The Case for Aid in Fiscally Constrained Times Andy Sumner and Michael Tribe 1 DSA Conference 2010
Abstract Aid (Official Development Assistance – ODA) is under pressure as fiscal constraints mount in OECD countries. The arguments in favour of commitments by (mainly) higher income countries to contribute financially through aid programmes to developing countries have been articulated by several writers over the years, but have consistently been challenged. However, in these difficult economic times it is still not that easy to find a coherent set of reasons in one place justifying ODA. There are a several important questions: What is the case for aid? What are the different ways of approaching the case for aid? Does the case for aid differ in fiscally constrained times? Does the case for aid differ by types of aid? Is the case in favour of aid affected by the nature of different types of aid, by its ‘effectiveness’, by the objectives of ‘donors’, and by the criteria relating to its allocation between countries, purposes and sectors? This note reviews the literature and aims to summarise cogently the main arguments in favour of continuing substantial international aid programmes. These arguments have a significant economic content, but also extend to moral and ethical issues and to political pressures. The discussion revolves largely around the reasons why higher income countries should contribute ODA to developing countries, rather than to the reasons why developing countries should accept international aid from the ‘donor community’.
Respectively IDS and University of Bradford and University of Strathclyde. Correspondence to: email@example.com and firstname.lastname@example.org and email@example.com
1. INTRODUCTION We approach international aid (official development assistance – ODA – as defined by the OECD‟s Development Assistance Committee in Box 1) from a direction which is essentially within the economics discipline, but with a multi-disciplinary mindset. A distinction is often made between „narrow‟ and „broad‟ economics. The former is focused principally on a „positivist‟ approach as opposed to a „normative‟ approach, while the latter is focused more broadly in an approach which may be described as „political economy‟ or as „heterodox economics‟. We should make it clear that this paper attempts to go back to first principles in considering the arguments for ODA, and is – at this point – still in a preliminary form. We have not attempted to base the paper on a comprehensive review of the „aid literature‟ for two reasons. First, in attempting to work on the basis of first principles if we had simply focused on critically summarising the literature our approach would have been insufficiently radical. Second, the „aid literature‟ is vast and has several distinctly different foci, so that – for example – the literature assessing developments in aid architecture would only be marginally relevant to discussion of the case for giving ODA. An example of a paper which took a notably different starting point to ours is that by Alesina and Dollar (2000). The following quotation states some of their main findings very clearly: “We find considerable evidence that the pattern of aid giving is dictated by political and strategic considerations. An inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former colony politically friendly to its former colonizer, receives more foreign aid than another country with a similar level of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a past as a colony. We also find significant differences between donors. Certain donors (notably the Nordic countries) respond more to the „correct‟ incentives, namely income levels, good institutions of the receiving countries, and openness. Other countries (notably France) give to former colonies tied by political alliances, without much regard to other factors, including poverty levels or choice of politico-economic regimes. The United State‟s [sic] pattern of aid giving is vastly influenced by that country‟s interest in the Middle East.” (Alesina and Dollar, 2000: 33-34). This represents what might be considered as a „revealed preference‟ approach to analysis – i.e. which factors have actually accounted for ODA allocations. This contrasts with the concerns of this paper which relate to a) which factors are widely accepted as justifying ODA allocations in principle and b) which are widely accepted as the official criteria for the allocation of ODA. Collier and Dollar (1999) take a similar approach to that of Alesina and Dollar in searching for systematic factors accounting for aid allocations, and particularly relating these to poverty reduction objectives and to “adequate policies”. Again, this does not lend itself to the „first principles‟ approach which is being attempted in the current paper. 2
Analysis of international aid within a more narrow „positive economics‟ approach does not allow for moral, ethical or value judgements, while the „political economy‟ or „heterodox‟ approach recognises that moral, ethical and value judgements are possibly as much at the centre of concern as „pure economic‟ issues and often cannot realistically be avoided. Positive economic analysis does not have much regard for multidisciplinarity or for the broader approach, and we would argue that this narrowness limits its relevance to many of the important issues relating to analysis of international aid and ODA, and particularly to systematic discussion of the case in favour of international aid. If „narrow‟ economists draw back from discussion of the case for aid then „broader‟ economists might relish the opportunity to enter this intellectual exploration?
Box 1. The Definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) “Official development assistance (ODA). Grants and concessional loans for development and welfare purposes from the government sector of a donor country to a developing country or multilateral agency active in development. A loan is considered sufficiently concessional to be included in ODA if 1 it has a grant element of at least 25%, calculated at a 10% discount rate. ODA includes the costs to the donor of project and programme aid, technical co-operation, forgiveness of debts not already reported as ODA, food and emergency aid, and associated administrative expenses.* Other official flows (OOF). Consists of: i) grants or loans from the government sector not specifically directed to development or welfare purposes (e.g. those given for commercial reasons) and ii) loans from the government sector which are for development and welfare, but which are not sufficiently concessional to qualify as ODA. Private flows at market terms. Flows for commercial reasons from the private sector of a donor country. Includes foreign direct investment, bank loans, and the purchase of developing country bonds or securities by companies or individuals in donor countries. Private grants. Funds from non government organisations for development or welfare purposes.”
The grant element is measured as the difference between the face value of a loan and the present value, calculated at a discount rate of 10%, of the service payments to be made by the borrower during the lifetime of the loan, expressed as a percentage of the face value. Source: OECD-DAC. 2008.
We should make clear that this paper is focused on ODA, with the emphasis on „official‟ and so is relevant for bilateral and multilateral aid to developing countries, but not for aid contributed by NGOs. We have also excluded consideration of major new initiatives such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) and the Gates Foundation which are not directly related to ODA. In addition it is worth noting that private remittances from developed market economies to developing countries now exceed ODA in global terms (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008: 154). ODA has a long history. The Development Decade of the 1960s (Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2010) was a period of comparative optimism, and the Pearson Commission (Commission on International Development, 1969) and the Brandt Commission (Independent Commission on International Development, 1980) continued a similar intellectual tradition. The IFI‟s (International Financial Institutions) Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1970s, 1980s (and into the 1990s) changed the 3
development agenda. However, the World Bank‟s „Comprehensive Development Framework‟ combined with a shift to a poverty reduction and policy-related emphasis and the introduction of international debt write-offs in more recent years has again changed the perspectives of international development and of the „aid industry‟ (Wolfensohn and Fischer, 2000). Controversy has never been far away. There have been well-known authors arguing the case for and against aid throughout this period, including Bauer (1972) and Easterly (2007). One of the most supportive cases in favour of foreign aid has been articulated recently by Sachs (2005), and Radelet (2003 and 2006) has produced significant contributions to the literature which are searchingly critical but with positive conclusions. In this paper we aim to discuss the case for aid systematically and cogently without adoption of some of the more polemical slants which have appeared in the literature. There are many major single-authored, jointly-authored and edited books which have focused on ODA, international aid, or plain „foreign aid‟. A few of these have run to second or even third editions. In our review of the literature it has been apparent that there has been comparatively little attention to „first principles‟ in the sense of why ODA is „given‟ or „accepted‟ at all. We include is this literature recent contributions such as those by Riddell (2008), Cassen (1994), Lancaster (2000 and 2007), Lancaster and Van Dusen (2005) and Tarp and Hjertholm (2000), rather than extending back to the 1960s and 1970s. In this context Riddell‟s recent book is a notable exception. There are, in addition, „development texts‟ which include substantial chapters and sections which review many significant issues relating to ODA. From the more „economic‟ direction these include Todaro and Smith (10th edition, 2008: Chapter 14) and Thirlwall (8th edition, 2006, Chapter 15). From a more multidisciplinary „Development Studies‟ direction basic texts which cover international aid quite substantially include Desai and Potter (2008: Chapter 10), Clark (2006: Chapter 29) and Chari and Corbridge (2008: Part 6)
2. THE CASE FOR ODA We take the view that the case for aid can be placed within two distinct areas: firstly the ethical or moral case, and secondly the self-interest case. The „developmental‟ case for aid bridges these two lines of argument (see Figure 1). 2 A recent contribution to the literature by Nixson takes a broad overview of many of the issues raised in this paper (Nixson, 2007-2008). Issues surrounding the effectiveness of aid is a second-order issue. If the objectives established by the moral/ethical case, or by the self-interest case, are not effectively achieved then the arguments in favour of aid would be significantly weakened. This will be explored in more detail in the third section of the paper.
Most of this paper is concerned with exploration of the case to be made within developed countries for aid to be given to developing countries. There is an obverse exploration of the case for developing countries to accept (or not to accept) such aid which is not much touched upon.
Figure 1 Summary of the Main Arguments in Favour of ODA A) Ethical – Moral Arguments i) Compassion / Humanitarian – response to international poverty: „international social justice‟ ii) Compensation – recompense for the sins of the past – colonialism, imperialism, slavery etc – deterioration of international terms of trade (e.g. Stabex) – climate change and environmental impacts iii) Responses to disasters
B) Self-interest i) Mutuality – income growth in LDCs creates markets for developed countries‟ exports – and vice versa – an interdependent world ii) Support for MNCs/FDI (e.g. infrastructure, education etc – supply of essential materials and agricultural products) iii) International security
2.a) The ethical case for aid ODA, ethics and international social justice The first argument in favour of richer countries giving aid to poorer countries is the ethical, moral or humanitarian one which is similar to the argument for income being transferred from richer to poorer people within any one country. In other words the more privileged in – global – society give some of their income to those who are less privileged. In the context of discussion about the rationale for ODA we should be clear that this is not related to private charitable income transfers, but is internationally comparable with the adoption of progressive taxation and expenditure programmes by national governments. Some forms of conditionality and means testing may, or may not, be applied to such transfers. At the international level one factor which needs to be recognised is that most richer countries have elements of poverty within their societies, and poorer countries have elements of privilege within theirs. Thus, it is logical that international aid programmes which have poverty reduction objectives (such as the adoption of the MDGs) would not aim to enrich the more privileged groups within developing countries.
Box 2 – Public Opinion and the Ethical Case for Aid “In a 1983 national opinion poll, people in Britain were asked if they believed rich countries should give help to poorer countries: 71 per cent were in favour and 13 per cent against. Of those in favour 78 per cent gave an ethical explanation for their positive attitude to aid, citing specifically morals, humanitarian reasons, conscience, duty, Christian duty, and the needs of the poor as the underlying reason for their support. It is, moreover, not only the general public which has made reference to ethical considerations when arguing the case for aid. In 1969 the Pearson Report answered the question „Why Aid?‟ as follows: „The simplest answer to the question is a moral one; that it is only right for those who have to share with those who have not‟. Eleven years later, the Brandt Commission gave as its motives for addressing the problems of Third World poverty „human solidarity and commitment to international social justice‟.” (Riddell, 1986: 24)
The quotation from Riddell‟s 1986 article on the ethical case for aid which has been reproduced in Box 2 makes it clear that in the mid-1980s public opinion gave ethics a major role in the justification for aid. Riddell‟s more recent major overview of aid contains two chapters focussing on the moral case for aid (Riddell, 2008: Chapters 8 and 9) but other literature relating to international aid gives little attention to this dimension of the case. Perhaps surprisingly contemporary surveys of public opinion suggest that, although the numbers are somewhat lower than in the mid-1980s, there is still a strong public view that there is a moral/ethical argument in favour of aid. A recent publication from the IDS, Sussex shows that, depending upon the nature of the question asked, between 50 percent and “over 6 in 10” of a sample supported the moral/ethical stance on aid (Henson and Lindstrom, 2010). This public view transcends aid-weariness, international security threats and ideological shifts in developed market economies which might have changed public opinion somewhat more. Perhaps the most radical approach to the reform of ODA would be to embody ethical principles into domestic and international fiscal policy. Discussion around what comes after the MDGs when the year 2015 is reached has in part focussed on the issue of whether aid transfers should be „automatic‟ rather than discretionary (i.e. at the discretion of the „donor‟ countries – see for example the discussion at the 2009 Policy Forum in Brussels – Tribe and Lafon, 2010). To what extent should at least some aid be provided as transfer payments through a form of internationally progressive taxation and grants? Although such a transfer payment system would resolve the issue of the source of funding, it would beg the question of the destination of the transfer payments – which countries would receive the aid and how much would each receive? It would be possible to construct a composite index based on measures of poverty as a criterion for the destination of such aid if the funding sources were to deposit the income transfers into a global fund – but this would have to be associated with multilateral aid systems rather than bilateral systems. Aid allocation between receiving countries, sectors and programmes would remain an issue. ODA as Compensation The second part of the moral/ethical case for aid relates to the issue of compensation from richer countries to poorer countries. One aspect of this case is based on past „sins‟ or „transgressions‟ of the former colonial powers including the issue of the slave trade. To the extent that imperialism/colonialism exploited or immiserated former colonies (which are now independent developing countries) it is possible to argue that transfers should be made from the former colonial powers to the countries which suffered from the exploitation. While such the logic and ethical basis for such an argument is appealing from many points of view it is clear that many contemporary higher income countries would argue that they were never directly involved in the slave trade, and many developing countries might not themselves have suffered directly from the slave trade. The negative economic impact of the slave trade on developing countries which were sources of slaves would have been based on the impact of the removal of an 6
able-bodied swathe of the population reducing the productivity of the affected economies on a cumulative basis. The economic impact of the slave trade can be compared with that of the extraction of mineral wealth (i.e. plundering rather than commercial transactions recognising the property rights of the indigenous population) in its immiserating effects. It would be extremely difficult to place a value on the level of transfers which might be associated with this „exploitation‟ element of the case for aid, and many people within the richer countries would reject these arguments for compensation either on the grounds that „exploitation‟ simply reflects the working out of legitimate market forces, or that their particular country was not involved in the slave trade or in past imperial/colonial exploitation. Equally, all developing countries were not involved in these forms of colonial exploitation, and of those which were some were more seriously affected than others. Fair and equitable compensation would be difficult to achieve even if the basic principle were to be accepted. Another aspect of the compensation element of the argument relates to contemporary, rather than past, „exploitation‟ either through movements of the international terms of trade against developing countries (and in favour of the richer countries), or through the process of richer countries seeking merchandise imports from countries which have significant reserves of cheap labour (perhaps an international variation of the „Lewis model‟). This aspect of compensation has been recognised in two particular instances which recognise distinctly different logical arguments: i) In the World Bank‟s 1994 review of the impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes on six sub-Saharan African countries the point was made that during the “adjustment period” ODA had been at a level which offset income lost through deterioration of the international terms of trade, implying that ODA had not made any net contribution to these economies (Husain, 1994: 7). Although this type of compensatory link is uncommon in official discussions of aid policy the fact that it appeared in such an influential source is of great interest. These remarks relate to secular deterioration in the net barter terms of trade and its impact on the international purchasing power of developing country exports, essentially based on the well-established arguments of the Prebisch-Singer thesis and its derivatives. ii) The EU‟s STABEX programme was devised in order to cushion the economic impact of fluctuations in export earnings due to changing world market conditions (Aiello, 1999). The STABEX scheme was never intended to relate to the deterioration of international terms of trade, but was explicitly focussed on the uncertainties created by fluctuating export revenues – focussed on instability rather than on secular and sustained changes in international trading relationships. Poverty Reduction through Economic Growth and Public Service Provision A more dynamic framework consistent with the positive relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries would emphasise the role of ODA in contributing to sustained economic growth and to poverty reduction. This contrasts with an approach which would emphasise a static form of 7
income redistribution from high income countries to poorer countries. The link between the growth of national income in developing countries and poverty reduction is provided by the „poverty elasticity of growth‟.3 ODA which supports agricultural, industrial, infrastructural or trade development as part of the economic growth and development programmes of recipient countries is directly related to objectives of long-term sustainable poverty reduction through the link between economic growth and reduced poverty. The implication of this is that for aid to have a poverty-reducing role it does not have to be committed to explicitly poverty-related project, programmes or policies. Equally, a broader definition of poverty which extends beyond income poverty means that public health, water and sanitation and other social infrastructure development programmes usually have clear poverty-reducing impacts – being evident in improvements to Human Development Index or Human Poverty Index composite indicators. These programmes often involve a „public goods‟ dimension in the sense that benefits to the individual arise through community-based services. Thus ODA-supported programmes can have a significant poverty-reducing role through contributions to both the stimulation of economic growth and public service provision (particularly water and sanitation, public health and education). Climate Change and the Environment Another form of compensation which is linked to ODA is that which recognises the negative economic role which the demonstrable global environmental impact of high developed country consumption levels (and global warming emission levels) is having on developing countries, and on their agricultural production in particular. This impact is an example of the transmission international external diseconomies but the forms of compensation which have been suggested, for example in documents produced at the time of the 2009 international conference in Copenhagen (UNFCCC, 2008), have not usually been conceptualised as being part of ODA. However, in the new, wider, view of ODA which is reflected in Table 1 below this type of financial flow needs to be included in consideration of the arguments for ODA. Conflict and Stress One of the most challenging issues within international development has been the role of conflict and civil strife in dislocating economies and societies over long periods of time. This has been problematic in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia in particular, but extends to other regions as well. The response of the ODA sector to this problem has involved two prongs. First, the issue of contributions towards attempting to control and resolve conflict, including international armed forces (which properly belongs to the security dimension of argument for ODA). Second is the contribution which can be made by ODA to recovery and rebuilding
The poverty elasticity of growth links economic growth to poverty reduction (Heltberg, 2002; McKinley, 2009), and is a more sophisticated approach to the growth/poverty relationship than that provided by the Dollar and Kraay arguments in their „Growth is Good for the Poor‟ (Dollar and Kraay, 2002 and 2004).
fragmented economies and societies. It is the second of these which properly belongs within the ethical/moral argument for ODA – part of the application of the principles of international social justice (Fukuda-Parr, 2010). Responses to Disasters The final element of the moral/ethical case for aid relates to international responses to disasters. This argument has an illustrious record and has become considerably more sophisticated over the years now involving significant collaboration between bilateral aid agencies, international institutions and international NGOs. Governmental institutions contribute not only funds but also a coordinating and emergency response role.
2.b) The Self-Interest Case Mutuality of Interest It was as long ago as the Brandt Commission (Independent Commission on Growth and Development Issues, 1980) that the issue of „mutuality‟ of interest‟ was articulated within an international public policy context. Essentially this aspect of the case for ODA relies on the fact that the stimulation of stronger economic growth in developing countries creates demand for exports of goods and services from developed market economies which provide the ODA. More crudely this argument could be seen as supporting „tied aid‟, which would give the „mutuality‟ a more institutional dimension. However, the tying of ODA is not an essential part of the argument for the mutuality of interest. A further argument which has been articulated in a political context relating to mutuality concerns the connection between international investment (particularly foreign direct investment) and ODA. For example, there is narrow complementarity between the performance of foreign private investment and public investment supported by ODA in economic infrastructure (such as transportation, water and waste management, energy and telecommunications) and in social infrastructure (such as education). There is a broader complementarity between the profitability of foreign private investment and ODA to the extent to which aid programmes improve „governance‟ and policy management (for example through the elements of the CPIA) (Alexander, 2010; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; African Development Bank Group, 2009; World Bank, 2007; World Bank, 2009). Another broader complementarity can exist between the performance of foreign private investment and ODA supporting social development programmes which enhance labour productivity, although this may be less tangible and longer term in its impact. International Security The security dimension of the argument for ODA has been given much emphasis recently (Mitchell, 2010). In the case of the United Kingdom this has recently particularly been associated with policy concerning internationally collaborative operations in Afghanistan which relate to direct military activity, to Afghan socio9
economic development, and to the connection between domestic and international security and its link to the Al Qaeda network. In the case of Afghanistan the international security dimension extends to the production and export of narcotic drugs, and the ODA connection to this may be seen as including development programmes which can provide sustainable livelihoods in the absence of narcotic drug production. The Iraqi situation has also related to allocations of international ODA, as is clear from the US data in Table 1. There are other aspects of the contemporary security case for ODA for which Somalian developments have been relevant. Somalia is an example of a failed state which has experienced difficulty in maintaining a sustainable government and administration. Meanwhile, immediate neighbours of Somalia have suffered considerable disruption, and there have also been significant international ramifications including piracy at sea, terrorist operations in East Africa, and international criminal activity. In this context there is an issue over which parts of governments‟ expenditures should be regarded as part of their defence policy (and be allocated from the defence component of national budgets) and which parts should be regarded as part of their international development policy (and be allocated from the ODA part of national budgets – allowing for the broader definition of ODA outlined below). There are other elements of the security dimension which relate to the provision of training of personnel, and equipment for, military and police forces in fragile – and even not-so-fragile – states which need to be viewed within the context of ODA. This can involve the strengthening of domestic police services (and judicial systems) in pursuit of greater stability of markets for goods and services and of personal security within the ambit of some elements of the CPIA measure (refer to the citations relating to the CPIA above). In the past the security dimension of ODA has been regarded as being related to major international military concerns, and the Cold War in particular. Aid to Pakistan and to Turkey, for example, have been viewed in this connection in the past. However, the Cold War is no more. Of course, recent arguments for the allocation of ODA to Pakistan would be more related to disaster relief (earthquake and floods) and to the security threat posed by Al Qaeda. A final element of the security element of ODA might be represented by the means of financing international peace-keeping operations, many of them undertaken by the United Nations, but there have been comparable operations undertaken by other international bodies. The same issues relating to whether such funding should be regarded as part of defence expenditure or of ODA expenditure would occur.
2. c) The nature of ODA Table 1 below is directly relevant to recent discussion about the nature of ODA in the United Kingdom. The definition of ODA from the OECD‟s DAC which has been reproduced earlier in this paper does not limit ODA to aid flows emanating from only 10
the principal aid institution in any one country. Thus, countries which have ODA programmes may have substantial flows from institutions other than the principal aid institution (DFID in the UK). Table 1 shows that USAID contributed only US$4.5 billion to ODA in 2004 as compared with over US$6 billion from the Department of State, and about another US$4 billion from other US government institutions. This does not allow for the near US$18.5 billion indicated for the Iraq reconstruction – and it is questionable whether this should be included in US ODA. At the time of writing comparable recent data for the United Kingdom was not readily available.
Table 1 – The Diversity of US Official Development Assistance – “US Foreign Aid Programs, 2004” – (millions of dollars) Department of State Refugee 756 International Organizations and programs 320 ESF* (policy) 3,263 NIS (distribution) 584 SEED (distribution) 442 HIV/AIDS (distribution) 488 Andean Counter-drug 727 Department of the Treasury Contributions to international financial institutions (IFIs) Technical Assistance and advice Debt relief Department of Agriculture PL-480 II (budget) US Agency for International Development DA, child survival, disaster Millennium Challenge Cooperation Peace Corps InterAmerican Foundation African Development Foundation White House Emergency Fund for Complex Crises Iraq reconstruction
1,383 19 94
4,511 994 308 16 19
Other departments and agencies
a. Iraq reconstruction funding is considered a one-time exceptional financing program. b. This is an estimate since data are not available for the technical assistance and other programs funded abroad by non-foreign affairs agencies. In 1994 OMB estimated about this amount for these expenditures. Thus the amount reflected here could be construed as conservative. Source: Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005:14.
2. d) ODA and fiscal constraints in OECD countries associated with the postglobal crisis context Two of the main issues implied by the title of this paper are those of whether the fiscal constraints, and public expenditure cut-backs, which are currently being experienced across developed market economies, affect the factors justifying allocations of ODA and the overall volumes of ODA. We have stated that the arguments justifying ODA commitments to developing countries set out in this paper have been based on first principles. In this sense they are affected by short-term economic considerations affecting developed market economies. Indeed, the mutuality of interests between ODA „donors‟ and „recipients‟ would tend to suggest that continued ODA commitment might be part of the recovery process. Arguments for ODA based on moral/ethical principles are certainly not affected by short-term considerations based on the ramifications of the 2008-2009 credit crunch, and the same applies to arguments based on security considerations and on long-term environmental considerations. There is still a long-term commitment by the developed market economies to allocate 0.7 per cent of their GDPs to „foreign aid‟, and this is not affected by short-term factors.4 The issue of whether, at times when public expenditure is being cut in many developed market economies, the aid budget should take its share of the cuts is a different order of question. Where individual donors have not reached the 0.7 per cent target, a logical approach would suggest that efforts should be continued to reach that target – implying that in several countries ODA allocations should continue to increase in real terms and as a proportion of GDP. In those developed market economies where the impact of the 2008-2009 credit crunch has been to reduce GDP then, perhaps perversely, the ratio of ODA to GDP might have increased (even with a constant level of ODA allocations in real terms) and the target of 0.7 per cent could be closer to being achieved. Perhaps the main difference of opinion between those who are supportive moral imperative for ODA allocations and those who are more sceptical govern attitudes over whether ODA should be cut in line with overall expenditure cuts or whether ODA should be maintained at a steady level increased. of the would public or be
One question is whether the cases for ODA which we have outlined – i.e. the ethical and the self-interest cases – are significantly different during periods of fiscal constraint in the aid „donor‟ (see Table 2). One could argue that the ethical case for ODA is largely independent of the fiscal context in the „donor country – this case is a long-term one. However, one could also say the compassion-ethical argument might be stronger, depending on the socio-economic situation in the potential recipient. What might be important is the relative impacts of the global crisis in recipient and „donor‟ country.
For a critique of the 0.7% „target‟ see Clemens and Moss (2005).
The self interest case for ODA may also be stronger in fiscally constrained times if it stimulates the global economy more than the same spend at home (but whether this can be accurately assessed is another matter). Further, the self-interest arguments related to security might also be stronger. Again, the impacts of the global crisis in „recipient‟ relative to the „donor‟ country might shape the argument. If a fragile state was particularly badly impacted by the crisis (lost remittances, falls in exports, etc) the resultant pressure on the country might form the basis of a self interest-security argument in favour of ODA which seeks to prevent further pressure on the country. Table 2. The global case for ODA Case for ODA Is this case for ODA stronger, weaker or neutral in fiscally constrained times in ODA „donor‟?
Ethical arguments Compassion – global socio-economic Stronger – depending on economic justice situation in recipient? Compensation Same – these are long-run arguments Disaster relief Same – given acuteness of need – for example Pakistan 2010 Self-interest arguments Mutuality Stronger – depending on the relative multiplier effects on the global economy? MNC inputs Stronger? Security Stronger – depending on the relative crisis impacts on recipient and „giver‟ country?
3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE FOR ODA FOR CONTEMPORARY AND EMERGING DEBATES This section seeks to discuss how the case for ODA that has been outlined can be related to contemporary and emerging debates on the practice of ODA and in particular what ODA seeks to achieve – i.e. aid effectiveness. This particularly relates to the ethical case for ODA and in particular the compassion/humanitarian and poverty reduction objectives of ODA but also can be related to the self-interest case for ODA outlined and notably international security and/or political objectives of 13
ODA (which in themselves raise ethical questions). The case for ODA is in some ways independent of aid effectiveness but the „case‟ would be weaker if aid does not really have a positive effect on the variables relative to ethical and self-interest arguments. We discuss here the case for ODA to contemporary debates on what ODA is seeking to achieve (aid effectiveness debates) and to the shifting nature of global poverty (linked to the ethical case for ODA) and in doing so seek to raise the question, is the case for ODA affected by the nature of the objectives of different types of ODA. 3a. Contemporary debates on ODA ODA and aid more broadly and „aid effectiveness‟ are going through somewhat of a ferment (see detailed discussion in Evans 2010a). This ferment has several dimensions as follows: The goals, players and instruments of aid are all mushrooming (Severino and Ray (2009; 2010); The transparency and accountability „revolution‟ (see for details Barder 2009; 2010). The questioning of whether aid effectiveness debates have missed the point by focusing on quantity or quality of aid rather than aid as a catalyst for economic or political change (Fischer 2010). Key drivers of the rethink have been the changing landscape and nature of aid – notably the new non-DAC donors (accounting for perhaps 15 per cent of global ODA) and other actors such as the foundations, the new modalities (innovative finance mechanisms) and the likely dwarfing of traditional ODA by climate financing, as well as new institutions such as cash-on-delivery and output-based aid (see Birdsall and Savedoff 2010). In short, there is considerable ferment on what ODA hopes to achieve (as well as what actually counts as „aid‟). Add to the mix some pressing timelines such as that for the Paris Declaration in December 2010, the high-level Seoul meeting in 2011 and the post-MDG debates emerging following the September 2010 MDG summit, and we have some fundamental questions that can relate the earlier discussions the case for aid with the contemporary practice of ODA. 3b. The case for ODA and differing objectives of ODA Historically aid objectives have included reducing international inequality; filling forex and savings gaps and more recently poverty reduction or intermediate variables thought to be supportive of poverty reduction – i.e. social sector spending, growth, infrastructure and „good governance‟. In particular, the social sectors have benefited from ODA increases over the last decade (see Table 3). At a global level, bilateral ODA has gone up in absolute terms 14
since 2000 from $46bn to $74bn and from 0.14% of donors GNI to 0.20 but actually fallen slightly as a percentage of recipients‟ GNI. There has been a structural shift towards social allocations and away from economic and productive sectors. In absolute terms, social sector, bilateral ODA spending has doubled 2000-2008 from about US$20bn/year to over US$40bn/year. In contrast production-sector ODA has stagnated.
Table 3. ODA Disbursements to developing countries, 2000 and 2008. 2000 Net ODA from DAC countries, excl. debt relief (constant 2007 US$m) Bilateral Multilateral Net bilateral ODA (% of OECD-DAC donors‟ GNI) Bilateral Multilateral ODA from OECD-DAC donors to developing countries (% Recipients‟ GNI) Sectoral Allocation of Bilateral ODA to from OECD-DAC donors to developing countries (by sector, % total) Social Infrastructure and Services of which: Basic social services Economic Infrastructure and Services Production Sectors Multisector/Cross-Cutting Source: McKinley (2010) calculated from IDS-DAC online. 0.14 0.07 0.7 0.20 0.09 0.6 46,454 25,429 74,120 33,190 2008
50.2 15.8 26.0 11.0 12.8
57.9 14.2 24.1 9.6 8.4
The move from productive sectors to social sectors, which one can partly attribute to the MDGs, can be seen as a good thing (focus on achieving health and education goals which are important); but it can also be seen as a distortion as it gives the (at least partly) impression that countries can have long-term sustainable progress in education and health without a well-functioning, inclusive and growing economy (See discussion in Bourguignon et al., 2008). Also, short run increases in social indicators could be achieved without any reduction in aid dependency or long-run structural political or economic change. In short, the current situation is one where the objectives of ODA are open to contestation and potentially large trade-offs between short run and long run objectives. Further different donors and different projects have different objectives that may well not be complementary at all. As noted above there is some consensus that the objective of ODA is to reduce poverty and this of course links to the earlier discussion of the ethical case for aid. The reduction of what exactly what in poverty reduction – i.e. what types of poverty or deprivations are reduced differs by ODA donor and project. The goal of development for the last 20 years has largely been growth-led poverty reduction as Barder (2009:2) argues but this objective needs revisiting because the “emphasis on the one goal – poverty reduction defined as a permanent reduction in the global poverty headcount through economic growth – has contributed both to poor program selection and poor program design and implementation, and it has thereby undermined the effectiveness of aid… [Further, a new agenda should,]… not target a 15
single measure of poverty reduction but explicitly manage a portfolio of objectives that (a) promote long-term and permanent changes in developing countries by investing resources and sharing knowledge; (b) tackle the causes of poverty by changing the policies of rich countries and investing in global public goods; (c) transfer income and consumption from the world‟s rich to the world‟s poor to enable them to live better lives while development is taking place, as a matter of global social justice; and (d) target more assistance on those in chronic and deep poverty.” (Barder 2009: 2) This discussion of ODA objectives can be related to the case for ODA thus – if the case for ODA is one an ethical one – humanitarian/poverty reduction then the ethical case for ODA could be strengthened in the short run by quick, MDG-type results (more children in primary school) at the same time as the ethical case for ODA could be weakened in the long run if there was no structural political and economic change leading to a reduction in aid dependency. This resonates with other calls for a new approach to development objectives: “The objective, through economic development and statebuilding, is transformation of developing countries into middle class societies in which citizens hold their governments accountable for provision of physical security and basic social services… A good indicator of progress in transformation is a growing middle class that has the economic heft and consequent political voice to hold government accountable for the domestic social contract.” (Birdsall 2009: 2) This means the ethical basis for aid may actually raises deeper fundamental questions about that arise from governance objectives of some ODA – those that fund or seek to catalyse political change and the role of donors in domestic politics and governance structures. Aid may seek to catalyse change by funding the progressive forces and coalitions of pro-poor change. This means question marks over what are the ethics of intervening in other countries for the „common good‟. In short the ethical case for ODA outlined earlier raises deeper ethical questions in the practice and trade-offs arising from ODA objectives. 3c. The case for aid and the new geography of poverty Alison Evans (2010a) has discussed the „new geography of global poverty‟ – that many of the world‟s poor live in middle income countries like India and Indonesia that may neither need or what ODA. If the case for ODA is one of poverty reduction, where the poor live and what resources their own governments have at their disposal are useful questions to pose. Of the world‟s „US$1.25 poor‟ 960m or 72% live, not in poor countries but in middle income countries and most of them in stable, non-fragile MICs (see table 4 and discussion in Sumner, 2010). Only about a quarter of the world‟s poor – about 370mn people or so live in the remaining 39 low-income countries (LICs), which are largely in sub-Saharan Africa. These findings are similar across nutrition 16
indicators and the UNDP‟s new multi-dimensional poverty index. Education – children out of primary school - is an exception; 60% of the children out of primary school are in LICs and just 40% in MICS. This is a dramatic change from just two decades ago when 93% of poor people lived in low-income countries. What is „new‟ about this? The poor haven‟t moved nor are these „newly‟ poor people. What has largely happened is the countries in which many of the world‟s poor live in have got richer in average per capita terms – transitioning from LIC to MIC status under World Bank classifications – whilst at the same time the number of poor people hasn‟t drastically fallen.
Table 4. Estimates of the change in global distribution of world‟s $1.25/day poor (percentage) 1988–90 and 2007–8 % of world‟s poor 1988-90 2007-8 7 72 7 22 1 11 6 61 93 28 31 28 13 12 80 16 14 13 14 68 100 23 27 25 50 100 Millions 1988-90 2007-8 120.88 956.57 120.88 293.18 18.25 143.51 102.64 813.06 1,547.13 370.76 408.68 370.76 210.08 156.38 1,337.05 214.38 228.33 223.99 241.06 1,138.45 1,668.02 299.90 355.07 334.98 663.39 1,328.69
Middle-income countries (MIC) MIC minus China and India MIC FCAS MIC NON-FCAS Low-income countries (LIC) LIC minus China and India LIC FCAS LIC NON-FCAS Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS = 43) Sub-Sahara Africa Least Development Countries (50)* China and India Total Source: Sumner (2010:14).
One read of this is that the case for ODA in some countries with substantial domestic resources is weakening or that global poverty may be increasingly turning from an international to a national distribution problem, potentially making governance and domestic taxation and redistribution policies more importance than Official Development Assistance (ODA). This is not to say the global distribution of wealth and assets is no longer important. Merely less so that was once the case. The emerging powers – the G20 minus G8 countries – are home to most of the world‟s poor (the BRICS to more than half) and by the end of 2011, the Economist notes, $7 trillion in foreign exchange reserves (half of which is accounted for by China). Further, many MICs are now donors themselves. Estimates of India‟s aid programme are $550m/year in 2008 and estimates of China‟s aid programme are in the region of at least $1-2bn/year (Brazil‟s aid programme is estimates at $1bn/year). 5 This would
For data estimates see: India‟s aid programme: http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2010/10/india-emerges-as-an-aiddonor.php China‟s aid programme: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40361.pdf or http://www.cgdev.org/files/13953_file_Chinese_aid.pdf
mean the new donors are set to overtake some DAC donors including Australia, Belgium, or Denmark. At the same time net annual ODA into India is $2.1bn and to China $1.5bn (see Table 5).
Table 5. Selected large MICs and poor people, net ODA, aid dependency and forex reserves Country Number of poor Net ODA ($bn, Aid dependency Forex reserves people (under 2008) ratio (2008, >9% (average $1.25/day, GNI = high) 2008–2010, millions, 2007) $bn) China 207,559 1.5 0.0 1953.3 India 455,830 2.1 0.2 279.0 Indonesia 47,002 1.2 0.3 71.8 Nigeria 88,592 1.3 0.7 53.0 South Africa 11,528 1.1 0.4 42.0 Sources: World Bank – World Development Indicators; Global Development Finance (GDF); International Monetary Fund (IMF); Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
This raises questions over the ethical case for ODA flows to countries with substantial domestic resources and might lead to a wider discussion of aid instruments and relationships beyond ODA. Further, on the case for aid – even if some middle income countries (MICs) can support their own poor people, others cannot (or more often the poor may lack voice in governance structures due to inequalities). Some MICs such as Pakistan are only just past the threshold and withdrawing aid suddenly might mean they slip back to LICs. Even when domestic resources appear more substantial political will may be ambivalent. So in MICs the donor strategy should include a broader range of aid instruments beyond resources - for example, focusing on issues such as trade, migration, tax havens, innovative finance and climate change, Northern consumption patterns (i.e. the footprint of red meat) and security cooperation (the „do no harm‟ narrative). This is very different from the current donor approach to MICs because the current approach is still largely framed by money rather than a broader range of aid instruments which may well include funding progressive forces such as CSOs. There‟s a further ethical debate for ODA and the international community in all of this. Is the international community committed to reduce poverty in some countries not all or in all countries? If the poor live in stable MICs, do those countries need aid flows or are domestic resources available? Whose „responsibility‟ are the poor in MICs – donors or governments or both? There are further questions that relate to the case for ODA: If most stable MICs don‟t need aid – judging by their aid dependency ratios (see Table 6) – should aid flows be redirected to LICs, FCAS LICs and/or to global public goods? What should the donor-recipient partnership/strategy and aid instruments for MICs be?
Brazils‟ aid programme: http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=5120&title=brazil-electionemerging-donor-aid
Table 6. Data on resources: Forex reserves, ODA and structural indicators in the 27 new MICs versus other groups (averages for countries with 2 data points) Total reserves in months of imports 27 new MICS (2000-9) MIC MIC FCAS MIC NON-FCAS LIC LIC FCAS LIC NON-FCAS 1988-90 1.3 2.9 1.8 3.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 2007-8 5.0 5.3 4.2 5.5 4.3 4.5 4.1 4.4 4.3 4.1 Net ODA received (% of GNI) 1988-90 7.0 7.2 13.6 6.1 16.4 17.0 15.9 15.7 15.3 19.1 2007-8 5.8 4.5 9.4 3.3 15.4 19.3 10.7 15.5 13.0 15.7 Net ODA received (% of gross capital formation) 1988-90 2007-8 40.4 28.4 33.6 73.7 26.5 88.3 108.5 68.9 95.9 93.9 15.7 53.9 8.3 62.6 77.4 44.4 68.9 54.4 66.0
FCAS 2.1 Sub-Sahara Africa 2.3 LDCs 2.3 Source: Sumner (2010:21).
This would all suggest the global case for ODA as previously outlined, may not differ not only in fiscally constrained times in the „giver‟ but also by the type of country (see table 7) and in particular the recipient‟s (i) available domestic resources (proxies LIC and MIC status) and their state capacities to deliver for their population a functioning state (proxies - FCAS or non-FCAS status). The ethical argument for ODA might be weaker if there were substantial domestic resources available (for example in stable MICs). However, the ethical argument is complicated because there is no guarantee the people who needed the resources would be able to access them. Further, the self-interest case for ODA might be stronger in fragile and conflict-affected states depending on the crisis impact, speed of economic recovery and fiscal space available (estimated to be very limited in LICs by Oxfam, 2010).
Table 7. Is the case for ODA stronger, weaker or neutral in fiscally constrained time and does this differ by type of recipient country? Case for ODA Is this case for ODA stronger, weaker or neutral in fiscally constrained times in ODA giver? Global ODA LIC stable (e.g. Tanzania, Ghana) LIC, FCAS (e.g. DRC, MIC stable MIC FCAS (e.g. Nigeria, Pakistan)
Ethical arguments Compassion Stronger if impacts worse in recipient? Stronger if impacts worse in recipient? Stronger if impacts worse in recipient? Weaker if substantial domestic resources? Weaker if substantial domestic resources? Might depend on state capacities to deliver . Same as long-run arguments Weaker if substantial domestic resources? Might depend on state capacities to deliver .
Same as long-run arguments Same – due to acuteness of need
Same as long-run arguments Same – due to acuteness of need
Same as long-run arguments Same – due to acuteness of need
Same as long-run arguments Weaker if substantial domestic resources?
Self-interest arguments Mutuality MNC inputs Security Stronger? Stronger? Stronger if impacts worse in recipient? Stronger? Stronger? Stronger if impacts worse in recipient? Stronger? Stronger? Much stronger if impacts worse in recipient? Stronger? Stronger? Stronger if impacts worse in recipient? Stronger? Stronger? Much stronger if impacts worse in recipient?
4. CONCLUSIONS In this paper we have sought to present in one place a coherent set of arguments which can form the basis of a case for ODA at firstly, a global level of analysis and secondly, how this argument might differ between different recipient countries. The main points we make are as follows: First, the ethical and self-interest case for ODA at a global level is based on 6 components as follows: a) Ethical/Moral Arguments: i) Compassion, ii) Compensation, and iii) Responses to disasters and urgent needs; and b) selfinterest: i) Mutuality of interest; ii) Support for MNCs and iii) Security. Second, the compassion or „international social justice‟ case for aid is a very strong one, and underlies continuing public support for ODA programmes in developed market economies. There are issues over the extent to which the „global social justice‟ argument should be transformed into forms of taxation and international transfer payments which are „automatic‟ rather than „discretionary‟ – and this has been raised within the current debate over the future of the MDGs. Third, the ethical case for ODA outlined is somewhat independent of fiscal context – the case relates to the long-term. However, the self interest case for aid may be stronger in fiscally constrained times if ODA stimulates the global economy in the context of mutuality. Fourth, the case for ODA is inter-related with ODA objectives (including aid effectiveness) and the „new geography of poverty‟. This suggests that the global arguments for ODA may not apply to all countries or to aid beyond ODA. Fifth, the ethical case for ODA may be stronger in countries with more serious crisis impacts and the self interest security case could be much stronger in fragile and conflict-affected states. In sum, at the global, or general, level of argument the case for ODA is clear but at the level of individual country ODA allocations the application of the principle may be considerably more difficult. We have noted that ethical arguments which relate to such long term issues as the impact of the slave trade of centuries ago can provide a general context within which part of the case for ODA can be articulated. However, because not all developing countries were subject to the slave trade, because the economic impact would be difficult to estimate with any accuracy, and because impacts on economic performance by factors other than the slave trade will have been significant over the intervening centuries and decades, this principle can hardly be seriously considered as one for the determination of individual ODA allocations in the 21 st century. There may, of course, be arguments concerning compensation for contemporary forms of „slavery‟, but these may be equally imponderable. A similar problem applies to the application of the principle of compensation for deterioration of the international terms of trade affecting developing countries. 21
We should also note that our frame of reference has related to „countries‟ which in the context of ODA means „governments‟. In some circumstances this creates difficulties: i) a government may have resources and capability but for whatever reason governance structures are unresponsive to the needs of the poor, ii) there are cases of „failed states‟ where in particular countries no effective government is in place for periods of time. Our frame of reference has also related to ODA as defined by the OECD DAC. However, ODA is far more complex than this definition encompasses. . For example, historically the UK has not included government-funded scholarships for developing country students but other European donors have done so. Other questions remain in terms of aid instruments beyond conventionally defined ODA? There is a „do no harm‟ narrative – arguing that the North can help the South such as with compensation relating to climate change negotiations, trade policy, migration policy, tax havens and innovative finance which are often not included within definitions of ODA. These aid instruments are potentially larger financially than current ODA flows to some countries. Finally, we have alluded to the conclusions of Alesina and Dollar (2000) which contrast global arguments and principles supporting the case for ODA and the the reality of international politics, and history. Aid effectiveness and the „policy environment‟ is another important dimension of their argument. The US relationship with the Middle East (Egypt and Israel in particular) plays a significant role in US ODA allocations; and the recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has had a major impact on the allocation of ODA internationally.
REFERENCES/BIBLIOGRAPHY African Development Bank Group. 2009. The 2009 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA): The 2009 Questionnaire. Tunis: African Development Bank – accessed from www.afdb.org Francesco Aiello. 1999. The Stabilisation of LDCs' Export Earnings. The impact of the EU STABEX programme. The International Review of Applied Economics. 13 (1) January: 71 – 85. Hafiz A. Akhand and Kanhaya Lal Gupta. 2002. Foreign Aid in the Twenty-first Century. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Alberto Alesina and David Dollar. 2000. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? Journal of Economic Growth. 5 (1): 33-63. Nancy Alexander. 2010. The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and Allocation of IDA Resources: Suggestions for Improvements to Benefit African Countries. Washington: The Heinrich Böll Foundation – accessed on 28th October2010 from www.boell.org O. Barder. 2009. What is Poverty Reduction?, CGD Working Paper 170, Washington, D.C.: Centre for Global Development. O. Barder, 2010. Beyond Planning: Markets and Networks for Better Aid, CGD Working Paper 185, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. Peter Bauer. 1972. Dissent on Development. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Nancy Birdsall. 2009. Reframing the Development Project for the Twenty-first Century. (Based on keynote remarks at the Conference on Building Our Common Future, sponsored by the UK Department for International Development, London, March 11, 2009.) – accessible from www.cgdev.org/content/article/detail/1423667 Nancy Birdsall and William Savedoff. 2010. Cash on Delivery: A New Approach to Foreign Aid, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. Lael Brainard, Carol Graham, Nigel Purvis, Steven Radelet and Gayle Smith. 2003. The Other War: Global Poverty and the MilleniumMillennium Challenge Account. Washington: Center for Global Development – Brookings Institution Press. Craig Burnside and David Dollar. 2000. Aid, Policies and Growth. American Economic Review. 90 (4): 847-868. Robert Cassen. 1994. Does Aid Work? (2nd ed). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sharad Chari and Stuart Corbridge (eds). 2008. The Development Reader. London: Routledge, David Clark. 2006. The Elgar Companion to Development Studies. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Michael Clemens and Todd Moss. 2005. Ghost of 0.7%: Origins and relevance of the International Aid Target. Working Paper 68. Washington: Center for Global Development – accessed on 30th October 2010 from www.cgdev.org 23
Paul Collier. 2007. The Bottom Billion. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Paul Collier and David Dollar. 1999. Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction. Policy Research Working Paper 2041. Washington: World Bank – accessed on 28th October 2010 from: www.worldbank.org Commission on Growth and Development. 2008. The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development. Washington: World Bank. Commission on International Development. 1969. Partners in Development. New York; Praeger. John Degnbol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen. 2005. Aid: understanding international development cooperation. London: Zed Books. Vandana Desai and Robert B. Potter (eds). 2008. The Companion to Development Studies (2nd ed). London: Hodder Education. David Dollar and Art Kraay, 2002. Growth is Good for the Poor. Journal of Economic Growth. 7 (3): 195-225. David Dollar and Art Kraay. 2004. Growth is Good for the Poor. In Shorrocks, A. and Van Der Hoeven, R. (eds.). Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Prospects for Pro-poor Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 62-80. William Easterly and David Dollar. 1999. The Search for the Key: Aid, Investment, and Policies in Africa. Policy Research Working Paper 2070. Washington: World Bank. William Easterly. 2007. The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. William Easterly (ed). 2008. Reinventing Foreign Aid. MIT Press. Encyclopedia of the Nations. 2010. The First UN Development Decade –accessed on 20th October 2010 at http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-Nations/Economic-and-SocialDevelopment-FIRST-UN-DEVELOPMENT-DECADE.html Alison Evans. 2010a. Aid Effectiveness post-2010 – a think piece on ways forward – June 2010. London: Overseas Development Institute. Alison Evans. 2010b. Returning to first principles – why give aid to some countries and not to others? ODI Blog 20th July. London: Overseas Development Institute – accessed from www.odi.org.uk Andrew Fischer. 2009. „Putting Aid in its Place: Insights from Early Structuralists on Aid and Balance of Payments and Lessons for Contemporary Aid Debates‟, Journal of International Development 21.6: 856–67 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr. 2010. Conflict prevention as a policy objective of development aid. In George Mavrotas (ed.). Foreign Aid for Development: Issues, Challenges, and the New Agenda. WIDER Studies in Development Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 123-151. Kanhaya L. Gupta (ed). 1999. Foreign Aid: New Perspectives. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 24
Arjan de Haan. 2009. How the Aid Industry Works. Sterling Va.: Kumarian Press. Rasmus Heltberg. 2002. The Growth Elasticity of Poverty. WIDER Discussion Paper 2002/12. Helsinki: UN University. Spencer Henson and Johanna Lindstrom. 2010. Aid to Developing Countries: Where Does the UK Public Stand? – Results and Analysis from the UK Public Opinion Monitor. Brighton: Institute for Development Studies. John Hudson and Paul Mosley. 2008. Aid Volatility, Policy and Development. World Development. 36 (10): 2082-2102. Ishrat Husain. 1994. Results of Adjustment in Africa: Selected Cases, Finance and Development. 31 (2): 6-9. Independent Commission on International Development Issues. 1980 North-South: a programme for survival. London: Pan Books. Carol Lancaster. 2000. Transforming Foreign Aid: United States Assistance in the Twenty-first Century. Washington: Institute for International Economics. Carol Lancaster and Ann Van Dusen. 2005. Organizing US Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century. Washington: Brookings Institution. Carol Lancaster. 2007. Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. London: University of Chicago Press. Terry McKinley. 2009. Revisiting the Dynamics of Growth: Inequality and Poverty Reduction. Centre for Development Policy and Research Discussion Paper 25/09. London: School of Oriental and African Studies: 23 pages. George Mavrotas. 2010. Foreign Aid for Development: Issues, Challenges, and the New Agenda. WIDER Studies in Development Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Andrew Mitchell. 2010. Development in a Conflicted World – Speech to the Royal Defence Studies College – 20th September. London: Department for International Development – accessed from www.dfid.gov.uk Frederick Nixson. 2007-2008. Overseas Aid – Is it Working? Transactions of the Manchester Statistical Society. Manchester: University of Manchester. OECD-DAC. 2008. OECD-DAC Statistics: A Brief Introduction. Paris: OECD-DAC – downloadable from the OECD website. OECD-DAC. 2010. Methodological work - what is ODA, how is it counted and who qualifies for it? Paris: OECD-DAC website – downloaded from www.oecd.org/dac/stats/methodology 16th September 2010. OECD-DAC. 2010. Development Cooperation Report 2010. Paris: OECD-DAC – downloadable from the OECD website www.oecd.org. S. Radelet. 2003. Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymaker's Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account. Washington: Center for Global Development. S. Radelet. 2006. A Primer on Foreign Aid. Working Paper No. 92. Washington: Center for Global Development – accessed from www.cgdev.org 17-9-10 Roger Riddell. 2008. Does Aid Really Work?. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 25
Jeffrey Sachs. 2005. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. Harmondsworth: Penguin Press. J-M. Severino and O. Ray. 2009. The End of ODA: Death and Rebirth of a Global Public Policy. Working Paper No. 167. Washington: Center for Global Development – accessed from www.cgdev.org 17-9-10 J-M. Severino and O. Ray, 2010. The End of ODA (II): The Birth of Hypercollective Action, CGD Working Paper 218, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. Andy Sumner. 2010. Global Poverty and The New Bottom Billion. IDS Working Paper. IDS: Brighton. Finn Tarp and Peter Hjertholm (eds). 2000. Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future. London: Routledge. Howard White. 1992. The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid: A Critical Survey. Journal of Development Studies. 28(2): 163-240. Michael Tribe and Aurélien Lafon. 2010. Proceedings of the DFID-DSA-EADIActionAid Policy Forum. IDS Bulletin. 41 (1): 129-134. UNFCCC. 2008. Investment and financial flows to address climate change: an update – Technical paper. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Accessed on 22nd November 2009 from: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/ World Bank. 2007. IDA‟s Performance-Based Allocation System: Options for Simplifying the Formula and Reducing Volatility. Washington: International Development Association, Resource Mobilization (FRM) accessed February 2007 from: www.worldbank.org World Bank. 2009. The World Bank‟s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment – An Evaluation. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington: World Bank – accessed on 28th October 2010 from www.worldbank.org James Wolfensohn and Stanley Fischer. 2000. The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) – A Joint Note. Washington: International Monetary Fund – accessed on 28th October 2010 from www.imf.org