Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila 20 SCRA 849, July 31, 1967 PDF

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 020 file:///D:/My Documents/Law School Ebooks/Constitutional Law 2/Ermi...
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 849

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
vs. City Mayor of Manila
No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS

ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC. and Go
CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY
MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR
ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporations; Presumption as

to constitutionality of ordinance; Evidence is necessary to show
invalidity.—An ordinance, having been enacted by coun-cilors
who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality or city and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and
necessitate action, must be presumed to be valid and should not
be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation. Unless,
therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for
evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. Where there was no
factual foundation laid for overthrowing an ordinance which is not
void on its face, the presumption of constitution-ality must
prevail.
Same; Police power; Ordinance regulating hotels, motels,
etc.—A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels,
motels and lodging-houses is a police power measure specifically
aimed to safeguard public morals. As such, it is immune from any
imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would
be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which
has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent
and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the
great public needs".
Same; Nature of police power; Judicial inquiry.—On the
legislative organs of the government, whether national or local,
primarily rests the exercise of the police power, which is the
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power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,

peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In
view of the requirements of certain constitutional guarantees,
850
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs.

City Mayor of Manila
the exercise of such police power, however, insofar as it may affect

the life, liberty or property of any person, is subject to judicial
inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as
either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of
due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee may call for correction by the courts.
Municipal Corporations; Municipal license fees.—Municipal
license fees can be classified into those imposed for regulating
occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for
revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful occupations are
incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing the
amount of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a
wide discretion in this class of cases. Aside from applying the
well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general
rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of
imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might
otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally
an important factor in the determination of the amount of this
kind of license fee.
Same; Discretion in fixing license fees.—Much discretion is
given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of
license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their present
business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent
the exercise of the police power. Persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected
by the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations
subject to the disadvantages which may result from the exercise of
that power.
Constitutional Law; Due process; Standards of legal infirmity.
—There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It
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furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should

conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental
action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. obedience to the
dictates of justice. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize
an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious pro portions as
an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be
deemed unreasonable and what would amount
851
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 851

to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an

admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.
Same; Reasonableness of ordinance regulating hotels, etc.—
The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila,
making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house,
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed
as a transgression against the command of due process. The
prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there
appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an
undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of
liberty, which cannot be absolute.
Same; Public interest; Government interference.—The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by
the government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest. If the liberty invoked were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where
the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.
Statutes; When statute is void because of ambiguity.— What
makes a statute susceptible to a charge that it is void on its face
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for alleged vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either

forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and diff er as
to its application.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of

Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Panganiban, Abad & Associates Law Office for
respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez & Associates for
intervenorappellee.
FERNANDO, J,:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of

the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the
due process clause. The lower court held that it is and
adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and
void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such
852

judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the

requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760
was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members,
Hotel del Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the
president and general manager of the second petitioner"
against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who
was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general
power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila
and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution
and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was
alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is
dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of
its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by
both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes,
employing and giving livelihood, to not less than 2,500
person and representing an investment of more than P3
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million." (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13,

1
1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted

Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the
then ViceMayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance
were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being
beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the
ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or
in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional
and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
procfess insofar as it would impose ?6,000.00 fee per annum
for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
_______________
1
The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden
Gate Motel, Miami Hotel, Palm Spring Hotel, Flamingo Motel, Holiday
Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel,
Siesta Court, Sun Valley Hotel, Springfield Hotel, New Palace Hotel,
Hotel del Mar, Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.
853
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 853

vs. City Mayor of Manila,
that the provision in the same section which would require

the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain
from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or
letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth,
the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if
any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be
specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate
as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a
certification that a person signing such form has personally
filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative,
with such registration forms and records kept and bound
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together, it also being provided that the premises and

facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of
Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds,
not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but
also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise
for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes
and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in f irst class motels such as a telephone in each
room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly
offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary,
unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to
the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels
to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18
years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels,
lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied
by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for
representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion
854

thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the

due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that
insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the
challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would
cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the
business and loss of its investments, there is once again a
transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary
injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above
ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court
on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said
Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an
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admission of the personal circumstances regarding the

respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City
of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a
denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition
did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged
ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose,
which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of
the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of
the right to privacy and the guaranty against
selfincrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of
the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law,
respondent Mayor prayed f or its dissolution and the
dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there
was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28,
1964, which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators

Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the
City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu is the president and
general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and
855
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 855

the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all

having the capacity to sue and be sued;
"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and
incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila
charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of
the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the
business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita
districts in Manila;
"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June
14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City
Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City
Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the
compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides
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inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to

the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons
stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
"5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor
Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance
(now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex C;
"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income
of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels
(including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on

January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the
burden of showing its lack of conf ormity to the
Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not
only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American
authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by
point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its
validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965,
the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in
detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of
what they considered to be applicable American authorities
and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged
ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
856

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are

members of the petitioners association, and referring to the
alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the
lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being
purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the
Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit
the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious
then that without any evidence submitted by the parties,
the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on
constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance,
dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the
untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the
City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the
conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the
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City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore,

null and void." It made permanent the preliminary
injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents
"to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question.''"
Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed.
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a
fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower
court against such a sweeping condemnation of the
challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to
stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both
procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is
the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance.
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity. x x x The action of
the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things,
be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in
effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the
wellbeing of the people. x x x The Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion
857
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 857

of personal or property rights under the guise of police

regulation."2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut
it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on
its f ace, which is not the case here. The principle has been
nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where
the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis
tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: "The
statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within
the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it
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void on the ground that the specif ic method of regulation

prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff
of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record
for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of f acts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its
face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to
the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of
protection associated with the due process guaranty does
not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a
police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity
resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything
of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict
and narrow the scope of police power which has been
properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and
the
_______________
2
US. v. Salaveria (1918), 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an
affirmation of the presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as
announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Eboña v. Daet, (1950) 85
Phil. 369.
3
282 US 251, 328, January 5, 1931.
858

least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the

great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another
leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if
it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
competence to promote public health, public morals, public
safety and the general welfare.6 Negatively put, police
power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society."7
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There is no question but that the challenged ordinance

was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful
to public morals. The explanatory note of the then
Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the
stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the
rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which
"provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry,
presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for
prostitutes and
________________
4
Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. AIso: 'To
Frankfurter the police power, true to its etymology, is the power to shape
policy. It def ies legal definition; as a response to the dynamic aspects of
society, it cannot be reduced to a constitutional formula. The law must be
sensitive to life; in resolving cases. it must not fall back upon sterile
claims; its judgments are not derived from an abstract duel between
liberty and the police power. Instead, in a world of trusts and unions and
large-scale industry, it must meet the challenge of drastic social change.
For him as for Holmes, 'society is more than bargain and business' and the
jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in vindicating interests not
represented by the items in a balance-sheet. In a progressive society, new
interests emerge, new attitudes appear, social consciousness quickens. In
the face of the unknown one cannot choose with certainty. Nor as yet, has
the whole of truth been brought up from its bottomless well and how f
ragile in scientif ic proof is the ultimate validity of any particular economic
adjustment. Social development is a process of trial and error; in the
making of policy the f ullest possible opportunity must be given for the
play of the human mind. If Congress or legislature does not regulate,
laissez faire—not the individual—must be the regulator. (Hamilton, Pre
view of a Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819).
5
Noble state Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412.
6
U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus, (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
7
Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
859
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 859

vs, City Mayor of Manila
thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to

check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of
these establishments by requiring these transients and
guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
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purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by

introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated
to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of
the kind from operating for purpose other -than legal" and
at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation
of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity
of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it,
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably
stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing
vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8
providing a license tax for and regulating the maintenance
or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10
prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte,12 prohibiting playing of
panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;13
prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and,
prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or
maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium
is, smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended ,to
protect public morals. ,
On the legislative organs of the government, whether
national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
________________
8
U.S. vs. Giner Cruz, (1918) 38 Phil. 677.
9
U.S. vs. Rodriguez, (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v.
Belderol, L-15719, May 31, 1961; Lapera v. Vicente, L-18102, June 30,
1962.
10
U.S. v. Pacis, (1915) 31 Phil. 524.
11
U.S. vs. Espiritu-Santo, (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U.S. vs. Joson, (1913) 26
Phil. 1; People vs. Chan Hong, (1938) 65 Phil. 625
12
U.S. v. Tamparong, (1915) 31 Phil. 321.
13
U.S. v. Salaveria, (1918) 39 Phil. 102.
14
Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, L-14149, May 30, 1969; Miranda v. City of
Manila, L-17252, May 31, 1961.
15
U.S. v. Ten Yu, (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
860

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power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,

morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties,
however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may
affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to
judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may
be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any
other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for
correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost
shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question
of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to
which the governmental action should conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate. case, be valid. What then is the standard of
due process which must exist both as a procedural and a
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or
any governmental action for that matter, from the
imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It
is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to
the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled
out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must
not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of
_______________
16
There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of
the right of privacy or the prohibition against self-incrimination.
Petitioners obviously are not the proper parties to do so. Nor may such an
incurable defect be remedied by an accommodating intervenor "who has
always taken advantage of, as he exclusively relies on, the facilities,
services and accommodations offered by petitioner-motels. A general
merchant, doing business not only in Baguio City but in the City of
Manila, has no legitimate cause for complaint. At least, not according to
the case as it has been developed.
861
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 861
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the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those

17
strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of

whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought." It is not a
18
narrow or "technical conception with fixed content

unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions
19
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive

inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."
20
Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or

pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.
21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an

ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious
proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
authority. It would seem that what should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of
the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted
deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more
specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the
need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the
enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must
be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is
even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such
character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet
the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any
semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners'
indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds
to single out such features as the increased fees for motels
and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to
contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual
license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for
________________
17
Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, (1938) pp.
32-33.
18
Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche, (1960) 363 U.S. 420, at 487.
19
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, (1961) 367 U.S. 1230.
20
Bartkus v. Illinois, (1959) 359 U.S. 121.
21
Pearson v. McGraw, (1939) 308 U.S. 313.
862
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both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200%
for the latter, f irst-class motels being required to pay a
P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly.
It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922
that municipal license fees could be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises,
for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or
enterprises and for revenue purposes only. As was
22
explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: "(2)

Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to
the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied
from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing
amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are
allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than
in the former, and aside from applying the well-known
legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The
desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of
persons who might otherwise engage in non-usef ul
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in
the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee.
Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes
for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in
cases of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter
cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable."23
________________
22
Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.
23
Citing Swarth v. People, 109 111. 621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago,
120 111. 627; 12 N.E., 227; United States Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago,
112 111. 19; Drew County v. Bennet, 43 Ark. 364; Merced County v.
Fleming, 111 Cal. 46; 43 Pac. 392; Williams v. City Council of West Point,
68 Ga. 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind. 84; Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind. 429;
Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. 7; Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann. 586;
Goldsmith v. City of New Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 646; People ex rel., Cramer
v. Medberry, 39 N.Y.S. 207; 17 Misc. Rep., 8; McGuigan v. Town of
Belmont, 89 Wis. 637; 62 N.W., 421; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig
v. Burnett, 32 Ala., 728, and Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Commissioner,
42 N.J.L. 364; 36 Am. Rep., 518. At pp. 829-830.
863
15 of 21 2/12/2019, 2:15 PM
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 863

Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta

24
this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the

American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to
implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this
Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing
authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to
cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a
wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax
so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide
latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses
for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that
"much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount," here the license fee of the
operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely
as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this
particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent
citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged
on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of
the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation
and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also
dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of
which outside the city markets under certain conditions is
permitted. x x x And surely, the mere fact, that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said
in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which
may in the public need and interest be affected by the
exercise of the police power embark in these occupations
________________
24
98 Phil. 148 (1955), citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301
U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed 477;
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. The Lutz decision was
followed in Republic v. BacolodMurcia Milling, L-19824, July 9, 1966.
25
Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, L-24322, July
21, 1967.
26
Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board, (1957) 101 Phil.
1142.
16 of 21 2/12/2019, 2:15 PM
864

subject to the disadvantages which may result from the

legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract,
insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that
in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a
different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be
viewed as a transgression against the command of due
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely
it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How
could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears
a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an
undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that
every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of
liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be
absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these
different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is
this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license;
it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the
general wellbeing. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of
the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint
by general law for the common good. x x x The liberty of the
citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public
health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise
within the proper scope of the police power."28
_______________
27
Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila, (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing
City of New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.
28
Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v.
Geiger-Jones (1916), 242 U.S. 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs.
17 of 21 2/12/2019, 2:15 PM
Cruz (1914), 189 Ala. 66.
865
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 865

vs. City Mayor of Manila,
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public

welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said
law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Persons and property may
be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state x x x. To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall
into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
and order and happiness for all."29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court
nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of
freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains
its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire
has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest."31 What may be
stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
________________
29
Calalang v. Williams (1940), 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734
30
46 Phil 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American
sovereignty, American Supreme Court decisions hav-ing thus an
obligatory effect. No alternative was left to this Court except to follow the
then controlling decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1924), 261 U.S.
525, which subsequently was overruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
18 of 21 2/12/2019, 2:15 PM
(1937), 300 U.S. 379

31
Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court (1940) 70 Phil. 340, at 360,
quoting a concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R.
No. 46496.
866

measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a

denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on
another due process ground by invoking the principle of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear/from a recital in
the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of
the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed
and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give
the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the
customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the
room with him at about the same time or coming at any
indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its
sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of
a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of
its owners or operators; another proviso which from their
standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full
rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof
means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be
asked, do these allegations suffice to render the
_______________
32
Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to
distinguish between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as an instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment
and those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of
legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also
collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite than the
test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the
due process clause disappears when the specific prohibition of the First
become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public
utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power
19 of 21 2/12/2019, 2:15 PM
to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational

basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and
of worship may well be infringed on such slender grounds. They are
susceptible of restriction only to prevent an immediate danger to interests
which the state may lawfully protect." (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu. v.
Barnette, (1942), 319 U.S. 624, at 639).
867
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 867

Acuña vs. Yatco
ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or

uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From
Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v.
Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that
what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an
enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the
situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would
prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about
not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there
is no canon against using common sense in construing laws
as saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands,
with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such
vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of
the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success.
Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so
uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this
Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed
and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,

Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., are on official leave.
Judgment reversed.
___________
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Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila 20 SCRA 849, July 31, 1967 PDF

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 020 file:///D:/My Documents/Law School Ebooks/Constitutional Law 2/Ermi...

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 849

No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS

Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporations; Presumption as

power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,

850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs.

the exercise of such police power, however, insofar as it may affect

furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 851

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs.

to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an

for alleged vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of

852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the

million." (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13,

1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 853

that the provision in the same section which would require

together, it also being provided that the premises and

854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the

admission of the personal circumstances regarding the

"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 855

the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all

inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on

856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are

City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore,

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 857

of personal or property rights under the guise of police

void on the ground that the specif ic method of regulation

858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 859

thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to

purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by

860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 861

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.

the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those

strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of

narrow or "technical conception with fixed content

based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive

Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an

862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: "(2)

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 863

Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta

this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the

864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

subject to the disadvantages which may result from the

Cruz (1914), 189 Ala. 66.

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 865