Letter of Application and the Research Proposal on Kant for Postdoctoral Fellowship in the

Philosophy Department at Aarhus University

4th October, 2016

The question I had in mind as I was in search of funding for a research project that would enable
me to write a book on the modes in and through which the subject constitutes itself as object of
knowledge and implements new modalities of being and thinking in contemporary philosophy
and natural sciences was simply this: “How does it further our understanding of the Kantian
subject to situate neuroscience in the context of transcendental realism/materialism and non-
reductive naturalism?” The answer I have in mind to this question is that “the ideas are objects
we are embedded in and embody at once.” This ontological/epistemological principle is the point
of departure for a broader research into the developmental possibilities of a new mode of
enquiry which would put art, philosophy, and neuroscience into a more interactive relationship
with one another, driven not only by the dialectical process constitutive of the methodological
differences between natural/social sciences, art, and philosophy, but also by the sustenance of a
generative interaction between various modes of being and thinking.

For a long time the question of “how can we become creative without becoming self-
destructive?” has been one of the major concerns of my studies. The relation of time to death
has been the driving subject-matter in the way of answering this question. Time exists because
we humans are mortals, but our mortality is not necessarily a barrier to our access to the idea of
infinitude. The objective and the subjective, or the ontological and the ontic dimensions of time,
that is, the time of infinity and the time of finitude, can be overlapped in such a way as to
configure a truth procedure and initiate a process of situating eternity in time. It is here that I
would like to make a contribution to the current research on time, metaphysics, art, and science
within a Kantian framework.

My aim is to produce a book in the way of contributing to the contemporary debates between
Analytic and Continental philosophies influenced by Kant in the context of neuroscience. With
the recent developments in cognitive computation and neuroplasticity softwares it seems that
Plato’s, Descartes’, and Kant’s claims concerning to the dual modes of being/thinking,
mind/body, and self/other turned out to be more sensible and less unrealistic than many
philosophers thought they were each in their own ways. By way of problematizing the correlative
mode constituting the relationship between the dualities of being/thought, consciousness/brain,
organic/inorganic, and subject/object, I intend to draw a cognitive map tracing the contours of
the current theories concerned with establishing new links between natural sciences and
humanities in general, and neuroscience, philosophy, art, and psychoanalysis in particular.

Dr. Cengiz Erdem

Kantian Reflections on Science, Metaphysics, and the Future of Time: Situating Kant’s Spatio-
Temporal Modalities of Being and Thought in Contemporary Philosophy and Neuroscience

Cengiz Erdem
(September, 2016)

Inferential Rationality

Kant’s initial project was to explicate the difference between “knowing-what” (pure reason) and
“knowing-how” (practical reason) in the way of laying the foundations of a scientific metaphysics.
Counter to Descartes1 and Hume2 he aimed at situating the subject within the limits of what can
be known by rational human beings. The Kantian subject is embodied, embedded, and extended
in space and time as opposed to the Cartesian subject thinking itself out of bounds in search of a
proof for the existence of God regardless of the limits of reason, and the Humean subject as “a
bundle of perceptions” according to whom all knowledge is rooted in sensory experience. Kant’s
shifting conceptualization of the subject explicates the relation between the knowing mind and
the acting/interacting body. The question is simply this: how does it further our understanding
of the Kantian subject to situate it in particular discursive contexts?

Following his “principle of sufficient reason” Kant introduces the question of “knowing-why” to
the epistemological field in the Critique of Judgement. What I would like to do is to re-introduce
the concept of time, or “knowing-when” into the empirical realism/critical idealism of Kant in
such a way as to actualize a unilateral relation, or a non-relation between thought and being, or
time and space. If the Kantian categorical imperative is based on a philosophical decision to posit
time and space as synthetic a priori categories rendering it possible for the subject to ground the
foundation of reason as the non-representable core of being, then we should indeed focus on
Kant’s “manifold of sense” and thereby take it upon ourselves to distinguish between multiple
modes, types, and layers of the representations of being and thought, organic and inorganic, the
finite and the infinite. Now, let us take a closer look at Kant whose attempt at reconciling critique
and construction strikes us as nothing short of a ground-breaking achievement.

It also follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something
must correspond to it which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for
itself and outside of our kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle,
the word 'appearance' must already indicate a relation to something the immediate

1
Dogmatic Rationalism > mind enjoys a priori cognitive access to reality, reason deduces features of
reality. For Descartes correlation between thinking and being is given.
2
Sceptical Empiricism > takes the intelligibility of sensory experience as given, reason cannot access a
priori knowledge of a mind independent reality. For Hume objective correlates of sensory experience,
sensations can be intelligible.
 representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this
constitution of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be
something, i.e. an object independent of sensibility. Now from this arises the concept of
a noumenon, which, however, is not at all positive and does not signify a determinate
cognition of any sort of thing, but rather only the thinking of something in general, in
which I abstract from all form of sensible intuition.3

There is a transcendental difference between thinking and knowing what is thought, sensing and
knowing what is sensed. Kant, for whom we can think the thing-in-itself but can only know it as
it is for-us, situates objectivity within the subject itself and inversely. This structure of thought is
indeed correlationist, as Meillassoux’s puts it, since it points towards the intertwined nature of
being and thought. A non-correlationist account of the relationship between objectivity and
subjectivity requires a thought thinking itself independently of being.4 It is at this point that the
role of paradox in Kant’s system of thought emerges as a constitutive element of his
conceptual/critical apparatus. The paradox is that infinitude is within finitude itself. This
immanence of the objective and timeless truth in time and space, the universal within the
particular, the immortal in the mortals, is that which prepares the ground for Hegel to carry out
the work of speculation necessary for the emergence of the rational subject as distinct from the
conscious self. Kant’s great contribution to philosophy is first and foremost the split he introduces
between the subject of enunciation and the enunciated content in such a way as to unite them.
Hegel only had to situate this process of becoming other than itself in time. The whole Kantian
edifice revolves around the dynamic interaction between ontological and epistemological modes
of being and thinking. Kant finds the way of overcoming the paradoxes of dialectical process in
and through submitting his thought to its own inner dynamics, that is, the dialectical
configuration of immanence and transcendence in relation to one another.

Kantian transcendentalism has at its root the immanence of the transcendental itself. This
accessibility of the Kantian conception of the relationship between finitude and infinitude,
thought and being, the organic and the organic, the subjective and the objective renders it
capable of generating new versions of itself. This openness to revision and update of the Kantian
edifice makes it a generic thought. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explicates what he means
by the synthetic a priori which is one of the core elements of Kant’s conceptual/critical apparatus.

3
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Alan Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 348, A252.
4
Laruelle introduces a unilateral duality (a non-correlation) of time and space, which privileges time over
space and intervenes in the symmetrically balanced nature of Kant’s neutrality constitutive of a bilateral
relation (a correlation) between these two conditions of possibility for cognition to take place. Non-
philosophy’s method of dualysis disrupts the equilibrium of the two terms at work in a dialectical process,
subsuming the Two under the One as the None.
This apparatus is transcendental precisely because it situates thought and being as immanent to
one another, the reflective judgement transcends the void which splits as it unites thought and
being. The split is projected on the nature of reality in-itself. The in-itself is itself split within itself
by nature. Since one becomes who one is by way of internalizing the work of nature, one projects
onto nature what one has already introjected from nature. Kant’s thought is a circle, but it is in
no way a vicious one, quite the contrary, it revises and updates itself as it goes along the way,
increasingly resembling a spiral as time goes by.

What Neuroscience lacks is a cultural context, likewise what humanities and social sciences lack
is a natural basis. Situated in-between the dualities of ontology/epistemology and
phenomenology/noumenology, the goal of this project is to establish a non-reductive interaction
between neuroscience and philosophy, nature and culture, organic and inorganic, empirical and
conceptual, epistemological and ontological, transcendent and immanent, the objective and the
subjective. In the way of establishing the link which has come to be considered missing between
the mental phenomena and the physical entities, I shall attempt to test and implement new
modes of being and thinking in and through which the subject constitutes itself as object of
knowledge in contemporary social and natural sciences in accordance with a non-reductive
account of the relationship between reasons and intuitions, thoughts and sensations, causes and
effects, intentions and actions, inferences and references, concepts and percepts. And this is
where Badiou’s formalisation of politics, art, science, and love as the conditions of philosophy
becomes relevant. For Badiou’s whole project is itself an attempt at a potentially evental act
situating truth as a process of eternity in time. His materialist dialectic opens up the possibility of
producing new common-senses in and through political, artistic, scientific, and amorous practices
as procedures of truth. By way of carrying out condensed reflections as well as intense
meditations on the creative process as it presents itself in Sellars’ manifest/scientific images and
Badiou’s mathematics-as-ontology/philosophy-as-truth-procedure, I intend to put social and
natural sciences in a progressively productive relation with art and philosophy so as to overcome
the problem of transmission among and communication between different temporalities, as well
as the varying modes of being and thought within the same temporality.

There is an interstitial time whereby thought takes it upon itself to transcend itself towards the
unknown. That’s where abstraction, formalisation, and visualisation take on a temporal modality
of being in and through which differential individuation and inferential rationality constitute new
normative judgments giving form and content to a new common-sense in accordance with a
general-intellect driven by the infinity of the noumenal as a regulative idea. That’s where the
thought as void consumes itself and a contraction takes place in time, giving birth to a rupture
between thought and being, a modal time-space between the past and the present, out of which
a progressively altered future continually emerges and change takes place.
Regulative Idea

In a world wherein conscious desire is absent, one cannot know what is to be done, what can be
done, and how to do it. The reduction of consciousness to physical matter deprives humanity of
the possibility of rationally intended change. The idea that intervening in the workings of nature
solely by way of that which nature presents independently of culture is to fall into the trap one
sets for oneself. It is not only necessary, but also possible to develop a theory of self-conscious
subjectivity as being aware of oneself within one’s own time and space. Thought can mean
something only in so far as it is situated within a context indeed, but for thought to mean
something worthy of the name of truth it also has to leave the old paradigm behind, change the
co-ordinates, reconstruct the context and perchance initiate a new course of continuity in change
driven by a conscious desire to transcend the mode of being and thinking in which the subject is
embedded and embodies at once. It is a matter of realising that theory and practice are always
already reconciled and yet the only way to actualise this reconciliation passes through carrying it
out and across by introducing a split between the subject of statement (the enunciated content)
and the subject of enunciation (the formal structure in accordance with this content).

Mode of Enquiry

The nature of this study requires a trans-/multi-disciplinary and inter-/mixed-methodological

attitude which goes beyond the opposition between merely conceptual and merely empirical
approaches. It requires a mode of enquiry which takes its driving force from a gap that opens
paths to a new field in which various perspectives interact and constitute a theoretical practice
in order to initiate the emergence of a new subject out of the old paradigm. To achieve this one
must not only pose new questions, but also provide new answers concerning the workings of the
human brain and its interactions with the world surrounding it, out of which the concepts of
mind, consciousness, affectivity, and intentionality emerge.

1) Is intentionality rooted in sentience or sapience?

2) Is sensation a metaphysical affair?

3) Is mind causally anchored to nature?

4) Are cognitive affairs merely linguistic affairs?

Conceptual Context and Structural Synopsis

As is well known since Kant, the instruments (software and hardware) social and natural scientists
have at hand to investigate natural and cultural phenomena play a very significant role not only
in the analysis, but also in the production of the object/subject of study itself. This study is a
venture into the relationship between the manifest and the scientific images of humanity5
designated by Wilfrid Sellars in relation to Alain Badiou’s materialist dialectic of the human
animal and the immortal subject of truth. In both cases an intersubjective position constitutive
of objectivity as a regulative idea is at work. The rigorous disjunction introduced by Sellars and
Badiou between sentience6 and sapience7 will be investigated in conjunction with the
contemporary thought embodied by and embodying transcendental realism/materialism,
embedded in and extended to non-reductive naturalism. By way of referring to Laruelle/Deleuze
as the representatives of non-reductive naturalism on one side, and Sellars/Badiou as the
representatives of transcendental realism/materialism on the other, with Kant as the vanishing
mediator in-between, I hope to demonstrate, at least in theory, that the constitutive link which
has come to be considered missing between the mental phenomena and the physical entities is
actually a non-relation rather than an absence of relation, for it is neither transcendent nor
immanent to the subject, but is rather the manifestation of a purely immanent affectivity (Michel
Henry), intervening in the ordinary flow of things, initiating a rupture in time as the subject itself.

The model of mind conceptualized by Gerald Edelman shows us that the mind is an embodied
and embedded substance which has the ability to adapt to changes surrounding it.8 I intend to
use Edelman’s A Universe of Consciousness to reconfigure the relationship between the manifest
and the scientific images of humanity and the transcendence of the human animal towards the
immortal subject of truth. Taking into consideration the emerging technologies within the field
of neuroscience, I hope to render a timely reconstruction of Kant’s theory of the subject and the
role of representation in its self-constitutive process, which associates the algorithmic dynamics

5
The Kantian relation between conception and sensation is at work in the relation between the scientific
and the manifest images of human behaviour. The distinction between thinking and sensing can be traced
back to Kant.
6
Sentience: phenomenal and experiential aspects of mind (consciousness).
7
Sapience: psychological and functional aspects of mind (self-consciousness, awareness of
consciousness).
8
“Imagine a peculiar (and even weird) string quartet, in which each player responds by improvisation to
ideas and cues of his or her own, as well as to all kinds of sensory cues in the environment. Since there is
no score, each player would provide his or her own characteristic tunes, but initially these various tunes
would not be coordinated with those of the other players. Now imagine that the bodies of the players are
connected to each other by myriad fine threads so that their actions and movements are rapidly conveyed
back and forth through signals of changing thread tensions that act simultaneously to time each player’s
actions. Signals that instantaneously connect the four players would lead to a correlation of their sounds;
thus, new, more cohesive, and more integrated sounds would emerge out of the otherwise independent
efforts of each player. This correlative process would alter the next action of each player, and by these
means the process would be repeated but with new emergent tunes that were even more correlated.
Although no conductor would instruct or coordinate the group and each player would still maintain his or
her style and role, the player’s overall productions would lead to a kind of mutually coherent music that
each one acting alone would not produce.” Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi, A Universe of
Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 49.
of the neuroplasticity softwares, as well as the programs visualising the neuronal interactions
and even analysing the data provided by the synaptic network in all its complexity.

The investigation will begin by tracing Kant’s affinities with and differences from Parmenides,
Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, and Bergson. This genealogical exposition will be followed by
Kant’s links to the three other forerunners of German Idealism: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. In
the third part the reflections of Kant in contemporary philosophy - as embodying and embodied
by Heideggerian Hermeneutics and Existential Phenomenology, Adorno and Horkheimer’s
Negative Dialectic, Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism, Michel Henry’s Material
Phenomenology, Laruelle’s Non-Philosophy, Sellars’ Psychological Nominalism, Badiou’s
Materialist Dialectic, Žižek’s Transcendental Materialism as attributed by Adrian Johnston,
Metzinger’s Phenomenal Self-Model, Meillassoux’s Speculative Materialism, and Brassier’s
Transcendental Nihilism - will be explicated and developed in light of the recent advances in
neuroscience (Gerald Edelman) and temporal-modal logic (Rudolf Carnap).

The next step will be to situate Kant’s conception of the subject into the context of neuroscience
and the subject of neuroscience into the context of Transcendental Realism/Materialism and
Non-Reductive Naturalism. I intend to reconstruct Kant’s edifice by theorizing a temporal
metaphysics of modality transfiguring Kant’s paradoxical configuration of Transcendental
Idealism and Empirical Realism. I shall therefore attempt to update Kant’s transcendental critique
and metaphysical construction by situating it in time in such a way as to reconfigure the Kantian
conceptual/critical apparatus. Resolving the tension between the transcendent and the
immanent inherent in the Kantian enterprise, the project will culminate in a discussion of the
different ways in which science, art, and philosophy may cast a focused view on current research
in cognitive computation manifest in digital epistemologies and actualised in new neuroplasticity
softwares in the service of a more effective pedagogy taking into consideration the embodied,
embedded, and extended nature/culture of the living and learning subject.

Lastly but by no means least significantly, the eventual subject-matter of this research project is
simply the idea that ideas are objects we are embedded in and embody at once. In the light of
this idea Kant’s conceptual/critical apparatus has the potential of functioning as a tool-kit to aid
in laying the foundations of a new mode of the relation between being and thought, which would
bring transcendental critique and metaphysical construction together without subsuming one
under the other. Laruelle’s and Deleuze’s analogical mode of thinking (non-reductive naturalism)
can be coupled with Sellars’ and Badiou’s digital mode of thinking (transcendental
realism/materialism) in such a way as to split as one unites Kant’s Transcendental Logic and
Transcendental Aesthetics in and through a disjunctive-synthesis. It is indeed possible to
rehabilitate Kantian concepts and methods so as to infer, derive, and present a future oriented,
non-reductive, and non-physicalist account of the contiguity between being and thought, the
organic and the inorganic, the psyche and the soma, the subject of enunciation and the
enunciated subject. Sustaining the conditions of possibility for a continuity in change is precisely
the reason why I would like to put forth some theoretico-practical steps in the way of thinking
reflectively within and determinatively without a Kantian frame at once, hence contributing to a
mode of existence which proceeds by modifying itself ad infinitum - albeit only until the end of
time.

Reference Matter

My reading of Kant heavily relies on the following works…

Adorno, Theodor. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001)

Allison, Henry E. Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986)

Heidegger, Martin. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5th edn. (Indiana, 1997)
- Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Indiana,
1997)

Carnap, Rudolf and Amethe Smeaton. The Logical Syntax of Language (London: K. Paul, Trench,
Trubner, 1937)

Caygill, Howard. A Kant Dictionary (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1995)

Deleuze, Gilles. Kant‘s Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam (London:
Athlone, 1984)
- Empiricism and Subjectivity, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (NY: Columbia
University Press, 1991)
- Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1994)

Sellars, Wilfrid. In the Space of Reasons: Selected Essays, eds. Kevin Scharp and Robert B.
Brandom (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2007)
- Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1968)
- Science, Perception, and Reality (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1991)
- Kant and Pre-Kantian Themes: Lectures by Wilfrid Sellars, ed. Pedro Amaral
(Atascadero: Ridgeview, 2002)
- Kant's Transcendental Metaphysics: Sellars' Cassirer Lectures, Notes and Other
Essays, ed. Jeffrey F. Sicha (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 2002)
- “Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus Lectures of Wilfrid
Sellars,” The Monist (1981), 64:1, 3-90.
-Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1997)
Kant, Immanuel. Opus Posthumum, ed. Eckart Förster, trans. Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
-Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (London: Wilder
Publications, 2008)
-Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1992)
-Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis W. Beck (New Jersey, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1993)
-Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, in Philosophy of Material Nature
(New York: Hackett, 1985)
-Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis W. Beck (New York:
Macmillan, 1985)

Žižek, Slavoj. Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1993)

Preliminary Bibliography

Badiou, Alain. Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (New York: Continuum, 2005)

Badiou, Alain. Logics of Worlds, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum, 2009)

Badiou, Alain. Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2000)

Badiou, Alain. Theoretical Writings, trans. eds., Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano (London:
Continuum, 2006)

Brandom, Robert. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism (Cambridge, MA.:

Harvard University Press, 2000)

Brassier, Ray. 'That Which is Not: Philosophy as Entwinement of Truth and Negativity' in Stasis,
No.1 2013

Brassier, Ray. 'Nominalism, Naturalism, and Materialism: Sellars' Critical Ontology' in

Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications, eds., B. Bashour and H. Muller,
(London and New York: Routledge, 2013)

Brassier, Ray. 'Lived Experience and the Myth of the Given', Filozofski Vestnik, Vol. XXXII, No. 3,
2011

Brassier, Ray. ‘The View from Nowhere’ in Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender, and Culture, Vol.
8, No.2, 2011.
Brassier, Ray. Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan,
2007)

Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1994)

Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990)

Grant, Iain Hamilton. Philosophies of Nature After Schelling (London and New York: Continuum,
2008)

Graham Harman, Nick Srnicek, Levi Bryant (eds.),The Speculative Turn: Continental Realism and
Materialism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011)

Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, trans., Wallace and Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Henry, Michel. The Essence of Manifestation, trans. G. Etskorn, (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague,
1973)

Henry, Michel. ‘Phenomenology of life’, in Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 2003.

Henry, Michel. The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis (Stanford: Sanford University Press, 1998)

Johnston, Adrian. Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity,

(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008)

Johnston, Adrian. “Alain Badiou, the Hebb-event, and Materialism Split from Within.”

Angelaki 13 (1): 27–49, 2008.

Johnston, Adrian. “Second Natures in Dappled Worlds: John McDowell, Nancy Cartwright, and
Hegelian-Lacanian Materialism,” Umbr(a): The Worst [ed. Matthew Rigilano and Kyle Fetter],
Buffalo: Center for the Study of Psychoanalysis and Culture (State University of New York at
Buffalo, 2011), 71-91.

Laruelle, François. ‘The Truth According to Hermes: Theorems on the Secret and Communication‘
in Parrhesia 9, 2010, 18-22.

Laruelle, François. ‘The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter‘, trans. Ray Brassier, in Pli,
Vol. 12. What Is Materialism? 2001, 33-40.

Laruelle, François. Future Christ: A Lesson in Heresy, trans. A. P. Smith, (New York: Continuum,
2010)

McDowell, John. Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1994)
Metzinger, Thomas. Being No One: The Self-model Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge: MIT Press,
2004)

Mullarkey, John. Post-Continental Philosophy (London & New York: Continuum, 2006)

Papineau, David. Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993)

Putnam, Hilary. Ethics Without Ontology (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2004)

Sellars, Wilfrid. In the Space of Reasons: Selected Essays, eds. Kevin Scharp and Robert B.
Brandom (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2007)

Žižek, Slavoj. The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2006)

Žižek, Slavoj. Less Than Nothing (London: Verso, 2012)