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Hiep Dinh

Essay #3 – Major Tutorial

Professor Michail Peramatzis

30/01/2019

Prompt: “Plato is obsessed with the unity of the state.” Discuss.

In modern usage, it seems to me that we often speak of unity as being against something,

in relation to something, or to accomplish something. One could assert sentences like: "We are

united against racism."; "We are united against the enemies."; "We stand united in the face of these

threats."; "We unite in opposing these plans." Is this the sense in which the unity of the state is

discussed in the Republic? Of course, Plato recognizes the necessity of wars, and includes the class

of guardians to fight and protect the city. But overall, foreign policy is not the focus of the work.

"When a social group has certain rules of conduct, this fact affords an opportunity for many

closely related yet different kinds of assertion; for it is possible to be concerned with the rules,

either merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which

accepts and uses them as guides to conduct. We may call these respectively the 'external' and the

'internal points of view'." (Hart 89)

In order to get a clearer sense of what Plato's unity is about, I will use Hart's concepts of

the external and internal perspectives as a helpful distinction. In his The Concept of Law, the legal

philosopher H. L. A. Hart distinguishes between these two points of view. With the external

perspective, one could look at the various laws of a country as an object of historical/personal

interest or for academic study. One could write a tome about the legal system in 19th century
Germany without, of course, being bound by any of those laws; one could make assertions like:

"In China it is the law that a person shall not spread seditious propaganda against the state and its

interests." By contrast, with the internal perspective, one makes assertions with a normative taste,

such as: "You ought not to exceed the speed limit." or "You should pay your fair share of taxes."

As Hart would say, from the internal point of view, one both accepts the laws and uses them as a

standard against which to judge one's behavior and to critique that of others.

From the external perspective, it seems that Plato’s state is a totalitarian one, seemingly

not immune from the usual political problems of tension between the rich and the poor, corruption

among the ruling class with not enough checks and balances in place, and potential revolt by the

exploited underclass. But I will suggest that Plato’s unity of the state is best seen as a unity from

the internal perspective, or internal unity for short. To take a leaf from Wittgenstein’s Tractarian

book, Plato’s solution to the normal problems in politics lies in the very dissolving of those

problems; his is a type of radical unity which eliminates, or at least tries to eliminate, the conditions

for the possibility of the citizens’ even thinking about revolt or discontent. The unity of the state

is preserved, for the march of history and politics as we know it has been halted.

I will now examine two ways in which Plato attempts to fortify the unity of the state. The

first one is intricately connected with his natural division of labor.

“But we prevented a cobbler from trying to be a farmer, weaver, or builder at the same time

and said that he must remain a cobbler in order to produce fine work. And each of the others, too,

was to work all his life at a single trade for which he had a natural aptitude and keep away from

all the others…” (374b5)


Plato is operating with a different mindset from that of someone like Aristotle, who would

want to place some emphasis on the pursuit of individual ἐυδαιμονία for a small section of the

population with enough wealth, education, and leisure. For Plato, the happiness of any particular

group is not the focus, but rather that of the entire πόλις as a whole. The crux of Plato’s principle

is that everyone should stick to only one field for which he or she is most naturally suited, and

should not meddle in anything else. There are those who are most suited for manual labor, i.e. to

provide the foundational material needs, those whose constitution qualifies them to be guardians

who protect the city against invaders, and those whose nature and education enables them to

eventually become philosopher-kings. As Popper concisely puts it: “For the principle that every

class should attend to its own business means, briefly and bluntly, that the state is just if the ruler

rules, if the worker works, and if the slave slaves. […] The state is just if it is healthy, strong,

united – stable.” (Popper 90, emphasis in the original) On page 183 of her An Introduction to

Plato’s Republic, Annas discusses the relation between the natural division of labor and the role

of women therein. This principle should also apply to women, I think, so as to prevent idleness:

for the sake of unity and stability, everyone should have an appropriate role to play, and should

play it gladly. The point is not about acknowledging gender equality, if such notions were even

present in the Greeks’ minds. Rather, the point is about cultivating the internal unity of the state.

Everyone must focus on that one field for which he or she is supposedly most naturally suited, so

that the state can benefit economically, and so that there will not be any malcontent questioning or

complaining about the order of things.

Plato also utilizes a number of measures having more to do with psychological control.

Using the word in its modern sense, the life of the rulers is quite spartan, lacking in many luxurious

creature comforts. They are not allowed to accumulate wealth and property, lest their souls become
corrupted by these trappings; there is also a system of communism of wife and children among the

rulers, so as to prevent the biases of familial interest from creeping in and threatening the state. In

addition, Plato engages in certain acts of epistemological engineering, so to speak. For example,

at 415a1 we have the Myth of the Metals, according to which the god had already mixed iron and

bronze into the producing class, those destined to provide the material needs for the rest of society,

silver into the auxiliaries, those meant to defend the πόλις against outside threats, and gold into the

rulers, those chosen to eventually become philosopher-kings. The notion that they are being

exploited shall not even occur to craftsmen and producers, nor shall the thought that perhaps they

could turn out to be better rulers than the current ruling class. At 389b7, Plato reinforces the rigid

class system by maintaining that only rulers, and certainly not the lowly producers, have the right

to tell lies for the good of the state. And one should also take note of the extensive discussions at

the beginning of Book III, in which Plato essentially advocates for state-wide censorship and

rewriting of Greek epic poetry, in order that only the right, state-approved thoughts will enter the

minds of the young. For example, only good deeds shall be attributed to the god(s). (The question

of Plato’s monotheism vs polytheism lies outside the scope of this essay.)

"[...] that very important feature of totalitarian states. They use considerable force to

maintain their rule. But Plato says that a good state bases its legitimacy on persuasion, not force.

(548b, 552e)." (Pappas 237)

Is Plato a totalitarian thinker who seeks unity of the state above considerations of individual

autonomy, self-determination, and freedom? There are those like Karl Popper whose answer to

this question is a resounding yes; as Popper himself puts it unequivocally in Volume I, Chapter 6

of The Open Society and Its Enemies: "Never was a man more in earnest in his hostility towards

the individual. [...] he hated the individual and his freedom just as he hated the varying particular
experiences, the variety of the changing world of sensible things. In the field of politics, the

individual is to Plato the Evil One himself." (Popper 103) Popper was writing in the 20th century,

against the backdrop of oppressive regimes such as the Soviet Union, which employed the full

strength of state police and ideological apparatuses to crush any dissent. Of course, Plato lacks the

full range of tools to build a full-fledged surveillance state in the modern sense. However, I think

that there is a better way to look at Plato in relation to the question of his totalitarianism. The point

should not be about expressing outrage and critiquing the way in which Plato censors and alters

the fabric of Greek epic poetry, or in which he confines each class to only one activity, takes away

property from the rulers, and attempts to eliminate family interests among the guardians by

instituting the sharing of wife and children. In other words, to see things in this mode of critique,

from the perspective of modern liberal democracy, is to use the external perspective.

As Leys puts it in his essay Was Plato Non-Political, reprinted in Vlastos' Plato II: "The

totalitarian recognizes the political problem, the existence of disagreement and conflict. He

proposes to solve the political problem by suppressing all except one faction. Plato, on the other

hand, was preoccupied with the prescription of institutions that had no political problems. His ideal

society was troubled by individual malefactors and by enemy states, but not by organized factions

[...] in ultimate disagreement over goals and policies." (Vlastos 168) I think that the point should

be about Pappas' contrast between force and persuasion, with the emphasis shifted to the internal

perspective of the citizens inside. Again, Plato's unity is a unity from the internal perspective, a

radical unity that seeks to root out the very conditions for the possibility of even thinking about

discontent or revolt, of contemplating freedom in the liberal-democracy sense. Reframed in this

manner, the question of Plato's totalitarianism still has much relevance, for it lies at the heart of

the chasm between the Eastern and Western points of view. China, for example, are supposedly a
totalitarian state which is ruled by a strongman dictator, and which offers little personal freedom.

Naturally, many outraged Western minds try to reach out to people on the other side and convince

them of the truth of their oppression, in the hope of sparking a democratic transition from within;

so far, these attempts have not been much successful. Of course, there are a number of Chinese

activists inside the country who have prompted intense crackdowns from the regime. But for the

most part, the majority of Chinese citizens do not think of things in the Western way. On the one

hand, there is totalitarianism of the kind that relies mainly on brute force, that raises to much too

high levels the temperature inside the boiling pan containing the masses. Such regimes, in which

there is widespread and constant antagonism between the rulers and the ruled, are likely to fall. On

the other hand, there are also totalitarian regimes that, from the internal perspective, manage to

blur the very distinction between a free society and a restrictive one by relying significantly upon

persuasion, propaganda, inculcation, and other psychological means. Citizens of such regimes see

the only freedom as consisting in following one among a set of natural, predetermined paths in

accordance with state and/or religious guidelines, almost like a God-given lot. It becomes a rather

tricky matter as to which perspective wins: the external perspective of the outsider, Western mind,

who sees China as indubitably a monstrous, totalitarian regime, or the internal perspective of an

average Chinese citizen, for whom the essence of freedom consists in harmony and unity. It is

almost as if the outsider is trying to teach the paradigm of Einsteinian relativity to someone living

in the 18th century who had been familiar with Newtonian mechanics all his or her life. Totalitarian

regimes that rely too much on force risk overheating the pan, thereby boiling alive the citizens

inside and the whole regime in the process. But as for a totalitarian state that blends force, when

necessary, with a significant amount of persuasion and a foundation of common epistemological


framework in favor of unity and harmony, such a state can render void the question of its

oppressive nature in the eyes of its citizens, thus sustaining its stable rule in the long run.

"These are not so much the machinations of a totalitarian monster as the dreams of an

impractical theorist." (Guthrie 469)

Plato's vision of the unity and harmony of the ideal city-state hinges upon a certain

conception of human nature. I am aware that Plato is more concerned with putting forward his

construction of the ideal πόλις rather than paying too much attention to its practicability;

nevertheless, I think a discussion of some objections to his conception of human nature could help

to draw out more clearly the assumptions underlying the state's unity. Plato assumes that, having

internalized the idea that justice is doing one's own, contributing to the common good by sticking

strictly to only one field of activity, each citizen will gladly set aside his or her dabbling in other

fields. But it seems to me that Plato is underestimating an intrinsic human need for variety, as

encapsulated in the Marxian vision of hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, and

criticizing after dinner. In addition, I am inclined to question Plato's characterization of his division

of labor as "natural". Is it true that each of us has that one profession/field of activity for which we

are most naturally suited, and from which any deviation constitutes injustice? Maybe it is the case

that we have two or more such fields of activity? Even if there exists only one field, how are we

supposed to discover and ascertain that that field is indeed our natural fit? As White aptly puts it

in his A Companion to Plato's Republic: "To say that someone has a certain function by nature is

to say that that function is not arbitrarily assigned to, or imposed on, him. But this explanation

does not take us very far. In particular, it does not give us directions for telling what a person's

natural function is, or for distinguishing one's function from arbitrarily imposed activities." (White

86) One could also claim that Plato underestimates the strength of familial bonds, and any attempts
at severing those bonds in favor of communism of wife and children, so as to ensure the primacy

of state over family interests, may well backfire with unforeseen consequences.

Needless to say, Plato is operating with the underlying view that virtue is knowledge, that

no one does wrong willingly, and that once enlightened regarding the right path, one will rationally

follow. But we have witnessed various modern insights against the homo economicus picture of

humans as purely rational beings. One example is the proto-existentialist Underground Man from

Dostoevsky's Notes from underground, who, despite knowing that it will be good for him,

deliberately refuses to see a doctor or to have the necessary medicine. He rebels for the sake of

rebellion: To hell with authority figures who claim to know what is best for the individual; for all

he cares, the state may as well perish. As the Underground Man himself puts it: "I say let the world

go to hell, but I should always have my tea." (Dostoevsky 106) Generalizations about an author

like Dostoevksy is, of course, open to great dispute, but I would say that if there is anything for

which we should admire him, and which will continue to have timeless relevance, it is

Dostoevsky's insights into, and meticulous plunging of, the tortured and often irrational depths of

consciousness. Finally, Plato believes that the philosopher-kings, due to their right birth and

appropriate education, will lead lives driven by desires for the Form of the Good, and will thus

have weakened drives for power and material gain. Besides historical evidence, it seems that such

beliefs in the incorruptibility of the philosopher-kings can also be called into question by recent

research. In a July 2017 article for the Atlantic entitled Power Causes Brain Damage, Jerry Useem

discusses, inter alia, what is termed the power paradox. According to this paradox, those in

positions of power, such as politicians or Wall Street bankers, surrounded by constant praise and

obedience, gradually loses the very qualities that help them rise to those positions in the first place;

the drug of power comes with its dose of self-undermining side-effects. For example, leaders,
without someone to keep them grounded on a regular basis, suffers from empathy deficits and

becomes less adept at reading situations and people. If power does cause structural changes to the

brain, then it seems that the point is not about education, virtue, or moral training from birth; rather,

not being capable of handling power seems to be an evolutionary weakness of the human brain.

Works Cited

Annas, Julia. An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. Notes from Underground. Everyman’s Library, 2004.

Guthrie, W. K. C. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. 4, Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law. Clarendon Press, 2012.

Pappas, Nickolas. The Routledge Guidebook to Plato’s Republic. Routledge, 2013.

Plato. Republic. Edited by C.D.C Reeve. Translated by G.M.A Grube, Hackett Publishing

Company, 1992.

Popper, Karl R. The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume 1: The Spell of Plato. Routledge,

1980.

Useem, Jerry. “Power Causes Brain Damage.” The Atlantic, July 2017,

www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/power-causes-brain-damage/528711/.

Vlastos, Gregory. Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays. II, University of Notre Dame Press,

1971.

White, Nicholas P. A Companion to Plato's Republic. Basil Blackwell, 1979.

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