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Contitutional Law II

Case Digests
Araya, Yuri
Biglaen, Mark Angelo
Bries, Avril
Co, Charles
Fernandez, Maite
Marcelo, Pamela
Ng, Audrey
July 17, 1995 | Mendoza, J. | Judicial Power (In General) RATIO:
1. Stare decisis? Stare decisis does not apply since the previous ruling was
SUMMARY: After the   SC   invalidated   PCSO   and   PGMC’s   Contract   of   Lease,   itself   a   departure   from   settled   rulings   on   “real   parties   in   interest”;;   5   years  
they made a revised Equipment Lease Agreement which Kilosbayan and several before, the Court denied standing to a party who questioned the validity of
lawmakers now contest. SC rules that the issue is not a constitutional one, but one another form of lottery. In Philconsa v Enriquez, legislators do not have
of contract law, which requires that petitioners  be  “real  parties  in  interest”.   standing to question the validity of any law or official action if the
DOCTRINE: While standing is required in constitutional law (direct & personal complaint   isn’t   grounded   on   the   impairment   of   powers   of   Congress.   In  
interest),  contract  law  has  the  stricter  requirement  of  “real  parties  in  interest”,  or addition, the vote for the 1st case was a narrow 7-6, and there have been
those who are parties to the agreement or are prejudiced in their rights with changes in the membership of the SC.
respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would 2. Law of the Case?No. This present case is a sequel of the 1st case and not its
result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it. continuation – the parties are the same but the cases are not. The ELA is
essentially different from the 1993 Contract of Lease, and hence the ruling
FACTS: in  the  prior  case  that  petitioners  had  standing  doesn’t  preclude  the  Court  to  
1. In Kilosbayan Inc. v Guingona, the SC invalidated the Contract of Lease determine their standing in this present case.
between the Phil. Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Philippine 3. Standing vs Real Party in Interest: Strictly speaking, the issue in this case
Gaming   Management   Corp.   (PGMC)   for   being   against   PCSO’s   charter.In is  not  even  petitioners’  standing  since  standing  is  a  concept  in  constitutional  
response, PCSO & PGMC made a new agreement that would conform to law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. While
the  SC’s  decision,  known  as  an  Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) where petitioners did invoke several state policies in Article II, these are not self-
PGMC leased online lottery equppment and accessories to PCSO in executing provisions and hence do not give rise to a cause of action. And
consideration  of  PCSO’s  4.3%  of  the  gross  amount  of  ticket  sales,  with  the   even if constitutional policies are invoked, this case basically involves
minimum of P35k per terminal annually. Said ELA lasts 8 years, with questions of contract law – WON petitioners  are  “real  parties  in  interest”.  
PCSO having the option to purchase said equipment at the sum of P25M at
the end. Rule 3, Section 2  of  the  Rules  of  Court  requires  that  “Every  action  be  prosecuted  
2. The current case is a petition for Prohibition, Review, and injunction filed and  defended  in  the  name  of  the  real  party  in  interest.” Real parties, in an action
by Kilosbayan (an organization composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, for annulment of contracts such as this, are those who are parties to the
priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in
justice, and national renewal), its trustees who are also suing in their their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the
individual and collective capacities as taxpayers and concerned citizens, and detriment which would result to them from the contract even though they did not
some members of Congress (Freddie Webb, Wigberto Tanada, Joker intervene in it. Even if PCSO is a government corporation, there is no allegation
Arroyo) suing as such and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. They seek that public funds are being misspent so as to make this action a public one and
to declare the ELA between the PCSO and PGMC invalid on the ground of justify relaxation of this requirement.
the Contract of Leases nullified in the 1st case.
3. Respondents claim that petitioners have no right to bring the suit since they In the present case, petitioners do not have such present substantial interest in
are not parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify since they the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. As in Valmonte, petitioners fail
have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the to show any direct and personal injury incurred by them because of the act
enforcement of the contract. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the complained of. Petitioners may still choose to raise an appropriate case before
rling in the 1st case sustaining   their   standing   has   become   the   “law   of   the   the COA or Ombudsman on the validity of public contracts or public bidding.
case”  and  can  no  longer  be  reopened.  

ISSUE: Won Kilosbayan has standing – NO.


TAÑADA v. ANGARA from unfair foreign competition, not to create an isolationist policy and shut
May 2, 1997 | Panganiban, J. | Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus | Judicial out foreign investments, goods and services.
Power (In General) 3. There is a built-in provision to protect weak economies and developing
countries, which puts every member on equal footing and obliges them to
abide in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at
SUMMARY: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the WTO Agreement different levels of economic development, and eliminates discriminatory
for   contravening   the   Constitution’s   “Filipino   First”   policy   and   for   impairing   treatment in international trade. It is also more lenient to developing
Philippine  sovereignty,  as  well  as  the  Senate’s  concurrence  in  its ratification. countries and gives them preferential treatment regarding economic
DOCTRINE: Constitutional mandates are read together and balanced. measures and protection from unfair competition and trade practices, like
Sovereignty is restricted by the voluntary act of nations. anti-dumping measures.
4. The inherent nature of treaties limits or restrict the absoluteness of
FACTS: sovereignty. Nations may voluntarily surrender some aspects of state power
1. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. When
Philippine Senate with the President’s   ratification   of   the   international   the Philippines joined the UN, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that under   “auto-limitation”.   The   underlying   consideration   is   that   reciprocal
the  Agreement  violated  the  mandate  of  the  1987  Constitution  to  “develop  a   commitment of the contracting states in granting the same privilege and
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by immunities to the Philippines
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
2. Petitioners   also   contended   that   the   “national   treatment”   and   “parity  
provisions”   of   the   WTO   Agreement   “place   nationals   and   products   of  
member  countries  on  the   same   footing  as  Filipinos  and  local  products,”   in  
contravention  of  the   “Filipino  First”  policy  of  our  Constitution,  and  render  
meaningless  the  phrase  “effectively  controlled  by  Filipinos.”

ISSUE/S: WoN the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Sec. 19, Art
II and Secs. 10 and 12, Art XII of the Constitution. – NO.

RULING: DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. Art II (declaration of principles and state policies) are not self-executing.
They do not embody judicially enforceable rights, but are merely used as
aids by the judiciary in exercising judicial review, and by the legislature in
enacting laws.
2. Economic self-reliance does not mean economic seclusion. Economic
nationalism principles must be read with other constitutional mandates to
attain a balanced economic development. Although it mandates a a pro-
Filipino bias, it also recognizes the need to exchange business with the
world based on equality and reciprocity. Its aim is to protect the economy
SANTIAGO, JR. v. BAUTISTA discretion. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied, hence
March 30, 1970 | Barredo, J. | Judicial Power (In General) this petition with the SC.

SUMMARY: Petitioner Santiago, Jr.filed a case against the teachers ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has a cause of action such that certiorari may
composing the Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor for alleged lie - NO
grave abuse of discretion in favoring Socorro Medina in the making of the
roll of honor students. The SC dismissed the petition stating that the RULING: Petition dismissed. Judgment appealed from affirmed.
committee is not a body exercising judicial functions for which certiorari
may lie to correct errors in their judgment. RATIO:
DOCTRINE: Certiorari is a   special   civil   action   instituted   against   “any   1. Certiorari is a special civil action  instituted  against  “any  tribunal,  board,  or  
tribunal board or officer exercising judicial functions. officer   exercising   judicial   functions.”   The   following   circumstances   must  
exist so that certiorari may be invoked:
a. There must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property
and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing
1. Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a grade 6 pupil at Sero Elementary School in and determination of their respective rights and obligations.
Cotabato City. At the end of school year 1964-65, Socorro Medina, Patricia b. The tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must
Liñgat, and Santiago, Jr. were adjudged as first, second, and third honors have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on
respectively by the Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.
composed by the school principal and other teachers. c. The tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign
2. Santiago, represented by his mother, disputes the said ranking primarily on power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the
the grounds that he was prejudiced by the actions of the teachers while legislative or executive department.
Medina was benefited. They claim that the members of the committee 2. Based from the following circumstances, the Committee on the Rating of
committed grave abuse of discretion in making the ranking for the honor Students for Honor does not exercise or are automatically vested with
pupils of the graduating class. judicial or quasi judicial functions since there is nothing on record about
3. Among the acts cited to support their claim are the following: any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the
a. Socorro Medina was coached and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such
by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, function involves the determination of what the law is, as well as to apply
thus supposedly giving Medina an advantage. the law in order to adjudicate the adverse claims of contending parties to
b. The committee had been illegally constituted as the same was composed of all rights which the law gives rise to.
the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of 3. Even assuming that judicial intervention may be sought in this case, the fact
the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the committee to select the that petitioner did not attach to his petition the pertinent documents to
honor students should be composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI.
support his claims (e.g. copy of the graduation programme containing the
c. Some teachers gave a starting grade of 75% to Santiago in Grade VI, while the
final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from disputed ranking, the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by the
were changed 80% to 85%, allegedly to pull Santiago, Jr. to a lower rank. teachers in the constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and
Medina also was given a perfect score, which was allegedly unnatural. erasures in his Grade I certificate) is fatal to his cause due to noncompliance
d. The words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and with Rule 65 on certiorari.
replaced with the words "second place."
4. Santiago, Jr. personally appealed his case to the principal, district supervisor
and  the  academic  supervisor  but  they  just  “passed  the  buck  to  each  other”.  
Later, a prayer for injunction was denied and the graduation exercises were
held with the disputed ranking. Also, a case was filed but was dismissed on
grounds that certiorari was an improper remedy, all administrative remedies
have not been exhausted, and there was no finding of grave abuse of
PEOPLE v. FERRER prohibition against membership in the outlawed organization. It applies to
December 27, 1972 | Castro, J. | Judicial Power (In General) all other subversive organizations.
3. If the Act is a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
SUMMARY: The Government of the Philippines appealed to the SC the Communists in court, as the law alone would suffice to secure their
decision of the Trial Court of Tarlac declaring the Anti-Subversion Act void punishment. But their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
for being a bill of attainder and for dismissing the criminal complaints against Government still has to prove at trial that the accused joined the Party
accused Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag pursuant to said Act. knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; knowing its subversive character
DOCTRINE: A bill of attainder must necessarily be an ex post facto law as and with the specific intent to further its basic objective.
well, applying retroactively and reaching past conduct, and that the penalties 4. The statute does not punish by membership alone. It specifically requires
imposed are inescapable. that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further
the   illegal   objectives   of   the   Party   which   must   be   shown   by   “overt   acts”.  
FACTS: “Membership”   is   distinct   from   “guilty   knowledge”:   the   former   requires  
1. Criminal complaints were filed against Feliciano Co (May 10, 1970), and proof  of  direct  participation  in  the  organization’s  unlawful activities, while
Nilo Tayag and 5 others (May 25) in the CFI of Tarlac for violating Sec. 4, the   latter   requires   proof   of   mere   adherence   to   the   organization’s   illegal  
Anti-Subversion Act, alleging that they were officers of the Communist objectives.
Party of the Philippines and Kabataang Makabayan, subversive 5. Moreover, a statute only becomes a bill of attainder when it applies either to
organizations, respectively; Co, as an instructor in Mao Tse Tsung named individuals or groups in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
University, a training ground for NPA recruits, and the latter for instigating without a judicial trial. But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so
the people to rise against the government. universally  acknowledged  to  be  certain  as  to  be  “judicially  noticeable”,  the  
2. The accused moved to quash, impugning the validity of the Anti-Subversion legislature may apply its own rules and judicial hearing is not needed fairly
Act for being a bill of attainder, as well as for being vague, embracing more to make such determination.
than 1 subject not expressed in the title thereof and for denying the equal 6. Furthermore, the statute is prospective in nature. A bill of attainder must
protection of the laws. necessarily be an ex post facto law as well, applying retroactively and
3. In its resolution dated Sept. 15, 1970, the Trial Court declared the statute reaching past conduct, and that the penalties imposed are inescapable.
void for being a bill of attainder, vague and overbroad, and dismissed the Section 4 prohibits acts committed after the approval of the Act. Members
informations, to which the Government appealed. of the party were given the opportunity to exempt themselves from liability
by renouncing in writing and under oath their membership to the Party,
ISSUE/S: WoN the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder – NO making the penalties prescribed not inescapable.
. 7. Basic Guidelines: (1) Subversive organizations other than CPP: a) Purpose
RULING: Resolution SET ASIDE. Cases REMANDED to the court a quo for of the organization is to overthrow the present Government of the
trial on the merits. Philippines and to establish a totalitarian regime under the domination of a
foreign power, b) Accused joined such organization; c) Did so knowingly,
RATIO: willfully and by overt acts. (2) In the case of CPP: 1) CPP continues to
1. Art.  3,  Sec.  1  (11)  of  the  Constitution  states  that  “No  bill  of  attainder  or  ex   pursue the objectives which led Congress on 1957 to declare it to be an
post  facto  law  shall  be  enacted”.  A  bill  of  attainder  is  a  legislative  act  which   organized conspiracy, b) Accused joined CPP; c) Did so willfully,
inflicts punishment without trial. It substitutes a legislative act for a judicial knowingly and by overt acts.
determination of guilt. The singling out of a definite class, imposition of a
burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill Fernando, J., dissenting: Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply
of attainder. either to named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a group in such a
2. The term CPP is used solely for defining purposes. The Act does not way as to inflict on them punishment amounting to a deprivation of any right,
specify the CPP or its members but merely declares such to be an organized civil or political, without judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the
conspiracy for the overthrow of the government for the purposes of the Constitution. The mere fact that a criminal case would have to be instituted
would not save the statute.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS v. ANG CHIO KHO reconsideration, praying for the deletion of the recommendation, which the
June 23, 1970 | Zaldivar, J. | Judicial Power (In General) CA, voting 3-2 in a special division, denied.
ISSUE/S: WoN  the  CA  correctly  recommended  respondent’s  deportation  – NO.
SUMMARY: The SolGen filed an appeal by certiorari in behalf of the
Director of Prisons praying that the SC strike out from the decision of the RULING: Writ of certiorari DENIED. (1 vote less than the necessary
CA the recommendation to the Executive Secretary to allow respondent majority.10 members. 5-in favor of deletion, 2-against, 3-did not take part)
Ang Chio Kho to leave this country in the 1st available transportation
abroad, but affirm the dismissal for habeas corpus. RATIO:
DOCTRINE: Courts are not concerned with the wisdom and morality of 1. The case before the CA was for habeas corpus. The only question to be
laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the law. resolved   by   CA   was   WoN   the   CFI   of   Rizal   had   rightly   dismissed   Ang’s  
petition for habeas corpus. It was not called upon to review any sentence
imposed upon Ang.
FACTS: 2. The deportation of aliens sentenced by the courts for violation of the laws of
1. Ang Chio Kho had been convicted of various offenses committed in the the land is an act of state that is political in nature, and is exercised solely in
Philippines. After serving 6 ½ years, respondent was granted conditional the discretion of the Chief Executive. There is no such law that gives the
pardon on July 4, 1959 by the President of the Philippines: that upon his court the authority to recommend to the President the voluntary departure of
release, he would voluntarily leave the country, never to return. Respondent undesirable aliens lawfully committed to jail.
accepted the conditions and left the Philippines for Taipei, Nacionalist 3. The recommendatory power of the courts is limited to those expressly
China on July 28, 1959. provided in the law, Art 5 of the RPC, making the questioned
2. In the evening of June 22, 1966, respondent, travelling under the name of recommendation unauthorized. The CE exercising his powers pursuant to
“Ah  Ming  Huy”,  arrived  at  the  Manila  International  Airport  on  a  PAL  plane   Sec   64(i)   of   the   Revised   Administrative   Code,   has   ordered   Ang’s  
from Taipei to Honolulu, for a 72hr stop-over. He surrendered his passport recommitment. For the court to suggest that the CE modify his decision to
to the immigration authorities of MIA and was issued a note that his recommit Ang is to interfere on the exercise of the political political
departure was scheduled for June 29, 1966 at 6:30 pm. He registered for a powers of his office.
3-day stay at the El Presidente Hotel at Parañaque, Rizal and contacted his 2 4. Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the province of
friends, Lim Pin and Go Bon Kim, who invited him to stay longer in the the judiciary to express opinion, or express a suggestion, that would reflect
Philippines. on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the CE on matters political in
3. On June 28, 1966, the 3 of them went to the Bureau of Immigration, with nature.
Lim requesting for a 14-day extension of his stay. Inspector Mariano Cristi 5. It may be   said   that   the   recommendation   simply   represents   the   3   judges’  
identified him Ang Chio Kho who was deported to Taipei. After his identity private opinion. However, the SC believes that court decisions should only
was established, he was arrested and was not allowed to proceed with his contain opinions relevant to the issue at hand. After all, courts are not
trip to Honolulu. On July 5, 1966, the Executive Secretary ordered his concerned with the wisdom and morality of laws, but only in the
recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence for interpretation and application of the law.
violating the condition of his pardon.
4. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on August 29, 1966 which
the Exec Sec failed to act on. Thus, on Oct 5, he filed for a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus with the CFI of Rizal. On Oct 10 and 17, the officer-
in-charge of the Bureau of Prisons and the SolGen filed their returns,
5. On January 31, 1967, CFI of Rizal dismissed the petition for habeas corpus,
to which respondent appealed to the CA which rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus, but with the majority opinion
recommending that he be deported at once. SolGen filed a motion for
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. v. LAND TENURE estates, to break up existing large estates, and to provide for their
ADMINISTRATION acquisition by purchase or through expropriation and sale to their
February 8, 1970 | Fernando, J. | Prohibition | Judicial Power (In General) occupants.
However, while historical discussion is valuable, it is not necessarily
decisive since social and economic conditions are always changing. To
SUMMARY: The Tatalon Estate owned by J.M Tuason & Co., Inc. was to be construe the Constitution with the particular circumstances during which it
expropriated by virtue of RA 2616. The trial court declared the law as was created may render it incapable of being responsive to future needs.
unconstitutional.  The  SC  reversed  the  lower  court’s  ruling. The words employed by the Constitution are not to be construed to yield
DOCTRINE: The power to expropriate lands is not one without limit as it fixed and rigid answers but as impressed with the necessary attributes of
requires the payment of just compensation and that the expropriated land be flexibility and accommodation to enable them to meet adequately whatever
used for public purposes. It is also limited by the due process and equal problems the future has in store.
protection clauses of the Constitution. 3. The power to expropriate lands is not one without limit, as it requires the
payment of just compensation and that the expropriated land be used for
public purposes. It is also limited by the due process and equal protection
FACTS: clauses of the Constitution.
1. J.M Tuason & Co., Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio Just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the
Deudor, et al. owned a particular piece of land (comprising of Tatalon time of its taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained,
Estate, Quezon City) which is to be expropriated by virtue of Republic Act. which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to
No. 2616. the expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just
2. The constitutionality of the said law authorizing such expropriation was compensation to which the owner of the expropriated property is entitled,
successfully challenged by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when the lower court the market value being that sum of money which a buyer and a seller would
declared the said law as unconstitutional and a writ of prohibition was agree on as a price to be given and received for such property.
issued. 4. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. claims that RA 2616 violates the equal protection
clause since it singled out the Tatalon Estate. Such argument, however, was
ISSUE/S: unsuccessful since petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption of
1. Whether or not the expropriation of lands comprising the Tatalon Estate is a validity. It appears that the purpose for expropriation was to make the bona
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain – YES fide occupants purchase the lots at minimum costs and to address the
2. Whether or not RA 2616 is unconstitutional for violating the equal housing problem in Quezon City. It was not proven that petitioner was
protection clause – NO singled out to bear the burden of government regulation.
5. On the other hand, petitioner led the occupants of Tatalon Estate to believe
RULING: Ruling of the lower court reversed. Writ of prohibition denied and that they were dealing with the representatives of the real owners, the
preliminary injunction set aside. Veterans Subdivision, in the purchase of their lots. This belief was bolstered
by the fact that the petitioners even entered into a compromise agreement on
RATIO: March 16, 1953 with the Deudors, agreeing to give the latter millions of
1. Verba legis: From the reading of the language of the provision itself (Art. pesos in settlement of their claim over the Tatalon Estate. Petitioner
XIII, 4), there is no doubt that Congress is granted the power to determine admitted   that   they   had   knowledge   of   Veterans   Subdivision’s   activities   but  
what lands may be expropriated so that they could be subdivided for resale did not do anything to stop them. It was only after that the estate became
to those in need of them. Even the courts are deprived of the power of developed that petitioner began asserting ownership.
curtailing such broad power of Congress.
2. Resorting to the extrinsic aids of constitutional construction, such as the
deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, to ascertain the historical
basis, reveals that the provision was included in order to resolve the
problems of unequal land ownership by prohibiting the ownership of large
Separate Opinions
(Barredo, J., Concurring)
- The   power   granted   to   Congress   by   the   Constitution   to   “authorize,   upon  
payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided
into   small   lots   and   conveyed   at   cost   to   individuals”   is   unlimited   by   any  
other provision of the Constitution.
- Just compensation is in reality a part of the power granted rather than a
limitation thereto, just as just compensation is of the essence in any exercise
of the power of eminent domain
- While the taking must be for public use as a matter of principle, in the
judicial proceeding, the Government need not present evidence of such
public use as a fact.

(Teehankee, J., Concurring and dissenting)

- Where Congress itself directly exercised the power to expropriate and
singles out a specific property under the Act, rather than have the Executive
agencies institute the corresponding expropriation proceeding under the
general laws it has enacted in pursuance of its constitutional power, Court
may pass upon necessity of taking of property for public use.
MUSKRAT v U.S. redress,   or   punishment   of   wrongs.”   A   case   or   controversy   implies   the  
January 23, 1911 | Day, J. | Judicial Power (Case or Controversy Requirement) existence of present or possible adverse parties whose contentions are
submitted to the court for adjudication.
SUMMARY: Pursuant to a 1907 statute passed by Congress that granted the In the present case, Congress has no power to provide for a suit of this
Judiciary to determine the validity of Congressional acts pertaining to distribution nature to be brought in federal court to test the constitutionality of prior acts
and sale of Cherokee lands, several Cherokees filed suits. SC refused to hear the of Congress because it is not a case or controversy. This court has no veto
case since there was no case or controversy, which Judicial power is limited to. power over legislation enacted by Congress, and its right to delare an act of
DOCTRINE: Judicial power is the right to determine actual controversies arising Congress unconstitutional can only be exercised when a proper case
between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction. Without between opposing parties is submitted for determination.
an actual case or controversy,  the  Court’s  opinion  on  the  validity  of  certain  acts   2. The Court extensively cited Marbury v Madison and several other cases,
would amount to an advisory opinion, contrary to the separation of powers. where they said that neither the legislative nor executive branch can assign
to the judicial branch any duties other than those that are properly judicial
FACTS: and to be performed in a judicial manner. When Secretary of State Jefferson
1. Congress passed a statute in 1907 that conferred original jurisdiction to the solicited   the   justices’   advice   for the Executive branch in the matter of
Court of Claims and appellate jurisdiction on the SC to determine the construction of laws, Chief Justice Jay and his associates answered that in
validity of certain Congressional acts related to the distribution and lieu of the separation of powers, and being judges of a court of last resort,
allotment of lands and funds to members of the Cherokee tribe. it’s  improper  to  extrajudicially  decide  the  Executive’s  questions. Also, they
2. Under the authority of said statute, 2 consolidated claims were brought in said  that  the  President’s  power  to  call  on  heads  of  departments  for  advisory  
the Court of Claims – the 1st by David Muskrat and Henry Dick who opinions is limited to the Executive.
opposed a 1906 Act (increased number of persons entitled to share in the
distribution of Cherokee lands), and the 2nd by William Brown and Levi “Judicial   power   is   the   right   to   determine   actual   controversies   arising  
Gritts which opposed a 1904 Act (prohibition against the sale of Cherokee between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.
lands). Both sought a declaration that the Congressional acts of 1904 and The right to declare a law unconstitutional rises because an act of Congress
1906 be declared unconstitutional so that an earlier 1902 Act be declared relied upon by one or the other of such parties in determining their rights is
controlling. The Court of Claims held the 1904 and 1906 Act as valid; SC in conflict with the fundamental law. The exercise of this duty is not given
granted certiorari. to it as a body with revisory power over the action of Congress, but because
the rights of the litigants in justiciable controversies require the court to
ISSUE/S: choose between the fundamental law and a law purporting to be enacted
1. WON there is an actual case or controversy – NO. within constitutional authority, but in fact beyond the power delegated to
2. WON   Congress   may   expand   the   Judiciary’s   jurisdiction   beyond   what   is   Congress.”
provided for in the Constitution (i.e. issue advisory opinions) – NO.

RULING: Reversed & remanded with orders to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

1. The Court has consistently declined to exercise any powers not judicial in
nature. Judicial power is defined by Justice Miller as the power of a court to
decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons
and parties who bring a case before it for a decision.
Under the Constitution, judicial power is limited to cases and controversies.
Cases   and   controversies   are   “the   claims   of   litigants   brought   before   the  
courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are established by
law or custom for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention,
PACU v. SECRETARY of EDUCATION naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. Mere
October 31, 1955 | Bengzon, J. | Judicial Power (Standing) apprehension that the Secretary of Educaion might under the law withdraw
one   of   the   petitioners’   permits   isn’t   a   justiciable   controversy.   Courts   will  
SUMMARY: Several colleges and universities petition the court to declare Act not pass upon the constitutionality of a law who fails to show that he is
2706 unconstitutional since it infringes on the right of a citizen to own and injured by its operation, since the power of the courts to declare a law
operate a school, despite failing to present any actual injury incurred by them unconstitutional is a last resort – it arises only when the interests of litigants
from  the  law’s  operation.  Court dimisses the case for their lack of standing. require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual
DOCTRINE: Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law who fails to (and not hypothetical) interference.
show that he is injured by its operation, since the power of the courts to declare a 2. Act No. 2706 was granted in 1917 and has granted the Department of
law unconstitutional is a last resort – it arises only when the interests of litigants Education for the past 37 years to supervise and regulate all private schools
require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual (and not in the country without any protests from the general public and parents
hypothetical) interference. concerned. And when a law has long been treated constitutional and
important rights have become dependent on it, the Court may refuse to
FACTS: consider an attack on its validity.
1. The petitioning colleges and universities of the Philippine Association of
Colleges and   Universities   request   that   Act   No.   2706   entitled   “An   act  
making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges
obligatory   for   the   Secretary   of   Public   Instruction”   be   declared  
2. They contend that said law deprives school owners, teachers, and parents
liberty w/o due process of law, parents are deprved of their natural aright
and duty to rear their children for civil efficiency, and the conferral of
power to the Education Secretary to prescribe rules and standards constitue
an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
3. The Government argues that there is no justiciable controversy exhibiting
unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question, petitioners are
in estoppel, and the Acts are constitutional.

ISSUE: WON petitioning colleges and universities have standing – NO.

RULING: Petition for prohibition DENIED.

1. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed only if,
and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned. In this case, petitioners claim that Section 3 of the Act (which
requires a permit to be obtained from the Secretary of ducation before a
privates school may be opened to the public) violates the right of a citizen
to own and operate a school.
However, none of the petitioners has cause to present said issue because all
of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their
permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of the law and
GONZALES v. HECHANOVA Moreover, the purchase of said commodity will be effected with public funds
October 22, 1963 | Concepcion, J. | Judicial Power (Standing) mainly raised by taxation, and as a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient
personality and interest to seek judicial assistance to restrain what he believes
SUMMARY: Petitioner Gonzales prays for a writ of preliminary injunction to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse public funds.
restraining respondents, their agents and representatives from implementing 2. 2 Acts are applicable. Language of the laws include within their purview ALL
the decision of Executive Secretary to import foreign rice. SC denied writ of importations of rice and corn in the Phil. RA 2207: Unlawful for any person,
injunction for lack of the requisite majority. assoc., corp., or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in
DOCTRINE: A taxpayer has sufficient personality and interest to seek the Philippines. RA 3452: Explicitly enjoins the Rice and Corn
judicial assistance to restrain what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully Administration or any government agency from importing rice or corn.
disburse public funds. Dept of Natl Defense, AFP, respondents and every officer of our Government
are government agencies and/or agents. Applicability to Government is shown
through: a) Importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the
President of the Philippines, hence, by or on behalf of the Government; b) RA
1. On September 22, 1963, respondent ExecSec authorized the importation of
3452  indicates  that  only  “private  parties”  may  import  rice  under  its  provisions;;  
67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources and created a
c) Punishment   for   violation   made   by   “public   official   and/or   employees”.  
rice procurement committee for the implementation of the importation.
Public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from
Ramon Gonzales, a rice planter and President of Iloilo Palay and Corn
employees of instrumentalities of government. Hence, duly authorized acts of
Planters Assoc., filed a petition averring that respondents are acting with
the former are those of the Government.
grave abuse of discretion by attempting the importation of foreign rice, since
Sec. 1, CA 138: All purchases by the Government shall give preference to
such is explicitly prohibited by RA 3452 which repeals or amends RA 2207.
materials produced in the Phil.
2. Respondents:  Petitioner’s  has  no  sufficient  interest to file petition and secure
relief prayed for; RAs 3452 and 2207 are not applicable since importation was Provisions of Sec. 2 of CA No. 1 are not self-executory. The Government can
authorized by Pres. as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 2 of Commonwealth secure   resources   for   our   national   defense   only   “during   a   national  
Act No. 1, allowing him during times of necessity to take preventive measures mobilization”.   In   absence   of   such,   resources   shall   be   produced   in   such   a  
and prepare for threats of war and emergency; Prohibition of importation of manner as Congress by law provides; in so far as rice and corn are concerned,
“any   government   agency”   does   not   apply   to   importations   made   by   the   RAs 3452, 2207, and CA 138 are such laws.
“Government  itself”. Refers  to  power  of  Pres.  during  “war  time”  or  “martial  law”,  neither  of which
obtains in the case at bar.
ISSUE/S: 3. Main function of Executive is to implement laws made by Congress. He may
1. WoN petitioner has sufficient interest. – YES. not defeat legislative enactments that acquired the status of laws by indirectly
2. WoN RA 3452 and RA 2207 are applicable to the importation. – YES. repealing the same through executive agreements providing for the
3. WoN RA 3452 prevails over the 2 contracts which have the force of executive performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. Conflict with a treaty and
agreements Pres. Macapagal entered into with Burma and Vietnam for the a statute: latest in point of time shall prevail is not applicable: Hechanova
purchase of rice. – YES. admits and insists that the contracts are not treaties. To justify executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation will upset the principle of
RULING: Injunction DENIED for lack of the requisite majority. separation of powers and system of checks and balances. Also, the
Constitution authorizes nullification of treaties in conflict with the
RATIO: fundamental   law   and   which   runs   counter   to   an   act   of   Congress:   “all cases
1. RA 3452, Sec I declares that the policy of the Government is to purchase which  the  constitutionality  or  validity  of  any  treaty…  are  questioned”.  
basic foods directly from tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners
in the Philippines who wish to dispose their products at a price which affords
them fair and just return for their labor and capital investment. Petitioner, as a
planter and landowner, which necessarily makes him a taxpayer, is entitled to
a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad.
July 31, 1975 | Fernando, J. | Judicial Power (Standing) RULING: DISMISSED.

SUMMARY: Petitioner Gonzales questioned the validity of EO 30 creating RATIO:

the Cultural Center of the Philippines which was funded by donations and 1. The funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from
contributions, alleging that it was an encroachment by the President on the donations and contributions, not from taxation. Accordingly, there was an
legislative prerogative. absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest.
DOCTRINE: With the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest owing Even assuming that public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does
from the public, a taxpayer may not have the right to question the legality of an not   necessarily   follow   that   a   taxpayer’s   suit,   assailing   the   validity   of   a  
issuance creating a trust for the benefit of the people but purely funded by legislative or executive act has to be passed upon. The Court is not devoid
charity. of discretion as to whether or not it should entertain such action (Tan v.
2. No encroachment on legislative prerogative in the issuance of EO 30. There
was an exchange of diplomatic notes between the Philippines and the US
FACTS: wherein the latter gives the former a special fund to be used for a Philippine
1. Petitioner Gonzales questioned the validity of EO 30 creating the Cultural cultural development project. In issuing EO 30, the President, in accord
Center of the Philippines. Its Board of Trustees, with Imelda Marcos as its with the constitutional injunction to promote arts and letters (Sec. 4, Art.
Chairman, accepted donations from the private sector, secured a $5M loan
XIV, Constitution of the Philippines), merely carried out the purpose of the
from Chemical Bank of New York, guaranteed by the National Investment trust in establishing the CCP as the instrumentality through which this
and Development Corporation, as well as received $3.5M from US Pres. agreement between the 2 governments would be realized. As head of state,
Johnson in the concept of war damage funds, all intended for the in behalf of the state as parens patriae, the President has the authority to
construction of the Cultural Center building estimated to cost P48M. implement for the benefit of the Filipino people by creating the Cultural
2. A suit of prohibition was filed with the CFI of Manila, alleging the illegality
Center. For the President to refrain from taking positive steps and await the
of the issuance of EO 30, which was dismissed. action of the then Congress could be tantamount to dereliction of duty.
3. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss this appeal by certiorari, and was 3. Legislative action is not precluded when the President acts in absence of
granted in a resolution dated March 5, 1970. Such a pleading was submitted either congressional grant or denial of authority. However, if Congress
to SC 12 days later contending that EO 30 represented a legitimate exercise would continue to keep its peace notwithstanding the action taken by the
of executive power, there being no invasion of the legislative domain and executive   department,   it   may   be   considered   as   a   “silently   vocal”,   that   is,  
that it was supplementary to RA 4165 creating the National Commission on
silence meaning consent. The assailed EO was issued on June 35, 1966.
Culture. It was likewise raised that petitioner did not have the requisite Congress until the time of the filing of the petition on August 26, 1969
personality to contest the validity of the EO as a taxpayer, as the funds came remained quiescent. Congress could have supplied the remedy by asserting
from donations and contributions, and not raised by taxation. itself. Instead, there was apparent conformity on its part to the way the
4. On October 5, 1972, PD 15 was promulgated, creating the CCP, defining its President saw fit to administer governmental property.
objectives, powers and functions and other purposes. Sec. 4 thereof was
later amended on April 26, 1973 by PD 179. With the promulgation of said
PDs, done by the President in the exercise of legislative powers under the
martial law, EO 30 has ceased to exist, making the discussion on its
constitutionality moot and academic.
1. WoN a taxpayer has the capacity to question the validity of EO 30, given
the circumstances. – NO.
2. WoN there was an encroachment on legislative prerogative in the issuance
of EO 30. – NO.
PEOPLE and HSBC v. VERA and UNJIENG validity of a statute, the issue of constitutionality may be raised by persons
November 16, 1937 | Laurel, J. | Judicial Power (Standing) interested in the effect to be given to the statute. But even granting the
HSBC was not the proper party to raise the question of constitutionality, the
SUMMARY: Judge Vera, pursuant to the Probation Act, heard the application by People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG and city fiscal, is such a
Unjieng. People and HSBC challenged it as unconstitutional but said judge proper party in the proceedings. The Court held if Act 4221 truly violates
dismissed it for lack of standing. SC declared the Act unconstitutional. the Constitution, the State had a substantial interest in having it set aside,
DOCTRINE: The State has standing challenge the validity of its own laws, for it and would sustain a direct injury in the form of a mortal wound inflicted
has substantial interest in setting aside a statute repugnant to the fundamental law. upon the fundamental law. Thus, the well-settled rule is that the State can
challenge the validity of its own laws. Furthermore, the Court held that the
FACTS: OSG   or   city   fiscal   themselves   have   the   standing   to   challenge   a   statute’s  
1. People of the Philippines is the plaintiff, and HSBC the offended party in a validity for it is his duty to enforce the constitutional law where 2
criminal case against Mariano Unjieng, where final judgment and an order conflicting statutes exist.
for execution of judgment had been entered on Nov 24, 1936.
2. In Nov 27, 1936, Unjieng applied for probation under Act No. 4221, 2. a. Encroachment   Upon   the   Executive’s   Power   to   Grant   Pardon—C. The
otherwise known as Probation Act. The application was referred to the Court held that the Probation Act did not conflict with the pardoning power
Insular Probation Office, which recommended denial. Notwithstanding this, of the Executive. Probation is merely a substitution of the imprisonment
Judge Vera of the Court of First Instance of Manila set the petition for prescribed by the criminal laws and is thus a judicial act as any other
hearing, where HSBC argued that the Act was unconstitutional. sentence, while pardon is outside and above the criminal law and binds and
3. Sec. 11 of Act No. 4221, which was raised as violative of equal protection directs the judges.
states,  “This  Act  shall  apply  only  in  those  provinces  in  which  the  respective  
provincial boards  have  provided  for  the  salary  of  a  probation  officer.”  While   b. Undue Delegation of Legislative Power—UC. The Act does not provide a
declining to pass upon the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that sufficient standard in exercising granted discretion, leaving its applicability
HSBC is not the party whose rights are affected by the statute, the judge to various provincial boards to determine. This Act is a matter of general
denied the application. legislation that treats of criminals in general, and must not be granted such
4. A motion for reconsideration was filed but due to delays regarding a motion unqualified and absolute discretion.
for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae for Unjieng, petitioners
brought it up to the Supreme Court, praying that J. Vera be prohibited from c. Equal Protection—UC. Classification based on reasonable basis, not one
further taking cognizance of the case due  to  the  statute’s  unconstitutionality.   made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted even under the scrutiny of
In the supplementary petition for this petition, the city fiscal concurred for equal protection. In this case, the inequality flows from the unwarranted
the first time with the constitutional issues raised by HSBC. delegation of legislative power, allowing a person coming w/in the purview
of the law to enjoy its benefits in one province and not in the other. And so
ISSUES: although the statute may appear fair on its face, its effect in operation reveal
1. WoN the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these that equal protection of the law is denied.
2. WoN the Act is unconstitutional—YES Although Sec. 11 is the one declared unconstitutional, the Court held that
the clear policy of the law is to defray the salaries of the probation officers
RULING: Writ of prohibition GRANTED. Act No. 4221 declared to the provinces should they desire the Probation Act to apply; without this,
unconstitutional and void. the system would be illusory. Thus, the whole statute should be declared
1. Although as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question
the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been
held that where the jurisdiction and decree of a court depend entirely on the
FLAST v. COHEN that "the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the Treasury's
June 10, 1968 | Warren, J. | Judicial Power (Standing) funds is remote, fluctuating and uncertain, to the point that complainant
failed   to   prove   the   “direct   injury”   he   will   sustain   to   merit   standing.  
SUMMARY: Appellants filed suit in the United States District Court of New Following the logic of the defense, a taxpayer’s  suit  can  only  be  entertained  
York to enjoin the allegedly unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds under if  his  tax  bill  is  not  qualified  as  “minute  and  indeterminable”.  More  plainly,  
Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Standing the taxpayer in Frothingham was denied standing not because he was a
which was granted was the only concern of the case. Adjudication for the merits taxpayer but because his tax bill is not large enough.
of  appellant’s  claim  is  to  be  determined  by  the  proper  court. 2. Petitioner was also able to establish a link between his status as taxpayer
DOCTRINE: Taxpayers must establish a logical link between that status and the and the injury he sustained when the questioned disbursements were
type of legislative enactment attacked, as it will not be sufficient to allege an executed. He alleged that such disbursements will cause him injury thru a
incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially violation of his Free Exercise rights whenever disbursements “favor”   a
regulatory statute. certain religion. This shows the personal stake of taxpaying complainant.
3. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of federal disbursements under
FACTS: the cloak of taxing and spending laws specified in the constitution. He has
1. A complaint,   rested   on   appellant’s   standing   as   federal   taxpayer was filed alleged that the disbursements according to the Act subject of contention
alleging that the Commissioner of Education Cohen together with others, can   be   a   violation   of   the   constitution’s   assertions   regarding   Establishment  
committed unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds under Titles I and and Free Exercise of the First amendment. This is an action by the Congress
II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. that is beyond the scope of its power that sufficient for the court to confer
2. According to the Act, federal funds will appropriated to finance instruction standing.
in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools, and to
purchase textbooks which Flast sought to be declared unauthorized, or if
authorized, declared unconstitutional because of the bar against favoring a
religion.   Cohen’s   prerogative   to   determine   which   religious   or   sectarian  
schools shall have grants will be in effect, giving aid to one religion over
another. Such disbursements can also be concluded as petitioners paying tax
in favor of a certain religion which is in violation of the Free Exercises
Clause of the First Amendment.
3. Flast sought judicial relief but the three-judge panel favored Cohen holding
that the former did not have standing because of failure to allege the
particular injury sustained. The court relied on the ruling in Frothingham vs
Mellon elaborating that being taxpayers alone can merit standing to sue.

ISSUE: WoN appellants have standing to sue only on the basis of being
taxpayers? — YES

RULING: Decision is reversed. Appellants have standing.

1. Government’s  defense  was  rooted  in  the  decision  in  Frothingham  v  Mellon  
wherein the taxpayer complained that she will increase her future federal
tax liability due to the unconstitutional law which includes grants for
maternity   care.The   court   held   that   a   federal   taxpayer’s   "interest in the
moneys   of   the   Treasury   is   comparatively   minute   and   indeterminable”   and  
April 19, 1972 | Stewart, J. | Judicial Power (Standing) 1. Where the party does not rely on a statute authorizing invocation of the
judicial process, the question of standing depends upon whether the part has
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. Where,
SUMMARY: Sierra Club filed a suit to restrain officials from allowing Disney to
however, Congress has authorized public officials to perform certain
develop a ski resort in Mineral King, invoking an interest in the conservation of
functions according to law, and has provided the statute for judicial review
national parks, game refuges and forests. SC held that this is not sufficient to
under certain circumstances (APA), the inquiry as to standing must begin
infuse them with standing, for they must also allege an injury-in-fact suffered as a
with a determination of whether the statute in question authorizes review at
consequence to the challenged administrative action.
the behest of the plaintiff.
DOCTRINE: The injury-in-fact test requires more than an injury to a cognizable
2. The Court previously held that persons had standing to obtain judicial
interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.
review where they alleged that the challenged action had caused them an
“injury   in   fact”   and   where   the   alleged   injury   was   to   an   interest   arguably  
w/in the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statutes that the
1. A prospectus was published in 1965, inviting bids from private developers
agencies were claimed to have violated. The Court held that the injury
for the construction and operation of a ski resort in Mineral King, which is
alleged by Sierra Club will be entirely by reason of the change in uses
part of the Sequoia National Forest. The proposal of Walt Disney
Mineral King will be put, and the attendant change in the aesthetics and
Enterprises was chosen from 6 bidders, and was granted a 3-yr permit to
ecology of the area, injuries previously ruled by the Court as applicable to
conduct surveys and explorations.
the  APA.  However,  the  “injury  in  fact”  test  requires  more  than  an  injury  to  
2. The plan outlines a $35M complex of motels, restaurants, swimming pools,
a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself
parking lots, and other structures to be constructed on 80 acres of the valley
among the injured. In other words, the injury that gives a person standing to
floor under a 30-yr use permit. A special-use permit was also issued to
seek judicial review is prerequisite to arguing before the court, whether the
construct ski lifts, ski trails, a cog-assisted railway and utility installations
argument invokes public interest or not. In this case, Sierra Club failed to
on the mountain slopes. The State of California proposed to construct a
allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their activities or
highway 20 miles in length and a high-voltage power line that would
pastimes by the Disney development.
traverse through Sequoia National Park, which required approval of
Morton, the Secretary of the Dept of Interior.
3. Representatives  of  Sierra  Club  objected  to  Disney’s  plan  and  filed  a  suit  in  
the   District   Court   as   a   membership   corporation   with   “a   special   interest   in  
the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game
refuges,  and  forests  of  the  country”,  invoking  the  judicial  review  provisions  
of   the   Administrative   Procedure   Act.   Said   APA   provides,   “A   person  
suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or aversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action w/in the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof. The District Court granted the petition
for preliminary and permanent injunction, which the CA reversed for lack
of standing.

ISSUE: WoN the Sierra Club has alleged facts that entitle it to obtain judicial
review of the challenged action—NO


U.S. v. SCRAP 7. SCRAP filed a suit requesting for a preliminary injunction against the Feb 1
June 18, 1973 | Steward, J. | Judicial Power (Standing) and April 24 orders of ICC that allowed collection of surcharges.

SUMMARY: Railroad companies requested additional 2.5% surcharge in all

freight rates which was granted. This is to address their need for revenues ISSUES: WoN SCRAP has standing to sue? - YES
pending the approval of their permanent selective rate increases. Various
groups challenged the constitutionality of the surcharges and they were RULING: District court’s  grant for preliminary injunction is reversed. Case
declared with standing. remanded to that court.
DOCTRINE: A party has standing ifheestablishes that "the challenged action
had caused him `injury in fact'. Standing cannot be denied to a party who is RATIO:
suing for harm experienced by many. 1. For a party to have standing, he must be able toestablish that "the
challenged action had caused them `injury in fact,' and where the alleged
injury was to an interest `arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated' by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to
1. On Dec 1971, all railroads companies (railroad) in the U.S. requested
have violated."
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  (ICC),  on  5  days’  notice,  to  have  a  2.5%  
2. In the case at bar, the pleadings sufficiently alleged that the SCRAP
surcharge on nearly all freight rates to compensate the worsening profit loss
members were "adversely affected" or "aggrieved". They pointed to their
while a selective rate increase on a permanent basis is pending. ICC
use of forests, streams, and other resources as adversely affected by the
determined it too short for public participation so refiling with not less than
surcharge that would increase use of nonrecyclable commodities as
30  days’  notice  was  determined.
compared to recyclable goods. Increase in demand for nonrecyclables will
2. Railroad did the refiling effective Feb 5, 1972 as suggested then various
then increase need for raw materials, thus destroying the environment.
groups including Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
3. Railroad’s  argument  that  SCRAP  and  various  groups  do  not  have  standing  
(SCRAP) requested ICC to suspend said 2.5% tariff claiming that failure to
because  in  the  latter’s  argument, too many people suffer the same injury is
do   so   would   cause   “economic,   recreational   and   aesthetic   harm”   to   their  
untenable. They argued that allowing them to file a suit claiming harm
members. This harm will be brought by the rate structure that would
would allow all people to do the same. This is erroneous since this would
discourage the   use   of   “recyclable”   materials   that   will   adversely   affect   the  
mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions affecting
environment. The negative impact of this surcharge shall be felt when the
all people could be questioned by nobody.
members’   use   the   forest,   streams,   and   other   resources   as   there   will   be   a  
decrease in the use of recyclable materials.
3. On Feb 1, 1972, ICC did not suspend the surcharge for a seven month
period allowed so by law due to the great need of the companies to offset
their losses and the pending status of the selective rate increases. This was
done under the condition that said tariff will not last later than June of the
same year.
4. The alleged harm that SCRAP will sustain was determined by ICC as
without basis so railroad is not in violation of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969.
5. Railroad subsequently filed proposed permanent selective increases
averaging 4.1% to the ICC. Various parties again requested suspension of
such increase. On Mar 6, railroad’s request to take effect on April 1 was
disapproved but republication was again recommended so there would be
more time for public participation.
6. On April 24, ICC suspended the proposal after republication but eliminated
the June expiration date for the 2.5% surcharge.
KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA, JR. general interest shared in common with the public. Transcendental
May 5, 1994 | Davide, J. Judicial Power (Standing) importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of
SUMMARY: PCSO and PGMC entered into a Contract of Lease, which procedure.
Kilosbayan, its Board of Trustees (as citizens and taxpayers), and members of b. In De La Llana v Alba, the Court said that while the general rule
Congress (as citizens, lawmakers, and taxpayers), seek to invalidate. Court for standing is that the person must have a personal and substantial
discussed their liberal policy on standing based on settled jurisprudence. interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
DOCTRINE:In matters of transcendental importance, the Court has the wide injury as a result of its enforcement, this rule has been relaxed in
discretion to waive the requirement of standing to allow it to resolve the serious previous jurisprudence such as Pascual v Secretary of Public
constitutional questions raised. Works and People v Vera. In Alba, the Court decided to continue
their progressive stance and also found petitioners to have standing
FACTS: as taxpayers.
1. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Philippine Gaming c. Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas v
Management   Corporation   (PGMC)   entered   into   a   “Contract   of   Lease”,   Tan: objections to taxpayers suits for lack of standing are
whose implementation petitioners seek to prohibit and restrain. procedural issues that must be subordinated to the importance of
2. Petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. is a non-stock domestic corporation composed the  case  at  issue  &  Court’s  duty  to  uphold  the  Constitution  
of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are d. Association of Small Landowners in the Phils, Inc. v Secretary of
committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The rest of Agrarian Reform: The Court has the wide discretion to waive the
the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tanda and requirement of standing to allow it to resolve the serious
Rep. Joker Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of constitutional questions raised
KILOSBAYAN’s   Board   of   Trustees   and   as   taxpayers   and   concerned  
citizens. Senator Webb, Tanada, and Rep Arroyo are suing in their
capacities as members of Congress, taxpayers, and concerned Philippine
3. PCSO and PGMC, in citing Valmonte v PCSO, allege that petitioners have
no standing to maintain the instant suit.

ISSUE: WON petitioners have standing – YES.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Contract of Lease invalid.

1. A  party’s  standing  is  a  procedural  technicality which the Court may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues
raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, the Court pushes aside
this technicality since the transcendental importance to the public demands
that the cases be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside
technicalities of procedure. In a taxpayer suit, the Court is also not devoid
of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained.
2. The Court discussed their liberal stance on standing:
a. Emergency Powers Cases: Ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed   to   question   the   constitutionality   of   Pres.   Quirino’s  
Executive Orders even if they were invoking only an indirect and
March 19, 1974 | Brennan, J. Judicial Power (Standing) 1. The   alleged   threats   of   prosecution   are   not   “imaginary   or   speculative”.   He  
has been warned twice to stop handbilling and has been told that, if he
SUMMARY: Steffel, who was twice stopped from handbilling and was continued handbilling, he will likely be prosecuted, a concern amply
threatened by police with arrest, brought an action for injunctive and demonstrated   by   his   companion’s   prosecution.   It   is   not   necessary   that  
declaratory relief in the District Court, claiming that the application to him of petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest to be entitled to challenge a
the Georgia criminal trespass law would violate his 1A and 14A rights. statute he claims deters his exercise of his constitutional rights.
DOCTRINE: It is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual Nonetheless,   the   reduction   of   the   Nation’s   involvement   in   Vietnam,   his  
arrest to be entitled to challenge a statute he claims deters his exercise of his cause for engaging in handbilling, shall be determined by the District Court
constitutional rights. if   subsequent   events   have   altered   petitioner’s   desire   to   engage   in  
handbilling, that it can be said that the case no longer presents a substantial
controversy to warrant the issue of declaratory relief.
2. When no state proceeding is pending and thus considerations of equity,
1. On October 8, 1970, petitioner and other individuals were distributing
comity, and federalism have little vitality, the propriety of granting federal
handbills protesting against American involvement in the Vietnam on a
declaratory relief may properly be considered independently of a request for
sidewalk of the North DeKalb Shopping Center. They were asked to leave
injunctive relief. The Congress, in enacting the Declaratory Relief Judgment
by the employees, and when they declined, police officers were summoned
of 1934, intended declaratory relief to act as an alternative to the strong
who told them that they would be arrested if they do not refrain from
medicine of the injunction and to be utilized to test the constitutionality of
handbilling. The group left but returned 2 days after to continue handbilling.
state criminal statutes, where injunctive relief would be unavailable.
The manager of the center called the police, and they were once again told
3. Declaratory relief was to provide a milder alternative to the injunction
that failure to stop their handbilling would result in their arrests. Petitioner
remedy. It has less intrusive effect on the administration of state criminal
left to avoid arrest but his companion stayed and was subsequently
laws (challenge constitutionality v. interference and disruption of state
arraigned on a charge of criminal trespass (Georgia statute).
proceedings). A state statute may be declared unconstitutional in toto
2. Petitioner alleged in his complaint his desire to continue distributing
(incapable of constitutional applications/total unconstitutionality), or
handbills but did not do so for fear of arrest.
unconstitutionally vague or overboard (incapable of being applied to its full
3. District Court denied all relief and dismissed the action, ruling that there
extent/partial unconstitutionality). The declaration does not necessarily bar
was no meaningful contention that the state has or will act in bad faith, thus,
prosecutions under the statute, as a broad injunction would.
lacking the rudiments of an active controversy.
4. A requirement that all the traditional equitable prerequisites to the issuance
4. Petitioner appealed only from the denial of declaratory relief, which the
of an injunction be satisfied before declaratory judgment is considered
Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed, ruling that irreparable injury
would   defy   Congress’   intent   to   make   declaratory   relief   available   in   cases  
must be measured by bad faith harassment, a test applied to a request for
where an injunction would be inappropriate.
injunctive relief against threatened state court criminal prosecution, as well
5. A federal district court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the
as pending; and that the same test of bad faith is a prerequisite for
merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the
declaratory relief.
propriety of the issuance of the injunction.
6. The solitary individual who suffers a deprivation of his constitutional rights
is no less deserving of redress than one who suffers together with others.
1. WoN there is an actual controversy under Art III and the Declaratory
Judgment Act. – YES.
2. WoN the District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly found
petitioner’s  request  for  declaratory  relief  inappropriate.  – NO.

FRANCISCO, JR. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES complaint barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
November 10, 2003 | Carpio-Morales, J.
1. While it was CJ Davide's personal rights that will be injured by the actions
SUMMARY: A second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice
Hilario Davide a year within the filing of the first complaint. The court held that of the HoR, the petitioners in this case did not sue for the CJ's rights—they
the action is barred as it violates the constitutional prohibition against the sued for their own rights.
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
within a one-year period. constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. The petitioner
DOCTRINE/S: In not a few cases, this Court has adopted a liberal attitude on must be able to show that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
the locus standi of a petitioner when the issues raised are of paramount sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
importance to the public. Such liberality does not, however, mean that the that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The petitioners suing as
requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally citizens were given standing because the case involved a public right. The
eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such mere fact of being a citizen satisfied the requirement of Personal Interest.
interest. A petitioner is allowed to sue as a taxpayer where there is a claim that
public funds are being illegally disbursed. He must however, specifically
FACTS: prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
1. Four months and three weeks after the filing of the first impeachment money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a
complaint by former President Estrada-- for culpable violation of the result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. The court
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes--against CJ granted standing to petitioners who sued as taxpayers because of the
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices, a second impeachment complaint allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
against the Chief Justice was filed by Reps. Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily
Fuentebella. The second complaint was founded on the alleged results of involve the expenditure of public funds.
the legislative inquiry conducted regarding the manner of disbursements A legislator is allowed to question the validity of any official action when it
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of theJudiciary Development Fund. infringes on his prerogatives as a legislator. The two legislators who were
The   second   complaint   was   accompanied   by   a   “Resolution   of   petitioners were given standing because of their task of ensuring that the
Endorsement/Impeachment”  signed  by  at  least  1/3  of  all  the  members  of  the   powers and privileges of their office remain inviolate.
HoR. Petitions against the HoR were filed, most of which are contending An association may represent its members specially if the taxpayers and
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it citizens in the association are substantial in number and the outcome of the
violates  the  provision  of  Section  5  of  Article  XI  of  the  Constitution  that  “no   suit will affect their interests. In the case of the Integrated Bar of the
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more Philippines, the court held that the mere invocation of the duty to preserve
than  once  within  a  period  of  one  year.”   the rule of law does not suffice. The court gave them standing however,
because of the issues they presented.
ISSUES: For class suits, petitioners must be numerous to fully protect the interests of
1. WoN the petitioners have standing – Petitioners who met the requirements those concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all the interests in
were given standing the suit as the outcome will be binding on them under the principle of res
2. WoN Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules judicata. The UP Law Alumni Cebu wouldn't have been given standing
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the because of their divergent interests that cannot be sufficiently represented
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution - YES but because they additionally alleged that they were suing as citizens and
taxpayers, they were given standing by the court.
RULING: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in All those who invoked the issue of transcendental importance were given
Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitutional hence, second impeachment standing by the court because the determinants formulated by Justice
Feliciano--(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
(2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory impeachable officer within a one-year period.
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions raised-- were present.
Petitioner Vallejos, for failing to allege any interest in the case, was not
given standing.

As regards intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an

intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation. While
intervention is not a right, it may be given if the applicant shows that he can
satisfy the requirements of the law.

2. The resolution of the issue hinges on the interpretation of the word

“initiate”.  The  HoR  bases  its  argument  on  Sec  16  Rule  V  of  the  “Rules  of  
Procedure  in  Impeachment  Proceedings” of the 12th Congress which states
that an impeachment complaint is deemed initiated through the following:
(1) upon finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
filed by a member of the HoR or a citizen endorsed by a member is
sufficient in substance or (2) when a third of the member of the HoR files a
verified complaint with the Secretary General. The HoR believes that filing
of a complaint does not mean initiating it and that one-year bar could not
have been violated as as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. The court
held   however   that   based   on   the   intent   of   the   framers,   the   term   “initiation”  
starts with the filing of the complaint and that the vote of one-third of the
house in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the proceedings. The
court also cited Fr. Bernas' explanation using reddendo singula singulis in
Sec 3 paragraphs 1 and 5 on the constitutional provision on impeachment
that   “impeachment  case”  and  “impeachment  proceeding”  are  two  different  
objects—that the case is to be decided by the senate but that a proceeding,
must first be initiated at  the  HoR;;  that  the  “impeachment  proceeding”  is  not  
initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because
that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding,   namely   the   trial   and;;   that   neither   is   the   “impeachment
proceeding”   initiated   when   the   House   deliberates   on   the   resolution   passed  
on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been
done. Thus, the proceeding is initiated when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. Clearly, Sec 16 and 17
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules of the 12 th Congress contravene
Sec 3(5) of Article XI. Therefore, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Reps Teodoro and Fuentebella violates the constitutional prohibition
SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR No. 159196: Senator Pimentel vs. Romulo, et al. arguing that the
February 3, 2004 | Tinga, J. | Petition to declare unconstitutional Proclamation presidential issuances are an unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of
No. 427 and General Order No. 4 | Judicial Power (Standing) martial law power.It serves as gateway to unconstitutional implementation
of warrantless arrests for the crime of rebellion
SUMMARY: Some 300 officers and enlisted men of AFP stormed into
Oakwood   Premiere   demanding   the   resignation   of   several   gov’t   officials  
including the president. President GMA then declared Proclamation No. 427 ISSUES:
and General Order No. 5 declaring a state of rebellion and directing AFP and 1. WoN petitioners had legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
PNP to suppress it, respectively. The petitions were dismissed and Proclamation and General Order – NO except for Rep. Suplico and Sen.
constitutionality of the  President’s  declarations  was upheld. Pimentel
DOCTRINE: A party only has legal standing or locus standi if it has a 2. WoN the declarations and issuances are considered as exercises of
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or emergency and martial law powers? – NO
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The only exception is if the case is of transcendental importance. RULING: Petitions dismissed.

FACTS: 1. Only Rep. Suplico and Sen. Pimental, as members on Congress, have legal
1. On July 26, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP standing to challenge the subject issuances. These petitioners claim that the
stormed into Oakwood Premiere apartments armed with high-powered declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an
ammunitions and explosives. They demanded the resignation of the exercise   of   Congress’   emergency   powers,   thus   impairing   the   lawmakers’  
President, Secretary of Defense, and PNP chief. legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a
2. In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, Pres. GMA declared a state of deceptive scheme to   avoid   congressional   scrutiny   into   the   President’s  
rebellion thru Proclamation No. 427. She then called out the AFP to exercise of martial law powers.
suppress the said rebellion thru General Order No. 4. By the evening of the 2. Other   petitioners   like   the   people’s   organizations SJS, Sanlakas, and PM
same day, the occupation ended and the soldiers agreed to return to the lacked standing because there were not able to prove that they have
barracks. The President, however, lifted the declaration of state of rebellion sustained or will sustain a direct injury from the issuances. Argument as
five days later. taxpayers   will   also   not   hold   because   a   taxpayer’s   suit   must   involve   an  
3. Seven petitions were then filed challenging the validity of the Proclamation illegal disbursement of funds by government.
and the General Order. Some of which are: 3. A citizen will be allowed to raise aconstitutional question only when he can
GR No 159085: Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa Party list show that he haspersonally suffered some actual or threatened injury as
organizations vs. Executive Sec. arguing that Sec. 18 Art. 7 does not require aresult of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; theinjury is fairly
declaration of state of rebellion to call out armed forces. There is also no traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to beredressed by
sufficient basis for President to proclaim a state of rebellion for an a favorable action. No such injury was presented by the other petitioners.
indefinite period 4. The   President’s   declaration   of   state   of   rebellion   and   general   order   are   not  
GR No. 159103: Social Justice Society Officers and members vs. Hon. the same as emergency powers granted by the Congress. The calling out
Exec. Sec. arguing that Sec. 18 Art. 7 does not authorize declaration of power of the President is granted by the constitution to address immediate
state of rebellion and it is a simple circumvention of the report requirement exigencies and threats to the government. The alleged usurpation of
to the Congress found in the same article. legislative   powers   by   the   President’s   supposed   exercise   of   emergency
GR No. 159185: Rep. Suplico et al. vs. Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and powers is of no basis. No specific instance was cited wherein the President
Exec. Sec. Romulo arguing that declaration of state of rebellion is a attempted to exercise powers beyond her scope as Chief Executive and
superfluity and is actually an exercise of emergency powers which belongs Commander-in-Chief.
to the Congress by virtue of Art. 6 Sec. 23(2) of the Constitution and is thus 5. The issuances cannot be considered as an exercise of martial law powers
a usurpation of power of Congress because there is no indication that military courts have replaced civil courts.
Neither are there signs that military authorities have taken over the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have personal and
functions of civil government. So the allegation that the President has substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain as
exercised martial law powers is beyond reason. a result of its enforcement. Second, taxpayers who seek to nullify laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
“expenditure  of  public  funds  by  an  officer  of  the  State  for  unconstitutional  
TAN v. MACAPAGAL acts   constitutes   a   misapplication   of   such   funds”.   Third,   when   a  
February 29, 1972 | Fernando, J. | MR| Judicial Power (Ripeness) constitutional question is raised, a Senator is usually considered as having
the required legal standing to bring a suit. The petitioners of the case at bar
fail to qualify under the said categories.
SUMMARY: The SC denies motion for reconsideration because sustaining 2. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the branches of government
the said motion is tantamount to violating the principle of separation of to be left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. Something must
powers. first be accomplished or performed by the other branches of government
DOCTRINE: As long as a Constitutional Convention has not yet acted upon before the judiciary may come into the picture--it is only then that it can
any proposed amendment, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts. Only pass judgment as to the validity of what was done and only when properly
when it has made clear what it plans to submit for ratification can appropriate
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The same doctrine applies
suits be filed.
to inquiries regarding the scope of the competence lodged in a
Constitutional Convention. The judiciary cannot and must not tell the
FACTS: ConCon what it can or cannot do. As long as any proposed amendment is
1. On October 6, 1971, the petitioners filed a 5-page petition for declaratory still not acted upon by a Constitutional Convention, it is beyond the
relief as taxpayers but purportedly suing on behalf of themselves and the jurisdiction of the Courts. Only when it has made clear what it plans to
Filipino people in assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution submit for ratification can appropriate suits be filed.
dealing with the range of authority of the Constitutional Convention praying
for  the  Court  to  declare  that  it  is  “without  power  under  Section  1,  Article  XV  
of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132 to consider, discuss and adopt
proposals to seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a
form of government other than the form now outlined in the present
Constitution, the Convention merely empowered to propose improvements to
the  present  Constitution   without  altering  the  general  plan  laid  within.”  Two  
days later, the said petition was dismissed.
2. On the last day of October came a printed 32-page motion for
reconsideration that relied mainly on American Jurisprudence.

1. WoN the petitioners have the necessary standing – NO
2. WoN the Court has the jurisdiction over the range of authority of the
Constitutional Convention – NO

RULING: The motion for reconsideration is DISMISSED.

1. There are three instances wherein a person is considered as having the
requisite standing to challenge the validity of a statute. First is that the
June 19, 1961 | Frankfurter, J. | Appeal | Judicial Power (Ripeness) 1. Even though the Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptive
devices and the giving of medical advice regarding contraceptives has been
SUMMARY: Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the Connecticut in the statute books for quite a long time now (enacted in 1879), it would
statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptives as well as giving medical advice seem that a prosecution for its violation has never been initiated, except for
about them. Court held that the issue is not yet ripe for adjudication since the one case (State v. Nelson) which was later dismissed. Furthermore, the
law was never enforced. unreality of these law suits is proven by the circumstance that sale of
DOCTRINE: A case is not yet ripe for adjudication if the law being attacked contraceptives is rampant in Connecticut, and there were no prosecutions
on constitutional grounds has not been reinforced, such that no one has are recorded with regard to this, nor there was any attempt to enforce the
sustained an actual injury or is in imminent danger of sustaining injury. ban against use and distribution of contraceptives.
2. Because the law has never been enforced, there is no actual injury nor
FACTS: imminent danger of sustaining injury to the plaintiffs. No suit has been
1. Petitioners (spouses Poe, Doe and Dr. Buxton) sought declaratory judgment brought up against Dr. Buxton or his patients. The fact that Connecticut has
to have certain Connecticut statutes (53-32 and 54-196 of the General not chosen to press the enforcement of this statute and in effect, to not
Statutes of Connecticut) prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the prosecute anyone for violation thereof deprives these controversies of the
giving of medical advice on their use violate the Fourteenth Amendment by immediacy which is an indispensable condition of adjudicating
depriving the plaintiffs of life and property without due process of law. constitutional questions.
2. The spouses Poe had no children but Mrs. Poe had had 3 pregnancies Also, it was not alleged that Ullman threatens to prosecute the plaintiffs for
terminating in infants with multiple congenital abnormalities from which use of, or for giving advice concerning, contraceptive devices. The
each died shortly after birth. Dr. Buxton, obstetrician and gynecologist, allegations are merely that, in the course of his public duty, he intends to
explained that the abnormalities in the infants were genetic and is of the prosecute any offenses against Connecticut law, and that he claims that use
opinion that contraception would be the best medical treatment for the of and advice concerning contraceptives would constitute offenses.
spouses to prevent psychological stress that can affect their physical and
mental health arising from another pregnancy. DISSENTING OPINION (Harlan, J.):
3. Jane Doe, on the other hand, is a 25-old housewife who lives with her The statute allows the State to enquire into, prove and punish married people for
husband and has no children. She recently underwent a pregnancy which the private use of their marital intimacy.
induced in her a critical physical illness, and another pregnancy might be The Connecticut statute does not invade the privacy of the home in the usual
extremely dangerous to her life. She also consulted Dr. Buxton who sense, since the invasion involved here may be accomplished without any
believes that contraception would be the safest treatment for her. physical intrusion into the home. It undertakes, however, to create a crime which
4. Dr, Buxton, however, cannot give advice about contraception under the fear is grossly offensive to this privacy, while the Constitution refers only to methods
that he may be punished for violation of the Connecticut statutes. The of punishing substantive wrongs, and the procedure it requires presupposes that
State's Attorney (respondent Ullman) intends to prosecute offenses against substantive offenses may be committed and sought out in the privacy of the
the State's laws, and claims that the giving of contraceptive advice and the home.
use of contraceptive devices would be offenses forbidden by Connecticut Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State
Gen. Statutes. Rev., 1958, 53-32 and 54-196. forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the case is ripe for adjudication – NO the State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered
and protected. It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid
extra-marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite
RULING: Petition dismissed.
another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent
in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of
that intimacy.
Even though the State has determined that the use of contraceptives is as
iniquitous as any act of extra-marital sexual immorality, the intrusion of the
whole machinery of the criminal law into the very heart of marital privacy,
requiring husband and wife to render account before a criminal tribunal of their
uses of that intimacy, is surely a very different thing indeed from punishing
those who establish intimacies which the law has always forbidden and which
can have no claim to social protection.
U.S. v. RICHARDSON supposed failure to require the Executive to supply a more detailed report of
June 25, 1974 | Burger, C.J. | Certiorari | Judicial Power (Ripeness) the  CIA’s  expenditures.
5. Respondent claims that without detailed information on CIA expenditures
he cannot intelligently follow the actions of Congress or the Executive, nor
SUMMARY: Respondent challenged the constitutionality of the CIA Act properly fulfill his obligations as a member of the electorate in voting for
as a federal taxpayer. Court held that he did not have standing to sue in such candidates seeking national office. This is a generalized grievance common
capacity. to all members of the public.
DOCTRINE: The gist of standing is whether or not the party seeking relief 6. The established principle is that a private individual challenging the
alleged   a   personal   stake   in   the   controversy’s   outcome   so   as   to   assure   constitutionality of executive or legislative action must show that he
concrete adverseness. A private individual challenging the constitutionality sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury; it is
of executive or legislative action must show that he sustained or is insufficient that he has a general interest common to all the public.
immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury 7. It can be argued that if respondent is not allowed to litigate the case, no one
can. But the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate the
FACTS: claims supports the argument that the subject matter is committed to
1. Respondent William Richardson, as a federal taxpayer, challenged the Congress’s  surveillance,  and  ultimately  to  the  political  process.
constitutionality of Central Intelligence Agency Act, which permitted the
CIA to account for its expenditures solely on the certificate of the Director.
He alleged that it violated Art I, Sec. 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution as the
clause required a regular statement and account of public funds.

ISSUE: WoN the party has standing to sue - NO

RULING: Respondent lacks the standing to sue. Judgment of the CA reversed.

1. The gist of standing is whether or not the party seeking relief alleged a
personal   stake   in   the   controversy’s   outcome   so   as   to   assure   concrete  
adverseness upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
2. The Court announced a two-pronged standing test requiring allegations: (a)
challenging an enactment under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art I
Sec 8 of the Constitution, and (b) claiming that the challenged enactment
exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed on the taxing and
spending power.
3. Respondent’s   challenge   is   not   addressed   to   the   taxing   or   spending   power,  
but to the statutes regulating the CIA (specifically 50 U.S.C. 403 j(b), which
provides different accounting and reporting requirements and procedures for
the CIA).
4. Respondent does not claim that the appropriated funds are being spend in
violation of a specific constitutional limitation imposed on the taxing and
spending power; instead, he asks that the Government be compelled to give
information on how precisely the CIA spends its funds. Thus, there is no
“logical   nexus”   between   his   asserted   taxpayer   status   and   the   Congress’s  
April 23, 1974 | Per Curiam | Certiorari | Judicial Power (Mootness) 1. Case is already moot since DeFunis will complete his law school studies at
the end of the term for which he has now registered regardless of any
SUMMARY: DeFunis was initially denied admission to a law school. By decision this Court might reach on the merits of the litigation.
virtue of a preliminary injunction, he was admitted to the law school. By the 2. Not one where there is voluntary cessation by defendant of act
time the Court was to render a decision to the case, he was already in his complained of: Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary
last quarter of his final year in law school. The Court held that the case is cessation" of the school's admissions practices but upon the simple fact that
already moot and does not fall within the exceptions to the mootness rule. petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy to permit him to
DOCTRINE: Exceptions to the mootness rule: (a) voluntary cessation by complete the term.
defendant of act complained of; (b) capable of repetition yet evading 3. Not one capable of repetition yet evading review: DeFunis will never
review. again have to go through the school's admissions process and just because
this particular case did not reach the Court until the eve of the petitioner's
FACTS: graduation from law school, it hardly follows that the issue he raises will in
1. In 1971, Marco DeFunis applied for admission as first-year law student at the future evade review.
the University of Washington Law School. He was denied admission and Furthermore,   assuming   the   school’s   admissions   policy   remains   unchanged  
filed a suit at the Washington trial court on behalf of himself questioning others may still challenge such policies in subsequent cases in the future
the  school’s  denial  to  accept  him  on  equal protection grounds. The suit also which the courts may render judgment.
prayed for preliminary injunction to command respondents (officers, faculty
members, and members of the Board of Regents of the University of
Washington) to accept DeFunis as a first-year law student, which was
2. By the time DeFunis was in second year of law school, the Washington
Supreme Court reversed ruling of the trial court and declared that nothing
was unconstitutional with the admissions policy. DeFunis then filed a
petition for certiorari, and Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, stayed the
judgment of the Washington Supreme Court pending the "final disposition
of the case by this Court. DeFunis was already in his third year when the
Washington Supreme Court first considered the petition for certiorari.
Petition for certiorari was granted on No. 19, 1973.
3. After oral argument (Feb. 26, 1974), the Court was informed that petitioner
had registered for his final quarter. Respondents have assured the Court that
this registration is fully effective regardless of the ultimate disposition of
the case.

1. Whether or not the case has been rendered moot- YES
2. Whether or not case falls within the exceptions to the mootness rule – NO

RULING: Judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is vacated.

BANCO ESPAÑOL FILIPINO v. PALANCA power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be
March 26, 1918 | Street, J. | Appeal |Procedural Due Process acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is
subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given opportunity to be
SUMMARY:Vicente Palanca challenged the decision of the CFI regarding heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
the foreclosure of the property of the original defendant. He alleged that the 2. The required notification proceedings in foreclosure cases to a non-resident
lower court did not acquire the jurisdiction over the matter and that the owner is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity,
original defendant was not informed, thus violating due process. SC denied statutes provide for publication and mailing of the notice to the defendant if
the petition. his residence is known. But this type of notification does not constitute a
DOCTRINE: Notice to the defendant in cases is essential. But in service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law
foreclosure cases, the type of notification required does not involve any whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of
assurance that the absent owner shall receive the actual notice. judicial proceedings.
3. This mode if notification in foreclosure cases does not involve any absolute
FACTS: assurance that the absent owner shall receive the actual notice. The idea
1. Defendant Palanca owed BancoEspanol P218k and executed a mortgage of upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of
his house as security for the debt he owed. After the execution of the notification which may fall short of actual notice is this: Property is always
instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China, there he died in 1910 assumed to be in the possession of its owner and it can be safely held that
without returning to the Philippines. under certain conditions, he has knowledge that proceedings have been
2. Plantiff in the foreclosure proceeding gave notice to the defendant pursuant instituted for its sale.
to Section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was 4. It is the duty of the owner of real estate who is a nonresident, to take
obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a measures that he shall be represented when his property is called into
newspaper in Manila. The court further directed the clerk of the court to requisition. His failure to do this and failure to get the notice by ordinary
deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope the summons and complaint publications do not exempt him from the consequences of his actions.
directed to the defendant in his last place of residence. Whether the clerk
complied does not affirmatively appear.
3. The proceedings continued and defendant was declared in default for not
appearing in the hearings. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
by the CFI and defendant was ordered to pay his debt or his mortgaged
property will be exposed to public sale.
4. After the confirmation of the sale, a motion was set by Vicente Palanca who
is the administrator of the estate of the original defendant, assailing the
decision of the CFI. He alleged that the clerk of the court did not obey the
order in the matter of mailing the papers directed to the defendant, which
led to the court not acquiring jurisdiction over the foreclosure of the
mortgaged property constituting a violation of due process of law.

ISSUE/S: WoN the lower court violated the due process required in law? - NO

RULING: Petition denied. There was no error in the judgment of the lower

1. Requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are
present, namely: (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial
ANG TIBAY v. CIR 2. In Goseco v CIR, it was emphasized that the CIR is not narrowly
February 27, 1949 | Laurel, J. | Dec on MR on Motion for New Trial | Procedural constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Section 20 of CW 103
Due Process requires  it  to  “act  according  to  justice  and  equity  and  substantial   merits  of  
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
SUMMARY: The SolGen files in behalf of CIR on the cases of National Labor bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
Union Inc., praying that their labor case be remanded to the CIR for a new trial, such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
which AngTibay opposes. SC grants the motion for a new trial and lays down 3. Due Process Requirements in Administrative Trials & Investigations:
due process requirements in trials and investigations of administrative character. i. Right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
DOCTRINE: 7  due  process  reqt’s  in  administrative  trials  &  investigations  (#3) affected to present his own case and submit evidence in suppor thereof
ii. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented
iii. The decision must be supported
iv. Evidence   must   be   “substantial”,   meaning   such   relevant   evidence   as   a  
1. The SolGen files in behalf of CIR on the cases of National Labor Union
reasonable mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion. CW 103
Inc., praying that their labor case (which did not prosper, w/ some
states that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts should not be
documents and exhibits offered as evidence were not admitted) be
controlling – this is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of
remanded to the CIR for a new trial. AngTibay opposes.
technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be
2. In their case, The National Labor Union alleged that ToribioTeodoro,
deemed inadmissible/incompetent in judicial proceedings would not
manager   and   proprietor   of   the   National   Workers’   Brotherhood   of  
invalidate the administrative order. However, this desirable flexibility in
AngTibay, falsely claimed that there was a shortage of leather soles in
administrative procedure will not justify orders without a basis in
AngTibay which made it necessary for him to lay off workers. However,
evidence having rational provative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay
said claim was unsupported by records of the Bureau of Customs or the
or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
accounts of native dealers of leather, and the scheme was allegedly adopted
v. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
to systematically discharge all NLU members from AngTibay, amounting
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected, to
to unfair labor practice and discrimination against NLU.
protect   the   parties’   right   to   know   and   meet   the   case   against   them.
3. In addition, NLU claims that the attached exhibits submitted for evidence
However,   this   must   not   detract   CIR’s   duty   to   enforce   the   law   actively  
were  so  inaccessible  to  them  that  even  w/  due  diligence,  they  couldn’t  have  
and use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and
been expected to have obtained such evidence and offered tot eh CIR. Said
informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy.
documents and exhibits are supposedly of such far-reaching importance and
vi. The CIR or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
effect that their admission would result in the modification and reversal of
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
the judgment herein.
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that
the volume of work in such that it is literally Relations personally to
ISSUE: WON a new trial should commence to allow NLU to present new
decide all controversies coming before them.
evidence – YES.
vii. CIR must render its decisions in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
RULING: MR denied, motion for new trial granted.
decisions rendered.
4. Except as to the alleged agreement between AngTibay& NWU, the record
is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
1. The Court of Industrial Relations, as an administrative court, exercises
predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. Therefore, in the interest
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
of justice, a new trial should commence giving NLU opportunity to present
employers and employees. It has national jurisdiction to consider,
new evidence.
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter, controverysy, or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers and
regulation the relations between them in accordance with Commonwealth
Act No. 103.
December 18, 1989 | Regalado, J. | Petition for Review of NTC order | 1. NTC, in exercising its rate-fixing powers, is limited by the requirements of
Procedural Due Process public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates,
which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of
SUMMARY: PHILCOMSAT was placed under the jurisdiction, control legislative power.
and regulation of NTC, including all of its facilities and services and fixing 2. Generally, notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
of rates, pursuant to EO 196. NTC ordered PHILCOMSAT to reduce its administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of
present rates by 15%. PHILCOMSAT questions the order, stating that it executive, administrative or legislative functions; but where it acts in a
violates procedural due process and substantive due process for being judicial or quasi-judicial manner, and its acts are particular and immediate
issued without notice and hearing and rather than a general and prospective, the person whose rights and property
DOCTRINE: When an administrative body acts in a judicial/quasi-judicial may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.
manner, the persons whose rights and property may be affected by the The order in question is a quasi-judicial adjudication. It pertains exclusively
action are entitled to notice and hearing. to petitioner, no rationalization was offered which prompted the imposition
of a 15% rate reduction, and petitioner was not afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent
FACTS: based its order.
1. By virtue of RA 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted a franchise to establish A rate-fixing order, be it temporary, is not exempt from statutory procedural
and operate in the Philippines, stations and associated equipment and requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of
facilities for international satellite communications, as well as the authority reasonableness. Sec 16(c) of the Public Servant Act provides that: The
to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in
telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and accordance with their rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the
ground terminals. limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
2. Under Sec. 5 of RA 5514, petitioner is exempt from the jurisdiction of then xxx c) to fix and determine individual or joint rates xxx which shall be
Public Service Commission, now NTC. However, pursuant to EO 196 (June imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public service.
19, 1987), it was placed under jurisdiction, control and regulation of 3. Any regulation which operates as an effective confiscation of private
respondent NTC, including all of its facilities and services and fixing of property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of
rates. property rights is void for being repugnant to the constitutional guaranties
3. Petitioner was required to apply for the certificate of public convenience of due process and equal protection of the laws.
and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, and authority 4. The inherent power and authority of the State, or its agent, to regulate rates
to charge rates. On Sept 16, 1987, it was granted provisional authority for 6 charged by public utilities should be reasonable and just. What is just and
months to continue operating its existing facilities, render the services it reasonable is based on sound business judgment based upon evidence. In
was offering, and to charge rates. It was extended for 6 months more, twice, determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential that to consider the
but was directed to reduce its present rates by 15%. given situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility, as well as
competition. A cursory perusal of the order reveals that the rate reduction is
ISSUE/S: solely and primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial
1. WoN EOs 546 and 196 constitute undue delegation of legislative power for statements of petitioner. It also did not elaborate on how it arrived at the
not having a fixed standard for the rate-fixing power– NO prescribed rates nor how the financial statements influenced its decision to
2. WoN the order violated procedural due process for being issued without impose a rate reduction.
notice and hearing – YES.
3. WoN the rate reduction violated substantial due process for being unjust,
unreasonable, and confiscatory – YES.

RULING: Writ prayed for is GRANTED. Order of NTC, set aside.

ATENEO v. CA RULING: Petition GRANTED. CA Decision reversed.
October 16, 1986 | Gutierrez Jr., J. | Petition for Review of CA resolution |
Procedural Due Process RATIO:
1. Rev  Welsh  did  not  stop  at  Guanzon’s  admission  and  interviewed  the  latter’s  
SUMMARY: Ramon   Guanzon’s   parents   file   for   damages   against   Ateneo   for   friends who were present during the incident. The Discipline Board was
expelling their son (for unbecoming conduct in slapping a cafeteria waitress) composed of distinguished faculty members and nothing in the records casts
without observance of due process, since they weren’t   informed   of   the   any doubt on their competence and impartiality. Guanzon himself appeared
proceedings. SC rules that due process was accorded and damages unwarranted. before the Discipline Board and admitted the slapping incident and even
DOCTRINE: The lack of notice given to parents of college students begged to be excused. He was given notice of the proceedings, he actually
undertaking   disciplinary   proceedings   doesn’t   equate   to   lack   of   due   process,   appeared to present his side, the investigating board acted fairly and
provided that the student is 18 and was advised to seek guidance from parents objectively, and all requisites of administrative due process were met.
and guardians. 2. The  claim  that  there  was  no  due  process  because  Guanzon’s  parents  weren’t  
given notice  of  the  proceedings  can’t  stand  since  Ramon  was  already  18  at  
FACTS: the time and a college student, intelligent and mature enough to know his
1. On Dec 12, 1967 at 5:15pm, 1st year student & dormer Juan Ramon Guanzon responsibilities.   In   Rev   Welsh’s   interview,   he   even   asked   if   he   would   be  
asked for a siopao from Carmelita Mateo, a dormitory cafeteria waitress. expelled, showing that he was fully aware of the gravity of his offense. He
When   she   asked   him   to   wait   for   it   to   be   heated,   he   called   her   “bilatni   bay”   was even asked to seek advice and assistance from his parents. Ramon is
(sex organ in Ilonggo) in the presence of other dormers and made threatening assumed to have reported the serious matter to his parents, and the fact that
gestures at her, prompting her to shout & throw a cardboard box top at he   chose   to   remain   silent   and   didn’t   inform   them   isn’t   Ateneo’s   fault.
Guanzon. Guanzon slapped Mateo and was restrained by the dormers. Moreover,   notwithstanding   his   parents’   non-participation, the university
2. Mateo sent a letter-complaint a day later to Rev Welsh, the Dean of Men & undertook a fair and objective investigation. Due process in administrative
Resident Students and Discipline Board Chairman, prompting him to conduct proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented and the
a  preliminary  inquiry  by  interviewing  Guanzon’s  friends  and  companions  who   existence of evidence to support the decision.
were at the cafeteria (they confirmed the incident). Finding probable cause, he 3. While  Mateo   wasn’t  entirely   blameless  since   she  also  shouted  at  Guanzon  
filed a memo to the Discipline Board members. Guanzon was fully informed and tried to hit him with a cardboard box top, her reaction was normal and it
of the   accusation   against   him   when   Fr.   Welsh   read   Mateo’s   letter,   and   doesn’t   justify   the   slapping.   The   incident   was   public,   which   added   to  
Guanzon admitted that the charge was true. Mateo’s   humiliation. There was unbecoming conduct and pursuant to
3. On Dec 19, notice of the meeting of the Board of Discipline was posted at the Ateneo’s  Rules  of  Discipline  and  Code  of  Ethics,  this  offense  constituted  a  
College Bulletin Board and the Dormitory Halls, with the Dean of Discipline ground  for  dismissal  from  the  college.  Ateneo’s  action  is  sanctioned  by  law  
personally notifying Guanzon of the Board meeting. He was told to seek the under Section 107, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (violation of
help of his guardians, parents, and friends including the student counsellors. disciplinary regulations as valid ground for refusing re-enrollment).
However,   he   didn’t   inform   his   parents   or   guardians   despite   knowing   the   4. Before Guanzon was permitted to enroll, he received the College Handbook
gravity of his offense. He spoke for himself and admitted to slapping Mateo, (general regulations) and College catalog (disciplinary rules) and Dorm
then asked to be excused so he could catch a boat for Bacolod for the Rules and Regulations. A   provision   states   “Dining   Room   – The kitchen
Christmas vacation. help   &   server   should   always   be   treated   w/   civility.”   Mateo,   b/c   of   her  
4. The Discipline Board unanimously dropped Guanzon from the rolls, the Dean service to boarders & her sex, deserved more respect & gracious treatment.
of Arts and Sciences and the President of the University reviewed and
confirmed  the  decision,  with  the  Student  Council’s  MR  denied. Other Issues:
5. In  the  current  case,  Guanzon’s  parents  are  seeking  damages,  alleging  that  their   On Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Issue is a purely legal question,
son was not accorded due process of law in the whole process. brought pursuant to the Civil Code law on damages. Hence, jurisdiction
belongs to Civil Courts and nothing of an administrative nature can be done.
ISSUE/S: WON Guanzon was accorded due process of law – YES.
On Damages: No basis. Guanzon, before dismissal, was granted an 5. Petitioners allege, however, that they were deprived of due process, w/c
honorable dismissal when he asked for it. He was able to promptly enroll to requires due notice and hearing; and or substantial due process, w/c requires
another school and his father was able to reimburse his full 2 ndsem tuition. that the body to conduct the investigation be competent to act and decide
free from bias or prejudice.

ALCUAZ et al v. PSBA ISSUE: WoN there has been deprivation of due process for petitioner-students
May 2, 1988 | Paras, J. | Review on Certiorari, Preliminary Mandatory and teachers—NO
Injunction | Procedural Due Process
SUMMARY: PSBA   students   were   blacklisted   for   “anarchic   acts”   against   the  
school. They were not allowed to reenroll upon recommendation by a special RATIO:
investigation committee, and they complained, saying this was violative of due 1. A student, once admitted, is considered enrolled for 1 semester. The same is
process. The Court held that min requirements for due process were complied w/. true for teachers, since the Manual provides that written contracts are for 1
DOCTRINE:Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail semester. As such, the denial of due process is untenable. The school cannot
proceedings and hearings similar to those in courts of justice. Such proceedings be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers.
may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part. 2. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those in courts of justice. Such
proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an
FACTS: essential part. The minimum standards laid down by the Court are: 1)
1. Petitioners are students of PSBA and respondents are the PSBA, a non- students be informed in writing of the nature and cause of the accusation, 2)
stock institution of higher learning organized and existing under laws of the they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, w/ assistance
Phils. In March 22, 1986, students and PSBA had an agreement on rules of counsel if desired, 3) they shall be informed of evidence against them, 4)
regarding protest actions, because students were not allowed to directly they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf, and 5) the
participate in policy-making, as this is provided by law. evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee. While
2. Despite this, petitioners demanded negotiation of a new agreement, which there was initially no hearing, violating Nos. 3 to 5, the requirements were
was turned down, resulting in mass assemblies. On Oct 8, the students were complied with when PSBA complied with the Court Nov 12 Order for the
sent uniform letters asking them to explain why the school should not take investigation.
any  administrative   action  against   their   “anarchic  acts”.  This   was  answered   3. The right of a school to refuse reenrollment of students for violation of
by counsel in Oct 22. However, they were blacklisted and denied admission disciplinary regulations is sanctioned by law. The Court ordinarily accords
during enrollment, which prompted petitioners to resort to the courts. A respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless
motion for intervention was filed by the PSBA Faculty Union, which was 1) the findings are not supported by evidence, 2) vitiated by fraud,
granted. imposition or collusion, 3) the procedure is irregular, 4) palpable errors are
3. On Nov 12, the SC issued a temporary mandatory order directing the committed, 5) grave abuse of discretion is manifest. In this case, the
respondents 1) to enroll the petitioners, and 2) to readmit the intervenors to investigation was fair, open, exhaustive and adequate, thus complying with
their former positions w/o prejudice to the investigation to be conducted by the requirements for due process.
the school authorities.
4. On Apr 27, 1987, PSBA filed their manifestation and submitted a report w/
recommendations by a special investigating committee. Findings included
the dismissal of Alcuaz, exoneration of the other 3 students, termination of
the services of some teachers, and exoneration of some. On Jun 29, the
motion to compel PSBA to re-enroll petitioners was denied by the Court,
except for the 3 exonerated students, holding that the results of the
investigation indicate prima facie the violation of rules and regulations of
the school.
NON v. J. DAMES 3. Refusal of re-enrollment due to failing grades was a mere afterthought.
May 20, 1990 | Cortes, J. | Certiorari | Procedural Due Process Excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not
SUMMARY: Petitioners were refused readmission for participating in student only is a denial of due process by also constitutes a violation of the basic
mass actions against Mabini College. tenets of fair play.
DOCTRINE: See ratio no. 2. This does not mean that no disciplinary action can be taken against
petitioners’  breach  of  discipline.  Penalty  that  could  have  been  imposed  must  
FACTS: be commensurate to the offense committed and must be imposed only after
1. Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with.
Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll for AY 1988-1989 for
leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in a
preceding semester. NOTE:
Assailed doctrine: A student, once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled
only for one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after the semester
ISSUE/S: WoN the students were afforded due process before they were is over, as the contract between the student and the school is deemed terminated.
refused re-enrollment. – NO. (Alcuaz, et. al. v. Philippine School of Business Administration, et. al.)

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Assailed decision ANNULLED. Mabini

College ordered to readmit and allow petitioners to re-enroll, without prejudice *The academic freedom aspect of Alcuaz and Non will be discussed in other
to its taking the appropriate action. digests found later in this compilation (see case digests for academic

1. While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free
speech and assembly, this should not be taken to mean that school
authorities are virtually powerless to discipline the students: Conduct by the
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
2. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural
due process.
Standards to be met to satisfy the demands of due process:
a. Students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
b. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
c. They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
e. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense
REYES v. CA for Preventive Suspension against them.
February 25, 1991 | Midealdea, J. | Petition for certiorari and prohibition with 10. On July 20, 1990, the RTC issued an Order which (a) required petitioners to
preliminary injunction and TRO, Petition for certiorari and mandamus with show cause why they should not be held in contempt for disobeying and
preliminary injunction and TRO | Procedural Due Process resisting its order dated June 27, 1990 and (b) denied the petitioners' motion
to lift injunction.
11. Petitioners’  appeals  to  the  CA  were  all  denied.
SUMMARY: The BOR resolved to direct the UPCM to admit students
dismissed because they failed to meet the admission requirement of 90
percentile in the NMAT even though during their NMAT, the UC-approved
1. WoN the BOR could validly direct the petitioners to admit the students to
cut-off grade was 70 percentile. SC held that the BOR acted within and in
the college of medicine – YES
accordance with its power of governance and administration of the University.
2. WoN the BOR acted beyond its power when it retained the NMAT cut-off
DOCTRINE: Students have the right to select a profession or course of
score of 70th percentile – NO
study subject to a fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
3. WoN the BoR violated the academic freedom related to the right of the
University to fix admission requirements – NO
4. WoN the decision of the CA was against justice and equity because the
FACTS: students themselves judicially confessed that they have no right to
1. Respondent-students obtained scores greater than 70 percentile on the admission – NO
NMAT which was the cut-off rate of the UP College of Medicine (UPCM)
for AY 1986-1987 as prescribed by the UPCM faculty and approved by the RULING: The petition is DISMISSED and the decisions of the CA are
University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986. AFFIRMED
2. On October 8, 1986, the UPCM Faculty prescribed a 90 percentile cut-off
score for admission effective academic year 1987-1988. RATIO:
3. BOR and UP Chancellor recommended the admission of applicants 1. To the BOR belongs the governance and the general powers of
obtaining a percentile rating from 70-90 but the Dean of UPCM refused to administration of the university. The UC has the power to fix the admission
admit the students. requirements to any college in the university while the College Faculty has
4. The students filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court the power to determine the entrance requirements of the college subject to
(RTC) and on June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary the approval of the autonomous UC. At the time that the students took the
injunction for their admission. NMAT, the new UPCM Faculty prescribed 90 percentile cut-off grade was
5. The students were admitted and spent three years in the College. without the UC's approval. Consequently, the UPCM Faculty cannot legally
6. Before the onset of school year 1990-1991, the students wrote a letter to the implement a change in the NMAT cut-off grade. It then follows that the
UPCM faculty stating that they would leave to the faculty the determination previously approved 70 percentile cut-off remains the prescribed passing
of their case and that they would like to appeal to remain in the College. The grade for the students. Thus, the students have all the right to stay in the
said letter was attached to a motion to dismiss submitted to the RTC. The college inasmuch as they met the cut-off score of 70 percentile imposed by
RTC dismissed the case with prejudice on June 15, 1990. the UC and such right could not be abridged or denied by the resolutions of
7. The UPCM faculty then held an emergency meeting on June 22, 1990 where the UC Manila dated July 20, 1990 and September 5, 1990 which sustained
it denied the appeal of the students by a vote if 86 on the grounds that they the Faculty's refusal to admit the students. Under the Constitution, the
are not qualified for admission to the UPCM. students have the right to select a profession or course of study subject to a
8. The students then filed a motion the RTC to reconsider its order of dismissal fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements
and, on June 27, 1990, the RTC issued an order for the admission of the (Article XIV, Section 5(3)). The UC can ratify acts of the College regarding
students to the college. admission requirements but the same should be done within a reasonable
9. The BOR, in 1031st meeting dated June 28, 1990, resolved to approve the time. To validate the resolutions at this point in time would not be fair and
admission of the students and order the petitioners to admit them. When the equitable to the students who have proved their mettle by passing the
Dean and Secretary of the UPCM failed to follow the order of the BOR, the academic requirements of the college for three years.
UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct and, later, Order 2. The BOR did not exercise the power to prescribe entrance requirements
(powers that it does not have) but merely upheld the power of the
University Council under the law to fix the requirements for admission to
the UPCM and rendered ineffective the action of the UPCM Faculty, which
attempted to exercise that power to increase the cut off score in NMAT to
90 percentile without the approval of the University Council and President
of the University in accordance with the exercise of its power of governance
and its duty in seeing to it that all the units abide with the law, university
rules and regulations.
3. The BOR in its order upholding the admission requirement approved by the
University Council in 1986 did not violate academic freedom but rather
supported the right of the University Council to fix or approve admission
requirements against the UPCM faculty and Dean who changed the
admission requirements approved by the University Council without
following the prescribed rules and procedures of the University.
4. There is no categorical admission of the absence of a right in the letter
submitted by the students and, even if there was, it cannot be accepted as it
involves a conclusion of law based on the students' misapprehension of their
legal right. The court found that the letter was predicated more on
overwhelming sense of hopelessness in view of the circumstances which
they  perceived  was  against  them  and  the  “three  agonizing  years  of  uncertain  
relationship  spent  in  the  college”.  

NOTE: The BOR's claim of plenary power over admission requirements is not
officially approved by the SC as such claim has no basis in law. The UC has the
final say in admission requirements provided the same conforms with law, rules
and regulations of the university. In the event the power is abused or misused, it
becomes the duty of the BOR, being the highest governing body in the
university, to step in and to correct the anomaly.
GOLDBERG v. KELLY the welfare bureaucracy. Also, there exists a governmental interest in
March 23, 1970 | Brennan, J. | Procedural Due Process affording a pre-termination evidentiary hearing to the recipients—for public
assistance is not mere charity but a means to promote general welfare.The
SUMMARY: Procedures for termination of financial aid, including post- government’s   competing   interest   in   summary   adjudication   is   on  
termination evidentiary hearings, were enacted by the State of NY but are conservation of both fiscal and administrative time and energy by reducing
being challenged as violative of due process. SC held that due process the number of evidentiary hearings actually held. However, these
requires fair hearing before termination. governmental interests are not overriding in the welfare context.
DOCTRINE:The extent to w/c procedural due process must be afforded the 3. The Court held that the purpose of a fair hearing is to produce an initial
recipient depends upon whether the interest in avoiding a grievous loss determination of the validity of the grounds for discontinuance in order to
outweighs governmental interest in summary adjudication. The fundamental protect the recipient against an erroneous termination of benefits. However,
requisite of due process, the opportunity to be heard, must be tailored to the the Court is not prepared to impose upon the State any procedural
capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard. requirement beyond those demanded by rudimentary due process; thus only
the barest minimum procedural safeguards are imposable. Accordingly, the
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard at
FACTS: a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, as tailored to the capacities
1. Residents of New York receiving financial aid under the federal or state and circumstances of those who are to be heard. Also, to ensure fairness and
program brought a complaint alleging that officials terminated or were proper determination on questions of fact, due process requires an
about to terminate aid w/o notice or hearing, denying them due process if opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Finally, the
law. Before the suit was brought, there was no requirement of prior notice decision   maker’s   conclusions   must   then   rest   solely   on   the   legal   rules   and  
or hearing before termination of financial aid. Thereafter, procedures were evidence adduced at the hearing. In this case, written submissions do not
adopted by the State and the constitutional adequacy of these procedures is provide the flexibility of oral arguments, and are additionally unrealistic for
now being challenged before the Court. recipients who cannot write nor afford professional help.
2. The procedures provide that a caseworker must first discuss eligibility
issues with the recipient, and recommend such to a supervisor, who has the
power to approve the same. It also provides that 1) notice must be given on
proposed discontinuance at least 7 days from its effective date; 2) with
notice that the recipient may request a review of the proposal; 3) written
notice of the decision be given to the recipient. Thereafter, aid is to be
discontinued. However, the letter informs the recipient that he may request
a  “fair  hearing”  post-termination.

ISSUE/S: WoN the due process clause requires that the recipient be afforded
evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefits—YES


1. The extent to w/c procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is
influenced by the extent to which he may be condemned to suffer grievous
loss, and depends upon whether the interest in avoiding that loss outweighs
governmental interest in summary adjudication.
2. In this case, the termination of aid pending resolution on eligibility may
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by w/c to live while he waits.
This might make him desperate and affect his ability to seek redress from
May 24, 1971 | Brennan, J. | Certiorari | Procedural Due Process RATIO:
1. The statute would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment if it barred the
SUMMARY:   Petitioner   challenged   Georgia’s   Motor   Vehicle   Safety   issuance of licenses to all motorists who did not carry liability insurance or
Responsibility Act as violative of due process because it excluded any post security; but the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit the scheme
consideration of fault or responsibility at a pre-suspension hearing and where only motorists involved in accidents are required to post security
suspended  an  uninsured  motorist’s  vehicle  registration  and  driver’s  license   under penalty of loss of the licenses.
unless he posts security for the amount of damages claimed. The Court 2. Licenses are not to be taken away without procedural due process required
held that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional. by the Fourteenth Amendment where their suspension involves state action
DOCTRINE: Except in emergency situations, due process requires that that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. Relevant constitutional
when the State seeks to terminate an interest, it must afford notice and constraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether it is a
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before the ‘right’  or  a  ‘privilege’.
effectivity of the termination. Different forms of due process are needed in 3. It is fundamental that except in emergency situations, due process requires
varying contexts. that the State afford notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case before the effectivity of the termination of an interest
FACTS: such as that involved in the case at bar.
1. Petitioner, a clergyman, was in an accident when five year old Sherry Capes 4. Different forms of due process are needed in varying contexts. The nature
rode  her  bicycle  into  the  side  of  his  car.  The  child’s  parents  filed  an  accident   of the procedural due process which must be afforded the licensee regarding
report with the Director of the Georgia Department of Public Safety his fault or liability for the accident need not take the form of a full
indicating that she suffered substantial injuries for which they claimed adjudication of the question of liability, which can only be made in
$5,000 in damages. litigation between the involved parties. The procedural due process in the
2. The Director informed the petitioner that unless he was covered by a case at bar will be satisfied by an inquiry limited to ther determination
liability insurance policy effective at the time of the accident, he had to file whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgments being rendered
a bond or cash security deposit of $5,000 or present a notarized release from against the licensee in the amounts claimed.
liability, plus proof of future financial responsibility, or suffer the 5. Georgia’s   argument   that   fault   and   liability   are   irrelevant   to   the   statutory  
suspension   of   his   driver’s   license   and   vehicle   registration,   pursuant to scheme does not hold as liability in the sense of an ultimate judicial
Georgia’s  Motor  Vehicle  Safety  Responsibility  Act. determination of responsibility plays a crucial role in the Safety
3. Petitioner asserted that he was not liable since the accident was unavoidable Responsibility  Act  and  is  an  important  factor  in  the  State’s  determination  of  
and that he needed his license for his ministerial duties, and requested an depriving an individual of his licenses. As an essential element, due process
administrative hearing before the Director. Said hearing was scheduled, but requires its inclusion in the preliminary hearing.
the Director informed him that the only evidence that could be accepted was 6. The Court holds that before the State may deprive petitioner of the license
that (a) WoN petitioner/his vehicle was involved in the accident; (b) WoN and registration, it must provide a forum for the determination of the
petitioner complied with the provisions of Law as provided; or (c) WoN question whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being
petitioner falls under any of the exceptions of law. At the hearing, the rendered against him as a result of the accident. Georgia has several
Director  rejected  petitioner’s  proffer  of  evidence  on  liability. alternative methods for compliance with such requirement.
4. Petitioner   challenged   the   Act’s   constitutionality   due   to   denial   of   due  
process, in failing to afford him a hearing on the question of his fault or
liability before suspending the licenses.

ISSUE/S: WoN the statute is unconstitutional for violation of due process –


RULING: Judgment reversed and remanded.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. 5. Upon motion of LAND, The Labor Arbiter ordered the DBP be impleaded
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and required the same to intervene in the case between Lirag and Albay and
March 19, 1990 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Certiorari | Procedural Due Process LAND.
6. The Writ of Garnishment prayed for by LAND was granted by the Labor
Arbiter and DBP was ordered to remit to the NLRC the sum of P6,
SUMMARY: Lirag was ordered by the NLRC to pay their former employees
292,380.00 out of the proceeds of the foreclosed properties of LIRAG sold
who were dismissed from service, but were unable to do so because DBP had
at public auction in order to satisfy the judgment previously rendered in
extrajudicially foreclosed their mortgaged properties after they failed to pay
favor of the complainants (Albay and LAND).
their obligations. The Labor Arbiter then ordered the DBP be impleaded and
7. DBP argues that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over them since they were
required them to intervene. Later, the NLRC ordered the DBP to pay the
not a party to the case and that they were denied due process of law.
complainant employees out of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. DBP argues
that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over them and they were deprived due
process of law as they were not an original party to the case. The Court, with
Whether or not DBP was deprived of due process of law – NO
respect to this issue of due process, held otherwise.
Whether  or  not  DBP  may  be  ordered  to  satisfy  the  claims  of  LIRAG’s  workers  
DOCTRINE: A body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that retains
by virtue of preference of credit to workers under the Labor Code - NO
jurisdiction and control over a case can issue such orders necessary for the
execution of the final judgment, including the impleading of those who are not
RULING: Petition granted. LIRAG’s  creditors  ordered  to  institute  insolvency  
original parties to the case, if such was an incident to the execution of the final
There is no deprivation of procedural due process if a party to the case was
given the opportunity to be heard and to present its evidence.
1. While the DBP was not an original party to the case of Albay and LAND,
they had to be impleaded, however, for the proper satisfaction of a final
judgment after the Writs of Execution were not satisfied because the
1. On Feb., 1982, Joselito Albay filed a case at the NLRC against Lirag
properties levied upon on execution had been foreclosed extrajudicially by
Textile Mills, Inc. (Lirag) for illegal dismissal, while on March 1, 1982, the
Labor Alliance for National Development (LAND) also filed a case against
2. The NLRC retained jurisdiction and control over the case and could issue
Lirag on behalf of their 180 members for separation pay, 13th month pay,
such orders as were necessary for the implementation of that award. As
gratuity pay, sick leave and vacation leave pay and emergency allowance.
such it could order the DBP be impleaded since such was an incident to the
The complainants in these 2 cases are former employees of Lirag who were
execution of the final judgment award. The DBP could not have been
dismissed from service due to the retrenchment policy by Lirag.
impleaded earlier in the proceedings because the cause of action of Albay
2. The Labor Arbiter, through a July 30, 1982 decision, ordered Lirag to pay
and LAND was only against Lirag.
the complainants. Said decision was affirmed by the NLRC and became
3. DBP cannot rightfully contend that it was deprived of due process. It was
final and executory.
given the opportunity to be heard and to present its evidence. Furthermore,
3. On Apr. 15, 1983, a Writ of Execution was issued with respect to the NLRC
the Order granting the motion of LAND for a Writ of Execution and
decision, while at the same time the DBP extrajudicially  foreclosed  Lirag’s
Garnishment was issued only after hearing. The fact that they filed an
mortgaged properties due   to   the   latter’s failure to pay their mortgage
opposition to said motion filed by LAND and that they appealed to the
obligations. As such, the Writ of Execution issued in favor of the
NLRC after the Order was issued proves that they had submitted to the
complainants was unsatisfied; thus, a Notice of Levy on Execution on the
NLRC’s  jurisdiction.
properties of LIRAG was then entered.
4. NLRC, however, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Writ
4. As the sole bidder in the foreclosure sale, the DBP acquired the foreclosed
of   Garnishment   out   of   the   proceeds   of   LIRAG’s   properties   foreclosed   by  
properties   and   the   proceeds   were   credited   to   partially   satisfy   Lirag’s  
DBP to compensate the monetary claims of the workers. The right to
preference given to workers under Article 110 of the Labor Code is a
preference in application adopted to determine and specify the order in
which credits should be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the
insolvent’s   assets.   It   is   a right to a first preference in the discharge of the
funds of the judgment debtor. It is not, however, a lien creating a charge on
property which is enforceable against the whole world like the mortgages of
DBP   on   LIRAG’s   properties.     A recorded mortgage credit (like the one
DBP   has   over   LIRAG’s   properties)   is   a   special   preferred   credit   under  
Article 2242 (5) of the Civil Code on classification of credits. The
preference given by Article 110, when not falling within Article 2241 (6)
(claims  for  laborers’  wages,  on  the   goods  manufactured  or  the  work  done)  
and Article 2242 (3) (claims of laborers and other workers engaged in the
construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals and other works,
upon said buildings, canals and other works, upon said buildings, canals and
other works) of the Civil Code and not attached to any specific property, is
an ordinary preferred credit although its impact is to move it from second
priority to first priority in the order of preference established by Article
2244 of the Civil Code.
5. Right to preference given to workers under Article 110 of the Labor Code
will find application in the insolvency proceedings where such unpaid
wages  shall  be  paid  in  full  before  the  “claims  of  the  Government  and  other  
creditors”   may be paid. For   an   orderly   settlement   of   a   debtor’s   assets,   all  
creditors must be convened, their claims ascertained and inventoried, and
thereafter the preferences determined in the course of judicial proceedings
which have for their object the subjection of the property of the debtor to
the payment of his debts or other lawful obligations. Thereby, an orderly
determination  of  preference  of  creditors’ claims is assured.
UP v. HON. LIGOT-TELAN March 29 meeting. The preliminary injunction was granted, hence the
October 21, 1993 | Romero, J. | Procedural Due Process instant petition.

SUMMARY: Nadal, a senior UP Law student who got suspended for 1 year ISSUE/S: WON Nadal was accorded due process in the administrative
because of falsification of his STFAP application, sues UP for not according disciplinary proceedings against him – YES
him due process in not giving him notice of a Board of Regents meeting
reviewing his sentence. SC rules that he was accorded due process. RULING: Petition GRANTED. CA Decision reversed.
DOCTRINE: What constitutes due process in a university is that which is
governed under its rules, since admission and the power to impose RATIO:
disciplinary  sanctions  falls  under  the  ambit  of  the  school’s  academic  freedom.   1. In Garcia v LST, the Court stated that a school or college with the right of
academic freedom decides for itself its aims and objective and how best to
attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference, save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. In ADMU v
1. Ramon Nadal, a student from the College of Law, applied for a scholarship
Hon. Capulong, the Court stated that the admission to an institution of
under the STFAP a.k.a. Iskolarng Bayan program for 2 schoolyears. A
higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege,
precautionary   measure   to   ensure   the   program’s   integrity   included   the  
and that the establishment of rules particularly on student discipline is
falsification or suppression of any material information as a punishable act
regarded as vital for the smooth operation and survival of the school.
under Section 2(a) of the Rules and Regulations on Student Council
2. Admission to UP and its power to impose disciplinary sanctions falls under
Discipline of the University. Also, a fact-finding team was created to visit
the   ambit   of   the   school’s   academic   freedom;;   hence,   what   constitutes   “due  
the  applicants’  homes  and  verify  the  truth  of  the  information  provided  in  the  
process”   is   that   which   is   governed   under   UP rules. UP rules does not
application/sworn statement.
necessitate the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are
2. Accordingly,   Nadal’s   home   in   Blue   Ridge,   QC   was   visited   and   the   team  
included as items on the agenda of the Board. Additionally, the March 29
found out that he withheld information about his ownership of a 1977
meeting was meant only to reconsider the previous decision laid down, so
Toyota  Corolla  and  that  his  mom  worked  in  the  US  to  support  his  brothers’  
Nadal’s   attendance was unnecessary. And since the issue falls within the
schooling. This prompted UP to charge him before the Student Disciplinary
school’s   academic   freedom,   it   is   beyond   the   court’s   jurisdiction   and   the  
Tribunal (SDT), which found him not guilty for withholding information
Court cannot give him any legal remedy regarding the matter.
about   the   car   but   guilty   regarding   his   mom’s   income.   This   charge   was  
3. Hon.Ligot-Telan’s   Grave   Abuse   of   Discretion: Mandamus is not issued in
tantamount to acts of dishonesty, which had the penalty of expulsion from
doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the
the  University.  The   UP  Diliman  Executive   Committee  affirmed  the  SDT’s  
petition being required. Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary
decision upon automatic review. Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents,
injunction, the lower court dared to tread upon legally forbidden grounds in
which was unable to decide on March 28 (4 guilty, 3 not guilty, 3
curtailing   UP’s   exercise of academic freedom. If Nadal had his way, it
conditional votes). Upon the prompting of Regent Antonio T. Carpio, the
would not only undermine the authority of UP to discipline its students who
BOR decided that they would rule on the issue once the information that
violate its rules and regulations, but would subvert the very concept and
Nadal was a scholarship grant recipient in Ateneo HS was affirmed.
intent to give financial assistance to poor but deserving students.
3. Upon   Ateneo’s   certification   that   Nadal   was   a   recipient,   a   special   BOR  
executive  session  in  March  29  at  night,  without  Nadal’s  presence  to  witness  
as such, found Nadal guilty, but lowered his penalty out of compassion to a
1-year suspension, non-issuance of certificate of good moral character, and
reimbursement of STFAP benefits w/ 12% interest, non-settlement of which
would constitue non-issurance of his ToR until he has paid.
4. Nadal files with RTC QC a petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction and prayer for TRO against the BOR and other UP officers
stating that he was denied due process since he was not present during the
January 18, 2000 | Melo, J. | Petition for Review of RTC decision | Procedural ISSUE/S:
Due Process 1. WoN at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, Jimenez is
entitled to the 2 basic due process rights of notice and hearing – YES.
SUMMARY: DOJ conducted an evaluation procedure (which function was 2. If yes, WoNentitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and
conferred to DFA but was not exercised) regarding a request for the obligations of the Phil Govt under the RP-US Treaty – NO.
extradition of Mark Jimenez to the US. Jimenez requested copies of the 3. If  yes,  WoN  there  is  conflict  between  respondent’s  basic  due  process  rights  
extradition documents, ample time to comment on the request and that the and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty – NO.
proceeding be held in abeyance, which the DoJ denied. SC ruled that
evaluation procedure partakes in the nature of criminal investigation which RULING: DISMISSED for lack of merit.
may lead to the deprivation of liberty. Therefore, extraditee must be accorded
due process rights of notice and hearing. RATIO:
DOCTRINE: The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in 1. The evaluation procedure sets into motion the extradition process, and
criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. would ultimately lead to the deprivation of liberty of the prospective
extraditee, which can be affected in 2 stages: 1) Provisional arrest of the
prospective extraditee pending submission of request. 2) Temporary arrest
of extraditee during pendency of the extradition petition in court. The
1. On  Jan  13,  1977,  Pres.  Marcos  issued  PD  1069  “Prescribing  the  Procedure  
evaluation process essentially partakes the nature of a criminal
for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
investigation. Although certain constitutional rights are ordinarily available
Country”,  founded  on  the  doctrine  of  incorporation.
only in criminal prosecution, the Court has ruled that where the
2. On Nov 13, 1994, Sec. of Justice Franklin Drilon signed in Manila the
investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life,
“Extradition   Treaty   between   the   Government   of   the   Republic   of   the  
liberty or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal and
Philippines   and   the   Government   of   the   United   States   of   America”,   which  
such forfeiture partakes the nature of penalty. Since the evaluation
was concurred by the Senate by way of Res. No. 11.
proceedings may lead his arrest, extradite must be accorded due process
3. On June 18, 1999, DoJ received from the DFA US Note Verbale No. 0522
rights of notice and hearing.
containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the US, who
The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade in criminal, civil and
was charged in the US for violating the ff provisions of the United States
administrative proceedings, non-observance of which will invalidate
Code: 1) Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US, 2) Attempt to
proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
evade or defeat tax, 3) Fraud by wire, radio or television, 4) False statement
affecting their interests and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear
of entries, 5) Election contributions in the name of another. Petitioner issued
therein and present their side.
DO 249 designating and ordering a panel of attys to take charge and handle
Rights and notice to hearing, dispensable in 3 cases: 1) Urgent need for
the case pursuant to PD 1069.
immediate action, 2) Tentativeness of administrative action and respondent
4. On July 1, 1999, pending evaluation, Jimenez, through counsel, wrote a
is prevented from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time, 3)
letter requesting 1) copies of the official extradition request from the US
twin rights have been offered, but right to exercise them had not been
Gov’t,   and   all   documents   submitted   therewith,   2) be given ample time to
comment on the request, 3) and that the proceedings be held in abeyance.
2. Both U.S. and Philippines accord common due process protection to their
Petitioner denied foregoing requests.
citizens. The administrative investigation does not fall under the exceptions
5. On Aug 6, 1999, Jimenez filed with the RTC of NCR a petition for
stated above, in Sec. 3, Rule 122, RoC.
mandamus, certiorari and prohibition, which was presided over by Hon.
3. Doctrine of incorporation, under international law, decrees that rules of
Ralph Lantion who ordered the DoJ Sec., DFA Sec. and the Director of
international law are given equal standing with national legislative acts.
NBI, their agents to refrain from conducting proceedings in connection with
They can repeal each other. There is also no conflict. Veil of secrecy is
the extradition of Jimenez, from filing the corresponding petition with a
lifted during trial. The request should impose the veil at any stage.
RTC and from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez for
a period of 20 days from service of the Order.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION (RESOLUTION) Minimize the escape of extradites from the law and expedite their trial. The
October 17, 2000 | Puno, J. | Procedural Due Process demand for advance notice can delay the extradition evaluation process,
which, in turn, may delay the service of justice.
SUMMARY: DoJ conducted an evaluation procedure regarding a request for 3. Understanding of the parties: Both RP (through the DoJ and DFA) and US,
the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the US. Jimenez requested copies of the as well as other countries with similar extradition treaties do not grant
extradition documents, ample time to comment on the request and that the extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceeding be held in abeyance, which the DoJ denied. SC ruled in favor of extradition process.
respondent. Upon an Urgent MR, SC, en banc, reversed the decision, holding 4. An extradition proceeding is sui generis, not a criminal proceeding that
that respondent is not entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation determines   an   accused’s   guilt   or   innocence   which   affords   him   the  
process. constitutional guarantees. Similarly, the evaluation stage is not akin to a
DOCTRINE: Procedural due process requires a prior determination of whether preliminary investigation.
procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn Extradition Proceedings Criminal Proceedings
depends on the extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer a
grievous loss. Summary in nature Full-blown trial

FACTS: Prima facie case: less stringent Proof beyond reasonable doubt
1. The DoJ received from the DFA a request for the extradition of Mark standards
Jimenez to the US. Petitioner designated and ordered a panel of attorneys to
take charge and handle the case pursuant to PD 1069.Pending evaluation, Final discretion resides in the Judgment is final and executory
Jimenez requested copies of the extradition request documents, ample time President
to comment on the request, and to hold the proceedings in abeyance.
Petitioner denied foregoing requests. Procedural due process must begin with a determination of the nature of the
2. SC, in its decision dated January 18, 2000 dismissed the petition and government function and the private interest affected by governmental
ordered petitioner to furnish respondent copies of the extradition request action. Not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same
and its supporting documents and to grant him a reasonable period within kind of procedure.
which to file his comment with supporting evidence. 5. No   threat   to   extraditee’s   liberty:   Private   respondent   may   be   provisionally  
3. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, to which respondent arrested only pending receipt of the request for extradition. DFA has long
opposed. SC granted MR. since received the extradition request, therefore, the threat has already
passed. Likewise, a warrant of arrest for temporary detention may only be
ISSUE/S: WoN private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice issued upon the filing of the petition for extradition. The extradition is still
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process – NO. in the evaluation stage. It is still uncertain if a petition for extradition will be
filed, thus, the threat is merely hypothetical.
RULING: Urgent Motion for Reconsideration GRANTED. Jan. 18, 2000 6. Right to liberty v. State interest: Given that the extradition is still in the
decision REVERSED. Assailed order SET ASIDE. evaluation process, the nature of the right claimed is vague and the degree
of prejudice suffered is weak, greater weight is accorded to the interest of
RATIO: the state – suppressing crimes.
1. RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be 7. Procedural due process requires a prior determination of whether procedural
furnished with the extradition documents – after the filing of the petition for protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on
extradition in the extradition court. The Treaty and PD 1069 are silent on an the extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer a grievous
extraditee’s  right  to  demand  copies  of  the  extradition  documents  while  the   loss. Right to notice and hearing is simply momentarily withheld during the
request is still under evaluation. evaluation stage. This is a soft restraint on his right to due process which
2. Treaties should be interpreted according to their intent: Assurance that the will not deprive him of fundamental fairness.
punishment of international and transnational crimes are not frustrated.
ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN 3. Petitioner’s   argument   that   the   Plunder   Law   is   vague   and   overbroad   is  
November 19, 2001 | Bellosillo, J. | Petition | Procedural Due Process beyond reason. He contended that there is a failure to inform him of the
nature of the accusation which seems for the court to be pure sophistry.
SUMMARY: Petitioner Joseph Estrada assailed RA 7659 as It is well settled that words of a statute will be interpreted by their natural
unconstitutional. He cited three reasons which allegedly constitute a signification unless it is evident that a technical meaning was applied to
violation of his right to due process. The Supreme Court did not find them those   words.   The   words   “combination”   and   “series”   assailed   by   the  
sufficient to merit a grant in the petition. petitioner for vagueness cannot hold for the law and the ConCom records
DOCTRINE: A law must be clear enough that it will provide the accused show enough meaning to it. A statute may only be considered as vague
definite parameters for the nature and cause of the accusation so he can when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
prepare for an intelligent defense, in accordance with due process. must necessarily guess its meaning. In the case at bar, ambiguity where
none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts of the statute.
4. Petitioner’s  contention  that  the  “reasonable  doubt”  has  been  forgone  is  not  
FACTS: true. The legislature only intended to supply proof even for only a single
1. On April 2001, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight allegation which is mixed in the Information and does not require proof in
separate Informations against petitioner for the violation, inter alia, of the every allegation.
Plunder law. Estrada then filed an Omnibus Motion for remand of case to 5. It is also stated that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal
the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and for reconsideration of the intent. In the information filed, it was alleged that plunder was committed
offenses charged, to give the accused an opportunity to file counter- “willfully,   unlawfully   and   criminally”   which   alleges   the   guilty   knowledge  
affidavits and other documents to prove lack of probable cause. of the petitioner. It was also held that plunder is a heinous offense, which
2. Sandiganbayan ruled in a resolution that probable cause for plunder exists implied malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral,
which the petitioner moved to quash to no avail. they are deemed mala in se.
3. Petitioner Joseph Estrada assailed the Plunder Law in the SC alleging that
(1) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
“reasonable  doubt”  standard  in  criminal prosecution; and (c) it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the RPC. These all
constitute a violation of his fundamental rights to due process and be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague thus
violating right to due process? - NO

RULING: Petition denied. Plunder law is constitutional.

1. The constitutionality of a challenged law will not be touched as long as the
case can be decided on other available grounds. Unconstitutionality must be
based on an infringement of the constitution so defined, that doubt even if
well-founded will not suffice.
2. As it is written in the Plunder law, standards and parameters are
ascertainable   to   determine   an   accused’s   nature   of   violation.   Conducts  
required and forbidden have been prescribed and the law was able to afford
some comprehensible guide that leads to its validity.
CALDER v. BULL 2. Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide that any law
August  8,  1798  |  Chase,  J.  |  “Old”  Substantive  Due  Process made by Congress, contrary to the Constitution of the United States, is void
– NO
SUMMARY: The Connecticut Legislature passed a law or resolution in
1795 granting a new trial and a period of appeal to Bull and his wife with HELD/RULING: Petition denied. Judgment affirmed
respect to a will executed by Morrison in their favor which was earlier
disapproved by the court in 1793. By virtue of the said law or resolution, RATIO:
the will was approved. Calder and his wife, claiming a right to recover 1. Kinds of ex post facto laws:
property from Morrison, challenges the 1795 legislative act, claiming that it Every law that makes an action , done before the passing of the law, and
was an ex post facto law. Petition denied. which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action
DOCTRINE: The prohibition against ex post facto laws only applies to Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
penal statutes. If the prohibition was to be construed to include all laws with committed.
retrospective effect this would render the prohibitions such as those against Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
impairment of obligation of contracts taking of private property for public than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
use without just compensation and deprivation of vested rights from citizens Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
under existing laws as unnecessary. different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offence, in order to convict the offender.
FACTS: 2. There is a distinction between ex post facto laws and laws with retrospective
1. Normand Morrison executed a will (Aug. 21, 1779) in favor of Bull and effect. The former are always retrospective in application and are the ones
wife, his grandparents. Said will was disapproved by the court of Probate prohibited by the Constitution. The latter, on the other hand, are not prohibited
for Harford on March 21, 1793 and the court refused to record that said per se and may even be enacted for the benefit of the community or individuals.
will. In the present case, no fact done by Calder and wife was affected by the
2. Calder and his wife, on the other hand, claim the property which is the operation of the law or resolution. What it only affected was the judgment of the
subject   of   Morrison’s   will   by   virtue   of   the   right   of   the   wife   as   heiress   of   court to which they had acquired the right to recover property. The right to
Morrison as physician. As a consequence of the disapproval by the court of recover property, in contrast to the right to property, was not a perfect and
Morrison’s  will,  the  right  to  recover  the  property was vested in Calder and exclusive right. The decree against the will of Morrison (1793) did not vest or
wife. transfer any property to Calder and wife.
3. On May, 1795, the Legislature of Connecticut passed a law or resolution 3. The Court held that this was not something that falls within the prohibition
that set aside the aforementioned decree and granted a new hearing, and against ex post facto laws. If the prohibition was to be construed to include all
appeal within 6 months. By virtue of this legislation, The Court of Probate laws with retrospective effect, this would render the prohibitions such as those
then approved the said will (July, 27, 1795) and ordered for it to be against impairment of obligation of contracts, taking of private property for
recorded. public use without just compensation, and deprivation of vested rights from
4. The ruling of the Court of Probate was affirmed by the superior court at citizens under existing laws, as unnecessary.
Harford (Feb., 1795), and was later affirmed by the Supreme Court of errors 4. The Court held that it has no jurisdiction to decide whether any law or
of Connecticut (June, 1796). resolution passed by Congress was against the Constitution, thus void. Even if it
5. Calder and wife are challenging the legislation which granted a new hearing has such jurisdiction, there is nothing in the law or resolution passed by the
claiming that it is an ex post facto law prohibited under the U.S. Legislature that is contrary to the Connecticut constitution. Furthermore, the
Constitution. courts of Connecticut would be the proper venue to settle those matters.
Also, while a question of very great importance, it not necessary to determine
ISSUE/S: whether the Legislature of any of the States can revise and correct by law, a
1. Whether or not the challenged law or resolution is an ex post facto law - NO decision of any of its Courts of Justice, although not prohibited by the
Constitution of the State, because the resolution or law in question does not go
so far.
LOCHNER v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK regulation covers safety, health, etc no matter how unfounded the claim
April 17, 1905 | Peckham,  J.  |  “Old”  Substantive  Due  Process may be and essentially override personal liberties. The question to be asked
is whether this is a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of police
SUMMARY: Lochner was charged under the NY statute prohibiting power.
employees to work more than 10 hrs a day. He challenged its validity and SC 3. Here the Court held that there is no reasonable ground for interfering with
found for him. liberty in the name of public health because:
DOCTRINE:The mere assertion that the subject relates to public health does a. Consumer health: Clean and wholesome bread does not depend on
not make the enactment valid. It must have a direct relation, as a means to an whether the baker works 10 hrs per day or 60 hrs per week. The
end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act that mere assertion that the subject relates to public health does not make
interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person can the enactment valid. It must have a direct relation, as a means to an end,
be held to be valid. and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act that
interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person
FACTS: can be held to be valid.
1. Joseph Lochner was charged with violation of the 110th section of Article 8, b. Baker’s   health:   The   trade   of   the   baker   is   not   an   unhealthy   one   to   the  
Chapter 415 of the Laws of 1987 (Labor Law of the State of New York), degree w/c would authorize the legislature to interfere with the right to
which   states,   “no   employee   shall   be   required   or   permitted   to   work   more   labor and right of free contract. There must be more than the mere
than   10   hours   per   day.”   His   violation   consisted   in   requiring   his   employee fact of the possible existence of a small amount of unhealthiness to
(baker/confectioner) to work more than 60 hours in 1 week. warrant legislative interference with liberty.
2. Lochner challenged the validity of the statute. The lower courts upheld the 4. These statutes remain interferences with the right of the individual and are
statute as a valid exercise of police power for public health. not saved from condemnation by the claim that they are passed under the
exercise of police power. There has to be some fair ground, reasonable in
ISSUE/S: WoN the statute is enacted in the valid exercise of police power— and of itself, to say that there is material danger to public health, or to the
NO. employees, if the labor hours are not curtailed.
5. The purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural and legal
RULING: Petition GRANTED. Decisions REVERSED. effect of the language employed; and whether or not it is repugnant to the
Constitution must be determined from the natural effect of such statutes
RATIO: when put into operation, and not from their proclaimed purpose. The Court
1. The Court held that the statute does not merely fix the number of hours opined that the real object and purpose of the statute seems to be to regulate
which shall constitute a legal day's work, but absolutely prohibits the hours between employer and employee in a private business, not dangerous
employer to permit, under any circumstances, more than ten hours' work to in any degree to morals, or in any real and substantial degree to health.
be done in his establishment. This necessarily interferes with the right of Under such circumstances, the freedom of master and employee to contract
contract between employer and employee, even should the latter desire to with each other cannot be prohibited or interfered with w/o violating the
earn extra money by working longer hours. This right to make a contract in 14th Amendment.
relation to his business, and consequently the right to purchase or sell labor,
is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14 th amendment of DISSENT, Holmes:
the Federal Constitution. - The case was decided upon an economic theory which a larger part of the
2. However, police power can impose reasonable conditions upon property country does not entertain. Courts ought to conclude judgment on whether
and liberty as they relate to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of statutes embodying certain views are in conflict with the Constitution of the US,
the public. Thus, if the contract be one which the state has the right to infringing upon fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
prohibit in the legitimate exercise of its police power, the 14th Amendment traditions of our people and our law—not on the basis of the dominant opinion.
would offer no protection. Similarly, there is a limit to the valid exercise of
police power by the state, else the 14th Amendment would have no efficacy
and the legislatures of the states would have unbounded power to say that a
PEOPLE v. POMAR 2. In  the  case  of  Adkins  v  Children’s  Hospital  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  the  
November 3, 1924 | Johnson,  J.  |  Appeal  from  CFI  judgment  |  “Old”  Substantive   US Supreme Court held that the minimum wage statute was void on the
Due Process ground that the right to contract about one's own affairs was a part of the
liberty of the individual under the constitution. In making such contracts,
SUMMARY: Pomar was found guilty for violating Sec 13 of Act 3071 which the parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they
requires owners or managers of a factory, shop, or place of labor to grant can as the result of private bargaining. However, this liberty is not absolute
pregnant laborers employed in a 30-day leave with pay before delivery and and must yield to the common good.
another 30-day leave after confinement. SC held that this created a term in 3. Here, Sec 13 creates a term or condition in every contract made by every
every contract w/o consent of the parties, in depriving them of their liberty to person, firm, or corporation with any woman who may, during the course of
contract. her employment, become pregnant, and a failure to include in said contract
DOCTRINE: The right to contract about one's own affairs is a part of the the terms fixed to a fine and imprisonment. This interferes with their rights
liberty of the individual under the constitution. Contracting parties may to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms employer-employee
establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, may agree upon. It creates a term in every such contract without the consent
provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. of the parties, depriving them of their liberty to contract. Such liberty to
contract is only deprived when such is used for the violation of a valid
FACTS: existing law. Thus, the rule is that contracting parties may establish any
1. Julio Pomar is the manager and person-in-charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they
tobacco factory, who granted Macaria Fajardo (a cigar-maker in the factory) are not contrary to law, morals or public policy.
vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy. However, he failed and refused 4. The state, in the exercise of its police power for providing legislation for the
to pay her the sum of P80, which she was entitled to as her regular wages protection of public health, public morals or public safety, remains subject
corresponding to 30 days before the delivery and 30 days after confinement. to the paramount authority of the constitution, and it will not be permitted to
Fajardo filed a complaint alleging a violation of Sec 13 of Act No. 3071 of violate rights secured and guaranteed by the same.
the Philippine Legislature.
2. Said   act   states,   “Every   person,   firm   or   corporation   owning   or   managing   a  
factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to
any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days
vacation  with  pay  before  and  another  thirty  days  after  confinement.”  Pomar  
contended that the provisions on which the complaint was based were
illegal, unconstitutional, and void.
3. The judge found him guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Act has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise
of the police power of the state—NO

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Decision of lower court REVOKED.

1. The Court first established that the purpose of Sec 13 was to safeguard the
health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any
description," and of insuring to them reasonable support for 1 month before
and 1 month after their delivery. But whether or not this was adopted in the
reasonable and lawful exercise of police power is another question.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v. PHILIPPINE Records show that no decree by Marcos was deemed unconstitutional by the
VETERANS BANK high court during his reign.
December 10, 1990 | Cruz, J. | Petition for Review of RTC decision |“Old”   2. PD 1717 is not a valid exercise of police power. It does not identify or
Substantive Due Process explain the public interest involved in the creation of the New Argix, Inc.
and the extinction of the property rights of creditors of AGRIX. The property
rights of the creditors of AGRIX, as protected by the Bill of Rights, are
SUMMARY: SC ruled that PD 1717 is not a valid exercise of police power arbitrarily destroyed in favor of another contrary to the principle that private
and it violates both the right to due process and equal protection clause. property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given to
DOCTRINE: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without another without compensation and any known public purpose.
due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the PD 1717 violates the equal protection clause since the secured creditors are
law. treated in the same manner as the unsecured creditors with respect to the
prosecution of their claims contrary to the principle that that there should be
FACTS: equality only among equals.
1. Presidential Decree No. 1717 ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group PD 1717impairs the obligation of the contracts between ARGIX and private
of Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development respondents without justification: No public interest is shown to warrant the
Company (NDC) and outlined how claims can be filed against the said group deprivation of the private respondent's vested property rights.
of companies. Earlier, a real estate mortgage was executed by Agrix New Agrix, Inc. was created by special decree notwithstanding the provision
Marketing, Inc. (AGRIX) in favor of Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB). of Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution.
During the course of the mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. PVB filed a
claim pursuant to PD 1717 for the payment of its loan credit. The New
Argix, Inc. and the NDC filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba, Laguna
for the cancellation of the lien invoking Section 4(1) of PD 1717 which
provides that "all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the
assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished." A second case
was filed with the same court when PVB took steps to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgage.
2. The RTC annulled not only Sec. 4 (1), but the entire decree on the grounds
that it was a violation of the principle of the separation of powers; impaired
the obligation of contracts; and violated the equal protection clause.

1. WoN the respondents are estopped from contesting PD 1717 – NO
2. WoN PD 1717 is unconstitutional – YES

RULING: The petition is DISMISSED. Pres. Decree No. 1717 is declared


1. The respondent should not be considered estopped for having abided with
the decree instead of boldly assailing it at a time when President Marcos was
the absolute ruler of the country and whose decrees were absolute law. To do
so would turn a blind eye to the reality during those oppressive times.
PEOPLE v. NAZARIO 2. The act must be utterly vague on its face (i.e. cannot be clarified by either
August 31, 1988 | Sarmiento, J. | Appeal from judgment of TC | “Old”   saving clause or construction), not merely imprecise or defectively phrased.
Substantive Due Process Nor can it refer to statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet are fairly
applicable to certain types of activities.
SUMMARY: Petitioner admitted to violation of certain municipal ordinances, 3. In no way are the ordinances in the case at bar vague. By their very
but contended that they were unconstitutional due to vagueness and therefore provisions, it is evident that the appellant falls within their scope. As the
he incurred no liability. The Court ruled that the ordinances set forth sufficient fishpond’s  actual  operator,  he  is  the  manager  of  the  same.  Nor  does  he  deny  
standards to clarify the imagined ambiguities and therefore were not vague. that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into
DOCTRINE: A statute or act is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards the fishponds, and maintained laborers to maintain them. While it appears
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and that it is the National Government which owns them, the government never
differ as to its application; but it must be utterly vague on its face. shared in the generated profits, and the Government is immune from taxes.
As the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and the recipients of
FACTS: their profits, the petitioner is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in
1. Petitioner was charged with violation of Ordinances No. 4, series of 1955, question.
No. 15, series of 1965, and No. 12, series of 1966, of the municipal council 4. The claim of vagueness as to dates of payment has no merit. Ordinance No.
of Pagbilao in Quezon province. 15,  in   making  the  tax  payable  “after   the  lapse  of  three   years  starting   from  
2. The pertinent provisions taxed fishpond owners/managers within the the date said fishpond is approved by the   Bureau   of   Fisheries”   and   its  
territorial limits of Pagbilao P3/hec of fishpond per annum (Sec 1 of amendment   by   Ordinance   No.12   which   reckons   liability   “beginning   and  
Ordinance No.4), the date of such payment beginning after the lapse of taking effect from the year 1964 is the fishpond started operating before the
three  years  starting  from  the  fishpond’s  approval  by  the  Bureau  of  Fisheries   year   1964”,   both   definitely   establish   the   dates   of   payment.   Appellant’s  
(Sec 1(a) of Ordinance No. 15), and beginning and taking effect from 1964, alleged uncertainty for his liability for 1964-1966 is a mere problem in
if the fishpond started operating before 1964 (Sec 1 of Ordinance No. 12). computation, but does not make the ordinances vague. As it is, the liability
3. Petitioner admitted committing the acts charged, but claimed that the accrues from 1 Jan 1964 for fishponds in operation prior thereto (Ordinance
ordinances were unconstitutional or, assuming arguendo their No.12), and for new fishponds, three years after their approval for the
constitutionality, did not apply to him. As the petitioner was a lessee of a Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). Ordinance No.12 merely granted
fishpond, he contended that he was not covered since the ordinances amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators, but did not repeal the old
referred  to  ‘owner  or  manager’,  and  maintained  that  they  are  vague  insofar   ordinances.
as reckoning the date of payment, since the Ordinances appear to refer to 5. While the standards which clarify the imagined ambiguities are not apparent
different dates. from their face, they are visible in the intent of the ordinances.

ISSUE/S: WoN the statues are unconstitutional

RULING: Appeal dismissed. Costs against appellant.

1. As a rule, a statute or act is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. Such is unconstitutional in two ways: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially he parties it
targets, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes arbitrary
flexing of the government muscle.
BALACUIT v. CFI discretion of the legislative authority is not only to determine what public
June 30, 1988 | Gancayco, J. | Petition for Review | “Old”  Substantive  Due   interest requires, but also what measures are necessary to protect such
Process interests.
3. As shown by a reading of the minutes of the regular session when the
SUMMARY: Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Ordinance No. ordinance was passed, the reason behind it was the complaints of parents
640, which mandated selling admission tickets to establishments like that paying full admission for their children was too financially
theaters to children at half price. Court ruled that there was no public burdensome. There is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the
interest which justified the ordinance and declared it unconstitutional. promotion of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Moreover,
DOCTRINE: The exercise of police power may adversely affect individual the Court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified that the
rights only to the extent that may be fairly required by the legitimate ordinance is unreasonable, if not   unduly   oppressive,   on   the   petitioners’  
demands of public interest or public welfare. (aka two-part test: Must be in businesses, since:
pursuit of state interest, and measures pursuant to the same must fit) a. The corresponding savings for the parents burdens petitioners with the
cost of the savings.
FACTS: b. The ordinance does not only make petitioners suffer loss of earnings,
1. Petitioners, who were theater managers, challenged the constitutionality of but also penalizes them for failure to comply.
Ordinance 640 passed by the Municipal Board of Butuan City, which c. The ordinance is difficult to implement as since its effectivity children
mandated the selling of tickets to any movie or other public exhibition at above 12 y/o have attempted to pass as below 12 y/o to avail of the
half-price to children between 7-12 y/o. Violation was penalized with a fine ordinance’s  benefits,  as  there  are  no  safeguards  against  this  undesirable  
of not less than P200 but not more than P600 or imprisonment of not less practice. City of Butuan’s  suggestion  that  birth  certificates  as  proof  be  
than two months and not more than six months; if such violator be a firm or required is not practicable.
corporation, the penalty shall be imposed upon its manager, agent or 4. Respondent’s   claim   that   it   aimed   to   protect   the   youth   from   the   pernicious  
representative. practice of movie operators and the like of demanding equal price for
2. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is unconstitutional for violation of admission tickets along with adults does not hold. There is nothing
the due process clause as it is oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, an pernicious, immoral or exploitative in charging equal price for both children
undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into and adults. The object of every business is to profit from a venture, and
contracts since theater owners are bound under contract with film owners petitioners are conducting legitimate business. No one is compelled to
for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge. purchase a ticket.
Respondent City of Butuan invoked the police power delegated to it under 5. Respondent’s   very   claim   that   movies   are   attractive   nuisances   also   fails   to  
the general welfare clause to justify  the  ordinance’s  enactment. justify reduction in price, and in fact encourages the obverse. The ordinance
would then encourage patronizing attractive nuisances by children of tender
ISSUE: WoN the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the due age, rather than more productive activities. Logically, exhibiting wholesome
process clause - YES movies   for   general   patronage,   much   less   children’s   films,   would   also   be  
discouraged, if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn
RULING: TC decision reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 640 declared profits.
unconstitutional and null and void.

1. The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police
power. The exercise of police power may adversely affect individual rights
only to the extent that may be fairly required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare.
2. There must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper
measures   to   secure   the   ends   sought   by   the   ordinance’s   enactment,   and   the  
AGUSTIN v. EDU that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
February  2,  1979  |  Fernando,  J.  |  Prohibition  |“Old”  Substantive  Due  Process general  welfare”  (Calalang v. Williams).
It   is   a   “dynamic   agency,   suitably   vague   and   far   from   precisely   defined,  
SUMMARY: Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of an LOI requiring rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon
motor vehicles to install EWDs for being oppressive and arbitrary, and for its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
constituting an undue delegation of legislative power. The SC upheld the thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
validity of the said LOI as a valid exercise of police power. unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
DOCTRINE: Police power is nothing more or less than the powers of communal  peace,  safety,  good  order,  and  welfare.”
government   inherent   in   every   sovereignty   which   is   identified   with   “state   2. Petitioner has failed to either rebut the presumption of validity or
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or substantiate his own claims regarding the arbitrariness of the LOI, while the
property in order to promote the general welfare. respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, were able to show the
necessity for enacting the LOI for preventing vehicular accidents especially
FACTS: during nighttime backed by statistical information and data.
1. Pres. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 229 providing for the 3. The EWD requirement is not an expensive redundancy for vehicles with
installation of early warning devices (EWDs) on motor vehicles. The LOI blinking lights or petroleum lamps since the EWD being required by the
also provides that such EWDs be issued by the Land Transportation LOI is universal among signatories of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Commissioner to all registered owners of motor vehicles, except Signs and Signals that would indicate a stationary vehicle along the road
motorcycles and trailers, with charge of 15% of the acquisition cost, and the that could endanger other passing vehicles.
same shall promulgate rules and regulations for the proper implementation 4. The LOI as amended and Administrative Order No. 1 also does not compel
of the LOI. Later, LOI No. 229 was amended by LOI No. 476 to the effect the motor owners to purchase the EWD required since it only requires that
that the motor vehicle owner is required to procure from any source and they equip their motor vehicles with an EWD either (1) procured from
present at the registration of his vehicle a pair of a EWD of any brand of the whatever source or (2) personally made as long as it conforms to the
owner’s  choosing.   standards set by the LOI and the order. Also, the allegation that the LOI will
2. Petitioner, an owner of a Volkswagen Beetle which already had blinking only benefit the dealers and manufacturers of EWDs is largely
lights fore and aft that can serve as EWD, alleged that the Letter of unsubstantiated.
Instruction and the implementing rules set out in Administrative Order No. 5. The LOI does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power since
1 issued by the Land   Transportation   Commission   “violate   the   provisions   there is a standard that defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
and  delegation  of  police  power”  as  well  as  the  provisions  of  due  process  of   its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. In this case, the
law and equal protection of law. He alleged that the measure was arbitrary clear legislative objective is public safety.
and unconstitutional, creating a burden on motorists who could very well 6. The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with
provide a practical alternative road safety device, and that it unfairly the  character  of  “generally  accepted  principles  of  international  law”  which  
benefited manufacturers and dealers. under the Constitution the Philippines adopts as part of the law of the land.
3. Petitioner prayed for judgment that the said LOI be declared void and

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the LOI is a valid exercise of police power – YES

RULING: Petition dismissed.

1. The LOI was issued in the exercise of police power. Police power is
“nothing   more   or   less   than   the   powers   of   government   inherent   in   every  
sovereignty,”   which   is   identified   with   “state   authority   to   enact   legislation  
OLMSTEAD v. U.S. itself shows that the search is to be of material things – the person, the
June  4,  1928  |  Taft,  C.J.  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process house, his papers, or his effects – and that it must involve search and
seizure. There was no searching nor seizure, nor was there an entry into the
SUMMARY: Olmstead, the lead conspirator, and several other individuals were houses or offices of the defendants. The evidence was secured through the
convicted of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by committing sense of hearing only. Also, English common law prevailed in Washington,
liquor related crimes. Court held that the wiretapping is not within the scope of the and the common law rule is that the admissibility of evidence is not affected
4th and 5th Amendments: Pertains only to material things and must involve actual by the illegality of the means by which it was obtained. A standard which
search and seizure. would forbid the reception of evidence if obtained by other than nice ethical
DOCTRINE: Dissent: 4th and 5th Amendments apply to all invasions on the part conduct by government officials would make society suffer and give
of the Government and its employes of the sanctities   of   a   man’s   home   and   the   criminals greater immunity.
privacies of life.It is not the means of the commission that constitutes the essence
of the offense, but the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, Justice Brandeis, dissenting:
personal liberty and private property. Evidence obtained by wiretapping are inadmissible. Where the physical
connection with the telephone wires was made and the intrusion being in
FACTS: aid of law enforcement are immaterial.
1. Petitioners were convicted in the District Court for the Western District of Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of
Washington of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by power must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world. Its
unlawfully possessing, transporting and importing intoxicating liquors and general language should not be necessarily confined to the form that evil
maintaining nuisances and by selling intoxicating liquors. had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new
2. The information was largely obtained by intercepting messages on the conditions   and   purposes…   In   the   application   of   a   constitution,   therefore,  
telephones of the conspirators by 4 federal prohibition officers. Small wires our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. Its
were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the residences of 4 of general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent
the petitioners and those leading from the chief office. into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost
3. The gathering of evidence continued for many months. The evidence in reality.
revealed the large business transactions of the partners and their When the 4th and 5th amendment were adopted, force and violence were the
subordinates, as well as parts of the criminal acts, all of which disclosed the only means known to man by which the Government could effect self-
conspiracy charged. incrimination, and could secure possession of articles by breaking and
4. 4th Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, entry. Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall become available to the government.
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, 4th and 5th Amendments apply to all invasions on the part of the
supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be Government and its employees   of   the   sanctities   of   a   man’s   home   and   the  
searched and the persons or things to be seized.5 th Amendment: No privacies of life. It is not the breaking of the his doors, and the rummaging
person…  shall  be   compelled,  in  any  criminal  case,  to  be  a   witness  against   of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense, but the invasion
himself. of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
ISSUE/S: WoN the evidence intercepted through wiretapping amounted to a The  tapping  of  a   man’s  telephone  line  involves  the   tapping  of  every  other  
violation of the 4th and 5th Amendments. – NO, according to the main opinion. person who he may call or who may call him.
4th and 5th Amendments are liberally construed in order to give effect to
RULING: Affirmed. their principles.
Wiretapping is a crime in Washington. The evidence was obtained by crime
RATIO: at   the   Government’s   expense   by   its   officers   while   acting   on   its   behalf.
1. 5th Amendment does not apply: No evidence of compulsion to induce the Permitting the admission of evidence illegally obtained would make the
defendants to talk over their many phones.4th Amendment: Amendment Government itself the lawbreaker. To declare that the Government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal (the ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Act is unconstitutional -YES
ends justify the means) would bring terrible retribution.
The court will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean RULING: Judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed.
1. Due Process: it was argued that the defendant is given no opportunity to be
heard on the issue as to whether he is the probable potential parent of
SKINNER v. OKLAHOMA socially undesirable offspring, but the Court did not pass upon this issue as
June  1,  1942  |  Douglas,  J.  |  Certiorari  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process
the constitutional challenge on grounds of the equal protection clause was
more apparent.
SUMMARY: The Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act punishes habitual
2. Equal Protection: the Act fails to pass the requirements of the equal
criminals with sterilization. Petitioner, who was twice convicted for two
protection clause because certain offenses do not fall within the scope of the
different crimes, challenges the constitutionality of the Act.
Act (see Fact No. 3). For example, larceny and embezzlement both involve
DOCTRINE: A law punishing habitual criminals with sterilization but with
the unlawful taking of property, but under the Act, those guilty of
exceptions as to certain crimes violates the equal protection clause because
embezzlement would never be sterilized regardless of the amount
it only applies to certain categories crimes while excluding others from its
embezzled or how many times it was committed, while those who are guilty
of other crimes (such as larceny) would be sterilized once they are
convicted two or more times.
FACTS: The Act failed to pass the strict scrutiny test especially that it involves a
1. The Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act defines "habitual criminal" as a basic civil right of man, which is that of procreation and that the power of
person who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes State to sterilize people has far-reaching consequences, which can also
"amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude," either in an Oklahoma cause irreparable injury to a person.
court or in a court of any other State, is thereafter convicted of such a felony
in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma SEPARATE OPINION:
penal institution. Stone, C.J.
2. The law provides defendants notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the - Concurs in the result but   dissents   from   the   majority   opinion’s   too   much  
right to a jury trial, but once the defendant is found to be   a   “habitual   reliance on the equal protection clause. Argues that the Act is also in
criminal”   under   the   Act,   judgment   is   rendered   to   the   effect   that   the   violation of the due process clause since it does not give a hearing to
defendant is made to undergo vasectomy (male) or salpingectomy (female), defendant on whether his criminal tendencies are inheritable that would
making him or her sexually sterile. merit sterilization to prevent fathering socially undesirable offspring.
3. Offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts,
embezzlement, or political offenses are not considered within the terms of
this Act.
4. Petitioner was convicted of many crimes (stealing chickens in 1926;
robbery with firearms in 1934). While he was in the penitentiary in 1935,
Oklahoma passed the Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act.
5. In 1936, proceedings under the Act were instituted against him. A jury trial
was conducted, with the court instructing the jury that the offenses he
committed involved moral turpitude and the only issue was whether
conducting the vasectomy would be safe for his health. The Supreme Court
of Oklahoma affirmed the judgment ordering vasectomy be performed on
6. Petitioner challenges the Act on grounds of due process and equal
protection of the law.
June 7, 1965 | Douglas, J. |Appeal  |“New”  Substantive  Due  Process

SUMMARY: Appellants were convicted of violating a statute that prohibits

contraceptives and spreading information about it. They assailed the statute as
violative of the constitutional right to privacy. SC granted the petition and
dismissed the charges against appellants.
DOCTRINE: Government may not control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation by means which invade the area of
protected freedoms, such as the right to privacy.

1. Appellants Griswold and Buxton were arrested after they gave information
and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing
conception, violative of the General Statutes of Connecticut penalizing
those who will use any drug or instrument preventing conception and those
who will assist other persons to commit such offense. Appellate Division of
the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the judgment
convicting the appellants.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Connecticut statute violated due process when it invaded the
right to privacy of the husband and wife with their physician? – YES

RULING: Petition granted. Decision of lower courts reversed.

1. The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the
Bill of Rights. The right to educate to educate a child in a school of the
parents’   choice   is   also   not   mentioned.   Yet   the   first   amendment has been
construed to include certain of those rights. In other words, the first
amendment has a penumbra of rights not specifically stated – including the
right to privacy which is protected from government intrusion.
2. In the case at bar, the relationship lying within the zone of privacy was
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. The Connecticut
statute is a law, which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives, seeks to
achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that
3. It has been established that governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. As an example, to allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives
is repulsive to the notions of privacy.
EISENSTADT v. BAIRD 2. As neither a deterrent to fornication nor a health measure, it also cannot be
March 22, 1972 | Brennan, J. | “New”  Substantive  Due  Process sustained as a prohibition on contraceptives itself. To say that
contraceptives are immoral and thus forbidden to unmarried persons who
still persist in having intercourse means that they risk for themselves
SUMMARY: Baird was convicted for giving an unmarried woman vaginal unwanted pregnancy, for the child illegitimacy, and for society a possible
foam, in violation of a statute forbidding contraceptives from being distributed obligation of support. It is not sensible and conflicts with fundamental
(a) by anyone other than a physician or registered pharmacist and (b) to anyone human rights.
other than married persons. The Court ruled that distribution to contraceptives 3. In Griswold, the Court spoke of the right of privacy in the marital
for both married and unmarried persons should be equal. relationship. However, the marital couple is not an independent entity with
DOCTRINE: To ensure justice, Courts should require that laws be equal in a unique mind and heart, but an associate of two individuals each with a
operation. separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
FACTS: unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
1. Appellee William Baird gave an unmarried woman vaginal foam at the end a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
of his lecture on contraception. He was charged and convicted with 4. Whatever the rights to contraception, they must be equal for married and
violation of Massachusetts law which made it a felony for contraceptives to unmarried persons alike. Since Griswold rules that distribution cannot be
be distributed by anyone other than a physician or registered pharmacist, denied to married persons, banning unmarried persons from obtaining them
and to anyone other than married persons. is equally impermissible. It is against the Constitution to require that
2. The  District  Court  dismissed  appellee’s  petition  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.   principles of law which should be imposed on a minority be imposed
CA held that the statute conflicted with fundamental human rights, was generally (overbroad); conversely, the Court also cannot pick and choose
violative of the Equal Protection Clause due to providing dissimilar only a few to whom they will apply the legislation (discriminatory). To
treatment to similarly situated married and unmarried persons, and its ensure justice, Courts should require that laws be equal in operation.
supposed purpose of protection of public health made it discriminatory and

WoN the statute is a health measure or deterrent to fornication - NO
WoN the statute is unconstitutional - YES

RULING: CA judgment affirmed.

1. The statute is clearly not a health measure. If there is a need to have a
physician prescribe contraceptives, it is equally great for married and
unmarried persons. It would be illogical to hold that a physician who can
prescribe for married persons is not sufficiently skilled to protect the health
of patients who are have no marriage certificate or are divorced. Moreover,
the   law   is   under   the   chapter   ‘Crimes   Against   Chastity,   Morality, Decency
and  Good  Order’,  which  contradicts  such  conclusion.  Nor  is  it  a  deterrent  to  
fornication, which is already punished by a separate law with a 90-day
sentence for offenders.
ROE v. WADE John  and  Mary  Doe’s  claim  is  based  on  a  possible  failure  of  contraceptive
January 22, 1973 | Blackmun, J. | “New”  Substantive  Due  Process measure and a future intent to procure an abortion, which cannot stand.
2. The principal thrust of the attack on the Texas statutes is that they
SUMMARY: Jane Roe, an unmarried and pregnant woman residing in Dallas, improperly invade a right possessed by a pregnant woman, the right to
sought to have the Texas criminal abortion statutes declared unconstitutional terminate her pregnancy. Such right is embodied  in  “liberty”,  protected  by  
for being unconstitutionally vague and abridging her right of personal privacy. the  due  process  clause,  or  in  “personal,  marital,  familial  and  sexual  privacy”  
SC held that the statutes, as paralleled with legitimate state interests, sweeps protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras.
unnecessarily broadly and is thus an unconstitutional infringement on liberty. 3. The Court held that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion
DOCTRINE: Where fundamental rights are involved, regulation limiting these decision, but that the right is not unqualified and must be considered against
may be justified only by a compelling state interest, and legislative enactments important state interests. For the criminal abortion statutes, the Court
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. outlined 3 possible legitimate interests by the State:
a. Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct—not a
FACTS: proper state purpose for it is overbroad for the law would fail to
1. Jane Roe, an unmarried and pregnant woman residing in Dallas, Texas, distinguish between married and unwed mothers.
brought an action against the DA, Wade, seeking 1) declaratory relief from b. High abortion mortality in the 1900s—Modern medical techniques
Texas criminal abortion statutes for being unconstitutionally vague and have altered this situation. Mortality rates for women undergoing
abridging her right of personal privacy, and 2) an injunction to restrain abortion in the early stages of pregnancy appears lower than normal
Wade from enforcing the statutes. She alleged that she was unable to get a childbirth. But because risk increases as the pregnancy continues, the
“legal”   abortion   in  Texas,   which  permits  abortion  only   when  the   mother’s   State   retains   a   definite   interest   in   protecting   the   woman’s   own   health  
life is threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy. She also alleged that and safety when an abortion is proposed at a later stage of pregnancy.
neither could she afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal c. Protecting prenatal life—Dispute as when life begins need not belabor
abortion under safe conditions. the Court. As long as potential life is involved, the State may assert
2. James Hallford, a licensed physician, was previously arrested for violating interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone.
the statute and 2 prosecutions were pending. He sought to have the statute Thus 3b and 3c shows that at some point in pregnancy, these respective
declared   unconstitutional   for   violating   his   own   and   his   patients’   right   to   interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors
privacy and his own right to practice medicine. that govern the abortion decision.
3. John and Mary Doe, a childless couple, filed a companion complaint to Roe 4. The Court held that where certain fundamental rights are involved,
alleging that their physician advised against pregnancy and should she get regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state
pregnant, she would like to have it legally aborted. interest, and legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake.
ISSUES: a. With respect to maternal health, the compelling point is approximately
1. WoN petitioners have standing—Only Roe at the end of the 1st trimester, where medicine has shown that abortion
2. WoN the Texas criminal abortion statute is unconstitutional—YES mortality is less than mortality in normal childbirth. Thus, prior to this
compelling point, abortion must be free of state interference; and after
RULING: Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code declared unconstitutional. this point, the State may regulate abortion procedure to the extent that
the regulation reasonably relates to the protection of maternal health.
RATIO: b. With   respect   to   State’s   legitimate   interest   in   potential   life,   the  
1. Standing: Roe was given standing for presenting an actual case or compelling point is at viability, which is when the fetus can presumably
controversy at the time of filing. Although her case is now moot because have  the  capacity  of  meaningful  life  after  the  mother’s  womb.  
she is no longer pregnant, it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Dr. Measured against these standards, Art 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in
Hallford makes no allegation of any substantial and immediate threat to any restricting legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical advice
federally protected right against state prosecutions. The Court held that he for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps too broadly. The
only has status as a potential defendant, which does not grant him standing. statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in
pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single reason, Fundamental  liberties  are   “implicit  in   the  concept  of  ordered  liberty”  such  
"saving" the mother's life, the legal justification for the procedure. that   “neither   liberty   nor   justice   would   exist   if   they   were   sacrificed”.   They  
are   also   characterized   as   those   liberties   that   are   “deeply   rooted   in   this  
Nation’s   history   and   tradition”. Proscriptions against the conduct have
ancient roots. Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was
BOWERS v. HARDWICK forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of
June  30,  1986  |  White,  J.  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process Rights. Today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to penalize
sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults. Against this
SUMMARY: Hardwick was arrested and charged with homosexual sodomy, background,  it  cannot  be  said  that  it  is  deeply  rooted  in  this  Nation’s  history  
pursuant to a Georgia statute criminalizing the same. He challenged the and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
constitutionality of said statute for placing him in imminent danger of arrest for 2. There should be great resistance to expand the substantive reach of the Due
being a practicing homosexual and for violating his fundamental rights. US SC Process Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
held that sodomy is not a fundamental right conferred by the Constitution. deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to
DOCTRINE: Fundamental liberties are those which are implicit in the itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if authority.
they were sacrificed,   and   which   are   deeply   rooted   in   the   nation’s   history   and   3. Although the act was committed in the privacy of the home, illegal conduct
tradition. is not always immunized whenever it occurs in the home. It would be
difficult to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving
FACTS: exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even
1. August 1982: Hardwick was charged with violating the Georgia statute though they are committed in the home.
criminalizing sodomy by committing said act with another adult male in the
bedroom of  respondent’s  home.  Respondent  brought  the  suit  in  the  Federal   J. Blackmun, dissenting: case presents a privacy issue first and foremost. SC
District Court challenging the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it misconstrued the question as whether there is a right to homosexual sodomy,
criminalizes consensual sodomy. District Court dismissed the action for rather than if the State can control all such activities.
failure to state a claim. J. Stevens, dissenting: statute does not create a class of homosexuals being
2. A divided panel on the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed, singled out, but rather affects all sexually active adults, even married couples.
holding  that  the  statute  violated  respondent’s  fundamental  rights  because  his   *Statute criminalizes sodomy in general. It criminalizes sexual activity between
homosexual activity is a private and intimate association that is beyond the married individuals which fits within the reproductive and marital privacy cases
reach of state regulation by reason of the 9th Amendment and the due of the SC.
process clause of the 14th Amendment.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon

homosexuals to engage in sodomy – NO.


1. The act of consensual sodomy is not protected under the fundamental right
to privacy or any right protected under the United States Constitution.There
is no nexus between family, marriage or procreation on one hand, and
homosexual activity on the other, as found in previous sexual liberty cases
before the US SC.
ROMER v. EVANS discrimination and prohibitions in state colleges based on sexual orientation
May 20, 1996 | Kennedy, J. | Certiorari  |“New”  Substantive  Due  Process will be forbidden because of the amendment.
3. In reality, the amendment imposes a special disability upon the
SUMMARY: State of Colorado tried to amend their constitution, prohibiting homosexuals. They are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may
any law that would ban discrimination against homosexuals and prohibiting seek without constraint.
any  action  by  the  government  to  make  homosexuals  a  “special”  class.  SC  that  
the amendment classified the homosexuals not to further a proper legislative
end but to make them unequal to everyone else.
DOCTRINE: A law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose. It can be sustained even if the law seems unwise or
works to the disadvantage of a particular group or if the rationale is tenuous.

1. The State of Colorado amendment their constitution in 1992. The parties
referred  to  it  as  “Amendment  2”.  This  was  due  to  the  contentious  campaign  
against ordinances that have been passed in various Colorado municipalities
which banned discrimination in many transactions and activities.
Amendment 2 also prohibited all legislative, executive or judicial action at
any level of the government designed to protect the homosexual class.
2. After the adoption of Amendment 2, several plaintiffs (respondents herein)
alleged that this amendment would subject them to risk of discrimination
based on their sexual orientation.
3. The trial court first granted a preliminary injunction to stay enforcement of
Amendment 2 which the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed and
remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the State advanced various
arguments to show that it served compelling interests but the trial court
found none. It enjoined the enforcement of Amendment 2 and the Supreme
Court of Colorado affirmed the ruling on second opinion.

ISSUE/S: WoN Amendment 2 can be sustained as a prohibition on specific

legal protection against special rights for homosexuals? - NO

RULING: Assailed judgment of the State Supreme Court is affirmed.

1. Sweeping and comprehensive is the change in legal status effected by
Amendment 2. Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class with
respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental
spheres. The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination.
2. Amendment 2 deprived the homosexuals from their right of securing
protection against what the discrimination laws address because they have
been repealed by said amendment. Specifically, laws against employment
LAWRENCE v. TEXAS seek to control a personal relationship which people are free to choose
June  26,  2003  |  Kennedy,  J.  |  New”  Substantive  Due  Process without being punished as criminals.
3. Adults may choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their
SUMMARY: Petitioners, both male, were found engaged in a private, homes  and  still  retain  their  dignity  as  free  persons.  The  expression  of  one’s  
consensual sexual act, and were charged with violation of the Texas Penal sexuality through intimate conduct with another is only a single element in
Code which criminalized homosexual sexual intercourse. The SC held that the a more enduring personal bond. The Constitution protects the liberty which
statute was unconstitutional and violative of individual liberty and the right to allows homosexuals the right to make this choice.
privacy. 4. Petitioners were two adults who, with full and mutual consent, engaged in
DOCTRINE:   “It   is   the   promise   of   the   Constitution   that   there   is   a   realm   of   sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. Their private lives are
personal  liberty  which  the  government  may  not  enter.” entitled to respect; the State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by criminalizing their private sexual conduct, which is protected by
FACTS: their  right  to  liberty  under  the  Due  Process  Clause.  “It  is  the  promise of the
1. Responding to a weapons disturbance report, Houston police officers Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government
entered   petitioner   John   Lawrence’s   apartment   where   they   saw   him   and   may  not  enter.”
petitioner Tyron Garner engaging in a sexual act. Petitioners were both 5. Historically, laws prohibiting sodomy were not enforced against consenting
adults at the time, and the conduct was private and consensual. adults acting in private, but against predatory, non-consensual acts (e.g.
2. Petitioners were arrested and held in custody overnight, and subsequently victim was a minor or an assault victim); these were the target of such
charged  and  convicted  for  ‘deviate  sexual  intercourse,  namely  anal  sex,  with   statutes. Such statutes were also largely not gender-discriminatory.
a   member   of   the   same   sex’,   in   violation   of   the   Texas   Penal   Code   which   Homosexuals   only   began   to   be   targeted   by   State   laws   in   the   1970’s,   and  
provided that deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same only nine states have done so; over the last decades, most are moving to
sex constituted an offense. abolish same-sex prohibitions.
3. Petitioners challenged the statute as violative of the Equal Protection 6. The consideration of whether or not homosexual conduct is immoral and
Clause, both in the Fourteenth Amendment and a similar provision in the that it has been subject to state intervention for many years does not
Texas Constitution. consider social changes showing otherwise (e.g. non-enforcement and
repeals of laws punishing homosexual conduct, decisions in courts abroad,
ISSUE: WoN the Texas statute was unconstitutional and the Bowers ruling recent cases upholding Constitutional protection of personal dignity and
should be overturned - YES autonomy involved in intimate and personal choices).

RULING: CA judgment reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings not

inconsistent with the opinion.

1. Bowers v Hardwick was the original controlling decision. In Bowers, a
police officer observed Hardwick, in his own bedroom, having sex with
another adult male, in violation of a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy,
irrespective of the gender of the participants. The statute was sustained by
the SC, which held that the Constitution does not confer a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and to hold otherwise would
invalidate the laws of many States which had for a long time held that such
was illegal.
2. While the statutes purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual
act, their penalties and purposes have more far-reaching consequences,
touching upon private human conduct, sexual behavior, and the home. They
U.S. v. WINDSOR It has the avowed purpose and practical effect of imposing a disadvantage, a
June 26, 2013 | Kennedy, J. |  Certiorari  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process separate status, and a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.
SUMMARY: Windsor, the surviving spouse in a same-sex marriage, 3. DOMA deprives a person of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment of
challenges the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) after the Constitution, and this liberty contains within it the protection against denial
she was denied estate tax exemption for surviving spouses since the DOMA of the equal protection of the laws. It creates an inequality between same-sex
does not include same-sex spouses in its definition  of  “spouse”.  The  Supreme   couples and heterosexual couples, as it deprives the former of rights, duties, and
Court declared the DOMA unconstitutional. responsibilities that are an essential part of married life which in most cases
DOCTRINE: A law that singles out a certain class of persons and directs its would be honored to accept were DOMA not in force. It also imposes a
restrictions and restraints violates to that certain class violates the equal disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds to be
protection guarantee of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment dignified and proper. It also has implications pertaining to: social security,
housing,  taxes,  criminal  sanctions,  copyright,  and  veterans’  benefits.  
- raises the cost of health care for families by taxing health benefits provided
by  employers  to  their  workers’  same-sex spouses
1. Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, then residents of New York were married in a
- denies or reduces benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and
lawful ceremony in Ontario, Canada, in 2007. Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer
parent, benefits that are an integral part of family security
returned to their home in New York City.
- makes it inapplicable to same-sex couples the provision in the federal penal
2. When Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor
code   that   it’s   a   crime   to   “assault,   kidnap,   or   murder   .   .   .   a   member   of   the  
sought to claim the estate tax exemption for surviving spouses.
immediate  family”  of  “a  United  States  official,  a  United  States  judge,  or  a  
3. She was barred from doing so, however, by a federal law, the Defense of
Federal   law   enforcement   officer,”   since   a   same-sex spouse does not fall
Marriage Act (DOMA), which excludes a same-sex partner from the definition
within  the  definition  of  “spouse”  as  an  “immediate  family”
of  “spouse”  as  that  term  is  used  in  federal  statutes.  
- makes it inapplicable to same-sex couples federal ethics rules
4. Windsor paid the taxes but filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of this
- prevents same-sex married couples from obtaining government healthcare
benefits they would otherwise receive
5. The United States District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that this
- prohibits  them  from  being  buried  together  in  veterans’  cemeteries
portion of the statute is unconstitutional and ordered the United States to pay
- forces them to follow a complicated procedure to file their state and federal
Windsor a refund
taxes jointly
- deprives   them   of   the   Bankruptcy   Code’s   special   protections   for   domestic-
ISSUE/S:   Whether   or   not   the   DOMA   violates   the   Due   Process   Clause’s  
support obligations
guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution –

RULING: Court of Appeals ruling affirmed. DOMA unconstitutional

1.  The  “regulation  of  domestic  relations”  is  “an  area  that  has  long  been  regarded  
as  a  virtually  exclusive   province  of  the   States”   (Sosna v. Iowa) such that State
laws may define and regulate domestic relations, including marriage, subject to
constitutional guarantees.
2. DOMA unusually deviates from the usual tradition of recognizing and
accepting state definitions of marriage such that it operates to deprive same-sex
couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal
recognition of their marriages.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMELEC essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not
April 8, 2010 | Del Castillo, J. | Certiorari  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process only to those that are favourably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state interest, it is not for the
SUMMARY: Ang Ladlad LGBT party filed a petition for registration with COMELEC or the Supreme Court to impose its views on the populace.
COMELEC for 2010 elections. COMELEC denied the petition which the Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with
Supreme Court reversed.   The   SC   averred   that   defendant’s   basis   for   refusing   speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
accreditation is against equal protection of laws and freedom of speech and discouraging a disfavoured one.
assembly. 3. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and
DOCTRINE: Laws of general application should be applied with equal force they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
to all. The Constitution and laws should be applied uninfluenced by public marginalized and under-represented sectors. This is in accord with the
opinion. country’s   international   obligations   to   protect   and   promote   human   rights.  
The Constitution and laws should be applied uninfluenced by public
FACTS: opinion. True democracy should be resilient enough to withstand vigorous
1. Plaintiff Ang Ladlad filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC debate due to conflicting opinions.
(respondent) in 2009. Respondent denied the registration averring the party
is neither enumerated in the partylist sectors in Constitution and RA 7941,
nor is it related to any that is in the enumeration. COMELEC also stated
that   plaintiff’s   group   tolerates   immorality   and   should   likewise   be   denied  
accreditation  for  misrepresentation  when  asked  if  “any  of  its  nominees  have  
not violated or failed to comply with laws relating to elections.
2. Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but was denied by the defendant.
Plaintiff then filed a petition praying that the Supreme Court annul
COMELEC’s  resolutions  and  to  grant  them  accreditation.   Ang Ladlad also
sought the mandatory injunction against COMELEC which previously
announced tht it would begin printing final ballots for the May 2010

ISSUE/S: WoN the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights

to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protectionof laws? - YES

RULING: Petition granted. Resolution of COMELEC were set aside and

accreditation was given to petitioner.

1. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the Office of the Solicitor General opined
that there should   have   been   a   finding   by   the   COMELEC   that   the   group’s  
members have committed or are committing immoral acts. Respondent has
failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth.
2. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda
and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through
normal democratic means. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
July 23, 1998| Puno, J. | Petition for review of decision of Executive Secretary 1. The Executive’s   authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
and Members of Inter-Agency Coordinating  Committee  |  “New”  Substantive   independent source of power to make laws. While the President has the
Due Process power to exercise administrative power in issuing AOs, rules, and
regulations, AO 308’s   subject   isinappropriate for an AO since it does not
SUMMARY: Pres. Ramos promulgates AO 308 or “Adoption   of   a   National   relate  to  particular  aspects  of  gov’t  operation  as  required  in  Section  3,  1987  
Computerized  Identification  Reference  System”  that  will  streamline  delivery  of   Administrative Code. While AOs must be in harmony with and for
basic services by collecting biometric & other data, which Sen Ople assails. implementing the law’s   legislative   policy,   AO 308 violates this in
SCfinds law as unconstitutional on its face as an undue usurpation of establishing, for the first time, a National Computerized Identification
legislative power & as violative of the right to privacy (overbroad, lacking Reference System. It requires a delicate adjustment of various contending
safeguards). state policies such as national security and privacy that should be left to the
DOCTRINE: The right to privacy is a Constitutionally-guaranteed legislature. Also, the claim that the AO does not confer any right, impose
fundamental right. Hence, it is subject to strict scrutiny – it is the  government’s   any duty, afford any protection, & create an office is false – w/o the ID, a
burden to show that AO 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and citizen will have difficulty in exercising his rights &enjoying his privileges.
that it is narrowly drawn. 2. Right to Privacy: is a Constitutionally-guaranteed fundamental right
independent of the right to liberty (as acknowledged in Morfe v Mutuc).
FACTS: Hence,   it   is   the   government’s   burden   to   show   that   AO   308   is   justified   by  
1. AO 308 issued by Pres Ramos on Dec 12, 1996 (1) to provide Filipinos & some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. The concept of
foreigners the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service & limited government has always included that governmental powers stop
social security providers and other gov’t  instrumentalities  and (2) to reduce short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. Also, the
fraudulent transactions, misrepresentation of persons seeking basic services. Constitution recognizes the rights to privacy in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and
2. Under Sec 4, the NSO-issued Population Reference Number (PRN) will 17 of the Bill of Rights. The zones of privacy are also recognized and
serve as the common reference number to establish linkages among protected in the RPC, the Anti-Wire-Tapping Act, the Secrecy of Bank
agencies such as GSIS, SSS, etc. through use of Biometrics technology & Deposits Act, the Civil Code, and the Intellectual Property Code.
computer application designs. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee is 3. Overbroad and Indefinite: AO 308 is too overbroad. It does not state what
designated to draw-up implementing guidelines, oversee implementation of specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology
said law. shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage, nor does it state
3. Senator Blas Ople assails AO 308 and files case against IACC members, whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for
including Exec. Sec. Ruben Torres on its usurpation of the power to identification   purposes.   AO308’s   indefiniteness   can   give   the   gov’t   the  
legislate and its impermissible  intrusion  on  the  citizenry’s  protected  zone  of   roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than
privacy. the identification of the individual through his PRN. It also does not tell us
4. Respondents argue that (1) petition is not a justiciable case because it has how the information gathered shall be handled, or who will control and
yet   to   be   implemented,   (2)   AO   308’s   issuance   w/in   Executive   &   access  the  date,  under  what  circumstances,  and  for  what  purpose.  AO  308’s  
Administrative Powers of the President, (3) funds necessary for penal aspect must also be clarified. These factors are essential to safeguard
implementation   may  be   sourced  from  concerned  agencies’  budgets,(4)  law   the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.
protects  the  individual’s  right  to  privacy 4. Hypothetical Danger? A   sophisticated   data   center’s   ability   to   generate   a  
comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over
ISSUE/S: a national network is a real threat. Once extracted, the information is putty
WoN  AO  308  usurps  Congress’  legislative  power – YES in the hands of any person and the end of privacy begins. The Court, as the
WoN AO 308 violates right to privacy – YES. ultimate   guardian   of   the   people’s   liberty,   must   smother   the   sparks   that  
endanger rights immediately.
RULING: Petition granted. AO 308 null & void for being unconstitutional. 5. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: The test is (1) WON by his conduct,
the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy, and (2) WON the
expectation   is   one   that   society   recognizes   as   reasonable.   AO   308’s   use   of  
biometrics in computer technology is so widely drawn that a minimum
standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology
used, cannot be inferred from tits provisions. As technology advances, the
level of reasonably expected privacy decreases.
6. SC’s  Disclaimer: The Court, per se, is not against the use of computers in
data handling to improve the bureaucracy. The right to privacy   isn’t  
intended to stifle technological advancements that enhance public service
and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused
and a compelling interest to justify such intrusions.
DUNCAN v. GLAXO WELLCOME which affirmed the NCMB's decision.
September  17,  2004  |  Tinga,  J.  |  Certiorari  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process
1. WoN  Glaxo’s  policy  against  employees  marrying  employees  of  competitor  
SUMMARY: Glaxo's policy of preventing its employees from having companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution by
relationships with employees of competitor companies was assailed as against creating invalid distinctions among employees on account of marriage – NO
the equal protection clause of the constitution. 2. WoN Tecson was constructively dismissed - NO
DOCTRINE: While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy
on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor RULING: Petition DENIED.
dispute will be decided in favor of the workers; The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the RATIO:
interest of fair play. 1. Glaxo's policy is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does
not violate the equal protection clause. Aside from the fact that Tecson
FACTS: agreed to abide by the company's policies as shown by his signing of the
1. Pedro Tecson was hired by Glaxo Wellcome as a medical representative contract, Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
after undergoing training. He signed a contract with them which stipulates, formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
among others, that he will disclose to the company's management any future information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
relationships that he will have with competing companies' employees and companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry. The
that if the management finds that the relationship poses a conflict of prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
interest, he will resign from the company. The same stipulation can be competitor   companies   upon   Glaxo’s   employees   is   reasonable   under   the  
found in the company's Employee Code of Conduct. circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
2. Tecson was assigned in the Camarines Area where he met Bettsy an interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy,
employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals and a competitor of Glaxo. They fell in Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a
love. competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. Glaxo
3. Before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his possesses the right to protect its economic interests and this cannot be
District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship denied. The Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and
with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
Bettsy in September 1998. investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor
4. In   January   1999,   Tecson’s   superiors   informed   him   that   his   marriage   to   to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of
Bettsy  gave  rise   to  a   conflict   of  interest.   Tecson’s  superiors  reminded him labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of
that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are
jobs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. The
possible because he was performing his job well. Tecson asked for some challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of
time to resolve the problem which his bosses gave him. He then applied to the Constitution because it is a settled principle that the commands of the
be transferred to Glaxo's milk division to remove the conflict of interest but equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under
this was denied. Subsequently, the company transferred him to the Butuan color of its authority. The equal protection clause erects no shield against
sales area, a transfer he did not want so he asked the company to reconsider. merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The court
It did not. also held that it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition
5. Tecson defied the order and stayed in Bicol. He was still paid his salary but against relationships between its employees and those of competitor
he was excluded from product conferences. companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry
6. The parties failed to resolve the issue so they submitted to voluntary persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is
arbitration. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board favored Glaxo a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise
and affirmed its right to transfer Tecson. The case was brought to the CA out of such relationships.
2. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation
resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable,
or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when
a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the
instant case. Tecson was not demoted nor discriminated against. His
transfer to Butuan was an exercise of Glaxo's management prerogative.
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC venues for which first names may be changed. RA 9048 does not sanction a
October  19,  2007  |  Corona,  J.  |  Certiorari  |  “New”  Substantive  Due  Process change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. The petition in the
trial  court  in  so  far  as  it  prayed  for  the  change  of  petitioner’s  first  name  was  
not   within   that   court’s   primary   jurisdiction   and   was   filed   in   the   wrong  
SUMMARY: Petitioner is a male transexual who has undergone sex venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
reassignment surgery and sought to change his first name and sex in his birth where his birth certificate is kept as provided for the RA 9048. More
certificate via a petition to the RTC of Manila who granted his petition. The importantly, the petition had no merit as the petitioner failed to show, or
RP, thru the OSG, filed a petition to the CA alleging that no laws allow for even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
changes in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. CA ruled in favor of and official name.
the Republic. SC held that the decision of the CA was correct. 2. There is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the
DOCTRINE: The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. Courts entries in his birth certificate. Art. 412 of the Civil Code states that no entry
cannot engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without judicial order.
interpret the law, not to make or amend it. Under RA 9048, change of sex in the civil registry is not a mere clerical or
typographical error but a substantial change guided by Rule 108 of the
FACTS: Rules of Court. Art. 407 and 408 of the Civil Code enumerate the acts,
1. On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a events, and judicial decrees that will be recorded in the civil register. Sex
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the reassignment is not among those acts or events. Neither is it recognized nor
RTC of Manila impleading the civil registrar of Manila as respondent. even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. Art. 413. states that all
2. Petitioner alleges that he is a male transexual and has undergone other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. He by special laws but there is no such special law in the Philippines governing
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand on January 27, sex reassignment and its effects. Lastly, under the Civil Registry Law, a
2001 and, from then on, lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
married. He sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from of  birth.  The  determination  of  a  person’s  sex  made at the time of his or her
“Rommel  Jacinto”  to  “Mely,”  and  his  sex  from  “male”  to  “female.”   birth,   if   not   attended   by   error,   is   immutable.   The   words   “male”   and  
3. The RTC granted the petition “female”  as  used  in  the  law  should  be  understood  by  their  ordinary  meaning  
4. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the as there is no legislative intent to the contrary. The ordinany meaning do
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. It cannot be
is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of argued  that  the  term  “sex”  as  used  in  the  law  is  something  alterable  through  
sex alteration and on February 23, 2006, the CA ruled in favor of the surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to- female
Republic. transsexual  to  be  included  in  the  category  “female.  
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
ISSUE/S and public policy consequences. First, to grant the changes sought by
1. WoN a person's first name can be changed on the grounds of sex petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
reassignment – NO marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another
2. WoN it is allowable for a person's sex in his/her birth certificate to be man who has undergone sex reassignment. Second, the laws that apply
change on the grounds of sex reassignment – NO particlarly to women and underscore the public policy in relation to women
3. WoN the entries in a person's birth certificate as to first Name or sex may be could  be  substantially  affected  if  petitioner’s  petition  were  to  be  granted. It
changed on the grounds of equity – NO is up to the legislature, should it decide to do so, and not to the Courts to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of
RULING: Petition is DENIED. sex reassignment.

1. RA 9048 governs the change of first names providing the reasons and
WHITE LIGHT CORP. v CITY OF MANILA protection rights of their clients were also being interfered with. The court
January 20, 2009 | Tinga, J. | Certiorari | “New”  Substantive  Due  Process agreed that the petitioners had standing because of their direct and personal
interest in the outcome of the case. The court also agreed that the owners
had the third party standing to plead for the rights of their patrons. The court
SUMMARY: The constitutionality of the City of Manila's ordinance prohibiting also said that assuming that the owners cannot assert the rights of their
short time admission to hotels was assailed by an organization of hotel and motel patrons, the overbreadth doctrine can be used by the owners, as the doctrine
operators. The court held that the ordinance curtailed the individual's liberty to applies to statutes that restrain constitutionally guaranteed rights. The court
make choices. believes that the ordinance suffers from overbreadth as it makes a sweeping
DOCTRINE: Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that intrusion on the right to liberty of the owners' clients.
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public 2. Although the goal of the ordinance was to minimize the use of the
welfare—the State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and other similar
intruding into the lives of its citizens. activities, and the goals are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the state, the means with which to achieve the
FACTS: end however, must align with the Constitution. It is here that the court uses
1. On December 3, 1992, Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim passed an ordinance— the rational basis test which tries to find less restrictive measures for the
Ordinance NO. 7774-- prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, furtherance of governmental interests, and the strict scrutiny test which
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of measures the quality and amount of governmental interest which justifies
Manila. On December 15 of that same year, The Malate Tourist and the regulation of freedom. With the exercise of police power, it must appear
Development Corporation sought to have the ordinance invalidated and that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
declared unconstitutional. On December 21, petitioners White Light particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and must be reasonably necessaryfor the accomplishment of the purpose and not
Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in hotels and rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between
motels in Manila. The RTC granted the motion and later on directed the city the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
from enforcing the ordinance. The RTC declared the ordinance null and accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
void on the ground that it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. The Court of Appeals to be arbitrarily invaded. The ordinance however, lacked the
reversed the RTC's decision. It held that the ordinance aimed to punish only aforementioned requisites and must be struck down as unconstitutional for
the owners of lodging areas who allowed short time stays and that the the following reasons:
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power since its objective was to a. The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by
curb illicit activities for the welfare of the general public. patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate
actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities
ISSUE/S: are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of Section 3 of the
1. WoN the petitioners had standing - YES Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus
2. WoN the ordinance is valid and constitutional – NO deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without
exception to the unjustified prohibition.
RULING: CA decision reversed, RTC decision reinstated. Ordinance No. 7774 b. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
declared unconstitutional. prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
RATIO: prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more
1. The petitioners alleged that as owners, their businesses were unlawfully effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of
being interfered with by the ordinance. They also alleged that the equal existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that
the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole
day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover,  drug  dealers  and  prostitutes  can  in  fact  collect  “wash  rates”  
from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.
c. Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable
complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute,
especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. The
government must avoid constitutional conflict by employing more
judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
CHURCHILL AND TAIT v. RAFFERTY schools and some barred livery stables from specific locations. The court
December 21, 1915 | Trent, J. | Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Manila| observed that though the reason for upholding the ordinances were for
Protected Interests in Property health, they had little bearing on health but had a great deal to do with
comfort, convenience and peace of mind. It is from this take-off point that
the court launches its argument against the billboards.
SUMMARY: The plaintiffs assail the constitutionality of a portion in section 3. The court held that the sense of sight gives contentment as much as the
100 of Act 2339 empowering the CIR to remove billboards that are objectionable other senses can. Hence, the state must protect sight--like it protected the
to the sight. The court held that the act is a valid exercise of police power. other senses mentioned before--for the public's attainment of contentment,
DOCTRINE: If police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social peace and comfort.
and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the 4. Billboards, placed along the arteries of travel, obstruct the range of vision
people are included within those subjects, everything that encroaches upon points where travelers are most likely to direct their eyes. They mar and
private property is amenable to police power. cover the beautiful landscapes which travelers and workers derive leisure
from. Hence, it is not unnatural for travelers and workers to protest against
FACTS: this intrusion. The main contention of the plaintiffs however was that the
1. The plaintiffs are owners of private lands in the Province of Rizal. On their billboards were on private land anyway and that restricting their erection on
property are billboards which some residents—British and German private land means restricting the use and enjoyment of those lands. They
Consuls-- find offensive. The Collector of Internal Revenue, after due also contend that such restriction would cause the death of billboard
investigation, found that the billboards were offensive to the sight and advertising. The court held however, that billboard advertising depended
consequently directed the removal of the said billboards in accordance with not upon the unrestricted use of private property but upon the unrestricted
subsection b of section 100 of Act 2339 which states that if the Collector of use of public highways. Hence, the regulation of billboards and their
Internal Revenue decides that a billboard is offensive to the sight or is restriction is not a regulation of private property but a regulation of the use
otherwise a nuisance, he may direct the removal of such billboard. of the streets and other public thoroughfares. The court furthermore iterated
that if police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and
ISSUE(S): economic condition, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are
1. WoN subsection b of section 100 of Act No. 2339 is unconstitutional included in the condition, then everything which encroaches upon private
because it constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law – property is amenable to police power.

RULING: Judgement appealed from reversed. (The perpetual restraint on the

CIR from removing the billboards is lifted.)

1. In the United States, the enjoyment of private property, specifically in
business and industry, was regulated through the use of police power. Police
power was exercised by the state through the laws that it passed limiting
business-owners from exploiting its workers and thus preventing them from
fully enjoying autonomy over their property. The state had to regulate the
businesses because it is its duty to ensure the physical well-being of its
citizens. Although the laws had little direct bearing on health and public
safety, it had direct bearing on economic and social conditions and which
safeguarded the citizens' physical well-being.
2. Offensive noises and smells have also been suppressed in some areas. Some
ordinances prohibited the location of garages near churches, hospitals or
U.S. v. TORIBIO human consumption anywhere, w/o a permit secured from the municipal
January 26, 1910 | Carson, J. | Appeal from the CFI of Bohol | Protected treasurer; 2) killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse
Interests in Property w/o such permit.
2. In challenging the validity of a statute under due process, it is important to
SUMMARY: Toribio was charged for slaughtering a carabao for human establish whether it constitutes 1) a taking of property for public use in the
consumption without a permit. He challenged the law as violative of due process. exercise of eminent domain, without providing for compensation of the
SC held that it was not an unlawful appropriation of property interest for public owner, or 2) an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power. Here, the
use (eminent domain) but a legitimate exercise of police power. restraint placed on slaughter of carabaos for human consumption fit for
DOCTRINE: Eminent domain pertains to appropriating property interests for agricultural work and draft purposes is not an appropriation of property
public use, while police power pertains to restricting private use that is deemed interests to a public use, and is not within the principled of the exercise of
detrimental to public welfare. the State of the right of eminent domain. It is in fact a mere restriction or
limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be
FACTS: detrimental to public welfare.
1. Luis Toribio was charged for violating Sec 30 of Act No. 1147, an Act 3. In the exercise of police power, the State may interfere whenever public
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. It appears interest demands, and large discretion is vested in the legislature to
that Toribio applied for a permit from the municipal treasurer of the determine what public interest requires and what measures are necessary for
municipality for the slaughter of a carabao for human consumption. This the protection of such interests. But to justify such state interference, it must
was   denied   on   the   ground   that   the   carabao   was   not   “unfit   for   agricultural   appear 1) that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
work   or   for   draft   purposes”,   in   accordance   with   Sec   31   of   the   same   Act.   those of a certain class, require such interference, and 2) the means are
Nevertheless, Toribio slaughtered or caused to have it slaughtered in reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
Carmen, Bohol, thus violating the prohibition. oppressive upon individuals.
2. Sec  30  of  the  Act  states,   “No  large  cattle  shall  be  slaughtered  or  killed  for   4. The Court outlined the events that led to the enactment of the statute—A
food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the contagious and infectious disease threatened the total extinction of carabaos
municipal   treasurer.”   Toribio   argues   that   the   prohibition   does   not   cover   in the Islands and largely affected agriculture, which was the principal
municipalities not provided with a municipal slaughterhouse. He also occupation in the country. Thus, people were forced to import rice,
argues that the statute is unconstitutional for violating section 5 of the resources began to drain, and people became impoverished. The govt then
Philippine Bill (due process clause). effected measures to increase supply of carabaos by importation, but scant
supply kept prices high, and the crime of cattle stealing became increasingly
ISSUES: prevalent.
WoN the prohibition extends to municipalities w/o a municipal 5. From the circumstances that surrounded the enactment of the statute, it
slaughterhouse—YES appears that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
WoN the statute violates due process—NO consumption fit for agricultural work and draft purposes was a reasonably
necessary limitation on private ownership. This is to protect the community
RULING: Appeal DENIED. Statute UPHELD. from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by
improvident owners, for the productive power of the community may be
RATIO: measurably and dangerously affected.
1. The Court held that the Act primarily seeks to protect large cattle against
theft,   even   providing   for   an   “elaborate   and   compulsory   system   of  
identification”.  This  purpose   would be impaired if animals were permitted
to be slaughtered w/o requiring proof of ownership privately outside a
municipal slaughterhouse. Thus, the construction adopted should be one
which tends to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker. In effect,
the prohibition in Sec 30 is taken to refer to 1) slaughter of large cattle for
PEOPLE v. FAJARDO 1. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or
August 29, 1958 | J.B.L. Reyes, J. |Appeal from CFI judgment | Protected limit  the  mayors’  action,  which  confers  upon  him  arbitrary  and  unrestricted  
Interests in Property power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and such undefined
and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se
SUMMARY: Former Mayor Fajardo questions his conviction by questioning lawful, is invalid (People v. Vera). Such ordinance makes possible arbitrary
the constitutionality of the ordinance he violated, which required that he seek discrimination and abuses in its execution, depending solely on the
the   mayor’s   permission   for   a   building   permit. SC: ordinance is invalid for unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities. Fundamental rights under
lacking standard and amounts to unjust taking property our government do not depend for their existence upon such a slender and
DOCTRINE: While property may be regulated in the interest of the general uncertain threat. Ordinance which thus invest a city council with purely
welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the arbitrary discretion, which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few
sightthe State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest are unreasonable and invalid.
owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them 2. Even if arguendo, the mayor can refuse a permit solely on the basis that it
solely  to  preserve  or  assure  the  community’s  appearance. would destroy the view of the public plaza (Section 3), the ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive since it operates to permanently deprive
FACTS: appellants of the right to use their own property. Hence, it oversteps the
1. During defendant-appellant   Juan   Fajardo’s   incumbency as Baao, CamSur bounds of police power amounts to a taking of propery without just
mayor, the municipal council passed Ordinance 7, Series of 1950 which compensation. While property may be regulated in the interest of the
requires that any person who seeks to construct or repair a building should general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures
first secure a written permit from the Mayor, w/ a minimum charge of P2 offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait v Rafferty), the State may not,
for a building permit and P1 for repair permit. under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
2. After   Fajardo’s   term,   he   and   his   son-in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to
written request with the incumbent mayor for a permit to construct a preserve   or   assure   the   community’s   appearance.   As   the case now stands,
building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in every   structure   that   may   be   erected   on   appellants’   land,   regardless   of   its  
Fajardo’s  name,  located  along  the  national  highway  and  separated  from  the   own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question – they are in
public plaza by a creek. The request was denied since among other reasons, effect constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious
the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally
Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit but was again achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation
turned down by the mayor. They then proceeded with construction without an opportunity to be heard.
a permit since they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house  having  been  destroyed  by  a  typhoon  and  they’d  been  living  on  leased Supporting jurisprudence
property. Arverne Bay Constr. Co v Thatcher: An ordinance which permanently so
3. On Feb 26, 1954, apellants were charged and convicted by the Justice of the restricts  the  use  of  property  that  it  can’t  be  used  for  any  reasonable  purpose  
peace for violating the ordinance, which CFI confirmed and sentenced them goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.
to pay a P35 fine each, costs, and to demolish the building. The accused The only substantial difference between restriction and actual taking is that
appealed to the CA, which forwarded the records to the SC since the appeal the former leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation
attacks  the  ordinance’s  constitutionality.     while the latter would relieve him of the burden.
Tews v Woolhiser: Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which
ISSUE/S: WON assailed municipal ordinance was valid – NO. can’t  reasonably  be  made  of  it  amounts  to  taking  without  just  compensation.  
Use of property is an element of ownership. If it be of public benefit that
RULING: Appeal GRANTED. Ordinance null and void. Conviction is reversed property remain open and unused, then certainly the public and not the
and said accused are acquitted. private individual should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such
property under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private
RATIO: property for public use.
YNOT v. IAC cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts. Also,
March 20, 1987 | Cruz, J. | Certiorari | Protected Interests in Property presumption of constitutionality is rebuttable.
2. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved to for the EO to be considered a valid
SUMMARY:   Ynot’s   carabaos   were   confiscated   by   the   police   commander   in  
exercise of police power. It should be taken note that the amended EO does
Iloilo as they were being transported from Masbate to Iloilo. The confiscation
not prohibit and penalize the slaughter of carabaos, rather their transport.
was the penalty prescribed by EO 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial
Restraining their transport and retaining them in one province will not
transportation of carabaos. Ynot challenged the constitutionality of the said EO
prevent their slaughter; any more than moving them to another province
but the RTC and the IAC declined to rule on the constitutional question raised.
will make it easier to kill them there.
The SC declared the EO as an invalid exercise of police power, a violation of
As for the prohibition on carabeef, there is also no reason to prohibit
the due process clause, and an invalid delegation of legislative power.
transport thereof since it does not also prohibit their slaughter.
DOCTRINE: To be considered a valid exercise of police power there must be a
3. Even if there was a reasonable connection between the means employed and
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
the purpose sought to be achieved, the penalty prescribed was unduly
be achieved by the law.
oppressive (outright confiscation by the police). While there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, namely, the
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the
1. On January 13, 1984, Restituto Ynot transported from Masbate to Iloilo six
need to correct it, the property involved in the present case is not inimical
carabaos which the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo City
per se to warrant their instant destruction.
confiscated for violating EO 626-A.
4. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
2. EO 626-A imposes an absolute ban on the interprovincial transportation of
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
carabaos or carabeef, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose.
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
This EO amended EO 626, which bans the slaughter of carabaos unless 7
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
years old for male and 11 years old for female.
on judicial functions and violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. Petitioner sued for recovery, but the Iloilo City RTC upheld the confiscation
5. The EO, being penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
of the carabaos. It also ordered the confiscation of the supersedeas bond of
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone
P12, 000 filed by Ynot for the return of the carabaos, for the carabaos could
would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
no longer be produced by Ynot. The court declined to rule on the
after trial and conviction of the accused.
constitutionality of EO 626-A for lack of authority, as well as for its
6. There is also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the Chairman of
presumed validity.
National Meat Inspection Commission and the Director of Animal Industry
4. Petitioner appealed the decision to the IAC which upheld said decision.
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken, as seen by the provision   “seized   property   shall   be  
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
1. Whether or not lower courts may pass upon the constitutional questions –
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the
case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director
2. Whether or not EO 626-A is a valid exercise of police power – NO
of Animal Industry may see fit, in  the  case  of  carabaos.”
3. Whether or not EO 626-A violates the due process clause – YES

RULING: EO 626-A declared unconstitutional. IAC decision reversed.

1. While they should exercise modesty in examining constitutional questions,
lower courts may pass upon the same when it is warranted, subject to the
review of the Supreme Court through the latter’s   appellate   jurisdiction  
(Article VIII, Sec. 5 (2)). This simply means that the resolution of such
U.S. v. CAUSBY 2. The 83 feet minimum safe altitude placed by the Civil Aeronautics
May 27, 1946 | Douglas, J. | Protected Interests in Property Authority does not apply to the path of glide—the landing and takeoff. The
minimum prescribed is 500 ft during the day and 1000 ft at night. Thus, the
SUMMARY: The Causbys assert property rights against US aircrafts that flights in question were not within the navigable air space which Congress
frequently pass over their property, causing its value to diminish. SC held that this placed within the public domain.
was  considered  a  “taking”  of  property  and  they  were  entitled  to  compensation. 3. If the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have
DOCTRINE: Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low exclusive control of immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.
and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment Otherwise buildings could not be erected and trees could not be planted.
and use of the land. Thus, the landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as
the can occupy or use in connection with the land.The fact that he does not
FACTS: occupy it in a physical sense—by the erection of buildings and the like—is
1. Respondents own 2.8 acres of land near an airport outside Greensboro, not material. What matters is whether there is an intrusion so immediate and
North Carolina, which has on it their dwelling house and outbuildings direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to
mainly used for raising chickens. The use of the airport by the US is limit his exploitation of it. Here, the Court of Claims established that there
pursuant to a lease for a term commencing June 1, 1942 to June 30, 1942, was a diminution in value of the property and that the frequent, low-level
with provisions for renewals until June 60, 1967, or 6 months after the end flights were the direct and immediate cause. Thus, a servitude has been
of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The path of glide to the imposed upon the land.
runway passes directly over the property—67 feet above the house, 63 feet
above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree.
2. Respondents allege that the noise was startling. As a result, they had to give
up their chicken business—6 to 10 chickens were killed in a day by flying
into walls from fright, w/c cost them a total of 150 chickens. Court of
Claims also found that the property had depreciated in value.
3. US contends that under the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the US has
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space over this
country; and any citizen is granted a public right of freedom of transit in air
commerce through the navigable air space (above the minimum safe
altitudes prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority) of the US.

ISSUE/S: WoN  respondents’  property  was  “taken”  by  frequent  and  regular  
flights over their land at low altitudes—YES

RULING: Case REMANDED to Court of Claims.

1. The argument by the United States does not control this present case; for
they themselves conceded that if flights over respondents' property rendered
it uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the 5 th
Amendment.   It   is   the   owner’s   loss,   not   the   taker’s   gain,   which   is   the  
measure of the value of property taken; such that if respondents could no
longer use the land due to frequency of flights, the taking would be as
complete as if the US entered upon the surface of the land.
REPUBLIC v. PLDT PLDT should have known that plaintiff is not limited to servicing
January 27, 1969 | Reyes, J.B.L., J. | Appeal | Protected Interests in Property government, in accordance with the executive order that created it.

SUMMARY: Bureau of Telecommunications filed a suit against PLDT ISSUE/S: WoN government may exercise its power of eminent domain to
praying that the latter be mandated to enter into a contract with the former, utilize the trunk lines of PLDT for public welfare – YES
granting the plaintiff use of the trunk lines. Court held that he may not coerce a
party to enter into a contract but the government may exercise its power of RULING: Case remanded. Judgment by CFI is affirmed insofar as it dismissed
eminent domain to utilize the trunk lines of PLDT for public welfare. the petition to compel PLDT to enter into agreement and continue servicing
DOCTRINE: Government, in the interest of national welfare, may exercise government telephone system.
the power of eminent domain and transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation. RATIO:
1. Parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where there is no
FACTS: agreement between them. Freedom to stipulate their own terms is the
1. In 1947, defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA essence of our contractual system. But CFI overlooked that although they
Communications, Inc. (not a party herein) whereby telephone messages may not compel PLDT to engage in a contract, the Republic may exercise
coming   from   the   US   and   received   by   RCA’s   domestic   station   could   its power of eminent domain and require PLDT to permit interconnection
automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT and vice-versa for with government subject to just compensation, for the benefit of public
outgoing international calls. The contracting parties agreed to divide the interest.
tolls but PLDT decided to rescind from the contract in 1958. 2. Under Section 6 of Article XIII, the State may, in the interest of national
2. In the same year PLDT and RCA entered into a contract, plaintiff Republic welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just
of the Philippines thru the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own compensation. Moreover, the executive order which created the Bureau of
Government Telephone System by renting trunk lines of PLDT to enable Telecommunications also stipulates that operation throughout the
gov’t  officer  to  call  private  parties.  In  1948,  the  bureau  extended  its  services   Philippines by utilizing existing facilities under terms with owners as
to the general public. agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned is allowed. But nowhere
3. After 10 years of going public, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with does it state that condemnation proceedings are not allowed when situations
RCA for a joint overseas telephone service. with unjust conditions for the bureau require so.
4. The defendant then filed a complaint to the bureau alleging that the latter 3. What the lower court should have done is to treat the case herein as one of
was in violation of the conditions under which PLDT allowed the use of its condemnation, independent of any contract, and proceeded to determine the
trunk lines. PLDT claimed that the bureau was already in competition with just compensation for the same.
their business so they threatened to sever the telephone connections they
provided, which they eventually did.
5. The bureau tried to compromise by proposing an interconnecting agreement
which, after negotiations, remained futile.
6. Plaintiff then filed a suit against PLDT praying for judgment ordering
defendant   to   execute   a   contract   with   plaintiff   for   the   use   of   defendant’s  
facilities and a writ of preliminary injunction against the severance of
existing telephone lines of the plaintiff. It claimed that severance of the
phone line prejudiced public interest.
7. Defendant filed a counterclaim denying that it had any obligation to execute
a contract with the bureau and that the latter used its facilities in fraud of its
rights when it went commercial to the prejudice of PLDT
8. Trial court rendered a decision that it could not compel PLDT to enter into
an agreement with the bureau but the latter is not guilty of fraud because
August 15, 1974| Zaldivar, J | Appeal from CFI decision | Protected Interests in 1. ‘Taking’   of   property   for   purposes   of   eminent   domain   requires   the  
Property following:
a. The expropriator must enter a private property – This was present when
SUMMARY: After expiration of their lease with the defendant-appellant, the by virtue of the lease agreement the AFP took possession.
government instituted expropriation proceedings. The Republic contended that b. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
the taking of the property for purposes of eminent domain should begin from period – When applied to occupancy of real property, the term
the time when such property was occupied by virtue of the lease. The Court ‘momentary’  is  construed  to  mean  “a  limited  period”,  one  not  indefinite  
held that their occupancy under the lease lacked two of the essential elements or permanent. The lease contract was for a one-year period, renewable
of taking for eminent domain, and that to sanction their contention would be to each year. Thus it is temporary and considered transitory. The fact that
sanction a deceptive practice. the AFP constructed installations of a permanent nature does not alter
DOCTRINE: The essential elements of taking for purposes of eminent domain that fact. By express stipulation in the agreement, as lessee the
are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a Republic undertook to return the premises in substantially the same
momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to condition as it was when they first occupied them. Although it is
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in claimed that they intended permanent occupation, this cannot prevail
such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all over the clear and express terms of the contract.
beneficial enjoyment thereof. c. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority – This is present since the Republic entered as a lessee.
FACTS: d. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
1. In 1947, the government leased a parcel of land from defendant-appellee appropriated or injuriously affected – This is present since the property
Carmen de Castellvi. After she refused to extend the lease, in 1959 they was used by the AFP.
initiated complaints for eminent domain against defendant-appellee, e. The utilization must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
alleging that the fair market value was not more than P2,000 / hec, and him of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property – This was not
prayed that they be authorized to take immediate possession of the lands present since Castellvi remained the owner and was continuously
upon deposit of the price with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.. recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the year to year
2. Castellvi filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the land was residential renewal of the contract and the provision in the contract whereby the
and had a total market value of P11, 389, 485, and that despite repeated Republic undertook to return the property upon termination of the
demands, the AFP, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been illegally lease. Moreover, Castellvi gained the monthly rentals.
occupying her property since 1 July 1956, causing her damages in 2. The  Republic’s  contention  that  the  contract was actually a permanent right
unrealized profits since it prevented her from disposing of or using it. to occupy the premises under the guise of a lease is unacceptable, since it
3. The Republic alleged that it had taken the property when the contract of contradicts the very nature of a lease and to sustain such contention would
lease commenced, not when proceedings began (i.e. 1947, not 1959). sanction a deceptive practice that would deprive owners of the true and fair
value of their property at the time when the expropriation proceedings were
ISSUE/S: WoN the taking of the property began in 1947 - NO actually instituted. Moreover, under Sec 4, Rule 67, RoC, just compensation
is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
RULING: Lands expropriated. Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of
P3,796,495.00 as just compensation, minus P151,859.80 that she withdrew out
of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of the land,
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full
payment is made or deposited in court;
December 22, 1988 | Sarmiento, J. | Review of MR from CA decision | 1. There was no breach of contract since there was no contract to begin with.
Protected Interests in Property Petitioners  rely  on  an  alleged  promise  by  Ayala’s  manager  to  build  a  fence  
with  a  gate  for  entrance/exit  as  evidence  of  Ayala’s  continuing  obligation to
SUMMARY: The Mayor of Makati directed BAVA to open several streets to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming
the general public. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened, but subsequently arguendo he had the authority to bind the corporation in such promise, it
it was forced open. Petitioners filed actions for breach of contract, arguing that would be with respect to building a fence; a fence is not a wall. From the
there was an agreement that the area would stay residential but due to the circumstances, it also cannot be said that there was a meeting of minds
opening it became commercial. Court held that there was no breach since there between the parties; thus, there was no contract.
was no contract, but assuming that there was a contract the opening of the 2. Petitioners have not shown why the questioned ordinances do not represent
street was a legitimate exercise of police power. a   legitimate   exercise   of   police   power   other   than   the   supposed   ‘non-
DOCTRINE: The non-impairment guaranty in the Constitution is secondary to impairment’   guaranty of the Constitution with respect to contracts.
more compelling interests of general welfare. However, the non-impairment guaranty is secondary to more compelling
interests of general welfare. Police power is elastic and must be responsive
FACTS: to various social conditions; there is no reason why when public welfare
1. After a series of changes in zoning regulations, the Mayor of Makati clashes with the individual right to property the former should not be made
ordered the opening of the streets of Bel-Air Village to the general public, to prevail through the state exercise of police power. The Ordinance has not
in the interest of public welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the
congestion. reversal of the appealed judgments.
2. The Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) expressed the concerns of
residents and requested the indefinite postponement of the plan, but
subsequently they voluntarily opened all streets except Jupiter Street.
3. After a request and an advisory were made regarding the opening of Jupiter
Street, the municipal officers of Makati forcibly opened, destroyed and
removed the gates at the corner of Reposo St. and Jupiter St., and at Jupiter
St. and Makati Ave, and opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to public
4. The residents filed actions for damages were filed against Ayala
Corporation and BAVA. Among other things, they alleged that there was a
bilateral contract between the parties, which Ayala and BAVA had
breached by allowing the commercialization of Jupiter Street despite
restrictions which Ayala and BAVA had themselves authored.
5. The lower courts relied on Ordinance No. 81 enacted by the Government of
the Municipality of Makati and Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 8101
promulgated by the Metropolitan Manila Commission. The two ordinances
allowed the use of Jupiter Street both for residential and commercial
purposes. The lower courts also held that these were valid exercises of
police power.

ISSUE/S: WoN the opening of the street was a legitimate exercise of police
power - YES

RULING: Petitions denied.

MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as granted
March 27, 2000 | Puno, J. | Certiorari | Protected Interests in Property by the national legislature.
2. Congress delegated police power to LGUs in the Local Government Code
of 1991, Sec. 16 (general welfare clause). LGUs are empowered to exercise
SUMMARY: Petitioner wrote to BAVA requesting the opening of Neptune St. police power through their respective legislative bodies, primarily by
and demolishment of a perimeter wall in the interest of public welfare. BAVA enacting ordinances.
resorted to the courts, which held that the authority necessary was in the City 3. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the ff.: formulation, coordination,
Council of Makati, not the MMDA. The MMDA invoked their police power as regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting
justification. The Court held that the MMDA had no police power. of policies, installation of a system and administration. Nothing in R.A.
DOCTRINE: The exercise of police power is confined to those to whom it is No.7942 grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. As
validly delegated. termed   by   its   charter,   the   MMDA   is   “a   development   authority”;;   it   was  
created to lay down policies and coordinate with various agencies for the
FACTS: delivery of basic services in the metropolitan area. All its functions, as
summed up in their charter, are administrative in nature.
1. On 30 Dec 1995, Petitioner MMDA sent a letter to respondent Bel-Air
Village Association (BAVA) a notice requesting respondent to open
Neputne St. to public vehicular traffic effective 2 Jan 1996. On the same
day, respondent was informed that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from Kalayaan Ave would be demolished.
2. On 2 Jan 1996, respondent instituted proceedings praying for a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune St. and prohibiting
the demolition of the perimeter wall. The TC issued the TRO the following
day, but after due hearing, they denied issuance of the preliminary
injunction on 23 Jan 1996.
3. On appeal to the CA, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued, and the
CA held that the MMEDA had no authority to order the opening of Neptune
St. and cause the demolition of the perimeter walls, since such authority is
vested by ordinance in the City Council of Makati.
4. Petitioner appealed, invoking its regulatory and police powers. They alleged
that one of its basic services is traffic management, which involves the
regulation  of  the  use  of  thoroughfares  to  insure  the  general  public’s  safety,  
convenience and welfare, and that there is no need to wait for the City of
Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune St. to the public.

ISSUE/S: WoN petitioner may open Neptune St. by virtue of police power - NO

RULING: Petition denied. CA ruling affirmed.

1. Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, which may
delegate this power to the President, administrative boards, lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations, or local government units. Once
ORTIGAS & CO. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. FEATI 3. The resolution of the municipality declaring the area of the lots as an
BANK and TRUST CO. industrial zone was passed in the exercise of police power to safeguard the
December 14, 1979 | Santos, J. | Appeal | Protected Interests in Property welfare of the people. The area is along the highway where different
commercial establishments have flourished and heavy traffic passes every
day. It cannot be considered as conducive to the health and safety of the
SUMMARY: Ortigas Partnership sued FEATI bank for not following the
residents in its route. The said resolution by the municipality is justified.
building restrictions of the lands sold to the latter as indicated when plaintiff
4. The motive behind the resolution, it being a legitimate response to a felt
executed deeds of sale. Court held that legitimate exercise of police power
public   need,   not   whimsical   or   oppressive,   will   not   bar   the   municipality’s  
supersedes any type of contract stipulation.
exercise of police power. Otherwise, the non-impairment of contracts clause
DOCTRINE: Non-impairment of contracts, although constitutionally
in the Constitution will prohibit it.
guaranteed, is not absolute. Laws created in the proper exercise of police
power do not bow down to the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of

1. Plaintiff, as vendor, sold two parcels of land to Augusto and Natividad
Angeles. The said vendees then transferred their rights of Emma Chavez to
whom the plaintiff executed corresponding deeds of sale after completion of
payment. Part of the deeds of sale contained a stipulation that said lots can
only be used for residential purposes.
2. Later on, FEATI Bank (defendant-appellee) bought the two parcels of land.
He constructed a building on said lots which the plaintiff immediately
demanded to be stopped to no avail. Defendant argued that the lots were
part of an area declared by the municipality as a commercial and industrial
3. The lower court submitted a decision favoring the defendant and declaring
the municipal resolution as prevailing over the building restrictions of the
said lots.

ISSUE/S: WoN the stipulations in the contract supersede the resolution of the
municipality for the commercial and industrial zone? - NO

RULING: Decision dismissing the complaint is affirmed.

1. Private interest should bow down to the exercise of police power. The
resolution of the municipality, presumed to be valid because of lack of
contention, roots from the Local Autonomy Act which empowers Municipal
Councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
2. Non-impairment of contracts, although constitutionally guaranteed, is not
absolute. Police power has been construed as the legitimate exercise of
power to prescribe regulations to promote health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. DULAY b .Garcia v. CA: in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and
April 29, 1987 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Certiorari and Mandamus | Protected Interests all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and
in Property not merely the condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied by the
owner. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities may be shown and considered in estimating its value.
SUMMARY: EPZA expropriated private lands for the establishment of an c. Republic v. Santos: according to Sec. 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the
export processing zone, which was granted. EPZA, however, questions the commissioners' report. It may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to
decision of Judge Dulay regarding the computation of just compensation, and the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the
argued that the determination is not in accordance with P.D. 1533. The SC defendant just compensation for the property expropriated. This Court may substitute its
declared P.D. 1533 as unconstitutional and void. own estimate of the value as gathered from the record.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio No. 1 on definition and rules on just compensation. 2. Presidential Decrees 76, 464, 794 and 1533, however, have practically set
Various factors must be taken into consideration in valuating properties to be aside the doctrines laid down by the Court. The provision common among these
expropriated. Tax values may be used as guides but cannot be absolute P.D.s is that just compensation for private property shall not exceed the value
substitutes for just compensation. declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the
property or determined by the assessor, whichever value is lower.
3. The Court held these decrees as unconstitutional for encroaching on judicial
FACTS: prerogatives in determining the value of just compensation. Under these P.D.s,
1. P.D. 1811 reserved a parcel of land for the establishment of an export while the courts have the power to determine just compensation for expropriated
processing zone. A part of this reserved area, however, was not a part of the property, such determination is only limited between the value declared by the
public domain. EPZA then move to have the private land expropriated, so owner/administrator   or   the   assessor,   thus   limiting   the   courts’   discretion   in  
expropriation proceedings were instituted. determining what is just and fair.
2. Judge Dulay granted the order for condemning the properties, and set the 4. Various factors must be taken into consideration in valuating properties to be
value of just compensation at Php 15.00 per square meter based on the expropriated. Tax values may be used as guides but cannot be absolute
consolidated report of 3 commissioners. EPZA filed an MR stating that the just substitutes for just compensation. Under P.D. 1533, in particular, the assessor
compensation must not exceed the maximum provided for by P.D. 1533, and the may use tax declarations as basis for just compensation. In the present case,
said P.D. has superseded the Rules on Court regarding the determination of just EPZA used the tax declarations which were already outdated and made before
compensation. The P.D. provides that the basis of just compensation shall be the the present owners had acquired the property. Such would be arbitrary and
fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be confiscatory. The Court held that these values stated in the P.D. may be used as
expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is guides   or   factors   to   be   considered   but   it   should   not   substitute   for   the   court’s  
lower. judgment of award of just compensation.
3. The MR was denied, hence this petition in the SC. 5. It is also a violation of due process if private owners are not given the chance
to prove the correctness of such tax declarations. It is unfair that the work of
ISSUE/S: Whether or not P.D. 1533 is unconstitutional for imposing a minor bureaucrats (the assessors) be made to prevail over judicial determination
mandatory mode of determining just compensation – YES of just compensation done after presentation of evidence and consideration of all
relevant factors.
RULING: Petition dismissed. P.D. 1533 is declared unconstitutional and void

1. The Court reiterated the rules on computing for just compensation:
a. Municipality of Daet v. CA: just compensation means the equivalent for the value
of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more and anything short
of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating entity (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. LTA.)
NPC v. CA and B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC be the price or value at the time it was taken from the owner and
June 22, 1984 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Certiorari | Protected Interests in Property appropriated by the Government.
In this case, NPC took possession of the land and constructed the access
SUMMARY: NPC expropriated the land originally owned by Lachica and road in 1961, when the land was still described as agricultural in use (in
Sadang, which was later acquired by San Diego, for the construction of an fact,  it  was  described  as  “cogonal”).  When it was taken during that time, it
access road to the Angat River Hydroelectric Project. The RTC and the CA was still owned by the spouses Sadang.
arrived at different conclusions on the value of just compensation. The SC 2. The convertibility of the property into a subdivision, the criterion relied
reversed the CA ruling and reinstated the RTC ruling with a modification as upon by the CA, is not controlling. The Supreme Court, in a number of
regards the legal interest. cases, has categorically ruled that it is the time of taking and not as
DOCTRINE: The basis for just compensation should be the price or value at the “potential   building”   site   that   is   the   determining   factor.   Furthermore,   the  
time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government taking nature of the land at the time of taking by the Government is the principal
into account the nature of the land at the time of such taking. It is the time of criterion for awarding compensation to the landowner. When NPC first
taking  and  not  as  “potential  building”  site  that  is  the  determining factor. entered the property; the subdivision was not yet in existence.
3. On The Issue of Legal Interest: since the value of just compensation
FACTS: should   be   fixed   as   of   the   time   of   the   “taking”,   and   not   of   filing   of   the  
1. The National Power Corporation (NPC) commenced negotiations in 1961 complaint (March 11, 1963), then the legal interest should also accrue from
with Maria Lachica and Esteban Sadang, owners of a parcel of land in San the  time  of  the  “taking”.  
Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, for the construction of an access road to the With respect to San Diego, the title was only issued to them on Dec. 7,
Angat River Hydroelectric Project. 1962, so the taking with respect to them should commence only from that
2. The spouses gave permission to NPC to begin construction of the road date; thus, the legal interest should accrue from December 7, 1962, 6% per
while the negotiations have not yet been concluded. In the meantime, B. E. annum, up to the time that payment is made by NPC.
San Diego, Inc, acquired the said parcel of land at a public auction and a
title was issued to them (Dec. 7, 1962).
3. NPC then instituted expropriation proceedings against the spouses Sadang,
and also, San Diego. The Trial Court then granted the Order of
Condemnation to have the land expropriated.
4. The only issue being presented in this case is the valuation of the land. The
RTC held that the value was at Php 3.75 per square meter, with interest at
12% per annum from March 11, 1963 until fully paid. The CA held that it
was Php 7.00 per square meter, taking as a basis the convertibility of the
land into a subdivision, which San Diego was planning to develop.

ISSUE/S: Whether the CA correctly pegged the value of the land at Php 7.00
per square meter – NO

RULING: CA decision reversed. RTC decision reinstated. NPC directed to

payment legal interest at six per cent (6%) per annum on the amount adjudged
from December 7, 1962, until fully paid.

1. In the case of Alfonso vs. Pasay, the Court held that to determine due
compensation for lands expropriated by the Government, the basis should
NPC v. CA and MANGONDATO 6. Mangondato later filed a case for recovery of possession of the property, to
March 11, 1996 | Panganiban, J. | Certiorari | Protected Interests in Property which a TRO was issued against NPC. While the resolution for the
preliminary mandatory injunction in the same case was pending, NPC filed
SUMMARY: NPC sought to expropriate the land owned by Mangondato for a case for eminent domain against Mangondato (July 27, 1992) over the
the construction of a hydroelectric power plant. It argued that the just subject property.
compensation  should  be  fixed  from  the  time  of  “taking”  (1978).  However the 7. The lower court denied recovery of possession of the property but ordered
RTC and the CA ruled that the just compensation should be fixed from the NPC to pay a monthly rent of Php 15000 from 1978 up to July 1992 with
time of filing of the suit for eminent domain (1992). The SC affirmed the CA 12% interest per annum and condemning the property in favor of NPC
decision with modification as to the legal interest. effective July, 1992 upon payment of P1, 000 per square meter or a total of
DOCTRINE: While the general rule in determining just compensation is that Php 21,995,000 as just compensation based on the commissioners report.
is fixed from the date of the filing of the complaint (Sec. 4, Rule 69) there is an Said decision was affirmed by the CA.
exception where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages
arising  from  government’s  use  of  the  property  expropriated.   ISSUE/S: Whether the value of just compensation should be fixed from the time
of taking or the from filing of complaint - FROM FILING OF COMPLAINT
1. In 1978, the National Power Corporation (NPC) took possession of a land in RULING: Petition dismissed. CA decision affirmed but legal interest is reduced
Marawi City to be utilized for hydroelectric power purposes. Believing that from 12% to 6% per annum.
the land taken was purely a public land, NPC paid the Marawi City a
“financial  assistance”  of  Php  40  per  square  meter.  Part  of  the  land  taken  was   RATIO:
actually owned by Macapanton Mangondato. 1. While the general rule in determining just compensation is that is fixed
2. In 1979, while NPC was constructing the Agus I (HE Hydroelectric Plant from the date of the filing of the complaint (Sec. 4, Rule 69), there is an
Project), Mangondato claimed just compensation for the land, arguing that exception. That is, where the owner would be given undue incremental
he was not privy to any agreement between NPC and Marawi City such that advantages  arising  from  government’s  use of the property expropriated.
payment to the city cannot be considered as payment to him. In the present case, however, NPC has failed to prove that their occupancy
3. At first, NPC refused   to   acknowledge   Mangondato’s   claim   but   changed   and use was the direct cause of the increase in valuation of the property
their position after more than a decade. In 1990, NPC resolved to pay from 1978 to 1992. Therefore, the CA was correct in pegging the value at
Mangondato Php 40 per square meter with legal interest of 12% from 1978, Php 1000 per square meter as of 1992.
with a total value of Php 1,184,088 pending determination of the fair market 2. A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for
value of the property. In another resolution in 1991, NPC resolved to pay purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
Mangondato Php 100 per square meter excluding 12% interest per annum. property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a
4. Mangondato, however, claimed that the value of the land was even greater momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant
than Php 300 per square meter, but settled for the Php 100 per square meter or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use
value in the meantime without prejudice to other claims he may have or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the
against NPC. Mangondato was paid Php 1,015,412 in addition to the Php utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the
1,184,088 earlier paid to him pursuant to a Deed of Sale of a Registered owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Property executed between the parties in March, 1992. 3. In the present case, the 3rd circumstance is lacking when NPC entered the
5. On  May  25,  1992,  NPC’s  board  resolved  to  pay  Mangondato  Php  100  per   property  in  1978,  and  even  refused  to  acknowledge  Mangondato’s  claim  for
square meter with 12% legal interest minus the amount already paid to him more than a decade. The fact that the parties executed a Deed of Sale over
and to Marawi City, with provisos that said authorized payment shall be the property means that NPC opted to buy the property instead of exercising
effected only after Agus I HE Project has become operational and that said the power of eminent domain. It was only in May, 1992 when NPC passed
payment shall be covered by a deed of absolute sale with a quitclaim the resolution providing for the payment to Mangondato and effectively
executed by Mangondato. repudiated the Deed of Sale that its intent to expropriate the land became
manifest. Since there was a valid contract, there was no need for
expropriation. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the Expressway, therefore extension must point southward not detour to the
opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the north.
price. 7. Respondent: No sudden change in selection of site, residents were duly
notified by the project, minimize social impact factor.
October 30, 1980 | Fernandez, J. | Certiorari and Prohibition | Protected Interests ISSUE/S: WoN the expropriation of the properties in Fernando Rein-Del Pan
in Property Streets are arbitrary – YES.

RULING: Certiorari and prohibition GRANTED.

SUMMARY: DPWC changed its original plan course for the extension of
EDSA, from passing through Cuneta Ave (mostly motels) to passing through
Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets (residential area). RP sought to expropriate the RATIO:
1. Right of the RP to take private property for public use upon just
properties, which affected residents, De Knecht among them, assails for being
compensation is provided in the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. IV). However,
arbitrary and capricious. SC ruled in favor of petitioner residents.
the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private
DOCTRINE: Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what
property should be taken.
private property should be taken.
a. HSC’s   report   which   considered   functionality,   social   impact   and   cost,  
stated that: a) EDSA extension is necessary and desirable for the
overall Metro Manila Transport system; b) Cost difference factor is so
1. The Govt, through the Department of Public Works and Communications
minimal as to influence in any way the choice of either alignment; c)
(now MPH) prepared a plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Blvd, which would
Negotiated sale approach to compensation apply to which ever
pass through Cuneta Ave up to Roxas Blvd. said extension plan is an
alignment selected; d) Factor of functionality militates strongly against
adjunct to the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project. On Dec 13, 1974, Sec.
Alignment 2 (Fernando Rein-Del Pan) while factor of great social and
Baltazar Aquino of DPHC decided to make the proposed extension pass
economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Alignment 1
through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets which are lined with old
(Cuneta Ave).
substantial houses.
2. The issue seems to boil down to a choice between the people and progress
2. On April 15, 1977, the affected owners of the residential houses filed a
and development. However, progress and development are carried out by
formal petition to Pres. Marcos asking him to order the Ministry of Public
the State precisely and ultimately for the benefit of the people, therefore,
Highways to adopt the original plan.
HSC recommends the reversion to Cuneta Ave.Based on the facts of record
3. Pres. Marcos, referred the matter to Human Settlements Commission (HSC)
and recommendations of HSC, the choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets
which recommended the reversion of the EDSA extension to the original
is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
plan, passing through Cuneta Ave. Nonetheless, MPH insisted on
implementing the 2nd plan.
4. On Feb 20, 1979, RP filed with CFI of Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation
proceeding against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein- Functionality: Alignment 1: Straighter, shorter, contour confirming to
Del Pan Streets. De Knecht, on Mar 19, filed a motion to dismiss alleging EDSA, better for interchange construction. Alignment 2: Serious
lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the Pres. of the Phil, repercussions on energy conservation drive and perspective of national
prematureness of complaint, and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the economy.
properties. Social Impact: Alignment 1: More residents and property owners
5. In June, RP filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the Cost difference: P269, 796
property sought to be expropriated on the ground that RP had made the
required deposit with the Philippine National Bank. Respondent Judge
issued said writ.
6. Petitioner: choice of property must be examined for bad faith, arbitrariness
or capriciousness. EDSA extension was envisioned to be linked to Cavite
February 12, 1990| Gancayco, J. | Review of CA decision and resolution |
Protected Interests in Property RATIO:
1. While the final judgment becomes the law of the case between the parties, it
SUMMARY: Following the De Knecht v. Bautista decision, BP Blg. 340 was is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private properties for public
enacted expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. Republic use upon the payment of just compensation is so provided in our
moved to dismiss the motion for dismissal of the expropriation action filed by Constitution and our laws. Expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by
defendants, pursuant to said BP, in order to proceed with the expropriation 1) voluntary negotiation with landowners, 2) taking appropriate court
proceedings. action, or 3) by legislation.
DOCTRINE: The Government may undertake expropriation proceedings by 2. The enactment of BP Blg. 340 was based on supervening evens following
1) voluntary negotiation with landowners, 2) taking appropriate court action, or the decision in De Knecht v. Bautista. The social impact factor has
3) by legislation. disappeared. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly
compensated, 80% of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the Edsa extension has
FACTS: been completed. Only private respondent remains as an obstacle to the
1. See De Knecht v. Bautista. project that will solve the traffic, drainage and flood control problems in the
2. Aug. 8, 1981: Defendants moved to dismiss the expropriation action in area.
compliance with the dispositive portion of De Knecht v. Bautista decision 3. Due to the aforestated supervening events, court finds justification on
which has become final and executory. Republic had no objection, pursuant proceeding with said expropriation proceedings. BP Blg. 340 therefore
to said decision. superseded the aforesaid decision of this court.
3. Sept 2, 1983: Republic filed motion to dismiss said case due to the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating the same properties Cruz, J., concurring:  BP  Blg.  340  is  not  a  reversal  of  the  court’s  finding  in  De  
and for the same purpose. Lower court dismissed said case by reason of Knecht v. Bautista that  the  expropriation  of  petitioner’s  property  was  arbitrary.  
enactment of said law. Supervening events have changed the factual basis of the decision to justify the
4. De Knecht appealed said order to the CA which dismissed the expropriation subsequent enactment of the statute. Sustaining said legislation is not a
proceedings on the ground that choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan as line nullification   of   the   court’s   findings. It is simply because the court itself found
through which EDSA should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive that under the changed situation, present expropriation is no longer arbitrary.
judicial approval.
5. Petitioner: Construction of Metro Manila Flood Control and Drainage
Project and EDSA extension are essentially to alleviate the worsening
traffic problem in Baclaran and Pasay City areas and the perennial
problems.  BP  Blg.  340  was  enacted  to  hasten  “The  Project”  and  thus  solve  
these problems. It has already acquired through negotiated purchase about
80-85 percent of the lands involved whose owners did not object the choice.
It is only with respect to the remaining 10-15 percent along the route that
petitioner cannot negotiate, including De Knecht whose holding is hardly
5% of the whole route area.
6. Respondent:  Decision  has  become  final  and  executory  and  petitioner’s  right  
should no longer be disturbed, and the same has become the law of the case
between parties involved.

ISSUE/S: WoN the enactment of BP Blg. 340 justifies the expropriation of

properties previously held arbitrary in the court’s decision on De Knecht v.
Bautista/ - YES.
May 21, 1987 | Gutierrez, Jr, J. | Protected Interests in Property 1. Power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the Constitution
only limits its exercise. The 3 Constitutional limitations are (1) taking must
SUMMARY: President issues PDs 1669 & 1670 to automatically expropriate the be for a public use, (2) payment of just compensation must be made, (3) due
Tambunting Estate & Estero de Sunog-Apog  area  to  provide  for  squatters’  social   process must be observed in the taking.
housing. SC: Unconstitutional for failing to meet 3 eminent domain requisites. 2. Due Process not Observed: Although due process does not always
DOCTRINE: Power of eminent domain is inherent in every state; Constitution necessarily demand that a proceeding be had before a court of law upon
only limits its exercise in that (1) taking must be for a public use, (2) payment of exceptional situations, it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein
just compensation must be made, (3) due process must be observed in the taking. notice and reasonable opportunity to be hard are given to the owner to
protect his property rights. Even in exceptional situations, once it is alleged
FACTS: that  one’s  right  of  due  process  of  law  has  been  violated,  the  courts  will  have  
1. Pursuant to nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program as a to step in and probe such alleged violation.
national housing policy, as well as EO 6-77 adopting the Metropolitan In   this   case,   Gov’t   should   have   filed   a   complaint   with   the   proper court
Manila Zonal Improvement Program, the Tambunting Estate and Estero de under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court to fulfill the requirement of
Sunog-Apog area was included in said programbecause of the City of due process. Instead, they declared the two properties as blighted areas and
Manila and NHA’s   finding   that   said   properties   included   blighted   directly expropriated them by decree without the slightest semblance of a
communities. Pursuant to this, PD 1669 and PD 1670 declared the hearing or any proceeding. Expropriation was instant and automatic upon
Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog area expropriated. Both PDs provide: the signing of the decree. And not only are the owners given no opportunity
a. NHA is designated administrator with authority to immediately to contest the expropriation or question the amount of payments fixed by
take possession, control, and disposition with power of demolition the PDs, but the decisions and orders of the NHA are expressly declared
of the expropriated properties and their improvements. beyond the reach of judicial review. The PD only provides that an appeal be
b. City Assessor is to determine market value (MV) of the property made to the Office of the President, but the courts are completely enjoined
pursuant to PD 76. City Assessor shall consider existing conditions from any inquiry of participation whatsoever.
in the area notably, that no improvement has been undertaken on 3. Public Purpose not Proven: The very foundation of the right of eminent
the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident families w/c domain is necessity of a public character. In this case, there is no showing
should considerably depress expropriation cost whatsoever as to why the properties involved were singled out for
c. A maximum amount for just compensation is imposed (17M for expropriation through decrees or what necessity impelled the particular
Tambuinting, 8M for Sunog-Apog) choices or selections. At least in expropriation thru legislation, debates open
2. 2 petitions: Property owners of Tambunting Estate and Estero de Sunog- to the public, Congressional records, and public hearings are involved. In
Apog challenge PD 1669 and PD 1670 on the grounds of:deprivation of this  case,  the  anonymous  adviser  who  drafted  the  decrees  for  the  President’s  
property without due process and equal protection, since the PDs provided signature cannot be questioned as to any possible error, partiality, act of
for automatic expropriation without them being given chance to oppose vengeance, or other personal motivations.
such or to contest the just compensation to which they are entitled to. They In particular, theprovision allowing NHA at its sole option to put portions of
also   contest   the   maximum   amount   imposed   and   the   City   Assessor’s   sole   the expropriated area to commercial use in order to defray the
authority to determine just compensation. developmental costs of its housing projects is unconstitutional. TheGov’t  
still has to prove that expropriation of commercial properties in order to
ISSUE/S: lease  them  out  also  for  commercial  purposes  should  be  “public  use” under
WON the PDs deprive petitioners of due process – YES. the Constitution. The Tambunting estate is very valuable property at the
WON taking is for public use – NO. junction of 3 main city streets and housing valuable businesses. The favored
WON the PDs violate the just compensation guarantee – YES. squatters allowed to buy these choice lots would obviously lease out or sell
their lots to wealthy merchants, and the public use and social justice ends
RULING: Petition GRANTED. PD 1669 and 1670 declared unconstitutional would not be served. Also,there is no showing how the President concluded
and void. that the Sunog-Apog area is a blighted community. Petitioners were able to
show that the area is a well-developed residential area without squatters,
and with roads, electric and telephone connections, etc. There are many
squatter   colonies   in   Metro   Manila   in   need   of   pupgrading   which   the   Gov’t  
should have attended to first. There is no showing for a need to demolish
the existing valuable improvements in order to upgrade Sunog-Apog.
4. No just compensation: Pursuant to PD 1533, the basis of just
compensation   is   the   MV   of   the   property   “prior   to   re   recommendation or
decision  of  the  appropriate  Gov’t  office  to  acquire  the  property”.   The time
of reckoning to determine said MV is when the government has made it
known to the property owner through a formal notice e.g. a hearing or
judicial proceeding.In this case,   the   Gov’t   improperly   fixed   the   maximum  
amounts of compensation and the bases thereof at the 1987 assessed values
(when  the  President,  after  a  fire  razed  the  squatters’  homes,  declared  that  the  
President would acquire the land and give it to the squatters). Thisdeprives
petitioners of the opportunity to prove a higher value, since the actual or
symbolic taking of the property occurred only in 1980 when the PDs were
Also, the PDs make no mention of any MV declared by the owner, only at
the MV determined by the City Assessor (which is also limited by the
provision   to   “consider   existing   conditions…no   improvement   has   been  
undertaken…squatted   upon...considerably   depress   depreciation   costs”. The
so called conditions, and the valuation vested solely to the City Assessor
should not be determined through a decree but in a proper proceeding for
the valuation of the property and also for the owner to be heard. Also, the
maximum amounts based on the tax documents provided for in the
questioned decrees cannot adequately reflect the property value and should
not be binding since there are other factors to be considered.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police power,
July 31, 1967 | Fernando, J. | Appeal from CFI | Protected Interests in Property which is the most essential, insistent and least limitable power of the state.
2. There is no question that the ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
SUMMARY: Petitioners challenged the validity of an ordinance issued by the certain practices hurtful to public morals. Moreover, the increase of annual
acting mayor of Manila (Astorga) in his capacity as mayor and claimed that such fees was to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for
ordinance is violative of the due process clause and vague. Lower court favored purpose other than the legal and at the same time, increase the income of the
the petitioners and issued a preliminary injunction against the implementation of city  gov’t.
the ordiance. SC reversed the decision averring that there was no strong and 3. A  person’s  liberty  must  be  justifiably  limited  for  order  and  common  good;;  a  
conclusive evidence that supports the allegations by petitioners and there is balance   must   exist   between   a   person’s   freedom   and   the   impositions   made  
always a presumption for validity in laws. on it by the state. In the instant case, no such imbalance has been proved.
DOCTRINE: For a statute to be declared invalid, there must be clear and strong
evidence that shows such intrusions of the state against the fundamental right.
There is always a presumption of validity of enacted laws and statutes.

1. Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Hotel del Mar and a
certain  Go  Chiu  as  president  of  Hotel  del  Mar  sued  the  Mayor’s  Office  of  
Manila and prayed for a preliminary injunction against Ordinance No. 4760.
At the same time, they tried to assail the validity of the ordinance averring
that it is unconstitutional.
2. According to petitioners herein, the ordinance is violative of the due process
clause for being arbitrary, vague and intrusive of the rights to privacy and
guaranty against self-incrimination. Pertinent provisions of the ordinance
include: (1) additional fee per annum on first and second class motels; (2)
requirement of executing a prescribed form in each hotel that contains there
personal details of customers like name, companion, hours of stay, etc; and
(3) prohibition against accepting people less than 18 years old in such hotels
more than twice every 24 hours.
3. Mayor’s  office  contended  that  the  ordinance  bears  a  reasonable  and  proper  
purpose which is to curb immorality in the area and argued that it was a
valid exercise of police power.
4. Instead of presenting evidence, both parties submitted a stipulation of facts.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUE/S: WoN Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional? - NO

RULING: Petition denied. Decision of lower court is reversed.

1. The court recognizes the fact that no evidence was presented to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance.
As was expressed by J. Malcolm, presumption is all in favour of validity.
Judiciary cannot set aside legislative action in when there is not a clear
ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS v. SECRETARY OF RULING: R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and
AGRARIAN REFORM 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the
July 14, 1989 | Cruz, J. | Review | Protected Interests in Property herein petitions. Petitions dismissed.

SUMMARY: Petitioners assailed P.D. No. 27, E.O. 228 and 229, and Proc. No.
1. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
131 contending, among others, that they were unconstitutional as they violated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
the equal protection clause, and the due process by depriving the ownership of
imposed. Classification is the grouping of similar persons or things; to be
property without just compensation. The SC upheld the constitutionality of the
valid, a classification: (1) must be based on substantial distinctions; (2)
measures, holding that the requisites for a valid classification were satisfied and
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
just compensation was made prior to transferring title and ownership.
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the
DOCTRINES: Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of
class. The Court found that all these requisites were satisfied by the
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly
challenged measures.
stressed   by   this   Court   that   the   measure   is   not   the   taker’s   gain   but   the   owner’s  
2. Petitioners have not shown that they belong to a distinct class entitled to
loss. Just compensation need not always be in payments of money, and may be
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also other
paid in bonds and stocks etc.
property owners must share the burden of implementing land reform is
Equal protection: all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike
untenable, as there is a substantial and clear distinction between these two
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.
classes of owners. Moreover, Congress is allowed leeway in providing for a
For a classification to be valid, it: (1) must be based on substantial distinctions;
valid classification. Its decision is accorded respect by the courts except
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
when there is abuse of discretion to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the class.
3. The laws challenged are not in the exercise of police power, but constitutes
taking under eminent domain – therefore, just compensation is imperative:
is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
1. The various petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the ff:
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and
a. P.D. No. 27 - providing for the compulsory acquisition of private lands
all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
retention limits for landowners.
taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by
b. E.O. 228 - declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of
this  Court  that  the  measure  is  not  the  taker’s  gain  but  the  owner’s  loss.  The  
P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
word  “just”  is  used  to  intensify  the  meaning  of  the  word  “compensation”  to  
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
c. Proc. No. 131 - instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
(CARP), and
4. Determination of just compensation addressed to the courts of justice
d. E.O. No. 229 - providing   the   mechanics   for   Proc.   No.   131’s
and may not be usurped by any other branch: the determination of the
just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive
2. Among others, they contended that the above were violative of due process,
upon the landowner or any other interested party - is only preliminary
equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property
unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice
shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
5. However, the measure here is not traditional exercise of the power of
WoN the above-stated measures were violative of equal protection – NO
eminent domain, but revolutionary (for the benefit of the Filipino nation)
WoN the above-stated measures were violative of due process by arbitrarily
- just compensation need not always be in payments of money, and may
transferring title before the land was fully paid - NO
be paid in bonds and stocks etc: Court assumed that the framers of the
Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian
reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this
assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be
needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid
not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method,
taking into consideration the financial limitations of the government.
6. The measures conform to the constitutional requirement that full payment
of just compensation must made first before title and ownership is to be
a. Although P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-
farmer   as   21   Oct   1972   and   declared   that   he   shall   “be   deemed   the  
owner”   of   a   portion   of   land   consisting   of   a   family-sized farm except
that  “no  title  to  the  land  owned  by  him  was  to  be actually issued to him
unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized  farmers’  cooperative”,  it   was   understood  that  full  payment  
of just compensation had to take place first.
b. E.O.   No.   228   Sec.   1   categorically   stated   that   “All   qualified   farmer-
beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the
land  they  acquired  by  virtue   of  Presidential  Decree  No.  27.”  It  clearly  
referred to lands already validly acquired under said decree, after proof
of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full
payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for it
to also provide in Sec 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by
the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of
ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered
as advance payment for the land."
c. The CARP Law conditioned the transfer of possession and ownership
of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or deposit by DAR of the compensation in cash
or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title remained with
the landowner.

“Eminent   domain   is   an   inherent   power   of   the   State   that   enables   it   to   forcibly  

acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation
to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is
willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an
ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the
owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered
by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert
the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner.
Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on
the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the
welfare of the people is the supreme law.”  
SUMULONG v. GUERRERO definition has been expanded and the requirement satisfied as long as the
September 30, 1987 | Cortes, J. | Review | Protected Interests in Property purpose of taking is public, including indirect benefit or advantage. Urban
renewal and redevelopment and construction of low-cost housing is
SUMMARY: NHA filed a complaint for expropriation of petitioners’   land   in   recognized   as   a   public   need   in   the   Constitution:   “just   and   dynamic   social  
Antipolo pursuant to PD 1244. Petitioners challenge the exercise of eminent order”:   II,   9;;   “continuing   program   of   urban   reform   and   housing”:   XIII,   9.  
domain re: the requirements of public purpose and just compensation. SC held Also, housing is a basic human need and shortage is a matter of state
that it was for public purpose but remanded because it deprives the Court of concern since it directly and significantly public health, safety, the
discretion in fixing just compensation and to allow petitioners hearing. environment, and in sum, the general welfare.
DOCTRINE: The requirement of public purpose is satisfied as long as the The Court justified socialized housing as a public use. According to a
purpose of taking is public, including indirect benefit or advantage. The State is NEDA report, 50% of urban families cannot afford adequate shelter even at
generally granted wide discretion in determining lands for expropriation. reduced rates and will need the government support to provide them with
social housing, either partially or totally.
FACTS: Also, expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The exercise of
1. On Dec 5 1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaint for eminent domain does not depend on a quantitative area basis. There is no
expropriation of 25 ha of land in Antipolo, including the lots of Sumulong cogent reason why the government, in its quest for social justice, should
(6,667 m2) and co-petitioner Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 m2). This was for the focus on large proportions of land (JM Tuason v LTA). The State acting
expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project. The land was at P1/m2 as the through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular
market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance w/ PD 1224, property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how
which   defines   “the   policy   on   the   expropriation   of   private   property   for   much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad
socialized housing upon payment of just compensation. The NHA deposited faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners herein failed to
the amount of P158,980 with the complaint, representing the total market demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the
value. The judge issued a writ of possession without notice or hearing. NHA's choice and the size of the site for the project. The property owner
2. Petitioners argue that PD 1244 is unconstitutional for being violative of due may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other
process: 1) not really for a public purpose since it benefits only a number of property would have been more suitable, or just as suitable, for the purpose.
people and thus not public, 2) allows taking of property regardless of size 3) The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered
deprivation of judicial discretion in fixing just compensation. Petitioners by and has to yield to the demands of the common good.
also challenge  the  judge’s  order  for  violating  procedural  due  process  for  not   2. Invoking the ruling in EPZA v Dulay, vesting provincial assessors with the
giving notice and hearing. authority to fix market value is a deprivation of judicial discretion in fixing
just compensation.
1. WoN socialized housing is a public purpose—YES
2. WoN PD 1244 constitutes a deprivation of judicial discretion in
determination just compensation—YES


1. The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain
limitations, that the property be for public use. Socialized housing is defined
as the construction and/or improvement of dwelling units of middle and
lower class income groups. The requirement  “public  use”  is  a  flexible  and  
evolving   concept.   The   strict   meaning   previously   attached   to   “public   use”  
was that it should be for the public to enjoy ie streets or roads. This
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v. J. ERICTA to tax, fix the license fee and regulate such other businesses, trades and
occupation as may be established or practiced in the city.
2. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit and to
June 24, 1983 | Gutierrez, Jr, J. | Review | Protected Interests in Property
confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits
the operation of a memorial park cemetery because Sec 13 of the said
SUMMARY: The City Government of Quezon City passed an ordinance which ordinance punishes with imprisonment and cancellation of permit to operate
orders private memorial type cemeteries to set aside 6% of their total land areas violators of the Sec 9. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision
for charity burials. Himlayang Pilipino sought to annul the ordinance. The court deters the operation of memorial park cemeteries.
held that the city government could not do this as this was not a valid exercise of 3. Art III Sec 1 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of
police power and the city charter does not have any provision that can justify the life, liberty or property without due process of law. Police power on the
ordinance. other hand, is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public
DOCTRINE: Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property and is
or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general usually exerted in order to regulate the owner's use and enjoyment of the
welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the property. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private
in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and
promoting the general welfare. There is no reasonable relation between the order and of promoting the general welfare. Sec 9 of the ordinance is not a
setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of private cemeteries for charity mere police regulation but an outright confiscation as it deprives the person
burial grounds and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the of his private property without due process of law and without
general welfare of the people. compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of
at least 6% of the total area of private cemeteries for charity burials and the
FACTS: promotion of health, morals, or the general welfare of the people. The
1. The Quezon City council passed an ordinance, Ordinance No. 6118 which ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
regulates the establishment, maintenance and operation of private memorial private cemetery for the benefit of paupers who are charges of the municipal
cemeteries in Quezon City. Sec 9 of the ordinance provides that at least 6% corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
burials of paupers who have been residents of Quezon City. For several 4. Also, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino had
years, Sec 9 of the ordinance was not enforced. It was only on the 7 th year commenced operation. The sequestration of 6% of the cemetery cannot
after the ordinance was passed that Sec 9 was enforced. even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by private
2. Himlayang Pilipino sought to annul Sec 9 of the ordinance. They alleged respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.
that the ordinance was against the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter,
the Local Autonomy Act and the Revised Administrative Code. The CFI
declared Sec 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 null and void.

ISSUE/S: WoN Sec 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is a valid exercise of Police

Power – NO

RULING: Petition for review DISMISSED. CFI decision AFFIRMED.

1. An examination of the Charter of Quezon City does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision
granting police power to the city. Sec 9 cannot be justified under the power
LUZ FARMS v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM - Section 32 which spells out the production sharing plan mentioned in Section
December 4, 1990 | Paras, J. | Prohibition | Protected Interests in Property 13
3. Petitioner primarily argues that the constitutional provision does not include
in  its  definition  and  scope  of  “agricultural  lands”  those utilized for livestock
SUMMARY: Luz Farms assails certain provisions of RA 6657 (Comprehensive
and poultry and swine raising, alleging among others, that land is not the
Agrarian Reform Law) for including livestockpoultry and swine farms within the
primary resource in the undertaking, unlike crop or tree farming. Therefore,
coverage   of   “agricultural   lands”   for   purposes   of   the   comprehensive   agrarian  
Congress has transcended the constitutional mandate of agrarian reform by
reform program. The Court ruled in favor of Luz Farms and declared such
including  within  its  scope  lands  which  are  not  “agricultural”.      
provisions as unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the
ISSUE/S: Whether or not livestock, poultry and swine farms are included in the
meaning of the word "agricultural" clearly show that it was never the intention of
definition of agricultural lands for purposes of RA 6657 – NO
the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
RULING: Petition granted. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No.6657 on the
Government. Therefore the inclusion of "private agricultural lands devoted to
inclusion of the raising of livestock,poultry and swine in its coverage as well as
commercial livestock poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial
theImplementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith are
farms”  under  RA  6657  is  invalidfor  purposes  of  the  coverage  of  agrarian  reform.  
declared null andvoid for being unconstitutional.

1. Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry business, assails In construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful
the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 6657, also known as the meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as
Comprehensive Agrarian Refrom Law, as well as the IRR of the said law throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. In the
with respect to production and profit sharing. The constitutional provision deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the
invoked is Article XIII Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution on Agrarian and word "agricultural”  clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of
Natural Resources Reform: the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
“The  State  shall,  by  law,  undertake  an  agrarian  reform  program  founded  on  the  right   It adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of
of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively
R.A. 3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to
the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just croplands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land.
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, SEPARATE OPINION (Sarmiento, J.)
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just The case is not just one of constitutional construction, since Article XIII Sec. 4
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of provides a basis for a clear and possible coverage of livestock, poultry and
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land swine raising within the scope of the comprehensive agrarian reform program.
sharing.” The case is more of an issue of equal protection, of whether or not agricultural
lands, on one hand, and livestock, poultry and swine raising, on the other hand,
2. The specific provisions of the said law being assailed as they are made to be treated alike or differently. Here, the two kinds of lands are not similarly
apply to petitioner are as follows: situated and hence, cannot be treated alike since in the latter, land is not really
- Section 3(b)which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the
the primary resource and most of the investments needed are fixed assets which
definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
- Section 11which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands are industrial in nature. The assailed provisions must be struck down as
devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising x x x." unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.
- Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
- Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
CARIDAY INVESTMENT CORPORATION v. CA ISSUE/S: WoN   restriction   against   construction   of   “more   than   a   single-family
August 2, 1989 | Griño-Aquino, J. | Review | Protected Interests in Property residential  building”  is  also  a  restriction  against  the use of the building by more
than one family – YES.
SUMMARY: Cariday leased its residential building (which could house 2
occupants) in Forbes Park to 2 people, in violation of the restriction, HELD/RULING: Petition DENIED.
prohibiting the use of the lot for more than a single family. FPA disallowed
the occupancy of the other tenant and disconnected the water supply of the RATIO:
building for its violation. SC upheld the restriction. 1. Restriction clearly defines not only the type and number of structures (1
DOCTRINE: Dissent: Private property does not constitute an absolute and residential building), but also the number of families (single family) who
unconditioned right. When a situation where one man is very wealthy and may use it as residence.
another is very poor exists on a national scale, it becomes a matter of social 2. Purpose of restriction: avoid overcrowding both in houses and in the
justice. subdivision which would result in pressure upon common facilities such as
water, power and telephone connections, accelerate deterioration of roads,
FACTS: and create sanitary and security problems. Restrictions are for aesthetic
1. A   “Deed   of   Restrictions”   is   annotated   on   the title of lot owners in Forbes consideration and for the preservation of the peace, beauty, tranquility and
Park Subdivision which limits the use of the lot for residential purposes serenity of living at Forbes Park.
only and in allowing not more than one single family residential building to 3. Prohibition may not be circumvented by building a house with an external
be constructed thereon (restrictions are for a period of 50 years from Jan 1, appearance of a single family dwelling but whose interior is designed for
1949). Violation of such empowers the disconnection of water service until multiple occupancy. What may not be done directly, may not also be done
violation ceases. indirectly.
2. Cariday Investment Corp, an owner of a residential building, made 4. Recognizing Filipino customs, concept of single-family dwelling may
“repairs”  which  made  additions  and  deletions  in  the  existing  residence,  and   embrace extended family. But leasing to 2 or more families who are not
that it can be used by more than one family. Cariday admitted that the related to the owner nor to each other would be impermissible.
building has the exterior appearance of a single residence but is designed to
allow occupancy of two families. The Forbes Park Association (FPA) Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissent:
demanded correction. No showing that 2 families living in one big residence would lead to any of
3. On July 1, 1987, Cariday leased 1 portion to James Duvivier who occupied the above unpleasant consequences.
it on July 5. Cariday also leased the other half to Procter and Gamble for the Single family restriction is intended to insure that Forbes Park real estate
use of Robert Haden, who notified the FPA of his moving in. Cariday also values remain higher that the values in any other residential area. The Court
requested for the issuance of a clearance for such move. is protecting not sanitation, peace and order, comfort or aesthetic
4. However, when Haden tried to move in, was stopped by the security guards. surroundings, which would not in the least bit be affected by 2 families
FPA advised Cariday that it will not allow the latter to lease its house to sharing 1 house, but inflated land values and elitist lifestyle (one family
more than 1 tenant, and threatened to disconnect the water service of its could hire a battalion of servants without violating the restriction).
property. Constitutional provisions on Social Justice and Human Rights emphasize
5. Cariday filed an injunction praying that the FPA be ordered to desist from the social function of land. Highest priority should be given to measures
cutting-off the water supply to its building and to desist from preventing its which enhance the right of all the people to human dignity and reduce
tenants’   ingress   into   and   egress   from   its   building.   TC   issued   writ   of   social, economic, and political inequalities through equitable diffusion of
preliminary injunction which was annulled by the CA which upheld  FPA’s   wealth and political power.
right to prohibit entry of additional tenants and to disconnect water service State is mandated to undertake housing programs and urban land reforms
for the violation of the restrictions. which seek to make available decent housing and basic services to the
underprivileged and homeless citizens.
Private property does not constitute an absolute and unconditioned right. ISSUE/S: WON the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special
When a situation where one man is very wealthy and another is very poor group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
exists on a national scale, it becomes a matter of social justice. subsidizing  a  gov’t  program  – YES.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common weal would be diluted
considerably of its reach and effectiveness if on the mere plea that liberty to RULING: Petition DISMISSED. RA 9257 legitimate exercise of police power.
contract would be restricted, the statute complained of may be characterized
as a denial of due process. RATIO:
1. Tax deduction =/= just compensation: Theoretically, the treatment of the
discount as a deduction reduces   the   establishments’   net   income   since   the  
discounts   would’ve   been   part   of   their   gross   sales   was   it   not   for   RA   9257.  
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. v. DSWD Said permanent reduction is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of
June 29, 2007 | Azcuna, J. | Prohibition | Protected Interests in Property
private property for public use or benefit, which would ordinarily entitle the
establishments to just compensation. In this case, the tax deduction would
SUMMARY: RA  9257  or  the  Expanded  Senior  Citizens’  Act  of  2003  provides  a  
not meet the definition of just compensation since it does not offer full
20% discount to medicines for senior citizens and provides a tax deduction
reimbursement of the senior citizen discount.
scheme   where   32%   of   the   discount   is   shouldered   by   the   gov’t   through   a   tax  
2. Legitimate exercise of police power:RA 9257 was enacted primarily to
deduction while the other 64% is shouldered by the private establishments.
maximize  senior  citizens’  contribution  to  nation-building and to grant them
Drugstore proprietors and corporations assail said law for being confiscatory. SC:
benefits for their well-being since the State considers them an integral part
Valid exercise of police power & presumed constitutional.
of   society.   The   Act’s   Declaration   of   Policies   cites   Article   XV,   Section 4
DOCTRINE:. When the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
(duty of the family to take care of its elderly members); Art II, Sec 10
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power b/c property rights,
(social justice); Art XIII, Sec 11 (integrated and comprehensive approach to
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
health   dev’t…make   essential   goods,   health…available   to   all   people   at  
affordable  cost…priority  for  elderly…”.  Pursuant  to  this,  the  Act’s  declared  
policy  is  to  recognize  the  private  sector’s  important  role  in  the  improvement  
1. Domestic corporations and proprietors of operating drugstores in the
of  senior  citizens’  welfare  and  to  actively  seek  their  partnership.  The  means
Philippines assailthe tax deduction scheme provided for in Section 4(a) of
employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector to
RA   9257   or   the   “Expanded   Senior   Citizens’ Act of 2003”.Said   provision  
achieve  the  law’s  objective  is reasonably & directly related. Hence, the law
grants a 20% discount to the purchase of medicines (branded & generic) in
is a legitimate exercise of police power.
all establishments for senior citizens. In turn, the establishment is granted a
3. Police Power > Right to Property: Similar to eminent domain, police
tax deduction based on the net cost of the medicines sold.
power has general welfare for its object and is described   as   “the   most  
2. While the old tax credit scheme deducts the credit from total tax due, the
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to
new tax deduction scheme allows the establishment concerned to subtract
all  the  great  public  needs.”  For  this  reason,  when  the  conditions  so  demand  
the tax deduction (32% of the 20% discounts granted) from gross income.
as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
The government then loses in terms of foregone tax revenues an amount
police power b/c property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
equivalent to the marginal tax rate the said establishment is liable to pay the
yield to general welfare. Moreover, the right to property, while provided for
government – an amount equivalent to 32% of the 20% discounts so
in Article XIII, has a social dimension – it can be relinquished upon the
granted. However, the establishment is still forced to shoulder 64% of the
State’s   command   for   the   public   good.   And in as much as pricing is a
granted discount.
property  right,   it’s unfair for petitioners to criticize said law as oppressive
3. Because of this, petitioners assail the validity of the tax deduction scheme as
just b/c they made the business decision of imposing only a small mark-up
a reimbursement mechanism for the 20% discount for being confiscatory
on their medicines b/c of the competitive nature of the industry.
and infringing upon Art III Sec 9, since it will result in a loss of profit and
4. Presumption of Constitutionality: In the absence of evidence
capital b/c (1) drugstores impose only a 5-10% mark-up on branded
demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question,
medicines and (2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores
there is no basis to invalidate said law since every law is presumed valid.
will be justly compensated.
Petitioners failed to come up with a financial report to properly show WON petitioners filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a TRO and WPI. In a
the   tax   deduction   scheme   greatly   disadvantages   them.   Petitioners’   claim   resolution on Nov 2007, the Former 22 nd Division issued a TRO against the
that they are burdened with P0.68 for every P1 senior citizen discount is execution of the ordinance. On Jan 2008, a WPI was granted, hence a
flawed since it is (1) unsubstantiated in tehe basene of any financial petition for certiorari was filed by respondents.
statement presented; (2) computation is erroneously based on the 4. The court had 6 mos to decide the case but the appeal was submitted and re-
assumption that all their customers are senior citizens; (3) 32% tax rate is to raffled only on July 23 2008, 5 days before the deadline. The ponente
be imposed on income and not on the amount of the discount. received the case July 25 2008. Because of this, an extension was requested
from the SC. The CA however, decided to decide the case before the SC
shall have acted on the request.
ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF DAVAO ISSUE/S: WoN the ordinance constitutes an unreasonable exercise of Police
January 9, 2009 | Lantion, J. | Appeal | Protected Interests in Property Power – YES

RULING: Appeal GRANTED. TC Decision upholding validity and

SUMMARY: The City of Davao passed an ordinance banning aerial spraying as constitutionality of the ordinance REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all agricultural entities in
Davao City. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance is void and RATIO: The court held that the enactment of the ordinance is an unreasonable
unconstitutional. exercise of the City of Davao of its delegated police power. Local governments
DOCTRINE: Since the ordinance forbids aerial spraying even of vitamins and may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the ff
minerals, the ordinance amounts to an arbitrary intrusion into the petitioners' requisites are met: (1)the interest of the public generally as distinguished from
prerogatives in pursuing a lawful endeavor and in protecting its investments. A those of a particular class require its exercise and (2)the means employed are
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
the means employed for its accomplishment for even under the guise of oppressive upon individuals. There must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
protecting public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property and a lawful method.
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Also, Sec 6 of the ordinance 1. Sec 5 is unreasonable and impossible to comply with – There are 3 forms of
which requires a buffer zone violates the due process clause because it ground spraying as distinguished from aerial spraying: truck-mounted boom
unreasonably deprives plantation owners of the lawful and beneficial use of such spraying, manual spraying and sprinkler spraying. The truck-mounted
areas to be ceded, without just compensation. spraying requires road networks which is impossible to achieve in three
months while manual spraying and sprinkler spraying raises concerns on the
FACTS: health of the workers as well as its inefficiency in protecting plantations.
1. The City of Davao passed an ordinance which bans the method of aerial Although the truck-spraying method is the most feasible, it is physically
spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all impossible for petitioners to adopt it within 3 mos. Sec 5 compels them to
entities in Davao. Sec 5 of the ordinance provides that the ban shall be abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to convert and
enforced 3 mos after the ordinance' effectivity. Sec 6 of the ordinance also adopt other spraying practices. Also, the whole ordinance must be declared
requires that a 30-meter buffer zone be created within the boundaries of the unconstitutional because it lacks a separability clause. A separability clause
plantations. The ordinance was published in the Mindanao Pioneer and was is a part of a statute which states that if any provision of the act is declared
scheduled to be enforced starting June 2007. The Sangguniang Panlungsod invalid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby. The absence of a
did not transmit an official copy of the ordinance to the Official Gazette. separability clause rules out the presumption of separability, thus, the
2. On Apr 2007 the petitioners filed for a TRO and a preliminary injunction. measure should be treated as a whole and the nullity of one provision
The TC granted the writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) and found that the invalidates the rest. Since Sec 5 was declared infirm and the ordinance has
period of 3 mos was unreasonable. The TC enjoined respondents from no separability clause, the whole measure must be struck down as
enforcing the ordinance for another 3 mos. unconstitutional.
3. On Sep 2007 the TC found the ordinance valid and constitutional. The 2. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution – The
equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the without the payment of just compensation. Sec 6 of the ordinance therefore
laws on all persons or things without distinction. What it requires is equality constitutes an unlawful taking of the property without due process.
among equals as determined according to a valid classification or a
grouping of things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from all others in these same particulars. The total ban on aerial spraying
runs afoul with the equal protection clause because it does not classify
which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially even as
reasonable distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or
beneficial effects of liquid substances to the public health, livelihood and
the environment. The measure also fails to differentiate among classes of
pesticides or fungicides and does not distinguish levels of concentration of
each substance when aerially sprayed, such that even substances beneficial
to agricultural production are covered by the ban.
3. The means employed provided for in the ordinance has no relation to the
purpose sought to be achieved – Even if the ordinance was enacted to
protect the public and the environment against the harmful effects of
aerially spraying pesticides or fungicides, there is no reasonable relation
between such purpose and the measure to ban aerial spraying of all forms of
substances, not only fungicides or pesticides, as the ordinance imposes. In
effect, the ordinance forbids the aerial spraying of vitamins or minerals and
other substances which are safe and normally enhance growth and harvest.
This amounts to an arbitrary intrusion into petitioners' prerogatives in
pursuing a lawful endeavor and in protecting its investments, exceeding
what may be fairly required by the legitimate demands of public welfare.
The indiscriminate ban on aerial spraying has no reasonable relation to the
public purpose for which the ordinance was enacted. Without a lawful
method concurring with the lawful subject, the measure is an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights and therefore offends due process.
4. The ordinance is tantamount to confiscation of property without due process
of law – Sec 6 of the ordinance requires that all agricultural entities must
provide for a 30-meter buffer zone within the boundaries of their
agricultural farms/plantations. The requirement however, makes no fair
distinction as to the area or size of the plantation over which the buffer zone
would be established. Owners of small farms which could meagerly
accommodate low-budget agricultural activity would have to cede portions
of their land for the buffer zone, downsizing the area to be cultivated and
constricting the viability of their lands for profitable endeavors. Thus, the
requirement violates the due process clause because it unreasonably
deprives plantation owners of the lawful and beneficial use of the land to be
ceded without just compensation. Moreover, the area to be ceded is not a
noxious property. Banana plantations per se are not noxious to the public
welfare. Police power therefore, cannot be invoked to justify a compulsion
for plantation owners to cede a portion of their property as a buffer zone
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY v.TREASURER 2. In the case at bar, the aforementioned requisites were not met for it taxes
February 17, 1968 | Bengzon, J.P., J. | Certiorari | Equal Protection only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by Ormoc Sugar Company
and none other. For a classification in a law to be reasonable, it should be in
SUMMARY: The City of Ormoc passed an ordinance levying tax on Ormoc terms applicable to future conditions. The ordinance must not be singular
Sugar Company alleging that it is not violative of the equal protection clause and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central of
since it is the only sugar mill in the city during that time. The SC thought the same class as plaintiff.
otherwise and averred that for an ordinance to be constitutional it must not isolate 3. Although during the time of enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company is the only
a single entity and must be applicable to all in the same class. sugar central in the city, Section 1 conclusively states that even if a later
DOCTRINE:See Ratio 1. company is set up, it cannot be subject to tax because the ordinance
expressly points to Ormoc Sugar Company as the entity to be levied upon.
1. On Jan 9, 1964, Municipal Board of Ormoc passed Ordinace No. 4
imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to
one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and
other  foreign  countries.”  
2. Ormoc Sugar Company paid said tax and filed a complaint in the CFI
against the Municipal Board, Mayor and Treasurer alleging that the
ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity
in taxation. Furthermore, the tax is allegedly not a production or license tax
which is allowed to be imposed under the Local Autonomy Act.
3. Defendants answered by asserting that said tax is allowed within the
defendant  city’s  power  and  it  did  not violate any constitutionally protected
4. The CFI ruled for the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Ormoc Sugar
Company appealed.

ISSUE/S: WoN the tax imposed is violative of the equal protection clause? -

RULING: Assailed decision is reversed. Ordinance is unconstitutional.

1. We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially
identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those
who belong to the same class.
DUMLAO v. COMELEC classified differently from younger employees for those of that age are
January 22, 1980 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Prohibition, Injunction | Equal subject to compulsory retirement. Possible classifications:
Protection a. Age (No): OSG argues that the policy was good insofar as it
promotes the emergence  of  younger  blood  in  “our  political  elective  
SUMMARY: Dumlao, retired Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, sought to run for the echelons”.  This  cannot  hold  for  persons  more  than  65  may  also  be  
same office but is prohibited by Sec 4 of BP 52 (retired who received retirement good elective officials.
benefits from office and over 65 disqualified from running for the same office). b. Retirement (No): 1) There may also be retirees below 65. 2) It is
Petitioners also assail the provision for disqualifying people accused of crimes not reasonable to disqualify retirees above 65 for they could be
from running for public office. SC upheld the validity of the special good officials like one aged 65 but is not a retiree.
disqualification for being a reasonable classification but declared invalid the c. 65, elective local official retired from the same local office
prohibition based on a judgment of conviction for failing to place a classification. (Yes): There is reason for disqualifying him from running for the
DOCTRINE: The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is same office. There is a new blood for the tiredness of the retiree
subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real from government work is present, so far as he has already declared
differentiations, one class can be treated differently from another class. himself tired and unavailable for the same government work,
which by change of mind, he would like to assume again. Here
FACTS: distinction becomes reasonable.
1. Petitioners seek to prohibit COMELEC from implementing certain 2. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification; what is
provisions of BP 52 for being unconstitutional. Sec 4 of said BP presents a merely proscribed is classification w/c is arbitrary and unreasonable.
special   disqualification   for   elective   officials,   “Any   retired   elective Reasonable classification must be based on substantial distinctions, where
provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have belonging to the same class. To justify the nullification of law, there must
been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution for it is a legislative
seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local prerogative to prescribe qualifications.
office from which he has retired.”  They  also  assail  2nd paragraph of Sec 4, 3. On Par 2: presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings and the
“a   judgment   of   conviction   for   any   of   the   aforementioned   crimes   shall   be   accused shall enjoy the right to be heard. Here, the accused is disqualified
conclusive  evidence  of  such  fact.” from running for public office once charges have been filed against him. He
2. Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya who filed his is in effect placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
certificate of candidacy for position of Governor in the upcoming elections. crime with a penalty of arresto mayor, w/c carries with it the accessory
He argues that par. 1 of Sec 4 is discriminatory and contrary to penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of his
constitutional guarantees of equal protection & due process. Co-petitioners sentence. A legislative or administrative determination of guilt should not
Igot and Salapatan assail the constitutionality of par. 2. be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.

ISSUE/S: Teehankee (Separate Opinion): Persons similarly situated are not similarly
1. WoN the special disqualification is unconstitutional—NO. treated ie retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor can run for governor both
2. WoN the presumption of guilt is unconstitutional—YES. are 65 and retirees but one is barred from running for the office of governor.
Also, if they have not received their retirement benefits, they are not disqualified
RULING: Sec 4 of BP 52 re Special Disqualification VALID. Par 2 INVALID. disqualification  and  consequent  classification  as  “old  blood”  or  “new  blood”  
must not hinge on an irrelevant question of WoN they have received their
RATIO: retirement benefits. Thus, classification is not based on substantial distinctions.
1. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated differently from another class.
Here, for purposes of public service, employees over 65 have been validly
QUINTO v. COMELEC officials are not covered because the very nature of their office is to engage
February 22, 2010 | Puno, C.J. | Motion for Reconsideration | Equal Protection in partisan political activities.
2. TheFarinas, et al. v Executive Secretarydecision is controlling in this case.
SUMMARY: COMELEC, Senators Roxas and Drilon, and Tom Apacible filed This case held that the difference created by the Legislature in the
for motions of reconsideration asking the reversal of the decision for the petition classification of elective and appointive officials is proper for there are
of Quinto and Tolentino. This petition declared provisions of the law and significant and material distinctions between the two. The equal protection
resolution of COMELEC, prohibiting public appointive officials from continuing of the law is not absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. It does
to discharge their duties upon filing for candidacy and not holding elective not demand absolute equality among people because it merely requires that
officials in the same breadth, as unconstitutional. SC: reversed assailed decision. all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions.
DOCTRINE: Four requisites to determine if classification by legislature is valid. 3. There are 4 requisites to determine if classification is valid. 1st,
First, classification rests on substantial distinctions. Second, it is germane to the classification rests on substantial distinctions. 2nd, it is germane to the
purposes of law. Third, it is not limited to existing conditions only. Last, it applies purposes of law. 3rd, it is not limited to existing conditions only. Last, it
equally to all members of the same class. applies equally to all members of the same class. In the case at bar, only the
2nd req. can be deemed questioned if applicable. For example, a member of
FACTS: the cabinet could wield the same influence as the vice-president who at the
1. This is a motion for reconsideration from COMELEC and movant- same time is appointed to a cabinet post. With the fact that they both head
intervenors with regard to a decision that declared the 2 ndproviso in the 3rd executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently.
paragraph of Sec 13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election and 4. Aforementioned example is an injustice that Congress needs to address but
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 as unconstitutional. they can proceed  at  it  “1  step  at  a  time.”  In  addressing  a  societal  concern,  
2. This allowed public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, Congress must draw lines & make choices, thereby creating some inequity
prerogatives & functions of their office despite their entry unto the political as to those included or excluded. But as long as the bounds of reasonable
arena. choice  aren’t  excluded,  courts  must  defer  to  legislative judgment. The fact
3. The motion argued that: (1) the assailed decision is contrary to the that   a   legislative   classification,   by   itself,   is   underinclusive   won’t   render   it  
constitutional proscription against participation of public appointive unconstitutional   b/c   there’s   no   constitutional   req’t   that   Congress   must   be  
appointive officials and members of the military in partisan activity; (2) the rigidly held to the choice of regulating all or none.
assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they 5. Any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly
give differential treatment to elective and appointive officials because the show that the law creates a classification that is arbitrary and capricious. He
treatment rests on material distinction and is germane to the purposes of must refute all rational bases for the differing treatment and respondents
law; (3) assailed provisions do not suffer from overbreadth; and (4) there is herein failed to discharge this heavy burden.
a compelling need to reverse the assailed decision for public interest. 6. The assailed provisions are neither overbreath. It was argued that the evils
sought to be prevented is when incumbent appointive officials who run for
ISSUE/S: WoN declaring public appointive officials ipso facto resigned from elective posts hold influential posts. The provisions are therefore
their positions upon filing for candidacy and not including elective officials, overreaching for it indiscriminately includes all civil servants, with or
violative of the equal protection clause? - NO without influence that can be used during elections. This argument is
erroneous because it fails to account for the large and growing bureaucracy.
RULING: Decision reversed. Assailed provisions, resolution constitutional. There is always the possible danger of systematic abuse by a powerful
political machine that has control on the masses of government workers,
RATIO: giving itself unbreakable grasp on the reins of power.
1. The assailed provisions of the law implement Section 2(4) of Article IX-B 7. Courts have always taken a careful approach when it comes to the
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibit civil service officers and employees overbreadth doctrine. Claims of such have been entertained only when, for
from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political activity. At the example, the possibility that the negative effect of muted protected speech
same time, this section of the Constitution applies only to civil servants of others outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some
holding apolitical offices and does not cover elected officials. Elective unprotected speech to go unpunished. In the case at bar, the probable harm
in permitting the incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as Clause of the Constitution -NO
they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of
having protected candidacies blocked by the possible effect of potentially RULING: The Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional.
overly broad statutes.
1. The Nov 2008 decision and the Aug 2010 resolution hold that the Cityhood
Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local
LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC Government Code particularly Sec 450 as amended by RA 9009 which
February 15, 2011 | Bersamin, J. | Motion for Reconsideration | Equal Protection states that:

SUMMARY: The League of Cities of the Philippines and several other “Section   450.   Requisites for Creation. –a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 16 laws (Cityhood Laws) which converted into a component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least
converted the municipalities covered by the laws into component cities and two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
sought to enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the requisites:
subject laws. The court held that the laws are constitutional. xxxxx
DOCTRINE: The Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
valid classification provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions (2) is income.”
germane to the purpose of law (3) is not limited to existing conditions only and
(4) applies equally to all members of the same class. The existence of substantial The Congress however, intended that those with pending Cityhood bills
distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the laws lies in during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new law and higher
the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component income requirement. Also, the exemption clauses found in the individual
cities of their provinces. Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of the intent to exempt the
municipalities from RA 9009. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted
FACTS: the municipalities from RA 9009, the Cityhood Laws are therefore
1. Before RA 9009—which increased the income requirement for amendments to the Local Government Code itself. Hence, the Nov 2008
municipalities to become cities from P20M to P100M—was introduced by decision and Aug 2010 resolution which hold that the exemption clauses in
Sen. Pimentel, there were 57 bills filed for conversion of 57 municipalities the Cityhood Laws are not found in the Local Government Code are
into component cities. During the 11th Congress, 33 of these bills were reversed.
enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were
the 16 municipalities that were converted into component cities through the 2. The Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal protection clause. The Equal
Cityhood laws. Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification
2. The League of Cities of the Philippines, the City of Iloilo, the City of provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions (2) is germane to the
Calbayog and Jerry Trenas assailed the constitutionality of the 16 laws. purpose of law (3) is not limited to existing conditions only and (4) applies
3. On Nov 18 2008, the Court En Banc granted the petitions and struck down equally to all members of the same class. The petitioners argue that there is
the laws as unconstitutional for violating Secs 10 and 6, Article X, and the no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood
equal protection clause.On Dec 21 2009 the Court En Banc declared the bills in the 11th Congress and those that did not have pending bills and that
Cityhood Laws as constitutional.On Aug 24, 2010 the Court En Banc the pendency is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality
resolved the Ad Cautelam MR and Motion to Annul Dec 2009 Decision. from another for the purpose of income requirement. The court held
Hence, the case at bar. however that:
o The imposition of the income requirement of P100M was to make it
ISSUE/S: difficult for municipalities to become component cities. There was no
1. WoN the Cityhood Laws violate Art X. Sec 10 of the Constitution -NO empirical evidence to support this amount. This being the case, P100M
2. WoN the Cityhood Laws violate Sec 6, Art X and the Equal Protection cannot be conclusively said to be the only amount sufficient to provide
for all essential government facilities and services. This is evident from
the existing cities which do not comply with the P100M requirement,
some of which have even lower that P20M average annual income.
o The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the
purpose of the Local Government Code and not RA 9009. The
substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become component cities. Congress, by enacting the
cityhood laws, recognized this capacity of the municipalities to become
the State's partners in accelerating economic growth and development
in the provincial regions which is the very thrust of the Local
Government Code. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert
into component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the purpose of
the Local Government Code which is to make the local government
units enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partner in the attainment of national goals which is
the very mandate of the Constitution.
o The petitioners' complaint about the purported reduction of their share
in the IRA was proved false when after the implementation of the
Cityhood Laws, their respective shares increased, not decreased. The
court held that the petitioners' issue all boils down to money and how
much more they would receive if respondent municipalities remain as
municipalities and not share in the 23% fixed IRA from the national
government to the cities.
o In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, the Congress merely took the
16 municipalities which were at a disadvantaged position and were
really on the same footing as the 33 municipalities which were
converted into cities prior to RA 9009.
o The petitioners complained of the projects they will not be able to
pursue. The court held however that the petitioners ignored the
respondents' obligations arising from contracts and projects they have
initiated and completed as component cities.
PEOPLE v. CAYAT established.
May 5, 1939 | Moran, J. | Appeal | Equal Protection Clause b. The classification is germane to the purposes of law. The prohibition is
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-christian
tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past that the free use of
SUMMARY: Cayat was found guilty of violating Act 1639 which prevents intoxicating liquors by the non-christian tribes have often resulted in
members of non-Christian Tribes from possessing intoxicating liquor. He lawlessness and crimes thereby hampering the efforts of the
challenged the act and assailed its constitutionality. The court held that the act government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
does not violate the equal protection clause as it satisfies the requirements on c. The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the
reasonable classification. time of its enactment. The act was not predicated upon the assumption
DOCTRINE: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty that the non-christian tribes are impermeable to any civilizing
of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on influence. On the contrary, the legislature understood that the
reasonable classification. For the classification to be reasonable, it must: (1) rest civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it
on substantial distinctions (2) be germane to the purposes of the law (3) not be must go measures of protection and security.
limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all members of the d. The act applies equally to all members of the class. The argument that
same class. The act satisfies these requirements. the act is unfair to non-christian tribes by reason of their culture is not
an argument against the equality of the act's application.
FACTS: 2. The provision that empowers (Sec 2) authorized agents of the government
Cayat was found guilty of violating Secs 2 and 3 of Act 1639 which makes it to seize and destroy prohibited liquor in the possession of members of non-
unlawful for members of non-Christian tribes to buy, receive, possess or drink christian tribes does not violate the due process clause because due process
intoxicating liquors other than the native wines which the members of such does not always require notice and hearing. This rule is especially true
tribes were accustomed to making. He was sentenced to pay P50.00 or suffer where much must be left to the discretion of administrative officials in
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cayat challenged the applying a law to particular cases. Due process of law simply means: (1)that
constitutionality of the act. there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the government (2)that it shall be reasonable in its
ISSUE/S: operation (3)that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
1. WoN the act denies the equal protection of the laws – NO procedure prescribed and (4)that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of
2. WoN the act violates the due process clause -NO the state or to all of a class.
3. WoN the act is an improper exercise of police power – NO 3. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and
good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its
RULING: TC judgement AFFIRMED. resources, and to add to its wealth and prosperity is a legitimate exercise of
police power. Act 1639 is designed to promote peace and order in the non-
RATIO: christian tribes so as to remove all the obstacles to their moral and
1. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the intellectual growth and eventually hasten their equalization and unification
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on with the rest of their Christian brothers. The law does not seek to mark the
reasonable classification. For the classification to be reasonable, it must: (1) non-christian tribes as an inferior race. On the contrary, the measure
rest on substantial distinctions (2) be germane to the purposes of the law (3) adopted is for the promotion of their inherent right to equality in the
not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all enjoyment of the privileges that their Christian brothers enjoy.
members of the same class. The act satisfies these requirements.
a. The classification rests on real or substantial distinctions for the act was
intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-christian
tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members of the non-christian
tribes who have reached a position of cultural equality with their
Christian brothers cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification
ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ 2. In this case, the Court held that there is a general public sentiment that the
May 31, 1957 | Labrador, J. | Injunction and Mandamus | Equal Protection alien   retailer   holds   a   controlling   and   dominant   position   in   the   nation’s  
economy (as proven by statistics)—controlling food, clothing, and almost
SUMMARY: RA 1180 prohibiting and limiting alien residents from engaging in all articles of daily life. The dangers arising from alien control and
retail trade, was upheld by the Court as constitutional for providing a reasonable domination in retail is founded on their ability to endanger national interest,
classification. economy, and security in its power to fix prices and supply. This factual
DOCTRINE: Requirements for equal protection: applies alike to all persons w/in milieu   reflects   the   legislation’s   purpose   and   target   in   the   enactment   of   the  
such class, and 2) reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between disputed nationalization law. The Court also held that such reasonable
those who fall within such class and those who do not. distinction exists primarily in the fact that alien residents owe no such
allegiance to the country and the control and is naturally lacking in that
FACTS: spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino consumers as
1. Petitioner Lao Ichong, for and in his own behalf of other alien residents, would prevent him from taking advantage of their weaknesses and
partnerships and corporations adversely affected by RA 1180, brought this exploiting them. Also, the alien makes no genuine contribution to national
action to obtain judicial declaration of unconstitutionality and to enjoin the income and wealth, his stay being transient and temporary, not investing in
Secretary of Finance and city and municipal treasurers from enforcing its industries that would help the economy and increase national wealth.
provisions. 3. Citizenship has been held to be a legal and valid ground for classification in
2. RA  1180,  “An  Act  to  Regulate  the  Retail  Business”,  nationalizes  the  retail   the exercise of police power. Aliens are under no special constitutional
trade business. Its main provisions include: 1) prohibitions against aliens protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because
from engaging directly or indirectly in retail trade; 2) an exception is made the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. This would
for aliens (natural persons) actually engaged in retail allowed to continue require a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar
until forfeiture of license, death, or retirement; and for 10 years in case of classes of citizens. And when the classification is actual, real and
juridical persons; 3) exception in favor of citizens and juridical entities of reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, legislation is
the US; 4) prohibition against aliens actually engaged from opening generally upheld to be within legislative prerogative, since the wisdom of
additional branches, etc. the law shall not be adjudged by the Court.
3. Petitioner argues that the Act is violative of equal protection, and is merely
the result of racialism and pure and unabashed nationalism.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Act is violative of equal protection of the laws—NO.

RULING: Petition DENIED. Act NOT unconstitutional.

1. The equal protection clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, but is not intended to prohibit legislation. Police power and
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection are supposed
to co-exist; and the balancing is the indispensable means for the attainment
of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. While constitutional
guarantees make no distinction accdg to race, color or nationality, equal
protection does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons be treated alike under like circumstances and
conditions. Thus, the requirements for its exercise are 1) it applies alike to
all persons w/in such class, and 2) reasonable ground exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
KOREMATSU v. U.S. assembly or relocation center would have illegally him of his liberty, the
December 18, 1944 | Black. J. | Equal Protection exclusion order and his conviction under is also illegal.

SUMMARY: Korematsu was convicted of violating an order that prohibits ISSUE/S:  Whether  or  not  the  exclusion  order  as  well  as  Korematsu’s  conviction  
people of Japanese descent from entering or remaining in areas designated as for violation thereof was valid – YES
military areasas a measure against espionage and sabotage. The Court upheld the
conviction as well the validity of the exclusion orderstating that the exclusion was RULING: Conviction affirmed.
necessary since the U.S. was at war with Japan.
DOCTRINE: Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their RATIO:
homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent 1. The various orders imposed separate requirements for the evacuation of
with basic governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modern those with Japanese ancestry namely, (1) depart from the area; (2) report to
warfare the country is threatened by hostile forces the power to protect must be and temporarily remain in an assembly center; (3) go under military control
commensurate with the threatened danger. to a relocation center there to remain for an indeterminate period until
. released conditionally or unconditionally by the military authorities.
FACTS: 2. These orders impose obligations which are separate from each other, insofar
1. Toyosaburo Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was as they were promulgated pursuant to congressional enactment, and
convicted in a federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, violations of each of them may be treated as separate offenses. The issue of
California, a 'Military Area', contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 the validity of the exclusion order is separate from that of the validity of a
(issued May 3, 1942) of the Commanding General of the Western detention order after exclusion has been effected.
Command, U.S. Army. Said Order directed that after May 9, 1942, all Korematsu’s   conviction   was   based   on   violation   on   the   order   of   exclusion  
persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area. No order, not for failing to report or to remain in an assembly or relocation
question was raised as to his loyalty to the United States. center.. It cannot pass upon the issue regarding the validity of the other
2. The said Order was issued pursuant to Executive Order 9066,a measure provisions since they have not been raised as issues.
issued as a protection against espionage and against sabotage to national- 3. The Court employed strict scrutiny, stating that all legal restrictions which
defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities, curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. In
and also the March 21, 1942 Act of Congress. doing so, it sustained the validity of the exclusion order at the time it was
3. The 1942 Act provides a penalty of fine or imprisonment for an act of made and when Korematsu violated it, since the exclusion of those with
misdemeanor with the following elements: (1) anyone who enters, remains Japanese ancestry was deemed necessary because of the presence of certain
in, leaves, or commits any act in any military area or military zone;(2) such people within the group that are disloyal to the U.S. (It is alleged that some
area or zone is prescribed by the authority of the President, the Secretary of of them do not want to pledge unconditional allegiance to the U.S. and to
War or any military commander designated by the Secretary of War; (3) the renounce allegiance to the Japanese Emperor, while others have requested
act was contrary to the restrictions in such area or contrary to the orders of to be repatriated to Japan).
the Secretary of War or any such military commander; (4) he is aware of the 4. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to
existence and extent of such restrictions and that he was in violation thereof. him or his race. He was excluded because of the war with Japan. There fear
4. Korematsu, however, contends that by the time the Order was issue, all of an invasion of the West Coast and the military felt constrained to take
threat of Japanese invasion in the West Coast had disappeared. proper security measures. As such, they decided that the military urgency of
Furthermore, it is to be noted that on May 19, 1942, (11 days before he was the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated
charged)Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1 was issued which provided for from the West Coast temporarily. Finally, Congress, reposing its confidence
detention of those of Japanese ancestry in assembly or relocation centers. In during wartime in the military, has determined that they should have the
connection with this, he alleges that there were conflicting orders on power to do the exclusion.
whether they should vacate the area or remain there, and contends that the
orders must be treated as one and inseparable such that if detention in the
PLESSY v. FERGUSON races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting or requiring their
May 18, 1896 | Brown, J. | Equal Protection separation do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other
and have been generally recognized as within the competency of state
SUMMARY: Plessy was arrested for violating a Louisiana statute which legislatures in the exercise of their police power.
requires for the segregation of the white and the colored races in railway 3. Every exercise of police power must be reasonable, and extend only to such
compartments. The US Supreme Court upheld the segregation. laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and
DOCTRINE: Separate but equal: Facilities which segregate based on race is not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class. As such, the
consistent with the 14th Amendment so long as they are equal. statute is reasonable.
4. When the government has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before
FACTS: the law, and equal rights for opportunities and improvements, it has
1. The State of Louisiana passed an act requiring railroad companies to accomplished the end for which it was organized. Legislation is powerless
provide separate but equal accommodations for the white and colored races, to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical
with an exception for nurses attending to the children of the other race. A differences. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one
fine of $25 or imprisonment of not more than 25 days is imposed on cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to
passengers who occupies a compartment not designated for his race, and on the other socially, the constitution of the US cannot put them upon the same
officers who assign the same. Anyone who refuses to occupy a coach plane. (In other words, so long as the government affords them equality
assigned by the officer will be refused carriage without any liability for before the law, civilly and politically, whatever inequality that happens in
damages. the social sphere is immaterial. The government cannot do anything about
2. Plessy, who was 7/8 Caucasian (but predominantly black in appearance), it.)
took a vacant seat in the section for whites. He was ordered to vacate the
coach and take a seat in the colored section but he refused and was forcibly Justice Harlan, dissenting:
ejected and arrested. Purpose of the statute is to exclude the colored people from coaches
3. Plaintiff: Act conflicts with the 13th Amendment, abolishing slavery, and occupied by whites.
the 14th Amendment, which prohibits certain legislation on the parts of the The constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
states. among citizens.
State enactments regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the base of
ISSUE/S: WoN the act providing for segregation of whites and colored races in race, and cunningly devise to defeat the purpose of the [civil] war, under the
railway carriages is unconstitutional – NO. pretense of recognizing equality of rights, can have no other result than to
render permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a conflict of races, the
RULING: Judgment of lower court AFFIRMED. continuance of which must do harm to all concerned.
1. 13th A: No conflict. Slavery implies involuntary servitude; ownership of
mankind as a chattel. The act of a mere individual refusing accommodations
to colored people cannot be justly regarded as imposing any badge of
slavery or servitude upon the applicant, but only as an ordinary civil injury
properly cognizable by the laws and subject to redress until contrary
appears. A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the
white and colored races has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the
two races or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude.
2. 14th A: Although the object of the amendment was to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, in the nature of things, it could not
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce
social, as distinguished from political, equality or a commingling of the two
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA REGENTS v. BAKKE RULING: Judgment affirmed   insofar   as   it   ordered   respondent’s   admission   to  
June 28, 1978 | Powell, J. | Equal Protection Clause Davis and invalidated the special admissions program, but reversed insofar as it
prohibited petitioner from using race as a factor in future admissions decisions.
SUMMARY: Allan Bakke, a white male, was twice rejected from UC Medical
School. He contested their special admissions program, which allowed certain RATIO:
disadvantaged minority applicants to be ranked only against each other and not 1. Petitioner argues that the program  is  a  “goal”  of  minority  representation  in  
against the general applicant pool, and exempted them from the GPA cut-off. the Medical School, while respondent labels it a racial quota. The
The Court held that the program violated the Equal Protection Clause but distinction is immaterial. The special admissions program is a classification
considering race was a factor was not in itself unconstitutional as it was in based on race and ethnic background. To the extent that there existed a pool
pursuit of a legitimate state interest. of at least minimally qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special
DOCTRINE: Strict racial quotas are unconstitutional, but affirmative action is admissions seats, white applicants could compete only for 84 seats in the
permissible. Equal protection is not merely based on a two-class theory. entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants. Whether the
limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of
FACTS: race and ethnic status, and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause.
1. Respondent Allan Bakke, a white male, twice applied to the Medical School 2. Because the landmark decisions in equal protection arose in response to the
of the University of California at Davis, and was rejected both times. Davis continued exclusion of Negroes from mainstream American society, they
had two programs: regular admission and the special admissions program. could be characterized as involving discrimination by the "majority" white
the  latter  program  allowed  “disadvantaged”  applicants  of  a  minority  group   race against the Negro minority. But they need not be read as depending
to be exempt from certain requirements in the former program, such as by upon that characterization for their results. Over the years the Court
exempting them from the 2.5 GPA cut-off and by not ranking them against consistently repudiated   “distinctions   between   citizens   solely   because   of  
candidates in the general admission program. No disadvantaged whites their ancestry" as being "odious to a free people whose institutions are
were admitted under the special program although many had applied. founded upon the doctrine of equality." Equal protection is not merely
2. Respondent filed for mandatory, injunctive and declaratory relief to compel based  on  a  “two-class  theory”,  i.e.  differences  between white and Negro.
his admission to Davis, alleging that the special admissions program 3. Granting preferential treatment is intractable. There is no principled basis
operated to exclude him on the basis of his race in violation of the Equal for  deciding  which  groups  would  merit  “heightened  judicial  solicitude”  and  
Protection Clause, a provision of the California Constitution, and Sec. 601, which would not. Political judgments regarding the necessity for the
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance, but the standard
3. The TC found that the special program operated as a racial quota since the of justification will remain constant.And although petitioner cited
minority applicants were only rated against each other and had 16 reserved jurisprudence with race-conscious remedies,they were inapplicable as there
slots in the class of 100, and held the special program as violative of the was no history of racial discrimination at Davis to remedy.
Federal   and   State   Constitutions   and   Title   VI.   However,   respondent’s   4. Classification is justifiable when there is a compelling governmental
admission was not admitted. The California SC, using the strict scrutiny interest   and   appropriate   fit   with   such   interest.   Petitioner’s   assertions   that  
standard, held that the special admissions program was not the least there was a compelling interest in increasing the number of minority doctors
intrusive means of achieving the goals of the compelling state interest of and that the program would help bring doctors to underserved parts of
integrating the medical profession and increasing doctors willing to serve California were rejected, but they held that there was an interest in
minority patients, and that the special admissions program violated the promoting a diverse student body that would have students that will
Equal Protection  Clause,  and  ordered  respondent’s  admission  to  Davis. contribute   most   to   the   “robust   exchange   of   ideas”;;   in   pursuit   of   such
diversity, considering race or ethnic background is permissible, but it
ISSUE/S: WoN the special admissions program violated the equal protection should be done through less restrictive programs which would not set rigid
clause - YES quotas for minorities.
WoN considering race as a factor in admissions violated the equal protection
clause – NO
GRATZ v. BOLLINGER important  to  the  Uni’s  composition  of  its  freshman  class.
June 23, 2003 | Rehnquist, C.J. | Equal Protection ISSUE/S:
1. WoN petitioners have standing – YES.
SUMMARY: An admission policy of the University of Michigan provides 2. WoN  the  University’s  use  of  racial preferences in undergraduate admissions
for an automatic distribution of 20 pts to underrepresented minority violate the Equal Protection Clause – YES.
applicants. Gratz and Hamacher contends that the policy violates EPC for
using racial preferences. RULING: District   Court’s   decision   granting   respondents   summary   judgment  
DOCTRINE: Admission criteria based on race must be narrowly tailored to REVERSED with respect to liability. Case remanded.
achieve a compelling interest. Race may be considered in an individual
assessment, but not as a sole or contributing factor for admission. RATIO:
1. Hamacher: The injury-in-fact necessary to establish standing is the denial of
FACTS: equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate
1. Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admission to the inability to obtain the benefit. 1) A party need only to demonstrate that it is
University  of  Michigan’s  College  of  Literature,  Science  and  the  Arts  (LSA)   able and ready to perform and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from
as residents of the State of Michigan but were both rejected, even though doing so on an equal basis: University denied him the opportunity to
Gratz  was  “well  qualified”,  Hamacher  “in  the  qualified  range”. compete for admission on an equal basis and he demonstrated that he was
2. The   University’s   Office   of   Undergraduate Admissions uses the guidelines “able  and  ready”  to  apply  as  a  transfer  student  should  the  university  cease  to  
for each academic year (which have been changed a number of times). use race in undergraduate admissions. 2) Criteria used to determine whether
OUA considers a number of factors in making admission decisions, a transfer applicant will contribute to diversity are identical to those used to
including HS grades, standardized test scores, HS quality, curriculum evaluate freshman applicants.
strength, geography, alumni relationships, leadership, and race. The 2. Strict scrutiny:  University’s  policy  which  automatically  distributes  20  pts  or  
University considers African –Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans 1/5 of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single
to be underrepresented minorities and admits virtually every qualified underrepresented minority applicant solely because of race (means) is not
applicant from these groups. narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity (purpose).
1995- GPA   +   “SCUGA”   factors:   quality of HS (S), strength of HS 3. In Bakke, Justice Powell states that employing an admission program in
1996 curriculum (C), unusual circumstances (U), geographical residence which   race   may   be   deemed   a   plus   in   an   applicant’s   file   would   be  
(G) and alumni relationships (A). = GPA 2 score. Put into guideline permissible, provided that each particular applicant be considered
tables: GPA 2: Y axis, ACT/SAT score: X axis. Tables divided into individually, assessing all that the individual possesses, and evaluating his
cells: admit, reject, delay for add. info, postpone for reconsideration. ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education.
*diff admission outcomes based on racial status. 4. The current LSA policy does not provide the individualized consideration
1997 Additional  points  for  “U”:  underrepresented  minority,  socioeconomic   being contemplated. The only consideration that accompanies this
disadvantage, etc. distribution is whether or not an individual is a member of one of these
1998 Selection index: applicant can score max of 150 pts.100-150: admit; minority groups. Instead of considering how the differing backgrounds,
95-99: admit or postpone; 90-94: postpone or admit; 75-89: delay or experiences and characteristics of students might benefit the University,
postpone; 74 and below (delay or reject). admission counselors would simply award 20 points to minority applicants
*members of underrepresented minority entitled to 20 pts because their applications indicate that they belong to the minority.
*95-98: qualified minority applicants admitted as soon as possible. Eligible 5. The   possibility   of   an   applicant’s   file   to   be   flagged   for   individualized  
for protected seats: athletes, foreign students, ROTC candidates, consideration is of little consequence. Such consideration is merely an
underrepresented minorities. exception and not the rule. The individualized review is only provided after
1999- Additional level of consideration: counselors may, in their discretion, admissions counselors have already automatically distributed the additional
2000 flag an application for the ARC to review after determining that 20 points. Such has the effect of making race a decisive factor for virtually
applicant is: 1) academically prepared to succeed at the Uni, 2) every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.
achieved minimum selection index score, and 3) possesses a quality
June  23  2003  |  O’Connor, J.| Certiorari to US SC | Equal Protection Clause
SUMMARY: Bakke,  a  Caucasian,  assails  the  U  of  Michigan  Law  School’s  race- 1. All  gov’t  racial  classifications  must  be  analyzed  by  a  reviewing  court  under  
conscious admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause after being strict scrutiny. Race-based action necessary to   further   a   compelling   gov’t  
denied admission. SC: Valid. Compelling interest of diversity, narrowly tailored. interest does not violate the equal protection clause so long as it is narrowly
DOCTRINE:Race-based action necessary   to  further  a  compelling   gov’t  interest   tailored to further that interest (Shaw v Hunt).
does not violate the equal protection clause so long as it is narrowly tailored to 2. Diversity, not just Race, as Compelling Interest: The Court endorses
further that interest. Justice   Powell’s   view   in   the Bakke case that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest in the context of university admissions, w/c has
FACTS: been the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions
1. The University of Michigan Law School follows an official admissions policies. Grounding his analysis in academic freedom, he emphasized that
policy that seeks to achieve student body diversity by complying with the the  nation’s  future  depends  upon  leaders  trained  through  wide  exposure  to  
Bakke case. The policy evaluates applicants on scores (LSAT, GPA, the ideas and mores of students as diverse as the nation. However, he also
recommendations)   &   the   “soft   variables”   (recommenders’   enthusiasm,   says   that   ‘diversity’   does   not   amount   merely   to   simple   ethnic   diversity  
quality of undergraduate institution, essay, etc). The policy does not define (where a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to
diversity solely in terms of racial and ethnic status nor does it restrict the be members of selected ethnic groups) but one that encompasses a far
types  of  diversity  contributions  eligible  for  ‘substantial  weight’,  but  it  does   broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
reaffirm  the  Law  School’s  commitment  to  diversity  with  special reference origin  is  but  a  single  though  important  element.”   In this case, Court defers
to including African-American, Hispanic, and Native American students to the Law School’s judgment that diversity is essential to its educational
who otherwise might not be represented in the student body in meaningful mission. Expert studies show that diversity promotes cross-racial
numbers.   By   enrolling   a   “critical   mass”   (e.g.   meaningful   representation   understanding, learning outcomes, better prepares students for the diverse
only; no number/percentage/range involved) of underrepresented minority workforce and legal profession. Since universities, esp. law schools, serve
students, the policy seeks to ensure their ability to contribute to the Law as   the   training   ground   for   many   of   the   Nation’s   leaders,   the   path   to  
School’s  character  and  the  legal  profession.     leadership must be open to talented individuals of every race and ethnicity.
2. Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident with 3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT 3. Narrowly Tailored: To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions
score, was denied admission. She filed this suit, alleging that respondents program  may  consider  race  or  ethnicity  only  as  a  ‘plus’-factor in a particular
had racially discriminated against her in violation of the 14 th Amendment, applicant’s   file,   i.e.   it   must   be   flexible   enough   to   consider   all   pertinent  
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that she was rejected because the Law elements  of  diversity  in  light  of  each  applicant’s  qualifications,  and  to  place  
School uses race as a predominant factor, giving applicants belonging to them on the same footing for consideration. Universities may not establish
certain minority groups a significantly greater chance for admission than quotas for members of certain racial/ethnic groups or put them on separate
students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups, and that admissions tracks. The Law School’s   individualized,   holistic   admission  
the School had no compelling interest to justify said use of race. program satisfies such – it ensures that all factors that may contribute to
3. District Court: use of race as admissions factor unlawful. CA 6th Circuit diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Court rejects the
reversed,  ruling  that  Justice  Powell’s  opinion  Bakke  was  binding  precedent   argument that the Law School should have used other race-neutral means to
establishing diversity as a compelling state interest and that the Law obtain the educational benefits of student body diversity – narrow tailoring
School’s  use  of  race  was  narrowly  tailored  b/c  race  was  merely  a  potential   does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race neutral alternative or
‘plus’   factor  and  b/c  the   Law  School’s  program   was   virtually  identical  to   mandate that a university choose between maintaining a reputation for
the Harvard admissions program described approvingly by Justice Powell excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide education opportunities to
& appended to his Bakke opinion. members  of  all  racial  groups.  It’s  enough  that  that  Law  School’s  admissions  
program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants. Finally, race-
ISSUE/S: WON   the   Law   School’s   race-conscious admission program violates conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. Court takes the Law
the Equal Protection Clause – NO. School at its word that it would like nothing better than to find a race-
neutral admissions formula and will terminate its use of racial preferences RATIO:
as soon as practicable. Court expects that in 25 years such use of racial 1. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, colour,
preferences will no longer be necessary. sex, religion and national origin; a plaintiff may bring an action against an
employer under a disparate treatment and/or disparate impact theory. The
case at bar falls under the former.
FRAGRANTE v. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU 2. In disparate treatment cases, the employer is normally alleged to have
March 6, 1989 | Trott, J. | Equal Protection treated  a  person  less  favourably  based  on  the  person’s  race,  colour,  religion,  
sex or national origin. To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment,
SUMMARY: Fragrante, a Filipino immigrant, was not selected for a clerk of plaintiff must show these four factors: (1) that he has identifiable national
court position, a job which required oral communication duties, due to his heavy origin; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
accent. He claimed that he was discriminated against based on national origin. employer was seeking applicants; (3) that he was rejected despite his
The Court held that a heavy accent was a legitimate reason for non-selection qualifications; and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open and
since it was relevant to performance of the job. the   employer   continued   to   seek   applicants   from   persons   of   complainant’s  
DOCTRINE: The presumption of employment discrimination may be qualifications. However, the burden of establishing the prima facie case for
overcome by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for adverse disparate treatment is not onerous and varies from case to case. The Court
action. did not pass upon whether or not Fragrante sufficiently established a prima
facie case and worked on the assumption that he did so.
FACTS: 3. Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer
1. Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Fragrante, a Filipino immigrant, applied as a to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating some legitimate,
clerk with the defendant-appellee, City and County of Honolulu. The non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. The Court held that
position involved tasks such as filing, processing mail, cashiering, orally defendant-appellees had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
providing   routine   information   to   the   “sometimes   contentious   public”   over   Fragrante’s   non-selection, but cautioned that an adverse employment
the telephone and at an information counter, and obtaining supplies. decision may be predicated upon an individual’s   accent   only   when   it  
2. Fragrante scored the highest of 721 test takers on the written Civil Service interfered materially with job performance. The record showed that
Examination for the position; however, after an interview conducted by interviewers   both   recorded   their   evaluation   of   Fragrante’s   problem   in  
Asst. Licensing Administrator George Kuwahara and Division Sec. Kalani separate written remarks on their rating sheets; thus, there was a legitimate
McCandless, he was not selected due to a perceived deficiency in relevant factual basis for the conclusion that Fragrante would be less able than his
oral communication skills by his heavy Filipino accent. Both interviewers competition to perform the required duties. The district court also noted that
had difficulty understanding Fragrante due to his accent and judged that it Fragrante had difficult manner of pronunciation and would often not
would interfere with his performance of certain aspects of the job. respond directly the propounded questions.
3. Fragrante alleged that he was discriminated against based on his national 4. After the employer presents legitimate reasons for plaintiff's non-selection,
origin, violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court held the burden shifts to the plaintiff, and he must show that the employer's
that effective communication abilities were a bona fide occupational purported reason for non-selection was "a pretext for invidious
qualification for the job in question and that the failure to hire Fragrante discrimination". Fragante essentially argued that the selection and
was caused by his deficiencies in oral communication, not his national evaluation procedures were so deficient as to render the proffered reason for
origin. Hence the instant appeal. non-selection nothing more than a pretext for national origin discrimination.
However, on examination it showed such was only a charge without
ISSUE/S: WoN there was a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act - NO substance. The process may not have been perfect, but it revealed no
discriminatory motive or intent.
RULING: District court is affirmed.
BRADWELL v. ILLINOIS ISSUE/S: WON  Bradwell’s  right  to  practice  law/admission to the bar in Illinois
April 15, 1873 | Miller, J. | Equal Protection Clause is protected by the 14th Amendment – NO.

SUMMARY: Mrs. Bradwell is denied the license to practice law in Illinois by RULING: Judgment AFFIRMED. Mrs. Bradwell not granted license to practice
the Illinois SC, since the law allegedly did not contemplate women practicing law in Illinois.
law. She questions the denial in Federal Court by invoking the 14 th Amendment
and the supposed right of every person, man or woman, to engage in any lawful RATIO:
employment for a livelihood. SC rules that 1. The Constitutional protection that  ‘citizens  of  each  State  shall  be  entitled  to  
DOCTRINE:.While there are privileges and immunities belonging to US citizens all the privileges and immunities of citizens   in   the   several   States’ is
which a State is forbidden to abridge, the right to admission to practice in the inapplicable to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained of, nor
courts of a particular State is not one of them. does  it  afford  protection  against  Illinois’  courts  or  legislation.  Plaintiff  must  
have seen this difficulty and attempts to avoid it by stating that she was
FACTS: born in Vermont. However, it is clear that at the time of her application, she
1. Mrs. Myra Bradwell, after obtaining the requisite qualifications, applied to was a US and Illinois citizen nor does she state anything to take her case out
the judges of the Illinois Supreme Court for a license to practice law in said of the definition of citizenship of a State ubnder Section 1,14 th Amendment.
State. This was accompanied by an affidavit claiming that she was born in 2. While there are privileges and immunities belonging to US citizens which a
Vermont and was formerly a citizen of that state. However, she is now both State is forbidden to abridge, the right to admission to practice in the courts
a US and Illinois citizen after residing in Chicago for many years. of a State is not one of them. Said right in no sense depends on citizenship.
According to the Chicago Statute, no individual is allowed to practice law And on whatever basis this right may be placed, as to the courts of a State,
without obtaining a license from 2 justices of the State SC. it would relate to citizenship of the State; as to Federal Courts, to
2. Illinois SC refused to issue Bradwell a license because her marital status citizenship of the US. Slaughter-House Cases clarifiy that the right to
would prevent her from being bound by her express or implied contracts control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a
which the law upholds between attorney and client. Said refusal was State is one of those powers which are not transferred for its protection to
anchored on an existing state statute prohibiting persons from practicing the  Federal  gov’t,  and its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by
law without a license obtained from 2 SC justices and the requirement of a citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such license.
certificate of good moral character. Other rules of admission are left to the
discretion to SC members, provided that (1) terms of admission must J. Bradley, concurring: Historically the right to engage in every profession has
promote the proper administration of justice and (2) SC should not admit not been one of the established fundamental privilege and immunities of the sex.
any persons or class of persons who are not intended by the legislature to be The law has alwaysrecognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
admitted, even though their exclusion is not expressly required by the destinies of man and woman. The harmony of interests and views that belong to
statute. The court said that granting Mrs. Bradwell a license would violate the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and
the 2nd limitation, since admitting women to engage in the practice of law independent careerfrom her husband.Also, historically women had no legal
was   not   contemplated   by   the   legislature   since   at   the   time   of   the   statute’s   existence, and were incapable of making bindingcontracts without  her  husband’s  
establishment,   the   US   had   adopted   England’s   Common   Law   System   in   consent. This played heavily in the Supreme Court of   Illinois’   decision.   The  
which female attorneys are unknown paramount destiny of women is to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife
3. Mrs. Bradwell brought the case to the Federal SC. Her counsel, Mr. and mother.
Carpenter, alleges that whatever the Illinois statute meant, the 14 th
amendment opens to every US citizen the honorable professions and servile
employments   of   life   under   the   ‘broad   shield   of   the   Constitution’.   Hence,  
only integrity, intelligence, and honor are the qualifications that can be
prescribed as conditions precedent to an entry upon any honorable pursuit
or profitable avocation.
GOESAERT v. CLEARY need not go to the full length of prohibition if it believes that as to a defined
December 20, 1948 | Frankfurter, J. | Appeal | Equal Protection Clause group of females other factors are operating which either eliminate or
reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibition.
Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured through ownership
SUMMARY: Valentine Goesaert challenged the Michigan law which prohibited of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may
women who do not have fathers or husbands who are licensed owners of bars confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight. The court is not in a
from being licensed bartenders in cities with a population of 50K or more. The position to contradict the legislature's position. Hence, Michigan has not
court affirmed the judgement of the Detroit Michigan District Court. violated its duty to afford equal protection of its laws.
DOCTRINE: The oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaid's
husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid without such DISSENTING: (Justices Rutledge, Douglas and Murphy)
protecting oversight. The law arbitrarily discriminates between male and female owners of liquor
establishments as a male owner, although absent, may employ his wife and
FACTS: daughter as barmaids. A female owner or her daughter may not work as
1. Michigan passed a law which prohibited women who do not have fathers or barmaids even if there was a man present in the bar to keep order. The
husbands who are licensed owners of bars from being licensed bartenders in classification belies the assumption that the statute was for the moral and
cities with a population of 50,000 or more. physical well-being of women. Since there could be no other conceivable
2. Goesaert was the owner of a bar in Dearborn Michigan. The city had a justification for such discrimination against women owners of liquor
population which exceeded 500,000. establishments, the statute should be held invalid as a denial of equal protection.
3. Goesaert and her daughter challenged the law, arguing that the law denied
them of equal protection of the laws and deprived them of their property
without due process of law. The district court did not rule in their favor.

ISSUE/S: WoN the Michigan law denied Goesaert of the equal protection of
laws -NO


1. The regulation of liquor traffic is one of the oldest and most untrammeled of
legislative powers. Although there is a vast change in the status of women,
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a
bar. The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have
long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have
long practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line
between the sexes, certainly, in such matters as the regulation of the liquor
traffic. While Michigan may deny to all women opportunities for
bartending, Michigan cannot play favorites among women without rhyme
or reason. The Constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws
upon States precludes irrational discrimination as between persons or
groups of persons in the incidence of a law. Since bartending by women
may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social
problems against which it may devise preventive measures, the legislature
GEDULDIG v. AIELLO new administrative guidelines were issued and Aiello, Armendariz and
June 17, 1974 | Stewart, J. | Equal Protection Johnson became eligible, rendering the cases with respect to them already
moot. Only Jaramillo is the one who has a live case.
SUMMARY: Four women suffered an employment disability after becoming
pregnant, but were ruled ineligible under the disability insurance program since ISSUE/S: WON the disability insurance program discriminates against those
the program itself excludes disabilities arising from pregnancy. When it was women suffering employment disabilities arising from normal pregnancy – NO
ruled that the exclusion only applies to normal pregnancy, the cases of the 3 out
of the 4 women became moot. The remaining one, Jaramillo, continues to RULING: District Court judgment reversed.
challenge the constitutionality of the program. The Court held that it does not
violate the equal protection clause, citing the primacy of the State interest in RATIO:
maintaining the fiscal integrity of its program. 1. California does not discriminate with respect to the persons or groups which
DOCTRINE: The Equal Protection Clause does not require a State to sacrifice are eligible for disability insurance protection under the program. The
the financial integrity of its programs just for the purpose of making it more classification challenged in this case relates to the fact that not all the set of
comprehensive in scope. risks has been selected by the State has selected to insure.
In this case, there is no evidence to show that the selection of risks to be
compensated to discriminate against any definable group or class in terms
of the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the
1. California’sdisability   insurance   system   compensates   private   employees  
temporarily disabled from working by "mental or physical illnesses and
2. The State has a legitimate interest in (1) maintaining the self-supporting
mental or physical injuries"not covered by workmen's compensation, under
nature of its insurance program; (2) distributing the available resources in
which an employee contributes to an Unemployment Compensation
such a way as to keep benefit payments at an adequate level for disabilities
Disability Fund 1% of his salary up to an annual maximum of $85.
that are covered, rather than to cover all disabilities inadequately; (3)
2. A disability lasting less than 8 days is not compensable, except when the
maintaining the contribution rate at a level that will not unduly burden
employee is hospitalized. Benefits are not payable for a single disability
participating employees, particularly low-income employees who may be
exceeding 26 weeks. A disability resulting from an individual's court
most in need of the disability insurance.
commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict, or sexual psychopath is not
It is because widening the coverage of the program to include more
compensable, nor are certain disabilities attributable to pregnancy.
disabilities might result to a reduction of the benefits payable for covered
3. In this case, four women were held to be ineligible even though they have
disabilities, or an increase in the maximum employee contribution rate just
made sufficient contributions into the Fund to become eligible for the
to provide protection against another risk of disability, which would be
benefits thereof, after each of them became pregnant and suffered
burdensome on the workers as well.
employment disability as a result of the pregnancy. For the three of them,
“The   Equal   Protection   Clause   does   not   require   that   a   State   must   choose  
Carolyn Aiello, Augustina Armendariz, and Elizabeth Johnson, the
between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
disabilities were attributable to abnormal complications encountered
all." (Dandridge v. Williams)
during their pregnancies. The fourth, Jacqueline Jaramillo, experienced a
normal pregnancy, which was the sole cause of her disability.
4. When they sued against the reinforcement of the program, the District
- The program covers disabilities arising from illnesses only suffered by men
Court ruled in favor of them holding that the exclusion of pregnancy-
(ex. prostatectomies, circumcision, hemophilia, and gout), but not normal
related disabilities is not based upon a classification having a rational and
pregnancy, which can only happen to women. Court should have employed
substantial relationship to a legitimate state purpose and violates the Equal
strict scrutiny due to a suspect classification based on gender.
Protection Clause.
- The  State’s  legitimate  interest  in  fiscal  integrity  may  be  achieved  through  more  
5. Prior   to   the   District   Court’s   decision,   a   similar   case   was   brought   to   the  
sexually  neutral  means.  Even  if  the  worker’s  contribution  is  to  be  increased,  this  
California Court of Appeals by a woman suffering from ectopic pregnancy.
will not destroy the program.
In that case, the appellate court ruled that what are excluded from the
benefits are those disabilities arising from normal pregnancy only. As such,
MISSISSIPPI UNIVERSITY FOR WOMEN v. HOGAN opportunities.(almost 98% of all registered nurses were women) The labor
July  1,  1982  |  O’Connor,  J.  |  Equal  Protection force reflects the predominance of women in nursing. (In contrast, for
example, to women in the Naval Force).
SUMMARY: Joe Hogan applied for a baccalaureate degree in nursing at an all- 4. Rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers faced by women,
female university (MUW) but was denied for being a male. SC held that the MUW’s   policy   of   excluding   males   from   admission   to   Nursing   tends   to  
female-only policy violates the EPC of the 14th Amendment. perpetuate the stereotype view of nursing as  exclusively  a  woman’s  job.  It  
DOCTRINE: A state may not preclude one gender or the other from lends credibility to the old view that women, not men, should become
participating in a unique educational environment solely on the basis of gender. nurses, and the assumption that nursing as a field for women is a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
5. No fit: The policy made no showing that the gender-based classification is
FACTS: substantially and directly related to its proposed compensatory objective.
1. MUW is an all-female collegiate institution maintained by the State of MUW permits men who audit to participate fully in classes. Also, both men
Mississippi. In 1971, it established a School of Nursing, which offered a 2- and women take part in continuing education courses offered by the School
year associate degree, 4-year baccalaureate program, and a graduate of Nursing. Record reveals that: 1) admitting men to nursing classes does
program. not affect teaching style, 2) the presence of men in the classroom would not
2. Joe Hogan, a registered nurse but does not hold a baccalaureate degree in affect the performance of the female nursing students, and 3) men in
nursing applied for admission to the MUW School   of   Nursing’s   coeducational nursing schools do not dominate the classroom. Record is
baccalaureate program. Although qualified, he was denied admission solely flatly inconsistent with the claim that excluding men from the School of
because of his sex. He was informed that he could audit the courses he was Nursing   is   necessary   to   reach   any   of   MUW’s   educational   goals.   Thus,  
interested in, but he could not enroll for credit. considering the interest and the relationship between the interest and the
3. Hogan filed an action in the US District Court for the Northern District of method used by the State, the State has fallen far short of establishing the
Mississippi, claiming the single-sex  admissions  policy  of  MUW’s  School  of   “exceedingly   persuasive   justification”   needed   to   sustain   the   gender-based
Nursing violated EPC of the 14th Amendment. classification.
6. Additional attempt at justification: MUW: direct beneficiary of specific
ISSUE/S: WoN the single-sex   admissions   policy   of   the   MUW’s   School   of   congressional legislation which permits the institution to exist as it has in
Nursing violates equal protection – YES. the past. 901(a), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: prohibits
gender discrimination in education programs that receive federal financial
RULING: CA judgment AFFIRMED. assistance but exempts admission policies of undergraduate institutions that
traditionally and continually have had a policy admitting only student of
RATIO: one   sex   from   the   general   prohibition.   SC:   Congress’   power   is   limited   to  
1. Intermediate scrutiny (heightened): to withstand test, there must be a adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the 14 th Amendment. It has
showing   that   the   classification   serves   “important   governmental   objectives   no power to restrict, abrogate or dilute these guarantees. Neither Congress
and   that   the   discriminatory   means   employed”   are   “substantially related to nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the 14 th
the  achievement  of  those  objectives”. Amendment.
2. Purpose: compensates for discrimination against women and, therefore,
constitutes educational affirmative action. Means: Women-only admissions
3. A gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it
intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened. Mississippi made no showing that women
lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain
positions of leadership in that field when the MUW School of Nursing
opened its door or that women currently are deprived of such
MICHAEL M. v. SUPERIOR COURT illegitimate teenage pregnancies. This is a legitimate goal by the legislature
March 23, 1981 | Rehnquist, J. | Certiorari | Equal Protection when they enacted the law.
3. Young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to
SUMMARY: Petitioner was convicted for statutory rape when he allegedly had problems and risks of sexual intercourse. Virtually, all the significant and
sex with a 16 ½ year old female. Petitioner appealed arguing that the statutory harmful consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the female. This is a
rape law is violative of the Equal Protection clause because it prosecuted only reasonable reason for legislature to exclude minor females from the penalty
males. He further contended that the law is overbroad for including females provided in law. Moreover, pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial
below 18 who are not even capable of pregnancy. SC dismissed the petition. deterrence to young females unlike for males. A criminal sanction imposed
DOCTRINE:See Ratio 1 solely on males thus serve to equalize the deterrents on the sexes.
4. Petitioner contends that the assailed statute is overbroad because it makes
FACTS: unlawful sexual intercourse with prepubescent females who are incapable of
1. At midnight of June 1978, petitioner and two friends approached Sharon becoming pregnant. This is untenable because it is irrational to limit the
(16 ½ years old) and her sister as they waited at a bus stop. Petitioner and scope of its rape statute to older teenagers and exclude young girls.
Sharon had already been drinking and moved away from the others and 5. Petitioner argues that the statute is flawed because it presumes that as
began kissing. After striking him because of initial advances, Sharon between two persons under 18, the male is a culpable aggressor. This is
submitted to sexual intercourse with petitioner. unpersuasive because the statute does not rest on the assumption that males
2. On July 1978, a complaint was filed against petitioner alleging that the 17 ½ are generally the aggressors. It is instead an attempt by legislature to
year old male then had unlawful sexual intercourse with a female under 18. prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancy by providing an additional deterrent
3. Petitioner sought to set aside the information asserting that the law is for mane. The age of man is irrelevant since males, regardless of age, can
unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender. The trial court up to the inflict the same harm sought to be prevented.
Supreme Court of California held that the law in constitutional. The
respondent court held that the assailed law discriminates on the basis of sex
because only females me be victims and only males may violate the law. It
further stated that it is justified by a compelling sate interest and that the
gender classification is supported by the physiological fact that females are
exclusively the ones who can be pregnant.
4. Petitioner appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: WoN California’s  “statutory  rape”  law  violates  the  Equal  Protection  
clause against men alone? - NO

RULING: Petition dismissed. Decision of California Supreme Court is


1. A gender-based   classification   will   be   upheld   if   it   bears   a   “fair   and  
substantial   relationship”   to   legitimate   ends.   As   principle,   the   legislature  
cannot make overbroad generalizations based on sex which are unrelated to
any differences between men and women or which demean the status of the
affected class. But the court recognizes that fact that sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances.
2. In the case at bar, the assailed statute was enacted to criminalize illicit
sexual intercourse with a minor female that will eventually prevent
PERSONNEL ADMIN. et al. v. FEENEY justification to withstand a constitutional challenge under the EPC. But even
June 5, 1979 | Stewart, J. | Equal Protection Clause if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a minority, it is
unconstitutional under the EPC only if the impact can be traced to a
SUMMARY: Feeney, who had repeatedly been ranked below male veterans in discriminatory purpose.
civil service exams even though they scored lower, challenged the statute 3. When a statute gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that it
granting veterans preference as gender-discriminatory. The Court used a twofold disproportionately has an adverse effect on women, a twofold inquiry is
inquiry and held that the there was no purpose to discriminate against women. appropriate. First, whether the classification is indeed neutral; and second,
DOCTRINE: When a statute neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination.
it disproportionately has an adverse effect on a certain group, a twofold inquiry 4. Appellee herself conceded that the statute is neutral on its face and
is appropriate. First, whether the classification is indeed neutral; and second, acknowledged that state hiring preferences are not per se invalid, as she
whether the adverse effect reflects invidious discrimination. limited her challenge to the absolute lifetime preference to the veterans. The
District Court found that the statute served legitimate and worthy purposes,
FACTS: and that the preference was not established for the purpose of discriminating
1. Appellee Helen Feeney, who was not a veteran, had passed a number of against women.
open competitive civil service examinations for better jobs during her 12-yr 5. The statute does not exclude significant numbers of women from preferred
tenure as a state employee, but due to Massachusetts veterans’   preference   state jobs because they are women or because they are nonveterans. The
statute, she was ranked below male veterans with lower scores. The definition   of   “veterans”   in   the   statute   has   always been gender-neutral and
statutory  preference  was  available  to  “any  person,  male  or  female,  including   Massachusetts consistently defined it to be inclusive of women who had
a  nurse”  honourably  discharged  from  the  US  Armed  Forces  after  at  least  90   served in the military. Also, although few women benefited from the
days of active service, at least one day of which was during wartime. preference, the nonveteran class is not substantially male. Contrarily,
2. Feeney challenged the statute on the ground that it discriminated against significant numbers of nonveterans are men, and all nonveterans, both male
women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, claiming that the and female, are placed at a disadvantage. Too many men are adversely
preference operated overwhelmingly to the advantage of males. The district affected by the statute to permit the inference that the statute is a pretext of
court agreed and declared the statute unconstitutional and reaffirmed the preferring men over women.
same  upon  remand,  finding  that  the  statute  had  adverse  impact  on  women’s   6. Feeney also contended that the consequences were inevitable and
employment opportunities and required the State to find a more limited foreseeable, and thus could not be considered unintended by the framers.
form of preference to achieve its goals. Hence the instant appeal. But   again,   the   preference   formula   itself   was   consistently   offered   to   “any  
person”   who   was   a   veteran,   including   women.   The   statute   is a preference
ISSUE/S: WoN the statute discriminated against women - NO for veterans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex, not for men over
women. The statute may reflect unwise policy in the sense that absolute and
RULING: Judgment reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. permanent preferences have been criticized by proponents of merit-based
employment policies, but the appellee simply failed to demonstrate that the
RATIO: law in any way reflects a purpose to discriminate based on sex.
1. The  equal  protection  guarantee  does  not  take  away  all  of  the  State’s  power  
Dissent, J. Marshall and Brennan: The law is unconstitutional based on discriminatory
of classification. Classification is ordinarily of no concern so long as it is
impact. Any veteran with a passing grade on the civil service exam must be placed ahead
rationally based. In assessing an equal protection challenge, a court is called of a nonveteran, regardless of scores. Because less than 2% of Massachusetts women are
upon  only  to  measure  the  legislative  classification’s  basic  validity.    Certain   veterans, the absolute preference rendered desirable state civil service employment an
classifications (e.g. racial) are presumptively invalid and can be upheld only almost exclusively male prerogative. It created a gender-based civil service hierarchy,
upon an extraordinary justification, including that of gender. with women occupying low-grade clerical and secretarial jobs and men holding more
2. Although public employment is not a constitutional right and the States responsible and remunerative positions. Where the foreseeable impact of a facially
have wide discretion in framing employment qualifications, precedent neutral policy is so disproportionate, the burden should rest on the State to establish that
dictates that any state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over sex-based considerations played no part in the choice of the particular legislative scheme
females in public employment requires an exceedingly persuasive
May 10, 1886 | Matthews, J. | Equal Protection Clause 1. The California SC considered the ordinances as vesting in the board of
supervisors a not unusual discretion in granting or withholding their assent
SUMMARY: Statutes prohibiting laundries in buildings other than those of to use wooden buildings as laundries, to be exercised on a case-to-case basis
brick or stone without the consent of a board of supervisors were challenged as with a view to protect the public against the dangers of fire. The Court
racially discriminatory. The SC ruled that the statutes were unconstitutional and disagreed, holding that nothing in the ordinances pointed to such a
that the Fourteenth Amendment was not limited to citizens. regulation of the business of keeping and conducting laundries. The statutes
DOCTRINE: The  Fourteenth  Amendment’s  constitutional  guarantee  applies  to   seemed intended to—and actually did—confer naked and arbitrary power to
all  persons  within  the  U.S.’s  territorial  jurisdiction. give and withhold consent not only as to places, but as to persons.
2. The ordinance did not prescribe rules and conditions for the regulation of
FACTS: the use of property for laundry purposes. It unrestrainedly allowed the use
1. San Francisco passed an order prohibiting laundries within the city and of brick or stone buildings for laundries, but, as to wooden buildings,
county’s   corporate limits without having first obtained the consent of the constituting nearly all those in previous use, it divided the owners or
board of supervisors, except if the same was located in a brick or stone occupiers into two classes, not as to their personal character and
building. Violators would be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and was qualifications nor the situation, nature and adaptation of the buildings
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment of not more themselves, but merely by an arbitrary line: (1) those permitted to pursue
than six months, or both. their industry by the mere will and consent of the supervisors, and (2) those
2. Petitioner Yick Wo, a Chinese native, had been engaged in the laundry from whom consent is withheld at their mere will and pleasure. Both classes
business in the same premises for 22 years and had a license from the board were  alike  only  in  that  they  were  tenants  at  the  supervisors’  will.  There was
of fire wardens and a certificate from the health officer. Petitioner applied to no call for discretion of a judicial nature.
the board of supervisors for their consent to maintain and carry on his 3. The rights of the petitioners were not less because they were aliens and
laundry, but the same was denied. Petitioner continued to operate his subjects of the Chinese Emperor. By the third article of the treaty between
laundry and was convicted and fined for violating the ordinance. He then the US government and China, concluded November 17, 1880, it was
challenged the ordinances as discriminatory against the Chinese. stipulated:   “If   Chinese   laborers,   or   Chinese   of   any   other   class,   now   either  
3. It  was  argued  that  petitioner’s  business,  and  that  of  many  of  other  Chinese,   permanently or temporarily residing in the territory of the United States,
was impaired by the ordinance; that the locations of the laundries were in meet with ill treatment at the hands of any other persons, the Government of
unpopulated areas, when previously regulation had been limited to thickly the United States will exert all its powers to devise measures for their
settled portions of the city; that all the Chinese applications were denied and protection, and to secure to them the same rights, privileges, immunities and
those of Caucasians granted; that the right to give consent reserved in the exemptions as may be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most
ordinance showed that carrying on a laundry business in a wooden business favored nation, and to which they are entitled by treaty.”
was not in itself dangerous; and that other regulations could have been 4. Nor is the Fourteenth Amendment confined to citizens. It states: Nor shall
prescribed without vesting the board with arbitrary and unregulated any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
discretion to grant special consent, among others. of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the  laws.”  This applies to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the
ISSUE/S: US. It is enacted by Sec. 1977 of the Revised Statutes, that all persons
WoN the statutes were racially discriminatory – YES within the US’s   jurisdiction shall have the same right in every State and
WoN aliens with temporary or permanent rights to reside within the US are Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
entitled to the protections guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws - YES and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens and shall be subject
RULING: California SC judgment reversed. Cases remanded to the proper to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
court. kind, and to no other.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS tenure”   cannot   serve   as   valid   bases   for   the   distinction   in   salary   rates.   The  
v. QUISUMBING dislocation factor and limited tenure are adequately compensated by other
June 1, 2000 | Kapunan, J. | Equal Protection benefits they receive exclusively like housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowance – which have a reasonable
relation with their status as foreign-hires and justify the exclusion of local
SUMMARY: Foreign-hires of the international school are paid 25% more than
local-hires, in addition to housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home
3. Sub-issue: They do not belong to the same collective bargaining unit; for
leave travel allowance benefits. SC held that salary differential is discriminatory
inclusion of foreign-hires into the same bargaining unit would not assure
and local-hires are entitled to equal pay as compensation for equal work.
either group of its respective collective bargaining rights.
DOCTRINE:Salary is a reward or compensation for services performed, and
must not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local hires.

1. In June 1995, negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were
held and Intl School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) contested the difference
in salary rates between foreign-hires and local-hires (25%). In Sept 7, 1995,
ISAE filed a notice of strike and they filed to strike a compromise,
necessitating DOLE to assume jurisdiction. In June 10, 1996, DOLE issued
an Order resolving the issue in favor of the school.
2. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the
school is discriminatory and amounts to racial discrimination. The School
contends that foreign-hires have to endure 1) dislocation factor: deviation
from a promising career path, and 2) limited tenure: uncertainty of
obtaining suitable employment after a long period in a foreign land; and that
this justifies the disparity.

ISSUE/S: WoN the salary differential constitutes racial discrimination—YES

RULING: Petition GRANTED as to salary differentials.

1. Public policy abhors inequality and discrimination, as embodied in the
Constitution   itself:   XIII,   1:   “to   give   highest   priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce   social,   economic   and   political   inequalities”.The   Labor   Code   also  
frowns upon discrimination, w/c penalizes payment of a lesser
compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of
equal value. Similar provisions institutionalize the long honored legal
truism  of  “equal  pay  for  equal  work.”
2. Salary   is   defined   as   “a   reward   or   recompense   for   services   performed”.  
While the Court recognizes the need of the School to attract foreign-hires,
salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local hires.
Local hires perform the same services and ought to be paid the same as
foreign-hires.   For   the   same   reason,   the   “dislocation   factor”   and   “limited  
May 4, 1987 | Powell, J | Equal Protection RATIO:
1. Freedom of Association is afforded constitutional protection in two senses –
SUMMARY: After the Duarte Rotary admitted 3 women members, Rotary (1)   private   association   (the   individual’s   choice   to   enter   into   and   maintain  
International revoked their charter and terminated their membership for violating certain intimate or private relationships such as marriage, begetting and
the Rotary Constitution. Duarte Rotary and 2 women file a complaint, alleging bearing of children, child rearing and education, cohabitation with relatives)
that this violated the Unruh Act w/c requires them to admit women members. SC: and (2) expressive association (freedom of individuals to associate for the
Unruh  Act  does  not  violate  Rotary  Intl’  right  of  private  &  expressive  association. purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities). To
DOCTRINE: To determine the nature and degree of constitutional protection of determine the nature and degree of constitutional protection, the Court must
a questioned association, the Court must consider the challenged   state   action’s   separately consider the effect of the challenged state action on both the
effect on the freedom of private association & freedom of expressive association. freedom of private association and freedom of expressive association.
2. X Private Association: 1st Amendment protects those relationships that
FACTS: presuppose deep attachments and commitments to the few other individuals
1. Rotary   International,   “an   organization   of   business   and   professional   men   with   whom   a   person   shares   personal   aspects   of   one’s   life.   Hence   in  
united worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage high ethical determining WON a particular association is sufficiently private to warrant
standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world” constitutional protection, size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are
is comprised of 19,788 Rotary Clubs in 157 countries w/ a 907,750 total excluded from critical aspects of the relationship are considered. In this
membership. Individuals are admitted to membership in a local Rotary Club case, relationship among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate
according   to   a   classification   system,   whose   general   rule   is   that   “1   active   or private relation contemplated. While Rotary membership is not open to
member is admitted for each classification, but he in turn may propose an the general public, each club promotes an inclusive, not exclusive, approach
addt’l   active   member,   who   must   be   in   the   same   business   or   professional   so that all useful local occupations are recognized end enable the club to be
classification.” Aside from these requirements, each local Rotary Club is a true cross-section   of   the   community’s   business   and professional life.
free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting members. Local membership ranges from 20-900 without any upper limit. Also, many
2. Membership in Rotary Clubs is men-only,   primarily   for   an   “aspect   of   of   the   Club’s   activities   are   carried   on   in   the   presence   of   strangers   and  
fellowship,   that   is   enjoined   by   the   present   male   membership”   and   also   to   inviting business associates and competitors are encouraged, to keep their
allow the Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries w/ varied “windows  and  doors  open  to  the  whole  world.”
cultures and social mores. However, women are permitted to attend 3. X Expressive Association: Expressive association is the right to associate
meetings,   give   speeches,   and   receive   awards.   Members’   women   relatives   with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
may form their own associations, and are authorized to wear their lapel pin. educational, religious, and cultural ends. In this case, admitting women to
Young women aged 14-28 may join Interact and Rotaract, organizations Rotary   Clubs   doesn’t   significantly   affect   the   existing   members’   ability   to  
sponsored by Rotary International. carry  out  their  various  purposes.  As  a  matter  of  policy,  the  Clubs  don’t  take  
3. The Duarte, California Rotary Club admitted 3 women to active positions on public (e.g. political or international) issues. While the Rotary
membership in 1977. Rotary International notified the Duarte Club that Clubs engages in 1st Amendment-protected  activities,  the  Unruh  Act  doesn’t  
admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary Constitution, and after require them to abandon this or its classification system. By opening
hearing   revoked   Duarte   Club’s   charter and terminated its membership. In membership  to  the  community’s  leading  business  and  professional  women,  
response, the Duarte Rotary and 2 women members filed a complaint to the Rotary Clubs are more likely to obtain a more representative membership of
California   Superior   Court,   alleging   that   Rotary   International’s   actions   community leaders with broadened capacity for service. And even if there
violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act in the California Cibil Code. was   an   infringement   to   the   Rotary   Club’s   right   to   expressive   association,  
it’s   justified   since   it   serves   the   State’s   compelling   interest   in   eliminating  
ISSUE/S: WON the Unruh Act, which requires California Rotary Clubs to discrimination against women, which extends to the acquisition of
admit women members, violates the 1st Amendment (right of association) – NO. leadership skills, business contacts, and tangible goods and services.

RULING: CA California Decision AFFIRMED.

BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA v. JAMES DALE on groups that would rather express other ideas. Govt actions that may
June 28, 2000 | Rehnquist, C.J. | Equal Protection unconstitutionally burden this freedom may present itself as a regulation
that forces the group to accept members it does not desire, which may
SUMMARY: James Dale, a gay rights activist, had his adult membership in the impair the ability of the group to express those views.
Boy Scouts of America revoked because of his sexual orientation. The majority 2. In this case, the Court held that the group engages in expressive
held  that  the  group  engages  in  expressive  association,  instilling  values  ie  “morally   association w/c they concluded from its 1) general mission, 2) Scout Oath
straight”  and  “clean”,  and that forced inclusion of Dale would significantly affect and  Law,  3)  position  statements.  Its  general  mission  is  to  “instill  values  in  
their ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. young  people”  and  these  values  are  reflected  in  the  Scout Oath and Law: to
DOCTRINE: Associations, especially private non-profit ones, have federal be  “morally  straight  and  clean”.  Position  statements  executed  by  BSA  state  
constitutional rights to enter and maintain private relationships and to associate that they did not believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are
for the purpose of engaging in protected speech. appropriate. The BSA asserts that its desire is to not promote homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior. The Court gave deference to
FACTS: their assertions regarding the nature of its expression and opined that it is
1. James Dale entered scouting in 1978. He was an exemplary scout and not   the   role   of   courts   to   reject   a   group’s   expressed   values   because   they  
received  the  rank  of  Eagle  Scout  in  1988,  one  of  Scouting’s  highest  honors.   disagree   with   them.   Also,   Dale’s   presence   as   asst scoutmaster would
He applied for adult membership in 1989 and BSA approved his application significantly burden their expression because his membership would force
for the position of asst scoutmaster. Around the same time, he attended the organization to send a message, both to the youth and the world, that
Rutgers University, where he first acknowledged to himself and others that Boy Scouts accept homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.
he was gay. He eventually became co-president of Rutgers University 3. Application of NJ’s  public  accommodations  law  to  require  BSA  to  accept  
Lesbian/Gay Alliance. He was interviewed by a local newspaper when he Dale  would  run  afoul  the  Scouts’  freedom  of  expressive  association.  First  
attended a seminar addressing psychological and health needs of lesbian of all, these statutes were enacted to prevent discrimination in traditional
and gay teenagers. places of public accommodation ie trains and inns; thus it was
2. After the local newspaper published the article, Dale received a letter inappropriate to apply it to a private entity.
revoking his adult membership. When he inquired for the reason, he was
told  Boy  Scouts  “specifically  forbid  membership  to  homosexuals.” J. Stevens, DISSENT:
3. In 1992, Dale filed a complaint with the New Jersey Superior Court alleging - At the time of the revocation, BSA had not publicly expressed such standard of
that   BSA   violated   NJ’s   public   accommodations   law   (prohibits   leadership (forbidding membership to homosexuals). The Boy Scout Handbook
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public defines   “morally   straight”   as   courage   to   do   what   is   right   and   to   refuse   what   is  
accommodation) by revoking his membership based solely on sexual wrong;;   and   “clean”   as   referring   to   body   and   mind,   choosing   the   company   of  
orientation. NJSC held that BSA was a place of public accommodation those  who  live  by  the  same  ideals.  Furthermore,  BSA’s  published  guidance  for  
because its large size, non-selectivity and inclusive policy establish that the Scoutmasters show that sex education is not for the organization but for home or
org is not sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional school, and instructs Scoutmasters not to teach Scouts on the subject of sex.
protection under the freedom of intimate association. - The Court previously ruled that it is not sufficient to articulate some
connection  between  the  groups’  expressive  activities  and  its  exclusionist policy.
ISSUE/S: WoN  applying  NJ’s  public  accommodations  law  in  this  way  violates   From the brief discussion on its rules, it is apparent that there is no shared goal
the  Boy  Scouts’  First  Amendment  right  of  expressive association—YES or collective effort to foster a belief about sexuality at all, let alone one that is
significantly burdened by admitting homosexuals.
RULING: NJSC judgment REVERSED (5-4). - The  majority’s  holding implies that homosexuals are simply so different from
the rest of society that their presence alone should be singled out for special First
RATIO: Amendment treatment.
1. The Court previously held that there is a right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious and cultural ends to prevent the majority from imposing its views
GOODRIDGE v. DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH evidence that forbidding same-sex marriage will increase the
November 18, 2003 | Marshall, C.J. | Equal Protection number of couples who enter into opposite-sex marriage in order to
have and raise children. Also, prohibiting same-sex marriage will
SUMMARY: Same-sex couples in Massachusetts were denied of obtaining not make children of opposite-sex marriages more secure, but it
marriage licenses. does prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the
DOCTRINE: Limiting the protections, benefits and obligations of civil advantages of a stable family structure. It cannot be rational to
marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the basic premises of individual penalize children by depriving them of State benefits because the
liberty and equality under the law. State  disapproves  of  their  parent’s  sexual  orientation.
c. Preserving scarce State and private financial resources: The
FACTS: department’s   generalization   that   same-sex couples are more
1. The Department of Public Health, among its responsibilities, oversees the financially independent than married couples, thus less needy of
registry of vital records and statistics, which enforce all laws relative to the public marital benefits, ignores the fact that many same-sex
issuance of marriage licenses and the keeping of marriage records, and couples have children and other dependents in their care.
which promulgates policies and procedures for the issuance of marriage Moreover, Mass. Marriage laws do not condition receipt of public
licenses by city and town clerks and registers. and private financial benefits to married individuals on a
2. Advocates for GLAD (Gay and Lesbian Advocates ad Defenders) filed a demonstration of financial dependence on each other. Benefits are
suit against the Massachusetts Department of Health on behalf of 7 same- available regardless of whether they mingle their finances or
sex couples in Mass. These couples are all in long-term relationships, some actually depend on each other for support.
of whom had children, attempted to obtain marriage licenses but were d. Additional rationales: broadening civil marriage to include same-
refused or denied the licenses on the ground that Mass. Does not recognize sex marriage will trivialize or destroy the institution of marriage:
same-sex marriage. plaintiffs do not seek to abolish marriage. Recognizing the right of
an individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish
ISSUE/S: WoN the denial of marriage license to same-sex couples violate the the validity or dignity of opposite-sex marriage.
RULING: Declaratory relief prayed for granted. Exclusion of qualified same- The Court refined the common-law meaning of civil marriage (from legal union
sex couples from access to civil marriage violates Mass. Law. of man and woman as husband and wife) to mean the voluntary union of two
persons a spouses, to the exclusion of all others. Reformulation furthers aim of
RATIO: marriage to promote stable, exclusive relationships and advances 2 legitimate
1. Scrutiny used by the court: rational basis (since the statute did not meet State interests: providing stable setting for child rearing and conserving State
even the lowest standard of review, strict scrutiny was no longer applied).3 resources,  leaving  intact  the  Legislature’s  broad  discretion  to  regulate  marriage.
legislative rationales:
a. Providing favorable setting for procreation: General Laws contain Marital Benefits: joint income tax filing, tenancy, extension of benefit of
no requirement that the applicants for a marriage license attest to homestead protection to spouse and children, automatic rights to inherit property
their ability or intention to conceive children by coitus. Fertility is of deceased spouse who does not leave a will, entitlement to wages owed to
not a condition of marriage, nor is it grounds for divorce. It is the deceased  spouse,  right  to  share  medical  policy  of  one’s  spouse,  presumption  of
exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to legitimacy and parentage of children born to married couple, evidentiary rights,
one another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non priority rights to administer estate of deceased spouse who dies without a will,
of civil marriage. Furthermore, same-sex couples, through etc.
adoption or other assistive technologies, could procreate.
b. Ensuring optimal setting for child rearing: State policy of
protecting  the  welfare  of  children.  The  “best  interests  of  the  child”  
does   not   depend   on   a   parent’s   sexual   orientation.   There   is   no  
TECSON v. COMELEC constitute prima facie proof of their contents under Section 44, Rule 130 of
March 3, 2004 | Vitug, J. | Certiorari | Equal Protection the Rules of Court.   Both   Lorenzo’s   death   certificate   and   the   marriage  
certificate  of  Allan  and  Bessie  indicate  that  Lorenzo  and  Allan’s  citizenship  
SUMMARY: Petitioners sought to have FPJ, a candidate to the 2004 is Filipino.
presidential elections, disqualified after he represented himself as Filipino 2. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on Sept.
citizen in his certificate of candidacy. They alleged, among others, that he was 11, 1954 (at 84 years old) in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could be assumed
an illegitimate child such that his citizenship would not follow the citizenship of that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines
his father. The Court dismissed the petitions, stating that legitimacy/illegitimacy was still a colony of Spain.
is irrelevant to citizenship under the Constitution. Petitioner alleges that Lorenzo was not in the Philippines during the period
DOCTRINE: The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose of 1898-1902, but has also failed to prove that Lorenzo may have been
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or somewhere else during that time since there were no records pertaining to
illegitimate. that period. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be
sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a
FACTS: person at the time of his death was also his residence before death.
1. Petitioners (Tecson and Desiderio, Velez and Fornier) sought the As such, Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en   masse  
disqualification of Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) from running in the 2004 Filipinization”   under   the   Philippine   Bill   of   1902 and his Philippine
presidential elections as well as the cancellation of his certificate of citizenship would pass to his son, Allan Poe.
candidacy. Of these three petitions, only that of Victorino Fornier was 3. Assuming Allan Poe is a Filipino, whether FPJ is a legitimate or illegitimate
granted due course by the Court. child of the former is immaterial. The 1935 Constitution, which follows the
2. It is alleged that he misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino jus sanguinis principle and was in force at the time FPJ was born, provides
citizen, named “Fernando,   Jr.,”   or   “Ronald   Allan”   Poe,   born   on   Aug.   20,   that those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines are also citizens of
1939 in Manila. Petitioner alleges that FPJ is not a natural-born citizen the Philippines (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3). The conferment of such citizenship
based on the ff: (1) His parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley is without any condition or distinction.
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, 4. Father Joaquin G. Bernas, as amicus curiae, stated that aside from having
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject; (2) Granting, however, no textual basis in the 1935 Constitution, prescribing distinctions, such as
that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his with respect to legitimacy or illegitimacy, would violate the equal
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien protection clause even twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction
mother. between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would
3. Petitioner   based   the   allegation   of   FPJ’s   illegitimacy   on   two   assertions:   make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino
(1)Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley; (2) Even if no such prior marriage had 5. Furthermore, the Court held that such distinctions between legitimacy and
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie   Kelley   only   a   year   after   FPJ’s   birth   illegitimacy remain and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and
(on Sept. 16, 1940). not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
6. The Court held that while the totality of the evidence may not establish
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the 1935 Constitution takes into account the conclusively that FPJ is a natural--born citizen of the Philippines, the
legitimacy/illegitimacy of a child for purposes of conferring Philippine evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that
citizenship – NO he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74,
RULING: Petitions dismissed. of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner was not able substantiate his case
regarding the material misrepresentation.
1. Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ,
NEAR v. MINNESOTA able to prove that the charges were true and published with good motives
June 1, 1931 | Hughes, C.J. | Freedom of Speech: Protected Speech (Prior and for justifiable ends, his newspaper is suppressed and further publication
Restraint) is made punishable as a contempt. This is of the essence of censorship.
2. It has been generally considered that the chief purpose of the guaranty of
SUMMARY: The Saturday Press, owned by Near, was abated under a freedom of the press is to prevent previous restraints or censorship upon
Minnesota statute for publishing malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles publication. The security of the freedom of the press requires that it should
against Minneapolis public officers. SC held that the statute which generally be exempt not only from the restraint by the executive but also from
provides for censorship is inconsistent with the freedom of the press guaranteed legislative restraint. However, the protection as to restraint is not absolutely
by the 14th Amendment. unlimited. Nonetheless, such limitation has been recognized only in
DOCTRINE: The freedom of press is essential to the nature of a free state but exceptional cases (e.g. during war).
that freedom may be restricted by the government in exceptional situations. 3. The statute cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is
permitted to show that the matter published is true and is published with
FACTS: good motives and for justifiable ends. If such is constitutionally valid, the
1. A Minnesota statute provides for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of a) legislature may provide machinery for determining in the complete exercise
obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, magazine or other periodical, or b) of its discretion what are justifiable ends and restrain publication
malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other accordingly: it could lead to a complete system of censorship.
periodical. 4. Charges of reprehensible conduct, and office malfeasance, unquestionably
2. The Saturday Press, published in Minneapolis, published and circulated create public scandal. However, the theory of the constitutional guaranty is
malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles about Charles Davis (special that even a more serious public evil would be caused by authority to prevent
law enforcement officer), Frank Brunskill (Chief of Police), George Leach publication.
(Mayor of Minneapolis), the Jewish Race, and other officials and persons,
accusing the public officers named and others in connection with the
prevalence of crimes and the failure to expose and punish them (that they
were in cahoots with the Jewish gangsters who were in control of gambling,
bootlegging and racketeering, and were neglecting their duties).
3. Minnesota officials obtained an injunction in order to abate the publishing
of the Press newspaper under said law. The state court order abated the
Press and enjoined the Defendants, publishers of the Press, from publishing
or  circulating  such  “defamatory  and  scandalous”  periodicals.

ISSUE/S: WoN the statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of

publication is consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as
historically conceived and guaranteed – NO.

RULING: Judgment REVERSED. The statute, in so far as it authorized the

proceedings in this action under clause (b) of section one, to be an infringement
of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.

1. Under the statute, the public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of
a newspaper or periodical before a judge upon a charge of conducting a
business of publishing scandalous and defamatory matter – charges against
public officers of official dereliction, in particular – and unless the owner is
NEW YORK TIMES v. U.S. The word "security" is broad, vague and general and should not be invoked to
June 30, 1971 | Per Curiam | Freedom of Speech: Protected Speech (Prior abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding
Restraint) of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative
government provides no real security for the Republic.
SUMMARY: The US Government sought to prevent the NYT and WP from
publishing classified material on the US relative to the Vietnam war. The Court
held that the Government failed to justify the imposition of prior restraint on the
DOCTRINE: Any system of prior restraints of expression bears a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity. Thus, the Government carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.

1. The United States sought to enjoin the New York Times and Washington
Post   from   publishing   classified   material   entitled   “History   of   US   Decision-
Making  Process  on  Viet  Nam  Policy”.

ISSUE/S: WoN enjoining the publication was unconstitutional - YES

RULING: CA judgment for District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. CA order for

the Second Circuit reversed. Case remanded.

1. Any system of prior restraints of expression bears a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity. Thus, the Government carries a heavy
burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint. In the
instant case, the Government failed to meet said burden.

Black, J. Concurring - The Government's power to censor the press was

abolished so that the press would be free to censure the Government. The press
was protected so that it could   bare   the   government’s   secrets   and   inform   the  
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in
government.   Paramount   among   the   free   press’s   responsibilities   is   the   duty   to  
prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them
off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.

To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the publication of news
by resort to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the
fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to
make "secure." The First Amendment was intended to outlaw injunctions such
as those in the instant case.
FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND court to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression; and if it is
March 1, 1965 | Brennan, J. | Freedom of Speech: Protected Speech (Prior made unduly onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, to seek judicial
Restraint) review, the censor's determination may in practice be final.
3. A noncriminal process which requires prior submission of a film to a censor
SUMMARY: Appellant was convicted under the Maryland censorship statute. is constitutional only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed
He challenged it as unconstitutionally impairing freedom of expression. The SC to prevent the dangers of a censorship system: (1) The burden of proving
held   that   the   statute’s   prescribed   scheme   did   not   satisfy   the   criteria   for   a   valid   that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor; and (2)
prior restraint. While the State may require advance submission of all films, the
DOCTRINE: Criteria for a valid prior restraint: (1) The burden of proving that requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend finality
the material is unprotected expression must rest on the censor; (2) Finality rests to the censor's determination whether a film constitutes protected
with the courts; (3) Judicial determination must be prompt. expression. Hence, (3) the exhibitor must be assured, by statute or
authoritative judicial construction, that within a specified brief period, the
FACTS: censor will either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film.
1. Appellant Freedman was convicted of exhibiting  ‘Revenge  at  Daybreak’  in   Any restraint in advance of a final judicial determination must be limited to
his theatre without submitting it to the Maryland State Board of Censors for preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with
prior approval as required by Sec(2) of the Maryland motion picture judicial resolution. Moreover, even after expiration of a temporary restraint,
censorship statute. He contended that the statute unconstitutionally impaired an administrative refusal to license, signifying the censor's view that the
freedom of expression. film is unprotected, may deter the exhibitor. Therefore, the procedure must
also assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect
ISSUE/S: WoN the censorship statute constituted an invalid prior restraint – of a temporary and possibly erroneous denial of a license.
YES 4. The Maryland scheme does not satisfy the criteria: (1) once the censor
disapproves the film, the exhibitor must assume the burden of instituting
RULING: CA decision reversed. judicial proceedings and persuading the courts that the film is protected
expression; (2) once the Board has acted against a film, exhibition is
RATIO: prohibited pending judicial review, however protracted; and appellant could
1. Appellant argues that Sec(2) of the statute constitutes an invalid prior have been convicted for showing the film while unsuccessfully seeking a
restraint because, in the context of the rest of the statute, it presents a danger license even without judicial determination; (3) the statute provides no
of unduly suppressing protected expression, read together with the other assurance of prompt judicial determination.
sections of the law:
a. The censorship   board’s   procedure   for   initial   decision,   without   any  
judicial participation, bars exhibition of any disapproved film, unless
and until the exhibitor undertakes a time-consuming appeal to the
Maryland courts and succeeds in having the Board's decision reversed.
b. Per Sec(17), no time limit is imposed for completion of Board action.
c. Sec(19) shows that if the film is disapproved or elimination ordered,
there is no judicial participation, nor assurance of prompt judicial
review. Experience on the only reported case showed that to complete
an appeal, initial judicial determination was four months and final
vindication on appellate review took six months.
2. Any system of prior restraints of expression bears a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity. Unlike prosecution for obscenity, a
censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the exhibitor or distributor.
Because the censor's business is to censor, he may be less responsive than a
PHARMACEUTICAL HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF mere constitutional declaration). Here, there was no transformation
THE PHILIPPINES v. DUQUE III regarding the ICMBS prohibition on advertising since the Milk Code did
October 9, 2007| J. Austria-Martinez | Certiorari | Freedom of Expression: not adopt such provisions embodied in the former. Instead, the Milk Code
Protected Speech (Prior Restraint) expressly provides that advertising may be allowed if duly authorized by the
Inter-Agency Committee. Under incorporation, customary intl. law is
SUMMARY: Petitioner seeks to invalidate the Revised IRR of the Milk Code for deemed incorporated in domestic legal system (generally-accepted
being unconstitutional and going beyond the law in prescribing an absolute ban principles). Here, the ICMBS was adopted as a mere recommendation and
on advertisements and promotion on infant formula, breastmilk substitutes etc. SC thus legally non-binding.
held that in prescribing an absolute ban on advertising, the DOH exceeded the 2. Under the RAC, the DOH shall define the national health policy and
authority vested by the Revised Administrative Code and the Milk Code. implement a national health plan in line with this. AO 2005-0014, which
DOCTRINE: Commercial speech is protected speech. There must be substantial embodies the national policy on infant and young child feeding, merely
state interest that would justify a restriction, which must not be overbroad. focuses on ideal breastfeeding practices and does not declare that
advertisement of breastmilk substitutes is against national policy. Thus, the
FACTS: DOH cannot ban such practices by virtue of its powers under the RAC; and
1. On Oct 28, 1986, President Aquino issued EO 51 (The Milk Code) to give can only do so pursuant to law (the Milk Code).
effect to the Intl. Code of Marketing Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS) 3. The Milk Code authorized the DOH to control the content of any
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) to the effect that information on breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement or
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected. related products; but such control is not absolute. Such control does not
2. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued the assailed Revised IRR (RIRR), which encompass the power to absolutely prohibit advertising, because such is not
was to take effect on July 7, 2006. On June 28, 2006, petitioner, on behalf contemplated in the Code. The Code merely authorizes regulation, to which
of its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes filed a Sec.   13   is   applicable,   w/c   states   that   “total   effect”   of   the   ads   should   not  
petition for certiorari with prohibition to enjoin the DOH Secretary Duque undermine breastfeeding. Even the SolGen concedes that Sec. 11 on the
from promulgating the IRR. absolute prohibition is not operational, and that it is actually Sec. 13 w/c is
3. Provisions mainly assailed are: 4f (declaration of principles prohibiting operational in line with the Milk Code.
advertisements on breastmilk substitutes), and 11 (actual prohibition). 4. Petitioners contend that the RIRR is an undue restraint on trade. SC held
4. Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not in accord with The Milk Code (w/c that despite recognition of free enterprise as a policy, it is still subject to
does not prohibit ads); to which respondents argue that the intl. agreements regulation if it affects public interest. Here, the RIRR was not shown to
entered into by the Philippines form part of the law of the land and the unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes.
RIRR was in accord with these agreements (ICMBS).
Puno (Concurring and Separate Opinion)
ISSUE/S: Advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes falls within the ambit
1. WoN the ICMBS was legally binding and in effect the RIRR issued in of commercial speech—speech that proposes an economic transaction.
accord with this was issued not in excess of its authority—NO This is a separate category of speech not on the same level of protection
2. WoN the DOH may implement said provisions of the WHA by virtue of its given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
powers under the RAC of 1987—NO nonetheless entitles to protection.
3. WoN the prohibition in the RIRR on advertisements is valid—NO Before, commercial speech was well within the broad powers of the
government to regulate. But in the 1970s,the Court held that consumers
RULING: PARTLY GRANTED. Articles 4f, 11, and 46 NULL and VOID. have a strong 1st Amendment interest in the free flow of info about goods
and services and any state regulation must support a substantial interest.
RATIO: The landmark case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service
1. Under the 1987 Constitution, intl. law can become part of the sphere of Commission established a 4-part analysis for evaluating constitutionality of
domestic law through transformation (requiring a constitutional mechanism commercial speech regulations: 1) the commercial speech must concern
such as ratification of treaty or local legislation), and incorporation (by lawful activity and must not be misleading, 2) the asserted govt interest
must be substantial, 3) the state regulation must directly advance the govt apply with full force the provisions of said Circulars and their
interest asserted, and 4) the regulation cannot be more extensive than accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television stations.
necessary to serve that interest. Here, the absolute ban is unduly restrictive. 6. (June 14, 2005) NTC held a dialogue with Kapisanan ng ga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas and assured the latter that the press release did not violate the
constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, and of press, and the right
CHAVEZ v. GONZALES to information.
February 15, 2008 | Puno, C.J. | Certiorari and Prohibition | Freedom of
Expression: Protected Speech (Prior Restraint) ISSUE/S: WoN the respondents exercised authority beyond their scope which
infringed on the constitutional right of free speech – YES
SUMMARY: Respondents NTC and DOJ Sec Gonzales issued statements
giving warnings to the press and media that publication or airing of the alleged RULING: Petition granted. Official statements of respondents warning media
wiretapped conversations between the President and COMELEC Commissioner on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation is unconstitutional restraint of the
Garcillano are violations of the law. SC held that such restraint is freedom of speech and of the press.
unconstitutional for failing to past the clear and present danger rule.
DOCTRINE: In challenges against freedom of speech, whether in broadcast or RATIO:
print media, the clear and present danger rule must always be satisfied for the 1. Freedom of expression is a preferred right that stands on a higher level than
acts to attain constitutionality. When restricting content-based media, the substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The same right is so broad
presumption on unconstitutionality prevails and the burden of proof is on the that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. However,
government. the freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in
scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media.
FACTS: 2. Freedom of expression is not an absolute immunity for every possible use
1. (June 5, 2005) Press Secretary Bunye told reporters that opposition was of language. Thus, all speech are not treated the same with techniques of
trying to destabilize the administration by releasing  the  “Hello  Garci”  tape.   reviewing applied differently on each category.
The Sec also produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly the 3. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech are evaluated by three tests: (a)
complete version, and the other a spliced or altered version which suggests the dangerous tendency rule which permits limitations on speech once a
that the President instructed a COMELEC official to manipulate the rational connection has been established between the speech restrained the
election results in favor of the President. He also admitted that the voice danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests test used as a standard
was that of the President, but subsequently made a retraction. when there is need to balance the conflicting social values and individual
2. (June 7, 2005) Atty. Paguia subsequently released an alleged authentic tape interests, and requires a detailed consideration of the interplay of interests in
recording of the wiretap. Included were conversations of the President, the a given situation; and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
First Gentleman, COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and Senator the premise that speech may be restrained because there is a substantial
Barbers. danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has to
3. (June 8, 2005) Respondent DOJ Sec Gonzales then warned reporters that prevent. The last test in the one generally adhered to for free speech cases.
those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its 4. Freedom of press has four aspects. These are (1) freedom from prior
contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; (3)
stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of circulation.
continuing offense. 5. Prior restraint refers to official government acts which restrict forms of
4. (June 9, 2005) Respondent then in another press briefing ordered NBI to go expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Certain
after organizations found to have caused the spread of the wiretapped previous restraints may be permitted by the constitution but determined
conversation. Gonzales said he was going to start with only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act. There are two kinds of
5. (June 11, 2005) NTC issued a press release giving a warning to radio and restraints. The first one is a content-neutral regulation which is merely
television owners to observe the Anti-Wiretapping law and pertinent concerned with the incidents of speech, or one that merely controls the time,
circulars on program standards. They claimed that they will not hesitate to place, or manner under well-defined standards. It is not subject to strict
scrutiny but only to intermediate approach which requires a substantial the DOJ Secretary who is the alter ego of the President, who wields the
governmental interest for its validity. The second test is a content-based awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the law.
restraint which is based on subject matter of the speech. This act demands
strict scrutiny and only when it has overcome the clear and present danger
rule will it pass constitutional muster. In this regulation, government has the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. It must serve an
important government interest which is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. Moreover, the incidental restriction on speech must be no
greater that what is essential to the furtherance of that interest. It cannot be
broad that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the
governmental interest.
6. Broadcast media is very different from print media. This is because of the
scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium operated, its pervasiveness
as a medium, and its unique accessibility to children. Although freedom in
the first form is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to the
second form, both still require satisfaction of the clear and present danger
rule when restricted.
7. In the case at bar, what is being regulated is the content of the speech so
respondents have the burden of showing that their acts do not abridge the
freedom of expression. It appears that the great evil which government
wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the
wiretapping law. However, evidence presented fall short of satisfying the
clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press
Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the recording. Secondly, the
integrity of the taped conversation is wanting because of the two versions
presented by him. Thirdly, evidence on the details of who and how the
wiretapping is ambivalent. Lastly, given all the unsettled facets of the tape,
it is even arguable whether airing it would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
8. The court should not be interpreted as devaluing violations of the law. But
the need to prevent violation cannot immediately trump the exercise of free
speech, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. There is
even no proof that the violation of the anti-wiretapping law endangers the
national security of the state.
9. Respondents also content that mere press statements do not constitute a
form of content-based restraint. This is unacceptable for it is not decisive
that press statements be reduced with formal orders or circulars because it is
sufficient that they were made in the exercise of official functions. If every
statement needs to be an official order, it would result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
10. There is also enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts. The
warning came from no less than the NTC which is empowered to cancel the
Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. It also came from
REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE harassment, excessive public exposure and distracts him from the effective
TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER presentation of his defense.
2. Massive intrusion of the media into the trial poses a prejudice to the
CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. defendant’s   right   to   due   process   as   well   as   to   the   fair   and   orderly  
ESTRADA administration of justice, due to the influence and pressure that media has
June 29, 2001 | Vitug, J. | Administrative Matter | Freedom of Expression: on the behavior of the people it focuses on and its ability to shape public
Protected Speech (Prior Restraint) opinion.
3. The propriety of granting or denying the petition involves the weighing out
SUMMARY: KBP requested to be allowed to cover live the trial of the of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to
criminal cases against then Pres. Estrada. SC denied the request, stating that the public information against rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial.
presence of the media in the trial proceedings may impair the fair Jurisprudence states that the right of the accused must be preferred, given
administration of justice and prejudice the accused. the  possibility  of  losing  one’s  life  and  liberty.  Therefore, a verdict must be
DOCTRINE: While the press must be allowed maximum freedom in carrying based solely on the presentation of credible evidence testified by unbiased
out the important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its witnesses, bereft of any influence or pressure, and decreed by an unbiased
exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in judge.
the judicial process. 4. A public trial is not synonymous with a publicized trial. While the press
must be allowed maximum freedom in carrying out the important function
FACTS: of informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must
1. The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) requested the Court necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial
for a live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases process.
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan 5. Other possible problems: live coverage  could  allow  the  “hooting  throng”  to  
“to   assure   the   public   of   full   transparency   in   the   proceedings   of   an   arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such
unprecedented  case  in  our  history”. that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular.
2. The Secretary of Justice submitted the instant petition submitting that the
prosecution involves a matter of public concern and interest which the
entire citizenry has a right to know, that the constitutional right of the
people to be informed can be best served by allowing a live media coverage
of the court proceedings, and that the same will ensure transparency in the
administration of justice. Likewise, the petition seeks a re-examination of
the 23 Oct 1991 resolution of the Court in a case for libel filed by then Pres.
Corazon Aquino which forbids the broadcasting and televising of a trial.

ISSUE/S: WoN live media coverage should be allowed in the trial – NO.


1. In Estes v. Texas, the US SC held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a
criminal defendant: Witnesses become subject to extraordinary out-of-court
influences which might affect their testimony, telecasting increases a
judge’s  responsibility  to  avoid  actual  prejudice   to  the  defendant  as   well  as  
affect his own performance, and subjects the defendant to mental
PEOPLE v. PEREZ much tend to insult a person in authority as they did to raise a disturbance in
December 22, 1923 | Malcolm, J. | Appeal | Freedom of Expression: Protected the community.
Speech (Subsequent Punishment) 2. In criminal law, there are offenses which are not directed to individuals but
rather against the existence of the state and public peace. As defined in Act
SUMMARY: Accused Perez had an altercation with Lodovice because of No. 292, sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.
difference in opinion about the administration of Gov-Gen Wood. He uttered A revolt against legitimate authority and an aim and open violence against
phrases   including   cutting   Wood’s   head   for   killing   Philippines’   independence.   the laws or the Constitution. This act must not be interpreted to abdrige the
TC convicted him violation of Art 256 of the Penal Code which the SC modified freedom of speech. Criticism penetrated to the foundations of government
to a violation of Treason and Sedition Law. are allowed unless the intention and effect be seditious, in which case,
DOCTRINE: When the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and press must yield to the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and punitive measures designed to protect the State.
petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of 3. In the case at bar, the accused maligned the Chief Executive of the
constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the Philippines in ways that pass the bounds of free speech and decency. More
existence of the State. than a figure of speech was intended and there is a seditious tendency in the
words used, which could easily produce disobedience and disloyalty to the
4. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in
1. Perez, a municipal secretary, had a discussion with a citizen named
the Philippines and of the sovereign power appointed by the U.S. President
Lodovice about the administration of Governor-General Wood. The accused
with consent of the U.S. Senate. A seditious attack on him is an attack on
shouted"The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's
the rights of the Filipino people and in American sovereignty.
head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed
5. An accused may be found guilty and convicted for a graver offense than
our independence" several times which led to a charge in the CFI for
that designated in the information. The designation of the crime by the
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.
fiscal is not conclusive. The Court found that there is information and
2. Two witnesses were presented by the government including Lumbao,
evidence during the trial that justifies the conviction of the graver offense of
municipal president, who affirmed that the accused did say what he said.
violation of Act No. 292.
Second witness Cresencio corroborated the testimony of Lumbao and
understood the speech as Perez inviting the Filipinos including himself to
Concurring and Dissenting:
get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood.
J. Villamor: I agree that the accused should be convicted for violating Article
3. Witnesses of the defense did not deny that the altercation happened but
256 of the Penal Code and not for Act. No. 292. There is no allegation nor proof
argued that the discussion was held in a peaceful manner and that what he
that when the accused uttered the words that gave rise to the proceedings, he
said was that Wood should be replaced by another. Counsel for defense
intended to incite others to gather for an illicit purpose. It also appears evident
further argued that the Spanish Penal Code was no longer in effect so
that the accused expressed himself in biting and poignant language, unbecoming
accused cannot be convicted for violating Article 256 thereof.
and improper of a lawabiding citizen and highly detrimental and insulting to the
4. This article contained provisions having to do with contempt of ministers of
authority of the Governor-General which is the thing prohibited and punished by
Crown or other persons in authority. Perez was convicted and appealed to
article 256 of the Penal Code.
this court.
J. Johnson: I agree with J. Villamor because I cannot give assent to a doctrine
which permits a complaintto be presented upon one theory and the trial to be
ISSUE/S: WoN Perez should be convicted for his speech? - YES
carried through upon that theory and then to condemn the defendant upon a
theory which was not even alleged by the prosecution.
RULING: Judgment affirmed with modification as to the law violated.

1. The petitioner was guilty for violating the Treason and Sedition Law and
not Article 256 of the Penal Code. The words of the accused did not so
DENNIS v. U.S. advocacy, not discussion. Petitioners wouldn’t  have  been  convicted  if  they  
June 4, 1951 | Vinson, C.J. | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech were merely pursuing peaceful studies and discussions or conducting a
(Subsequent Punishment) course explaining the philosophical theories set forth in the books which
had  been  placed  in  evidence.  The  Smith  Act  doesn’t  intend  to  eradicate  the  
SUMMARY: Dennis, et al are convicted under the Smith Act (law criminalizing free discussion of political theories nor to destroy the right to discuss and
the  advocacy  of  overthrowing  the  US  Gov’t  by  force  and  violence)  for  conspiring   evaluate   ideas   without   fear   of   gov’t   sanction.   Rather,   Congress   was  
to organize the US Communist Party. They allege that the statute violates their concerned with the kind of activities the petitioners were engaged in.
freedom of speech. SC: Convictions affirmed. 3. The 1st Amendment’s  basis  is  that  speech can rebut speech, propaganda will
DOCTRINE: Clear and Present Danger Test, as reformulated by Justice Hand: answer   propaganda,   free   debate   of   ideas   will   result   in   the   wisest   gov’t  
WON the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such policies. However, free speech must be occasionally subordinated to other
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.// Any conspiracy values  &  considerations.  Here,  the  Court  employs  Justice  Holmes’  clear  and
teaching and advocating the overthrow of the government of the US by force and present danger test in the Schenk Case: whether the words used are used in
violence is a clear and present danger w/c the State has the right to prevent. such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
FACTS: right to prevent. In this case, Justice Hand reinterpreted the rule as WON
1. The Smith Act (Section 2 &3) makes it a crime for any person to knowingly the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such
and willfully advocate the overthrow or destruction of the US Government invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
by force or violence, to organize or help to organize any group which does 4. In   this   case,   requisite   danger   is   the   petitioners’   actions   in   1945-1948 in
so, or conspire to do so. It includes the printing, circulating, and publicly conspiring   to   overthrow   the   government.   The   mere   fact   that   the   CP’s  
displaying any written or printed matter advocating and teaching such. activities   hasn’t   resulted   in   an   attempt   to   overthrow   the   Government   yet  
2. Eugene Dennis and others were convicted under this act for conspiring to doesn’t  matter.  Their  formation  of  such  a  highly  organized  conspiracy  with  
organize the Communist Party of the United States, which was an rigidly disciplined members subject to call by their leaders, coupled with
organization who advocated the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and whose the similar uprisings in other countries and the inflammable nature of world
primary goal is to achieve a successful overthrow of the existing order by conditions,  justify  the  petitioners’  convictions.  The  conspiracy  to  advocate,  
force and violence. Hence, they   assailed   the   Smith   Acts’   constitutionality   and not just the advocacy itself, can be constitutionally restrained.  It’s  the  
for violating their freedom of speech and that it is void for its vagueness. existence of the conspiracy to advocate such ideology which creates the
danger. If the ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot bind the
ISSUE/S: WON the exercise of free speech in advocating the overthrow of the Government to wait until the catalyst has been added. The success or the
government by force and violence is protected by the 1st Amendment – NO. probability of success is also not a factor, because an attempt by itself is a
sufficient evil for Congress to prevent.
RULING: Smith Act VALID. Convictions AFFIRMED. 5. The clear and present danger test is not vague– the Court has attempted to
sum  up  the  factors  which  are  included  within  its  scope,  and  believes  it’s  a  
RATIO: clear enough standard.
1. The   Smith   Act’s   purpose   is   to   protect   the   existing   US   Government from
change by violence, revolution, and terrorism – not from change by
peaceable, lawful, and constitutional means. It’s   undisputable   that   this  
purpose  is  within  Congress’  power  – it is the ultimate value of any society,
for  if  a  society  can’t  protect  its very structure from armed internal attack, no
subordinate value can be protected. The only question is WON the means
employed conflict with the 1st and 5th Amendment.
2. Petitioners contend that the statute, on its face, prohibits academic
discussion of the merits of Marxism-Leninism, which is contrary to the
concept of free speech and a free press. However, the Statute is directed at
November 10, 1919 | Clarke, J. | Freedom of Speech: Protected Speech ISSUE/S: WON there was some evidence, competent and substantial, before the
(Subsequent Punishment) jury, fairly tending to sustain the verdict – YES

RULING: The ruling of the trial court is AFFIRMED

SUMMARY: The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict the
defendants for inciting resistance to the war effort and for urging curtailment of
production of essential war materials and that there was no violation of their
1. (Court): Citing excerpts from the two leaflets, the Court concluded that these
Constitutional rights to free speech. Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion,
leaflets: (1) appealed to the "workers" of this country to arise and put down
argues that there was insufficient evidence to show the necessary intent provided
by force the Government of the United States which they characterize as
for by the Espionage Act and that the conviction was in clear violation of the
their "hypocritical," "cowardly" and "capitalistic" enemy; (2) to persuade the
defendants First Amendment Rights.
persons to whom it was addressed to turn a deaf ear to patriotic appeals in
DOCTRINE: (Court): When prosecuted under the Espionage Act, persons who
behalf of the Government of the United States, and to cease to render it
sought to effectuate a plan of action which necessarily, before it could be realized,
assistance in the prosecution of the war; (3) to create an attempt to defeat the
involved the defeat of the plans of the US for the conduct of the war with Germany
war plans of the Government of the United States by bringing upon the
must be held to have intended that result notwithstanding their ultimate purpose
country the paralysis of a general strike, thereby arresting the production of
may have been to prevent interference with the Russian Revolution.
all munitions and other things essential to the conduct of the war; and (4)
(Holmes): Speech could be punished if it posed a clear and present danger of
culminated with a definite threat of armed rebellion. While the actions of the
causing some harm. A person does not do an act w/ intent to produce it unless the
defendants may have been cause by their resentment over the Government's
aim to produce it is the proximate motive of the specific act.
sending troops into Russia as a strategic operation against the Germans on
the eastern battle front, the plain purpose of their propaganda was to excite,
FACTS: at the supreme crisis of the war, disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they
1. The defendants were convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison under the hoped, revolution, in this country for the purpose of embarrassing, and, if
Espionage Act on the basis of two leaflets they printed and threw from possible, defeating the military plans of the Government in Europe. It is then
windows of a building – one denouncing the sending of American troops to clear that the language of these circulars was obviously intended to provoke
Russia and the other denouncing the war and US efforts to impede the and to encourage resistance to the United States in the war, as the third count
Russian Revolution. runs, and the defendants, in terms, plainly urged and advocated a resort to a
2. The defendants had united to print and distribute the described circulars, and general strike of workers in ammunition factories for the purpose of
that five thousand of them had been printed and distributed about the 22nd curtailing the production of ordnance and munitions necessary and essential
day of August, 1918. to the prosecution of the war as is charged in the fourth count. Since the
3. The defendants were charged on four counts: That the defendants conspired, sentence does not exceed that which might lawfully have been imposed
when the United States was at war with the Imperial Government of under any single count, a verdict of guilty on the third and fourth counts
Germany, to unlawfully utter, print, write and publish: (1) "disloyal, sustains a verdict of guilty on all counts.
scurrilous and abusive language about the form of Government of the United
States;" (2) language "intended to bring the form of Government of the (Holmes, Dissenting): The conviction of the defendants curtails their First
United States into contempt, scorn, contumely and disrepute;" (3) language Amendment Rights. The United States constitutionally may punish speech that
"intended to incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United States in produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will
said war.", and that (4) they conspired to unlawfully and willfully, by bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States
utterance, writing, printing and publication, to urge, incite and advocate constitutionally may seek to prevent. It is only the present danger of immediate
curtailment of production of things and products, to-wit, ordnance and evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
ammunition, necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war. expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned. By itself, printing
4. Defendants argue that there is no substantial evidence to support the leaflets do not present an immediate danger to the Government's war efforts but
judgment upon the verdict of guilty, and that the motion of the defendants printing them for the purpose of obstructing that war effort would indicate a
for an instructed verdict in their favor was erroneously denied.
greater danger and have the quality of an attempt. For the second leaflet to be 2. Before the court could decide on the matter, the president of petitioner, Mr.
punishable, it must have been published with the intent charged in the fourth Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
count or with a specific and actual intent to hinder the war efforts. When the 3. The court will decide nevertheless for the guidance of inferior courts and all
success of an attempt depends upon others, it is necessary to show that the actor others.
has intent to do something evil since, without this intent, the actor's aim may be
accomplished without bringing about the evils sought to be checked. In the case RULING: Petition to withdraw or dismiss granted (case having become moot
at hand, Holmes argues that intent to prevent interference with the revolution in and academic)
Russia might have been satisfied without any hindrance to carrying on the war
in which we were engaged. In fact it is evident that the only object of the paper RATIO:
is to help Russia and stop American intervention there against the popular 1. All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad
government -- not to impede the United States in the war that it was carrying on. protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for
The third count charges an intent to provoke resistance to the United States in its limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present
war with Germany. From the concerned statute, Holmes finds resistance to the danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
United States means some forcible act of opposition to some proceeding of the nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
United States in pursuance of the war. Again, Holmes argues that there is no substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
actual or specific intent to start a resistance on the leaflets. In the case of the first 2. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the
and second count, there is no evidence to support them. freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
EASTERN BROADCASTING v. DANS, JR 3. Broadcast media have established a pervasive influence in the lives of all
July 19, 1985 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Resolution | Freedom of Speech: Protected citizens. Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only
Speech (Subsequent Punishment) in public, but in the privacy of his home. Moreover, broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion pictures may be
prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the same
SUMMARY: Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation sought to allow the selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or
reopening of their radio station (DYRE) which had been closed on grounds of viewer is constantly tuning in and out.
national security. Petitioner contended the issue of freedom of speech. However, 4. Ordinarily, newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan
the motion was withdrawn after petitioner sold its rights and interest in the radio areas where low income masses find the cost of books, newspapers, and
station. The court still ruled on the motion for guidance of the other courts. magazines beyond their humble means. On the other hand, the transistor
DOCTRINE: Freedom in broadcast media is somewhat lesser in scope than the radio is found everywhere and is very cheap. The television set is also
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Material in broadcast media is becoming universal. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every
so accessible and pervasive in all parts on the country that the clear and present person of every age whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech
danger test, employed in cases of freedom of speech, must be used meticulously would be difficult to monitor or predict.
and with extreme care. 5. The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular
circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio
FACTS: stations, whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry
1. Petitioner was closed on the allegation that the radio station was used to itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of
proof was submitted to establish factual basis for the closure. Petitioner also
raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the
respondent’s  general  charge  of  “inciting  people  to  commit  acts  of  sedition”  
arose  from  the  petitioner’s  shift  towards  what  it  stated  was  the  coverage  of  
public events and the airing of programs.
U.S.  v.  O’BRIEN substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free
May 27, 1968 | Warren, C.J. | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
(Symbolic Speech) freedom is no greater than is essential to that interest.
2. Contrary   to   O’Brien’s   position   that   the certificates served no legitimate
SUMMARY: O’Brien  was  convicted  after  he  burned  his  Selective  Registration   purpose and they can be disposed off by the possessor according to the
Certificate to show his antiwar beliefs. He argues that the law penalizing the latter’s   will   and   convenience,   the   certificates   serve   many   purposes   that  
mutilation and destruction of such certificates violates free speech. The Court would be frustrated once they are mutilated or destroyed.
held that the law serves a legitimate State interest which is not at all connected The registration certificate serves as proof that the individual described thereon has
with speech. registered for the draft. These certificates may be used to know who among the
people are delinquent in their obligations under the Selective Service System, and
DOCTRINE: When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the
makes it easier for the Selective Service System to verify the classification and
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in registration status of the registrants.
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First The availability of the certificates also benefits the registrant since it is easier for the
Amendment freedoms. board to locate his file, or for purposes of inquiry especially through a local board
other than his own.
FACTS: The certificates carry continual reminders for the registrants to notify the local board
1. David   O’Brien   was   charged   with   violation   of   Universal   Military   Training   of changes in their address and status, and such continued awareness of the system is
vital to the smooth operation of the system.
and Service Act of 1948 after he and three other companions burned their
Protection against mutilation of the certificates may also serve to deter people from
Selective Registration Certificates before a sizeable crowd in order to show
using these documents for fraudulent purposes.
his opposition to the war. 3. The purposes sought to be achieved by these certificates are in line with the
2. The said law, as amended in 1965, penalizes any person who forges, alters,
legitimate State interest of raising armies. These certificates, which form
knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any
part of the Selective Service System, substantially furthers the smooth and
such certificate (such as the Registration Certificate). Said certificates are
proper functioning of the system that Congress has established to raise
issued to males who upon reaching the age of 18 are required to register
armies. It has been held that the constitutional power of Congress to raise
with a local draft board for the military under the Universal Military
and support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is
Training and Service Act.
broad and sweeping. Furthermore, the power of Congress to classify and
3. O’Brien  claims  that  he  knew  he  was  violating  the  law  by  committing  the  act  
conscript  manpower  for  military  service  is  "beyond  question.”
in order to communicate his antiwar beliefs. He also argues that his act of
4. In this case, what the law only penalizes is the act of mutilating or
burning the certificate was a symbolic speech protected by the First
destroying the certificates, independent of the communicative aspect of
Amendment, and the purpose of Congress in enacting the 1965 Amendment
such  act.  O’Brien  is  convicted  for  burning  the  certificate,  which  caused  the  
(on mutilation and destruction of certificates) was to abridge free speech.
frustration of a legitimate State interest. The act of mutilation or destruction
of the certificate bears no connection with speech, and there is nothing
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the law penalizing the mutilation and destruction of
expressive in such conduct. The law, as amended, does not distinguish
certificates curtail free speech – NO
between public and private destruction, and it does not punish only
destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views.
RULING:  O’Brien’s  conviction  affirmed.  
5. On   O’Brien’s   argument   that   Congress   passed   the   amendment   in   order   to  
curtail free speech, the Court held that it will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.
1. When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course
However, even if they are to resort to the reports of the Senate and House
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
Armed Services Committees, the amendment penalizing the mutilation and
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
destruction of the certificates stemmed from the concern regarding
unrestrained destruction of cards would disrupt the smooth functioning of
A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
the Selective Service System.
constitutional power of the Government and furthers an important or
February 24, 1969 | Fortas, J. | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech 1. The wearing of armbands as a sign of protest against U.S. involvement in
(Symbolic Speech) the Vietnam War was a silent and passive expression of opinion on the part
of the students. There is no evidence to show that it interfered with the
SUMMARY: Petitioners were suspended from school for wearing black school’s   work,   caused   disruption   in   classes,   or   collided   with   the   rights   of  
armbands to show their opposition to the war in Vietnam. The Court held that other students to be secure and let alone. While some of the children
their act falls within the constitutional guarantee of free speech and that it did wearing armbands received hostile remarks from other children outside the
not cause any material and substantial   interference   with   the   school’s   work   nor   classrooms, there were no threats or acts of violence on school premises.
infringe on the rights of others. 2. Undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
DOCTRINE: In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify overcome the right to freedom of expression. In order for the State in the
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. The more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
prohibition on certain acts can only be sustained when it can be shown that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. The prohibition on certain acts
engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and substantially interfere can only be sustained when it can be shown that engaging in the forbidden
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."
FACTS: In this case, there was no showing that the school officials had reason to
1. Petitioners John Tinker, his sister Mary Beth Tinker, and Christopher anticipate such disruption. Also, it appears that the policy was enacted in
Eckhardt were high school students in Des Moines, Iowa. They and their order to prevent any controversy arising from the expression of opposition
parents joined the plan of a group of students and adults in Des Moines to to the Vietnam War.
wear  black  armbands  and  to  fast  on  Dec.  16  and  New  Year’s  Eve  as  a  sign   3. Furthermore, the school officials did not purport to prohibit wearing of all
of  protest  against  the  Government’s  involvement  in  the  Vietnam  War.   symbols of political or controversial significance. It appears that what was
2. The principals of Des Moines became aware of this plan and they adopted a prohibited only was the wearing of said armbands, but not of other symbols
policy to request any student wearing an armband to remove the same, and pertaining to national political campaigns or even the Iron Cross
to suspend him/her from school if he/she refused until he/she returns to (traditionally symbolic of Nazism). Prohibition of expression of a particular
school without the armband. Petitioners were aware of the regulation that opinion is not constitutionally permissible unless it is shown that it is
the school authorities adopted. necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or
3. The petitioners were sent home and suspended from school after they went discipline.
to school wearing their armbands. They did not return to school until after 4. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.
New   Year’s   Day,   which   was   the   period   after   which   they   would   no   longer   Students in school as well as out of school are "persons" under the
wear the armbands according to the plan. Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State
4. Petitioners, through their fathers, filed a suit for nominal damages and must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the
injunction against the school officials to prevent them from disciplining the State. Students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that
petitioners. The District Court dismissed the complaint (ruling sustained by which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the
the CA), holding that it was reasonable for the school to suspend the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence
students in order to prevent disturbance of school discipline. of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their
speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.
ISSUE/S: WoN the wearing of armbands as a sign of protest was
constitutionally protected free speech – YES

RULING: District Court ruling reversed. Case remanded for further

proceedings as to the relief to be granted.
PRIMICIAS v. FUGOSO absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
January 27, 1948 | Feria, J. | Mandamus | Freedom of Expression: Protected enjoyment of others having equal rights. The power to regulate the exercise
Speech (Assembly and Petition) of such and other constitutional rights is termed police power. The
Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of
SUMMARY: Primicias instituted an action to compel Mayor Fugoso to issue a
the Administrative Code is the legislative body of the City. Section 2444 of
permit for the holding of a meeting/ indignation rally at Plaza Miranda. The
the same Code grants the Municipal Board, among others, the following
court, because of the urgency of the prayer and after mature deliberation, issued
legislative power, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression
the writ without prejudice to a reasoned decision. The court eventually came up
of riots, affrays, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the
with the reasoned decision. Justice Hilado dissented however, stating that what
use of streets, avenues ... parks, cemeteries and other public places" and "for
was really regulated was not free speech but the use of a public place.
the abatement of nuances in the same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances it
DOCTRINE: (Majority) Fear of serious injury alone cannot justify suppression
may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
of free speech and assembly. To justify suppression of free speech, there must be
prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort,
reasonable ground to feel that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants." The board
Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these
enacted Sec 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.
functions essential for effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is
2. Sec 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila prohibits the
relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so
holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places unless a
stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively
permit is first secured from the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior
trivial harm to a society. Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied
to the holding of such parade or procession. As there was no express and
to prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations of the law, not
separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly.
holding of public meeting or assembly, the provisions of Sec 1119 was
(J. Hilado's Dissent) The right of peaceful assembly and petition is not absolute
but subject to regulation as regards the time, place, and manner of its exercise.
3. The provision is susceptible of two constructions: one is that the Mayor is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permits for the
FACTS: Congressman Cipriano Primicias, the campaign manager of the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets
Coalesced Minority Parties, wrote a letter to Manila Mayor Valeriano Fugoso to and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the
request for a permit to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo for the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor,
purpose of denouncing the alleged fraudulent manner in which the last elections subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the
have been conducted. Mayor Fugoso however, did not grant the request as the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with the view to prevent
Mayor's office adopted a policy of not permitting meetings of that nature until confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public
the results of the elections have been officially announced because the meetings places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize
are likely to incite the people and disrupt the peace. Hence, the action for the risk of disorder.
mandamus in the present case. 4. The court adopted the second construction. Section 2434 of the
Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which
ISSUE/S: WoN the Mayor is vested with unregulated discretion to grant permit provides that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal
for holding lawful assembly in the streets or other public places of Manila – NO licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the
Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner, because the said general
RULING: Petition for Mandamus GRANTED. power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board
requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor. It is not a specific
RATIO: or substantive power independent from the corresponding municipal
1. The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the ordinances which the Mayor, as Chief Executive of the City, is required to
government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the enforce under the same section 2434. Moreover, one of the settled maxims
people recognized and guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the Legislature to
countries. But it a settled principle that the exercise of those rights is not
make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or to greatly inconvenience and interfere with the right of the public in general
authority except certain powers of local government, specially of police to devote said plaza to the public uses for which it has been destined since
regulation which are conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal time immemorial. The regulatory action is predicated upon the general
corporation. Taking this into consideration, and that the police power to comfort and convenience and is in consonance with peace and good order.
regulate the use of streets and other public places has been conferred by the Hence,   it   is   not   a   “guise   of   regulation”     and   does   not   abridge   or   deny   the  
Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City it is to be presumed that right.
the Legislature has not conferred upon the Mayor the same power, specially 2. There is no constitutional right to use public places under government
if we take into account that its exercise may be in conflict with the exercise control for the exercise of the right of assembly and petition - The action
of the same power by the Municipal Board. taken by the City Mayor was not even a regulation of the constitutional
5. Assuming that the legislature has the power to confer to the Mayor the right of assembly and petition, or free speech but rather of the use of a
powers mentioned, under our democratic system of government no such public place under the exclusive control of the city government for the
unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, exercise of that right. No political party or section of our people has any
except in cases of national emergency. constitutional right to freely and without government control make use of
6. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense is, "that there is a such a public place as Plaza Miranda, particularly if such use is a deviation
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the from those for which said public places have been by their nature and
fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter purpose immemorially dedicated. When the use of public streets or places is
and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the involved, public convenience, public safety and public order take
faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly precedence over particular civil rights. For if the citizen asserting the civil
constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a right were to override the right of the general public to the use of such
disruption of public order." The court held however that fear of serious streets or places just because it is guaranteed by the constitution, it would be
injury alone cannot justify suppression of free speech and assembly. To hard to conceive how upon the same principle that citizen be prevented
justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to feel from using the private property of his neighbor for the exercise of the
that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. Moreover, even asserted right. The constitution, in guaranteeing the right of peaceful
imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions assembly and petition, the right of free speech, etc., does not guarantee their
essential for effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively exercise upon public places, any more than upon private premises, without
serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent government regulation in both cases.
that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial 3. The discretion of the City Mayor is not unregulated, for the phrase "any
harm to a society. Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to good reason of general interest" is certainly an effective regulatory
prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations of the law, not condition precedent to the exercise of the power one way or the other.
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly. The Mayor's action was not an absolute denial of the permit, but a mere
postponement of the time for holding the "rally" for good reasons "of
HILADO, Dissenting: general interest" because there were allusions in the papers that in case of
1. The right to free speech and assembly is not absolute but subject to defeat of the candidates in the petitioner's side, there will be minority
reasonable regulations. - The Mayor of Manila had the duty and the power resignations in the congress, rebellion and even revolution in the country.
to grant and refuse municipal permits of all classes for any good reason of Judging from the tenor of the request for permit and taking into
general interest and to comply with and enforce and give the necessary consideration the circumstances under which said meeting will be held, it is
orders for the faithful enforcement and execution of the laws and ordinances safe to state that once the people are gathered thereat are incited, there will
in effect within the jurisdiction of the city. Among the general powers and surely be trouble between the opposing elements, commotion will follow,
duties of the Municipal Board, whose ordinances the said Mayor was at and then peace and order in Manila will be disrupted.
once bound and empowered to comply with and enforce, were such as
regulate the use of streets, parks and other public places. Plaza Miranda is a
public square or plaza used by a great number of people. The holding of the
meeting contemplated by the petitioner, if granted, must have been expected
February 26, 1970 | Resolution | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech 1. The right to freedom of assembly while not unlimited is entitled to be
(Assembly and Petition) accorded the utmost deference and respect. The mayor was empowered to
refuse issuance of said permit if done under the criteria in Primicias.
SUMMARY: Navarro applied for a permit to hold a public rally at Plaza 2. The grounds for his refusal (fact 1 letter excerpt) do not meet the standard
Miranda. The Mayor stated that he would be willing to grant the permit if it was of the Primicias ruling. Under the circumstances, the effect is one of prior
held on Saturdays, Sundays, or holiday; or in another venue less prejudicial to restraint of a constitutional right. This is not allowable. A law subjecting the
public  order.  The  Court  upheld  the  Mayor’s decision. exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license,
DOCTRINE: The mayor possesses reasonable discretion in determining the without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing
public places to be used for the assembly, provided that such discretion is not authority, is unconstitutional.
exercised arbitrarily.

1. Navarro applied for a permit to hold a public rally or demonstration at Plaza
Miranda.  Mayor  Villegas,  in  his  letter  addressed  to  the  petitioner,  said,  “In
the greater interest of the general public, and in order not to unduly disturb
the life of the community, this Office, guided by a lesson gained from the
events of the past few weeks, has temporarily adopted the policy of not
issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstrations
during week days.”
2. Mayor Villegas further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative venue, for
holding it in Plaza  Miranda  poses  a  “clearer and more imminent danger of
public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed
as an  aftermath  of  such  assemblies”.

ISSUE/S: WoN Navarro is entitled to the issuance of the permit, pursuant to his
constitutionally protected right of assembly—NO


As stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, the mayor possesses reasonable discretion in
determining the public places to be used for the assembly in order to 1) secure
convenient use thereof by others and 2) provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order. Here, the
mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused to grant the permit; rather, he
expressed his willingness to grant a permit if it was not held during weekdays
and further offered the Sunken Gardens as an alternative venue. He ratiocinated
that every time assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a
state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed,
storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the
general detriment of the public.
June 5, 1973 | Makasiar, J. | Review of CIR decision | Freedom of Expression: 1. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil
Protected Speech (Assembly and Petition) rights but also political rights  essential  to  man’s  enjoyment  of  his  life,  to  his  
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. While the Bill of Rights
SUMMARY: PBMEO, despite being forewarned by PBM, proceeded with its also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
demonstration  against  Pasig  Police,  resulting  in  the  PBMEO  officer’s  dismissal.   rights is recognized. The rights of free expressions and of assembly occupy
PBM contends that the demonstration prejudices the operation of the company. a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
PBMEO argues that it is an exercise of their right to freedom of expression. SC our civil and political institutions.
ruled in favor of PBMEO. 2. Property rights: can be lost thru prescription; minimum test: rational
DOCTRINE: Human rights, like the freedom of expression and assembly, relation between means and purpose of law– not arbitrary, discriminatory or
have a primacy over property rights. oppressive. Human rights: imprescriptible; stringent criterion – an existence
of a grave and imminent danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent.
FACTS: 3. Demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of
1. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization, a legitimate labor expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for
union of PBM Co, Inc. employees, decided to stage a mass demonstration at redress of grievances – harassment of local officers. The pretension of PBM
Malacañang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig that it would suffer loss by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 to
Police, to be participated by the 1st shift (6:00-14:00), regular 2nd (07:00- 2 is a plea for the preservation of merely their property rights. Material loss
16:00) and 3rd shifts (08:00-19:00) workers. They informed PBM of can be adequately compensated, while the debasement of a human being
proposed demonstration, and that it was not directed towards the Company can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.
but towards said police. 4. To regard the demonstration against police officers as evidence of bad faith
2. The Management of PBM informed them that the demonstration is an in the CBA and a cause for dismissal, stretches unduly the compass of the
inalienable right guaranteed by the Constitution, but that any demonstration CBA and is a potent means of inhibiting speech; therefore, it infringes on
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. It the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, peaceful assembly
forewarned the PBMEO representatives that workers in the 1 st and regular and petition.
shifts, primarily the officers of PBMEO, who fail to report for work on 5. PBM’s   claim that it only suggested that the 1st and regular shifts should
March 4th shall be dismissed for violating the existing CBA provision of report for work fails to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
“No   Lockout-No  Strike”.  It  proposed  to  utilize  the  2 nd and 3rd shifts (non- demonstration – the complete unity of the Union members and their total
regular), instead of the 1st and regular shifts in order to not violate the presence. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression, if the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). demonstrators are to be reduced by 1/3, then by that much the circulation of
3. Despite the pleas, petitioners proceeded with the demonstration. PBM the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished.
charged the petitioners and other employees in the 1 st shift with a violation 6. At any rate, the PBMEO notified PBM 2 days in advance of the projected
of Secs 4(a)-6,   13,   14,   15   of   RA   875   and   of   the   CBA   providing   for   “No   demonstration. PBM could have made arrangements to counteract or
Strike  and  No   Lockout”.  The   order  found  PBMEO  guilty   of  bargaining in prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of absence of its workers
bad faith and for perpetrating a unfair labor practice, thus, considered for a day.
petitioners to have lost their status as employees of PBM.

ISSUE: WoN   PBM’s   property   rights   can   thwart   the   Union’s   rights   to   free  
expression and assembly – NO.

RULING: Orders of Court of Industrial Relations NULL AND VOID. 8

petitioners reinstated with full back pay from date of dismissal until reinstated.
RESTAURANT & ALLIED INDUSTRIES v. CA 1. Strike: any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
November 11, 2008 | Velasco, J. | Certiorari (Review and Special Civil Action) employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 6 categories of an
Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech (Assembly and Petition) illegal strike: (1) contrary to a specific prohibition of law; (2) violates a
specific requirement of law; (3) declared for an unlawful purpose; (4)
employs unlawful means in the pursuit of the objective; (5) declared in
SUMMARY: Because of a bargaining deadlock with the Hotel (employer), the
violation of an existing injunction; (6) contrary to an existing agreement
Union (employees) shaved their heads/sported closely cropped hair then attended
(e.g. no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause)
work with such hair, in protest. Hotel prevented them from entering premises for
2. Head Shaving an Unprotected Action:Union is liable for conducting an
violating Hotel Grooming Standards, setting off a series of strikes involving
illegal  strike.  The  Union’s  violation  of  the  Hotel’s  Grooming  Standards  was  
picketing and unlawfully blocking the entry and exit of Hotel premises, ending w/
not merely an expression of grievance or displeasure, but clearly a
the Hotel firing many Union officers/members. SC: Illegal Strike.
deliberate, calibrated and calculated act designed to inflict serious damage
DOCTRINE: Acts which are not merely an expression of grievance or
to  the  Hotel’s  finances  or  its  reputation  – an unprotected action. The Hotel
displeasure, but a deliberate, calibrated and calculated act designed to inflict
employees’   appearances   directly   reflect   the   Hotel’s   character   and   well-
serious damage to another, is unprotected. // 6 requisites of illegal strike (Ratio 1)
being as a 5-star hotel that provides service to top-notch   clients.   It’s  
important to note that being bald or having cropped hair per se does not
evoke negative or unpleasant feelings. But the reality that many employees
1. The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file
assigned   to   the   Hotel’s   food   and   beverage   outlets   with   full   heads   of   hair  
employees of Dusit Hotel Nikko, a 5-star service establishment. Due to a
suddenly deciding to come to work bald-headed/cropper hair suggests that
bargaining deadlock between the Union and the Hotel in negotiating their
something was wrong. Hotel does not need to advertise its labor problems
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), the Union filed a Notice of Strike
with its clients. By shaving their heads, the Union succeeded in forcing the
and a Strike Vote where the Union decided to strike. 3 days later, the Union
Hotel to choose between allowing its inappropriately hairstyled employees
held   a   general   assembly   at   the   Hotel’s   basement,   where   some   members  
to continue working to the detriment of their reputation, or to refuse them
decided to shave their heads or sport closely cropped hair then going to
work even if it had to cease operations in affected service units.
work the next day w/ the same hairstyles.
3. Other  Reasons  why  the  Union’s  actions  amounted  to  an  illegal  strike.
2. Because of this, the Hotel prevented the workers from entering the premises
a. Violated  CBA’s  No  Strike,  No  Lockout  provision
for violating the Hotel’s   Grooming   Standards.   The Union then staged a
b. Violated  Union’s  duty  and responsibility to bargain in good faith
picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other workers were also prevented
c. Violated mandatory 30 day cool off period and 7 day strike ban
from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this reason, the
d. Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike – formed
Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to
human  barricades  of  obstructed  the  Hotel’s  driveway
temporarily cease operations in 3 restaurants.
4. Union’s  Liability  under  the  Law: The dismissal of the Union Officers is
3. Subsequently, the Hotel suspended the Union members, and the Union
upheld but the 61 Union members are reinstated without backwages. Labor
continued the picket. The Hotel then terminated the services of 29 Union
Code Art 264(a), par 3: Any union officer who knowingly participates in an
officers and 61 Union members and suspended many other employees. The
illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
Union again conducted a strike for unfair labor practice and union-busting,
the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
where they unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress of Hotel premises.
his employment status. In this case, while firing of Union Officers is
justified,   individual   Union   members   weren’t   proven   to   have   committed  
ISSUE/S: WON the Union conducted an illegal strike – YES.
illegal acts during the strike for them to lose their employment.
RULING: AFFIRMED. Union liable for illegal strike. Union officers
dismissed, 61 Union members reinstated.
J.B.L REYES v. BAGATSING assembly or rally. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest;
November 9, 1983 | Fernando, C. J. | Mandamus with Preliminary Mandatory much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.
Injunction | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech (Assembly and Petition) 2. The choice of Luneta and the front of the US Embassy as staging places for
the rally cannot be legally objected to in the absence of a clear and present
SUMMARY: J.B.L. Reyes files the present petition on behalf of the Anti-Bases danger. Citing the case of Hague v. CIO, it was stated that the use of streets
Coalition after their permit to conduct a peaceful march and rally from Luneta to and parks for communication of views is not absolute, but relative, such that
the U.S. Embassy on Oct. 26, 1983 was not granted. The Court granted the it may be regulated in the interest of peace and order and the general
petition stating that there was no clear and present danger that would justify the comfort and convenience of the public, but may not be abridged or denied.
withholding of the permit. Also, it is settled law that there is freedom of access as to public places,
DOCTRINE: Freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, especially so as to parks and streets. Their use is not dependent on whether
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the an individual or a group applies for the permit. If it were, freedom of access
state has a right to prevent. becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection question.
3. Furthermore, while the official vested with the power of granting permits
FACTS: (in this case, the Mayor) is given discretion whether such permits must be
1. JBL Reyes, retired SC Justice, filed the petition on behalf of the Anti-Bases granted, this discretion is not an unregulated one.
Coalition after their permit to conduct a peaceful march and rally from The general rule is that while a permit should recognize the right of the
Luneta to the U.S. Embassy on Oct. 26, 1983 from 2-5 PM, to be followed applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another
by a short program, was not granted. The said activity is in connection with place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there
forwarding a petition to the US Ambassador based on the resolution is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were
adopted on the last day of the Intl Conference for General Disarmament, made. In this case, mere assertion of subversives and criminals infiltrating
World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila. gathering is not sufficient to qualify as a clear and present danger.
2. Manila Mayor Ramon Bagatsing denied the permit on the grounds that there 4. Ordinance 7295 finds its basis from the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
were persistent intelligence reports of criminal and subversive elements that Relations (1961) w/c provides  that  “The receiving State is under a special duty
may infiltrate and disrupt gatherings involving many people. Nonetheless, to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion
he recommended that a permit to rally may still be issued if the rally is to be or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment
of  its  dignity.”The Philippines is a signatory to the Convention, which, as a
held at the Rizal Coliseum or any enclosed area to ensure the safety of the
participants as well as the public. He also cited Ordinance 7295 of the City restatement   of   the   “generally   accepted   principles   of   international   law”,  
of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations becomes part of the law of the land under the Constitution.
within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery. Even so, absent the showing of the clear and present danger of any intrusion
or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its
ISSUE: WoN a clear and present danger has been sufficiently shown that would dignity, there would be no justification for the denial of the permit insofar
justify the withholding of the granting of the permit to rally – NO as the terminal point would be the Embassy.

NOTE: (Guidelines on Grant of Permits)

RULING: Petition for mandatory injunction granted.
Applicants for permit for an assembly must inform the licensing authority of public
place where and the time it will take place.
RATIO: If it is a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
1. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for possession is required.
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is accorded the Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
utmost deference and respect, and is not to be limited, much less denied, concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that permit or to its grant but at another public place.
the state has a right to prevent. However, what is constitutionally It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
guaranteed is peaceful assembly, not disorder or tumult attending an present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
Applicants must be heard on the matter if the licensing authority is of the view that ISSUE/S: WoN the MECS order violates the constitutional rights of peaceable
there is an imminent and grave danger of substantive evil. assembly and free speech of the students – Yes, insofar as the penalty was
The decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to the applicants at excessive.
the earliest opportunity so they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
RULING: Petition GRANTED. Decision of Ramento nullified and set aside.
TRO made permanent.
May 21, 1984 | Fernando, C.J. | Review of decision of Ministry of Education RATIO:
NCR Director | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech (Assembly and 1. Though it is undeniable that petitioners held a rally at a place other than that
Petition) stipulated in the permit and continued on longer than the time allowed, and
that they caused class disturbances and caused the work of non-academic
SUMMARY: Petitioners held a rally at a place other than that specified in the employees, the penalty of 1 year suspension is out of proportion to their
permit granted by the school authorities, causing disturbances in classes and in misdeed.
non-academic works, to which they were suspended for 1 academic year. SC 2. Petitioners are entitled to invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free
held that the penalty was severe. Imposed 1 week suspension. speech – they do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
DOCTRINE: Authority of school officials over the conduct of their students expression at the schoolhouse gate. While the authority of educational
cannot go so far as to be violative of the right to free speech and assembly. institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so
far as to violate the constitutional safeguards. However, conduct by the
FACTS: student which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
1. Petitioners, Officers of the Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta or invasion of rights of others is not immunized by the constitutional
University Foundation sought and were granted by the school authorities a guarantee of freedom of speech.
permit to hold a meeting from 8-12 on Aug 27, 1982. Petitioners, along 3. Regarding the tenor of the speeches made by the student leaders: The
with other students, held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and critical and spiteful utterances made by the leaders are quite understandable.
Animal Science 2nd floor lobby, instead of the basketball court as specified Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic and would be
in the permit, where they manifested in vehement language their opposition ineffective if, during a rally, they speak in the guarded way. At any rate,
to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their
of Agriculture. They marched toward the Life Science Building (not utterances. They may applaud the speakers, but with the activity taking
covered by the permit) and continued on their rally, causing disturbances of place inside the school premises at day time, no clear and present danger of
classes, as well as the work of non-academic employees. On the same day, public disorder is discernable, without prejudice to disciplinary action.
they were asked to explain why they should not be held liable for illegal 4. Nevertheless, petitioners cannot be totally absolved of their actions.
assembly. Respondents can take disciplinary action, to which an admonition or a
2. On Sept 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under a preventive censure would suffice. 1 year suspension is too severe. If the concept of
suspension for failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front proportionality of offense committed and sanction imposed is not followed,
of the Life Science Building. and element of arbitrariness intrudes – give rise to a due process question.
3. Ramento, Director of NCR, Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, Court imposed a 1 week suspension.
found petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated par 146(c) of the 5. Guidelines: Utmost leeway is accorded the content of placards or
Manual for Private School –holding of illegal assembly for violation of the utterances made. If assembly is to be held in school, permit must be sought
permit resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. They from school authorities who cannot deny such request arbitrarily.
were suspended for 1 academic year.The Court issued a TRO, enjoining Conditions may be imposed as to avoid disruption of class or work of non-
respondents from enforcing the order of the MECS. academic personnel. If there are violations, penalty should not be
disproportioned to the offense.
BAYAN v. ERMITA peaceful assembly and association even under the Universal Declaration of
April 25, 2006 | Azcuna, J.| Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus | Freedom of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Expression: Protected Speech (Assembly and Petition) 3. The  law  is  not  vague  in  its  provisions.  “Public”  need  not  be  defined  since  its  
ordinary meaning (an organized body of people; a group of people
SUMMARY: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of BP No. 88, under distinguished by common interests of characteristics) is well-known. Not
which rallies were dispersed, and the Calibrated Pre-Emptive Response policy. every  expression  of  opinion  is  a  public  assembly.  The  law  refers  to  “rally,  
The SC held that BP No. 88 was constitutional as it merely regulated the demonstration, march, parade, procession, or any other form of mass or
exercise  the  right  to  peaceful  assembly,  and  only  to  the  extent  of  the  ‘clear  and   concerted  action  held  in  a  public  place”;;  hence,  it  does  not  cover  any  and  all  
present  danger’  test,  but  that  the  CPR  was  unconstitutional.   kinds of gatherings.
DOCTRINE: The right to peaceful assembly and petition is not absolute. The 4. The law is not overbroad, since it regulates the exercise of the right to
clear and present danger test provides a recognized exception to said right. peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent necessary to avoid a clear
and present danger of substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
FACTS: 5. There is no prior restraint since the content of the speech is irrelevant to the
1. The groups in the three separate petitioners (Bayan et al., Jess Prado et al., regulation. Moreover, for those who cannot obtain the permit, Sec 15
and KMU et al.) all took part in rallies and mass actions which were provides for the creation of freedom parks in every city and municipality,
dispersed by policemen in September – October 2005. Petitioners assailed where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly. However, the Court
BP No. 880, seeking primarily to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the ruled that no prior permit could be required for the exercise of the right to
“no   permit,   no   rally”   policy   and   the   Calibrated   Pre-Emptive Response public assembly in any city or municipality unless said city or municipality
(CPR) policy. They argued that it violated the Constitution and the complied with Sec 15.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights 6. In view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is
illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is
ISSUE/S: WoN BP No. 880 is constitutional – YES and should be that mandated by the law itself, i.e. maximum tolerance.
WoN CPR is constitutional - NO 7. Situations where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and police
immediately disperse rallies when the rallyists cannot produce a permit on
RULING: Petitions granted in part. CPR null and void. demand must also be addressed. In such situation, based on maximum
tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed on a
RATIO: (Note: Court explicitly stated they applied heightened scrutiny) given date can, after two days from the same, rally in accordance with their
1. BP No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies, but a restriction that application without the need to show a permit, with the grant of such permit
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It is content- presumed under the law. It will then be the burden of the authorities to show
neutral, not content-based (i.e. would be biased against mass actions against that the application was denied, in which case the rally may be peacefully
the government) and applies to all kinds of public assemblies that would use dispersed following the maximum tolerance procedure prescribed by law.
public   venues.   The   term   “lawful   cause”   does   not   make   it   content-based
because assemblies really must be for lawful causes, otherwise they would
not  be  “peaceable”  and  entitled  to  protection.  Nor  are  the  words  “opinion”,  
“protesting”   and   “influencing”   to   define   public   assembly   content-based,
since  they  can  refer  to  any  subject.  “Petitioning  the  government  for  redress  
of grievances comes from the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
Finally,   “maximum   tolerance”   is   for   the   protection   and   benefit   of   all  
rallyists, independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
2. The permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health, which is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right to
IBP v. ATIENZA modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who
February 24, 2010 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Certiorari | Freedom of Expression: must be heard on the matter. e) If the mayor or any official acting in his
Protected Speech (Assembly and Petition) behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant   may   contest   the   decision   in   an   appropriate   court   of   law.   f)   …   a  
SUMMARY: Mayor Atienza modified the application for a permit to rally decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the
filed by IBP, changing the venue to Plaza Miranda instead of in Mendiola applicant shall be immediately executory.
Bridge, as indicated in the application. 3. Freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
DOCTRINE: Freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present
except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 4. The rights to freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and petition for
redress and grievances, while not identical, are inseparable.
FACTS: 5. In objections or modifications in the grant of permits, it is an indispensable
1. IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from test be the standard for the decision reached. If the public official concerned
2:30-5:30 pm to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law is of the view that such imminent and grave danger exists, the applicants
students and multi-sectoral organizations. Respondent issued a permit but must be heard on the matter.
indicated Plaza Miranda as venue. 6. In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion
2. Petitioners filed for certiorari before CA, but having been unresolved within when he did not immediately inform IBP who should have been heard first
24 hrs, filed a petition before SC. The court denied the petition for being on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive
moot and academic, the relief in view of pendency of action in CA, and evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. Respondent failed to
MR. indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against
3. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with said standard test.
P/Supt. Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District 7. Although the Mayor is not devoid of discretion in granting permits, such
earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. They alleged that the discretion is not unrestrained. There is an assumption, especially where the
participants voluntarily dispersed after the program. assembly is scheduled for a specific public place that the permit must be for
4. MPD instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for violating the Public the assembly being held there. The exercise of such right cannot be
Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit. Cadiz abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.
filed a Counter-Affidavit.CA ruled that that the petition became moot and
lacked merit, and also denied the MR.

ISSUE/S: WoN   the   modification   in   the   venue   in   IBP’s   rally   permit   constitute  
grave abuse of discretion – YES


1. Case became moot and academic, but is capable of repetition yet evading
review – arise each time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the
concerned official, yet it evades review due to limited time in processing
application where the shortest allowable period is 5 days prior to the
2. Sec 6 of Public Assembly Act: c) If the mayor is of the view that there is
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
April 18, 1969 | Fernando, J. | Declaratory Relief w/ Preliminary Injunction | RULING: The Court was unable to arrive at the needed 2/3 vote. Thus, the
Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage) petition is DISMISSED and the writ of prohibition prayed for is DENIED.

SUMMARY: Petitioners ask that RA 4880 which prohibits the (too early)
1. There are two tests that supply an acceptable criterion for permissible
nomination of candidates for election and limits the period of election campaign or
restriction of constitutional liberties – (1)   the   “clear   and   present   danger”   rule,  
partisan political activity be declared unconstitutional for violating the freedom of
and  (2)  the  “dangerous  tendency”  rule.  In  the  first,  there  must  be  a  danger  or  evil  
speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association.
of substantive character that the state has the right to prevent in order to justify
The court was unable to obtain the 2/3 vote necessary to nullify the act thus RA
the limitation on freedom of expression. This danger must not only be clear (that
4880 could not be declared unconstitutional.
there is a causal connection between the evil and the utterance questioned) but
DOCTRINE: Congress has the power, under narrowly drawn legislation, to
also present (the danger must be imminent, immediate, or inevitable. The
impose necessary restrictions on liberties such as the freedom of speech, etc. –
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom to assemble, and freedom to
pursuant  to  the  “clear  and  present  danger”  rule  and    the  “dangerous  tendency”  rule.
association being invoked by the petitioners can be constitutionally limited or
restricted   in   the   presence   of   “clear   and   present   danger”.   In   the   case   at   hand,   it  
FACTS cannot be denied that the statute was enacted to address and in response to a
1. Petitioner Cabigao was a City Councilor of the 4 th District of Mania and an serious substantive danger in the electoral process, not only in danger of
official candidate under the Nacionalista Party for Vice Mayor to which he happening, but already in existence and would likely continue unless curbed or
was elected. Petitioner Gonzales was a private individual who was a remedied. In fact, the main author of the Act, Sen. Tanada, as amicus curiae,
registered voter in Manila and political official of Cabigao. explained  that  the  provisions   in  the  act  restricting  the  “election  campaign”  and  
2. Petitioners argue that portions of RA 4880 violate their freedoms of “partisan  political  activity”  were  deemed  by  the  legislature  to  be  part  and  parcel  
speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of of the necessary and appropriate response to the existence of a grave and actual
association. evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption, as well as violence
3. These portions are: (1) Sec 50-A which prohibits the (too early) that has marred elections and partisan political activities in the country.
nomination of candidates within 90 days prior to the elections, and (2) Sec
50-B which limits the period of election campaign or partisan political Re: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press
activity. (Minority) The   provision   that   “the   simple   statement   of   opinion   shall   not   be  
4. RA   4880   defined   the   terms   “candidate”,   “election   campaign”,   and   considered   part   of   a   political   campaign”   and   that   nothing   in   the   Act   “shall   be  
“partisan   political   activity”.   Likewise,   there   is   a   provision   stating   that   understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political
nothing   in   the   Act   “shall   be   understood to prevent any person from problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates from public
expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from office   whom   he   supports”   if   properly   implemented,   as   they   ought   to   be,  
mentioning the names of the candidates from public office whom he minimizes the bar to free expression feared by the petitioners.
5. Petitioners  assert  that  “there  is  nothing  in  the  spirit  or  intention  of  the law Re: Freedom of Association and Freedom to Assemble
that would legally justify its passage and enforcement. They allege further (1) In Sec 50-A – The scope of legitimate activities by political parties are not
that the regulation and limitation of political matters through police power unduly narrowed. They can also assemble but not for the purpose of nominating
with the absence of clear and present danger would render their a candidate.
constitutional rights meaningless. (2) In Sec 50-B – The Court is of the opinion that no unconstitutional
6. Respondent stresses that RA 4880 is an exercise of police power designed infringement exists insofar as the formation of organization, associations for
to  ensure  a  free,  orderly,  and  honest  election  by  “regulating  conduct  which   election purposes are restricted and that the prohibition against giving, soliciting,
Congress  has  determined  harmful.” or receiving contribution for such purposes is constitutional. The restriction on
the freedom to assemble was to be decided but the Court concluded it was not
ISSUE/S: WON RA 4880 should be annulled – NO enough to annul RA 4880.
(Majority) However, the majority of the Court views that the prohibition of 1. Although the limitation imposed by the resolution does not absolutely bar
actions (speeches, interviews, announcements) in Sec 50-B prohibits the petitioner’s   freedom   of   expression,   it   is   still   a   restriction   on   his   choice   of  
constitutional right to freedom of expression (speech, assembly) and that, on its forum where he may express his view. COMELEC gave no reason to justify
face, the challenged statute must be nullified. In other words, the challenged such restriction. This form of regulation is tantamount to restriction of
statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid 2. Plebiscite  issues  are  matters  of  public  concern  and  importance.  The  people’s  
limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently decide would
be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues. The
people affected by the issues should not be unduly burdened by restrictions
SANIDAD v. COMELEC on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
January 29, 1990 | Medialdea, J.| Certiorari | Freedom of Expression: Protected 3. COMELEC spaces and COMELEC radio time provide a forum for
Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage) expression, but do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the
public because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or
SUMMARY: Petitioner contested a COMELEC resolution preventing media to specific radio/TV times.
practitioners from discussing plebiscite issues through their columns, radio or 4. The laws cited by COMELEC are not on point as they are relevant to
TV time during the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on issuance of permits to franchises and to limiting space and time for public
plebiscite day. The Court granted his petition, ruling that there was no basis for information and campaigns among candidates. These statutes cannot be
the resolution. construed to mean that COMELEC has the right to supervise and regulate
DOCTRINE: Freedom of expression may not be restricted without justifiable the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression
reason. during plebiscite periods, as they are neither franchise holders nor
candidates. In fact, the plebiscite has no candidates. Besides, the evil sought
FACTS: in prohibiting certain forms of election propaganda (favouring a specific
1. Under RA 6766, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras would take part in a candidate) does not apply in a plebiscite.
plebiscite for the ratification of an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2167 to
govern the conduct of said plebiscite.
2. Petitioner  Pablito  Sanidad,  newspaper  columnist  of  the   ‘Overview’  for  the  
‘Baguio   Midland   Courier’,   assailed   the   constitutionality of Sec 19 of the
COMELEC resolution, which prohibited mass media columnists,
commentators, announcers or personalities from using their columns or
radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues
during the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite
day. Sanidad alleged that it violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of expression and the press. He also maintained that it was a prior restraint
and imposed subsequent punishment for those who violated it, since it
contained a penal provision.

ISSUE/S: WoN the COMELEC resolution violated freedom of the press and
freedom of expression - YES

RULING: Petition granted.

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB v. COMELEC access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as
March 5, 1992 | Feliciano, J. | Review of COMELEC decision | Freedom of may  be  defined  by  law”.  
Expression: Protected Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage) 3. Sec   11(b)’s   restrictive   impact   on   freedom   of   speech   and   freedom of the
press is limited in duration since it only applies to election periods, and in
SUMMARY: Petitioners assailed Sec 11(b) of RA 6646 as violative of freedom its scope, since it applies only to purchase and sale, including purchase and
of the press and freedom of speech. The Court considered the constitutional sale disguised as donation, of print space and air time for campaign and
value of equal access to opportunities to public service and that the restrictive other political purposes, i.e. only paid political advertisements of political
impact was limited, and held that it was valid. candidates, not everything newsworthy related to the candidates or
DOCTRINE: Free speech and free press are not unlimited rights, for they are commentaries or expressions of belief or opinion from the media.
not the only important and relevant values, and may be restricted in view of 4. In a sense, the listeners and viewers in the Philippines are a   “captive  
other values. audience”,   and   repetitive   political   commercials   when   fed   into   electronic  
media constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. The paid
FACTS: political advertisements injected into the electronic media and repeated with
1. Petitioners assailed Sec 11(b) of RA 6646 as violative of the freedom of mind-deadening frequency are commonly intended and crafted, not to
expression. Said section prohibited certain forms of election propaganda, inform and educate but to condition and manipulate, not to provoke rational
including for any newspapers radio, TV station, or other mass media, or any and   objective   appraisal   of   candidate’s   qualifications   or   programs   but   to  
person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience.
space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free from such
COMELEC as provided under Secs 90 (COMELEC space– allocating all intrusions and their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of
candidates free and equal space in newspapers) and 92 (COMELEC time– candidates to advertise themselves through modern electronic media and the
allocating all candidates free and equal radio and TV time) of BP Blg. 881. right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the marketing of
“packaged”  candidates.
ISSUE/S: WoN Sec 11(b) is unconstitutional - NO

RULING: Petitions dismissed.

1. The legitimacy and importance of the objective of the assailed provision,
which is to equalize rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from
enjoying   the   undue   advantage   of   huge   campaign   “war   chests”,   is  
indisputable. It is also mandated by Art IX (C) (4) of the Constitution,
which expressly authorizes the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of the franchises of permits for the operation of
media of communication and information, for the purpose of equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, and uniform and
reasonable rates of charge for the use of the same, in connection with public
information campaigns and forums among candidates.
2. Free speech and free press are not unlimited rights, for they are not the only
important and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities. In
Philippine society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public
office,  without  regard  to  one’s  financial  resources,  is  clearly  important. Art
II  Sec  26  of  the  Constitution  provides  that  “the  State  shall  guarantee  equal  
March 31, 1992 | Gutierrez Jr, J. | Petition for Review | Freedom of Expression: RATIO:
Protected Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage) 1. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free
speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public
interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this
SUMMARY: Adiong assailed the COMELEC's resolution that prohibits the
case. Free speech is accorded the status of a preferred freedom because it is
posting of decals and stickers which are election propaganda, in mobile places
an indispensable condition of nearly every freedom. It is difficult to imagine
like cars and other moving vehicles. The court held that the prohibition is null
how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections
and void.
may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is
DOCTRINE: The qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from
denied and taken away. Too many restrictions will deny people the robust,
the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other
uninhibited, and wide open debate, the which is essential for our elections
freedom. It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights
to truly be free, clean and honest. Although the COMELEC is granted
and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to
powers to regulate the conduct of elections, the COMELEC should lean in
convince or persuade is denied and taken away.
favor of freedom as there can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts
to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
FACTS: curtailed.
1. On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2347. A 2. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of
portion of the resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers which validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its
are election propaganda, in mobile places like cars and other moving application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's
vehicles and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting,
areas that it fixes. and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the
2. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 constitutionally sanctioned objective. The posting of decals and stickers in
elections, assails the COMELEC's Resolution. According to him, such mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any
prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened
Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's
that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule
being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the
irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over
on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. 3. Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned
Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The
petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference
in the entire country as to the location of the supposed Comelec Poster and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A
Areas. sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to
have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by
ISSUE/S: WoN The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else.
on mobile places whether public or private except in designated areas provided 4. The prohibition is also void for overbreadth because the restriction as to
for by the COMELEC is null and void - YES where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a
RULING: Petition GRANTED. The portion of Section 15(a) of Resolution No. privately-owned vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition would not only
2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that decals and stickers may be deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers
posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive
Section 21 of the resolution is DECLARED NULL and VOID. the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The provisions
allowing regulations are so loosely worded that they include the posting of
decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom. This is
delegation running riot.
5. The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate
equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies s not
impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles.
Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of
expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of
marginal significance. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and
stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles
needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the
citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial
resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can
afford to dole out more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to
spread out the number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right
of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free
January 28, 2000 | Panganiban, J. | Certiorari | Freedom of Expression: Protected 1. An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified
Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage) individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election
by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted.
SUMMARY: COMELEC banned ABSCBN and others from erecting exit polls The results are announced to the public to give an advance overview of how
for the 1998 elections arguing that it would cause disruption and confusion among the electorate voted.
the populace. SC held that such an abridgement, although it may have legitimate 2. The court has always ruled in favor of freedom of expression, and any
causes, does not overcome the drastic effect of curtailing the fundamental right of restriction is treated an exemption. To justify a restriction, the promotion of
the people to free speech. a substantial government interest must be clearly shown. Furthermore, when
DOCTRINE: In the  exercise  of  police  power,  even  if  the  government’s  purposes   conflicted between freedom of the electorate to know and actions allegedly
are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle made to assure clean and free elections, the court shall lean in favor of
fundamental personal liberties, where the end can be more narrowly achieved. freedom.
Moreover, interest of the state must outweigh the curtailment of a fundamental 3. In the exercise of   police   power,   even   if   the   government’s   purposes   are  
right in order to justify a restriction. legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties, where the end can be more narrowly
FACTS: 4. In the case at bar, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental
1. COMELEC issued a resolution that approved the issuance of a restraining right to vote and the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot. However,the
order to stop ABSCBN or any other groups from erecting exit polls for the responsibility of ensuring orderly votingdid not outweigh the restriction of
1998 elections. the  people’s  freedom  of  speech.
2. The resolution was issued upon information that ABSCBN has prepared a 5. Respondent’s   argument   that   the   exit   polls has the tendency to cause
project to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make exit confusion with the results of COMELEC, which could compromise the
surveys for President and Vice President, results of which will be integrity of the electoral process and cause anarchy, thus passing the clear
broadcasted immediately. and present danger test, is untenable. First, the survey result is not meant to
3. The COMELEC believed that such a project might conflict with the official replace the official COMELEC count. It is merely an opinion of the polling
COMELEC count as well as the unofficial quick count of NAMFREL group as to who the general has probably voted for. Second, the assailed
Respondent also argued that the exit surveys indirectly violate the sanctity resolution is too broad since its application is without classification as to
of ballots as voters are lured to reveal the contents of the same. Such polls whether the polling is disruptive or not. There is no showing that exit polls
also were designed to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as cause chaos in voting centers. Moreover, the prohibition incidentally
to who are the winners and losers in the election which in turn might result prevents collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The
in violence and anarchy. It was further argued that their only goal in issuing valuable information derived from them will remain unknown and can
the resolution is to maintain clean and free elections. deprive people of studies on the impact of current events and factors on
4. Petitioner on the other hand contended that in precipitately and voter’s  choices.
unqualifiedly restraining the holding and reporting of exit polls, the 6. Conclusively, the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion and grossly violated the by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
petitioner’s  constitutional  rights. media and the electorate.

ISSUE: Won the COMELEC resolution banning exit surveys violated the
freedom of speech and of press? - YES

RULING: Petition granted. Resolution by the COMELEC is nullified.

May 5, 2001 | Mendoza, J. | Prohibition | Freedom of Expression: Protected 1. As a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press, the
Speech (Free Speech and Suffrage) provision is presumed to be invalid. While COMELEC is granted
supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment/utilization of franchise for the
SUMMARY: Section 5.4 of the Fair Election Act prohibits publishing of surveys operation of media of communication under Article IX-C, Sec 4 of the
affecting national candidates (15 days before election) and local candidates (7 Constitution,   such   power   is   limited   to   ensuring   “equal   opportunity,   time,  
days b4 elections). SWS & Manila Standard assail it as a prior restraint to free space,   and   the   right   to   reply”   as   well   as   “uniform   and   reasonable   rates   of  
speech, press, and expression. SC: Unconstitutional for being a direct and total charges   for   the   use   of   such   media   facilities   for   “public information
suppression of a category of protected speech even if only for a limited period; campaigns  and  forums  among  candidates.”
failing 3rd and 4th criterion  of  the  O’Brien  test.   2. O’Brien   Test: A   government   regulation   is   sufficiently   justified   if   (1)   it’s  
DOCTRINE: Prior restraint on election surveys affecting candidates is within  the  Government’s  constitutional  power  (2)  furthers  an  important  and  
unjustifiable, be it by duration/scope. The prohibition may be for a limited time, substantial  gov’t  interest  (3)  gov’t  interest  is  unrelated  to  the  suppression  of  
but the total suppression of a category of speech is direct, absolute,& substantial. free expression (4) incidental restriction on free speech, expression, and
press is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of such interest. In this
FACTS: case, the provision fails the 3rd and 4th criterion.
1. RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, Section 5.4, prohibits the publishing of 3. Total Suppression of a Category of Expression: Section 5.4 shows a bias
surveys affecting national candidates 15 days before an election and local for a particular subject matter/viewpoint by preferring personal opinion to
candidates 7 days before an election. Election surveys are defined as the statistical results by allowing the former but suppressing all forms of the
measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters regarding a latter on the very same subject matter. And government has no power to
candidate’s   popularity,   qualifications,   platforms,   or   a   matter   of   public   make content-based restrictions on protected speech, which elections fall
discussion   in   relation   to   the   election,   including   voters’   preference   for   under. In this case, the prior restraint which Section 5.4 imposes on
andidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period. protected speech is unjustifiable. The prohibition may be for a limited time,
2. SWS, who wishes to conduct, release, and publish election surveys, and but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and
Manila Standard, who wishes to publish the same, brings this action for substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is
prohibition to stop COMELEC from enforcing said provision. Petitioners not  made  less  so  just  because  it’s  limited  for  15/7  days  before  an  election.
allege that the provision constitutes a prior restraint without any clear and
present danger to justify such, and that no similar restriction is imposed on Restriction   Greater   than   is   Necessary   to   Further   Gov’t   Interest: Section 5.4
politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast aims to prevent last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect,
media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to junking of weak or losing candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating
the day of the election. called   ‘dagdag-bawas’.   Such   interests   can   be   more   narrowly   pursued   by  
3. As defense, COMELEC justifies the restriction by saying that the law has a punishing unlawful acts rather than speech because of apprehension that such
rational connection to its objective – to prevent the debasement of the speech creates the danger of such evils. COMELEC has the power under the
electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, Administrative Code of 1987 to stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear
and absence of reply. Also, they allege that such impairment is minimal down, and stop an unlawful, libelous, misleading, or false election propaganda,
since  it’s  restricted  both  in  duration  and  in  scope.   after due notice and hearing. They can confiscate bogus survey results calculated
to   mislead   voters,   candidates   can   have   their   own   surveys   conducted,   and   it’s  
ISSUE/S: WON RA 9006, Sec 5.4 is an unconstitional abridgment of free doubtful if government can do anything with the natural tendency of bandwagon
speech, expression, and press – YES. effect.

RULING: Section 5.4 of RA 9006 unconstitutional.

PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER v. ROBINS 2. Appellant contends that his right to exclude others from his property has
June 9, 1980 | Rehnquist, J. | Appeal | Freedom of Expression: Protected Speech been violated when the Supreme Court of California has interpreted the
(Use  of  Private  Property  as  Forum  for  Other  People’s  Speech) State Constitution to entitle its citizens to exercise free expression. This
allegedly is tantamount to a taking of his property, but it is well known that
SUMMARY: Several high school students engaged in a public expressive not every destruction or injury to property by governmental actions has
activity inside Pruneyard, a privately owned shopping center, which prohibits been held to be a taking in the constitutional sense. In this case, there is
such activities. The California Supreme Court favored the students which the US nothing to suggest that preventing appellant from prohibiting the appellees
Supreme Court affirmed. activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a
DOCTRINE: The state may exercise its police power to uphold the fundamental shopping center. The decision of the California Supreme Court makes it
right to free speech. To strike down the government regulation, it must be shown clear that the Pruneyard may restrict expressive activityby adopting time,
that its action has curtailed a very essential right to the prejudice of the contender place and manner regulations that will minimize interference with its
and that such regulation can be considered beyond the limitation prescribed by the commercial function, but not prohibiting expression all in all. Appellants
constitution. failed to demonstrate that their right to exclude others is so essential to the
use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation
FACTS: has exceeded its boundaries.
1. Appellant Pruneyard is a privately owned shopping center that is open to 3. Appellants finally contend that a private property owner has a First
the public for the purpose of encouraging the patronizing of tis commercial Amendment right not to be forced by the State to use his property as a
establishments. It has a policy not to permit any visitor or tenant to engage forum for the speech of others. Here, by contrast, there are a number of
in any publicly expressive activity, including the circulation of petitions, distinguishing factors. Most important, the shopping center, by choice of its
which is not directly related to its commercial purposes. owner, is not limited to the personal use of appellants. It is instead a
2. Appellees are high school students who sought to solicit support for their business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they
opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism. So they set up a please. The views expressed by members of the public in passing out
table  in  a  corner  of  Pruneyard’s  central  courtyard  and  distributed  pamphlets   pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be
and asked people to sign petitioners. Their activity was peaceful and orderly identified with those of the owner. Second, no specific message is dictated
and  was  not  objected  to  by  Pruneyard’s  patrons.  Soon  after,  a  security  guard   by the State to be displayed on appellants' property. There consequently is
informed them that they would have to leave because their activity violated no danger of governmental discrimination for or against a particular
Pruneyard regulations. The guard suggested they move to the public message. Finally, appellants can expressly disavow any connection with the
sidewalk so appellees left and later filed a lawsuit. message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers stand.
3. Superior court held that appellees were not entitled under either Federal or
California constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping
center property which the California Supreme Court reversed.

ISSUE/S: Won regulation and actions of Pruneyard violated the constitutional

right to exercise free speech? - YES

RULING: California Supreme Court decision is affirmed.

1. The State has the authority to exercise its police power or its sovereign right
to adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution. It is established that the State
may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so long as the
restrictions do not amount to a taking without just compensation.
May 30, 1962 | Concepcion, J. | Appeal from CFI decision | Freedom of RATIO:
Expression: Unprotected Speech (Defamatory Speech) 1. Plaintiff Presented in Unfavorable Light The mistake on who filed the
complaint in the Aug 11 article and omitting the small number of stencils/
SUMMARY: Policarpio sues Manila Times as publisher, for 2 news items amount  involved  presented  Policarpio  in  an  unfavorable  light.   It’s  obvious  
covering the malversation and estafa charges against her which she alleged that if another agency of the Government filed the criminal complaint,
presented her in an unfavorable light and omitted/made mistakes on key details. accused would look guiltier than if the complaint was filed by a begrudged
SC: Entitled to damages. former subordinate who got fired. And prior to the publishing of the article
DOCTRINE: To enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory the   defendant   could’ve   ascertained   the   details   on   the   number   of   stencils/  
information must be true, fair, made in good faith, and w/o comments or remarks. amount involved from the witnesses, contrary to their claim that they had no
way of knowing. Also, the amount/value of property embezzled in estafa is
FACTS: material to the offense since the penalty partly depends on such.
1. Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio, member of the Philippine Bar and the Executive 2. ‘True   &   Fair’   Requirement:   Presenting news items in a sensational
Secretary of the local UNESCO National Commission, filed charges against manner is not per se illegal; newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of
her subordinate Reyes, causing her to be dismissed. In turn, Reyes filed discretion in determining manner in presenting an event to the public and
counter-charges which were referred to a Special Investigator Alba in the the importance to be attached to it. Newspapers may publish news items
Office of the President. While the administrative investigation was pending, relative to judicial/legislative/official proceedings, which are official and
Reyes filed a complaint against Policarpio for malversation of public funds non-confidential, since the public is entitled to know the truth about it. But
& estafa through falsification of public documents. to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be
2. On August 11, The Saturday Mirror published an article with the plaintiff’s   true, fair, made in good faith, and without comments or remarks.
picture  on  its  front  page  entitled  “WOMAN  OFFICIAL  SUED”.  Its  subtitle,   3. Defamatory Imputations Presumed Malicious: Defendants assert that
which   was   not   true   was   “PCAP   RAPS   L.POLICARPIO   ON   FRAUD”.   their alleged malice in publishing the news   items   wasn’t   established   by  
Similarly,   the   statement   in   the   article’s   1st paragraph, to the effect that Policarpio.   But   under   RPC   Art   354,   “Every defamatory imputation is
plaintiff  “was  charged  with  malversation and estafa in complaints filed with presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
the   city   fiscal’s   office   by   the   Presidential   Complaint   and   Action   justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the ff. cases: (1) private
Commission  (PCAC)”,  is  false  since  the  complaints  were  filed  by  Reyes.  It   communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
was   also   not   true   that   said   “criminal   action   was   initiated   as   a   result   of   legal, moral, or social duty; and (2) a fair and true report, made in good
current  administrative  investigation”.  A  similar  article  was  published  in  the   faith without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
Daily Mirror on August 13, 1956. official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
3. Now, plaintiff seeks to recover from Manila Times, the author, and editors, statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
P150k as actual damages + moral, exemplary, etc. for the 2 published act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
articles which she claims to be per se defamatory, libelous, and false, 4. In this case, the August 11 article contained information derogatory to the
exposing her to ridicule, jeopardized her good name and business, causing plaintiff and presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she in
her grave embarrassment, anguish, incalculable damages. She claims that fact  was.  It  wasn’t  a  fair  and  true  report  of  the  proceedings  alluded  to,  and  
the false statements (that PCAC filed the case, not Reyes) gave the general the   subtitle   “PCAC   RAPS   L.   POLICARPIO   ON   FRAUD”   is   false   and   a  
impression that she was most likely guilty of the crimes and that the comment or remark. Hence, such remarks are presumed malicious. And the
omission of details on the number of stencils involved for the malversation mistake in saying that PCAC was the one who filed the case would either
charge (only 18-20) and alleged misappropriated sum (only P54) conveyed make the publication actually malicious (if they knew) or negligent (if they
that the offenses imputed to her were more serious than they really were. didn’t),  which  would  still  make  them  liable  either  way.  
5. Rectification only Mitigating: Their rectifying this mistake in the August
ISSUE/S: WON Policarpio is entitled to damages for the 2 articles – YES. 13   article   and   including   the   number   of   stencils   involved   doesn’t   wipe   out  
their  responsibility  from  the  August  11  article,  although  it’s  mitigating.
RULING: REVERSED.  P3k  moral  damages,  P2k  attorney’s  fees,  +  costs
July 31, 1970 | Fernando, J. | Appeal by Certiorari | Freedom of Expression: RATIO:
Unprotected Speech (Defamatory Speech) 1. The  erroneous  publication  of  Fidel  G.  Cruz’s  photo  as  the  author  of  a  hoax  
is  basis  for  an  action  for  libel.  Newell  states  that  “Publication  of  a  person’s  
SUMMARY: Fidel G. Cruz sued Lopez (publisher) and Gatbonton (editor) after photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person is a libel
the Manila Chronicle erroneously published his photo as that of another Fidel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the
Cruz who was the author of a hoax. The SC held that the erroneous publication article  are  imputed  to  such  person.”  This  proposition  has  been  supported  by  
was actionable for libel but the timely correction by the magazine will entitle several cases.
Lopez and Gatbonton to mitigation of damages to be paid. 2. Hale: The civil aspect of libel deals with the award of damages as a redress
DOCTRINE: Pressure of deadline is not a defense in libelous publication in a for   a   personal   wrong   when   a   person’s   good   reputation   has   been   impaired.  
weekly magazine. Retraction will not extinguish liability for the libelous On the other hand, publication of defamatory statements tends strongly to
publication but may provide justification for mitigation of damages to be paid induce breach of the peace by the person defamed, and it is in the interest of
the state that peace is maintained to the extent that the offender committing
FACTS: libel is penalized with fine or imprisonment.
1. The Manila Chronicle published an article wherein a sanitary inspector 3. It was held that when man publishes, he does so at his own peril. Libel on
named Fidel Cruz assigned to the Babuyan Islands sent a distress signal to a its face is harmful. The usual principles of tort will make him liable if the
passing U.S. Airforce plane which in turn relayed message to Manila. Later, statements are false, or are true only of someone else, if one publishes
an American Army plane dropped an emergency kit (including a two-way manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual without any
radio) on the beach of the island. Through this, he communicated to Manila justification other than for advertisement or a piece of news. However, it
that there was a series of killings happening in the island. must be noted that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly
2. As a response, the Phil. government sent a group of scout rangers to the offended, the judiciary must not also ignore the obligation of a news media
island led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. They found out that there were to disseminate information of a public character, to provide comment
no killers on the island and that Fidel Cruz merely wanted to be transported thereon as well as the conditions attendant on the business of publishing. No
home to Manila. encroachments to press freedom should be allowed in the guise of a
3. On two occasions (Jan. 13, 1956 with a Year End Quiz and Jan. 15, 1956 punitive action inflicted on what otherwise would be characterized as libel.
issue), the Manila Chronicle published articles with regard to the hoax 4. Pressure of deadline is not a defense in libelous publication in a weekly
perpetrated by Fidel Cruz, with a photo supposedly of Cruz. It turns out, magazine. While a newspaper should not be held to account for honest
however, that the photo they attached was the photo of Fidel G. Cruz, mistakes owing to pressure of a daily deadline, there is no such pressure to
former Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor. The meet, and no occasion to act with haste in a weekly magazine. Furthermore,
Manila Chronicle had photos of both persons which were on file in there is the added requirement of reasonable care imposed, which in this
accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper case was not satisfied.
offices, and were inadvertently switched in the course of the preparation of 5. Even so, the correction promptly made by the Manila Chronicle, which has
the newspaper format. Necessary corrections were made when the error was the force of retraction, will not extinguish their liability for the libelous
brought  to  petitioners’  attention,  stating  as  reason  for  the  error  the  pressure   publication but may provide justification for mitigation of damages to be
to meet the publishing deadlines. paid.
4. Fidel Cruz sued Eugenio Lopez (Manila Chronicle publisher) and Juan
Gatbonton (editor) for recovery of damages arising from the defamatory DISSENTING OPINION (Dizon , J.)
nature of the publication, w/c the TC granted and the CA affirmed. - For liability in damages to arise from an alleged libelous publication,
without offending press freedom, there is need to prove that the publication
ISSUE/S: WoN petitioners are liable for damages for libelous publication – was made with actual malice, that is, with the knowledge of its falsity or
YES (but mitigated due to retraction) with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not (New York Times v.
Sullivan; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts). In this case, actual malice was not
RULING: CA decision modified as to award of damages.
proven such that petitioners were aware of the false imputation to Cruz and statements that reflect upon the agency of which he is in charge. Once libel
that they disregarded the truth when they published the same. per se is established, malice & legal injury is presumed to exist unless the
- Similarly, liability based on tort is also not justified since the hoax ascribed speaker can fully prove that the speech was true on all counts. Good
to Cruz did not impute to him immorality or moral turpitude. At most, motives   and   belief   in   truth   doesn’t   overturn   the   presumption.   In   this   case,  
petitioners or their subordinates only committed excusable negligence. the ad was found to be libelous per se without Sullivan proving actual
damages to himself, the defense claiming that the ad was truthful was
unavailable since the ad contained factual errors, and he got $500k.
March 9, 1964 | Brennan, J. | Certiorari | Freedom of Expression: Unprotected ISSUE/S: WON   Alabama’s   libel   law   infringes   freedom   of   speech   &   press   –
Speech (Defamatory Speech) YES.

SUMMARY: City Commissioner Sullivan files a civil libel suit against NY RULING: REVERSED & REMANDED. No actual malice proved.
Times for an ad that allegedly criticized him as a public officer. The ad, which
was false at some points, claimed that the police arrested Martin Luther King Jr. RATIO:
several times to destroy King’s  black  movement  and  imputed  actions  against  civil   1. Paid Ads Covered by Free Speech Protection: A civil suit is still subject
rights   protestors   to   the   police.   Alabama’s   libel   laws   rewarded   damages.   SC:   to the 14th Amendment. Also, expression does not lose constitutional
Alabama’s  libel  laws  infringe  on  free  speech/press.  No  damages  rewarded.   protection  just  because  it’s  a  paid  advertisement.  The  ad  here  communicated  
DOCTRINE:Actual malice standard – To recover damages in a defamation/libel information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed
suit, plaintiff must prove that the publisher/speaker knew that the statement was abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern. That NY Times got paid for publishing the ad is immaterial.
FACTS: 2. The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one
1. The New York Times published a full-page  ad  entitled  “Heed  Their  Rising   of the major public issues of our time, clearly qualifies for constitutional
Voices”  seeking to solicit funds to defend Martin Luther King Jr. to defend protection. Public discussion is a political duty long-recognized by the
him against an Alabama perjury indictment. The ad alleged that the Government. The question is whether it forfeits that protection by the falsity
Montgomery,  Albama  police’s  arrest  of  the  Rev.  Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.  for   of some of its factual statements and by its alleged defamation of Sullivan.
perjury was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public 3. On Errors and Damages to Reputation: Erroneous statements are
facilities and encourage blacks to vote. Ad says that the police arrested King inevitable in free debate, and it must be protected if free speech is to have
7 times even if it was only 4 times. The ad also described/ criticized alleged “breathing   space”   to   survive.   Likewise,   injury   to   someone’s   official  
police actions against civil rights protesters (such as padlocking them in the reputation   doesn’t warrant the repression of speech. And if neither factual
school, etc), some of which were false. error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield
2. Despite not being explicitly mentioned in the ad, Montgomery city from criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two is likewise
commissioner Sullivan filed a libel action against NY Times and 4 black inadequate to support the suppression of speech.
ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the 4. Alabama’s  Civil  Libel  Law  Suppresses  Free  Speech: A rule such as this
allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally since one which compels the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all
one of his duties included supervision of the police department. The NY his factual assertions, lest he be punished with unlimited and exorbitant
Times   refused   to   retract   the   ad,   saying   that   they   didn’t   think   any   of   the   libel  judgments,  amounts  to  “self-censorship”.  And  imposing  the  burden  of  
language therein referred to Sullivan. truth on the speaker may deter not just false speech but even true ones.
3. Under Alabama Law, as applied in this case, a publication is libelous per se Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from
if the words are such as to injure him/impute misconduct in his public voicing  their  criticism  even  though  it’s  believed  or/and  in  fact true, because
office.  It  must  be  shown  that  speech  was  “of  and  concerning”  the  plaintiff.   of the doubt on WON it can be proved in court and fear of the expense of
If the plaintiff is a public official, his place in the government hierarchy is having to do so. Hence, it dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
sufficient evidence to show that his reputation has been affected by debate and infringes upon free speech and press.
5. The Actual Malice Standard: The constitutional guarantees require a his   acquittal,   and   that   the   characterization   of   petitioner   as   “smut  
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a distributor”  and  “girlie-book  peddler”  was  false  and  defamatory.
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that 5. Petitioner’s  argument:  1)  Public  figures  have  more  access  to  the  media  to  
the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it counter the defamatory material, and they assumed the risk of defamation
was false or with reckless disregard of WON it was false. In this case, by thrusting themselves into the public arena, unlike the private individual;
Sullivan fails to prove actual malice. 2) The important values served by the law of defamation in preventing and
redressing attacks upon reputation.
6. Respondent:   matter   of   public   interest,   reports   were   “hot”   news   written  
ROSENBLOOM v. METROMEDIA under deadline pressure.
June 7, 1971 | Brennan, J. | Freedom of Expression: Unprotected Speech
ISSUE/S: WoN  NYT’s  “knowing  or  reckless  falsity  standard”  applies  in  a  libel  
(Defamatory Speech)
action brought by a private individual for a defamatory falsehood uttered in a
broadcast involving an event of public or general interest – YES.
SUMMARY: Metromedia’s   WIP   broadcasted   about   Rosenbloom’s   arrest  
concerning the seizure of his magazines, which they reported as obscene RULING: AFFIRMED.
without   adding   “allegedly/reportedly”.   SC,   in   affirming   CA,   upheld   the  
freedom of the press since the broadcast concerns public interest. RATIO:
DOCTRINE: Constitutional protection extends to all communication and
discussion involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to 1. The 1st Amendment extends to a myriad of matters of public interest.
whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous. Debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.
(OMG. Sexual innuendo. haha) If a matter is a subject of public or general
FACTS: interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private
1. 1963: The Special Investigations Squad of Philadelphia PD purchased individual   is   involved.   The   public’s   primary   interest   is   not   whether an
various magazines from more than 20 newsstands in relation to the individual is well-known or private, but if the information is of interest and
enforcement   of   the   city’s   obscenity   laws.   George   Rosenbloom,   a   importance to the community.
distributor of nudist magazines, arrived at one newsstand to deliver some 2. The NYT standard – that the defamatory falsehood must be uttered with
of his magazines while an arrest was being conducted, and was knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
immediately apprehended along with the newsboy. The police obtained a false or not – was  applied  to  give  effect  to  the  Amendment’s  function  to  
warrant to search his home and warehouse, and seized the inventory of encourage ventilation of public issues, not because the public official has
magazines and books found therein. Petitioner, who had been released on any less interest in protecting his reputation than a private individual.
bail, surrendered and was arrested for a 2nd time (poor guy). 3. Argument 1: Public and private individuals have the same ability to
2. Captain Ferguson of the PPD, telephoned local radio stations and respond:  depends  on  media’s  continuing  interest  in  the  story.  The  solution  
newspapers to inform them of the raid and of the arrest of petitioner. lies  in  ensuring  the  private  citizens’  ability  to  respond,  not  in  the  stifling  of  
Metromedia’s   WIP   broadcasted   about   said   seizure   and   arrest   (no public discussion of matters of public concern. Also, we are   all   “public”  
“allegedly/reportedly”  qualifying  “obscene”). When it was broadcasted for men to some degree. The idea that public figures voluntarily exposed their
a 3rd time, WIP corrected the 3rd sentence   to   read   “reportedly   obscene”.