G.R. No.
108119 January 19, 1994 imply that the right of a party to take depositions as means of discovery is not
FORTUNE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND INTER-MERCHANTS
CORPORATION, respondents.
Petition: This petition seeks the review on certiorari of the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order of the RTC disallowing
the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito S. Teope
Facts:
An action for breach of contract was filed by petitioner against respondent before
the RTC of San Pablo City. After respondent had filed its Answer, petitioner
served the former with written interrogatories. The interrogatories were
answered by respondent through its board chairman, Juanito A. Teope.
The pre-trial conference was thereafter scheduled for January 9, February 12 and
April 22, 1992. However, petitioner served upon private respondent a Notice to
Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination notifying the latter that herein
petitioner would take the deposition of said Juanito A. Teope.
Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition/Vehement
Opposition to Plaintiff's Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination, dated
March 27, 1992, alleging inter alia that : (a) herein petitioner has previously
availed of one mode of discovery, that is, the written interrogatories which
practically covered all the claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case; (b)
there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the
oral deposition; (c) the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if
required during the trial on the merits.
The trial court thereafter issued an order that the requested deposition shall not
be taken for the reason that the deposition of Juanito A. Teope, appears
unwarranted since the proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written
interrogatories of the plaintiff and has signified his availability to testify in court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed an original
action for certiorari before the Supreme Court. However, this Court referred the
case to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits.
As earlier stated, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing
the petition and holding that it does not have jurisdiction to direct that a
deposition shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for so ruling. This is
provided for in Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. Said sections
absolute.
Hence, the instant petition was filed.
Issue: Whether there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that
the deposition shall not be taken
Ruling: NO.
It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of discovery would be
untrammeled and efficacious, Rule 29 imposes serious sanctions on the party
who refuses to comply with or respond to the modes of discovery, such as
dismissing his action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by
default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or
agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as
established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal
to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or
defenses; striking out his pleadings or parts thereof; or staying further
proceedings.
But then, there are concomitant limitations to discovery, even when permitted to
be undertaken without leave of court and without judicial intervention. As
indicated by the Rules, limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. Also, further limitations
come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches
upon the recognized domains of privilege.
Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good
cause that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The
requirement, however, that good cause be shown for a protective order puts the
burden on the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reasons for the
order. A particular and specific demonstration of facts, as distinguished from
conclusory statements, is required to establish good cause for the issuance of a
protective order. What constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the
kind of protective order that is sought.
In the present case, private respondent failed to sufficiently establish that
there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that the
deposition shall not be taken, for several reasons.
1. We agree with petitioner's submission that the fact that petitioner had
previously availed of the mode of discovery, which is by written interrogatories
supposedly covering all claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case, cannot be
considered "good cause", because: (a) the fact that information similar to that
sought had been obtained by answers to interrogatories does not bar an
examination before trial, and is not a valid objection to the taking of a deposition
where there is no duplication and the examining party is not acting in bad faith;
and (b) knowledge of the facts by the petitioner concerning which the proposed
deponent is to be examined does not justify a refusal of such examination.
It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the present Rules the
fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not
bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not
attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other
party.
2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute
"good cause" to justify the court's order that his deposition shall not be taken.
That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the
deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial. But the same reason
cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.
3. We are also in conformity with petitioner's submission that the mere fact that
the court could not thereby observe the behavior of the deponent does not justify
the denial of the right to take deposition.
4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended
to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the
setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order that the deposition
shall not be taken in this case, and that respondent court erred in affirming the
same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby
rendered ORDERING the court a quo to allow herein petitioner to take the
deposition upon oral examination of Juanito S. Teope in and for purposes of Civil
Case No. SP-3469 pending before it.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21231 July 30, 1975
CONCORDIA LALUAN, et al., petitioners,
vs.
APOLINARIO MALPAYA, MELECIO TAMBOT, BERNARDINO JASMIN, et
al., respondents.
Facts: The petitioners filed with the CFI of Pangasinan a complaint against the
respondents for recovery of ownership and possession of two parcels of land.
They base their claim on their alleged right to inherit, by legal succession, from
Marciana Laluan (the respondent Malpaya's wife) who died intestate and without
any children.
The first parcel of land they allege as paraphernal property of the late Marciana
Laluan. They claim that the respondent Malpaya sold the land to the respondent
Tambot. The second parcel of land they allege as conjugal property of the spouses
Malpaya and Laluan, and charge that the respondent Malpaya, with right to sell
only one-half thereof, sold the whole property, four days after the death of his
wife, to the respondents Tambot and Jasmin.
The respondents claimed that the parcels of land belonged to the respondent
Malpaya as his exclusive property. The respondents Tambot and Jasmin further
aver that they bought the properties in good faith, unaware of any flaw in the title
of their vendor.
At the hearing scheduled, neither the respondents nor their counsel appeared.
The petitioners thus moved for leave to continue with the presentation of their
evidence. This the court a quo granted, allowing the petitioners to adduce their
evidence before the clerk of court.
The court a quo rendered judgment in favour of petitioners, the court ordered the
respondent Tambot not only to deliver the possession of the land to the
petitioners but also to pay them damages.
The respondents Tambot and Jasmin filed their Mocion de Reconsideracion. The
court a quo denied the same. The respondents then appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The respondent Court rendered judgment remanding the case to the
court a quo for further proceedings. The respondent Court voided the procedure
whereby, at the continuation of the hearing of the case, the court a quo, in the
absence of the respondents and their counsel, allowed the petitioners to present
their evidence before the clerk of court.
The petitioners, through a motion for reconsideration, asked the respondent
Court to re-examine its decision. This motion, however, the respondent Court
denied. In the instant petition for certiorari, the petitioners pray for the reversal
of the decision of the respondent Court.
Issue: Whether or not the reception by the clerk of court of the petitioners'
evidence, in the absence of the respondents and their counsel, constitutes a
prejudicial error that vitiated the proceedings.
Ruling: NO.
No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from
authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant. After all,
the reception of evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task
— the taking down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the
pieces of documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This task
of receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk of court, the exercise of
judicial discretion usually called for when the other party who is present objects
to questions propounded and to the admission of the documentary evidence
proffered. More importantly, the duty to render judgment on the merits of the
case still rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare
the decision based upon the evidence reported.
But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the concomitant result
thereof, i.e., the judgment rendered by the court based on the evidence presented
in such limited proceedings, prejudice the substantial rights of the aggrieved
party, then there exists sufficient justification to grant the latter complete
opportunity to thresh out his case in court.
1. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property,"
the court a quo, declared it as the paraphernal property of the deceased Marciana
Laluan. In so doing, the court a quo relied mainly on the documents presented by
the petitioners before the clerk of court at the hearing on August 1, 1957.
However, the respondents contend that the land described in the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property" is not any of those set forth in the deed of
donation.
The sketch appearing on the deed of donation covers three parcels of land. All of
these three parcels have stated metes and bounds quite different from those of
the land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the location too
of the latter land differs from those of the parcels described in the deed of
donation.
All these give rise to a grave doubt as to the specific identity of one of the parcels
of land in dispute which the court a quo neither noticed nor considered
notwithstanding the obvious fact that the location, area and boundaries of the
land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" do not coincide with
those of any of the parcels described in the deed of donation propter nuptias.
The invariable applicable rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an action
to recover ownership, the person who claims that he has a better right to the
property must prove not only his ownership of the property claimed but also the
identity thereof. The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land
he claims. And where doubt and uncertainty exist as to the identity of the land
claimed, a court should resolve the question by recourse to the pleadings and the
record as well as to extrinsic evidence, oral or written.
2. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale," the court a quo,
in its decision dated September 23, 1957, found and declared it as the conjugal
property of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya. In so doing, the courta quo relied
heavily on the presumption established by article 1407 of the Civil Code of 1889
that "[a] 11 the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in
the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
It needs no emphasis to point out that the court a quo committed no error in
declaring that the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale" belongs to
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya. Likewise, the
court a quo committed no error in declaring the "Absolute Deed of Sale" null and
void as to the one-half portion of the land described therein which belonged to
Laluan, spouse of the respondent Malpaya; in declaring the petitioners the
owners pro indiviso of one-half of the land subject of the said "Absolute Deed of
Sale;" and in ordering the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to deliver the
possession of the said half-portion to the petitioners.
ACCORDINGLY, (1) the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 1963
and its resolution dated March 30, 1963 are set aside; (2) the judgment of the
court a quo dated September 23, 1957, insofar as it pertains to the "Absolute
Deed of Sale," is hereby affirmed; and (3) the judgment of the court a quo of the
same date, insofar as it relates to the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," is
set aside, and the case (civil case 11219) is hereby remanded to the court a
quo for a new trial, to the end that the identities of the parcels of land in dispute
may be specifically established. At the new trial, it will not be necessary to retake
evidence already taken, but the parties shall be afforded opportunity to present
such evidence as they may deem relevant to the particular question raised herein.
No costs.
G.R. No. L-29742 March 29, 1972
VICENTE YU, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
EMILIO MAPAYO, defendant-appellee.
Petition: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Davao City
Facts: Appellant filed suit to recover from defendant Emilio Mapayo the sum of
P2,800, representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of a Gray Marine
Engine sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, plus attorney's fees. The answer
admitted the transaction and the balance due but contended that by reason of
hidden defects of the article sold, the defendant had been forced to spend P2,800
for repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due on
the price of the engine, and counterclaimed for damages and attorneys' fees. The
City Court, after trial, disallowed the defenses and ordered the defendant to pay
plaintiff P2,500.00 and costs.
Defendant Mapayo appealed to the Court of First Instance, filing an answer
therein that was a virtual reproduction of his original defenses in the City Court.
When, after several continuances, the case was called for hearing on 13 March
1968, the defendant, as well as his counsel, failed to appear and the court
scheduled the case for hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered
plaintiff to present his evidence, plaintiff however argued that all of the
allegations of the complaint are admitted hence he does not have to present
evidence and that it should be the defendant who should present the evidence
first. The Court however treated the plaintiff’s action as a refusal to present
evidence. The court then issued an order on the same day making it of record that
the attorney for the plaintiff refuses to present evidence, either oral or
documentary, when required by the Court.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by counsel for plaintiff, it was denied by
the court reasoning that the court asked said counsel twice whether he would
present his evidence for the plaintiff, but said counsel refused to do so and sticked
to his demand that he would introduce his witnesses only in rebuttal. This is
dictation to the Court to disregard its lawful command and a violation of the order
of trial provided in the Rules of Court.
Further motions to reconsider having proved futile, the plaintiff appealed.
Issue: Whether the plaintiff had a right to insist that it was for defendant to come
forward with evidence in support of his special defenses
Ruling: YES.
We find for plaintiff-appellant. Since the answer admitted defendant's obligation
as stated in the complaint, albeit special defenses were pleaded, plaintiff had
every right to insist that it was for defendant to come forward with evidence in
support of his special defenses. Section 2 of Revised Rule of Court 129 plainly
supports appellant:
Sec. 2. Judicial admissions.— Admissions made by the parties in
the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings
do not require proof and can not be contradicted unless
previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake.
While this appeal is not a complaint against the presiding judge, We cannot
refrain from observing that the trial judge's despotic and outrageous insistence
that plaintiff should present proof in support of allegations that were not denied
but admitted by the adverse party was totally unwarranted, and was made worse
by the trial judge's continual interrupting of the explanations of counsel, in
violation of the rules of Judicial Ethics.
Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the dismissal of the case
was manifestly untenable and contrary to law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby revoked and set aside,
and the court below is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
the defendant for the sum of P2,800.00, plus attorney's fees which this Court
considers just and reasonable (Civil Code, Article 2208, paragraph 11). Costs
against defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-60937 May 28, 1988
WALTER ASCONA LEE, ESPIRITU TAN, BENITO CHIONGBIAN and HENRY
CHIONGBIAN, petitioners
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch 37; CITY SHERIFF OF PASAY CITY and LEONCIO C.
MENDIORO, respondents.
Petition: This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision
of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the respondent judge
Facts:
The private respondent filed a complaint for accounting with damages. The
complaint was based on a contract for arrastre services executed between
respondent Mendioro and William Lines, Inc., represented by Benito Chiongbian.
Among the substantial allegations in the complaint were: plaintiff Mendioro
conducted arrastre operations as per arrastre contract with William Lines, Inc.;
(2) All the income from the arrastre operations during the said period were
received and held in trust for Mendioro by defendants Lee, Tan and Chiongbian
(3) Defendants Lee, Tan and Chiongbian were duty-bound to turn over to plaintiff
Mendioro the income they held in trust for him; and (4) They failed to do so
despite Mendioro's repeated demands.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion was denied
after which they filed an answer.
The trial court granted the motion to include Jose (3) Millares Cesar Almario and
Henry Chiongbian as indispensable parties. At the pre-trial stage of the
proceedings, the parties filed a partial stipulation of facts wherein they stated
that Arrastre Services, Inc., a corporation of which Mendioro was one the
incorporators, took over the operations at Pier 14, and Mendioro assigned his
shareholdings in P-14 Arrastre Services, Inc., to defendant Henry Chiongbian.
During the hearing, the counsel for the petitioners failed to show up and
Mendioro was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
Subsequently, an amended order of the trial court granted the petitioners an
opportunity to adduce their evidence. Protracted and lengthy trials were
conducted. Eventually, the trial court rendered its decision against the
petitioners.
The copies of the trial court's decision were mailed to the petitioners' counsel at
William Lines Building. The first, second and third notices of the registered mail
were delivered respectively to the guard-on-duty at counsel's offices but the
mailed decision remained unclaimed at the post office despite the proper notices.
An urgent ex-parte motion for execution was granted and the corresponding writ
of execution was issued. A notice of garnishment was further issued to certain
banks. The petitioners' subsequent motion to set aside the judgment and to quash
recall the writ of execution with prayer for a restraining order was denied.
In a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction filed with the Court of Appeals, the petitioners
questioned the issuance by the respondent judge of the order. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and set aside the writ of
preliminary injunction it had earlier issued.
The instant petition was filed which we, on October 4, 1982, initially resolved to
deny for being for being unmeritorious.
We reconsidered our resolution dated October 4, 1982 and gave due course to
this petition requiring the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the judgment against the petitioners was premature in the
absence of a formal accounting to be made by the petitioners.
(2) Whether or not the delegation of the reception of the evidence ex-parte to the
lower court's legal researcher is illegal.
Ruling:
(1) No. The petitioners contend that since the complaint of the private
respondent was one for accounting with damages, the lower court could not and
should not have rendered a money judgment without first ordering them to
submit a formal document captioned "Accounting."
The trial court found the amount due to Mendioro as P859,981.53 after deducting
the actual and, legitimate expenses for salaries and rentals of handling
equipment. In lieu of the document referred to by the petitioners, the trial court
relied on the evidence presented in court in a span of three years (from 1978 to
1981) during which time all the parties were afforded the chance to adduce their
evidence.
We find no compelling reason that may warrant the setting aside of the
aforequoted findings of the trial court sustained by the Court of Appeals. Once
again we reiterate that the trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great weight
on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons
(2) No. The petitioners question the delegation of the reception of the
evidence ex-parte in the lower court to its legal researcher invoking our ruling
in Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (66 SCRA 425) They argue that such practice does not
have any basis in law. Their argument is not meritorious. In the case
of The National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals (121 SCRA 777, 781), we
categorically stated that:
The contention that the Trial Court cannot delegate the
reception of evidence to its Clerk of Court, citing the case of Lim
Tanhu v. Ramolete (supra) is not well taken. Suffice it to say, for
purposes of this suit, that the Id case referred to reception of
evidence by a Clerk of Court after declaration of defendant's
default. No default is involved herein. As held in the case of
Laluan v. Manalo (65 SCRA 494 [1975l), no provision of law or
 principle of public policy prohibits a Court from authorizing its
Clerk of Court to receive the evidence of a party litigant.
More important, however, is the fact that the trial court reconsidered its earlier
order and allowed the petitioners to present their evidence. For almost three
years, from July 20, 1978 to May 22, 1981, the petitioners participated in the
protracted trials which followed.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment under review is hereby
AFFIRMED. The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 50480 December 14, 1979
CONTINENTAL BANK, petitioner-appellant
vs.
HON. JOEL P. TIANGCO, Presiding Judge of Branch XXVIII, Court of First
Instance of Manila, INCOME AND ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, STAR LIFE
INSURANCE CORPORATION and PRIMITIVO E. DOMINGO, respondents
appellees.
Facts: The CFI of Manila rendered a decision ordering Income and Acceptance
Corporation, Star Life Insurance Corporation and Primitive E. Domingo to pay
solidarily Lo the Continental Bank the sum of P46,300.81, with twelve percent
interest per annum. That judgment was rendered on the basis of the evidence
which was presented before the deputy clerk of court who was commissioned Lo
receive the same after the defendants were declared in default for
nonappearance at the pre-trial. As no appeal was interposed from the said
judgment, it became final and executory. It was not satisfied.
The sheriff in his return stated that he served the writ of execution upon the
judgment debtor, P.E. Domingo, who manifested that he would settle the case
with the bank. After the expiration of the sixty-day period, without the judgment
having been satisfied, the sheriff returned the writ to the court.
The bank, "through the Statutory Receiver", filed a complaint also in the CFI of
Manila for the revival of the said judgment. lt was alleged therein that the
judgment debtors (now the private respondents) had made partial payments and
that the amount due as of March 15, 1977 was P34,622.19 with twelve percent
interest a year from March 16, 1977. The bank prayed that the judgment be
revived.
The defendants answered the complaint. Then, they filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds that the action for revival of judgment had prescribed and that the
plaintiff bank had no cause of action because the judgment sought to be revived
is void since it was based on the evidence received by the deputy clerk of court
as commissioner.
The motion to dismiss was opposed by the bank. The trial court granted the
motion in a minute order. The plaintiff appealed under Republic Act 5440.
Issue: Whether the judgment in question is void and unenforceable because it
was based on evidence which was heard by the deputy clerk of court as
commissioner.
Ruling: NO.
We have admonished the trial courts not to issue a minute order like the one
under appeal. A trial court should specify in its order the reasons for the dismissal
of the complaint so that when the order is appealed, this Court can readily
determine from a casual perusal thereof whether there is a prima
facie justification for the dismissal.
Also erroneous and unmeritorious is respondents' contention that the judgment
in question is void and unenforceable because it was based on evidence which
was heard by the deputy clerk of court as commissioner. That judgment is valid
and enforceable because it was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and
it was not impaired by extrinsic fraud nor by lack of due process. The trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the judgment debtors. They acquiesced
in the validity of the judgment when they made partial payments to satisfy it.
The defendants or private respondents did not question in the lower court its
delegation to the deputy clerk of court of the duty to receive plaintiff's evidence.
'There is no showing that they were prejudiced by such a procedure, that the
commissioner committed any mistake or abuse of discretion, or that the
proceedings were vitiated by collusion and collateral fraud. It is too late at this
hour for them to question the reception of plantiff's evidence by the deputy clerk
of court acting as commissioner.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. Costs
against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169677 February 18, 2013
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as successor-in-interest of
ASIAN BANK CORPORATION,Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and
HON. RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA (in their capacities as Chairman and
Members, respectively, of the Second Division of SANDIGANBAYAN) and
the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Petition: Special civil action for certiorari
Facts:
The Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr.,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. The action was
obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their nominees,
dummies and agents. Among the properties subject of the action were two
parcels of commercial land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City, covered by TCT
No. 266423 and TCT No. 266588 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
registered in the names of Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr. and Ludivina L. Genito.
The Republic subsequently moved for the amendment of the complaint in order
to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted
the motion. It appears that Asian Bank claimed ownership of the two parcels of
land as the registered owner by virtue of TCT No. N-201383 and TCT No. N-
201384 issued in its name by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Asian Bank
was also in possession of the properties by virtue of the writ of possession issued
by the RTC in Quezon City.
When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence against
the original defendants in Civil Case No. 0004, it moved to hold a separate trial
against Asian Bank.
Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the motion until it was first
given the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and documentary
evidence the Republic had already presented against the original defendants, and
contended that it would be deprived of its day in court if a separate trial were to
be held against it without having been sufficiently apprised about the evidence
the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an additional defendant.
The Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was proper because
its cause of action against Asian Bank was entirely distinct and independent from
its cause of action against the original defendants.
The Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution granting the Republic’s
motion for separate trial, reasoning that plaintiff’s claim against Asian Bank is
entirely separate and distinct from its claims as against the original defendants,
albeit dealing with the same subject matter.
Asian Bank moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but the
Sandiganbayan denied its motion. Hence, Metrobank commenced this special
civil action for certiorari as the successor-in-interest of Asian Bank and
transferee of the properties.
Issue:
(1) Whether the Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank;
(2) Whether there was evidence that Asian Bank acquired the properties in bad
faith
Ruling:
First and Second Issues:
Separate Trials are Improper
The first and second issues, being interrelated, are jointly discussed and resolved.
The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-
claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint,
or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of
such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any
party.
We conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in
ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the
issue against Asian Bank was distinct and separate from that against the original
defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of
having all the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside
the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a "single trial will generally lessen the delay,
expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts."
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary
grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case,
or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials
of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will
promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all
parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.

As we see it, however, the justification of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the
separate trial did not constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the
exceptions. To begin with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated.
In that context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of convenience.
And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian Bank was necessarily connected
with the cause of action against the original defendants. Should the
Sandiganbayan resolve the issue against Spouses Genito in a separate trial on the
basis of the evidence adduced against the original defendants, the properties
would be thereby adjudged as ill-gotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of the
Republic without Metrobank being given the opportunity to rebut or explain its
side. The outcome would surely be prejudicial towards Metrobank.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for certiorari.

Let the writ of certiorari issue: (a) ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the
Resolution dated June 25, 2004 and the Resolution dated July 13, 2005 issued by
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0004 granting the motion for separate trial
of the Republic of the Philippines as to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company;
and (b), DIRECTING the Sandiganbayan to hear Civil Case No. 0004 against
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the same trial conducted against the
original defendants in Civil Case No. 0004.

The Court DECLARES that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction
over the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 as against Asian Bank
Corporation/Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company.

No pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.