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Lutz vs Araneta, G.R. No.

L-7859, December 22, 1955 singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption
infringe no constitutional limitation."

FACTS: Ortigas & Co. v. CA (

Walter Lutz, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the
intestate estate of Antonio Ledesma, sought to recover from
the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located
under section 3 of the Commonwealth Act of 567 or the Sugar in Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan with several restrictions in
Adjustment Act thereby assailing its constitutionality, for it the contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for
provided for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture residential purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025.
of sugar, alleging that such enactment is not being levied for a Later, a zoning ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA)
public purpose but solely and exclusively for the aid and reclassifying the area as commercial. Private respondent
support of the sugar industry thus making it void and (Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot from Hermoso and
unconstitutional. The sugar industry situation at the time of built a single storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car
the enactment was in an imminent threat of loss and needed sales company. Ortigas & Co. filed a petition a complaint which
to be stabilized by imposition of emergency measures. The sought the demolition of the constructed car sales company to
action having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the against Hermoso as it violated the terms and conditions of the
plaintiffs appealed the case directly to this Court Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay
raised the issue to the Court of Appeals from which he sought
favorable ruling. Hence, the instant petition.
Is CA 567 constitutional, despite its being allegedly violative of
the equal protection clause, the purpose of which is not for the
benefit of the general public but for the rehabilitation only of Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts
the sugar industry? RULING: The decision appealed from is entered prior to its effectivity
affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power
YES. CA 567 is constitutional. The protection and promotion of may be given effect over any standing contract. Hence,
the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that petition is denied.
the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what
is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. RATIO:
Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed to fully play,
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or
subject only to the test of reasonableness and it is not
govern certain activities or transactions could be given
contended that the means provided in the law bear no relation
retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or
to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If
contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to
objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no
future contracts, but equally to those already in existence.
reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds
Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have
for their prosecution and attainment. Analysis of the Act, will
to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of
show that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to
police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the
good order, safety, and general welfare of the people.
threatened sugar industry. In other words,
Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be
Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs.
power. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Court already
upheld subject ordinance as a legitimate police power
That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers measure.
themselves can hardly be a ground of complaint; indeed, it
appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW
who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds v. NLRC
derived from it. At any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax
Maribel S. Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the
that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has
Radiology department of St.
been repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a

Lukes Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) on October 13, 1984. disregards decency or morality; (4) obstruct or interferes with
the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body
On April 22, 1992, Congress passed and enacted Republic Act
of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A
No. 7431 known as the Radiologic Technology Act of 1992. Said
nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens.
law requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice
A nuisance per se are those which affect the immediate safety
as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the
of persons and property and may summarily be abated under
Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of the undefined law of necessity. As Gaycanco was able to
registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology. procure a building permit to construct the building, it was
implied that the city engineer did not consider the building as
RATIO: such of a public nuisance, or a threat to the safety of persons
and property. The MMDA was only to enforce Authoritative
While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed
power on development of Metro Manila, and was not
by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated
supposed to act with Police Power as they were not given the
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health,
authority to do such by the constitution, nor was it expressed
morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general
by the DPWH when the ordinance was enacted. Therefore,
welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to
MMDA acted on its own when it illegally demolished
engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or
Gancayco’s property, and was solely liable for the damage.
technical knowledge may be required to take an examination
as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. The most Whether there was a valid delegation of police power. Then
concrete example of this would be in the field of medicine, the we can determine whether the City Government of Quezon
practice of which in all its branches has been closely regulated City acted within the limits of the delegation.
by the State. It has long been recognized that the regulation of
this field is a reasonable method of protecting the health and It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government,
safety of the public to protect the public from the potentially through the city council, police power by virtue of Section
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of
who would practice medicine Quezon City.


FACTS: Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted the Assailed Ordinance

which requires heavy industries operating along the portions
The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, of Batangas Bay within the territorial jurisdiction of Batangas
City Government of Quezon City and the Metro Manila City to construct desalination plants to facilitate the use of
Development Authority stemmed from a local ordinance seawater as coolant for their industrial facilities. 15
pertaining to Construction of Arcades, and the clearing of
Public Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of which he PSPC averred that the Assailed Ordinance constitutes an
was able to obtain a building permit for a two-storey invalid exercise of police power as it failed to meet the
commercial building. substantive requirements for validity.22 Particularly, PSPC
argued that the Assailed Ordinance contravenes the Water
ISSUES: Code of the Philippines (Water Code), and encroaches upon
the power of the National Water
Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property can be
constituted as a public nuisance. Whether or not MMDA was Resources Board (NWRB) to regulate and control the
in their authority to demolish Gancayco’s property. Philippines' water resources. 23 In addition, Batangas City and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod failed to sufficiently show the
factual or technical basis for its enactment. 24 In this
HELD: The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. connection, PSPC alleged that the Assailed Ordinance unduly
The court decided that the wing wall of Gancayco’s building singles out heavy industries, and holds them solely
was not a nuisance per se, as under Art. 694 of the Civil Code accountable for the loss of water and destruction of aquifers
of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as any act, omission, without basis, resulting in the deprivation of their property
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything rights without due process of law.
else that (1) injures of endangers the health or safety of the
others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or

The Assailed Ordinance is void for being ultra vires, for being The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
contrary to existing law, and for lack of evidence showing the to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
existence of factual basis for its enactment. object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
The requisites for a valid ordinance are well established. Time
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
and again, the Court has ruled that in order for an ordinance
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. R.A. No.
the concerned LGU to enact, but must also be passed in
7277 was enacted primarily to provide full support to the
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Moreover,
improvement of the total well-being of PWDs and their
substantively, the ordinance (i) must not contravene the
integration into the mainstream of society.
Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must The PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of medicine is
not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and supported by a valid objective or purpose as aforementioned.
consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not be It has a valid subject considering that the concept of public use
unreasonable. is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use by the
public, but held synonymous with public interest, public
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
benefit, public welfare, and public convenience. As in the case
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and
of senior citizens, the discount privilege to which the PWDs are
general welfare of the people. As an inherent attribute of
entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to
sovereignty, police power primarily rests with the State. In
which these citizens belong. The means employed in invoking
furtherance of the State's policy to foster genuine and
the active participation of the private sector, in order to
meaningful local autonomy, the national legislature delegated
achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and
the exercise of police power to local government units (LGUs)
directly related. Also, the means employed to provide a fair,
as agents of the State.72 Such delegation can be found in
just and quality health care to PWDs are reasonably related to
Section 1673 of the LGC, which embodies the general welfare
its accomplishment, and are not oppressive, considering that
clause. 74
as a form of reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs
Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the in the purchase of medicine can be claimed by the
State, it is incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the establishments as allowable tax deductions pursuant to
will of their principal, the State.75 Necessarily, therefore, Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 as implemented in Section 4 of DOF
ordinances enacted pursuant to the general welfare clause Revenue Regulations No. 1-2009. Otherwise stated, the
may not subvert the State's will by contradicting national discount reduces taxable income upon which the tax liability
statutes. The Assailed Ordinance effectively contravenes the of the establishments is computed.
provisions of the Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City
the power to control and regulate the use of ground water
which, by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains Seeking to prohibit the Manila International Airport Authority
solely to the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) (MIAA) and the Department of Transportation and

DRUGSTORES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from implementing
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY AFFAIRS the following agreements executed by the Philippine

On March 24, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7277, entitled "An Government through the DOTC and the MIAA and the
Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO):
Self-Reliance of Disabled Persons and their Integration into the
The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times
Mainstream of
of national emergency, and in the exercise of its police power,
Society and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the to temporarily take over the operation of any business
"Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," was passed into law affected with public interest. In the 1986 Constitutional

W/N PWD discount is a valid exercise of police power. On the Commission, the term national emergency was defined to
contrary, it is an invalid exercise of the power of eminent include threat from external aggression, calamities or national
domain because it fails to provide just compensation to disasters, but not strikes unless it is of such proportion that
petitioners and other similarly situated drugstores would paralyze government service.[60] The duration of the
emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long the

temporary takeover by the government would last.[61] The propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
temporary takeover by the government extends only to the the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,
operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As "of condemnation declaring, that the plaintiff has a lawful right
such the government is not required to compensate the to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public
private entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment
of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the
entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, filing of the complaint."
likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the said
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned
business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the
with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation
government is in exercise of its police power and not of its
for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court
power of eminent domain.
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
the Constitutional provision on temporary government evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be
takeover and obligate the government to pay reasonable cost final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the
for the use of the Terminal and/or suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding
the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe
Terminal Complex.[63] Article XII, section 17 of the 1987
the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence
Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of
or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a
the times necessitate the government to temporarily take over
dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
appeal therefrom.
business affected with public interest. It is the welfare and
interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in Expropriation proceedings must be dismissed when it is
determining whether or not to temporarily take over a determined that it is not for a public purpose, except when:
particular business. Clearly, the State in effecting the
First, the trial court's order already became final and
temporary takeover is exercising its police power. Police
power is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers. [64] Its exercise therefore must not be unreasonably Second, the government already took possession of the
hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the property; and
government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness of
its exercise.[65] Thus, requiring the government to pay Lastly, the expropriation case already caused prejudice to the
reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the landowner.
property pursuant to the operation of the business
contravenes the Constitution.
Remedios Biglang-awa received a Notice from the respondent
Republic, through the Department of Public Works and
The National Power Corporation instituted expropriation Highways (DPWH) Project Manager Patrick G. Gatan, requiring
proceedings for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement her to submit the documents necessary to determine the just
over parcels of land located in Barangay Marinawa, Bato, compensation for her property. Subsequently, the respondent
Catanduanes owned by respondents Socorro T. Posada, Republic, through the DPWH, deposited with the Land Bank of
Renato Bueno, Alice Balin, Adrian Tablizo, Teofilo Tablizo, and the Philippines the amounts of P3, 964,500.00 and P2,
Lydia Tablizo.4 The expropriation for the construction and 511,000.00 for the properties of Salvador and Remedios
maintenance of its Substation Island Grid Project.5 The case Biglang-awa, respectively, based on the appraisal report of the
was docketed as Civil Case No. 0008.6 The National Power Quezon City Appraisal Committee.
Corporation offered the, price of P500.00 per square meter. In
their Answer, respondents objected to the offer and alleged Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67
that the value of the properties was P2, 000.00 per square of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on
meter. July 1, 1997. Previous doctrines inconsistent with this Rule
are deemed reversed or modified. Specifically, (1) an answer,
There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The not a motion to dismiss, is the responsive pleading to a
first is concerned with the determination of the authority of complaint in eminent domain; (2) the trial court may issue a
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount

equivalent to the assessed value of the property, pursuant accordance with the delegating law.[23] In fact, the courts
to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a hearing to have adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving
determine the provisional sum to be deposited; and (3) a questions involving the proper exercise of this delegated
final order of expropriation may not be issued prior to a full power by local bodies, as compared to instances when it is
hearing and resolution of the objections and defenses of the directly exercised by the national legislature.[24]
property owner.(Emphasis Ours)
The courts have the obligation to determine whether the
Thus, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 following requisites have been complied with by the local
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and the Robern Development government unit concerned:
Corporation case, the only requisites for authorizing
immediate entry in expropriation proceedings are: (1) the 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
substance; and (2) the making of a deposit equivalent to the government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
compliance with the requirements the issuance of the writ of property .calr
possession becomes ministerial.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
The issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Rule 67 of purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure alone is neither
capricious nor oppressive, as the said rule affords owners
safeguards against unlawful deprivation of their property in 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
expropriation proceedings, one of which is the deposit Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
requirement which constitutes advance payment in the event laws.
expropriation proceeds, and stands as indemnity for damages
should the proceedings fail of consummation.[11] The 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
deposit likewise sufficiently satisfies the compensation owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said
requirement of the Constitution.[12] Moreover, the owners offer was not accepted
of the expropriated lands are entitled to legal interest on the
compensation eventually adjudged from the date the In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise
condemnor takes possession of the land until the full the power of eminent domain over petitioners' property by
compensation is paid to them or deposited in court means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite.
The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section
19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the
SUGUITAN V. CITY OF MANDALUYONG exercise of the power of eminent domain

On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC.,
Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994[3] petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO
authorizing then Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute MANILA
expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Sugui
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R.
located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in
Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market,
Mandaluyong City. The intended purpose of the expropriation
to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses,
was the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center.
mostly made of light materials, were located. The road had to
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code,
nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power may be so that fire trucks could pass through in case of
validly delegated to local government units, other public conflagration.[2] Likewise, the residents in the area needed
entities and public utilities, although the scope of this the road for water and electrical outlets.[3] The municipality
delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-
of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict square meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching
compliance with the terms of the delegating law. Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho] which is abutting E. R.
Santos Street.
Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local
governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved
whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in an Ordinance [5] authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate

expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty
appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that the and inherent in government.
property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government.
purchase the property for public use as an access road but they
It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public
rejected the offer.
entities and public utility corporations, subject only to
There is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of
conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly
an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, authorized by statute.
the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was,
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting
therefore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as
domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of
evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be
the poor and landless, upon payment of just compensation,
present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, as in
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular
laws. Provided:
inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court
based on the said inspection has no probative weight. (1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner
the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must
and such offer was not accepted;
be expressly provided for by statute
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon
the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a
FACTS: deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value
of the property based on the current tax declaration; and
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of
land, which the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion (3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be
thereof for the “sports development and recreational determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in value at the time of the taking of the property
January 1994. Masikip refused.
There is already an established sports development and
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City.
said portion of land for the alleged purpose that it was “in line Evidently, there is no “genuine necessity” to justify the
with the program of the Municipal Government to provide expropriation. The records show that the Certification issued
land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for
community.” the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation,
indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a
Compound Homeowner’s Association, a private, non-profit
complaint for expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by
organization, not the residents of Caniogan.
Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that
there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila, GR 14355
was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition (1D), 31 October 1919
for lack of merit.
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that
ISSUE: certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing
a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue,
W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property
Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no
Eminent domain is “the right of a government to take and necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in
appropriate private property to the public use, whenever the question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for
public exigency requires it, which can be done only on many years, and was covered with sepulchres and
condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor.” It monuments, and that the same should not be converted into
is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private a street for public purposes.

HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise twenty-six years later. They wrote to ask for compensation for
eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity their land on January 22, 1973. 2 Their claim was referred to
must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the the Secretary of Justice who in due course rendered an opinion
necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the dated February 22, 1973, 3 that just compensation should be
taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 paid in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 76. The
Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. Commission on Audit, however, declined to adopt the
vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.) recommendation. In a decision handed down on September
26, 1973. The Acting Chairman ruled that "the amount of
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain
compensation to be paid to the claimants is to be determined
must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular
as of the time of the taking of the subject lots.
case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal
corporations and other entities within the State, general Issue: whether or not just compensation should be fixed as of
authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be the time of actual taking of possession by the expropriating
questioned by the courts, but that general authority of entity or only after conveyance of title to the expropriator
municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right pursuant to expropriation proceedings duly instituted
to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the
Held: In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
domain, there is a "taking" when the owner is actually
authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
thereof. 12 There is a "taking" in this sense when the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or
expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary
entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the
period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of
conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question
devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to
which the courts have the right to inquire into.
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the thereof. Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property
necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is must be ascertained as of the year 1947, when it was actually
purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the taken, and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit,
wisdom and propriety of the legislature in authorizing the which, by the way, still has to be done. The value, once fixed,
exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the shall earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is
question of the right to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston effected, conformably with other principles laid down by case
Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.) law.

By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI
restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes
rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to
designated by the law.
extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation
Ansaldo vs. Tantuico proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just
compensation, the government argued that it had taken the
Facts: Two lots of private ownership were taken by the
property when the contract of lease commenced and not
Government and used for the widening of a road more than
when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the
forty-three years ago, without benefit of an action of eminent
disputed land was not taken when the government
domain or agreement with its owners, albeit without protest
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the
by the latter. The lots belong to the petitioners, Jose Ma.
essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power
Ansaldo and Maria Angela Ansaldo, are covered by title in their
of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by
names and have an aggregate area of 1,041 square meters.
condemnor upon the private property for more than a
These lots were taken from the Ansaldos sometime in 1947 by
momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such
the Department of Public Work Transportation and
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
Communication and made part of what used to be Sta. Mesa
enjoyment of the property, are not present.
Street and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan,
Metro Manila.Said owners made no move whatever until

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place While expropriation normally involves a taking of title to and
when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property possession of the property, an easement of right of way on a
as lesse. private property can be considered a taking under eminent
domain under certain conditions.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the
expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959. While expropriation normally involves a taking of title to and
possession of the property, an easement of right of way on a
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must private property can be considered a taking under eminent
enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary domain under certain conditions. In Republic v. PLDT:[81]
period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it
to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in
injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title
government entered and occupied the property under a and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
contract of lease. through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right
of way.[82]
ASOQUE & TARCINIA ASOQUE There is taking in the context of the state's power of
eminent domain when the following elements are present:
The National Power Corporation entered the Spouses
Asoque's land to install transmission lines for its 350 KV Leyte- (1) The expropriator enters a private property;
Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Line Project.[8] The National
Power Corporation utilized 4,352 square meters for the The entrance into the private property is indefinite or
project. permanent;

Spouses Asoque allege that beforehand, they were made to There is color of legal authority in the entry into the
understand that the National Power Corporation would pay property;
them the value of the portion of the land used and all
improvements that would be destroyed for the National Power (4) The property is devoted to public use or purpose; and
Corporation's project.[10] Spouses Asoque incurred actual
damages as a result of the National Power Corporation's The use of property for public use removed from the
owner all beneficial enjoyment of the property.[83]
cutting off some coconut trees and other fruit- and non-fruit-
bearing plants during the construction.[11] They were also
A right-of-way easement or burden becomes a "taking" under
prohibited from introducing on the 4,352-square-meter area
eminent domain when there is material impairment of the
any improvement that could rise by a few meters from the
value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses of the
property for an indefinite period. The intrusion into the
Upon Spouses Asoque's demand for just compensation, the property must be so immediate and direct as to subtract from
National Power Corporation only paid for the improvements the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his or
destroyed and refused to pay for the actual value of the 4,352- her exploitation of it.
square-meter area utilized for the project.[13] The National
Power Corporation claimed that it was only liable to pay for
right of way at 10% of the market value under Section 3-A of FACTS : The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4)
Republic Act No. 6395 Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the
expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in
Petitioner is liable to pay respondents just compensation and
barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express
not merely an easement fee on the basis that its acquisition of
authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by
a right-of-way easement over the portion of respondents' land
condemnation proceedings any private land within and
was a taking under the power of eminent domain.
without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in
Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564),
more specifically, for the development into integrated resort

complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the
potential tourism value instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, the dismissal or
discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms
The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is as the court deems just and equitable. Here, NAPOCOR seeks
not "public use" because private concessioners would be to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground
allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, that the transmission lines constructed on the respondents’
hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with property had already been retired. The retirement of the
even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation
restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets proceedings of the element of public use. Accordingly, the
and highways do not diminish in the least bit the public Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings and
character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of requires the return of the property to the respondents.
store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated
land does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the
and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping eventual return of the property to the
companies are still for public use. The expropriation of private respondents, NAPOCOR should compensate the
land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public respondents for the disturbance of their property rights
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of
restoration of the possession by paying actual or other
homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service
compensatory damages. The compensation must be based
companies, and other private concerns
on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their
The public respondents have stressed that the development of dispossession of the property and of its use, including the
the 808 hectares includes plans that would give the petitioners value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by
NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission
and other displaced persons productive employment, higher
lines.Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation
incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities, and
proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal,
better living standards. Our dismissing this petition is, in part,
the Court treats the dismissal of the expropriation
predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case
proceed with the expropriation of the 282 hectares already into an action for damages.
Identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex to
promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.
On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution passed by the
FACTS: barangay council, petitioner Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando,
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) entered into a Pampanga filed a Complaint for eminent domain against
private property owned by respondents Borbon in order to respondent’s spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan,
construct and maintain transmission lines for its Power
the registered owners of a parcel of land Petitioner sought to
Transmission Project. NAPOCOR then filed for expropriation
convert a portion of respondents land into Barangay Sindalans
of an easement of right of way over a portion of the
feeder road. The alleged public purposes sought to be served
said property. However, during the pendency of the appeal,
NAPOCOR filed a motion to discontinue the expropriation by the expropriation were stated in Barangay Resolution No. 6
proceedings, that the property sought to be expropriated was Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property
no longer necessary for public purpose, that because the
was for private use, that is, for the benefit of the homeowners
public purpose ceased to exist, the proceedings for
of Davsan II Subdivision. They contended that petitioner
expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was
now duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and deliberately omitted the name of Davsan II Subdivision and,
that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation instead, stated that the expropriation was for the benefit of
proceedings was in accordance of the Rules of Court. the residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that
the access road being proposed to be built across the
respondents land was to serve a privately owned subdivision
and those who would purchase the lots of said subdivision.
Whether the expropriation proceedings should be
discontinued or dismissed pending appeal. They also pointed out that under Presidential Decree No. (PD)
957, it is the subdivision owner who is obliged to provide a
feeder road to the subdivision residents

Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all compensation. Defendant’s motion for reconsideration
subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II was deniedhence this appeal
Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them.
However, the failure of the subdivision owner to provide an .Issues: Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of (1)
access road does not shift the burden to petitioner. To deprive police power and (2) eminent domain
respondents of their property instead of compelling the
subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law Held: (1 and 2)No. Republic Act No. 1383 does not
is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently constitute a valid exercise of police power. The Actdoes
illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the not confiscate, nor destroy, nor appropriate property
basis of an unlawful purpose. belonging to appellee. It merely directs that
allwaterworks belonging to cities, municipalities and
Thirdly, public funds can be used only for a public purpose. In
municipal districts in the Philippines be transferred
this proposed condemnation, government funds would be
employed for the benefit of a private individual without any tothe NAWASA for the purpose of placing them under
legal mooring. In criminal law, this would constitute the control and supervision of one agency with aview to
malversation. Respondents must be granted the opportunity promoting their efficient management, but in so doing
to show that their lot is not a servient estate. Plainly, it does not confiscate them because itdirects that they
petitioners resort to expropriation is an improper cause of be paid with an equal value of the assets of the
action. NAWASA.Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
One last word: the power of eminent domain can only be affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
exercised for public use and with just compensation. Taking an Section 6, Article XIII of our Constitution provides:
individual’s private property is a deprivation which can only be
justified by a higher goodwhich is public useand can only be "SEC. 6.The State may, in the interest of National
counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these Welfare anddefense, establish and operate industries
safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, and means of transportation andcommunication, and,
immoral, and null and void, but would also constitute a gross
upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public
and condemnable transgression of an individual’s basic right
ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be
to property as well.
operated bythe Government."
Facts: Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint
Section 1 (2), Article III, of our Constitution provides:
for declaratory relief against defendant a
publiccorporation, created under Act.1383. It contends "(2)Private property shall not be taken for public
that the said act does not include within its purview use without justcompensation".
theBaguio Water Works system, assuming that it does,
is unconstitutional because it deprives the ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS SEC. OF
plaintiff ownership, control and operation of said water AGRARIAN REFORM
works without just compensation and due process of FACTS:
law.The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the The following are consolidated cases:
ground that RA 1383 is a proper exercise of police
power and eminent domain of the State. The court A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27,
denied the motion and ordered the defendants to file EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition
ananswer. The court holds that the water works system are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four
of Baguio belongs to the category of private property tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228
and cannot be expropriated without just compensation as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now
and that contend that President Aquino usurped the
legislature‘s power.
Sec. 8 of R.A.1383 provides for the exchange of the
NAWASA assets for the value of the water works system A petition by landowners and sugar planters in
of Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not just Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation

131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two
Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion. letters] to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the
demolition on the ground that the City was still looking
A petition by owners of land which was placed by the
for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the
DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders
A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days.
to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven Unfortunately for Petitioners, during the suspension
hectares. period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City
passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a
ISSUE: socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
Whether the aforementioned EO‘s, PD, and RA were
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No.
HELD: 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was expropriation of their property for the purpose of
valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain. selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the
concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people.
131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6
of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE:
Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and What is Eminent Domain? Was this validly exercised in
Eminent Domain this case?
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the RULING:
regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of It is where a local government unit may, through its
the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
under the power of eminent domain for which exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
payment of just compensation is imperative. The purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant
of the land. What is required is the surrender of the to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent.
title and the physical possession of said excess and all
No, it has not been validly invoked in this case due to
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the
the fact that The foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain should be a genuine necessity and that
The Court declares that the content and manner of the necessity must be of public character. Government may
just compensation provided for in Section 18 of the not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private
CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. property should be expropriated. In this case, there was
no showing at all why petitioners property was singled
out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what
Lagcao vs. Labra necessity impelled the particular choice or selection.
Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of
FACTS: petitioners property as the site of a socialized housing
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession project.
of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied
by squatters. Thus a demolition order was issued.
However, when the demolition order was about to be

It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners case at the price of P400.00/sq. m. but the
had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction proposed compromise did not push through in
against the illegal occupants of their property but view of the failure of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to act on the Deed of Sale entered
Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the into by the parties.11 Subsequently, petitioner
demolition on the pretext that the City was still moved that NPC be immediately ordered to pay
searching for a relocation site for the squatters. the amount of P7,845,000.0012 representing the
However, instead of looking for a relocation site during 100% zonal value of the subject land13 in
the suspension period, the city council suddenly accordance with Republic Act No. (RA)
8974.14 NPC opposed the motion, contending that
enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of the said law only applies to expropriation cases
petitioners lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and initiated by the government to acquire property
simple. The unconscionable manner in which the for any national government infrastructure
questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that project.15
respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160
and RA 7279. It must be emphasized that RA 8974 does not
take away from the courts the power to judicially
FELISA AGRICULTURAL CORP V. NATL TRANSMISSION determine the amount of just compensation. It
merely provides relevant standards in order to
facilitate the determination of just compensation,
and sets the minimum price of the property as
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint6 for the provisional value62 to immediately
recovery of possession with damages or payment recompense the landowner with the same degree
of just compensation dated January 9, 2001 filed of speed as the taking of the property, which
by petitioner Felisa Agricultural Corporation reconciles the inherent unease attending
(petitioner) against NPC before the RTC, expropriation proceedings with a position of
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-11356. Petitioner fundamental equity.63
claimed that in 1997, it discovered that the NPC's
transmission towers and transmission lines were
Nonetheless, it is settled that where actual taking
located within a 19,635-square meter (sq. m.)
was made without the benefit of expropriation
portion (subject land) of its lands situated in
proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of
Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod City. Further verification
the possession of the property prior to the filing
revealed that the transmission towers were
of expropriation proceedings, the Court has
constructed sometime before 1985 by NPC which
invariably ruled that it is the value of the property
entered the subject land without its knowledge
at the time of taking that is controlling for
and consent.7
purposes of compensation.64 Any other
interpretation would be repugnant to the
For its part,8 NPC denied having entered the Constitution which commands the exproriator to
subject land without any authority, and claimed pay the property owner no less than the full and
that petitioner's President, Jovito Sayson, fair equivalent of the property from the date of
granted it the permit to enter9 on September 21, taking.65
1989 for the construction of the 138 KV Mabinay-
Bacolod Transmission Line. It further countered
The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic
that since the transmission lines have been in v. Lara,66 is that:
existence for more than ten (10) years, a
continuous easement of right of way has already
[W]here property is taken ahead of the filing of
been established. Considering, however, that the
the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof
action was brought beyond the five-year
may be enchanced by the public purpose for
prescriptive period to do so in accordance with
which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon
the NPC Charter, the claim is barred by
the property may have depreciated its value
thereby; or, there may have been a natural
increase in the value of the property from the
In the course of the proceedings, the parties
time the complaint is filed, due to general
agreed to narrow down the issue to the payment
economic conditions. The owner of private
of just compensation and agreed to settle the

property should be compensated only for what he
actually loses; it is not intended that his
compensation shall extend beyond his loss or
injury. And what he loses is only the actual value
of his property at the time it is taken. This is the
only way that compensation to be paid can be
truly just; i.e., "just not only to the individual
whose property is taken," "but to the public,
which is to pay for it." 67

However, it must be emphasized that in

determining just compensation, the courts must
consider and apply the parameters set by the law
and its implementing rules and regulations in
order to ensure that they do not arbitrarily fix an
amount as just compensation that is
contradictory to the objectives of the law. Be that
as it may, when acting within such parameters,
courts are not strictly bound to apply the same to
its minutest detail, particularly when faced with
situations that do not warrant its strict
application. Thus, the courts may, in the
exercise of their discretion, relax the
application of the guidelines subject to the
jurisprudential limitation that the factual
situation calls for it and the courts clearly
explain the reason for such deviation.6