopna brigada
• 71. specijalna brigada (poglavito topnička i protuoklopna potpora).

Kompletan sastav i zapovjedništvo KSJ su koncem lipnja bili locirani na vježbali-


štu Slunj168 i u završnoj fazi ustroja i popune, ali se taj proces nije odvijao planiranom
dinamikom, kako glede opremanja, tako ni po pitanju osposobljavanja namjenski
organiziranih postrojbi za borbenu uporabu.169
Lociranje postrojbi KSJ obavljeno je tako, da je on prije svega mogao predstav-
ljati operativnu pričuvu 21. i 15. korpusa te strategijsku pričuvu, ili pak udarnu sna-
gu za izvođenje napadajnih djelovanja radi presijecanja teritorija RH na „izabranim
pravcima“.
Upravo činjenica da je izvođenje operacije „Oluja“ počelo prije potpunog formi-
ranja ovog Korpusa, bitno je umanjila mogućnosti učinkovite i svrhovite uporabe
postrojbi ovoga Korpusa, a samim time i cjelokupne SVK.

168 
 MDCDR, 18., AFS snimljen pomoću bespilotne letjelice tijekom mimohoda povodom Vidov-
H
dana (Dan RSK), na kojem je razvidna tehnika iz sastava KSJ.
169 
Obavještajna informacija od 15. srpnja 1995. godine, „Stanje i aktivnosti SVK, VRS i VJ“, MORH,
klasa: 804-08/95-172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1741.

125
4.3. Početak operacije „Oluja“ uvjetovan je aktualnim
stanjem u zapadnim dijelovima BiH
Uza sve prethodno navedene aktivnosti, u tijeku su bila i neprekidna borbena
djelovanja na bojišnici prema zapadnoj Bosni. Međutim, za razliku od jeseni 1994.
godine, ovoga puta su nositelj aktivnosti u napadajnoj operaciji bile postrojbe SVK,
a ne VRS. Nakon ustroja KSJ i njegovog prezentiranja na mimohodu organiziranom
na vježbalištu kod Slunja povodom Dana SVK 28. lipnja,170 gotovo sve je trebalo biti
spremno za početak završne faze te operacije.
U prvoj polovini lipnja 1995. aktivne su bile i bojišnice na području Bosanske
Posavine te na području Dinare i Livanjskog polja. Na području Bosanske Posavine
snage 1. krajiškog korpusa pokušavale su tijekom svibnja i početkom lipnja napadaj-
nim djelovanjima na snage HVO-a ZP-a Orašje proširiti koridor i osigurati sjevernu
stranu koridora. Intenzitet napadajnih djelovanja smanjen je krajem prve dekade lip-
nja, a snage VRS doživjele su još jedan neuspjeh.
Na području Dinare i Livanjskog polja snage HV-a i HVO-a počele su 4. lipnja
1995. napadajnu operaciju „Skok-2“, koja je za cilj imala vezati snage 2. krajiškog
korpusa i tako smanjiti pritisak postrojbi toga korpusa na bihaćkoj bojišnici te ote-
žati možebitno dovođenje svježih snaga na područje koridora. Ujedno, pomicanjem
bojišnice na sjever - sjeverozapad u smjeru Grahova, i na zapad u smjeru Vrlike,171
namjera je bila stvoriti uvjete za izravnu ugrozu Grahova. Operacija je završena do
kraja prve dekade mjeseca lipnja.

4.3.1. P
 lan izvođenja napadajne operacije na 5. korpus A BiH
Završne pripreme za napadajnu operaciju na područje zapadne Bosne trebale su
biti gotove do 10. srpnja 1995. godine, a napadajna operacija trebala je biti izvedena
u tri faze:
1. faza (pripremna, uglavnom realizirana do kraja mjeseca lipnja):
• uz angažiranje snaga NO APZB, čija je zadaća bila uz topničku potporu
39. korpusa SVK zauzeti šire područje Vrnograča i odbaciti snage 5. kor-
pusa A BiH na položaje s kojih neće moći topništvom ugrožavati promet-
nicu Dvor – Glina;
170 
„ Obavještajna informacija za 28. lipnja 1995. godine“, 29. lipnja 1995., MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-
172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1599.
171 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid br. 52 (Prilog na str. 294.).

126
• topničkim djelovanjem snaga 2. krajiškog korpusa po području Bihaća
iscrpljivati snage 5. korpusa A BiH i slabiti moral pučanstva bihaćke en-
klave;

2. faza (odlučujuća)
• uz angažiranje snaga u dodiru s postrojbama 5. korpusa A BiH, napada-
jnim djelovanjima po čitavoj bojišnici vezivati glavninu snaga 5. korpusa
A BiH;
• angažiranjem udarnih manevarskih snaga iz sastava Korpusa specijal-
nih jedinica s područja Slunja, na glavnom smjeru napada prema Cazinu
presjeći snage 5. korpusa A BiH i spojiti se sa snagama 2. krajiškog kor-
pusa VRS;

3. faza (završna)
• na području sjeverno od crte Kordunski Ljeskovac – Cazin – Otoka
(ponovo) uspostaviti tzv. AP ZB;
• razbiti snage 5. korpusa A BiH u okruženju južno od navedene crte te
ostvariti potpuni nadzor nad unskom prugom, širim područjem Bihaća i
zrakoplovnom bazom Željava.

U isto vrijeme snage 5. korpusa A BiH nalaze se u izuzetno nepovoljnom opera-


tivnom položaju, posebno zbog:
• višestruko izražene brojčane nadmoći združenih snaga SVK i VRS u odnosu
na snage 5. korpusa A BiH;
• iscrpljenosti dugotrajnim borbama, koje su posebno intenzivne bile tijekom
razdoblja rujan – studeni 1994. godine;
• trajnog okruženja, uz otežane uvjete logističke potpore, koja je gotovo
prekinuta nakon rušenja helikoptera u kojem se nalazio tadašnjih ministar
vanjskih poslova BiH Irfan Ljubijankić (rušenje se dogodilo u noći 27./28.
svibnja 1995. na području Batnoge);
• razjedinjenosti unutar bošnjačkog (muslimanskog) pučanstva s područja za-
padne Bosne, pri čemu su snage NO APZB kontinuirano angažirane u na-
padajnim djelovanjima na snage 5. korpusa A BiH, na strani postrojbi SVK;
• izgubljenog šireg područja Vrnograča, koje su snage NO APZB, uz potporu
topništva iz sastava 39. korpusa, zauzele do kraja lipnja i prisilile snage 5. ko-
rpusa A BiH da se povuku prema jugu;

127
• stalnog topničkog djelovanja postrojbi iz sastava 2. KK po gradskom području
Bihaća, s ciljem iscrpljivanja snaga, otežavanja zapovijedanja i opskrbe te sla-
bljenja morala pučanstva i pripadnika postrojbi 5. korpusa A BiH.

Zbog organizacijsko-ustrojbenih problema, posebno zbog činjenice da je ustroj


KSJ kasnio, 2. faza operacije nije počela ni do 19. srpnja,172 još uvijek su težišno bile
angažirane snage NO APZB i nije bilo izraženog glavnog smjera napada (topnička
djelovanja i napadajna djelovanja manjih razmjera izvođena su duž cijele bojišnice,
poglavito radi vezivanja snaga 5. korpusa A BiH i njihovog iscrpljivanja).

4.3.2. Grupiranje snaga SVK za napadajnu operaciju


O ozbiljnosti i odlučnosti pristupa operaciji koja bi trebala dovesti do konačnog
zauzimanja područja zapadne Bosne govorilo je i grupiranje snaga za izvođenje na-
padajnih djelovanja.173
Za izvođenje operacije pripremljene su i organizirane sljedeće snage:

1. OG „Pauk“ (približno 10.500 ljudi)174 sastava:


• 3 brigade NO APZB - 4500 ljudi
• ojačanja iz sastava 21. K – 1500 ljudi i ojačanja iz sastava 39. K -2000 ljudi
• policijske snage - 300 ljudi
• dragovoljci iz SRJ i BiH – 600 ljudi.
Zapovjednik: general pukovnik Mile Novaković.
Imala je zadaću s crte Cetingrad – Vrnograč napadati na smjeru prema Pe-
ćigradu.

2. TG „Kordun“ (približno 1500 ljudi), sastava:


• bojna 2. okbr/KSJ
• bojna 2. gardbr/KSJ
• divizijun 71. spec brig/KSJ
• divizijun/21. mad.
172 
“ Obavještajna informacija za 18. srpnja 1995. godine”, 19. srpnja 1995., MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-
172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1777.
173 
„Obavještajna informacija za 20. srpnja 1995. godine“, 21. srpnja 1995., MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-
172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1796.
174 
HMDCDR, 2., kut. 1002/3., „Redovni borbeni izveštaj“ zapovjednika OG „Pauk“ Mile Novakovi-
ća, 2. 8. 1995.

128
Imala je zadaću u drugoj fazi operacije izvesti napad na smjeru Rakovica –
Tržačka Raštela – Cazin, i spajanje sa snagama VRS koje napadaju iz smjera
Bosanske Krupe.

3. TG „Lika“ (približno 1500 ljudi), sastava:


• bojna /2. okbr/KSJ
• bojna(-1)/2. gardbr/KSJ
• mad(-1)/71. specbr/KSJ.
Imala je zadaću u drugoj fazi operacije izvesti napad na smjeru Selište – Ve-
lika Gata, radi spajanja sa snagama VRS.

4. TG „Zapad“ (21. K) (približno 1200 ljudi), sastava:


• 1/13. pbr
• 1/19. pbr
• 2/21. gr. odred
• 21. mad (-1)
Imala je zadaću s crte Cetingrad – Rakovica napadati smjerom Šturlić i
Tržačka Raštela.

5. TG „Jug“ (15. K) (približno 3500 ljudi), sastava:


• 1/50. pbr
• 1/103. lbr
• MUP (200 ljudi)
• dragovoljci (400 ljudi)
• 15. lpbr/2. KK
Imala je zadaću iz područja Željave napadati na smjeru Izačić - Gata.

6. TG „Istok“ (39. K) (približno 1800 ljudi), sastava:


• 1/24. pbr
• 1/33. pbr
• 1/1. lbr/1. KK
• 1/43. mtbr/1. KK
Imala je zadaću s crte Vrnograč - Žirovac - Ivanjska napadati na smjeru pre-
ma Bužimu.

129
7. Snage iz sastava 1. i 2. KK (približno 6000 ljudi)
• pod izravnim zapovijedanjem generala Manojla Milovanovića, s IZM-a u
Jasenici;
• imale su zadaću izbijanja na desnu obalu Une u području od Bosanske
Krupe do Spahića i Grmuše te spajanja sa snagama SVK u području Oto-
ka – Cazin, u drugoj fazi operacije.

4.3.3. Uvjeti i tijek izvođenja napadajne operacije SVK


Do 24. srpnja najvećim su dijelom osigurani uvjeti za početak 2. faze napadaj-
ne operacije,175 koja je podrazumijevala uvođenje glavnih snaga (TG „Kordun“ i TG
„Lika“)176 te intenzivnija napadajna djelovanja postrojbi 1. i 2. krajiškog korpusa na
smjerovima prema Ripaču, Grabežu i Grmuši, odnosno 39. korpusa prema Bužimu.
Tada postaje potpuno jasno da se napadajna operacija na područje zapadne Bo-
sne, iako s određenim kašnjenjem, odvija prema planu te da će predstojeća realizaci-
ja 2. faze, u slučaju da bude uspješna, neminovno dovesti do razbijanja snaga 5. kor-
pusa A BiH i zauzimanja područja zapadne Bosne.
U takvim uvjetima počinju izravne pripreme za poduzimanje napadajne opera-
cije „Oluja“, čije je uspješno izvođenje bilo jedino rješenje za sprječavanje humanitar-
ne katastrofe znatno većih razmjera od one u Srebrenici (BiH).
Na neizbježnost takve katastrofe u slučaju pada zapadne Bosne ukazivalo je slje-
deće:
• dugotrajne borbe radi zauzimanja područja zapadne Bosne rezultirale su
brojnim žrtvama, što bi zasigurno dovelo do masovne odmazde nad pripad-
nicima 5. korpusa A BiH, ali i nad civilnim stanovništvom;
• još u zimu 1994. godine u proglasu generala Manojla Milovanovića ukaziva-
no je na mogućnost civilnih žrtava, ako se pripadnici A BiH ne predaju;
• unutarbošnjački sukob (A BiH – NO APZB) toliko je radikaliziran, a pripad-
nici NO APZB su kolaborirali sa SVK, da bi to bio dodatni motiv (razlog) za
masovne odmazde i nad civilnim pučanstvom;
• značajno veće (površinom) područje nego u slučaju Srebrenice i značajno
veća gustoća naseljenosti pučanstva nedvojbeno bi za posljedicu imale i iz-
175 
„ Obavještajna informacija za 23. srpnja 1995. godine“, 24. srpnja 1995., MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-
172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1807.
176 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid br. 56 (Prilog na str. 295.).

130
ravno proporcionalne razmjere zločina, a posljedice borbenih djelovanja bile
bi zasigurno mnogo veće;
• tijekom napadajnih djelovanja postrojbi 5. korpusa A BiH u smjeru Kulen
Vakufa, u jesen 1994. godine, postrojbe VRS (2. krajiški korpus) i civilno
pučanstvo u područjima borbenih djelovanja pretrpjeli su značajne gubitke i
žrtve, što bi zasigurno bio snažan motiv za odmazdu u odnosu na musliman-
sko pučanstvo s područja zapadne Bosne.

4.3.4. Operacija „Ljeto-’95“


Nakon pada Srebrenice i genocida počinjenog nad bošnjačkim pučanstvom, na-
kon neizbježno očekivanog pada Žepe i nejasnih stavova koje je glede zaštite „si-
gurnih zona“ dala Londonska konferencija (21. srpnja), jasno je bilo da je potrebno
spriječiti razbijanje snaga 5. korpusa A BiH i okupaciju područja zapadne Bosne od
strane SVK-VRS snaga.
Kašnjenje početka 2. faze napadajne operacije na područje zapadne Bosne i poziv
bosanskog vodstva upućen RH za vojnu pomoć (22. srpnja 1995. potpisan je Splitski
sporazum između hrvatskog predsjednika Franje Tuđmana i predsjednika BiH Alije
Izetbegovića), omogućio je intenzivno angažiranje snaga HV-a u napadajnoj opera-
ciji na grahovsko-glamočkoj bojišnici, izvedenoj pod kodnim nazivom „Ljeto-’95“.
Već početkom lipnja 1995. „srpske“ snage (i politika) imale su mogućnost izbora
glede prioriteta angažiranja vlastitih snaga i definiranja značaja ciljeva. Naime, jasno
je bilo da su na zapadu BiH kritična dva područja, Cazinska krajina i Dinara - Gra-
hovo, a s bosanske strane na tim bojišnicama bile su angažirane snage jednog od
brojčano manjih korpusa VRS – 2. krajiškog korpusa.
Očito je odluka bila da je osvajanje područja Cazinske krajine prioritetna zadaća,
iako se to s vojnog gledišta može smatrati dvojbenom odlukom, s obzirom na stanje
kakvo je bilo na području Dinare i Livanjskog polja i na koje je još u svibnju ukazivao
zapovjednik 2. krajiškog korpusa. Po svemu sudeći, „srpska“ (velikosrpska) je politika
smatrala, da je osvajanje teritorija na području BiH još uvijek prioritet, na što je uka-
zivala i činjenica da su se diljem BiH odvijale napadajne operacije koje su za cilj imale
zauzimanje bošnjačkih (i hrvatskih) enklava, uglavnom „zaštićenih područja“.177
U takvim uvjetima logično je bilo poduzeti napadajnu operaciju radi zauzimanja
područja Grahova, a očekivani ishodi bili su u svakom slučaju nepovoljni za VRS i
SVK:
177 
„ Obavještajna informacija za 16. srpnja 1995. godine“, 17. srpnja 1995., MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-
172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1743.

131
• napad na snage 2. krajiškog korpusa i borbene skupine iz sastava SVK morao
bi dovesti do odustajanja od napada na područje Cazinske krajine, radi
angažiranja snaga za obranu Grahova i zaleđa Knina, čime se sprječava osva-
janje područja Cazinske krajine;
• inzistiranje na realizaciji druge faze napadajne operacije na Cazinsku kra-
jinu dovodi snage 2. krajiškog korpusa koje izvode obranu Grahova i zaleđa
Knina na području Dinare u vrlo tešku situaciju, jer nemaju nikakve pričuve
koja bi mogla zamijeniti već iscrpljeno ljudstvo angažiranih brigada. Na taj
način nudi se opcija odsijecanja Knina i oslobađanja okupiranih područja.

Operacija „Ljeto-’95“ počela je 25. srpnja. Ne ulazeći u detalje operacije, koja je


izvođena u uvjetima vrlo dobro uređene i organizirane obrane, obrana postrojbi 2.
krajiškog korpusa probijena je 28. srpnja pred Grahovom178 i dan kasnije pred Gla-
močem. Do 30. srpnja snage 2. korpusa povukle su se s Glamočkog polja i s južnog
dijela Grahovskog polja.179

Stanje na bojišnici za Cazinsku krajinu


Narastanje opasnosti od ugroze Knina iz smjera Grahova i Dinare konačno je
dovelo do toga da GŠ SVK odluči dio snaga koje su sudjelovale u drugoj fazi opera-
cije na Cazinsku krajinu prebaciti kao ojačanje snagama razbijenog 2. krajiškog i 7.
(kninskog) korpusa. Tako je 2. gardbr KSJ prebačena na područje sjeverne Dalmaci-
je i pridodana kao potpora 7. korpusu SVK radi zaustavljanja prodora snaga HV-a i
HVO-a na smjeru prema Strmici i Kninu. To je za posljedicu imalo slabljenje udara
potrebnog za izvršenje proboja na glavnom smjeru napada prema Cazinu, što dovo-
di do postupnog slabljenja intenziteta ukupnih djelovanja u napadajnoj operaciji na
zapadnu Bosnu.
Uočavajući da otvoreni nastavak napadajnih djelovanja na područje zapadne Bo-
sne postupno radikalizira stav međunarodne zajednice, da vjerojatno neće biti ostva-
rena postavljena zadaća, a da s druge strane prijeti napad HV-a prema Kninu i Gra-
čacu, te na smjerovima koji izvode prema Izačiću i Cazinskoj krajini, vodstvo „RSK“
(Martić i Mrkšić) sastaje se 30. srpnja sa specijalnim izaslanikom glavnog tajnika
UN-a za bivšu Jugoslaviju, Yasushijem Akashijem. Na njegov nagovor „pristaju“ na
prekid daljnjih napadajnih djelovanja na Cazinsku krajinu.
178 
„ Obavještajna informacija za 29. srpnja 1995. godine“, 30. srpnja 1995., MORH, klasa: 804-08/95-
172/02, Ur. br.: 512-06-06/1-95-1872.
179 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Zemljo-
vid br. 57 (Prilog na str. 296.).

132
Manji dio snaga je stvarno povučen s bojišnice prema Cazinskoj krajini i upućen
na bojišnicu prema snagama HV-a, ali pritisak na postrojbe 5. korpusa A BiH pre-
staje tek nakon početka operacije „Oluja“ (4. kolovoza 1995. godine), a napadajna
djelovanja postrojbi SVK i VRS te NO APZB na područje zapadne Bosne trajala su
sve do tada. O tome svjedoče i sljedeći podaci:
• GŠ SVK upućuje 1. kolovoza zapovijed 39. korpusu da prema zahtjevu
zapovjedništva OG „Pauk“, a radi prikrivanja topničke potpore koju SVK da-
je u borbenim djelovanjima koja izvodi OG „Pauk“, premjesti jednu bitnicu
haubica 122 mm na teritorij zapadne Bosne, prema odluci zapovjednika OG
„Pauk;180
• Zapovjedništvo OG „Pauk“ uputilo je 2. kolovoza „redovni borbeni izvještaj“
zapovjedniku GŠ SVK, u kojem ga izvješćuje o borbenim djelovanjima ti-
jekom dana;181
• Obavještajni odjel 1. krajiškog korpusa VRS uputio je 3. kolovoza
„obavještajni izvještaj“ Obavještajnoj upravi GŠ SVK i obavještajnim odje-
lima u zapovjedništvima korpusa SVK, u kojem se konstatira stanje na
bojišnici prema 5. korpusu A BiH, gdje se „svakodnevno vode borbe i svaki
dan ima poginulih boraca 5. K“, koji se „nadaju skoroj akciji HV i deblokadi
Cazinske krajine jer je pitanje vremena koliko mogu pružati otpor“;182
• novoformirana 15. „laka brigada“ iz sastava 15. „ličkog“ korpusa SVK (do-
micilna na području Gornji Lapac – Srb) raspoređena je na području Balje-
vac – Ličko Petrovo Selo, i prema izvješću Odsjeka sigurnosti Zapovjedništva
15. korpusa najvećim dijelom je popunjena obveznicima koji su dovedeni s
područja Srbije;183
• Zapovjedništvo OG „Pauk“ izvješćuje 4. kolovoza 1995. godine, nakon
početka napadajne operacije „Oluja“, da „snage čvrsto drže prednji kraj“ te
da ima prebjega „na slobodni teritorij Republike zapadne Bosne“184.

180 
 MDCDR, 2., kut. 1002/3, „Naređenje 39. K na ličnost komandanta/Komandi ‘Pauk’“, 1. 8. 1995.
H
181 
HMDCDR, 2., kut. 1002/3, „Redovni borbeni izveštaj“ zapovjednika OG „Pauk“, 2. 8. 1995.
182 
HMDCDR, 18., “Obavještajni izvještaj sa stanjem do 17.00 časova“, 3. 8. 1995.
183 
HMDCDR, 2., kut. 4118, Izvješće Odsjeka sigurnosti 15. korpusa, 2. 8. 1995.
184 
HMDCDR, 2., kut. 1002/3, „Redovni borbeni izveštaj“ Komande „Pauk“, 4. 8. 1995.

133
4.4. Ostali čimbenici koji su utjecali na izbor vremena početka i
načina izvedbe operacije „Oluja“
Iz prethodno navedenih podataka i konstatacija razvidno je kakvu i koliku opa-
snost je glede sigurnosti i perspektive opstanka i razvoja Republike Hrvatske pred-
stavljalo zadržavanje statusa quo te kako su tu opasnost dodatno potencirale aktivno-
sti SVK (i VRS) koje su bile u tijeku neposredno pred operaciju „Oluja“. Nedvojbeno
je da bi daljnje uspješno realiziranje svih tih aktivnosti bitno popravilo strateški po-
ložaj „RSK“ glede obrane (produženja okupacije) „zapadnih teritorija“, a oslabilo po-
ložaj RH, te dovelo do nove humanitarne krize velikih razmjera.
Niz drugih okolnosti također je uvjetovao izbor vremena početka operacije
„Oluja“:

Splitski sporazum – potpisivanje Splitskog sporazuma sigurno je jedan od


značajnijih događaja na političkom planu, koji je na vojnom planu omogućio prom-
jenu odnosa snaga, koja je bila od strategijskog značaja glede definiranja gravitaci-
jskog središta operacije „Oluja“. Međutim, značaj tog sporazuma dolazi do izražaja u
svojoj punini tek kada se sagledaju i vojne aktivnosti koje su na području BiH slijedi-
le nakon operacije „Oluja“. Radi se o operacijama HV-a i HVO-a „Maestral“ i „Južni
potez“, koje su na strategijskoj razini doprinijele sklapanju Daytonskog sporazuma,
odnosno porazu politike koja je vojnim sredstvima željela ostvariti ideju o svim Srbi-
ma u jednoj državi. I nadalje, tek je vojni poraz preostalih srpskih snaga u BiH doveo
do završetka rata i mirne reintegracije UNPA sektora Istok u sastav RH. Napadajne
operacije „Maestral“ i „Južni potez“ odvijale su se sinkronizirano s napadajnim oper-
acijama A BiH, a tijekom posljednjeg tjedna operacije „Južni potez“ istovremeno su
izvođeni i intenzivni zračni napadi NATO snaga na objekte i instalacije VRS.

Aktivne bojišnice na području BiH - u isto vrijeme (ljeto ‘95. godine) bile su
vrlo aktivne brojne bojišnice na području BiH, kao što su:
• područje Posavine (koridor) gdje napadajna djelovanja izvode snage VRS;
• područje Sarajeva, gdje je 15. lipnja počela ofenziva snaga A BiH, kao pokušaj
proboja blokade i spajanja snaga 1. korpusa A BiH sa snagama 7. korpusa A
BiH i gdje je prijetila opasnost da operacija ne uspije ako se vrijeme izvođenja
značajnije produži (napad su izvodile poglavito snage koje su se nalazile u
okruženju), što se i dogodilo;
• područje Majevice i Ozrena, gdje su napadajna djelovanja izvodile snage
VRS, nakon prethodne ofenzive snaga A BiH;

134
• područje livanjsko - kupreške i grahovsko - glamočke bojišnice;
• Srebrenica i Žepa;
• područje Goražde – Rogatica.

U djelovanjima na tim i drugim bojišnicama bila je vezana glavnina snaga


VRS, a na grahovsko – glamočkoj i dio snaga 11. i 7. korpusa SVK, koje su kao oja-
čanja dovedene na to područje. Eventualni manevar snaga VRS svodio se na pre-
bacivanje jedne do dvije bojne, poglavito iz 1. krajiškog korpusa, s jedne na drugu
bojišnicu u području odgovornosti toga korpusa, zavisno od stanja na pojedinoj
bojišnici.

Otežane mogućnosti dovođenja ojačanja - u takvim okolnostima je prosuđi-


vano kako bi se vrijeme možebitnog uvođenja operativne, a osobito strategijske pri-
čuve na smjerovima prema Kordunu, Lici i sjevernoj Dalmaciji produžilo s 36 sati
u „normalnim“ okolnostima, na minimalno 48 do 60 sati. Naime, značajnija ojača-
nja iz sastava VRS, za čije dovođenje bi trebalo manje od 36 sati, gotovo da su bila
isključena, jer se radilo o postrojbama koje bi trebalo izvući iz borbenih djelovanja
(uglavnom u pojasu odgovornosti Istočnobosanskog korpusa VRS) te je bilo ne-
moguće odmah ih uvesti u borbu i to u izvođenje napadajnih (protunapadajnih)
djelovanja.
Dovođenje ojačanja iz sastava VJ (s područja SRJ) bilo je još upitnije, osim na
područje istočne Slavonije i Srijema, gdje su ona mogla biti uvedena i u vremenu
kraćem od 12 sati, ali se tu radilo o njihovom dovođenju radi izvođenja napadajnih
djelovanja na dobro organiziranu obranu, što je smanjivalo vjerojatnost angažiranja
VJ zbog negativnih političkih implikacija takvog čina na SRJ.
Što brže izbijanje na granicu s BiH, na glavnim smjerovima napada koji su se po-
klapali s glavnim prometnim pravcima prema BiH, bio je jedan od uvjeta uspješnog
izvođenja operacije „Oluja“, jer se na taj način sprječavalo uvođenje ojačanja, ako bi
ih se uopće i pokušalo dovesti.
Treba napomenuti da je operacija „Oluja“ bila dio strategijske operacije, u okvi-
ru koje su se, osim napadajnih djelovanja na području sektora Sjever i Jug, izvodile i
obrambene operacije na bojišnici prema sektoru Istok i na području Južnog bojišta.
Gardijske brigade HV-a predstavljale su udarnu snagu u tim djelovanjima, pri če-
mu je pet gardijskih brigada (1., 2., 4., 7. i 9.) bilo angažirano u napadajnoj operaciji
„Oluja“, dok su dvije (3. i 5.) sudjelovale u organizaciji obrambene operacije na po-
dručju istočne Slavonije i Srijema.

135
Nejedinstvo u političkom vrhu „RSK“ - ne manje značajna je i činjenica, da su
u to vrijeme do izražaja došla razmimoilaženja u stavovima vodstva iz istočnog dijela
„RSK“ i vodstva „RSK“ koje je poglavito bilo iz zapadnog dijela „RSK“, a koja su se
odnosila na problematiku „ujedinjenja“ s RS. U vezi s tim ne smije se zanemariti ni
činjenica da je srpsko pučanstvo iz istočnog dijela „RSK“ sve više osjećalo odbojnost
prema „krajišnicima“ iz zapadnog dijela „RSK“, na čije područje su stalno morali sla-
ti pomoć i ojačanja.

Neobjektivne prosudbe vojnog vodstva „RSK“ - u prosudbi operativnog polo-


žaja ukupnih „srpskih“ snaga trebalo je u obzir uzeti i analize Zapovjedništva SVK.
Odluke toga Zapovjedništva ukazuju na činjenicu kako je GŠ SVK prosuđivao da
postoji mogućnost napadajne operacije HV-a radi oslobađanja „zapadnih dijelova
RSK“, ali nije nalazio pravi odgovor na takvu mogućnost, i to iz dva bitna razloga:
• „odmazda“ je smatrana dovoljnim čimbenikom odvraćanja
• borbene mogućnosti HV-a su prosuđivane uz veliku dozu podcjenjivanja.

Zapovijed 11. korpusu o izvođenju stalnih pokreta snaga, radi vezivanja što zna-
čajnijih snaga HV-a na tom dijelu bojišnice i smanjivanja pritiska na području Bano-
vine, Korduna i Like, jedna je od odluka koja ilustrira prvu tvrdnju.
O neobjektivnom prosuđivanju protivnika, koje je primjetno kroz cijelo vrijeme
okupacije, a osobito od vremena pojave „strategije realne prijetnje“ (izjave generala
Radinovića) pa sve do početka operacije „Oluja“, dovoljno govori sadržaj „Odluke za
daljnja djelovanja, naređenja“ koju je 2. kolovoza 1995. godine izdao zapovjednik GŠ
SVK general pukovnik Mile Mrkšić.185
Iako se radi o vremenu kada se slijedom praćenja aktivnosti HV-a može zaklju-
čiti kako je vjerojatnost poduzimanja napadajne operacije vrlo velika, GŠ SVK piše
„Odluku“ koja je puna nepotrebnih formalnosti i demagoških fraza, u kojoj se po-
dcjenjivački, između ostaloga, tvrdi i kako su „ustaše u napad kretale samo ako su
vojnici (misli se na vojnike SVK) uplašeni od artiljerijske vatre napustili svoje polo-
žaje bez borbe“.

Mogućnost uporabe operativnih smjerova s područja BiH - kao dodatan zna-


čajan čimbenik u prosuđivanju vremena izvođenja operacije „Oluja“ uzeta je u ob-
zir i mogućnost uporabe operativnog smjera koji iz područja Bosanskog Grahova
vodi prema Kninu, a koji je u slučaju „Oluje“ bio od strategijskog značaja. Naime,
185 
HMDCDR, 2., kut. 1002/2, “Odluka za dalja dejstva, naređenje”, 2. 8. 1995.

136
još krajem 1993. godine, nakon izrade prve idejne zamisli za izvođenje napadajne
operacije, analizom borbenih djelovanja za oslobađanje Knina u sklopu završnih
operacija tijekom 2. svjetskog rata je utvrđeno, da su dugotrajne borbe za tadaš-
nje oslobađanje Knina rezultirale uspjehom tek nakon uvođenja u napad snaga s
područja BiH. U vezi s tim posebno značajno je bilo pratiti tijek operacija koje su
snage HV-a i HVO-a izvodile na području Livanjskog polja i iza Dinare, jer je tek
izbijanje snaga HV-a u zaleđe Knina omogućilo definiranje gravitacijskog središta
čijim ostvarivanjem će oslobađanje okupiranih područja biti onako učinkovito ka-
kvo je bilo.

Izbor smjerova napada - s obzirom na definiranje gravitacijskog središta opera-


cije „Oluja“, što je predstavljao Knin kao stvarno i simboličko, vojno i političko, ad-
ministrativno i kulturno središte „RSK“, čije oslobađanje je značilo i stvarni i simbo-
lički poraz pobune i raspad tvorevine „RSK“, izabran je glavni smjer napada prema
Kninu. Najveći dio ostalih glavnih smjerova napada izabran je u skladu sa sljedećim
kriterijima:
• što brže izbiti na državnu granicu prema BiH, kako bi se zatvorili prosuđeni
smjerovi za možebitna uvođenja ojačanja i pričuvnih snaga s područja BiH;
• osigurati što brži proboj blokade (okruženja) u kojem su se nalazile snage 5.
korpusa A BiH i omogućiti pružanje (logističke) potpore tim snagama;
• međusobno prostorno odvojiti pojedine (regionalne) dijelove tzv. „prostor-
nog strategijskog središta“ „RSK“, kako bi se onemogućio manevar snagama
strategijske pričuve (KSJ) te oslabili svi aspekti koordinacije (dezorganizacija
sustava obrane);
• povoljne geografske značajke pojedinog operativnog smjera (kapacitet) i
značajke sustava obrane protivnika na tom smjeru, kako bi se osiguralo
izvođenje operacije uz što manje gubitke.

U odnosu na prethodno navedene kriterije donekle je specifičan smjer koji je s


područja Velebita vodio prema Svetom Roku, odnosno Gračacu i Metku, na kojem
su napad izvodile postrojbe Specijalne policije MUP-a. Naime, kako se radi o pri-
rodnom smjeru koji iz područja Gospića izvodi prema Gračacu i dalje prema granici
BiH, odnosno prema Kninu, vrlo značajnom u funkciji odsijecanja okupiranog pod-
ručja sjeverne Dalmacije od ostalih dijelova okupiranih područja, na tom području
su obranu izvodile snage 9. mtbr/15. K, jedne od najjačih brigada iz sastava SVK, u
čijem pojasu obrane je bilo angažirano približno 2000 ljudi.

137
U uvjetima dobro organizirane obrane, napad na smjeru od Gospića prema Gra-
čacu ne bi jamčio brzi prodor u smjeru granice, pa je odlučeno da se napad izvede
u lijevi bok obrane 9. mtbr. Takav napad bio je moguć samo uz uporabu snaga obu-
čenih za borbena djelovanja na teško prohodnom planinskom zemljištu specifičnih
kraških karakteristika.
S druge strane, značajke zemljišta onemogućavale su možebitni brzi manevar
snaga 9. mtbr radi organiziranja obrane na bočnom smjeru, kao i brzo dovođenje
ojačanja s razine SVK (15. korpus nije imao odgovarajuće operativne pričuve, jer su
značajne snage korpusa bile angažirane na bojišnicama u ili prema BiH – 15. lbr pre-
ma Bihaću, a dijelovi 103. prema Strmici i Grahovu).

Vjesnik, 7. kolovoza 1995.

138
Umjesto zaključka
Reintegraciju okupiranih područja RH očito nije bilo moguće ostvariti mirnim
putem. Zbog toga je poduzeta operacija „Oluja“ u kojoj je oslobođen najveći dio tada
okupiranih područja RH. S druge strane, operacija „Oluja“ je rezultirala izbijanjem
HV-a na državnu granicu prema BiH, čime je bila osigurana povoljna operativna
osnovica za operacije koje su kasnije vođene na području BiH, a koje su dovele do
završetka rata. Naime, tek je vojni poraz srpskih snaga u BiH stvorio uvjete za pri-
mjenu mirovnog plana Kontaktne skupine, koji je oživotvoren Daytonskim spora-
zumom.
U sklopu navedenog postignut je i sporazum o mirnoj reintegraciji UNPA sekto-
ra Istok u sastav RH te je uspostavljena misija UNTAES-a (United Nations Transiti-
onal Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium) koja je reintegra-
ciju uspješno i provela.
Završetak rata ujedno je bio i početak razdoblja gradnje sigurnosti, stabilnosti i
međusobnog povjerenja među ljudima, narodima, etničkim skupinama i državama
na prostorima koji su bili zahvaćeni ratom, čime su stvorene temeljne pretpostavke
za početak rješavanja složenih problema povratka izbjeglica i prognanika.

Vjesnik, 9. kolovoza 1995.

139
Novi list, 31. siječnja 1995.

140
Novi list, 1. veljače 1995.

141
POPIS PUBLIKACIJA I DOKUMENATA KOJI SU
KORIŠTENI TIJEKOM IZRADE I NA KOJE SE REFERIRA
U TEKSTU EKSPERTIZE
Objavljene publikacije
1. Miroslav Brandt i dr., Izvori velikosrpske agresije (str. 328), August Cesarec,
Zagreb, 1991.
2. Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, Politika, Beograd, 1993. (str. 75, 78,
84, 87, 90, 91, 93-96, 104, 106, 127, 134, 135, 150).
3. „Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-
1995, Volume I”, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, May 2002,
(zemljovidi „J“, „L“ i „D“, te zemljovidi br. 24, 37, 38, 39, 40, 48, 49, 52, 55, 56,
57 i 62).
4. “Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-
1995, Volume II”, Central Intelligence Agency, October 2003 (stranice 207-
208, 251, 297, 393, 547).
5. Radovan Radinović, „Realna pretnja na delu“, Vojska Krajine, broj 4-5/93.
6. David OWEN, Balkanska Odiseja, Zagreb, 1998. (str. 106, 107).

Dokumenti kreirani u Obavještajnoj upravi GSHV-a (kopije dokumenata nalaze


se u privitku izvornog teksta Ekspertize, te u bazi skeniranog gradiva Hrvatskog me-
morijalno-dokumentacijskog centra Domovinskog rata, a izvorni dokumenti nalaze
se u pismohrani MORH-a)
1. Prosudba stanja, mogućnosti i namjera neprijatelja, 7. studenoga 1993.
2. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 14. do 21. veljače 1994.,
21. veljače 1994.
3. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 4. do 11. travnja 1994.,
12. travnja 1994.
4. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 22. do 29. svibnja 1995.,
31. svibnja 1995.
5. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 16. do 23. svibnja 1994.,
23. svibnja 1994.
6. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 31. siječnja do 7. veljače
1994., 7. veljače 1994.
7. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 7. do 14. veljače 1994.,
14. veljače 1994.

142
8. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 14. do 21. lipnja 1995.,
21. lipnja 1995.
9. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 7. do 14. lipnja 1995.,
16. lipnja 1995.
10. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 30. svibnja do 6. lipnja
1995., 7. lipnja 1995.
11. Obavještajna informacija za 5. srpnja 1995., 6. srpnja 1995.
12. Informacija o ojačanjima u tenkovima pristiglim na područje sektora „Istok“,
7. veljače 1994.
13. Informacija broj 512-06-06/1-93-3067, 24. rujna 1993.
14. Pokazatelji i značajke potpore SRJ prema „RSK“, 30. ožujka 1995.
15. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 3. do 10. listopada
1994., 11. listopada 1994.
16. Podaci o potpori koju VJ pruža SVK, 22. lipnja 1995.
17. Pregled ojačanja upućenih iz VJ u „RSK“ tijekom lipnja 1995. godine, 28.
lipnja 1995.
18. Uzroci i ciljevi preustroja Srpske vojske Krajine, travanj 1994.
19. Izvorišta i bitne značajke vojne strategije RSK – informacija, 11. listopada
1993.
20. Prosudba aktualnih grožnji neprijatelja o odmazdi po gradovima u RH, rujan
1993.
21. Prilog razmatranju Vojne strategije RH - Obavještajna analiza, listopad/
studeni 1993.
22. Obavještajna prosudba mogućeg razvoja događaja na vojno-političkom
planu i moguća ugroza RH u narednom razdoblju, osobito u varijantama
angažiranja HV-a, 26. ožujka 1994.
23. AFS položaja za „Orkan“
24. AFS uređenih obrambenih položaja na prvoj crti.
25. AFS uređenih obrambenih položaja na drugoj crti.
26. AFS posjednutih paljbenih položaja i označena lokacija na zemljovidu.
27. AFS posjednutih paljbenih položaja i označena lokacija na zemljovidu.
28. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 31. svibnja do 6. lipnja
1994., 6. lipnja 1994.

143
29. Raščlamba djelovanja neprijatelja u razdoblju od 15. veljače do 17. ožujka
1994. godine – specifičnosti provođenja Strategije realne prijetnje, 17. ožujka
1994.
30. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 21. do 28. ožujka 1994.,
29. ožujka 1994.
31. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 21. do 28. veljače 1994.,
28. veljače 1994.
32. Obavještajna informacija o tijeku realizacije operacije „Granica-’94“, 13.
ožujka 1994.
33. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 18. do 25. travnja 1994.,
25. travnja 1994.
34. Aktivnosti i namjere snaga SVK i VRS glede snaga 5. korpusa A BiH, 5. rujna
1994.
35. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 24. do 31. listopada
1994., 1. studenoga 1994.
36. Operativni položaj i prosudba namjera snaga VRS i SVK na području Za-
padne Bosne, 13. studenoga 1994.
37. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 15. do 24. studenoga
1994., 25. studenoga 1994.
38. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 18. do 25. srpnja 1994.,
26. srpnja 1994.
39. Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 24. studenoga do 5.
prosinca 1994., 5. prosinca 1994.
40. Operacija zračnih snaga NATO-a na području Zapadne Bosne (23. 11. 1994.),
23. studenoga 1994.
41. Raščlamba obavještajnih podataka o tijeku i rezultatima operacije „Bljesak“
(poglavlje „Ojačanja iz VJ“, str. 8), 10. svibnja 1995.
42. Pripreme za napadnu operaciju združenih snaga SVK i VRS na područje Za-
padne Bosne, 24. lipnja 1995.
43. AFS snimljen pomoću bespilotne letjelice tijekom mimohoda u povodu Vi-
dovdana (Dan SVK), na kojem je razvidna tehnika iz sastava KSJ SVK.
44. Stanje i aktivnosti SVK, VRS i VJ - Obavještajna informacija, 15. srpnja 1995.
45. Obavještajna informacija za 28. lipnja 1995., 29. lipnja 1995.
46. Obavještajna informacija za 18. srpnja 1995., 19. srpnja 1995.

144
47. Obavještajna informacija za 20. srpnja 1995., 21. srpnja 1995.
48. Obavještajna informacija za 23. srpnja 1995., 24. srpnja 1995.
49. Obavještajna informacija za 16. srpnja 1995., 17. srpnja 1995.
50. Obavještajna informacija za 29. srpnja 1995., 30. srpnja 1995.

Dokumenti Glavnog štaba SVK i pojedinih zapovjedništava SVK (preslike doku-


menata nalaze se u privitku izvornog teksta Ekspertize)
1. Podaci za analizu komandnog kadra, Komanda 15. korpusa, 5. 1. 1995.
2. Informacija jedinicama (o govoru generala Mrkšića u Skupštini RSK), Kom-
anda 2. pbr, 3. 6. 1995.
3. Pregled popune jedinica 7. korpusa po ratnoj formaciji, Komanda 7. korpusa,
28. 10. 1994.
4. Organizacija života i rada u 7. korpusu - naređenje, Komanda 7. korpusa, 22.
6. 1994.
5. Informacija podčinjenim jedinicama, Komanda 7. korpusa, 20. 8. 1993. go-
dine
6. Referat po pitanjima borbene gotovosti, Komanda 7. korpusa, 15. 4. 1994. go-
dine
7. Direktiva za djelovanje SVK, GŠ SVK, februar 1995.
8. Naređenje Komande 7. korpusa SVK o prijelazu na novu organizacijsko-for-
macijsku strukturu, 22. 4. 1994.
9. Privremena formacija Komande 7. korpusa, 23. 4. 1994. (primjer za 3. pbr i
92. mtbr).
10. Naređenje Komande 15. korpusa o dozvoljenom prosječnom dnevnom bro-
jnom stanju, 7. 2. 1995.
11. Zaključci iz mobilizacijske procjene, Komanda 7. korpusa, lipanj 1994.
12. Pregled popune jedinica 7. korpusa po ratnoj formaciji, Komanda 7. korpusa,
9. 8. 1994.
13. Komanda 2. krajiškog korpusa, str. pov. broj 3-36 od 16. 2. 1995. godine,
izvješće o sastanku koji je predsjednik RS Radovan Karadžić 15. veljače 1995.
godine organizirao u Grahovu.
14. Komanda 2. krajiškog korpusa, str. pov. broj 701-18 od 27. 2. 1995., dopis
koji je zapovjednik 2. korpusa Radivoje Tomanić uputio u GŠ VRS, izravno
zapovjedniku VRS-a Ratku Mladiću.

145
15. Izvještaj o uzrocima i načinu pada Zapadne Slavonije, Republika Srpska Kra-
jina, Državna komisija za utvrđivanje uzroka i načina pada Zapadne Slavoni-
je, Knin 11. 7. 1995.
16. Informacija o padu Zapadne Slavonije, Glavni štab SVK, Odjeljenje za in-
formiranje, 4. 5. 1995.
17. Redovni dnevni borbeni izvještaj zapovjednika OG „Pauk“, generala pu-
kovnika Mile Novakovića, 2. 8. 1995.
18. Zapovijed zapovjednika GŠ SVK generala Mrkšića od 1. 8. 1995.
19. Izvješće Odsjeka sigurnosti 15. korpusa od 2. 8. 1995.
20. Redovni borbeni izvještaj OG „Pauk“ od 4. 8. 1995.
21. Odluka za daljnja djelovanja, naređenje zapovjednika GŠ SVK od 2. 8. 1995.

146
EXPERT REPORT
By Retired Brigadier General Ivan Pokaz
FOR CASE IT – 06 – 90 – T

“STORM”
− THE RESPONSE TO THE
“STRATEGY OF REAL THREAT”

(Overview and analysis of the military situation


in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the period between 1991 − 1995
in the context of the operation “Storm”)

Zagreb, 2015
INTRODUCTION
The military-police operation ‘Storm’ was planned, prepared and carried out as
a legal, legitimate and justified solution, which in the conditions at the time enabled
the reintegration of occupied areas into the legal system of the Republic of Croatia.
It was apparent fo r many reasons that any further continuation of the status quo
in the area of the Republic of Croatia and in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina as
well, would make elementary functioning and future development of the Repub-
lic of Croatia as a modern European state impossible (it would lead, in col-
loquial jargon – to the ‘cyprusization’ of the Republic of Croatia), and would
intensify the existing and create new instabilities as well as a security, war and
humanitarian crisis and threat to the closer and wider region.
The status quo was based on the fact that parts of the territory of the Republic
of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were forcefully occupied and ethnically
cleansed by the use of military force (aggression by the Yugoslav People’s Army) and
paramilitary forces (rebellion of the local Serb population) in 1991 (in Bosnia and
Herzegovina during 1992) with the intent to cut off this part of the territory from
its mother state and adjoin the same to another state (Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via /SRJ/ or some other ‘designed’ Serb state).
In the process, other parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia were ex-
posed to combat operations all with the intent to render impossible or at least
hamper Croatia in organizing the defense of its territory and thus prevent the real-
ization of goals of the planned policy of the Greater Serbia.
The key role in the planning, organization and realization of the rebellion
of the local Serb population, the aggression against the Republic of Croatia and the
occupation of a part of its territory lay with the Yugoslav People’s Army – JNA. By
itself, this had to result in the use of military means for the realization of the goals
of the aforementioned Greater Serbia policy, and in the open aggression against
the Republic of Croatia with JNA forces from Serbia and from the area of the then
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Already well-known and publicly accessible articles and publications, as for ex-
ample the SANU Memorandum, Slobodan Milošević’s speeches, the book by
Veljko Kadijević, book by Admiral Branko Mamula, articles by General Ra-
dovan Radinović, book by General Milisav Sekulić, therefore the testimonies and
statements of direct participants from the aggressor’s side, which show:

149
• That the rebellion of the local Serb population during 1991
- was planned, enticed and assisted by the then Yugoslav (read: Serb and
Greater Serbian) policy and the JNA,
- carried out as an armed and terrorist act against the Republic of Croatia,
- was a part of the plan (strategy) for the realization of the idea and pol-
icy of the ‘Greater Serbia’;
• That the establishment of the so-called ‘Republic of Serb Krajina’ /RSK/
- was not only a result but a fundamental goal of those policies,
- a necessary step towards the realization of the idea and policy of the
‘Greater Serbia’ in accordance with the motto of those policies – ‘all Serbs
in one state’ which was impossible to accomplish without destroying Cro-
atia, or rather without occupying and separating parts of its territory by
force, or without destroying Bosnia and Herzegovina and occupying the
majority of its territory as well;
• That a so-called ‘Serb Krajina Army’ was formed in the occupied areas of
the Republic of Croatia in order to
- after the JNA would formally withdraw, ensure the ‘defense’ of the estab-
lished ‘borders’ of the ‘RSK’ or rather the ‘western borders of the Greater
Serbia’ and
- its formation as well as maintenance (financing, replenishment, devel-
opment, equipping training and activity) would not be possible without
the overall and continued support by the SRJ and the Yugoslav Army /
VJ/;
• That the so-called ‘RSK’ with their military, material, economic, human and
other resources, despite all sorts of support from the SRJ (VJ) could not en-
sure efficient execution of the mission (breaking off the occupied areas) and
therefore the ‘strategy of reprisal’ or the ‘strategy of real threat’ was de-
vised which was designed to, as its creators openly stated, drive the Republic
of Croatia into ‘long and agonizing death’;
• That the ‘strategy of reprisal’ was designed to deter the Republic of Croatia
from any type of attempt to use military means to liberate and reintegrate
its then occupied areas, under the threat of inflicting ‘unacceptable losses’ by
using artillery-rocket systems on towns and other non-military facilities (ci-
vilian targets).

150
In these types of conditions either the efforts of the Republic of Croatia or the
international community were no longer showing any signs of the possibility of re-
integrating the then occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia into its state and legal
system in a peaceful manner, and especially not in the near or reasonably accept-
able period of time. With respect to the same it became apparent:
• That even the UNPROFOR mandate as it was defined and with the means
and methods by which it was supposed to be realized, was going to provide
any guarantee that the reintegration of occupied areas of the Republic of Cro-
atia was going to be carried out successfully, while even the basic presump-
tions for the same didn’t exist as for example:
- demilitarization of the UNPA areas,
- return of refugees to the UNPA areas,
- establishment of Croatian government in the so-called ‘pink’ zones,
- prevention of combat operations from the occupied areas of the Repub-
lic of Croatia toward western Bosnia and towns in the free part of the
Republic of Croatia;
• That the situation in the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia was very
strongly conditioned by the situation in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina
given the area of the Serb Republic was:
- providing the necessary operational depth for an efficient defense of the
occupied areas,
- enabling linking (traffic, territorial, political, economical, national) of
‘Serb countries’ in the absence of which the realization of the idea of the
‘Greater Serbia’ would not be possible,
- one of the factors on which the implementation of the ‘strategy of real
threat’ was based.

After nearly five years of occupation of a part of the Croatian state territory, by
operation ‘Storm’ the major part of that area was liberated and its integration
into the state and legal system of the Republic of Croatia was made possible.
However, it is especially important to note that it was the military operations
that were carried out in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the participation
of the Croatian Army /HV/, Croatian Defense Council /HVO/ and the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina /A BiH/ which either preceded operation ‘Storm’ or were
its logical continuation, that ensured the conditions for the end of the war in Bosnia

151
and Herzegovina and the defeat of the policy that threatened to cause a permanent
destabilization of the region.
In the end it enabled:
• the peaceful reintegration of the then UNPA Sector ‘East’ into the state and
legal system of the Republic of Croatia,
• removing the danger of a potential military or terrorist threat from the bor-
der areas of the Republic of Croatia and
• the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the formation of the Day-
ton Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Without going into the clarifications of other (relevant) contexts in which op-
eration ‘Storm’ was being carried out, as for example political, national, religious,
regional, diplomatic, geo-strategic, historic etc., and by reviewing mainly the mili-
tary dimension (military aspects of the causes, reasons, conditions of implementa-
tion and achievements) this expert report shows:
• that the military-police operation ‘Storm’ was a regular and legitimate mili-
tary operation, with long-term planning and preparations1 and finally it
was carried out with the aim of liberating and integrating the then occupied
areas of the Republic of Croatia into its state and legal system, with the use of
military means, while earlier efforts by the Republic of Croatia and the inter-
national community to achieve the reintegration through political means and
in a peaceful manner was not accomplishing the expected and desired results;
• that the possibility of a military liberation of the occupied areas of the
Republic of Croatia was prepared from the very beginning of the aggres-
sion against the Republic of Croatia, as an alternative if all other activities
conducted for the purpose of reintegrating the then occupied areas of the Re-
public of Croatia in a peaceful manner and through political means, would
not provide the desired results in a reasonable period of time, and they were
particularly actualized and intensified after the emergence of the ‘strategy of
real threat’;
• that the time and the manner of carrying out operation ‘Storm’ were con-
ditioned by the development of the general situation in the wider and closer
environment of the Republic of Croatia and particularly by the military situ-
ation in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina and mainly in the area of
Bihać and Grahovo.
1 
Referat /Report/, Staff Brigadier Obradović, Zagreb, 19 September 1995.

152
The contents of the expert report are divided in four chapters:

• The first chapter points to the genesis of the (armed) rebellion of the Serb
ethnic population in Croatia directed against the creation of an independent
state of Croatia and for the purpose of realizing the idea of the ‘Greater Ser-
bia’;
• It explains the role of the JNA who was a determining factor for this kind
of development of events, as well as the fact that the previous, at least for-
mally Yugoslav army transformed into the Serb army;
• It points to the connection between the idea and the policy of the ‘Greater
Serbia’ and the realization of the same policy through the creation, func-
tioning and sustention of the ‘Republic of Serb Krajina’ and its ‘army’ as a
unified part of ‘Serb territories’ or rather ‘Serb armies’.

• The second chapter explains the importance of announcing the ‘strategy of


real threat’ as a lever and as an attempt to permanently maintain the status of
occupation:
• The focus of the first part of this chapter is on the explanation of the the-
oretical-doctrinal significance of the adoption and implementation of the
strategy of real threat;
• The second part presents the genesis of the inception of the ideological
concept of operation ‘Storm’ as the only possible answer to the strategy of
real threat;
• The third part explains the situation, activities and intentions of the en-
emy in the period from the adoption of the ‘strategy of real threat’ to
operation ‘Storm’, in order to demonstrate that this strategy was imple-
mented in practice and that the liberation of the then occupied areas of
the Republic of Croatia and their reintegration was not possible without
a military operation.

• The third chapter explains that the implementation of the UNPROFOR


mandate was not able to provide any guarantee that the reintegration of the
occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia was going to be conducted in a
peaceful manner, mainly due to the lack of cooperation from the Serb side,
but also due to the indecisiveness of certain parts of the UNPROFOR contin-
gent to compel the Serb ‘side’ to a cooperative attitude.

153
• Aside from the importance of the activities the SVK had carried out in the
period of time after operation ‘Flash’, the fourth chapter also explains the
significance and the influence the situation and activities of the warring par-
ties in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina had on the final planning and
carrying out of operation ‘Storm’. It points out that operation ‘Storm’, even
though it had a decisive role in the liberation of the then occupied areas of
the Republic of Croatia, was also part of the overall military activities, includ-
ing the ones which preceded it and the ones that followed, and were realized
by forces of the HVO, HV and A BiH in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which led to the final ending of war activities in the area of the Republic of
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the end to a defeat of the policy
which threatened the (long)lasting destabilization of the area of southeastern
Europe.

154
1.

AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF


CROATIA – THE ATTEMPT TO REALIZE
THE IDEA OF THE ‘GREATER SERBIA’

Introduction
On 28 June 1989 on the occasion of the celebration of the 600th anniversary of
the Battle of Kosovo, on Gazimestan, not far from Priština, a big gathering was orga-
nized where Slobodan Milošević delivered a speech saying among other things the
following:
Today, six centuries later, we again find ourselves in battles and before bat-
tles. They are not armed battles, even thought the same are not excluded yet.
However, regardless of what kind they are, battles cannot be won without deter-
mination, courage and sacrifice.
Thus, only three years after the publication of the ‘Memorandum of the Ser-
bian Academy of Sciences and Arts’ which revived and actualized the 19th century-
born idea of the ‘Greater Serbia’, Milošević openly spoke about a time before the
battle, in which he didn’t exclude the possibility of armed battle.
These are battles which in accordance with the idea of the ‘Greater Serbia’
and as a result of the assertion that Serbs are historically, ethnologically and an-
thropogeographically the most valuable population and the core of the Balkan penin-
sula and thus have the right to include in its state every country where there are Serbs
and naturally, rule them2 (tr. remark: free translation) and in accordance with the
2 
Stanko Žuljević, Izvori velikosrpske agresije, pg. 328.

155
hypothesis of the Memorandum that the Serb nation was robbed after World War II
and every Serb outside Serbia in other federal parts of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia /SFRJ/ was in danger (tr. remark: free translation) were undertaken in
order to vivify the mentioned slogan of ‘all Serbs in one state’.
This was the time when the break of the SFRJ was already foreseeable and de-
clared as the only ‘cohesive’ factor of the unified SFRJ which could and had to en-
sure the realization of the slogan all Serbs in one state was (it declared itself) the
then Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA).
The mentioned ‘Memorandum’ and the leadership of the then Federal Republic
of Serbia created a basis for the realization of the intent to dominate 2/3 of the area
of the former SFRJ. The party-political leadership of Serbia gradually commenced
the realization of that idea with the assistance of the then federal army – JNA, which
gradually turned into the instrument of the Serb (‘Greater-Serb’) policy.
The idea of the ‘Greater Serbia’ could not have been realized prior to meet-
ing certain conditions. The political leadership of the then Serbia systematically
worked on meeting those conditions:
• Redefining the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Serbia which practi-
cally revoked the status of autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina within Serbia
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which presented the first step towards
the creation of the ‘Greater Serbia’
• Violent suppression of movements and protests of the Kosovo Albanians in
their efforts to achieve autonomy,
• Expansion of Serbia to the territories of the former republics of the SFRJ, par-
ticularly to parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina.

The fall of the SFRJ and the emergence of new states in the area of the for-
mer SFRJ, was interpreted by ideologists and realizers of the idea of the ‘Greater
Serbia’ as a direct threat to Serb national interests therefore this threat had to be
prevented even by armed force – by the use of the then JNA.
Thus, on the incentive and with the support of the SRJ and the direct engage-
ment of the JNA a significant number of the Serb population in the Republic of
Croatia participated in the aggression against the Republic of Croatia (RH) who
didn’t want Croatia as their state but attempted to break off a part of Croa-
tian territory from the mother country, approximately to the line Virovitica, Kupa
River, Karlovac, Karlobag, and in order to create the ‘Greater Serbia’.

156
The book by General Veljko Kadijević3 ‘Moje Viđenje Raspada’4 testifies ‘exact-
ly’ to this point where among other things the author states the following:
• The principal ideas behind the basic concept for deploying the JNA in the Yugo-
slav region were:
- Total defeat of the Croatian Army, if the situation so allowed, and certainly
to the degree that would enable fulfillment of the set goals;
- Full coordination with Serb insurgents in the Serbian Krajina.
• The idea behind this maneuver embraced the following basic elements:
- A total air and sea blockade of Croatia;
- The directions of offensives of the main forces of the JNA directly connect-
ed to the liberation of Serb regions in Croatia and JNA garrisons deep in-
side Croatian territory. To this end cut Croatia along the following lines:
Gradiška-Virovitica; Bihać-Karlovac-Zagreb; Knin-Zadar; Mostar- Split.
The strongest group of armored mechanized forces would liberate East-
ern Slavonia and then move quickly westward, linking up with forces in
Western Slavonia and proceeding on to Zagreb and Varaždin, i.e. toward
the Slovene frontier. At the same time, strong forces from the Herceg Novi-
Trebinje region would be used to block Dubrovnik from land and break into
the Neretva valley thus linking up operations with forces working along the
Mostar-Split line.
- After the seizure of certain installations, secure and hold the border of the
Serbian Krajina in Croatia, withdraw the remaining troops of the JNA from
Slovenia and subsequently pull the JNA out of Croatia;

However, it is important to note that on page 134, at the end of the third para-
graph, the following is also said very clearly:
...full awareness that the role of the Serb nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
would be instrumental to the future of the Serb nation at large. The location of
JNA forces was to be adjusted accordingly.

3 
 t the time of the fall of Yugoslavia, General Kadijević was carrying out the duty of the Federal
A
Secretary of National Defense which was in fact the duty of the Minister of Defense of the
SFRY.
4 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada – vojska bez države/My view of the Break-Up – A Mili-
tary Without a State/, Politika, Beograd, 1993 (pg 134-135).

157
General Kadijević thus anticipated in a certain way what was going to hap-
pen in the end: the defeat of the Greater-Serbian policy with respect to Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina would have to occur in Bosnia and Herzegovina. More-
over, precisely in accordance with the above stated ‘location’ of the JNA, the Serb
forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina occupied (controlled) over 70 percent of the ter-
ritory of Bosnia in Herzegovina5 until 1994, and only during the joint operations by
the A BiH, HVO and the HV led in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina after
operation ‘Storm’ the conditions were created for a military defeat of the Army of
the Serb Republic (‘VRS’) and following, the defeat of the Greater-Serbian policy.

1.1. T
 ransformation of the JNA to the Serb army – from
the Military ‘without a State’ to the military above the
State
The transformation of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) from the armed force
of ‘all nations and nationalities’, as it was usually referred to in political vocabu-
lary of the time, to the army of one nation or the Serb army6 (which continued
to be used as a concept and title) which occurred during the 1980’s deserves spe-
cial attention.
The need for this special attention arises from the undisputable fact that pre-
cisely the transformation of the JNA to the Serb army was one of the relevant
phenomena of the crisis in the former SFRJ. More precisely, this phenomenon
was actually partly causing and complicating even further the political crisis in the
former state, and it undoubtedly had a key role in imposing the war as the manner
of its ‘resolution’.
What this means is that firstly the threat of using armed force and later the use
of the same with the aim of rendering impossible the realization of legitimate as-
pirations for independence outside the SFRJ, and under the justification of ‘saving
the state’ inevitably led to and resulted in war in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

5 
“ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map “L”.
6 
This of course includes everyone else who for different reasons accepted the slogan of the ‘fight for
Yugoslavia’ even though it was simply a front for unitarian Greater-Serb ambitions.

158
1.1.1. Th
 e position of the JNA in the system of defense and the
Yugoslav society
From several viewpoints the position of the JNA in Yugoslav society was particu-
lar and even unusual with respect to the constitutional determinants of the armed
forces of contemporary states of the second half of the 20th century. Such determi-
nants of its position were starting to be manifested during the 1980’s, therefore
in the time of the intensification and complication of the Yugoslav crisis. The
most important one is that the JNA acted in Yugoslav society as one of the most
important political factors and we could say that in this way all the other specific
characteristics of its position were being demonstrated.
In the constitutional respect, the JNA was identified as a ‘common armed force
of all nations and nationalities’ and as a ‘part of the unified armed forces’ formed
together with the Territorial Defense (TO).
Its role was to ‘protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and
the constitutional social system of the SFRJ’ together with the TO.
Therefore, the task of the JNA, according to the Constitution, comprised of two
parts:
- defense of the country from an outer aggression and
- protection of the constitutional order.7

On the basis of such position in the system, the JNA was politically treated pri-
marily as an ‘important factor of internal stability’ and later, as relations within the
Federation were falling intensively into a crisis, as ‘one of the most important’ inte-
grating factors of the state which in time reached the description of the ‘only
remaining true’ factor of unity and territorial integrity of the country.
An important feature of the position of the JNA can be found in the fact that
there was an ‘Organization of the SKJ /League of Communists/ within the JNA’ as a
part of the SKJ which held the position almost equal to the one of the SK /leagues
of communists/ of the republics and provinces of the former SFRJ. This fact by it-
self enabled it to act in the Yugoslav political stage as a truly independent and even
as a formally independent political factor.

7 
 ere is a basis for the assertion that a constitutional-legal expert report would demonstrate that
Th
these were in fact two sides of one main task, the defense from outer aggression, but this is not the
subject of this report, rather what the usual interpretation of the constitutional definition was.

159
We could say that on the basis of the fact that aside from being the ‘armed force
of all nations and nationalities’ the JNA objectively held the position in the system
as an ‘armed force of the party’ or as a ‘party force’. Understandably, this needs to be
perceived in the ideological-political sense and not the functional sense.
This generated significant negative consequences which manifested most dras-
tically in the political usurpations of the JNA leadership, the most grave being
the transformation of the JNA into the Serb army and the act of provoking and im-
posing war on account of Greater-Serbian policy and under the excuse of ‘saving
Yugoslavia’. The stated usurpations of the political role in the Yugoslav crisis become
particularly apparent when you observe the system of command of the armed
forces of the former state.
One should not forget that standing at the top of the command structure of the
armed forces of the SFRJ was the SFRJ Presidency and the highest collective organ
of command and control. On behalf of the Presidency, by the Constitution, su-
preme command was carried out at a given time by the current President, who
was elected from the members of the Presidency according to the prescribed pro-
cedure for a period of one year. It is no less important that this procedure was insti-
gated after the death of Josip Broz Tito, and later became permanent and the order
of ‘election’ to that duty was already known in advance.
The SFRJ Presidency had the authority to, aside other things, determine the ex-
istence of a direct threat of war, to order a general or partial call-up, and if the SFRJ
Assembly was unable, to proclaim a general state of war and accordingly approve
plans for use and to order the use of armed forces.
It needs to be pointed out that the very combat use of the armed forces, or rather
units and other effectives of the JNA and the TO, was under the exclusive author-
ity of the Presidency and could not have been passed over to lower bodies in the
system of command.
The highest administrative organ and simultaneously the staff organ of the su-
preme command, officially called the ‘Supreme Command Staff ’, was the Federal
Secretariat for the National Defense (SSNO), led by the Federal Secretary, and
also within the SSNO alongside others was the General Staff of the JNA (GŠ
JNA) as the highest staff organ and the operative-planning body of the SSNO.
As such, even though in peacetime it was universally responsible for the concep-
tual and doctrinal issues of the development and preparation of the armed forces
for the country’s defense in the event of an aggression, to which purpose the SFRJ

160
Presidency as the Commander in Chief transferred a series of its authorities to
the same, the SSNO had no authority to bring decisions on the use and command
over the use of JNA troops.
In connection with the second element of the armed forces of the former SFRJ
i.e. the Territorial Defense of the republics and provinces, it is sufficient to mention
that command and control was under the authority of the republics’ and provinces’
presidencies which then had the (republic, provincial) TO Staffs as expert opera-
tive- planning organs, which were in the operational sense subordinated to the JNA
commands of the strategic level, and the supreme command over those forces
as well was understandably achieved by the SFRJ Presidency. The apparent duali-
ties and interweaving in this segment of the system is not relevant for this analysis.
Even though it may not appear so from this concise outline of the highest level
of the system, the system of command of the armed forces in the former state was in
functional terms very complex and subject to blockades, in other words vulnerable.
This entirely fundamental feature arose from the very character of the state and its
social and political system, including the previously described particular position
of the JNA.
Events that occurred in the late 1980’s and the armed conflicts at the beginning
of the 1990’s have demonstrated this fact very realistically.
One should not forget that at the time the JNA leadership almost entirely open-
ly usurped for itself the exclusive right of arbitration in actual political turmoil and
conflicts. Accordingly, it tried to impose its own solutions ‘in the interest of all’,
and on the other hand it obstructed and refused every initiative and attempt of
other types of solutions, up to a less or more openly demonstrated disobedience
and autonomous work or rather the use of the JNA effectives outside its authority,
i.e. illegally.
In this manner it brought itself in a position above the state and by continu-
ously accusing others of attempting the same, it objectively blocked the system of
command at the highest level.
An abundance of material and evidence which confirm this fact is presented in
the already mentioned book by General Veljko Kadijević.
To illustrate the same, the following will be sufficient:
• ...authors of the 1974 Constitution tried to bring about the fall...by constitu-
tional means...of the entire Yugoslav state, but without providing any consti-
tutional means to stop this from happening...The armed forces were placed in

161
a situation where they had to act unconstitutionally...Some of the other major
questions that arose here were: which constitutional order should be protected...
What legitimacy was there for such a move...8;
• The second major dilemma was: would the armed forces carry out their tasks
within the existing legal system...or would it go against that system...if within
the system, how; or rather, if autonomously, how...9;
• ...when it came to planning...and written directives, decisions or orders from
the Supreme Command, we were unable to work the way virtually all armies in
the world do, because any such written document was immediately passed into
enemy hands. We were forced, therefore, to work quite differently.10;
• The author himself stated that it was a matter of ...political issue of the first
order... and asked himself ...where would this really lead considering the do-
mestic and international situation... but as we know he didn’t yield under this
responsibility. Moreover, he emphasized with self-assurance that he would
never follow the example of the Soviet Army, which did not lift a finger and
the USSR collapsed as a state...11

As we can already see on the basis of this partial analysis, the position of the
armed forces in society and the system of command allowed for various deforma-
tions, as a consequence of the possible conflicts between internal political opposites,
and a probable, latent one was precisely the alignment with the unitarian, in fact
Great-Serbian policy, and transformation into the means for the attempt of found-
ing its’ suitable state.
Understandably, its title is less important. In connection with the above, it
hardly needs mention that the national composition of the JNA was the basic
prerequisite, because it is self-explanatory. Looking back from this distance, and es-
pecially, after everything, one could say it was only a question of time and a com-
bination of internal and external circumstances when this was going to happen.
Therefore, we need to examine the course of events of the transformation of the
JNA into the Serb army and how it was demonstrated.

8 
Annex 1-3.
9 
Annex 1-3.
10 
Annex 1-3.
11 
Annex 1-3.

162
1.1.2. Process of transformation of the JNA into the Serb army
The gradual transformation of the JNA to the army of one, or rather unitarian
and Great-Serbian political option, or so to say one nation, needs to be observed as s
process within the framework of an all-round crisis in the former Yugoslav state and
its society, which started to increase rapidly after the death of Josip Broz Tito.
What affected the crisis to quicken and become more complicated during the
1980’s and eventually to flare it up at the end of the same period were certainly the
international circumstances at the time which are not essential to this analysis.
As well as the overall mentioned crisis, the process of the transformation of the
JNA itself can be examined in the manner to differentiate between three general pe-
riods or stages:
- First - from the appearance of the ‘Kosovo issue’ from 1981 to 1987;
- Second - from 1988 to 1990;
- Third - the period of concentrated events from the end of 1990 to the be-
ginning of the open aggression against the Republic of Croatia in
the summer of 1991.

The first period of the transformation


The first period began with the riots breaking out in Kosovo in spring 1981. After
a series of unsuccessful attempts to pacify and normalize the situation, the state lead-
ership very quickly decided to announce a state of emergency and implementation
of measures which this kind of decision, in accordance with the constitution and the
laws at the time, enabled and ordered for. Among these measures, the most signifi-
cant was naturally the use of the JNA. This was the first time the JNA was in fact pre-
sented as an armed force which was not only prepared to ‘protect the constitutional
order and the unity of the country’, but was doing so.
Units of the Priština Corps of the JNA deployed in the Province region were
brought to the level of war formation, and even though this was not formally stated,
they were actively carrying out the role of the main force for the ‘normalization’ of
the situation.
In time, the Corps Command became an ‘institution’ whose information and
evaluation of the situation in Kosovo were perceived as credible and objective i.e. re-
liable and accurate. The JNA leadership was impressed by this fact, and the appear-
ance of the then SSNO Admiral Mamula at the SFRJ Assembly or at other occasions
in Serbia were starting to be used as first-class material and enticement for attack-

163
ing those leaderships in the country which had a different view of the causes, conse-
quences and manners to overcome the crisis in Kosovo.
Soon those political forces which were not interested in normalizing and paci-
fying the situation in the Province as to manipulating the problem with the aim of
imposing a unitarian, Great-Serbian concept of relations in the state, started to gain
power in Serbia.
In this ‘vacuum of authority’ which had occurred after Tito’s death, the JNA lead-
ership started to appear more frequently, less or more publicly, as the adjudicator and
the only ‘impartial observer’ with respect to political issues, feigning ‘political cor-
rectness’ before the state and the society. The ‘Kosovo issue’ was convenient for them
to take on this desired role as very good and strong motive for an increasingly more
open expression of their dissatisfaction with the ‘vacillation of the country’ and par-
ticularly the Serb republic ‘caused’ by the current 1974 Constitution.
In the process, the military leadership pulled the JNA to the side of those forces
in Serbia which by using Kosovo as a motive and an argument, started a political
confrontation with the ‘western republics’ as Slovenia and Croatia were called at the
time, and with the aim of imposing changes to the Constitution in accordance with
the mentioned unitarian and Great-Serbian concept.
This period, among other things, was also marked by the changes in the organi-
zation and the system of command of the JNA on the strategic level, which were im-
posed by the military leadership, and which are still sometimes the subject of dispute
and speculation as to their motives and political background.
What this means is that until then the existing organization of the JNA mostly
corresponded to the areas of the republics and provinces, thus each of them had its
‘own’ army (or armies), which was the designation of the strategic-operative group,
or rather Monte Negro and the provinces had ‘their own’ corps. The military leader-
ship started to asses this as the consequence of the ...the spirit of dismantling all that
was federal, including the army12, in the 1974 Constitution.
As the subject of the ...fiercest attacks by the destroyers of Yugoslavia... as Veljko
Kadijević put it in his book, there was a reorganization in the mid-1980’s, and instead
of the previous six armies, three intermediate zones were formed (strategic groups
– northwest, central and southeast), whose territorial division ignored the borders
of the republics and provinces. Alongside, the staffs of the republican and provincial
Territorial Defense were operationally subordinate to the intermediate commands,
12 
Annex 1-3.

164
which was particularly indicative. According to Kadijević, the aim was to undermine
the republics’ and provinces’ already established control of their territorial defense units
and reduce their already legalized influence on the JNA.13
Therefore, regardless of the attempts during those years (mid 1980’s) to make the
persuasion that reasons of a military, i.e. strategic-operative, nature were the ones
which predominantly caused these changes, there can be no doubt that the true mo-
tive was political, and more precisely, directly unitarian, regardless of how the cre-
ators designated it and even perceived it. V. Kadijević’s assessment that this was the
subject of ‘fiercest attacks’ as well as the fact that the stated changes took place despite
this opposition, and even without the approval of Slovenia, which was a precedent,
portray how the military leadership by involving itself in the political domain, really
did create and exacerbate the Yugoslav crisis.
Understandably, it was no accident that this period was also marked by the ‘ap-
pearance’ i.e. public proclamation of the well-known ‘SANU Memorandum’ by
which the Serb intellectual ‘elite’ presented to the public the ‘problem of the Serb na-
tion in another Yugoslavia’.
This was a truly significant political event in the circumstances at the time, and
we could also say, a political event with long-term political effects. Nevertheless, it
is important and sufficient to state regarding this issue that the appearance of the
‘Memorandum’, unlike many other events of significantly less importance, caused
a very tepid reaction by the JNA. We could almost say that it ‘went by unnoticed’.
This, naturally, confused the opponents, but even more important and encouraging
for the supporters of the ‘Memorandum’ view of the then political and other issues
in the country.
At the end, what also needs to be mentioned is that the very ‘ending’ of this pe-
riod was marked by the establishment of control of the bureaucratic – nationalist
and unitarian powers in the Serb SK /League of Communists/ and the sudden ap-
pearance of Slobodan Milošević on the political stage of the country. What followed
was the period in which the military leadership tried to maintain a public appear-
ance of distancing themselves from Milošević’s policy, while actively supporting it,
not merely by creating conditions and ‘opening room’ for politically corresponding
requests and initiatives but already with simply showing no opposition. We will at-
tempt to demonstrate this more directly in the continuation.

13 
Annex 1-3.

165
The second period of the transformation
The second period (1988 – 1990) as the logical continuation of what preceded
it was marked by intensified political activity of the JNA. The same activity was di-
rected toward imposing and even forcing changes to the Constitution which would,
among other things, enable more secure financing of the JNA and therefore bigger
autonomy in decision-making, but also obstructing and compromising the activities
of those powers in the country which were increasingly more strongly requesting for
democratic change and the establishment of a multi-party system.
Based on the initiatives from Serbia and the JNA in 1988 some of these changes
were introduced in the Constitution of the SFRJ. However, what were the true in-
tentions behind those initiatives can be found in the following assessment by Veljko
Kadijević:
...The only truly positive results came from those amendments which dealt with
the position of the autonomous provinces...and which, through the amend-
ments to the Constitution of the SFRJ enabled the creation of the integral Re-
public of Serbia.14
The factual abolishment of the previous autonomies of the provinces was assessed
by the military leadership as ‘useful’ on the one hand, but on the other hand as a failed
attempt to ‘relatively strengthen the federal state with the introduction of the 1988
amendments.’ The full ambitions at the time are further clarified by Kadijević only
in 1993 when he publicly stated that the ‘military leadership’ even then (1988/1989)
called for rapidly creating a new Yugoslavia from those nations which truly wanted to
live in a common state.
Therefore, this shows that the pretended position of principle: that the army
would not take any political decisions but would take part in preparing all political de-
cisions in whose implementation it was involved15 was merely an empty phrase, and
that even in the time of the 1988 amendments to the Constitution the military, en-
tirely directly even though not publicly took the side of ‘those’ who according to their
judgment ‘wanted to live in a common state’.
The political nature of this decision is quite clear. Since then, the military leader-
ship of the former state definitely usurped itself the right of passing political judg-
ment and labeling in the lines of ‘for or against the state’ thus bringing itself, dissat-
isfied with the current state, to the position of a ‘military without a state’ (Kadijević)
and truly – a military above the state.
14 
Annex 1-3.
15 
Annex 1-3.

166
Parallel with the strong pressures directed toward ‘fixing the country’ to their
own standards, the military leadership conducted a military-expert planning and
preparation for the use of the armed forces in accordance with the current assess-
ments of the domestic and international situation, and for the purpose of creating a
‘new Yugoslavia’. The plans were modified and elaborated depending on the develop-
ment of the situation.
For illustration purposes it is worth mentioning some of the guidelines of the ba-
sic concept of the deployment of the armed forces. Thus Kadijević wrote, that they
planned to take action and engage in activities that would enable the armed forces to
perform their tasks by means of deterrence...
This should be interpreted, among other things, as a ‘demonstration of force’
which in fact resulted in the continuous rising of tensions within the society and in-
stigating ‘war psychoses.
Furthermore, to let the enemy attack first so that the whole world could see who the
real aggressor was and what it wanted.
Only someone very naive could interpret this as a course toward passively wait-
ing, because it is evident, and events have confirmed it, that there truly existed a plan
to provoke conflicts in order to create a motive for an intervention of JNA units.
With respect to the above stated, we also need to analyze the causes of the Serb rebel-
lion against the Republic of Croatia.
And finally, the guideline of the idea, the realization of which was interpreted
very controversially in the public, is the following: paralyze territorial defense in those
parts of the country where it might provide a basis for creating the armies of secession-
ist republics.
Kadijević here continues to write lies that with this aim all territorial defense units
were disarmed and goes on to immediately refute himself by clarifying that they used
the territorial defense of Serb regions in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in tan-
dem with the JNA.16
As was the decision to disarm the territorial defense units brought by the SFRJ
Presidency after tremendous pressures by the JNA leadership, the realization of oth-
er ‘ideas’ of deployment of the armed forces also presumed the persistent effort to
legally legitimize the same. This is why the end of this period was marked with the
effort to provoke in various ways and impose the decision on the proclamation of the
state of emergency in the country, in order to ‘cover up’ the intentions and activities
16 
Annex 1-3.

167
aimed at rendering impossible the instigated democratic changes. The obstacle in
this direction was the absence of a ‘real state’ and a ‘real Commander-in-Chief in the
form of the SFRJ Presidency’, as described by the then JNA leading officer.
For the purpose of removing or at least alleviating this ‘absence’, the military
leadership attempted to put S. Milošević at the duty of the President of the Govern-
ment (SIV – Federal Executive Council) but Milošević and the Serb leadership re-
jected this proposal. However, what is important is that their different appraisal con-
cerned not the goals, but how they were to be achieved.17 It goes without saying that
this was merely Milošević’s well-known sense of pragmatism. It is indicative that in
those years Milošević in fact almost never made statements in his appearances in
favor of the JNA and particularly referred to the JNA. This was obviously a ‘silent
partnership’ on a joint ‘task’ because there was not even the least criticism from the
military leadership directed at the Serbian leadership or public support.
The first half of 1990 which so to speak represents the end of this period, was,
aside from the mentioned disarmament of the TO, marked by attempts of the JNA
leadership to ‘push through’ certain decisions through the SFRJ Presidency and the
Federal Executive Council which would to all purposes render impossible and delay
indefinitely the multi-party elections in Slovenia and Croatia.
At that time, alongside other things, direct pressure was also made at the leader-
ship of the then Federal Republic of Croatia at the specially held meeting in Zagreb
one month prior to the elections, and on the initiative of the SSNO. When even that
didn’t succeed, actions were made which would occur prior to and were the direct
preparations for the total and open appearance in the role of the army which ‘is cre-
ating a new state’.

The third period of the transformation


Thus we enter the third period of this process, which was significant for its con-
centrated set of events in a relatively short period of time, the strong psychological and
propaganda activities aimed at compromising the multi-party system, and particu-
larly the policy of the parties that were elected to power, and provoking ‘international
conflicts’ in order to create a motive for JNA intervention, either under the legitimacy
of acting in a state of emergency or in the manner of some variation of a ‘coup d’etat’.
With respect to the above stated, further modifications of the plans for deploy-
ment of JNA units were made and according to this newly-defined task – defend the

17 
Annex 1-3.

168
right of those nations which wish to live in the common state of Yugoslavia, which in
fact means to enter into armed conflict with those who no longer wish to live in Yugo-
slavia.
Clearly, this kind of decision in the then current conditions couldn’t have been
accepted through regular procedure and by everybody, in its form it was autono-
mous and the result of the usurpation of impartial political and even less legal role.
What follows is that this ‘defense’ could have been carried out only in the manner of
a conspiracy or a criminal endeavor.
Furthermore, this entails certain according, hidden and secret activities of spe-
cialized services i.e. elements of the security-intelligence system of the JNA, relying
on the Serbian SDB /State Security Service/ and others.
In a relatively short period of time the first significant effect of such concealed
activity became apparent in the form of the well-known ‘Log Revolution’ in the Knin
area and parts of Lika and Kordun which were primarily populated by Serbs, in Au-
gust 1990.
From that point on, the exacerbation of created tensions was enticed and in fact
a ‘crisis situation’ was being managed. This management depicts the course of events
from the continuous emphasis of the increasingly less acceptable political demands
toward the Republic of Croatia as a state, to the known ‘incidents’ regarding the
opening of new police stations (Plitvice, Kijevo) and the policemen ‘rebellion’ (Pak-
rac, Glina).
A specific course of such action was the discovery and monitoring of the prepa-
rations for defense against anticipated JNA intervention in the Republic of Croatia
which was labeled as illegal armament and formation of paramilitary armed com-
positions.
This area was assessed as the most favorable for all types of political compromis-
ing of the new government of the Republic of Croatia including a realistically feasible
attempt to sanction the same pursuant to the then Law on Military Courts as a crimi-
nal offence of ‘preparing an armed rebellion’ and others within the scope of ‘counter-
revolutionary threat to the social order determined by the SRFY Constitution’.
At the same time, this was perceived as an opportunity for a new stronger at-
tempt to force the decision on the proclamation of the state of emergency in the state.
However, when that also failed on the well-known session of the SFRJ Presidency
(12-15 March 1991) the military leadership directed everything toward provoking
armed conflicts.

169
A particularly significant component of the overall activity of the JNA during
this period was contained in the enticement and assistance to the military organiza-
tion of the ‘defense of the Serb people in Croatia’. Naturally, this meant arming the
Serb population with weapons from the JNA storage, and the secret training of units
from the war composition of the JNA and the TO in the areas which were later de-
clared as the SAO Krajina /Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina/18. How this was
carried out according to the ‘modified role of the JNA in relation to its role as de-
fined by the Constitution’, according to Kadijević, is presented in the principal idea
of the basic concept and its goal that was to protect the Serb nation in Croatia...and
to enable it to....and militarily organize itself for defense...to fulfill its task within the
scope of ‘preventing clashes between the nations’, as worded in the SFRJ Presidency...19
On the basis of this the ‘strengthening of military organization’ followed which
meant enlarging the units by forming a higher lever of command, of course, with re-
plenishments in personnel and other military-expert activities from the JNA.
All of this was directed toward the realization of the fundamental and unique
idea to carry out the ‘protection of the Serb nation in Croatia’ in such a way that all
regions with a majority Serb population would be completely freed from the presence of
the Croatian army and the Croatian authorities...20
Therefore, the goal was radical, and the same was the occupation and plunder of
parts of someone else’s territory.
What the plan was, is particularly evident in the idea behind the maneuver of the
‘operative-strategic assault operation’ (read: aggression), as revealed by V. Kadijević21:
- a total air and sea blockade of Croatia;
- The directions of offensives of the main forces of the JNA directly connected to
the liberation of Serb regions in Croatia and JNA garrisons deep inside Cro-
atian territory. To this end cut Croatia along the following lines: Gradiška-
Virovitica; Bihać-Karlovac-Zagreb; Knin-Zadar; Mostar-Split. The strongest
group of armored mechanized forces would liberate Eastern Slavonia and then

18 
 e types of deceptions that were attempted is also evident in the fact that in the Knin area in Janu-
Th
ary 1991 within the ‘action of disarming paramilitary formations’ there was in fact a certain amount
of weapons ‘collected and handed over’, which was supposed to be the proof of the ‘equal’ approach
by the JNA and the ‘cooperation’ of the Serbs.
19 
Annex 1-3.
20 
Annex 1-3.
21 
Annex 1-3.

170
move quickly westward, linking up with forces in Western Slavonia and pro-
ceeding on to Zagreb and Varaždin...
- ...At the same time, strong forces from the Herceg Novi-Trebinje region would
be used to block Dubrovnik from land and break into the Neretva valley thus
linking up operations with forces working along the Mostar-Split line.
- after the seizure of certain installations, secure and hold the border of the Ser-
bian Krajina in Croatia...

If we take into account the when and how this plan was designed and created,
and particularly the consequences its implementation created, there cannot be even
the slightest doubt regarding the fact that the JNA leadership is truly responsible for
the war caused by the criminal endeavor.
Equally, it is absolutely clear that definitely in spring 1991 by the policy of the
military leadership even the last admixtures of Yugoslav character disappeared,
which truly left only the empty usual designator ‘JNA’.
Without attempting to presume that the phenomenon of the transformation of
the JNA into the Serb army was sufficiently integrally covered, the presented con-
tents show to the validity of certain important assertions regarding this issue:
• The transformation of the JNA to the Serb army is one of the particular and
especially important phenomena of the crisis in the former SFRJ;
• This type of deformation of the JNA arose from the character of the very so-
cial and political system in which it (JNA) as an entirely ideologized and po-
liticized armed force which, based on the nature of things, latently strived to
get involved and arbitrate in the political and even in other social domains,
naturally, personalized in appearance and activity of individuals who for a
long period of time presented the military leadership;
• During the Yugoslav crisis, the military leadership gradually usurped itself
with more and more right of passing political judgment and labeling in the
lines of ‘for or against’ Yugoslavia which didn’t belong to them and in its ac-
tivities further complicated the existing and created new political problems
and conflicts, and given that it misused the ‘authority’ of armed force, includ-
ing the threat of its use, is objectively most responsible for the war(s) in the
area of the former SFRJ. This, and particularly because it placed armed force
in the service of one policy and one nation, deciding without authority to
‘create a state of nations who wish to live in it’;

171
• In the final period of the crisis, the activities of the military leadership were
marked by the maneuvering on the very edge of the constitution and the law
of the former state, and in the first half of 1991 the preparations for use be-
gan and the use of the armed forces which was against the law and at the be-
ginning by voluntary interpretation of the superiors’ decisions, and later by
complete autonomous action;
• The stated activities had all the marks of a conspiracy and of a criminal en-
deavor because they were carried out outside and against the existing institu-
tions of the system even with directly and publicly waiving obedience to their
superiors who were ‘in the process’ labeled as the ‘destroyers of Yugoslavia’
and ‘haters of the Serb nation’ and the initial evidence of the stated can be
found in the mentioned book by V. Kadijević. Its credibility in this respect
is significant because it was written not long after the events it describes and
while the author still didn’t anticipate that the ‘mission’ was going to fail, he
is certain that he ‘did the right thing’.

1.2. Support in maintaining the established status of


occupation

1.2.1. Establishing occupation and the ‘Serb Army of Krajina’


In accordance with the principal ideas behind the basic concept the JNA carried
out its tasks and General Kadijević also spoke about this as a witness during the trial
against General Vlado Trifunović, and the Belgrade daily newspaper ‘Borba’ wrote
about it in the issue dated 18 May 1993:
If the Vance Plan hadn’t been signed, we would have even gone to Zagreb, with
this statement the Army General Veljko Kadijević started his testimony in the
process against General V. Trifunović. For the first time before the Criminal
Council of the Military Court the previous first man of JNA publicly stated the
Army’s tasks in Croatia. The phrasing of the SFRJ Presidency preventing clashes
between the nations actually meant liberating Serb regions, and pulling out
JNA units to the borders of one future Yugoslavia. This first task was carried out
to the full because 1/3 of the Croatian territory remained in Serb hands, said
Kadijević. Aside from this, he continued, one army managed to create three –
the army of Yugoslavia, army of the Serb Republic and enabled the creation of
an army in Serb regions. Veljko Kadijević claimed that the entire SFRJ Presi-

172
dency was not informed of this plan instead was presented with only partial
and initial ideas, while the orders to corps commanders were issued orally so
that the enemy wouldn’t discover them. As their enemies he declared the Croa-
tian army, the indoctrinated Croatian people, the international community and
the very organized and synchronized peace movement of pacifists and moth-
ers. One of the questions was also why the JNA didn’t also occupy Zagreb after
Vukovar, and Kadijević answered the following: we didn’t proceed to Zagreb
because the Vance plan had been signed and we didn’t want to violate it. If this
hadn’t been done, we would have freed up our units. In the end he added that he
knows that Croatia convicted him for war crimes and the destruction of Osijek,
Dubrovnik, Vukovar…still he concluded: I was acting on my conscience and I
would do the same again. (tr. remark: free translation)
In reality, after the fall of Vukovar, General Kadijević intended (wanted) to con-
tinue JNA activity in the direction of Zagreb (the corridor along the Sava River) and
Varaždin (the corridor along the Drava River) however, this type of activity was not
approved by the state leadership.22
The JNA practically established and organized the state of occupation in parts of
the territory of the Republic of Croatia by providing continuous support to all activi-
ties and particularly those related to the formation of the ‘Serb army’, the transfor-
mation (organization, manning, formation, training) of the ‘territorial defense’ to the
‘Army of the Serb Krajina’ (SVK) whose formation became formal on 19 March 1992.
The Army of the Serb Krajina was formed (among others) into 6 operative com-
positions (corps’) of different formations and strength, deployed across regional di-
visions of the then occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia (the then RSK – Repub-
lic of Serb Krajina). These were the following:
• 11th East-Slavonian Corps, composed of:
- 6 motorized (infantry) brigades (the 35th, 37th, 39th, 40th, 43rd, 45th)
- 1 mixed artillery regiment (map)
- 2 batteries of Medium Self-Propelled Air Defense Rocket Regiment /ss-
rp/KUB
- and a total strength of
· 10.000 – 11.000 men23
22 
“ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume II”, Central
Intelligence Agency, October 2003, pages 207-208.
23 
Information regarding the numerical strength of soldiers in the corps’ and other units of the SVK
do not relate to the wartime formation but rather to the average level of manning in the period

173
· 120 to 130 tanks
· 65 to 70 OT /armored personnel carrier/ BVP /infantry combat ve-
hicle/
· 120 to 130 artillery weapons 105mm caliber or larger

• 18th West-Slavonian Corps, composed of:


- 3 light (infantry) brigades (the 51st, 54th and 98th)
- 2 squads (59th and 63rd)
- and a total strength of
· 4.000 to 4.500 men
· 25 to 30 tanks
· 20 OT/BVP
· 50 to 55 artillery weapons of 105mm caliber or larger

• 39th Banija Corps, composed of:


- 4 infantry (light) brigades (the 24th, 26th, 31st and 33rd)
- 1 squad
- 1 armored battalion (okb)
- 1 mixed artillery regiment (map)
- and a total strength of
· 5.000 to 6.000 men
· 40 to 50 tanks
· 20 OT/BVP
· 110 to 120 artillery weapons of 105mm caliber or larger

• 21st Kordun Corps, composed of:


- 4 light brigades (the 3rd, 11th, 13th and 19th)
- 2 mixed artillery battalions (mad)
- and a total strength of
· 4.500 to 5.000 men
of time prior to the signing of the ‘Zagreb Agreement’. These are generally information from the
assessments of the Intelligence Administration of the GSHV (‘Prosudba stanja, mogućnosti i na-
mjera neprijatelja’ /Assessment of the siutation, capabilities and intentions of the enemy/ dated 07
November 1993, or rather the “Intelligence assessment of the possible development of events on the
military-political aspect and a possible threat to the Republic of Croatia in the upcoming period,
paricularly in the different possibilities of engagement of the Croatian Army’, 26 March 1994). The
numerical strenght was somewhat larger immediately after the formation of the SVK and evidence
of the same can be found in the statement by General Mile Novaković.

174
· 45 to 50 tanks
· 20 OT/BVP
· 65 to 70 artillery weapons of 105mm caliber or larger

• 15th Lika Corps, composed of:


- 1 mtbr /motorized brigade/ (the 9th)
- 4 infantry (light) brigades (the 18th, 50th, 70th and 103rd)
- 2 mad
- and a total strength of
· 5.500 to 6.000 men
· 60 to 70 tanks
· 25 to 30 OT/BVP
· 70 to 75 artillery weapons of 105mm caliber or larger

• 7th North-Dalmatian Corps, composed of:


- 2 mtbr (the 75th and 92nd)
- 2 light brigades (the 1st and 4th)24
- 2 infantry brigades (2nd and 3rd)
- 1 map
- 1 PZO light artillery regiment (ltp)
- 2 PZO KUB ssrp batteries
- and a total strength of
· 8.000 to 9.000 men
· 90 to 100 tanks
· 45 to 50 OT/BVP
· 110 to 120 artillery weapons of 105mm caliber or larger
· 1 air force squadron (12 to 16 ‘Jastreb’ and ‘Galeb’ airplanes)
· 1 air force squadron (3 ‘Gazela’, 4 ‘Ga-MA’ and 2 MI-8 helicopters)

• 1 R-65 ‘Luna’ rocket division o


• 4 ‘Orkan’ multiple rocket launchers
• a PZO rocket brigade
• 75th mabr /mixed artillery brigade/
• other staff units and institutions of the GS SVK /Main Staff of the SVK/

24 
The 4th light brigade was not formed immediately with the formation of the corps, but later in 1993.

175
This was thus an army with the composition of approx. 40.000 – 50.000 men,
which also had a substantially and absolutely large number of various weapons and
weapons systems and could present and did present a real threat, from which the
‘strategy of real threat’ was carried out in 1993 and the same was based on at least
three factors of ‘deflection’ from attempts to possibly liberate the occupied areas of
the Republic of Croatia by military means, and these were the following:
• the threat the SVK presented with its strength and operative deployment
• the threat of SVK artillery (rocket and artillery weapons) in range of numer-
ous larger (including Zagreb) and smaller cities in the Republic of Croatia;
• the possibility of engaging part of the forces from the composition of the Yu-
goslav Army (VJ) and/or the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS) (border areas
of the Republic of Croatia) as an operative or strategic reserve, as direct rein-
forcements or as direct support.

However, since the SVK could not have been formed at all without the overall
and diverse help and support of the JNA, equally so its further activity in the func-
tion of maintaining the state of occupation of part of the territory of the Republic of
Croatia where the self-proclaimed ‘Republic of Serb Krajina’ (‘RSK’) existed, would
not be possible without the constant support of the VJ.

1.2.2. Support the SRJ (VJ) gave to the ‘RSK’ (SVK)


The support the SRJ or rather the JNA (VJ) provided to the ‘RSK’ or rather the
SVK, can be differentiated according to its form into three time periods:
• prior to the rebellion,
• from the first signs of rebellion to the establishment of the ‘RSK’ and the
SVK,
• from the formation of the SVK to Operation ‘Storm’, still, the aim of this sup-
port had always been to ensure conditions for the secession of the so-called
‘Serbian territories’ from the mother country Croatia and their incorporation
into a ‘unique Serbian land’ in order to form the ‘Greater Serbia’ (new Yugo-
slavia), and across all three periods of time, two ‘constants’ can be recognized:
• Political – establishment of the ‘RSK’ and secession from the Republic of
Croatia for the purpose of achieving the idea of the ‘Greater Serbia’
• Military – direct support to the stated policy with no limitations as regards to
the manner and funds of realizing the same support.

176
Various contents and forms of military support (i.e. cooperation), particularly
in the period after the formation of the SVK, clearly point to the uniformity of the
functioning of the VJ, the VRS and SVK, which undoubtedly points to the inten-
tions of unifying the ‘Serbian lands’ into one state.25

• Until the formation of the SVK the support from the JNA was demonstra-
ted primarily in the following:
- Disarmament of the territorial defense of the Republic of Croatia (take-
over of storages) in the areas with the majority of Croatian population;
- Deployment of JNA units in the areas of larger concentrations of Serb
population;
- Arming the local Serb population;
- Preventing Croatian Police intervention in the focal points of rebellion
(‘buffer zones’);
- Transformation of JNA units (equipment) into SVK units;
- Direct combat support in the occupation of certain areas and settlements;
- Direct assault operations for the purpose of occupying certain areas of
the Republic of Croatia (Srijem, Vukovar, Konavli etc.);

• After the formation of the SVK, support from the SRJ or rather the VJ be-
came even more intensified and diverse, and it was particularly expressed
with respect to providing personnel26 where the SVK was practically opera-
ting as an integral part of the VJ.27
The support the VJ (SRJ) provided to the SVK (RSK) can be divided into the
following categories, and due to the amount of materials which prove this
support, only some of the stated categories will contain document references:

25 
 e unique functioning also relates to the VRS or rather the RSK with whom even a Declaration
Th
was signed in 1995 on the consolidation into a unified state, however, this is not the case of the same
level of cause and effect relation as with the FRY. “Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za radoblje
od 14.-21. veljače 1994 /Analysis of intelligence information for the period of 14-21 Feburary 1994/,
21 February 1994.
26 
‘Podaci za analizu komandnog kadra’ /Information for the analysis of command personnel/, 15th
Corps Command, 5 January 1995.
27 
‘Information to units’, (regarding the speech of General Mrkšić in the RSK Assembly), 2nd Infantry
Brigade Command, 3 June 1995.

177
• Personnel support
- Manning of the highest officers’ personnel assigned to SVK units from
the VJ and vice versa:
· General Dušan Lončar, until then the commander of the 37th Uzica
Corps of the VJ, appointed on 4 April 1994 as the commander of the 11th
SVK Corps;28
· Colonel General Mile Mrkšić was assigned to the duty of SVK Com-
mander on 16 May 1995 after the previous commander, Major General
Milan Čeleketić resigned from that duty. General Mrkšić transferred to
this duty immediately from the duty of the Assistant Chief of the Main
Staff of the VJ /GS VJ/ for special units. It needs to be mentioned that
General Mrkšić at the beginning of the aggression against the Republic
of Croatia participated in the attacks in the area of Srijem and Vukovar
as the commander of the 1st Guards Mechanized Brigade.
· Colonel Slobodan Tarbuk, from mid 1992, the commander of the 39th
Banija Corps and in 1993 on his own request transferred to the SRJ to
the duty of Chief of Staff of the Kragujevac Corps of the VJ, and at the
end of May 1995 was returned to the duty of the commander of the 39th
Banija Corps of the SVK29 after Colonel Žarko Gačić was relieved of
that duty because he received the order to fire the ‘Orkan’ on Zagreb on
1 May at 13.00 hrs and authorized the activity only on 2 May (based on
the security officer’s assessment, ‘he acted cowardly’). (tr. remark: free
translation)
- Manning with officers of various missing military specialties (air force,
armor, EI /electronic reconnaissance/ and PED /counter-electronic op-
erations/, rocket, PZO)
· Relying on the personnel and material support by the VJ30 the ED /elec-
tronic operations/ units were also beginning to be formed within the
SVK corps’ and SVK EI and PED Centers at the Plitvice Lakes. On the
basis of an order issued by the Chief of the VJ Main Staff, two complete

28 
‘Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 4.-11. travnja 1994’ /Analysis of intelligence
information for the period of 4-11 April 1994/, 12 April 1994.
29 
‘Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 22.-29. svibnja ‘ /Analysis of intelligence in-
formation for the period of 22-29 May/, 31 May 1995.
30 
‘Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 16.-23. svibnja 1994’ /Analysis of intelligence
information for the period of 16-23 May 1994/, 23 May 1994.

178
ED platoons were also transferred to the composition of the SVK from
the VJ.31 (tr. remark: free translation)
- Manning with personnel mobilized in the area of the SRJ (reserve per-
sonnel, conscripts)
· A typical example is the operation led during June and July 1995 in
the area of the SRJ under code name ‘Storm’ and which will be further
discussed in the fourth chapter.
- Specialist training for conscripts in certain specialties32 which was not
able to be organized in the SVK
· When reviewing the reports on the numerical strength of certain
commands of the SVK it is evident that a certain number of con-
scripts were undergoing training in the VJ and VRS.33
- Education of cadets in military schools and academies
· Complete education of the future officer personnel was conducted in
the area of the SRJ because there were no military schools in the SVK;

• Theoretical – doctrinal cooperation


- Defining strategy of defense
· The strategy of real threat was created under the leadership of Gen-
eral Radinović.34
- Drafting the doctrine of the use of units
· The SVK incorporated into their use the rules from the VJ (‘Rules of
Service in the VJ’, ‘Formation Rules in the VJ’35);
- Preparations for the reorganization and modernization
· When with the arrival of General Mrkšić as commander of the SVK the
initiative was put into motion for the formation of special (maneuver)
units on the level of the SVK and within the corps’36, in order to provide
31 
‘Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 31. siječnja do 7. veljače 1994’ /Analysis of in-
telligence information for the period from 31 January to 7 February 1994/, 7 February 1994.
32 
‘Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 7.-14. veljače 1994’ /Analysis of intelligence
information for the period from 7-14 February 1994/, 14 February 1994.
33 
‘Pregled popune jedinica 7. korpusa po RF’ /Overview of the manning level of units according to
wartime formation/, 7th Corps Command, 28 October 1994.
34 
The ‘Strategy of Real Threat’ will be further discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 2).
35 
’Organizacija života i rada u 7. korpusu, naređenje’ / ‘Order to organize life and work in the 7th
Corps’, 7th Corps Command, 22 June 1994.
36 
‘Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 14.-21. lipnja 1994’ /Analysis of intelligence
information for the period from 14-21 June 1995/, 21 June 1995.

179
expert assistance a crew of officers – instructors from the VJ Special
Forces Corps (KSS) arrived at Slunj led by the Commander of the VJ
KSS, General Miodrag Panić.37 (tr. remark: free translation)
- Security – intelligence cooperation
· Linking up and centralized control of activities of intelligence services of
the VJ, VRS and the SVK.38 (tr. remark: free translation)
· On 7 February 1994 in the Intelligence Administration (ObU) of the VJ
Main Staff, an analysis was held on the work of the units for EI /elec-
tronic reconnaissance/ which the representatives of the SVK also par-
ticipated in.39 (tr. remark: free translation)
- Going to consultations and briefings to the VJ Main Staff
· One of the regular meetings between representatives of the SVK and
VJ was held in Belgrade on 5 June 1995 and the main topic was how to
mobilize militarily capable men in the SRJ for the manning needs of the
SVK.40 (tr. remark: free translation)
· General Mile Mrkšić together with several officers of the SVK Main
Staff and the Commander of the 11th Corps (General Dušan Lončar)
was at a meeting with the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (issue
of the election of the Minister of Defense) and the Chief of the VJ Main
Staff (analysis of the realization of tasks and combat readiness of SVK
units).41 (tr. remark: free translation)
- Inter-military cooperation
· On 20 August 1993 General Mladić (Commander of the VRS) visit-
ed the 18th SVK Corps42 and on 5 September the 7th SVK Corps talked
about the joint defense of Serb countries.

37 
‘Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 7.-14. lipnja 1995’ /Analysis of intelligence
information for the period from 7-14 June 1995/, 16 June 1995.
38 
Annex 1-20.
39 
Annex 1-20.
40 
‘Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 30. svibnja do 6. lipnja 1995’ /Analysis of in-
telligence information for the period from 30 May to 6 June 1995/, 7 June 1995, Annex 1-21
41 
‘Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za 5. srpnja 1995’ /Analysis of intelligence information for 5
July 1995/, 6 July 1995.
42 
‘Informacija potčinjenim jedinicama’ /Information to subordinated units/, 7th Corps Command, 20
August 1993.

180
· The meeting between Milan Martić and Radovan Karadžić on 17 Feb-
ruary 1994 discussions were held on the obligations of military coop-
eration and other activities directed at the incorporation into a joint
state.43 (tr. remark: free translation)
· Coordination of work of the SVK and the VRS in activities in the area of
Dinara and Bosansko Grahovo and western Bosnia.44 (tr. remark: free
translation)
• Logistic support45, 46, 47, 48, 49
- Replenishment of all types of ammunition
- Fuel replenishment
- Replenishment with spare parts for various combat means
- Replenishment with military and police uniforms
- Overhaul of technical means of the SVK in the SRJ
- Help in sending personnel for technical maintenance
• Reinforcements
- rtillery units until the level of division o Rocket units until the level of di-
vision o Tank units until the level of battalion
- EI and PED units until the level of company
• Equipment and modernization
- Artillery and rocket weapons
· For example, artillery and rocket weapons for the formation of the
Special Units Corps (KSJ) which will be further discussed later on;
- Tanks
· During January 1994 there were 35 T-34 tanks delivered for the needs
of the 11th Corps (in the function of strengthening the defense),

43 
Annex 1-9.
44 
Document of the 2nd Krajina Corps.
45 
‘Informacija o ojačanjima u tenkovima pristiglim na područje sektora ‘Istok’,/Information on re-
plenishment with tanks in the area of Sector East/, 7 February 1994.
46 
Informacija /Information/ no. 512-06-06/1-93-3067, dated 24 September 1993.
47 
‘Pokazatelji i značajke potpore SRJ prema ‘RSK’ /Indicators and characterstics of support from the
SRJ to the ‘RSK’/ dated 30 March 1995.
48 
‘Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 3. do 10. listopada 1994’ /Analysis of intelli-
gence information for the period from 3-10 October 1994/, 11 October 1994.
49 
‘Report on questions of combat readiness, 7th Corps Command, 15 April 1994’ (page 0418-0154).

181
· Replenishment with M-84 tanks from the composition of the Special
Brigade (Niš) in June 1995, for the needs of the formation of the SVK
KSJ,
- Rocket launchers
- Helicopters
- Communications systems

The significance and the amount of support is particularly illustrated in the in-
formation of the support coming from the SRJ (VJ) to the RSK (SVK) after August
1994 when an embargo was installed against the SRJ on any type of financial, eco-
nomic and military assistance directed toward the Serb Republic and the ‘Republic
of Serb Krajina’ which will be further discussed in the third chapter and also in the
information on support immediately prior to the beginning of the final stage of the
assault operation against Western Bosnia.50, 51

50 
‘Podaci o potpori koju VJ pruža SVK’ /Information on support from the VJ to the SVK/, dated 22
June 1995.
51 
‘Pregled ojačanja upućenih iz VJ u ‘RSK’ tijekom lipnja 1995’ /Overview of reinforcements sent
from the VJ to the ‘RSK’ during June 1995/, dated 28 June 1995.

182
2.

STRATEGY OF REAL THREAT –


ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN THE STATE OF
OCCUPATION

Introduction
In less than 8 years from the creation of the SANU Memorandum, at the begin-
ning of 1994, when the military structures of the ‘RSK’ were considering reorganiza-
tion (partial professionalization) of the ‘Serb Krajina Army’, as the result of the im-
plementation of the idea of the ‘Greater Serbia’, the creator of the military strategy of
the ‘Republic of Serb Krajina’, Yugoslav Army Colonel General Radovan Radinović52
was obviously justifiably claiming in an interview given to the paper ‘Vojska Krajine’
/Army of Krajina/53 that:
Without a decisive defeat on the battlefield of specifically that army (meaning
the SVK) Croatia cannot count on the realization of its still unfulfilled dream
– reintegration of the RSK into its constitutional and territorial order. (tr. re-
mark: free translation)

52 
 olonel General Prof.Dr. Radovan Radinović is a well-known military theoretician in the former
C
JNA. At the time of the publication of the Strategy of Real Threat he was performing the duty of the
Chief of the Administration for Strategic Studies and Defense Politics of the Ministry of Defense of
the FRY. In other words, he was the head of the highest expert institution of the state in charge of
finding scientific methods of using the army and other state means in accordance with its policies.
53 
‘Uzroci i ciljevi preustroja Srpske Vojske Krajine’ /Causes and goals of the reorganization of the Serb
Krajina Army/, April 1994, Intelligence Administration of the GSHV /Croatian Army Main Staff/.

183
Until that time, three separate Serb states’ were formed in the area of the former
Yugoslavia and their corresponding armies:
• Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ) and its pertaining
- Yugoslav Army (VJ – Vojska Jugoslavije)
• Serb Republic (RS) and its pertaining
- Army of the Serb Republic (VRS – Vojska Republike Srpske)
• Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) and its pertaining
- Serb Krajina Army (SVK – Srpska Vojska Krajine)

Even earlier, in February 1993 the so-called strategy of ‘real threat’ or also called
the ‘strategy of deterrence’ was publicly announced which in fact represented the
continuity of the Great-Serbian military strategy.
This is a fact which the creators and the propagators of the strategy (General
Radinović primarily) did not even attempt to seriously conceal. Even more, by em-
phasizing that the Croatian aggression (meaning aggression of Croatia against the
RSK) would in fact impose war against the entire Serb people, this fact was openly
used to strengthen the impression of the ‘real threat’.
The strategy of real threat was actually the product of the development of the
Great-Serbian military strategy – from the strategy of liberation (this was in fact a
strategy of occupation from the beginning of the 1990’s) to the strategy of defense
(this was the strategy of ‘real threat’ or ‘deterrence’) which was designed to enable
the preservation of the results of aggression i.e. the up to then established ‘borders’
of the ‘Greater Serbia’.

184
2.1. The Strategy of Real Threat – the strategy of terrorism

2.1.1. Basic starting point


While the strategy has its
• sources in the idea of the ‘Greater Serbia’ and
• foothold in the overall strength of the Serb countries,
the forms and methods of its realization undoubtedly fall within the domain of ter-
rorism.54

This is without a doubt evident in the text published in the paper of the Serb Kra-
jina Army Vojska Krajine, double issue 4-5, July – August 199355 with the superscript
caption ‘Advantages of the Krajina Strategic Position’ /Prednosti krajiške strateške
pozicije/ and title ‘Real Threat at Work’ /Realna prijetnja na dijelu/, by Colonel Gen-
eral Radovan Radinović.
It was clearly the intent of the editors to use the author’s authority to increase the
credibility of the set assertions and clarifications, in order to use the article to create
a psychological and promotional effect i.e. to encourage their own forces which was
much needed at the time.
This conclusion is also suggested by the fact that in those days the media of the
RSK published a series of statements containing direct threats of an assault on Za-
greb as a response to the potential HV attack on Knin.56
This act of ‘encouragement’ has all the characteristics of liberating the remain-
ing ethnic ‘obstructions’ which might, possibly, hinder typically terrorist ‘fire strikes’
on civilian facilities regardless if the facility was a residential building, school, sacral
object or other cultural facility, or even a hospital or other similar facilities. Because,
the General continued to clarify and prove, ‘reprisal is the basic strategy of the de-
fense of the RSK’.
The following quotation from the above stated article best affirms the aforemen-
tioned statement:
54 
I zvorišta i bitne značajke vojne strategije RSK – informacija’ /Sources and important characteristics
of the military strategy of the RSK – information/, GS HV ObU /Intelligence Administration of the
Croatian Army Main Staff/, 11 October 1993.
55 
Radovan Radinović, ‘Realna prijetnja na dijelu’ /Real Threat at Work/, ‘Vojska Krajine’, no.4-5/93.
56 
Obavještajna informacija ‘Prosudba aktualnih grožnji neprijatelja o odmazdi po gradovima u RH’ /
Intelligence information – Assessment of current enemy threats of reprisal against cities in the Re-
public of Croatia/, 1 September 1993.

185
The Zagreb area and its infrastructure and industrial capacities are located 24
kilometers from the Serb positions, and this is the distance of a successful range
of the rocket systems and the best artillery systems for support which are de-
ployed in the Kordun and Banija part of the battlefield.
In the case of a Croatian aggression against Krajina all these systems would fo-
cus their activity on Zagreb and its closest surroundings. There would be no cal-
culations made here, because every Serb would be aware that this would be the
final reckoning between the Krajina and Croatia, or rather a fight for survival.
Krajina would in fact have no other choice but to defend itself with all available
means and methods.
Zagreb would be exposed to such destruction which would make life there im-
possible for a long period of time and the losses in civilian life would be enor-
mous.
There is no such urban concentration in the Krajina area with the exception of
Knin therefore survival of combat strikes is simpler than can be ensured in Cro-
atia. This threat is realistically achievable regardless of the impetus and inten-
sity of Croatian strikes including mass rockets and air strikes for which Croatia
is not prepared at the moment, but in perspective and with the assistance of its
powerful mentors it could achieve the capacity. (tr. remark: free translation)
The author equally threatened Karlovac which would be exposed to destructions
of all support systems with no serious capabilities of Croatia to efficiently prevent it as
well as the threatening the Dalmatian battlefield with efficient fire on the towns of
Sinj, Split, Šibenik, Biograd and Zadar and placing under total fire control the main
roads between Šibenik and Zadar, Novigradsko Ždrilo, and the Zemunik airport and
the Peruča hydroelectric power plant.
Further on in the article the General claimed that the strategy of real threat …had
very efficient results and will continue to do so in the future. It is self-explanatory that
the publication of the article was supposed to increase the ‘credibility of the threat’
and therefore prove the advantages of Krajina’s strategic position.
Particularly important in several ways is the fact that the content of the article
in an obvious wish to achieve the best possible promotional effects (intimidation on
one side and encouragement and boosting morale on the other) possibly even un-
noticed by the author and the editors, revealed the true, terrorist essence of the strat-
egy. Also, alongside the phrase all available means and methods (meaning all types of
weapons) what ‘slipped’ was the direct statement that the losses in civilian life would
be enormous.

186
Further more, the towns and everything they are and represent, particularly
mentioning Dubrovnik again, were according to this strategy the main ‘objects of
fire strikes’ i.e. reprisal.

2.1.2. U
 nderestimating others57 is an important characteristic of the
creators and realizers of the idea of the ‘Greater Serbia’
In order to more fully observe the achievements of the ‘strategy’ it is also interest-
ing to review the text underneath the subtitle ‘geo-strategic chaos of Croatia’.
The subtitle itself sufficiently illustrates the manner in which the author brought
his conclusions. Even more, it was not enough to assess the geo-strategic position of
Croatia with respect to the ‘RSK’ as being ‘extremely unfavorable’ which is to a cer-
tain extent correct, but he had to emphasize this fact by developing a disparaging
syntagm of ‘geo-strategic chaos’, and in addition he added the following claim:
There is no state in Europe which has such an unfavorably composed and shaped
state area as Croatia…and for those who haven’t even read a single letter of the
strategy there is no dilemma that the state is…so vulnerable that its efficient de-
fense of its integral area in war in impossible, regardless of the type and size of
its enemy’s military force…. (tr. remark: free translation)
Understandably, nothing can follow after this type of disparaging approach ex-
cept from the further presentation of intentions which is evident in the following
statements:
….By establishing the RSK as an independent state Croatia was driven away
from the Danube which represented the most important link between southeast
and middle Europe. The RSK practically cut off Croatia in several parts….Pos-
sible directions of cutting off Croatia into separate individual parts would be
the following:
• Grubišno Polje – Hungarian border
• Karlovac – Metlika
• Maslenica Bridge.58…
(tr. remark: free translation)
57 
 is refers to people of other nations and national minorities in the former Yugoslavia or states
Th
founded in the area where the former Yugoslavia used to exist.
58 
This also shows the ambitions of the initial strategy of the aggression against the Republic of Croatia
(see the book of General Kadijević) where General Radinović according to his duty and function
had a significant if not the principal role and the reasons for the later (1994) offensive in the area
of Western Bosnia.

187
The strategy also answered the question of how to carry out this cutting off ’ of
Croatian territory quickly into four, five and even more parts which was also pro-
posed as a strategic response to the possible decision by Croatia to solve the Serb issue
in its former administrative borders by military means.
This could be achieved with relatively small forces and even by merely placing the
most sensitive facilities in the areas on the stated axes under fire control, claimed the
author not reframing from writing that Croatia had no means to defend it.. (tr. re-
mark: free translation)
At the end, the author claimed:
Tormented between the two final solutions – to decide not to recognize the in-
dependence of the Serb state and the inability to support this decision militarily
– Croatia as a state has been condemned to a long and agonizing death… (tr.
remark: free translation)
That the ‘strategy of real threat’ was not going to remain a simple subject of theo-
retical discussion or academic debate, was proven by the events which followed and
in the documents which were supposed to lead to its further practical application.
One of these documents is the ‘Directive for the activity of the SVK’ which the
RSK President issued in February 1995.59 In trying to find answers to potential mili-
tary threats which the various forms of offensive activities of the HV might have on
the ‘RSK’, the Directive offered the solution not only in the defensive activities of the
SVK but also implicitly included offensive (counter-attack) activities. This entailed
offensive activities which would result in the state area of the Republic of Croatia
being cut off on the already mentioned directions but also in ‘liberating’ those ‘Serb
areas’ which at the time were not within the composition of the ‘RSK’. Among other
things, the Directive included breaking out to the Adriatic coast.
Mile Martić60 also spoke of further captures and ‘cutting off ’ when from 25 - 27
April 1995 he and the SVK Commander, General Čeleketić, were visiting Western
Slavonia. In speaking of strengthening the defensive capabilities of the SVK, there-
fore its 18th West-Slavonian Corps, he also stated that this corps would be capable of
even ‘liberating the currently occupied areas’.
There is no doubt that the ‘strategy of real threat’ was the result of the feeling
of powerlessness on the one hand and arrogance and disparagement on the other.
59 
 irektiva za djelovanje SVK /Directive for the activity of the SVK/, GŠ SVK /SVK Main Staff/, Feb-
D
ruary 1995.
60 
See information on the visit to Western Slavonia in Chapter Four.

188
Equally so, it is without a doubt that this strategy was implemented and that it was
the expression and the result of the policy which did not accept any solutions that
didn’t implicitly include the permanent secession of the ‘RSK’ from the Republic of
Croatia.
The understanding of this approach is important for the understanding of every-
thing that followed61 which will not be discussed here from aspects other than the
military one, and which inevitably led to the search of a military solution for the re-
integration of the then occupied areas into the state and legal system of the Republic
of Croatia.

2.2. In search of an appropriate answer to the strategy of


real threat
A significant part of the preparations for the carrying out of the offensive opera-
tion with the aim of liberating the then occupied parts of the areas of the Republic of
Croatia was conducted before all on the intelligence level within the overall prepara-
tions of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia.
The preparations of the military intelligence segment were carried out the entire
time through practical and specific research of the current and real enemy.
The result of the work of this system only on the level of the Intelligence Admin-
istration of the GS HV until the end of operation ‘Storm’ was the following:
• More than a thousand of daily intelligence information
• Over a hundred of topic related intelligence information
• 150 weekly analyses of intelligence information
• dozens of intelligence assessments

More intensive intelligence activities in the role of intelligence preparation of the


battlefield (IPB – IPOE) for the purpose of carrying out the offensive operation with
the aim of liberating the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia started with the
appearance of the ‘strategy of real threat’.
61 
 ejection of the Z-4 Plan (January 1995) by the ‘competent’ structures of the RSK which offered
R
the ‘Krajina’ larger autonomy within the Republic of Croatia then the RSK had realistically had at
the time, is the consequence of the fact that they were not prepared to accept the formulation of
the Plan which defined the ‘Krajina’ as part of the Republic of Croatia with practically confederate
status.

189
They of course were not directed at that time (directly and only) toward the prep-
aration for operation ‘Storm’ but were directed toward investigating the enemy in or-
der to find the most efficient answers to neutralize the damaging effects of the ‘strat-
egy of real threat’ and finding the best solution for carrying out the offensive military
operation to liberate the then occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia.

2.2.1 Drafting the first conceptual idea of the offensive operation for
the liberation of all of the then occupied areas of the Republic
of Croatia
The ‘proclamation’ of the strategy of real threat and its further interpretation by
General Radinović undoubtedly demonstrated that the chances for a peaceful rein-
tegration of the then occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia were sustainable only
in theory.
This was sufficient reason to approach the analysis of effects that this ‘strategy’
might have on the strategic issues of defense or rather integration of the entire state
territory of the Republic of Croatia into a unified state and legal system.62
This also resulted in the drafting of the first vision of the offensive operation pre-
sented in the material of the Intelligence Administration of the GS HV titled ‘Attach-
ment to the Consideration of the Military Strategy of the Republic of Croatia’ with
the subtitle ‘Outline of the possible model of ‘response’ to the implementation of the
‘strategy of real threat of the RSK’.
Following are the main points of this document.
Firstly, it raised the question of the necessity to find specific ‘answers’ to the basic
issues (main issues) imposed by the implementation of the ‘strategy of real threat’:
• How to neutralize the enemy’s advantages which arose from the possibility
of using a ‘more favorable geo-strategic position’, and ‘opening of the front from
Baranja to Prevlaka’?
• What was the sufficient ratio of forces required for carrying out a blitz of-
fensive with the aim of liberating the then occupied areas and how to ensure
them?
• How to avoid the consequences of the initial strike (reprisal) and to prevent
the enemy from retaliating with rocket-artillery means in the shortest time
possible?
62 
‘Prilog razmatranju Vojne Strategije RH’ /Attachment to the analysis of the Military Strategy of the
Republic of Croatia/, Intelligence Analysis, October/November 1993.

190
• How and along which axes to surprise the enemy and deliver blows which
will most quickly disorganize their defense system and ensure breaking out
to the state border in the then occupied areas and create conditions to defeat
the SVK?
• How to prevent bringing in reinforcements or engagement of strategic re-
serves from the area of the SRJ and the RS (Serb Republic), or rather from the
systems of the VJ and the VRS?

Given that the enemy’s strategy of reprisal was based on the use of long-range
rocket-artillery systems which enabled them to carry out strikes on urban centers
and economic infrastructure in the free parts of the Republic of Croatia, the model
of response needed to involve a complex of activities aimed at:
• Precisely determining and monitoring the types, amounts and location of
those weapons on one side, and
• Arming Croatian Army units with means to efficiently detect those positions
and destroy the mentioned enemy rocket-artillery systems on the other.

Therefore, it was important to prevent the enemy from materializing their poten-
tial strategic advantage to execute their idea of inflicting Croatia with unacceptable
losses and destruction or rather it was important to create conditions which would
ensure an ‘acceptable’ (rational) level of destruction and other losses.
Given that this would eliminate the advantage on which the enemy was building
its entire defense strategy, it alone would ensure a more favorable strategic position.
Furthermore, it would enable a relatively fast realization of a strategic initiative
and other prerequisites for realizing the idea of crushing the enemy and achieving
the final liberation of the then occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia.
The main strategic problem was to fulfill the basic condition for the undertaking
of the offensive operation in accordance with the principles of the ‘blitzkrieg doc-
trine’. One should not forget that the creators of the Serbian strategy reached another
correct conclusion that Croatia would have to apply the principles of this very doc-
trine.
There is a lot of evidence to support this evaluation, and in this sense it is suffi-
cient to state only the following: not a single idea of an operation for the liberation of
the then occupied areas which had not been based on fast breaches on selected axes
for the purpose of cutting off enemy forces into smaller parts and disorganize their

191
system of defense, and to break out to the state border with the aim of preventing
assistance coming from the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, would not
have a chance of success.
Naturally, this primarily refers to the areas of Banovina, Kordun, Lika and North-
ern Dalmatia which the enemy referred to as the ‘territorial strategic focal point’ for a
reason, even though the same previously applied equally to the parts of Western and/
or Eastern Slavonia and Baranja.
There was an indisputable need for organization and preparation of the neces-
sary number of units of adequate strength who would also be adequately armed and
trained, and capable of carrying out the tasks of the bearers of the offensive.
Even though we would need to review in more detail the specific tasks which
would generally, and on certain directions more specifically, show what their ap-
pearance and general characteristics would have to be63, it was possible even then to
determine that those units would have to be:
- on the composite tactical level,
- strength of 3.000 – 4.000 of chosen, professionally trained and highly moti-
vated men,
- armed with modern armored transporters, means for strong autonomous fire
support and capable for fast relocation, and
- equipped with means for PO/anti-armor/ combat and protection against air
attacks.

It is apparent that given their purpose and main tasks, their main characteristic
would have to be the capability:
• to carry out strong strikes and
• breaches of the battlefield on the chosen heading and
• to continue a fast breakthrough deep into the enemy’s positions,
• transfer to defense to secure the success and/or carry out an attack on the cut
off or encircled enemy elements.

63 
 xactly this type of approach was one of the main criteria in bringing the decision on the use of Spe-
E
cial Police Units of the Ministry of the Interior in Operation ‘Storm’ on the heading leading from
Velebit toward Gračac and Medak, because the doctrine of the use of such units and accordingly
their training and equipment was appropriate for precisely this type of task, on this type of terrain.

192
It was entirely certain that the described units, even if they were supremely
equipped, would not be able to carry out their tasks if the other conditions were also
not previously met and they were as follows:
- first of all, this refers to carrying out planned frontal combat activities, at
the least with the purpose of stretching and tying up enemy forces and pre-
venting their maneuver along the battlefields in order to close off those axes
where our forces would strike with the aim of achieving a breaches and pen-
etrating in depth of enemy space;
- understandably, it would be most optimal to activate the entire battlefield
(‘strategic front’) and inflict the highest possible losses upon the enemy’s ini-
tial positions and wherever possible, push them back from their fixed posi-
tions and thus disrupting the deployment of forces and gradually disorganiz-
ing their defense system.
- Under the assumption of achieving surprise even on the operative level, the
stated type of activity would lead the enemy to the problem of an imposed
‘activation of the strategic front’. Namely, in this manner the enemy would
be preempted in their intention to open the front ‘from Baranja to Prevlaka’.
This would ensure the strategic initiative as an important prerequisite for ef-
ficient activity of the bearers of the offensive and the overall planned develop-
ment of the operation.

However, the gravity of the problem of preventing the enemy in realizing their
strategic idea of ‘activating the front from Baranja to Prevlaka’ implies the need to
point out some of the other aspects of planning such an operation:
- the strategy of real threat involved the undertaking of appropriate actions by
the RSK and the RS along all operative axes leading from these ‘republics’ to the
territory of Croatia, where there was reason to recognize the ‘announcement’
of similar ‘actions from the area of the SRJ.
- This in itself resulted in a string of questions regarding the forces and their
activity against the enemy in the then occupied areas of Western Slavonia
and eastern Croatia, and the defense of Posavina from attacks from north-
ern Bosnia and closing off the operative axis Šid – Vinkovci and axes leading
toward the area of southern Croatia (especially Konavli), where in the least
favorable version the VJ forces would engage in attacks from the SRJ.

193
It was estimated that reinforcements (strategic reserve) of certain strength could
be introduced in the following areas on the following axes:
• Eastern Slavonia and Baranja:
- 2 to 3 mbr /mechanized brigade/
- 3 to 4 mad /mixed artillery battalion/
- 2 mpoad /mixed anti-tank artillery battalion/
- on the Šid – Vinkovci axis and over the bridges at Bogojevo and Ba-
tina
• Banovina and Kordun:
- 2 mtbr /motorized brigade/
- 2 lpbr /light infantry brigade/
- 2 mad
- on the Prijedor – Dvor (Glina or Virginmost) axis and
- on the Prijedor – Kostajnica – Dubica axis;
• Lika:
- 1 mtbr
- 1 lpbr
- on the B. Petrovac – Vrtoče – K. Vakuf – D. Lapac – Udbina axis
• Northern Dalmatia:
- 1 mtbr
- 1 lpbr
- on the Bosansko Grahovo – Knin axis

With the introduction of the complex of issues into the overall analysis, two fol-
lowing conclusions (two assessments) quickly imposed themselves:
• the offensive operation with the task of liberating the occupied areas would
not be able to encompass all of the then occupied areas at once,
• the realistic idea would be that strategic idea which would direct the offensive
to the already mentioned ‘territorial strategic focal point’ of the enemy while
the other stated battlefields would envisage individual combat activities with
the purpose of preventing enemy breaches or rather the carrying out of a set
of combat activities of the ‘defensive operation’ type.

A significant place in the string of questions which the military strategy was sup-
posed to answer was the choice of the time of the start of the operation.

194
This pointed out to the need to establish cooperation with the Army of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the HVO in order to carry out such operations, in order to use
their coordinated activity to tie up forces of the VRS which would in this manner be
prevented from realizing their role as the strategic (in some segments only operative)
reserve of the SVK.
The strategy of the ‘realistically coordinated steps’
In the conclusion of the stated document the following was concluded:
Given that, as it was already stated, in the course of the implementations of the
enemy’s strategy of ‘real threat’, the ‘answer’ to the same would also have to be-
gin immediately and systematically. Taking into account the previously stated,
it is evident that this involves an entire complex of activities and measures, gra-
dually and thoroughly aligned with the realistic possibilities and circumstan-
ces, but systematically directed to the final purpose – liberating the currently
occupied areas and establishing the sovereignty of our state in these parts as
well, even through war, as the only legitimate means, having in mind the stated
contents, it seems to impose on itself that the Strategy of ‘real threat’ needs to be
countered by our military strategy of ‘realistically coordinated steps’ (tr. remark:
free translation)
Therefore, even then, in October 1993, it was assessed that the strategy of real
threat left no doubt regarding the determination of the ‘RSK’ to use even the SVK to
enable the permanent separation of a part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia
and annexation of the same to the ‘Serb countries’ and that the likelihood of a peace-
ful reintegration of the then occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia was practically
negligible.
The accuracy and validity of this assessment was confirmed by future events
which resulted in the necessary application of military force for the purpose of liber-
ating the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia.

2.2.2. T
 raining personnel for intelligence activity for support during
operations
The drafting of the Assessment of the possible development of events in the mili-
tary-political field and the possible threat to the Republic of Croatia in the upcoming
period, particularly in the different options of the use of the Croatian Army64 (March
64 
 rosudba mogućeg razvoja događaja na vojno-političkom planu i moguća ugroza RH u nared-
P
nom razdoblju, osobito u varijantama angažiranja HV /”Assessment of the possible development of

195
1994) points to the fact that the enemy intentions on the military field were signifi-
cantly conditioned by the UNPROFOR mandate and that in the end, they could re-
sult in long- term conflicts of low intensity (in case there was a change of the UN-
PROFOR mandate in accordance with the propositions of the Republic of Croatia),
or they could lead to conflicts of high intensity in case there is no change in the UN-
PROFOR mandate and the Republic of Croatia was brought into a situation to use
military means to solve the issue of integrating the then occupied areas into its state
and legal system.
From a military standpoint, the second version (high intensity conflict) involved
a strong and timely introduced and efficiently used operative (strategic) reserve from
the composition of the VJ and VRS.
Furthermore, it involved replenishment and manning of SVK units, good engi-
neering work on the first and second defense zone and a flexible defense (tr. remark:
fluctuating defense with units in movement in the first zone of defense).
According to assessments, the weakest point was the timely introduction of the
operative reserve (up to 36 hrs) which resulted in the conclusion that a systematic
and centralized direction of intelligence activity was required.
The following was proponed (quote)65:
• Increase offensive intelligence penetration into the operative and strategic depth
of the enemy and thus ensure the systematic intelligence research for the pur-
pose of timely discovery and efficient monitoring of activities which may point
to preparations from the areas of ‘grey’ operations (low intensity conflicts) or to
the changes which may significantly alter the ratio of forces, in order to prevent
surprises;
• Establish a unique system of gathering intelligence information (engage all ser-
vices – SIS /Security and Information Service/, SZUP /Service for the Protec-
tion of the Constitutional Order/, COB /Information Center/, Liaison offices at-
tached to the UN and the EC, which are currently operating independently and
sometimes use military intelligence information incorrectly) in order to ensure
the Intelligence Administration with a more complete and integral analysis and
assessment on this same basis. (end quote) (tr. remark: free translation)

events on the military-political field and a possible threat to the Republic of Croatia in the upcom-
ing period, particularly in the different options of the use of the Croatian Army”/, 26 March 1994.
65 
Annex 2-7.

196
Following this assessment and given proposals, a series of measures were taken
which undoubtedly fall into the string of measures for intelligence preparation for
the conduction of the operation.
Those measures are as follows:
• Organization of the system of gathering information and reporting:
- Horizontal linking on the state level (request and proposal of the Intel-
ligence Administration) for the purpose of establishing coordination be-
tween all services on the State level, in order to ensure exchange of intel-
ligence information;
- Horizontal, vertical and expert linking within the military system of
management and gathering of intelligence in order to ensure timely avail-
ability of information;
• Formation and equipping of units within the scope of professional activities
of the Intelligence Administration (special focus on unmanned aerial vehi-
cles and ED platoons within the Guards Brigades) in order to enable the ap-
plication of all forms of gathering intelligence information that would not
lead to provocations on the battlefield which would surely make training of
HV units more difficult;
• Conduction of tasks of gathering information in accordance with the pos-
sible alternatives of carrying out of offensive operations (use of intelligence
resources in the planned areas and/or axes of engagement in the operation):
- Systematical AFS /aerial photography/;
· Of the entire separation line (battlefield),
· Axes which lead in depth,
· Deployment of elements of the implementation of the strategy of real
threat,
· Command posts and communications centers,
· Engineering work of the second defense zone (up to 10 km)
(A total of 6.000 km2 of enemy controlled territory was photo-
graphed)

197
2.3. Enemy activities – implementation of the ‘strategy of
real threat’

Introduction
According to the Assessment of the current situation66 (beginning of 1994) of the
strength and deployment of enemy forces in the occupied areas of the Republic of
Croatia including the possibility of reinforcements and support from the Yugoslav
Army and the Army of the Serb Republic, the conclusion was reached that these were
respectable forces located in a relatively favorable operative position.
This conclusion also arose from the following facts:
• That the enemy disposed of a respectable amount of heavy weapons, par-
ticularly rocket-artillery and armored-mechanized weapons, including long-
range systems (‘Orkan’, R-65 ‘Luna-M’, P-21 and P-22 anti-ship missiles mod-
ified for hitting land targets) which the enemy used to threaten with reprisal
on towns67 and civilian facilities of vital importance,
• That the enemy conducted strong fortifications and engineering work68 of
their positions and that its manpower was still relatively motivated which
partially alleviated the increasingly more evident problem of the lack of man-
power and realistically, they could count on the already mentioned overall
assistance by the SRJ and the RS.

However, the operative position of the enemy was slowly becoming weaker due
to the more frequent and more severe problems. Aside from the constants contained
in the stated facts that this was a very long battlefield across disconnected parts of
‘Krajinas’, which had very little depth in certain areas, which were the source of near-
ly unsolvable problems of maneuvering forces and ensuring the flexibility of the de-
fense, one of the problems which was becoming more and more evident was the lack
of manpower and economic resources for maintaining the army.
In connection with the need to solve this problem is one of the causes for the re-
organization of SVK brigades which commenced at the beginning of 1994.

66 
“ Obavještajna prosudba” /Intelligence Assessment/.
67 
Aerial photography of positions for an ‘Orkan’ (Annex on the page 282).
68 
Aerial photography of engineered positions for defense on the first and second line.

198
The reorganization was intended to solve two major problems:
- protection of the ‘border’ which became relevant after the signing of the ‘Za-
greb Agreement’ and
- a smaller and more equal composition of the brigades, of the basic composite
tactical units of at least three different types.

In the attempt to solve the problem of the protection of the ‘border’ or rather to
secure defense on the battlefield and in depth of the territory, in conditions of ex-
tremely limited human and material resources, they developed a solution which had
no basis in the military practice and theory at the time.
Namely, the proposed solution entailed that a squad was assigned with a zone of
responsibility of a width of up to 2 kilometers where three groups would be deployed
each consisting of three soldiers.69
Taking into account the standard rotation of manpower according to the prin-
ciple where 1/3 was on the battlefield , 1/3 on leave and 1/3 preparing for tasks, it
arises that there would be a total of only a couple of thousand of soldiers engaged in
the defense of the entire battlefield.
This kind of situation best demonstrates the magnitude of the problem the SVK
was facing and due to the same was never able to function independently.
The problem of maintaining the Army also represented a large burden, for the
manpower engaged and the economy as well. With respect to the same, immediately
after the Zagreb Agreement, a temporary formation was drafted by which the exist-
ing units were reduced to ‘border’ units, where the border companies (one from each
battalion) also represented the peacetime core of wartime battalions.70 The number
of border companies within individual corps’ and brigades, alongside corresponding
sections of the ‘border’ is presented in the document ‘Composition of border units’.71
This situation was upheld practically until spring 1995 and the units were prohib-
ited from engaging a number of personnel exceeding the approved limit72, which put
into question the normal conduction of daily tasks.

69 
 rder of the 7th Corps Command on the transition to the new organizational-formational struc-
O
ture, 22 April 1994.
70 
Temporary Establishment of the 7th Corps Command, 23 April 1994 (example for the 3rd pbr and
92nd mtbr).
71 
Sastav graničnih jedinica SVK /Composition of border units of the SVK/.
72 
Order of the 15th Corps Command on the approved average daily numeric strength, dated 7 Febru-
ary 1995.

199
For the purpose of balancing the compositions and the combat capabilities of
the brigades, a proposal was drafted in cooperation with the GŠ VJ /Yugoslav Army
Main Staff/ for the reorganization of the ‘light infantry brigade’73.
In the light of the above, the following was investigated during 1994:
- Reorganization of the SVK and support from the SRJ and the RS;
- Combat activities;
- Changes of the strategic position.

2.3.1. Beginning of the reorganization of the SVK


At the beginning of 1994, the newspaper Vojska Krajine published interviews
with Milan Martić, the President of the RSK, and the already mentioned General
Radovan Radinović.74
Martić stated the main priorities of strengthening the ‘RSK’ and its determina-
tion as a state, among which the principal is to75:
Realize an efficient and stable system of defense, as a prerequisite for the rea-
lization of the proclaimed political and other goals, which requires changes in
organization, formation and personnel. (tr. remark: free translation)
General Radinović pointed out that without a doubt the SVK was going to have
the most prominent role in the fight for the acquirement of political independence of the
Serb people (tr. remark: free translation) and that precisely for this reason it is neces-
sary to reorganize it, which among other things was aimed at enabling the SVK for
tasks of strategic deterrence with a high level of risk and threats for the attacker and an
efficient strategic reception, including the capacity for a strategic offensive on the chosen
axes. (tr. remark: free translation)
This shows that the ‘RSK’ had no alternative to the process of reorganization be-
cause from all of the attributes of statehood this ‘state’ was able to (to a certain extent)
materialize (realize) only one – the army.
The goal of the ‘RSK’ leadership was to form such an army which would be capa-
ble of maintaining the existing situation (the status of occupation of parts of the Re-

73 
“ Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 31. svibnja do 06. lipnja 1994” /Analysis of
Intelligence Information for the period from 31 May to 6 June 1994/, dated 6 June 1994.
74 
Annex 2-1.
75 
The same priorities were defined by Borislav Mikelić at the first session of the Government of Na-
tional Unity held on 22 April 1994.

200
public of Croatia) until the time when possibly the attitude of the international com-
munity toward the problem of reintegration of those areas (UNPA) might change.76
Taking into account the limited resources (human, material) and territorial con-
ditioning of the system of ‘defense’, a solution was presented as a compromise (nec-
essary evil) for a combined composition of the army which implied three compo-
nents:
• Professional units
as the first strategic line-up
• Peacetime units (standing army),
as the second strategic line-up and
• Reserve units (people’s army),
as the third strategic line-up.

This type of organization of the army (and/or the system of defense) was intend-
ed to ensure the realization of several strategic tasks:
o Defense of every part of the territory, in depth and across;
o A relatively favorable ratio of forces in the initial grouping for strategic de-
fense (up to 50.000 men in the territorial strategic focal point of the ‘RSK’);
o Quick growth of the army to the wartime formation and mobilization of the
people for the needs of waging war;
o Strategic deterrence with a high level of risk and threat for the attacker;
o Strategic reception including the capacity for strategic offensive activities on
several chosen axes.

Professional units
Would consist of a smaller segment of the army, however in combat readiness
and equipment they should be most effective. They would be the basic force for pre-
venting strategic surprise and for conducting strategic counter-attacks on targets in
depth of the free territory of the Republic of Croatia, therefore the force of strategic
deterrence and strategic reprisal. They should be capable of successfully countering
the strategy of the action of limited scope.77
76 
 recisely in this interview General Radinović presented his theory of the impossibility of reintegra-
P
tion of the RSK into the Republic of Croatia without a decisive defeat of exactly that army on the
battlefield.
77 
Designator which was used in the SVK for HV operations which were in fact part of the strategy of
‘realistically coordinated steps’.

201
The doctrine of use would be based on the following:
• Realization of the ‘real threat’ as the basis of the strategy of ‘deterrence’ and
which would be manifested through activity of artillery-rocket systems on
significant economic facilities in the free territory of the Republic of Croatia;
• Carrying out offensive activities against HV units which have wedged in
depth of the defense with the aim of regaining control of lost territory;

Therefore, these would be units which would represent the strategic reserve of
the GŠ SVK /Main Staff of the Serb Krajina Army/ which would be equipped with
contemporary combat means and systems, deployed in depth of RSK territory, on
one or several axes of activity (use), and which could use the internal tactical and
operative axes for maneuvers.

Peacetime army
Would be manned according to the following:
• In peacetime, with active duty officers, and the military formation would
consist entirely of conscripts;
• In wartime, with reserve soldiers and officers who in the case of mobilization
would report to their units.

Combat readiness of these units was ensured and maintained through periodic
summons of reserve formation for military exercises, and for the conscript forma-
tion through regular training.
These units would be included into the system of forces for the prevention of
strategic surprise and for the reception of the first strategic strike of the attacker.
The peacetime formation and operative development would be coordinated with
the military-geographic and military-territorial divisions, geo-political position and
situation and therefore in accordance with the analysis of the battlefield, front line
and operative axes.

People’s army
These would be units which would represent the territorial component, and they
would be used only in the case of war for ensuring the required density of the defense
along the entire area of the RSK and the required numeric ratio of forces.78
78 
I t should be mentioned that the SVK leadership and the majority of the reserve formation accepted
without criticism the positive ‘experiences’ of the system of Territorial Defense from the time of the

202
The main problem with the formation of this type of armed forces was the lack
of the two main resources: personnel and contemporary (efficient) combat means.
While the lack of combat means seemed to cause the biggest problems regarding
the formation of maneuver and special units, the lack of personnel was evident in the
formation of all three components of the army.
Precisely this example of ‘manipulating’ this resource and with the aim of form-
ing an ‘Army’, or rather manning the army according to wartime formation, shows
the full disagreement between what was proclaimed and what was achievable, and
therefore all the irrationalities of one policy which based the emergence and survival
of the ‘state’ on military means.
In evidence of the same is the following information:
• The resources for manning the SVK with personnel were definitely limited
by the number of inhabitants which was in mid 1994 in the area of the ‘RSK’
close to 430.000, thus meaning that with the maximum efforts and by re-
specting certain worldwide established norms, this would enable the forma-
tion of an army of approx. 50 – 60.000 men;
• At the same time, documents of the 7th Corps from July 199479 reveal asser-
tions that the area from which the Corps is manned (North Dalmatia) has
nearly 70.000 inhabitants, out of which 15.000 can be used for manning units
of the 7th Corps, while the wartime formation of the corps envisages approx.
17.000 men. Therefore, they counted on engaging over 24 percent of the en-
tire population which is an entirely incomprehensible calculation even if we
were to ignore the unfavorable age structure of the population that lived in
that area at the time;
• The following is also evident from the documents of the 7th Corps Command80:
even though the wartime formation envisaged a composition of 17.000 men,
the number of people envisaged (found) for manning according to this type
of formation was 13.523 military conscripts, which was a level of manning of
approx. 80 percent. The situation with the manning of officer personnel was
even worse, because from the 1276 formation posts, 693 were filled;

former state, transferring almost directly those ‘experiences’ of an ‘armed people’ to the formation
of the SVK, neglecting among others the fact that those ‘experiences’ were not put into practical
use themselves.
79 
Conclusions from the mobilization assessment (pages 10-11), 7th Corps Command, June 1994.
7 Corps Command, Summary of manning levels as per wartime establishment, 9 August 1994.
80  th

203
• Due to the constantly present process of emigration which was particularly
present with the younger population, the situation regarding manning was
gradually deteriorating, which is again illustrated in the documents of the 7th
Corps Command from that time.81 Only nearly three months later, the num-
ber of manpower envisaged according to wartime formation was increased
to 17.355, and according to manning plans manning was ensured for only
12.466 formation posts which presented a realization of manning on the level
of 72 percent.

It is without question that the situation regarding the possibilities of manning the
army with domicile population was continuously deteriorating which was the case
with other corps’ deployed in the area of the territorial strategic focal point as well,
and it is obvious that the manning of units according to wartime formation had to
rely on support from the RS and the SRJ, or the ‘strength’ of the army was consciously
manipulated either to boost the morale of their own population or to attempt to de-
ter the Croatian leadership from the potential undertaking of military operations for
the purpose of liberating the occupied areas.
In accordance with this situation the only realistic danger which may have arisen
from the reorganization of the SVK was connected with the possibility of forming
maneuver forces and professional units.

2.3.2. Combat activities


A significant ‘problem’ for the ‘RSK’ remained to be the undefined ‘borders’ and
with the aim of ‘establishing and finally defining’ the same with the use of SVK forc-
es, and using the activities of the UNPROFOR in setting up checkpoints, the carry-
ing out of actions under the designation ‘Granica-94’ /Border 94/ started.82, 83, 84, 85

81 
7th Corps Command, 7th Corps wartime strength by wartime establishment.
82 
Raščlamba djelovanja neprijatelja u periodu 15. veljače do 17. ožujka 1994 – specifičnosti provođenja
strategije realne prijetnje /Analysis of enemy activities in the period from 15 February to 17 March
1994 – characteristics of the implementation of the strategy of real threat/, 17 March 1994.
83 
Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 21. do 28. ožujka 1994 /Analysis of intelli-
gence information for the period 21-28 March 1994/, 29 March 1994.
84 
Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 21. do 28. veljače 1994 /Analysis of intelli-
gence information for the period 21-28 February 1994/, 28 February 1994.
85 
Obavještajna informacija o tijeku realizacije operacije Granica-94 /Intelligence information on the
course of realization of operation Border 94/, 13 March 1994.

204
The goal of the action was to conduct fortifications and engineering work on the
most part of the existing separation lines which after the deployment of UNPRO-
FOR checkpoints would be designated as the ‘state border’.
This led to the systematic creation of new focal points of conflicts and their prov-
ocation was particularly directed at the area of Lika and Northern Dalmatia unlike
the previous situation, when the focal point of such activities was in the area of East-
ern Slavonia.
The purpose of provoking constant tensions and low intensity conflicts along
the entire ‘border’ was to demonstrate force on one hand which was intended to be
a factor of deterrence from a potential intention to conduct an offensive operation,
and on the other hand, they wanted to demonstrate that the integration of occupied
areas of the Republic of Croatia into its state and legal system was not possible, which
was intended to result in the prolongation of the UNPROFOR mandate at the time
and to keep the status of ‘krajinas’ (tr. remark: occupied areas of the RH) unchanged.
In this sense the transfer of the focus of activities of military provocation onto the
territorial strategic focal point was logical.
Engineering work was conducted in order to fortify the first zone of defense even
more but also to organize defense in depth which was intended to caution of the or-
ganization of a decisive defense and also to deter the RH from possibly carrying out
a military operation to liberate the occupied areas.
The GS SVK /Main Staff of the Serb Krajina Army/ issued an order to the corps’
on a systematic approach to conducting engineering work on old and new defense
positions, on the prohibition of entering negotiations and concluding ceasefire
agreements on the levels of local military commands, and across battlefields on all
occupied areas the number of ‘crisis’ points and the occurrence of provoking con-
flicts started to increase.
The Main Staff of the Yugoslav Army (GS VJ) brought a decision according to
which all officers from the composition of the VJ who had been sent as assistance to
the composition of the SVK, were to remain permanently in the composition of the
SVK (realization of the concept of one army), and various support by the VJ contin-
ued to increase.
The implementation of the agreement on ceasefire (first stage, pulling out artil-
lery weapons in depth and pulling out manpower from the zone of depth of 1 kilo-
meter from the separation line) was systematically delayed and hindered, which in
fact represented an attempt to realize the set out plan to ‘establish and protect the
borders’ as the main determinant of RSK’s statehood.

205
The artillery didn’t pull out to the defined locations, they even remained on the
same locations they were supposed to pull out from, and the manpower dressed in
civilian clothes or police uniforms continued to stay in the ‘demilitarized’ zone.
Every corps and brigade commander of the SVK received a Decision on the for-
mation of sector (regional) and local (municipal) commissions for determining and
making modifications of the separation line, and which were responsible for their
work to the central ‘republican’ commission led by General Mile Novaković, advisor
to the President of the RSK for military issues. The commissions were established
with the purpose to ‘interpret’ certain points of the agreement in order to ensure
modification of the agreed separation lines, or to keep the artillery within the pro-
hibited zone.86

2.3.3. A
 ttempts to improve the strategic position by occupying the
area of Western Bosnia
Undoubtedly the area of Western Bosnia, most of which was at that time under
the control of the forces of the A BiH 5th Corps and a smaller part under the control
of the forces of the People’s Defense of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
(NO APZB)87, was an area of strategic importance to the RSK,
• with respect to the possibility of maintaining the status of occupation of west-
ern parts of the RSK,
• And with respect to the potential aspirations to further threaten parts of the
territory of the Republic of Croatia.

This kind of importance of the area of Western Bosnia also arose from the facts
that this area (while under control of A BiH):
• Impaired traffic connections of the occupied areas of Banovina, Kordun
and Lika, and substantially of Northern Dalmatia as well, with the other ‘Serb
lands’,
86 
“ Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 18. do 25. travnja 1994” /Analysis of intelli-
gence information for the period from 18-25 April 1994/, 25 April 1994.
87 
These were paramilitary formations organized in the Cazin Krajina, composed of Bosnians loyal
to the local political leader Fikret Abdić, who fought against legal units of the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (forces of the 5th Corps under the command of General Atif Dudaković), and for poli-
tical and territorial autonomy of Western Bosnia from Bosnia and Herzegovina. These forces were
formed with the assistance and on the initiative of the Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Kra-
jina, thus they collaborated with the SVK forces.

‘Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I’, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 23.

206
• Significantly reduced operative depth of the forces of the 39th, 21st and 15th
Corps of the SVK, without which there was no possibility for a quality de-
fense, or any type of offensive activity (in the event of occupying the area of
Western Bosnia, operative depth would increase from the 25-30 kilometers
at the time to even 100 kilometers);
• Tied up a significant number of forces of the mentioned three SVK corps’
which due to this fact were not able to be engaged in the battlefield toward
the Republic of Croatia, and the forces of the 2nd Krajina Corps of the VRS,
which were supposed to serve as the strategic reserve of the SVK;
• Prevented an efficient defense of the occupied areas of the Republic of Croa-
tia (Banovina, Kordun, Lika, and Northern Dalmatia) in the case of an offen-
sive operation by the HV (Croatian Army).

In these kinds of conditions the carrying out of offensive activities by the joint
forces of the SVK and VRS in the area of Western Bosnia with the aim of crushing
the forces of the 5th Corps of A BiH and placing that area under VRS control, were to
be anticipated. The offensive operation in the area of Western Bosnia was launched
in the fall (September) of 1994.

Course of the operation in fall 1994


The course of the offensive operation of the ‘Serb’ armies in the area of Western
Bosnia is presented in somewhat more detail here, regarding the chronology and
content and the particular details of certain activities, in order to obtain a fuller view
of its significance in connection with the carrying out of operation ‘Storm’.
At the end of August the offensive operation of the 5th Corps of A BiH ended suc-
cessfully88 and led to crushing the forces of the NO APZB89 therefore it prevented the
earlier plan of the ‘Serb’ armies which was based on assessments that by a long-term
and exhausting combat between two Muslim (Bosnian) armies the overall strength
of the Bosnians in the area of Western Bosnia would also be weakened, which would
allow the Serb forces to more easily conduct an operation with the aim of placing
the right shore of the Una River and the Una railway under their control and subse-
quently the entire area of Western Bosnia.

88 
“Aktivnosti i namjere snaga SVK i VRS glede snaga 5. korpusa A BiH” /Activities and intentions of
SVK and VRS forces regarding the A BiH 5th Corps/ 5 September 1994.
89 
‘Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I’, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 49.

207
At the same time, the Serb ‘authorities’ in the occupied areas of Banovina and
Kordun were faced with a large number of refugees, civilians and members of mili-
tary units loyal to Fikret Abdić (a total of 19.000 – 20.000 men) deployed mostly in
the area of Turanj and Batnoga.
Assessing that the operative position of the forces of the A BiH 5th Corps was very
unfavorable, because they were:
• Encircled by ‘Serb’ armies,
• Engaged on a very long battlefield,
• Their abilities for manning the units were diminished due to the large num-
ber of refugees and conflicts with Abdić’s forces,
• Continuously exposed to the lack of heavy artillery weapons and tanks, and
• Any kind of logistic support was continuously hampered,
the Command of the 39th Corps of the SVK decided to carry out the attack.
Forces engaged in the attack on the Bojna – Golubići and Žirovac axes on 1 Sep-
tember 1994 were the forces of the 24th (Glina) lbr /light brigade/ and the aim of the
offensive operation was to place the northern part of Western Bosnia under Serb
forces’ control.90
However, by conducting a fast and well-organized counter-attack the forces of
the A BiH 5th Corps already on 2 September stopped and then on 2/3 September
crushed the forces of the attacker and broke trough to the border with the Republic
of Croatia. During the attack, and according to the reports of the Commander of the
39th Corps, the 24th lbr had 11 killed, 10 captured and dozens of wounded soldiers,
whereas the forces of the A BiH 5th Corps had 7 dead.
Since that period and onward, the forces of the VRS and SVK commenced with
preparations for the launching of a large-scale offensive operation in the area of West-
ern Bosnia with the aim of completely crushing the forces of the A BiH 5th Corps and
joining (connecting) ‘Serb lands’ (RS and ‘RSK’).
However, due to a lack of operative reserve and the forces for maneuver (there
are other active battlefields in BiH and the VRS doesn’t have the necessary reserve
forces) and also on the basis of an assessment that the forces of the A BiH 5th Corps
would not engage in offensive activities on a larger scale, the forces of the VRS and
the SVK, particularly those from the composition of the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps, in-
decisively and slowly prepared for an offensive operation.
90 
‘Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I’, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 37.

208
In order to relieve the pressure of the Serb forces which in the course of their
preparations for an offensive operation engaged in unsystematic and rather disor-
ganized (uncoordinated) combat (mainly artillery) activity against the forces of the
5th Corps, the units of the 5th Corps during September engaged in a series of small-
er (counter)-attacks thus forcing the forces of the 2nd Krajina Corps in the area of
Grabež and Otoka, and the forces of the 39th Banija Corps in the area of Bojna and
Žirovac, to transfer to defense and conduct a large number of sabotage operations in
the wider battlefield area.91
These types of activities by the forces of the 5th Corps undoubtedly slowed down
the preparations of the joint Serb forces for an offensive operation and also led the
forces of the 5th Corps to the point of entirely taking over the systematic initiative
across the entire battlefield.
In general terms, this however did not significantly change the operative position
of the forces of the A BiH 5th Corps which were still in encirclement, and exposed to
fatigue due to constant combat activities, hampered logistics and nearly no manning
possibilities.
Assessing that it was not possible to maintain a long-term initiative in these
kinds of conditions, and given the continuously anticipated pressures and somewhat
slowed down but nevertheless present preparations (reinforcements) of the Serb
forces for the offensive operation, units of the 5th Corps undertook an offensive op-
eration in the Bihać part of the battlefield.92
The operation was launched on 24 October93, with an attack on the following
(main) axes94:
• Grabež – Veliki Radić – Bosanska Krupa, and
• Bihać – Ripač – Bosanski Petrovac (Kulen Vakuf).

91 
I t needs to be mentioned that the units of the A BiH 5th Corps developed a specific doctrine of of-
fensive activities, with which they compensated for the lack of artillery. More precisely, by engag-
ing numerous sabotage groups in depth of enemy positions, on targets which were usually engaged
with artillery, they achieved even better results than if they were actually using artillery.
92 
Evidently, when this decision was made it was taken into account that other battlefields were also
active (Posavina, Kupres) which weakened the possibilities of the forces engaged in the Bihać bat-
tlefield which were forced into a position to even send reinforcements to other areas (Posavina).
93 
“Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 24. listopada do 31. listopada 1994” /Analysis
of intelligence information for the period from 24-31 October 1994/, 1 November 1994.
94 
‘Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I’, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 38.

209
- during the offensive activities on the Grabež part of the battlefield, the
lines of defense of the 17th Ključ and 15th Petrovac Brigade of the VRS
2nd Krajina Corps were breached and the Bihać – Bosanska Krupa traffic
route was cut off in the area of Veliki Radić.
- during 25 October the units of the A BiH 5th Corps succeeded in taking
control of the area up to the line Grmuša – Veliki Radić – Ripač – Lo-
hovska brda.
- during 26 October offensive activities continued with the engagement on
the majority of forces on the Ripač – Gorjevac – Vrtoče (Kulen Vakuf)
axis and with smaller forces on the Grmuša – Kezlovac – Mali Radić axis.
- until the end of the day the forces of the 5th Corps in the south part took
control of the line Lohovo – Račić brdo – Veliki Ljutoč – trig point 707 –
Gorjevac.

Forces of the 5th Corps also captured (took control of military storages) large
amounts of weapons and ammunition (3 tanks, destroyed 7 tanks and captured a
division-size number of 105mm howitzers).
Replenishment with ammunition and weapons and the disintegration of the sys-
tem of defense of VRS units led to the continuation of offensive activities, and so
units of the 5th Corps reached the line Mali Radić – Vrtoče – Kulen Vakuf on 28 Oc-
tober, and in the northern part until 30 October they established control over the
Bihać – Bosanska Krupa traffic route and placed Bosanska Krupa in encirclement.
However, the main goal of the operation – linking with the forces of the A BiH
7 Corps which were carrying out attacks from the direction of Kupres was not ac-
th

complished, and until 30 October the VRS and SVK forces took a series of measures
to prevent the attack of the units of the A BiH 5th Corps and to create conditions to
transfer into a counterattack.
It is without a doubt that the insurmountable obstacles in the continuation of of-
fensive activities of the 5th Corps were the following:
- inability to introduce fresh forces;
- deep breach (wedge) in the direction of Kulen Vakuf without the possibility
to secure the flanks and
- a lacking and hampered logistics support.

210
On the other hand:
• Radovan Karadžić declared a state of war alongside a notice to all military
conscripts to report to their units no later than 30 October;
• Numerous reinforcements and volunteers were sent to the western-Bosnian
battlefield, among others members of the SVK (600 men from the 11th Corps,
a Special Police platoon from Okučani, 1 battalion from the composition of
the 7th Knin Corps to the area of Drvar, and a company from the composition
of a special battalion of the RSK RSUP /Republican Secretariat of the Inte-
rior/ was transferred from Plaški to the Bihać battlefield etc.)
• A general mobilization was announced in Bosanski Petrovac and Drvar of
conscripts from the ages of 18 to 55;
• The ‘Pantere’ /Panther/ special battalion from the composition of the East-
Bosnian Corps of the VRS was sent as reinforcement to the Bihać battlefield;
• Every corps of the VRS gathered volunteer companies and deployed the same
to the western-Bosnian battlefield;
• An operative command of VRS forces was established under the code name
‘Pauk’ /Spider/, and the Chief of the Main Staff of the VRS, Colonel Gener-
al Manojlo Milovanović, was assigned as the Commander of this operative
command.

At the beginning of November 1994 the operation of the joint forces of the VRS
and SVK was launched95 and until 15 November the first stage of the operation was
basically accomplished in the course of which the forces of the 2nd Krajina Corps re-
gained the majority of the area lost during the previous operation by the forces of the
5th Corps and regained control of the area of the Grabež plateau, and with the par-
ticipation of the forces from the composition of the 15th Lika Corps they put Bihać in
danger (they reached the line Lohovska Brda, Golubić, Ripač, Pritoka).96
Immediately after, the 2nd stage of the operation started with the engagement of
the forces of the 21st and 39th SVK Corps and the forces of the NO APZB97. The goal
of this stage of the operation was to increase pressure on the Kordun-Banovina part
95 
“ Operativni položaj i prosudba namjera snaga VRS i SVK na području Zapadne Bosne” /Opera-
tive position and assessment of intentions of VRS and SVK forces in the area of Western Bosnia/,
13 November 1994.
96 
Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I’, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 39.
97 
“Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 15. do 24. studenog 1994” /Analysis of intel-
ligence information for the period from 15-24 November 1994/, 25 November 1994.

211
of the battlefield with maximum use of the pressure of returning refugees to the Ca-
zin Krajina.
General Milovanović then issued an announcement98, calling the forces of the 5th
Corps of the A BiH to surrender with the threat that otherwise:
the VRS will be forced to pursue members of the 5th Corps wherever they may
be, which will make the separation of those who are guilty from the innocent
more difficult and lead to the suffering of a large number of innocent Muslim
civilians. (tr. remark: free translation)
Given the extremely difficult situation in the area of Western Bosnia, on 18 No-
vember 1994 President Tuđman addressed the President of the Security Council of
the UN, Madeleine Albright. He informed her of the attacks by the rebel Croatian
Serbs on Bihać. Regarding the same, he requested assistance from the UN or rather
air strikes on Serb forces.
On 19 November 1994 the UN Security Council brought Resolution 958. It in-
cluded a reminder of Resolution 836 which expressed the concern over the deterio-
ration of the situation in Bihać. The Resolution confirmed the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia which was obviously a manner of saying
that the Serbs from the UNPA areas cannot attack Bihać. It was stated in the conclu-
sion of the Resolution that air strikes were going to be implemented for the purpose
of protecting Bihać and that those air strikes could be implemented on targets in
Croatia as well.
The same day the UN Security Council also brought Resolution 959. It con-
demned any form of violation of the internationally recognized borders of the Re-
public of Croatia with Bosnia and Herzegovina and demanded from all participants
in the conflict and particularly the Krajina Serbs to fully respect the borders and to
refrain form their violation which also related to attacks on Bihać.
As the conditions were gradually being fulfilled for the 3rd stage of the operation i.e.
the fall of the protected area of Bihać and crushing the 5th Corps of the A BiH, NATO
forces conducted an air strike on 21 November on the Udbina airport and on 23 No-
vember it also attacked VRS targets in the area of the western-Bosnian battlefield.99

98 
‘Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 24. studenog do 5. prosinca’ /Analysis of in-
telligence information for the period from 24 November to 5 December/, 5 December 1994.
99 
‘Operacija zračnih snaga NATO na području Zapadne Bosne (23.11.1994)’ /NATO Air Force Op-
eration in Western Bosnia (23 November 1994)/, Intelligence Administration of the GS HV /Croa-
tian Army Main Staff/, 23 November 1994.

212
Even though the offensive operation in the area of Western Bosnia was not there-
by entirely prevented its intensity was significantly diminished and a humanitarian
disaster was prevented which would have occurred with the fall of Bihać, and the
delivery of humanitarian aid was enabled for the area of Cazin Krajina and Bihać.
This outcome of the offensive operation undisputedly pointed out some signifi-
cant shortcomings in its planning and execution:
• Lack of maneuver forces and forces for fast breaches in depth of the oppo-
nent, which enabled the forces of the 5th Corps to organize their defense on
the battlefield because there was no need to organize defense in depth of the
territory, and in this manner they were able to ensure some kind of reserve to
replace the forces which were exhausted the most during combat activities;
• Protracted carrying out (leading) of the operation left enough time for the
international community to react, which couldn’t allow a humanitarian cri-
sis of great proportion and a large number of civilian casualties which would
certainly take place as General Milovanović himself announced in his threat;
• Insufficient coordination of activities of the forces of the VRS, SVK and NO
APZB, with respect to time, goals and forms of activity.
• Acute lack of manpower for manning the units of the SVK (and VRS) led to
excessive exhaustion of the engaged manpower which in combination with a
lack of motivation and the increasing feeling of having no perspective signifi-
cantly lowered morale and the efficiency of the manpower and units.

Attacks in the area of Western Bosnia continued with lower intensity in the first
half of 1995 when the forces of the 5th Corps of the A BiH managed to achieve certain
advances in the southeast and east part of the battlefield with respect to the forces
of the 2nd Krajina Corps but lost a part of the territory in the northwestern part of
the battlefield where the forces attacking were the forces of the ‘Spider’ Operative
Group100 composed primarily of members of the NO APZB who were trained and
commanded over by instructors from the SDB SRJ /State Security Service of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia/.
The importance of occupying the area of Western Bosnia is illustrated in the let-
ter which the Commander of the 2nd Krajina Corps, Brigadier Radivoje Tomanić,
sent to the VRS Main Staff on 16 February 1995, to General Manojlo Milovanović
personally.101
100 
‘Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I’, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 55.
2 Krajina Corps Command, str. conf. no.: 3-36 dated 16 February 1995.
101  nd

213
In his letter he reported on the meeting that the President of the Serb Republic
Radovan Karadžić organized in Grahovo on 15 February 1995, where he met with
government representatives in the municipalities within the area of responsibility of
the 2nd Krajina Corps and brigade commanders from the composition of the same
corps and officers from the Corps Command.
In informing the VRS Main Staff of the content of Radovan Karadžić’s presenta-
tion, Tomanić stated that he said that:
The A BiH 5th Corps must be destroyed, that he was decisive, and not to have
rumors circulating that the international community and the political leader-
ship prevented the fall of Bihać....He pointed out that Bihać was the key to the
war and that’s why he was asking to cooperate with the RSK and solve – destroy
the 5th Corps of the A BiH.
The report ended with the conclusion: the President didn’t make any specific con-
clusions, aside from saying that the country will attempt to use the ceasefire to ensure
ammunition and fuel for the needs of the VRS, and that the 5th Corps of the A BiH
needed to be crushed, and that plans were made to establish a joint Council of Defense
of the RS and RSK. (tr. remark: free translation)
The importance of Bihać is also demonstrated in the statement from the book
‘Balkan Battlegrounds’102 where in the Annex 62 Operation ‘Zima-94’ /Winter 94/
the following is stated:
Although a resounding battlefield success, Operation “Zima 94” failed to achie-
ve its immediate strategic objective of relieving Serb pressure on Bihać. This was
not a reflection on the HV/HVO strategy but rather the result of a conscious
choice made by the VRS Main Staff to continue its assault on the enclave rather
than detach troops to relieve the threatened sector. This reflected the perpetual
strategic dilemma faced by the VRS Main Staff—the lack of strategic and ope-
rational-level troop reserves. The difficult choice forced on Mladić and Milova-
nović in 1994 would be amplified during 1995.
The VRS’s failure to shift forces to cover Livno, however, definitely contributed
to the Croats’ success in achieving the second important objective of the campa-
ign. The HV’s goal was to bite off a portion of Serb territory in the Dinara-Liv-
no sector so that HV troops might eventually reach positions from which they
could more easily strike Knin, the Krajina Serb capital. Despite their long fron-
102 
‘Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume II’, Central
Intelligence Agency, October 2003, Annex 62, page 547.

214
tages and limited resources, the VRS defenders rallied enough to slow the able
HV assault and stop the HVO. If the VRS command had been able or willing to
commit more units to the battle, the HV gains could have been curtailed even
further. That might have made it more difficult for the HV to position itself for
its mid-1995 offensive in time to defeat the RSK.
Even though the aforementioned sufficiently demonstrates the importance for
the Serbs to crush the A BiH 5th Corps, the significance of crushing the forces of the
5th Corps of the A BiH and the occupation of that area is even better demonstrated in
the urgent letter103 that the Commander of the 2nd Krajina Corps Radivoje Tomanić
sent to the VRS Main Staff, directly to the Commander of the VRS Ratko Mladić.
Providing information regarding his conversation with General Mrkšić with
whom he met in Bosansko Grahovo on 22 May 1995, during which it was stated that:
this kind of behavior by the SVK and the NO APZB is untenable because this Muslim
corps while being in complete encirclement is successfully battling three SVK corps’, the
2nd Krajina Corps and members of the NO APZB, and he asked the Commander of
the VRS Main Staff that he together with General Mrkšić evaluate the possibility and
urgently devise a joint plan for an operation to crush and destroy the 5th Corps of the
A BiH because it is imperative for the RS and the RSK........because it would achieve
strategic goals in this decisive and difficult time. (tr. remark: free translation)
And the time referred to above was the time when Operation ‘Skok-1’ /Jump 1/
and Operation ‘Bljesak’ /Flash/ had already been carried out.

103 
2nd Krajina Corps Command, str. conf. no. 701-18, dated 27 February 1995.

215
3.

INEFFICIENT UNPROFOR MANDATE


WAS NO GUARANTY OF PEACEFUL
REINTEGRATION

Introduction
The documents from the time when the UNPROFOR mission was carried out in
the area of the Republic of Croatia clearly show that the basic tasks of the UNPRO-
FOR mandate were not carried out in the manner they were supposed to be carried
out nor was it realistic to expect that they would be carried out in a foreseeable peri-
od of time. A known fact can be confirmed that the UNPROFOR mandate was ineffi-
cient and that there were no guaranties it was going to ensure the peaceful reintegra-
tion of the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia into its state and legal system.
Numerous factors influenced the inefficiency of the UNPROFOR mandate and
the most significant factor was certainly the lack of political decisiveness and agree-
ment of the most relevant international factors to recognize and prevent the project
of creating the ‘Greater Serbia’.
In these conditions, what seemed to be the biggest problem was the unwilling-
ness of Knin to agree to any type of modality of integration into the state and legal
system of the Republic of Croatia and the UNPROFOR didn’t have a mandate which
could force them into agreeing to the same. The UNPROFOR offered nothing more
but a status quo or monitoring of unsuccessful agreements on ceasefires or separa-
tion of conflicted ‘parties’.
The status quo was absolutely unacceptable for the Republic of Croatia because it
signified the obstruction of any kind of development and functional survival of the

217
State, precisely as it was worded by the creator of the Serb-Krajina ‘strategy of real
threat’: Croatia as a state has been condemned to a long and agonizing death…
Furthermore, future military-occupational intentions of the ‘Serb armies’ were
also directed toward the area of Western Bosnia, an enclave which with its geograph-
ical position presented a large obstacle toward a quality unification of the ‘Serb lands’
(‘RSK’ and RS). The potential success of a combined offensive operation by the SVK
and the VRS would not only lead to a humanitarian crisis and a new genocide in the
area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it would also bring the so-called ‘Republic of
Serb Krajina’ into a significantly more favorable geo-strategic position with respect
to the Republic of Croatia, which would make more achievable the carrying out of
further conquering intentions, and less achievable the reintegration of the UNPA ar-
eas into the state and legal system of the Republic of Croatia.
Concurrently, the Serb conquering intentions toward the enclaves in Bosnia and
Herzegovina were being realized which were accompanied with ethnic cleansing for
the purpose of ensuring ethnic homogeneousness of the envisaged ‘Greater Serbia’.
According to information stated in the document of the UN Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination104 dated September 1993, it is stated that 9.998
people were forcefully relocated from the UNPA areas in the period from April 1992
to September 1993. These persons were relocated under the escort of UN representa-
tives. Without the help of the UN, another 13.470 persons were exiled from the UN-
PA areas and the ‘pink zones’ thus the total number of persons who were exiled after
the UN assumed responsibility of the protected areas reached 23.470. In the same
period of time 273 persons were killed in the UNPA areas.
Even though these processes were occurring ‘before the eyes’ of the UNPROFOR
and there were no indications from their side that they were going to do anything to
prevent it. It can be established that the inefficiency of the UNPROFOR was one of
the basic reasons for the State leadership to bring a decision to use military means for
the purpose of liberating the then occupied areas of the state territory.

104 
 nited Nations, International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina-
U
tion, CERD/C/249, 17 September 1993, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Forty-third session.

218
3.1. Establishment of the UNPROFOR
3.1.1. A
 ggression against Croatia and Croatian efforts in
establishing peace
In order to protect itself, Croatia has from the beginning of the aggression made
efforts to internationalize the issue and call in the peace forces. It wasn’t successful
among other things due to the fact that it still wasn’t recognized as an independent
state (independent international subject) therefore it needed the approval (accord)
of the Yugoslav authorities for the arrival of peace forces.
This wasn’t convenient for Yugoslavia (Serbia) at that time because its authorities
were counting on defeating with its military means the defense of Croatia which was
still in the process of creation, and thus occupy parts of its territory which in accor-
dance with the idea of the ‘Greater Serbia’ were supposed to enter the composition
of this formation.
Only later, after the JNA and the local paramilitary Serb troops occupied near-
ly one third of the Croatian state territory and when Croatia’s military capabilities
started to grow, the then Yugoslav authorities started to move in favor of the arrival
of UN peace forces.
As the events that followed have clearly demonstrated, the cessation of war ac-
tivities and the establishment of peace in Croatia were needed by Serbia as well in
order to disencumber forces which would be used to carry out the aggression in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina.

3.1.2. C
 hronology of the acceptance of the Vance Plan and the
establishment of the UNPA areas
• 25 September 1991 – Resolution 713 imposed an embargo on armament on
all republics of the SFRJ. The JNA and Serbia used their supremacy in arma-
ment and intensify an open war against Croatia.
• 26 October 1991 – JNA withdrawal from Slovenia completed.
• 20 November 1991 – After destroying the town with artillery fire, JNA took
control of Vukovar. After the occupation it conducted crimes: executions of
civilians, prisoners of war and the wounded.
• 23 November 1991 – In Geneva a ceasefire agreement is signed and the Vance
Plan of UN Peacekeeping Mission is accepted. The agreement is signed by
Croatia, Serbia and the JNA.

219
• 02 January 1992 – the Sarajevo Ceasefire Agreement is signed by which the
agreement on the cessation of war activities signed in Geneva became opera-
tional.
• 15 January 1992 – beginning of the process of international recognition of
the Republic of Croatia as an independent and sovereign state.
• 21 February 1992 – by Resolution 743 the Security Council establishes the
UN Peacekeeping Mission, UNPROFOR, and orders the peace operation to
start as soon as possible. Vance’s concept was declared the Peacekeeping plan
of the UNPROFOR Mission.

At the time just prior to the signing of the Sarajevo Cease-fire Agreement, Croa-
tia was already considerably militarily organized and strengthened and in several
places it successfully carried out operations for the liberation of occupied territory.
This was particularly significant in the area of Western Slavonia where, precisely as
the result of Croatia’s orientation toward a peaceful solution, further continuation of
the successful operation by the Croatian army which would have probably liberated
that area even then, was stopped.
At the end of June and the beginning of July 1992, approx. 6 months after the
signing of the Sarajevo Cease-fire Agreement, the deployment of the UNPROFOR to
every UNPA sector was concluded. At that time, the UNPA areas were nearly com-
pletely ethnically cleansed of Croats and other inhabitants of non-Serb nationalities.
The remaining population of non-Serb nationality who stayed in these areas was ex-
posed to constant discrimination, terror and pressures to leave these areas.

3.1.3. UNPROFOR/UNCRO mandate


The mandate of the UNPROFOR consisted of the Peacekeeping Plan (Vance
Plan) and other tasks and functions determined by the resolutions of the UN Secu-
rity Council.
The Vance Plan105 envisaged, in a brief outline, the following:
• establishment and demilitarization of UNPA areas therefore withdrawing
and demobilizing every armed force besides the UNPROFOR. Deployment
of military observers (UNMO) to the UNPA areas in order to monitor and
verify the demilitarization; Withdrawal of the JNA from all areas of the Re-
public of Croatia;

105 
Concept for a UN peace keeping operation in Yugoslavia.

220
• establishment of civilian police in accordance with the ethnic composition
prior to the breakout of conflicts and CIVPOL supervision of the work of the
local police stations for the purpose of protecting human rights and prevent-
ing all forms of discrimination, regardless nationality, religion, etc.;
• return of all displaced persons and refugees to their homes in the UNPA ar-
eas and protection of the population in the UNPA areas from fear of armed
assaults.

The protective role the international forces of the UN were supposed to fulfill
envisaged deploying forces in depth of the UNPA areas, and with respect to the bor-
der lines of the UNPA areas it envisaged the establishment of checkpoints on traffic
routes. The protective role was intended to be assumed simultaneously with the pro-
cess of demilitarization. The deployment of military forces of the UN between the
conflicting parties was intended only in the UNPA areas and on the border UNPA
areas as well. The purpose of the presence of protection military forces of the UN was
to ensure conditions in which the UNPA could be demilitarized and to prevent inter-
ethnic conflicts after the return of displaced persons of non-Serb nationality.
The Vance plan envisaged the UNPROFOR mandate to be temporary without
prejudging a political solution. Concurrently with the UNPROFOR peacekeeping
operation, a political negotiating process was also envisaged. This process was led
by the ICFY106. Even though the plan envisaged establishment of three UNPA areas,
four UNPA areas were formed which operated as UN Sectors ‘East’, ‘West’, ‘North’
and ‘South’107. The implementation of the UNPROFOR mandate was envisaged sole-
ly in the UNPA areas.
Resolution 762 dated 30 June 1992 approved the Plan of the Secretary General
of the UN contained in point 16 of his report dated 26 June 1992 which determined
the priority reintegration of the ‘pink zones’ into the RH108:
• the JNA must withdraw into the FR Yugoslavia, and until the withdrawal all
heavy weaponry must be placed in UN custody;
• the Croatian Army and other armed units must withdraw from the ‘pink
zones’;
• CIVPOL would be deployed with the aim of re-establishment of Croatian au-
thority in these areas;
106 
I nternational Conference on Former Yugoslavia.
107 
‘Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I’, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map ‘J’.
108 
Report of the UN Secretary-General dated 30 June 1992.

221
• A joint commission would be established under the chairmanship of the UN-
PROFOR and consisting of representatives of the Government of the Re-
public of Croatia and the local ‘Serb’ authorities with the participation of the
European Community to oversee the process of the restoration of Croatian
authority in the ‘pink zones’.

The ‘pink zones’ were the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia which ac-
cording to the Vance plan were not a part of the UNPA areas. The majority of these
zones were in Sector South.
Resolutions 815 (1993), 871 (1993), 947 (1994) determined that the negotiating
solution for the status of the UNPA areas should be explored within the framework
of their reintegration in the Republic of Croatia. The stated was also expressed in the
Declaration on the ‘Situation in the occupied areas of Croatia’ which the General As-
sembly of the UN brought on 9 December 1994. FR Yugoslavia was asked to respect
the territorial integrity of Croatia and to immediately cease all administrative, mili-
tary and traffic measures of integration of the UNPA areas into its own composition.
FR Yugoslavia was also asked to immediately end all military and logistic support to
the self-proclaimed Serb authorities in the UNPA areas and a request was also made
that Croatia and FR Yugoslavia mutually recognize their independence in their in-
ternationally recognized borders.
The UNCRO Mission was established with Resolution 981109 dated 31 March
1995. Since the UNPROFOR was not able to initiate the implementation of the
Vance plan in three years, the Government of the Republic of Croatia decided to re-
scind its accord for the continuation of the peacekeeping mission. Under diplomatic
pressure of the international community, and particularly the USA, the Republic of
Croatia agreed to the continuation of the peacekeeping mission, but with certain
modifications. The proposal of the Republic of Croatia for the modification of the
peacekeeping plan was not adopted, but the request for reorganization and separation
of the peace missions was. Separation was carried out at the request of the Republic
of Croatia and Macedonia, while Bosnia and Herzegovina was in accordance with
requesting changes in the functioning of the UNPROFOR.
The following were formed: UNCRO110 Mission for Croatia, UNPROFOR111 Mis-
sion for Bosnia and Herzegovina and UNPREDEP112 Mission for Macedonia. The or-
109 
 N Resolution 981.
U
110 
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation.
111 
United Nation Protection Forces.
112 
United Nation Preventive Deployment.

222
ganizational structure of the missions was defined in paragraph 84 of the Report113 of
the UN Secretary-General dated 22 March 1995. The stated missions are marked in
the report under the designators UNPF-1, UNPF-2 and UNPF-3. In the new struc-
ture the following is significant:
• The Missions will operate independently and each will have a civilian Chief
of Mission at the assistant secretary-general level and would have its own
military commander;
• In order to avoid the expenses and in view of the interlinked nature of the
problems, overall command and control of the stated peacekeeping opera-
tions would be exercised the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG) and the Theatre Force Commander;
• The theatre headquarters (UNPF HQ) would be in Zagreb and the admin-
istrative, logistical and public information responsibilities would be coordi-
nated there;

Even though the Resolution 981 unequivocally set the request for the separation
of the operative elements of the missions, this was not carried out in practice. Instead
of limiting itself only to the coordination of the logistical, administrative and public
information responsibilities, the UNPF HQ directly subordinated the UNMO and
CIVPOL to itself, thus their field reports were not even sent to the UNCRO HQ but
directly to the UNPF HQ.
Given that all of the key functions were in fact centralized in the UNPF HQ;
the importance of the UNCRO Chief of Mission and the UNCRO Mission Military
Commander was marginalized and insignificant. The reorganization of the mission
resulted in an unchanged status and additional accumulation of paper work.
The UNCRO mandate was the following:
• The Peacekeeping plan remained the same (Vance plan)
• Tasks of UN forces were defined in the CeaseFire Agreement dated 29 March
1994 (surveillance and verification of the separation of forces)
• Facilitating the implementation of the Economic Agreement dated 2 Decem-
ber 1994 were verified
• Controlling, by monitoring and reporting, the crossing of military personnel,
equipment, supplies and weapons over the international borders of the RH
and BiH and the RH and Yugoslavia
113 
Report of the UN Secretary-General dated 22 March 1995.

223
• Monitoring the demilitarization of the area of the Prevlaka peninsula taken
over from the UNMOP Mission
• Facilitating to the delivery of humanitarian aid for BiH across RH territory
• Implementation of all prior relevant Security Council resolutions

Resolution unequivocally defined in point 5 that the negotiations on the solution


can be searched only in alignment with the reintegration of UNPA areas in the RH
while respecting civil rights of all communities.
On the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNCRO was allowed to use mili-
tary force only for the purpose of self-defense and ensuring own freedom of move-
ment.

3.2. Inefficiency of the UNPROFOR / UNCRO


The implementation of the mandate of the UNPROFOR and later UNCRO was
not based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which means that the UNPROFOR/
UNCRO was not able to apply force in the implementation of its mandate. Use of
force was permitted only in self-defense and later for the purpose of ensuring its own
freedom of movement. The implementation of the mandate depended solely on the
willingness of the parties to respect the signed agreements and resolutions of the Se-
curity Council. However, aside from the stated, UNPROFOR/UNCRO had a signifi-
cant possibility of influencing the development of events.

3.2.1. O
 bstructions of the Vance Plan and the Security Council’s
Resolutions
The only fulfilled element of the Vance plan was the withdrawal of the JNA from
RH, at least formal. In fact, in the occupied areas the JNA in most cases merely
transformed into the milicija /militia/, territorial defense or the Serb Krajina Army
(SVK), which never ceased to function without the support of the JNA or rather the
Yugoslav Army (VJ) later on.
Given that the basic goal of the Serb rebellion and the JNA aggression against the
RH was the secession of the occupied parts from the Republic of Croatia, the Knin
authorities did not agree to solutions which would lead toward reintegration of those
areas into the RH, which is evident in the following evaluations:

224
• David Owen, the Co-Chairman of the International Conference on Former
Yugoslavia at the time, wrote in his book that he and Cyrus Vance, the other
Co- Chairman of the same Conference, visited the UNPA areas on 19 and 20
November 1992. It became clear wrote Owen, that the Vance plan is not be-
ing implemented. A part of the Plan was to rebuild the Maslenica bridge in
order for the continental part of Croatia to establish connection with the Dal-
matia region. However in the Knin negotiations the Krajina Serb leadership
refused to support anything other than the secession from Croatia or rather
the existence of an independent Serb republic in parts of Croatian territory.114
• In his report S/25777 dated 15 May 1993 regarding the UNPROFOR man-
date, the UN Secretary-General expressed his concern over the current sit-
uation in the UNPA areas and the ‘pink zones’. At that occasion, the UN
Secretary-General concluded that the UNPROFOR did not succeed in im-
plementing the peacekeeping plan in Croatia due to the refusal of the Serbs
to agree to the principle, as stated in the report, that the only basis for pacifi-
cation is their acceptance of Croatia’s sovereignty in exchange for guaranty-
ing their minority rights.
• The UNPROFOR Civil Affairs Coordinator (CAC) in Sector South, Jeannie
Peterson, in her letter dated 25 March 1993 sent to the Deputy Chief of Mis-
sion and the Head of Civil Affairs, Cedric Thornberry, stated the following:
Croatian expectations for the return of resettled persons to the areas occu-
pied by the Serbs were large, and this was not accomplished. Croatia is now
requesting the same amount of determination in the attempts to find a pea-
ceful solution in Croatia, with the implementation of the Security Council’s
resolution and under the auspices of the International Conference on Former
Yugoslavia, in the same manner as with respect to Bosnia. They are propo-
sing a continuation of 6 months for a reinforced UNPROFOR mandate.
The Serb side has become determined to keep the occupied territory for cen-
turies and obtain the recognition of its state (RSK). They claim that those
areas were never a part of the Croatian state and insist on the equal right
to self-determination as other territories of the former Yugoslavia. The local
authorities may....)115 (tr. remark: free translation)

114 
 avid OWEN, Balkanska Odiseja, Zagreb 1998, pg 106-107.
D
115 
Letter by Jeannie Peterson dated 25 March 1993 sent to the Deputy Chief of Mission and Head of
Civil Affairs, Cedric Thornberry.

225
• The President of the Republic of Croatia in his letter to the UN Secretary-
General dated 21 March 1995116 requested a change of the peacekeeping plan
while neither the stated peacekeeping plan was being implemented nor there
were no other achievements which would suggest that the Serb insurgents
were going to accept reintegration into the Republic of Croatia. The letter
also stated that in the course of the duration of the UNPROFOR Mission not
a single displaced person returned to the UNPA areas and another 600 or so
people of non-Serb nationality were killed at the time of UNPROFOR’s pres-
ence in the UNPA areas, and another 12.000 were exiled from the same areas.

No resolution of the Security Council has averted the Knin authorities from their
intentions to create, and with the use of military means, maintain the status of occu-
pation and their own ‘state’ in the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia. To them,
the resolutions represented a violation of the Vance plan and they based their posi-
tion on the provision which stated that the UN mission was not going to prejudge a
final solution. This is referred to in the internal memorandum of the ICFY dated 14
February 1994117 where McLeod informed Stoltenberg of the following:
3. The Vance Plan stated that implementation of the plan did not prejudge the
final political solution, and this is an element that Knin hangs on to. However,
resolution 815 and others have specified that the UNPAs are an integral part
of the Republic of Croatia, rather prejudging the final political solution. This is
the first problem.
The stance of the Government of the ‘RSK’ was that it can negotiate with Croatia
only from the position of an ‘independent and sovereign’ ‘state’. In accordance with
the same, the subject of negotiations cannot be any of the documents of the UN Se-
curity Council requesting the integration of the ‘RSK’ (UNPA) in the Republic of
Croatia. Negotiations can only be held on the ceasefire and the separation of the
‘RSK’ and the Republic of Croatia.
The position of the ‘RSK’ Government on the resolutions of the Security Council
was the following: The RSK Assembly has authorized the Government of the ‘RSK’
to conduct a revision of all resolutions whose provisions are contrary to the premise
of the Vance plan according to which they would not prejudge a political solution.
In this sense the ‘RSK’ Government was supposed to work on the revision of resolu-
tions 762, 769, 815 and 820. The ‘RSK’ Government rejected these resolutions at its
116 
 etter from the President of the Republic of Croatia to the UN Secretary-General.
L
117 
ICFY Memorandum from McLeod to Stoltenberg, 14 February, 1994.

226
session in Beli Manastir held on 10 October 1993. For this reason the Government
of the ‘RSK’ was obligated to insist on the changes of these resolutions with the UN
Security Council, the Co-Chairman of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia and
the UNPROFOR. According to this the following would have to be discarded from
the resolutions, the term ‘pink zones’ from Resolution 762, and from Resolution 769
the postulation on the application of Croatian customs and other regulations on the
borders with the UNPA areas with other states, from Resolution 815 the provision on
the UNPA areas as a constituent part of Croatian territory and from Resolution 820
the postulation that the Croatian side would have to give permission for the traffic of
merchandise in and out of the UNPA areas. It is evident that the Krajina Serbs were
rejecting the postulations of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.
Speaking of the signed agreements between Zagreb and Knin, the following can
also be observed:
The Zagreb Agreement on Ceasefire and the separation of forces was signed
on 29 March 1994. For the Croatian side, the ceasefire was intended to be an intro-
duction into the reconstruction of traffic and infrastructural connections with the
UNPA areas which would further lead to their reintegration in Croatia. However,
the ceasefire was convenient for the Serb leadership on the ‘western border’ with the
RH due to the strategic turning point in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Eleven days ear-
lier, on 18 March 1994 the Washington Agreement was signed which established an
alliance between the A BiH and the HVO, and this presented a direct threat to the
Serb forces in general.
However, even aside from the above stated, the SVK didn’t respect the basic
guidelines of the Zagreb Agreement. The Agreement, among other things, envisaged
the withdrawal of artillery weapons (depending on the range) from zones of certain
depth from the separation line and placing those weapons to locations under super-
vision of the UNPROFOR.
These are only some of the examples of this type of breaches of the agreement,
and the fact that they occupied artillery or rocket positions along the very line of sep-
aration is undisputed evidence of the intentions of the implementation of the ‘strat-
egy of reprisal’ and are in no case evidence to the ‘needs of organizing the defense’.
• On 13 February 1995 the unmanned aerial vehicle took photographs of firing
positions for a 130mm artillery battery (4 pieces)118 not far from the settlement
Draksenić (in the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina), on the right shore of the

118 
Marked location on a map and an aerial photography of occupied firing positions.

227
Una and Sava rivers, directed toward the area of the Republic of Croatia (prob-
able targets in the area of Novska or rather Kutina).
• On 8 May 1995 an UAV took photographs of a firing position for an ‘Orkan’
VLR /multiple rocket launcher/119 whose position not far (6 kilometers of air
distance) from the separation line (battlefield) clearly points out the intention
of operating on ‘targets’ in depth of the free territory of the RH, which was con-
ducted on 2 May 1995 during operation ‘Flash’ when Zagreb was fired on from
those positions.
• In cases when heavy weaponry was placed under the supervision of the UN-
PROFOR, the units of the SVK used various justifications and motives to ex-
tract those weapons from UNPROFOR custody.120
• Information regarding preparations, implementation and the targets of the of-
fensive operation in the area of Western Bosnia are presented in Chapter 4 in
order to demonstrate that these were activities which with respect to their scope,
the forces used and duration could not have passed unnoticed by UNPROFOR
members and if they did pass unnoticed, than this is evidence of the lack of in-
terest of the UNPROFOR for carrying out the tasks of their mandate.

The Economic Agreement between Zagreb and Knin was signed on 2 December
1994 which included the opening for traffic of the highway through Western Slavo-
nia.
This agreement was supposed to represent the next step in the reintegration of
the occupied areas in the Croatian state. However, the Economic Agreement was
extremely significant for the ‘Serb’ lands and armies as well, for which any kind of
abatement toward the RH was convenient with respect to conducting combat activi-
ties in the area of Western Bosnia. In December 1994 the joint Serb forces were car-
rying out one of their largest operations in the area of Western Bosnia. Bihać was
about to fall and the RH was faced with a decision on immediate military interven-
tion.
Due to the disregard of the assumed responsibilities, the RH sent a series of pro-
tests to the UNPROFOR and later to UNCRO. For demonstrational purposes, only
some are stated here:

119 
 arked location on a map and an aerial photography of firing positions.
M
120 
Raščlamba obavještajnih informacija za razdoblje od 18. do 25. srpnja 1994 /Analysis of Intelli-
gence Information for the period from 18-25 July 1994/, 26 July 1994.

228
9 August 1992
Letter from General A. Tus, Chief of the GSHV, sent to General Satish Nambiar,
Commander of the UNPROFOR.121 UNPROFOR was requested to prevent the shell-
ing of Slavonski Brod and other towns and settlements and that the UNPROFOR re-
establish its checkpoint in the village of D. Varoš which was after the withdrawal of
the UNPROFOR occupied by rebel Serb forces and the same were opening infantry
fire from the stated checkpoint on the village of Pivare.

9 April 1993
A letter from Defense Minister Gojko Šušak sent to General L. E. Wahlgren,
Commander of UNPROFOR forces122. In the letter, the Defense Minister warned of
the continuous attacks by Serb paramilitary forces in the areas of Zadar and Šibenik
and the UNPROFOR was requested to take necessary steps to increase the strength of
UNPROFOR forces in Sector ‘South’, particularly along the battlefield and in localities
of the grouping of aggressor artillery...in order to in the spirit of the signed agreement
in Geneva establish supervision of the aggressor artillery which is a prerequisite for the
implementation of quoted agreement and the UN Security Council Resolutions 815 and
802. (tr. remark: free translation)

8 June 1993
A letter from the Defense Minister Gojko Šušak sent to General L. E. Wahlgren,
Commander of UNPROFOR forces123.
The letter contains a protest regarding the artillery attack of the ‘SVK’ units on
HV positions in the area of Svilaja and Vrlika, in the course of which more than 50
shells of different calibers were fired, and they fired on civilian targets, and the UN-
PROFOR was requested to procure cessation of fire.

26 April 1994
A letter from Hrvoje Šarinić, the Head of the Croatian Delegation for Negotia-
tions with the Serbs and the State Commission for Relations with the UNPROFOR,
sent to Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General.124

121 
 etter from the Chief of the GSHV dated 9 August 1992.
L
122 
Letter from the Defense Minister dated 9 April 1993.
123 
Letter of the Defense Minister dated 8 June 1993.
124 
Letter of Mr. Hrvoje Šarinić dated 26 June 1994.

229
The letter contained information that the Ceasefire Agreement of 29 March 1994
was being violated and that the implementation of the agreement is being obstructed
by rebel Serbs and that the UNPROFOR was unable to ensure the implementation
of the Agreement.
It also pointed out the fact that on the occasion of the signing of the Agreement a
question was put forward if the UNPROFOR was going to be able to implement the
Agreement and the response was something in the lines that there were not going to
be any problems. It proved to show that the assertion was not correct and that the
doubt in the abilities of the UNPROFOR was justified.

22 December 1994
An analytical material was drafted under the title ‘Overview of the status and im-
plementation of the UNPROFOR mandate with annexes’125. It is evident that during
1994 over 2.000 protests were sent.

3.2.2. L
 ack of objectivity and neutrality in the implementation of the
mandate
In general terms, when speaking of nearly every unit of the UN in the Republic
of Croatia, the conclusion can be reached that they showed a certain amount of par-
tiality toward the Serb population in the occupied areas of the RH. This attitude was
undoubtedly influenced by the following factors:
- Socialization in the living surroundings, because the majority of UN mem-
bers were living in the occupied areas of the RH (UNPA areas) where the
Serbs were the majority, and neighbors and ‘hosts’;
- Prejudice of Croats and Croat-Serb relations, which in the time of Yugosla-
via, and stemming from the Serb lobby, were systematically being created af-
ter World War II;
- Lack of knowledge of the real causes of the conflicts in the area of the former
Yugoslavia and acceptance of the explanations given by the local population
(Serbs) according to which they were the victims of ‘Ustasha’ attacks.

However, this attitude was also influenced by the desire of the majority of mem-
bers of the UN for the mandate to last as long as possible, because these were pro-

125 
 regled stanja i provedbe mandata UNPROFOR-a /Overview of the status and implementation of
P
the UNPROFOR mandate.

230
fessional soldiers who were much better paid while on mission then in their mother
countries. Given that it was precisely the Serb ‘side’ for whom the maintaining of the
status quo was convenient and that Croatia was constantly requesting for the status
and end of the UN mandate to be resolved, their sympathies toward the Serbs can to
a certain degree be understood, but not justified.
The policy of the country a certain unit came from also left a significant mark on
the overall behavior and attitudes.
The critical oversights were made in the work of the UN Sector services of pub-
lic information which completely failed to explain to the local population the man-
date of the UN mission and the meaning of the resolutions of the Security Council,
which resulted in a completely distorted form of interpretation of the Vance plan in
the UNPA areas.
The Serbs in the occupied areas of the RH felt and believed that the mandate
of the protection forces of the UN was to protect and guard them ‘from the Croats’,
and to protect the UNPA areas (which were as ‘Serb autonomous provinces’ and
‘Serb provinces’ on 19 December 1991, therefore prior to the signing of the Sarajevo
Ceasefire Agreement, declared as the so-called ‘Republic of Serb Krajina’) from the
Republic of Croatia.
Prevalent was the absurd interpretation according to which the mandate of the
peacekeeping forces in the UNPA areas was the protection of the ethnically cleansed
areas and the local Knin authorities.
UNPROFOR/UNCRO in the process of their activity was the only element of
the international community which created an illusion of statehood with the popu-
lation of the ‘RSK’. In the process, unprecedented concessions were made: the Knin
authorities didn’t even want to hear of the fact that the UNPA areas were in RH, and
the UN took account that the name ‘Croatia’ was not even mentioned in the mission’s
designation.
The below stated names of UN Missions in the period from 1991 to 1997, dem-
onstrate the principle of inserting the name of the country in the mission’s designa-
tion:
MINURSO  United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
(the acronym of the designation in French);
UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia;
UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo;
MONUC UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

231
UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea;
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia;
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire;
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti;
UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan;
UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste;
UNAMID African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur;
MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Rep. and Chad;

After conducting an analysis of every mission beginning in 1991 and until the
end of 2007, it is possible to reach the conclusion that in that period a total of 45 mis-
sions were opened. In no more than 6 the (unwritten) rule was not applied that the
designator should contain the name of the state where the mission was being carried
out. And those are as follows:
UPROFOR United Nations Protection Force;
UNCRO United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation;
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force;
UNTAES United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, ...
UNMOP United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka;
UNPSG United Nations Civilian Police Support Group

It is indicative that 5 missions (of the stated 6) were conducted in Croatia. The
only mission outside Croatia is the UNPREDEP, in Macedonia, where the name of
the state was excluded due to the well-known dispute with Greece regarding the
name ‘Macedonia’.
Regarding missions which were carried out in the area of the Republic of Croatia
it is unquestionable that the exclusion of the state name of Croatia in the designation
of the mission represented a concession toward the (local, rebel) Serbs for which any
type of association of the occupied areas with Croatia was unacceptable.
To what extent the Knin authorities were sensitive (allergic) to the issue of us-
ing the name ‘Croatia’ is demonstrated in the problem of the former UNPROFOR
Commander of Croatia Command (COCC) General Tayyeb.126 The title of his duty,
which contained the word ‘Croatia’ was unacceptable to the Serbs from the occupied
126 
Letter from the Head of the Civil Affairs of Sector North to Akashi dated 10 February 1994.

232
areas to the degree that the UNPROFOR Command was considering of renaming it
to ‘UNPA Commander’. The proposal for the modification was prompted by General
de Lapresle.
The issue with the name ‘Croatia’ continued with the UNCRO mission as well
during 1995. The Knin authorities would not even accept the designation of the mis-
sion UNCRO, even though ‘CRO’ didn’t stand for Croatia but for Confidence Resto-
ration Operation. Due to the ‘CRO’ in the mission’s designation, the UNCRO Com-
mand in Sector North sent formal letters to the RSK authorities on memorandums
without a mission designator, most often using only the title United Nations. Their
view of neutrality assumed that they used these types of memorandums for written
correspondence with the bodies of the Croatian authorities.
The same problem occurred during the appointment to duty of the UNCRO
Commander, General Al Rodan.127 In commenting the stance of General Janvier, the
recording clerk at the meeting, Colonel Žarko Novaković, recorded the following:
It is obvious that he is trying to manifest and moderate our decisive position
regarding our unacceptance of any type of discussions with General Rodan in
which he would declare himself as the Commander of the UNCRO mandate of
the UN which is unacceptable for us. (tr. remark: free translation)
Despite the entirely clear stances of the Knin authorities which serve to show that
the concept of reintegration in the Republic of Croatia is rejected entirely, there was
a shared interest of Knin and the UN to prevent a potential outbreak of war between
the HV and the SVK. This shared interest was present from the beginning and it is
difficult to distinguish to what extent the stated corresponds to the UN principle of
neutrality.
International negotiators of the ICFY launched negotiations between Zagreb and
Knin knowing beforehand that they wouldn’t result in any specific agreements that
would lead to reintegration. Their goal was to open the negotiation process as a pre-
ventive measure to prevent the HV from entering the war. This shared interest is evi-
dent in the record of the meeting between Martić, Bildt and Stoltenberg held in Knin
on 4 July 1995.128
BILDT – We are slipping into a new war between the RSK and the RH. In order
to prevent it, we must enter a new round of peace negotiations. The RH wis-
hes to enter the European integration processes (Trade and Cooperation Agree-
127 
 ecord of the meeting Janvier – Mrkšić, Knin, 7 June 1995.
R
128 
Record of the meeting between Martić, Bildt and Stoltenberg, Knin, 4 July 1995.

233
ment, European Council...). Based on the conclusions of the last years European
Summit in Knin, the dynamics and intensity of that integration will be in accor-
dance with the cooperativeness and respect of the universal norms of behavior
in the aspect of domestic and foreign affairs of the Republic of Croatia. The West
has made clear to Croatia that the option of war and threat of force as an alter-
native to a political solution of the crisis can be counterproductive.
MARTIĆ – a trip to Geneva is useless, it is pointless. If there is a chance for any
agreement that the Croats will not violate – I will agree to negotiations...
If the Croats would demonstrate a minimum of good faith and withdraw their
troops from the Dinara Mountain, the possibility of a meeting in Geneva would
become a realistic one.
BILDT - ...to begin with, we should not use the term negotiation, but rather
discussion. If the Republic of Croatia was to attack again, it will be faced with
serious, long-term and damaging consequences related to its inclusion in the
European integration processes. (tr. remark: free translation)
The assistance of the UNCRO in preventing a potential HV military operation
became operational at the meeting between Martić and Akashi held in Knin on 30
July 1995. Akashi reported on the same to the Secretary-General Annan on 2 August
1995.129 Even though it was absolutely clear that no positive results could be achieved
on the planned meeting in Geneva, Akashi offered UNCRO assistance to Martić in
preventing a potential military operation by the HV in return for their acceptance of
6 points relating to Bihać.
In return for these commitments, I was prepared to order an active deployment
of UNCRO forces along the likely main axis of any potential HV advance into
the Krajina.
Martić said: We cannot accept that there are borders between the Serbs. Mr.
Akashi, you are asking me to capitulate... Let me be honest. The ‘RSK’ is really
in a very difficult position, and we want to find a peaceful solution. But... it will
be a capitulation.
The term UNPROFOR was often used by our interlocutors, but never UNCRO.
The stated document can serve to conclude that the deployment of the UNCRO
on the presumed main axes of attack by the HV was offered merely as a possibility,
but already on 24 July 1995 the operative order was signed for the stated operation

129 
Letter from Akashi to Annan, 2 August 1995.

234
under the designator Active Presence130 and information of the same was delivered
to the ICFY on 1 August 1995. This type of order is in direct contravention with the
basic principles of peacekeeping according to which the mandate and deployment of
UN forces would have to be defined in accordance with the parties in conflict.
More precisely, the exposure and vulnerability of the UN forces which would
be caught between two fires in the separation zone at the beginning of the conflict
would significantly endanger the safety of the soldiers who were neither equipped
nor prepared, and finally sent to operate in conditions of an open war.
The inaccurate reports of the HV supposedly taking UNCRO members hos-
tage131 during operation ‘Storm’ are witness to the fact that a part of the members
of UNCRO was using false reporting to create a platform for a political / diplomatic
pressure for the purpose of preventing a HV operation.
The Protest of the SVK Commander sent on 4 August 1995132 to the UNPF HQ
demonstrates that the SVK was the source of the disinformation on the HV suppos-
edly taking hostages. The structure of the content shows the intention to disseminate
disinformation, because it is illogical that the SVK Main Staff would express larger
concern for the safety of the UN then its own units.
We are addressing you for the second time today because we are still restrained
and we are not carrying out retaliation in the territory of the Republic of Croa-
tia. Army of the Serbian Krajina respects all instances of the Geneva conventi-
ons which is not typical of the Croatian side.
Croatian Army is still targeting exclusively civilian targets in the whole territory
of the Republic of Srpska Krajina and particularly Knin and other town centers.
As you know, members of the peace forces are also under a continuous fire. Par-
ticularly notable are attacks against UN personnel in the areas of separation,
where the Croatian Army has, according to our information, taken 7 UN posts
and taken hostages 70 members of the peace forces.
Please use your authority and take measures to protect civilian population and
the UN personnel, by engaging NATO forcers.
The impression is that the Serb civilians and UN members were the main goals
of the attack of the HV, which is absurd, because each and every kind of incident
presented a significant problem for the HV an opened the possibility of diplomatic
130 
 NCRO operation order ‘Active Presence’.
U
131 
Report from Janvier to Annan, 5 August 1995.
132 
Protest from Mrkšić to Janvier, 4 August 1995.

235
pressure for the purpose of preventing the operation. Being aware of the stated, the
HV Main Staff took a series of preventive measures in order to avoid the stated or to
reduce the same to the least possible degree.
Taught by experience of the ICTY indictment against Martić which charged him
of shelling Zagreb, and which was brought and publicly announced prior to the be-
ginning of operation ‘Storm’, one of the important elements of the campaign of dis-
seminating disinformation conducted by the SVK leadership were also the protests
in which they falsely accused the HV regarding artillery activity.
An impression was trying to be created that HV artillery was engaged in massive
activity on civilian targets, while the SVK was abiding by international laws of war.
At the same time this was used to attempt to create conditions for undertaking ‘legit-
imate’ rocket strikes on Croatian tows in accordance with the ‘strategy of real threat’.
The protest of General Mrkšić133 sent to the UNPF HQ on 4 August at 06:30 hrs
states that the HV had attacked nearly every area (tr. remark: occupied area) and
target in those areas. The very statement that at 05:00 hrs the HV engaged in artil-
lery activity on targets in Eastern Slavonia, West Sirmium and Baranja is inaccurate,
because this was the area of Sector ‘East’ where the HV was organizing its defense
against a potential attack from the UNPA areas and it was not suitable for the same
to open a front in that area. In the protest the following is also stated:
Long-range artillery fire began at exactly 0500 hours this morning, on 4 August,
against all civilian targets in the towns of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš, Vr-
ginmost, Vojnić, Glina, Petrinja and most populated places in the western part
of Krajina and in areas of Eastern Slavonia, Western Sirmium and Baranja.
We demand that you take immediate measures to stop the aggression.
We demand that you immediately inform the UN Security Council and the Se-
cretary-General, Butrous Butrous-Ghali. We wish to point out that the Serbian
Army of Krajina did not fire on civilian targets in the Republic of Croatia.
The campaign of disseminating disinformation was continuous and full-scale.
The goal was to persuade the international community to apply diplomatic pressures
in order to prevent the operation, and this was the point of the existence of a shared
interest of the UN forces, the SVK and a part of the international community which
was inclined toward Milošević’s policy.

133 
Protest from Mrkšić to Janvier, 4 August 1995, 06:30 hrs.

236
4.

SITUATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE VRS


AND SVK PRIOR TO OPERATION „STORM“

Introduction
Passing the decision to undertake Operation “Storm” as the final means for the
implementation of the policy of reintegration of the then occupied areas into the
state and legal system of the Republic of Croatia was influenced by the processes in-
dicated in Chapters 2 and 3, which can be summarized as follows:
• The determination of the politics of the Serb ‘authorities’ in the occupied areas
of the Republic of Croatia to use military means to prevent any attempt of rein-
tegration of these areas into the state legal system of the Republic of Croatia;
• The unwillingness of the international forces, but also of the most important
factors of the international community, to impose more pressure on the overall
‘Serb’ politics in order to provide for the implementation of what had been de-
fined by the relevant resolutions of the UN SC concerning the reintegration of
the occupied areas.

The decision to carry out the Operation “Strom” as well as the very course and im-
plementation of the operation were also influenced by the processes on the territory
of BiH presented in this chapter. This particularly refers to the military activities that
were conducted and in which the VRS forces were engaged, in some cases even in joint
operations with the SVK forces. These activities can be concisely defined as follows:
• the culmination of the offensive combat operations of the VRS aimed at the oc-
cupation of the remaining Bosnian and Bosnian-Croatian enclaves or at the re-
tention of the occupied areas within the Republic of Srpska.

237
This set of reflection does not exclude the influence of the overall situation and
the activities in the territory of BiH, first of all the political and diplomatic activities,
furthermore the activities of the international forces (UNPROFOR), the economic
and humanitarian situation, the influence of Serbia, etc., but the influence of the mil-
itary forces and their activities was certainly more direct and transparent.

4.1. The Washington Agreement – effects on the activities in


BiH and the Republic of Croatia

Introduction
The focus of the outline is on the military system, in particular on the Army of
the Republic of Srpska and on the influence that this system had on the planning and
implementation of Operation “Storm”. The intention is to demonstrate how the situa-
tion and the activities of this system significantly influenced (directly and indirectly)
the choice of the axes of attack, the structure of the forces engaged, the time of the
commencement of the operation, but also on the planned and implemented dynam-
ics of the conduct and the defining of the center of gravity of the operation.
When speaking of the situation and the activities of the VRS, it refers in particu-
lar to 1995; however, it is absolutely clear that the situation was also conditioned by
what had happened the years before, especially in 1994. The year 1994 was strongly
marked by the signing of the Washington Agreement which, as an important politi-
cal event, had extremely significant repercussions on the plan of military relations: it
concerned changes in the relation of the forces and contents, as well as the modality
of the forces engagement, which was clearly evident that year.

4.1.1. Th
 e relation between the Washington Agreement and the
Zagreb Agreement
The significance of the Washington Agreement
The Washington Agreement, signed on 01 March 1994, was preceded by meetings
of the HVO and A BiH commanders in mid-February in Kiseljak and on 23 Febru-
ary in Zagreb. Already during the second meeting a ceasefire agreement was signed,
which came into effect on 25 March. Immediately after the Washington Agreement,
on 12 March the “Split Agreement” was signed, which further formulated the issue
of forming a joint army of the Federation of BiH.

238
Namely, the Washington Agreement formally established the joint Federation
Army, but even after the Split Agreement was signed it was far from what is called a
functional unified army. The main achievement of the Washington Agreement was
the cessation of all serious military conflicts between the HVO and A BiH (units)
and the establishment of a coordination, such as it is, of a joint or at least parallel
(synchronized) operation against the mutual opponent – the VRS.
The establishment of an alliance relationship between the A BiH and HVO
caused that the VRS, an army that in late 1993 and early 1994 conducted offensive
operations and was successful in all parts of the battlefield in BiH, by the end of 1994
had become an army that suffered significant losses and occasionally or permanently
lost parts of the territories occupied and held since the beginning of the aggression
of the JNA against BiH.
At the time of the signing of the Washington Agreement, almost three fourths
of the BiH territory134 were held by the VRS, and those were not only areas in
which prior to the war the Serbs were the majority population, but also a signifi-
cant part of the territory in which prior to the war the Bosnians and Croats re-
spectively were in absolute majority, as well as a significant part of the territory in
which none of the constitutive peoples in BiH had the absolute majority popula-
tion prior to the war.135
It was a result of the aggression and occupation that was absolutely clearly an-
ticipated by the concept of the strategic offensive operation of the JNA. General
Kadijević explicitly stated in his book136 that this operation among other things im-
plied the following:
to take into account that the role of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina
will be a crucial one for the future of the Serb people as a whole … and the lo-
cation of the JNA forces has to be adapted to that.
While assessing at the end of 1995 the individual participants in the war in BiH,
the authors of the book titled “Balkan Battlegrounds”137 also provided the following
assessment of the VRS:

134 
 alkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I, Central
B
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map ‘L’.
135 
Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map ‘D’.
136 
Annex 1-3.
137 
Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, page 393.

239
The VRS generals, Mladić and Milovanović, and the VRS Main Staff displayed
to the end their prowess at engineering strategic shifts of their limited formati-
ons. The move of seven major formations from halfway across the country des-
pite heavy damage to its command and control structure during the NATO air
campaign was a triumph of the VRS Main Staff professionalism and skill. The
Serbs’ rapid execution of major counterattacks also showed how powerful the
VRS remained at the end of the war, particularly against the ARBiH.
Furthermore, while referring to the impacts of the NATO air strikes on the VRS
units (September 1995) they stated the following:
The VRS’ capabilities were certainly degraded, but it still functioned as a cohe-
rent military force throughout its operational area and was able to move mul-
tiple brigade-sized combat formations clear across Bosnia even at the height of
the air campaign.
On the next page of this book it is stated that General Milovanović still made
some errors that cost the VRS dearly. There is an attempt to explain the dilemmas he
encountered and had to solve, particularly those concerning the choice of the focal
point for the implementation or maneuver of the forces or the inclusion of reinforce-
ment.
It is obvious that when making these assessments the authors of the book forgot
or overlooked an important fact:
Only one strategic error, the most important one, was made, namely the aggres-
sion and occupation of the territories that could not be claimed by the Bosnian Serbs
by any means or on any basis, which was executed with the direct and “comprehen-
sive” engagement of the JNA.
The Serb forces were by no means capable of permanently defending (retaining)
the areas that had been occupied and ethically cleansed in that way and waging a war
without any serious defeat. This was in particular not possible after the A BiH and
the HVO had organized, fairly armed and joined in an alliance relationship.
As long as the A BiH and the HVO were mutually conflicted the VRS was able
to successfully defend the occupied areas and wage a war without any serious defeat.
It was not before the VRS experienced a defeat during the operations that followed
Operation “Storm” that the Serb politics was willing to give up the war of conquest
for the territories that could not be claimed by the Serbs.

240
The Zagreb Agreement – there is a causal relation with the Washington
Agreement
During 1994 many battlefields on the territory of BiH were active. However, in
the context of the present outline we refer to those battlefields and areas which were
in direct causal relation with the events in the territory of the Republic of Croatia in
1995, namely:
• the corridor through Bosanska Posavina which had a general significance
both for the VRS and the SVK, because it was the only direct connection of
the “western Serb states” with the mother state (Serbia);
• the area of Western Bosnia (Cazin Krajina, Bihać), which had a special mili-
tary significance for the VRS and SVK, because it enabled a quality linking-
up of the RS and “RSK”, essentially reduced the operative depth of the “RSK”
territory and linked up significant forces of the VRS and SVK (while it was
under the control of the 5th Corps of the A BiH);
• the area of Kupres, Glamoč and Livno, which represented a strategically im-
portant rear for the occupied area of the Knin Krajina, both from the point of
view of the defense of this area and from the point of view of its liberation.

Although the aforesaid three areas and their retention under the Serb control, i.e.
putting under Serb control in the case of Western Bosnia, were not equally signifi-
cant or ranked in priority for the RS and the “RSK”, they all still reflected instability
and insecurity to both of the “Serb” “states”. They were their common interest.
Thus, the agreement of the “RSK” authorities to sign the Zagreb Agreement must
be taken into consideration within this context. The Zagreb Agreement was entered
into at the Russian Embassy in Zagreb on 29 March 1994 through the mediation of
the Russian special envoy Vitalii Churkin. This Agreement facilitated the cessation
of significant combat activities in the territory of the Republic of Croatia at the time
when the conditions were generated for the intensification of combat activities in
BiH (Washington Agreement).
The ceasefire in Croatia could be of avail for both RS and “RSK”:
- the SVK forces were available to provide assistance to the VRS forces (in the
operations carried out in the area of Western Bosnia), and
- the VRS forces were de facto relieved of the obligation of operational and/
or strategic reserve of the SVK and they could focus on “solving” their own
problems that emerged with the alliance of HVO and A BiH.

241
The two agreements had two different effects in two states:
• The Washington Agreement facilitated the intensification of combat activi-
ties in BiH in which the forces of the A BiH and HVO gradually became more
and more dangerous to the VRS. During fall and winter (November and De-
cember) this resulted with two operations: in the area of the Livno – Kupres
battlefield and in Western Bosnia, during which the VRS forces suffered their
first significant territorial losses;
• The Zagreb Agreement “inaugurated” a certain climate of negotiation, which
in December resulted in the economic agreement and opening of the high-
way between Novska and Nova Gradiška. However, this Agreement also fa-
cilitated to show on the political level to what extent the positions of the two
side differed as regards the finding of a final peaceful solution and to what
extent the structures of the “RSK” authorities were internally subdivided as
regards the two options: negotiation with the Croatian authorities (only if it
was of any benefit for the “RSK” and did not include any talks on reintegra-
tion) or a priory refusal of any talks concerning the integration within the
Republic of Croatia.

4.1.2. In(direct) effects of the two agreements


Effects within the territory of BiH
With regards to the first effect, the VRS suffered its first significant loss of terri-
tory in the second half of October, when the forces of the 30th Partisan Division were
suppressed in an attack by forces of the 7th Corps of the BiH Army, and in an attack
by the HVO parts of the 2nd Krajina Corps138 were suppressed so that the HVO forces
entered the city of Kupres and liberated it in early November.
At that time an offensive operation by the SVK in the territory of Western Bosnia
was underway, as was explained in Chapter 2, item 2.3.3. Although after the NATO
air strikes (on 21 and 22 November) the intensity of the operations weakened, the
danger of the occupation of Bihać was still a reality. In order to weaken the pressure
of the Serb forces on the 5th Corps of the A BiH, and as the forces of the 2nd Krajina
Corps of the VRS were for the most part engaged in the attack, forces of the HVO
and the HV conducted Operation “Zima” (Winter) on 29 November whereby they
attacked the forces of the 2nd Corps in the Livno Valley and Dinara areas.
138 
 alkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I, Central
B
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 48.

242
By the end of the year the battlefield had been shifted some 20 kilometers toward
the northwest139 and the VRS had lost some 200 square kilometers140 of land within
the Livno-Kupres battlefield and the Dinara region.
During these activities the following key weaknesses of the VRS became evident:
- A shortage of reserve forces and forces for maneuver (specifically within the
2nd Krajina Corps structure)
- An indecisiveness of the command structure in passing decisions regarding
priority tasks (should the focus be the defense in the Livno Valley or in an of-
fensive on Western Bosnia), and
- Fatigue and a loss of motivation among the manpower which had become
exhausted as a result of the long-lasting conflicts within the numerous battle-
fields in BiH.

The said problems were evident within all of the VRS structures but were espe-
cially emphasized within the 2nd Krajina Corps, which was located in semi-encircle-
ment so to say, battling in the Bihać, Livno and Kupres battlefield.
It is true that one of the main goals of the Operation “Winter-94” (Zima-94) –
the weakening of the pressure of the Serb forces in an attack on Bihać – was not di-
rectly accomplished, but it is a fact that the VRS (2nd Krajina Corps) did not succeed
in crushing the forces of the 5th Corps of the A BiH, nor did they seize Bihać, which
surely resulted in the incapability of replenishing forces and/or new forces which
would be capable of successfully completing the operations regarding Bihać.

Effects within the Republic of Croatia


As mentioned, the Zagreb Agreement enabled a certain level of negotiation but
at the same time it exposed the part of the “RSK” politics which refused negotiations
with the RH Government and which would not accept any form of reintegration into
RH.
The Economic Agreement as a direct result of the cease-fire Agreement (Zagreb
Agreement) implied a modified UNPROFOR mandate which the rebel Serbs re-
fused. They especially refused the termination of the UNPROFOR mandate which
the RH requested due to its inefficiency.
139 
 alkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I, Central
B
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 40.
140 
Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, page 251’.

243
There were increasing divisions within the structures of the “RSK” Government
as a result of these circumstances:
• On the one hand were those forces which requested a more radical approach
towards the RH and more intense ties with the Republic Srpska in BiH, forces
which through constant provoking of tensions along the battlefield wished to
demonstrate how the UNPROFOR presence was essential and their mandate
needed to remain as was. Simply, members of these factions were politically tied
to Martić, militarily to General Čeleketić, territorially to the “territorial strategic
focal point” of the area of the “RSK”, and their policy was to refuse any form of
agreement with RH, even in those cases when the population within the occu-
pied territories of the RH would directly benefit from such negotiations.
• On the other hand were the forces which supported a certain (commercial)
cooperation with the RH, which were against any form of institutional link-
ing to the Republic of Srpska (RS) and supported ties with the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (SRJ), which simply could be politically tied with Goran
Hadžić, support the program of the President of the “Government” Borislav
Mikelić, territorially support the occupied territories of Easter Slavonia, Ba-
ranja and Srijem. These forces nevertheless counted on the fact that time was
in their favor and how any hasty moves in the military sense could only be
beneficial on a short-term basis.

Considering the first group had an increasingly difficult time “communicating”


with the SRJ, especially taking into consideration the embargo which was imposed
on that country with regards to BiH (Republic of Srpska), the true military capabili-
ties of the corps within the “territorial and strategic focal point” (the 7th, 15th, 21st and
39th Corps) including the 18th Corps within the area of Western Slavonia suffered
constant weakening.
The reality of the “strategy of real threat” was all that remained, which in itself
had become less of a threat as the HV forces became more significant. Regardless of
this fact, Martić policies which supported such a strategy easily refused talks regard-
ing the Z-4 plan (January 1995) confirming thus how these policies did not consider
any form of reintegration into RH as acceptable.
On the other had, the military capabilities of the 11th Corps had not been signifi-
cantly reduced, on the contrary thanks to the strong ties to the Yugoslav Army (VJ)
and especially to the 12th Corps, these forces felt they were incorporating themselves
into that Corps. The commander of the 11th Corps (General Dušan Lončar) signifi-

244
cantly contributed to this feeling of incorporation; he was surely one of the finer
officers of the Serb Krajina Army (SVK) and supported the program of the Prime
Minister of the “RSK” Mikelić, although he did not support Hadžić’s policies which
allowed for his professional affirmation. Clearly, the economic potentials of that part
of the “RSK” were somewhat greater again due to strong ties to the SRJ.
In its attempts to compromise any form of cooperation with the RH, Martić’s
politics led to the circumstances which resulted in the RH Government deciding to
conduct Operation “Flash” as the only way to cease the obstructing of the concluded
agreements.
Even when the approval for the prolongation of the UN’s stay under a modified
mandate (UNCRO) had been given, which implied the UN’s control of the “border”
crossings between the BiH and the “RSK” and the SRJ and the “RSK”, the “RSK” lead-
ership, as a sign of protest, decided to close down the highway where it passed through
the UNPA Sector “West” for the first time on 24 April and then again on 29 April.
It is indicative that on 29 April the highway remained closed on 30 April as well
despite attempts and warnings from UNPROFOR. The decision not to open the
highway was made by the commander of the 18th Corps and the Commander of the
Serb Krajina Army Main Staff (GŠ SVK) General Čeleketić141. Attempts made by the
Minister of Defense of the “RSK” (Rade Tanjga) to open the highway also failed al-
though an agreement had been reached to such an effect on 30 April.
It is also revealing that Martić and General Čeleketić visited Western Slavonia
from 25 to 27 April when they announced “that the situation in regards to the high-
way would soon become complicated” and that the “SVK was prepared to defend West-
ern Slavonia and even to return part of the occupied territories.”142
Although the book “Balkan Battlegrounds” states143 how the “attack struck with
almost no warning leaving it minimal time to call up its reservists” clearly this was not
the case, Martić and Čeleketić expected an attack because they ordered full mobiliza-
tion which was conducted144 until 30 April.145
141 
“ Izvještaj o uzrocima i načinu pada Zapadne Slavonije” /Report on the fall of Western Slavonia/,
Republic of Serb Krajina, state commission for establishing the causes and manner of the fall of
Western Slavonia, page 4, Knin, 11 July 1995.
142 
Ibid, page 3.
143 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Central
Intelligence.
144 
Information of the fall of Western Slavonia (point 1), SVK Main Staff, Information Sector, 4 May
1995.
145 
“Izvještaj o uzrocima i načinu pada Zapadne Slavonije” /Report on the fall of Western Slavonia/,
(page 5).

245
Operation “Flash” demonstrated the fundamental weaknesses of the SVK which
were especially noted in the defense that was “organized” by the 18th Corps forces:
- Disorganized defense and especially weaknesses which emerge from man-
ning of the units with reservists;
- A shortage of reservist and maneuver forces although the 18th Corps had a
possibility to undertake this manning
- The fact that the remaining SVK forces were unwilling to send reinforce-
ments to the area of Western Slavonia;
- The unwillingness of the VRS Main Staff to provide operative reserves which
was depended on in the defense of Western Slavonia;
- The inability to undertake a counter-attack and/or to cut off the relatively
deep wedges of the enemy forces.

The fact was that at that time the 7th Corps SVK forces were mostly engaged in
combat in the Dinara region and part of the 5th, 21st and 39th Corps forces were en-
gaged in the battlefield towards Western Bosnia.
Furthermore a minimum of 24 to 36 hours were needed to bring the forces there
whereby their participation in combat ( a counter-attack) would be channeled in the
direction of Stara Gradiška – Okučani which lacked the necessary capacities to ac-
cept forces which could undertake a successful counter-attack.
When reinforcements or operative reserves from the VRS are concerned, it is
questionable whether the VRS would have had significant enough forces that it could
have engaged in Western Slavonia, even if there had been political will for its involve-
ment in the conflict in RH.
Specifically, at that time the forces of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps were engaged
in combat activities in the area of the Grahovo-Glamoč battlefield, Western Bosnia,
Doboj, Ozren, Vlašić and the Posavina corridor, without planned reserves.
With regards to the implementation of the strategy of real threat it was evident
that Martić and the Serb Krajina Army Main Staff (GŠ SVK) did not withdraw from
its implementation (shelling Zagreb for example) and it is in this context that we can
interpret the engagement of “….armor-mechanized combat groups for attack” from
the 36th armored brigade, 12th motorized brigade and the 453rd motorized brigade to
the bridge areas of the Danube and to the area of Šid-Tovarnik.146
146 
 aščlamba obavještajnih podataka o tijeku i rezultatima operacije “Bljesak” /Analysis of intelli-
R
gence information on the course and results of Operation Flash – chapter Reinforcements from the
Yugoslav Army/, 21 February 1994.

246
4.2. The state and activities of the Serb Republic Army
(VRS) and the Serb Krajina Army (SVK) in early
Summer 1995

4.2.1. General aspects of the situation


The military and political situation within the occupied territories of RH (Re-
public of Serb Krajina - RSK) and BiH (Republic of Srpska – RS) at the beginning
of June 1995 was strongly influenced by numerous interdependent and significantly
interdependent processes:
• The weakening of the morale of the population and the members of the SVK
units within the occupied territories of the RH;
• The strengthening of the attempts and undertaking of political steps to unite
the RSK and RS into one state;

When discussing the weakening of the population’s morale we can conclude how
this was a result of the fact that the “Serb Army” in the previous period suffered a
number of significant defeats:
• Failure of the operation to widen the corridor in Bosanska Posavina.
• Failure in the offensive operation of the VRS units in Western Bosnia,
• The embargo imposed upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia regarding
economic, financial, military and other forms of cooperation with the RS and
the RSK,
• NATO air force activities on the Udbina airport and on anti-aircraft facilities
in Bosanska Krajina,
• The failure of the VRS forces, especially the 2nd Krajina Corps in the Livno-
Kupres and Glamoč-Grahovo battlefields,
• Crushing of the 18th SVK Corps forces and liberation of areas in Western Sla-
vonia in Operation “Flash”

This state of affairs resulted in:


• The strengthening of a sense of a hopelessness and abandonment by Serbia
among the majority of the RSK population;
• Conflicting political views in the highest “state” leadership of the RSK and
discord regarding plans to unite the “Serb states”;

247
• Intensified pressure on the population to move to Serbia;
• Problems in manning SVK units (professional soldiers, conscripts and re-
serves).

All of these processes and problems were present in a significantly lesser de-
gree in the occupied areas of Eastern Slavonia (this conclusion does not concern
the problem of political discord as it was the most prominent precisely between the
eastern and western parts of the “RSK”), where the majority of the problems arose
due to the arrival of a greater number of refugees from Western Slavonia (problems
of securing lodging) and due to constant requests to send reinforcements (men and
units) to the RS and to the occupied areas of Banovina, Kordun, Lika and Northern
Dalmatia.
With regards to the requests for unification, in the case of the Western part of the
“RSK” they were predominantly focused on the unification of the RS and the “RSK”,
while in the case of the eastern part they were focused towards unification with Ser-
bia (SRJ) whereas the unification with RS was denied.
Namely on 28 May 1995 a meeting of the “RSK Council” was held in Knin at
which meeting a vote of no confidence to the Government of Borislav Mikelić was
passed and a unanimous decision was passed to unify the “RSK” and RS.
However the “Coordination Board” for Eastern Slavonia and Baranja headed by
Goran Hadžić was against the unification with RS claiming that Eastern Slavonia
and Baranja were a “natural part of Yugoslavia” and announced the secession of the
“Eastern parts” from the “RSK” should the unification with the RS occur.
A no confidence vote for the Government of Borislav Mikelić was passed primar-
ily due to the fact that he too was against the unification of the RS and the “RSK” and,
although he was born in the Banovina region he was inclined to support Hadžić’s
“Coordination Board” position.
The problems of the restructuring and manning of units also significantly dif-
fered in the two aforementioned parts of the “RSK”.
Namely, owing to a large number of refugees from the liberated territories of
Western Slavonia, many of whom were conscripts, the manning the 11th Corps units
was significantly less of a problem than within the remaining SVK corps.
In addition, the direct support in weapons and equipment as well as cooperation
with the Yugoslav Army in forming corps maneuver units was also a significant ad-
vantage of the 11th Corps with respect to other corps’ of the SVK.

248
In this respect, Martić considered the Commander of the 11th Corps General
Dušan Lončar as a “Mikelić staff ” and considered his possible replacement147, even
though he was one of the most capable military individuals in the SVK, who did
not belong to the “radical wing” within the highest command structure and without
which the command capabilities of the 11th Corps would be at stake. For this reason
he was offered the position of the SVK deputy commander which he refused threat-
ening to submit a retirement request.
The emigration problems were also completely different and significantly less
prominent in Eastern Slavonia than in the western parts of the “RSK”.
Such a state of affairs forced the creators and the enforcers of the idea to unify
the “Serb lands” to urgently undertake the necessary steps which would allow for a
faster and more complete unification of the “Serb lands” into one state. As this “uni-
fication” by military and political means was accomplished, the arising problem was
the “unsettled status” of the two key areas (territories):
• The corridor through Bosnian Posavina without which there could be no
substantial ties between the “western Serb states” and Serbia and
• The area of Western Bosnia without which there could be no substantial ties
between the western part of the “RSK” with the remaining “Serb states”.

As the operation for the “expansion” of the corridor failed, the possible (prob-
able) military success of the joint forces of the SVK and the VRS in Western Bosnia
became imperative.
The importance of the taking over of territory in Western Bosnia is evident in
a letter by the Commander of the 2nd Corps Brigadier Radivoje Tomanić sent on
16 February 1995 to the Main Staff of the VRS, to the personal attention of General
Manojlo Milovanović.

4.2.2. Indicators of the strategically significant activities and changes


within the Serb Krajina Army (SVK)
Intelligence information collected in the period after Operation “Flash” indicat-
ed that preparations by joint forces from the SVK and VRS and by the People’s De-
fense of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (NO APZB) were underway to
undergo a new (final) offensive operation in western Bosnia, that is against the forces
of the 5th Corps of the Bosnian Army (A BiH).
147 
“ Tjedna raščlamba obavještajnih informacija” /Weekly analysis of intelligence information/, dated
7 June 1995.

249
Truly the offensive operation of the joint forces of the SVK and VRS was being
carried out the whole time, therefore even after NATO air force intervention, but it
was in fact of a lesser intensity (especially shelling activities) and lacked any signifi-
cant mutual activities at the level of both “armies”, as it lacked significant advance-
ments of the battlefield.148
However, there was the matter of other activities which were to result in the
strengthening of military power of the “RSK”, meaning the strengthening of the SVK
capabilities to guarantee the survival of the “RSK” .
These activities (indicators) were as follows:
• Manning of units with manpower from all categories (professional soldiers,
conscripts and reserve components);
• The commencement of the formation of the Special Units Corps;
• Grouping forces in accordance with the plan of the offensive operation in the
area of Western Bosnia (forming tactical groups and operative group “Pauk”
(Spider).

Introduction of military conscripts mobilized within the Federal Republic of


Yugoslavia (SRJ)
The decision to mobilize all military conscripts who originated from the then oc-
cupied territories of RH and BiH, who had either on a temporary or permanent basis
inhabited the territory of SRJ was passed on 1 June 1995, and operationally put into
force under codename “Storm”149 on 5 June 1995.
From the beginning of this operation until mid-June, approximately 4500 to
5000 military conscripts had been brought to the occupied territories of Banovina,
Kordun, Lika and Northern Dalmatia, and as of 5 July they had planned to bring in
a total of 8.000-8.500 military conscripts.150
Introducing such a large number of conscripts considerably decreased the prob-
lem of manning SVK units, especially if the fact that officers from the Yugoslav Army
148 
 alkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I, Central
B
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 55’.
149 
Pripreme za napadnu operaciju združenih snaga SVK i VRS na područje Zapadne Bosne /Prepa-
rations for the assault operation of the joint SVK and VRS forces in the area of Western Bosnia/,
dated 24 June 1995.
150 
Intelligence information on personnel and material support the VJ (SRJ) extended to the SVK
(RSK)

/Podaci o kadrovskoj i tvarnoj potpori koju VJ (SRJ) pruža SVK (RSK)” dated 22 June 1995. Table
‘Overview of reinforcements from the VJ to the SVK during June 1995’.

250
and volunteers from various Serb “political” origins were sent as well alongside the
mobilized conscripts.
Reinforcements were sent to all the SVK corps, but particularly to the 39th (Bani-
ja), 21st (Kordun), 15th (Lika) and 7th (Knin) corps.
Regarding problems with the mobilization of conscripts in SRJ, a meeting was
held in Belgrade on 5 June between representatives of the Ministries of Defense of
the SRJ and the “RSK”, at which the technological issues regarding the mobilization
process and transportation and receipt of the mobilized within the “RSK” were for-
mulated.
Collection centers were formed in Batnoga (Banovina) and Slunj as well as a
smaller camp in the area of Lika, and collection centers in SRJ (Novi Sad, Bubanj
Potok).
The course of the mobilization was discussed in an radio broadcast “news” on
Radio “Petrova Gora” (16 June at 1700 hrs) according to which “today’s Politika
notes….how convoys of busses full of military conscripts are arriving in Krajina, to
their native land to help defend it…” and how those soldiers “would man the military
formations”.151
However, apart from manning SVK units, the effect the arrival of the mobilized
military conscripts had was of even more importance with regard to the following:
• The strengthening of the morale of the population and members of the SVK
units;
• The removal of the sense of isolation and being left to “fend for themselves”
on behalf of Serbia (SRJ),
• The manifestation of “care” and Serbia’s (SRJ) readiness to “defend the west-
ern Serb states” and
• A partial delay of the departure of the population from the western parts of
the RSK to SRJ.

151 
“ Pripreme za napadnu operaciju združenih snaga SVK i VRS na područje Zapadne Bosne” /Prepa-
rations for the assault operation of the joint SVK and VRS forces in the area of Western Bosnia/,
dated 24 June 1995,.

251
On account of the manning with military conscripts which were either recruits,
mobilized of volunteered to be manned in SRJ, the manning situation in the corps
and other SVK components was significantly improved in comparison to March
1994152, so that their numerical strength in mid July 1995 was as follows:
• 11th Corps (“Slavonia-Baranja”)
- March 1994 10.000-11.000
- July 1995 12.500-13.000
• 18th Corps (“Western Slavonia”)
- March 1994 4.000-4.500
- July 1995 practically non-existent
• 39th Corps (“Banija”)
- March 1994 5.000-6.000
- July 1995 9.500-10.000
• 21 Corps (“Kordun”)
st

- March 1994 4.500-5.000


- July 1995 7.000-7.500
• 15 Corps (“Lika”)
th

- March 1994 5.500-6.000


- July 1995 6.500-7.000
• 7 Corps (“Northern Dalmatia”)
th

- March 1994 8.000-9.000


- July 1995 9.500-11.000
• Special Units Corps
- March 1994 did not yet exist
- July 1995 3.500-4.000
• Remaining SVK units
- March 1994 2.500-3.000
- July 1995 2.500-3.500
Total:
- March 1994 39.500-44.500
- July 1995 51.000-56.000
152 
 bavještajna prosudba mogućeg razvoja događaja na vojno političkom planu... / Intelligence as-
O
sessment of the possible development of events on the military-political aspect and a possible
threat to the Republic of Croatia in the upcoming period, paricularly in the different possibilities
of engagement of the Croatian Army/, 26 March 1994).

252
As a result of this organized manning of SVK units, the army’s strength which
was deployed in the “western parts of the RSK” reached a number count of approxi-
mately 43000 men.
If reinforcements from the 11th Corps (the equivalent of one battalion) and nu-
merous “volunteer” groups (Chetnick oriented) from the SRJ are added to this figure
the number surpassed 45.000 men by the end of June.
The change of the personnel structure with regard to its quality and motivation
should also be taken into consideration. This especially pertains to the manning with
professional personnel the ratio of which in these structures by the end of July had
grown (approx. 15% participation) in comparison to March 1994 (approximately
10% participation).
Alongside this fact, the professional structure in the “western parts” amounted to
even 20% as the Special Units Corps (KSJ) was located there which was manned with
up to 40% participation of professional personnel.
It should be noted that the manning of units was a continual process which de-
veloped intensely until the beginning of Operation Storm when difficulties arose
within the SVK units regarding ensuring the necessary personal firearms for the
newly arrived troops153, which is evident in requests made by the Commander of
the 39th Corps requesting automatic rifles for 485 new arrivals from the former 18th
“Western Slavonia” Corps.
One can conclude that the numerical count of personnel in the SVK structure
approximately numbered 50.000 and as such was in line with assessments given by
General Radinović with regards to the numerical personnel count necessary for the
“successful defense of the RSK from aggression”.

Beginning of the reorganization of the SVK and the structuring of the Special
Units Corps of the SVK
On 31 May, General Mile Mrkšić, Commander of the SVK Main Staff (GS) held
a meeting with the highest ranking officials of the GS SVK, corps commanders and
commanders of the independent brigades (regiments) at which meeting he informed
them of two key tasks154:
- The beginning of the transformation and professional reorganization of the
SVK and the strengthening of the defense system;
153 
 equest by the Commander of the 39th Corps sent to the SVK Main Staff for delivery of needed
R
weapons for 485 newly arrived soldiers in the 26th pbr.
154 
Weekly analysis of intelligence information dated 7 June 1995.

253
- The upcoming meeting within the SRJ Ministry of Defense where the issue of
the mobilization and recruitment from the territories of the SRJ (Operation
Storm) to man SVK units would be discussed.

Despite the fact that the reorganization of the SVK had began in early 1994, it
was only upon the arrival of General Mile Mrkšić as Commander of the GS SVK
(May 1995) that efforts were made to implement the reorganization. Intense efforts
were made to structure the special maneuver units at the SVK corps level155, and to
structure the Special Units Corps (KSJ) at the SVK level.
The purpose of the structuring of such units was to remove the main weaknesses
with regards to the operative capabilities of the SVK such as:
• Manning with professional personnel, as opposed to manning based on re-
serve personnel;
• Equipping with weaponry which enables greater firepower and greater mo-
bility (maneuver) instead of the existing weaponry intended for executing
defense operations;
• Creating SVK components for maneuver in order to avoid the army draw-
backs based solely on territorial components;
• Securing operative (at corps level) that is strategic reserves (at the SVK lev-
el) in order to avoid the disadvantages of a defense organized solely on the
first line (in one combat formation) and attacks not allowing for commit-
ment of fresh and quick maneuver attack forces.

With regards to the corps level, it regarded the intention to organize the so-called
“armor-mechanized combat groups for attack” which were the equivalent of a bat-
talion (300 to 350 members), reinforced by a tank company, an armored transporter
company, self-propelled gun battery (howitzers), self-propelled anti-air gun battery,
as had already been organized and proven in combat activities within BiH (especially
within the units of the Eastern-Bosnian and Drina corps of the VRS).
However, this concept was quickly abandoned so that two such units were formed
only within the 11th Corps of the SVK and with regards to the other corps, it was con-
cluded that it would be a better solution to organize maneuver units at the SVK level
after which the organization of the Special Units Corps began.
155 
 maneuver battalion was formed only in the 11th Corps while the other corps’ rescinded from the
A
formation of this type of unit because the Special Units Corps were starting to be formed on the
level of the entire SVK.

254
In this regard specifics regarding the problem of all the other SVK corps with
regards to the 11th corps arose. Namely, even though, due to the restricted capa-
bilities of the so-called lateral /rokadne/ routes in the areas of responsibility of the
39th, 21st, 15th and 7th Corps, and on the other hand the clearly channeled attack direc-
tions (defense) it was necessary to provide these specific corps an operative maneu-
ver reserve but due to restrictions in manpower this was not possible.
For this reason the Special Units Corps was organized at the SVK level which en-
tailed the following combat units within its composition:
• 2nd guards brigade (motorized brigade with part of the personnel on the OT
(armored personnel carrier)
• 2nd armored brigade
• 71st special brigade (mainly gun and anti-armor support).

The total composition and command of the KSJ were located in Slunj at a train-
ing post at the end of June156 and were in the final organizational and manning phase,
but this process did not develop at the desired rate with regards to equipment or with
regards to equipping specially organized units for combat use157.
The positioning of the Special Unit Corps, or rather their location, was done in
such a manner to be able to primarily represent the operative reserve of the 21st and
15th Corps and the strategic reserve or the attack force for executing offensive opera-
tions the purpose of which was the severing of RH territory at the “chosen routes”.
The launching of Operation Storm before the completion of the formation of this
Corps significantly reduced the possibility to use the units of this corps and in turn
the whole of the SVK in an efficient manner.

156 
 erial photography using a UAV during the Vidovdan parade (The Day of the RSK) which shows
A
the equipment of the Special Units Corps.
157 
Intelligence information dated 15 July 1995, “Stanje i aktivnosti SVK, VRS i VJ” /Status and activi-
ties of the SVK, VRS and the VJ/.

255
4.3. Beginning of Operation “Storm” conditioned by the
latest developments in the western parts of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Along with all aforementioned activities, constant combat activities were ongo-
ing on the battlefield towards Western Bosnia.
However, the difference from fall 1994 was that this time the carriers of the activ-
ities in the offensive operation were the units of the Serb Army of the Krajina (SVK)
and not the Army of the Republic Srpska (VRS).
After the Special Units Corps had been established and presented at the military
parade organized at the training range near Slunj on the occasion of the Day of the
SVK on 28 June158, almost everything was ready for the commencement of the final
stage of that operation.
In the first half of June the battlefields in the area of Bosanska Posavina, Dinara
and the Livanjsko polje were active.
During May and in the beginning of June in the area of Bosanska Posavina the
forces of the 1st Krajina Corps conducted offensive operations against the forces of
the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) Orašje MD, thereby trying to enlarge the cor-
ridor and secure the northern side of the corridor. The intensity of the offensive op-
erations decreased in the end of the first decade of June, while the forces of the VRS
suffered another failure.
In the area of Dinara and the Livanjsko polje the HV and HVO forces started on
4 June the offensive operation „Jump-2“, the aim of which was to tie up the forces of
the 2nd Krajina Corps and thereby reduce the pressure of that Corps’s units on the
Bihać battlefield and impede a potential enforcement by new forces in the area of the
corridor. At the same time, the shift of the battlefield to the north – northwest in the
direction of Grahovo and to the west in the direction of Vrlika159 was intended to cre-
ate conditions for the direct threat of Grahovo. The operation was completed by the
end of the first decade of June.

158 
I ntelligence information for 28 June 1995, dated 29 June 1995.
159 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 52.

256
4.3.1. P
 lan for the conduct of the offensive operation against the 5th
Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (A BiH)
The final preparations for the offensive operation in the area of Western Bosnia
were supposed to be finalized by 10 July 1995, while the offensive operation was sup-
posed to be conducted in three phases:

• First phase (preparation, mostly completed by the end of June)


- With the engagement of the National Defense of the Autonomous Prov-
ince of Western Bosnia (NO APZB), the task of which was to occupy the
broader area of Vrnograč and force back the forces of the 5th Corps of
the A BiH to the positions from which they could no longer threaten the
route Dvor-Glina with artillery. All of this was supposed to be accom-
plished with the artillery support of the 39th Corps of the SVK.
- With the engagement of the artillery of the 2nd Krajina Corps in the Bihać
area exhaust the forces of the 5th Corps of the A BiH and weaken the mo-
rale of the population in the Bihać enclave.

• Second phase (decisive)


- With the engagement of the forces in contact with the units of the 5th
Corps of the A BiH tie up most of the forces of the 5th Corps of the A BiH
by offensive operations on the entire battlefield.
- With the engagement of the striking maneuver forces from the Corps’s
special units from the area of Slunj cut off the forces of the 5th Corps of
the A BiH on the main axis of attack and link up with the forces of the 2nd
Krajina Corps of the VRS.

• Third phase (final):


- (Re)-establish the so-called Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia in
the area north from the axis Kordunski Ljeskovac – Cazin – Otoka;
- Break the forces of the 5th Corps of the A BiH in encirclement south from
the aforesaid axis and establish total control over the Una railway, the
broader area of Bihać and the air base Željava.

At the same time the forces of the 5th Corps of the A BiH were in an extremely
unfavorable operative position, particularly due to:

257
• The joined forces of the SVK and VRS that multiply outnumbered the forces
of the 5th Corps of the A BiH;
• The exhaustion due to long lasting combats which were particularly intensive
during the period September – November 1994;
• The constant encirclement with aggravated conditions of logistic support,
which had almost been interrupted after the helicopter had been taken down
in which Minister Ljubijankić was traveling (the helicopter was taken down
in the night 27th/28th May in the area of Batnoga);
• The division within the Bosnian population from the area of Western Bosnia,
whereas the forces of the NO APZB were constantly engaged on the side of
the SVK units in offensive operations against the forces of the 5th Corps of the
A BiH;
• The loss of the broader Vrnograč area, which had been occupied by the NO
APZB forces with the artillery support of the 39th Corps by the end of June,
due to which the forces of the A BiH were forced to withdraw towards the
south;
• The constant artillery fire by the units of the 2nd Krajina Corps on the town
area of Bihać with the aim to exhaust the forces, to impede the command and
supply and to reduce the morale of the population and the members of the 5th
Corps of the A BiH.

Due to problems concerning the organization and establishment, particularly in


view of the fact that the establishment of the Special Units Corps (KSJ) had been de-
layed, phase 2 of the operation did not even start before 19th July160, the forces of the
NO APZB were still mainly engaged and there was no explicit axis of attack (artil-
lery and offensive operations of smaller proportions were conducted along the entire
frontline, mainly in order to tie up and exhaust the forces of the 5th Corps of the A
BiH.

4.3.2. Grouping of the SVK forces for the offensive operation


The grouping of the forces to conduct the offensive operations161 spoke in favor of
the seriousness and decisiveness in the approach to the operation that was supposed
to result in the final capturing of the area of Western Bosnia.

160 
I ntelligence information dated 19 July 1995.
161 
Intelligence information for 20 July 1995, dated 21 July 1995.

258
The following forces were prepared and organized for the operation:

• OG (Operative Group) “Pauk” (Spider) (approx. 10.500 men)162 composed


of members of he:
- 3rd NO APZB Brigade 4.500 men
- Reinforcement from the 21st Corps 1.500 men
- Reinforcement from the 39th Corps 2.000 men
- Police forces 300 men
- Volunteers from the FRY and BiH 600 men
- Commander Colonel General Mile Novaković
- Task: attack from the line Cetingrad – Vrnograč on the axis towards
Pećingrad;

• TG (Tactical Group) “Kordun” (approx. 1.500 men) composed of members


from the:
- Battalion of the 2nd Armored Brigade / KSJ
- Battalion of the 2nd Guards Brigade / KSJ
- Battalion of the 71st Special Brigade / KSJ
- Battalion/21st Motorized Artillery Battalion
- Task: in the 2nd phase of the operation carry out an attack on the axis
Rakovica – Tržačka Raštela – Cazin and to link up with the VRS forc-
es attacking from the direction of Bosanska Krupa;

• TG “Lika” (approx. 1.500 men) composed of members of the:


- battalion / 2nd Armored Brigade / KSJ
- battalion(-1) / 2nd Guards Brigade / KSJ
- mechanized artillery battalion(-1) / 71st Specialized Brigade /KSJ
- Task: in the second phase of the operation carry out an attack on the
axis Selište – Velika Gata in order to link up with the VRS forces;

• TG “Zapad” (West) (approx. 1.200 men) composed of members of the:


- 1/13th Infantry Brigade
- 1/19th Infantry Brigade

162 
 egular daily combat report by the Commander of OG ‘Pauk’, Colonel General Mile Novaković,
R
dated 2 August 1995.

259
- 2/21st Border Detachment
- 21st Mechanized Artillery Battalion(-1)
- Task: carry out attacks from the line Cetingrad – Rakovica slong the
axis Šturlić and Tržaška Raštela

• TG “Jug” (South) (15th Corps) (approx. 3.500 men) composed of members


of the:
- 1/50th Infantry Brigade
- 1/103rd Light Brigade
- Ministry of the Interior (400 men)
- Volunteers (400 men)
- 15th Light Infantry Brigade / 2 Krajina Corps
- Task: carry out attacks from the area of Željava on the axis Izačić –
Gata.

• TG “Istok” (East) (approx. 1.800men) composed of members of the:


- 1/24th Infantry Brigade
- 1/33rd Infantry Brigade
- 1/1st Light Brigade /1st Krajina Corps
- 1/43rd Motorized Brigade /1st Krajina Corps
- Task: to carry out attacks from the line Vrnograč – Žirovac – Ivanjska
along the axis towards Bužim.

• Forces composed of members of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps (approx.
6.000 men)
- under the direct command of General Manojlo Milovanović, from the
FCP in Jasenica;
- Task: to break out at the right Una river shore in the area from Bosanska
Krupa to Spahići and Grmuša, and to link up with the SVK forces in the
area Otoka – Cazin, in the second phase of the operation.

260
4.3.3. C
 onditions and the course of the offensive operation of the
SVK
By 24th July most of the conditions had been created for the commencement of
the second phase of the offensive operation163, which implied the introduction of
the main forces (TG “Kordun” and TG “Lika)164 and more intensive offensives of
the units of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps along the axes towards Ripać, Grabež and
Grmuša and the units of the 39th Corps towards Bužim.
It became clear then that the offensive operation in the area of Western Bosnia,
although with a certain delay, was carried out as planned and that the forthcoming
realization of The second phase in case o success would inevitably lead to the break
up of the forces of the 5th A BiH Corps and occupation of the area of Western Bosnia.
Under these conditions the direct preparations for the offensive operation
“Storm” started. The successful implementation of this operation was the only solu-
tion for the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe of significantly larger propor-
tions than that in Srebrenica.
The following indicated that such a catastrophe would be inevitable in the case of
the fall of Western Bosnia:
• Long lasting combats aimed at occupying the area of Western Bosnia resulted
in many victims, which would certainly lead to a mass retaliation over the
members of the 5th Corps of the A BiH, but over the civilian population as
well;
• As early as in the winter 1994 General Manojlo Manojlović pointed out in his
notification that civilian victims would be possible if the members of the A
BiH refused to surrender;
• The inter-Bosnian conflict (A BiH – NO APZB) was radicalized to that point
(the members of the NO APZB collaborated with the SVK) that it would rep-
resent another motive (reason) for mass retaliation over the civilian popula-
tion as well;
• The significantly larger territory than in the case of Srebrenica and the signif-
icantly larger density of population would inevitably have the consequence of
directly proportional rate of crime, while the consequences of combat opera-
tions would certainly be much more serious;
163 
I ntelligence information dated 23 July 1995.
164 
Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 56.

261
• In the course of the offensive operations of the units of the 5th Corps of the
A BiH in the direction of Kulen Vakuf in fall 1994 the VRS units (2nd Krajina
Corps) and the civilian population in the areas of combat operations suffered
major losses and victims, which would certainly represent a strong motive
for retaliation against the Muslim population from the area of Western Bos-
nia.

4.3.4. Operation “Summer ‘95”


After the fall of Srebrenica and the genocide committed against the Bosniak pop-
ulation, after the inevitable and expected fall of Žepa and the undefined attitudes
presented at the London Conference (21st July) concerning the protection of the “safe
areas”, it was clear that it was necessary to prevent the breaking of the forces of the 5th
Corps of the A BiH and the occupation of the areas of Western Bosnia by the SVK-
VRS forces.
Due to the delay of the second phase of the offensive operation in the area of
Western Bosnia and the appeal of the Bosnian leadership to the Republic of Croa-
tia for military assistance (on 22nd July the Split Agreement was signed) it was pos-
sible to engage intensively the HV forces in the offensive operation on the Grahovo-
Glamoč frontline that was conducted under the code name “Summer ‘95”.
As early as in early June the “Serb” forces (and, of course, politics) had the option
to choose concerning the priority of engagement of their own forces and defining the
significance of the goals. It was clear that there were two critical points in the west of
BiH: Cazin Krajina and Dinara-Grahovo. From the Bosnian side the forces of one of
the VRS corps’ that was smaller in numbers – the 2nd Krajina Corps – was engaged
on these frontlines.
It had obviously been decided that capturing the area of Cazin Krajina was a pri-
ority task, although from the military point of view it might be considered a dubious
decision, considering the situation as it was in the area of Dinara and Livansko polje,
to which the commander of the 2nd Krajina Corps had already alerted already in May.
Apparently, the “Serbian” (Greater Serbian”) politics’ position was that the occu-
pation of territories in the area of BiH was still the priority issue. This was also sup-
ported by the fact that throughout BiH offensive operations were carried out aimed
at the occupation of Bosnian (and Croatian) enclaves, mostly in the “safe areas”165.

165 
“ Obavještajna informacija za 16. srpanj 1995” /Intelligence information for 16 July 1995/, 17 July
1995.

262
Considering these conditions, it was logical to conduct an offensive operation
ailed at the seizure of the Glamoč area. The expected results would in any case by un-
favorable for the VRS and SVK:
• An offensive against the forces of the 2nd Krajina Corps and the combat units
of the SVK would have to result in the withdrawal from offensive operations
in the Cazin Krajina due to the necessity to engage the forces for the defense
of Grahovo and the Knin hinterlands, which would prevent the occupation
of the area of Cazin Krajina;
• Insisting on the realization of the second phase of the offensive operation in
the Cazin Krajina brings the forces of the 2nd Krajina Corps, engaged in the
defense of Grahovo and the Knin hinterlands in the Dinara area, into a very
difficult position, because they have no reserves that could replace the al-
ready exhausted manpower of the brigades engaged. In that way the option is
to cut off Knin and liberate the occupied areas.

Operation “Summer ‘95” started on 25th July. This report does not intent to ana-
lyze the details of this operation.( However, it was carried out under the conditions
of a very well prepared and organized defense, and the defense of the units of the 2nd
Krajina Corps was rammed on 28th July in front of Grahovo166 and on the next day in
front of Glamoč. By the 30th July the forces of the 2nd Krajina Corps had withdrawn
from Glamočko polje and the southern part of Grahovsko polje; thus the line had
been achieved as indicated in the appended map.167

The situation on the frontline for Cazin Krajina


As the risk of the threat for Knin from the direction of Grahovo and the Dinara
increased, the SVK General Staff finally decided to relocate one part of the forc-
es, which had participated in the second phase of the operation in Cazin Krajina,
as reinforcement to the forces of the broken 2nd Krajina Corps and the 7th (Knin)
Corps. Thus the 2nd Guards Brigade of the Special Forces Corps was relocated to
the area of Northern Dalmatia and attached as support to the 7th Corps of the SVK
in order to stop the breach of the HV and HVO forces on the axis towards Strmica
and Knin.

166 
“ Obavještajna informacija za 29. srpanj 1995”/Intelligence information for 29 July 1995/, 30 July
1995.
167 
“Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume I”, Central
Intelligence Agency, May 2002, Map no. 57.

263
As a consequence, the strike that was necessary to carry out the breach on the
main axis of attack towards Cazin was weakened. This led to a gradual decrease of
intensity of the overall activities in the offensive operations in Western Bosnia.
Having realized that the open continuation of the offensive operations in the area
of Western Bosnia was gradually radicalizing the position of the international com-
munity, that the set task would probably not be accomplished and that on the other
hand the HV threatened to attack towards Knin and Gračac and along the axes lead-
ing to Izačić and Cazin Krajina, the “RSK” leadership (Martić and Mrkšić) met on 30
July with the Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi. He convinced them to “agree” to termi-
nate further offensive operations in Cazin Krajina.
A minor part of the forces was indeed withdrawn from the frontline towards Ca-
zin Krajina and redirected to the frontline towards the HV forces; however, the pres-
sure on the units of the 5th Corps of the A BiH stopped only after the beginning of
Operation “Storm” (04 August 1995). The offensive operations of the SVK and VRS
forces and the forces of the NO APZB in the area of Western Bosnia lasted until that
date. The following information confirms this:
• The SVK General Staff issued on 01 August an order168 to the 39th Corps say-
ing that according to the request of the Command of Operation “Spider” and
with the aim of concealing the artillery support of the SVK in the combat op-
erations carried out by the OG “Spider”, one 122 mm howitzer battery should
be relocated to the territory of Western Bosnia according to the decision of
the OG “Spider” commander;
• On 02 August the OG “Spider” Command submitted to the Commander of
the SVK General Staff a “regular combat report”169 containing information
about the combat activities during the day;
• On 03 August the Intelligence Department of the VRS 1st Krajina Corps
submitted to the Intelligence Administration of the SVK General Staff and
the intelligence department of the SVK Corps’ Commands an “intelligence
report”170 containing information as to the situation on the frontline towards
the 5th Corps of the A BiH, where “combats were ongoing and soldiers of the
5th Corps were being killed every day” who “were hoping that the HV action
would start and the Cazin Krajina would be unblocked soon, because it is a
question of time as how long they could offer resistance”;
168 
 rder by the Commander of the SVK Main Staff General Mrkšić dated 1 August 1995.
O
169 
Regular combat report by the Commander of OG “Pauk” dated 2 August 1995.
170 
Intelligence Report with the situation until 17.00 hrs dated 3 August 1995.

264
• The newly formed 15th “Light Brigade” from the SVK 15th “Lika” Corps (do-
miciled in the area Gornji Lapac – Srb) was deployed in the area Baljevac –
Ličko Petrovo Selo. According to the report of the Security Department of
the 15th Corps’ Command171 the brigade was manned with conscripts who
had been engaged from the area of Serbia;
• On 04 August 1995, after the commencement of the Operation “Storm” the
OG “Spider” reported172 that “the forces are holding firmly the front end” and
that “defectors to the free territory of the Republic of Western Bosnia” were
observed;

4.4. Other factors that determined the choice of the


time for the commencement and the modality of
implementation of Operation “Storm”
The aforementioned information and statements reveal that the maintenance of
the status quo represented a huge risk concerning the security and perspective for
the preservation and development of the Republic of Croatia. Such risk was addi-
tionally increased by the activities of the SVK (and the VRS) that were ongoing im-
mediately before Operation “Storm”.
It is beyond doubt that the further successful realization of all these activities
would have improved the strategic position of the “RSK” concerning the defense
(prolongation of the occupation) of the “western territories” and weakened the posi-
tion of the Republic of Croatia. In addition, it would have lead to a new large-scale
humanitarian crisis.
The choice of the time for the commencement of Operation “Storm” was condi-
tioned by a number of other circumstances:

The Split Agreement


The signing of the “Split Agreement” was certainly one of the more significant
events in political terms, which in the military sense enabled the shift in the relation
of forces that was strategically significant concerning the defining of the center of
gravity of Operation “Storm”.

171 
 eport from the Security Department of the 15th Corps Command dated 2 August 1995.
R
172 
Regular combat report of OG “Pauk” dated 4 August 1995.

265
However, the significance of this agreement comes fully into its own only after
the military activities that followed after Operation “Storm” have been considered.
Those were the operations “Maestral” and “Southern Move”, which on the strategic
level contributed to the conclusion of the Dayton Accord, i.e. to the defeat of the
politics that wished to realize the idea of all Serbs in one state with military means.
Furthermore, it was only after the remaining Serb forces in BiH were defeated in
military terms that the end of war and the peaceful reintegration of the UNPA sec-
tor “East” into the Republic of Croatia could be achieved. The offensive operations
“Maestral” and “Southern Sweep” were conducted synchronized with the offensive
operations of the A BiH. During the last week of the Operation “Southern Sweep”
intense air strikes were simultaneously carried out by NATO airplanes on facilities
and installations of the VRS.
Active battlefields on the territory of BiH
Simultaneously (in summer ’95) numerous battlefields on the territory of BiH
were very active, such as:
• The area of Posavina (corridor) where the offensive operations were carried
out by the VRS;
• The area of Sarajevo, where on 15 June the offensive of the A BiH forces start-
ed as an attempt to penetrate the blockade and link up the forces of the 1st
Corps of the A BiH and the forces of the 7th Corps of the A BiH. It was exactly
that area where the risk was big that the operation would fail if the time of
the implementation was significantly prolonged (the attack was mostly car-
ried out by the forces that were in the encirclement), and this is exactly what
happened;
• The area of Majevica and Ozren, where the offensive operations were con-
ducted by the VRS forces following the prior offensive of the A BiH forces;
• The area of the battlefield Livno-Kupres and Grahovo – Glamoč;
• Srebrenica and Žepa;
• The area of Goražde – Rogatica.

The major part of the VRS forces was engaged in the operations at these and
other battlefields, while at the battlefield Grahovo-Glamoč parts of the forces of the
11th and 7th Corps of the SVK were engaged as reinforcement in that area. A possible
maneuver of the VRS forces merely implied the relocation of one or two battalions,
mainly from the 1st Krajina Corps, from one battlefield to another in the area of re-
sponsibility of that corps, depending on the situation on the battlefields.

266
Impeded possibilities of introducing reinforcement
Under such circumstances it was estimated that the time of potential introduc-
tion of the operative and, in particular, the strategic reserve on the axes towards Kor-
dun, Lika and Northern Dalmatia would be prolonged from 36 hours under “nor-
mal” circumstances to least at 48 to 60 hours.
Significant reinforcements from the VRS, for the introduction of which less than
36 hours would be required, were almost impossible, because those were forces that
had to be withdrawn from combat operations (mostly in the area of responsibility of
the Eastern-Bosnian Corps of the VRS) and they could not be introduced into com-
bat immediately under circumstances in which offensive (counter-offensive) opera-
tions were conducted.
The introduction of the reinforcement from the Yugoslav Army (VJ) (from the
territory of the SRY) was event more questionable, except to the area of Eastern Slavo-
nia and Srijem, where these forces cold be introduced in less than 12 hours; however,
in this case the intention was to introduce these forces to carry out offensive opera-
tions against a well organized defense, which reduced the probability of engagement
of the VJ due to the negative political implications of such an act for the SRY.
One of the conditions for the successful implementation of the Operation “Storm”
was to reach as fast as possible the border with BiH on the main axes of attack that
overlapped with the main traffic routes towards BiH. BY that the introduction of re-
inforcement would be impeded, if there would be an attempt at all to introduce the
forces.
It has to be pointed out that Operation “Storm” was a part of a strategic opera-
tion within which, along with the offensive operations in the area of Sectors “North”
and “South”, defensive operations on the frontline towards Sector “East” and in the
area of the “Southern frontline” were also conducted. The HV guards brigades rep-
resented the striking force in these operations, whereas five guards brigades (1st, 2nd,
4th, 7th and 9th) were engaged in the offensive operation “Storm” and two (3rd and 5th)
participated in the organization of the defensive operation in the area of Eastern Sla-
vonia and Srijem.

Discord within the political leadership of the “RSK”


Not less significant is the fact that at that time dissensions in the attitudes of the
leadership of the eastern “RSK” part and the leadership mainly from the western
“RSK” part came to the surface, which referred to the issue of “unification” of RS.

267
Concerning the aforesaid, one must not forget about the fact that the Serb popu-
lation from the eastern part of the “RSK” was more and more developing an averse-
ness to the “Krajina people” from the western part of the “RSK”, to which aid and
reinforcement had to be sent all the time.

Non-objective assessments of the RSK military leadership


For the assessment of the operational position of the overall “Serb” forces the
analysis of the SVK Command had to be taken into consideration as well.
The decisions of this command indicate that the SVK General Staff assessed that
there was a possibility that the HV would commence an offensive operation aimed
at the liberation of the “western parts of the RSK”, but he could not find an adequate
response to such a possibility for two significant reasons:
• reprisal was considered a sufficient factor of determent, and
• the combat abilities of the HV were assessed with a significant amount of un-
derestimation.

The order for the 11th Corps to perform constant movements of the forces in or-
der to tie up as many of the HV forces as possible in that part of the frontline and
reduce the pressure in the area of Banovina, Kordun and Lika represents one of the
decisions illustrating this assertion.
That the opponent was non-objectively assessed, which was observed through-
out the time of occupation, particularly from the time the “strategy of real threat”
emerged (as stated by General Radinović) until the beginning of Operation “Storm”
is sufficiently implied in the content of the Decision for further activities, orders is-
sued on 2 August 1995 by the SVK GS Commander Colonel General Mile Mrkšić.173
Although it was a time when observing the activities of the HV it could be con-
cluded that the possibility of an offensive operation was immense, the SVK GS wrote
a decision full of unnecessary formalities and demagogical phrases in an underes-
timating tone stating, among other things, that the Ustasha174 launched attacks only
when soldiers (referring to the SVK soldiers), terrified by the artillery fire abandoned
their positions without fight.

173 
 ecision for further activities, Order by the Commander of the SVK Main Staff dated 2 August
D
1995.
174 
The ‘Ustasha’ was a term also used in official documents of the RSK and the SVK as a synonym for
Croats and Croat soldiers.

268
The possibility of the use of operational axes from the territory of BiH
Another important factor in the assessment of the time of the conduct of the Op-
eration “Storm” was also the possibility of use of the operational axis leading from
the area of Bosansko Grahovo to Knin, which in the case of Operation “Storm” was
significant in strategic terms.
Already in late 1993, after the initial concept for the conduct of the offensive op-
eration had been drafted, on the basis of an analysis of the combat operations for the
liberation of Knin within the final operations during WW 2, it was established that
the long-lasting combats for the liberation of Knin then were successful only after
the forces from the territory of BiH had been introduced.
Concerning the aforesaid, it was especially important to observe the course of
the operations conducted by the HV and HVO forces in the area of Livanjsko polje
and behind the Dinara mountain, because only after the HV forces had emerged in
the Knin hinterlands could the center of gravity be defined, the realization of which
would make the liberation of the occupied territories efficient in the way as it actu-
ally was…

Choice of the axes of attack


With regards to the defining of the center of gravity of the Operation “Storm”,
and this was Knin as the actual and symbolic, military and political, administrative
and cultural center of the “RSK”, the liberation of which also meant the actual and
symbolic defeat of the rebellion and the collapse of the artificial formation of “RSK”,
it was determined that the main axis of attack would be the one towards Knin.
Most of the other main axes of attack were chosen in accordance with the follow-
ing criteria:
• to emerge as soon as possible at the state border with BiH in order to close
down the assessed axes for possible introduction of reinforcement and re-
serve forces from the territory of BiH;
• to secure as fast as possible the penetration of the blockade (encirclement) in
which the forces of the 5th Corps of the A BiH were held and enable the pro-
vision of (logistic) support to these forces;
• In territorial sense to separate the individual (regional) parts of the so-called
“territorial strategic center” of the “RSK” in order to prevent the maneuver
with the strategic reserve forces (Special Units Corps) and weaken all aspects
of coordination (disorganization of the defense system);

269
• Favorable geographic features of each operational axis (capacity) and the
characteristics the opponent’s defense system on that axis in order to secure
the conduct of the operations with as few losses as possible.

With regard to the aforementioned criteria, the axis leading from the area of
Velebit to Sveti Rok, i.e. Gračac and Medak, was specific to a certain degree, on which
the attack was carried out by the special police units of the Ministry of the Interior.
Since this axis in fact represented a natural axis leading from the area of Gospić
to Gračac and further towards the BiH border, i.e. Knin, that was very important in
the function of cutting off the occupied areas of Northern Dalmatia from the other
parts of the occupied areas, in this area the defense was carried out by the forces of
the 9th Motorized Brigade / 15th Corps, one of the most powerful brigades of the SVK,
in the area of defense of which approx. 2.000 men were engaged.
Under the conditions of a well organized defense, the attack on the axis Gospić-
Gračac would not have guaranteed a fast penetration in the direction of the border,
thus it was decided that the attack should be carried out along the left flank of the de-
fense of the 9th Motorized Brigade. Such an attack was possible only with the imple-
mentation of the forces trained for combat operations on rugged mountain terrains
with specific limestone features.
On the other hand, the terrain features prevented a possible fast maneuver of the
9 Motorized Brigade aimed at organizing the defense on the flank axis, as well as
th

a fast introduction of reinforcement from the level of the SVK (15th Corps did not
dispose of adequate operational reserves because a significant part of the forces was
engaged on the frontlines within or towards BiH – 15th Light Brigade towards Bihać
and the 103rd partly in the direction of Strmica and Grahovo).

270
Instead of a conclusion
The peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia was
not possible. Therefore, Operation “Storm” was conducted, during which most of the
then occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia were liberated.
On the other hand, the Operation “Storm” also resulted in the emergence of the
HV at the state border with BiH, which provided a favorable operational basis for
the operations that were afterwards conducted in the area of BiH and led to the end
of the war.
Namely, it was not before the military defeat of the Serb forces in BiH that the
conditions could be created for the implementation of the peace plan of the Contact
Group that was put into effect with the Dayton Accord.
Within the scope of the aforesaid, the agreement on the peaceful reintegration of
the UNPA Sector “East” into the Republic of Croatia was reached and the UNTAES
mission was established, which successfully conducted the reintegration.
The end of the war was at the same time the beginning of a period of building up
the security, stability and mutual trust amongst the people, nations, ethnic groups
and states in the areas caught in the war, which provided the basic preconditions to
start solving the complex issues of the return of refugees and displaced persons.

271
KRATICE

A H
A BiH – Armija Bosne i Hercegovine HE – hidroelektrana
AFS – aero-foto snimanje (snimka) HMDCDR – Hrvatski memorijalno-do-
AP – autonomna pokrajina kumentacijski centar Domovinskog
rata
AP ZB - Autonomna pokrajina Zapadna
Bosna HRM – Hrvatska ratna mornarica
HRZ – Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo
B HUMINT - Human Intelligence
BiH – Bosna i Hercegovina
HV – Hrvatska vojska
BL – bespilotna letjelica
HVO – Hrvatsko vijeće obrane
BVP – borbeno vozilo pješaštva
ICFY – International Conference on
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency Former Yugoslavia
CIVPOL – Civilian Police (Civilna poli-
cija UNPROFOR-a) I
IDS – izvidničko diverzantska satnija
C
IMINT - Imagery Intelligence
COB – Centar za obavješćivanje
IPS – izdvojena prislušna skupina
EI – elektroničko izviđanje
IS – izvidnička satnija
EZ – Europska zajednica
IZM – izdvojeno zapovjedno mjesto
gardbr – gardijska brigada

G J
gr. – granični JNA – Jugoslavenska narodna armija
GS OSRH – Glavni stožer Oružanih sna-
ga Republike Hrvatske K
GSHV – Glavni stožer Hrvatske vojske K – korpus
GŠ JNA - Generalštab Jugoslavenske na- KK – Krajiški korpus
rodne armije km – kilometar
GŠ SVK – Glavni štab Srpske vojske Kra- KSJ – Korpus specijalnih jedinica
jine

273
KSS VJ - Korpus specijalnih snaga Voj- O
ske Jugoslavije ob - oklopna bojna
kut. – kutija ObO – obavještajni odjel
obod – obavještajni odsjek
L
ObU – obavještajna uprava
lbr – laka brigada
OG – operativna grupa
lpbr - laka pješačka (pješadijska) brigada
okbr – oklopna brigada
ltp - laka topnička pukovnija
OSINT - Open Source Intelligence
M OSRH – Oružane snage Republike Hr-
vatske
mabr – mješovita artiljerijska brigada
OT – oklopni transporter
mad - mješoviti artiljerijski divizijun
map - mješovita artiljerijska pukovnija
P
MKSJ – Međunarodni kazneni sud za
pbr – pješačka (pješadijska) brigada
bivšu Jugoslaviju
PO – protuoklopna/i
MO RSK - Ministarstvo odbrane Repu-
blike Srpske Krajine PZO – protuzračna obrana
MO SRJ – Ministarstvo obrane Savezne
Republike Jugoslavije R
MORH – Ministarstvo obrane Republike R. – republika
Hrvatske RF – ratna formacija
mpoad – mješoviti protivoklopno-arti- RH – Republika Hrvatska
ljerijski divizion RS – Republika Srpska
MUP – Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova RSK – Republika Srpska Krajina
RSUP – republički sekretarijat unutraš-
N njih poslova
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
sation (Organizacija Sjevernoatlant- S
skog ugovora)
SAD – Sjedinjene Američke Države
NO APZB - Narodna obrana Autono-
SANU - Srpska akademija nauka i umet-
mne pokrajine Zapadna Bosna
nosti

274
SAO – Srpska autonomna oblast U
SatED – satnija za elektroničko djelova- UN – Ujedinjeni narodi
nje UNCRO - United Nations Confiden-
SDB – služba državne bezbednosti ce Restoration Operation in Croa-
SED – središte elektroničkog djelovanja tia (Operacija Ujedinjenih naroda za
obnovu povjerenja u Hrvatskoj)
SEI – središnjica elektroničkog izviđanja
UNMO – United Nations Military Ob-
SFRJ – Socijalistička Federativna Repu-
server
blika Jugoslavija
UNMOP - United Nations Mission of
SIGINT - Signal Intelligence
Observers in Prevlaka
SIS – Sigurnosno-informativna služba
UNPA - United Nations Protected Area
SIV – Savezno izvršno vijeće
UNPREDEP - United Nations Preventi-
SK – Savez komunista ve Deployment Force
SKJ – Savez komunista Jugoslavije UNPROFOR – United Nations Prote-
specbr – specijalna brigada cted Force
SR – socijalistička republika UNTAES - United Nations Transitional
SRJ – Savezna Republika Jugoslavija Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Bara-
nja and Western Sirmium
SSNO - Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu
obranu Ur. br. – urudžbeni broj
ssrp - srednji samohodni raketni puk
V
SVK – Srpska vojska Krajine
VBL – vod bespilotnih letjelica
SZUP – Služba za zaštitu ustavnog pore-
tka vED – vod za elektroničko djelovanje
VJ – Vojska Jugoslavije
T VRS – Vojska Republike Srpske
TG – taktička grupa VS – Vijeće sigurnosti
TO – Teritorijalna obrana
Z
ZP – zborno područje

275
PRILOZI
AFS uređenih obrambenih položaja na prvoj i drugoj crti (Vedro Polje - Hrastovac).
Aerial photography of engineered positions for defense on the first and second line
(Vedro Polje - Hrastovac).

278
AFS uređenih obrambenih položaja na prvoj i drugoj crti - Veljun.
Aerial photography of engineered positions for defense
on the first and second line - Veljun.

279
AFS snimljen pomoću bespilotne letjelice tijekom mimohoda povodom Vidovdana
(Dan RSK) 28. 6. 1995., na kojem je razvidna tehnika iz sastava
Korpusa specijalnih jedinica SVK.
Aerial photography using a UAV during the Vidovdan parade (The Day of the RSK)
which shows the equipment of the Special Units Corps.

280
AFS posjednutih paljbenih položaja - Draksenić.
Marked location on a map and an aerial photography of occupied firing positions.

281
AFS paljbenog položaja - Markovine.
Marked location on a map and an aerial photography of firing positions.

282
Zemljovidi su preuzeti iz knjige Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict,
1990-1995, Volume I i II, CIA, Washington DC, May 2002., October 2003.

283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
KAZALO IMENA
A I Miše Željko, 21
Abdić Fikret, 82, 83 Izetbegović Alija, 131 Mladić Ratko, 61, 89, 111,
Akashi Yasushi, 102, 105, 144
106, 132 J Mrkšić Mile, 58-60, 90, 107,
Al-Rodan Kamal, 104, 105 124, 132, 136, 144, 145
Janvier Bernard, 104
Albright Madeleine, 87 Jović Borisav, 33
Annan Kofi, 106 N
Nambiar Satish, 101
K
B Nazor Ante, 48
Kadijević Veljko, 33, 40,
Babić Lazo, 116 41, 44, 45, 47-50, 52-54, 66, Novaković Mile, 55, 82,
111, 141 128, 145
Bildt Carl, 105
Karadžić Radovan, 61, 85, Novaković Žarko, 105
Brandt Miroslav, 39, 141
88, 89, 144
Broz Josip - Tito, 43, 46, 47
Kirudja Charles, 104 O
Klarić Dario, 21 Obradović, stožerni
C Kozina Anđelko, 21 brigadir, 35
Churkin Vitaliy, 113
Owen David, 98, 141
L
Č Letica Slaven, 39 P
Čeleketić Milan, 58, 67, Lončar Dušan, 58, 60, 116, Panić Miodrag, 60
115-117 120
Pavić Radovan, 39
Čović Bože, 39
Perić Braco, 21
LJ Peterson Jeannie, 98
D Ljubijankić Irfan, 127
Pleština Budimir, 21
Dudaković Atif, 82 Pokaz Ivan, 9
M
G Mamula Branko, 33, 46
R
Gačić Žarko, 59 Martić Milan, 61, 67, 77,
105-107, 115-118, 120, 132
Radinović Radovan, 33,
Ghali Boutros Boutros, 60, 63, 64, 66, 68, 77, 123,
107 McLeod Charles, 99 136, 141
Gotovina Ante, 9, 13, 15, 21 Mikelić Borislav, 77, 115, Rogić Zvonimir, 21
116, 119
Milošević Slobodan, 33,
H 39, 48, 50, 60, 108, 119 S
Hadžić Goran, 115, 116, 119 Milovanović Manojlo, 86- Sauville de La Presle
89, 111, 112, 120, 130 Bertrand, 104

297
Sekulić Milisav, 33 Tayyeb Ghazi, 104 W
Stoltenberg Thorvald, 99, Thornberry Cedric, 98 Wahlgren Lars-Eric, 101
105 Tomac Zdravko, 39
Tomanić Radivoje, 88, 89, Ž
Š 120, 144
Žugić Goran, 21
Šarinić Hrvoje, 102 Trifunović Vlado, 54
Žuljić Stanko, 39
Šušak Gojko, 101 Tuđman Franjo, 87, 131
Tus Antun, 101
T
Tanjga Rade, 116 V
Tarbuk Slobodan, 59 Valentić Mirko, 39
Vance Cyrus, 98

298
KAZALO MJESTA
A Bubanj Potok, 122 E
Autonomna pokrajina Bužim, 129, 130 Eastern Slavonia, 104
Zapadna Bosna, 15, 82 Eritrea, 103
C Ethiopia, 103
B Cazin, 127, 129, 130, 132 Europa, 37, 66, 105
Balkanski poluotok, 39 Cazinska krajina, 82, 87,
Baljevac, 133 88, 112, 131-133 G
Banovina, 70, 71, 82, 83, 119, Central African Republic, Gata, 129
121, 136 103
Gazimestan, 39
Baranja, 69-71, 107, 115, 119 Cetingrad, 128, 129
Georgia, 103
Batina, 71 Chad, 103
Glamoč, 112, 132
Batnoga, 83, 122, 127 Congo Democratic
Glamočko polje, 132
Beli Manastir, 99 Republic, 103
Glina, 51, 71, 107, 126
Benkovac, 107 Cote d’Ivoire, 103
Golubić, 84, 86
Beograd, 33, 39, 40, 48, 60, 122 Crna Gora, 47
Goražde, 135
Bihać, 9, 36, 41, 85-89, 101, Gorjevac, 85
106, 112, 114, 115, 127, 128, D Gornji Lapac, 133
137 Dalmacija (sjeverna), 70, Gospić, 137, 138
Biograd, 65 72, 80-83, 119, 121, 132,
Grabež, 84, 85, 130
Bogojevo, 71 135, 137
Dalmacija, 98 Gračac, 70, 132, 137, 138
Bojna, 84
Darfur, 103 Gradiška, 41
Bosanska Krupa, 85, 129,
130 Dinara, 61, 89, 105, 114, 117, Grahovsko polje, 132
Bosanski Petrovac, 72, 85, 126, 131, 132, 137 Grčka, 104
86 Doboj, 117 Grmuša, 85, 130
Bosansko Grahovo, 36, 61, Donji Lapac, 72 Grubišno Polje, 66
72, 88, 89, 126, 131, 132, Donji Varoš, 101
136-138
Bosna (sjeverna), 71
Draksenić, 100 H
Drava, 54 Haag, 9, 13, 15, 55
Bosna (zapadna), 13, 15,
35, 61, 62, 66, 70, 82-84, 86- Drniš, 107 Haiti, 103
88, 91, 100, 101, 112-114, Drvar, 86 Herceg-Novi, 41
117, 118, 120-122, 126-128, Dubica, 71 Hrastovac, 75
130-133 Dubrovnik, 41, 54, 66 Hrvatska (Republika
Bosna i Hercegovina, 13, Dunav, 66, 118 Hrvatska), 9, 13, 33- 36,
16, 41, 49, 66, 70, 93, 96-98,
111, 112 Dvor, 71, 126 39-41, 46, 47-52, 54, 55, 57,

299
63-69, 71, 87, 91-96, 98-100, 75, 77-79, 81, 82, 84, 89, 90, O
103-105, 107, 113, 119, 134 92, 98, 99, 106, 107, 112,
Obrovac, 107
Hrvatska (SRH), 50 116, 117, 122
Okučani, 86, 117
Kulen Vakuf, 72, 85, 86, 131
Orašje, 126
Kupa, 40
I Osijek, 20, 54
Kupres, 85, 112, 114
Istok (sektor), 95, 107, 134, Otoka (Bosanska), 84, 127,
135 Kutina, 100 130
Ivanjska, 129 Ozren, 117, 134
Izačić, 129, 132 L
Liberia, 103 P
J Ličko Petrovo Selo, 133 Pakrac, 51
Jasenica, 130 Lika, 51, 70, 72, 81-83, 119, Pećigrad, 128
Jug (sektor), 95, 98, 101, 135 121, 122, 135, 136
Peruča, 65
Jugoslavija (SFRJ), 9, 13, Livanjsko polje, 114, 126,
131, 137 Petrinja, 107
15, 33, 39, 40, 42, 43, 48, 50-
55, 63, 66, 93, 95, 98, 99 Livno, 89, 112 Petrova Gora, 122
Jugoslavija (SRJ), 33, 34, 40, Lohovo, 85 Pivare, 101
49, 57, 58, 63, 69, 75, 79, 92, Lohovska brda, 85, 86 Plaški, 86
95, 97, 119 Plitvice, 51, 59
Posavina (Bosanska
M
K Majevica, 134
Posavina), 71, 85, 112,
Karlobag, 40 117, 118, 120, 126, 134
Makedonija, 96, 104 Prevlaka, 69, 71, 97, 104
Karlovac, 40, 41, 65, 66
Mali Radić, 85 Prijedor, 71
Kezlovac, 85
Markovine, 100 Priština, 39
Kijevo, 51
Maslenica, 98 Pritoka, 86
Kiseljak, 110
Maslenički most, 66 Pula, 20
Knin, 33, 41, 55, 64, 67, 72,
77, 89, 91, 98-100, 104, 105,
Medak, 70, 137
107, 116, 132, 136, 137 Metlika, 66
Mostar, 41
R
Konavle, 71
Račić brdo, 85
Kordun, 51, 70, 71, 82, 83,
Rakovica, 129
119, 121, 135, 136 N Republika Srpska, 13, 35,
Kordunski Ljeskovac, 127 Neretva, 41 54, 63, 75, 79, 88-92, 115
Kosovo, 39, 46, 47, 103 Niš, 62 Ripač, 85, 86, 130
Kostajnica, 71 Nova Gradiška, 113 Rogatica, 135
Krajina (Bosanska), 118 Novi Sad, 122
Krajina (Republika Novigradsko ždrilo, 65
Srpska Krajina), 13, 34, Novska, 100, 113
36, 40, 41, 52, 57, 63-67, 73,

300
S Sudan, 103 Vinkovci, 71
Sarajevo, 134 Sveti Rok, 137 Virovitica, 40, 41
Sava, 54, 100 Svilaja, 101 Vlašić, 117
Selište, 129 Vojnić, 107
Sinj, 19, 65 Š Vojvodina, 40
Sjever (sektor), 95, 104, 135 Šibenik, 65, 101 Vrginmost, 71, 107
Slavonija (istočna), 41, 70, Šid, 71, 118 Vrlika, 101, 126
71, 81, 107, 115, 119, 120, Šturlić, 129 Vrnograč, 126-129
135 Vrtoče, 72, 85
Slavonija (zapadna), 41, Vukovar, 54, 59, 93
67, 70, 71, 93, 101, 115-119 T
Slavonski Brod, 19, 101 Timor-Leste, 103
Slovenija, 41, 47, 50, 93 Tovarnik, 117 W
Slunj, 60, 122, 125-127 Trebinje, 41 Washington, 9
Spahići, 130 Tržačka Raštela, 129 Western Sahara, 103
Split, 20, 41, 65, 110 Turanj, 83
Srb, 133 Z
Srbija (Republika Srbija), U Zadar, 41, 65, 101
33, 39, 40, 46-48, 51, 60, 70, Udbina, 56, 72, 87, 118 Zagreb, 19, 20, 35, 39, 41, 48,
92, 93, 110, 112, 119, 120, 54, 57, 59, 63-65, 77, 98,
122, 133 Una, 100, 130 100, 105, 107, 110, 113, 118
Srbija (Velika Srbija), 13, Zapad (sektor), 95, 116
33-36, 39, 40, 57, 63, 64, 66, V Zemunik, 65
91-93 Varaždin, 41, 54
Srebrenica, 130, 131, 135 Vedro Polje, 75
Srijem (zapadni), 59, 107, Ž
Velebit, 70, 137 Željava, 127, 129
115, 135
Velika Gata, 129
SSSR, 45 Ženeva, 93, 101, 105
Veliki Ljutoč, 85
Stara Gradiška, 117 Žepa, 131, 135
Veliki Radić, 85
Strmica, 132, 138 Žirovac, 84, 129
Veljun, 75

301
O autoru
IVAN POKAZ rođen je 21. prosinca 1942. godine u
Vrpolju (Slavonski Brod). Završio je Gimnaziju u Đa-
kovu, Vojnu tehničku akademiju u Ljubljani, diplomski
studij na Visokoj tehničkoj školi KoV-a u Zagrebu, posli-
jediplomski studij na FER-u Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. Bio je
na dužnostima tehničke struke u Osijeku, Đakovu i Ma-
riboru, a kao magistar znanosti iz područja elektrotehni-
ke biran je u zvanje višeg predavača na Vojnoj tehničkoj
akademiji i na Vojnom tehničkom fakultetu u Zagrebu.
Kao sudionik Domovinskog rata od ljeta 1991. godi-
ne obnašao je dužnost stručnog savjetnika u Upravi za
istraživanje, razvoj i proizvodnju MORH-a, a od siječnja
1992. pa do konca 2000. godine različite dužnosti u Obavještajnoj upravi GSHV-a:
načelnik Odjela za elektroničko izviđanje, zamjenik načelnika Uprave, a od 1996. do
2000. godine načelnik Obavještajne uprave GS OSRH. Od 2001. pa do umirovljenja
2003. godine bio je vojni izaslanik RH u Republici Austriji i Slovačkoj Republici te u
OESS-u. Ima čin brigadnog generala Hrvatske vojske.
Od umirovljenja 2003. godine radi kao viši savjetnik u nekoliko tvrtki koje se
bave poslovnim savjetovanjem u područjima korporativne sigurnosti i upravljanja
sigurnosnim rizicima. Objavio je više stručnih i znanstvenih radova na međunarod-
nim konferencijama iz tih područja. Od 2006. do 2008. godine radio je u timu za
pripremu obrane generala Mladena Markača.

303