Del Val v. Del Val
Thus, contention of petitioners
Facts:
> Petitioners and private respondents are brothers and Sisters and are the only
heirs and next of kin of Gregorio del Val who died intestate.
> It was found out that the deceased took out insurance on his life for the sum of
40T and made it payable to private respondents as sole beneficiary.
> After Gregorio’s death, Andres collected the proceeds of the policy.
> Of the said policy, Andres paid 18T to redeem some real property which Gregorio
had sold to third persons during his lifetime.
> Said redemption of the property was made by Andres’ laywer in the name of
Andres and the petitioners. (Accdg to Andres, said redemption in the name of
Petitioners and himself was without his knowledge and that since the redemption,
petitioners have been in possession of the property)
> Petitioners now contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the
estate of the deceased and not to Andres personally.
> Pet filed a complaint for partition of property including the insurance proceeds
> Andress claims that he is the sole owner of the proceeds and prayed that he be
declared:
> Sole owner of the real property, redeemed with the use of the insurance
proceeds and its remainder;
> Petitioners to account for the use and occupation of the premises.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have a right to the insurance proceeds?
Held:
NOPE.
The contract of life insurance is a special contract and the destination of the
proceeds thereof is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with the
subject. Our civil code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to
life-insurance contracts of to the destination of life-insurance proceeds that subject
is regulated exclusively by the Code of Commerce.
that proceeds should be considered as a dontation or gift and should be included in
the estate of the deceased is UNTENABLE.
Since the repurchase has been made n the names of all the heirs instead of the
defendant alone, petitioners claim that the property belongs to the heirs in
common and not to the defendant alone. The SC held that if it is established by
evidence that that was his intention and that the real estate was delivered to the
plaintiffs with that understanding, then it is probable that their contention is correct
and that they are entitled to share equally with the defendant. HOWEVER, it
appears from the evidence that the conveyances were taken in the name of the
plaintiffs without the knowledge and consent of Andres, or that it was not his
intention to make a gift to them of real estate, when it belongs to him.
Ayala Investments vs CA
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching,
EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981
making him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to
AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and
Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally
pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment,
RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff,
caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff
sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed
injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to
the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court
from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent
spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only
bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.

HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to
prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite
the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the
debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the
extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or
services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as
a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted
with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal
partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly
for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the
family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s employment
(prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the
benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting
from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.
Rodriguez vs Rodriguez (Group 12)
G.R. No. L-23002
Doctrine: Property Relations/ Prohibition of Donation Between Husband and Wife
Facts: Concepcion Felix, widow of the late Don Felipe Calderon and with whom she
had one living child, Concepcion Calderon, contracted a second marriage on June
20, 1929, with Domingo Rodriguez, widower with four children by a previous
marriage, named Geronimo, Esmeragdo, Jose and Mauricio, all surnamed
Rodriguez.Prior to her marriage to Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix was the registered
owner of 2 fishponds located in the barrio of Babañgad, Bulacan which she
consequently sold to her daughter Concepcion Calderon for P2,500. The properties
were then donated back to her and Rodriguez thus, having the properties registered
under the names of the spouses.
On March 6, 1953, Domingo Rodriguez died intestate, survived by the widow,
Concepcion Felix, his children Geronimo Esmeragdo and Mauricio and
grandchildren Oscar, Juan and Ana, surnamed Rodriguez, children of a son, Jose,
who had predeceased him.The heirs of Domingo entered into an extra-judicial
settlement of his estate. Among the properties listed as conjugal were the two
parcels of land in Bulacan, which, together with another piece of property, were
divided as follows: ½ to Concepcion Feix as her share to the conjugal property; ¾ of
the remaining ½ to his children and ¼ of the remaining ½ to his grandchildren.
Corresponding new TCTs were issued.
On March 23, 1953, in a power of attorney executed by the children and
grandchildren of Domingo Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix was named their attorney
in-fact, authorized to manage their shares in the fishponds. On October 12, 1954,
the Rodriguez children executed another document granting unto the widow
lifetime usufruct over one-third of the fishpond which they received as hereditary
share in the estate of Domingo, which grant was accepted by Concepcion Felix.
Then, in a contract dated December 15, 1961, the widow appeared to have leased
from the Rodriguez children and grandchildren the fishpond for a period of 5 years
commencing August 16, 1962, for an annual rental of P7,161.37. At this time, the
relationship between Concepcion Felix and her step children turned sour and the
widow subsequently failed to deliver the balance of the earnings of the fishpond. A
demand letter was sent to her to claim such, but her answer was the present case
seeking the annulment of the transfer to the conjugal partnership of the two
fishponds on the ground that the conveyances in issue were obtained through
duress, and were inexistent, being simulated and without consideration.
Issue: WON the transfer of the two fishponds to the conjugal property were valid
Ruling: The charge of simulation is untenable, for the characteristic of simulation is
the fact that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal
effects or in way alter the juridical situation of the parties. Thus, where a person, in
order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of
it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of
the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. But appellant contends that
the sale by her to her daughter, and the subsequent sale by the latter to appellant
and her husband, the late Domingo Rodriguez, were done for the purpose of
converting the property from paraphernal to conjugal, thereby vesting a half
interest in Rodriguez, and evading the prohibition against donations from one
spouse to another during coverture. If this is true, then the appellant and her
daughter must have intended the two conveyance to be real and effective; for
appellant could not intend to keep the ownership of the fishponds and at the same
time vest half of them in her husband. The two contracts of sale then could not
have been simulated, but were real and intended to be fully operative, being the
means to achieve the result desired. Nor does the intention of the parties to
circumvent by these contracts the law against donations between spouses make
them simulated ones.
What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the fact that they
were resorted to in order to circumvent the legal prohibition against donations
between spouses. The illicit purpose then becomes illegal causa within the terms of
the old Civil Code. Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by
illegal subject matter or illegal causa, apply rigorously the rule in pari delicto non
oritur action, denying all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. And appellant is
clearly as guilty as her husband in the attempt to evade the legal interdiction of
Article 1334. Wherefore, her present action to reivindicate the, conveyed
properties was correctly repulsed by the Court. In view of the foregoing, the
decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant Concepcion Felix Vda.
de Rodriguez.
Notes:
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between
the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the
spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition
shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
Art. 1306. If the act which constitutes the illicit consideration is neither a crime nor
a misdemeanor, the following rules shall be observed:
1. When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he may have
given by virtue of the contract, or enforce the performance of the undertaking of
the other party; (not sure what article is this in the NCC)
ABALOS VS MACATANGAY
Arturo and Esther Abalos were husband and wife. They own a parcel of land in
Makati. On June 2, 1988, Arturo, armed with a purported Special Power of Attorney,
executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Galicano
Macatangay, Jr. in which Arturo acknowledged he received a P5k check from Galicano
as earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price and that Arturo binds
himself to sell the land to Galicano within 30 days from receipt of the P5k. The
purchase price agreed upon was P1.3 M. However, the P5k check was dishonored
due to insufficiency.
Apparently however, Esther and Arturo were having a rocky relationship. Esther
executed a SPA in favor of her sister and that she is selling her share in the conjugal
property to Galicano. It was alleged that that the RMOA is not valid for Esther’s
signature was not affixed thereto. And that Esther never executed a SPA in favor of
Arturo. Galicano informed the couple that he has prepared a check to cover the
remainder of the amount that needs to be paid for the land. He demanded that the
land be delivered to him. But the spouses failed to deliver the land. Galicano sued the
spouses.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contract of sale between Arturo and Galicano.
Whether or not the subsequent agreement between Galicano and Esther is binding
and that it cured the defect of the earlier contract between Arturo and Galicano.
HELD: No. No matter how the RMOA is looked upon, the same cannot be valid. At
best, the agreement between Arturo and Galicano is a mere grant of privilege to
purchase to Galicano. The promise to sell is not binding to Arturo for there was
actually no consideration distinct from the price. Be it noted that the parties
considered the P5k as an earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price.
Assuming arguendo that it was a bilateral promise to buy and sell, the same is still
not binding for Galicano failed to render a payment of legal tender. A check is not a
legal tender.
Still assuming arguendo, that the P5k was an earnest money which supposedly
perfected a contract of sale, the RMOA is still not valid for Esther’s signature was not
affixed. The property is conjugal and under the Family Code, the spouses’ consents
are required. Further, the earnest money here is not actually the earnest money
contemplated under Article 1482 under the Civil Code.
The subsequent agreement between Esther and Galicano did not ratify the earlier
transaction between Arturo and Galicano. A void contract can never be ratified.