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An Overview of API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 Fitness-For-Service

Assessment Standard with Applications to Case Studies

Conference Paper · November 2015

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 An Overview of API 579-1/ASME FFS-1
Fitness-For-Service Assessment
Standard with Applications to Case
Studies

By
Mohammad M. Megahed
Mohammad S. Attia
Faculty of Engineering – Cairo University – Egypt

3rd International Conference in Africa and Asia

Welding and Failure Analysis of Engineering Materials
2-5 November 2015
Luxor, Egypt
 Layout of This Presentation
 What is FFS assessment- How FFS is a
Multidisciplinary Field – Advantages of FFS –
Levels of Assessment- History of FFS
Assessment
 Parts and Annexes of FFS Standard
 Concept of Remaining Strength Factor (RSF)
 Concept of Failure Assessment Diagram (FAD)
 Matching between Damage Mechanisms and
FFS Parts
 Case #1:FFS Assessment of Two Regeneration
Columns suffering from wall cracking
 Case #2:FFS Assessment of a Corroded
Cantilever Pipe
Cover Pages of FFS Documents
 Objectives of FFS Assessment
 FFS assessment is a multi-disciplinary
approach to determine whether an equipment,
which is suffering from flaws or damage or
subjected to operating conditions higher than
design loads, is fit for continued service or
not.
 Final outcome of FFS assessment is a decision:
to run as is, repair, re-rate, alter, or retire the
equipment.
 FFS outcome may also include an estimate of
remaining life which is useful for planning
future inspection (in case of continued
running) and future budgeting (in case of
equipment retiring)
 FFS is Multidisciplinary Field involving Many
Subject Areas

 Stress Analysis
 Finite Element Analysis
 Metallurgy
 Materials Engineering
 Non-Destructive Examinations (NDE)
 Corrosion Science and Engineering
 Fracture Mechanics
Advantages of FFS Assessment

 Safe and reliable operation of aging

equipment
 Reduce downtime by eliminating
unnecessary repairs
 Extra time to plan shutdown and
replacement of equipment
 Improved yields, if rate of equipment
deterioration or life consumption can be
estimated
Historical Background of FFS Assessment

 1990: Joint industry project was

organized by the Materials Properties
Council (MPC) to develop FFS guidelines
for the refining industry
 2000: Based on MPC final report, API
issued API-579 recommended practice
for FFS Assessment, which was
welcomed by both refinery and non-
refinery industries
 2007: ASME joined forces with API and
issued API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 Standard
 Contents of API 579 -Code Parts
Part 1 - Introduction
Part 2 - FFS Engineering Evaluation Procedure
Part 3 - Brittle Fracture
Part 4 - General Metal Loss
Part 5 - Localized Metal Loss
Part 6 - Pitting Corrosion
Part 7 - Blisters, HIC, and SOHIC Damage
Part 8 - Weld Misalignment and Shell Distortions
Part 9 - Crack-Like Flaws
Part 10 - Equipment Operating in the Creep Range
Part 11 - Fire Damage
Part 12 - Dents, Gouges, and Dent-Gouge Combinations
Part 13 - Laminations
Contents of API 579- Annexes
 Annex A - Thickness, MAWP, and Stress Equations for a
FFS Assessment
 Annex B1 - Stress Analysis Overview for a FFS Assessment
 Annex B2 - Recommendations for Linearization of Stress
Results for Stress Classification
 Annex B3 – Histogram Development and Cycle Counting for
Fatigue Analysis
 Annex C - Compendium of Stress Intensity Factor
Solutions
 Annex D - Compendium of Reference Stress Solutions
 Annex E - Residual Stresses in a FFS Evaluation
 Annex F - Material Properties for a FFS Assessment
 Annex G – Damage Mechanisms
 Annex H – Technical Basis and Validation
 Annex I - Glossary of Terms and Definitions
 Annex K – Crack Opening Areas
 API 579 Assessment Levels
Most conservative
 Level 1 assessment:
 conservative screening criteria
 Minimum amount of inspection and information
 May be performed by an Inspector or Engineer
 If result not acceptable, can resort to levels 2 or 3
 Level 2 assessment:
 more detailed evaluation
 More detailed calculations needed
 Would be done by an experienced Engineer
 Produces more precise results
 If result not acceptable, can resort to level 3
 Level 3 assessment:
 The most detailed evaluation
 Detailed inspection and information required
 Usually based on numerical techniques such as FEA
 Produces most precise results.
 To be performed by experienced engineering specialist
Most rigorous
Concept of Remaining Strength Factor (RSF)

RSF = LDC /LUC

RSF = Remaining Strength Factor
LDC = Limit Load of the Damaged Component
LUC = Limit Load of the Un-Damaged Component
RSF is estimated by equations for Level-1 and Level-2
Assessments, and computed by Non-linear FEA in
Level-3
RSF is compared with an allowable value, RSFa
If RSF < RSFa an allowable value, then the component
can be re-rated. Recommended RSFa = 0.9
MAWPr/MAWP = RSF/RSFa
MAWP = Original maximum allowable pressure
MAWPr = Rerated pressure value
 Illustration of RSF Concept
w  300N / m
Corroded cantilever
150
mm
198
mm
pipe under pressure
and mechanical
PDnozzle
4tnozzle
e
loads. What is the W
2  92N PDpipe
4t pipe
to
12
" Lin

remaining strength 15
0m
m

nn
e c ti on
mm
factor for pipes with
o
3 45
gi dC
Ri
increasing levels of
future corrosion W1  2220N
 1st Yield and Limit Pressures for corroded pipes with
FCA = 0.4, 1, 1.6 mm compared to as –new pipe

240
Future
FCA=0.4mm
Limit
Effective Stress [MPa]

200 Uncorroded
Corrosion
Pressure RSF
Py=13.5 MPa
160
Allowance
(MPa)
120
FCA (mm)
80
0 37 100%

PL=37 MPa
PL=18 MPa

40
0.4 18 49%
1.0 15 41 %
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1.6 12 32%
Internal Pressure [MPa]

240
Effective Stress [MPa]

200

160
FCA=0.4mm
120 FCA=1mm
FCA=1.6mm
80

40

0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Internal Pressure [MPa]

Deformed Shapes at limit loads of corroded
pipe with FCA = 0.4 mm, 1 mm and 1.6 mm

Calculation of RSF for

corroded cantilever
pipes with increasing
corrosion levels
(a)

Future
Limit
Corrosion
Pressure RSF
Allowance
(MPa)
FCA (mm)
0 37 100%
(b)

0.4 18 49%
1.0 15 41 %
1.6 12 32%
 FFS Parts Addressing Corrosion Assessment

 Part 4 – Assessment of General Metal Loss

 Part 5 – Assessment of Local Metal Loss
 Part 6 – Assessment of Pitting Corrosion

 Both Part 4 and Part 5 assessments use the

RSF concept to evaluate wall thinning
 Inspection data for both parts consists of wall
thickness readings in a grid pattern
 Pitting corrosion assessment estimates an RSF
value that depends on diameter, depth and
spacing of pits.
 FFS Assessment of Crack-Like Flaws and
Brittle Fracture

 Part 3 – Assessment of Existing Equipment for

Brittle Fracture.
 Part 9 – Assessment of Crack-Like Flaws.
 Part 3 evaluates toughness of material of
construction relative to operating
temperatures
 Part 9 evaluates structural integrity when
cracks or other planar flaws are detected.
 Part 9 utilizes the failure assessment diagram
(FAD) approach
 Engineers who apply Part-9 should have a
basic understanding of fracture mechanics.
 Part-9 Failure Assessment Diagram- FAD

0.8
Toughness Ratio Kr

Unacceptable Region
Cut-off for steels
0.6 with yield plateau

Cut-off for ASTM A508

0.4 Cut-off for
Cr-Mn steels
Cut-off for
0.2 Acceptable Region stainless steels

0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
 P
Load Ratio L  P ref

 ys
r

17
Matching between Degradation
Mechanisms and FFS Parts
 Case-1
Fitness-For Service
Assessment of Two
Regeneration Columns
Suffering from Wall
Cracking
 Introduction
 A gas plant implements a sweetening process, in which
CO2 and small amounts of H2S are stripped-off the
produced gas through two Lean Benfield System Trains
# A, B. The process is conducted inside a vertical tower;
known as a “Regeneration Column”. Geometry of the
column: height = 28 m above the skirt, Di = 3 m, wall
thickness =16 mm
 The lower 18.6 m is fabricated from carbon steel (ASTM-
A516- Grade 70) with yield strength around 400 MPa,
while the upper 10 m is fabricated from stainless steel
316.
 A passivation technique of the inner wall was adopted
through circulating a Vanadium Pent-Oxide (V2O5)
through the lower section the regenerator column;
supposed to be effective for a normal duration of 5
years
Construction of the Regeneration Column
 Design Conditions and Loads
 Design Conditions
Design Pressure Pd = 4.1 barg,
Operating pressure Po = 1.6 barg,
Po reduced to = 0.4 barg.
Design temp. Td = 140 oC ,
Operating temp. To = 115 oC.
Column weight +Contents = 1350 kN
Maximum eccentricity of weight = 100 mm
Maximum wind speed = 31 m/sec
 Estimation of Stresses in the wall due to Operating Loads:
Hoop stress due to 0.4 barg = +4 MPa
Axial stress due to 0.4 barg = +2 MPa
Axial stress due to column weight = -9 MPa
Stress due to weight eccentricity = + 1.2 MPa
Highest hoop stress due to P = 4 MPa = 1% of Sy
Highest compressive stress due to all loads = -8 MPa = 2 %
of Sy
Problem History and Inspection Data
History
Year 1999: commissioning of the two columns: A, B
Year 2002: Uniform pitting observed at C.S./S.S. interface of
deepest pit =1.5 mm. Pits attributed to galvanic corrosion.
Year 2004: Leaks observed at small pinholes at weld locations in
the CS section, e.g. at shell girth welds, and piping connections.
Years 2004-2006: Increasing number of leaks + observed corrosion
in the vessel wall under the insulation
Damage was observed only in column A but not in column B
Most Important Inspection Results (April 2006)
Vessel Body: Branched long through-thickness crack at the girth
weld of Strakes 4 and 5.
Down-Comer: Non-penetrating internal circumferential cracks at the
welds connecting the down- comer piping to the vessel wall with
max. length of 220 mm.
N5 and N6 Nozzles: Non-penetrating internal circumferential cracks
at the HAZ of the welds connecting nozzles to vessel wall, lengths up
to 150-230 mm
Girth Weld Crack Defects

Through-Thickness
Branched crack ~80
mm long at shell
girth weld joining
strakes 4 and 5.
Examples of Flaws at Nozzle N5

16 axial cracks observed inside the nozzle parallel to

flow direction with maximum length of 100 mm
Scope: Use API-579 RP for FFS Assessment of
the most significant cracks in Column A

Cracks at toes of welds connecting

down-comer to shell
Crack

Cracks near welds of nozzles N5 , N6

Shell girth-weld
Methodology of Part-9 of API-579 RP for
Crack-Like Flaws: FAD
FAD combines the effects of stress field and stress
intensity factor into one assessment point
Level-3 Assessments
Assessment result for each cracking case is
shown on a simple plot known as the Failure
Assessment Diagram (FAD), which
characterizes the border of safe operation in a
2-D plot.

Since the observed cracking pattern was

growing with time, it was compulsory to
implement Level-3 assessment, which is the
most stringent assessment procedure.

Assessment results of the most severe cracks

in the column wall identified both the present
condition and the remaining life of the column
based on Level-3 assessment.
 Steps of Level-3 Assessment for a Typical Crack

Step1: Determine operating conditions and supplemental loads

Step 2: Determine Stress distributions
Step 3: Determine Material Properties
Step 4: Determine Crack-Flaw like dimensions
Step 5: Determine Partial Safety Factors
Step 6: Compute Reference Stress for Primary stresses
Step 7: Compute Load Ratio for primary loads
Step 8: Compute Stress Intensity factor attributed to primary loads
Step 9: Compute Reference stress for secondary and residual stresses
Step 10:Compute Secondary and residual stress reduction factors
Step 11:Compute Stress intensity for secondary and residual stresses
Step 12:Compute plasticity reduction factor
Step 13:Calculate toughness ratio; Ordinate of FAD
Step 14:Evaluate the result on the FAD
 FFS of Down-Comer Flaws Increasing
Crack Depth (a)

4 Case # a [mm] K iR MPa m K iR / K mat

5 1 6.4 91.81 0.69
2 8 119.77 0.90
3.5
Toughness Ratio Kr

3 9.6 150.23 1.14

4 12.8 203.975 1.55
4 5 16 497.21 3.77
1.5
3
Not-Acceptable
1
2 Crack

0.5 1
Acceptable
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
 P
Load Ratio LPr  ref

 ys
30
Variation of Stress Intensity Factor with Crack Depth
for Down-Comer Cracks

600

Through-thickness crack
Stress Intensity Factor (KI )

500 2c

a
400 t
[MPa m ]

Elliptical Crack (2c,a)

300

200
Material Fracture Toughness
KIC=131.8 MPa m
100

0 a=0.8t
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Crack Depth (a) [mm]
31
 FFS of the Branched Through-Thickness Girth
Weld

FFS Treatment of Branched

Crack to determine the
Equivalent Crack Length as 67
mm

0.8
Toughness Ratio Kr

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
 P
Load Ratio LPr  ref

 ys
Reboiler Vapour Return Nozzle N5 – Circumferential Crack
X58 with L= 150 mm is the most Serious

X58 =150 mm

X43 =120 mm
 FFS of Crack N58 with L =150 mm in Nozzle N5 for
increasing Values of Crack Depth

3
Case # a [mm] K iR MPa m K iR / K mat
1 8 96.6 0.733
2.5 2 11.2 114.8 0.871
Toughness Ratio Kr

3 12.8 128.3 0.973

4 16 299.7 2.274
4
2
3 Not-Acceptable
1
2

0.5 1
Acceptable
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
 P
Load Ratio L  P ref

 ys
r
Conclusions Recommendations
Stresses due to Operating loads were found to be very
small. Residual stresses are present at the welds due
to absence of PWHT. Presence of residual stresses and
the lack of effectiveness of the passivation technique
are the main causes of observed cracking located
primarily at or near the welds in the CS section of the
tower(s).

The branched through-Thickness Shell crack is on the

border between Safe and Unsafe regimes of FAD. About
98 % of Material Toughness is exhausted. Crack
branching may lead to uncontrolled growth. Immediate
Repair is highly recommended.

Surface cracks at the down-comer weld could become

serious if the crack depth exceeds 50 % of shell wall
thickness. Inspection by ToFD should be conducted to
determine crack depth. Failure has serious
consequences since crack is in the vessel wall.
Conclusions and Recommendations
 Circumferential surface cracks in the walls of
Nozzle N5 could become unsafe if crack depth
exceed 80 % of wall thickness.
 Circumferential surface cracks in the walls of
Nozzle N6 could become unsafe if crack depth
exceed 60 % of wall thickness.
 Since cracks in nozzles N5, N6 are in the protruding
part of the nozzles, consequences of failure are not
very serious
 Conducting future inspection by ToFD technique
should provide crack depths for non-penetrating
surface cracks at the down -comer and nozzles N5,
N6. ToFD will also show crack growth rate (if any)
Actions taken after First FFS Assessment

 ToFD Inspection was conducted in May 2007; almost

one year after April 2006 inspection campaign and 5
months after the first FFS Assessment report submitted
in January 2007.
 ToFD inspection provided current depths for the most
significant cracks. ToFD inspection results also showed
that cracks are propagating, and adjacent neighboring
cracks are combining together to form longer cracks.
 Further ToFD inspection campaigns were conducted to
monitor the status of cracking in both columns A, B.
Cracks kept propagating at an alarming rate with
Column A deteriorating faster than column B. A decision
was taken to replace the two columns with new ones
with improved design and material of construction
 FFS Assessment has given the operator of the columns
enough lead time to re-design and contract the new
improved columns
 Case-2
Fitness-For-Service
Assessment of a Corroded
Cantilever Pipe
Based on an Article entitled:
“Assessment of corrosion damage acceptance criteria in
API579-ASME/1 code” M. S. Attia · M. M. Megahed · M.
Ammar Darwish · S. Sundram, published in “The
International Journal of Mechanics and Materials in
Design” 01/2014; DOI:10.1007/s10999-014-9278-6 ·
1.20 Impact Factor
Problem Statement and Objectives
 A 4” sch. 80 API 5L Grade B steel pipe is suffering
from severe corrosion, and FFS assessment is
required.
 Wall thickness measurement by UT in 2006 and
2008 showed that the annual corrosion rate is
around 1.2 mm
 Pipe nominal thickness is 8.6 mm and metal loss is
localized in a straight section at 6 O’clock. The
minimum wall thickness recorded is around 3 mm
 The pipe carries internal pressure in addition to
mechanical loads due to attached valves
 This type of piping arrangements is of type-B and
therefore FFS assessment of level-1 may not be
made if supplemental mechanical loads can be
ignored; which is not the case. Thus Levels 2 and 3
only are conducted here
 Schematic of the Corroded 4” Cantilever Pipe

Corroded
Region

Nominal wall thickness = 8.6 mm

MAWP = Design Pressure = 1350 psi =90 barg
Current operating pressure = 225 psi =15 barg
Material Yield Strength = 207 Mpa
Design Stress = 138 MPa
Mechanical Loads acting on the 4” Pipe
 UT Wall Thickness in the Corroded Region

UT Grid size:
10 mm in axial direction
46 mm in circumferential
direction

Nominal Wall thickness =

8.56 mm
Min. Wall thickness
At 180o = 3.0 mm
At 135o = 3.5 mm
At 225o = 4.8 mm
3D Wall Thickness Profile in Corroded Region
 Calculation of Critical Wall Thickness
tminC = Min. required thickness based on hoop
stress due to pressure = 3.76 mm
tminL = Min. required thickness bases axial stress
due to pressure =1.88 mm
t sl = Required supplemental thickness due to
axial stress arising from sustained
mechanical load
= 0.76 mm
Total tminL = tminL + t sl
= 1.88 + 0.76
= 2.64 mm
Critical Thickness Profiles compared with
tminc and tminL

tminc = 3.76 mm

tminL = 2.64 mm

Length for thickness

Averaging = 11.65 mm
Average Measured Thickness
tamC = 3.07 mm
tamS = 3.44 mm
 Results of Level-2 FFS Assessment

1. The pipe does not satisfy level-2 acceptability criteria

for Average Measured Thickness or Minimum Measured
Thickness
2. The pipe should not be operated at the Pd=1350psi.
3. Operation at P=225psi is possible up to 16 months.
Estimation of Remaining Life through Level-2 FFS, If
Pressure is reduced to 225 psi

Estimated MAWP for increasing FCA according to FFS

Level-2
FCA Time MAWP MAWP (psi)
(mm) from (psi) According to Level-2
Last (with the conservative
Inspecti Accordin assumption
on g to tamS = tamC = tmm = 3 mm
(months) Level-2
0 0 1392 1194
0.4 4 1209 1032
0.8 8 1027 870
1.2 12 846 710
1.6 16 542 503
2.0 20 219 187
 Corroded Pipe FE Model used in Level-3 FFS

Material model = Elastic Perfectly-plastic

Material Yield Strength = 207 MPa
Limit load analysis is composed from 2 steps:
- Apply all mechanical loads and keep them in action
- Apply monotonically increasing pressure and observe
stresses and strains
- Limit pressure is reached when the pressure stabilizes while
strains keep increasing
3D Wall Thickness Profile in Corroded Region
Limit Pressures for Corroded and As-New Pipe
Effective Stress in Corroded Pipe at Onset of
Yielding (a) and Plastic Instability (b)
 Deformed Shape for Various FCA values:
(a) 0.4 mm, (b) 1 mm, (c) 1.6 mm

Note the local

instability in
the corroded
region for all (a)

values of FCA
Also note the
global
instability for
the case of (b)

FCA = 1.6 mm

©
Limit Pressures for the Corroded Pipe for Various
FCA values: (a) 0.4 mm, (b) 1 mm, (c) 1.6 mm
Variation of Effective Strain with Pressure for Corroded Pipes
for Various FCA values: (a) 0.4 mm, (b) 1 mm, (c) 1.6 mm
Level-3 Assessment of Global and Local Instability

Checks against Global and Local Instability under Factored Load

Combinations as per Tables B1.3 and B1.4 for Design and Current
Operating Pressures

Decision
Pressure FCA Global Instability Local Instability
Level adopted for
Instability Check (mm)
1.5xRSFa x (P+W) 1.7xRSFa x (P+W)
Pass
= 1350 psi

0.4 Safe Safe

Pressure
Design

1.0 Safe Unsafe Fail

1.6 Safe Unsafe Fail

Pass
Pressure =
Operating

0.4 Safe Safe

Current

225 psi

1.0 Safe Safe Pass

1.6 Safe Safe Pass

 Conclusions and Recommendations
 The corroded pipe failed Level-2 FFS assessment.
 Ignoring Level-2 thickness acceptability criteria,
a Remaining life of about 18 months is estimated
for operation at a reduced pressure of 225 psi
 Level-3 assessment shows safe operation at Pd
for up to 4 months only. Operation at a reduced
pressure of 225 psi can be tolerated for about 16
months.
 Inspection data only permit assessment based
Part-4 of FFS-General Metal Loss. Assessment
using Part-5 for local metal loss requires finer UT
inspection grid.

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