You are on page 1of 382

E.L.R.

A DIGEST
OF THE

ELECTION LAW REPORTS


VOLS. I TO X
1951-55

Editor:
A. N. AIYAR, B.A., B.L.,
Senior Advocate, Supreme Court.

Published under the authority of the Election Commission of India


by the Manager of Publications, Civil Lines, Delhi.
and
Printed by the Company Law Institute Press, Madras.
All Rights Reserved,
V

i.j
CONTENTS.
PAGE

I. Table of Headings v to viii


II. Table of Cases Digested i—22

III. Digest J
—243
IV. Index to Statutes referred to 244—272
V. Table of Cases overruled, followed etc., i—lxxviii
f
TABLE OF HEADINGS.

PAGE
Abatement !
Aeroplane i
Agency I
Amendment 2
Ballot boxes 4
Ballot papers 8
Canvassing office 15
Certiorari (see High Courts infra)
Corrupt practice 16
1. Admission in pleadings, effect of " 16
2. Appeal on the ground of religion, caste or community 16
3. Appeal to national symbols 1 19
4. Bribery 20
5. Burden of proof 21
6. Conveyance of voters 22
7. Effect 23
8. Employing more persons 23
9. Exceeding prescribed limit of expenditure 25
10. False personation by agent 25
11. False return of election expenses 26
12. False statements relating to personal character or
conduct 31
13. Fraud 36
14. Fresh instances 36
15. Government servants' assistance, procuring of 37
16. Incurring expenses for candidate 44
17. Interference with voters 44
18. Naming guilty persons 44
19. National anthem, use of 45
20. Paid canvassers, employment of 45
m

VI ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

PAGE"
21. Particulars of corrupt practice 45
22. Printer's or publisher's name, omission of 52'
23. Undue influence 53
Delimitation 57
Disqualification of candidates 58
1. Citizenship, want of 58
2. Conviction 59
3. Construction of s. 7(d) 59
4. Interest in contract with Government •60
5. Office of profit 79
6. Part C States 93
7. Miscellaneous 93
Double member constituencies 95
Election agents 100
108
i Election Commission
Election enquiries in
Election expenses 112
Election petition 114
1. Abatement 114
2. Adjourned hearing
3- Admissions 116
4- Amendment of petition 116
5- Burden of proof 126
6. Collusion 129
7- Consolidation of petitions 129
8. Contents 129
9- Costs 130
10. Court fees 130
11. Deposit of security 131
12. Joint petitions 132
13- Limitation 132
14. List of particulars 139
i5- New grounds 140
16. Parties 142
17- Recriminatory petition 152
TABEE OF HEADINGS vii

PAGE
18. Reliefs 153
19. Remand 155
20. Signature 156
21. Verification 156
22. Withdrawal 160
Election Rules 160
Election Tribunal 160
Electoral roll 165
Estoppel 173
High Courts X
74
Illegal practice (see Corrupt practice above)
Legislative Council 192
Ministers 193
Nomination of candidates—I
1. Age of candidate 197
2. Name of candidate 198
3. Name of constituency ' 198
4. Electoral roll 199
5. Father's name 209
6. Name of Legislature 209
7. Name of village 210
8. Proposer and seconder 211
9. Scheduled Castes 212
10. Several nominations by same proposer 212
11. Signature 214
12. Symbols 217
13. Withdrawal 219
Nomination of candidates—II
1. Improper rejection of nomination 220
2. Improper acceptance of nomination 223
Non-compliance with rules 229
Part C States 229
Police 230
Vlll ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

PAGE
Polling 230
Polling agent 232
Polling officers 233
Returning Officer 234
Scheduled Castes 237
Scheduled Tribes 238
Secrecy of voting 338
Sikhs 239
Supreme Court 239
Voting 24O
Waiver 240
Words and phrases 24I
TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED,
E.L.R. VOLS. I TO X
Abdul Rauf v. Govind Ballabh Pant and Others :
(Lucknow Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 240 7, 46, 48, 49, 51,
127, 157,164, 241
Abdul Rouf v. Makhtar Ali and Others : (Gauhati
Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 340 22, 25, 38
Ajayab Singh and Another v. Karnail Singh and
Others : (Hissar Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 368 205
Ambedkar, B. R. and Another v. S. A. Dange and
Others : (Bombay Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R.
364 54' 95
Amin Ahmad v. Nand Lai Sinha : (Patna High Court)
5 E.L.R. 40 109
Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others: (Nagpur
Election Tribunal), 10 E.L.R. 57 27,28,41,45,194
Arunachalam, A. J. v. Election Tribunal, Vellore,
and Others (Madras High Court), 9 E.L.R. 471 67
Aslam Khan v. Fazlul Haq and Others: (Bareilly
Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 341 59
Asrar Ahmad v. Nihal Uddin and Others : (Bareilly
Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 81 73, 151, 221
Atre, P. K. v. Dr. T. R. Naravne and Others : (Bom-
bay Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 355 230
Audesh Pratap Singh v. Brij Narain and Others: «
(Allahabad High Court), 9 E.L.R. 1 49,180,181, 241,
242
Awadesh Prasad Sinha v. Prabhawati Gupta and
Others : (Patna Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 176 120
Awadhesh Prasad Sinha v. Prabhavathi Gupta and
Others : (Patna Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 45 39, 95, 154, 159,
166, 173
Baddrudduja Syed v. Mohammad Khoda Buksh and
Others: (West Bengal Election Tribunal), 2
E.L.R. 189 206
Baijnath Prasad Varma v. Chandreshwar Narain
Prasad Singh and Others: (Patna Election Tri-
bunal), 2 E,L,R. 88 235
ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Bakaram Sukaram Konkani v. Shankar Rao Chinduji


Bedse and Others : (Bombay Election Tribunal),
3 E.L.R. 409 96, 120, 222,
236, 238
Balailal Das Mohapatra v. Trailakya Nath Prodhan
and Others: (West Bengal Election Tribunal),
4 E.L.R. 221 10
Balasubramanian, P. N. v. C. R. Narasimhan and
Others: (Vellore Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 461 94, 166, 204
Balasubrahmanyan, P. N. v. Election Tribunal,
Vellore, and Others : (Madras High Court), 7
E.L.R. 496 166,199
Balbir Singh v. Arjan Singh and Others : (Barnala
Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 341 81,142, 173
Balchand v. Laxminarain Mateh: (Nowgong Election
Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 465 68, 214, 219,
229, 232,237
Balwant Singh and Others v. Devi Lai and Others:
[Hissar Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 1 22, 72
Bankat Lai v. Madan Mohan and Others : (Bikaner
Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 375 152, 211, 221
T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another: (Shimoga
Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 197 2, 15, 26, II
231
Basappa T. C. v. T. Nagappa and Others : (Supreme
Court), 10 E.L.R. 14 132, 185, 242
Bawa Bachjttar Singh v. Election Commission and
Others : (Punjab High Court), 9 E.L.R. 506 183
Bajaysingh v. Narbada Charan Lai and Others:
(Bhopal Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 426 213, 236
Bena v. Jagat Singh and Others : (Kotah Election
Tribunal), 10 E.L.R. 174 99
Beni Madho Rai v. Bola and Others : (Allahabad
Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 308 82, 94
Bhagwan Singh v. Dr. Raghbir Parkash and Others :
(Barnala Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 461
Bhairon v. Thakur Ganpat Singh and Others: (Ajmer
Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 409 82, 107, 213
Bhan Singh v. Krishna Kant and Another: (Nowgong
Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 212 96,99
TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED 3

Bhanwarlal Sogani v. Damodar Lai Vyas and Others


(Kotah Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 407 218, 224
Bherusingh v. Prabhu Dayal Chaubey and Others:
(Indore Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 325 88,170
Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani
(Supreme Court), 10 E.L.R. 357 46, 138, 151,
157
Bhola Nath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta and Others :
(Faizabad Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 288 104, 140, 160
Bholanath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta and Others:
(No. 2), (Faizabad Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R.
104 60, 71, 85
Bishnu Kumar Singh v. Ram Bilas Sinha and Others:
(Patna Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 60 218
Biswanatha Roy v. Tarakdas Banerjee and Others :
(West Bengal Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 223 238
Braj Naresh Singh v. Hukam Singh: (Allahabad
Election Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 80 88, 196, 243
Dr. Brijendra Swarup v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow,
and Others: (Allahabad High Court), 10 E.L.R.
191 134. 154
Brij Naresh Singh v. Hukam Singh and Others:
(Lucknow Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 266 200
Brindaban Prasad Tiwari v. Sitaram and Others:
(Madhya Bharat Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 48 89, 91

Chander Nath v. Kunwar Jaswant Singh and Others:


(Bikaner Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 147 84, 221, 242
Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parash-
ram and Others: (Supreme Court of India), 9
E.L.R. 301 62, 237
Chenchurama Naidu, N. v. The Chief Electoral Offi-
cer, Andhra State, Kurnool, and Another:
(Andhra High Court), 10 E.L.R. 268 173
Chinna Malla Reddi and Others v. The Revenue
Divisional Officer, Guntur, and Others: (Madras
High Court) 9 E.L.R. 361 166
Chiranji Lai v. Panna Lai Kaushik and Others: ..•-,. r
(Kotah Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 274 147 .
ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Chiranjit Singh v. Mam Raj and Others : (Hissar


Election Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 1 69
Damodar Goswami v. Narnarayan Goswami and
Others : (Allahabad High Court) 10 E.L.R. 272
Dandapani Das v. Mohan Nayak and Others: (Orissa
High Court) 8 E.L.R. 220 180
Daulat Ram v. Maharaja Anand Chand and Others :
(Bilaspur Election Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 87 20, 82, 92, 242

Debi Prasad v. Mohammed Naseer and Others :


(Gorakhpur Election Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 137 158

Deo Chand and Others v. Vashist Narain and Others :


(Allahabad Election Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 138 132

Desai Basawaraj v. Dasankop Hasansab and Others :


(Dharwar Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 380 17, 20, 22, 30,
41, 49, i n , 159,
205, 226
Deshpande and Others, v. State of Hyderabad and
Others : (Hyderabad High Court) 10 E.L.R. 203 88, 185, 195
Devasharam Sinha v. Sheo Mahadev Prasad &
Others : (Patna Election Tribunal) 10 E.L.R. 461 23, 35, 108,129,
196, 228, 229
Dharam Vir v. Bhala Ram Others : (Barnala Elec-
tion Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 64 97, 147, 215
Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj and Others :
(Supreme Court of India) 9 E.L.R. 485 i n , 124, 137
138, 240
Din Singh and Others v. Kapil Deo and Others:
(Jaipur Eiection Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 247 107
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh :
(Supreme Court of India) 9 E.L.R. 494 227,229,239,242
Elaya Pillai v. K. Parthasarathy and Others :
(Madras High Court) 8 E.L.R. 20 44,156, 241
Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao : (Supreme
Court of India) 2 E.L.R. 499 109. 175
Faqir Chand v. Pritam Singh arid Others : (Barnala
Election Tribunal) 7 E.L R. 119 31. 55. 5«. 81
TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED 5

Fida Hussain v. Sheobhajan Singh and Others:


(Patna High Court) 9 E.L.R. 33 150
Fida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others:
(Hazeribagh Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 1 146

Gairola, K. N. v. Ganga Dhar Maithani and Others :


(Bareilly Election Tribunal) 3 E.L:R. 162 145
Gairola v. Gangadhar Maithani and Others (No. 2) :
(Bareilly Election Tribunal) 8 E.L.R. 105 19, 21, 57, 233
Ganda Singh v. Sampuran Singh and Others : (Barnala
Election Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 17 59, 132
Gangadhar v. Election Tribunal, Vindhya Pradesh,
and Others (Judicial Commissioner's Court,
Vindhya Pradesh) 10 E.L.R. 183 141, 240
Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lai Jain and Others :
(Nowgong Eleetion Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 392 30, 141
Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lai and Others:
(Nowgong Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 448 5, 30, 41, 214, 229
Gayaprashad v. Krishnachandra Sharma and Others :
(Jabalpur Election Tribunal), 10 E.L.R. 6 134. 165, 166
Ghasi Ram v. Ram Singh and Others: (Patiala
Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 124 39
Gian Chand v. Sriram Bansal and Others ; (Patiala
Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 136 79, 103,142
Gidwani Choithram Partabrai v. Agnani Thakurdas
Chuharmal and Others: (Bombay Election
Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 194 9, 174
Gokaldas Hirjee v. Zaveri Vallabhadas and Others :
(Saurashtra Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 234 101
Govind Malaviya v. Murli Manohar and Others:
(Allahabad Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 84 15, 37, 84, 154,
159
Gulapchand Chordia v. Thakur Narain Singh and
Others : (Ajmer Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R.
397 82
Gurdial Singh v. Manmohan Kour & Others (Patiala
Election Tribunal), 10 EX.R. 450 100
ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Gurnam Singh and Another v. Partap Singh and


Others : (Ludhiana Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R.
338 20, 26, 56, 204,
234
Haji Nazimuddin v. Dandiram Dutta and Others and
Sivaprasad Sarma v. Dandiram Dutta and
Others : (Assam Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R.
412 103
Hakikatulla v. Nathu Singh and Others : (Bikaner
Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 10 81, 171
Hamirkha Alarkha v. Returning Officer, Jamnagar
City, and Others (Saurashtra High Court), 5
E.L.R. 230 176
Hans Raj v. Ram Singh and Others : (Delhi Election
Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 12 212 , 221
Hansa Jivraj Mehta v. Indubhai B. Amin and Others :
(Baroda Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 171 80, 242
Hanuman Prasad Misra v. Tara Chand and Others :
(Faizabad Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 446 65. 97, 105 .
Hari Das v. Hira Singh Pal and Others : (Himachal
Pradesh Election Tribanal), 4 E.L.R. 466 50,92, 97, 209
219, 222, 237
Hari Datt v. Madan Mohan and Others : (Bareilly
Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 25 II, 241
Hari Shankar Prasad Gupta v. Shibban Lai Saksena
(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 126 39
Hari Shankar Prasad Gupta v. Sukhdeo Prasad and
Another: (Allahabad High Court), 8 E.L.R.
161, 180
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others :
(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 216 13,109,186,242
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and Others :
(Hoshangabad Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 248 8, 10, 172, 207.
211
Harish Chandra Bajpai and Another v. Trilok Singh
and Others : (Allahabad High Court), 10 E.L.R.
198 126, 185
TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED ?

Harnam Singh v. Jwala Prasad and Others : (Ajmer


Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 332 199, 236
*
Horen Jones v. Mohan Singh and Others : (Shillong
Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 147 79, 242
Hukam Singh and Another v. Sardul Singh and
Others : (Pepsu High Court), 6 E.L.R. 162 176
Isher Singh v. Manjit Inder Singh and Others:
(Barnala Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 90 81, 105

Jadumani Mangraj v. Dinabandu Sahu and Others :


(Cuttack Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 480 39, 44, 123, 138,
156
Jagajeevandas Shetty v. Sanjeeva Shetty and Others :
JMangalore Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 358 48, 55, 152
Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh and Others : (Supreme
Court of India), 9 E.L.R. 231 112 150, 152, 243
Jagannath v. Pandurang and Others: (Jabalpur
Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 167 91, 97
Jagannatha Sharma and Others v. S. C. Gupta and
Others: (Delhi Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 8 197
Jagdish Singh v. Rudra Deolal and Others : (Gwalior
Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 311 11, 90, 172, 227
Jaisingh v. Gopal Singh and Others : (Kotah Election
Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 351 161
Jarnna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhiram Ratanlal
Jain and Others : (Madhya Bharat High Court),
5 E.L.R. 1 153,162
Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others v. Lachhi
Ram and Others: (Supreme Court of India),
10 E.L.R. 120 23, 31
Jamuna Nandan Prasad Sinha v. Jagdish Narain and
Others : (Patna Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R.
14 199, 214
Jang Bahadur Singh v. Basant Lai and Others:
(Nowgong Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 429 5, 42
Jaswant Singh v. Jagan Nath and Others: (Delhi
Election Tribunal), 10 E.L.R. 1 197, 225
Jaswant Singh v. Mangal Das and Others ; (Delhi
Election Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 385 199
s ELECTION LAW REPORTS JHCEST

Jawahar Shankar Pacholi v. Hirdaya Narain Singh


and Others: (Faizabad Election Tribunal),
3 E.L.R. 397 132
Jawahar Shankar Pacholi v. Hirday Narain Singh
and Others (No. 2): (Faizabad Election Tribu-
nal), 6 E.L.R. 495 14,23,52,193,
243
Joginder Singh v. Harchand Singh and Others :
(Kapurthala Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 447 145
Joginder Singh v. Raghbir Singh and Others :
(Patiala Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 81 , 171
Dr. John, V. K. v. G. Vasantha Pai and Others and
Srinivasan, A. v. G. Vasantha Pai and Others :
(Madras High Court), 10 E.L.R. 345 135.136,155.
John Mathai, Dr. v. Returning Officer, Kottayam,
and Three Others and Kurian Isaac v.
Returning Officer, Kottayam, and Three Others:
(Travancore-Cochin High Court), 1 E.L.R. 1 188
Jujhar Singh v. Bhairon Lall and Others : (Kotah
Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 457 35, 56,171
Jwala Prasad Misra v. Mahadeo and Others:
(Rajnandgaon Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 473
70, 133
Jyostna Chandra and Another v. Mehrabali and
Others : (Gauhati Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R.
17. 55. 234
Kalika Prasad Singh v. Abdul Hayat Chand and
Others: (Patna Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R.
118
85
Kalyan Chandra Mohile v. Bishambhar Nath Pandey
and Others : (Allahabad Election Tribunal),
3 E.L.R. 125 219
Kalyan Singh v. Election Tribunal, Ajmer and
Others: (Ajmer Judicial Commissioner's Court),
8 E.L.R. 207 123, 141, 179
Kanaiyalal Bhabhutbhai Mehta v. Satyendra Kalidas
Zaveri and Others : (Palanpur Election Tribunal),
1 E.L.R. 339
Kanaiyalal Durlabhram Bhansali v. Popatlal Mul-
shanker Joshi and Others: (Palanpur Election
140
Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 244
TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED

Kanauji Lai Shukla v. Bhagwan Din and Others:


(Gorakhpur Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 1 71, 202, 241
Kandasami Kandar v. Subramania Goundar and
Others : (Vellore Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R.
156 232
Dr. Kannabhiran v. A. J. Arunachalam and Others :
(Vellore Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 167 66
Karnail Singh v. Election Tribunal, Hissar, and
Others : (Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 189 206
Kartar Singh v. Balu Ram and Others: (Jullunder
Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 71 53
Keshau Prasad v. Brijraj Singh and Others : (Rewa
Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. yy 4, 128
Kesho Ram v. Hazura Singh and Others : (Patiala
Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 320 45, 80, 198
Khader Sheriff, S. v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and
Others : (Madras High Court), 7 E.L.R. 471 J
37> *77> 241
Khilumal and Another v. Arjundas and Others:
(Ajmer Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 497 139
Khushwat Rai v. Karan Singh and Others : (Faizabad
Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 93 47, 122, 141
Kishenlal Lamror v. Madan Singh and Others:
(Ajmer Election Tribunal), 10 E.L.R. 49 81, 242
Kosalram, K. T. v. M. R. Meganathan and Others :
(Madras High Court), 9 E.L.R. 278 108, 124
Krishnaji Bhimrao Antrolikar v. Shankar Shantaram
More and Others : (Poona Election Tribunal),
5 E.L.R. 34 136, 158
Krishnaji Bhimrao Antrolikar v. Shanker Shantaram
More and Others: (Poona Election Tribunal),
7 E.L.R. 100 2, 32, 33. 47. 52,
242
Krishnappa v. Narayansingh and Others : (Nagpur
Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 294 8o, 92

Lachhiram v. Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others:


(Gwaliqr Election Tribunal), 9 EX-R- 149 16, 50, 150
10 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Lahri Singh v. Attar Singh and Others : (Patiala Elec-


tion Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 403 80, 129
Lakkappa v. Narasimhe Gowda and Others : (Mysore
High Court), 9 E.L.R. 201 183
Lakhan Lai Mishra v. Trebeni Kumar and Others :
(Bhagalpur Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 423 213, 226
Lakshmana Pillai v. Chengam Pillai and Others :
(Madras Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 103 143, 212
Lakshmi Chand v. Ladhu Ram Chodhri and Others :
(Jaipur Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 200 105
Lallu Chand v. Tej Singh and Others : (Jaipur Elec-
tion Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 318 160
Lallu Chand v. Tej Singh and Others : (Jaipur Elec-
tion Tribunal) 8 E.L.R. 28 108, 210
Laxman Rao v. Laxminivas Ganeriwal and Others :
(Secunderabad Election Tribunal) 1 E.L.R. 239
Laxman Rao v. Laxminivas Ganerival and Others :
(No. 2) (Secunderabad Election Tribunal) 2
E.L.R. 20 151, 207
Laxmidatta and Another v. Madanlal Bhupar and
Others : (Kotah Election Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 398 169, 172, 226,
242
Linga Gowda, M.C. v. N.K. Shivananjappa (Bangalore
Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 163 120
Linge Gowda v. Shivananjappa : (Bangalore Elec-
tion Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 288 26, 29, 31, 37,
48, 57, 194, 242
Lumba Ram v. Ram Narain and Others : (Bikaner
Election Tribunal) 5 E.L.R. 319 71, 173

Madan Mohan v. Bankat Lai and Others : (Rajasthan


High Court) 8 E.L.R. 119 123, 148, 160
178
Madan Pal v. Rajdeo Upadhya and Others : (Gorakh-
pur Election Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 28 35, 47, 147
Madan Singh v. Kalyan Singh and Others : (Ajmer
Election Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 405 • 82, 141, 215
TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED II

Madhadeo v. Audesh Pratap Singh and Others:


(Gorakhpur Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 398 153
Mahadeo v. Jwalaprasad Mishra and Others : (Nagpur
High Court) 6 E.L.R. 1 122
Maharaja Anand Chand, In re : (Election Commission
of India) 5 E.L.R. 197 93, n o
Maharaja of Parlakimedi v. Bijay Chandra Das and
Others : (Cuttack Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R.
101 60, 72
Mahendra Sahu v. Dutia Raul and Others : (Cuttack
Election Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 117 92
Maharaja Singh v. Ratan Amol Singh and Others :
(Ludhiana Election Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 320 42, 83, 134
Mahendra Kumar v. Vidyavati and Others : (Supreme
Court of India) 10 E.L.R. 214 42, 93, 229
Mahesh Datta v. Murlidhar and Others: (Gwalior
Election Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 154 90,130,170, 173,
242
Majibar Rahman Chaudhury v. Abdul Barkat Ataul
Gani: (West Bengal Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R.
481 36, 4 1
Mandal Sumitra Devi v. Suraj Narain Singh and
Others :. (Bhagalpur Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R.
136 104, 120, 156,
225
Maneklal Amolakchand v. Thete Gopal Ramji and
Others : (Nasik Election Tribunal) 9 E.L.R. 36 109, 206, 214,
224, 239
Mani Kanta Das v. Janab Amjad AH and Others :
(Gauhati Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 406 78
Manjuran, M.M. v. K.C. Abraham (Ernakulam Elec-
tion Tribunal) 10 E.L.R. 376 34. 41. 54. 73.

Manmohani Sehgal v. Sucheta Kirpalani (Delhi Elec- 155, 163


tion Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 347
Marutrao Bhaurao and Others v. Ghulabrao Dada- 113
saheb and Others : (Poona Election Tribunal)
5 E.L.R. 303 14,132, 154, 233
H ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Mast Ram v. Harnam Singh Sethi and Others :


(Ludhiana Election Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 301 26, 29, 48, 53,56,
242
Mathra Das and Others v. Dara Singh and Others
Patiala Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 441 132, 172, 200, 222
Meganathan, M. R. v. K. T. Kosalram and Others :
(Tanjore Election Tribunal) 9 E.L.R. 242 24, 27, 30, 33,
52, 123, 129,
150,112, 164, 242
Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavada Akbar
Dalumiyan and Others : (Ahmedabad Election
tion Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 499 169
Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavada Akbar
Dalumiyan and Others (No. 2): (Bombay Elec-
tion Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 374 26, 32, 82
Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas and Others : (Ajmer Elec-
tion Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 301 102, 142, 151
Mohanlal v. Trilochan Singh and Others : (Rajnand-
gaon Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 41 33
Mohan Vithal Raj v. Gangadhara Siva and Others :
Vellore Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 91 105, 198
Mohinder Singh v. Mihan Singh and Others : (Patiala r
Election Tribunal) 10 E.L.R. 426 100
Moinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi : (Bombay Elec-
tion Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 248 18, 34, 129, 231
Moreshwar Parashram v. Chaturbhuj Vithaldas
Jasani and Others : (Nagpur Election Tribunal)
7 E.L.R. 428 6o, 98, 224, 237
Motiram v. Ramchandar Chowdhary and Others :
(Bikaner Election Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 135 207, 219
Motisinghji Maharamansinghji Mahida v. Chawda
Ishwarbhai Khodabhai and Others: (Kaira Elec-
tion Tribunal) 1 E.L.R. 330 101

Mukti Nath v. Uma Shanker Misra and Others :


(Gorakhpur Election Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 109 52, 241
Mulai and Another v. Lai DanBahadur Singh: (Rewa
Election Tribunal) 9 E.L.R. 8 216, 238, 241,
243
TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED 13

Munuswami Gounder v. Khader Shariff and Others :


(Vellore Election Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 74 139
Munuswami Gounder v. Khader Shariff and Others
No. 2.: (Vellore Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 283 26, 28
Murlidhar v. Kadam Singh and Others : (Madhya
Bharat High Court) 10 E.L.R. 135 124, 161, 162
Muthiah, M. v. A.S. Subba Raj and Others: (Tirunelveli *
Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 109 119
Muthiah, M. v. A. S. Subbaraj and Others: (Tanjore
Election Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 165 36, 141

Nagappa, T. v. Basappa and Others: (Mysore High


Court), 9 E.L.R. 216 183
Nagendra Mahto v. The State: (Patna High Court) 10
E.L.R. 140 7, 114
Nagjibhai Govindbhai Arya v. Mithalbhai Ramji
Chawhan and Others: (Baroda Election Tri-
bunal), 1 E.L.R. 162 98, 220
Naranarayan Goswami v. H. D. Chaudhury and
Others: (West Bengal Election Tribunal), 2
E.L.R. 253 9
Naranjan Singh v. Brish Bhan and Others: (Patiala
Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 179 96,140
Narasimhe Gowda v. Lakkappa and Another: (Banga-
lore Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 234 61, 95
Narasinga Rao, P. v. Suryanarayana and Others:
(Vishakhapatnam Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 83 217
Narotam Singh v. Des Raj and Others: (Patiala
Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 309 211
Nathulal Mantri and Another v. Vindrawan Prasad
Tiwari and Others: (Madhya Bharat High Court)
9 E.L.R. 375 130
Natwar Lai v. Bhartendra Singh and Another (Kotah
Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 408 81, 236
Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. Sudhir Chandra Bhan-
dari and Others: (West Bengal Election Tribu-
nal), 6 E.L.R. 197 123, 213
1

14 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Niranjan Singh v. Jaidev Gadadhar and Others:


(Rajnandgaoh Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 352 yy
Nrisinha Kumar Sinha v. Satyendra Chandra Ghosh
Moulik and Others: (Calcutta Election Tribunal,
2 E.L.R. 121 210, 221

Nrisinha Kumar Sinha and Others v. Returning


Oincer,aBurwati-Khargram and Others: (Calcutta
High Court), 1 E.L.R. 23 190
Nurul Islam v. Muhammad Rafique and Others:
(Nowgong Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 70 1, 14

Nyalchand Virchand Sheth v. Election Tribunal,


Ahmedabad and Others: (Bombay High Court),
8 E.L.R. 417 39
Nyalchand Virchand Sheth v. Vithalbhai Ran-
chhodhbhai Patel and Others: (Bombay Election
Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 451 41. 44. 45. 156,
242

Padmanabha Menon v. A. M. Thomas and Others:


(Ernakulam Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 404 54
Pandit Harish Chandra v. Raja Man Singh and
Others: (Jaipur Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 129 68, 92, 223
Paramasivam, N. v. Election Tribunal, Tiruchirapalli
and Others: (Madras High Court), 8 E.L.R. 102 49
Parmatma Singh v. Deo Saran Sinha and Others:
(Patna Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 353 76
Partap Singh v. Nihal Singh and Others: (Patiala
Election Tribunal,) 3 E.L.R. 31 17, 197
Parthasarathy, K. v. Elaya Pillai and Others: (Tiru-
chirapalli Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 188 41, 44, 52
Polaki Kotesam and Others v. S. M. Patnaik and
- Others: (Orissa High Court), 8 E.L.R. 159 167, 172
Ponnuswami, N. P. v. Returning Officer, Namakkal:
(Madras High Court), 1 E.L.R. 89 191, 241
Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal and
Others: (Supreme Court of India), 1 E.L.R. 133 192, 241
Prabhudas Ramjibhai Mehta v. Lallubhai Kishordas
Maniar: (Bhavanagar Election Tribunal), 1
E.L.R. 154 67, 220
TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED

Prabhudas Ramjibhai Mehta v. Lallubhai Kishordas


Maniar (No. 2): (Saurashtra Election Tribunal),
2 E.L.R. 249 103

Pradipta Kishore Das v. Md. Atahar and Others:


(Cuttack Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 467 7- 8, 243
Prakasam, T. v. U. Krishna Rao and Others:
(Madras Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 384 118

Prakasam, T. v. U. Krishna Rao and Others (No. 2):


(Madras Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 54 47, no, 139
Prakasam, T. v. U. Krishna Rao and Others (No. 3):
(Madras Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 376 4. 8, 9, 44
Prakash Narain v. Jagdish Chandra Joshi and
Others: (Rewa Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 205 171
Pranlal Thakorlal Munshi v. Indubhai Bhailalbhai
Amin and Others: (Baroda Election Tribunal),
1 E.L.R. 182 197
Prem Nath v. Ram Krishan and Others: (Jullundur
Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 271 144, 174, 217
Pritam Singh v. Charan Singh and Others: (Lucknow
Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 276 144
Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patel v. Shantilal
Girdharlal Parikh and Others: (Mehsana Elec-
tion Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 223

Radhakrishnan v. Masilamani Chettiar and Others:


(Vellore Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 148 4, 6, 8, 10, 231
Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Chandra Bhanu Gupta
and Others: (Lucknow Election Tribunal), 6
E.L.R. 123 156
Raghunath Singh v. Kampta Prasad Saxena: (Now-
gong Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 424 16, 39, 149
Raghuraj Singh v. Vasant Rao and Others: (Jabalpur
Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 295 119
Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo and Others:
(Supreme Court of India), 9 E.L.R. 294 42, 45, 155, 240
Ramchandra Choudhuri v. Sadasiva Tripathy and
Others: (Nayagarh Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R.
450 152
ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

ftmachandra Choudhuri v. Sadavisa Tripathy and


Others (No. 2): (Nayagarh Election Tribunal),
5 E.L.R. 401 39, 57, 194
Ramachandra Choudhuri v. Sadasiva Tripathy and
Others (No. 2): (Nayagarh Election Tribunal),
5 E.L.R. 194 161
Ramachandran Nair v. Ramachandra Das and
Others: (Quilon Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 442 103, 153, 220
Ramakrishna Reddy v. Kamala Devi: (Secunderabad
Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 173 208
Rama Reddi v. Chidanandam and Others: (Bellary
Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. ^7^ 118
Rama Reddi v. Chidanandam and Another (No. 2):
(Bellary Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 42 71, 77
Ramaswami, V. V. v. Election Tribunal, Tirunelveli,
and Others : (Madras High Court), 8E.L.R 233 24, 65
Ramayan Sharan Singh and Another v. Rameshwar
Yadav and Others: (Hazaribagh Election
Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 296 95, 166
Ram Chand v. Wadhawa Ram and Others : (Ludhiana
Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 386 68, 95
Rameshwar Prasad Singh v. Krishna Gopal Das and
Others). (Hazaribagh Election Tribunal), 4
E.L.R.112 210,234
Ramkrishna v. Thakur Daoosingh : (Nagpur High
Court), 6 E.L.R. 186 177
Ramlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission of
India and Others: (Patna High Court), 7
E.L.R. 364 168
Ramlal ;v. Sujaniram and Others: (Rajandgaon
Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 27 212, 237
Ram Murti v. Sumba Sadar and Others : (Berhampur
Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 330 91, 94
Ram Singh v. Ghosi Ram and Others (Pepsu High
Court) 9 E.L.R. 183 45, 241, 242
Ram Singh v. Hazari Lai and Others: Jaipur
Election Tribunal).. 6 E.L.R. 224 171, 198, 201
Ram Singh and Others v. Returning Officer, Kot
Putli, and Others: (Rajasthan High Court), 1
E.L.R. 52 190
TABiE OF CASES DIGESTED 17

Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh and Others:


(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 129 24
Ranchhodlal Liladhar Vayeda v. Sanjalia Mohanlal
Virjibhai and Others: (Ahmedabad Election
Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 493^ 198, 209
Ranchhodlal Liladhar Vayeda v. Election Tribunal,
Ahmedabad : (Bombay High Court), 8 E.L.R.
59 177, 208
Ratan Shukla v. Brijendra Swarup and Others:
(Faizabad Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 116 122
Ratan Singh and Another v. Padam Chand Jain and
Others; (Rewa Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 189 5,7,215,243
Rattan Anmol Singh and Another y. Atma Ram and
Others : (Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R.
41 217, 236, 241, 243
Rattan Singh v. Devinder Singh and Others :
(Ludhiana Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 234 17, 53, 66, 133,
154, 219, 237,
239, 240
Rikhab Das v. Ridhichand Palliwal and Others :
(Jaipur Election Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 115 16, 43, 47, 129,
230, 232
Roopchandra Sogani v. Rawat Man Singh and
Others : (Jaipur Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 339 163
Roop Chandra Sogani and Others v. Rawat Man
Singh and Others (No. 2): (Jaipur Election
Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 327 115
Roopchandra Sogani and Another v. Rawat Man
Singh and Others (No. 3): (Jaipur Election
Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 21 131, 210, 224, 243
Rudra Pratap Narain Singh v. Bhagwandin Misra
and Others: (Allahabad High Court (Lucknow
Bench), 1 E.L.R. 60 191
Sahi Ram v. Manphool Singh and Others, (Bikaner
Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 47 82, 84
Saka Venkata Rao v. Election Commission : (Madras
High Court), 1 E.L.R. 417 no
Salig Ram Jaiswal v. Sheo Kumar Pande and
Others : (Allahabad Election Tribunal), 9 E.L.R.
67 98,114, 150, 154
ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Sambandam, S. K. v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and


Others: (Madras High Court), 5 E.L.R. 341 3, 200
Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, and
Another : (Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R.
293 116,187
Sankara Pandia Nadar, A. S. S. S. v. V. V. Rama-
swami and Others : (Tanjore Election Tribunal),
5 E.L.R. 417 7. 25, 64
Sant Singh v. Shamsher Singh and Others : (Ludhiana
Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. Z03 80, 83, 95
Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. Hukam Singh and Others :
(Patiala Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 316 1,18, 19, 55,147
Sarju Prasad Namdeo v. Gopal Saran Singh and
Others : (Nowgong Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R.
149
- 444
Satish Chander v. Ganga Singh and Others : (Bikaner
Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 38 209
Satya Dev Bushahri v. Ghanshyam and Others :
(Himachal Pradesh Election Tribunal), 4
E.L.R. 67 31. 153
Satya Dev Bushahri v. Ghanshiam : (Himachal
Pradesh Judicial Commissioner's Court), 6 164
E.L.R. 388
Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and Others: 42, 43. 93. 95-
(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 103 229
Satyanatham, N. v. K. Subramaniam and Others :
(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 311 75
Seshaiah v. Koti Reddi and Others: (Bellary
Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 39 15
Shah Mohammad Umair v. Ram Charan Singh and
Others : (Patna High Court), 8 E.L.R. 179 149. 178, 243
Shah Umair Sahib v. Ramcharan Singh and Others :
5.6, 8
(Patna Election Tribunal), 10 E.L.R. 162
Shakti Parshad Shukla v. Balwant Singh and Others : 203, 2 2 2
(Kapurthala Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 301
Shankare Gowda v. Mariyappa and Another : Mysore 21,112
Election Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 101
Shankar Nanasaheb Karpe v. Maruti Sitaram Sawant
and Others: (Kolaba Election Tribunal), 1
E.L.R. 302
TABLE OF CASES DIGESt*I>

Shankar Nanasaheb Karpe v. Returning Officer,


Kolaba, and Another: (Bombay High Court),
i E.L.R. 13 188
Shankar Rao Ramaji and Another v. The State of
Madhya Bharat: (Madhya Bharat High Court),
1 E.L.R. 34 190
Shankar Tripathi v. Returning Officer, Mirzapur,
and Others: (Allahabad Election Tribunal),
2 E.L.R. 315 1, 17, 130, 159,
232
Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Bashir Hussain Zaidi and
Others : (Faizabad Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R.
280 48
Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Bashir Hussain Zaidi and
Others (No. 2): (Faizabad Election Tribunal),
8 E.L.R. 300 5, 156, 214
Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Election Tribunal, Faizabad,
and Others : (Allahabad High Court), 8 E.L.R.
201 162, 178
Shantilal Chaudhary v. Raghuraj Singh and Others;
(Madhya Bharat High Court), 7 E.L.R. 489 177
Shantilal Chaudhary v. Raghuraj Singh and Others
(No. 2): (Indore Election Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 93 57,111,116, 164
Sheo Kumar and Another v. V. G. Oak and Others :
(Allahabad High Court), 5 E.L.R. 103 175
Sheo Mahadeo Prasad v. Deva Sharan Sinha and
Others : (Patna High Court), 10 E.L.R. 144 125
Sheonarayan Vaidya v. Sardarmal Lalwani: (Bhopal
Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 401 23, 24, 36, 131,
242
Shibban Lai Saxena v. Hari Shanker Prasad and
Others : (Gorakhpur Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R.
313 145
Shibban Lai Saksena v. Harishanker Prasad and
Others : (Gorakhpur Election Tribunal), 9 E.L.R.
403 40,50, 151, 157,
233
Shiv Dayal and Others v. Teg Ram and Others :
(Ludhiana Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 346 201
20 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Shiv Dutt and Others v. Bansidas Dhangar and


Others : (Faizabad Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R.
55 158
Shiv Dutt and Others v. Bansidas Dhangar and
Others (No. 2): (Faizabad Election Tribunal),
9 E.L.R. 324 19.30 ,241 .243
Shiva Das and Another v. Sheikh Mohammad Abdul
Samad and Others : (Allahabad Election Tri-
bunal), 8 E.L.R. 265 6, 8, 16, 24, 29,
32, 50, 107, 159.
170
Shivarama Karanth v. Venkataramana Gowda and
Others : (Mangalore Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R.
187 40, 84
Shivdev Singh v. Dara Singh and Others : (Patiala
Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 496 1, 114, " 5
T. Siddalingaiya, Member, Mysore Legislative
Assembly, In re : (Election Commission of India),
7 E.L.R. 416 60
Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograj Singh Shankar
Singh Parihar : (Bombay High Court), 2 E.L.R.
283 117,144,164
Sivathanu Pillai v. Nesamony and Others: (Tri-
vandrum Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 312 36, 54, 118
Sivathanu Pillai v. Election Tribunal, Trivandrum,
and Others : (Travancore-Cochin High Court),
2 E.L.R. 263 174
Sochet Singh v. Thakar Singh and Others : (Kapur-
thala Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 401 154
Sochet Singh v. Thakar Singh and Others (No. 2):
(Kapurthala Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 102 104,140
Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others : (Ludhiana
Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 55 4, T4, 240
A. Srinivasan v. G. Vasantha Pai and Others and
V. K. John v. G. Vasantha Pai and Others :
(Madras High Court), 10 E.L.R. 245 3i, 52, 53. 135.
136, 154
Sri Ram v. Mohammad Taqi Hadi and Others:
(Bareilly Election Tribunal), 8 EX.R. 139 20, I2§, 232
TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED

Subba Raj, A. S. v. M. Muthiah and Others : (Madras


High Court), 5 E.L.R. 21 no, 121
Subba Raj, A. S. v. M. Muthiah (No. 2): (Madras High
Court), 9 E.L.R. 290 124
Subbaraya Goundar A. K. v. Muthusami Goundar
and Others : (Madras High Court), 7 E.L.R. 465 215
Subramanya Bhatt v. Abdul Hameed Khan and
Others: (Madras Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R.
225 203
Subramanya Goundar v. Kandasami Goundar and
Others : (Vellore Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 214 117
Subramania Goundar, K. S. v. Election Tribunal,
Vellore, and Others: (Madras High Court),
8 E.L.R. 66 126, 148
Subramanyam, K. v. Abdul Hameed Khan and
Others: (Madras Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R.
432 140, 170
Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat and Others : (Punjab
High Court), 9 E.L.R. 145 "3
Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu and
Others: (West Bengal Election Tribunal),
4 E.L.R. 73 19, 21, 128, 231
Sujaniram v. Lai Shyam Shah and Others : (Nagpur
High Court), 5 E.L.R. 183 223, 238
Sukar Gope v. State of Bihar : (Patna High Court),
1 E.L.R. 68 189, 241

Sumer Singh v. Thakur Gurdat and Others : (Jullun-


dur Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 171 83
Surain Singh v. Waryam Singh and Others : (jullun-
42
dur Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 99
Suraj Bhan v. Hem Chand Jain and Others : (Delhi
96, 131, 159
Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 1
Suraj Narain v. Ram Nath and Others : (Gorakhpur
235
Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 305
Suryaji Rama Rao v. Bhika Trimbak Pawar : (Nasik
Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 205 133,217
Swaminatha Mercondar, R. v. S. Ramalingam : (Tiru-
chirapalli Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 51 15
22 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Swaminatha Merkondar v. Ramalingam and Others


(No. 2): (Trichirapalli Election Tribunal),
2 E.L.R. 390 21
Tej Singh v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, and Others :
(Rajastan High Court), 9 E.L.R. 193 108, 142,161,182

Thakur Daoosing v. Ramkrishna Rathor and Others :


(Rajnandgaon Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 34 89,][46
Thete Gopal Ramji v. Amolok Chand and Others :
(Nasik Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 477 193
Tikaram Sharma v. Lalit Bahadur Kharga andOthers :
(West Bengal Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 252 205„ 220
Tirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh and Others : (Pepsu
High Court), 9 E.L.R. 163 182, 241
Trambaklal Manishanker v. Prabhulal Bhimji and
Others (Saurashtra Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R.
245 IOI, 221

Udainath Singh v. Jagat Bahadur Singh and Others:


(Rewa Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 26 59
Udainath Singh v. Jagat Bahadur Singh and Others:
(No. 2), (Rewa Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 199 147, 226
Ugam Singh v. Hari Singh and Others: (Bikaner
Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 470 197, 201, 203,
223
Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chand and Others:
(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 30 128, 228,240
Vijaya Mohan Reddy v. Paga Pulla Reddy and
Others: (Secunderabad Election Tribunal), 2 104, 142, 164,
E.L.R. 414 173. 198, 212,
221, 235
Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Members, In
the matter of: (Election Commission of India), 4
E.L.R. 422 87, 242
Yograjsingh Shankar Singh Parihar v. Sitaram Hira-
chand Birla and Others: (Bombay Election Tri-
bunal), 1 E.L.R. 389 119.143
Yograjsingh Shankarsingh Parihar v. Sitaram Hira-
chand Birla and Others: (No. 2), (Bombay Elec-
tion Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 439 85, 114 242
A DIGEST
OF THE

ELECTION LAW REPORTS


VOLS. I TO X.

ABATEMENT.
Abatement of proceedings—Resignation of returned candidate—Where
the Election Commission has referred an election petition to a Tribunal,
the Tribunal is bound to decide the petition, even though the candidate
who has been returned has resigned his seat, if the petitioner has not
merely asked for a declaration that the election of the returned candi-
date is void but also for a declaration that he has been duly elected. The
petition does not abate on the resignation of the returned candidate.
NuKtrii ISLAM V. MUHAMMAD BAFIQTTE AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 70.
Dissolution of Assembly—Whether election petition abates—
An election petition does not abate on the dissolution of the Assembly
if there are allegations of corrupt practice against the respondent in
the petition.
SHIVDEV SINGH V. DABA SINGH AND OTHEBS, 5 E.L.R. 496.

AEROPLANE.
Aeroplane.—Dropping leaflets from aeroplane—Whether corrupt
practice—An aeroplane is not a vehicle used for road transport and the
dropping of leaflets from an aeroplane does not amount to a corrupt
practice within section 123(6) or 123(8). Section 123(8) does not prohibit
a public servant from giving permission to a candidate to hire and use
an aeroplane for carrying on his election oampaign.
SHANKAB TBIPATHI v. BETURNING OFFICER, MIBZAPITB, AND
OTHERS, 2 E.L.B. 315.
AGENCY.
Agency.—Newspapers—Agency in election law has a muoh wider
significance than under the ordinary law of principal and agent and may
be inferred from the circumstances and conduct. Newspapers which
make special propaganda for the election of a particular candidate can
be treated as his agents for purposes of election law.
SABDUL SINGH CAVEESHAB V. HUKAM SINGH AND OTHEBS,
6 E.L.E. 316. See also 8 E.L.E. 265.
Carrying voters—The term "agent" in election law has a wide
significance. No authorisation or declaration in writing is necessary
2 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

and the fact of agency may be established by circumstances arising out


of the general features of the case, the conduct and connection of the
parties, and the subsequent recognition of the acts of the supposed
agent or at least an absence of disavowal of such aots. The doctrine of
agency is carried by election law much farther than in civil and cri-
minal cases. Where the respondent was a member of the Traffic Board,
and a person who was the owner of a bus service and well known to the
respondent employed his buses exclusively for carrying voters free of
charge to the polling booth on the election day with the placards of the
symbol of the respondent, and the respondent did not object to these acts:
Held, (i) that the bus-owner acted as an agent of the respondent and
the latter was guilty of a major corrupt practice under section 126(6);
(ii) that, even if the respondent had nothing to do with these
acts, they would amount to a minor corrupt practice under section 12
read with section 123(6) of the Act.
T. C. BASAPPA v. NAGAPPA AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 197.
Secretary of political party.—Even though the term "agent"
has a much wider signification in election law than in the law of agency
the Secretary of the Election Propaganda Committee of a Party, who
publishes leaflets and posters in his capacity as such Secretary, cannot
be deemed to have done such act as the agent of the candidate set up
by the Party, unless there is evidence to show that the act was done
with the knowledge> consent or connivance of the candidate. Great
Yarmouth case (5 O'M. & H. 176), Bombay Central (M.B.) 1935 (Ham.
mond 201), Baba Gurdit Singh v. Partap Singh Kairon (l Doabia 92)
and Syed Mahamud Shah v. Ghulam Samad and Others (2 Doabia 3 0)
referred to.
KBISHNAJI BHIMEAO ANTEOLIKAR v. SHANKAE SHANTAEAM MOEE
AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 100. See also 7 E.L.E. 457, 8 E.L.E. 417 and
9 E.L.E. 451.
See ELECTION AGENT, ELECTION EXPENSES and NOMINATION.
AMENDMENT.
Amendment of particulars.—See COEEUPT PRACTICE.
Amendment of petition.—See ELECTION PETITION.
Amendment of rnles.—Applicability of new rules to pending elections
—The words "the rules and orders made thereunder" in seotion 18(l)(b)
of the E. P. Act, 1951, do not mean rules and orders made before the
date of the notification and in force on the date of the notification.
They only mean rules made under the> power conferred by the Act.
Where, after the notification of the Governor under section 18(1), but
before the nomination papers of the candidates had been filed, Eules 91
AMENDMENT OF RULES 3

and 96 to 102, of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Eleo»


tions and Election Petitions) Eules, 1951, (which related to the method
of counting of votes) were repealed and new rules were substituted for
the name and the Eeturning Officer counted the votes in accordance with
the new rules, and the election of the successful candidate was impugned
on the ground that the Eeturning Officer should not have applied the
new rules : the Election Tribunal held that no one had a vested right
in the manner of counting votes, as the rules relating to counting were
a matter of procedure and the new rules were rightly applied to the
election in question. [S. K. SAMBANDAM V. SUBYA EAO AND OTHEBS,
2 E.L.R. 61]. On a writ application to the High Court of Madras
Held, that, though the right to vote was a substantive right, yet, as
the rules in question did not abrogate any right to vote or to stand for
election but merely regulated the mode in which that right should be
exercised, they were wholly procedural in nature, and the Eeturning
Officer acted rightly in applying the new rules for the counting of
votes. Held further, that until a person had chosen to stand as a candi-
date and filed his nomination paper he could not acquire any substan-
tive rights in respect of that election and, as the new rules had come
into force before the nomination papers were filed, the new rules were,
in any event, applicable to the case. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer,
Namakkal (1 E.L.E. 133) and United States v. Classic (85 L.Ed. 136)
referred to.
S. K. SAMBANDAM V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, MADBAS, AND OTHEBS,
5 E.L.E. 341.
The elected members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly were
called upon to elect members to the Punjab Legislative Council "in
accordance with the Act and of the rules and orders made thereunder"
by notification dated 4th March, 1952. Subsequently, the Central
Government, by a second notification dated 10th March, 1952, sub-
stituted the new rules 96 to 102 for the existing rules. The Eeturning
Officer applied the new rules to the election : Held, (i) that after the
10th March, 1952, the old rules must be deemed to have been scored
out and the new rules written in their place, and the application of
the new rules to the election would, therefore, in no way conflict with
the words of the notification of the 4th March, 1952, directing the elec-
tion to be "in accordance with the Act and rules and orders made there-
under;" (ii) that the right of the petitioner to stand for election was more
in the nature of a "privilege" rather than an "acquired right" and, if
before the date of nomination that privilege was subjeoted to oertain
conditions different from the previous ones, that oannot be taken to
have affected his vested interest: Starey v. Graham ([1899] 1 Q.B.D. 406),
Reynolds.and Another v. Attorney-General .([1896] A.C. 240) referred to.
4 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

(iii) that rules 96 to 102 as amended by the notification dated


10th March, 1952, were therefore rightly applied by the Eeturning Officer
in counting the votes, and these were the only rules according to which
recount could be taken. S. K. Sambandam v. M. Surya Sao and Others
(2 E.L.E. 61) referred to.
SOHAN LAL v. ABINASH CHANDEB AND OTHEES, 4 E.L.E. 55.
BALLOT BOXES.
Ballot boxes.—Affixing of seals—The Conduct of Elections and Elec-
tion Petitions Eules, 1951, do not contemplate affixture of seals by the
candidates or their polling agents on the ballot boxes at the close of the
poll. The expression "their seals" in rule 46(1) (iii) refers to seals on
*the boxes, not seals, of the candidates or their agents.
T. PEAKASAM v. U. KEISHNAEAO AND OTHEES (NO. 3), 2 E.L.E. 376.
Arrangement of boxes—Under rule 21(5) of the Conduct of
Elections and Election Petitions Eules, 1951, the ballot boxes have to be
placed at the polling booth side by side in the same order in which the
names of the candidates to whom such boxes have been alloted appear
in the list of valid nominations published under rule 11. If the boxes
are arranged in this order, and no objection is raised at the time, the
validity of the election cannot be challenged on the ground that the
boxes of the candidates of a particular party were kept side by side,
and illiterate voters might have been misled to putting the ballot
papers into adjacent boxes without understanding the symbols.
BADHAKEISHNAN v. MASILAMANI CHETTIAB AND OTHERS, 4
E.L.E. 148.
Defective boxes—Where the question is whether the design of
certain ballot boxes was such that they could be opened without damag-
ing the paper seals fixed by the presiding officers of the polling stations,
open demonstration in court by a person showing that such ballot boxes
could be opened without damaging the paper seals is relevant and
admissible evidence, even though he is not an expert, (ii) The mere fact
that if the paper seals were fixed loosely and the threads bearing the
lac seal were long, the ballot boxes used could be opened without
breaking the seals, or the fact that the ballot boxes could be opened by
the use of dexterity and skill of a high order, is not sufficient to prove
that the construction of such boxes was mechanically defective and that
there was non-oompliance with rule 21(1).
KESHAU PBASAD v. BEIJBAJ SINGH AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.E. 77.
Prom the mere fact that the boxes were defective in design it
cannot be presumed that the result of the election has been materially
affected. Haverford (L.E. 9 C.P. 7) and Hackney case (31 L.T. 69) distd.
KESHAU PEASAD v. BEIJBAJ SINGH AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.E. 77.
BALLOT BOXES

The fact that a ballot box could be, opened without breaking
the seals by superior mechanical cunning and force does not prove that
its design was defective. Keshau Prasad v. Brijraj Singh (7 E.L.E. 77)
followed.
EATAN SINGH AND ANOTHEE V. PADAM CHAND JAIN AND OTHBES,
7 E.L.E. 189.
-Even if it is proved that the ballot boxes were defective and
were such that they could be tampered with and that there were
irregularities in conducting the election, the election cannot be set aside
under the Indian law unless it is proved further that the result of the
election has been —not merely might have been—materially affected by
the said defect or irregularity. The fact that in some cases it may be
very difficult to give positive proof of this fact is no ground for ignoring
the law laid down in the Indian Act. Woodward v. Sarsons (10 C.P. 733)
distinguished.
SHANTA DEVI VAIDYA V. BASHIE HUSAIN ZAIDI AND OTHEES
(No. 2), 8 E.L.E. 300.
The fact that certain types of ballot boxes had been ap-
proved by the Election Commission does not debar the Election
Tribunal from considering whether' they have been constructed
in accordance with and finding that they are defective. The mere
fact that the ballot boxes were inherently defective and instruc-
tions for sealing the boxes were issued by the Election Commission
in ignorance of this defect and consequently the boxes could be
opened without breaking the paper seal or wax seal and there was thus
a non-compliance with rule 25(1) would not by itself invalidate an
election. It must further be established that the result of the election
was materially affected by this non-compliance with rule 25(l).
JANG BAHADUB SINGH V. BASANT LAL AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 429. <
The mere fact that the ballot boxes used were defective and
rule 21(l) was not therefore complied with is not a ground for setting
aside an election unless it is further proved that the result of the
election has been materially affected thereby.
GANGAPEASAD SHASTEI v. PANNA LAL AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 448.
Inspection of boxes.—Eule 46(l)(iii) of the Conduct of Elections and
Election Petitions Eules, 1951, which provides that the Eeturning
Officer shall allow the candidates and their election agents and counting
agents present an opportunity to inspect the ballot boxes and seals, is
sufficiently complied with if those who were present had an opportunity
to inspect the boxes if they liked and no one was prevented from
inspecting them. He need not show the boxes to each of them.
SHAH UMAIB SAHIB V. EAMCHAEAN SINGH AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E,
162.
ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Opening of boxes.—Under rule 46(vi) as amended it is not irregular


to permit more than one ballot box to be opened at the same time,
provided all the boxes opened at the same time belong to the same
candidate.
EADHAKBISHNAN v. MASILAMANI CHETTIAB, 4 E.L.E. 148.
Symbols.—Where the absence of some of the symbols in some
ballot boxes does not present any difficulty in identifying the boxes
owing to the presence of other symbols it is not a ground for setting
aside the election.
SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHEB V. SHEIK M O H A M M A D ABDUL SAMAD
AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 265.
Tampering.—(i) The mere fact that the outer seals of some ballot
boxes are missing or broken does not raise an inference or even a pre-
sumption of "tampering." Tampering must be proved as a fact, (ii) If
the outer seals are missing or broken there is a duty on the Eeturn-
ing Officer to enquire whether there was tampering, but the fact that
he has failed to make an enquiry does not invalidate the counting or
avoid the election, (iii) To constitute "tampering" it is not necessary
to prove that the ballot papers were taken out, added to or destroyed.
Actual meddling with the boxes is enough, (iv) If tampering is proved
it makes the election at the booth concerned void. It is not necessary
to prove that the result of the election was affected.
SHAH UMAIB SAHIB V. RAM CHAEAN SINGH AND OTHEES, 10
E.L.R. 162.
Where, at the time of counting, it was found that one of the
ballot boxes had the label of a ladder (the symbol of respondent No. 2.
outside, and the label of two bulls and a yoke (the symbol of respond-
ent No. 1) inside: Reid (MiTBA dissenting)—(i) that it must be presumed
that the mistake in labelling existed at the time of the polling; that the
mistake amounted to a "tampering" with the box within the meaning
of rule 46(l)(iv), even though there was no evidence to show that any-
one had actually meddled with the box, and it was incumbent on the
Eeturning Officer to postpone the counting of votes under rule 46(l)(iv)
and to follow the procedure laid down in rule 58, that is, to take afresh
poll. He cannot make an enquiry as to whether the tampering was done
before or after the poll, (ii) The provisions contained in rule 46(l)(iv)
and rule 58 are not merely directory provisions, and if these provisions
are not complied with, and the result of the election has been materially
affected thereby, the election must be set aside under section 100(2)(c).
Per MlTEA.—As there was evidence to show that all the labels on
the boxes were intact from the commencement of the poll until they
were delivered to the police, the so-called tampering must have taken
BALLOT BOXES

place afterwards. The removal of the outer label or its displacement


after the close of the poll would not materially affect the result of
the election and, as such, would not amount to "tampering" within
the meaning of rule 46(l)(iv), and the Returning Officer was not bound
to order a re-poll in the circumstances of the case. [Procedure relating
to polling and the counting of votes described and disoussed in detail.]
PBADIPTA KISHOBE DAS V. MD. ATAHAB AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.R.
467.
The instruction issued by the Election Commission, that even
if the seal on the thread is not intact, if the paper seal is intact the
ballot box may be treated as untampered and closed, is unsatisfactory
and gives opportunity to tamper with the boxes.
ABDUL 'RAUF V. GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.R.
240.
Where the Form No. 10 prepared at several polling stations
were fictitious, there was serious manipulation of ballot papers, the
provisions of rule 33 were not observed and it was difficult to ascertain
the exact number of votes polled by each candidate: Held, that the
election was vitiated by non-compliance with the rules and the result
was materially affected thereby, and the election should be declared
void. »
RATAN SINGH AND ANOTHEB V. PADAM CHAND JAIN AND OTHEBS,
7 E.L.R. 189.
Where the evidence showed that the accused behaved in a
disorderly manner by entering into a room where the ballot boxes were
kept, without the permission of the Presiding Officer, and'refused to
quit when he was ordered to go out of the room, and that he attempted
to put some of the ballot papers into a ballot box, whereupon he was
arrested : Held, that though it was stated in the complaint that the
accused had thereby committed an offence under section 132(3) read
with section 128 of the R. P. Act, as the material allegations were set
out in it, conviction of the accused under section 131(l)(b) and section
136(l)(f) of the Aot would not be illegal.
NAGENDBA MAHTO v. THE STATE, 10 E.L.R. 140.
-'•—Where the Presiding Officer of a polling station suspects that
there has been tampering with a ballot box, it is open to him to subs-
titute another ballot box in its place and continue the polling and if it
is subsequently found that there was no tampering, the ballot papers in
both the boxes can be counted. Such a case does not fall within section
58 of the Act and there is no need for a re-poll.
SANKABA PANDIA NADAB v. V; V. RAMASWAMI AND OTHEBS, 5
E.L.R. 417.
8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Transport and custody of boxes.—The arrangements to be made


under rule 34 for the safe transport and custody of the ballot boxes
until the commencement of the counting of votes is a matter in which
the Eeturning Officer has to use his discretion, but the measures adopted
should be such as to be reasonably sufficient for their safe custody.
T. PBAKASAM v. U. KBISHNA EAO AND OTHERS (NO. 3), 2 E.L.B. 376.
BALLOT PAPERS.
Ballot papers.—Counting—Where one of the ballot boxes of a candi-
date was missing and the counting of the papers in that box was held
over and the Eeturning Officer therefore counted the papers of another
candidate, and when the missing box was discovered, the papers therein
were counted : Held, though there was a non-compliance of rule 46(5)
it was a mere irregularity which did not affect the result of the election.
SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER V. SHEIK M O H A M M A D A B D U L SAMAD
AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.B. 265.
Bale 46 does not contemplate that the result of the counting
of the ballot papers of each candidate must be announced then and
there.
T. PRAKASAM v. U. KRISHNA BAO AND OTHERS (NO. 3), 2
E.L.E. 376.
Bule 46(1), els. (v) and (vi), do not prohibit the counting of a
particular candidate's boxes by more than one counting party at the
same time. It only prohibits the counting of more than one box by
the same person at the same time.
SHAH UMAIR SAHIB V. EAM GHARAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 10
E.L.E. 162.
Counting of votes on different dates and at different places is
not prohibited by the E. P. Act, 1951, or the rules thereunder.
HARI VISHNU KAMATH V. SYED AHMED AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.B. 248.

Procedure relating to counting of votes described and dis-


cussed in detail.
PRADIPTA KISHOBE DAS V. MD. ATAHAR AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.B. 467.
Double member constituencies—The practice of providing each
elector with a plurality of votes in the case of double constituencies,
with instructions to put one vote in each box is imperfect as it leads to
a huge wastage of votes by illiterate people putting both the votes in
the same box. It is desirable to devise better machinery.
BADHAKBISHNAN v, MASILAMANI CHETTIAB AND OTHEBS, i
E.L.B. 148,
- BALLOT PAPERS 9

Inspection of ballot papers—Candidates and their agents have


no right to claim inspection of all the ballot papers. Under rule 46, the
right to inspect is restricted to such papers as in the opinion of the
Returning Officer, are liable to be rejected. T. PRAKASAM V. U. KRISHNA
RAO AND OTHERS (NO. 3), 2 E.L.R. 376.
—.—Interchange of ballot papers 1.—Where elections for the House
of the People and the Legislative Assembly were held on the same
day and in the election for the House of the People the Presiding
Officer of a particular booth by mistake gave to the voters ballot papers
intended to be used for the election for the Assembly, and under the
instructions of the Election Commission the Returning Officer rejected
1
these votes on the ground that he had no power to condone the irregu-
larity and regularise the votes as the poll was over and counting had
begun: Held, that rule 47(l)(c) was not mandatory, and in any event as
in the present case the ballot papers found in the ballot boxes actually
contained the serial numbers and marks of ballot papers authorised for
use at the particular booth though there was an interchange of ballot
papers, there was a substantial compliance with rule 47(l)(c) and, as
there was nothing to show that the voters had been misled, the Return-
ing Officer had power.even after the counting had started to condone the
irregularity ; and the rejection of the votes was therefore improper.
Abdul Majid v. Say ad Ahmed (1 Doabia 229) and Mohansingh v. Santokh
Singh (l Doabia 192) referred to. GlDWANI CHOITHRAM PARTABRAI V.
AGNANI THAKTJRDAS CHUHARMAL AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 194.
2. Where, in a poll for elections to the Assembly and the House
of' the People held in the same polling station and on the same
day, there has been an interchange of ballot papers owing to the mistake
of the officers conducting the poll, votes cast in favour of a candidate for
the Assembly oannot be rejected as invalid merely on the ground that
they have been cast on ballot papers meant for the House of the People.
This is only a mere irregularity and is not fatal to the validity of the
votes. The fact that the Returning Officer had rejected such votes does
not preclude the Tribunal from treating them as valid and if the Tribunal
finds that if such votes are also counted the petitioner would have
more votes than the returned candidate, the Tribunal can declare the
election of the latter void and declare the petitioner as duly elected.
The Tribunal can inspect the ballot papers in a case like this, even
though such procedure may infringe the secrecy of the ballot. Qidwani
Ghoitram Partabrai v. Thakurdas Ghuharmal and Others (1 E.L.R. 194)
followed. NARANARAYAN GOSWAMI V. H. D. CHAUDHURY AND OTHERS
2 E.L.R. 253. [Reversed in 10 E.L.R. 272, see p. 13 infra].
10 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

3. Wrong issue of Assembly ballot papers to voters for the


Parliament and vice versa for election held on the same day is an irregu-
larity which would vitiate the election if the result of the election has
been materially affected thereby. RADHAKBISHNAN V. MASILAMANI
CHETTIAE, 4 E.L.B. 148.
4. Where elections for the House of the People and the Assembly
were held at the same polling station on the same day, and due to a
mistake of the polling officers, there was an interchange of ballot papers
at the time of distribution to voters, and votes whieh were cast for the
petitioner who stood for the Assembly were rejected on the ground that
they were cast by ballot papers intended for use for election to the
House of the People and it was also found that if those votes had been '
accepted as valid, the petitioner would have secured more votes than
the returned candidate :—Held, (i) that the Tribunal had jurisdiction
to consider whether the votes thus east on wrong ballot papers were
valid or not; (ii) that the Tribunal had the power to regularise the
mistake, even though the Election Commission had no opportunity to
do so, as the matter was not brought to the notice of the Commission in
time ; (iii) that rule 47(l)(c) with regard to proper serial numbers and
distinguishing marks of ballot papers was not mandatory but only
directory, and though rule 47(l)(e) was not strictly complied with, the
ballot papers could be accepted as valid in the circumstances of the
oase; (vi) that the petitioner should therefore be declared to have been
duly elected. Woodward v. Sars&ni (10 C.P.D. 733), Qidtnani Choithram
Partabrai v. Agnani Thakurdas Ohuharmal (1 3.L.R. 194) referred to.
BALAILAIi DAS MOHAPATRA V. TKAILAKYA NATH PEODHAN AND
05DHEES, 4 E.L.R. 221.
5. -The provision contained in rule 47(l)(c) of the E. P. Eules
1951, that a ballot paper contained in a ballot box shall be rejected if it
bears any mark different from the mark authorised for use at the poll-
ing station or polling booth at which the ballot box in which it was
found was used, is of a mandatory nature. Consequently, where there
has been an interchange of ballot papers intended for the Legislative
Assembly and the House of the People through a bona fide mistake of
the Presiding Officer of a polling station in distributing the papers and
ballot papers containing marks authorised for use for election to the
Legislative Assembly are used for election to the House of the People the
ballot papers must be rejected by the Returning Officer. Election Com-
mission a]so has no jurisdiction to issue an order that such ballot
papers shall be treated as valid after they have been actually used
wrongly. (Puranih and Chatterji, S.M. Ahmed dissenting). HABI VlSHNTT
KAMATH v. SITED AHMED AND OTHERS, 5 E.L..R. 248. (Trib).
BALLOT PAPERS It

6.—:—Where ballot papers intended for use for election to the House
of the People were, by a- bona fide mistake of the presiding officer of a
polling station, delivered to voters for election to the State Legislative
Assembly and the voters cast their votes for the Assembly in
such ballot papers: Held, that the ballot papers must be regard-
ed as ballot papers "authorised for use at the polling station" within
the meaning of rule 47(l)(c), and the vote3 cast in such ballot papers
cannot be rejected under that rule. The provisions of rule 47(1)
(o) are not direotory but mandatory. Obiter.—If such ballot papers
cannot be deemed to be papers "authorised for use a,t the polling
station" within the meaning of rule 47(l)(c) the Election Commission
oannot validate the votes cast in such papers by issuing directions to
the Returning Officer to treat such ballot papers as valid. Gidwani
Choithram Partabrai v. Agnani Thakurdas Chuharmal and Others
(1 B.L.B. 194), Naranarayan Qoswami v. Dr. H. D. Chattdhury and
Others (2 B..LE. 253) and Balailal Das Mohapatra v. Trailahya Nith
Prodhan and Others (4 E.L.E. 221) considered. Hari Vishnu Kamath
v. Syed Ahmed and Others (5 E.L.E. 248) not followed. HABI DATT V.
MADAN MOHAN AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.R. 25.
7. An election cannot be declared void merely because there
has been an interchange of Parliamentary and Assembly ballot papers
where it has been consistent and there is no evidence to show that
the result of the election has been materially affected thereby.
JAGDISH SINGH V. RUDBA DEOLAL AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.R. 311.
8. By a bona fide mistake caused by the faintness of the distin-
guishing marks Assembly ballot papers were wrongly given to Parlia-
mentary voters by the Polling Officers and the votes cast by the
Parliamentary voters in the Assembly ballot papers were counted by
the Returning Officer. The Tribunal held that though under rule 47(1)
(o) these papers ought to have been rejected, in considering whether the
result of the election had been materially affected by the non-observ-
ance of rale 47(l)(c) the initial mistake of the Polling Officers in not
following rules 23 and 28 must also be taken into account and if these
rules had been observed the result of the election would not have bean
affected, and the election could not be set aside under seotion 102(l)(c).
—(see 5 E.L.R. 248). The High Court of Nagpur by a majority con-
firmed the order of the Tribunal in an application under arts. 226 and
227. Sinha C.J. and Bhutt J. held that there was no failure to exercise
any jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal or usurpation of jurisdiction not
vested in it nor any substantial miscarriage of justice and the order of
the Tribunal oould not be set aside under article 226 or 227. But
Mudholkar J. held that in taking into consideration the non-compliance
12 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST
with rules 23 and 28 the Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction and in
failing to consider the effect non-compliance with rule 47(l)(c) it failed
to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law and its decision must
be quashed : [See 8 E.L.R. 350], On appeal the Supreme Court
held:—
(i) Rule 47(l)(c) of the R.P. Rules, 1951, which provides that a
ballot paper shall be rejected if it bears any serial number or mark
different from the serial number or mark of ballot papers authorised for
use at the polling station or the polling booth at which the ballot box
in which it was found was used, is mandatory.
(ii) The Election Commission which has the power to prescribe a
distinguishing mark for the ballot papers has also the power to change it.
But the prescribing of a distinguishing mark as contemplated by rule 28
must relate to the election as a whole. There cannot be one distinguish-
ing mark for some of the voters and another for others with reference
to the same election and at the same polling station.
(iii) Under rule 23 the Polling Officer has to deliver the proper
paper to the voter and if a distinguishing mark had been prescribed
under rule 28, the ballot paper to be delivered must bear that mark.
The approval by the Election Commission subsequent to the polling
cannot render valid ballot papers which did not bear the distinguishing
mark prescribed for the election; such ballot papers are liable to be
rejected under rule 47(l)(c).
(iv) Under section 97 all matters which can be put forward as
grounds for setting aside the election of a candidate if he had been
returned under rule 48 of the Election Rules can be urged in answer to
the prayer in his election petition that he might be declared duly elec-
ted. Therefore, the returned candidate can show that if the petitioner
had been returned under rule 48 his election would have been liable to
be set aside for breach of rule 23, and that therefore he should not be
declared elected.
(v) As the Returning Officer has no power under rule 47 to accept
a vote which has not the distinguishing mark prescribed by rule 28 on
the ground that it was due to the mistake of the Presiding Officer in
delivering wrong ballot paper, the Election Tribunal reviewing this
decision under rule 47 (4) also can have no such power.
(vi) In maintaining the eleotion of the successful candidate on
the basis of the votes which were liable to be rejected under rule 47(1)
(o) the Tribunal committed an error, and though this error was not one
of jurisdiction, as the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide whether on a
construction of section 10C(2)(o) it could go into the fact of breach of
rule 23, it was an error manifest on the face of the record, and a ground
BALLOT PAPERS 13

for issuing a writ of certiorari. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Sayed


Isak and Others (8 E.L.E. 350) reversed. HAKI VlSHNU KAMATH V.
AHMAD SAYED ISHAQUB AND OTHBBS, 10 E.L.R. 216. (S.C.)
9. The provision contained in rule 47(l)(c) of the Representation
of the People (Conduct of Eleotions and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951,
that "a ballot paper contained in a ballot box shall be rejected if it
bears a aerial number or mark different from the serial numbers or
marks authorised for use at the polling station or the polling booth at
which the ballot box in which it was found, was used" is mandatory
and the Returning Officer is bound to reject a ballot paper which oon-
tains a mark different from that authorised for use at the particular
polling station or booth, even though the use of the wrong ballot
paper was due to a bona fide mistake of the polling officer in distributing
ballot papers. The Tribunal has no higher powers in this respect than
the Returning Officer and it cannot treat such ballot papers as valid,
on the ground that the vot68 indicate the true intention of the voters
even though they are given by wrong ballot papers. If the law pre-
scribes that the intention of the voters should be expressed in a parti-
cular manner, the intention must be expressed in that manner.
Rule 47(l)(o) is applicable to a case where, even though there is a
common polling station for Assembly and Parliamentary elections,
there are separate polling booths for the two elections. Hari Vishnu
Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque (10 E.L.R. 216) followed. DAMODAE
GOSWAMI v. NABANABAYAN GOSWAMI AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.R. 272.
—Marked ballot papers—1.—The petitioner who had unsuccessfully
contested the election for a seat in the Punjab Legislative Counoil
challenged the election on the ground, inter alia, that the result of the
election had been materially affected by the improper rejection of a
ballot paper. The elector marking this ballot paper gave his first and
the only preference in favour of the respondent by putting the figure " 1"
in the column provided for the purpose opposite the name of the res-
pondent, but he added a horizontal line " " after "l". The Return-
ing Officer rejected this ballot paper on the ground that from this mark
the particular elector casting his vote could be identified. There
was no evidence or suggestion that this mark " " was put in
by any previous arrangement or understanding to identify the
voter. Held, that the ballot paper was improperly rejected inasmuch as
the horizontal line after the figure " l " was in no way material, and in
any case, this was not a mark from which the voter could be identified
and the chance of there being any arrangement between the voter and
any candidate was excluded. A ballot paper is liable to be rejected in
such oases only if, either the mark itself reasonably gives the indication
14 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

of the voter, or there is some extrinsic evidence irorn which it can be


inferred that the mark was placed by the voter by some arrangement.
Woodward v. Sarsons and Sadler (10 C.P.D. 733) relied on. SOHAN LAL V.
ABINASH CHANDER AND OTHBBS, 4 B.L.B. 55.
2. Ballot papers which contain marks or writings by which the
electors could be identified must be rejected even though those marks
or writings were not made by the electors or at their instance but by
the offioers entrusted with the conduct of the poll. Rule 47(l)(a) is of
a mandatory nature and such ballot paper cannot be regularised by the
Election Tribunal, as the irregularity is of a fundamental character.
Oidwani Choithram ~Partabrai v. Agnani Thakudas Chuharmal (1 B.L.E.
194) distinguished. Ballot papers over which the number of the elector
in the electoral roll and the page number of the roll in which his name
is entered are noted are liable to the rejected under rule 47(l)(a).
Ghamparan North case (2 Khanna 104) relied on. NUBUL ISLAM V.
MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.R. 70.
3. Where the Election Commission had merely directed
under rule 28, that the serial numbers in the ballot papers must
have a prefix "By" and had issued no direction under rule 20, for
using any official marks for the ballot papers, but the Returning Officer,
thinking that such a mark was necessary, affixed the ballot papers with
the official Ash ok Chakra mark, after some ballot papers had been
issued, and it was contended that these papers were invalid under rule
47(l)(c): Held, that, as the Election Commission had not issued
any direction under rule 20, rule 47(l)(c) was not applicable
to the case and the ballot papers bearing the official mark ware not
invalid. MARUTRAO BHAURAO AND OTHERS V. GULABRAO DADASAHBB
AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 303.
—Postal ballot.—Attestation of a postal ballot by a person who has
merely given consent to the inclusion of his name in an appeal in
support of a particular candidature would not invalidate the ballot
paper; for, mere consent to the inclusion of one's name in such
appeal would not amount to working for a candidate in or about the
election." JAWAHAR SHANKAR PACHOLI D. HIRDAY NARAIN SINGH AND
OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 495.
—Recount and scrutiny.—(i) A candidate is not entitled to a recount
or scrutiny of the ballot papers unless there are sufficient grounds to
satisfy the Tribunal that the return was not accurate and that recount
and scrutiny are called for in the interests of justice. Mere vague and
general allegations that the proper procedure has not been followed and
that, on a proper counting, the petitioner would be found to have
BALLOT PAPERS 15

received more votes, are not sufficient. The charges should be definite
and must be substantiated by reliable prima facie evidence. (ii)
Employment of assistants in the counting is permissible under the
law. R. SWAMINATHA MERCONDAR v. S. RAMALINGAM, 2 E.L.R. 51.
In an election petition the petitioner is not entitled to a recount
and scrutiny as a matter of right, merely for the asking. He has to
make out good grounds for believing that there have been mistakes on
the part of the Returning Officer and that a recount and scrutiny is
necessary in the interests of justice. At the same time, from the very
nature of the case, positive proof of miscount at an election cannot be
given before the recount takes place. Where 2 unauthorised votes
were found in two ballot paper packets of the petitioner and 77 un-
authorised votes in one ballot paper packet of the 2nd respondent and
70 unauthorised votea in a ballot paper packet of the 4th respondent,
the Tribunal held that there w a s p r m a facie evidence that the validity
of the votes counted had not been properly scrutinised by the Returning
Officer and ordered recount and scrutiny. Lakshmana Aiyar v. Bajam
Aiyar (58 M.L.J. 118) followed. SESHAIAH V. KOTI REDDI AND OTHERS,
3 E.L.R. 39.
Spurious papers.—Where some ballot papers which were not
genuine were found in the ballot box of the respondent and there was
no evidence to show who put them in :
Held, that this did not prove any corrupt practice under sub-
section (3) or (8) of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act,
1951, on the part of the respondent but th'e case was one which was
covered by rule 47 of the Representation of the People Rules, 1951, and
the Returning Officer should have rejected the ballot papers as spurious
ballot papers under that rule. GoviND MALAVIA V. MUBLI MANOHAR
AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 84.
Where there is no evidence raising a presumption of any
stuffing or misconduct on the part of the Returning Officer in favour of
any particular candidate a mere excess of a few ballot papers in the
boxes of a booth is not a ground for setting aside an election. Insein
(2 Ham. E.P. 158) referred to. T. 0. BASAPPA V. T. NAGAPPA AND
OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 197.
CANVASSING OFFICE.
Setting up canvassing office near polling booth.—Setting up a canvass-
ing office within 100 yards of a polling booth is an electoral offence but
not a corrupt practice, and cannot by itself vitiate an election. Even
if it be a breach of section 130 of the Act, the election cannot be
vacated unless there is proof that the result of the election was

IN ft
rd ELECTION EAW REPORTS DIGEST

materially affected thereby. ElKHAB DAS V. RlDIGHAND PAMJIWAL


AND OTHBBS, 9 B.L.E. 115.
CERTIORARI.
(See H I G H COURTS).
CORRUPT PRACTICE.
1. Admission in pleadings. 13. Fraud.
2. Appeal on the ground of religion 14. Fresh instances.
etc. [s. 124 (5)] 15. Government servant's assistance,
3. Appeal to national symbols. procuring of [s. 123 (8)].
4. Bribery. 16. Incurring expenses for candidate
5. Burden of proof. [s. 125(1)].
6. Conveyance of voters. 17. Interference with voters.
7. Effect of corrupt practice. 18. Naming guilty persons [s. 99].
8. Employing more persons. 19. National anthem, use of.
9. Exceeding limit of expenditure. 20. Paid canvassers, employment of
[s. 123 (7)]. [s. 123(7)].
10. False personation. 21. Particulars of corrupt practice,
11. False return of election expenses. [s. 83 (2)].
12. False statements relating to per- 22. Printer and Publisher, omission
sonal character or conduct of name of [s. 125 (3)].
[s. 123 (5)]. 23. Undue influence [s. 123(5)].
1. Admission in pleadings, effect of.—Corrupt practices must
generally be pleaded and proved by the petitioner, but in the interests
of justice if a corrupt practice comes to the notice of the Tribunal from
the admission of the respondent the Tribunal is bound to take notice of
it. This however, does not mean that the petitioner can be declared
elected without giving an opportunity to the respondent to
recriminate. RAGHUNATH SINGH v. KAMPTA PBASAD SAXBNA, 8
E.L.R. 424.
The Election Tribunal has no power to inquire into corrupt
practices which are not set up in the election petition or the list of
particulars even though they are admitted by the respondent. Amritsar
City case (Sen and Poddar 28) dissented from. SHIVA DASAND ANOTHER
v. S H E I K MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD AND OTHERS, 8E.L.R. 265.
2. Appeal on the ground of religion, caste or community [s. 124(5)].
—Though the cow is an object of reverence amongst Hindus it is not a
symbol of the Hindu religion and appeal to save the cow is nottherefore
an appeal on the ground of religion or caste. LACHHIRAM V. JAMUNA
PRASAD MUKHARIYA, 9 E.L.R. 149.
-An appeal to vote for a candidate who is a Chamhar on the
ground that he is a Chamhar is not an appeal on the basis of professional
brotherhood but an appeal on the ground of qaste. LACOHIRAM V
JA#UNA PRASAD MUKHARIYA, 9 E.L^R. 149,
CORRUPT PRACTICE 1J

Although an appeal to Basavanna or an appeal to Nandi


would be an appeal to religion, bullocks are not themselves religious
symbols and the taking out of a prooeasion of bullocks would not amount
to a corrupt practice. DESAI BASAWARAJ V. DASANKOP HASANSAB AND
OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 380.
In a case when the respondent is charged with carrying on
propaganda in the name of religion, a rigid standard of proof is required
regarding his complicity in the propaganda, this being a oorrupt practice,
and the standard is to be one as is demanded in a criminal case. JYOSTKA
CHANDEA AND ANOTHEE v. MEHEABALI AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 488.
The mere presence of the symbol of Khanda, Ghakar and 2
Kirpans on the posters will not amount to an appeal to the voters on
the ground of religion, or to convey the sense that those who do not
vote in favour of the Panthio candidates would be rendered objects of
divine displeasure or spiritual censure. A general exhortation to voters
and particularly to members of the Sikh community to vote solidly for
the nominees of the Akali party does not amount to a systematic appeal
to vote on the grounds of religion. Sardul Singh v. Hukam Singh and
Others (6 E.L.E. 316) followed. RATTAN SINGH v. DEVINDBE SINGH
AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 234.
An appeal to Muslims to vote for the Congress candidate and
that otherwise they would be turned out and would have to go to
Pakistan does not involve an appeal to voters on communal lines and
does not violate section 124(5) of the Representation of the People
Act. SHANKAR TRIPATHI v. RETURNING OFFICER, MIRZAPUR AND
OTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 315.
Soliciting a vote on the ground of the voter and the candidate
being kinsmen as evidenced by their common gotra is not an appeal on
the ground of caste, and certainly not of community, which is a term of
even larger import. PARTAB SINGH V. NIHAL SINGH AND OTHERS, 3
E.L.R. 31.
In order that an appeal to voters may be a corrupt praotioe
under section 124(5) there should be a systematic appeal. A sporadic or
solitary instance of an appeal is not enough. PARTAB SlNGH v. NlHAL
SINGH AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 31.
The object of section 124(5) of the R. P. Act, 1951, was to
introduce the principle of non-discrimination between different castes,
communities and religions, which was emphatically laid down in the
Constitution of India and the said clause has merely carried into effect in
the sphere of the law of elections the provisions of articles 15, 16, 29 and
325 of the Constitution of India. The mischief which section 124(5)
ELD—3
l8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

aimed at preventing was the voting for or against a candidate only because
of his religion, caste, race or community and that being the real object of
the section, we must put a restrictive interpretation upon the unduly
wide terms of section 124(5). Looked at from this point of view it could
not have been the intention of the Legislature by this section to prevent
all reference to religion in electioneering speeches, especially when the
right to conserve the culture of a section of the citizens is expressly con-
ceded in article 29(1) of the Constitution. The real intention of the
section was to prevent attacks on a particular religion, or a candidate
only on the ground that he is a follower of a particular religion. Conse-
quently an attack on a candidate on the ground that in his attitude on the
question of the teaching of the Koran in Municipal Schools he took a view
which was against the Koran, or against Islam, or against religion in
general, would not fall within the purview of section 124(5). MOINUDDIN
B. HABEIS v. B. P. DivGl, 3 E.L.E. 248.
The words "Panth" and "Panthic" have gained so much
currency as referring to the Akali Party of the Sikhs that no special
religious or communal appeal is conveyed to the electorate by the use
of these words during election propaganda than the use of the officially
recognised name of 'Akali Party". Baba Gurdit Singh's Case (1 Doabia
92) referred to. SAEDUL SINGH CAVEESHAE V. HUKAM SINGH AND
OTHERS, 6 B.L.R. 316.

Criticism of the policy and doings of the Congress party is not


objectionable unless it oversteps the legitimate bounds of criticism and
comes within some forbidden corrupt practice.
An appeal to the effect that the Congress is interfering with the
Sikh religion, and the electorate should make the Akali Party strong by
not voting for the Congress, is an appeal on the grounds of religion and
would fall within section 124(5) of the Act if it is made systematically.
An appeal to vote for the symbol of Tirkaman and for the saffron
flag because of their association with the Gurus of the Sikhs is an
appeal to vote on the ground of community within section 124(5).
Though in determining the scope of section 124(5) of the E.P. Act,
1951, which makes systematic appeal to vote or refrain from voting on
the grounds of caste, race, community or religion a corrupt practice,
regard should be had to articles 13, 19(l)(a), 25(1) and 29(1) of the Con-
stitution, and the scope of section 124(5) cannot be narrowed down to
prohibition of attacks on a particular religion or on a candidate, only on
the ground that he is follower of a particular religion. The scope of
the words of section 124(5) is much wider as it prohibits all kinds of
appeals to vote on the ground of religion, whether it be the religion of
CORRUPT PRACTICE 19

the electorate or of the candidate; and even in its wider sense it would
not be inconsistent with the power of the State to make laws restrict-
ing the freedom of speech and expression in the interests of security of
the State etc., which is conferred by article 19(2). Moinuddin v.
B. P. Divgi (3 B.L.R. 248) dissented from, SAETTL SINGH CAVBESHAB
v. HUKAM SINGH AND OTHBES, 6 E.L.E. 316.
The respondent who was a Gadaria by caste got printed and
distributed in his constituency a leaflet containing an appeal to the
Gadarias to help the respondent in the election and provide him with
workers and money and conveyances. Held, per RAGHUNANDAN SAEAN
and SANYAL (3?ABUQI dissenting) that the publication of the leaflet did
not amount to a corrupt practice under section 124(5) because, per
RAGHUNANDAN SAEAN, it did not contain any appeal to vote or refrain
from voting, and per SANYAL, the appeal for help was not confined to
Gadaria voters, but extended to the whole electorate including voters of
all castes.- Per FABUQI.—A general appeal to Gadarias to help the
respondent implied an appeal to vote for him and the publication fell
within section 124(5). SHIV D U T T AND OTHBES V. BANSIDAB
DHANGAE AND O T H B E S (NO. 2), 9 B.L.R. 324.

Where a leaflet published by the respondent which was signed


by the members of several castes contained an appeal to wage earners
(Eameray Bhai) such as peasants, workers, artisans, petty shop keepers
and petty servants like patwaris and school-teachers, to unite against
the big men and zamindars and not to vote for them, but to vote for the
respondent as he was a worker: Held, per RAGHUNANDAN SAEAN and
SANYAL (FABUQI dissenting)—that the appeal was not an appeal on the
grounds of caste or community but an appeal on economic considera-
tions and did not come within section 124 (5). Per FABUQI—The res-
pondent and the persons to whom the appeal was made were a body of
people having a common interest and therefore " a oommunity " and
the distribution of the leaflet amounted to a corrupt practice under
section 124 (5). Per RAGHUNANDAN SAEAN.—The word " community "
which is used in section 124 (5) in collocation with the words caste, race
and religion must be giv-en a narrower meaning than the dictionary
meaning of a body of people having common interest. SHIV DUTT AND
OTHBES V. BANSIDAS DHANGAE AND OTHBES (NO. 2), 9 E.L.R. 324.

——See also oases cited under SPIEITUAL INFLUENCE infra


pp. 54, 55.
3. Appeal to national symbols—An appeal to vote or refrain from
voting on the ground of caste, race, community or religion must be
systematic. But an appeal to religious or national symbols need not be
29 ELECTION LAW RRPORTS DIGEST

systematic. DESAI BASAWARAJ V. DASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHERS, 4


E.L.E. 380.
Where a picture of the bust fof Mahatma Gandhi with folded
hands was put up on the same board on which the words Vote for
Dasankop" were written, making it appear that Mahatma Gandhi was
himself appealing with folded hands to vote for the respondent
(Dasankop): Held, the picture of Mahatma Gandhi was a national
symbol and the respondent did commit the minor oorrupt practice of
appealing to a national symbol for canvassing support for his eleotion.
DESAI BASAWARAJ t>. BASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 380.
' -Hoisting of the National Flag in the Congress camp for short
period by mistake would not amount to an appeal to the national flag
for the furtherance of a candidate's election and in any event it is of
no consequence if it is not shown to have materially affected the result
of the eleotion. GURNAM SlNGH AND ANOTHER v. PARTAP SlNGH AND
OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 338.
4. Bribery.—Burden of proof—The charge of bribery is a serious one
and the same kind of evidence is required to prove such a charge in pro-
ceedings arising out of an election petition, as is necessary in criminal
trials. In any event, clear and unequivocal proof is required before a
charge of bribery can be held to have been established; suspicion, how-
soever strong, is not sufficient to prove suoh a charge. The evidence,
whether it is direct or circumstantial, must be conclusive and if there
is any doubt, the returned candidate should be given the benefit of the
doubt. But the guilty mind or intention of the candidate need not be
proved for declaring an election void, where the act of bribery is com-
mitted by his agent. Where the issue is whether A paid a bribe to B
toinduoeB to withdraw his candidature, oral evidence to the effect that
0 made a statement at a meeting that it was decided that A should pay
a certain sum of money to 0 to be paid to B for withdrawing his candi-
dature, is admissible under section 10 of the Evidence Aot. SRI EAM V.
MOHAMMAD TAQI HADI AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 139.
Entertainment expenses—Entertainment not exceeding the
limits of customary hospitality would not amount to "gratification"
within section 123(1). DATTLAT EAM V. MAHARAJA ANAND OHAND AND
OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 87.
Gratification offered before becoming prospective candidate—
Section 123(1) would not apply to a gratification which was offered before
the person who offered it began to hold himself out as a prospective
candidate. DAULAT BAM V. MAHARAJA ANAND CHAND AND OTHERS, 6
1.87.
* CORRUPT PRACTICE 21

—Charitable expenses.—Though elections are not intended to pre-


vent charity, there should be no sort of influence on the electorate in
the guise of charity for securing votes when election is imminent. If the
motive behind the charity is corrupt it would be a subtle form of
bribery. East Nottingham (6.0'M. & H. 292), Kingston-upon-Hull {6 O'M.
& H. 372) and Amritsar and Sialkot General Rural Constituency case (2
Doabia 94) referred to. SHANKABE GOWDA V. MABIYAPPA AND ANOTHEB,
9 E.L/R, 101.
Offer of land and cattle to the landless and the poor irres-
pective ofi caste, creed, community and religion—The offer made by a
candidate, of land and cattle to the landless and the poor, irrespective
of caste, cread, community and religion does not amount to the corrupt
practice of bribery as defined in section 123(1), for the giving of land to
the landless and improving the position of the poor in general is in the
line with lessening of inequality of wealth and income which is a com-
monly accepted aim and object of statesmen and Governments in most
modern democratic countries.
The phrase "offer of gratification to any person whatsoever",
occur ing in seotion 123 (1), should be given a liberal and reasonable
interpretation as a legislature could not have intended that a narrow
interpretation should be put upon it. SWAMINATHA MEEKONDAB V.
EAMALINGAM AND OTHEBS (NO. 2), 2 B.L.R. 390.
5. Burden of proof.—In the case of allegations of corrupt practice,
the burden of proof is on the petitioner and that burden never shifts, the
standard of proof is as in criminal cases and the benefit of doubt will go
to the respondent. [Case-law referred to]. D B . K. N. GAIBOLA V.
GANGADHAB MAITHANI AND OTHEBS (NO. 2), 8 B.L.E. 105.

-. I t cannot be laid down broadly that an enquiry into a corrupt


practice is in the nature of a criminal case and that the respondent is in
the position of an accused person, and, though the burden of proof is on
the petitioner to prove a corrupt practice, the respondent is not absolved
from all liability to adduce evidence to disprove the case of the peti-
tioner. STJDHANSU SEKHAE GHOSH V. SATYENDEA N A T H BAST: AND
OTHEBS, 4 E.L.R. 73.
The enquiry into corrupt practices under the law of election
being of a quasi-criminal character, strict proof is to be demanded of the
person bringing the oharge to prove his case beyond all reasonable
doubt, but that does not fully exonerate the person charged with suob.
corrupt practice, from producing evidence, specially of facts within bis
ELD—4
22 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

apecial knowledge as he-is bound to do under the provisions of sec-


tion 186 of the Indian Evidence Act. ABDUL ROUFV. MAKHTAB ALI
AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.R. 340.
See also 3 E.L.R. 488, 8 E.L.R. 1,10 E.L.R. 461.
6. Conveyance of voters [s. 123(6)].—Where it was proved that some
voters who had cast their votes for the respondents were sitting near a poll-
ing station in a truck hired by the respondent and entrusted to one of his
workers who had been asked to canvass voters, and the plea of the res-
pondent was that the truck was not hired for conveying voters but for
his own workers and agents, and the voters were workers and were to be
carried to another polling station for canvassing for the candidate, and
that as he was not present at the time, he was not liable even if his
workers had misused the vehicle: Held, per MAHABAJ KlSHOBE and G. H.
GTANI: The mere fact that the voters were found sitting in a motor truck
hired by the candidate was not sufficient to prove a corrupt practice
under section 123(6) in the absence of further evidence to prove that the
truck was hired for the purpose of conveying electors and not for con-
veying his workers and agents and the offence would also not be com-
plete unless it is proved that the truck had moved with the voters, for
the voters may change their mind and get down before the truck moved
and a mere attempt to convey voters is not a corrupt practice. As a
corrupt practice must be proved beyond doubt as in a criminal case,
where the circumstances are capable of two interpretations, the benefit
of the doubt must be given to the respondent. Per T. C. SETHI.—(i)
Carrying of voters even as workers or canvassers for the respondent is
prohibited by section 123(6), and even if it were otherwise the burden of
proof was on the respondent to show that the voters were transformed to
canvassers, (ii) It is not the actual carrying of voters that is prohibited
but even the hiring or procuring of vehicles for carrying voters is pro-
hibited by section 123(6). (iii) If a candidate places a hired motor truck
at the disposal of his workers and agents it is his duty to see that it was
not misused. BALWANT SlNGH AND OTHERS V. DEVI LAL AND OTHERS,
8 E.L.R. 1.
Necessity of particulars—In the case of a oorrupt practice of
procuring motor trucks, for conveying electors to and from polling
stations, it is sufficient in an election petition to state the date of
procuring the motor trucks and the motor trucks procured and it is not
necessary to state at what polling stations eleotors had been conveyed,
for the corrupt practice defined in section 123 (6) is the procuring of
trucks and not the conveying of electors. DESAI BASAWARAJ v,
DASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHEBS, 4 E-L.R. 380.
CORRUPT PRACTICE 2$

Necessity of particulars—Where an allegation of a corrupt


practice falling within section 123 (6) is made in an election petition full
details of the voters conveyed, the village from which they were
conveyed, the nature of the vehicles used and other particulars must be
stated in the list of particulars supplied under section 83(2).
SHEONARAYAN VAIDYA v. SARDARMAL LALWANI, 4 E.L.E. 401.
Nature of particulars required—The main ingredient of the
corrupt practice under section 123(6) of the E. P. Act, 1951, is the
'hiring" or ' procuring" of the vehicle and it is necessary that the peti-
tioner should give full particulars of the date of hiring or procuring and
the names of the persons who hired or procured and other particulars
relating to hiring and procuring required by section 83(2). Stating the
dates of carrying the voters and the names of persons who carried them is
not a compliance with section 83(2). The standard of proof required in
the matter of a corrupt practice is the same as that in a criminal charge.
DEVASHARAN SIKHA v. SHEO MAHADEV PBABAD AND OTHERS, 10
E.L.E. 461.
7. Effect—Proof that election was materially affected, whether neces-
sary.—If it is proved that an election has been procured or induced by
the commission of a corrupt practice, the election of the returned candi-
date can be declared void under section 100(2) (a) of the E. P. Act, 1951,
without further proof that the result of the election has been materially
affected by the commission of such corrupt practice. JAMUNA PBASAD
MUKHARIYA AND OTHERS v. LAOHHI EAM AND OTHERS, 10
E.L.E. 120. [S.C.]
May cause disqualification though election not void—Under sec-
tion 140 of the Act a candidate may be disqualified from membership if
he is found to be guilty of an illegal practice; but under section 100(2) (a)
his election cannot be set aside unless it is further proved that the result
of the election was materially affected by this illegal practice. [The
anomaly of the situation pointed out]. JAWAHAR SHANKAR PAOHOLI V.
HIRDAY NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 495.
8, Employing more persons [s. 123(7)].—Incurring more expenditure
— Gist of the offences—Employees of third persons assisting candidate in
election—Whether volunteers or employees of candidate—The gist of the
corrupt practice defined in section 123(7) of the E. P. Act, 1951, is that
the employment of extra persons and the incurring or authorising of excess
expenditure must be by the candidate or his agent. The provisions of
rules 117 and 118 must be read in the light of the definition of the
corrupt practice in section 123(7), and a candidate cannot be held to be
guilty of the corrupt practice under section 123(7) or 124(4) merely
24 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

because a number of persons employed in the estate of his father worked


for him in elections and if these persons and the remuneration they
received from his father were included, the maximum number of
persons that a candidate might employ on payment and the expenditure
he might incur under the provisions of rules 117 and 118 would be
exceeded. So far as the candidate is concerned such persons must be
regarded as mere volunteers. [Their Lordships left open the question
whether if one's own servants are also utilised or employed in the conduct
of the election, their salary for the period they are so utilised or employed
should be regarded as election expenses and shown in the return]. RANA-
NJATA SINGH I>. BAIJNATH S I N G H AND OTHERS, 10B.L.E. 129. (S.C.)
The employment of a driver for a motor car for driving the
candidate during the period of the election is not employment of a per.
son "in connection with an election" within the meaning of rule 118,
and employment of such a driver in addition to the number of persons
prescribed in Schedule VI would not amount to a corrupt practice with-
in section 123(7) of the Act. SHEONAEAYAN VAIDTA V. SARDARMAL
LALWANI, 4 E.L.R. 401.
The employment of paid propagandists in connection with an
election comes within section 123(7) and is, therefore, prohibited by law-
Quaere: Whether employment of coolies for pasting notices, affixing
posters etc. is prohibited by section 123(7).
Expenses incurred in promoting or procuring the election of a cant
didate form a primary part of the expenses "in connection with the elec-
tion" and the number of persons who could be employed in connection
with an election, fixed by law is inclusive of the persons employed to
promote the candidature of the candidate. It does not refer merely to
the number of persons who could be employed in connection with the
conduct and management of the election. The words "for payment" in
Schedule VI do not mean "for making payment" but "for remuneration."
In order that the employment of more persons that the maximum
number prescribed in Schedule VI may be a corrupt practice within
section 123(7) it is not necessary that it should be done wilfully or with
a corrupt motive. The law in India as laid down in section 123(7) is
not the same as the English law on the subject. M. R. MBGANATHAN
v. K. T. KOSALBAM, 9 E.L.R. 242.
——Rule 118 of the Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions
Rules, read with Schedule VI thereto, prescribes the number of persons
that a candidate can employ for payment; and a candidate who employs
more than the prescribed number of persona would be guilty of a major
corrupt practice under section 123(7) of the Act.
CORRUPT PRACTICE 25

Contravention of the rule limiting the number of persons that a


candidate may employ on payment in connection with the election is not
one which, under the Indian statute, the Tribunal is competent to
condone, whatever be the English Law.
The enquiry into corrupt practices under the law of election being
of a quasi-criminal character, strict proof is to be demanded of the person
bringing the charge to prove his case beyond all reasonable doubt, but
that does not fully exonerate the person charged. ABDUL EOUP v.
MAKHTAE ALI AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.R. 340,

9. Exceeding prescribed limit of expenditure [s.lli {!)].—Expenses


of meetings.—A candidate can incur expenses for meetings in connection
with one's own candidature. Incurring of such expenditure does not
contravene sub-section (7) of section 123. Operation of the said sub-
section (7) is confined to expenditure which is in itself in contravention of
any provision of the Act or the rules relating to expenditure, e.g., section
77 and rule 117.' SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHEEI>. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL
SAMAD AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 265. [See also cases cited in p. 24 supra].

10. False personation by agent [s. 123(3)]. -Section 123(3) of the E.P.
Act, 1951, applies not only to cases where the agent procures an applica-
tion for a ballot paper by another person in the name of a third person for
the purpose of personation, but also where the agent himself applies for a
ballot paper in the name of another. I t is a settled rule of election law
that personation by an agent is, without more, sufficient to avoid an
election, and section 123 (3) does not make any departure from this
fundamental principle. V. V. EAMASWAMI V. ELECTION TEIBUNAL,
TlEUNELVKLI, AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 233.
Mens rea—presumption—Mens rea is an essential element in
the offence of false personation specified in section 123(3).
It is not an offence of a trivial character" within the meaning
of section 100(3)(b).
Where a corrupt practice specified in section 123 has been commit-
ted by any agent other than the election agent it cannot be presumed,
in the absence of evidence to that effect, that it was committed contrary
to the orders of the candidate. SHANKAEA PANDIA NADAK V.
V. V. EAMASWAMI AND OTHEES, 5 E.L.E. 417.
Corrupt motive.--A corrupt motive is necessary to make persona-
tion a corrupt practice within section 123(3) of the E.P. Act, 1951. Stepney
Case (4 O'M. & H. 34), Chhail Behari hall Kapur v. Shyam Sunder
hall (3 Jagat Narain 59), Maulvi Yaqinuddin Ahmed v. Maulvi Kader
26- ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Bux (2 Jagat Narain 75) and Belfast Case (4 O'M. & H. 108) referred to.
L I N G E GOWDA V. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6 B.L.E. 288.

Full particulars to be given.—Where the corrupt practice of false


personation is alleged in an election petition, full particulars of each
instance of personation must be given in the list of particulars and it
must also be alleged that the candidate or his agent abetted or procured
the acts. Suspicion, however strong, is not sufficient to prove false
personation. T. C. BASAPPA V. T. NAGAPPA AND OTHEBS, 3 E.L.E. 197.
11. False return of election expenses* [s. 124 (4)].—When return
'false',—A mere omission of a particular item of expenditure in the return
of election expenses which is not prompted by any corrupt motive would
not be a "false" return within the meaning of section 124 (4). GURNAM
SINGH AND OTHERS V. PARTAP SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 338.

In order that a return may be "false" in material particulars


for the purposes of section 124 (4), the return must be deliberately false,
i.e., made with a corrupt motive. Amritsar City Muhammadan Con-
stituency, 1938 (Sen & Poddar 34), Lyallpur and Jhang General Con-
stituency, 1938 (Sen & Poddar 504), and Hissar North General Constitu-
ency (Sen & Poddar 367) referred to.
A return cannot be said to be false merely because the notional
hire of cars borrowed from others is not included in it. I t is sufficient to
show the actual expenses incurred by the candidate. MEHTA GOEDHAN
DAS GlKDHARILAL V. CHAVADA AKBAB DALUMIYAN AND OTHERS, 7
E.L.E. 374.
The word "false" in section 124(4), which makes the filing of a
false return of election expenses a corrupt practice, is not equivalent to
"incorrect" but means "deliberately false", and implies a corrupt motive;
omission to include a minor item of expenditure would not therefore
amount to a corrupt practice under section 124(4) where the total
amount spent is much below the maximum allowed by law. Kalapraj
v. Bishambhar Nath Tripathi (2 Doabia 355), relied on. MAST B A M V.
HARNAM SINGH S E T H I AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 301.
Knowledge of candidate, whether relevant—Under the Indian
law, exceeding the prescribed limit of maximum election expenses is
a corrupt practice per se. The question of bona fides or knowledge of
the candidate does not arise. MUNUSWAMI GOUNDER v. KHADER
S H A R I F F AND OTHERS, (NO. 2) 4 E.L.B. 283.
Motor car expenses—(i) Amounts spent for repair of motor
oars need not be shown as election expenses even though the immediate
object of the repairs was for using the car for election purposes, (ii)
•See also ELECTION EXPENSES infra.
CORRUPT PRACTICE 27

The reasonable hire for the cars belonging to others used by a candidate
in connection with his elections, even if none was in fact paid, should
be included in the election expenses, for otherwise a candidate with
rich and influential friends and supporters could easily evade the provi-
sions of law as to the maximum of election expenditure, (iii) With
regard to the candidate's own cars used for election purposes it is not
necessary to include either a reasonable hire or value of depreciation of
the same in the return. M. R. MEGANATHAN V. K. T. KOSALKAM
AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 242.

Expenses of meetings etc. —Expenses of party organisations—


Expenses incurred in holding any public meeting or issuing advertise-
ments, circulars or publications or in otherwise presenting to the
electors the candidate or the views or the extent or nature of his back-
ing or disparaging another candidate, by the candidate or his election
agent or any other person with his connivance, with a view to promote
such candidate's election, would be expenses on account of or in respect
of the conduct or management of the election. Therefore, the expenses
incurred after the nomination of a candidate by the candidate himself
sir by his election agent or by other persons (such as the All-India
Congress Committee; the Provincial Congress Committee and the
District Congress Committees in the case of a Congress candidate) and
all other persons who took part in the election campaign, and by visitors
who visited the constituency to support the candidature of the candidate
and to canvass votes on his behalf are expenses incurred or authorised
by the candidate for the " conduct and management " of his election and
should be included in the return of election expenses. AMIHCHAND V.
SURENDBA LAL JHA AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 57.
Expenses incurred by associations—The mandatory provision
in rule 112 directing the inclusion of particulars in paragraphs 1 and 2
of Schedule IV shows that expenses incurred by an association, club or
sooiety for furthering the prospects of a candidate's election have to be
included in the return of his election expenses. Though the explanation
under clause (l) of section 125 excludes the incurring or authorizing of
expenses by an institution or an organisation from the definition of
illegal practice it does not permit exclusion of these expenses from the
return. The failure of a candidate to include it in his return would
amount to a breach of rule 112 and a return which does not include
these expenses would not be a correct return, and if a candidate excludes
these expenses wilfully then the return would further be a false one. If
an association or a sooiety is interested in the success of a candidate,
and members of that sooiety or organisation canvass for the candidate,
28 ELECTION LAW RS»O«TS DIGEST

suoh association or society and every member of such association or


society would be an agent of the candidate under section 79(a) and the
expenses incurred by them would not be unauthorised expanses.
AMIROHAUD V. StTBENDBA LAL JHA AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.R. 57.

When election begins^-Payment made to party organisations


before nomination—As soon as a person makes his choice and declares
unambiguously that he intends to stand for election and expresses this
declaration through an overt act, (e.g., an application to a political asso-
ciation for a party ticket) he becomes a prospective candidate. MlTNTJ-
SWAMI GOUNDEE V. KHADEB SHABIFF AKD OTHEBS (NO. 2), 4 E.L.E. 283.
Under the rules of the Tamil Nad Congress Committee a person
who wished to stand as a candidate on the Congress ticket had to apply to
the Committee paying a subscription of Bs. 100 which was not returnable
and also a deposit of Es. 400 which was to be returned if he was not selected
as a candidate by the Committee. The respondent made an application to
the Committee declaring his intention to stand as a candidate and seeking
the Congress ticket, paying the sum of Es. 500. He also paid another sum
of Es. 500 to the District Congress Committee as a 'donation". The evi-
dence showed that candidates were selected on the recommendation of the
District Congress Committee and that the District Congress Committee
spent moneys out of the donations for carrying on propaganda for
Congress candidates. The respondent did not show these two items of
Es. 500 in the return of election expenses: Held, (i) that the respon-
dent must be deemed to have become a prospective candidate from the
date on which he applied to the Congress Committee, and the sum of
Es. 500 paid to the Congress Committee was an election expense, and
omission to show it in the return of election expenses was a corrupt
practice under section 124(4). (ii) The sum of Es. 500 paid to the
District Congress Committee was not really a charitable donation but an
expenditure incurred for furthering his prospects as a candidate and this
sum also should have been shown in the return. MtTNUSWAMI GoiTNDEB
v. KHADEB SHABIFF AKD OTHEBS (NO. 2), 4 E.L.E. 283.
—•—-Until an intending candidate begins to 'institute a canvass' of the
oonsitituency thinking that the election is imminent he cannot be styled
a 'prospective candidate'. Consequently, where the Congress Organisation
called for applications for candidature early in September, 1951, and the
respondent deposited on the 3rd September, Es. 250 as application fee and
Es. 1,500 for propaganda work on his behalf and he filed his nomination
paper only on the 21st of November, and there was nothing to show that
he started his election campaign before filing his nomination : Held, that
he1 became a 'prospective candidate' only from the date of nomination
COftfttJPT PRACTICE 29

and he was not, therefore, bound to include the two sums of Es. 250 and
Rs. 1,500 in his return of election expenses. Munuswami Qounder v.
Khader Shariff and Others (No. 2) (4 E.L.R. 283) dissented from.
Rochester Case (4 O'M. & H. 159) referred to. LlNGE GOWDA V. SHIVANAN-
JAPPA, 6 E.L.R. 288.
Expenses of party organisations—Expenses incurred by the
Congress Organisation or other persons for a meeting held with the main
object of propagating the cause of the Congress in general, cannot be held
to be election expenses of the candidate set up by the Congress. Elgin
case (5 O'M. & H. 2), Lancaster case (5 O'M. & H. 44) and Haggerston
case (5 O'M. & H. 69) referred to. MAST RAM v. HARNAM SINGH S E T H I
AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 301.
Donations to party—A payment by way of donation to the Con-
gress by a candidate after he had been selected as a Congress candidate
cannot, without further evidence connecting it with the candidate's elec-
tion, be deemed to be an election expense. Munuswami Gounder v. Khader
Sharif and Others [No. 2] (4 E.L.R. 283) distinguished. MAST RAM V.
HARNAM SINGH S E T H I AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 301.
Payments made to party organisations—The respondent paid
Rs. 100 to the Congress Parliamentary Board, Lucknow, for a Congress
ticket to stand for Constituency A, but he was not given a ticket for
that constituency, but he managed to get'a ticket for Constituency B.
After his nomination and before the date of polling he also donated a
sum of Rs. 1,000 to the B City Congress Committee expressly stating
that it was a mere donation by way of general help to the Congress and
not towards election expenses : Held, that as the sum of Rs. 100 was not
an expense in respect of the election to Constituency B, and the sum of
Rs. 1,000 was given expressly as a general donation to help the Congress,
the respondent was not bound to include these expenses in his return of
election expenses. Mast Bam v. Harnam Singh and Others (7 E.L.R.
301) relied on. SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER V. SHEIK MOHAMMAD
ABDUL SAMAD AND OTHERS, 8J1.L.R. 265.

Omission of small items—per RAGHUNANDAN SARAN and SANYAL


(FAEUQI dissenting)—The omission of an item of expense incurred in
connection with the election would not make the return false in a
"material partioular" within section 124(4), except where it relates to
a corrupt practice or if the item is included in the return the total
amount would exceed the prescribed limit. Omission of a small amount
representing the cost of printing a leaflet would not therefore be a
corrupt practice under section 124(4) if the leaflet did npt in fact
ELD—5
30 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

contain any offensive matter and its publication did not amount to a
corrupt practice. Per FARUQI.—If the omission of an item of expense
from the return is made deliberately and is made with a view to con-
ceal a real or supposed corrupt practice, it would be hit by sec-
tion 124(4), The mere fact that the amount was small or that the
impression of the candidate that it related to a corrupt practice was
•wrong, is immaterial. SHIV DUTT AND OTHEES V. BANSIDAS DHANGAE
AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.R. 324.
Where item if included would exceed maximum—amounts paid
to Congress Committee.—Though, when the charge is that the respondent
haa committed a corrupt practice under section 124(4) by making a
false return it ia neoesaary to prove a corrupt motive, it is not neces-
sary to establish any such corrupt motive when the omission of certain
items of expenses in the return is relied on only to prove that if they
had been included, the maximum fixed would have been exceeded and
the election would be void under section 100 (2) (b) read with section
123(7). Amounts paid to the Congress Committee for nomination as
their candidate need not be shown in the return of election expenses if,
under the rules, they are refundable, even though they had not been
actually refunded on the date of making the return. M. R. MEGA-
NATHAN V. K. T. KOSALEAM AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.R. 242.
Necessity of giving full particulars—The making of a false
return of election expenses is a corrupt practice, and unless full parti-
culars of the false items are given in the election petition or the list the
petitioner cannot be allowed to adduce evidence relating to them.
GANGA PRASAD SHASTRI v. PANNA L A L J A I N AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R.
392.
In the case of the corrupt practice of filing a false return of
election expenses, it is not necessary to state the items of the return
which are alleged to be false. That would be a matter of evidence
and particulars of evidence need not be given in an election petition as in
the case of suits. DESAI BASAVAEAJ V. DASANKOP HASANSAB AND
OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 380. "*
Since the making of a false return of election expenses is a
corrupt practice under section 124(4), the petitioner cannot be allowed
to give evidence about the return being false in material particulars
if he has not given in the list of particulars full particulars of the
items in the return which are alleged to be false. GANGA PHASAD
SHASTRI V. PANNA L A L AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 448.
Scope of enquiry of Tribunal—An Election Tribunal cannot go
into the question whether the return of election expenses was filed with
CORRUPT PRACTICE 31

the proper authority or within the prescribed tirne. The Election Tri-
bunal cannot make an enquiry as to whether the return of election ex-
penses filed by the petitioner is false in material particulars unless a
recriminatory petition is filed by the respondent against the petitioner.
FAQIR CHAND v. PEITAM SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 119.
12. False statements relating to personal character or conduct [s. 123
(5)].—Comparing a party (the K.M.P. party) to a Kudilce marriage and
a transitory bubble does not amount to an attack on the personal con-
duct or character of the candidate of the party and would not come
within section 123(5). Cumberland {Cockermouth Division) Case (5
O'M. & H. 155) referred to. LINGE GOWDA V. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6
E.L.R. 288.
False statements relating to personal character of candidate—
Law relating to—Whether ultra vires—Section 123(5) of the R. P. Act,
1951, (which makes the publication by a candidate or his agent of false
statements about the personal character or conduct of any candidate a
major corrupt practice) and section 124(5) of the Act (which makes a
systematic appeal to vote or refrain from voting on the grounds of
caste, race, oommunity or religion, e t c , a minor corrupt practice) do
not contravene article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution and are not ultra
vires. These provisions do not curtail any fundamental right but only
lay down conditions attached to the exercise of the right to stand as a
candidate for election to Legislature, which is not a common law right
but only a statutory right. JAMUNA PBASAD MTJKHARIYA AND OTHERS
v. LAOHHI RAM AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 122(S.C).
Statements that candidate would destroy Hindu religion etc.—
Where the allegation in the petition was that the respondent and his
agents, at various places and on various occasions, exhorted the people
not to vote for the petitioner because he would bring about social inter-
course between low caste and high caste Hindus and that he would put an
end to their devtas and destory the Hindu religion: Held, that the allega-
tions did not relate to the personal character or conduct of the respondent
but only pointed out to the voters who believed in untouchability and
the devtas, what the views of the petitioner were in the matter and did not
amount to undue influence under section 123(5). SATYA DEV BtrSHAHRI
v. GHANSHTAM AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 67.
Galling a person a communist—Whether calling a person a
communist amounts to a corrupt practice under section 123(5) is a ques-
tion of law and not a mixed question of law and fact. A. SRINIVASAN
v. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHERS; V. K. J O H N V. G. VASANTHA P A I
AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 245.
32 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Must be statements of fact, not opinion—In order that the


publication of a statement may be a corrupt praotioe under section 123
(5), the statement must be one of fact, not one of opinion, and comment
as to political conduct as distinguished from personal conduct will not
come within section 123(5). A statement referring to the speech made
by a person who had left the Congress party and joined the Socialist
party that he is a betrayer and unworthy son of his mother
(meaning the Congress) and wants to dig her grave does not amount
to a corrupt practice within section 123(5). Jadunandan Mahtoon v.
Mosahib Singh (1 Doabia 46) referred to. MEHTA GOBDHANDAS
GlEDHAELAL V. CHAVADA AKBAE DALUMIYAN AND OTHEBS ( N O . 2),
7 E.L.R. 374.
Must be statements of fact—Newspaper comments—Where a
newspaper, started to support Congress candidates and which was
published for 38 days, contained statements to the effect that J. S. a
rival candidate set up by the Jan Sangh party would withdraw in favour
of the respondent who was a Congress candidate, that the Jan Sangh
voters were eunuchs and Jan Sangh workers were monkeys, that a
dancing girl was employed for securing votes for J. S. and that Jan Sangh
leaders were contemplating the murder of Pandit Nehru : Held, that
on the facts of the case the editor and publisher could not be held to be
agents of the respondents, and, as the statements could not be held to
be false statements of fact, or to cast aspersions on the personal
character or conduct of J. S., the respondent was not guilty
of any corrupt practice under section 123(5). Amritsar City case
(Sen and Poddar 34) and Bihar and Orissa Landholders' Constituency
case (Sen and Poddar 129) referred to. SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHEB
v. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.B.
265.
Statements relating to candidature—In order that a statement
may be one relating to the ' candidature" of a person within the mean,
ing of section 123(5) of the E. P. Act, 1951, it must relate to the right
or qualifications of the candidate or the factum of his candidature.
Statements relating to the prospects of his election do not come within
section 123(5). KBISHNAJI BHIMEAO ANTEOLIKAB V. SHANKAB SHANTA-
EAM MOBE AND OTHEBS, 7 B.L.E. 100.
Must relate to personal character or conduct—Where a poster
which was headed "For purification of the Congress" contained the
following words, viz-, "to eradicate goondaism defeat Dr. A": Held,
that the statement did not relate to the personal conduct or character
of the candidature of Dr. A. and its publication did not amount
CORRUPT PRACTICE 33

to a corrupt practice under section 123(5). KEISHNAJI BHIMBAO


ANTBOLIKAB v. SHANKAR SHANTAEAM MOEB AND OTHBBS, 7
E.L.E. 100.
Statements mutt relate to personal character or conduct— The
publication of a false statement will not amount to a corrupt practice
within section 123(5), unless it relates to the personal character or conduct
of any candidate or to his candidature or withdrawal. "Where a pamphlet
published by the members of the Socialist party stated that the petitioner
represented the Congress party which was responsible for scarcity of
grain, cloth, etc., and that Marwadis represented capitalists who engaged
in anti-social activities and exploitation of the masses : Held, that the
publication did not amount to a corrupt practice within the section 123(5)
or section 124(5), as it did not relate to the personal character or conduct
of the petitioner, and did not contain any appeal to vote or refrain from
voting on the grounds of caste, community or religion. A verification of
a list of corrupt practice can be amended by making verbal alterations
to comply with the requirements of Order VI, rule 15, of the Civil
Procedure Code. MOHANLAL v. TEILOCHAN SlNGH AND OTHEES, 2
E.L.E. 41.
Statements relating to political activities involving personal char-
acter—There is no sharp dividing line separating what is personal from
what is political or otherwise. A statement may involve both importa-
tion sand if it affects the veracity and honour of the candidate as
well as his political character it will be within the mischief of the Act.
M. E. MEGANATHAN v. K. T. KOSALEAM AND OTHBES, 9 B.L.E. 242.
Allegations made against a candidate would amount to aa
offence under section 123(5), only if they refer to his personal character
or conduct. A distinction must be drawn between criticism of a candi-
date as a politician or a public man, and statements in relation to his
personal character and conduct. Criticism of his public activities, how-
ever ill-mannered, unfair or exaggerated it may be, is not forbidden. It
is only when the man underneath the politician" is attacked and his
honour, integrity or veracity is assailed that the allegation amounts to a
corrupt practice. Shaikh Muhammed Mansoor v. Maulvi Muhammad
Shafi Daudi (Hammond 677), Hoshiarpur West Muhammadan Consti-
tuency Case (Sen and Poddar 399) and Cockermouth Division Case (5 O'M.
& H. 154) referred to. Where it was alleged against the petitioner who
was a member of a Municipal Corporation that he opposed the teaching of
the Koran in municipal schools and that if he were elected he would use
his position and influence to stop the teaching of the Koran : Held, that
it related to his public character and to bis conduct as a member of the
34 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Municipal Corporation and not to his personal character or conduct and


did not therefore amount to an offence under section 123(5) of the Act.
MOINUDDIN B. HABEIS V. B. P. DlVGl, 3 B.L.E. 248.
Liability for statements of supporters.—To establish agency for
which the candidate would be responsible, he must be proved, by himself
or by his authorised agent, to have employed the persons whose conduct
is impugned, to act on his behalf, or to have to some extent put himself in
their hands or to have made common cause with them, for the purpose
of promoting his election. To what extent such relation may be sufficient
to fix the candidate must be a questisn of degree and of evidence to be
judged by the Election Tribunal.
Mere non-interference with persons, who, feeling interested in
the suecess of the candidate, may act in support of his canvass, is not
sufficient to saddle the candidate with any unlawful acts of theirs of
which the Tribunal is satisfied he or his authorised agent is ignorant.
Where a charge of publication of false statements about the
personal character and conduct of a candidate is made, it must be
sustained by a false statement directly relating to the personal
character or conduct of the candidate, and reference to the personal
character or conduct of the candidate must be explicit and derivable
from the plain meaning of the words used.
The mere fact that a person is a subscriber to a newspaper does
not raise any presumption that he had knowledge of the contents of
that newspaper.
Where the managing director of a newspaper was the President
of the Provincial Congress Committee and the editor and publisher of
it was a prominent Congressman, and the paper was actively canvassing
for the Congress through its editorials, reports, circulars and advertise-
ments and receiving donations from the Congress: Held, that these
facts were not sufficient to make that newspaper or its editor an agent
of the candidate put up by the Congress so as to make the candidate
liable for the statements made in that paper.
The circumstances in which by reason of the relationship between
a candidate and the association to which he belongs, the association or
any of its members could be regarded as the agent of the candidate, and
decisions bearing on the topic, discussed. M. M. MATHBW V. K. C.
ABEAHAM 10 B.L.E. 376.
A statement of opinion, however unjust or harsh it may be,
without reference to any concrete fact, does not come within the mischief
of section 123(5), The mere statement of a defamatory opinion, unless
coupled with the grounds upon which it is formed, is not a statement of
CORRUPT PRACTICE 35

fact. Further, the statement must relate to the personal character or


conduct. A distinction must be drawn between the criticism of a candidate
as a politician or a public man and statements in relation to his personal
character or conduct. Criticism of his public or political activities,
however ill-mannered, unfair or exaggerated it may be, is not forbidden-
It is only when the man underneath the politician is attacked and his
honour, integrity or veracity assailed in the statement, that the state-
ment becomes offensive within the meaning of section 123(5). Statements
criticising the public and political acts of a Minister as such, do notcome
within section 123(5), however pungent and offensive they may be, if his
personal character is not attacked. DEVASHARAN SlNHA V. SHEO
MAHADEV PEASAD AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 461.

False allegations of bribery—A false allegation that the petitioner


had bribed Government officials and got a false report from them is not a
mere expression of opinion or of a trivial or limited character but a serious
allegation about the personal character of the petitioner and it would
amount to major corrupt practice under section 123(5) and is a ground for
setting aside an election under section 100(2)(b). MADAN PAL V. EAJDEO
UPADHTA AND OTHEBS, 6 B.L.E. 28.
False statements by secretary of party organisation—The fact
that an objectionable poster was published by the Publicity Department
of a society which' has set up a candidate and not by the candidate him-
self would not absolve the latter from liability for such publication, as
the society which set him up as a candidate could be treated in law as the
agent of the candidate. Amritsar South (l Doabia 92) relied on. J U J H A R
SINGH V. BHAIRON LALL AND OTHERS 7 B.L.E. 547. See also 6 B.L.E.
316, 7 E.L.E. 100, 7 E.L.E. 457, 8 B.L.E. 265.
False statement must be by candidate or agent^—Publication of
posters containing objectionable matter would not amount to a corrupt
practice under section 123(2) in the absence of evidence to show conniv-
ance of the candidate or the agent, and though circumstantial evidence
is good evidence, a particular inference can be drawn from such
evidence only if it is not capable of any other explanation or inter-
pretation. North Oaya {General) Bural Constituency case (l Doabia
43) followed. FAQIR CHAND V. PRITAM SlNGH AND OTHERS, 7
B.L.E. 119.
False statements about oneself—While the Indian law relating to
election makes publication of a false statement regarding a rival candidate
a major corrupt practice under section 123(5), it does not make publica-
tion of a false statement of a candidate's own personal qualifications a
corrupt practice specifically. Such publication or propaganda c^n be a
36 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

ground for declaring an election void under seotion 101 (l) (a) only if it is
of such a character as to amount to "undue influence" within the mean-
ing of section 123(2) of the Act. Where a candidate published several
leaflets in which he was falsely described as a 'Bar-at-law": Held, that
though the propaganda was of a very highly objectionable nature, it did
not in the eye of the law amount to a corrupt practice within section 123(2)
and could not be made a ground for setting aside his election.
MAJIBAE EAHMAN CHATJDHURY v. ABDUL BARKAT ATATJL GANI, 4
B.L.E. 481.
Particulars must be given—Where an allegation of a corrupt
practice under section 123(5) is made, the names of the persons who made
the statement should be stated in the list of particulars and evidence can-
not be allowed to be adduced of statements made by persons whose names
are not given in the list. SHEONARAYAN VAIDYA V. SARDARMAL LAL-
WANI, 4 E.L.E. 401.
13. Fraud.—Though fraud is not expressly mentioned in section 100
of the Act as a ground for declaring an election void, fraud is
involved in many of the corrupt practices mentioned in the Act and
an election can, therefore, be set aside for fraud if the fraudulent
act falls within one or other of the sub-clauses of section 100(2)
and also satisfies the other requirements of the particular sub-clause
under which it falls. SlVATHANTJ PlLLAI V. NESAMONY AND OTHERS, 1
E.L.E. 312.
14. Fresh instances.*— Whether can be proved—Adding fresh instances
of a corrupt practice cannot be regarded as a mere amendment of the
particulars of such corrupt practice; on the contrary, each single instance
of a corrupt practice is a substantial charge in itself which has to be
• alleged in the original petition. Consequently, where a petition contains
a charge of a corrupt practice and some instances are given it is not open
to the petitioner to rely on other and similar instances of the same charge,
(e.g., bribery), and adduce evidence in support thereof. Mohamedally
Allabux v. Jafferbhoy Abdullabhoy Lalji (Hammond 173) and Abdul
Jabbar v. Azizur Bahman (3 Jagat Narain 215) dissented from. Kistna
case (N.M.B.), 1938, (Hammond 447) and Eistar North {General) Con-
stituency case (1 Doabia 297) followed. M. MUTHIAH v. A. S. SUBBARAJ
AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 165.

An election petition need not contain all the details of the corrupt
practices and if a corrupt practice is alleged in the petition, particulars of
other instances of the same practice can be given in the list of corrupt
•See also cases cited under "21 PARTICULARS" infra p. ^$ft.
CORRUPT PRACTICE :$f

practices. GOVIND MALAVIA V. M U B L I MANOHAE AND OTHBES, 8


E.L.E. 84.
'Though section 83(3) allows further and better particulars to be
given in respect of matters referred to in the list of corrupt practices, it
does not allow fresh instances of corrupt practices, which were not origi-
nally mentioned, to be added. Where it was stated in the list of corrupt
practices annexed to an election petition that the votes in villages A, B
and C were procured by the respondent by payment of Es. 5 each and that
a full list would be supplied later on, and nearly 5 months after the filing
of the petition, the petitioner supplied a list containing the names of 21
persons who had been so bribed: Held, that the list of corrupt practices
did not set forth full particulars as required by section 83 and the peti-
tioner could not be allowed to supplement the particulars given, by giving
a further list of the voters who had been bribed. Bohtak Muhammadan
Constituency case, 1946: Mohammad Shafi Ali Khan v. Mohammad
Khurshid Khan (Sen and Poddar 728), Calcutta North Mohammadan
Urban Constituency case, 1937: Mohammad Siddique v. Khwaja Sir
Nazimuddin (Sen and Poddar 253) followed. BHAGWAN SINGH V. D E .
E A G H B I B PAEKASH AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.R. 461.
15. Government servants' assistance, procuring of [s. 123 (8)].—
A. Who are government servants.—
-Director of Government owned company.—A director of a company
does not become a Government servant merely because the Government
owns a large number of shares in the company and he was nominated as
a director by the Government under a clause in the articles of association
of the company which empowered the Government to nominate some
directors of the company. LlNGE GOWDA v. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6 E.L.R. 988.
District Board Chairman.—See 9 E.L.R. 403, p. 40 infra.
Employee of Cane Development Board.—An employee of a Cane
Development Union formed in pursuance of the United Provinces Sugar
P actories Control Rules, 1948, is not a government servant within the
meaning of section 123(8) of the E.P. Act, 1951, even though the appoint-
ment of such employee is subject to the approval of the Cane Commis-
sioner of the U.P. State Government, as he does not receive any salary
torn the Government and is not directly under the control of the Govern-
ment. MADAN P A L V. EAJDEO UPADHYA AND O T H E E S , 6 E.L.R. 28.
Adalati Punches and Adalati Sarpanches are Government servants
even though they are appointed by election, as they are village officers
employed in the State and Explanation (b) to section 123(8) includes such
illage officers within the definition of Government servants. MADAN PAL
v. RAJDEO UPADHYA AND O T H E E S , 6 E.L.R. 28.
ELD-6
38 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

——Gaonburahs—A Gaonburah is a village headman employed by


the Government of Assam for performing some public duties and is a
person serving under the Government" within the meaning of section
123(8) of the E.P. Act, 1951, and a candidate who issues leaflets signed
by Gaonburahs to further the prospects of his election would be guilty of
a major corrupt practice under section 123(8). The enquiry into corrupt
practices under the law of election being of a quasi-criminal character,
strict proof is to be demanded of the person bringing the charge to prove
his case beyond all reasonable doubt, but that does not fully exonerate
the person charged with such corrupt practice, from producing evidence,
specially of facts within his special knowledge as he is bound to do under
the provisions of section 186 of the Indian Evidence Act. ABDUL EOXTP
v. MAKHTAB ALI AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 340.
Government servant who is also President of Party Association—
Where a Government servant was also President of the District Congress
Election Propaganda Board and as such he issued letters to electors to
vote for Congress candidates, and in an election petition against a
Congress candidate who was successful in the elections, it was contended
that the respondent was guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(8)
of the R. P. Act, 1951, as he had procured the assistance of a Govern-
ment servant for furthering the prospects of his election : Held, (i) that
it was the duty of the Election Tribunal to consider whether the
respondent had knowledge of the propaganda made by the President of
the Congress Propaganda Board or had ratified his acts, and whether on
the facts the President could be considered to be an agent of the respond,
ent within the meaning of section 70 of the Aot; (ii) that, if he could be
considered to be an agent, the respondent would be guilty of corrupt
practice under section 123(8) in having obtained the assistance of a
Government servant though the Government servant happened to be the
agent himself; (iii) that, as copies of the letters sent by the President of
the Congress Election Propaganda Board to the voters were sent to the
respondent and other Congress candidates, there was prima facie evidence
to show that the respondent had knowledge of the acts done by the
President for the furtherance of the prospects of his election and the
Tribunal should have considered whether this constituted ratification on
the part of the respondent of the acts done by the President; (iv) that
even if the President of the Congress Propaganda Board was not an agent
of the respondent, he would be guilty of an illegal practice under section
125(1) as he had incurred expenses for posting the letters to the various
voters; (v) that in not considering the above questions and passing the
necessary orders in the light of its finding on these questions, the Tribunal
had failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it under section 99 of the
CORRUPt PRACTICE 3$

Act and the High Court could interfere under articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution and remand the case to the Tribunal and direct it to give
the necessary findings in compliance with the provisions of section 99 of
the Act. NYALCHAND VIRCHAND S H E T H V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,
AHMEDABAD AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 417. See also 9 E.L.R. 451.
Member of Debt Conciliation Board—A member of a Debt
Conciliation Board receiving an honorarium is a Government servant and
getting his assistance would amount to a corrupt practice under section
123(8) of the R. P. Act, 1951. GHASI RAM V. RAM SINGH AND
OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 124.
Mukhia—A Mukhia of Uttar Pradesh is not "a person serving
under the Government of the State" within the meaning of section 123(8)
of the R. P. Act, 1951, and appointing him as a polling agent does not
amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(8). AWADESH PRASAD
SlNHA V. PRABHAVATHI GUPTA AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 45.
Mukhias and Zamindars of Vindhya Pradesh are Government
servants; -at any rate they are village officers. RAGHUNATH SINGH v.
KAMPTA PRASAD SAXENA AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 424.
Explanation (b) to sub-section (8) of section 123 of the
R. P. Act, 1951, enlarges the definition of persons "serving under the
Government of any State" contained in the sub-section so as to include
a village headman or any other village officer, by whatever name, he is
called, within the said expression : and, as a Mukhia is a village headman,
and, in any event, a village officer, employing a Mukhia to canvass is a
major corrupt practice under section 123(8), which is sufficient to render
an election void. The argument that as a village headman is not paid by
the State he cannot be in the service of the State is not sound, for, pay-
ment is not the test of service. Shibban Lai Saksena v. Harishankar
Prasad and Others (9 E.L.R. 403) affirmed. HARI SHANKAR PRASAD
GUPTA V. SHIBBAN L A L SAKSENA, 10 E.L.R. 126. (S.C.).
Officer of Court of Wards—Sub-manager of the Aul Court of
Wards governed by the Orissa Court of Wards Act, 1947, is not a person
serving under the Government within section 123 (8), but only an
employee of the Court of Wards. JADUMANI MANGRAJ V. DlNABANDHU
SAHU AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 480.

The Manager of a Court of Wards under the Orissa Court of


Wards Act, 1947, is not a Government servant within the meaning of
section 123(8) of the R. P. Act, 1951, though he is a ' public servant'
within the meaning of section 12 of the Indian Penal Code.
RAMACHANDRA CHOWDHURI V. SADASIVA TRIPATHY AND O T H E R S ,
5 E.L.R. 401.
ELECTION tAW &EP6£TS DIGES?

Panohes and Sarpanches—Clause (b) of the Explanation to sec-


tion 123 (8) expands the scope of the expression " person serving under
the Government of any State " used in the body of sub-section (8) so as
to include within that expression all village headmen and village officers
whether such persons be Government servants or not in a strict sense.
Sarpanches, Panches, Sabhapathis, Upasabhapathis and Mukhias of the
Uttar Pradesh are therefore " persons serving under the Government of
a State" within section 123(8), and obtaining their assistance for
furtherance of the prospects of a candidate's election would constitute a
corrupt practice. The Chairman of a District Board does not hold an
office of profit under the Government and is not therefore disqualified for
being chosen as a member of the Legislature of a State even though he
receives a monthly allowance in lieu of the cost of petrol, oil and other
expenses which he may have to incur in touring through the District
to perform duties as Chairman of the Board. B E U BEHABI LAL.— It is
doubtful whether Presidents and Vice-Presidents of Gaon Sabhas, and
Panohes and Sarpanches of Panchayati Adalats of Uttar Pradesh come
within the expression ' any other village officer by whatever name he
is called " in section 123(8) (b). Deo Chand v. Vashist Narain and Others
(6 B.L.E. 138) dissented from. Balchand v. Laxmi Narain and Others
(8 E.L.E. 465), Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lal and Others (8 E.L.E.
448), Baghunath Singh v. Kamta Prasad Saxena (8 E.L.E. 424), Madan
Pal Singh v. Bajdeo Upadhya (6 E.L.E. 28), Lahri Singh v. Attar Singh
(3 E.L.B. 403) relied on. SHIBBAN LAL SAKSBNA V. HAEISHANKBE
PBASAD AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 403. [Affirmed in 10 E.L.E. 126].
President of Co-operative Stores—President of a Co-operative
Stores which receives food grains procured by the Government and
distributes them to ration shops is not a person serving under the
Government within the meaning of section 123 (8) of the E. P. Act, 1951.
SHIVARAMA KARANTH v. VENKATAEAMANA GOWDA AND OTHEBS,
3 E.L.E. 187.
Secretary of Rural Board getting honorarium—The mere fact
that a person may be getting an honorarium from the State, or may be
paid travelling allowances by the State, or that the appointing authority
is the State, or bis services are liable to be terminated by the State are
not conclusive on the question whether he is serving the State or not.
These are facts that may be taken into consideration, but the real test
is the right to control the manner in which that person does his work
A non-official Secretary of a District Eural Development Board in the
State of Bombay is not a person serving the Government though he
may hold an office of profit under the Government; and obtaining the
assistance of such a person would not therefore amount to a corrupt
CORRUPT PRACTICE 4I

practice under section 123(8). NYALCHAND VIBCHAND SHBTH V.


VlTHALBHAI RANCHHODBHAI PATEL AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 451.
Teacher of aided school—A teacher of a Government aided
school is not a Government servant within the meaning of section 123(8)
of the Aot. MAJIBAR RAHMAN CHAUDHURY V. ABDUL BARKAT ATAUL
GANI, 4 E.L.R. 481. See also M. M. MATHEW V. K. C. ABRAHAM,
10 E.L.R. 376.
Vatandar Patil—Procuring the services of a vatandar Patil
would not amount to a corrupt practice unless it is also proved that
the vatandar Patil was officiating as the Patil at the time when his
services were procured. DESAI BASAWARAJ V. DASANKOP HASANSAB
AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 380.
Zamindars of V. P.—Zamindars of Vindbya Pradesh are
village officers employed by the State and a candidate who obtains the
assistance of such zamindars for furthering the prospects of his election
is guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(8). GANGA PRASAD
SHASTBI v. PANNA LAL AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 448.
B. What amounts to procuring assistance.—
Attending meetings—asking for votes—Where'°the respondent
attended a Conference of Village Officers in which a resolution was
passed appealing to all to set up as candidates, and obtain the election
of, the respondent and two other Village Munsiffs at the ensuing elec-
tions : Held, that the respondent's mere presence would not amount to
a corrupt practice under section 123(8) in the absence of evidence to
show that he had offered himself as a candidate at the Conference or
solicited the help of the Village Officers for his election, or connived at
the passing of the resolution. Held also, that it was perfectly legiti-
mate for the respondent to ask for the votes of the Village Officers them-
selves and for that purpose to draw their attention to the resolution
passed at the Conference. K. PARTHASARATHY V. ELAYA PlLLAI AND
OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 188.
Inviting for meetings—asking for votes—A candidate, his agent
or any other person with his connivance is entitled to obtain or
attempt to obtain the vote of a person serving under the Government
of India or the Government of any State; and, in doing so, if the candi-
date or his agent, or any other person working for him, asks a person
serving under the Government of India or the Government of any
State, to attend any meeting or in any other lawful manner induces
such person to vote for a candidate, that would not be corrupt
practice. AMIR CHAND V. SURENDBA LAL J H A AND OTHERS, 10
B.L.R. 57.
43 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST
r
—l—Appointment as polling agent—Acting as a polling agent does
not in itself, and in absence of any further act, amount to "assisting a
oandidate in the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's elec-
tion" and the mere appointment of a lambardar or sarpanch as a poll-
ing agent does not, therefore, amount to a corrupt practice under sec-
tion 133(8). Naraindas v. Manohar Das (E.P. No. 3 of 1952) and Satya
Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev (6 B.L.E. 414) followed. Ghasi Bam v.
Bam Singh and Others (4 B.L.E. 124) explained. MAHABAJ SlNGH v.
BATAN AMOL SINGH AND OTHBES, 7 B.L.E. 320.
The zamindars of Vindhya Pradesh are Government servants
and village officers, and employing them as polling agents would amount
to a corrupt practice under section 123(8). JANG BAHADITB SINGH V.
BASANT LAL AND OTHBBS, 8 B.L.E. 429. [Overruled in 10 E.L.E. 103].
The appointment of a Government servant as a polling agent
does not, without more, contravene section 123 (8). But if it is made
out that the candidate or his agent had abused the right to appoint a
Government servant as a polling agent by exploiting the situation for
furthering his election prospects, the matter can be dealt with as an
infringement of section 123(8). SATYADEV BUSHAHRI V. PADAM D E V
AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.E. 103 (S.C.).
The appointment of a Government.servant as polling agent does
not per se fall within the mischief of section 123(8) and does not constitute
a corrupt practice under that provision. Obiter:—If such polling agent
does canvassing work also that would be corrupt practice under section
123(8). Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and Others (10E.L.E.
103) followed. MAHENDBA K U M A B V. YIDYAVATI AND OTHEBS, 10
E.L.B. 214. (S.C.)
•—•—Proposing or seconding a candidate—Obtaining the signature of a
Government servant as a proposer to a nomination does not amount to
procuring any assistance from him for the furtherance of the prospects of
an election within the meaning of section 123(8) and is not a corrupt
practice. SUBAIN SINGH v. WABYAM SINGH AND OTHEBS, 6 B.L.B. 99.
The fact that a candidate was proposed or seconded by a Govern-
ment servant does not constitute a corrupt practice under section 123(8)
of the E.P. Act, 1951, and is not a sufficient ground for setting aside the
election of that candidate. But, though it is permissible for a candidate
to get himself proposed or seconded by a Government servant, he cannot
go further, and if the procurement of Government servants to propose and
second a nomination is part of a plan to procure their assistance for the
.furtherance of the candidate's prospects in other ways than by vote, then
section 123(8) is attracted, for, in "that case, the plan and its fulfilment
CORRUPT PRACTICE 43
must be viewed as a connected whole and the acts of proposing or second-
ing, which are innocent in themselves, cannot be separated from the rest.
R A J KRUSHNA BOSB V. BINOD KANUNGO AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 294.
(S.C)
It is permissible for a candidate to canvass Government ser-
vants for their votes and if a Government servant chooses to reveal his
hand, it would be permissible for the candidate to disclose the fact and
use it in furtherance of his election; for the law imposes no secrecy on the
intentions of those who, of their own free will, choose to say how they
intend to vote. But they cannot be compelled to disclose the fact and any
improper attempt to obtain such information would be a corrupt practice.
The policy of the law is to keep Government servants aloof from politics
and also to protect them from being imposed on by those with influence or
in positions of authority and power, and to prevent the machinery of
Government from being used in furtherance of a candidate's return. But
at the same time it is not the policy of the law to disenfranchise them or
to denude them altogether of their rights as ordinary citizens of the land.
R A J KRUSHNA BOSE V. BINOD KANUNGO AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 294
(S.C.)
Per DAS J. (VIVIAN BOSE J. dubitante).— The proposing or
seconding of a person by a Government servant cannot be regarded as
assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of a candidate's election
within the meaning of section 123(8), in the absence of a finding that at the
time of the proposal or seconding the candidate had begun to hold himself
out as a prospective candidate. R A J KRUSHNA BOSE V. BlNOD KANUNGO
AND OTHERS, 9 B.L.R. 294. (S.C.)

Section 33(2) of the R. P. Act, 1951, confers a privilege on


the electors, including Government servants, to propose or second a
candidate ; and, as section 123(8) does not deprive him of this privilege,
the proposing or seconding of a candidate by a Government servant
does not amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(8) of the Act.
SATYA D E V BUSHAHRI v. PADAM D E V AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 103 (S.C).

Participation in election propaganda—Participation by a


Government servant in election propaganda in favour of a candidate
would not amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(8) unless
there is evidence to show that the assistance of the Government ser-
vant was procured or obtained by the candidate or his agent or by any
other person with the connivance of the candidate or his agent.
Abdul Bouf v. Makhtar Ali and Others (2 E.L.R. 340) and Lahri Singh
v. Attar Singh and Others (3 E.L.R. 403) referred to. RIKHAB DAS t>.
RlDHICHAND PALLIWAL AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 115.
44 ELECTION LAW KEPORTS DIGEST

C. Government servant on leave.—


Government servant on leave—Procuring the services of a
Village Munsiff for furthering the prospects of election would not cease
to be a corrupt practice under section 123(8) merely because at the time
when the services were procured the Village Munsiff was on leave and
was not actually discharging the duties of his office, as he does not cease
to be a Government servant when he is on leave. Emmens v. Elderton
(4 H.L.C. 624) referred to. K. PABTHASABATHY V. ELAYA PILLAI AND
OTHBES, 4 E.L.E. 188.
A Village Munsiff who is on leave and for whom a substitute
has been appointed, and who does not consequently receive any salary
from the Government, is still "a person serving under the Government"
within the meaning of section 123(8) of the E.. P. Act, 1951. The word
' employ" is used in a variety of contexts and the meaning to be attri-
buted to the word depends upon the context and purpose of the enact-
ment in which it is used. A Village Munsiff who is employed in a State
does not cease to be "employed" in that State within the meaning of
section 123(8) of the B. P. Act, 1951, when he is on leave and is not
actually performing his duties. Emmens v. Elderton (4 H.L.C. 624)
applied. Ashworth v. McGuirk & Go. Ltd. ([1944] K.B. l) and Be
Feldman (97 L.T. 548) distinguished. ELAYA PILLAI v. K. PABTHA-
SABATHY AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 20.
Procuring the assistance of a Government servant even when
he is on leave would come within section 123(8), for a Government
servant does not cease to be such when he is on leave. The object
of the Explanation to clause (8) of section 123 is to bring within the
meaning of "persons serving under the Government," persons who may
not be Government servants in the strict sense of the expression.
J ADUMANI MANGRAJ V. DlNABANDHU SAHTJ AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.R. 480.
16. Incurring expenses for candidate. —Expenses incurred by a per-
son for posting letters for supporting a candidate would not constitute
an illegal practice under section 125(1), where he does so in his capa-
city as an agent of the political party who has put up the candidate, as
such a case would be covered by the Explanation to the section. NYAL-
CHAND VlBCHAND SHETH V. VlTHALBHAI EANCHHODBHAI PATEL AND
OTHEBS, 9 E.L.E. 451. See also 8 E.L.E. 417, supra p. 38.

17. Interference with voters.—Merely directing voters to go to the


Congress Office and asking them to get the tickets bearing their electoral
roll numbers from there, does not amount to an interference with the voters.
T. PBAKASAM v. U. KBISHNA EAO AND OTHEBS (NO. 3), 2 E.L.E. 376.
18. Naming guilty persons.—An Election Tribunal is bound to make
an order under section 99, only in respect of any corrupt or illegal practice
CORRUPT PRACTICE 45

alleged in the petition. NTALOHAND VlBOHAND SBTH V. VlTHALBHAI


EANCHODBHAI P A T B L AND O T H E B S , 9E.L.E. 451.
If any charge of corrupt practice is made the duty of the
Tribunal does not end with declaring the election void, but they must
also as laid down in section 99 record a finding whether any corrupt
practice has been committed, the nature of such corrupt practice and
persons found guilty of such practice. EAJ KBUSHNA BOSB. V. BlNOD
KANUNGO AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 294 (S.C.)
Held, per K. B. KABTAR SINGH and JAI EAM SAXENA
(V. B. SABWATE dissenting) ^—Under the proviso to sub-section (l) of
section 99 of the E. P. Act, 1951, the Election Tribunal must, before
making an order recording the names of persons who have been proved
guilty of a corrupt practice, under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of that
sub-section, give notice to show cause not only to persons who are not
respondents to the petition but also to the respondents to the petition.
Per SARWATE.—Persons who have been joined as respondents to the
petition can be named under section 99(l)(a)(ii) without giving them a
fresh notice or a further hearing under the proviso to section 99(l).
KESHO E A M V. HAZUBA SINGH AND O T H E R S , 8 E.L.E. 320.
Where a respondent, who was the principal respondent, was
present before the Tribunal and had defintie notice of the corrupt prac-
tices alleged against him and evidence was adduced in respect of these
practices in his presence and witnesses were cross-examined by him;
Held, that it was not necessary to give him fresh notice and opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses under the proviso to section 99(1), before he
is named as a person guilty of corrupt practice under secsion 99(l)(a)(ii).
Ghasi Bam v. Bam Singh and Others (4 E.L.E. 124) affirmed. EAM
SINGH V. GHASI E A M AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 183.

19. National anthem, use of.—A national anthem is not a national


symbol, nor is a song relating to the cow, the use of, or appeal to, a reli-
gious symbol and singing such songs does not therefore amount to a minor
corrupt practice. AMIROHAND V. SURENDRA L A L J H A AND OTHERS,
10 E.L.E. 57.
20. Paid canvassers, employment of.—Under rule 118, it is not
permissible to employ paid canvassers and such an employment would
amount to corrupt practice under section 123(7) of the Act. No candidate
is therefore at liberty to use under the cloak of a messenger a paid can-
vasser. AMIECHAND v. StTEENDRA LAL JHA AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 57.
21. Particulars of corrupt practice.—Necessity of
Under the Indian law if corrupt and illegal practices are alleged, the peti-
tion must be accompanied by a list setting forth the full particulars of the
ELD—7
4© ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

practices alleged. A statement of particulars in the petition itself is not


enough. The Indian law is more stringent in this respect than-the
English law as section 83(2) is clear and mandatory and omission to
comply with its requirements entails the penalty of dismissal under
section 85. Malik Barkat AH v. Maulvi Muharram Ali. (Hammond 467
at p. 473) and P. K. Atre v. Naravne (l B.L.E. 365) relied on. ABDUL
BAST V. GQVIND BALLABH PANT AND O T H E E S , 8 E.L.R. 240.

Full particulars must be given—The requirement of full parti-


culars of all corrupt practices alleged in the petition including the names
of the parties and the date and place of commission, enjoined by sec-
tion 83 (2) must be complied with, with sufficient fullness and clarifica-
tion, so as to enable the opposite party fairly to meet them ; and they
must be such as not to turn the enquiry into a rambling and roving
inquisition. BHIKAJI KESHATT JOSHI AND ANOTHER v, BBHLAL
NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHBBS, 10 E.L.E. 357(S.C).

Tribunal is not bound to call for full particulars—Duty • is on


petitioner—While the Tribunal has undoubtedly the power to permit
amendment of the schedule of corrupt practices by permitting the
furnishing of better particulars as regards the items therein specified,
there is no duty cast upon the Tribunal to direct suo motu the furnishing
of better particulars. As the primary responsibility for furnishing full
particulars in full compliance with section 83(2) is on the petitioners
they are not absolved from their duty to comply with the requirements
of section 83(2) merely because neither the Tribunal nor the respondent
has called upon them to furnish full particulars. BHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHI
AND ANOTHBB v. BBIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.R.
357 (S.C.)
Where particulars are given with regard to some corrupt
practices only—Where full particulars are given with regard to some of
the corrupt practices alleged, but are not given with regard to others,
the Tribunal will not be justified in dismissing the petition in ioto at an
early stage on the ground that, taking the petition as a whole, there was
substantial non-compliance with the requirements of section 83(2). In a
case of this kind, the Tribunal should exercise its powers and call for
better particulars. On non-compliance with this, it should strike out
such of the charges as remain vague and call upon the petitioner to
substantiate those which are reasonably specific. BHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHI
AND ANOTHEB V. BBIJLAIi NANDLAL BlYANI AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.E.
357 (S.C.)
Under section 85 of the Act the power of the Eleotion Commis-
sion to condone delay is confined to delay in the presentation of the
CORRUPT PRACTICE 47
petition. I t has no power to condone non-compliance with requirements
of section 83 with regard to the filing of the list of particulars of corrupt
practices. An election petition cannot, however, be dismissed where the
particulars relating to the corrupt practices are given in the petition it-
self, on the mere ground that they were not given in a separate
list. T. PBAKASAM v, U. KBISHNA RAO AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 2
E.L.R. 54.
Particulars mentioned in petition but not in list, whether suffici-
ent—False statements—' Relating to candidature", meaning of—B.P. Act,
1951, ss. 83(2), 123{5), 125{3) If particluars of a corrupt practice are given
in the election petition, evidence relating thereto cannot be shut out
merely because such particulars are not repeated in the list of particulars
also. KRISHNAJI BHIMRAO ANTROLIKAR V. SHANKER SHANTARAM
MORE AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 100.
Where full particulars of corrupt and illegal practices are
given in the election petition itself which is duly signed and verified, the
petition cannot be dismissed on the ground that no separate list of corrupt
practices has been filed along with the petition as required by section 83(2).
Purshottamdas Banchhoddas Patel v. Shantilal Girdharlal Parek (l E.L.R.
223), Kanaiyalal Durllabhram Bansali v. Popatlal Mulshankar Joshi (l
E.L.R. 244), Debi Prasad v. Mohammad Nasir and Others (3 E.L.R. 137),
Mukti Nath Bat v. Uma Shankar and Others (3 E.L.R. 109) and T. Pra-
kasam v. Dr. U. Krishna Bau and Others (2 E.L.R. 54) followed.
KHUSHWAQT R A I v. KARAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 93.

The objection that there was no separate list accompanying the


election petition containing the full particulars of the corrupt practices
mentioned in the petition, as required by section 83(2) cannot be taken
for the first time after the issues have been framed and evidence on both
sides about the corrupt practices had been adduced. Purshottamdas
Banchholddas Patel v. Shantilal Girdharlal Parikh (1 E.L.R. 223) and
Kanaiyalal Durllabhram Bhansali v. Popatlal Mulshankar Joshi and
Others (1 E.L.R. 244) distinguished. RlKHAB DAS V. RlDHICHAND PALLI-
WAL AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 115.

^Necessity of full particulars—-To deliver particulars which


contain nothing but the name of the candidade and the character of the
offence suggested, leaving everything else in blank, and to attempt
under them to fish out some possible material from which the blank may
be filled up is an abuse of procedure, and allegations which are made to
make a fishing inquiry and to introduce such kind of evidence as may be
available at the time of hearing must be struck out. Pontefract (4 O'M.
& H. 202), Worcester (1892, Day's Election Cases, 88), Bedfast Borough
4$ ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Western Division case (4 O'M. & H. 105) referred to. ABDUL E A O F V.


GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND O T H E E S , 8 E.L.E. 240.
The provisions of section 83(2) are mandatory and an election
petition is liable to be rejected if full particulars of the corrupt practices
alleged are not clearly set out in a list accompanying the petition or at
least in the petition itself. Debi Prasad v. Mohammed Naseer (3 E.L.B/
137) relied on. LiNGE GOWDA v. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6 E.L.E. 288.
——Further and better particulars of corrupt and illegal practices
can be called for under section 83(3), only with regard to those matters
that have already been referred to in the list filed along with the petition
under section 83(2); vague allegations without particulars, contained in
the petition, cannot be developed into specific charges after the expiry of
the period of limitation. Ambala North {Sikh Rural) Constituency (2
Doabia 290) and Calcutta North (Mohammadan Urban) Constituency (2
Doabia 322) followed. MAST BAM V. HAKNAM SlNGH S E T H I AND
OTHEES, 7 E.L.E. 301.
The provision contained in section 83(2) of the E.P. Act, 1951,
that an election petition shall be accompanied by a list signed and verified
setting forth full particulars of any corrupt or illegal practice which the
petitioner alleges, is mandatory and if the allegations of corrupt practices
made in the petition and the list are vague and indefinite, they must be
struck off. The petitioner cannot be allowed to give full particulars by
filing another list. Under section 83(3) the petitioner can be permitted to
give further or better particulars only if he has given some particulars
in the original list. Even with regard to irregularities a concise state-
ment of the material facts must be furnished by the petitioner. [Case law
reviewed.] SHANTA DEVI VAIDYA V. BASHIR HUSSAIN ZAIDI AND
OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 280.

The rule enunciated in section 83(2) of the Act which provides


that the petition shall be accompanied by a list setting forth full parti-
culars of any corrupt practice including as full a statement as possible
as to the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt
or illegal practice and the date and place of the commission of each such
practice, is a salutary rule and is intended to avoid surprises to the
opposite party and manipulations and developments of the case as
originally presented. A petition which does not comply with the re-
quirements of the section is therefore liable to be dismissed. JAGA-
JEEVANDAS SHETTY V. SANJEEVA SHETTY AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 358.
If the petitioner does not give particulars required of any
corrupt or illegal practice alleged by him in the petition, he cannot lead
evidence ab6ut such practice. I t is not clear from the Act whether
CORRUPT PRACTICE 49
the Act contemplates any other consequences for failure to furnish thai
particulars of a corrupt or illegal practice. But, even if the petitioner
is not allowed to lead evidence on the ground that he had not furnished
the particulars required, still it may be open to him to put questions by
way of cross-examination of witnesses of the opponent, because that
would not be leading evidence. I t would also be open to the Tribunal
to give a finding that the opponent has committed a corrupt practice or
an illegal practice, if there is a sufficient material for such a finding, e.g.,
in the admissions made or an admission found in the documentary evi-
dence led by an opponent. DESAI BASAWAEAJ V. DASANKOP HASAASAB
AND OTHBBS, 4 E.L.B. 380.
——The word "may" in section 90(4) of E.P. Act confers a discre-
tion on the Tribunal, and the Tribunal is not therefore bound to dismiss
a petition for non-compliance with section 81, 83 or 117 of the Act. The
High Court will not therefore interfere by a writ with an order of the
Tribunal declining to dismiss a petition for non-compliance with the pro-
visions of section 83. AUDESH PBATAP SINGH v. BBIJ NABAIN AND
OTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 1.
Where particulars of some only are given—If a petition contains
also grounds other than corrupt and illegal practices, the proper proce-
dure is not to dismiss the petition completely for failure to give a list of
particulars but to shut out those grounds which cannot be urged for
want of particulars and proceed to hear the remaining grounds. Mukti
Nath Bai v. Uma Shanker Misra and Others (3 E.L.E. 109) and Debi
Prasad v. Mohammed Naseer and Others (3 E.L.E. 137) not followed.
ABDUL E A U F V. GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 240.
If the respondent does not raise before the Election Tribunal
the objection that full particulars of the corrupt practices are not given
in the petition and he does not move the Election Tribunal to strike off
the allegations in the petition relating to those malpractices or to call
for further and better particulars but fights the case before the Tribunal
on the materials placed before it, it is not open to him to contend before
the High Court in an application for a writ of certiorari, that, as full
particulars were not given in the petition, it should be deemed that such
malpractices were not alleged in the petition and they should not have
been inquired into. N. PAEAMASIVAM V. ELECTION TBIBUNAL,
TlBUCHIEAPALLI, 8 E.L.E. 102.
If an election petition is not accompanied by a list containing
full particulars of the corrupt practices alleged in the petition as
required by section 83(2), it oan be dismissed by the Election Commis-
sion under section 85 or by the Election Tribunal under section 90(4). At

I
50 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

any rate, evidence should not be allowed to be adduced with regard to


any such practices about which full particulars are not given. H A E I
DAS v. HIRA SINGH PAL AND OTHBBS, 4 B.L.R. 466.

—:—Amendment of list of particulars—An election petition is not


liable to be dismissed summarily on the ground that full details of the
exact place and time of commission of the corrupt practices alleged in
the petition are not stated with perfect precision if the particulars given
are sufficient to enable the respondent to make enquiries and adduce
counter evidence and he is not prejudiced. The list of particulars can
be allowed to be amended by giving further particulars, and at any rate
the petition will have to be heard so far as corrupt practices, of which
full particulars are given, are concerned. Abdul Bauf v. Govind Ballabh
Pant (8 B.L.R. 240), Sri Ram v. Mohammad Taqi Hadi (8 E.L.R. 139),
Dr. K. N. Gairola v. Ganga Dhar Maithani and Others, (3 E.L.R. 162),
M. C. hinge Gowda v. N. K. Shivananjappa (2 E.L.R. 163), Ramchandra
Ghoudhari v. Sadasiva, Tripathi (5 E.L.R. 194), Bhola Nath v. Krishna
Chandra Gupta (3 E.L.R. 288) referred to. SHIBBAN LAL SAKSENA V.
HAEISHANKEE PBASAD AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 403.
A petitioner cannot be allowed to amend the list of particulars
so as to introduce a new corrupt practice not mentioned in the lists
accompanying the petition. The power to allow amendment contemplated
by section 83(3) is confined to giving better or further particulars of
corrupt practices included in the lists. LACHHIEAM V. JAMUNA PEASAD
MUKHARITA, 9 E.L.R. 149.
•• A petitioner cannot be allowed to amend the list of particulars
attached to an election petition by adding fresh instances of a corrupt
or illegal practice mentioned therein, e.g., by giving fresh instances of
personation or new items of expenditure not shown in the return of
election expenses. The R. P. Act, 1951, has not altered the law in this
respect. Bombay City, 1924 case (Hammond 173), Saharanpur, 1920
case (Hammond 621), Kistna, 1928 case (Hammond 447), Akyab, 1928 case
(Hammond 45), North- West Gurgaon Mohammadan Constituency, 1946
case (Sen and Poddar 655), Ferozepore Central Mohammadan Constitu-
ency, 1946 case (Sen and Poddar 903), Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patel
v. Shantilal Girdharlal Parekh (1 E.L.R. 223). SHIVA DAS AND
ANOTHER V. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD AND OTHEBS,
8 E.L.R. 265.
——Under section 83 (2) of the Act a petitioner cannot be allowed
to add new grounds to the list of particulars already submitted, though
he may be allowed to give further particulars of grounds already alleged,
SAHI RAM v. MANPHOOL SINGH AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.R. 47.
!
CORRUPT PRACTICE : 51

New list of particulars—An application for amendment of the


petition by giving new lists or adding particulars to the lists beyond
what is allowed by section 83(3) cannot be entertained after the time
prescribed for filing the petition under rule 119 has expired, and it is
only when there are lista aoeonipanying the petition and they contain
some particulars required by section 83 (2) that the Tribunal oan allow
those particulars to be amended, or order such furtha* and better pafcti*
oulars to be furnished with regard them under section 83 (3). Muham-
inad Siddiqui v. Sir Nazimuddin (2 Doabia 322), Radhey Shyam
Sharma v. Chandra Bhanu Gupta and Others (E. P. 256 of 1952) and
Saharanpur case (Hammond 621) followed. , Sitaram Hirachand Birla
v. Yograj Singh Shankar Singh Parihar (2 B.L.E. 283) dissented from,
ABDUL RAUE1 V. GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 240.
••- Where the list of corrupt and illegal practices filed with an
election petition under section 83(2) was not verified by the petitioner
though the election petition itself which enumerated the corrupt and
illegal practices was verified, and the Tribunal further found on scrutiny
that the/list did not in a majority of the cases set forth full particulars
of the alleged corrupt and illegal practices such as the date and place of
commission and the averments made were of a vague character. Held,
ijhat the provisions of section 83(2) had not been sufficiently complied
with as the list itself was not verified and M l particulars were not given
and the petition had to be dismissed. Held further, that the petitioner
could not be allowed to file a new list after the filing of the petition nor
can the list itself be amended subsequently, though under section 82(3)
amendment of the particulars given in the list can be allowed.
PUESHOTTAMDAS EANCHHODDAS PATEL V. SHANTILAL GlBDHAELAL
PAEIKH AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 223.
— - F i l i n g .after expiry of period of limitations-Power of Tribunal to
amend petition and to receive list—If an election petition, in which there
are allegations regarding corrupt and illegal practices committed by the
respondents is not accompanied by a list as contemplated in sub-section
(.2) of section 83, such an election petition cannot be deemed to be a
proper and valid election petition. There is no provision in the Act
enabling the Tribunal to amend the petition itself, and though sub-
section (3) of section 83 gives the Tribunal power to amend the parti-
culars given in the list, it does not give any power to the Tribunal to
amend the petition itself, or to allow the petitioner to give a list after the
period of limitation has expired. The words "conclusion of the trial" in
section 98 of the E. P. Act have not been defined in the Act, and the
section does not mean that the Tribunal cannot dismiss a.petition unless
the entire oral evidence of the parties is recorded and arguments are
52 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

heard in full. If an election petition is-dismissed because it is found to


be time-barred, or on any other technical ground which might be suffi-
cient for the decision of the case, the trial of the case must be legally
deemed to have concluded at that stage. Pritam Singh v. Charan Singh
and Others (2 E.L.E. 276) and Purshottamdas Banchoddas Patel v.
Shantilal Girdharilal Parekh (l E.L.E. 223) referred to. MUKTI NATH
E A I v. UMA SHANKER MISRA AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 109.
The reception of an additional list particulars within the period
of limitation is not prohibited by law. M. E. MEGANATHAN v.
K. T. KOSALRAM, 9 E.L.E. 242.
Where allegation is of general corruption or undue influence—
Whatever might be the case where a corrupt practice is alleged for the
purpose of obtaining the relief of setting aside an election of a returned
candidate under sections 84(a) and 100(2), where the allegation is one of
general corruption or general undue influence falling within section 100(l)
auch particulars cannot in the very nature of things be given and there-
fore cannot be insisted upon. A. SRINIVASAN V. G. VASANTHA P A I AND
OTHERS and V. K. JOHN V. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHERS, 10
E.L.E. 245.
22 Printers' or publisher's name, omission of.—The omission of the
name of the printer and publisher in printed circulars having reference to
an election, by ignorance or oversight without any ulterior motive,
would not amount to an illegal practice under section 125(3). JAWAHAR
SHANKAR PACHOLI V. HIRDAY NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6.
E.L.E. 495.
-The omission of the publisher's name in a printed notice in
which the printer's name is given is not corrupt practice under section
125(3) of the Act as the printer will in such a case be presumed to
be the publisher. K. PARTHASARATHY v. ELAYA P I L L A I AND OTHERS,
4 E.L.E. 188.
Under section 125(3), publication of a poster would be an illegal
practice if it does not bear on its face the name of the printer as well as
the name of the publisher; giving the name of the printer alone or
publisher alone is not enough to take it out of section 125(3). K R I S H N A J I
BHIMRAO ANTROLIKAR V. SHANKER SHANTARAM MORE AND OTHERS,
7 E.L.E. 100.
Per H A N S E A J KHANNA and PARMA NAND SACHDEVA.—For
the purposes of section 125(3) of the E. P. Act, 1951, the name of the
press may be taken as the trade name of the printer and by the custom
of the printing trade, the printer of a pamphlet should be assumed to be
the publisher, if the publisher's name is not given in the pamphlet. Per
HARBANS SINGH,—At the most there is only a presumption that the
CORRUPT PRACTICE 53

printer is the publisher, and where it is admitted or proved that a poster


was in fact published by the candidate, the candidate will be guilty of an
illegal practice under section 125(3), if the poster does not bear his name
as the publisher. The motive of the candidate or the innocent nature of
the contents is immaterial, as a corrupt motive is not an ingredient of aa
"illegal practice" defined in section 125. Saran South Case (2 Hammond
E. P. 250) and Parthasarathy v. Elaya Pillai and Others (4 B.L.B. 188)
and Tipperah Case (Sen and Poddar 802) discussed. MAST EAM V.
HAENAM SINGH S E T H I AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.E. 301.
For the purposes of s. 125(3) of the E. P. Act, 1951, the name
of the press may be taken to be the name of the printer and the printer
may be assumed to be the publisher, if the name of the publisher is not
stated. RATTAN SINGH V. DEVINDSR SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 234.
23. Undue influence [S. 123(2)].—Necessity of particulars—In the list
of corrupt practices accompanying an election petition in which allega-
tions of undue influence and threats of ostracism on voters have been
made it is not incumbent on the petitioner to state the names of the
voters on whom these alleged corrupt practices have been practised.
Amritsdr City Muhammadan Constituency case 1938 (Sen and Poddar 34)
and Hissar North General Constituency case 1938 (Sen and Poddar 367)
relied on. KAKTAB SINGH v. BALU EAM AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 71.
Coercion and intimidation—Coercion and intimidation are not
enumerated among the corrupt practices and, having regard to the
definition of "undue influence" it is clear that "coercion" and "inti-
midation" have been used in the E. P. Act, 1951, not in their ordinary
literal sense of an improper act by an individual but in a very technical
sense of what might bo termed as undue influence by a group. Where
an election petition alleges that the election was void under section 100
(l)(b) on account of coercion and intimidation, the petitioner must
state in the petition the particular group, community or section which
exercised such coercion or intimidation, and the group, community or
section on which it was exercised. A. SRINIVASAN V. G. VASANTHA P A I
AND OTHERS ; V. K. JOHN V. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R.
245.
Misleading of voters—-Where the representatives of a candidate
for a double member constituency, one of the seats in which was reserv-
ed for the Scheduled Castes, issued an appeal to the voters to give both
their vote's to the same candidate and deliberately told them that they
were not bound to give one of their votes to a Scheduled Caste candi-
date : Held, that this did not amount to the exercise of any undue
influence on the voters within the meaning of as, 100(a) and 123(2) or
ELD—8
54 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

induoing the voters to do something which was forbidden, by law or


fraudulent. B. E. AMBEDKAR AND ANOTHER V. S. A. DANGE AND
OTHERS, 1 B.L.E. 364.
Beligious and spiritual influence—*(i) Publication in a newspaper
and in pamphlets to the effect that the Bishop had blessed the candi-
dature of the respondent does not amount to exercise of undue influence
or intimidation or corrupt practice under section 123(5). Bellary
Muhammadan Rural Constituency case (l Doabia 169) and North West
Ghirgaon Muhammadan Constituency case (2 Doabia 332) relied on. (ii)
When it is alleged that spiritual influence has been exercised, the
nature or substance of the direction issued by the spiritual head should
be given in the particulars. SlVATHANU PlLLAI v. NBSAMONT AND
OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 312. •
A Catholic priest has great influence and in the-proper exer-
cise of that influence on electors the priest may counsel, advise, recom-
mend, entreat, and point out the true line of moral duty, and explain
why one candidate should be preferred to another, and may, if he thinks
fit, throw the whole weight of his character in the scale ; but he may
not appeal to the fears, or terrors or superstition of those he addresses.
He must not hold out hopes of reward here or hereafter, and he
must not use threats of temporal injury, or of disadvantage, or of
punishment hereafter. He must not threaten to ex-communicate or
withhold the sacraments. [Case law referred to.] MATHAI MATHEW
MANJURAN v. K. C. ABRAHAM, 10 B.L.R. 376.
In this case the Tribunal held after a careful perusal of a pas-
sage in a newspaper in which the answers given by the Archbishop,
Ernakulam, and the Bishops of Quilon, Kottayam and Palai to the ques-
tion "who are they for whom you should not vote" were published that
the publication of the answers did not amount to the exercise of undue
influence. PADMANABHA MENON V. A. M. THOMAS AND OTHERS,
1 E.L.E. 404
In the case of a corrupt practice under section 123(2), what is
relevant is the intention of the person who is actually charged with having
committed the corrupt practice. The words actually used by him
are very material. The effect produced on the elector is not the crucial
thing, except in so far as the election is sought to be set aside on the
ground that it was not a free one by reason that the corrupt practice
has extensively prevailed. But even there, the intention of the person
charged with 'the commission of the corrupt practice is an essential
factor. Longford (2 O'M. & H. 16); South Heath (4 O'M. & H. 132);
Malik Barkat AH v. Maulvi Muharram Ali Chisti (Hammond 469)
•See »J?p upder "i. Appeal on grounds ofreligion"r p, 16 supra,
CORRUPT PRACTICE 55

referred to. If a case of undue influence described in section 123(2) of


the E. P. Act is sought to be rested on the use of spiritual authority,
proviso (a) to section 123(2) applies and restricts it to cases where threats
of divine displeasure or spiritual censure (not mere promises of divine
grace) are made. The mere holding out of an inducement of pious
hopesf spiritual benefits, divine pleasure etc., in the absence of any such
spiritual threat, would not constitute undue influence. The distribution
of prasadams and taking promises from electors touching cocoanuts would
not amount to undue influence referred to in section 123(2). Even eminent
persons in the religious and secular field are as much entitled to take
part in elections and advise electors in the matter of their franchise, for
the law does not strike at the existence of influence but only the abuse of
influence. JAGAJEEVANDAS SHETTT V. SANJEEVA S H E T T T AND OTHEES,
3 B.L.E. 358.
An appeal to the voters in the name of the Koran that the elec-
tion of a woman is against the injunctions of the Koran, being in the
nature of mental coercion would amount to corrupt practice only if it has
been proved to have emanated from persons whose opinion in matters of
religion carried great influence with the voters. JYOSTNA CHANDRA AND
ANOTHEE v. MEHEABALI AND OTHEES, 3 B.L.E. 488.

• To constitute "undue influence" within section 123(2) of the


Act, it is not necessary that there should be any actual threat or physical
compulsion, but the method of inducement adopted should convey to the
mind of the person addressed that non-compliance with the wishes of the
person offering the inducement may result in physical or spiritual harm to
himself or to any other person in whom he is interested. Some fear of
harm resulting from non-compliance with the request is thus an essential
element in undue influence. Where the influence is said to.be by a reli-
gious appeal it should be shown that it was made to appear to the persons
addressed that non-compliance would be considered to be irreligious or
sinful. This kind of undue influence can generally be exercised by religious
teachers or persons having reputation for learning and piety, but it may
be exercised by a newspaper editor also if he has some standing in the
society. Where the propaganda which has been carried on in favour
of a candidate or party does not amount to undue influence within section
123(2) but only to a corrupt practice within section 124(5), the eiection
cannot be set aside unless it is proved further that the result of the elec-
tion has been materially affected by such propaganda. SAEDUL SINGH
CAVEESHAE t). HtTKAM SlNGH AND OTHEES, 6 B.L.E. 316.
• Where a poster contained a statement that a vote cast for the
Akali Party candidate was a vote in favour of the Guru and asked the
56 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Sikhs to get the blessings of the Gurus by supporting the Akali Party
candidate: Held, that the publication and distribution of such posters did
not amount to undue influence with the exercise of any electoral right
within section 123(2), but could be regarded as a systematic appeal to
voters to vote for a particular candidate on the ground of religion, and as
such a minor corrupt practice under section 124(5). FAQIR CHAND V.
PBITAM SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.B. 119.

• Where the title of a poster published under the signature of an


eminent political leader who was not a spiritual or religious leader impli-
ed that not voting for the Congress was 'mahan pap': Held, that the word
'pap' though it originally meant 'sin' has come to be applied to anything
ethically undesirable, especially when it is not used by spiritual or religious
leader, and the poster did not mean that not voting for the Congress would
bring divine displeasure or spiritual censure within the meaning of sec-
tion 123(2)(a) of the Act, and its publication did not amount to exercising
undue influence as defined in section 123(2). Southern Towns (Moham-
madan) Constituency (2 Doabia 310), North Gaya {General) Bural Con-
stituency (1 Doabia 46), Hoshiarpur West (Mohammadan) Constituency
(l Doabia 267) referred to. MAST BAM v. HAENAM SINGH SETHI AND
OTHERS, 7 B.L.B. 301.

Statements and expressions cannot amount to exercising undue


influence within the meaning of section 123(2)(a), unless they induce or
attempt to induce fear of spiritual censure or divine displeasure. State-
ments invoking divine pleasure or spiritual benefit for those who vote in
a particular way would not fall within section 123(2)(a). GURNAM
SINGH AND ANOTHER V. PARTAP SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 B.L.B. 338.

——To constitute undue influence it is not necessary that there


should be any physical compulsion ; methods of inducement which are
so powerful as to leave no free will to the voter in the exercise of his
choice may amount to undue influence. Where a poster published by
the Congress Committee against a rival candidate, who was a Jagirdar,
contained the picture of a tenant tied up to a tree and a well dressed
Jagirdar asking another who is seen waving a whip to flog the tenant,
and the tenant's wife was shown lying prostrate on the ground : Held,
that, though the poster could not be brought under section 123(5) as a
false statement relating to the personal character or conduct of the peti-
tioner, it amounted to exercise of undue influence over the voters (who
were mostly illiterate villagers) and fell within section 123(2). JUJHAB
SINGH V. BHAIEON L A L L AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.B. 457.
Undue influence by Government servants—Minister doing elec-
tioneering campaign during official tours—A candidate who is a Minister
CORRUPT PRACTICE 57

is not guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(8) merely because


during the course of his official tours as a Minister he conducted his
electioneering campaign also. Nor wouid a District Magistrate's tour
just before election, by itself amount to exercising undue influence on
voters. Habibgang South N. M. B. 1924 (Hammond 387) and Gajendra
Chandra Chaudhuri and Others v. P. G. Datta (2 Jagat Narain 85) relied
on. RAMACHANDRA CHOWDHUBI v. SADASIVA TEIPATHY AND OTHBKS
(No. 2), 5 E.L.R. 4C1.
A leader of a political party is entitled to declare to the public
the policy of the party, and ask the electorate to vote for his party
without interfering with any electoral right and such declarations on
his part would not amount to undue infiuence under section 123(2). The
fact that he happens to be a Minister or Chief Minister of the State
would not deprive him of this right. Lichfield (I O'M. & H. 26) and
Surendra Narayan Sinha v. Babu Amulyadhone Boy and Others (2 Doabia
368) referred to. LlNGB GOWDA v. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6 E.L.R. 288.
Must prevail extensively—An election can be declared wholly
void under section 100(l)(a) on the ground of undue influence only,
if it has prevailed extensively and the election has not been a
free election by reason thereof. DK. K. N. GAIBOLA V. GANGADHAR
MAITHANI AND O T H E E S (NO. 2), 8 E.L.R. 105.
Where the allegation in the petition was that the workers of
the respondent threatened the electors that if they did not vote for the
respondent, Shri Tung Nath, Shri Badri Nath and Kalimai, the local
deities of the various areas, would be displeased, but the evidence
showed that such threats were made only in 4 out of the 58 polling
stations of the constituency and also that the workers who made these
threats had no pretence to any religious or spiritual leadership : Held,
that it cannot be held, even if the allegations were true, that the undue
influence prevailed extensively nor was it such as to have had much
effect on the electors, and the election could not be declared void on the
ground of undue influence under s. L00(l)(a). Lahore City M. 1922
(Hammond 467), Drogheda case (1 O'M. & H. 256), Bridgewater case (l O'M.
& H. 116), North Durham case (2 O'M. & H. 156) referred to. D R . K. N.
GAIBOLA V. GANGADHAR MAITHANI AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 8 E.L.K. 105.
DELIMITATION.
Delimitation. —Finality of President's order—The President of India
is the final authority for delimitation purposes under the Indian Cons-
titution,' *nd a notification of a State Government including certain
villages in a particular tappa cannot override the President's Order in
which they are included in another tappa. SHANTILAL CHOUDHUBY V.
RAGHUBAJ SINGH AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.R. 93.
58 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES.
1. Citizenship, want of.
2. Conviction [s. 7(a)].
3. Construction of s. 7(d).
4. Interest in contract with Govt. [s. 7(d)J.
5. Office of profit [s. 7(e)].
• 6. Part CStates.
7. Miscellaneous.

Disqualification of candidates—Citizenship, want of.—Person born in


Indian State leaving for JPaki&tan after 1st March, 1947, and returning to
India—The petitioner was born in the Eampur State and joined the
services of the Government of India in 1945. On the partition of India
he intimated to the Government of India his final choice to serve in
Pakistan and proceeded to Lahore in August, 1947, relinquishing his
appointment in India and joined the Pakistan service. In January, 1948,
the Nawab of Bampur promulgated constitutional reforms for Eampur
and the petitioner returned to Eampur from Pakistan in March, 1948,
with a view to stand for election and got himself enrolled as a pleader in
the Eampur High Court. During the elections in Eampur his name was
entered as a voter in the electoral roll of the Eampur State and he was
elected as a member of the Legislative Assembly of the State, and
eventually became a Minister of that State. In July, 1949, the Eampur
State merged in India and became a district of Uttar Pradesh. The
petitioner's name was included in the electoral roll for Eampur City for
the general elections of 1951-52 for the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assem-
bly as no one raised any objection to the inclusion of his name, but his
nomination paper for the general elections was rejected by the Eeturning
Officer on the ground that he was not a citizen of India. He filed an
election petition to set aside the election of the returned candidate on the
ground that his nomination paper was improperly rejected : Held, (i) the
lack of statutory qualification, or statutory disqualification, can be con-
sidered both by the Eeturning Officer and by the Election Tribunal, even
if an objection on this ground was not raised at the time of the prepara-
tion of the electoral rolls and the name of the petitioner was entered as a
voter in the final electoral roll; (ii) the petitioner must be held to have
migrated to Pakistan "from the territory of India" within the meaning of
article 7 of the Constitution of India, even though at the time when he
left for Pakistan, Eampur State had not merged in India ; (iii) the ques-
tion whether the petitioner had migrated to Pakistan so as to disentitle
him to be deemed a citizen of India under article 7 depended on the
intention with which, and the purpose for which, the petitioner went to
Pakistan'; (iv) the evidence in the case and the conduct of the petitioner
plearly indicated that the petitioner's intention was to settle permanently
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 59
in Pakistan when he opted for Pakistan services and went to Pakistan in
August, 1947, and he should therefore be deemed to have lost his status
as a citizen of India under article 7 of the Constitution; (v) his return to
Eampur in 1948 could not restore him to the status of a citizen of India
and he was therefore disqualified to stand for the election and his nomina-
tion paper rightly rejected by the Eeturning Officer on the ground that
he was not a citizen of India. The expression "conclusive evidence" in
section 36(7) of the E. P. Act, 1951, is not used in the same sense as con-
clusive proof" in section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, and does not mean
that the entries in the electoral roll cannot be challenged before the
Eeturning Officer. 'Migration" implies moving from one country to
another with the intention of shifting permanently to the latter. AsLAM
KHAN V. EAZLUL HAQ AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 341.

2. Conviction.—An order of amnesty passed by the Euler of a State


granting unconditional release of prisoners is one passed by him as the
Chief Executive Officer of the State under section 401 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. The effect of such an order of remission of sentence is
to wipe out the remitted portion of the sentence altogether and not merely
to suspend its operation, and for the purpose of deciding whether a person
is disqualified under section 7(b), it is the period of sentence that was
actually undergone by him and not the sentence originally awarded by
court that is relevant. Such an order is not in the nature of a jail order
under which remissions are allowed to prisoners during the period of
imprisonment on grounds of good behaviour or working on holidays under
the jail rules, but which cannot operate to affect the order of sentence
passed by a court of law. Braja Rishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Oobinda
Pradhana (Sen and Poddar 82) and Venkatesh Yeshwant v. Emperor
(A.I.E. 1938 Nag. 513) relied on. GANDA SINGH V. SAMPUBAN S I N G H
AND O T H E B S , 3 E.L.E. 17.

In order that a person may be disqualified for being chosen as,


or for being, a member of either House of Parliament or the Legislative
Assembly or Council of State under section 7(b) of the E. P. Act, 1951,
it is not necessary that he should have undergone any part of the sentence
imposed upon him. Nor does the fact that he has preferred an appeal
from the conviction and sentence, and the appeal is pending, remove the
disqualification under section 7(b) except in the case of a sitting member
who has been convicted after his election. Braja Kishore Chandra Singh
Deo v. Gobinda Pradhana (Sen.and Poddar 82) distinguished. UDAINATH
SINGH V. JAGAT BAHADTJB SINGH AND O T H E B S , 3 E.L.E. 26.

3. Construction of s. 7(d).—Seotion 7(d) must be strictly construed


and is not applicable unless there is a contract with the Government
So ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

which fulfils the requirements of the Constitution with regard to such


contracts. BHOLANATH V. KRISHNA CHANDBA GCTTA AND OTHBBS
(No. 2), 6 E.L.R. 104. Overruled in 9 E.L.R. 301].
Words employed in statutes regulating the qualifications for
entry into Legislatures are proper subject-matter for beneficial construc-
tion that would advance the object of the statute, and in construing clause
7(d) of the Act the Tribunal is not fettered by the technical rules of law
in the Indian'Contract Act regarding formation of contracts. MAHABAJA
OP PARLAKIMEDI v. B U O Y CHANDBA D A S AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 101.
Section 7(d) should be liberally construed and the beneficial
effect of it should not be allowed to be whittled down by subtle arguments
based upon a conflict of powers or the law of agency. A. J. ABUNA-
CHALAM v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 471.

4. Interest in contract with government.—Contract for supply of


goods and contract for work and labour distinguished—Contracts ancillary
to or for purposes connected with performance of services, and contracts
for performance of services distinguished—The expression "contract for
the performance of any services" in section 7(d) means a contract directly
fot the performance of any service itself and does not include contracts
which are only ancillary to or for purposes connected with the
performance of any such service. In re T. SlDDALINGAIYA, MEMBER,
MYSORE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 7 E.L.R. 416.
The word "works" in the expression "contract for the execu-
tion of any works" in section 7(d) connotes something to be built or
constructed and not something to be done. In re T. SfDDALINGAIYA,
MEMBER, MYSORE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 7 E.L.R. 416.
-——Contracts not fulfilling constitutional formalities—In order
that a person may be disqualified under section 7(d), it is not necessary
that the contract in which he has a share or interest should be with the
appropriate Government or that it should be a contract which fulfils the
requirements laid down by article 299(l) of the Constitution with respect
to contracts made by the Government. Hanuman Prasad Misra v. Tara
Chand (5 E.L.R. 446) and Maharaja of Parlakimedi v. Bijay Chandra
Das and Others (4 E.L.R 101) referred to. Horen Jones v. Mohan Singh
and Others (2 E.L.R. 147) dissented from. MORESHWAR PARASHRAM
v. CHATXTRBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 428.
[Affirmed by the Supreme Court in 9 E.L.R. 301].
Firm supplying when orders were placed—In response to a
notification issued by the Deputy Commissioner, calling for tenders for
the supply of tiles and bricks for Government buildings for the year
1909-51, a firm, of which the respondent was a partner, submitted -a
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 6l

tender on 20th September, 1950, which was accepted on 4th November,


1950; and in pursuance of this, the respondent's firm supplied tiles and
bricks for 1950-51. For the next year, fresh tenders were called for.
The respondent's firm did not make any tender and the tender made by
another firm was accepted. This firm failed to supply and the Deputy
Commissioner isssued an order to all the Amildars of the district to plac e
orders for their requirements of tiles and bricks with the respondent's
firm, fixing also the price of the materials, and forwarded a copy of the
order to the respondent's firm also "for information and needful action."
The respondent's firm supplied tiles in September and October, 1951, and
the respondent's nomination paper was filed on 20th November, 1951,
before some of the bills therefor had been paid. The question being
whether the respondent was disqualified to stand as a candidate on the
ground that he was interested in a contract for supply of goods to the
Government, under section 7(d) of R.P. Act, 1951:
Held Per HOMBE GOWDA and Mm IQBAL HUSSAIN (KANDASWAMI
PlLLAl dissenting) that, from the correspondence and the conduct of the
firm an implied contract by the firm to supply goods to the Government
could be inferred, that this contract subsisted at the date of the nomi-
nation, and the respondent was therefore disqualified under section 7(d).
Per KANDASWAMI P I L L A I {contra).—The contract to supply goods
terminated at the close of the year 1950-51, i.e., on the 31st March, 1951,
and the subsequent supplies of tiles were casual sales. NAEASIMHB'
GOWDA V. LAKKAPPA AND ANOTHER, 4.E.L.R. 234. •
Agreement to supply goods if and when orders are placed—
Whether contract—Term for replacement of goods unsold within-certain
period—Whether separate contract—Whether contract terminates before
payment is received—Contract not complying with constitutional formali-
ties.—(i) Where the correspondence between the parties merely sets out
the terms on which the parties are willing to supply and purchase goods
if and when orders are placed, a contract does not come into existence
until an order is placed, and each order and acceptance constitutes a
distinct contract.
(ii) A contract for the supply of goods does not terminate as soon
as the goods are supplied but continues in being until the vendors are
fully paid and the contract is fully discharged by performance on both
sides. The view that the moment goods are supplied and the contract
is fully executed on one side and all that remains is for the purchaser to
receive payment, the contract terminates and a new relationship of
creditor and debtor takes its place, is not correct. O'Carrol v. Hastings
('1905, 2 Ir. R, 590), Satyendra Kumar Pas v, Chairtnan of the Municipal
PLD-9 .
62 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Commissioners of Dacca (I.L.E. 58 Cal. 180) followed. Boyse v. Birley


(L.E. 4 C.P. 296), Tranton v. Astor (33 T.L.E. 383) and Cox v. Truscott
(21 T.L.E. 319) distinguished and doubted. Where a contract for supply
of goods contains an agreement for replacement of the stocks which
remained unsold within a certain period the contract could not be
deemed to terminate as soon as the goods are supplied ; for, the guarantee
clause is only a term of the main contract to supply goods and so long
as the guarantee clause remains in force the contract cannot terminate ;
at any rate, as the obligation even under this clause was to supply fresh
stocks in exchange for stocks returned, there would still be a subsisting
contract for the supply of the goods which are sent as replacements.
CHATTXRBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI v. MORESHWAR PARASHRAM AND
OTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 301 (S.C.).
A contract for the supply of goods to the Government is not void
even though it is not executed in the manner prescribed by article 299(l)
of the Constitution, and even though the Government could not be sued
on such a contract. Section 7(d) of the E. P. Act, 1951, does not require
that the contracts at which it strikes should be enforceable against the
Government; all that it requires is that the contract should be for the
supply of goods to the Government. Therefore, a person interested in a
contract for supply of goods to the appropriate Government would b ^
disqualified under section 7(d), even though the contract does not comply
with the formalities prescribed by article 299(l) of the Constitution.
CHATURBSUJ VITHALDAS JASANI V. MORESHWAR PARASHRAM AND
OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 301 (S.C.).
^Contracts under food distribution and procurement scheme for
procurement, storage, distribution, etc.—'The members of a joint Hindu
family, of which the respondent was the manager, formed themselves
into a firm in 1950, to carry on the family business, and in 1951, the
firm entered into four kinds of contracts with the Governor of
Madras, viz., (i) a stock-holder's agreement by which the firm undertook
to hold the reserve stock of the Government, store them safely and to
dispose of them as directed by the Government; (ii) to store and sell
imported foodgrains and food-products which were allotted to the firm
by the Government; (iii) a quota-holder's agreement by which the firm
agreed to pay tjae Government the difference between the landed cost
and market price of paddy aud rice allotted to the firm ; and (iv) a
wholesale procuring agency agreement under the Madras Foodgrains
(Intensive Procurement) Order, 1951. The respondent, intending to
stand as a candidate for election, executed a deed on the 15th Novem-
ber, 1951, by which he'relinquished his> interest in the firm to the other
partners, and gave notice of hi? retirement to the Eegistrar of Firms
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 63

and in the newspapers, and his retirement was accepted by the Collector
on 1st October, 1952, " with effect from 15th November, 1951 ". The
accounts between the respondent and his firm, and the accounts between
the firm and the Government were not however settled until the 15th
March, 1952. The nomination paper of the respondent was filed on the
20th November, ^ 5 1 : Held, (i) that a formal contract with the
Government complying with the formalities laid down in article 299 of
the Constitution is not necessary for the purposes of disqualification
under section 7(d); (ii) the fact that the stock allotted for storage had
been disposed of on the date of nomination did not put an end to the
stock-holder's agreement as the agreement was not confined to one allot*
ment alone, and moreover the accounts had not been settled ; (iii) as it
is open to the members of a joint Hindu family to form themselves into
a firm to carry on their business, and the members of the respondent's
family had done so, section 9(2) of the Act had no application ; (iv) the
contracts in question were contracts for performance of services
undertaken" by the State Government under the scheme for equitable
distribution of foodgrains contemplated by the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, and the various foodgrain control and
procurement Orders passed thereunder, even though the State had
assumed the performance of such services voluntarily and was under no
statutory or enforceable obligation to do so; Leek v. Epsom Bural
District Council (1922, 1 K. B. 383) referred to; (v) the relinquishment
deed was not, on the facts of the case, a real one and at any rate it was
not effective as the accounts between the partners and the share of the
respondent in the assets and liabilities of the firm had not been settled ;
(yi) even if the relinquishment was a true one, as it was one between
the partners inter se, and was not made with the concurrence of the
State Government, it could not put an end to the obligation of the
respondent under the contracts ; (vii) as election is a matter of public
concern, it was not open to the Collector to accept the relinquishment
with retrospective effect from 15th November, 1951, so as to affect the
rights of third parties or remove the disqualification which attached
to the respondent on the date of nomination ; Ford v. Newth (11901]
1 Q.B. 683) relied on; Maidstone 1831, and Dartmouth 1845 ([1845],
B and Arn. 460) distinguished ; (viii) whatever may be the correct view
where the only thing that remains is an outstanding liability on the
part of the Government, there can be no doubt that where a person has
not completely performed his obligations under the contract, he is
interested in the contract within the meaning of section 7(d); (ix) the
respondent was therefore interested in contracts for the performance of
services undertaken by the appropriate Government within the meaning
64 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

of section 7(d) on the date of hia nomination and disqualified to stand as


a candidate. SANKABA PANDIA NADAE, A.8.S.8. v. V. V. EAMASWAMI
AND OTHEES, 5 E.L.R. 417.

Besignation of membership—Unconditional acceptance without


settlement of accounts and payment of dues—Whether terminates
contract—An association of merchants styled "Merchants' Association
Sidhauli" of which the respondent No. 1 was the President, and a firm,
of which respondent No. 1 was a partner, was one of the members, obtain-
ed a 'license' from the Controller of Foodgrains of the U. P. Government,
under the foodgrains procurement and levy scheme of the Government,
by which the association undertook to buy, store and deliver to the State
Government controlled foodgrains of such specification as may be prescri-
bed by the Food Controller and to deliver such foodgrains only to such
person or persons, and at such prices, as may be fixed by the State
Government. The agreement was terminable by mutual consent or on
one month's notice. Ti# respondent, intending to stand as a candidate,
tendered resignation of his office of President of the Association on the
21st November, 1951, and his resignation was accepted, but he was
requested to sign cheques until a new President was appointed, and he con-
tinued to sign cheques after his nomination. The respondent's firm also
resigned its membership on the 22nd November and its resignation was
accepted on the same day but moneys due to it for grains supplied to the
association were fully paid only after the acceptance of the nomination.
Eespondent No. 1 was elected to the general seat. An election petition
was filed to declare that the election of respondent No. 1 was void and
petitioner was duly elected, without an express prayer for declaring the
election of the candidate for the reserved seat also void: Held, per
D. N. EOT and A. SANYALB (M. U. FABUQI dissenting)—(i) though the
respondent's firm as such could not be a partner of the association as a firm
is not a juristic person, the legal effect of one firm becoming a partner
of another firm was that the individuals of the two firms become part-
ners in the latter firm, and the respondent No. 1 was therefore a partner
of the association; (ii) that the license' was really a contract as there were
mutual obligations under it; (iii) that for the purposes of section 7(d) it is
not necessary that there should be a contract with the Government; it is
enough if there was a contract for supply of goods to, or the execution
of any works or the performance of any services undertaken by, the
Government; and there need not be a contract satisfying the requirements
of the Constitution with regard to contracts made on behalf of the Govern-
ment; (iv) that under the procurement and levy scheme, the State Govern-
ment had undertaken an essential service, viz., the equitable distribution of
foodgrains at fair prices to consumers and retail dealers, and the association
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 65

had therefore entered into a contract for the performance of a service


undertaken by the State Government; (v) that, as the security amount
had not been returned and the respondent No. 1 continued to sign cheques
as President and the accounts with the association had not been finally
settled and payments made before the nomination was filed, the contract
continued to subsist at the time of nomination, and the resignation of the
respondent and his firm could not remove the disqualification of the res-
pondent under section 7(d); (vi) that, on the facts, the result of the election
was materially affected by the improper acceptance of the nomination of
respondent No. 1 and the whole election must be declared void. Per
M. U. P A B U Q I {contra).—(i) Neither the Merchants' Association nor its
member firms were juristic persons capable of entering into a contract,
and it was no one's case that the members individually had entered into
a contract with anybody and section 7(d) had no application to the case;
(ii) as the respondent's resignation and the resignation of the firm were
unconditionally accepted and the Eegional Controller had consented to
the resignation, the respondent was not interested in the agreement in
question; the mere signing of cheques after acceptance of the resignation
until another person was appointed did not negative the effect of the
resignation; (iii) in the case of an improper acceptance of a nomination
as election cannot be set aside unless the petitioner proves positively that
the result of the election was materially affected thereby, and as there
was no. evidence at all to prove it, the result of the election cannot be
held to have been materially affected. HANUMAN PBASAD MISEA V.
TABA CHAND AND OTHEBS, 5 E.L.E. 446.

Contracts with State Government for supply of foodgrains under


Control Orders—Where, under an order issued by the Central Government
under section_4(b) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,
1946, empowering the State Governments to exercise the power of con-
trolling the production and distribution of essential commodities, the
Madras Government issued Foodgrains Control Orders, and under the pro-
visions of these Control Orders it entered into contracts with a firm, of
which the petitioner was a partner, for the stocking and equitable dis-
tribution of foodgrains: Held, that in exercising its powers under section
4, the State Government was not acting on behalf of the Central Govern-
ment but on its own behalf and the contracts in question were, therefore,
for the performance of services undertaken by the "appropriate Govern-
ment," that is, the Government of the Madras State, within the meaning
of section 7(d) of the Eepresentation of the People Act, 1951, and not the
Central Government, and the petitioner was disqualified under aection7(d).
V. Vi' EAMASWAMI v. ELECTION TBIBUNAL, TIRUNELVJBLI^ AND
OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 233.
• -J

66 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Contract for supply and distribution offoodgrains—Persons who


have entered into a contract with a Government for the distribution and
supply of foodgrains, under a scheme of the Government for equitable dis-
tribution of foodgrains in the State are persons interested in a contract
for the performance of services undertaken by the Government and so
disqualified under section 7(d). Per SACHDEVA and HANS E A J KHANKA
(HARBANS SlNGH dubitante):—A person who has entered into a contract
for the transport of foodgrains under such a scheme is also disqualified
under section 7(d). Bam Chand v. Wadhawa Bam and Others (5 E.L.B.
386) followed. BATTAN SINGH V. DEVINDEE SINGH AND OTHERS, 7
E.L.E. 234.
' Nominee for distribution of yarn within a district under the
State nominee system—The agreement between the Governor and a
nominee under the State Nominee Scheme for yarn distribution, by which
all the yarn in the country was taken over by the Indian Union and the
Central Government distributed the yarn to the various States for supply
to the consumers, and the States, in their turn, appointed a certain
number of nominees for each district who were authorised to lift the yarn
from the mills and distribute it to the other licensed dealers in the
district, is not a mere license but a contract. In view of the provisions
contained in the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, of the
Central Government, the Madras Essential Articles Control and Bequisi-
tioning (Temporary Powers) Act, 1941, and the Madras Yarn Dealers
Control Order, 1948, the State Nominee Scheme for the distribution of
yarn was a service undertaken by the State Government in the interest
of the community. The State Government did not act as a mere agent
of the Central Government in performing this service. A nominee of the
State Government under this scheme is therefore a person.interested in a
contract for the performance of services undertaken by the appropriate
Government within the meaning of section 7(d) of the B. P. Act, 1951,
and disqualified for membership of the State Assembly. Where the
nomination paper of the returned candidate was improperly accepted the
election has to be wholly set aside. The election of the candidate alone
cannot be declared void and another candidate cannot be declared duly
elected. Dictum: The E.P. Act, 1951, must be suitably amended with a view
to have questions relating to the validity of the nomination papers finally
disposed of as far as possible before the holding of elections. The English
model is not a sure guide on this point as the conditions there are wholly
different and election petitions have become very rare in that country.
D R . KANNABHIEAN V. A. J. AEUNACHALAM AND O T H E E S , 2 E.L.E. 167.
—*—Stock-holder appointed under Iron and Steel Control Order,
1941.-+-The word "contract" in section 7(d) applies to allihe three kinds
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 67

of contracts mentioned in the said clause and not merely to the first two,
and consequently a candidate would be disqualified for being chosen as a
member of the Parliament or a State Legislature if he has any share or
interest in a contract for the performance of any services undertaken by
the appropriate Government. A person who is registered and appointed
by the Central Government as a stock-holder in a State under the Iron
and Steel Control Order, 1941, is not, however, disqualified for being
chosen as a member of the Legislature of that State under section 7(d),
for, (i) there is no express or implied contract between him and the State
Government, and (ii) the services, if any, in the case of the Iron and Steel
Control Order, are undertaken by the Central Government and not by
the State Government. PBABHUDAS EAMJIBHAI MEHTA V. LALLUBHAI
KISHOBDAS MANIAB, 1 E.L.E. 154.
Licence for distribution of yarn under State Nominee Scheme—
Licence on terms and conditions fixed by parties —Where in pursuance of
the scheme for the supply and distribution of yarn to the public laid down
by the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, of the Central
Government, the Madras Essential Articles Control and Eequisitioning
Act, 1946, and the Madras Yarn Dealers Control Order, 1948, the peti-
tioner obtained a licence and entered into an agreement with the Govern-
ment of Madras for the distribution and supply of yarn to the public :
Held, (l) that whether the service of supply and distribution of yarn
undertaken by the Madras Government was performed in exercise of the
powers delegated to it by the Central Government under section 4 of the
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946, or it was acting in
exercise of the t statutory powers conferred on it by the Madras Act of
1946, in either case it was exercising its power as a Provincial Govern-
ment and not as an agent of the Central Government, in issuing, .the
licence and entering into the agreement with the petitioner and the
agreement entered into by the petitioner was therefore one for the per-
formance of services undertaken by the "appropriate Government" within
the meaning of section 7(d) of the E. P. Act, 1951 ; (ii) that as the licence
was issued to the petitioner subject to terms that were mutually agreed
upon between him and the Government and for valuable consideration,
there was a valid contract between him and the Government and the peti-
tioner was therefore disqualified to be chosen as a member of the Madras
Legislature under section 7(d) of the E. P. Act, 1951. A. J. AEUNACHALAM-
v. ELECTION TBIBUNAL, VELLOBB, AND 0 T H E B S , 9 E.L.E. 471.
Licence-holder for supply to ration shops —A person holding a
licence from the Government for the supply of sugar to ration-card
holders under the Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, is not a person
"interested in a contract for the supply of goods to, or the performance of
68 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

any services by, the Government" within the meaning of section 7, clause
(d), and is not disqualified to stand as a candidate for election under the
said clause. Gian Ghand v. Sri Bam Bansal and Others (2 B.L.E, 136)
followed. Dr. Kannabhiran v. A. J. Arunachalam and Others (2 E.L.E.
167) distinguished. PANDIT HAEISH CHANDRA V. RAJA MAN SINGH
AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 129.
Licensee for supply of sugar under Sugar Control Order—A State
which makes provision for the supply and distribution of sugar in accord-
ance with the Sugar Control Order issued by the Central Government
under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, does not
undertake any service of supplying sugar to the public but merely carries
out the directions' of the Central Government under the Sugar Control
Order. Consequently, a member of a firm which supplies and distributes
sugar under a licence granted by the State in accordance with the scheme
for distribution of controlled articles is not disqualified under section 7(d)
of the-R. P. Act, 1951. At any rate, even if the Government should be
deemed to have undertaken the service of supplying sugar in such cases, it
is the Central Government that undertakes such a service and not the
State Government. Prabhudas Bamjibhai Mehta v. Lalhibhai Kishordas
Maniar (1 E.L.R. 154) followed. BALCHAND V. LAXMINARAIN MATBH,
8 E.L.R. 465.
Contract to distribute rice under East Punjab Paddy and Bice
(Mill Control and Procurement) Order, 1948—In pursuance of the scheme
for distribution of foodgrains at fair prices introduced by the East
Punjab Paddy and Rice (Mill Control and Procurement) Order, 1948, the
Governor of the Punjab entered into an agreement with» an association
called the "New Rice Association," by which the association agreed to
distribute all rice manufactured by it, in the manner laid down, and at
the prices fixed, by the Government. The petitioner, who was a partner
of a firm which was a member of this association, stood as a candidate
for election to the Punjab State Assembly, but his nomination was
rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that he was interested
in a contract for the performance of services undertaken by the State
Government: Held, that the Punjab Government had taken upon itself
an essential service for the equitable distribution and availability at a
fair price of foodgrains and other essential commodities, and the contract
entered into by the association was a dontraot for the performance of a
service undertaken by the Punjab Government, and, as the petitioner's
firm was a member of the association, he was interested in the contract
and was disqualified to stand for election under section 7(d) of the
R. P . Act, 1951, and his nomination was rightly rejected : RAM CflA$fT>
v. WAPHAWA RAM AND OTHBRS, 5 E.L.R. 38§.
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 69

Forest contractor undertaking to resell stock to Government if so


required, to clear all undergrowth and shrub and to give housing accommod-
ation to labourers—Where a forest contractor had purchased certain
Qpupes from the Government under an agreement which provided inter
alia that when the production of 1951-52 sales was ready, if he was called
npon by the Government to sell his stock of firewood and charcoal, he
will have to sell the stock to the Government at a certain maximum
ceiling selling price: Held, that the contract to sell the firewood and
charcoal to the Government if so required, was a valid one and amount-
ed to a contract to supply goods to the Government and the contractor
was disqualified under the first part of cl. (d). Held also, that a provi-
sion in the agreement to clear all undergrowth and shrubs and to burn
fire traces 50 feet wide round the coupe did not amount to a contract
for ' the execution of any works"; and an undertaking to collect
certain kinds of bark and fruits to meet the requirements of the loca-
lity and to sell the same to them and to provide housing accommodation
to the labourers did not make him "interested in a contract for the
performance of any services undertaken by the Government" within cl.
(d) of s. 7 of the Act. SHANKAB NANASAHEB KAEPE V. MABUTI
SITAEAM SAW ANT AND OTHEBS, 1 E.L.E. 302.

Depot-holder under food rationing scheme—Whether contractor or


mere licensee—Under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,
1946, and the East Punjab Rationing Order, 1948, the Punjab Govern-
ment assumed control of the supply and distribution of food-grains to
the public and, therefore, supply and distribution of food-grains under
these enactments was a service undertaken by the Government"
within the meaning of section 7(d) of the R. P. Act, 1951. But a person
who has been appointed as a depot-holder and authorised by the Govern-
ment to supply rationed food-grains to card-holders in accordance with
the provisions of the Rationing Order, is a mere licensee and not a
person who has entered into a contract with the Government, because
there is no finality in the arrangement, as the authorisation can be
withdrawn or cancelled by the Rationing Controller at any time and no
mutuality, as the depot-holder has no enforceable rights against the
Government. Gian Chand v. Sriram Bansal and Others (2 E.L.R. 136),
and Pandit Harish Chandra v. Raja Man Singh and Others (5 E.L.R.
129) followed. Bam Ghand v. Wadhawa Bam{5 E.L.R. 386), Dr. Kanna-
bhiran v. A. J. Arunachalam and Others (2 E.L.R. 167) and Sankara
Pandia Nadar v. V. V. Bamaswami and Others (5 E.L.R. 417) distin-
guished. CHIBANJIT SINGH V. MAM R A J AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.R. 1.
Agent for procurement and supply of food-grains—The respond-
ent was a partner of a firm which acted as the procurement agent of the'
ELD—IO
70 ELECTION LAW* REPORTS DIGEST

State Government and had undertaken to supply food-grains and render


incidental services to it. The agreement provided (i) that during the
period commencing from 1st November, 1950, to the date of termination
of the agreement, the agent will purchase for the Government at the
most economical prices, the kinds, qualities and quantities of food-grains
as may be specified by the Deputy Commissioner and that the agent
will render such further services as provided in clause 15, if so required
by the Deputy Commissioner ; (ii) the agent will be paid the price for
food-grains which are accepted under clause 6 and such incidental
charges as the Director of Food Supplies may consider reasonable. The
contract was subsisting and operative at the time when the respondent
filed his nomination paper. Held, that the agreement for the supply of
goods to the Government was not void for uncertainty under section 29
of the Indian Contract Act, but was a valid contract and the respondent
was disqualified to be a member under section 7(d). JwALA PEASAD
MISBA v. MAHADBO AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 473.

Contracts for supply of printed receipt books and forms to Collec-


tor and Civil Surgeon—Where the nomination paper of the petitioner
was rejected under s. 7(d) of the E. P. Aot, 1951, on the ground that he
was interested in a contract for supply of goods to the appropriate
Government, as a printing firm of which petitioner was a partner had
submitted tenders for printing a certain number of forms and receipt
books, which were called for by the Collector, Civil Surgeon and by the
District Rural Development Board of a District and these tenders had
been accepted by them : Held, (i) that when the tender made by the
petitioner's firm was accepted by the Collector, Civil Surgeon and the
Board respectively, there was a complete contract for printing as the
tender was an offer and not a mere invitation for offers ; (ii) the ques-
tion whether a contract for supply of printed matter was a contract for
work and labour or for supply of goods would depend on the particular
facts of each case and in the present case the contracts were for supply
of goods within the meaning of s. 7(d), not for mere work and labour ;
Clay v. Yates (25 LJ. Ex. 237) and Bobinson v. Graves ([1925] 1 K.B.
579) distinguished ; Lee x- Griffin (30 L.J.Q.B. 252), applied ; (iii) that
the expression "contract for supply of goods" in s. 7(d) did not neces-
sarily imply a course of dealings but would include contracts which are
to be completed by a single delivery and isolated contracts ; (iv) that
the contracts for supply to the District Collector and Civil Surgeon were
contracts for supply of goods to the appropriate Government and they
came within the purview of s. 7(d) even though they were not expressed
to be made by the President or Governor as required by art. 299 of the
Constitution ; (v) that the petitioner was accordingly disqualified under
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES Jl

s. 7(d) and his nomination paper was rightly rejected.


KANAIYALAL
BHABHUTBHAX M E H T A V. SATTENDEA KALIDAS ZAVBEI AND OTHERS,
JL,iJ,LTB,339.
;):.••-•• —a—Becognised contractors and firms—The respondent was the pro-
prietor of a firm which, along with some other firms, had been approved
by the Government for the purchase of medicines and drugs by
Aushadhalayas under the control of the District Board, Municipal Board,
Notified Area Committee, and Eural Development Department. It was
contended that the respondent was disqualified for membership under
section 7(d) of the Act. Held, that the respondent cannot be said to
have any share or interest in a contract for supply of goods to or for the
execution of any works or the performance of any service undertaken by,
the State, simply because his firm was approved by the State Government
for supply of some drugs to different dispensaries within the Province, and
he was not disqualified under section 7(d) of the Act. KANAUJI LAL
SHUKLA v. BHAGWAN D I N AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 1.

The mere fact that the name of a person is in the list of contrac-
tors approved by the Government does not disqualify him under sec-
tion 7(d). EAMA EBDDI v. CHIDANANDAM AND ANOTHEB (NO. 2),
3 E.L.R. 42.
Lessee of land under Collector—A person to whom the Collector
has leased out land under section 4 of the U. P. Land Utilization Act,
1948, is not disqualified under section 7(d) of the E.P. Act, 1951, as the
transaction is not a contract express or implied, between the lessee and
the State Government, for the supply of goods to or the performance of
any services undertaken by, the State Government. BHOLANATH V.
KEIRHNA CHANDEA GUPTA AND OTHEES (NO. 2), 6 E.L.E. 104.
Lessee for quarrying stone—Where the Director of the Depart-
ment of Mines, and Geology of a State granted to the petitioner the sole
right to quarry building stone from the various quarries of the State under
a contract which contained a stipulation that the petitioner agreed to
submit to the excavation and removal of all stone required for the State
Eailway and Military works, and also to allow the P.W.D. contractors
to excavate and remove all stone required for Government works on
payment of a fixed royalty : Held, that the contract was not one for the
supply of goods" to the Government within the meaning of section 7(d)
of the E.P. Act, 1951, as there was no agreement to supply goods but
only to allow the removal of stone required for Government purposes.
Shankar Nanasaheb Earpe v. Maruti Sitaram Sawant and Others
(1 B.L.E. 302) distinguished. LUMBA EAM V. EAM NAEAIN AND
QTHEKS, 5 B.L.B, 319-
72 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Lessee of salt factory from Government—By registered


lease deed executed by the petitioner as lessee and the Governor-
General in Council as lessor, the latter demised to the petitioner
for a period of 25 years certain piece of land together with all salt
pans and brine pans, compendiously described as a salt factory.
Clause 17(a) of the agreement provided that "the lessor shall be entitled
to a lien every year on 50 per cent, of the salt produced by the lessee in
the factory and the lessee shall in any season in which notice is given
before the 15th January, store at his own expense and keep in reserve
the first and every succeeding alternate heap of 1200 or 2400 maunds (as
the case may be) of the salt manufactured in the leased land in that
season, which the Government will have the option to purchase at
such rate as may be decided by the Collector from time to time, provided
that each heap of the Government Eeserve stock of one season shall be
released for disposal by the lessee -as it is replaced by a heap of equal
quantity of the new salt of the succeeding season". Clause 18 provided
that "the lessee shall pay in cash in a lump sum on the first day of June
in each year so much of the charge incurred by the Collector in paying
the Government establishments of the factory as may be in excess of
such percentage of duty as the Central Board of Eevenue may fix under
section 43 of the Madras Salt Act 1889 or any statutory modification
thereof on salt manufactured in the leased premises and removed there-
from in the previous official year." Held, (i) that clause 17(a) contained
a contractual obligation and was not merely an incident of the lease ;
(ii) that salt supplied to the Government under clause 17(a) was not rent
under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act; (iii) that the provision
contained in clause 17(a) was not merely a burden imposed upon the
lessee in consideration of the demise but a contract which was primarily
entered into for the supply of salt to the Government; (iv) that the agree-
ment was not merely a standing offer which became a contract when the
Government exercised its option to purchase the salt (after giving notice
before the 15th of January of any year) but a binding contract to supply
goods ; and (v) the petitioner was, therefore, 'interested in a contract
for supply of goods to the appropriate Government" within the meaning
of section 7 (d) and his nomination paper was rightly rejected.
Shankar Nanasheb Karpe v. Maruti Sitaram (1 E.L.E. 302) followed.
Beg v. Demers ([1900] A.C. 103), Helby v. Mathews ([1895] A.C. 471),
and Nutton v. Wilson (1899, 22 Q.B.D. 744) referred to. MAHABAJA
op PAELAKIMBDI V. BIJAY CHANDEA DAS AND OTHEES, 4 B.L.E. 101.

Licensee for sale of arms—A person who holds a licence for the
sale of arms and ammunition from the Government is not disqualified
under section 7 (d). BALWANT SINGH AND OTHEES V. DEVI L A L AND
OTHEBS, 8 B.L.E. 1.
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES >/$

Manager of grant-in-aid educational institutions.—Where a


scheme framed" by the Government of a State for giving aid to private
educational institutions provided that institutions which wished to
accede to the scheme must deposit 80 per cent, of their fee collections in
the State treasury for payment of the teaching staff, and if they did so,
the deficit, if any, necessary for paying the staff would be met by the
Government, and it was contended that the Head-master and manager
of a private institution which had acceded to the scheme was a person
interested in a contract for the performance of services undertaken by
the appropriate Government and was therefore disqualified to be chosen
as a member of the Legislative Assembly under section 7(d) of the E. P.
Act, 1951: Held, (i) that the imparting of education was not a service
which was the monopoly of the State Government and private educational
institutions were not performing any service undertaken by the Govern-
ment ; (ii) that the scheme framed by the Government and the accession
of the institution to the scheme did not amount to an offer by the
Government and acceptance by the institution with a view to the forma-
tion of any contract ; (iii) that the Head-master and manager of an
institution receiving aid under the scheme was not 'interested in a
contract for the performance of a service undertaken by the Government'
and not disqualified under section 7(d). Held also, that the decision of
the S upreme Court in Vithaldas Jasani's case (9 E.L.R. 301) did not
mean that for the purposes of section 7(d) there need not be a legal con-
tractual relation resulting from an offer and acceptance supported by
consideration. MATHAI MATHEW MANJURAN V. K. C. ABRAHAM
AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E .376.
Person running buses taken over by Custodian of Evacuee Pro-
perty—The Custodian of Evacuee Property took possession of certain
motor buses, trucks and cars when the petitioner's brothers who appar-
ently owned them in part migrated to Pakistan and the petitioner ran
the buses under an agreement with the Custodian who gave possession
of these to the petitioner. The nomination of the petitioner to a seat in
the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh was rejected on the ground
that he had a share or interest in a contract for the execution of works
or performance of services undertaken by the State of Uttar Pradesh:
Held, that the Custodian was not acting for the Uttar Pradesh State in
any event, and the petitioner was not therefore disqualified. ASRAR
•AHMAD V. NIHAL UDDIN AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 81.
-Transport permit-holder—Carriage of mails under condition
attached to permit—A contract is none the less a contract even though it
is entered into under the terms of a permit granted under a statute, which
makes it obligatory on the holder to enter into such a contract in eertain
^4 ELECTION LAW fcfefORTS DIGEST

conditions. Under section 48 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Act and


rule 160(B) of the Eules made thereunder the Transport Authority may
attach to any stage carriage permit a condition that the holder of the
permit shall, if so required by the authority which granted the permit,
carry mails at such rates and conditions as that authority may fix. The
petitioner who was a transport permit-holder was directed under the
abovesaid condition contained in his permit to carry mails, and he entered
into a formal agreement with the Union Government in this behalf and
carried mails between certain stations: Held, that, though the petitioner
was under a statutory obligation to carry mails if so required under the
terms of the permit granted to him, yet, as there was a contract between
him and the Union Government for the performance of services under-
taken by that Government, the petitioner was disqualified under section
7(d) of the Eepresentation of the People Act, 1951, for being chosen as a
member of the Parliament. Bansom v. Surbiton ([1949] Ch. 180)
distinguished. SATYANATHAN V. SUBBAMANYAM AND OTHERS, 9
E.L.E. 394.
Bule 160-B of the Madras Motor Vehicles Eules provided that it
shall be a condition of every stage carriage permit, that the holder of the
permit shall, if so required by the Transport Authority which granted
the permit, carry mails at such rates and on such terms as the Transport
Authority may fix after consultation with the holder of the permit and
the postal authorities concerned. In pursuance of such a condition in his
permit, the appellant, who was the holder of a stage carriage permit,
entered into a formal agreement with the Governor-General to carry
mails on a monthly remuneration of Es. 200. , The agreement could be
terminated by either side by giving 4 months notice. # The election of the
appellant to the House of the People was challenged in an election peti-
tion on the ground that, as this contract was subsisting on the material
dates, the appellant was interested in a contract for the performance of a
service undertaken by the Central Government and was, therefore, dis-
qualified for being chosen as a member under section 7 clause (d). The
appellant contended that section 7(d) did not apply as the obligation
undertaken by him to carry mails was a statutory obligation imposed by
rule 160-B of the Madras Motor Vehicles Eules and not a contractual
one, that there was no consideration for this contract and that the t»ans-
port of mails was not a "service undertaken" by the Central Government.
The Tribunal overruled these contentions and held that the appellan#*ra#'
disqualified. On appeal to the Supreme Court: Held, (i) that the obliga-
tion undertaken by the appellant under the agreement to carry mails was
not a statutory liability but a contractual obligation even though it was
entered into in pursuance of a statutory condition in the stage carriage
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 75

permit, as it was open to the appellant not to accept a permit with such
a condition, or to terminate the contract by notice, (ii) the contract
was fully supported by consideration; and (iii) the transport of mails was
a service undertaken by the Central Government within the meaning of
section 7(d), and the appellant was, therefore, disqualified and his election
was rightly set aside by the Election Tribunal. N. SATYANATHAN V.
K. SUBRAMANYAN AND OTHERS, 10 B.L.E. 311 (S.C.).
When contract terminates—Payment of final bill for work done
—Whether terminates contract —The petitioner, who was a prominent
man of a village in Bihar, execiited an agreement in favour of the Sub-
Divisional Officer undertaking to repair certain minor irrigation works at
an estimated cost of Es. 2,508, before the 4th December, 1949, and took
advances amounting to Es. 1,600, but being unable to complete the work,
requested the Collector on 8th April, 1950, to measure the work that he
had done and pay him for it and to prepare a new estimate for the
unfinished work and entrust it to some others. The Circle Officer was
accordingly directed to measure the work and he submitted a final bill
which was duly checked and passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, for
Es. 1,512-11-0. The petitioner was accordingly ordered on 25th June,
1950, to refund Rs. 87-5-0 and certificate was issued for recovering it on
23rd August, 1951, and the amount was recovered on 18th November,
1952. It appeared, however, that the correct amount due to the petitioner
was Es. 1,612-11-0 and not Es. 1,512-11-0 and that a sum of Es. 12 was
really due to the petitioner. The petitioner filed his nomination paper on
the 23rd November, 1951, and it was rejected on 'the ground that he was
interested in a contract for the execution of works undertaken by the
Government and was therefore disqualified under section 7(d) of the E. P.
Act, 1951: Held, per HARGOBIND PRASAD SINHA and ADITYA NABAYAN
LAL (BASU PRASAD dissenting)—that, as the petitioner had unequivo-
cally expressed his inability to perform the contract and the Collector had
settled the amount payable to the petitioner for work done by a final bill
and never insisted on his completing the contract, the contract must be
deemed to have been put an end to with the consent of both parties
under section 39 of the Indian Contract Act, at any rate when the certifi-
cate for recovery was issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer in August,
1951, and, as the contract did not subsist on 23rd November, 1951, when
the nomination paper was filed, the rejection of the nomination was
improper. The fact that the correct amount payable to the petitioner
was Es. 1,612-11-0 could not alter the legal posilion. Per BASU PRASAD
{contra)—(i) There was not sufficient evidence for coming to the conclu-
sion that the Sub-Divisional Officer had terminated the contract within
the meaning of section 39 of the Indian Contract Act; (ii) whatever
76 ELECTION LAW REPARTS DIGEST

might have been the intention of the Sub-Divisional Officer, as he had


not paid the petitioner in full on a correct statement of accounts, he had
not performed his part of the contract in its entirety, and as this con-
tractual obligation of the Sub-Divisional Officer cannot be deemed to
have been put an end to by the petitioner's acquiescence or relinquish-
ment under section 63 of the Contract Act until 18th November, 1952,
when the certificate amount was paid by him, there was a subsisting con-
tract when the nomination paper was filed and the nomination was
rightly rejected. Held also, BASU PBASAD and HABGOBIND PEA8AD
SlNHA (ADITTA NABAYAN L A L dubitante)—that the agreement entered
into by the petitioner was a contract and not merely an obligation under-
taken by the petitioner as headman of the village in the discharge of his
duties as headman under the Bihar Private Irrigation Works Act, 1922.
Satyendra Kumar Das v. The Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners
of Dacca (I.L.E. 58 Cal. 180), Seshaiah v. Koti Beddi (3 B.L.E. 39),
Boyse v. Birley (1869, 38 L.J.O.P. 203), Baidyanath Prasad v. Chandresh-
war Prasad (2 E.L.E. 88) and Kalika Prasad v. Hayat Chand (4 B.L.E.
118) referred to. PARMATMA SINGH V. DEO SABAN SIHNA AND OTHERS,
5 B.L.E. 353.
Belinquishing claims against Government before filing nomina-
tion A person would be disqualified under section 7(d), if he has a share
or interest in a contract for the execution of any works undertaken by
tlis appropriate Government. I t does not refer to the completion or
otherwise of the works undertaken, and once it is proved that the person
concerned has a share or interest in a contract of that type, the disqualifi-
cation would not cease merely because the work has been completed. I t
is, however, open to him to relinquish his claims for payment and thus
terminate his interest in the contract. The respondent was a contractor
who had undertaken to do certain works under the appropriate Govern-
ment. Prior to the date of filing his nomination, he had completed the
works and had also relinquished his claims for money due for works that
he had done : Held, that, though the mere fact that the respondent had
completed his work would not remove the disqualification under section
7(d) of the Act, under section 63 of the Indian Contract Act the respond-
ent was entitled to dispense with the performance of the promise of the
other party, which in this case was the payment of money by the
Government to him, and he had thus ceased to have any share or interest
in the contract and was not, therefore, disqualified for membership under
section 7(d). La Feuvre v. Lankester (118 E.R. 1241), Boyse v. Birley
(1869, 20 L.T.B. 786), Ford v. Neivth (1901, 1 Q.B. 683), 0'Carroll v.
Hastings (1905, 2 Irish Eeports 593) referred to. Satyendrakumar Das
v, Chairman of Municipal Commissioners of Dacca (I.L.E. 58 CaJ, 180),
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 7f

and Athikesavtdu Naidu v. Ekambara Mudaliar (1939,1 M.LJ. 420)


followed. RAMA EBDDI V. CHIDANANDAM AND OTHERS, (NO. 2)
3E.L.B. 42.
Retirement by notice in writing to other partners—Public notice
and notice to Registrar not given before nomination—The respondent
was a partner in a registered firm which had entered into an agreement
with the State for the supply of grains at certain rates. On the 25th
October, 1951, he gave intimation to his partners through the managing
partners and to the Deputy Commissioner that he intended to retire from
the partnership with effect from the 1st November, 1951. The partners
consented and some of the remaining partners continued the firm and
entered into a new agreement with the Government on the 28th March,
1952, with effect from the 1st November, 1951. The respondent filed his
nomination paper on the 15th November : Held, by the majority
(MANDLEKAB dissenting)—that as the partnership was one at will it was
open to the respondent to retire by giving notice to the other partners and
he ceased to be a partner from the 1st November, even though he had not
given public notice of his retirement or notice to the Eegistrar of Firms
as required by sections 63 and 72 of the Partnership Act and continued to
be liable to third parties. Per MANDLEKAB.—As the respondent had not
given written notice-to all the partners but only to the managing partner
and as he had not also given notice to the Registrar of Firms and public
notice as required by the Partnership Act, and the new agreement with tha
State was drawn up long after the date of nomination, the respondent-
continued to be a partner and was disqualified under section 7(d) on the
date of nomination. Held also, that when a nomination paper of a disquali-
fied person has been improperly accepted the result of the election must
be deemed to have been materially affected. Mula Singh v. Mangu Ram
and Others (2 Doabia 268) referred to. NlEANJAN SlNGH v. JAIDBV
GADADHAB AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 352.

Retirement from firm interested in contract—The petitioner


was a partner in a registered firm which had entered into a contract
with the Central Government in the Postal Department to carry mail.
The petitioner assigned his interest in the firm in favour of the other
partners a few days before filing his nomination paper. No mention was
however made about the contract with the Government in the aforesaid
deed of assignment. Held, that, inasmuch as the petitioner could not be
discharged of his liability to the Central Government under the con-
tract except with the. consent of the aforesaid Government, he continued
to be under the disqualification under section 7(d) of the R. P. Act, 1951.
Obiter.—If there had been, in fact, a valid assignment of a contract
78 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

before nomination that would save a contractor from disqualification


though some formalities connected with the assignment, such as the
giving of notice under section 63(l) or 72(e) of the Indian Partnership
Act might not have been gone through by them as there is no time limit
fixed for giving these notices and this provision is made for the protec-
tion of the customers in respect of their future dealings which would not
be affected in any way without such notice having been previously given.
MANI KANT A DAS V. JANAB AMJAD ALI AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.E. 406.
What constitutes 'financial interest'—In orderthat the Govern-
ment may have financial interest" in a corporation within the meaning
of section 7(e) of the E. P. Act, 1951, it is not necessary that the Govern-
ment should have an interest in the corporation itself. It is enough, if it
has a financial interest in the business of the corporation. Where a
Co-operative Society acted as procuring agents of textile goods for a
State and at the relevant period held a permit for lifting a certain quota of
Government, and though the agreement provided that all risks, liabilities
and expenses shall be borne by the Society, the Government was entitled
to levy a cess at a certain rate on the price of the cloth sold by the
society : Held, that the Government had a "financial interest" in the
Society, and the manager of the Society was disqualified under sec-
tion 7(e). The mere fact that the Government holds a certain sum of
money as security for the due performance of a contract by a corpora
tion and is entitled to forfeit it in certain circumstances does not make
the Government financially interested in the corporation within sec-
tion 7(e). The fact that a corporation has taken loans from the Bank to
which the Government has advanced moneys and over which the Govern-
ment has effective control does not make it a corporation in which the
Government has a financial interest," even if the goods pledged by the
Odrporation with the Bank are re-pledged by the Bank with the Govern-
ment. As the provisions contained in section 7, clauses (d) and (e), are
disabling provisions they must be construed strictly. Bai Saheb Bhagwan
Das's case (4 Jagat Narain 12) referred to. A ' contract for the supply
of goods" in section 7(d) means a contract of an abiding and subsisting
character and is not intended to cover casual supplies of goods. Where
a society had, in response to letters addressed to the local firms by the
Eegistrar of the Government Secretariat to quote their price for articles
of stationery, quoted its prices and without any further agreement on
the part of the Government to place orders, or on the part of the society to
supply, executed orders from the Government from time to time : Held,
that there was no "contract for the supply of goods to the Government"
within the meaning of section 7(d), and a shareholder of the society was
not disqualified under that clause. McPhersQn v. Appanna (A.I*E, 1951
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 7§

S.0.184) and State Aided Bank of Travancore Ltd. v. Dhritram (A.I.E.


1942 P.O. 6) relied on. HOREN JONES v. MOHAN SINGH AND OTHERS,
2 B.L.E. 147.
——-Licensee of food grain depot—Royalty on sale of wood—
License to quarry stone.—(i) The owner of a food grain depot under
a license from a State in which the scheme of rationing, procurement and
distribution of grains laid down by the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act, 1946, is in force is not disqualified under section 7(d) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, on the ground that he is interested
in a contract for performance of services undertaken by the State; for under
the Essential Supplies (Temporal Powers) Act, 1951, and the Orders made
thereunder the State does not undertake any services to the people but
merely controls the production, supply and distribution of food grains in the
State. Membership of a grain dealers' association which has agreed to pur-
chase all food grains arriving at a particular mandi and to sell them to such
persons and at such prices as the Government may fix, does not entail dis-
qualification under section 7(d). (ii) A person who has purchased from the
Government for a fixed sum of money the right to collect royalty on the
sale of wood from certain villages for a certain period is not disqualified
under section 7(d), on the ground that he is interested in a contract for the
performance of any services on behalf of the Government, (iii) A lease of
a Government quarry for the extraction of ore does not amount to a con-
tract for supply of goods to the Government within the meaning of sec-
tion 7(d) of the Act even though it contains a term that if the Government
requires any quantity of stone or sand, the contractor will not refuse to
sell to the Government at the current price. GlAN CHAND V. SBIEAM
BANSAL AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 136.

5. Office of profit.—"Holding office of profit under Government"—


Tests—Source from which profit is derived—Power to appoint and remove
— Vice-Chancellor of Baroda University—The source from which a person
received profit is not the sole test as to whether he holds an office of
profit under the Government within the meaning of art. 102 (l) (a) of the
Constitution, The power to appoint and remove is also one of the tests
and if a person is appointed by the Government to an office of profit and
is removable by the Government from the office he would be a person
holding an office of profit under the Government even though he is not
paid out of Government funds. The petitioner who was the Vice-
Chancellor of the "University of Baroda received an honorarium of
Rs. 500 per month, a car allowance and a free furnished house from the
funds of the University, but was appointed by the Government of Baroda
and was liable to be removed from office by the Government: Held (i)
8o ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

that even though the petitioner received her allowances from-the funds
of the University and not from the State direct, as she was appointed by
the Government of Baroda and was liable to be removed by the Govern-
ment he was disqiialified under art. 102(l)(a) of the Constitution for
beingsch osen as a member of Parliament; (ii) the fact that she was
originally appointed by the Government of the State of Baroda and not
by the Government of Bombay did not make any difference, as all the
powers of the Government of Baroda vested in the Bombay Government
on the merger of the State in Bombay. S. N. Haider v. S. N. Malik
(Hammond 257), Khwaja Hakim Jain v. Moulvi Shaikh Mahomed
Husain (Hammond 311) and Delane v. Hillcoal (9 B. and C. 310) referred
to. HANSA JlVEAJ MEHTA v. INDUBHAI B. AMIN AND OTHERS,
1 E.L.B. 171.
Office of profit—tests—The consideration to be borne in mind in
the case of an office of profit is not whether the holder himself made
profit out of the office, but whether the office was one which enabled him
to make profit. L A H B I SINGH v. ATTAR SINGH AND OTHEBS, 3 E.L.E. 403.
The most important test for determining whether an office is
held under the Government is whether the power of appointment and
dismissal vests in the Government. KRISHNAPPA V. NABAYANSINGH
AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.B. 294.
-See also Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Members, In re,
4 E.L.B. 422 pp. 85-87 infra.
Resignation of office before filing nomination—Besignation not
accepted—Whether disqualification continues—Where a candidate who
was in the service of the State Government as a teacher and thus held
an office of profit under the Government resigned his post a few days
before the date of filing the nomination and thereafter ceased to attend
to his duties, but the Government did not accept his resignation as the
intention to resign was not intimated to them before the stipulated date-
Held, that under article 310 of the Constitution his service was
dependent on the pleasure of the Government and his resignation not
having been accepted, the disqualification continued to operate. LAHBI
SINGH V. ATTAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.B. 403. [See also 2 E.L.B.
330, 4 E.L.B. 34, 5 E.L.B. 48, 6 E.L.B. 308].
Assessoi—An assessor of a Ssssions Court does not hold an
office of profit under the Government and is not disqualified under
article 19l(l)(a) of the Constitution. KESHO BAM V. HAZUBA SlNGH
AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.B, 320.
An assessor of a Sessions Court does not hold an office of profit
under the Government. SANT SINGH V. SHAMSHER SlNGH AND
OTHERS, 7 B.L.B. 203.
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 8l

An assessor of a Sessions Court does not hold an office of profit


under the Government within the meaning of section 7(d). NATWAR
L A L v. BHARTENDRA SINGH AND AKOTHEE, 5 E.L.E. 408.
An assessor does not hold an office of profit under the Govern-
ment but merely gives assistance to the State in the administration of
Justice in his capacity as a citizen and is not therefore disqualified under
article 19l(l)(a) of the Constitution. I S H B B SlNGH v. M A N J I T INDEB
SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 90.

An assessor does not hold an office of profit under the Govern-


ment and is not disqualified for being chosen as a member under article
191(l)(a) of the Constitution. FAQIR CHAND V, PRITAM SlNGH AND
OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 119.

A person who is put on the list' of assessors of a Court of


Sessions does not thereby hold an office of profit within the meaning of
article 19l(l)(a) of the Constitution. BALBIB SINGH V. ABJAN SlNGH
AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 341.

A person who has been appointed as an assessor on the Eailway


Bates Tribunal for a certain period by a notification of the Government
is not thereby disqualified under article 102 or 191 of the Constitution;
for, assessorship of the Tribunal is not an office" as it is not an employ-
ment and has no existence independent of the incumbent, nor can a person
appointed as an assessor be said to hold an office except when he actually
sits as an assessor. Further, the office, if any, is not one held under the
Government of India or the Government of any State. KlSHENLAL
LAMBOB v. MADAN SINGH AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 49.

Chairman of Municipality—Whether the post of Chairman of


any particular Municipality held by any person, is an office of profit held
under the Government of a State, will depend upon the various provisions
of the Municipal Act which govern the said Municipality. As the President
of the Jodhpur Municipality receives an honorarium of Es. 130 a month
and the Jodhpur Municipal Act does not make the President and the Vice-
President of the Jodhpur Municipality absolutely independent of the
Government but they are, on account of the provisions of the Act, under
the control of the Government so far as their appointment, removal etc.
are concerned, the President of the Jodhpur Municipality holds an office
of profit under the Government of the State of Bajasthan. HAKIKATUL-
LAH v. NATHU SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 10.

Director of Government company—A person would not be dis-


qualified under section 7 (e) by being a Director of a Bank in which the
Government baa a financial interest unless the office of such Director is
$2 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

declared by Parliament by law to so disqualify its holder. DAULAX BAM


v. MAHAEAJA ANAND CHAKD AND OTHERS, 6 B.L.R. 87.
-—Honorary Magistrate—An Honorary Magistrate is not dis-
qualified for membership of the State Legislature. BENI MADHO B A I V.
BHOLA AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.B. 308.
—Honorary Secretary of District Development Board—The non.
official Honorary Secretary of a District Development Board of the
Government of Bombay holds an office of profit, but he does not bold
the office under the Government of Bombay, as there is no relationship
of master and servant between him and the Government. Mere power
of appointment and dismissal, and payment of an honorarium from the
Government treasury and general supervision or control cannot make
a person a servant of the Government if he has not agreed to be subject
at all times to the orders and direction of the Government not only with
regard to the nature of the work but also in the manner of doing it.
Hansa Jivraj Mehta v. Indubhai B. Amin (l E.L.B. 171), and Majibar
Bahman Chaudhury v. Abdul Barkat Ataul Gani (4 E.L.B. 481) referred
to. MEHTA GORDHANDAS GIEDHARIAL V. CHAVADA AKBAE DALU-
MIYAN AND OTHERS [NO. 2], 7 E.L.B.. 374.

Istimrardar An Istimrardar does not hold an office of profit


under the Government. BHAIBON V. THAKUB GANPAT SINGH AND
OTHERS, 6 E.L.B. 409.

I An Istimrardar is not a holder of an office of profit under


f the Government. MADAN SINGH V. KALYAN SINGH AND OTHEBS
6 E.L.B. 405.
——An Istimrardar is not the holder of an office of profit under
the Government. GULABCHAND CHOEDIA V. THAKUR NAEAIN SINGH
AND OTHEES, 6 E.L.B. 397.

Lambardar Even assuming that lambardari is an office of


profit, it is only the holder of the lambardari in question who will be
disqualified to be a member of a State Legislature ; the other members
of his family who are joint with him are not disqualified, as the
disqualification in question is a personal one so far as the holder is
concerned. SAHI BAM V. MANPHOOL SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.B. 47.
Lambardars—'Ihe Punjab State Legislature (Prevention of
Disqualification) Act, VII of 1952, is not ultra vires the State Legisla-
ture either on the ground that it violates the fundamental right of
equality before the law guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution or
•op.the ground that it renders nugatory the provision debarring a
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 83

lambardar and other village headmen from giving any assistance to a


candidate to further the prospects of his election, or on the ground that
it is given retrospective effect from 26th January, 1950. SUMER SINGH
v.. THAKUB GURDAT AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 171.
. Lambardars—Law removing disqualification of lambardars with
retrospective effect from 26th January, 1950—Whether infringes funda-
mental right of equality before the law—Held per HABBANS SINGH and
HANS E A J KHANNA (PAEMA NAND SAGHDBVA dissenting):—A
lambardar appointed under the Punjab Land Revenue Act holds an
office of profit under the Government, within the meaning of
article 191(1) (a) of the Constitution but this disqualification under
article 191(1) (a) is removed with retrospective effect from the 26th
January, 1950, by the Punjab State Legislature (Prevention of
Disqualification) Act, VII of 1952. The Punjab State Legislature
(Prevention of Disqualification) Act. VII of 1952, does not make any
unreasonable discrimination between one class of lambardars and
another class of lambardars, even though lambardars who did not stand
for election on the belief that they were disqualified did not get the
benefit of the retrospective operation of the Act and others who
stood for election notwithstanding the disqualification imposed by
article 191(1) (a) got the benefit of the Act, and the Act is not therefore
ultra vires on the ground that it contravenes article 14 of the Constitu-
tion. Per PARMA NAND SACHDEVA.—The clause (2) of section 1 of the
Punjab State Legislature (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1952,
which gives it retrospective operation from the 26tb January, 1950
involves an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination as amongst the
lambardars, as many lambardars could not take advantage of the retros-
pective operation of the Act while others could, and is therefore ultra
vires on the ground that it infringes the fundamental right of equality
before the law guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution. Held by
the Full Tribunal:—(i) The Election Tribunal has jurisdiction to
decide whether an enactment passed by a Legislature is ultra vires
or not. SANT SINGH V. SHAMSHER SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 203.
MAHARAJ SINGH V. RATAN AMOL SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 320.

Lawyers approved but not retained by Government for conduct-


ing railway cases—A lawyer who is an approved railway pleader",
that is, a pleader who is engaged by the Government for conducting
railway cases who does not receive any retaining fee but only a
fee for the cases conducted, does not hold an office of profit under the
Government within the meaning of section 7(e) or article 102(l)(a) of
the Constitution of India. Harnandan Prasad v. Kamta Prasad Kakkar
([1924] A.L.J. 129), Mohammad Bux v. Mohammad Abdul Baqi Khan
84 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

([1923] Ind. Cas. 490) and Great Western Bailway v. Bater ([1922] A.C. 1)
referred to. GOVIND MALAVIYA V. MUELI MANOHAE AND OTHERS,
8 B.L.R. 84.
Member of Committee receiving travelling and halting allmoances
—Travelling and halting allowances received by a member of an Area
Committee constituted under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charita-
ble Endowments Act. 1951, are not remuneration but represent
reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, and a member of anArea Com-
mittee constituted under the Act does not, therefore, hold an office of
profit" within the meaning of article 191 of the Constitution and is not
disqualified for membership of the Legislature. To constitute an office
an office of profit" within the meaning of article 191 of the Constitu-
tion of India, prestige and like advantages attached to the office will not
suffice. Pecuniary advantage is an essential element, and once there
is, or there can be, pecuniary gain, its quantum is immaterial. But the
Constitution does not enjoin a wholesale ban on every type of office
irrespective of whether any remuneration is attached to it or not
merely because the office carries prestige and other advantages.
Hansraj Jivaraj Mehta v. Indubhai B. Amin and Others (1 E.L.R. 171)
distinguished. SHIVABAMA KARANTH V. VENKATARAMANA GOWDA
AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 187.

Membership of the District Vitran Committee is not an office


of p?:ofit under the Government within the meaning of article 19l(l)(a)
of the Constitution and does not entail disqualification to become a
member of the State Legislature. Chander Nath v. Kunwar Jaswant
Singh (3 E.L.R. 147) followed. SAHI RAM v. MANPHOOL SlNGH AND
OTHERS, 7 E.L.R, 47.

The word profit" in article 191 of the Constitution of India


does not necessarily mean any remuneration in cash, but it certainly
means some kind of advantage or gain which is tangible or which can be
perceived ; the mere influence which one gains by virtue of his position
as member of a committee which has no remuneration attached to it is
not profit within the meaning of article 191 of the Constitution and the
member of such a committee would suffer no disqualification by being
a member thereof. CHANDER N A T H V. KUNWAR JASWANT SINGH
AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 147.
Membership of Legislative Assembly constituted under the
Government of India Act, 1935—The prohibition contained in article
171(3)(d) of the Constitution applied to members of the new Assembly
constituted under the Constitution of India and not the members of the
old Assembly, then functioning temporarily under article 382 of the
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 85

Constitution. A member of the old State Legislative Assembly was not,


therefore, disqualified to stand for election to the State Legislative
Council. The word "Assembly" occurring in the two parts of sub-
clause (d) of article 171(3) of the Constitution of India means the same
body, i.e., the Legislative Assembly first constituted under the Constitu-
tion. KALIKA PBASAD SINGH V. ABDUL HAYAT CHAND AND OTHEBS,
4 E.L.B. 118.
-Member of Legislative Assembly—A member of the Legislative
Assembly of a State drawing a fixed salary and travelling ar"3 daily
allowances does not hold an office of profit under the State Government
and is not therefore disqualified under Isection 7(d). BHOLANATH V.
KEISHNA CHANDRA GUPXA AND OTHEBS (NO. 2), 6 B.L.R. 104.

Member of out-going Legislative Assembly receiving salary—The


expression 'office" in article 191 of the Constitution means a position
or place to which certain duties are attached more or less of a public
character and is a sort of a permanent position held by successive incum-
bents. An office which has a salary attached to it is an office of profit
and a member of the Legislature receiving a monthly salary as a mem-
ber holds an office of profit. But he does not hold an office of profit
under the Government (which in the case of a Part A State is synony-
mous with the Governor) since he is subordinate only to the Speaker
and the House, and not to the Governor. YoGEAJSiNGH SHANKAR-
SING-H PARIHAE V. SlTAEAM HlRACHAND BlRLA AND OTHEES (NO. 2),
3 B.L.E. 439.
Members of Assembly appointed Members of District Advisory
Councils—Receipt of travelling and daily allowances—Whether Members
hold office of profit—Office of profit, essentials of—"Hold", "office",
"profit", meanings of—Guiding principles as to disqualification—•
English and Indian law—The Vindhya Pradesh Government appointed
a District Advisory Council for each of the eight districts in the
State, and the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State
representing these districts were all appointed members of the res-
pective District Advisory Councils. The order of appointment provided
that the members will get travelling allowance and daily allowance appli-
cable to members of the Legislative Assembly for the day or days of the
meetings. Under the rules the travelling allowance was one and a half first
class railway fare and the daily allowance was Es. 5 for each day of resid-
ence at the place where the meetings were held. The question whether
the members who had been so appointed had become disqualified to be
members of the Assembly was referred by the President to the Election
ELP—i?
86 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Commission. The Commission was of opinion—(i) Membership of the


Vindhya Pradesh District Advisory Councils was an office" within the
meaning of sections 16 and 17 of the Government of Part C States Act,
195], read with the provisions of articles 101 and 102 of the Constitution
and the members held that office "under" the Government of Vindhya
Pradesh, (ii) Members of the Assembly who had actually attended any
meeting of a Council must be said to have "held" such office, (iii) Eor
the purpose of deciding the question of disqualification, so long as any
profit was attached to an office, it did not matter whether the profit had
in fact been appropriated or not and therefore there was no distinction for
the present purpose between members who drew their allowances and
those who did not. (iv) "Where a member of a council, committee, or
board is merely entitled to a bona fide travelling allowance or daily allow-
ance (as distinguished from a "sitting fee" or "attendance fee") which
purports to covet, and presumably covers, only his actual out-of-pocket
expenses, and the amount of allowance is not fixed at such a high figure
as to make it a mere cloak for giving a profit, there is no profit". Conse-
quently, the payment of li first class railway fare to the members of
District Advisory Councils was not a source of profit to the members,
(v) The daily allowance at the rate of Es. 5 per diem, which was being
paid to the members of the Legislative Assembly in respect of their attend-
ance at the sessions of the Assembly was such a reasonable amount that
it could not be said to yield any profit to the members of the Council
who went to attend meetings thereof, (vi) But, by making the daily
allowance rate the same for resident and non-resident members, the
Government laid itself open to the charge of offering a certain amount of
profit, though a small profit, to the resident members, and as the quantum
of profit is not a material consideration, members residing in the District
Headquarters, who had attended any of the meetings of the respective
District Advisory Councils, should be deemed to have held offices of profit
under the Government and, therefore, incurred the disqualification referred
to in section 17 of the Government of Part C States Act, 1951. "Profit"
within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the
law must be material in character and not merely moral or spiritual, but
any material advantage, howsoever insignificant, will constitute profit"
and bring the member in question within the mischief of the relevant
provisions. The English law in this respect is, however, very strict.
There is no justification for adopting such a strict and technical view of
the matter in India. The word profit" should be given a reasonable and
natural interpretation. If consideration is paid in the shape of a remunera-
tion, "sitting fee" or 'attendance fee," it becomes a "profit," inasmuch as
it does not even purport to cover any actual expenses. Such consideration
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 8/

or remuneration should be deamad to constitute 'profit" even though,


on detailed accounting, it may be found that no financial advantage has
in fact, been gained by the member in question. In the matter of
VINDHYA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY MEMBERS, 4 E.L.E. 422.

Ministers and Deputy Ministers—-The respondents who were


elected members of a State Legislative Assembly were appointed Deputy
Ministers on the 5th February, 1954. At that time, no emoluments,
either by way of salary or allowance, were attached to that office, but
salary was attached to that office with effect from the 5th February, 1954,
by an Ordinance passed on the 13th February, 1954. The very same
Ordinance declared in exercise of the powers vested in the Bajpramukh
under article 191(l)(a) of the Constitution that the office of a Deputy
Minister would not constitute nor be deemed to have constituted at any
time a disqualification for its holder being chosen or retained as a member
of the Legislative Assembly. Certain members of the State Legislative
Assembly applied under article 228 of the Constitution for the issue of a
writ of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ or direction on the
ground that the office of the Deputy Minister was "an office of profit" and
its acceptance by the respondents disqualified them for retaining their
respective seats in the Legislative Assembly after the date of their appoint-
ment, that the vacancies which thus arose could only be filled up by the
procedure laid down by section 150 of the Eepresentation of the People
Act, 1951, and that the action of the Bajpramukh and the State Assembly
in removing the disqualification retrospectively by enacting an Ordinance
and, later on, the Hyderabad Act V of 1954, operated in effect to re-
appoint the respondents to fill up the vacant seats without holding a fresh
election as required by law, and, further, that in order that a declaration
contemplated by clause (a) of article 191(0 may be effective, it should be
made prior to the occurrence of the vacancy : Held, (i) that when a salary
was attached to the office of the Deputy Minister and it became an office
of profit, the disqualification envisaged by article 191(l)(a) was also taken
away and the two acts being simultaneous, the acceptance of the office of
the Deputy Minister did not disqualify and did not bring about any
vacancy, and section 150 of the Bepresentation of the People Act had no
application ; (ii) that the fact that the members would have entertained
the hope when they accepted the office of Deputy Minister that the Legisla-
ture would ultimately fix a remuneration for the post, and salary was
given to them with retrospective effect from the 5th February, would not
make the acceptance of that office on 5th February, 1954, acceptance of
an office of profit on that date, so as to attract to itself the disqualification
mentioned in article 191 and to render the respondents' seats automatically
&8 feLECTIOisf LAW SEPO&TS E>1GEST

vacant; (iii) that, as under article 192 of the Constitution questions


of this nature must be referred to t h e Governor or Eajpramukh for deci"
sion, it was not a proper case for the issue of a writ of quo warranto
by the High Courts. V. D. D B S H P A N D E A N D O T H E B S V. S T A T E OF
H Y D E E A B A D A N D O T H E R S , 10 B . L . E . 203.

Minister—Election declared void—Nomination for by-election


more than six months after first election but within six months from date
of order declaring election void—Exemption of Minister from disqualifi-
cation on the ground of holding office of prof it—Applicability—-When tho
election of a candidate who has been returned as a member and subse-
quently appointed as a Minister is declared void in an election petition,
the period of six months for which he can continue as a Minister under
article 164(4) of the Constitution runs from t h e date on which t h e order
of the Tribunal is published and not from the date of his appointment as a
Minister. B E A J N A E E S H S I N G H V. HUKAM S I N G H , 9 B . L . E . 80.

Pateli—Pateli is an office of profit under the Government within


the meaning of article 191 of the Constitution of India as a Patel has
important duties to perform under the Land Eevenue System and his
appointment and removal rests with the Government and there is also
profit attached to the office. The actual making of profit is not necessary
to make an office one of profit; it is enough if the holder may reasonably
be expected to make a profit out of it. Delane v. Hillcoat (9 B. and C.
310) referred to. BHEBUSINGH v. P E A B H U D A Y A L CHAUBEY AND
O T H E B S , 2 E . L . E . 325.
Patel—Tender of resignation—Whether terminates office before
acceptance-- The office of a Patel under t h e Madhya Pradesh Abolition of
Proprietory Eights Act, 1951, is an office of profit under the State Govern-
ment within the meaning of article 191(l) (a) of the Constitution. I n
order t h a t an office may be an office of profit' it is not necessary that
there must be some sort of regularity of income. Neither is it necessary
that there should be actual making of profit by the incumbent; it is
enough if the holder of the office may reasonably be expected to make
a profit out of it. The Madhya Pradesh Offices of Profit (Eemovai of
Disqualifications) Act, 1950, did not apply to Patels appointed under the
Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietory Eights Act (Act I of 1951),
and, as the Madhya Pradesh Offices of Profit (Eemovai of Disqualifications)
Amendment Act of 1952 was deliberately given retrospective effect only
from 23rd February, 1952, Patels holding office as such under Act I of
1951 were disqualified t o stand for election until t h a t date. The respond-
ent who was appointed as a Patel under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition
of Proprietory Eights Act, 1951, intending to stand as a candidate for
DISQUALIFICATION Ot CANDIDATES 89

election as a member of the Legislature, tendered resignation of his office


to the Tahsiidar on the 8th November, 1951. The Tahsildar accepted
the resignation on the same date and the respondent filed his nomination
paper on the 15th November, 1951. Under the rules the appointing
authority was the Deputy Commissioner and a Patel had to give threa
months' notice before resignation : Held, per PANDE and MANDLEKAR
(CHIPLONKBB, dissenting)—that the acceptance of the resignation by the
Tahsildar was invalid as he was not the appointing authority and, there-
fore, had no right to accept the resignation, and also because three
months' notice was not given as required by the rules, and the respondent,
therefore, continued to hold the office of a Patel and was disqualified.
Per CHIPLONKBR.—The respondent ceased to hold office as a Patel when
he tendered his resignation and ceased to do his duties, though he may be
liable for the consequences of not giving three months' notice. THAK.UR
DAOOSING v. EAMKRISHNA EATHOR AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 34.

-Patels—Zamindari Abolition—-Zamindars appointed as patels


—Injunction by Court against taking possession of Zamindaris—Whether
appointee disqualified—On the promulgation of the Madhya Bharat
Zamindari Abolition Act, the Government of Madhya Bharat fixed a date
for the vesting of the villages, but before that date, on a petition for a
writ of mandamus, the High Court of Madhya Bharat issued an injunc-
tion ad interim restraining the Government from taking possession of the
Zamindari lands. During the interval between the promulgation of the
Act and the interim injunction, the Government had notified the appoint-
ment of the erst-while Zamindars including the petitioner as the Patels
of the villages previously held by them as Zamindars, but by reason of
the injunction the operation of the Act was suspended and the Govern-
ment issued instruction to the Collectors directing that notwithstanding
the notification of appointment, the nominees should not do the work of
Pateli: Held, that under the circumstances the petitioner did not hold
the office of a Patel under the Government during the period when the
injunction was in force. BRINDABAN PRASAD TlWARI V, SITA EAM AND
OTHERS, 5 B.L.E. 48.

Patels—Appointment of patels —Implied acceptance—Notifica-


tion under Madhya Bharat Zemindari Abolition Act, 1951—Injunction
restraining Government from taking possession of Zemindari lands—
Whether terminates appointment—-Where the respondents who had filed
their nominations on 20th November, 1951, were appointed patels for one
year from 2nd October, 1951, under the Madhya Bharat Zemindari
Abolition Act, 1951, by a Notification published in the Gazette on 2nd
September, 1951, and they were personally informed of the appointment
90 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

and the evidence also showed that later on they received the remunera-
tion for the whole year : Held (i) that the conduct of the respondents
amounted to an acceptance of their office and they must be deemed to
have held the office of patels on the date of nomination ; (ii) they did not
cease to be patels because an order of injunction was passed by the High
Court on 1st October, 1951, directing the Government not to take actual
possession of the lands and a letter was issued to the patels by the
Government asking them not to work as patels but only to make certain
reports. Brindaban Prasad Tiwari v. Sitaram and Others (5 E.L.E. 48)
dissented from. The office of patel is an office of profit under the
Government. MAHESH DATTA V. MUELIDHAR AND OTHBES, 7 E.L.R. 154.
Patels —Injunction restraining functioning, effect of—In
pursuance of the Madhya Bharat Zemindari Abolition Act, 1951, and the
Patel Appointment Bules thereunder, the respondents were appointed
Patels by a Notification in the Gazette in September, 1951. Copies of the
notice were served on them and they accepted the copies. In October,
1951, the High Court of Madhya Bharat issued an injunction against the
Government against taking possession of the zemindaris. They filed their
nomination papers in November, 1951: Held, that the respondents were
validly appointed as patels and held an office of profit at the time of
nomination notwithstanding the injunction of the High Court restraining
the Government from taking possession, though owing to the injunction
they could not work for the time being, or the scope of their work was
restricted. Mahesh Datta v. Murlidhar and Others (7 E.L.B. 154) followed.
Brindaban Prasad Tiwari v. Sita Bam and Others (5 E.L.B, 48) dissented
from. JAGDISH SINGH V. RUDEA DEOLAL AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.B. 311.

Patel appointed under Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary


Bights Act, 1951—Where the respondent was selected as a patel under
the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietory Bights Act (I of 1951),
and was formally appointed as a patel by the Deputy Commissioner, but
he did not execute an agreement in Form A or Form B or give security
as required by the rules before entering upon his duty, nor was he
exempted from these formalities, and he did not do any act as a patel:
Held, that there was no valid appointment as a patel, and even if there
was an appointment, the respondent did not hold",the office of a patel.
Held also, that though the office of a patel under Act I of 1951 was an
office of profit under the State, it was exempted from disqualification by
the Madhya Pradesh Offices of Profit (Bemoval of Disqualifications) Act
(VII of 1950), inasmuch as this office was merely a substitute for the
office of lambardar which was expressly exempted by Act VII of 1950.
The fact that the Bemoval of Disqualifications Amendment Act (IV of
DisQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES Ql

1952) was given retrospective effect only from the 23rd February, 1952,
does not show that the office of patel tinder Act I of 1951 was not
exempted by Act VII of 1950. JAGANNATH V. PANDUBANG AND
OTHEBS, 4 E.L.E. 167.

Besignation—Effect 0/—The disqualification of a person who holds


an office of profit under the State does not cease on his submitting an un-
qualified resignation of his office but only when his resignation is accepted
by the proper authority. A person who held an office of profit tendered
an unqualified resignation of his office on the 19th October, and got a
reply that he ^cannot be relieved until a substitute was available. He
applied for one month's leave on a medical certificate on the 6th
November, and ceased to work from the next day and filed a nomination
paper on the 10th November. On the 12th December, he was placed
under suspension with effect from the 7th November and his resignation
was accepted only on the 14th January, next year: Held, that he did not
cease to hold his office by tendering his resignation or by ceasing to
work or by being suspended and was disqualified to stand for election on
the 10th November. Aberbrothock (25 Journ. 667), Lanarkshire (2 Doug.
367) and Bengal Marwari Association case (Hammond 157) distinguished.
Sudarsana Bao v. Christian Pillai (45 M.L.J. 798), President Taluk
Board, Hospet v. / . Chandrappa (A.I.E. 1925 Mad. 173), People's
Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Bameshwar Prasad Varma (A.I.E. 1942 Pat.
452) and Venkatasubba Bao, In re (A.I.E. 1944 Mad. 132) relied on.
BAM M U B T I V. SUMBA SADAB AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.E. 330.

The material date for consideration of the validity of the nomi-


nation paper is that of the nomination, and not of the scrutiny, and there-
fore, if a candidate held the office of patel on the date of nomination, his
subsequent resignation before the date of scrutiny will not validate the
nomination. The plea that the result of the election has been materially
affected by the improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination
could be raised by any petitioner, whether he is a candidate or not. The
material date for the determination of the question whether a nomination
has been improperly rejected is that of the nomination itself and if a
nomination paper is improperly rejected, subsequent acceptance of an
office of profit by the candidate is not a ground for holding that the
result of the election has not been materially affected by the improper
rejection. The improper rejection of a nomination renders the election
void. (Case law referred to). BEINDABAN PBASAD TlWARl V. S I T A E A M
AND OTHEBS, 5 E.L.E. 48.

Buler getting alloivance as privy purse under Agreement of


Merger—An ex-Euler of an Indian State who receives a sum of money
f2f ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

annually as privy purse from the Central Government under an Agreement


of Merger in consideration of his having given up his rights as a
Euler does not hold an office of profit under the Government within the
meaning of article 102 or 191 of the Constitution. DAULAT EAM V.
MAHABAJA AN AND CHAND AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 87.
The mere fact that a. junior member of a royal family of a State
received a substantial monthly allowance from the State and, under the
rules all allowance holders are bound, under certain contingencies, to
render certain services to the State, will not render him the "holder
of an office of profit under the Government" within the meaning of
article 191 of the Constitution. PANDIT HARISH CHANDRA y.BAJA MAN
SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.E. 129.
Sarbarakars—Sarbarakars in the State of Orissa are not holders
of an office of profit under the State within the meaning of article 19l(l)>
(a) of the Constitution, inasmuch as (i) the office of Sarbarkar is herit-
able, (ii) a salami is paid on every appointment, (iii) an interest in land is
created in favour of the Sarbarkar and he is a tenant in respect of it ; and
(iv) the source from which he gets his commission is not the general
revenue of the State but the collection from tenants from out of which
he pays the revenue. Lala Sohan Lai V. Lala Binda Saran (Sen and
Poddar 685) and Nawab Talib Mehadi Khan v. Baja Mohammad Akram
Khan (1 Doabia 240) referred to. MAHENDRA SAHU V. DUTIA EAUL
AND OTHERS, 3 B.L.E. 117.
——Teacher of grant-in-aid school—A person serving as a teacher in
a grant-in-aid school does not hold an office of profit under the Govern-
ment merely because the school receives grants from the Government
for payment of a portion of the dearness allowance and the pay of the
teachers. KRISHNAPPA V. NARAYANSINQH AND OTHERS, 7 B.L.E. 294.
University Employees—University, whether Corporation in
which Government has any financial interest"—The Punjab University
constituted under the East Punjab University Act, 1947, is not a cor-
poration in which the Government has any financial interest" within the
meaning of section 7(e) of the E.P. Act, 1951, even though it receives a
substantial annual grant from the Government, its accounts are examined
and audited by the Government, it uses service postage stamps, its funds
are deposited in Banks approved by the Government, the Governor is the
Chancellor, and the Vice Chancellor is also appointed by the Governor
and a person who holds an office of profit under the University is not
therefore disqualified from standing for election under section 7(e) of the
Act. Hansa Jivraj Mehta v. lndubhai S. Amin and Others (1 E.L.B.
171) distinguished. HARI DAS V. HlRA SlNGH PAL AND OTHERS,
4 B.L.E, 466,
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 93

6. Part C States.—Disqualification of candidates—Under section 17


of the Part C States Act, 1951, read with article 102(e) of the Constitution
what would be a disqualification for a candidate for being chosen to either
House of Parliament under article 102, would be a disqualification to be
chosen for the Legislature of a Part C State. The omission in section 8
of the Part C States Act, 1951, of Part II of the E. P. Act, 1951, in which
section 7 of the latter Act occurs, does not lead to the conclusion that
the disqualifications referred to in section 7 do not apply to Part G States.
A contract with the Chief Commissioner of a Part C State would, under
section 9 of the Part C States Act, read with section 3(8) of the General
Clauses Act, be a contract with the Central Government and would
operate as a disqualification for election to either House of Parliament
under sections 7(d) and 9 of the E. P. Act, 1951, and it would be a
disqualification under section 17 of the Part C States Act, 1951, for
election to the Legislate Assembly of the State. SATTA DEV BUSHAHEI
v. PABAM DEV AND OTHERS, 10 B.L.E. 103 (S.C.). See also MAHENDEA
KUMAR V. VIDYAWATI AND OTHERS, 10 B.L.E. 216 (S.C.).

7. Miscellaneous.—Disqualification arising before election—Power


of Governor or Election Commission to make enquiry—Articles 190(3) and
192(1) of the Constitution of India are applicable only to disqualifica-
tions to which a member of the Legislature becomes subject after he is
elected as such and neither the Governor nor the Election Commission
has jurisdiction to enquire into a disqualification which arose before the
election. SAKA VENKATA EAO V. ELECTION COMMISSION, 1 E.L.E. 417,
affirmed by Supreme Court in 2 E.L.E. 499.
If a question whether a member has, or has not, become
subject to a disqualification properly arises under article 103 of the
Constitution and, on the representation of any person, that question is
referred by the President to the Election Commission for its opinion,
the fact that the person who raised the question and made the repre-
sentation to the President does not wish to proceed with the matter and
asks for permission to withdraw his petition, is not a sufficient ground
for the Election Commission to desist from giving its opinion on the
reference. Articles 101(3) and 103(1) of the Constitution are applicable
only to disqualifications to which a member of a House of the Legisla-
ture becomes subject after he is elected as such member, and neither
the Governor nor the Election Commission has jurisdiction to enquire
into a disqualification which arose before the member's election. Elec-
tion Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao (2 E-L.B. 499) followed. MAHARAJA
ANAND CHAND, In re, 5 E.L.E. 197,
ELD—13
94 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

The Election Tribunal has power to decide whether a candi-


date was disqualified under article 191 of the Constitution of India.
Article 192 applies only to disqualifications arising after a person has
become a member of the Legislature. RAM MTTRTI V. STTMBA SADAR
AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.E. 330.

-Grounds of disqualification—Poiver of State Legislatures to


create new grounds—Under article 191(1) of the Constitution of India
disqualifications other than those expressly mentioned in the said
article can be created only by any law made by the Parliament. The
State Legislatures have no power to create new disqualifications, and
rule 61-A(1) of the U. P. Panchayat Eaj Eules cannot, therefore,
have the effect of disqualifying a panch for membership to the State
Legislature, though on the face of it, it purports to do so. BENI MADHO
E A I v. BHOLA AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 308.

Material date for deciding qualification —Candidate not entered


on any electoral roll at the time of nomination—Entry as voter in a roll
before scrutiny of nominations—The question of qualification or dis-
qualification of a candidate has to be ascertained with reference to his
status on the date of his nomination and a candidate whose name did
not appear in any electoral roll on the date of his nomination does not
become qualified to stand for election by getting his name entered on
an electoral roll before the date of the scrutiny of the nomination
papers and producing that electoral roll before the Returning Officer at
the time of scrutiny. Sections 33(6) and 36(7) (a) of the R. P. Act, 1951,
properly construed, do not preclude a Returning Officer before whom an
electoral roll containing the name of a candidate is produced at the
"time of scrutiny of nominations from making an enquiry as to whether
the name of the candidate was in any electoral roll on the date of his
nomination and from rejecting his nomination if his name did not
appear in any roll on the date of the nomination. A revised electoral
roll does not speak from the date of the original roll and nomination
of a person who was not in a roll at the time of nomination cannot be
validated by a subsequent amendment or revision of the roll. Hardford
v. Linskey (L.E. 1889, 2 Q.B. 852), Pritchard v. Mayor of Bengor
(13 Appl. Cas. 241), Gethard v. Clarke (L.R. 5 C.P. 253), Baldurni v.
Ellis (1929,1 K.B. 273), Sir Manindra Chandra Nandy v. Pravash
Chandra Mitter (Hammond 545), Saka Venkata Rao v. Election
Commission (1 E.L.R. 417) referred to. P. N. BALASTJBRAMANIAN V.
C. R. NARASIMHAN AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 461.
The question whether a candidate was qualified to be chosen as
a member should be determined with reference to his status on the date
DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES 95

on which his nomination paper is presented and not with reference to


the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers. Consequently, if a person's
name is not entered on the electoral roll as a voter on the date on
which his nomination paper was presented, his nomination must be
rejected, even though on an application made by him to the Election
Commission before the date of nomination an order is issued by the
Election Commission before the date of scrutiny to include his name in
the electoral roll. AWADESH PEASAD SlNHA v. PEABHAVATHI GUPTA
AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 45.

A candidate is not qualified to stand for election unless his


name is in the electoral roll as a voter on the last day fixed for nomina-
tions, and if his name was not in the electoral roll on that day his nomi-
nation must be rejected even though his name was included in the roll by
a direction of the Election Commission before the date of scrutiny of
nominations. BAJTAYAN SHAEAN SINGH AND ANOTHER v. RAMESHWAE
YADAV AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 296.

The material date for determining whether a candidate was


qualified is the date of his nomination and if he was disqualified on that
date, his nomination must be rejected, even though the disqualification
was removed before the date fixed for scrutiny of nominations. RAM
CHAND v. WADHAWABAM AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 386.

The crucial date with respect to which the respondent's


qualification has to be determined is the date of nomination. NAEASIMHE
GOWDA V. LAKKAPPA AND ANOTHER, 4 E.L.E. 234.

If a candidate was not qualified on the date of nomination


his nomination must be rejected even though the disqualification is re-
moved before the date of scrutiny of the nominations. SANT SlNGKH V.
SHAMSHER SINGH AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.E. 203.
-The observation of the court in Chathurbhuj Vithaldas v.
Moreshivar Parasram (9 E.L.E. 301) that the material period for deter-
mination of the qualification of a person starts with nomination and
ends with the announcement of the result of the election is not a deci-
sion on the point as it proceeded on an agreed statement of the counsel
on both sides. It was not decided in the case that the period did not
extend up to the notification of the result in the Gazette. SATYA DEV
BUSHAHEI V. PADAM DEV AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 103 (S.C.).
DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES.
Appealing to voters to give both votes to same candidate—Whether
undue influence. See B. R. AMBEDKAB AND ANOTHER V. S. A. DANGE
AND O T H E E S , 1 E.L.R. 364 (pp. 53-54 supra).
96 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Nomination paper—Specification of seat for which candidate


stands, necessity of—Where a nomination for a double member consti-
tuency, one of the seats in which was reserved for the Scheduled Castes,
was rejected by the Beturning Officer on the ground that the candidate
had not specified whether he sought election for the general seat or the
reserved seat, but it appeared from the nomination paper that the can-
didate had crossed out the portion referring to the declaration required
for candidates standing for the reserved seat and he did not also mention
his caste against column 6 but simply put a cross against it: Held, that
there was sufficient indication in the nomination paper that the candi-
date did not intend to stand for the reserved seat but was standing for
the general seat and the rejection was improper. BHAN SlNG-H V.
KRISHNA KANT AND ANOTHER, 4 E.L.E. 212.
Omission to state whether candidate stands for general or reserved
seat—Validity of nomination—-Improper rejection of candidate for general
seat—Whether affects election to reserved seat.—Where the nomination
of a candidate who was not a member of a Scheduled Caste, for a seat in
a double member constituency, one of the seats in which was reserved
for the Scheduled Castes, was rejected on the ground that he had not
stated anywhere in the nomination paper that he was a candidate for
the general seat, but it appeared that he had placed a cross mark against
clause VI of the form and had indicated therebj' that he was not a
member of the Scheduled Caste: Held, that there was no substantial
defect in the nomination and the rejection of the nomination paper
was improper. Held further, that the entire election, including the
election of the candidate for the reserved seat, was void. Where a
nomination paper has been improperly rejected the result of the elec-
tion must be deemed to hava been materially affected. SUBAJBHAN
v. HEM CHAND JAIN AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.R. 1.
Improper rejection of candidate for one seat—Whether whole
election void—In a double member constituency if the nomination paper
of a candidate for the reserved seat has been improperly rejected and
the election to that seat has to be set aside, the whole election, includ-
ing that for the general seat must be set aside. BAKAEAM SUKAEAM
KONKANI v. SHANKAB EAO CHINDUJI BEDSE AND OTHEES, 3 E.L.R.
409.
• In a double member constituency the declaration of the elec-
tion as wholly void must relate to the general as well as the reserved
seat irrespective of whether the candidate whose nomination was im-
properly rejected was eligible for the reserved seat or the general seat.
NAEANJAN SINGH V> BEISH BHAN AND OTHEES, 3 E.L.R. 179.
DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES 97

In the case of double member constituency in which there is a


general seat, and a seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes, election to
the general seat and the reserved seat are not two separate elections but
one indivisible election in which candidates of the Scheduled Castes are
also contesting for the election to the general seat. Consequently, the
expression "the election" in section 100(l)(c) should be interpreted in
such a case as meaning the election to both the seats, and if the improper
rejection of a nomination for either of the two seats has affected
the election, the election for both the seats should be set aside. Suraj
Bhan v. Hemchand and Others (2 E.L.E. l)» Ramchandran Nair v. Rama-
chandra Das (1 B.L.E. 442), Vijay Mohan Reddy v. Paga Pulla Beddy
(2 E.L.E. 414), and Nagjibhai v. Mithabhai (l E.L.E. 162) followed.
JAGANNATH v. PANDURANG AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 167.

In a double member constituency if the nomination of a candi-


date for the general seat is found to have been improperly rejected and
the result of the election to that seat has been materially affected thereby,
the whole election, including the election of the candidate for the
reserved seat also, has to be declared void. Suraj Bhan v. Hem Ghand
Jain and Others (2 E.L.E. l) followed. H A R I DAS V. H I R A SINGH P A L
AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 466.

Petition for setting aside election to one seat—Maintainability


—Power to set aside whole election.—-(i) Though the petition did not
contain an express prayer for declaring the election of the candidate
returned for the reserved seat also void, the Tribunal has power to give
such relief as was just and proper on the facts and circumstances proved ;
(ii) that in the case of a double member constituency, the principle that
the election for the two seats is one indivisible election applies to the
improper acceptance as well as improper rejection and the whole election
can be set aside even in the case of improper acceptance of a nomination
for the general seat, if the result of the election has been affected;
(iii) that on the facts, the result of the election was materially affected
by the improper acceptance of the nomination of respondent No. 1 and
the whole election must be declared void. HANUMAN PRASAD MlSRA
v. TARA CHAND AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 446.
In a double member constituency the whole election for the
constituency for the reserved seat as well as the general seat has to be
declared void if the election to one of the seats is found to be void.
DHARAM V I R v. BHALA BAM AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 64.

• In the case of a double member constituency if a nomination


for the reserved seat is found to have been improperly rejected and the
result of the election has been materially affected thereby, the whole
98 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

election, including that for the general seat also, has to be declared void.
MORESHWAB PABASHRAM V. CHATTJRBHUJ VlTHALDAS- JASANI AND
OTHERS, 7 B.L.E. 428.

In a double member constituency, where the whole election is


not declared void under sub-section (l) of section 100, but the election of
the candidate to the general seat alone is declared void on the ground of
irregularity and fraud in counting the votes, it is not necessary to set
aside the election of the candidate returned for the reserved seat also,
merely because the election of the other candidate has been declared void.
A candidate for the general seat in a double member constituency is
entitled to file an election petition challenging the election of the candi-
date for the reserved seat. SALIG RAM JAISWAL V. SHEO KUMAR
PANDE AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 67.

Petition to set aside election of candidate for reserved seat alone


—Candidates duly nominated for general seat not impleaded—In a plura 1
member constituency which was entitled to elect candidates for two
seats, one of which was reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the other,
a general seat, the nomination paper of the petitioner who stood for the
reserved seat was rejected on the ground that he did not belong to the
Scheduled Castes but was an Arya Samajist. The petitioner filed an
election petition impleading as respondents only the four Scheduled
Caste candidates who had been duly nominated without impleading the
duly nominated candidates for the general seat, and praying only for a
declaration that the election of the first respondent was void : Held, (i)
that the words at the election" in s. 82 of the B. P. Act, 1951, meant
the whole election and the petiti oner was accordingly bound to implead
as respondents the candidates who had been duly nominated for the
general seat also and, as s. 82 was mandatory and the petitioner had
failed to implead them, the petition was not maintainable ; Held also,
that, as the ground for setting aside the election was the improper rejec-
tion of a nomination paper, the case was covered by s. 100(l)(c) of the
Act and the election can be declared void only as a whole, and the prayer
for declaring the election of the first respondent alone void could not be
granted. Bathischandra v. Amulyacharan (I.L.E. 58 Cal. 87) followed.
Line and Others v. Warren and Others (14 Q.B.D. 548) distinguished.
Basantsing v. Ratansingh (l Doabia 80) and Lewis v. Gibbon (l Doabia
259) referred to. NAGJUBHAI GOVINDHBAI ARYA V. MITHABHAI RAMJI
CHAWHAN AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 162.

Petition to set aside election to general seat—Candidate returned


for reserved seat—Whether necessary party —Where in a double member
constituency the candidate for the reserved seat was declared elected
DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES. 99

under section 54(2) and an election petition to set aside the election of
the candidate returned for the general seat alone was filed without
impleading the candidate elected for the reserved seat and it was found
that the nomination paper of the petitioner for the general seat was
improperly rejected : Held, (i) that the election for the two seats was a
single election and not two different elections and the election for one
seat alone could not be declared void ; (ii) the candidate elected for the
reserved seat was also a necessary party to the election petition under
section 82 of the Act; (ii) non-compliance with section 82 was not fatal
and the candidate for the reserved seat could be added as a party on the
application of the petitioner or by the Tribunal suo motu ; (iv) that if he
was so added the proceeding against him could be deemed to have com-
menced only when he was added as a party, and, as the period of time
prescribed by rule 119 had expired, there was no use of impleading him
at this stage and the petition was liable to be dismissed. BHAN SINGH
v. KRISHNA KANT AND ANOTHER, 4 E.L.E. 212.
Petition to set aside election of candidate for general seat—
Candidate for reserved seat, whether necessary party—As the election to
a double member constituency is a single election and the entire election
has to be set aside if the election of one of the candidates is void, the
candidate elected for the reserved seat is a necessary party to an eleotion
petition to declare the election of the candidate to the general seat void.
Non-joinder of such candidate even after objection is raised will be fatal
to the maintainability of the petition. The question whether non-joinder
of a candidate as respondent to an election petition is fatal or not, will
depend on the answer to the further question whether the Tribunal can
or cannot grant the relief sought behind the back of such a candidate
without causing any detriment to his interests. BENA V. JAGAT SINGH
AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 174.
•——Symbols—Unrecognised party—Allotment of common symbol—
Legality—Held, per NAWAL KISHORE and KRISHNA SAHAI.—Under the
Election Rules, and instructions issued by the Election Commission,
candidates who are not members of a recognised All India Party could be
treated only as Independent candidates, and in the case of a double
member constituency, a common symbol, e.g., Camel, cannot be allotted
to the candidates of an unrecognised party, with a thick black circle
around that symbol for the Scheduled Caste candidate. But the election
cannot be set aside on account of such an irregularity in the allotment of
symbols unless it is further proved that the result of the election was
materially affected thereby. Per DALIP SINGH.—The symbol of a Camel
with a black circle around it is not an unapproved symbol and can be
100 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

assigned to a Scheduled Caste candidate of an unapproved or unrecognised


party. The difference between the recognised and unrecognised parties
in the matter of allotment of symbols is that in the case of recognised
parties certain symbols are reserved for them and in the case of un-
, recognised parties, one common symbol cannot be reserved for all the
candidates. But if a symbol is allotted to one candidate for a general
seat, the same symbol with a circle may be assigned to the Scheduled
Caste candidate set up by the party even though it is an unapproved
1
party. Th9re is no prohibition or bar in the instructions or rules against
i allotting to a Scheduled Caste candidate set up by an unapproved party a
i • symbol with a circle round it. MOHINDEB SINGH v. MlHAN SlNGH AND
I OTHEES, 10 E.L.R. 426.

I_ ' ELECTION AGENTS.


I Election agents.—Acceptance of agent, necessity of—Election law does
" . not require that Form 5A must be filed along with the nomination paper,
' and a nomination paper cannot therefore be rejected summarily on the
ground that Form 5A was not filed with the nomination paper. But, if
I Form 5A is not produced along with the nomination paper or when the
candidate is required by the Beturning Officer to do so,, and it is found
that the agent had not accepted his appointment and signed Form 5A
f before the delivery of the nomination paper, the Beturning Officer will be
' fully justified in rejecting the nomination on the ground that section 33
or Act XLIII of 1951 had not been complied with, for, acceptance by the
agent of his appointment as agent is necessary for a valid appointment of
an election agent. Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas and Others (2 E.L.B. 301)
followed. GXJEDIAL SINGH v. MANMOHAN K A U B AND OTHEES, 10
E.L.B. 450.
Declaring different election agents in different nomination papers
—Rejection of all papers—Whether proper—Validity of first appointment
—A candidate filed two nomination papers on a certain date in which he
declared that he had appointed X as his election agent. He filed two
more nomination papers on the next day in one of which he declared that
he had appointed Y as his agent and in the other, that he had appointed
himself as his agent. All the four nomination papers were rejected by the
Beturning Officer on the day of scrutiny on the ground that the candi-
date had appointed more than one person as his agent: Held, that when
a Beturning Officer scrutinises the nomination papers he should not
scrutinise all the nomination papers collectively but should scrutinise
them one after the other, and since in the first nomination paper the
candidate had appointed only one agent that nomination paper was valid,
ELECTION AGENTS IOI

and as the power to appoint an agent can be exercised only once, the
subsequent appointment of another person as agent was invalid, but the
invalidity of the subsequent appointment cannot affect the validity of the
first appointment, and the rejection of all the nomination papers was
therefore improper. Held further, that non-compliance with the provi-
sions of section 40 of the E. P. Act, 1951, is not a ground for rejecting a
nomination inasmuch as section 40 is not mentioned in section 36(2) (d)
while sactions 33 and 34 are expressly mentioned. Benares and Mirzapur
Districts Muhammadan Bural Constituency, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 154)
and Razzar Muhammadan Rural Constituency, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 716)
approved. Manipuri and Etah District Muhammadan Rural Consti-
tuency, 1946 (Sen and Poddar 530) distinguished and doubted.
MOTISING-HJI MAHAEAMANSINGHJI MAHIDA v. CHAWDA ISHWARBHAI
KHODABHAI AND OTHERS, 1 B.L.R. 330.

Different persons appointed in different nomination papers --


Rejection of all papers—Legality—Validity of first nomination —
A candidate can appoint only one person as his election agent, but where
he has appointed different persons jmder different nomination papers
which are not presented simultaneously, all the nomination papers cannot
be rejected. The first nomination paper would be valid and the others
should be rejected. Razzar Muhammadan Rural Constituency case, 1937
(Sen and Poddar 716) not followed. Benares and Mirzapur District
Muhammadan Rural Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 154), and Moti-
singhji Mahida v. Iswarbhai Khodabhai and Others (l E.L.E. 330)
followed. Manipuri andEtah Districts Muhammadan Rural Constituency
case (Sen and Poddar 530) distinguished. GOKALDAS HlEJEB v. ZAVBBI
VALLABHDAS AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.E. 234.

Different persons appointed under different nomination papers


—Procedure —Rejection of all papers—Legality—Validity of first nomina-
tion—Power to revoke appointment before scrutiny—A candidate can
appoint only one person as an election agent. Where a candidate appoints
different persons as election agents in different nomination papers which
are not presented simultaneously all the nomination papers cannot be
rejected. The first nomination paper and appointment of agent would be
valid and the others invalid. A candidate is entitled to revoket he
appointment of an agent after the filing of the nomination papers and
before their scrutiny. It is well settled that when the nomination of a
candidate is improperly rejected by the Eeturning Officer there is a strong
presumption that the result of the election has been materially affected.
TRAMBAKLAL MANISHANKEE v. PEABHULAL B H I M J I AND OTHEES, 2
E.L.E. 245.
ELD—1 4
102 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Declaring different agents in different nomination papers—


Validity of nomination—A candidate can appoint only one election agent,
and his nomination will be invalid and all the nomination papers must be
rejected if he appoints different election agents in different nomination
papers, even though he has not appointed more than one agent in each
nomination paper. The view that each nomination paper is a separate
entity and has to be considered independently at.the time of scrutiny and
the first nomination can be held to be valid in such cases is not correct.
The fact that the nomination papers were not presented simultaneously but
only at short or long intervals cannot make any difference and the view
that once the candidate has appointed an election agent he cannot exercise
the power again and the subsequent appointments are therefore
ineffective and should be ignored is also erroneous. Benares and Mirzapur
Districts Muhammadan Rural Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 154 ;
2 Doabia 197), Bazzar Muhammadan Bural Constituency case (Sen and
Poddar 716), Motisinghji Mahida v. Iswarbhai Khodabhai and Others
(l B.L.E. 330) dissented from. Manipuri and Etah District Muhammadan
Bural Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 530) and Mahomed Hussain v.
Mohamed Baffique (-A.I.E. 1941 Cal. 130) followed. Held also (i) that
in an election petition the respondent can support the order of the
Returning Officer rejecting a nomination paper on grounds other than
those mentioned in the order of the Returning Officer, (ii) If the Returning
Officer has not called upon the candidate to produce a certified copy of
the electoral roll, the respondent to the election petition cannot urge the
non-production thereof as a ground for supporting the rejection of the
nomination paper, (iii) Omission to file a statement in Form 5A with the
nomination paper is not a contravention of section 33(3), and does not in-
validate a nomination, (iv) Omission to specify three symbols and omission
of the words ' with yoke on" after ' two bulls" in the only one symbol
which had been mentioned, are not defects justifying the rejection of a
nomination paper, (v) A person holding an office of profit under Government
is not disqualified to be an election agent under section 145 of the R. P .
Act. (vi) A candidate is a "duly nominated" candidate if he has filed a
nomination paper in accordance with the formalities prescribed in section
33(3) of the Act even though his nomination paper was later rejected on
scrutiny, and such a candidate, must be joined as a party to an election
petition under section 82 of the Act. The non-joinder of a duly nomi-
nated candidate is not fatal to the maintainability of a petition if
adequate relief can be granted to the parties in his absence. MENGHRAJ
v. BHIMANDAS AND OTHEES, 2 B.L.R. 301.

Candidate appointing himself as election agent-—Appointment


declared in nomination paper itself—Validity of nomination—The norni-
ELECTION AGENTS 103

nation paper of a candidate who has appointed himself as his election


.. agent cannot be rejected merely because the declaration of appointment
• of himself as election agent is not made in a separate document but is
•'j noted in the nomination paper itself. It is well settled that if a nomi-
•. nation of a candidate is improperly rejected the result of the election
is presumed to have been materially affected thereby, inasmuch as the
entire electorate is deprived of its right to vote fora candidate who was
• qualified to stand as such. This presumption would require the most
conclusive evidence for its rebuttal and in the absence of such evidence
the election of the returned candidate must be declared void if a nomi-
nation paper has been improperly rejected. H A J I NASIMUDDIN V.
DANDIRAM DUTTA AND OTHEES ; and SlVAPKASAD SARMA V. DANDI-
EAM DUTTA AND OTHERS, 1 B.L.R. 412.
-The instruction contained in the form of nomination paper
that if more than one nomination paper is delivered by or on behalf
of a candidate the name of the election agent, whether such agent
is the candidate or any other person, shall be specified in each such
nomination paper, is sufficiently complied with if the candidate describes
the agent as "myself" in each nomination paper. The nomination papers
cannot be rejected on the ground that he does not write down his
proper name in each of them. In any event the description of the agent
as myself" is only 'a technical defect which is not of a substantial
character" within the meaning of section 36(4) of the Act. EAMA-
CHANDRAN NAIR V. EAMACHANDRA DAS AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 442.
'Forin 5-A of the Eules has to be attached to a nomination
paper only when the candidate appoints a person other than himself
as his election agent. GlAN CHAND V. SBIRAM BANSAL AND OTHERS, 2
E.L.E. 136.
Where a candidate who intended to appoint himself as his
election agent filed three nomination papers in which he had struck off
the words printed in the form of nomination paper in Schedule II refer-
ring to the appointment of another person as election agent, so that the
printed matter read as follows: "I hereby declare that I have appointed
myself as my election agent " : Held, that the nomination could not be
rejected on the ground that the candidate had not written his name in
full or even the words "myself" in the declaration in the nomination
papers. The footnote in the form which requires that the candidate
should writs his name even when he appoints himself as his agent goes
beyond section 33(3) of the E. P. Act, and non-compliance with it will
not invalidate the nomination, PEABHUDAS EAMJIBHAI MEHTA V.
LALLUBHAI KISHORDAS MANIAR (NO. 2), 2 E.L.E. 249.
104 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Provisions regarding the filling up of forms are merely direc-


tory and it is sufficient if they are obeyed substantially. They do not
enjoin literal compliance and exact fulfilment. Where, therefore, a
candidate haa signed his full name in the declaration form and has
stated above that he declares that he appoints himself as hi3 election
agent there is substantial compliance with section 40 of the Act and
rules framed thereunder and Schedule I I , inasmuch as it is clear from
the declaration who is the person appointed as election agent and there
is no possibility of mistake or ambiguity in this. Wasawa Singh v.
Warayam Singh (2 Doabia 263) and Gurbaksh Singh v. Baldev Singh
(1 Doabia 13) relied on. VlJAYA MOHAN BEDDY V. PAG-A PlTLLA BEDDY
AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 414.

-Failure to file Form V-A—Whether invalidates nomination—


Failure to file Form V-A with the nomination paper can at best be a
non-compliance with the provisions of section 40 of the E. P . Act, 1951,
for which no penalty is prescribed and it cannot invalidate the nomi-
nation paper. Such an omission doe-s not bring the case within section
36(2)(d) of the Act as it does not amount to failure to comply with the
provisions of section 33(l) or (3). Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas and Others
(2 E.L.E. 301) followed. SOCKET SINQH i>. THAKAE SINGH AND OTHBBS
(No. 2), 3 E.L.E. 102.
Nomination paper—Appointment of election agent—No separate
form has been prescribed for appointing the candidate himself as his
election agent other than the appointment and declaration contained in
the form of nomination paper itself. I t is not therefore necessary that
the declaration should be contained on a separate chit of paper in order
to fulfil the meaning of the word accompanied" contained in section
33(3) of the E. P. Act, 1951. BHOLA NATH V. KRISHNA CHANDRA
GUPTA AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 288.

-The provision contained in section 33(3) of tha B. P. Act, 1951,


that no candidate shall be deemed to be duiy nominated unless a decla-
ration of appointment of an election agent is submitted along with the
nomination is mandatory. Where, in the nomination paper no person
other than the candidate was appointed as agent and the words "myself"
and "as my", were also struck off: Held, that the nomination was
not valid. MANDAL SUMITRA DEVI V. SURAJ NABAIN SINGH AND
OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 136.

Candidate appointing himself as agent—Provision to insert


name and father's name of agent—Whither applies—The form of nomina-
tion paper contemplates the insertion of the name of the election agent
and his father's name only where the candidate appoints a person other
ELECTION AGENTS 105

than himself as his election agent. In any event, omission to insert the
name of the election agent and his father's name in the nomination
paper is not a material defect, when the candidate appoints himself as
his agent, and a nomination paper cannot be rejected merely on the
ground of such omission. The foot-note in the form relating to this
matter is unhappily worded and requires amendment. Ramachandran
Nair v. Ramachandra Das and Others (1 B.L.E. 442) followed. MOHAN
VITHAL E A J v. GANGADHARA SIVA AND OTHBES, 4 B.L.E. 91.

It is not necessary to state the name of the election agent and


his father's name in the declaration of appointment of election agent
where the candidate appoints himself as his election agent and only one
nomination paper has been filed by him, or on his behalf. Quaere: Whether
he should state his name again in the declaration of appointment of agent,
when more than one nomination paper are filed. Ramachandran Nair
v. Ramachandra Das and Others (l B.L.E. 442), Prabhudas Ramjibhai
Mehta v. Lallubhai Kishordas Maniar (l E.L.E. 154) and Bejoy Singh,
v. Narbada Gharan Lai and Others (2 B.L.B. 428) referred to. LAKSHMI
CHAND v. LADHU RAM OHODHEI AND OTHERS, 4 B.L.R. 200.

Under sections 33(3) and 40 of the R. P. Act, 1951, it is incum-


bent upon a candidate to deliver a declaration in Form 5-A along with
the nomination paper, and a nomination paper can therefore be rejected
if such declaration is not filed along with it. ISHER SlNGH v. MANGIT
INDBR SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 B.L.R. 90.

(i) A declaration that the candidate has appointed himself as


his election agent on the form of nomination itself is a sufficient compli-
ance with sections 33 (3) and 4.0 of the R. P. Act, 1951. The words
" accompanied by a declaration " in section 33 (3) do not necessarily
imply that a separate paper containing such declaration is essential,
(ii) The appointment of an election agent need not be made before the
tiling of the nomination paper, (iii) Omission to state the place of
verification or to add words to the effect that the statements made on
information are believed to be true, are not substantial defects for which
a petition could be dismissed, (iv) Indian election law relating to giving
of particulars of corrupt practices is much more stringent than the
English law and allegations of corrupt practices in respect of which full
particulars are not given must be struck off. PlANUMAN PRASAD MlSEA
v. TARA GHAND AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.R. 446.

' Appointment of election agent—Omission to file Form V, effect of


—Candidate appointing himself as agent—Declaration in nomination
Io6 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

paper, whether sufficient—Construction of declaration—Name of another


agent inserted without striking off myself" and as my "—Whether two
agents appointed—Validity of nomination—Appointment of more than one
agent—Whether all nomination papers void—Oral evidence as to factum
of appointment of agent—Admissibility—-The respondent filed three
nomination papers. In the first, which was in Hindi, in the form of
declaration of appointment of agent he inserted the name of " G. S." but
did not strike off the words " swayam ho " and " apna " though he struck
off the word " mera". In the second form, which was in English, the
name of " G. S." was inserted and the words " myself " and " as my "
were both struck off. In the third, which was in Hindi, the name of
'" G. S." was inserted and words " swayam ko " and " mera " were both
struck off. The first was rejected on the ground that the candidate had
appointed both " G. S." and himself as agents, and the remaining two
on the ground that Form V was not filed along with the nomination
papers : Held, (by the Full Tribunal) that there is no provision which
makes the Sling of Form V with nomination papers compulsory and the
rejection of the second and third nomination papers on the ground that
Form V was not filed along with them was improper. Held per
K. K. SHAEMA and A. N. KAUL (P. L. SHOMB, dissenting)—(i) that, oa
the face of the first nomination paper, read with the statements of the
candidate, he had appointed "G. S." and himself as agents, and, therefore,
this nomination paper was invalid ; and as the candidate had appointed
more than one agent, all the nomination papers, including the 2nd and
3rd, could be rejected on this ground. P. L. SHOME.—In the declaration
in the first nomination paper the appointment of either the one, or the
other, or both, was not clear and so there was no valid appointment of
any agent in that paper and the question of the validity of the 2nd and
3rd on the ground that more than one agent was appointed did not arise
for decision. Held further (by the Full Tribunal) that oral evidence as
to the factum of appointment of an election agent is not excluded by
section 91 of the Evidence Act, though the appointment itself has to be
in writing. Held also Per K. K. SHAEMA and A. N. KATJL (P. L. SHOMB,
dissenting)—(i) Under section 40 of the E. P. Act, 1951, where a candi-
date appoints himself as his agent it is not necessary that there should
be a separate appointment in writing in addition to a declaration in the
nomination paper itself to that effect. Haji Nasimuddin and Another
v. Dandiram Dutta and Others (l B.L.E. 412) followed, (ii) The appoint-
ment of an election agent can be made by a candidate under section 40
only after his nomination paper has actually been subscribed by the
proposer and seconder and the nomination has been assented to by the
candidate, and before delivering to the Eeturning Officer. Section 33(3)
ELECTION AGENTS 107

does not require any writing anterior to the declaration of appointment


of agent to evidence such appointment. Per K. K. SHABMA and
A. N. KAXJL.— Where more than one election agent is appointed by a
candidate all his nomination papers must be rejected as all the nomina-
tion papers must be considered collectively. The view that each
nomination paper must be taken as a separate entity and one of them
can be accepted and the others rejected, is not sound. Benares and
Mirzapur District (Sen & Poddar 154), Bazzar Muhammadan Rural
Constituency Case (Sen & Poddar 716), Gohal Das Hirji v. Zaveri
Vallabhdas (2 E.L.R. 234), Motisinghji v. Ishwarbhai Khodabhai
(1 E.L.R. 330) not followed. D I N SINGH AND OTHERS V. KAPIL DEO
AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 247.
——-The nomination of a candidate who has appointed himself as
his agent cannot be rejected on the ground that he has not written his
name in the declaration of appointment in the form of nomination paper
but retained the word ' myself ". Haji Nasimuddin v. Dandiram Dutta
(1 E.L.R. 412) referred to. BHAIRON V. THAKUR GANPAT SINGH AND
OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 409.

Though a candidate files several nomination papers, if he does


not appoint any person other than himself as his election agent, it is not
necessary that he should write out his own name as the agent in each
paper. It is enough if he writes "myself". SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER
v. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 265.
Though there should be a separate declaration of appointment
of election agent in addition to the nomination paper, the form of nomina-
tion prescribed under rule 4 provides for appointment of election agent
also, and if the form is properly filled up and filed, sections 33(3) and 40
are sufficiently complied with. Deo Ghand and Others v. Vashist Narain
and Others (6 E.L.R. 138) explained. SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER V.
SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 265.
Candidate appointing himself as agent—Declaration of appoint-
ment in nomination form itself—Whether sufficient—Per K. K. SHARMA J.
and A. N. KAUL (SHOME, dissenting)—"Where a candidate appoints himself
as his election agent, the declaration in the nomination paper that he has
appointed himself as his election agent is a sufficient compliance with sec-
tion 40 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is not necessary
that he should appoint himself as his election agent in a separate piece of
paper before filing his nomination paper. SHOME.—Section 40 requires that
an appointment of an election agent, whether it be the candidate himself
or another person, should be made before the delivery of the nomination
paper and that it should be in writing. A declaration in the nomination
io8 ELECTION 1AW REPORTS DIGEST

paper itself cannot therefore satisfy the provisions of section 40 ; and if no


separate appointment in writing is made before delivering the nomination
paper, apart from the declaration in the nomination paper itself the
nomination must be rejected. Haji Nasimuddin v. Dandiram Dutta and
Others (1 E.L.R. 412) and Din Singh and Others v. Kapil Deo and Others
(6 B.L.E. 247) followed. LALLXJ CHAND V. T E J SINGH AND OTHERS, 8
B.L.E. 28.
A declaration made in the form of nomination paper itself before
it is delivered to the Returning Officer that the candidate has
appointed "self" as his election agent, is sufficient compliance with the
provisions of sections 40 and 33(3) of theEepresentation of the People Act,
1951. T E J SINGH V. ELECTION TBIBTJNAL, JAIPUR, AND OTHERS,
9 E.L.R. 193.
Form VA is not a "declaration" within the meaning of section
33(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, but only a document
evidencing the act of appointment and failure to file Form VA with the
nomination paper is not therefore a ground for rejecting the nomination
for non-compliance with section 33(3). Isher Singh v. Manjit Inder
Singh and Others (7 E.L.R. 90) dissented from. Mengh Baj v. Bhimandas
and Others, (2 E.L.E. 301) followed. DEVASHARAN SINHA V. SHEO
MAHADBY PEASAD AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 461.
——If an election agent is not appointed under Form VA, there
will be a non-compliance with section 40(2) and rule 11-A, but such
non-compliance is not a ground for setting aside an election unless it is
shown to have materially affected the result of the election. DEVASHABAN
SINHA v. SHEO MAHADEV PRASAD AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.R. 461.

ELECTION COMMISSION.
Election Commission—Jurisdiction of High Courts over—Where the
Election Commission has referred a petition to an Election Tribunal for
disposal, it is not open to the Tribunal to go behind the order of the
Election Commission and consider whether the Election Commission
ought to have dismissed the petition under section 85 for non-compliance
with the provisions of section 81, 83 or 117, and whether it acted illegally
or without jurisdiction in referring the petition to the Tribunal. I t is
also not within the jurisdiction of the High Court to consider the legality
or otherwise of the order of the Election Commission as the Commission
is not within the reach of the High Court. K. T. KoSALRAM v
M. R. MEGANATHAN AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 278.
The fact that the Election Commission has its office at Delhi
which is outside the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court will not
ELECTION COMMISSION IO9

cease to be a ground for holding that the Madras High Court has no
jurisdiction to issue a writ against the Commission merely because
the election is to the Madras State Legislative Assembly. ELECTION
COMMISSION V. SAKA VENKATA EAO, 2 E.L.E. 499 (S.C.).
-High Court—Power to issue writ against Election Commission.
See HIGH COUETS infra.
Power to regulate its own procedure —Power to authorise officer to
sign on behalf of Commission—High Court—Power to issue writ against
Election Commission—The Election Commission can regulate its own pro-
cedure and can authorise one of its officers to authenticate and sign notifica-
tions issued in the name of the Election Commission under sections 39(2)
and 151 of the Eepresentation of the People Act, 1951. The issue of noti-
fications under sections 39(2) and 151 of the Act is a part of the process of
the election within the meaning of article 329(b) of the Constitution, and
the said article 329(b) excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court
to issue a writ under article 226 to restrain the Election Commission
from issuing such notifications. AMIN AHMAD V. NAND LAL SlNHA, 5
E.L.E. 40.
Press notes—Press notes issued by the Election Commission have
no legal force, but are merely directory in their nature. MANEKLAL
AMOLAKCHAND v. THBTB GOPAL E A M J I AND OTHEBS, 9 E.L.E. 36.
Approval of defective ballot boxes—Effect—See BALLOT BOXES
supra p. 5 (8 E.L.E. 429) and p. 7 (8 E.L.E. 240).
—Interchange of ballot papers—Power of Election Commission to
validate votes cast on wrong ballot papers —The Election Commission
which has the power to prescribe a distinguishing mark for the ballot
papers has also the power to change it. But the prescribing of a distin-
guishing mark as contemplated by rule 28 must relate to the election as
a whole. There cannot be one distinguishing mark for some of the voters
and another for others with reference to the same election and at the
same polling station. Under rule 23 the polling officer has to deliver the
proper paper to the voter and if a distinguishing mark had been prescribed*
under rule 28, the ballot paper to be delivered must bear that mark. The
approval by the Election Commission subsequent to the polling cannot
render valid ballot papers which did not bear the distinguishing mark
prescribed for the election ; such ballot papers are liable to be rejected
under rule 47(l)(c). JlARI VISHNU KAMATH V. AHMAD SAYED
;
ISHAQTTE AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 216 (S.C.) reversing 8 E.L.E. 350.
See also 5 E.L.E. 248 and 7 E,L,B, 25,
ELD—15
110 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Power to condone non-compliance with section 83—The Election


Commission has no power under section 85 of the E. P. Act, to condone
non-compliance of the requirements of section 83 with regard to the filing
of the list of corrupt practices along with an election petition. T. PRAKA-
SAM v. IT. KRISHNA EAO AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 2 E.L.E. 54.
Power to inquire into disqualification 'of candidates arising
before election— Articles 190(3) and 192(l) of the Constitution of India are
applicable only to disqualifications to which a member of the Legislature
becomes subject after he is elected as such and neither the Governor nor
the Election Commission has jurisdiction to enquire into a disqualifica-
tion which arose before the election. SAKA VENKATA EAO V. ELECTION
COMMISSION, 1 E.L.E. 417, affirmed by Supreme Court in 2 E.L.E. 499.
See also MAHAEAJA ANAND CHAND, In re, 5 E.L.R. 197.
Withdrawal of complaint—Duty of Commission to proceed with
enquiry—If a question whether a member has, or has not, become subject
to a disqualification properly arises under article 103 of the Constitution
and, on the representation of any person, that question is referred by the
President to the Election Commission for its opinion, the fact that the
person who raised the question and made the representation to the
President does not wish to proceed with the matter and asks for permis-
sion to withdraw his petition, is not a sufficient ground for the Election
Commission to desist from giving its opinion on the reference. MAHARAJA
ANAND CHAND, In re, 5 E.L.E. 197.
Power to condone delay in presentation of election petition—Sea
ELECTION PETITION—LIMITATION, pp. 136 to 138 infra.
Power to condone delay in filing return of election expenses
and: effect of condonation—See 3 E.L.E. 347, p. 113 infra.
Power to allow amendment of verification—Section 85 did not
make it imperative on the part of the Election Commission to dismiss
an election petition for defective verification ; the Election Commis-
sion has inherent jurisdiction to permit the necessary amendments in
an election petition so as to make it conform to the requirements of
section 83 and the power of dismissal under section 85 is intended to be
exercised only if there is failure to amend after being required so to do ;
even if it is held that the only jurisdiction which the Election Com-
mission possessed under the Act for defective verification was to dismiss
the petition under section 85, it could not affect the jurisdiction of the
Election Tribunal to proceed with the trial. A. S. SlTBBA RAJ V.
M. MUTHIAH AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 21.
Whether the Election Commission has inherent power to allow
amendment of a defective verification or not, if it does not in fact dismiss
ELECTION COMMISSION III

a petition for defective verification but appoints a Tribunal for hearing


the petition, the Tribunal has a discretion under section 90(4) to allow
the verification to be amended and if it does so the Supreme Court will
not interfere wtih its order in an appeal under article 136 of the Con-
stitution. DlNABANDHU SAHU V. JADUMONI MANGABAJ AND OTHEBS,
9 B.L.E. 485 (S.C.).
ELECTION ENQUIRIES.
— -Election enquiries—nature of—respondent's evidence—An election
inquiry, though quasi-criminal in nature, allows the respondent to be
examined and cross-examined on oath and, while deciding whether the
allegations of the petitioner are proved beyond reasonable doubt or not
the evidence of the respondent on oath must also be considered. DsSAI
BASAWABAJ v. DASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHEES, i B.L.E. 380.
Election enquiries—political considerations—Though the con-
duct of the trial of an election petition must not be left to the caprice of
the parties and it ought to be the concern of the Tribunal to purge elections
of all kinds of corrupt practices and impurities so as to guard the political
rights of the citizens and the constituency, this does not justify a
departure from legal principles. Though political justice is concerned
wrth the political rights of the citizen, its administration is governed not
by politics but by law, equity and good conscience. Allah Dad Khan v.
Sardar Mohammad Azam (2 Doabia 314) and Amir Mohammad Khan v.
Atta Mohammad Khan (1 Doabia 98) distinguished. SHANTILAL
OHAUDHUEY W.BAGHUBAJ SINGH AND OTHEES (NO. 2), 9 E.L.E. 93.

Election enquiries—general principles—(i) The general rule is


well settled that the statutory requirements of election law must be
strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a
suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the com-
mon law and that the court possesses no common law power, (ii) It is
also well settled that the success of a candidate who has won at an elec-
tion should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such
interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law. (iii)
None of these propositions, however, has any application if the special
law itself confers authority on a Tribunal to proceed with a petition in
accordance with certain procedure and when it does not state the con-
sequences of non-compliance with certain procedural requirements laid
down by it. (iv) Though the election of a successful candidate is not to
be lightly interfered with, one of the essentials of that law is also to
safeguard the purity of the election process and also to see that people do
not get elected by flagrant breaches of that law or by corrupt practices.
112 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

(v) In cases where the election law does not prescribe the consequence or
does not lay down a penalty for non-compliance with certain procedural
requirements of that law, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal entrusted with
the trial of the case is not affected. JAGAN NATH V. JASWANT SINGH
AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 231 (S. C ) .

ELECTION EXPENSES.
[See also CORRUPT PRACTICE p. 26ff. supra].
-Accounts—Duty of agent to keep regular accounts—Method of
keeping accounts—Duty to preserve them—Non-production—Adverse in-
ference—It is the duty of an election agent to keep separate and regular
books of accounts of all election expenses in the manner prescribed in
section 44 of the B. P. Act, 1951, and rule 111 of the rules thereunder,
and he must preserve such account books and connected papers till the
disposal of an election petition. Stepney case (4 O' M. & H. 178) and
East Dorset case (6 O' M. & H. 22) referred to. (The method of keeping
election accounts as laid down in the Stepney case pointed out). Non-
production of books of account of election expenses without proper
explanation creates an adverse inference either that the candidate has not
maintained such books at all, or if he has maintained them, the entries in
them might go against him. Mohammad Zakria Kitchlew v. ShSik
Mohammad Sadiq'(Sen and Poddar 34) referred to. SHANKARE GOWDA
v. MARITAPPA AND ANOTHER, 9 E.L.E. 101.
False return, effect of—Mere falsity of a return of election
expenses is not a ground for declaring an election void under s. 100(2)(a)
though if the items omitted are expenses forbidden by law, they would be
grounds for avoiding the election. M. E. MEGANATHAN V. K. T. KOSAL-
RAM AND OTHERS, 9 B.L.E. 242.
Omission of items—Inference—If any particular item of expendi-
ture is not included in the return of election expenses it is evidence of
knowledge on the part of the election agent that the expenditure is
corrupt. Sitakanta Mahapatra v. Harekrishna Mehtab (3 Jagat Narain
93 ; Hammond 102) referred to. T. C. BASAPPA V. T. NAGAPPA AND
OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 197.

Jurisdiction of Tribunal to consider whether return is false—


Condonation of delay and removal of disqualifications by Election Com-
mission—Effect of—"At the election," meaning of—The Election Tribunal
has jurisdiction in the trial of an election petition, to go into the question
whether the return of election expenses filed by a candidate is false in
^ ELECTION EXPENSES . 113

material particulars. There is no difference in this respect between the


law under the old Constitution and the present Constitution of India.
.;' The fact that the Election Commission had condoned the delay in filing
••j a return of election expenses and the irregularities in it and removed the
'-s disqualifications arising from default in filing a proper return, in the
..•: exercise of its powers under sections 7(e) and 144 by permitting the
candidate to file a fresh return does not take away the jurisdiction of
.1 the Election Tribunal to go into the question whether the original
return was false in material particulars. The words "at the election"
in section 99 of the Act must be interpreted to mean "in relation to the
election" and not "during the course of the election". The Attoch case
(1 Jagat Narain 1 ; 1 Hammond's E. P. 1); Farrukhabad case : Samp
Narain v. Baja Durga Narain (3 Jagat Narain 22) and Ghittagong
case: Haji Badi Ahmad v. Md. Anwarul Azim (Sen and Poddar 261)
followed. MANMOHANI SEHGAL V. SUCHETA KEIPALANI, 3 E.L.E. 347.

-Though the filing of a false return of election expenses is only


a minor corrupt practice and is not a ground for setting aside an election,
an Election Tribunal constituted to hear election petitions has jurisdic-
tion to go into the question whether the return of election expenses made
by the respondent was false in material particulars as alleged in the
petition ; for the acts committed by the candidate which have been
falsely reported in the return may amount to corrupt practices and may
have affected the result of the election materially. Further, though a
minor corrupt practice is not sufficient for setting aside an election, it
may involve the disqualification of a candidate for voting for a certain
period, and for this reason also an Election Tribunal can go into the
question whether the return of election expenses submitted by a candi-
date was false. At any rate the Election Tribunal does not act in excess
of its jurisdiction in proceeding to try the question and the High Court
will not prohibit it from doing so by issuing a writ under article 226
I or 227 of the Constitution. SUCHETA KBIPALANI V. S. S. DULAT AND
O T H E B S , 9 E.L.E. 145.
ff Election expenses—Amount paid to a party for nomination/ as
the party candidate—Amount paid by a candidate to the Congress
Parliamentary Board for being nominated by the Congress is an elec-
I tion expense" contemplated by Chapter VIII of theE.P. Act, 1951, even
| though the expenditure wrs incurred before the date of nomination, and
1
should be shown in the return of election expenses. Omission to men-
tion the expenditure in the return would not, however, amount to a
minor corrupt practice under section 124(4) unless such omission was
actuated by a corrupt motive. SALIG EAM JAISWAL V. SHEO KUMAR
.:. ELD—16
ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

PANDE AND OTHEES, 9 B.L.E. 67. [See also cases cited at p. 24 ff.
supra],
' Enquiry into petitioner's return—The respondent is not entitled
to claim an inquiry in an election petition into an allegation that the
petitioner's return of election expenses is false, if the petitioner has not
claimed that he should be declared elected. SHIVDEV SlNGH V. DARA
SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.E. 496.
ELECTION OFFENCES
Though an act may be an offence under section 130 of the
E. P. Act, 1951, it would not necessarily amount to an illegal practice
to serve as a ground for setting aside an election. YOGRAJSINGH
SHANKARSINGH PARIHAR V. SlTABAM HlRACHAND BlRLA AND OTHERS,
(No. 2), 3 E.L.E. 439.
The use of badges and wall paintings within 100 yards of the
polling station on the polling day cannot be a ground for declaring the
election of the returned candidate to be void under section 100(2) of the
Act, even though it may amount to an offence under section 133 of the
Act. YOGRAJSINGH SHANKARSINGH PARIHAR v. SlTABAM HlRACHAND
BIRLA AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 3 E.L.R. 439.
-As the subject matter of section 13l(l)(b) and section 130(l)(f)
of the E. P. Act falls within article 327 and item 72 of List I -'and also
under item 93 of list I of the Constitution the Parliament had full com-
petence to legislate with regard to election offences in the manner
provided in these sections, and these sections are not therefore ultra
vires, NAGENDRA MAHTO V. T H E STATE, 10 E.L.E. 140.
Necessity of sanction. See 6 E.L.E. 388; pp. 163—164 infra.
ELECTION PETITION
1. Abatement. 12. Joint petition.
2. Adjourned hearing. 13. Limitation.
3. Admissions. 14. List of particulurs.
4. Amendment of petition. 15. New grounds.
5. Burden of proof. 16. Parties.
*6. Collusion. 17. Recrimination.
7. Consolidation of petitions. r8. Reliefs.
8. Contents. 19. Remand.
9. Costs. 20. Signature.
10. Court fees. 21. Verification.
11. Deposit of security. 22. Withdrawal.
1. Abatement.—Dissolution of Assembcj—By the combined opera-
tion of sections 98 and 99 of the E. P. Act, 1951, when an election is
sought to be set aside on the ground of corrupt practices the Tribunal
ELECTION PETITION—ABATEMENT 115

has, in addition to declaring whether the election is or is not void, to


record a rinding whether any corrupt practice was proved or not.
Consequently, though it has declared the election void in another election
petition or owing to the President's Proclamation dissolving the Assembly
the necessity for making a declaration of the election being void does not
remain, still the petitioner could insist that a finding about corrupt
practices us3d in the election should be given. Carter v. Mills (9 0. P.
117), Marshall v. James (9 C. P. 702), Exeter Case (6 O'M. and H. 228)
and Nurul Islam v. Aid. Rafique and Others (2 B.L.E. 70) referred to.
The petitioner cannot, however, insist that the Tribunal should record its
findings about all the corrupt and unfair practices alleged in the petition,
the cumulative effect of which may have been necessary to be considered
to see if the election had to be declared void as being materially affected
by such practices. SHIVDEV SINGH V. DARA SINGH AND OTHERS, 5
E.L.E. 496.
On resignation of candidate. See 2 E.L.E. 70.
2. Adjourned hearing.— Non-appearance of parties—Dismissal for
default—Propriety—Non-appearance of petitioner—Power of Tribunal
to permit ex parte respondent to prosecute petition—If the petitioner fails
to appear on a date to which an election petition has been adjourned,
whether the adjournment was made by the Tribunal on its own motion
or at the request of a party, the Tribunal is not bound to dismiss the
petition summarily for default of appearance. On the other hand, as
election petitions do not concern merely the parties but affect the entire
constituency summary dismissal of election petitions for default of
appearance of the petitioner would be contrary to the spirit of election
law. Where the petitioner shows negligence in the prosecution of the
petition or deliberately wants to defeat his own petition by non-
appearance, a respondent who expresses a desire to prosecute the petition
must in the interests of justice be permitted to do so. The Tribunal may
in such a case call upon him to give security for the costs of the
respondent. The fact that the respondent who desires to prosecute the
petition did not put in appearance at previous hearings and was made
ex parte, is not a ground for not permitting him to prosecute the petition
when he finds that the petitioner is negligent or colluding, for the fact
that the petitioner was prosecuting the petition at the previous hearings
is a sufficient cause for his non-appearance at such hearings. EOOP
CHANDRA SOGANI AND OTHERS V. EAWAT MAN SINGH AND OTHERS
(No. i), 5 E.L.E. 321. '
——Non-appearance of respondent—Appearance at subsequent
hearing—Failure to show good cause for non-appearance—Bight to take
ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

part in further proceedings—Discretion of court —Failure to exercise


discretion—Power of High Court to issue writ of certiorari—Ii a
respondent to an election petition fails to appear at an adjourned hearing
of the petition and the Tribunal decides to proceed ex parte, but at a
subsequent hearing the respondent appears, he cannot be prevented from
taking part in the proceedings from that stage, merely because he did not
appear at the previous hearing and was not able to show sufficient cause
for his non-appearance at that hearing. The view that, unless he gets
the decision of the court to proceed ex parte set aside, he is debarred from
taking part in the further hearings is incorrect. The Tribunal has in such
circumstances a discretion to allow him to take part in the further pro-
ceedings on such conditions as it may think fit. Whether the petitioner
had, owing to the non-appearance of the respondent and the decision of
the court to proceed ex parte, contented himself with adducing evidence
just enough to prove a prima facie case and would be prejudiced by giving
permission to the respondent to take part in the further proceedings in
the case is a matter to be considered by the Tribunal in exercising its
discretion. If a Tribunal prevents a respondent who appears at a subse-
quent hearing from taking part in further cross-examination and to argue
his case, on the ground that he is not entitled to do so until he got the
decision of the court at the previous hearing to proceed ex parte set
aside, the Tribunal will be failing to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by
law and the High Court can quash its decision by issuing a writ of
certiorari under article 226 of the Constitution. SANGBAM SINGH V.
ELECTION TEIBUNAL, KOTAH, AND ANOTHEB, 10 B.L.E. 293 (S. C).

3. Admissions—Judgment on.—Judgment on admissions of respondent


— Section 92 of the E. P. Act, 1951, which specifies some special powers
which may be exercised by an Election Tribunal, does not limit the
general jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal by section 90 to apply the
provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, as nearly as may be, to the trial
of election petitions. A judgment on the admissions made by the respond-
ent could, therefore, in proper cases, be given by an Election Tribunal,
provided the admission is clear, as provided in Order XII, rule 6, of the
Civil Procedure Code. SHANTILAL CHAUDHAEY V. RAOHUBAJ SlNGH
AND OTHBBS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.E. 93.
4. Amendment of petition.—Power to amend—Where an election
petition is filed within the period of limitation, no question of limitation
could arise with regard to a subsequent amendment of the reliefs prayed
for by way of addition or in the alternative, and if in the original petition
itself there is a prayer 'for such other and further reliefs as the Tribunal
may deem fit", the Tribunal can grant additional or further relief even
ELECTION PETITION—AMENDMENT I17

without an amendment of the petition .GlDWANI CHOITHBAM PA14TAB-


EAI v. AGLVANI THAKUBDAS CHUHABMAL AND OTHBBS, 1 E.L.E
194.
——Though section 82 is mandatory, the Election Tribunal has
power, in an appropriate case, to direct the impleading of additional
respondents not originally impleaded, in accordance with section 82
because the Tribunal can apply the relevant provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure under section 90(2) of the B. P. Act, 1951, to the trial of
election petitions in the interests of justice. Kangra cum Gurdaspur
M. B. Case (Hammond 437) Saharanpur N. M. B. Case (Hammond 623),
OJcara Muhammadan Constituency Case (2 Doabia 149), Gidwani
Choithram Partabrai v. A. T. Chuharmal (1 E.L.E. 194) distinguished.
SlTBBAHMANYA GOUNDAR V. KANDASAMI GOUNDAR AND Ol'HEBS,
1 E.L.E. 214.
No obligation is- cast upon an Election Tribunal under section
90(4) of the E. P. Act, 1951, to dismiss an election petition which does not
comply with the provisions of section 83. The word used in section 90(4)
is may" and this confers a discretion on the Tribunal, and the very fact
that the Legislature has left it to the discretion of the Tribunal clearly
goes to show that the Legislature has conferred the power upon the
Tribunal in proper cases to amend a petition and to bring it in conformity
with section 83 so that it need not be dismissed. When in the same
statute, with regard to the same subject-matter the Legislature has used
the expression shall" in one section and may" in another, it is not
proper to hold that these two expressions were used with the same mean-
ing and connotation in both the sections. The expression "trial of suits"
in section 90(2) of the Act does not mean the same thing as the hearing
of a suit, but covers the earlier stages also and the power conferred upon
the Tribunal by section 90(2) to try a petition in accordance with the
procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure is a power much
wider than merely applying procedure which would be applicable to the
hearing of a suit. SITABAM HIBACHAND BIBLA v. YOGBAJ SINGH
SHANKAB SINGH PABIHAB, 2 E.L.E. 283.

The Election Tribunal has no power to allow amendment of


the election petition itself though under section 83(3) of the E. P. Act,
1951, it has power to allow amendments to the particulars given in the
list of corrupt and illegal practices. The provision in section 90(2) of
the Act of 1951, that an election petition has to ba tried as nearly as
may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil
Procedure Code to the trial of suits refers to the conduct of the enquiry
and not to the petition itself. Kangra cum Gurdaspur M. B. case
Il8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

(Hammond 435), Amritsar City case (Hammond 83) and Saharanpur


N. M. B. case (Hammond 621) followed. SIVATHANU PlLLAi v.
MESAMONY AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 312.

Under the provisions of section 90 of the E. P. Act, 1951, all


the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code which relate to trial of suits
are applicable to trial of election petitions, subject to special provisions
in the Act itself relating to any particular matter, and an Election Tri.
bunal has, therefore, ample power to allow amendments of the election
petition. An election petition can be allowed to be amended even after
the period of limitation for filing the petition has expired, when the
amendment does not introduce any new cause of action or change the
nature of the case or the relief asked for. Section 92 of the Act is
merely an enabling section and does not indicate that other provisions
in the Civil Procedure Code relating to trial of suits are not applicable
to election petitions. The provisions contained in section 83(2) relating
to amendment of particulars of corrupt practices also do not lead to any
inference that other amendments to pleadings cannot be allowed.
Appasivami Padayachi v. Ethirajulu Naidu (A.I.E. 1926 Mad. 1043) and
Kandaswami Chettiar v. Foulkes (A.I.E. 1926 Mad. 396), relied on.
Where in an election petition the acceptance of the nomination paper
of the respondent was objected to on the ground that he was disquali-
fied as he was a P.W.D. Contractor who has undertaken certain building
contracts for the State and the petitioner sought to amend the petition
by adding and repairs to X", a piece of work which he had omitted to
mention in the petition : Held; that the amendment could be allowed.
B A M A B E D D I v. CHIDANANDAM AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 373.

The Election Tribunal has ample power to allow duly nomi-


nated candidates, who have been inadvertently omitted, to be impleaded
as parties to an election petition. The word ' trial" is used in section
90(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951, in a wide sense and includes all steps in a
suit or proceeding from its inception till final judgment, and Order I,
rule 10. of the Civil Procedure Code is therefore applicable to election
petitions. Bombay City case (Hammond 181) and Saharanpur case
(Hammond 621), not followed. T. PBAKASAM V. U. KRISHNA EAO AND
OTHERS, 1 E.L.R, 384.

A defect in verification as distinguished from the total


absence of verification may be rectified by amendment. Election
Tribunal has very wide powers of amendment of pleadings and can
exercise them at any stage of the proceedings subject to specific provi-
sions to the contrary in the Act. The enumeration of certain powers
jn section 92 of tlie Act is not intended to restrict the scope of the
ELECTION PETITION—AMENDMENT II9

powers of t h e Tribunal to those mentioned therein. An amendment to


an election petition for impleading a new party can be allowed even
after the expiry of the period of limitation for presenting the petition
prescribed by rule 119 if no one has acquired any substantive rights by
reason of the failure to implead the party in time, and no prejudice is
likely to be caused to any party including the party sought to be im-
pleaded. YOGBAJSINGH SHANKABSINGH PABIHAR V. SlTABAM HlBA-
CHAND BlBLA AND OTHERS, 1 B.L.R. 389.
The provisions contained in section 90(4) of the E. P. Act,
1951, that the Tribunal may dismiss an election petition which does
not comply with the requirements of sections 81, 82, 83, or 117 is not
mandatory but merely permissive, and an election petition cannot be
dismissed by the Election Tribunal summarily merely because the
verification does not strictly comply with the requirements of Order
VI, rule 15, of the Civil Procedure Code. The Tribunal is bound to give
an opportunity to the petitioner to correct the verification. By virtue
of seetion 92(2) the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code so far as they
can be applied gavern the procedure-relating to the trial of election
petitions, that is the entire proceeding before the Tribunals. Sections
90(2) and 92 do not indicate that the Tribunal is only clothed with such
powers as are mentioned in those sections and there is nothing in the
language of section 82(3) which limits or narrows the general powers of
amendment which the Tribunal has. Section 82(3) only lays down in
what particular respect the list of corrupt or illegal practices can be
modified or altered. Piare Lai v. Bhagaivandas (I.L.E. 55 All. 216)
applied. Be Baker, Nichols v. Baker (44 Ch. D. 262), Julius v. Lord
Bishop of Oxford (5 App. Cas. 214), Beg y. Commissioners (14 Q.B. 474),
Raja of Vizianagaram v. Secretary of State (I.L.R. 1930 Mad. 383)
relied on. Ananda Chandra v. Panchilal Sarma (5 Bom. L.R. 691) and
Viswambhar Pandit v. Vasudev Pandit (I.L.R. 13 Bom. 37) distinguished.
M. MUTHAIAH v. A. S. STJBBARAJ AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 109.

Though the powers under Order VI, rule 17, of the Civil
Procedure Code have not been conferred on them, Election Tribunals
like all civil courts have inherent power to allow amendments ex debito
justitiae and to prevent abuse of process. Amendment of verification
stands on a different footing from amendment of pleadings, and even if
the Tribunal does not possess the powers under the Civil Procedure
Code, it should exercise its inherent powers and permit amendments of
the verification to rectify clerical errors, e.g., in the dates, and inadvert-
ent omissions in the petition also, RAGHURAJ SINGH V, VASANT RAO
AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.R. 295,
120 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

The only provision in the R. P. Act, 1951, which enables a


petitioner to amend an election petition is clause (3) of section 83 which
relates to amendment of particulars of corrupt practices mentioned in
the list. Apart from this, the Tribunal has no power to allow amend-
ment of an election petition. The word " trial " in section 90(2) means
the regular trial and does not include all the preliminary stages of plead-
ings which lead to the trial. Amritsar City case (Hammond 83) and
Lala Chaman Lai v. Lala Shadilal (l Jagat Narain 66) relied on.
Mohammad Allah Baksh v. Jafferbhoy Abdulbhoy and Others (II Jagat
Narain 48) not followed. M. C. LlNGA GOWDA v. N. K. SHIVANANJAPPA,
2 B.L.E. 163.
The Election Tribunal has no power to allow amendment of an
election petition by impleading a new party to the petition. Even
assuming that the Tribunal may under certain circumstances add a
person as respondent, it cannot do so after the period of limitation for
filing the petition has expired. Lala Chaman Lai v. Lala Shadi Lai
(1 Jagat Narain 66) followed. AwDESH PKASAD SlNHA V. PBABHAWATI
GUPTA AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 176.
The Tribunal has power to allow amendment of an election
petition for adding as parties candidates who had withdrawn
their candidatures, who were not originally impleaded as parties.
BAKAEAM STTKABAM KONKANI v. SHANKAB RAO CHINDUJI BEDSE AND
OTHEBS, 3 E.L.R. 409.

If the verification in a petition is defective the petitioner


may be allowed to remove the defect and make a proper verifica-
tion even after the period of limitation. Where the petitioner
filed an election petition in time but omitted to sign the petition and
the list above the verification also, but the Election Commission
permitted him to put his signature after the expiry of the period of
limitation : Held, that the petition was not time-barred. MANDAL
SUMITRA DEVI V. SITBAJ NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 136.
Where the verification of a petition stated generally that the facts
mentioned therein were true to the knowledge and information of the
petitioner and did not specify what he verified of his own knowledge and
what, upon information believed to be true, and did not also state when
and where it was signed and the Election Tribunal which was appointed
by the Election Commission to hear the petition held that though the
verification was defective and section 83 of the R. P. Act, 1951, was
not strictly complied with, as it had a discretion under section 90(4) of
the Act, it was not bound to dismiss the petition summarily on this
ground, and allowed the petitioner to rectify the verification, and the
ELECTION PETITION—-AMENDMENT 121

respondents applied to the High Court for a writ restraining the Elec-
tion Tribunal from proceeding to hear the petition on the ground that
the Tribunal had no jurisdiction : Held, (i) that section 85 did not
make it imperative on the part of the Election Commission to dismiss
an election petition for defective verification ; (ii) the Election Com-
mission has inherent jurisdiction to permit the necessary amendments
in an election petition so as to make it conform to the requirements of
section 83 and the power of dismissal under section 85 is intended to be
exercised only if there is failure to amend after being required so to do ;
(iii) even if it is held that the only jurisdiction which the Election
Commission possessed under the Act for defective verification was to
dismiss the petition under section 85, it could not affect the jurisdiction
of the Election Tribunal to proceed with the trial ; (iv) when once the
matter came before it under section 86, the powers of the Election Tri-
bunal were those which are conferred on it by section 90(4); (v) under
section 90(4) what is conferred on the Election Tribunal is a discre-
tionary power to dismiss the petition for non-compliance with section 83
and that power is " notwithstanding anything contained in section 85,"
and the Tribunal was, therefore, not bound to dismiss the petition for
defective verification ; (vi) apart from the wider question whether an
Election Tribunal has jurisdiction to order amendment of election peti-
tions, as the amendments ordered in this case were of a formal character
and as every Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction to permit clerical and
formal amendments, the Election Tribunal had exercised a sound discre-
tion in permitting the verification to be amended as required by
Order VI, rule 15, C.P.C., and its order was eminently reasonable and
just, and a writ of prohibition cannot be issued. Cases referred to :—
Jones v. Robson ([1901] 1 Q.B. 673), King v. Lincolnshire Appeal Tri-
bunal; Stubbins, ex parte ( [1917] 1 K.B. 1), Ghinnappa Beddi v. Thomasu
Beddi (A.I.E. 1928 Mad. 265), Martin v. Mackonochie ([1878]
3 Q.B.D. 730), Mackonochie v. Penzance ([1881] 6 App. Gas. 424);
Worthington v. Jaffries ([1878] L.E. 10 C.P. 379), Farquharson v.
Morgan ([1894] 1 Q.B. 552), Bex v. North; Ex parte Oahey ([1927]
1 K.B. 491), Be London Scottish Permanent Building Society ([1893]
63 L.J.Q.B. 112), Madangopal v. Bhagwandas (11 All. 304), Pandurang
v. Bamachandra (A.I.E. 1930 Bom. 554), Julius v. Bishop of Oxford
( [1880] 5 App. Gas. 214), Bajitram v. Kateswarnath (18 All. 396), Basdeo
v. John Smidt (22 All. 55), Piarelal v. Bagwandas (A.I.E. 1933 All. 295),
Ma Yon v. Ma Sawe Thin (A.I.E. 1933 Eang. 410), Bishanlal v. Kisan
Vithoba (A.I.E. 1937 Nag. 108), Lahore City case (1 Hammond's E.P. 148)
and Amritsar City case (2 Hammond's E.P, 26). A. S. SUBBA E A J V.
M. MTJTHIAH AND OTHEES, 5 E.L.E. 21.
ELD—17 ,
122 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

The Election Tribunal has full power to allow an amendment


of the election petition for the purpose of rectifying mistakes in the
address of the respondents to the petition. KHUSHWAQT EAI V. EAR AN
SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.R. 93.
Where, through a clerical mistake the respondent's name in an
election petition was wrongly typed as ' Saraswati Parsad " instead of
Sheo Parsad " : Held, that it was perfectly competent to the Tribunal
to permit an amendment of the petition to correct this mistake. The
view that an Election Tribunal has no power at all to allow an amend-
ment of the petition under any circumstances is erroneous. Pritam
Singh v. Gharan Singh and Others (2 E.L.B. 276) dissented from;
Dr. K. N. Gairola v. Gangadhar Maithani and Others (3 B.L.R, 162) and
Sitaram Hirachand Birla r. Yograjsingh Shankarsingh (2 E.L.E. 283)
followed. EATAN SHUKDA V. BEIJENDRA SWARUP AND OTHERS,
5 E.L.E. 116.
Where an election petition contained all the three reliefs
mentioned in section 84 of the E. P. Act, 1951, and, as the relief for a
declaration that the election was wholly void was barred by limitation
under rule 119(b), the petitioner applied for amending the petition by
deleting the prayer for a declaration that the election was wholly void,
and the application was allowed by the Tribunal: Held, that the Elec-
tion Tribunal had power to allow the petition to be amended and did
not act without, or in excess of, jurisdiction in doing so, and the High
Court would not interfere by issuing a writ under article 226 or 227
of the Constitution. While it is not open to the Election Commission
to allow amendments, the Election Tribunal is empowered to do so,
not only by the use of the expression " may " in section 90, sub-sec-
tion (4), but also by the provisions of sub-section (2) of that section and
of section 92 which confer on the Election Tribunal the power possessed
by a civil court in the trial of suits. The "trial" of an election
commences when the Tribunal proceeds to deal with the petition and
not when it begins to hear the evidence. The word " may " in sec-
tion 90, sub-section (4), does not mean ''shall" and the Election
Tribunal is not bound to dismiss a petition for non-compliance with
sections 81, 83, or 117. Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograjsingh
(2 E.L.E. 283) followed. Julius v. Bishop of Oxford (5 App. Cas. 214)
distinguished. MAHADEO V. JWALAPRASAD MlSHRA AND OTHERS,
6 E.L.E. 1.
The Election Tribunal has no power to allow amendment of an
election petition ; allowing amendment of the petition itself is against
the tenor and spirit of election law. Section 90(2) of the B. P, Act, 1951,
ELECTION PETITION—AMENDMENT 123

applies only to the trial of the petition and not to the petition itself^
Adding the correct addresses of the respondents does not, however,
amount to amendment of the petition and a petitioner can be allowed
to supply them even after the expiry of the period of limitation for
filing the petition. Saharanpore District {N.M.B.) Case (l Jagat Narain
66) referred to. NlHAEENDU DUTT MAZUMDAR V. SXJDHIB CHANDBA
BHANDARI AND OTHEBS, 6 E.L.R. 197.
'Section 92 which enumerates some of the powers which the
Tribunal may exercise does not cut down the powers granted to a
Tribunal by section 90(2). Section 92 gives certain minimum powers
to the Tribunal, and is not subject to the rules made under the Act.
Section 90, sub-section (2), on the other hand, gives all the powers,
which may be necessary for the trial of petitions and which are to be
found in the Code of Civil Procedure, to the Tribunal; but this is
subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder.
MADAN MOHAN V. BANKAT L A L AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.R. 119.

Though there is conflict of judicial opinion on the question


whether the Election Tribunal has power to allow amendment of an
election petition, it has jurisdiction to decide whether it could permit
an amendment and whether it is entitled to consider an objection raised
in the written statement, and the High Court cannot interfere with its
decision on this question, under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution,
even if its decision be wrong. KALYAN SINGH v. ELECTION TBLBUNAL,
AJMEB, AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.R. 207.

The Election Tribunal is not bound to dismiss an election


petition which is not duly verified or does not otherwise comply with the
provisions of section 83 of the Act; it has a discretion to dismiss it or
not to dismiss it. The Election Tribunal has also ample power to allow
the verification of an election petition to be amended. JADUMANI
MANGABAJ v. DINABAKDHU SAHU AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.R. 480.

——Election Tribunal has power under section 90(2) to allow


amendment of defective verification. M.R. MEGANATHAN V. K.T. KOSAL-
EAM, 9 E.L.R. 242.
Where, in the verification of an election petition the petitioner
did not specify the paragraphs in which he made the allegations
from his own knowledge and the other paragraphs, the allegations
in which were made on his information, and the Election Tribunal
allowed the petitioner to amend the petition for rectifying this
defect: Held, that the Tribunal had inherent power to grant leave to
amend the verification for rectifying defects in the same. Order VI, rule
124 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

17, of the Civil Procedure Code which empowers the court to grant leave
to amend, would also apply to proceedings before an Election Tribunal,
under section 90(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951, as the enumeration of powers
in section 92 does not exhaust the procedure applicable to the trial of
suits. Sitaram Hirachand Birla v.Yograj Singh Shankar Singh Parihar
(2 E.L.E. 283) followed. K. T. Ko SALE AM v. M. E. MEG-ANATHAN AND
OTHBES, 9 E.L.E. 278;

A quasi-judicial Tribunal has ample power to allow a party to


rectify clerical and formal defects in the pleadings and proceedings before
it. Omission in the verification of an election petition to specify with
reference to the separate paragraphs of the petition what the petitioner
verifies from his own knowledge and what he verifies from information
received by him and believed to be true, and omission to state the date
on which and the place at which it was signed are merely defects of a
formal character and an Election Tribunal has power to allow the peti-
tioner to rectify these defects. A. S. SUBBA E A J V. MUTHIAH [NO. 2],
9 E.L.E. 290.
A reference of an election petition by the Election Commission
to a Tribunal is not void or ultra vires simply because the petition did
not fully comply with the provisions of section 81, 83 or 117 of the
E. P. Act, 1951. Quaere : Whether section 90(2) of the Act confers on
an Election Tribunal the powers given to a court by O. VI, r. 17, of the
Civil Procedure Code to allow amendment of the pleadings generally
A. S. Subba Baj v. Muthiah (5 E.L.E. 21) affirmed. A. S. SUBBA EAJ v.
MUTHIAH [No. 2], 9 E.L.E. 290.

Whether the Election Commission has inherent power to allow


amendment of a defective verification or not, if it does not in fact dismiss
a petition for defective verification but appoints a Tribunal for hearing
the petition, the Tribunal has a discretion under section 90(4) to allow
the verification to be amended and if it does so the Supreme Court will
not interfere with its order in an appeal under article 136 of the Constitu-
tion. DlNABANDHU SAHU V. JADUMONI MANGABAJ AND OTHEES,
9 E.L.E. 485 (S. C).
Under section 90(4) it is not obligatory for the Election Tribu-
nal to dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provi-
sions of section 83. The Tribunal has power to allow the petitioner to
amend the petition by adding further particulars so as to bring it in
conformity with section 83. Sitaram, Hirachand Birla v. Yograj Singh
Shankar Singh Parihar (2 E.L.E. 283) and Mahadeo v. Jwalaprasad
Mishra and Others (6 E.L.E. l) referred to. MXJELIDHAE V. KADAM
SINGH AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 135.
ELECTION PETITION—AMENDMENT 125

The combined effect of sections 90(2) and 92 of the Bepresenta-


tion of the People Act, 1951, is that while an Election Tribunal can
exercise the powers which are vested in a court under the Civil Procedure
Code with respect to the items enumerated in section 92 of the Act with-
out any restriction, the provisions of the Code in other respects may also
be applicable to the trial of an election petition subject to the restrictions
made by the Act or the rules framed under the Act. Sitaram Hirachand
Birla v. Yograj Singh Shankar Singh Parihar (2 E.L.E. 283) relied on.
The scheme of the Act, however, is that sufficient opportunity should be
given to the candidates to know what they may have to allege in their
election petitions if they choose to iile such petitions and that before the
prescribed period it should be ascertained once for all what the petition
is and what charges are to be met by the respondents. This rules out
the possibility of permitting an amendment to be made in the election
petition by raising new charges after the prescribed period and if an
Election Tribunal allows an amendment to be made adding a new charge
or an independent prayer which was not laid before the authority within
the prescribed period, it would be acting beyond its jurisdiction. Where,
after an election petition had been filed and the time prescribed for filing
the petition had expired, the petitioner made an application for amending
the petition by adding a new allegation that the ballot boxes of a parti-
cular polling booth were not included in the counting and the votes
therein were not counted and also that votes in the tampered ballot boxes
of another polling booth were included in counting and the Tribunal
allowed the amendment: Held, that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to
allow such an ednondment and the order allowing amendment could be
quashed by the High Court in an application under article 226 of the
Constitution. Dictum.—The very fact the Legislature has made provision
for the amendment of the election petition in the Act itself goes to show
that the general provision of amendment of pleadings as laid down in
Order VI, rule 17, of the Civil Procedure Code was not contemplated to
be applicable for the amendment of the election petition. The contents of
an election petition could, be amended only under the provisions of sec-
tion 83(3) of the Act. Order VI, rule 17, of the Civil Procedure Code is
not applicable for making amendments thereof. SHEO MAHADEO PBASAD
v. DEVA SHAEAN SINHA AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 144.
"Where an application for amendment of an election petition is
made under section 83(3) of the E.P. Act, the Election Tribunal has the
right to decide whether it comes within section 83(3) and if the Tribunal
holds that the petition should be allowed on the ground that it does not
change the nature of the original petition but merely gives further parti-
culars, the order, even if wrong, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction,
126 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

nor can it be said that it is such a patent error, or the decision is so


palpably erroneous, as to justify interference under article 226 of the
Constitution. HABISH CHANDRA BAJTAI AND ANOTHER V. TRILOK
SINGH AND OTHERS, 10 B.L.R. 198.

5. Burden of proof—In election petitions—Under the English law


burden of proving that the result of the election has been materially
affected by an irregularity or contravention of the rules is on the party
who seeks to sustain the election, whereas under the Indian law as
enacted in section 100(2)(c) of the E.P. Act, 1951, it is upon the person
who impugns the election. K. S. SUBRAMANIA GOUNDAR V. ELECTION
TRIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND O T H E R S , 8 E.L.R. 66.
Though it is necessary to prove that the result of the election
has been materially affected, not only that it might have been materially
affected, a finding of fact that the result has been materially affected
can be arrived at as an inference from circumstances and probabilities,
where direct evidence is not available. The method of deciding the
question whether an election has been materially affected by delay in
commencing polling, by working out an average on the basis of the
number of voters in a particular station and the number of votes
recorded during the hours when the polling went on, and arriving at the
proportionate number of votes that would have been polled for the
balance of the scheduled hours or the number of votes that would have
been polled in the particular station but for the irregularity, is generally
a faulty method ; but it cannot be ruled out altogether, and in some
cases it may be the only method available for arriving at a finding.
K. S. SUBRAMANIA GOUNDAR V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND
OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 66.
Though the procedure to be followed in the trial of election
petitions is that laid down in the Civil Procedure Code, the standard
of proof required to prove corrupt practices is the same as in criminal
cases. SRI BAM V. MOHAMMAD TAQI H A D I AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 139.
The burden of proving that the result of the election has been
materially affected by a contravention of the law or the rules is, under
the Indian law, on the person who impugns the election, though it is
otherwise under the English law. S R I E A M V. MOHAMMAD TAQI H A D I
AND O T H E R S , 8 E.L.E. 139.
-Under the English law relating to Parliamentary elections if
non-compliance with any of the provisions of the rules is proved, the
onus lies on the respondent to show that it did not affect the result of
the election, whereas under section 100(2)(c) of the Indian Act, even
though the petitioner succeeds in proving non-compliance with rules, the
ELECTION PETITION—BURDEN OF PROOF 127

onus still remains on him to prove that it has materially affected the
result of the election, that is to say, it has caused the returned candidate
to obtain a majority of votes. It is not enough to show that the result
of the election might have been affected. Islington West Division Case
(5 O'M. & H. 120), Woodward v. Sarsons (L. E. 10 C. P. 748), Durham
{County) Northern Division Case (2 O'M. & H. 152), and Warrington
Case (1 O'M. & H. 42) referred to. ABDUL RAUF V. GoviND BALLA.BH
P A N T AND OTHBES, 8 E.L.R. 240.

Improper acceptance, or rejection of nomination—Burden of


proving that "'result of election has been materially affected"—English and
Indian law—-When result "materially affected"—Duty of producing posi.
tive evidence—Decision not to be based on mere possibility and conjectures
—Before an election can be declared wholly void under section
100 (1) (c) of the E. P. Act, 1951, the Election Tribunal must find
that the result of the election has been materially affected" by the
improper acceptance or rejection of a nomination. The words the result
of the election has been materially affected" in this clause indicate that
the result should not be judged by the mere increase or decrease in the
total number of votes secured by the returned candidate but by proof of
the fact that the votes would have been distributed in such a manner
between the contesting candidates as would have brought about the
defeat of the returned candidate. The language of section 100 (l) (e) of
the E. P. Act clearly places the burden of proving that the result of the
election has been materially affected on the petitioner who impugns the
validity of the election, though under the English Act (Ballot Act, 1872,
s. 13), the burden is upon the respondent to show the negative, i.e., that
the result of the election has not been affected. Bai Bahadur Surendra
Narayan Sinha v. Amulyadhone Boy aud Others (Sen and Poddar 188)
followed. G. M. Karale v. B. K. Dalvi and Others (2 Jagat Narain 31), Basu
Sinha v. Bajandhari Sinha (3 Jagat Narain 80), Jagadish v. Budra
Deolal (8 E.L.R. 311) referred to.
In the case of the improper acceptance of a nomination: (a) if
the nomination accepted was that of the returned candidate, the
result of the election must be materially affected ; (b) if the difference
between the number of votes is more than the wasted votes the
result cannot be affected at all; (c) if the number of wasted votes is
greater than the margin of votes between the returned candidate and the
candidate securing the next highest number of votes it cannot be presumed
that the wasted votes might have gone to the latter and that the
result of the election has been materially affected. This is a matter
which has to be proved and, though it must be recognized that the peti-
128 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

tioner in such a case is confronted with a difficult situation, he cannot be


relieved of the duty imposed upon him by.' section 100(l)(c) and if the
petitioner fails to adduce satisfactory evidence to enable the court to find
in his favour on this point, the inevitable result would be that the
Tribunal would not interfere in his favour and would allow the election to
stand. Lakhan Lai Mishra v. Tribeni Kumar (3 E.L.E. 423) and
Mandal Sumitra Devi v. Surajnarain Singh (4 E.L.R. 136) dissented
from.
It is impossible to accept the ipse dixit of witnesses coming from
one side or the other to say that all or some of the votes would have
gone to ona or the other on some supposed or imaginary ground. The
question is one of fact and has to be proved by positive evidence. If the
petitioner is unable to adduce evidence the only inescapable conclusion
to which the Tribunal can come is that the burden is not discharged and
that the election must stand. The language of section 100(l)(c) is too
clear for any speculation about possibilities. VASHIST NARAIN SHABMA
v. DEV CHAND AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 30 (S. C).
'An infringement of the rules alone is not sufficient to vitiate an
election. The determining factor is whether the result of the election
has been materially affected and every case is to be judged, regard being
had to its special circumstances. The burden of proof rests upon the
party who maintains the validity of the election notwithstanding the
infraction of tho rules, to establish that the result of the election has not
been materially affected. Shyam Chand Basack v. Chairman of the
Dacca Municipality (24 C.W.N. 189) referred to. SUDHANSU SEKHAR
GHOSH V. SATYENDRA NATH BASU AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 73.

Non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or rules made


thereunder would not justify a declaration that the election of the
successful candidate was void unless it is also proved that such non-
compliance had materially affected the result of the election. KESHAU
PEASAD v. B B I J E A J SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 77.
English and Indian law —There is a material difference between
the English law on the subject and the law which prevails in this country
with regard to elections to Legislatures. Under the Indian law if a
petitioner has to bring his case within.-the provisions of section 100(2)(e),
mere proof of non-compliance with even the mandatory provisions of the
Constitution or of the R. P. Act is not enough, even though such non-
compaliance or gross irregularity may possibly have affected the result of
the election ; he must further prove that the result of the election has been
materially affected by such non-compliance or irregularity. Under the
English law an Election Tribunal would be justified in setting aside the
ELECTION PETITION—BURDEN OF PROOF 129

election if it were satisfied that there was a likelihood that the result of the
election may have been affected by the non-compliance or the irregularity.
MOINUDDIN B. HARRIS V. B. P. DIVGI, 3 E.L.R. 248.

Under the law in India as enacted in section 100 of the R. P. Act,


1951, mere proof of non-compliance is not sufficient to avoid an election ;
it must further be shown that the result of the election was materially
affected thereby and the burden of proving this is on the petitioner who
challenges the election, though it is otherwise under the English law.
Shy am Chand Basak v. Chairman of Dacca Municipality (24 0. W. N.)
•189), Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. Sudhir Chandra Bhandari and
Others (6 B.L.R. 197), P. K. Atre v. T. B. Naravne and Others (l E.L.R.
355) and Moinuddin B. Harris v. Dr. Divgi and Others (3 B.L.R. 248)
followed. RIKIIAB DAS v. RIDICHAND PALLIWAL AND OTHERS,
9 E.L.R. 115.

6. Collusion—Collusion—Other respondents' rights—-Where the


petitioner though not openly withdrawing the petition is trying
collusively to keep back the available evidence for sustaining the grounds
taken in the petition, the Tribunal has, in order to ensure a fair and
effectual trial of the petition, power to permit any respondent to the
petition to support the grounds by leading evidence to prove them.
LAHRI SINGH V. ATTAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 403.

7. Consolidation of petitions—It is open to a person who has


perferred an election petition to prefer a second petition containing new
allegations within the time prescribed by law and in such a case the
Election Commission can consolidate the two petitions and refer them
both to an Election Tribunal and the two petitions must be treated as one
in the eye of the law. In any event it is open to the petitioner to apply
for leave to amend the earlier petition by adding the new allegations
contained in the second petition and then withdraw the later petition.
M. R. MBGANATHAN v. K. T. KOSALRAM AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 242.

8. Contents— Material facts—An election petition and the list of


particulars and the schedule attached to the petition, m,ust be read
together, and if the list contains the material facts, the petition cannot
be summarily dismissed on the ground that it does not contain a state-
ment of the material facts. DEVASHARAN SlNHA V. SHBO MAHADEV
PRASAD AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 461.

Concise statement of facts—The Tribunal is not bound to dismiss


an election petition under section 90(4) of the R.P. Act, merely because
it does not contain a concise statement of the material facts as required
ELD—18
130 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

by section 83(1). "May" in section 90(4) does not mean "shall" and is
not mandatory. MAHESH DATTA V. MUKLIDHAE AND O T H E E S ,
7 B.L.E. 154. See also cases cited under CORRUPT PRACTICE, pp. 46-52.
9. Costs—Quaere: Whether the Tribunal has power to award special
costs to a Eeturning Officer who has unnecessarily been made a party.
SHANKAR TEIPATHI v. E E T U R N I N G OFFICER, MIRZAPUR AND OTHERS,
2 B.L.E. 315.
Costs—Duty of Tribunal to determine amount of costs and
specify by whom it is payable when it makes an order tinder s. 98
—Drawing up statement of costs subsequently—Legality—Order for pay-'
inent of costs without fixing the amount or person by whom it is payable—
Whether executable—Order as to costs—Execution by civil court—Orders,
whether appealable—Though the E. P. Act, 1951, does not provide for an
appeal against an order passed in execution proceedings of an order as to
costs, the fact that an order of an Election Tribunal as to costs is to be
executed in the same manner and by the same procedure as if it were a
decree for the pa3'ment of money made by the Principal Civil Court of
Original Jurisdiction or the Small Causes Court imports that the ordinary
incidents of the procedure of that court are to attach. The general right
of appeal from the decisions of the civil court in execution procedings of
a money decree would, therefore, apply to orders made by that court in
the course of the execution of an order of the Election Tribunal as to
costs. When an Election Tribunal makes an order under section 98 of the
E.P. Act, 1951, disposing of an election petition it must also fix the total
amount of costs payable and specify the persons by and to whom costs shall
I
be paid. As the Tribunal becomes functus officio as soon as the order under
section 98 is notified in the Gazette by the Election Commission it has
no jurisdiction to draw up a statement of costs subsequently ; nor can the
executing court draw up a statement of costs. Where a Tribunal merely
stated in its order that the petitioner shall get 50 per cent, of the costs
incurred and fixed the pleader's fee at Es. 250, but did not specify the
amount of costs or by which of the respondents it should be paid: Held, (i)
that the order was not executable even in respect of the amount of
Es. 250 : (ii) that a statement of costs drawn up after the order under sec-
tion 98 was notified by the Election Commission could not be treated as
a valid order of the Tribunal as it was not in existence on that date and
the statement had not been adopted and notified by the Election Commis-
sion. NATHULAL MANTRI AND ANOTHER V. VINDRAWAN PRASAD
TIWAEI AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 375.
10. Court fees—An election petition presented under Part VI of the
R. P. Act, 1951, is not a petition presented to an executive authority
ELECTION PETITION—COURT-FEES I3I

within the meaning of article l(c) of the Second Schedule to Che Court
Fees Act and is not subject to any court-fee under that Act. SURAJ
BHAN v. H E M CHAND JAIN AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.R. 1.

11. Deposit of security—Deposit in Bank of Baroda for Government


—Treasury—Whether sufficient—Where a constituency was once part of
the Baroda State and in accordance with the usual practice followed
there with respect to deposits ir favour of Government the sum of
Rs. 1,000 which had to be deposited as security for costs under section
117 of the E. P. Act, 1951, was deposited by the petitioner in the Bank
of Baroda to the account of the Government Treasury and the receipt of
the Bank of Baroda was enclosed with the election petition : Held, that
there was substantial compliance with the provisions of section 117 and
the Tribunal was not bound to dismiss the petition on the ground that a
Government Treasury receipt had not been produced as required by
section 117. PURSHOTTAMDAS RANCHHODDAS PATEL V. SHANTILAL
GlEDHAELAL PABIKH AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 223.
-Deposit of security —Omission to file proper Treasury receipt
— Whether fatal—Power of Election Commission to accept proper
receipt after limitation—'Where the receipt of deposit of security
filed with an election petition was not in favour of the Secretary
to the Election Commission as required by section 117 of the E. P. Act,
1951, and the Election Commission pointed out this defect to the peti-
tioner and asked for a proper receipt without prejudice to the law
governing the case, and a proper receipt was filed by the petitioner, but
only after the period of limitation for filing the petition had expired:
Held, that the provision contained in section 117 of the E. P. Act, 1951,
relating to deposit of security is mandatory and as this provision was not
complied with, the Election Commission was bound to dismiss the petition
utider section 85. It had no power to condone the default and receive a
proper Treasury receipt after the period of limitation had expired.
SHBON.VRAYAN VAIDTA v. SABDARMAL LALWANI, 4 E.L.R. 401.

— Where a Tribunal orders that security must be deposited


"within" a certain period of time from the date of the order, the day on
which the order was made must be excluded in computing that period on
the principle embodied in section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ehbal S Go. (A.I.R. 1945 Bom. 316),
Secretary of State v. Malik Amir Mohammad Khan (A.I.E. 1935 Lah.
653), Puran Chand v. Mohd. Din and Others (A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 291), and
Bamchandra Govind Unavne v. Laxman Sevleram Bonghe (A.I.R. 1938
Bom. 447) referred to. EOOP CHANDRA SOGANI AND ANOTHER V.
BAWAT MAN SINGH AND OTHERS (NO. 3), 9 E.L.R. 21.
132 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

See also JOINT PETITIONS infra.


12. Joint petitions—A candidate whose nomination was rejected and
some of the electors of the constituency may join as petitioners and file a
single election petition for declaring the election of the returned candi-
date void. MATHBA DAS AND OTHEBS V. DAE A SINGH AND OTHERS,
4 E.L.E. 441.
Joint petition—Security—Beliefs—A joint election petition'
by more than one petitioner is maintainable. Sections 110 and 112
of the R. P. Act, 1951,f clearly envisage such joint petitions. A security
of Es. 1,000 is sufficient for a joint petition. MARUTBAO BHAURAO AND
OTHERS V. GULABRAO DADASAHEB AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.E. 303.

Joint petition—Security—An election petition can be presented


by two or more electors jointly. There is also no objection to
a candidate and some electors making a joint petition. In the case
of a joint petition, a single security of Rs. 1,000 is sufficient even if there
are two or more petitioners. DEO CHAND AND OTHERS V. VASHIST
NARAIN AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 138.

13. Limitation— Computation of time—Day on which notice under rule


113 was published to be excluded—In computing the period of limitation
for filing an election petition under rule 119 the day on which the notice
under rule 113 was published in the official gazette must be excluded.
T. C. BASAPPA v. T. NAGAPPA AND ANOTHER, 10 E.L.R. 14.
When last day is a gazetted holiday —Where the last day for
the presentation of an election petition falls on a gazetted holiday it is to
be excluded from the computation of the period of limitation under sec-
tion 4 of the Limitation Act, and a petition filed on the next working day
will be within time. GANDA SINGH V. SAMPURAN SINGH AND OTHERS,
3 E.L.R. 17.
——Application of rule 119 {a) and (b)—Case where more than one
candidate has been returned—Petition not praying for setting aside whole
election—Sub-rule (a) of rule 119 does not apply to cases where there is
more than one returned candidate as defined in section 79 (f) of the E. P .
Act, 1951. Such a case is governed by sub-rule (b) of rule 119 even
though the petitioner does not pray for the setting aside of the election
as a whole but only for a declaration that the election of the returned
candidates is void and that the petitioner has been duly elected. JAWAHAR
SHANKEB PACHOLI v. HIRDAXA NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E.
397.
Application of rule 119 (a) and (b)—The final authority for decid-
ing whether an election petition is barred by limitation is the Election
ELECTION PETITION—LIMITATION 133

Tribunal. The period of limitation laid down in clause (a) of rule 1 19


applies to a case where there is only one returned candidate, and clause
(b) applies where there are' more returned candidates than one and the
election petition calls in question the whole election. An election
petition which calls in question the election of one of the returned
candidates on the ground that he was below 25 years of age
attracts the application of sec. 100(l)(c) and is governed by clause (b) of
rule 119. SURYAJI RAMA EAO V. BHIKAJI TBIMBAK PAWAE, 2 E.L.R. 205,
Unders ection 84 it is open to a petitioner to pray for any one
of the three reliefs mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that section in
the alternative, in a single petition. Where a petitioner claims one of
the three reliefs referred to in section 84 in the alternative, limitation for
either of the two reliefs, namely (a) that election of the returned candi-
date is void and (b) that the election of the returned candidate is void
and the petitioner has been duly elected, will be governed ' by the longer
period of limitation under rule 119(a) while the limitation for the third
relief (that the election is wholly void) will be governed by the shorter
period in rule 119(b). The entire petition will not be barred merely
because the relief governed by rule 119 (b) is also claimed in the
alternative. The Tribunal has ample power in such a case to allow the
petitioner to withdraw the relief for a declaration that the whole election
is void. When two candidates have been returned, one for the general
seat and one for the reserved seat, it is not a case where there are more
returned candidates than one at an election" within the meaning of
rule 119 (b), and a petition for declaring the election of one of the candi-
dates void is governed by rule 119 (a). JAWALA PEASAD MlSBA V.
MAHADEO AND OTHBES, 3 E.L.R. 473.

Where two candidates have been returned in an election for a


double member constituency, one for the general and the other for the
reserved seat, and an election petition is filed for declaring (i) that the
election of both the returned candidates is void and (ii) that the.election
is wholly void, the petition is one in which there are more returned can-
didates than one and the election petition calls in question the election as
a whole" within the meaning of rule 119(b) and both the reliefs claimed
in the petition are governed by the period of limitation prescribed in rule
119(b). The view that in a case like this, relief No. (i) is governed by
rule 119(a) and relief No. (ii) by rule 119(b) is not correct. RATTAN
SINGH V. DEVINDEB SINGH AND OTHBBS, 7 E.L.R. 234.
Held, per HANS R A J KHANNA and PABMA NAND SACHDEVA
(HABBANS SINGH, dissenting):—-The grounds mentioned in sub-section (l)
of section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, are grounds
134
"ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

sub t ° r rin to?


sub-secion
6C
(2) off sectTIOn 1
b6 W h l l y V id and thS gl UDds
100 are °grounds° ' for declaring
'° the — tio
- dof inthei n
election
re urned candidate void. Consequently, if a petitioner claims only a decla!
lation that the election 18 wholly void, he cannot ask for an enquiry into
grounds which are not covered by sub-section (l) but by sub-section (2)
two'
two 1 fnd of7'reliefs
kinds I t °f l i mgrounds
"r *f 1S" "different, i t a t i n Pr6SCribed by rule 119
° alleged in an election *»tl«e
petition
which are covered by sub-section (2) alone and do not come withL sub-
section (1) cannot be enquired into if the petition has not been filed
within the time prescribed by rule 119(a) for claiming a declaration that
the election of the returned candidate is void. Per HAEBANS SINGH -
The grounds mentioned in sub-sections (l) and (2) of section 100 are not
mutually exclusive, and if in a petition the election is attacked as a whole

grounds mentioned in sub-section (l) are not proved b u U h o ^ menfo ed


0 ^ (TELEIS 6 TYf BaUanSi^v. Deviser Stnghand
Others (7 E.L.E. 234) referred to. MAHABAJ SINGH V. BATAN ANMOI 0L
SINGH AND OTHBES, 7 E.L.E. 320.
An 6lect
i ^ Petition in which both the election of the candidate
for the reserved seat and the election of the candidate for the general sea
are sought to be declared void on the ground that the election as a whote
was void as the electoral rolls on the basis of which the election was held
were not prepared m accordance with law and the result of the election
as a whole was materially affected thereby, is governed for purposes of
limitation by sub-rule (b) of rule 119 and not by sub-rule (a) of the J d
rue. GAYAPKASHAD „. KBISHNACHANDBA SHABMA AND OTHEBS 10
ili.ij.xl. o. '

— T h e period of 14 days prescribed in rule 119 applies to a petition


in which the relief mentioned in section 84(a) or 84(b) is claimed, while
he penod of 60 days applies when the relief under section 84(c) is claimed-
When there is only one returned candidate section 84(c) cannot apply a n d
there can therefore be no overlapping of section 84(a) and (c) in such a
ease. Dr. BEUENDKA SWAEUP „. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, LUCKNOW
AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 191. -^^OKJSO^ ,

— S u b - r u l e (a) of rule 119 covers only those cases where the elec-
lon o a smgle returned candidate is called in question, whatever may be
the rehefs sought by the petitioner. If the petition calls in question the
election of more returned candidates than one, sub-rule (a) cannot apply
ELECTION PETITION—LIMITATION I35

The words "calls in question the election as a whole " in sub-rule (b)
means calls in question the election of each of the returned candidates
whether the reliefs asked for are those falling within section 84(a) or 84(c).
Where two candidates, A and B, were returned and an election petition
was filed praying for declaration, first, that the election of both the
returned candidates A and B was void and secondly, that the election was
wholly void : Held, that the petition was not governed by sub-rule (a) so
far as the first relief was concerned, but was in its entirety governed by
sub-rule (b). A. SRINIVASAN v. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTILEBS, V. K.
JOHN V.G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHEES, 10 B.L.E. 245. [Eeversed in
10 B.L.E. 345.]
-Clause (a) of rule 119 of the E. P. (Conduct of Elections
and Election Petitions) Eules, 1951, would apply to every election
petition in so far as it is directed against a returned candidate.
If there is only one returned candidate clause (a) would apply, whether
the relief prayed for is that his election should be set aside or the election
should as a whole be set aside, because the result comes to the same
thing though the grounds may be different. When there are more returned
candidates than one, an election petition may pray for a declaration that
the election of any one of them is void. Even then, clause (a) would
apply. I t would equally apply when the election of more than one can-
didate is impugned individually. In such a case, though an election
petition may comprise reliefs directed against several candidates, for the
purpose of limitation such a petition should be deemed to comprise several
petitions, each directed against one of the candidates returned, and time
must be calculated under clause (a) with reference to each of them.
Clause (b) of rule 119 would apply only to a case where there are more
returned candidates than one and the election petition prays that the
election be declared to be wholly void. The words ''calls in question the
election as a whole" in clause (b) must be construed with reference to
section 84 (c) and section 100(1), that is to say, with reference to the
prayer for a declaration that the election is wholly void. A. Srinivasan
v. G. Vasantha Pai and Others (10 E.L.E. 245) reversed on this point.
Dr. V. K. JOHN V. Q. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHERS and A. SBJNIVASAN
v. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 345.

Where an election petition prayed, first, that the election be


declared wholly void and secondly, that the election of respondents A and
B (the two returned candidates) be declared void and the petition was
not filed within the period prescribed in rule 119(b) but within that pres-
cribed in rule 119(a) and the Election Tribunal held that the petition in
its entirety was governed by clause (a) and so was within limitation:
I36 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Held, that the petition so far as it related to the second prayer, namely,
for a declaration that the election of the two returned candidates was
void was governed by clause (b) and was time-barred and only the first
prayer for declaring the election wholly void was within time. Held also,
that, as the Election Tribunal had no jurisdiction to proceed with the
trial of the petition so far as the second relief was concerned, the High
Court had power under article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of
prohibition prohibiting the Tribunal from proceeding with the trial of the
petition so far as this relief was concerned. Hari Vishnu Kamath v.
Ahmad Ishaque and Others (10B.L.E. 218), T. G. Basappa v. T. Nagappa
and Another (10 E.L.E. 14), Krishn%sw%mi Ayyar v. Mohanlal Binjnni
([1948] 2 M.L.J. 559) and B. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal
Tribunal ([1952] 1 A.B.R. 122) referred to. Da. V. K. JOHN v. G. VASAN-
THA PAI AND OTHERS and A. SRINIVASAN U. G. VASANTHA P A I AND
OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 345.

The fact that the Election Commission has referred an election


petition to an Election Tribunal does not necessarily lead to an inference
that it has condoned the delay in the filing of the petition. Dinabandhu
Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj (9 E.L.E. 485) distinguished. A. SBINIVASAN
v. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHBES and V. K. JOHN V. G. VASANTHA P A I
AN-DOTHEBS, 10 E.L.E. 245.
-Condonation of delay by Election Commission—Power of Elec-
tion Tribunal—The point of view from which the Election Commission
has to consider the condonation of delay in th9 presentation of an election
petition and the point of view which an Election Tribunal has to consider
the question whether it should dismiss an election petition for delay in
prasentation in spite of the condonation of such delay by Election Com-
mission, are entirely different. The Election Tribunal can only inquire
whether the Election Commission had not properly exercised its
discretion. It cannot go into the question whether there was sufficient
cause for condoning the delay. KRISHNAJI BHIMAEAO ANTROLIKAR V.
SHANKAE SHANTABAM MOEB AND OTHEBS, 5 E.L.E. 34.

-Condonation of delay by Election Commission suo motu— Legality


— Validity of reference—Tribunal's power to reconsider the question—
The Election Commission has jurisdiction to excuse delay in the presenta-
tion of an election petition, and even if it excused delay suo motu with-
out any application in this behalf by the petitioner and without hearing
the respondents, it cannot be said to have acted in excess of its jurisdic-
tion or without jurisdiction and a reference of the election petition to a
tribunal for hearing the petition cannot be held to be incompetent and
cannot, therefore, be set aside by the High Court by a writ of certiorari.
ELECTION PETITION—LIMITATION 137

Under the E. P. Act, 1951, the respondents who have not been heard
would in such a case have a right to question the order of the Election
Commission before the Election Tribunal and the tribunal has power
under section 90(4) of the Act to hear the objections of the respondents
and to vacate the order of the Election Commission and dismiss the peti-
tion if it is of opinion that there was no sufficient cause for excusing tha
delay and that the order of the Election Commission was wrong.
S. KHADBE S H E R I F F V. ELECTION TEIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND OTHERS,
7 E.L.R. 471. [This view has been overruled by the Supreme Court.
See infra].
Delay in filing petition—Power of Election Commission to
condone delay—Application for condonation and notice to respondent,
whether necessary—Power to condone delay suo motu—Finality of order
of Election Commission.—The proviso to section 85 of the E. P. Act,!
1951, does not contemplate a formal application for condonation of delay,
or the Election Commission giving to the respondent notice of the appli-
cation or the holding of an enquiry as to the sufficiency of the grounds in
his presence before passing an order condoning delay in the presentation
of an election petition. It is open to the Election Commission to condone
the delay suo motu, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the
delay and the policy of the Legislature is to make the decision of the
Election Commission on the question final and not open to question at any
later stage of the proceedings. In this respect, the position under the
proviso to section 85 is materially different from that under section 5 of
the Limitation Act, under which an order excusing delay is not final, and
is liable to be questioned by the respondent at a later stage. The words
"notwithstanding anything contained in section 85" in section 90(4) of
the Act does not empower an Election Tribunal to review any order
passed by the Election Commission under section 85. Section 90(4) will
be attracted only when the Election Commission passes on the election
petition to the Tribunal without passing any order under section 85.
DlNABANDHU SAHU V. JADUMONI MANGABAJ AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R.
485 (S.C.).
Condonation of delay—Election Commission s power—The words
"sufficient cause" in the proviso to section 85 should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or
inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. Krishna v.
Chathappan (I.L.R. 13 Mad. 269) relied on. The jurisdiction of the
Election Commission to pass an order under section 86 of the Act con-
stituting a Tribunal for hearing an election petition arises if the petition
is not dismissed under section 85 as a matter of fact. It does not depend on
ELD—19
I38 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the legal position whether the petition was liable to be dismissed under s. 85.
Section 90(4) itself contemplates that a petition not complying with
section 81, 83 or 117 may be referred to the Tribunal. Even assuming
that the Election Commission has no jurisdiction to condone delay
suo motu, if it refers the petition to the Tribunal for disposal, the Tribunal
has jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders under section 90(4). DiNA-
BANDHU SAHU V. JADUMONI MANGARAJ AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 485
(S.C.).
-Election petition—Limitation—Condonation of delay by Elec-
tion Commission—Jurisdiction of Tribunal to reconsider—Where the
Election Commission has condoned the delay in filing an election petition
in the exercise of its discretion under section 85 of the E. P. Act, 1951,
it is not open to the Election Tribunal to which the petition is referred
for trial by the Election Commission, to reconsider the matter and
dismiss the election petition as time-barred on the ground that there was
not sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Dinabandhu Sahu v.
Jadumoni Mangaraj and Others (9 E.L.E. 485) followed. BHIKAJI
KESHAO JOSHI AND ANOTHER V. BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND
OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 357 (S.C.).

The Election Commission may condone delay in the presenta-


tion of an election petition even without an express personal
representation by the petitioner for condonation of delay. JADUMANI
MANGARAJ V. DINABANDHU SAHTJ AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 480.

——Petition sent by post before, but received after, expiry of period of


limitation—Whether time-barred—Condonation of delay by Election Com-
mission suo motu—Legality—Interference by Tribunal—When an election
petition is sent by registered post it can be deemed to be presented to the
Election Commission within the meaning of section 81(2) of theE. P. Act,
1951, only when it is delivered to the Secretary of the Commission or the
officer appointed by the Election Commission in this behalf. T. Prakasam
v. U. Krishna Bao and Others (No. 2) (2 E.L.E. 54) dissented from. The
Election Tribunal has power to dismiss an election petition under section
90(4) of the Act on the ground that it is barred by limitation, even though
the delay in presenting the petition has been condoned by the Election
Commission ; but it would be proper to do so only in very expectional
cases, where the Election Commission has act9d in a grossly illegal
manner or ultra vires. The Tribunal cannot sit as a caurt of appeal or
revision over the Election Commission. Th.9 Election Commission has
power to condone delay in presenting an election petition suo motu with-
out hearing tb.9 respondents to the petition. Khiluinal v. Arjan Das and
Others (l E.L.E. 497) and Krishnaswami Panikonder v, Ramaswami
ELECTION PETITION—LIMITATION 139

Ghettiar (I.L.R. 41 Mad. 412 P.O.) explained. [The question whether the
Election Tribunal has power to condone delay independently of the Com-
mission, was left opan.] MUNUSWAMI GOUNDEE v. KHADER S H E R I F F
AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 74. [Partly overruled by 10 E.L.E. 357 above].
The Post Office is not an agent of the Election Commission for
receiving election petitions and an election petition sent by post can be
deemed to have been presented to the Election Commission only when it
is actually delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or any person
authorised by the Commission in this behalf. Section 85 of theR. P. Act,
1951, empowers the Election Commission to condone delay in the
pi'essntation of the petition if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause,
but it is doubtful whether the Election Tribunal has such power. Erom
the mere fact that the Election Commission did not dismiss a petition on
the ground that it was time-barred it cannot be inferred that the Com-
mission in the exercise of its discretion condoned the delay in the
presentation of the petition. Delay in the presentation of an election
petition cannot be condoned if it is due to want of care and attention.
KHILUMAL AND ANOTHER, V. AEJUNDAS AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 497.
Petition sent by registered post—Date of presentation—Date of
delivery to post office or date of receipt by Commission—Whan a petition
is sent by registered post to the Secretary to the Election Commission it
is presented to tha Election Commission within the meaning of section
81(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951, on the date on which it is delivered to the
post office and not when it is delivered by the post office to the Secretary.
T. PEAKASAM v. IT. KRISHNA EAO AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 2 E.L.E. 54.
Under section 81(2) the date of presentation of an election peti-
tion, when it is sent by registered post, is the date on which it is so sent
and not the date on which it is delivered. The reference to "delivery"
in clause (b) is only to show that it must also be delivered in fact.
JADUMANI MANGRAJV. DINABANDHU SAHU ANT) OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 480.

14. List of particulars.—Section 83 lays down in unequivocal terms


that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of the
material facts on which the petitioner relies, and shall also be accom-
panied by a list setting forth full particulars of any corrupt or illegal
practice which the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as
possible as to the names of the parties alleged to have committed
such corrupt or illegal practice and the date and place of commission of
each such practice. It is not open to the petitioner making an election
petition, in the face of this express provision of section S3 of the Act, to
plead that the list was not given in the original petition with full parti-
culars because it would have made the petition cumbrous, or because it
140 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

would only be a matter of evidence to be gone into without express


pleading. If full particulars are not given, those paragraphs in the
petition or in the list which lack in particulars and which deal with
corrupt and illegal practices should be struck off. A subsequent petition
under section 83(3) for amending the election petition or the list for
giving full particulars eanuot be accepted. BOLA NATH V. KRISHNA
CHANDEA GUPTA AND OTHEES, 3 B.L.E. 288.

The provision contained in section 82(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951,


that an election petition shall be accompanied by a list signed and
verified setting for the full particulars of any corrupt practice which peti-
tioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible as to the names
of the parties alleged to have contributed to such corrupt or illegal
practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice,
is mandatory. Consequently, where an election petition is not accom-
panied by such a list it is liable to be dismissed, even though parti-
culars of the corrupt or illegal practices are given in the petition or in
the exhibits attached to the petition. On the facts the Tribunal held
that even the averments in the petition amplified by the exhibits did
not satisfy the requirements of section 83(2). Section 83(2) of the Act
Act does not contemplate the filing of a fresh or supplementary list
after the filing of the petition, nor an amendment of list itself,
though amendments of the particulars included in the list can be
allowed under section 83(3). Purshottamdas Banchhoddas Patel v.
Shantilal Girdharilal Parikh (l E.L.R. 223) followed. The Attock case
(l Hammond) distinguished. "When evidence with regard to alleged
corrupt or illegal practices is to be led, the petitioner can be allowed to
lead evidence only with regard to the corrupt or illegal practices in
respect of which he has given sufficient particulars as required by sec-
tion 83(2) and not with regard to others. KANAYALAL DUBLLABHRAM
BHANSALI V. POPATLAL MULSHANKEE JOSHI AND OTHBES, 1 B.L.E. 244.
See also under COEEUPT PEACTICB—PAETICULAES, pp. 45-52
supra.
15. New grounds.—A. Grounds not raised in the petition—Under
section 80 of the Act an election can only be called in question by an
election petition and in no other way. It is'therefore not open to a
respondent to challenge the validity of the election on grounds which
are not raised by the petitioner. K. SUBBAMANYAM v. ABDUL HAMEED
KHAN 1 E.L.E. 432 ; SOGHET SINGH V. THAKAE SINGH AND OTHEES
(No. 2), 3 B.L.E. 102 and NAEANJAN SINGH V. B E I S H BHAN AND
OTHBES, 3 E.L.E. 179.
ELECTION PETITION—NEW GROUNDS

-In an election petition it is not open to the' respondent to


challenge the validity of the election on grounds which are not raised
in the petition. Naranjan Singh v. Brisk Shan Singh and Others (3 B.L.R.
179), Sochet Singh v. Thakar Singh and Others (3 B.L.E. 102) and
K. Subrahmanyam v. Abdul Hameed Khan and Others (l B.L.R. 432)
followed. KHUSHWAQT RAI V. KARAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.R. 93.
Held, by the majority (P. LOBO dissenting):—It is not open to a
respondent to an election petition to support the petition on the ground
of illegalities and irregularities on the part of the returned candidate
which have not been alleged in the petition itself. P. LOBO.—There is
no bar to a respondent who is not a returned candidate to bring to the
notice of the Tribunal illegalities and irregularities not allegedly the
petitioner and incidentally support the election petition by proving
them. It would be in the interests of justice to do so. GANGA PBASAD
SHASTEI v. PANNA LAL J A I N AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 392.

It is open to a respondent who is not the returned candidate to


challenge the election on grounds not alleged in the election petition
MADAN SINGH V. KALYAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 405.
It is not open to a respondent to an election petition who is a
defeated candidate to seek to avoid the election of the returned candidate
on grounds not alleged by the petitioner in the election patition-
M. MUTHIAH V. A. S. SUBBARAJ AND OTHERS, 7 B.L.R. 165.
An Election Tribunal will not be acting in excess of its juris-
diction if it hears grounds in support of the election petition which are
raised in the written statement of the respondent and 'not raised in the
petition itself. It is not bound to decide the election petition as it stood
when it was forwarded by the Election Commission to the Tribunal for
disposal. KALYAN SINGH V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, AJMER, AND OTHERS,
8 E.L.R. 207.
An Election Tribunal cannot set aside an election on a ground
not taken by the petitioner himself ; if it does so, the decision of the
Tribunal will be erroneous on the face of it and could be quashed by a
writ of certiorari. Where the ground on which an election petition is
allowed is not one mentioned in section 100, the decision of the Tribunal
will be in excess of its jurisdiction. GANGADHAE V. ELECTION TRIBU-
NAL, VINDHYA PRADESH, AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 183.
B. Grounds not taken before Returning Officer —The validity
of the nomination paper of a candidate is a matter which concerns not
merely the petitioner but also other candidates as well as other members
of the electorate who are interested in exercising or abstaining from
I42 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

exercising their right of franchise. It is therefore open to a party


challenge the validity of a nomination before the Tribunal even on
grounds not taken before the Eeturning Officer or to challenge the
validity even where no objection was raised at the time of the nomina.
tion. The right of objection to a nomination paper cannot ba waived
nor is any estoppel created against a candidate by his not raising any
objection at the time of nomination to the act of theEeturning Officer.
Mohan Lai Mandal v. Badhanath Das and Others (Sen and Poddar 388),
Panna Lai v. Mohan Lai (2 Jagat Narain 143) relied on. VlJAYA
MOHAN EBDDY V. PAGA PULLA EEDDY AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.E. 414.

Fresh grounds for supporting the rejection of a nomination


other than those stated by the Eeturning Officer, can be urged before an
Election Tribunal, and if the Tribunal finds these new grounds are true
the rejection of the nomination can be upheld. GIAN CHAND V. SRI-
BAM BANSAL AND OTHEES, 2 B.L.E. 136.
-——It is settled law that in an election petition the respondent
can support the order' of the Eeturning Officer rejecting a nomination
paper on grounds other than those mentioned in the order of the
Eeturning Officer. If the Eeturning Officer has not called upon the
candidate to produce a certified copy of the electoral roll, the respondent
to the election petition cannot urge the non-production thereof as a
ground for supporting the rejection of the nomination paper. MENGH
E A J v. BHIMANDAS AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.E. 301.

The fact that the objection that a candidate was disqualified


for standing as a candidate was not taken before the Eeturning Officer
at the time of scrutiny cannot create any estoppel or bar against con-
testing his election in an election petition on that ground. BALBIB
SINGH V. ARJAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 B.L.E. 341.

The respondent to an election petition is entitled to raise a


plea that the nomination of the petitioner, though rejected on one
ground by the Eeturning Officer, was defective on one or more of the
other grounds mentioned in section 36(2) and such a plea, if taken,
must be enquired into by the Election Tribunal. T E J SINGH V. ELEC-
TION TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR, AND OTHERS. 9 E.L.E. 193.

16. Parties—Candidates who have withdrawn—-Whether necessary


parties—Effect of non-joinder—Power to implead—The expression"duly
nominated" in section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951, is not synonymous
with the expression "validly nominated" which occurs in section 38,
and a candidate who satisfies the requirements of section 33 is a "duly
nominated candidate" within the meaning of section 82 even though he
ELECTION PETITION — PARTIES 143

has withdrawn his candidature within the time fixed for withdrawals
under section 37, and is a necessary party to an election petition. Non-
joinder of a duly nominated candidate, is not however, a defect fatal to
the maintainability of an election petition, but can be cured by implead'
ing the necessary party by amending the petition, unless such a pro-
cedure would result in some prejudice to the other parties or after the
nature of the petition. YOGBAJSING SHANKAB SINGH PAEIHAB V.
SlTAEAM HlBACHAND BlBLA AND OTHEBS, 1 E.L.S. 389.
Candidates whose nominations have been accepted after
scrutiny are "duly nominated" candidates within section 82 and are
therefore necessary parties to an election petition, even though they
have withdrawn their candidature. Where candidates who had with-
drawn have not been made parties to an election petition, the tribunal
can allow an amendment of the petition for joining them as parties
Anglo Indian Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 51) referred to-
LAKSHMANA P I L L A I v. CHENGAM PILLAI AND OTHBBS, 2 E.L.E. 103.

A candidate becomes a "duly nominated" candidate within


the meaning of section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951, on his making
the requisite deposit if he files his nomination papers with the
Returning Officer within the prescribed time duly proposed and seconded
with a declaration that the candidate who has appointed an election
agent who is not disqualified to act as such. Candidates who have not
withdrawn and whose nomination papers are accepted after scrutiny
are validly nominated candidates. Candidates who have been thus
nominated remain "duly nominted" even though they have withdrawn
their candidature under section 37 or their papers have been rejected
during scrutiny under section 36 and are necessary parties to an election
petition. An election petition cannot be summarily dismissed for non-
joinder of a "duly nominated" candidate if it is possible for the Tribunal
to decide the questions between the parties to the petition without,
requiring the presence of the persons who have not been impleadad.
The Election Tribunal has no power to allow new parties to be implead-
ed. The powers of the Election Tribunal in the matter of amendment
of pleadings is not co-extensive with those of the Civil Courts under
the Code of Civil Procedure. If an election petition does not contain a
statement of the material facts and a list setting forth the full parti-
culars of the corrupt or illegal practices alleged in the petition as
required by section 83 the Election Tribunal has no power to allow
an amendment of the petition though it has power to allow the parti-
culars included in the list to be amended and to call for further parti-
culars. Quaere: Whether it is not open to a petitioner to claim two of
144 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the reliefs mentioned in section 84 either cumulatively or alternatively.


P R B M N A T H v. RAM KISHAN AND OTHEES, 1 E.L.E. 271.

A candidate whose nomination has been accepted by the


Returning Officer is a ' duly nominated" candidate within the meaning
of section 82 of the R. P. Act, 1951, and is therefore a necessary party
to an election petition even though he has withdrawn his candidature.
The Election Tribunal has no power to allow an application to implead
a necessary party to an election petition after the time prescribed by
rule 119 for presenting the petition has expired. If a duly nominated
candidate is not impleaded as a party as required by section 82, the
election petition has to be dismissed. The absence of a reference to
section 82 in seation 90(4) of the Act, does not curtail the powers of the
Tribunal to dismiss a petition for non-compliance with section 82, in
view of the provisions of section 80. Mahommedally Allabux v.
Jafferbhoy (Hammond 172), Hazara Barn's case (Sen and Poddar 395) and
Baba Khalil Ahmad's case (Sen and Poddar 168) relied on. Bamachandran
Nair v. Bamachandra Das (1 E.L.R. 442) not followed. PEITAM SINGH
v. CHAEAN SINGH AND O T H E E S , 2 E.L.R. 276.

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidatures are not


necessary parties to an election petition, as they are not "candidates who
have been duly nominated at the election" within the meaning of section
82 of the Act. There is a vital distinction between candidates for an
election and candidates at the election. As a candidate who has withdrawn
is not a nesassary party to an election petition, the fact that the Tribunal
has aided him as a party is a mere surplusage and cannot be made a
ground for issuing a writ against the Tribunal. There is neither a statu-
tory obligation nor even a statutory discretion vested in the Tribunal to
dismiss a petition for mere non-joinder of parties. It does not follow that
because a party to a suit or to an application or to a petition is brought
on the record at a late stage and even beyond the period of limitation
the suit, application or petition must fail as a whole. It is for the
court to consider what is the effect of non-joinder and if relief can be
granted to the plaintiff in the absence of the party who was not
before the court during the period of limitation, the court is not
bound to dismiss the suit or petition as a whole ; the plaintiff or petitioner
may be given a limited relief. It is only if the High Court is satisfied
that there is a clear and unequivocal statutory obligation upon the
Tribunal to dismiss an election petition that it can issue a writ and direct
the Tribunal to dismiss the petition. SlTAEAM HlEACHAND BlBLA v.
YOGBAJ SINGH SHANKAE SINGH PAEIHAE, 2 E.L.R. 283.

I
ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES I45

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidature are duly


nominated" candidates and are necessary parties to an election petition.
But a petition cannot he summarily dismissed because they have not been
made parties. They can be impleaded as parties even after the expiry of
the time prescribed for filing tha petition. Though an amendment of an
election petition should not ordinarily be allowed, an amendment can be
allowed where the amendment sought for does not change the nature of
the case or widen the scope of the inquiry and is made in good faith and it
does not prejudice any of the parties. Pritam Singh v. Charan Singh
and Others (2 B.L.E. 276) dissented from. T. Prakasam v. U. Krishna
Rao and Others (1 B.L.E. 384) and Bamachandran Nair v. Ramachandra
Das and Others (1 B.L.R. 442) followed. K. N. GAIROLA V. GANGA DHAR
MAITHANI AND OTHERS, 3 B.L.E. 162.

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidatures are "duly


nominated candidates" within the meaning of section 82 of theE. P. Act,
1951, and are necessary parties to an election petition, but non-joinder of
such candidates is not fatal to the maintainability of the petition and the
court has power to implead such candidates as parties on an application
being made to it in that behalf by the petitioner. Pritam Singh v. Charan
Singh (2 B.L.E. 276) not followed. Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograj
Singh Shanher Singh Parihar (2 E.L.R. 283), Lakshmana Pillai v.
Chengam Pillai and Others (2 B.L.E. 103), Menghraj v. Bhiman Das and
Others (2 E.L.E. 301), and Prem Nath v. Ram Kishan and Others (l
B.L.E. 271), referred to. SHIBBAN LAL SAXENA V. H A R I SHANKER
PRASAD AND OTHERS, 3 B.L.E. 313.

Held by the majority (MEHAR SlNGH dissenting):—Candidates


who have withdrawn their candidatures are "duly nominated candidates"
within the meaning of section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951, and must there-
fore be joined as parties to an election petition, but an election petition
cannot be dismissed merely because such candidates are not joined as
parties. The provisions of section 82 are directory and not mandatory.
MEHAR SINGH —The provisions of section 82 are mandatory and if
candidates who had withdrawn their candidature are not impleaded as
parties to the petition within the period of limitation for filing the elec-
tion petition, the petition has to be dismissed. The question whether the
matter in dispute between the petitioner and the respondents could be
disposed of in the absence of the candidates who have not been impleaded
is not relevant under the present election rules. [Case law reviewed.]
JOGINDER SINGH V. HAROHAND SINGH AND OTHERS, 3 B.L.E. 447.
Held by the majority (GOBIND SARAN dissenting).—Candidates
who were duly nominated and who withdrew their candidatures thereafter
ELD—20
146 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

under section 37 of the E. P. Act, 1951, are necessary parties to an


election petition under section 82. Section 82 of the Act is mandatory
and non-compliance with its provisions is fatal, and neither the Election
Commission nor the Election Tribunal has any discretion to proceed with
an election petition if the petitioner does not join all duly nominated
candidates as parties to the petition as required by section 82. The term
conclusion of the trial" used in section 98 means the stage when the
election petition can be finally disposed of and the trial can therefore be
concluded. "When therefore the Election Tribunal finds that for the
failure to comply with the provision of section 82, the election petition
is not maintainable and for this defect the election cannot be called in
question under section 80, it can dismiss tha petition under section 98.
The provisions contained in rules 3, 6 and 9 of Order I of the Civil
Procedure Code regarding joinder of defendants cannot be applied to
election petitions, having regard to the mandatory nature of section 82
of the Act. Under the E. P. Act, the Tribunal has, therefore, no power
to add as parties those who were duly nominated at the election but
have not been joined as respondents in the original election petition. Per
GOBIND SABAN.—Candidates who have withdrawn are duly nominated
candidates" within the meaning of section 82 and they are proper parties
to an election petition; but non-joinder of such candidates is not fatal
and a petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground of such non-
joinder unless the Tribunal finds that the nature and character of the
allegations are such that it is not possible to pass a just decision in their
absence. When an application1 is made for impleading such a candidate,
the Tribunal has power to implead him, even if the time for filing the
election petition has expired. PlDA HUSSAIN v. SHBO BHAJAN SlNG'rf
AND OTHBES, 4 E.L.B. 1.
Omission to join candidates who had withdrawn their candi-
datures as parties to an election petition is not fatal to the maintainability
of the petition. The defect can be cured by adding thorn as parties
subsequently. Pritam Singh v. Char an Singh (2 E.L.B. 278) not follows 1.
THAKOOB DAOOSING v. EAMKEISHNA BATHOS AND OIHEBS, 4
E.L.B. 34. '
A candidate whose nomination has been rejected by theBeturn-
ing Officer is not a duly nominated" candidate and he is not a necessary
party to an election petition. A candidate who has withdrawn his candida-
ture is a "duly nominated" candidate and is a proper party to an election
petition, but an election petition is not liable to be dismissed merely
because such a candidate has not been joined as a party. The Tribunal
has a discretion in the matter and if the controversy in relation to the
ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES

election can be settled finally in the absence of such candidate it would be


unjust to dismiss a petition on the ground of non-joinder of such a candi-
date. Even under the old election rules where the words used were must
join" it was necessary to join all the other candidates who were nomi-
nated, only when the petitioner in addition to questioning the election of
the returned candidate claimed a declaration that he himself or any other
candidate has been duly elected. CHIRANJI LAL V. PANNA LAL KAUSHIK
AND OTHEES, 4 B.L.E. 274.

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidatures are not


necessary parties to an election petition within the meaning of section 82
of theE. P. Act, 1951. [The conflict of opinion on this point has been
set at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaganath v. Jaswant
Singh and Others (Civil Appeal No. 100 of 1952 decided on January, 20,
1954)]. UDAINATH SINGH V. JAGAT BAHADUR SINGH- AND OTHERS,
(No. 2) 5 B.L.E. 199.
• —Candidates who have withdrawn their candidatures are neces-
sary parties to an election petition but a petition is not liable to be dis-
missed for non-joinder of such candidates. They may be added as parties
if an application is made for that purpose, and the fact that they are added
only after the period of limitation for filing the petition has expired, will
not make the petition time-barred as against the respondents against
whom the petition was filed in time. MADAN PAL V. EAJDEO Ur-ADHYA
AND OTHERS, 6 B.L.E. 28.

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidature are "duly


nominated candidates and as such they should be made parties to an elec-
tion petition under section 82 of the Act. The petition is not, however,
liable to be dismissed for such non-joinder. The tribunal will in such
cases be guided by the rules contained in Orders V and VI of the Civil
Procedure Code and such candidates can be joined as parties even after
limitation. But if a party is added after limitation the petitioner cannot
be allowed to claim the relief that he or any other candidate should be
declared duly elected. There is no material difference in this respect
between the law before Act XLIII of 1951 and the present law under this
Act. SARDTJL SINGH CAVEESHAB V. HTJKAM SINGH AND OTHEESI
6 E.L.E. 316.
-Candidates who have withdrawn their candidature are duly
nominated candidates" but non-joinder of such candidates as parties is not
fatal to the validity of an election petition. They can be impleaded as
parties even after limitation. DHARAM V I E V. BHALA EAM AND
OTHEES, 7 E.L.E. 64.
14° ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGfeST

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidature are not


duly nominated candidates," and an election petition is, therefore-
maintainable even though they are not impleaded as parties to the peti-
tion. An Election Tribunal has power to add necessary parties in appro-
priate cases. K. S. SUBEAMANIA GOUNDAR V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,
VELLORE, AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 66.

Candidates who had withdrawn their candidature are not


'candidates duly nominated at the election" within the meaning of sec-
tion 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951, and an election petition cannot be dis-
missed merely because such candidates have not been impleaded as
parties to the petition. Sheo Kumar Pande v. V. G. Oak and Others
(5 E.L.E. 103) and Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograj Singh Shankar
Singh Parihar (2 E.L.E. 283) followed. Even if such candidates are held
to be candidates duly nominated at the election, non-joinder of such
parties is not a fatal defect and the Election Tribunal has power to im-
plead them. Such candidates are not "necessary parties" in the sense
that relief cannot be given to the parties to the petition in their absence,
where the petitioner claims only a declaration that the election of the
returned candidate is void and does not claim that he himself or any
other candidate should be declared duly elected, and in such a case the
Election Tribunal would not be acting in excess of its jurisdiction in
permitting the petitioner to implead such candidates as parties even
after the period of limitation for filing an election petition has expired.
Obiter: Where the petitioner claims a declaration that he himself
should be declared duly elected, it would be against the principles of
natural justice to grant the relief claimed, in the absence of candidates
who had withdrawn their candidature and the election petition will have
to be dismissed if they have not been impleaded as parties before the
expiry of the period of limitation for filing the election petition. MADAN
MOHAN V. BANKAT L A L AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 119.

The provision contained in section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951,


that the petitioner shall join as respondents all the candidates who were
duly nominated at the election other than himself if he was so nomi-
nated is not mandatory but only directory and an election petition
cannot therefore be dismissed merely because candidates who bad been
nominated but who had withdrawn their candidature have not been
joined as respondents. Where an Election Tribunal dismisses an election
petition on the ground that candidates who had withdrawn their candi-
dature have not been joined as respondents it does not commit a mere
error of law but refuses to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law
through a misconception of the law and the High Court can set aside its
ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES 149

decision in the exercise of its powers of superintendence under article


227 of the Constitution, though it may not be possible to issue a writ
under article 226 owing to the dissolution of the Tribunal or for other
reasons. Mere use of the word ' shall" does not necessarily make a
provision imperative, the nature of the provision must depend upon the
context and the collocation in which the word "shall" is used, and must be
gathered from the intention of the Legislature and from the four corners
of the Act itself. Per SINHA J.—Candidates who had been nominated
but who have withdrawn their candidature are still candidates who
were duly nominated at the election" within the meaning of section 82.
The two expressions "candidates at the election" and "candidates for
the election" have been used indiscriminately in the Act without any
idea of drawing a distinction between the connotation of these expres-
sions. Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograj Singh Shankar Singh Parihar
(2 E.L.E. 283) and Sheo Kumar and Another v. V. G. Oak and Others
(5 B.L.E. 103) dissented from. Candidates who have withdrawn are not
only not necessary parties but are not even proper parties, but in view
of the language of section 82 they should be made parties to an election
petition, and if they have not been made parties at the time of filing the
petition there is absolutely no bar to make them parties later by amend-
ing the petition. Such amendment is of a formal nature and no question of
limitation arises. SHAH MOHAMMAD UMAIE V. BAM CHAEAN SINGH
AND OTHEER, 8 E.L.E. 179.

——The question whether non-joinder of any candidate as respond-


ent to the petition is fatal to the petition or not, will depend on the
answer to a further question whether the Tribunal can, or cannot, grant
the relief sought, behind the back of such candidate, without causing
any detriment to his interests. BAGHUNATH SINGH v. KAMPTA PBA-
SAD SAXENA, 8 E.L.E. 424.

Section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951, is not mandatory, and omis-


sion to implead as a party even a candidate who has been validly nomi-
nated as a candidate and who has gone to the polls is not fatal to the
maintainabilityof an election petition, much less omission of a candidate
who has withdrawn his candidature. The question whether the non-
joinder of a person as respondent is fatal to the petition or not, will
depend in each case upon the answer to the further question whether
the Tribunal can safely grant to the petitioner the relief prayed for,
without adversely affecting the interest of the party who has not
been joined and who ought to have been joined under section 82.
SAKJU PBASAD NAMDEO v. GOPAL SAEAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 8
E.L.E. 444.
150 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

The provision contained in section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951,


that the petitioner shall join as respondents all the candidates who were
duly nominated at the election is not mandatory in character and an
election petition cannot be dismissed on the preliminary ground that
the candidates who had withdrawn their candidature have not been
joined as respondents. If an Election Tribunal dismisses an election
petition summarily on this ground it fails to exercise a jurisdiction vested
in it by law and the High Court can set aside its order in the exercise
of its powers of superintendence under article 227 of the Constitution.
Shah Mohammad Umair v. Bam Charan and Others (8 B.L.E. 179)
followed. FIDA HUSSAIN v. SHEOBHAJAN SINGH AHD OTHEES, 9 E.L.E.
33.
A candidate who has withdrawan his candidature is not a duly
nominated candidate and is not a necessary party to an election peti-
tion. SALIG- EAM JAISWAL v. SHEO KUMAB PANDE AND OTHEES, 9
E.L.E. 67.
A candidate who has withdrawn his candidature is not a neces-
sary party to an ejection petition, and failure to join him as a party is
not fatal to the maintainability of the petition. LACHHIEAM V. JAMUNA
PBASAP MDKHAEIYA AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 149.
The provision contained in section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951,
that all duly nominated candidates shall be joined as parties to an elec-
tion petition is only a directory provision. Failure toimplead a candi-
date who has withdrawn his candidature is therefore not a fatal defect,
and an election petition cannot be dismissed in limine for failure to
implead such a candidate. The Tribunal should proceed in such a case
in the manner provided in the Civil Procedure Code, which has been
made applicable to the trial of election petitions, and it can permit-
candidates who have not been impleaded to be made parties to the peti-
tion. The court reserved its final opinion on matters specifically covered
by sections 81, 83 and 11.7 of the E. P. Act, 1951. JAGAN NATH V.
JASWANT SINGH AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 231 (S.C.).
——Though section 82 requires all the candidates duly nominated
to be included omission to implead all of them is not by itself a reason
for dismissing the petition in limine. An opportunity should be given
to petitioner to amend the petition to implead them. M. E. MEGANATHAN
v. K. T. KOSALBAM, 9 E.L.E. 242.
Non-joinder of a duly nominated candidate is not a fatal defect
for which an election petition could be summarily dismissed. The
Tribunal can permit the parties left out to be impleaded and such par-
ties can be impleaded, even after the period of limitation for filing the
ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES

election petition had expired. Sita Bam Hira Ghand Birla v. Yograj
Singh Shankar Singh Parihar (2 E.L.E. 283) and Jag an Nath v. Jaswant
Singh (9 E.L.E. 231) followed. SHIBBANLAL SAKSBNA V. HAEISHANKBE
PRASAD AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 403.

An election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine


merely because candidates who had withdrawn their candidature have
not been impleaded as parties to the petition. The effect of non-joinder
of such parties is a matter to be taken into consideration at the appro-
priate stage with reference to the final result of the case. Jag an Nath
v. Jaswant Singh and Others (9 E.L.R. 231) followed. BHIKAJI KESHAO
JOSHI AND ANOTHEE v. BEIJLAL NANDLAL BITANI AND OTHERS, 10
E.L.E. 357 (S.C.).
-Candidates whose nomination papers have been rejected by the
Returning Officer on scrutiny are not ' duly nominated" candidates
and are not, therefore, necessary parties to an election petition under
section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951. Pandit Mangal Bam and Others v.
Ghaudhari Anant Bam and Another (Sen and Poddar 438), Manzur
Hussain v. Ghulam Mohammad (Sen and Poddar 746), Mohammad Shaft
v. Mohammad Iqbal Ahmed Khan (Sen and Poddar 970) and Piarey Lai
v. Munshi Amba Prasad (Hammond 29), referred to. LAXMAN RAO V.
LAXMINIVAS GANERIWAL AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 239.
A candidate whose nomination has been rejected by the Re-
turning Officer is not a ' duly nominated" candidate within the mean-
ing of section 82 of the R. P. Act, 1951, and is not a necessary party to
an election petition. LAXMAN RAO v. LAXMINIVAS GANERIVAL AND
OTHEES (NO. 2), 2 E.L.R. 20.
A candidate whose nomination has been rejected is not a neces-
sary party to an election petition but joinder of such a person as a
party is not a ground for rejecting the petition. ASEAE AHMAD V.
NIHAL UDDIN AND OTHEES, 3 E.L.R. 81.
A candidate is a ' duly nominated" candidate if he has filed a
nomination paper in accordance with the formalities prescribed in sec-
tion 33(3) of the Act even though his nomination paper was later rejec-
ted on scrutiny, and such a candidate must be joined as a party to an
election petition under section 82 of the Act. But, the non-joinder of
a duly nominated candidate is not fatal to the maintainability of a peti-
tion if adequate relief can be granted to the parties in his absence.
MRNGH R A J U. BHIMANDAS AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.R. 301.
Power to implead new parties as respondents after limitation —
An Election Tribunal has power to implead new parties as respondent?
152 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

to an election petition, even after the expiry of the period of limitation


for filing the petition. Election cases are not purely cases between pri-
vate parties, but the State is even more interested in them and it is all
the more necessary that all parties should be on the record. The ex-
pression "trial of suits" is used in section 90(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951,
in a wide sense so as to cover all the stages of the enquiry into an elec-
tion petition from its presentation until its disposal; there is no justi-
cation to restrict it to the stage commencing with the hearing of the
petition. Section 92 of the Act is not exhaustive of the powers of the
Tribunal. On the other hand section 90(2) gives a wide scope to the
Tribunal to use such provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as might
be necessary and appropriate for the trial of an election petition pro-
vided they are not inconsistent with any provisions of the B. P. Act,
or rules made thereunder. Mahommedally Allabux v. Jafferbhoy Abdulla-
bhoy Lalji (Hammond 173), Lala Ghainan Lai v. Lala Shadi Bam
(Hammond 621) and Ghiraghdin and Another v. Gh. Jahanghir Khan
(2 Doabia 144) not followed. EAMACHANDEA CHOTTDHURI V. SADASIVA
TEIPATHY AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.E. 450.

The non-joinder of a duly nominated candidate is not fatal to


an election petition and no question of limitation therefore arises when
such a candidate is joined later on, after the period of limitation has
expired. The provisions of section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act do
not apply to election petitions. Those are governed by the of the E. P.
Act, 1951, which is a complete code in itself. Suraj Bhan v. Hemchand
Jain and Others (2 E.L.E. 1), Menghraj v. Bhimandas (2E.L.B. 301)
referred to. Pritam Singh v. Gharan Singh(1 E.L.E. 276) not followed.
BANKAT LAL v. MADAN MOHAN AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 375.
Objections to be taken early—All objections on the ground of
non-joinder of parties should be taken at the earliest possible oppor-
tunity as the provisions of Order I, rr. 9 and 13 of the Civil Procedure
Code apply to election petitions. JAGAJEEVANDAS SHBTTY V. SANJEEVA
SHETTY AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 358.

Tribunal's power to decide—The determination of the question


whether the parties to an election petition have been properly implead-
ed is a matter not for the Election Commission but for the Tribunal to
decide. JAGAN NATH V. JASWANT SINGH AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 231
(S.C.).
17. Recriminatory petition—Withdrawal of claim for declaration
that petitioner was duly elected—Effect of—A recriminatory petition
becomes redundant and need not be heard if the petitioner withdraws
his prayer for a declaration that he has been duly elected. Jullundur
ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES 153

North Constituency 1946 case, (2 Doabia 223 ; Sen and Poddar 965)
referred to. SATYA D E V BUSHAHEI V. GHANSHYAM AND OTHEES, 4
E.L.E.67.
Notice of recrimination—Under section 86(5) and section 97
a notice of recrimination to the Tribunal in or to be valid must be
given to the Chairman by presenting the notice personally or by send-
ing it by registered post so as to reach him within time in the ordinary
- course of post. The presentation of the notice to a member of the Tri-
bunal who was not authorised either by the Act, or by the Chairman
himself, to receive the notice would not be a valid presentation. The
' trial" of an election petition commences when, after the filing of a
reply thereto and of a recriminatory petition, if any, the points in con-
troversy between the parties are settled and their investigation begins.
JAMNA PEASAD MUKHAEIYA v. LACHHIEAM EATANLAL JAIN AND
OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 1.

18. Reliefs—Petition claiming more than one relief—Maintain-


ability- Section 84 of theE. P. Act which prescribes the three kinds of
reliefs which may be claimed in an election petition does not prevent a
petitioner claiming reliefs alternatively so long as he does not seek more
than one relief at a time, and even if two or more reliefs are claimed
cumulatively the petition cannot be dismissed summarily for this reason.
Whether sub-sections (l) and (2) of section 100, and section 101, are
mutually exclusive or not and whatever be the scope of the prayer made
in an election petition, the relief which the tribunal can and is bound to
grant must depend on the grounds alleged and proved. EAMACHANDEAN
N A I B v. EAMACHANDBA DAS AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 442.

Section 84 of theE. P. Act, 1951, does not mean that the peti-
tioner can claim in an election petition only one of the three declarations
mentioned in the section. Where a petitioner claimed (a) that the elec-
tion of respondent No. 1 be declared void and the petitioner be declared
duly elected and (b) that in case the petitioner be not declared duly
elected, the entire election be declared void : Held, that the petition was
not defective and could not be summarily dismissed. Gidwani Ghoithram
Parlabrai v. Agnani Thakurdas Ghuharmal and Others (1 E.L.E. 194)
referred to. MAHADEO V. AUDESH PEATAP SINGH AND O T H E E S ,
2 E.L.E. 398.
In an election petition, the petitioner is not bound to confine
his claim to one of the three declarations referred to in section 84,
clauses (a), (b) and (c). He can claim any one of these reliefs alternatively
but he cannot claim two or more reliefs cumulatively. Bamachandran
ELD—2i
154 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Nair v. Bamachandra Das and Others (l E.L.R. 442) followed. SOCKET


SINGH V. THAKAE SINGH AND O T H E E S , 2 E.L.R. 401.

I t is competent to a petitioner to pray for one or more of the


three reliefs mentioned in section 84 ; he is not bound to confine his
prayer to one of the three reliefs. MARUTRAO BHATTEAO AND OTHERS
V. GULABEAO DADASAHEB AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 303.
Section 84 of the R. P. Act, 1951, does not mean that in an
election petition the petitioner can claim only one of the three reliefs
mentioned therein. It means that he can claim any one or more of the
three reliefs. RATTAN SINGH v. DEVINDEE SlNGH AND OTHERS,
7 E.L.R. 234.
A petitioner has a light to claim the reliefs mentioned in
clauses (b) and (c) of section 98 in the alternative. GOVIND MALAVIYA V.
M U R L I MANOHAR AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 84.

A petitioner can claim in an election petition two or more of


the reliefs mentioned in section 84 of [the R. P. Act, 1951. AwADESH
PEASAD SINHA v. PRABHAVATHI GUPTA AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 45.
In an election petition the petitioner may claim one or more
of the reliefs mentioned in section 84. He is not bound to confine
himself to one of the reliefs mentioned in the section. SALIG RAM
JAISWAL v. SHEO KUMAE PANDE AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.R. 67.

It is not open to a person filing an election petition to claim


more than one of the reliefs mentioned in section 84 of the R. P. Act,
1951, even alternatively. Each of the three reliefs mentioned in that
section are separate and distinct reliefs and the grounds upon which the
different reliefs could be granted are also different. I t is also not open to
the Tribunal to grant any relief other than the relief that has been prayed
for in the petition. Accordingly, where the prayer in the petition is to
declare the election of the returned candidate void the Tribunal cannot
declare the whole election void. D R . BEIJENDEA SwAEUP V. ELECTION
TBIBUNAL, LUCKNOW, AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 191.
The relief for declaring an election wholly void referred to in
clause (c) of section 84, and the relief for declaring the election of the
returned candidate to be void referred to in clause (a) of section 84 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, are alternative and not cumula-
tive, but a petition praying for these reliefs cumulatively is not liable to
be dismissed on that account. It is for the Tribunal to decide to
which of the reliefs the petitioner is entitled, and to grant him
such relief. A. SRINIVASAN V. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHERS,
10 E.L.R. 245.
ELECTION PETITION—RELIEFS 155

Under section 84 of the E. P. Act, 1951, it is open to the


petitioner in an election petition to pray for any one or more of the reliefs
mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the section. The petition is not
liable to be dismissed merely because he claims more than one of these
reliefs nor can he be compelled- to confine himself to one of these reliefs,
though the Tribunal can actually grant him only the particular relief to
which he is entitled on the facts found by the Tribunal. Audesh Pratap
Singh v. Brji Narain and Others (9 B.L.E. l) Mahadeo v. Jwalaprasad
Mishra and Others (6 E.L.E. l) and Durga Sharikar Mehta v. Thakur
Baghuraj Singh and Others (9 E.L.E. 494) relied on. A. Srinivasan v.
G. Vasantha Pai and Others (10 E.L.E. 245) affirmed on this point.
Dr. V. K. JOHN V. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHBES and A. SRINIVASAN
v. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.E. 345.
Where an election petition claims only one of the reliefs men-
tioned in section 84 the Election Tribunal has power to permit the
petitioner to amend the petition so as to include in it a prayer for another
relief mentioned in section 84, and claim either relief in the alternative,
provided the other party is not prejudiced thereby. MATHAI MATHEW
MANJTTRAN v. K. 0. ABRAHAM, 10 E.L.E. 376.

19. Remand— Remand of petition to Election Tribunal—Legality—


As Election Tribunals are ad hoc bodies to which remands cannot easily
be made as in ordinary courts of law, it is essential that Tribunals should
do their work in full and decide the whole case. If any charge of corrupt
practice is made their duty does not end with declaring the election void,
but they must also, as laid down in section 99 of the Act, record a finding
whether any corrupt practice has or has not been committed and the
nature of that corrupt practice, and also the names of all persons found
guilty of any corrupt practice. E A J KRUSHNA BOSE V. BlNOD
KANUNGO AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 294 (S.C.)

When an Election Tribunal announces its order and the order


is published by the Election Commission, the Tribunal becomes functus
officio. If after the Tribunal has become functus officio the High Court
in an application for a writ passes an order directing the Tribunal to make
a further order under section 99 of the Act relating to the commission of
any corrupt practice, the order of the High Court will not be binding on
the Election Commission as the Commission is not within its jurisdiction;
and, even if the Election Commission, in pursuance of the order of the
High Court, appoints a fresh Tribunal, it will not be a legally con-
stituted Tribunal as the conditions necessary for constituting a Tribunal
mentioned in section 86 of the E. P. Act, 1951, do not exist in such a
156 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

case. NYALCHAND VlBCHAND SHBTH V. VlTHALBHAI EANCHHODBHAI


PATEL AND OTHBES, 9 E.L.E. 451.
20. Signature—Signature on a blank paper—-Where the draft of an
election petition was fully approved by the petitioner and the petition
was afterwards typed on some blank papers which the petitioner had
signed before hand at the proper places : Held, that the petition was not
invalid and could not be rejected on the ground that it was not signed,
though the corrections not initialled by the petitioner might be ignored.
EADHEY SHYAM SHABMA V. CHANDEA BHANU GUPTA AND OTHERS,
6 E.L.E. 123.
Where the petitioner filed an election petition in time but omitted
to sign the petition and the list above the verification also, but the
Election Commission permitted him to put his signature after the expiry
of the period of limitation : Held, that the petition was not time-barred.
If the verification in a petition is defective the petitioner may be allowed
to remove the defect and make a proper verification even after the period
of limitation. MANDAL SITMITBA D E V I ». STJEAJ NAEAIN SINGH AND
OTHEES, 4 E.L.E. 136.
Signature after declaration only—An election petition cannot
be dismissed merely because it has been signed only at one place, namely,
after the declaration at the foot of the document, and ihere is no signature
after the body of the petition also. The signature to the declaration at
the end of the document constitutes sufficient execution of the whole
document. JADUMANI MANGBAJ V. DINABANDHIT SAHTJ AND O T H E E S ,
8 E.L.E. 480.
21. Verification—The objection that the election petition was not
properly verified cannot be raised for the first time before the High Court
in a writ petition, for if it was raised before the Election Tribunal,
the Tribunal might have permitted the petitioner to rectify the defect.
ELAYA PILLAI v. K. PABTHASABATHY AND O T H E E S , 8 E.L.E. 20.
An election petition cannot be thrown out on the ground that
some of the paragraphs of the petition have not been verified at all, when
the verification with regard to the remaining :portion of the petition is
substantially according to law. SHANTA DEVI VAIDYA V. BASHIE
HUSAIN ZAIDI AND O T H E B S (NO. 2), 8
E.L.E. 300.
The provisions contained in section 83 of the E. P. Act, 1951,
are mandatory and consequently if an election petition does not (i) con-
tain a concise statement of the material facts relied on, or (ii) is not
signed by the petitioner, or (iii) is not verified in the manner laid down
in the Civil Procedure Code for the verification of pleadings, or (iv) if any
ELECTION PETITION—VERIFICATION 157

corrupt or illegal practice is alleged, it is not accompanied by a list


setting forth full particulars including as full a statement as possible of
the names of the parties who committed and the place and date of com-
mission of such practice, it can be dismissed under section 85. If the
petitioner himself verifies the petition, a single signature below the peti-
tion and the verification is enough. Omission to put two signatures, one
at the end of the petition, and the other after the verification is, in any
event, only a technical defect of an unsubstantial character and does not
affect the validity of the petition. A verification that certain allegations
are true on belief and knowledge", even though it is ambiguous, may be
taken to be verification on knowledge ('belief" being superfluous) and as
complying with order VI, rule 15, of the Civil Procedure Code. But a
verification,as "true on belief" is bad if it does not state that the belief
is based on information received by the petitioner. Bajit Ram v.
Kateshar Nath (I.L.E. 18 All. 396) referred to. ABDUL B A U F V. GOVIND
BALLABH PANT AND OTHERS, 8 B.L.E. 240.
Where the date and place of verification are stated in the peti-
tion, the lists attached may be presumed to be made at the same place
and on the same date and the petition cannot be rejected for omis-
sion to specify the date and place of verification. ABDUL BAUF V.
GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND OTHBES, 8 E.L.B. 240.

An election petition is not liable to be dismissed summarily


because the date and place of verification have not been stated in the
verification. SHIBBAN L A L SAXENA V. HABISHANKEB PEASAD AND
OTHEBS, 9 B.L.E. 403.

'Where a verification is meant to express that all the allega-


tions in the petition are in their entirety based on information and
belief, there is no scope, and hence no need, to specify with reference to
the various paragraphs which of the allegations are based on personal
knowledge and which upon information and belief. A verification
differs from an affidavit in this respect, (ii) An election petition cannot
be dismissed on the sole ground that the verification of the petition does
not show the date on which it was signed. In such a case the petitioner
should normally be called upon to remove the defect by adding a supple-
mentary verification. BHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHI AND ANOTHEE V. B R I J -
LAL NANDLAL BlYANI AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.B. 357 (S.C.).
Irregularities in the signing and verification of an election peti-
tion or list which do not affect the merits of the case or prejudice the
other side are not grounds on which an election petition could be dismiss-
ed in limine. The Tribunal has ample power to allow them to be
amended so as to bring them into conformity with the requirements of
158 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the law. Where an attestation to a verification merely stated that it was


declared on a certain date and at a certain place, but it did not state the
place at which or the date on which it was signed : Held, that this was
only a technical defect not of a substantial character. KBISHNAJI
BHIMAEAO ANTBOLIKAB v. SHANKAB SHANTARAM MOBB AND OTHEES,
5E.L.E. 34.
Where the petitioner filed an election petition along with a list
of corrupt practices but he failed to verify the list as required by
section 83(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951, and after the expiry of the
time prescribed for presenting the petition, he filed a verified list of
corrupt practices : Held, that the law of election required the fulfilment
of technicalities to some extent rigidly, and inasmuch as the petitioner
did not file a verified list along with the petition, the petition filed by
him did not comply with section 83(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951, and should
be dismissed, even though the details of the corrupt practices were
mentioned in the petition which was verified. Held, further, that the
petitioner cannot be permitted to verify the list after the period of
limitation for filing the petition had expired. DEBI PBASAD V.
MOHAMMED NASEBB AND OTHERS, 3E.L.E. 137.
Where an election petition which contained full particulars
of the corrupt practices alleged and was duly signed and verified but
the list of corrupt practices filed with it was not verified and on
this defect in the list being brought to the notice of the petitioner by
the Election Commission, the petitioner filed a duly verified list,
but' the period of limitation for filing the petition had expired when
this verified list was filed : Held, per A. SANYAL and. M. U. FABUQI
(D. N. EOT dissenting) (i) that as the election petition contained full
particulars of the corrupt practices, and this was duly verified, omission
to verify the list was not a defect for which the petition could be dismiss-
ed summarily; further, as the list forms part of the petition it should also
be deemed to have been verified ; (ii) that, as the Election Commission
had called for a verified list and such a list had been filed and the Election
Commission had the power to condone delay in the filing of a petition,
the defect in the presentation of the original petition was cured By the
filing of the second verified list. D. N. BOY (contra)—The principle to
be applied to cases of defective verification is that if the defect is trivial
it will be condoned but if it is serious the election petition must be dis-
missed. The total omission to verify the list of corrupt practices is a
substantial defect and this defect cannot be cured by the subsequent filing
of a duly verified list after the period of limitation has expired. SHIVA
D U T T AND OTHERS V. BANSIDAS DHANGAR AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 55.
ELECTION PETITION—VERIFICATION • 159

Where a defect in the verification of a petition is not such as to


prejudice the respondent on the merits, it is merely a technical defect
not of a substantial character and the petition could not be rejected on
this ground. SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER V. SHBIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL
SAMAD AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 265.

An election petition cannot be thrown out on account of mere


defect in the verification, as defect in verification is a mere irregularity
and not a substantial defect affecting the maintainability of the petition.
AWADHESH PEASAD SINHA v. PRABHAVATHI GUPTA AND OTHEES,
8 E.L.E. 45.
——'A vrification should show what paragraphs are true to
the knowledge of the petitioner and what paragraphs are true to his
information and belief. Where a verification merely states that the
petition is true to the knowledge, information and belief of the petitioner
it does not comply with the strict requirements of verification, but this
is not necessarily a ground for rejecting a petition. It is not necessary
in an election petition to state the sources of information of the facts
alleged in it, as the sources of information are not material particulars
required within section 83 of the Act. DESAI BASAWAEAJ V. DASANKOP
HA SAN SAB AND OTHERS, 4 B.L.E. 380.
Where the verification of an election petition merely stated that
the contents of the petition are true to my knowledge and belief" with-
out mentioning separately with reference to the different paragraphs as
to which were verified from knowledge, and which on information received.
Held, that though the verifiction. was defective, there was a substantial
compliance with Order VI, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, and section 83
of the E. P. Act and the petition could not be dismissed on the ground of
defective verification under section 85. GoviND MALAVITA V. M U R L I
MANOHAE AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E'. 84.

Where the verification of a petition ran as follows: "Statements


made in paragraphs 1 to 9 and 11 are true to the best of my knowledge
and the statements made in paragraphs 10 and 12 are true to the best of
my belief" : Held, the verification was not defective. SlIEAJ BHAN V.
H E M CHAND JAIN AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 1.

Omission to mention date and place of verification is not a fatal


defect. SHANKAR TEIPATHI V. E E T U E N I N G OFFICER, MIRZAPUR, AND
OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 315.
Where an election petition was verified as follows:—"That, I do
hereby verify that the contents of paragraphs 1 to 41 above are true to
the best of my knowledge, and information, and belief and I affix my
l6o ' ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

signature this 15th day of May, 1952, at 12-20 hours in verification


whereof. Held, that, although the verification of the election petition
was defective, there was substantial compliance with Order VI, Eule 15
C. P. 0. and section 83 of the B. P. Act, 1951, and the election petition
could not be dismissed merely on the ground of defective verification.
Under s. 90(4) of the E. P. Act, 1951, the Tribunal is not bound to dis-
miss an election petition for every non-complinance of ss. 81, 83 and 117
of the Act. The question of dismissal is a matter for the Tribunal's dis-
cretion and the test to be applied will be that if the defect is trivial it
will be condoned, and if the defect is serious, the election petition will be
dismissed. Bajit Bam v. Katesar Nath (I.L.E. 18 All. 396) followed.
BOLA NATH V. KRISHNA CHANDRA GUPTA AND OTHEBS, 3 B.L.E. 288.

22, Withdrawal.—A petitioner who asks for withdrawal of an elec-


tion petition is not bound to show sufficient reasons for the withdrawal.
I t is for those who object to the withdrawal, if any, to prove why the
petitioner should not be allowed the withdraw. North Durham case
(3 O'M. & H. 2) referred to. SHIV DAYAL V. TEG E A M AND OTHEES, 6
E.L.E. 346.
See also COLLUSION, p. 129 supra.
ELECTION RULES.
Change of rules—Applicability of neiv rules to pending petitions
—See pp. 2 to 4 supra.
ELECTION TRIBUNAL.
(See also cases under ELECTION PETITION).
Qualifications of members—Advcoate of High Court of another
State—Under section 86 of the E. P. Act, 1951, it is not necessary that
the district judge Chairman or 'member, or the advocate member
of an Election Tribunal should be selected from the list of district
judges or the list of advocates, respectively, supplied to the Election
Commission by the High Court of the State in which the constituency,
the election for which is contested, is situated. They can be appointed
from the list of district judges or the list of advocates supplied to the
Election Commission by the High Court of any other State. L A L L U
CHAND v. T E J SINGH AND OTHEES, 3 E.L.E 318.

Section 86 of the E. P. Act, 1951, does not mean that persons


whose names have been included in the lists submitted by the High Court
of one State cannot be appointed as Chariman or members of an Election
Tribunal constituted for trying an election petition in another State.
MADAN MOHAN V. BANKAT L A L AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 119.
ELECTION TRIBUNAL l6l

An advocate practising in the High Court of one State can he


appointed as a member of an Election Tribunal which has to function in
any other State. Hadan Mohan v. Banhat Lai and Others (8 B.L.E. 119)
referred to. T E J SINGH V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR, AND OTHEES,
9 E.L.E. 193 ; SAHI BAM V. MANPHOOL SINGH AND 'OTHERS, 7 B.L.E.
47.
Practice for a period of not less then ten years, meaning of—
Ten years' practice as advocate, whether necessary—Under section 86(2)(b)
of the E. P. Act, 1951, a person who is an advocate of the High Court
and who has put in practice as a lawyer for a period of not less than ten
years is qualified to be appointed as a member of an Election Tribunal.
The section cannot be interpreted to mean that the person should have
practised "as an advocate" of the High Court for a period of not less than
ten years. HARI SHANKAR PRASAD GUPTA V. SUKHDEO PRASAD AND
OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 341.

The expression "persons who are or have been District Judges"


in section 88(2) (a) of the E. P. Act, 1951, is wide enough to include
persons who have officiated as District Judges even though their sub-
stantive post was that of a Subordinate Judge, and also retired District
Judges. EAMACHANDRA CHOUDHURI v. SADASIVA TRIPATHY AND
OTHERS (NO. 2), 5 E.L.B. 194.
It cannot be said that there is bias, or a possibility of bias on
the part of a member of the Tribunal merely because his wife is a mem-
ber of the Congress party and the petitioner defeated a Congress
candidate at the bye-election. MUELIDHAR v. KADAM SlNGH AND
OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 135.'
• -Where the petitioner challenged the constitution of the Elec-
tion Tribunal on ground that one of the members was not qualified to
act as such member at the date of his appointment but at the date of the
hearing of the petition he had become so qualified and there was nothing
to bar his reappointment: Held, that the High Court would not interfere
under article 226 of the Constitution of India. HARI SHANKAR PEASAD
GUPTA V. SUKHDEO PRASAD AND ANOTHER, 8 E.L.E. 341.

Qualification of Chairman—Under section 86 of the E. P. Act,


1951, it is not necessary that the Chairman of an Election Tribunal, who
is a District Judge, should be a District Judge who has served, or is
serving, as a District Judge in the State in which the Tribunal is consti-
tuted. The words "in the State" in section 86(2) do not mean in the
State in which the Tribunal is constituted. JAISINGH. V. GOPAL SINGH
AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 351.
PLP-J2
l62 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

The Chairman of an Eieotion Tribunal can continue to function


as Chairman of the Tribunal even after he is appointed as Legal Bemem-
brancer of the Government. There is nothing illegal or against the Consti-
tution in his continuing as Chairman of the Tribunal for trying certain
election petitions and resigning his office as Chairman of the Tribunal for
trying other election petitions. Article 14 of the Constitution does
not prohibit such procedure. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarhar
(A.I.E. 1952 S.C. 75) distinguished. SHASTA DEVI VALDYA V. ELECTION
TBIBUNAL, .FAIZABAD, AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 201.

Jurisdiction—The power of the State Legislature to make a


law on the subject of elections to Legislatures of States is subordinate
to the Parliament's power. A Tribunal appointed under the E. P. Act,
1951, is therefore competent to try a petition calling in question an
election to the State Legislature of Madhya Pradesh even though the
said Act is not an Act of the Madhya Pradesh State. MURLIDHAR v.
KADAM SINGH AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.E. 135.

Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere with decisions of Tri-


bunal —-Though it is not open to the High Court to exercise its powers
under article 226 or article 227 of the Constitution so as to interfere
with a decision of an Election Tribunal merely upon the ground that the
decision is erroneous either in respect of facts or in point of law, it has
the power to examine and correct any decision of the Tribunal on the
ground of jurisdiction, fraud or violation of the principles of natural
justice. An Election Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine finally
whether a person desiring to give evidence under section 97 of the B. P.
Act, 1951, has or has not satisfied the conditions laid down in section
97 and, even though the Tribunal has arrived at an erroneous decision
on this question, it cannot be held that the decision was made without
jurisdiction or that the Tribunal gave itself, or deprived itself of, juris-
diction by the wrong decision, and the High Court cannot, therefore,
interfere with the decision of the Tribunal under article 226 or 227 of
the Constitution merely because the decision was erroneous. JAMNA
PBASAD MlTKHAEIYA V. LACHHIBAM EATANLAL JAIN AND OTHERS,
5 E.L.E. 1.
Constitution—Retirement of Chairman or member—Re-consti-
tution of whole Tribunal by fresh appointment of Chairman and member-
—An Election Tribunal does not cease to exist as soon as the Chairman
or any one of its members relinquishes his office or otherwise becomes
incapable of sitting on the Tribunal, and it is not necessary to recon-
stitute the whole Tribunal again. The place of the Chairman or mem-
ber which has become vacant can be filled up and the Tribunal can
ELECTION TRIBUNAL 163

continue to function as the same Tribunal. It is also not necessary that


the Chairman should be appointed beforethe other members are appoint-
ed or that the other two members should be appointed at the same
time and by the same order. BOOPCHANDBA SOGANI v. RAWAT MAN
SINGH ANDOTHEBS, 3 E.L.B. 339.

Status—Whether "court"—Power to declare laws ultra vires—


An Election Tribunal is not a "court" within the meaning of the proviso
to section 113 of the Civil Procedure Code, and it has therefore no juris-
diction to declare a provision of a statute, such as section 133 of the
Civil Procedure Code, unconstitutional on the ground that it infringes
the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed by article
14 of the Constitution, or to refer the question to the High Court under
section 113 of the Code. MATHAI MATI-IEW MANJURAN V. K. 0.
ABEAHAM, 10 E.L.E. 376.

Whether court"—Forged nomination paper—Private complaint


for forgery—Jurisdiction of magistrate to take cognizance—Complaint
from Election Tribunal, whether necessary—Returning Officer and Elec-
tion Tribunal, whether "court"—Proceedings before a Eeturning Officer
under section 36 of the E. P. Act, 1951, are not judicial or even quasi-
judicial proceedings and he is not therefore a "court" within the mean-
ing of section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Election Tri-
bunal is however a court" within that section. Where a nomination
paper which is alleged be forged was produced by the petitioner before
the Eeturning Officer and it was also produced subsequently before the
Election Tribunal at the instance of the rival candidate in connection
with a recriminatory petition, and a complaint was filed by the rival
candidate before a Magistrate against the petitioner for the offences of
forgery under section 465, and using a forged document as genuine under
section 471, of the Indian Penal Code in respect of that nomination
paper, and it was contended that under section 195 of the Criminal
Procedure Code the Magistrate had no power to take cognisance of the
offences: Held, that, though the Eeturning Officer was not a "court"
w ithin the meaning of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, the Elec-
tion Tribunal was a ' court", and under section 195, the Magistrate had,
therefore, no jurisdiction to take' cognisance of the offences without
a complaint in writing by the Election Tribunal. Held further, that,
for the application of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, it was not
necessary that the nomination should have been forged with the inten-
tion of using that document as evidence before the Election Tribunal,
or that the proceedings before the Election Tribunal should be pending
when the complaint was made or that the document should have been
164 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

produced by the accused himself before the Tribunal. Gobindram v.


Emperor (A.I.E. 1942 Sind. 62), Emperor v. Bhawanidas (A.I.E. 1916
All. 299) and In re Baku Vyankatesh (A.I.E. 1926 Bom. 433) followed.
SATYA D B V BUSHAHHI v. GHANSHIAM, 6 E.L.E. 388.

Nature and powers of—The Election Tribunal is a judicial body


and derives its power and authority from the provisions of the E. P. Act.
Its procedure is regulated by the said Act and as a judicial body it is
governed, by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
VIJAYA MOHAN BEDDY V. PAGA P U L L A EEDDY AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.E.
414.
Power to enquire into corrupt practice suo motu—The Tribunal
has jurisdiction to inquire suo motu into allegations of corrupt practice
made in an election petition for the purpose of taking action under section
99 of the E. P. Act, 1951, but it will not do so unless it is properly seized
of the matter and there is material which could be made the foundation
of an enquiry. SHANTILAL CHAUDHAEY V. E A G H U E A J SINGH AND
OTHEBS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.E. 93.

Power to question competency of reference—It is not open to an


Election Tribunal to challenge the competency of the Election Commis-
sion to refer an election petition to it for trial N. E. MEGANATHAN V.
K. T. KOSALEAM AND OTHBES, 9 E.L.E. 242.
Once an election petition has been referred to a Tribunal by th'e
Election Commission the duty of the Tribunal is to dispose of it according
to law. It is not open to the Election Tribunal to challenge the compe-
tence of the Election Commission to appoint the Tribunal or to refer the
election petition to it for trial. SlTAEAM HlEACHAND BlELA v.
YOGEAJ SINGH SHANKAE SINGH PABIHAE, 2 E.L.E. 283.

Power to reconsider question of limitation See, ELECTION


PETITION—LIMITATION supra.
Power of High Courts to interfere with orders of—See H I G H
CoUBTS infra.
Does not possess common law powers—As an election contest is
not an action at law but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the
common law, the court possesses no common law powers in such pro-
ceedings and as a general rule strict observance of the statute is required
as regards the steps necessary to give jurisdiction. Section 85 enacts
this principle of election law. ABDUL EAUF V. GO VTND BALLABH PANT
AND OTHBES, 8 E.L.E. 240.
Irregularities in electoral roll—Though ordinarily a Tribunal
will have no jurisdiction to enquire into irregularities committed in the
ELECTION TRIBUNAL 165

preparation and publication of the electoral roll, it will have jurisdiction


in the matter if there has been a non-compliance with the rules made
under the Act and this is alleged to have materially affected the result
of an election. GAYAPKASHAD V. KEISHNACHANDEA SHAEMA AND
OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 6.
ELECTORAL ROLL.
——Bogus inclusion or exclusion of names—Remedy of elctors and
candidates—Application for inclusion by third person—Written authority
and presentation to proper officer, necessity of- Removal of name—Notice
to party —Application by third person for writ of certiorari for inclusion
or exclusion of names—Maintainability—Application to Election Commis-
sion— Whether more adequate remedy -Bule 11 of theEules framed under
the E. P. Act, 1950, which provides that a claim for including a person
in the electoral rolls shall be signed either by the person desiring his
name to be included or by an agent authorised in writing by such person,
necessarily implies that the authority in writing, if the claim is preferred
by an agent, 'must be in existence at the time the claim is presented ; a
subsequent ratification of the act of another person who has taken upon
himself the responsibility of making a claim is not enough. A claim under
rule 11 for including a person's name in the electoral rolls must be made
personally to the appropriate officer and in the absence of any rules
which authorise such officer to delegate his power in this behalf to any-
one else, presentation to the manager of his office will not be a valid pre-
sentation- Queen Empress v. Arlappa (I.L.E. 15 Mad. 137), Habib Shah
v. Deli Bax Singh (14 I.C. 221) relied on. Under rule 14(2) the name of
a person entered in an electoral roll cannot be removed on the objection
of any other person without serving notice on the former, of the grounds
on which inclusion of his name has been objected to and hearing him,
except in cases where the Eevising Authority is prima facie satisfied as
to the validity of the objection. It is open to an elector or an intending
candidate to apply for a writ for the inclusion or the exclusion of another
person's name from the electoral roll ; for, a writ of certiorari does not
require any personal right or interest to support it. The only distinction
is that in the case of a man personally aggrieved he can ask for a writ
almost ex debito justitiae and that in the case of a man who has not
suffered any injury the court has a discretion to grant or refuse the
application according to the circumstances of the case. A person's name
cannot, however, be removed from the roll by a writ unless he is made a
party to the application and has been given an opportunity to show cause
why his name should not be removed. The remedy provided by rule 20(2)
does not prevent the issuing of a writ, for it is not an adequate remedy
where there has been a large scale exclusion of names and further does
i66 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

not provide for removal of names at all where bogus additions have been
made. They remedy provided by rule 25(a) under which the Election
Commission may at any time revise the rolls, is, however, an adequate
remedy for a person complaining of the inclusion or exclusion of names in
an electoral roll, and it will not be proper to issue a writ for such purpose
when the law provides a more adequate remedy in rule 25(a). CHINNA
MALLA EBDDT AND OTHEES v. T H E B E V E N U E DIVISIONAL OFFICER,
GUNTUB, AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 361.
A revised electoral roll does not speak from the date of the
original roll and nomination of a person whose name was not in the
roll at the time of nomination cannot be validated by a subsequent
amendment or revision of the roll. P. N". BALASUBEAHMANTAN V.
C. K. NAEASIMHAM AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 461.
The words the electoral roll shall be deemed to have been
revised accordingly" in section 25(2) of the E. P. Act, 1950, were not
intended to give retrospective effect to an order for inclusion of a name
in the electoral roll from the date of the final publication of the roll but
only mean that the electoral roll need not be reprinted and republished
on account of the addition or alteration. P. N. BALASUBBAHMANYAN
v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 496.
The words "the electoral roll to which such direction relates
shall be deemed to have been revised accordingly" in rule 20(3) of the
Eepresentation of the People (Preparation of Electoral Eolls) Eules,
1950, are not intended to give retrospective effect to such direction-
EAMATAN SHAEAN SINGH AND ANOTHER V. EAMBSHWAE YADAV AND
OTHEES, 5 E.L..E 296.
The words "shall be deemed to have been revised accord-
ingly" in sub-rule (3) of rule 20 of the Eepresentation of the People
(Preparation of Electoral Eolls) Eules, 1950, do not give retrospective
effect to an order of the Election Commission for the inclusion of a
person's name in the roll under the said rule from the date of the final
publication of the roll; such an order has effect only from the date on
which it was issued. AWADESH PEASAD SlNHA V. PRABHAVATHI
GUPTA AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 45.
Revision—Notice to individuals not necessary—A revised elec-
toral roll is not invalid merely because the names of some persons were
excluded from the roll without giving a separate notice to each of them
to show cause why his name should not be removed. GAYAPBASAD V.
KEISHNACHANDEA SHAEMA AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 6.
Revision'—Reprinting entire roll with amendments as single roll—
Legality-—Persons included in first roll—Omission toinolude in revised roll
ELECTORAL ROLL 167

—Remedy—Application for mandamus to Returning Oficer to conduct


election under old roll—-Maintainability—Where the nomination of a
candidate for a bye-election was rejected by the Eeturning Officer, and
some of his supporters whose names were included in the electoral roll
prepared in 1950 but not included in the revised roll prepared in
1952 and who had not objected to the draft revised roll or taken any
steps for the inclusion of their names in the revised roll, applied to the
High Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Eeturning Officer not
to conduct the election on the basis of the revised roll of 1952, on the
ground that the Election Commission had acted illegally in reprinting
the entire roll with amendments and publishing it as a single roll.
Held, that in revising an electoral roll under rule 22 of the Repre-
sentation of the People (Preparation "of Electoral Eolls) Eules, 1950, it
was open to the Election Commission either to prepare only a list of
amendments and cause it to be printed and published along with the old
roll or to have the entire roll incorporating all the amendments printed
and published as a single roll, and the revised roll was not accordingly
illegal or invalid: POLAKI KOTBSAM v. S. M. PATNAIK AND OTHERS,
8 E.L.E. 159.
As the petitioners had not taken the proper steps and pur-
sued the proper remedies, which were open to them under the law, to
ha.ve their names included in the revised electoral roll, they had no
right to vote, and they could not claim at this stage that their right of
franchise had been taken away arbitrarily ; The petition was also
liable to be dismissed as it was not a bona fide one but 6nly an attempt
to get over the order of the Returning Officer rejecting the nomination
paper of a third person, by indirect means, and also on the ground that
it was filed after an inordinate delay. POLAKI KOTESAM v. S. M. PAT-
SAIK AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 159.

Revision—Rule providing for fee for applications—Validity—


Publication of roll in Hindi—Whether contravenes Constitution—Power
to regulate and, control preparation of electoral rolls, whether includes
power to impose fees—Taxes and fees—Difference—'Where a candidate
who was unsuccessful in an election brought a suit against the Election
Commission and others for the following reliefs : (1) that the proviso
to sub-ruin (2) of rule 20 of the Representation of the People (Prepara-
tion of Electoral Eolls) Eules, was ultra vires; (2) that the electoral
rails of the constituencies for which the election was held were ultra
vires and illegal; and (3) that all the acts relating to the election done
by defendants 1 to 4 were ultra vires and illegal: Held, that the suit
was really one to get the election of the successful candidates set aside
i68 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

and was therefore barred by article 329(b) of the Constitution. Ponnu-


swami v. Returning Officer (l E.L.E. 133 : [1952] S.C.B. 218) and Theberge
V. Laudry (1876, 2 App. Cas. 102) applied. BAMLAKSMAN SHARMA V.
ELECTION COMMISSION OP INDIA AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 364.

Rule 20, sub-r_n!e (2), of the Eepresentation of the People


(Preparation of Electoral Bolls) Eules, 1950, which provides that an
application for revision of the electoral rolls after the final publication
shall not be entertained if it is not accompanied by a fee of Bs, 50 is
not ultra vires. BAMLAKSMAN SHAEMA V. ELECTION COMMISSION OF
INDIA AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.E. 364.

Even though sub-section (2) of section 28 does not in ex-


press words empower the Central Government to make rules providing
for the realisation of fees, sub-section (2) of section 28 does not restrict
the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (l) of section 28,
and under sub-section (l) of this section the Central Government is fully
competent to enact a rule imposing a fee for applications for revision of
the rolls. King-Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee ([1945] P.C.B. 195) relied
on. EAMLAKSMAN SHAEMA V. ELECTION COMMISSION ON INDIA AND
OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 364.

The imposition of fee for an application for revision of the


electoral roll is not the levying of a tax but merely a provision for regu-
lation and control of the preparation of the rolls, and neither rule 20(2)
in so far as it imposes a fee, nor section 28 in so far as it empowers the
Government to make a rule imposing such a fee, contravenes art, 327 of
the Constitution BAMLAKSMAN SHAEMA V. ELECTION COMMISSION
AND OTHERS, 7E.L.B. 364.
Eule 6 of the Eepresentation of the People (Preparation of
Electoral Bolls) Eules, 1950, which permits electoral rolls to be /prepared
in languages other than English (e.g., Hindi) does not contravene art. 343
(2) of the Constitution. BAMLAKSMAN SHAEMA V. ELECTION COM-
MISSION AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.B. 364.
Amendment of revised roll—Rule empowering name of voter to be
included in roll under direction of Election Commission before nomination
—Whether ultra vires—Central Government s power to make rules—
Inclusion of name in Assembly roll -Duty to enter name in Parliamentary
roll also—Where the petitioner's name was not entered in the roll of the
Parliamentary Constituency for which he stood, but on the day before
his nomination was filed, an order was received from the Election Com-
mission to include his name in a particular Assembly Constituency and
the Electoral Officer included his name in the Parliamentary Constituency
ELECTORAL ROLL 169

also on the same date: Held, that, under the provisions of rule 23
of the Representation of the People Rules, 1950, his name was properly
included in the electoral roll of the Parliamentary Constituency also.
M E H T A GOBDHANDAS GIBDHABLAL v. CHAVDA AKBAR DALUMIYAN
AND OTHBES, 4 E.L.R. 499.

Validity of ride 20(2).—The general power of the Central Govern-


ment to frame rules under section28(l) of the R.P. Act, 1950, is not curtail-
ed or in any way limited by the illustrative instances in which such power
may be exercised, mentioned in section 28(2)(h). The Central Government is
competent to make rules in consultation with the Election Commission for
carrying out the purposes of the R. P. Act, 1950, and since preparation
of the electoral rolls was one of the purposes of the R. P. Act, 1950, and
the said Act did not restrict either expressly or impliedly the authority
of the Central Government to make rules on the point, the Central
Government had powor to enact a provision like rule 20(2). MEHTA
GOEDHANDAS GlEDHAELAL V. CHAVDA AKBAE DALUMIYAN AND
OTHEBS, 4 E.L.R. 499.

•The provisions of sub-rule (2) of rule 20 of the Representation


of the People (Preparation of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950, which permit
amendment of an electoral roll by including the names of new persons
in the roll in pursuance of a direction issued by the Election Com-
mission, do not conflict with the provisions of section 25 of the R. P.
Act, 1950, but, on the other hand, merely supplement section 25(2); and
sub-rule (2) of rule 20 is not therefore ultra vires. MEHTA GOBDHANDAS
GIBDHAELAL V. CHAVDA AKBAB DALUMIYAN AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R.
499.
Omission to prepare draft roll for certain villages—Misdescrip-
tion of female voters—Voters deprived of franchise—Validity of election
—Jurisdiction of Tribunal to consider these questions—Finality of roll
—Publication of rolls—Presumption of due publication—The provision
contained in rule 3 of the Representation of the People (Preparation of
Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950, that an electoral roll should be prepared
containing the names of all persons appearing to be entitled to be
registered therein for every constituency, is mandatory and omission to
prepare a draft electoral roll for some villages is, therefore, a non-com-
pliance with the rules which would avoid an election if its result has been
materially affected by such non-compliance. LAXMIDATTA AND
ANOTHER V. MADANLAL DHUPAB>AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 398.

Transfer of village after publication—The transfer of a village


to another revenue division by a notification of the Government after
ELD—33
170 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the publication of an electoral roll prepared in accordance with the


delimitation proposed prior to the transfer would not amount to un-
authorised transplantation of that village to a new constituency and
invalidate an election held according to the electoral roll as it was pub-
lished before the transfer of the village. BHBBTJSINGH V. PBABHU
DAYAL CHAUBEY AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 325.
Finality of roll—An electoral roll published according to the
rules is final and the validity of an election cannot be objected to on the
ground that no list of voters was prepared for a particular village.
MAHESH DATTA v. MUBLIDHAB AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 154.
Where the particulars against a serial number in an electoral
roll were: (Name) Hamid, (Father or husband) Yusuf, and (sex) male,
and an application for a ballot paper made by a woman Hamida, wife
of Yusuf, who resided at the address mentioned in the electoral roll,
with the help of the candidate's agent was rejected : Held, that the fact
that the electoral roll was conclusive did not prevent the candidate
from proving that the entry really related to Hamida, wife of Yusuf,
and the candidate was not guilty of corrupt practice of abetment of
personation under section 123(3) of the R.P. Act, 1951. Muzaffarnagar
1924 (Hammond 517), Karnal South (Sen and Podda*r 438) relied on.
SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER V. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD AND
OTHERS, 8E.L.R. 265.
As to age—The finality attached to decisions of the .Revising
Authority under rule 18(1) of the Eules for the Preparation of Electoral
Rolls, so far as age is concerned can only be as to the person entered in
the electoral roll being not less than 21 years of age. An entry in an
electoral roll as regards the age of a voter is not conclusive in other
respects, and it is therefore open to a candidate to adduce evidence
before the Returning Officer to prove that he was not less than 30 years
of age when he was nominated, even though according to the age as
given in the electoral roll he would not be more than 28 years of age
on that date. Aligarh District East (N. M. B.) (Hammond 56) Aligarh
District, West (Hammond 62) Golaghat [N.M.B.) (Hammond 375) U.P.
Anglo-Indian Constituency case (2 Doabia 106) referred to. K. SUBRA-
MANYAM v. ABDUL HAMEED KHAN AND OTHEES, 1 E.L.R. 432.
-The Election Tribunal is not bound to take an entry as to age
in the electoral roll as conclusive but has power to ascertain and deter-
mine the real age of a candidate. The qualifying data so far as a
candidate is concerned is the date of nomination. Where the election
of a candidate is set aside on the ground that he was below 25 years of
age and so disqualified, the petitioner who got the next highost number
ELECTORAL ROLL

of votes cannot be declared as duly elected as the votes given for the
unqualified candidate are not invalid votes within section 101 (a).
PBAKASH NARAIN v. JAGDISH CHANDRA JOSHI AND OTHERS, 4 B.L.E.
205.
The entry in the electoral roll relating to the age of the proposer
is not conclusive by reason of the provisions of section 36(7)(a) of the
K. P. Act, 1951, and notwithstanding such an entry in the electoral roll,
the question of age could be enquired into by the Eeturning Officer as
well as the Election Tribunal. K. Subramanyam v. Abdul Hameed Khan
(1 B.L.E. 432) applied. HAKIKATTTLLAH V. NATHU SINGH AND OTHERS,
6 B.L.E. 10.
Though an electoral roll is final so far as the Eeturning Officer
and presiding officer are concerned, the Election Tribunal can inquire into
the question whether a voter was a minor and as such his vote was
invalid, even though according to the age given in the roll he was a
major. J U J H A R SINGH v. BHAIRON LALL AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 457.
Correction of entry—Time limit—Section 25(b) of the E. P.
Act, 1950, does not fix any time limit for correction of an incorrect
entry as to age in the electoral roll; the Electoral Eegistration Officer may
therefore correct an entry at any time before the scrutiny of the nomina-
tion papers. Even though on the date of the nomination the age of the
candidate as entered in the electoral roll was below 25 years, the nomina-
tion cannot be rejected if he was really not below 25 years of age on that
date and the wrong entry in the electoral roll is corrected by the Elec-
toral Eegistration Officer before the date of scrutiny. EAM SlNGH V.
HAZARI LAL AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 224.

As to qualification—An entry of a person's name in the roll


of a particular village is conclusive evidence that that person was quali-
fied to be entered on the roll of that village as a voter and the Eeturning
Officer has no jurisdiction at the time of scrutiny of nominations to go
behind the roll and inquire whether he was qualified to be entered as a
voter in the roll of that village, and reject the nomination on the ground
that he was not qualified to be entered as a voter in that roll. JoGINDER
S I N G H V. EAGHBIR SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 81.

——Section 62 of the E. P. Act, 1951, which makes an electoral roll


final and conclusive does not prevent the Tribunal from inquiring into the
question whether, owing to a misdescription of the names of female
voters in the roll, several female voters were not allowed to vote, and
also whether, owing to omission to prepare an electoral roll with regard
to some villages, the result of the election was materially affected.
172 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

LAXMIDATTA AND ANOTHEB v. MADANLAL DHUPAE AND OTHEBS, 7


E.L.R. 398.
It is settled law that the Election Tribunal can go behind the
electoral roll and determine whether the candidate possessed necessary
qualifications for standing as a candidate. JAGDISH SINGH V. EUDEA
DEOLAL AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 311.

Injunction against conducting election according to roll—•


"Under article 329 (b) of the Constitution the High Court has no
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus or direction to the Returning
Officer that he should or should not conduct the election on the basis of
the revised roll, as it would amount to calling the election in question
otherwise than by an election petition within the meaning of section
329(b). POLAKI KOTESAM v. S. M. PATNAIK AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 159.
Certified copy—Where a copy of an entry in an electoral
roll bears the seal of the office of the Deputy Commissioner who is
also the Electoral Eegistration Officer and it is signed as a true copy
by the Head Copyist of the Deputy Commissioner's Office, it must be
presumed that the Deputy Commissioner, who was the custodian of the
electoral roll had duly authorised the Head Copyist to issue true copies,
and the copy must be treated as a "certified copy" of the entry. Brij
Naresh Singh v. Thakur Hukum Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 266)
followed. H A E I VISHNU KAMATH V. SYBD AHMED AND OTHEES, 5
E.L.R. 248.
'A copy of an electoral roll attested by a First Class Magistrate,
who in his official capacity as President of a Town Committee had to
keep copies of the electoral roll under his custody, is a certified copy ;
and even if it is not strictly a certified copy" within the meaning of
section 36(7)(a) of the E. P. Act, 1951, and is not conclusive, it is still
evidence which could be looked into by the Returning Officer for identify-
ing the candidate at the time of scrutiny. Shankar Singh v. Thakur Moti
Singh (Hammond 95) followed. MATHBA DAS AND OTHBES V. DAEA
SINGH AND OTHEES, 4 E.L.R. 441.
Presumption of regularity —Under section 114(c)of the Evidence
Act, it must be presumed that the authorities charged with the duty of
publishing the electoral rolls had duly published them. LAXMIDATTA
AND ANOTHER V. MADANLAL D H U P A E AND OTHBBS, 7 E.L.R. 398.
Beturning Officer—Duty to call for electoral roll. See NOMTNA.
TION OP CANDIDATES-
Application for writ of mandamus to Electoral Officer toprepare
electoral roll in a certain manner—Election in progress—Jurisdiction to
ELECTORAL ROLL 173

issue writ—Where, after the publication of a notice calling upon a con-


stituency to elect a member and after nominations had been filed and the
list of valid nominations had been published, and the date for the election
had also been fixed, an application was made for a writ of mandamus against
the Chief Electoral Officer of the State and the Returning Officer of the con-
stituency, for directing the respondents to prepare the electoral roll of the
constituency including certain villages which had been included in
another constituency in the electoral roll as finally published : Held, that
as the writ prayed for would interfere with the process of the election
under article 329(b) of the Constitution the High Court had no jurisdic-
tion to issue any such writ. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal
(1 E.L.E. 133) applied. N. CHENCHCEAMA NAIDTJ V. T H E C H I E F ELEC-
TOEAL OFFICER, ANDHEA STATE, AND ANOTHEB, 10 E.L.E. 268.
See also cases under N O M I N A T I O N - ELECTOEAL EOLL.

ESTOPPEL.
——Whether applicable to election disputes'—The principles of
estoppel and approbation and reprobation of parties are not applicable to
election disputes as the proper conduct of elections is a matter of public
concern in which the whole electorate is interested. MAHESH DATTA V.
MUELIDHAE AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.E. 154.
Admission before Beturning officer—The mere fact that the
petitioner conceded before the Beturning Officer, that he was holding a
contract with the Government would not estop him from contending
before the Tribunal that there was no contract for the supply of goods
to the Government. LUMBA EAM V. BAM NABAIN AND OTHERS, 5
E.L.E. 319.
——Omission to raise objection before Beturning Officer—Eight of
objection to a nomination paper cannot be waived nor is any estoppel
created against a candidate by his not raising any objection at the time of
nomination to the act of the Eeturning Officer. VAJAYA MOHAN EEDDY
v. PAGA P U L L A EEDDY AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 414. See also BALBIR
SINGH V. ARJAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E- 341.

Withdrawal of objection before Beturning Officer—The with-


drawal of an objection to a nomination before the Eeturning Officer would
not prevent the objection from being raised before the Election Tribunal
on the principle of estoppel, waiver or acquiescence. AWADESH PRASAD
SINHA v. PRABHAVATHI GUPTA AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 45.

Bight of person on ivhose objection nomination was rejected to


urge that nomination was improperly rejected—A candidate on whose
objection a nomination paper has been rejected is not estopped from
174 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

urging in an election petition that the nomination paper was improperly


rejected as the proper conduct of elections is a matter of concern to the
entire electorate and the equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot be imported
to election proceedings. PREM N A T H V. E A M KiSHAN AND OTHERS, 1
B.L.E. 271.
HIGH COURTS.
Jurisdiction to issue writ to Election Tribunal—When writ can
be issued—Article 329(b) of the Constitution and sections 105 and 170 of
the E. P. Act, 1951, do not entirely oust the jurisdiction of the High
Courts over Election Tribunals. The High Courts are only precluded
from entering into the merits of a disputed election. Whether an Elec-
tion Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or assumes jurisdiction which it
does not possess, or an order happens to be made by a Tribunal through
manifest fraud on the part of the person in whose favour it is made, are
matters on which the jurisdiction of the High Court is not taken away.
Whether the election petition can be allowed to be amended, whether
fresh instances of corrupt practices can be allowed to be added to those
mentioned in the list accompanying the petition, whether the allegations
in the petition or the lists purporting to relate to corrupt practices such
as bribery or publications of false statements in relation to the personal
character or conduct of the petitioner or in relation to his candidature
or withdrawal would, if believed, constitute such corrupt practices,
whether the allegations in the petition falling beyond the purview of the
actual relief prayed for in it, could or should be enquired into, and
similar questions, are matters which the Tribunal alone could decide and
about which the High Court has no right to pronounce upon. Parry £
Go. Ltd. v. Commercial Employees Association (A.I.E. 1952 S. C. 179)
Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan (L. E. 5 App. Cas. 417) and
Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. (A.I.E. 1940 P. C. 105) referred to.
SlVATHANU PlLLAI V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, TBIVANDBAM, AND
OTHEBS, 2 E.L.E. 263.

Jurisdiction to issue writ against Election Tribunal—Dis-


qualification of Member of State Assembly—Reference to Election Com-
mission—Jurisdiction of High Court to issue writ against Commission—•
The respondent who had been convicted and sentenced to rigorous impri-
sonment for seven years, was elected a member of the Madras Legislative
Assembly. At the instance of the Speaker of the Assembly, the Governor
of Madras referred to the Election Commission, which had its offices
permanently located at New Delhi, the question whether the respondent
was disqualified and could be allowed to sit and vote in the Assembly.
The respondent thereupon applied to the High Court of Madras under
HIGH COURTS . 175

article 226 of the Constitution for a writ restraining the Election Commis-
sion from enquiring into his alleged disqualification for membership of
the Assembly and the High Court, accordingly issued a writ against the
Election Commission. Held that the fact that the matter referred to it
for decision related to a member's right to sit and vote in the Legislative
Assembly at Madras and the parties to the dispute resided in the State
of Madras could not give jurisdiction to the High Court of Madras to
issue such a writ against the Election Commission. Held further, that
articles 190(3) and 192(1) of the Constitution of India are applicable only
to disqualifications to which a member becomes subject after he is elected
as such, and neither the Governor nor the Election Commission had
jurisdiction to enquire into the respondent's disqualification which arose
long before his election. The judgment of the Madras High Court in
Saka Venkata Rao v. Election Commission (1 E.L.E. 417) reversed.
ELECTION COMMISSION V. SAKA VENKATA RAO, 2 E.L.R. 499 (S.C.).

Jurisdiction over Election Tribunal—Gertiorari—Errors of law,


whether ground for interference—The High Court has jurisdiction to
entertain a writ petition against an Election Tribunal. An error of law
in the decision of the preliminary issue whether a candidate who has
withdrawn his candidature was a necessary party to ' the election peti-
tion, is no ground for quashing the order of the Tribunal in the exercise
of the powers to issue a writ of certiorari to subordinate Tribunals. The
question whether a candidate who withdrew his candidature should be
impleaded or not is not in the nature of a collateral fact upon the existence
of which the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal depends. SHEO
KUMAR AND ANOTHER V. V. G. OAK AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 103.

Jurisdiction over Election Tribunal—Power to issue writs—•


When writs will be issued—Excess or want of jurisdiction, necessity of—
The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs or orders under articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution to quash the orders of an Election Tri-
bunal is not taken away by article 329(b) of the Constitution or any of the
provisions of the R. P. Act, 1951, or by any other provision of law. This
jurisdiction is, however, confined to errors of jurisdiction, that is to say*
where the Tribunal has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or refused to
exercise its jurisdiction, or there is an error apparent on the face of the
record. Where several nomination papers are filed the Election Tribunal
has jurisdiction to decide whether in such a case all the nomination
papers would be invalid, or the first would be valid and the others alone
would be invalid, and, as there was no excess or want of jurisdiction, or
any error apparent on the face of the record, the High Court would not
interfere by issuing a writ under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution,
176 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

even if the decision of the Election Tribunal was wrong. The word
"election" in article 329(b) of the Constitution does not include the
proceedings before the Election Tribunal or the Tribunal's verdict.
HAMIEKHA ALABKHA v. BETITRNING OFFICER, JAMNAGAR CITY, AND
OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 230.

Power to issue writ against Election Tribunal—When writ will


be issued—Guiding principles—Delay, effect of—Per TEJA SINGH C.J.
and PASSEY J. —An Election Tribunalconstituted to determine an election
petition after the result of the election has baen declared, is subject to
the superintendence and control of the High Court under article 227 of the
Constitution. The High Court would not, however, interfere under
article 227 in any matter which relates to the merits of the election
petition. Section 105 of the E. P. Act, 1951, cannot take away the powers
of the High Court which were expressly given to it by articles 228 and
227 of the Constitution. HUKAM SlNGH AND ANOTHER v. SARDUL
SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 162.

If a party aggrieved by an order of tho Election Tribunal seeks


to invoke the extraordinary and discretionary remedy of writ to avoid
miscarriage of justice, lie must do so as early as possible. In cases where
there is other remedy also available, a long and un-explained delay in
making the petition might render it liable to be dismissed on that score,
but if the aggrieved party has no other remedy under the law, the delay
in filing" a petition may not by itself be a sufficient ground for rejecting it
outright. HlXKAM SlNGH AND ANOTHER V. SARDUL SlNGH AND
OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 162.

Jurisdiction to issue writ against orders of Election Tribunal—•


"Election", meaning of—Scope of article 329{b)—Jurisdiction of High
Court over Election Commission—The High Court has no jurisdiction to
interfere with an order of an Election Tribunal, under article 226 or 227
of the Constitution, inasmuch as under article 329(b) no election can be
called in question except by an election petition presented to such
authority as may be provided by the appropriate Legislature, and the
Parliament has vested the Election Tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction in
such matters. The High Court cannot interfere under articles 226 or
227 for the further reason that when an order of the Election Tribunal is
adopted by the Election Commission, it becomes the act of the Election
Commission and issuing an order against an Election Tribunal which has
become functus officio would, in effect, be issuing an order against the
Election Commission itself and no High Court has jurisdiction to issue
an order against the Election Commission as its office is located at New
Delhi. The term "election" in article 329 of the Constitution includes
HIGH COURTS 1JJ

all proceedings commencing with the nomination and ending with the
declaration of the result and an election must therefore be deemed to
continue till a final decision, by whosoever it be, is reached, regarding the
result of the poll; that an election petition has been filed and dismissed or
allowed does not therefore remove the bar of article 325(b). Ponnuswami
v. Upturning Officer, Namakkal (1 E.L.R. 133) applied. RAMKRISHNA
v. TFTAKUK DAOOSING, 6 E.L.R. 186. [Overruled],
Error apparent on the face of the record"—An error of law
apparent on the face of the record" for which the High Court may set
aside an order of a Subordinate Tribunal by a writ of certiorari is not a
formal or accidental error which can be remedied by means of an amend-
ment ; an error in a proposition of law which forms the basis of the
Tribunal's conclusion is an error apparent on the face of the record.
S. KHADER S H E R I F F V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND OTHERS,
7 E.L.R. 471.
-Power of superintendence over Eleetion Tribunal"Interference
with mere errors of law—The general power of superintendence over
subordinate courts and Tribunals conferred by article 227 of the Consti-
tution on the High Courts involves a duty to keep them within the
bounds of their jurisdiction—to see that they do what their duty requires
them to do and that they do it in a legal manner. It does not, however,
empower the High Courts to sit as an appellate court and correct mere
errors of law or fact committed by subordinate courts and Tribunals. In
giving the Election Tribunal the power to dismiss an election petition for
non-complianca with sections 81, 83, or 117, the Legislature has vested the
Tribunal with the jurisdiction to decide whether a petition or the schedules
attached to it containing the list of corrupt practices have been properly
verified or not, and if it decides that they have not been properly verified,
the High Court will not interfere with the decision under article 226
or 227 of the Constitution, even though its decision may be erroneous,
as the powers conferred by those articles are not intended to be exercised
for correcting errors ' of law or fact. SHANTILAL CHAUDHARY V.
RAGHURAJ SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 489.

Mere wrong decision—However dissatisfied the High Court


may be with the judgment of the Tribunal on the merits and however
different a view it might have taken, it is after all for the authority
set up under the Constitution to decide matters on merits, and if the
High Court were to interfere on the merits it would be ignoring the
provisions of article 329 of the Constitution. RANCHHODLAL LlLADHAR
VAYEDA v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, AHMEDABAD, 8 E.L.R. 59,
ELD—24 • • ••
178 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Jurisdiction over Election Tribunals—Power to issue writ


of certiorari—When writ will be issued—Jurisdiction of special
Tribunals—General principles —An application under article 226 of
the Constitution for a writ to quash an order of the Election Tribunal
is not an application which calls in question an election within
the meaning of article 329 (b) of the Constitution and the juris-
diction of the High Courts to entertain such an application under
article 226 is not barred by article 329 (b). The fact that a High
Court cannot issue a writ against the Election Commission because
the Election Commission is not located within its territorial juris-
diction, cannot deprive that High Court of its jurisdiction to issue
a writ to quash an order of an Election Tribunal which was fun-
ctioning within its territorial jurisdiction. The High Court does not
in such a case do anything indirectly which it cannot do directly.
Election Commission, India v. Saha Venkata Bao (2 E.L.E. 499) referred
to. Once an election petition is referred to an Election Tribunal for
disposal, the Election Tribunal has full jurisdiction to decide all ques-
tions of fact and law, and no writ of certiorari will lie against its decision
even though it may be wrong in law, except where it offends against the
principles of natural justice or is clearly in excess of jurisdiction or there
is an error apparent on the face of the record. An Election Tribunal does
not act without jurisdiction in trying an election petition which has been
referred to it for disposal by the Election Commission, even though candi-
dates who had withdrawn their candidature had not been impleaded as
parties to the petition. MADAN MOHAN V. BANKAT L A L AND OTHEBS
8E.L.E. 119.

The power of superintendence vested in the High Courts by


article 227 of the Constitution includes the power to interfere judicially
with the judgments of subordinate courts. Bimala Prosad Boy v. State
of West Bengal (A.I.E. 1951 Cal. 258) and Girish Chandra Majhi v.
Girish Chandra Maity (A.I.E. 1951 Cal. 574) relied on. SHAH
MOHAMMAD UMAIBV. BAM CHABAN SINGH ANDOTHEBS, 8E.L.E. 179.

The High Court will not exercise its powers under article 226
of the Constitution to interfere with an order of an Election Tribunal re-
fusing to examine a "particular witness. Queen v. Marsham ([1892], 1
Q.B. 371) distinguished. SHANTA D E V I VAIDYA V. ELECTION TRIBU-
NAL, FAIZABAD, AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 201.
•Jurisdiction over Election Tribunals—Power to issue writ
after Tribunal has disposed of the petition - Whether Tribunal exists
dormantly or automatically revives when its order is set aside—Power to
issue direction to Election Commission —Article 329 (b) of the Constitution
HIGH COURTS 179

does not. bar the jurisdiction of the High Courts to exercise their
powers under articles 226.and 227 over Election Tribunals constituted
to decide disputes connected with the election or arising out of the same.
KALYAN SINGH V. ELECTION TBIBUNAL, A J H E B , AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E.
207.

-An Election Tribunal constituted to try an election petition


ceases to exist as soon as it completes its task and passes final orders
disposing of the petition. I t cannot be deemed to exist thereafter in a
dormant state or to revive automatically when its order is vacated by a
High Court. The High Court cannot therefore issue a direction or writ
to an Election Tribunal after it has disposed of the petition finally. It
can only vacate the order of the Tribunal. The High Court cannot also
issue a writ or direction to the Election Commission to cease to take
further action or to vacate notifications issued by it in pursuance of the
orders of an Election Tribunal. KALYAN SINGH V. ELECTION TEIBUNAL,
A J M E E , AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 207.

Power to issue writ of certiorari against Election Tribunal—


Power of superintendence, scope of—When writ will be issued—Tribunal
ceasing to exist—The language of article 227 of the Constitution is com-
prehensive enough to enable the High Courts to exercise their powers
of superintendence over an Election Tribunal appointed under the
R. P. Act, 1951. The power of superintendence under article 227 would
include judicial review but this power is not unlimited and cannot be
employed to correct every form of hardship. A writ of certiorari can-
not be granted to quash a decision of an inferior court acting within its
jurisdiction, on the ground that inadmissible evidence has been admitted
or the decision is wrong. I t is not open to the High Court to canvass
the reasoning of the impugned decision, unless it can be shown that the
authority which passed that order acted without jurisdiction, or in excess
of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice. The correct
rule is that there must be an error apparent on the face of the record or
of the order impugned ; or the error should be admitted in the face of
the court; and the error of law must affect the jurisdiction of the Tri-
bunal. The mere fact that two views are possible on a question of fact
would not be sufficient to hold that the order of the Tribunal is bad and
to justify the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash that order. A writ
of certiorari can be issued only in respect of matters which are within
the jurisdiction of the High Court. Where an inferior court is one of
civil jurisdiction, but by statute or custom it administers a law peculiar
to its own from in respect of some particular matter and so possesses to
T8O ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

this limited extent jurisdiction which the superior court does not possess,
certiorari will not issue to remove proceedings which come within that
special jurisdiction. Per NABASIMHAM J.—The limitations imposed on
the High Court in exercising its powers of issuing a writ of certiorari
under article 226 may not apply with full force when the court exercises
its powers under article 227. Article 227 seems to be wide enough to
enable the High Court not only to set aside the order of the inferior Tri-
bunal in appropriate cases but also to give adequate relief where the circum-
stances of the case justify the exercise of this extraordinary power. The
fact that the Tribunal is an ad hoc Tribunal and ceases to exist after giving
its decision does not make any difference as regards the exercise of this
power. DANDAPANI DAS V. MOHAN NAYAK AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.B 220.
Delay, effect of—The powers which the High Courts enjoy under
article 226 of the Constitution are of a discretionary nature, though that
discretion has to be exercised in accordance with judicial principles. The
High Court will not, therefore, interfere when the application for the issue
of a writ of quo warranto is a belated one. [In this case the High Court
refused to interfere as the application was filed nearly one year after the
proceeding before the Election Tribunal had commenced and almost all
the evidence had been adduced.] H A B I SHANKAB PRASAD GUPTA V.
SUKHDEO PRASAD AND ANOTHER, 8 B.L.E. 341.

Mere irregularities—The court will not grant a quo warranto in


a case where there is only a mere irregularity which can be cured. H A R I
SHANKAR PRASAD GUPTA V. SOTCHDEO PRASAD AND ANOTHER, 8 E.L.E.
341.
• Mere wrong decision—The High Court is not a court of appeal
from a decision of the Election Tribunal and it cannot quash or modify an
order made by the Tribunal on the ground it is not an order which the
High Court itself would have been disposed to make. AUDESH PHATAP
SINGH V. B R I J NARAIN AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 1.

Against order allowing amendment—The case which a respondent


has to meet is to be found in the petition, and the list; whether that case
has been so radically changed by an amendment of the particulars in the
list must depend on the facts, but the High Court would not be justified
in interfering with an order of the Tribunal allowing an amendment un-
less it is quite clear that the Tribunal has overreached itself. If an
amendment causes inconvenience to the respondent, this can be compen-
sated by costs. "Where it was alleged in an election petition that electors
in a large number of villages were subjected to undue influence and that
particulars so far ascertained were given in the list attached to the petition
HIGH COURTS l8l

and subsequently an application was made for amendment of this


list by adding the names of two more villages in which undue influence
was practised, and the amendment was allowed by the Tribunal : Held,
that, as the application was one for amendment of the list only and not of
the petition itself and section 83(3) permitted amendment of the list by
giving further and better particulars, and the amendment did not sub-
stantially alter the nature of the petition, the Tribunal did not act with-
out jurisdiction in allowing the amendment and the High Court would
not interfere with the order by issuing a writ. Maude v. Lowley (1874,
L.E. 9 C.P. 165) distinguished. AUDESH PEATAP SINGH V. B R I J NARAIN
AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 1.
Jurisdiction over Election Tribunals—Power to issue writs—
Powers of superintendence—• Election," meaning of— Finality" of orders
•—Whether excludes power to issue writs-—Writ against Tribunal which
has ceased to function—There is nothing in article 329(b) of the Constitu-
tion which takes away the remedy granted by article 226 to a person who
is aggrieved by any decision of the Election Tribunal, or the power of
superintendence of the High Court over the proceedings of the Tribunal
under article 227. Finality given to orders of an Election Tribunal by
section 105 of the R. P. Act, 1951, cannot affect the constitutional
powers of superintendence of the High Court, as no Parliamentary or
State Legislatures can abrogate the supervisory powers granted by the
Constitution. The proceedings before the Election Tribunal or its orders
cannot be regarded as included in the term ' election", and calling in
question orders or proceedings of the Tribunal is not therefore the same
thing as "calling in question an election." An order of the Election
Tribunal, when it is adopted by the Election Commission and notified,
does not become an order of the Election Commission, and even though
the Tribunal has ceased to exist and the Election Commission is not
situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, a writ or
order can be issued or made under article 226 or 227. The existence or
non-existence of the inferior court or Tribunal is not a matter of any
consequence for the exercise of the powers of superintendence, and they
are not taken away as soon as the court or Tribunal ceases to function
or is abolished. The power of superintendence under article 227 of the
Constitution does not make the High Court a court of appeal or revision
over the proceedings of the Tribunal. It is only where there is any
grave miscarriage of justice and flagrant violation of law, or where the
Tribunal has failed to act within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or acts
contrary to the provisions of law prescribing the mode of its acting
which has materially affected its decision, that the High Court may
interfere to remedy the obvious error or the grave injustice. The question
182 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

whether an election petition complies with the provisions of section


83 of theB.P. Act, 1951, with regard to the contents of the petition and
the filing of a list containing full particulars of corrupt practices, is a
matter which is within the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal to decide
and even if it finds that the petition does not comply with section 83, the
Tribunal is not bound to dismiss the petition. The High Court will not
therefore interfere with a writ under article 227 of the Constitution to
quash an order of a Tribunal refusing to dismiss a petition for non-
compliance with section 83. Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhiram
(5 B.L.E. 1), Huham Singh v. Sardul Singh and Others (6 B.L.E. 162),
Jagdish Chandra v. Prakash Narain and Others (A.I.E. 1953 V. P. 5l)
followed. Shankar Nanasaheb Karpe v. Returning Officer, Kolaba (1
E.L.E. 13) and N. P. Ponnusivami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal (l
B.L.E. 133) referred to. Ramakrishna v. Thakur Daoosing (6 E.L.E. 186)
dissented from. TIEATH SINGH V. BACHITAE SINGH AND OTHERS, 9
E.L.E. 163.
Mere wrong decision—-However wide the jurisdiction of the
Higli Court under article 226 of the Constitution may be, it is not
so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court
of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned
and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made.
T E J SINGH V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, J A I P U B , AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 193.
Jurisdiction to issue writs against Election Tribunals and Elec-
tion Commission—When ivrit will be issued—Errors apparent on the face
of the record and flagrant errors of law— Whether sufficient grounds—Arti-
cle 329 (b) of the Constitution does not deprive the High Courts of their
jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 to issue writs to quash the proceed-
ings of Election Tribunals. An Election Tribunal is set up only after an
election is over, and calling in question the order of an Election Tribunal
is not calling in question "an election" within article 329(b). The order
of an Election Tribunal does not become an order of the Election Com-
mission when it is published by the latter nor is the Election Tribunal a
mere amanuensis of the latter. Section 105 of the E. P. Act, 1951, which
provides that the order of an Election Tribunal shall be final and con-
clusive cannot prevail over the constitutional powers of the High Courts
under articles 226 and 227. An Election Tribunal does not become
functus officio after it has pronounced its order; even if does become so,
this fact cannot affect the effectiveness of a writ that may be issued to
quash its proceedings. The High Court can issue a writ against the
Election Commission in respect of duties which the latter performs or has
to perform within the jurisdiction of the High Court. Saka Venkata
HIGH COURTS 183

Rao's case (2 B.L.E. 499) distinguished. Apart from questions of jurisdic-


tion, a writ of certiorari can also be issued where a Tribunal has com-
mitted mistakes apparent on the face of the record or committed flagrant
violation of law. [The order of the Tribunal was set aside by a writ in
the case on the ground that it considered the question of an implied con-
tract not alleged in the pleadings and not specifically put in issue, and
gave a finding clearly against admitted facts and also committed a flagrant
error of law in inferring an implied contract from the mere fact that a
firm supplied goods when orders were placed from time to time.]
LAKKAPPA v. NAEASIMHE GOWDA AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 201.
Jurisdiction—Power to issue writs against Election Tribunals
and Election Commission—When writ will be issued—Errors apparent
on the face of the record and flagrant errors of law—Whether sufficent
grounds —Article 329(b) of the Constitution does not deprive the High
Courts of their jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 to issue writs to
quash the proceedings of Election Tribunals. An Election Tribunal is set
up only after an election is over, and calling in question the order of an
Election Tribunal is not calling in question an election" within article
329(b). The order of an Election Tribunal does not become an order of
the Election Commission when it is published by the latter nor is the
Election Tribunal a mere amanuensis of the latter. Section 105 of
the R. P. Act, 1951, which provides that the order of an Election
Tribunal shall be final and conclusive cannot prevail over the con-
stitutional powers of the High Courts under articles 226 and 227. A writ
can be issued to an Election Tribunal even after it has pronounced its
order, for it does not become functus officio after it has pronounced its
order; even if it does become so, this fact cannot affect the effectiveness
of a writ that may be issued to quash its proceedings. T. NAGAPPA V.
BASAPPA AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 216.
Jurisdiction to issue writ against Election Tribunal—Article
329(b) of the Constitution is no bar to an application for a writ against an
Election Tribunal as such application does not call in question any elec-
tion. Under article 226 of the Constitution the High Court can issue a
writ against any authority within the jurisdiction of the High Court;
it is not necessary that the authority should be subordinate to the High
Court. The correctness of the appreciation of evidence by an Election
Tribunal cannot be questioned in a petition for a writ under article 226.
BAWA BACHITTAE SINGH V. ELECTION COMMISSION AND OTHEES, 9
E.L.E. 506.
Jurisdiction over Election Tribunals—Writ of certiorari—
General principles—"Errors apparent on the face of the record"—Finding
184 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

of fact supported by evidence though erroneous not sufficient for issue


of ivrit-—One of the fundamental principles in regard to the issuing of a
writ of certiorari is that the writ can be availed of only to remove or
adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts and the expression "judicial
acts" in this connection includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions
by administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exer-
cise such functions and is used in contrast with what are purely
ministerial acts. The second essential feature of a writ of certiorari is
that the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-
judicial tribunals or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory capacity.
In granting a writ of certiorari the superior court does not review or
reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribu-
nal purports to be based and substitute its own views for those of the
inferior tribunal, but it demolishes the order which it considers to be
without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous. Certiorari may and is
generally granted when a court had acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of tin
subject-matter of the proceeding or from the absence of some preliminary
proceeding or the court itself may not be legally constituted or may
suffer from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances, and
when the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of some
collateral fact, the court cannot by a wrong decision of the fact give it
jurisdiction which it would f-.ot otherwise possess. A tribunal may be
competent to enter upon an enquiry but in making the enquiry it may
act in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or whore no particular
procedure is prescribed, it may violate the principles of natural justice,
and a writ of certiorari may be available in such cases. An error in the
decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of cer-
tiorari, but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the
proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the
provisions of law. In other words, it is patent error which can be
corrected by certiorari but not mere wrong decision. Where the only
amendment of the election petition applied for by the petitioner was a
modification in the prayer clause by the addition of an alternative prayer
and no change in the averments in the petition was sought to be intro-
duced and, though the Tribunal allowed the amendment, it ultimately
granted only the prayer which was originally asked for and did not allow
the alternative prayer which was introduced by the amendment : Held,
that the fact that the Tribunal allowed the petition to be amended was in
the circumstances immaterial and the final order of the Tribunal could not
be held to be one passed without jurisdiction. Where there is evidence
in support of the findings of fact arrived at by the Election Tribunal, the
HIGH COURTS ' 185

High Court cannot, in an application for a writ under article 226, consider
whether that finding of fact is right or wrong and quash the order of the
Tribunal merely because in its opinion the finding is wrong. [Their Lord-
ships held on the merits that the errors which the High Court held to be
errors apparent on the face of the record were not errors apparent on the
face of the record, but were findings of fact based on the evidence adduced
in the case, and even though the High Court might on a review have
come to a different conclusion, these were not matters justifying the issue
of a .writ quashing the order of the Tribunal]. T. C. BASAPPA V.
T. NAGAPPA AND ANOTHER, 10 B.L.E. 14 (S.C.).
-The jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the
Constitution is discretionary and the High Court would not issue a writ
of certiorari unless the Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or the
decision is palpably erroneous. It will not constitute itself into a court
of appeal either on questions of fact or on questions of law and a mere
wrong decision cannot be corrected by a writ of certiorari. T. G. Basappa
v. T. Nagappa and Another (10 E.L.S. 14) relied on. Audesh Pratap
Singh v. Brij Narain and 'Others (9 B.L.R. l) referred to. H A E I S H
CHANDEA BAJPAI AND ANOTHER V. TRILOK SINGH AND OTHERS, 10
E.L.R. 198.
Application for writ by third person—The rule that no person
may invoke the court's aid in respect of a wrongful act of a public
nature not affecting prejudicially the real and special interest or a
specific legal right of the relator is not applicable to the writ of quo
warranto. A member of the public may challenge a public act of the
State and apply for a writ of quo warranto in respect thereof, provided
he does so bona fide and is not a man of straw set up by others as a
mere pawn in the game, and provided it is in the interest of the public
that the legal position should be judicially declared once for all.
V. D. DESHPANDE AND OTHERS V. STATE OP HYDBBABAD AND OTHERS,
10 B.L.E. 203.
Power to issue writs—(i) Article 226 confers on High Courts
power to issue appropriate writs to any person or authority within their
territorial jurisdiction, in terms absolute and unqualified and Election
Tribunals functioning within the territorial juriedietions of the High
Courts fall within the sweep of that power, (ii) On a plain reading of
article 329(b) what is prohibited therein is the initiation of proceedings
for setting aside an election otherwise than by an election petition
presented to such authority and in such manner as provided therein. If
proceedings have been instituted in accordance with article 329(b) by
the presentation of an election petition, the requirements of that article
ELD-25
i86 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

are fully satisfied and thereafter when the election petition is in due
course heard by a Tribunal and decided, whether its decision is open
to attack, and if so, where and to what extent, must be determined by
the general law applicable to decisions of Tribunals, and as they are
subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under article
226, a writ of certiorari under that article will be competent against
decisions of Election Tribunals. N. P. Ponnuswatni v. Returning
Officer, Nmnahhal Constituency (1E.L.E. 133) and Durga ShanJcar Mehta
v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others (9 E.L.E. 494) followed, (iii) The
High Courts have power under article 226 to issue writs of certiorari
for quashing the decisions of Election Tribunals, notwithstanding that
they have become functus officio after pronouncing their decision, for a
writ of certiorari for quashing is directed against the record, and a writ
can be issued to the District Judge or the Chief Judge of the Court of
Small Causes in whose custody the records are kept, to transmit tha
record to the High Court, (iv) The Election Tribunals are subject to
the superintendence of the High Courts under article 227 of the Consti-
tution and as that superintendence is both judicial and administrative
the High Court can under article 227 not only annul the decision of
the Tribunal, but it can also issue further directions in the matter,
(v) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when
an inferior court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it,
or fails to exercise it, Certiorari will also be issued when the court or
Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as
when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard,
or violates the principles of natural justice. The court issuing a writ of
certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction
and consequently the court will not review findings of fact reached by the
inferior court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. A writ of certiorari
can also be issued to correct an error of law. But it is essential that it
should be something more than a mere error ; it must be one which must
be manifest on the face of the record. Parry & Co. v. Commercial
Employees'1 Association, Madras (A.I.E. 1952 S.C. 179), Veerappa Pillai
V. Raman and Raman Ltd. (A.I.E. 1952 S.C. 192), Ebrahim Aboobaker
v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, Neio Delhi (A.I.E. 1952 S.C.
319) and T. G. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another (10 E.L.E. 14), Rex
v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal: Ex parte Shaw
([1952] 1 K.B. 338) relied on. (vi) What is an error apparent on the face
of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an
element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left
to be determined judicially on the facts of each case. Batuk K. Vyas v.
Surat Borough Municipality (A.I.E. 1953 Bom. 133) referred to. HARI
VISHNU KAMATH V. AHMAD ISHAQUB, 10 E.L.E. 216.
HIGH COURTS 187

Delay, effect of—After the issue of rule nisi if the court has
examined the record and is satisfied that the order complained of is mani-
festly erroneous or without jurisdiction it is not bound to reject the
application for a writ simply on the ground that the application has been
made after great delay. DAMODAE GoSWAMI V. NABNABAYAN
GOSWAMI AND OTHERS, 10E.L.E. 272.

Application by voter—A writ of certiorari quashing the decision


of an Election Tribunal can be issued at the instance of a voter even
though the candidate who has been aggrieved does not apply for such a
writ. As the High Court has the power to issue a writ under article 227
on its own motion, it is not bound to refuse a writ merely because the
attention of the court was drawn to the error in the records by a person
not directly affected thereby. In a democratic constitution a voter has not
only a right to exercise his vote, but he is also entitled to see that the
constituency is properly represented and for that purpose to insist that
elections are conducted fairly and in accordance with the rules. DAMO-
DAE GOSWAMI V. NARNAEAYAN GOSWAMI AND OTHEES, 10E.L.E. 272.

Writ after Tribunal has become functus officio—The decision


of an Election Tribunal can be quashed by a writ of certiorari even after
the Tribunal has become functus officio. DAMODAE GOSWAMI V.
NAKNABAYAN GOSWAMI AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 272.

Article 329(b) of the Constitution bars only the initiation of


proceedings calling an election in question and does not take away the
power of the High Court to issue a writ to quash the decision of an
Election Tribunal. DAMODAE GOSWAMI V. FABNAEAYAN GOSWAMI
AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 272.
The power of the High Courts to issue writs of certiorari under
article 226 of the Constitution against Election Tribunals is not in any
way curtailed by section 150 of the E. P. Act, 1951. Hari Vishnu
Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (10 E.L.B. 216), Durga Shankar Mehta v.
Thakur Baghuraj Singh (9 E,L.E. 494) and Baj Krushna Bone v. Binod
Kanungo and Others (9 E.L.E. 294) followed. SANGRAM SINGH V.
ELECTION TRIBUNAL, KOTAH, AND ANOTHER, 10 E.L.E. 293 (S. C).

Power to issue writ of certiorari and mandamus against


Returning Officer — Article 329, clause (b), of the Constitution
of India read with the provisions of the E. P. Act, 1951, excludes
the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs in the nature
of certiorari or mandamus under article 226 of the Constitution for
quashing the order of a Eeturning Officer rejecting the nomination of a
candidate, and directing the Eeturning Officer to include the name of
that candidate in the list of valid nominations. An election commences
i88 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

at any rate when a candidate is duly proposed and seconded and his
nomination paper is filed with the Returning Officer, and the act of a
Returning Officer in scrutinising the nomination takes place after the
commencement of the election and as a part of it. Writs of certiorari and
mandamus will be issued only if they would be final and effective and
such writs not be issued unless the authority whose act is complain-
ed of has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him by law or has
acted in excess of Ms jurisdiction or mala fide. D E . J O H N MA THAI v.
RETURNING OFFICER, KOTTATAM AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 1.
The term "election" in article 319(b) of the Constitution, which
provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution no
enaction to the Parliament or to the Legislature of a State shall be called
ie question except by way of an election petition, must, in its context
and in juxtaposition with articles 327 and 322, bear a wider meaning than
the very limited meaning of the result of an election or the counting of
votes. I t has the same meaning as in articles 327 and 328, namely,
matters relating to or in connection with election, and covers every
stage from the time of the notification till the declaration of the result
and even perhaps, if there is an election petition, till the decision of the
Tribunal. The High Courts, have, therefore, no jurisdiction to issue a
writ under article 226 of the Constitution against the order of a Return-
ing Officer rejecting a nomination paper of a candidate under section 36 (2)
, of the R. P. Act, 1951. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued against
a public officer merely because in discharging his statutory duties he has
decided wrongly. I t can be issued only to compel him to discharge his
duties if he has failed to do so, and such a writ will not be issued unless
the court issuing it is satisfied that its decision would be final and
effective. Obiter : As the High Courts have a general power of superin-
tendence over all tribunals except those constituted under any law-
relating to the Armed Forces, presumably an Election Tribunal set up
after an election would be subject to the superintendence of the High
Courts under article 227, and the High Courts would have power to
compel an Election Tribunal to act within its jurisdiction and not to
exceed the powers conferred on it by statute. SHANKAR NANASAHEB
KABPE v. RETURNING OFFICER, KOLABA, AND ANOTHER, 1 E.L.R. 13.
The Constitutent Assembly must be deemed to have used the
term ' election" in article 329(b) of the Constitution of India in its com-
prehensive sense, embracing the whole procedure whereby an elected
member is returned. Election activities commence as soon as any person
is nominated as a candidate for election and the nomination paper is
delivered to the Returning Officer in the prescribed manner and when -he
rejects or accepts a nomination paper he takes a definite step towards
HIGH COURTS 189

the election of the candidate concerned, and it cannot be said that such a
step does not constitute election. The power of the High Courts to issue
a writ against a Eeturning Officer in respect of the rejection or accept-
ance of a nomination under article 226 of the Constitution is therefore
barred by article 329(b). The High Court has no power under article
226 to issue a writ, also in view of the fact that the same matter may
be dealt with by an Election Tribunal whose orders are final under sec-
tion 105 of the E. P. Act, 1951. The Eeturning Officer has a judicial
duty to perform at the scrutiny and, as it is his duty to deeide whether
or not a nomination paper should be accepted, if he rejects the nomina-
tion paper, even though improperly, he acts with jurisdiction and
discharges a judicial and not a ministerial function, and in such a case
the High Court has no power to interfere with the decision by a
mandamus or any other writ. Even if it be assumed that the jurisdic-
tion of the High Court has not been abridged by article 329(b), this is
not a case in which the High Court should issue a mandamus, or any
other writ, in exercise of its powers under article 226, firstly, because
there is a possibility of a conflict of decisions between the Election Tri-
bunal and the High Court, and secondly, because there is another remedy
open to the petitioner. SUKAB GOPE v. STATE OF B I H A B , 1 E.L.E. 68.
The word "election" in article 329(b) of the Constitution, which
provides that notwithstanding anything in the Constitution no election
to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the
Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by way of an
election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may
be provided for by a law made by the appropriate Legislature, refers to
the entire process of election including the nomination of candidates and
scrutiny of nomination papers, and the High Courts have therefore no
power to interfere with an order of a Eeturning Officer accepting or
rejecting a nomination paper by issuing writs or directions under article
226 of the Constitution. Section 170 of the E. P. Act, 1951, is not ultra
vires the Parliament inasmuch as under article 246 of the Constitution
read with items 72 and 95 of List I of the Seventh Schedule thereto, the
Parliament has exclusive power to make laws affecting the jurisdiction
of the High Courts in election matters. This section, however does not
oust the jurisdiction of the High Courts to interfere with election matters
under article 226. The real bar is created by article 329(b) Dictum :
" i t is eminently desirable that the provisions of the E. P. Act, 1951, be
suitably amended so as to provide for the final decision of questions,
relating to the rejection of nomination papers before the polling begins,
for, otherwise, the returned candidate will be deprived of his succes after
he has incurred considerable expense and suffered considerable worry in
ELD—26
190 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

getting through the election, merely because the Eeturning Officer had
come to an erroneous conclusion." NRISINHA KUMAR SlNHA AND
OTHERS V. BBTITRNING OFFICER, BUEWAN KHARGRAM AND OTHERS,
1 E.L.E. 23.
-A High Court cannot, in the exercise of its powers under article
226 of the Constitution interfere with the order of a Beturning Officer
refusing to receive a nomination paper or accepting or rejecting a nomina-
tion paper after scrutiny, or issue orders or directions to him in the
matter of nomination of candidates, inasmuch as article 329(b) of the
Constitution provides that notwithstanding anything in the Constitution
an election cannot be called in question except by way of an election
petition, and the term "election" in article 329(b) is not restricted in its
meaning to the result of an election or the counting of votes but covers
the entire procedure by which a person is elected in accordance with the
provisions of the E. P. Act, 1951, including the nomination of candidates.
Quare : Whether the decision of an Election Tribunal or any proceedings
of the Tribunal could be challenged before a High Court by way of a
petition under article 226 or article 227. SHANKAR EAO RAMA.TI AND
ANOTHER V. T H E STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT, 1 B.L.E. 34.

The High Court will not, in the exercise of its powers under
article 226 of the Constitution, issue a writ or direction against the
acceptance or rejection of a nomination paper by a Eeturning Officer
inasmuch as the party aggrieved has a specific and adequate remedy,
namely, an election petition under Part VI of the E. P. Act, 1951. One
of the fundamental principles with regard to high prerogative writs is
that once they are issued they must be final and not subject to inter-
ference by any other authority or Tribunal, and the fact that, if an
election petition is filed, the Tribunal with have the power to re-examine
the matter is another reason why the High Court should not issue a writ
or order in such cases under article 226. The word "election" is used in
article 329(b) of the Constitution and section 80 of the E. P. Act, 1951,
in a comprehensive sense including at least the stage of nomination.
Neither article 329(b) of the Constitution nor section 80 or 170 of the
E. P. Act, 1951, takes away in express terms the power of the High Court
to issue writs under article 226 and it is difficult to hold that the High
Court has no power to issue an appropriate writ, or direction under
article 226 under any circumstances in a matter relating to elections to
the House of the People or any State Legislature. Dr. John Mathai v.
Returning Officer, Kottayam (E.L.E. l) discussed. EAM SINGH AND
OTHERS V. EETURNING OFFICER KOT PUTLI AND OTHERS, 1
E.L.E. 52.
HIGH COURTS

The expression "election" used in article 329(b) of the Consti-


tution is intended to cover comprehensively all the diverse steps involved
in the process of selecting a representative, from the issuing of a notifica-
tion calling upon a constituency or constituencies to elect their
representatives, up to the declaration of the results, and the High Courts
have therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain an application under article
226 of the Constitution for cancelling an order of a Returning Officer
accepting or rejecting a nomination paper and to issue directions to him
to include the name of the petitioner in the list of valid nominations, or to
prevent him from publishing the list of valid nominations. RuDRA PRATAP
NABAIN SINGH V. BHAGWANDIN MISRA AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 60.

(i) The word ' election" in art. 329(b) of the Constitution in-
cludes all the steps commencing with the notification and ending with
the declaration of the result of the election and nomination of the candi-
dates being a part of the process of election, the acceptance or rejection
of a nomination paper by a Returning Officer can be questioned only by
an election petition as prescribed in article 329(b). (ii) The words "not-
withstanding anything contained in the Constitution" in article 329 are
very wide, and exclude the power of the High Court to issue writs or
orders under article 226 in respect of orders of a Returning Officer accept-
ing or rejecting the nomination of a candidate, (iii) Article 329(b) does
not preclude the High Court from issuing a writ of eertiorari on permis-
sible grounds quashing the order of the Tribunal made in an election
petition, (vi) The Parliament has nopower to take away the jurisdiction
of the High Court to issue writs under article 226, and section 170 of the
R. P. Act, 1951, does not deprive the High Court of its power to issue writs
under article 226. (v) The order of a Returning Officer is a judicial act
is liable to be quashed by a writ, if a writ is otherwise maintainable.
N. P. PONNUSWAMI v. RETURNING OFFICER, NAMAKKAL, AND OTHERS,
1 E.L.R. 89. (H.C.)
The appellant, who was a candidate for election to the Legislative
Assembly of the State of Madras and whose nomination paper was
rejected by the Returning Officer, applied to the High Court of Madras
under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of eertiorari to quash the
order of the Returning Officer rejecting his nomination paper and to
direct the Returning Officer to include his name in the list of valid
nominations: Held by the Full Court, that on a proper construction of
the provisions contained in article 329(b) of the Constitution and sec-
tion 80 of the R. P. Act, 1951, the High Court had no jurisdiction to
interfere with the order of the Returning Officer. The word "election"
has by long usage acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning. In the
ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

narrow sense it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate which


may embrace the result of the poll when there is polling, or a particular
candidate being returned unopposed when there is no poll. In the wide
sense the word is used to connote the entire process culminating in a
candidate being declared elected and it is in this wide sonse that the word
is used in Part XV of the Constitution in which article 329(b) occurs.
The scheme 8f Part XV of the Constitution and the E. P. Act, 1951,
seems to be that any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election
should be brought up only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate
manner before a special tribunal and should not be brought up at an
intermediate stage before any court. Questioning the rejection of a
nomination paper is questioning the election" within the meaning of
article 329(b) of the Constitution and section 80 of the B. P. Act, 1951.
The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right
but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the
li mitations imposed by it. Strictly speaking, it is the sole right of the
Legislature tq examine and determine all matters relating to the election
of its own members, and if the legislature takes it out of its own hands
and vests in a special tribunal an entirely new and unknown jurisdiction,
that special jurisdiction should be exercised in accordance with the law
which creates it. Judgment of the High Court of Madras (1 E.L.R. 89)
affirmed. N. P. PONNUSWAMI v. BETUBNING O F F I C E S , NAMAKKAL,
AND OTHEBS, 1 E.L.E. 133. (S.C.)

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.
Nomination for special constituency of Council—Omission to
give name of Assembly constituency and number in its roll—Validity of
nomination—Under section 6 of the B.P. Act, 1951, in order that a person
may be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Council of
a State for a particular special constituency it is not necessary that
he should be an elector in that constituency. It is enough if he is an
elector for any Assembly constituency in that State. Where a candidate
for a seat for a special constituency of the Legislative Council of a State
oave against items 7 and 8 of the form of his nomination paper the name
of the special constituency for which he was standing as a candidate and
his number in its roll instead of the name of the Assembly constituency
in which his name was entered as an elector, and his number in the roll
of this constituency : Held, that in the circumstances of the case, and in
view of the form of nomination paper and the provisions of sub-sections
(5) and (6) of section 33, the candidate had not failed to comply with the
provisions of section 33 in filling the details against items 7 and 8 of the
nomination paper. The non-mention of the name of the Assembly
MINISTERS 193

constituency and his number in that roll was at best only a technical defect
which was not of a substantial character which cannot be made a ground
for rejection of the nomination paper. Bamanugraha Narayan v. Sarda
Prasad (3 Jagat Narain 232) referred to. THETE GOPAL EAMJI V.
AMOLOK CHAND AND OTHEES, 1 B.L.E. 477.

Under article 173 of the Constitution read with section 6 of


the E. P. Act, 1951, a person*can stand as a candidate for a constituency
of the Legislative Council irrespective of whether his name appears or
does not appear in the electoral roll of the constituency for which he
stands if his name is included in the electoral roll of any Assembly
constituency of the State. JAWAHAE SlNGH PACHOLI V. HlBDAY
NAEAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 495.

Special constituency 0/ Legislative Council—Electoral roll


number—Number in roll of Assembly constituency given in nomination—
Validity of nomination—In the case of an election for a special consti-
tuency of the Legislative Council of a State (e.g., the Teacher's consti-
tuency) the serial number of the candidate to be given against column 8
of the form of nomination is his serial number in any Assembly consti-
tuency of the State. JAWAHAB SHANKAB PACHOLI V. HIBDAY NABAIN
SINGH ANDOTHEBS, 6 E.L.E. 495.

MINISTERS.

Bight to address meetings and ask for votes for their party
candidates.—Ministers are prominent members of their party and in that
capacity they are entitled to address meetings and to tell people what
their party had done and what its programme was and to ask them to
vote for the candidate set up by their party. Such an action of the
Ministers cannot be held to amount to "exercising undue influence."
Ministers are officers appointed by the Governor but they are in no
sense servants of the State Governments, and the rules requiring
Government servants to refrain from taking part in election propaganda
or in any other way assisting a candidate in an election, do not apply to
them. Canvassing by them would not, therefore.be a corrupt practice
under sub-section (8) of section 123 of the E. P. Act, 1951. Though
according to the law in England, no Minister of the Crown or Crown
servant and no member of the police force, should engage in canvassing
or be appointed or accepted as a canvasser, there is no law in India pro-
hibiting the State Ministers from taking part in canvassing votes for
others. Though they wield considerable influence, and when they
194 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

canvass, they use that influence, the influence cannot be called undue in-
fluence, as the law does not prohibit canvassing by Ministers and it is
not illegal for,them to use that influence. If a Minister redresses the
grievances of a class of the public or people of a locality or renders them
any help, on the eve of an election he would not be guilty of a corrupt
practice unless he obtains a promise from such people or imposes a con-
dition on them that they should vote for him or any other candidate at
the election. Where the Industries Minister of a State asked the mine
owners to send, and the mine owners sent, their ears to be used for pro-
moting the election of a particular candidate: Held, such an action on
the part of a person, whether a Minister or not, would not amount to any
corrupt or illegal practice. A candidate, his agent or any other person
with his connivance is entitled to obtain the vote of a person serving
under the Government of India or the Government of any State; and
in doing so, if the candidate or his agent, or any other person working
for him, asks a person serving under the Government of India or the
Government of any State, to attend any meeting or in any other lawful
manner induces such person to vote for a candidate, that would not be
corrupt practice. There is nothing illegal in a Minister's combining his
non-official work with his official work and occupying Government rest
or circuit houses during his tour. AMIRCHAND V. SURENDRA LAL J H A
AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 57.

Undue influence by Government servants—Minister doing elec-


tioneering campaign during official tours.—A candidate who is a Minister
is not guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(8) of the E. P. Act,
1951, merely because during the course of his official tours as a Minister
he conducted his electioneering campaign also. Nor would a District
Magistrate's tour just before election, by itself, amount to exercising
undue influence on voters. Habibgang South N.M.B. 1924 (Hammond
387) and Gajendra Chandra Ghaudhnri and Others v. P. G. Datta (2
Jagat Narain 85) relied on. BAMACHANDRA CHOWDHCJRI V. SADASIVA
I E I P A T H Y AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 5 B.L.E. 401.

Bight to ask voters to vote for his party—A leader of a political


party is entitled to declare to the public the policy of the party, and ask
the electorate to vote for his party without interfering with any elec-
toral right and such declarations on his part would not amount to undue
influence under section 123(2). The fact that he happens to be a Minister
or Chief Minister of the State would not deprive him of this right.
Lichfield (1 O'M. & H. 26) and Surendra Narayan Sinha v. Babu
Amulyadhone Boy and Others (2 Doabia 368) referred to. LlNG-E GOWDA
v. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6 E.L.E. 288.
MINISTERS 195

Ministers and Deputy Ministers—Acceptance of office—Disquali-


fication—Act removing disqualification—Effect—The respondents who
were elected members of a State Legislative Assembly were appointed
Deputy Ministers on the 5th February, 1954. At that time, no emolu-
ments, either by way of salary or allowance, were attached to that office,
but salary was attached to that office with effect from the 5th February,
1954, by an Ordinance passed on the 13th February, 1954. The very
same Ordinance declared in exercise of the powers vested in the Raj-
pramukh under article 191(l)(a) of the Constitution that the office of a
Deputy Minister would not constitute nor be deemed to have constituted
at any time a disqualification for its holder being chosen or retained as
a member of the Legislative Assembly. Certain members of the State
Legislative Assembly applied under article 226 of the Constitution for
the issue of a writ of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ or
direction on the ground that the office of the Deputy Minister was "an
office of profit" and its acceptance by the respondents disqualified them
for retaining their respective seats in the Legislative Assembly after the
date of their appointment, that the vacancies which thus arose could
only be filled up by the procedure laid down by section 150 of the S. P.
Act, 1951, and that the action of the Eajpramukh and the State Assembly
in removing the disqualification retrospectively by enacting an Ordin-
ance and later on, the Hyderabad Act V of 1954, operated in effect to
re-appoint the respondents to fill up the vacant seats without holding a
fresh election as required by law, and, further, that in order that a
declaration contemplated by clause (a) of article 191(1) may be effective,
it should be made prior to the occurrence of the vacancy: Held, (i)
that when a salary was attached to the office of the Deputy Minister and
it became an office of profit, the disqualification envisaged by article
19l(l)(a) was also taken away and the two acts being simultaneous, the
acceptance of the office of the Deputy Minister did not disqualify and
did not bring about any vacancy, and section 150 of the B. P. Act had
no application ; (ii) that the fact that the members would have enter-
tained the hope when they accepted the office of Deputy Minister that
Legislature would ultimately fix a remuneration for the post, and salary
was given to them with retrospective effect from the 5th February,
would not make the acceptance of that office on 5th February, 1954,
acceptance of an office of profit on that date, so as to attract to itself the
disqualification mentioned in article 191 and to render the respondents'
seats automatically vacant; (iii) that, as under article 192 of the
Constitution questions of this nature must be referred to the Governor
or Eajpramukh1 for decision, it was not a proper case for the issue
of a writ of quo warranto by the High Court. V. D. DESHPANKE
T96 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

AND OTHEES v. STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHBBS, 10 B.L.E.


203.
Minister—Election declared void—Nomination for by-election
more than six months after first election but within six months from date
of order declaring election void—Exemption of Minister from disqualifi-
cation on the ground of holding office of profit—Applicability.—When
the election of a candidate who has been returned as a member and
subsequently appointed as a Minister is declared void in an election
petition, the pariod of six months for which he can continue as a Minis-
ter under article 164(4) of the Constitution runs from the date on which
the order o! the Tribunal is published and not from the date of hia
appointment as a Minister. BRAJ NARESH SINGH V. HUKAM SINGH,
9 E.L.R. 80.
Criticism of acts of Ministers—Whether attach on personal
character—A statement of opinion, however unjust or harsh it may be,
without reference to any concrete fact, does not come within the mis-
chief of saction 123(5). The mere statement of a defamatory opinion,
unless coupled with the grounds upon which it is formed, is not a state-
meat of fact. Further, the statement must relate to the personal
character or conduct. A distinction must be drawn between the criti-
cism of a candidate as a politician or a public man and statements in
relation to his personal character or conduct. Criticism of his public
or political activities, however ill-mannered, unfair or exaggerated it
may be, is not forbidden. It is only when the man underneath the
politician is attacked and his honour, integrity or veracity assailed in
the statement, that the statement becomes offensive within the meaning
of section 123(5). Statements criticising the public and political acts of
a Minister as such, do not come within section 123(5), however pungent
and offensive they may be, if his personal character is not attacked.
DEVASHAEAN SINHA v. SHEO MAHADEV PRASAD AND OTHERS, 10 B.L.E,
461.

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—I.

Sea also, 1. QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES, 2. ELECTION AGENT


and 3. ELECTORAL EOLL.
T. Age of candidate 8. Proposer and seconder
2. Name of candidate 9- Scheduled castes
3. Name of constituency 10. Several nominations
4. Electoral roll number 11. Signature
5. Father's name 12. Symbols
6. Name of Legislature 13. Withdrawal
7. Name ohhf village
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 197

1. Age of candidate—Omission to mention age —Whether substantial


defect—Betuming Officer'spower to reject nomination suo motu—Omission
to mention the age of the candidate in a nomination paper is a defect of
a substanhtial character and the Eeturning Officer will not therefore be
acting improperly in rejecting a nomination paper on his own motion if
it does not contain the name of the candidate, even without calling
upon the party concerned to show cause why the nomination paper
should not be rejected. Lewis v. Gibbon (l Doabia 259) and Waswa Singh
v. Wary am Singh (2 Doabia 263) distinguished. Queen v. Tugwell (3
Q.B.D. 704), Baldwin and Others v. Ellis and Others {[1929] 1 K. B-
273) referred to. PRANLAL THAKORLAL MUNSHI V. INDUBHAI BHAILAL-
BHAI AMIN AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 182.

Age not entered in electoral roll—A nomination of a candidate


cannot be rejected on the ground that his age is not entered in the
electoral roll. JAGANNATH SHARMA AND OTHERS V. S. C. GUPTA AND
OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 8.

Age of candidate— Objection regarding age not taken before Re-


turning Officer—Whether can be, raised before Tribunal—Entry in
School Register—Admissibility — Probative value—Though objection as
regards age has not been taken before the Eeturning Officer, that does
not preclude the petitioner from raising it before the Tribunal in an
election petition; for, being under age is a statutory disqualification for
candidature at an election, and in respect of a statutory disqualification
there can be no waiver. An entry in a school register is relevant
evidence admissible under section 35 of the Evidence Act but the law
does not make such entry conclusive nor even presumptive evidence of
the date of birth. PARTAP SINGH V. NIHAL SINGH AND OTHERS, 3
E.L.E. 31.
Entry of age in an electoral roll is not final. It is open to
the candidate to prove his real age. UGAM SINGH V. HARI SINGH
AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 470. See also under ELECTORAL BOLL supra.
Discrepancy as to age between electoral roll and nomination
paver—Where the identity of a candidate is not in doubt and the ques-
tion of eligibility is not involved, difference of a few years in the age
as given in the nomination paper and in the electoral roll is of no con-
sequence and is not a proper ground for rejecting the nomination paper.
The election law does not require that the description of the candidate
in the nomination paper must literally agree with the description in
the electoral roll. JASWANT SINGH V. JAGAN N A T H AND OTHERS, 10
E.L.E. 1.
ELD—27
198 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Wrong entry in roll, effect of. BAM SINGH V. HAZAEI LAL


AND OTHEBS, 6 B.L.E. 224 infra.
2. Name of candidate—Discrepancy in name—Effect of—Where
the petitioner's name was inserted as "Eaj, Mohan Vithal" in the elec-
toral roll, in the nomination paper, and in the list of valid nominations,
and the petitioner contended in an election petition that his correct
name was "Mohan V. Eaj" and owing to the mistake in the name, the
result of the election was affected : Held, that, as the petitioner had
not raised any objection to the electoral roll or to the nomination paper
and list of valid nominations, it was not open to him to raise this con-
tention, and the election could not be set aside for the reason that there
was a misdescription of the petitioner's name in the nomination paper.
Mathew v. Brown (1876, 1 C.P.D. 596) distinguished. Dictum.—It is of
the utmost importance that important papers relating to an election,
like nomination papers, should be preserved in the custody of senior
officers, particularly when an election petition has been filed. MOHAN
VITHAL E A J V. GANGADHABA SIVA AND OTHEBS, 4 B.L.E. 91.

Name of candidate —Once the identity of the candidate is esta-


blished by other evidence, trivial discrepancies in the description of his
name in the electoral roll do not matter and are not sufficent for rejec-
tion of a nomination paper. Sardar Harcharan Singh v. S. Narottam
Singh {I Doabia 77) relied on. VlJA MOHAN REDDY V. PAGA PxiLLA
EEDDY AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.E. 414.
Where in a nomination paper a candidate's name was given as
"Vayeda Eanchhodlal" and his father's name was given as Liladhar"
and it was rejected because his name as given in the electoral roll was
"Eanchhodlal Liladhar Vayeda": Held, that, as the identity of the
candidate was established the discrepancy in the name was a mere
technical defect and the nomination paper was wrongly rejected. Begum
Wahidul Hasan V. Amj'adi Bano Begum Mohammad Ali (Sen and Poddar
487) referred to. EANCHHODLAL LILADHAR VAYEDA V. SANJALIA
MOHANLAL VlBJIBHAI AND OTHEBS, 4 B.L.E. 493.
3. Name of constituency—Misdescription of name of constituency
by clerical error—Where a candidate whose name was entered as an
elector in the Kofc Kapura Constituency and who intended to stand for
election to the Faridkofc Constituency, wrongly mentioned "Faridkot"
against column number 7 of the nomination paper, but it was clear from
the entries against column 8 that he was an elector in the Kofc Kapura
Constituency : Held, that the error was nothing more than a clerical
error and the nomination paper could not be rejected on this ground.
KESHO RAM V. HAZUBA SINGH AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 320.
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—ELECTORAL ROLL 199

Name of constituency and number in electoral roll—omission to


fill in—Whether fatal defect—If a nomination paper contains sufficient
particulars to identify the candidate the provisions of the law are suffi-
ciently complied with. A meticulous compliance with the rules is not
necessary. The question whether the particulars are sufficient to
identify the candidate is to be decided on the facts of each case. In this
case, though columns Nos. 7 and 8 of the nomination paper (the
name of the constituency and the electoral roll number therein) were
left blank, it was held that the rejection of the nomination paper on
this ground was improper as the candidate was a well-known person of
the locality and by reason of the description given in the other columns
there could be no doubt at all about his identity. JASWANT SINGH y.
MANGAL DAS AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 385.
Name of constituency—Omission in a nomination paper to
fill up the particulars as to the name of the constituency, in the elec-
toral roll of which the candidate's name appears, is not a mere technical
defect of an unsubstantial character but a substantial defect for which
the nomination can be rejected. Baldwin v. Ellis (1929, 1 K.B. 273)
relied on. P. N. BALASUBRAHMANYAN V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,
V E L L O R E , AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 496.
4. Electoral roll—number— Where, against column number 14 the
serial number of the seconder in the electoral roll was wrongly shown
as No. 3 in the electoral roll of Ward No. XIII of Ajmer City whereas
his serial number was No. 3 in the electoral roll of Ward No. XVIII of
Ajmer City, and, as there were 32 Wards in the Ajmer City, each of
which had a separate roll and as no one drew the attention of the Ee-
turning Officer to the fact that ''No. X I I I " was a mistake for ''No.
XVIII" at the time of scrutiny, the Eeturning Officer rejected the
nomination paper : Held, that in the circumstances of the case the error
in the description of the electoral roll was a material defect as the
identity of the seconder could not be discovered by the Eeturning Officer
without a laborious inquiry and the nomination paper was rightly
rejected. HARNAM SINGH V. JWALA PRASAD AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 332.
——Electoral roll—number of proposer and seconder—Per ADITYA
NAHAYAN LAL—A nomination paper cannot be rejected merely because
the serial number of the proposer or seconder in the electoral roll has not
been stated in it, without making any summary inquiry about their
identity. JAMUNA NANDAN PRASAD SINHA V. JAGDISH NARAIN SINGH
AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 14.
-Electoral roll—duty to produce certified copy of entry in roll—
Meaning of "certified copy"—In order that a copy of entry in an electoral
200 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

roll may be a "certified" copy within the meaning of section 33(6) of the
E. P. Act, it is not necessary that it should be a copy certified by the
Electoral Eegistration Officer. A copy supplied to the candidate on an
application made by him to the Deputy Commissioner who is also the
District Election Officer and signed by the Head Copyist of the Deputy
Commissioner's Officer and certified to be a true copy by him bearing the
stamp of the Collectorate is a certified copy within section 33(6). Held,
also, if a nomination paper has been improperly rejected the result of
the election must be presumed to have been materially affected and it is
impossible to lead such convincing evidence as can rebut this presumption.
Obiter: The wording of section 100(l)(c) is misleading and requires amend-
ment. BELT NAEESH SINGH V. H U K U M SINGH AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 266.
Production of copy of roll—• Where a candidate produced
printed' copy of the Block of the electoral roll for the constituency,
wherein his name was entered as a voter, but the Eeturning Officer passed
an order calling upon him to produce a certified extract from the electoral
roll and rejected his nomination for non-compliance with this order:
Held, (i) that by producing the printed copy of the Block of the electoral
roll in which his name appeared, the candidate had substantially complied
with the requirements of section 39(4) of the E. P. Act, 1951; (ii) even
assuming that the provisions of section 39(4) were not complied with, the
Eeturning Officer had no power under section 36(2)(d), or any ether pro-
vision of law to reject the nomination for non-compliance with the
proviso to section 39(4). Basti Election Case (Sen and Poddar 106)
applied. The purpose of the proviso to section 39(4) is not to prescribe
ordeals for the intending candidates to undergo, but to provide for guides
to the Eeturning Officer in deciding about the identity of the candidate
and of the proposer and seconder. S. K. SAJIBANDAM V. ELECTION
TBIBUNAL, MADBAS AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 341.
Description of part of roll—necessity of—The instruction
contained in note 6 of the nomination form that where an electoral roll
is sub-divided into parts, the description of the part of the electoral roll
in which the name of the person concerned is entered must be given, is
not mandatory but only directory and a substantial compliance with the
provision is enough. The nature and degree of the defect would depend
on the difficulty involved in tracing out the entry. MATHBA DAS AND
OTHERS V. DARA SINGH AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 441.

Omission to state part of roll—Form of nomination —Foot-note


(6)—The provision contained in food-note (6) of the Form of nomination
paper given in Schedule II of the Eepresentation of the People (Conduct
of Elections and Election Petitons) Eules, 1951, that where the electoral
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—ELECTORAL ROLL 201

roll is sub-divided into parts and separate serial numbers are assigned to
the electors entered in each part, a description of the part in which the
name of the person concerned is entered must also be given in items Nos.
8, 10 and 14 of the Form, is not a mandatory but a directory provision
and if the identity of the candidate in question is not in doubt, the mere
omission to state the part of the electoral roll in which the candidate's
name is entered would not invalidate the nomination paper. Even if
there is any doubt about the identity, if it can be cleared by the Re-
turning Officer by holding a summary inquiry under section 36, he
should do so. E. Few v. Gibbon (Sen and Poddar 66) and Tikarain
Sharmav. Lalit Bahadur Kharga (1E.L.R. 252) followed. There were
nine electoral rolls for a constituency in each of which the serial No.
174 occurred. In a nomination paper the serial No. 174 was mentioned
without mentioning the part of the roll, but along with serial No. 174
the number of the embossed leaf in which the candidate's serial No.
174 occurred was given and it was easier to identify the candidate from
this description than from the part of the roll, but the Returning Officer
rejected the nomination on the ground that the part of the roll was not
mentioned, though he had no doubt about the identity of the candidate:
Held, that the nomination paper was improperly rejected. RAM SINGH
v. HAZAEI LAL AND OTHERS, 6 B.L.R. 224.
Failure to mention the name of the zail or sub-division of the
electoral roll in which the names of the candidate, his proposer and
seconder are entered is not a fatal defect justifying the rejection of the
nomination paper. If the name of the zail or sub-division is not given,
the Returning Officer should refer to the relevant zail or sub-division if it
is in his possession, or is produced by the candidate at the time of scru-
tiny. SHIV DAYAL AND OTHERS V. T E J RAM AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 346.
Omission to mention in the nomination paper the part and sub-
division of the electoral roll in which the candidate's name is entered is
only a technical defect not of a substantial character, where the identity
of the candidate can be ascertained without them. UGAM SINGH V.
H A R I SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 B.L.R. 470.

Non-compliance with the instructions contained in the


footnote (6) to the .Form of nomination paper given in Schedule II does
not amount to non-compliance with a mandatory provision of law.
SHIVA DAYAL AND OTHERS V. T E J RAM AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 346.
Electoral roll—Production of copy—Under section 33(5) it is the
duty of the Returning Officer to satisfy himself that the names and
the electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer and
seconder as entered in the nomination paper are the same as those
202 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

entered in the electoral roll, and under sub-section (6) if he finds that
the name of the candidate is not registered in the electoral roll, he shall
for the purposes of sub-section (5) require the person presenting the
nomination papers to produce either a copy of the electoral roll in which
the name of the candidate is included, or a certified copy of the relevant
entries of such roll. If, therefore, the Eeturning Officer rejects a nomi-
nation paper without discharging his duty under section 33(6) such
rejection is improper. The Eeturning Officer has power to make a
summary inquiry in deciding objections as to nomination. While
scrutinizing nominations he performs a judicial function and should act
judicially. He should not mechanically reject a nomination if any
obscurity in nomination can be cleared up by summary inquiry. If a
nomination paper is improperly rejected the presumption is that the
result of the election has been materially affected and the onus is on the
respondent to rebut this presumption. Tar a Prasad v. Rat Bahadur
Devi Charan Baruah (2 Jagat Narain 83), S. B. Lewis v. G. E. Gibbon
(Sen and Poddar 883), Kalap Baj v. Bishambhar Nath Tripathi (Sen and
Poddar 106) relied on. KANAUJI LAL SHUKLA V. BHAG-WAN D I N AND
OTHERS, 3 B.L.E. 1.

Copy issued by Head copyist whether "certified copy"—There


being no definition of the expression "certified copy" in the E. P. Act,
1951, or the rules thereunder the production of a copy of the electoral
roll issued by "any public officer having custody of the same is sufficient
compliance with the requirement of section 33 of the Act. A copy of
the electoral roll issued by the Head Copyist of the Collectorate in
discharge of his public duties is a certified copy within the meaning of
the Act. KANAUJI L A L SHUKLA v. BHAGWAN D I N AND OTHEBS, 3
E.L.E. 1.
—•—'A candidate filed two nomination papers, one for Jalore A con-
stituency and the other, for Jalore B constituency, at the same time.
He attached a certified copy of the electoral roll of Jodhpur constituency,
in which his name appeared, with the nomination paper for Jalore A, and
requested the Eeturning Officer to treat it as evidence for both the con-
stituencies. The Eeturning Officer who held the scrutiny of the nomina-
tions on the same day, accepted the nomination for Jalore A and rejected
that for Jalore B on the ground that a certified copy of the electoral roll
or entry therein was not produced with i t : Held, (i) that, as the Eeturn-
ing Officer was in possession of the certified copy of the electoral roll at
the time of the scrutiny, though it was attached to the nomination for
Jalore A, it was his duty to look into it and he acted improperly in reject-
ing the nomination for Jalore B ; (ii) if the Eeturning Officer has evidence
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—ELECTORAL ROLL 203

other than a copy of the electoral roll to decide the question of identity and
eligibility he can proceed on that evidence. He is not bound to rest his
evidence on the electoral roll alone and reject a nomination if a copy of the
roll is not produced. UGAM SINGH V. H A E I SINGH AND OTHEES, 6 B.L.E.
470.
Non-production of certified extract of roll—Whether ground
for rejection The non-production of a certified extract of the
relevant entry in the electoral roll which has been called for by a Be-
turning Officer is not a ground for rejection of a nomination under sec-
tion 36(2)(d) of the E. P. Act, 1951, especially in the case of elections
to the Legislative Councils. In the case of electoral rolls first prepared
under the Act of 1950, the production of a copy supplied by the Electoral
Eegistration Officer of the part of the electoral roll in which the name
of the candidate appears is sufficient compliance with the requirements
of section 22-A read with section 26 of the E. P. Act, 1950. Though
under section 36(7) of the Act a certified copy of an entry in the electoral
roll is conclusive evidence of the candidate's right to stand for election,
it is open to the candidate to produce other evidence to show that he is
qualified to stand, if this is questioned, and an order rejecting a nomi-
nation paper for non-production of a certified extract of the roll cannot,
therefore, be justified under section 32(2)(a) where the question whether
he is qualified to stand has not been considered at all by the Eeturning
Officer. Basti District North-East General Rural Constituency case
(Sen and Poddar 106) followed. StTBRAHMANYA BHATT V. ABDUL
HAMEED KHAN AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.E. 225.
A nomination paper cannot be rejected because the name of the
constituency in which the proposer and seconder were enrolled as voters
was not stated but only their numbers in the electoral roll. As the
proposer and the seconder should belong to the constituency from which
the candidate is seeking his election the numbers in the electoral roll
must be presumed to belong to the constituency mentioned in item No.
1 of the form. SHAKTI PAESHAD SHUKLA V. BALWANT SINGH AND
OTHERS, 4 B.L.E. 301.

(1) Sections 33(6) and 36(7)(a) do not preclude a Eeturning Officer


before whom an electoral roll containing the name of a candidate
is produced at the time of scrutiny of nominations from making an
enquiry as to whether the name of the candidate was in any electoral
roll the date of his nomination and from rejecting his nomination if his
name did not appear in any roll on the date of the nomination. (2) The
statutory provisions regarding the insertion of the constituency and
204 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

number in the electoral roll as prescribed in columns 7 and 8 of the


nomination are matters of substance and not of mere form, and omission
to fill in these particulars is a proper ground for rejecting a nomination,
though mistakes in the insertion of particulars may be a ground for
amending the form at a later stage with the consent of the Returning
Officer. (3) A revised electoral roll does not speak from the date of
the original roll and nomination of a person who was not in a roll at
the time of nomination cannot be validated by a subsequent amendment
or revision of the roll. P. N. BALASUBBAMANIAN V. C. E. NARASIMHAN
AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 461.

Electoral roll number—Giving number scored out by supple-


mentary list—Candidate's number in another list pointed out during
scrutiny—Rejection of nomination, whether proper—Duty of Returning
Officer to make summary inquiry—Where the electoral roll number of
of a candidate was given in a nomination paper as No. 342 in village A
in ignorance of the fact that the entry relating to this number has been
struck off by a supplementary list, but at the time of scrutiny of nomina-
tions, the candidate pointed out that he was also registered as a voter
in village B against serial No. 3241, but the Eeturning Officer rejected
the nomination on the ground that the candidate had given an electoral
roll number which did not exist, without making any summary inquiry
whether the candidate was entered as a voter at serial No. 3241 in
village B : Held, that there was only a bona fide mistake in entering
the serial number of the candidate in the electoral roll, as the candidate
was not aware of the fact that entry No. 324 had been struck off by a
supplementary list, and as there was no doubt about the identity of the
candidate, the Eeturning Officer was bound in the circumstances to make
an enquiry into the allegation of the candidate that he was entered as a
voter against serial No. 3241 of village B and to come to a decision on
the point, and the rejection of the nomination was in the circumstances
of the case, improper. Case law reviewed. GUBNAM SlNQ-H AND ANO-
THER v. PABTAP SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 338.
Electoral roll subdivided into par Is—Omission to state part of roll
—Whether fatal defect—The instruction given in Note (6) of the form of
nomination paper requires that where the electoral roll is sub-divided
into parts and separate serial numbers are assigned to the electors en-
tered in each part, a description of the part in which the name of the
person concerned is entered must also be given in item Nos. 8,10,14 of
the form. If this instruction has not been complied with in any nomi-
nation paper, it cannot be said to have been completed in the prescribed
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—ELECTORAL ROLL 205

form within the meaning of section 33(l) of the R. P. Act, 1951, and
the Returning Officer would be acting improperly in accepting it. DESAI
BASAWAEAJ v. DASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHERS, 4 B.L.R. 380.

Omission to state part of roll—Where a constituency was


composed of two towns, Sirsa and Dabwali, each of which was divided
into several wards, and in a nomination paper, against column number 8
the candidate simply mentioned " 1400, Ward No. 1 " without adding
Sirsa also, but it appeared that in Ward No. 1 of Dabwali there
were not more than 800 voters and there would have been no difficulty
in tracing out the entry against 1400, Ward No. 1 in Sirsa, but the
Returning Officer rejected the nomination on th9 ground that the name
of the part in which the candidate's name was entered was not given,
though he was satisfied about the eligibility of the candidate to stand for
election. Held, per MAHARAJ KISHORB and T. G. SETHI (G. S. GYANI,
dissenting) that there was only a technical defect not of a substantial
character and the nomination paper was improperly rejected. AjAYAB
SINGH AND ANOTHER V. KARNAIL SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 B.L.R. 388,
[Affirmed by Supreme Court in 10 E.L.R. 189 infra.]
Omission to state part of roll—Where a nomination was rejected
on the ground that it did not mention the parts of the sub-divisions of
the electoral roll in which the name of the candidate, the proposer and
seconder appeared, but the Tribunal found on the facts that no difficulty
could arise in finding out the correct entries relating to the candidate,
the proposer and seconder if the Returning Officer had looked into the
electoral rolls of their respective sub-divisions and the electors also could
not have found any difficulty in ascertaining their identity and eligibility :
Held, that the defect was only a technical defect which was not of a
substantial character within the meaning of section 36(4) of the R. P.
Act, 1951, and the Returning Officer acted improperly in rejecting the
nomination paper. Held also, that where a nomination paper has been
rejected improperly there is a xn'esumption that the result of the election
has been materially affected, inasmuch as the entire electorate is deprived
of the right to vote fora candidate who is entitled to stand. TlKARAM
SHABMA v. L A L I T BAHADUR KHABGA AND O T H E R S , 1 E.L.R. 252.

Omission to state part of roll—Where the name of the part of the


electoral roll in which the name of the candidate appeared was not filled up
against column No. 8 of the nomination paper, but there was no difficulty
in identifying the candidate, and the entry of his name in the roll was
pointed out to the Returning Officer, but the nomination form was reject-
ed on the ground that it had not been duly filled up: Held, affirming the
decision of the majority of the Tribunal, that the defect was only a
ELD-28
206 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

technical defect not of a substantial character and the nomination was


improperly rejected. Ajayah Singh and Another v. Karnail Singh and
Others (6 B.L.E. 368) affirmed. KAENAILSINGHV. ELECTION TBIBUNAL,
HISSAB, AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.E. 189 (S. C).

If in addition to his being enrolled as a voter in a constituency


of the Assembly which is a necessary qualification for a candidate to the
Legislative Council, he is also enrolled as a voter in the special consti-
tuency of the Council for which he intends to stand as a candidate,
omission to state in column 7 of the nomination paper the particulars of
the constituency of the Assembly in which he is enrolled as a voter would
not invalidate the nomination paper when the candidate in question has
stated as against column 7 the particulars of the special constituency of
the Council in which he is enrolled as a voter, and has also stated
correctly his number in that roll. The defect, if any, is only a technical
defect not of a substantial character. MANEKLAL AMOLAKCHAND V.
THETE GOPAL E A M J I AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 36.
-Name of Parliamentary Constituency —Omission to mention in
a nomination for the House of the People the name of the relevant
Parliamentary Constituency in which the name of the candidate is
included and the serial number of the candidate in the electoral roll of
that constituency are grave errors and irregularities which materially
affect- the validity of a nomination and afford a sufficient ground for
rejection of the nomination paper. The fact that the name of an Assembly
Constituency which formed one of the units of the Parliamentary Consti-
tuency and the number of the candidate in the electoral roll of that
Assembly Constituency were mentioned in the nomination paper will
not cure this defect or impose upon the Eeturning Officer a duty to find
out the relevant Parliamentary Constituency from the Delimitation
Order and ascertain from its roll whether the candidate's name is included
in it. Though there is a presumption that a person whose name is entered
in the roll of an Assembly Constituency is a Parliamentary elector, a
candidate cannot rely on this presumption alone : he must comply with
the requirements of section 33 of the E. P. Act, 1951, with regard to
particulars to be stated in a nomination paper. Saharanpur District
N. M. B. case (4 Jagat Narain 96), Punjab North East Town case (2 Jagat
Narain 143), Baipur North case, (2 Jagat Narain 146) and Ambala
Division case (Hammond 77) referred to. BADDBUDDTIJA SYED V,
MOHAMMAD KHODA BUKSH AND OTHEBS, 2 B.L.E. 189.

Where a voter's name is entered in an electoral roll of a Legis-


lative Assembly Constituency, a Eeturning Officer may accept the
nomination of a candidate for a Parliamentary Constituency on produc-
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—ELECTORAL ROLL 207

tion of a copy of an entry from the electoral roll of the corresponding


Assembly Constituency. HAEI VlSHNU KAMATH V. SYED AHMED AND
OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 248.

Where the Beturning Officer of the constituency for which a


candidate is nominated is also the Beturning Officer of the constituency
in the electoral roll of which the proposed candidate's name is entered as a
voter, it is the duty of the Beturning Officer to call for the electoral roll
and satisfy himself that the names and electoral roll numbers of the
candidates and the proposer and seconder as entered in the nomination
paper are the same as those entered in the electoral rolls. He cannot
call upon the candidate to produce a certified, copy of the roll and reject
the nomination paper if the candidate fails to do so. Section 33(6) of the
B. P. Act, 1951, which empowers the Beturning Officer to call upon the
candidate to produce a copy of the roll applies only to a case where the
Beturning Officer of the constituency in the electoral roll of which the
candidate's name is entered is a different person. LAXMAN BAO V.
LAXMINIVAS GANERIVAL AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 2 E.L.B. 20.

Supplementary rolls—Where, against column 10 a candi-


date merely stated, 94, Ward No. 1, Sadulgarh" Avithout stating that
the number 94 referred to the number in the supplementary electoral roll
and not number 94 in the main roll, and, as the Beturning Officer's
attention was not drawn to the fact that there was a supplementary roll,
even at the time of scrutiny, he rejected the nomination paper : Held that
omission to state that number 94 was the number in the supplementary
roll was a substantial defect and the nomination paper was rightly reject-
ed. Malhar Bao v. Vishnu Pant (1 Doabia 206) and Bameshwar Prasad
Singh v. Krishna Gopal Das and Others (4 E.L.B. 112) relied on. MOTI
BAM v. BAMOHANDAR OHOWDHARY AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.B. 135.

Electoral roll number—Order of Election Commission to include


name in roll—Order passed before nomination—Nomination filed without
electoral roll number oiving to want of knowledge of order—Validity of
nomination—Where the Election Commission had passed an order for
including a candidate's name in the electoral roll on the 23rd of Novem-
ber, 1952, but, as this fact was not known to the candidate or the
proposer or seconder, a nomination paper was filed on the 24th November,
1952, leaving column No. 8 (against which the serial number of the candi-
date has to be stated) blank and the rejection of the nomination was upheld
by the Tribunal on the grounds (i) that a nomination would not be valid
unless the proposer and seconder had knowledge on the date of nomination
that the candidate was qualified to be chosen as member and (ii) there was
a non-compliance of section 33(2): Held (i) that the view that knowledge
208 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

of the proposer arid seconder that the candidate was qualified to stand is
necessary for a valid nomination was wrong; but there was a non-com-
pliance with the provisions of section 33, and the Returning Officer had
jurisdiction to reject the nomination on this ground ; (ii) the Election
Tribunal should have carefully considered the question whether the
defect was an unsubstantial one with reference to the provisions of sec-
tion 38(4); (iii) it must however be assumed that tha Election Tribunal
was of the opinion that the defect was not a mere technical one not of a
substantial character within section 36(4) and the High Court would not
interfere under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution even if it was of
opinion that the defect was a substantial one, as it was a question on the
merits. RANCHHODLAL LILADHAR VAYEDA V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,
AHMEDABAD, 8 E.L.R. 59.

Where information that a candidate's name was included in the


roll by the Election Commission under rule 20(3) of the Representation
of the People (Preparation of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950, was received
only on the day on which the nomination papers were filed : Held, that
the nomination of the candidate could not be rejected merely on the
ground that columns 7 and 8 thereof were left blank in the nomination
paper. Provisions with regard to the filling up of nomination papers
are not mandatory and need not be fulfilled exactly; substantial com-
pliance is enough. Rule 20 of the Representation of the People (Prepara-
tion of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950, is not ultra vires. The Central
Government has ample power to make such a rule under section 28 of
the R. P. Act, 1950. Where the direction for the inclusion of a candi-
date's name in the electoral roll was issued by the Election Commis-
sion on the date on which nomination papers had to be filed and there was
no evidence as to the exact time at which the direction was issued on
that day : Held, that the direction must be presumed to have been
issued at a time when the order would be effective, that is to say, before
the expiry of the time fixed for filing nominations on that day. RAMA
KRISHNA REDDY V. KAMALA DEVI, 5 E.L.R. 173.

Unless a candidate is a qualified elector to the knowledge of his


proposer and seconder when the nomination is presented, the nomina-
tion cannot be regarded as nomination of a qualified elector. Where a
candidate whose name was not in the electoral roll, applied to the
Election Commission to include his name and submitted a nomination
paper in which against column No. 7 it was stated : I have applied to
the Secretary, Election Commission, for including my name in the
electoral roll -.-and instructions are expected in due course" and
column No. 8 was left blank, and the nomination was rejected even
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—ELECTORAL ROLL 209

though the Eeturning Officer received before the date of scrutiny a


the name of the proposer in column No. 9 of the nomination paper si
not a mere technical defect of an unsubstantial character, but a sub-
stantial defect for which a nomination can be rejected. The fact that
the name of the proposer could be ascertained from his signature and
his electoral roll number which was given in the nomination paper, is
immaterial and cannot cure this defect. Per JAGJIT SlNGH.—The
details to be filled up in the nomination paper are intended to ensure
direction from the Election Commission that the Commission had
agreed to the inclusion of the candidate's name in the electoral roll and
allotting him a certain number in the roll. Held, that a nomination
paper has to be scrutinised as it stood when it was presented; and
notwithstanding the provisions of rule 20 of the Eepresentation of the
People (Electoral Eolls) Eules, 1950, the nomination could be rightly,
rejected on the ground that it did not comply with the requirements of
law. EANCHHODLAL LILADHAR VAYEDA v. SANJALIA MOHANLAL
VlRJTBHAI AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 493. [Affirmed in 8 E.L.E. 59 supra
p. 208.]
See also cases cited at pp. 94, 95 supra.
5. Father's name—Minor discrepancy—Where the name of the
candidate's father was given in the nomination paper a s ' PrabbuDayal"
instead of "Prabhu Lai" and, though the Eeturning Officer had no doubt
about the identity of the candidate and no one objected to the nomina-
tion on this ground, he rejected the nomination on the ground that there
was a discrepancy between the father's name in the nomination paper
and the electoral roll: Held, that the defect was only a technical defect
not of a substantial character, within the meaning of section 36(4) and
the nomination paper was improperly rejected. SATISH CHANDEB V.
GANGA SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 38.

When there is no doubt about the identity of the candidate,


errors in the description of his father's name are immaterial. H A E I
DAS v. HIRA SINGH PAL AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 466.

6. Name of Legislature—Assembly described as " West Bengal State "


—Where, in the nomination papers of a candidate for the West Bengal
Legislative Assembly, the heading in respect of the Legislative Assem-
bly was filled up as "West Bengal State" and the Eeturning Officer
rejected them suo motu at the time of scrutiny on the ground that the
name of the Legislative Assembly was not properly described : Held,
that the addition of the word 'State" was not a defector irregularity,
and the rejection of the nomination on such a frivolous ground was
210 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

grossly improper and unjustifiable. Held also, it is settled law that if


the nomination paper of a candidate is improperly rejected the result of
the election must be presumed to have been materially affected thereby
inasmuch as the entire electorate is deprived of its right to vote for a
candidate who was qualified to stand. This presumption would require
the most conclusive evidence for rebuttrl. NBISINHA KlTMAB SlNHA v.
SATYENDEA CHANDBA GHOSH MOULIK AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.E. 121.
Where the particular Legislature for which the candidate
stands has been indicated in writing in the nomination form, omission
to strike out the names of the other three Legislative bodies printed in
the nomination form is only a technical defect of an unsubstantial
character. LALLU CHANP V. TEJ SINGH AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 28.
Where in a nomination paper of the Eajasthan Legislative
Assembly the words "Lok Sabha", "Vidhan Parishad" and "Electoral
College" in the printed form bad been scored out and the words
"Vidhan Sabha" (Legislative Assembly) were alone retained, but the
word "Eajasthan" was not added before the words "Vidhan Sabha",
and the nomination paper was rejected on the ground that the omission
to specify the Legislative Assembly for which the candidate proposed
to stand by adding the word "Eajasthan" before "Vidhan Sabha" was
a fatal defect: Held, that the defect in the nomination form, if any,
was only a technical defect of a non-substantial character as there
could no doubt about the Assembly for which the candidate intended to
stand and the rejection was improper. EOOP CHANDBA SOGANI AND
ANOTHEB v. EAWAT MAN SINGH AND OTHEES (NO. 3), 9 E.L.E. 21.
7. Name of village—Where there were 400 to 500 villages in a cons-
tituency and each village had a separate electoral roll having a sepa-
rate set of serial numbers and in a nomination for election to a con-
stituency, the name of the village, in the roll of which the candidate's
name appears, was not given in column No. 8, though the serial number
of the candidate was correctly given, and the Eeturning Officer rejected
the nomination paper on the ground that the village was not stated :
Held, that the omission to state the name of the village was a substan-
tial defect and the nomination paper was rightly rejected. There is
nothing in law to debar a Eeturning Officer from rejecting a nomination
paper on account of a mistake of a substantial character even though
he had failed to notice the defect and draw the attention of the candi-
date or his agent to the defect at the time of the presentation of the
nomination paper. Malhar Bao v. Vishnu Pant (1 Doabia 206) relied
on. EAMESHWAE PBASAD SINGH V. KEISHNA GOPAL DAS AND
OTHEBS, 4 E.L.E. 112.
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—PROPOSER & SECONDER 211

8. Proposer and seconder—Omission of name—Per S. G. MATHUR


and D A L I P SiNGH J A I N (JAGJIT SINGH dissenting).—The total omission
either the ideatity or the eligibility of the candidate and the proposer
and the seconder, and a meticulous accuracy in filling up the entries in
the nomination form is not to be insisted upon. A substantial com-
pliance is all that is required. Where, in spite of any omission, the
necessary particulars can be ascertained from the other entries in the
form, the defect is more or less formal and not of a substantial charac-
ter, and judged in this light the omission to fill the name of the pro-
poser in column No. 9 is not a defect of a substantial character where
his name is evident from the signature appearing against column No. 12
and the electoral roll number given in the nomination paper. NAKOTAM
SINGH V. D E S E A J AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 309.
Omission of name of proposer—Where, the electoral roll number
and the signature of the proposer were legibly given but his name was not
inserted in column No. 9, and the nomination was rejected by the Ee-
turning Officer: Held, that the omission of his name was a defect of a
technical character and the rejection of the nomination was improper.
Under the provisions of section 33(5) it is the duty of the Eeturning
Officer to satisfy himself whether the names and the electoral roll num-
bers of the candidate, the proposer and the seconder as entered in the
nomination paper are the same as those entered in the electoral roll and
the duty cast upon the Eeturning Officer by this sub-section is not of a
formal nature. Held also: In case of improper rejection of the nomina-
tion paper of a candidate there is a very strong presumption that the
result of the election has been materially affected. This' presumption
is not irrebuttable but very strong evidence is required to rebut it.
The question whether the candidate whose nomination paper has been
rejected would have succeeded or failed cannot be the criterion to
determine whether the result of election has been materially affected
by improper rejection of the nomination paper, as a decision on this
question can be based only on speculation and guess work. BANKAT
L A L v. MADAN MOHAN AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 375.
Proposer standing as candidate —A nomination cannot be
rejected merely because after filing the nomination, the proposer also
stands as a candidate. H A E I VISHNU KAMATH V. SYED AHMED AND
OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 248.
Omission of proposer's constituency. See 4 E.L.E. 301, p. 203
supra.
Wrong electoral roll number. See 8 E.L.E. 332 and 7 E.LE.
14, p. 199 supra.
212 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Signature of proposer—See SIGNATURE infra p. 214ff.


9. Scheduled Castes—Description as " Harijan "—A nomination
paper of a candidate, who is admittedly an Adi Dravida, for a seat
reserved for the Scheduled Castes cannot be rejected merely because he
has described himself as "Harijan"; at the most, it is only a technical defect
not of a substantial character within section 36 (4) of the R- P. Act,
195.1. LAKSHMANA P I L L A I v. CHEN GAM P I L L A I AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.E.
103.
Declaration—Additional District and Sessions Judge, 'whether
"magistrate"—Art additional District and Sessions Judge is a "magis-
trate" within the meaning of rule 6 of the Representation of the People
(Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, and can
attest the verification of a declaration made under section 33 (3) of the
R. P. Act, 1951. A defect in the verification required under rule 6 is not
a technical defect not of a substantial nature within the meaning of sec-
tion 36(4) of the Act. Per CHIPLONKEB and MANDLEKAR (PANDE
dissenting) :—'When a nomination paper has been improperly rejected the
result of th3 election must be presumed to have been materially affected: a
statement by one of the respondents that hewas only an alternative candi-
date and would have withdrawn his candidature in favour of the others
cannot rebut this presumption. Per PANDB :—Under section 100 (l) (c)
of the Act an election can be declared void on the ground that a nomi-
nation has been improperly rejected, only if the Tribunal is further
satisfied that the result of the election has been materially affected
thereby. RAMLAL V. SUJANIRAM AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 27.
10. Several nominations by same proposer—Section 33 (2) of the
R. P. Act, 1951, does not mean that a proposer cannot subscribe to more
than one nomination paper of the same candidate ; and the nomination of
a candidate cannot therefore, be rejected merely on the ground that the
same person has subscribed to more than one nomination paper for him.
In such a case the first nomination paper can be accepted and it is not
necessary to consider the others. HANS R A J V. RAM SlNGH AND OTHERS,
2 E.L.R. 12.
There is no contravention of section 33(2) of the Act, where the
proposer and seconder of a candidate file as proposer and seconder two
nomination papers for the same candidate. Hans Raj v. Bam Singh (2
E.L.R. 12) relied on. VIJAYA MOHAN RBDDY V. PAGA P U L L A RBDDY
AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 414.

The provision contained in footnote No. 6 of the Form of Nomi-


nation Paper prescribed in Schedule I I of the (Conduct of Elections and
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—SEVERAL NOMINATIONS 213

Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, that if more than one nomination paper
in delivered by or on behalf of a candidate the name of the election agent
appointed shall be specified in each such nomination paper even if the
agent so appointed is the candidate himself, is mandatory and nomina-
tion papers which do not comply with this provision are invalid. The
defect is not a merely technical one but goes to the root of the matter.
BEJAYSINGH v. NAEBADA OHAEAN LAL AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 426.

Under section 36 (7) (b) of the R. P. Act, 1951, nomination


papers subscribed by the same proposer or seconder in excess of the
number of vacancies, are not valid. Such nomination papers need not
ba considered at all and no question of their rejection under section 36(2)
arises. Hans Baj v. Bam Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 12) dissented from.
Where there was only one vacancy and two nomination papers were
filed on consecutive days for the same candidate in which the seconder
was the same: Held, that the second nomination was invalid. LAKHAN
LAL MISHRA V. TRIBENI KUMAR AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 423.

-The nomination of a candidate cannot be rejected merely


because he has filed several nomination papers in which the same persons
have signed as proposer and seconder respectively. Hansraj v. Bam
Singh (2 E.L.R. 12) and Vijaya Mohan Beddy v. Paga Pulla (2 E.L.R.
414) followed. BHAIRON V. THAKUR GANPAT SINGH AND OTHERS, 6
E.L.R, 409.
Under section 36(6) of the Act, the Returning Officer must
scrutinis6 all the nomination papers filed on behalf of a candidate and
endorse on each of them his reasons for accepting or rejecting the same,
The practice of not scrutinising the remaining nomination papers if one is
found to be valid is contrary to law. NlHARENDU DUTT MAZTJMDAB V.
SCDHIR CHANDRA BHANDARI AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 197.

Section 33(2) of the R. P. Act, 1951, which provides that an


elector can subscribe as proposer or seconder as many nomination papers
as there are vacancies to be filled and no more, does not mean that the
same proposer or seconder cannot subscribe to more than one nomination
paper of the same candidate if there is only one vacancy. The section
only means that if there is only one vacancy to be filled, a person can
subscribe as a proposer or seconder to the nomination of one candidate
only and if there are two vacancies, to the nomination of two candidates
only, and so on. A nomination of a candidate cannot, therefore, be
rejected merely because he has filed more than one nomination paper
signed by the same persons as proposer and seconder. Hans Raj v. Bam
Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 12) followed. Lakhan Lal Mtshra v. Tribeni
Kumar and Others (3 E.L.R. 423) and Bejaysingh v. Narbada
ELD—29
214 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Charan Lai (2 B.L.R. 426) dissented from. JAMUNA NANDAN PRASAD


SlNHA V. JAGDISH NARAIN SlNG-H AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 14.
Where a candidate filed two nomination papers, and in one
of them he mentioned his father's name as "Garibdass" and in the
other as ' Chhiraulia" and Returning Officer rejected both nomination
papers as both came up for scrutiny on the same day : Held, that the
Returning Officer should not have mixed up the two nominations and
rejected both on the ground of this inconsistency, and, as it was proved
that Garibdass' was the father's name and Ohhiraulia" was the sur-
name of the family, both nominations were valid. BALCHAND V.
LAXMINARAIN MATEH, 8 B.L.R. 465.
Where the same proposer and seconder have subscribed more
nomination papers than one, all the nomination papers cannot be rejected
on the ground that there was only one vacancy. The Returning Officer
should accept one of them and reject the others. MANEKLAL AMOLAK-
CHAND V. THETE GOPAL RAMJI AND OTHERS, 9 B.L.R. 36.
11. Signature—A nomination paper is not necessarily bad merely
because the particulars therein were filled in only after the candidate had
signed the same. Gox v Davies (2 Q.B. 202), Midnapur South case (2
Hammond B.P. 185) and Mahant Digvijai Nath v-. Sri Prakash (Sen and
Poddar 147) relied on. Harman v. Park (Q.B. 369) distinguished.
SHANTA D E V I VAIDYA V. B A S H I E HITSAIN ZAIDI AND OTHBES,
8 B.L.R. 300.
The first proviso to section 33(3) does not require a declara-
tion signed by the candidate but only a declaration verified in the
prescribed manner. Want of the signature of the candidate below this
declaration is therefore not a sufficient ground for rejecting a nomination
paper. GANGA PBASAD SHASTEI V. PANNA L A L AND OTHERS, 8
E.L.R. 448.
A candidate filed his nomination paper with a form of appoint-
ment of agent (Form 5-A) which was duly signed. In the nomination
paper he omitted to put his signature after the declaration of the appoint-
ment of election agent, though he had signed at the end, that is, after the
declaration of the symbols. His nomination was rejected b3r the Return-
ing Officer on the ground that it did not comply with the provisions of
section 33(3) of the R. P. Act, 1951, as the candidate had not subscribed
to the declaration of appointment of election agent. The Election Tribunal
held that the nomination paper was improperly rejected. Held,
(i) that the subscription at the end of the nomination form after the
declaration of symbols must be held to relate not only to the declaration
of the choice of symbols but also to the declaration which occurred before
it relating to the appointment of the agent; (ii) even assuming that there
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—SIGNATURE 215

was non-compliance with the provisions of section 33(3), the defect was
only a technical defect not of a substantial character within the meaning
of section 36(4), and it was not a ground for rejecting the nomination
paper, as the name of the election agent had been filled up in the nomina-
tion paper and an appointment paper in accordance with Form 5-A duly
signed by the candidate had been filed with the nomination paper ; and
the order of the Tribunal was right. Gaton v. Caton (L.E. 2 H.L. 127)
distinguished. Obiter.—The more fact that the nomination paper was
accompanied by the document by which the candidate had appointed the
agent in Form 5-A duly signed, was not a sufficient compliance with sec-
tion 33(3), for, what section 33(3) requires is not the appointment of an
agent (for which provision is made in section 40) but a declaration that
the candidate has already appointed himself or some other person as his
election agent. A. K. SUBBAEAYA GOUNDAB v. MUTHUSAMI GOTJNDAE
AND OTHEES, 7 B.L.E. 465.

Signature—Illiterate persons—A nomination paper cannot be


rejected merely because the thumb-marks of the proposer and seconder
were uot put in the presence of and attested by the Returning Officer.
MADAK SINGH v. KALYAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 405.

Attestation of a thumb-mark for the purposes of the E. P. Act,


1951, and the rules thereunder, can be made only by theEeturning Officer
or the presiding officer or such other officer as may be specified in this
behalf by the Election Commission, and such officer must be satisfied as
to the identity of the person concerned. Attestation by an Additional
District Magistrate not authorised in this behalf by the Election Com-
mission is not valid. Want of proper attestation is a substantial defect
and would invalidate the petition. DHAEAM V I E V. BHALA RAM AND
OTHEES, 7 E.L.E. 64.
For the purposes of the E. P. Act and the Eules thereunder a
thumb-mark put by a person by way of signature should be attested in
the manner prescribed by rule 2(2), and signature" includes subscription
to a nomination paper. Consequently, if the proposer is an illiterate
person and he subscribes to the nomination paper by putting a thumb-
mark and the thumb-mark is not duly attested as laid down in rule 2(2),
the nomination paper would be invalid and can be rejected by theEeturn-
ing Officer. The Eeturning Officer is not bound in such a case to verify
the identity of the proposer by making an enquiry at the time of presenta-
tion of the nomination paper or at the time of scrutiny. Moreover, as
the nomination paper is invalid on presentation it could not be validated
by attestation at a subsequent stage. RATAN SINGH AND ANOTHEB V.
PADAM CHAND JAIN AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.R. 189.
2l6 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

—The term "subscribed" in rule 2(2) of the R. P. (Conduct of


Elections and Election Petitions) Eules, 1951, includes signature
and the signature of the proposer and seconder is a necessary require-
ment of a valid nomination paper, and in the case of an illiterate
person his thumb-mark requires attestation within the definition of
rule 2(2). Mere presence of the Returning Officer at the time when tin
candidate's nomination papers were written and thumb-marked by th-j
proposer or seconder is not enough. His conscious presence at the time
is necessary for complying with the requirement of rule 2(2) of the R, P.
Rules for the purpose of the attestation of those thumb-marks by tho
Returning Officer. Moreover, section 33 of the S. P. Act, 1951, contem-
plates that nomination papers complete in all respects should be presented
to the Returning Officer on the date notified and nomination papers which
did not comply with the rules relating to the filling in of the nomination
papers and attestation of the thumb-marks of illiterate proposers and
seconders cannot be said to be complete. The defect of the non-attestation
of the thumb-marks could not be remedied by the Returning Officer
subsequently on the date of scrutiny by calling upon the proposer and
seconder to admit their thumb-marks before him. MULAI AND ANOTHEI;
v. L A L DAN BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHEBS, 9 E.L.R. 8.

The definition of "sign" in section 2(l)(k) of the R. P. Act,


1951, shows that the Legislature has attached special importance to tbo
fact that in the case of illiterate persons unable to write their names it
is necessary to guard against misrepresentation and fraud by requiring
that their signatures should be formally authenticated in tha manner
prescribed in the Rules, and the court is bound to give full effect to this
policy. The word ''subscribing" in section 33(l) of the Act imports
"signature", and under rule 2(2) a person who is unable to write and
puts a mark instead can be deemed to have signed an instrument only if
it is attested by an officer in the manner prescribed in that rule. Where
a nomination is proposed or seconded by a person who is illiterate and
is unable to write his name, the mark which he puts instead of his
signature must be duly attested by an officer in the manner prescribed
by rule 2(2). "Want of due attestation in such a case is not a technical
defect of an unsubstantial nature within section 36(4). The substance
of the matter of attestation is the satisfaction of the Returning Officer
at a particular moment of time, i.e., at the time of putting the mark
about the identity of the person making the mark in place of writing a
signature and this satisfaction cannot be dispensed with altogether even
though, if the Returning Officer was satisfied at the proper tim.6 about
the identity, but by some slip on his part he omitted formally to record
his satisfaction, the omission could probably, in a case like that, be
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—SIGNATURE 217

regarded as an unsubstantial technicality. The defect of want of attesta-


tion cannot be remedied by adding it at the time of scrutiny. RATTAN
ANMOL SINGH AND ANOTHER V. ATMA RAM AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 4!.
(S. C.)
Discrepancy as to signature of proposer—If it is reasonably clear
on a scrutiny of the nomination paper that the proposer did not subscribe
his signature thereto, the Eeturning Officer will be justified in rejecting
the nomination paper under section 36(2)(d) of the E. P. Act, 1950. Where
the name of the proposer was written as "JutthadaVenkata Ramanayya"
and the signature clearly read as Jutthada Venkataramaiah" and the
nomination paper was rejected by the Eeturning Officer, and on the
facts the Tribunal found that the signature was not genuine: Held,
there was a discrepancy on the face of the nomination paper and it was
rightly rejected. P. NARASINGA EAO V. SURYANABAYANA AND OTHERS,
2 B.L.R. 83.
12. Symbols—Omission to specify symbols—Eule5(2)of theRapre-
sentation of the People (Conduct of Elections etc.) Eules with regard to
the symbols is not a mere rule of procedure and omission to specify
three symbols as required by that rule is not a mere irregularity or tech-
nical defect not of a substantial nature within section 36(4) of the R. P.
Act, and if a Eeturning Officer has rejected a nomination paper on this
ground the Election Tribunal cannot interfere with his order. PEEM
N A T H v. RAM KISHAN AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 271.

Candidate changing party after nomination—-Allotment of


symbol not mentioned in nomination paper—A candidate who intended
to stand for the Socialist party at the time of his nomination
and had chosen as his symbols a tree, a ladder and a pair of scales in
his nomination paper, finding that the nomination of the Congress candi-
date had been rejected, joined the Congress party and at his request
the Eeturning Officer assigned to him the symbol of the Congress, viz.,
two bullocks with a yoke. It was contended in an election petition that the
Returning Officer acted illegally in assigning to him a symbol which had
not been mentioned in his nomination paper. Held, that, under rule 10
of the Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions Rules the ultimate
discretion in the matter of assignment of symbols rested with the Eeturn-
ing Officer. Neither the candidate nor the Eeturning Officer was bound
by the first choice of symbols made by the candidate in his nomination
paper and the Eeturning Officer did not act illegally in assigning the
Congress symbol to the candidate. SUBYAJI EAMA RAO V. BHIKA
TEIMBAK PAWAR 2 E.L.R. 205.
Wrong choice—Whether vitiates nomination—As the final
allotment of symbols is left to the discretion of the Returning Officer,
2l8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the mere fact that a declaration regarding choice of symbols was not
correctly made in a nomination paper is not a material irregularity and
is not a sufficient ground for rejection of the nomination paper. BHAN-
WAELAL SOGANI V. DAMODAE LAL VTAS AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 407.
The petitioner filed a nomination specifying the following
symbols as chosen b3r him in the order of preference: (l) Weighing Scale
(2) Bicycle (3) Elephant. Under notifications issued by the election
authorities all the three symbols chosen by the petitioner, namely,
"Scales",'"Cycle", and "Elephant", were allotted or reserved symbols
and were not free symbols available to the petitioner on the relevant date.
Consequently the petitioner wras required to choose three symbols out of
the list of "free symbols", which he failed to do: Held, (l) that the wrong
choice of symbols in contravention of the Rules was not a mere technical
defect but a material irregularity which rendered the nomination paper
invalid and liable to be rejected ; Amir Ali Khan v. Shamsul Huq (Sen
and Poddar 1043) relied on. Gouri Shankar Prasad v. Thahur Hanu-
man Singh (1 Jagat Narain 9) referred to. (2) The defects in naming the
symbols (such as "Bicycle" for "cycle", "Weighing Scale" for "scale")
were only of a technical nature and cannot invalidate the nomination
paper. The power of imposing restrictions on the choice of symbols is
not a legislative power, but an executive power, and a delegation of such
powrer by the Election Commission to the Electoral Officer is valid. The
law does not enjoin that the restrictions imposed on the choice of symbols
should be published in the official gazette and their non-publication in the
official gazette does not therefore render the imposition of the restrictions
null and void. BISHNL' KUMAE SINGH V. RAM BILAS SINHA AND
OTHEES, 3 E.L.R. 60.

The Election Commission can delegate to a Chief Electoral


Officer its power to impose restrictions on the choice of symbols. The
law does not enjoin that the restrictions imposed on the use of symbols
should be .published in the Gazette. The provisions relating to the
declaration of preference of symbols are mandatory and a nomination
paper in which these provisions are not observed can be rejected. A can-
didate filed some nomination papers as an Independent candidate and
mentioned "camel, cart and pitcher" as his symbols in the order of pre-
ference. Subsequently, he filed other nomination papers as the official
candidate of the Kisan Janta party in which also he put the symbols in
the same order of preference. As cart' was the symbol officially allotted
to the Kisan Janta party by the Chief Electoral Officer, the candidate
stated that that party had been dissolved and "cart" should be allotted
to him as his first preference, even though he had not put it as the first in
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—SYMBOLS

his declaration: Held, that the rules relating to the declaration of prefer-
ence of symbols were mandatory, and as the candidate had not complied
with the provisions of rule 5(2) of the E. P. Eules, 1951, and section 33(3)
of the Act, there was a substantial defect and the nomination of the
candidate could be prop9rly rejected. MOTIRAM v. BAMCHANDAU
CHOWDHARY AND OTHERS, 7 B.L.E. 135.

The choice of symbols to be stated by a candidate in his nomin-


tion paper is more or less a matter of directory procedure, and as the
symbols have to be allotted finally by the Eeturning Officer irrespective
of the choice of the candidates, a nomination paper cannot be
rejected on the mere ground that the candidate had chosen a symbol
whicn he had no right to choose without the permission of the Eeturning
Officer. EATTAN SINGH V. DEVINDER SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 234.
The mere fact that previous permission of the Eeturning Officer
was not obtained by a candidate for choosing a symbol specified in items
1 to 14 of the list of symbols published by the Election Commission,
would not invalidate his nomination if the Eeturning Officer allots that
symbol to him without any objection. BALCHAND V. LAXMINARAIN
MATEH, 1 E.L.E. 465.
Symbols—Unrecognised party. See 10 E.L.E. 246, pp. 99-100
supra.

13. Withdrawal—Withdrawal of nomination—The mere omission in


a withdrawal notice of the name of the person who presented it is not a
ground for holding that the withdrawal is ineffective. In such a case, if
the Eeturning Officer has accepted it, it must be presumed to have been
presented by a duly authorised person. HARI DAS V. H I E A SINGH P A L
AND OTHEES, 4 E.L.E. 466.

Delivery of notice of withdrawal by proposer—Authority of can-


didate, whether necessary —The words "who has been authorised in this
behalf in writing" in section 37, govern not only the words "election
agent" but also "proposer" and seconder" and so, even when the pro-
poser himself presents the withdrawal notice to the Eeturning Officer
he must have authority in writing from the candidate to do so. Where
the withdrawal notice is presented to the Eeturning Officer by a person
who is not authorised by the candidate to do so and his name is conse-
quently excluded from the list of validly nominated candidates published
under section 38, the result of the election must be presumed to have
been materially affected and the election must be set aside. K ALT AN
CHANDRA MOHILB V. BISHAMBHAB NATH PANDEY AND OTHEES, 3
E.L.E. 125,
220 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—II.
Improper rejection or acceptance.
1. Improper rejection of nomination—Effect ©/—Where there has
been an improper rejection of the nomination of a candidate, the election
can be set aside without any affirmative proof that the rejection of the the
nomination has materially affected the result of the election. PEABHTJDAS
EAMJIBHAI MEHTA v. LALLUBHAI KIRORDAS MANIAR, 1 E.L.E. 154.
Improper rejection of a nomination paper is a material irre-
gularity affecting the result of the election and is sufficient to avoid it
inasmuch as the entire electorate is deprived of its right to vote for a
candidate who was qualified to receive their vote. Held also, that if
the ground for setting aside the election was the improper rejection of a
nomination paper, the case was covered by section 100(l)(c) of the Act
and the election can be declared void only as a whole, and the prayer
for declaring the election of the returned candidate alone void could not
be granted. NAGJIBHAI GOVINDHBAI ARYA V. MITHABHAI E A M J I
CHAWAN AND OTHEES, 1 B.L.E. 162.
-Where a nomination paper has been rejected improperly there
is a presumption that the result of the election has been materially
affected inasmuch as the entire electorate is deprived of the right to
vote for a candidate who is entitled to stand. TlKARAM SHARMA V.
L A L I T BAHADUR KHARGA AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 252.
The improper rejection of a nomination paper does not stand
on the same footing as an improper acceptance thereof. In the former
case there is an initial presumption that the result of the election has
been materially affected. It is doubtful whether oral evidence to the
effect that in the opinion of the witness, even if the nomination of
certain persons had been accepted the result of election would not
have been affected is admissible under the Evidence Act; in any event
it is not of any value. EAMACHANDRAN NAIR V. EAMACHANDRA DAS
AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 442.
The improper rejection of a nomination paper must necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the result of the election has been materially
affected. There is no difference between the English and the Indian law
in this respect. Section 100 (l) (c) of the E. P. Act, 1951, does not
mean that before declaring an election void on the ground of improper
rejsction of a nomination paper, the Tribunal must also find as a question
of fact that the result of the election has been materially affected by the
improper rejection. Evidence consisting of opinions and conjectures
regarding the merits of the candidates is entirely valueless for determin-
ing whether the result, of an election has been materially affected by
the improper rejection of a nomination, Bohtak case (l Hammond 183),
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—IMPROPER REJECTION 221

Davies v. Kensington (1874, L. E. 6 C. P. 720), Mayo case (1874, 2 O'M.


and H. 191), Hackney case (1874, 2 O'M. and H. 77) referred to. HANS
E A J v. BAM SINGH AND OTHEES, 2 B.L.E. 12.
It is settled law that if the nomination paper of a candidate
is improperly rejected the result of the election must be presumed to
have been materially affected thereby inasmuch as the entire electorate
is deprived of its right to vote for a candidate who was qualified to
stand. This presumption would require the most conclusive evidence
for rebuttal. NEISINHA KUMAR SINHA V. SATYENDBA GHANDEA GHOSH
MOULIK AND OTHEES, 2 B.L.E. 121.
It is well settled that when the nomination of a candidate is
improperly rejected by the Eeturning Officer there is a strong presumption
that the result of the election has been materially affected. TBAMBAK-
LAL MANISHANKEB v. PEABHULAL BHIMJI AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 245.
If a nomination paper has been improperly rejected the result
of the election must be presumed to have been materially affected and it
is impossible to lead such convincing evidence as can rebut this presump-
tion. BELT NABESH SINGH V. H U K U M SINGH AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.E. 266.
If the nomination paper of a candidate is improperly rejected
there is in the very nature of things the strongest possible presumption
that the result of the election is materially affected as no one can
possibly forsee what could have been the result if the candidate had
been allowed to fight the election, and the strongest and most conclusive
evidence is required for its rebuttal. VlJAYA MOHAN EEDDY V. PAGA
PULLA EEDDY AND OTHEES, 2 B.L.E. 414.
——Whenever a nomination paper has been improperly rejected
there is a presumption that the result of the election has been materially
affected and the burden is heavily upon the successful candidate to rebut
it. ASEAE AHMAD V. NIHAL UDDIN AND OTHEES, 3 B.L.E. 81.
There is a strong presumption that in the case of improper
rejection of a nomination paper the result of the election is materially
affected, but no such presumption arises in the case of improper accept-
ance, as in the first case the whole electorate is deprived of its right to
exercise franchise in favour of the rejected candidate and in the second,
there is no denial of such right to the electorate; but this presumption is a
rebuttable one and it is a question of fact in each case, depending upon the
evidence led by the parties, whether this presumption has been rebutted
or not. On the facts the Tribunal held that the presumption was rebutted
and the result of election had not been materially affected. CHANDEE
NATH v. KUNWAE JASWANT SINGH AND OTHEES, 3 B.L.E. 147 and
BANKATLAL v. MADAN MOHAN AND OTHEES, 3 B.L.E. 375 supra p. 211,
ELD—30
222 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Where the nomination of a candidate is improperly rejected


there is a presumption that by shutting him out the results of the election
are materially affected, and the party which alleges that they are not so
affected will have to establish by evidence that the contest by the candi-
date which was thus prevented would not have mattered. BAKAEAM
SUKAEAM KONKANI V. SHANKAE RAO CHINDTTJI BEDSE AND OTHEES,
3 E.L.E. 409. .,
——Oral evidence to prove that even if the nomination of a parti-
cular candidate had not been rejected and he had been allowed to stand
for the election, the result of the election would not have been affected,
is mere speculation and valueless. Hackney case (2 O'M. & H. 77) and
Hans Baj v. Bam Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 12) followed. SHAKTI |,
]
PAESHAD SHUKLA v. BALWANT SINGH AND OTHEBS, 4 E.L.R. 301.
• -Where a nomination of a candidate has been improperly rejected
the result of the election must be presumed to have been affected. It is
not necessary for the rejected candidate to show that he had a good
chance of success. Pyare Lai v. Amba Prasad (Hammond 27), Hans Baj
v. Bam Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 12) and Suraj Bhan v. Hem Ghand
and Others (2 E.L.R. l) referred to. H A E I DAS V. HlEA SlNGH PAL AND
OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 466.
The improper rejection of a nomination paper raises a strong
presumption that the result of the election has been affected. It is
difficult to rebut this presumption. Consideration of the • chances of
success or failure of the rejected cannot be a criterion in the matter and
all attempts to probe into the the minds of the electorate through oral
evidence must be avoided, as it would be mere speculation to do so.
Hans Baj v. Bam Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 12) and Bankat Lai v.
Madan Mohan and Others (3 E.L.R. 375) approved. Chander Nath v.
Kunwar Jaswant Singh and Others (3 E.L.R. 147) explained. MATHEA
DAS AND OTHEBS V. DABA SINGH AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 441. j
Where a nomination has been improperly rejected there is a j
strong presumption that the result of the election must be materially
affected, but this presumption is a rebuttable one. The view that the
words the result of the election has been materially affected" in section
100(l)(o) relate only to "acceptance" of a nomination and not to
"rejection" and in the case of an improper rejection the election must in all
cases be set aside, is not correct. The difficulty of proving that the election
has not been materially affected, in the case of an improper rejection, is
no reason to ignore the clear words used in section 100(l)(c) and their plain
meaning. Where the contesting respondent, a member of the Bharatpur
ruling family who stood as an Independent candidate, secured 24, 752 votes
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—IMPROPER REJECTION 223

out of a total of 32,690 votes polled, (the total being 44,000) and respondent
No. 3, who stood with the petitioner for the Kisan party and for whom
the petitioner was only a covering candidate, got only 2,093 votes, and
there was evidence to show that the petitioner had agreed to withdraw if
both the petitioner and respondent No. 3 were nominated for the Kisan
party: Held, that this was a case in which the Tribunal could hold that
the result of the election was not materially affected by the rejection of
the petitioner's nomination. Obiter : If the intention of the Legislature
was that the improper rejection of a nomination paper by itself rendered
the election void, section 100(l)(c) should have been split into two parts
as follows, viz., "(i) that nomination has been improperly rejected,
(ii) that the result of the election is likely to have been materially affected
by an improper acceptance of any nomination. Even if that is not the
intention, it would be very advisable that this .clause is so split because
there can be no doubt that it is very difficult to prove that the improper
rejection of a nomination paper had not materially affected the result of
the election, as the electorate had no chance in such a case to vote for the
rejected candidate. PANDIT HABISH CHANDRA v. RAJA MAN SINGH
AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.B. 129.

The question whether the result of an election has been materially


affected by the improper rejection of a nomination within the meaning of
section 100(l)(c) is a question of fact which the Election Tribunal has
exclusive jurisdiction to decide and the High Court will not interfere with
the finding of a Tribunal on this question. SlTJANIRAM v. LAL SHTAM
SHAH AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 183.

Though a strong presumption that the result of the election has


been materially affected arises when a nomination is improperly rejected,
the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. Observations to the contrary
in Brijnaresh Singh v. Thakur Hukum Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 266),
dissented from. [On the evidence the Tribunal found that the presump-
tion was rebutted.] Ghander Nath v. Kunwar Jaswant Singh and Others
(3 E.L.E. 147) approved. TJGAM SING-H v. HARI SINGH AND OTHERS,
6 E.L.R. 470.

The view that the decision of a Returning Officer accepting or


rejecting a nomination can be deemed to be improper" within the mean-
ing of section 100(l)(c) only if it is perverse or violates the principles of
natural justice, and that it cannot be deemed to be improper merely
because on the materials placed before it, the Tribunal comes to an oppo-
site conclusion, is not correct. If the Tribunal is of opinion that the
acceptance or rejection was not right, the order of the Returning Officer
would be ' improper" for the purposes of section 100(l)(c). Bam Murti
224 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

v. Sumba Sadar (2 B.L.E. 330) and Prem Nath v. Ram Kishan and
Others (l E.L.R. 271) dissented from. Ramachandran Nair v. Rama-
chanda Das and Others (1 E.L.E. 442) referred to. MoBESHWAB
PABASHKAM v. OHATUBBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI AND OTHBBS,
7 E.L.E. 428.
The presumption that the result of the election has been
materially affected which arises from the improper rejection of a nomina-
tion is not irrebuttable, though it may require strong and conclusive
evidence to rebut it. Hans Raj v. Ram Singh and Others (2 E.L.E. 12),
and Brij Naresh Singh v. Thakur Hukum Singh and Others (2 E.L.E. 266)
dissented from. BHANWABLAL SoGANl V. DAMODAB L A L VYAS AND
OTHEBS, 7 E.L.E. 407.

Where a nomination paper has been improperly rejected there is


a very strong presumption that the result of the election has been materi-
ally affected, but this presumption is a rebuttable one. The view that the
presumption is irrebuttable is not correct. EOOP CHANDBA SOGANI AND
ANOTHEB v. RAW AT MAN SINGH AND OTHEBS (NO. 3), 9 E.L.E. 21.

-Under the Indian law there is no irrebuttable presumption that


the result of the election has been materially affected when a nomination
paper has been wrongly rejected. Under section 100(l) of the E. P. Act,
1951, the Tribunal has to form an opinion in each case on its own facts, as
to whether the result of the election has been materially affected
MANEKLAL AMOLAKCHAND v. THETB GOPAL E A M J I AND OTHEBS,
9 E.L.E. 36.
When a person whose nomination paper has been wrongly
rejected makes no protest by filing an election petition or otherwise, no
inference can arise that'the election has been materially affected.
Shankar Rao Raniaji v. State of Madhya Bharat (A.I.E. 1952 M. B. 97)
explained. MANEKLAL AMOLAKCHAND V. THKTE GOPAL EAMJI AND
OTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 36.

An election held in circumstances in which one or more quali-


fied candidates are prevented from contesting the same by reason of the
improper rejection of a nomination paper is not an election as contemp-
lated by law and consequently, must, in the words of section 100 of the
E. P. Act, 1951, be declared "wholly void." In such cases it is as irrele-
vant to raise the question of the chance of success of the rival candi-
date before the Tribunal as it would have been before the Returning
Officer. The law does not contemplate the substitution of the opinion
of the Tribunal for the verdict of the electorate and there is also in such
cases no legally admissible data on which the Tribunal can base a
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—IMPROPER ACCEPTANCE 225

conclusion as to the probable chances of success of a particular candidate


as against another. Hans Raj v. Ham Singh and Others (2 E.L.E. 12)
followed. Brij Naresh Singh v. Thahur Hukam Singh (2 B.L.R. 266)
and other cases referred to. JASWANT SlNGH V. JAGAN NATH AND
OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 1.

2. Improper acceptance—The improper acceptance of a nomination


paper cannot be placed on the same footing as improper rejection because,
in the case of improper rejection, the constituency is deprived of the right
to make a choice between the candidates whose nomination papers have
been accepted and the candidate whose nomination paper has been impro-
perly rejected. If the number of votes secured by a candidate whose
nomination paper has been improperly accepted is lower than the difference
between the numbers of votes secured by the successful candidate and
the candidate who has secured the next highest number of votes, it cannot
possibly be said that the result of the election hag been materially
affected. On the other hand, it is impossible to foresee the result if the
number of votes secured by the candidate whose nomination paper had
been improperly accepted is higher than the difference. The Tribunal
need not consider whether the result of the election would have been
altered but only whether the result has been materially affected. When
we are not in a position to say what would have been the result of the
election if the votes secured by a candidate who has been wrongly deemed
to be a duly nominated candidate had been made available to the other
candidates including the petitioner, there is no escape from the conclusion
that the result has been materially affected. MANDAL SUMITEA DKVI
v. SUEAJ NARAIN SINGH AND OTHRES, 4 E.L.R. 136. [But see 9 E.L.E.
494 and 10 E.L.E. 30, p. 227 infra].

The result of an election has to be deemed to be materially


affected if the nomination paper or papersiof a candidate are held to have
been improperly rejected or accepted by the Returning Officer. The
question whether or not the result has been materially affected where
a nomination paper has been improperly accepted must always be a
question of fact to be determined on the facts of each particular case;
no hard and fast rules for determining this can possibly be laid down.
If the number of votes secured by the candidate whose nomination
paper has been improperly accepted is lower than the difference bet-
ween the number of votes secured by the successful candidate and
the candidate who has secured the next highest number of votes, it is
easy to find that the result has not been materially affected. If, how-
ever, the number of votes secured by such a candidate is higher than
the difference just mentioned, it is impossible to foresee what the
result would have been if that candidate had not been in the field. It
226 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

will neither be possible to say that the result would actually have
been the same or different nor that it would have been in all probability
the same or different. LAKHAN L A L MlSHEA V. TRIBENI KUMAE AND
OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 423. [See 9 E.L.R. 494 and 10 E.L.E. 30, infra
p. 227.
• If the improper acceptance of the nomination was of a person
who was not returned as duly elected, the question whether the improper
acceptance has materially affected the result of the election might be
difficult to decide. But, when the improper acceptance of a nomination
paper is that of the returned candidate himself the result of the election
must be materially affected by the improper acceptance. DESAI
BASAWABAJ v. DASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 380.
The result of an election cannot be "materially affected" by an
improper acceptance of a nomination, within the meaning of section
100(l)(c) of the E. P. Act, 1951, unless the improper acceptance has
actually turned the scale in favour of the returned candidate.
Consequently, an election of a candidate cannot be declared void on the
ground of improper acceptance of the nomination of another candidate
unless it is proved that the returned candidate would not have succeeded
in the election if the nomination of the latter had been rejected. If the
evidence on both sides is useless and the petitioner cannot discharge his
onus in a legal way, the election cannot be set aside ; merely because it
is difficult or even impossible for the petitioner to discharge this onus,
he cannot be deemed to have discharged it. Patna West N. M. B.
(Hammond 533), Bengal Legislative Council Case: Singha v. B. A. Boy
(2 Doabia 368) and Hoshiarpur West General Constituency Case 1946 (Sen
and Poddar945) followed. Bellary M. B. (1 Doabia 169) disapproved.
Lakhan Lal Mishra v. Tribeni Kumar and Others (3 E.L.E. 423) dissented
from. The usual manner of distributing the votes in the case of an
improper acceptance of a nomination is to act on the percentage of votes
obtained by the other candidates. The theory of "votes thrown away"
cannot be applied except where the disqualification of the candidate for
whom the votes were cast had wide publicity or notoriety or the voter
had knowledge of the disqualification. In any event this theory is not
applicable for determining whether the result of an election has been
materially affected. Beresford Hope v. Lady Sandhurst [1889] 23 Q.B.D.
79 distinguished. "UDAINATH SINGH V. JAGAT BAHADUR SINGH AND
OTHERS (NO. 2), 5 E.L.E. 199.

An election cannot be said to said to have been materially


affected by an irregularity unless the irregularity has actually turned the
scale in favour of the returned candidate. LAXMIDATTA AND ANOTHER
v. MADANLAL DHUPAR AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 398.
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—IMPROPER ACCEPTANCE 227

The fact that the result of an election has been materially


affected by the improper acceptance of a nomination paper is a question
of fact to be proved by the petitioner by affirmative evidence and to be
decided in each case on the material on record and not on the basis of
mere probabilities. It cannot be presumed that the votes given to the
disqualified candidate would have come to the patitioner and the verdict
of the electorate cannot be set aside on the basis of such probabilities.
JAOTDISH SINGH V. RUDRA DEOLAL AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 311.

If the want of qualification of a candidate does not appear on


the face of the nomination paper or the electoral roll, and no objection
is raised to his nomination, the Eeturning Officer has no other alternative
but to accept the nomination and the acceptance of the nomination can-
not in such a case be held to have been "improper" within the meaning
of section 100(l)(c), even though the Election Tribunal finds subsequen-
tly after enquiry that the candidate whose nomination was accepted was
not really qualified under the Constitution to be chosen as a member of
the Legislature. The election cannot be declared wholly void in such
ease on account of the improper acceptance of a nomination under sec-
tion 100(l)(c), but the case is one of ' non-compliance with the provisions
of the Constitution" referred to in section 100(2) (c) and the election of
the returned candidate alone can be declared void. Where in a double
member constituency, the nomination of the candidate for the reserved
seat was accepted by the Returning Officer as on the face of the nomi-
nation paper and electoral rolls he was not disqualified and no objection
was raised by any one, but in an election petition it was found that he
was below 25 years of age at all material times and the whole election
including that of the candidate for the general seat was declared void
under section 100(l)(c) by the Election Tribunal: Held, that the case
was not one of an "improper acceptance" of a nomination within sec-
tion 100(l)(c) but one of non-compliance with the provisions of the
Constitution within section 100(2)(c), and the election of the candidate
for the general seat cannot be declared void. Stowe v. Joliffe(9 O.P. 734)
referred to. DURGA SHANKAR MBHTA V. THAKUR RAGHURAJ SINGH
AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 494 (S.C.).

In the case of the improper acceptance of a nomination : (a)


if the nomination accepted was that of the returned candidate, the result
must be materially affected ; (b) if the difference between the number
of votes is more than the wasted votes the result cannot be affected at
all; (c) if the number of wasted votes is greater than the margin of
votes between the returned candidate and the candidate securing
the next highest number of votes it cannot be presumed that the
228 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

wasted votes might have gone to the latter and that the result of the
election has been materially affected. This is a matter which has to be
proved and. though it must be recognized that the petitioner in such a
ease is confronted with a difficult situation, he cannot be relieved of the
duty imposed upon him by section 100(l)(c) and if the petitioner fails
to adduce satisfactory evidence to enable the court to find in his favour
on this point, the inevitable result would be that the Tribunal would not
interfere in his favour and would allow the election stand. Lakhan Lai
Mishra v. Tribeni Kumar (3 E.L.E. 423) and Mandril Sumitra Devi v.
Surajnarain Singh (4 E.L.E. 136) dissented from. It is impossible to
accept the ipse dixit of witnesses coming from one side or the other to
say that all or some of the votes would have gone to one or the other
on some supposed or imaginary ground. The question is one of fact and
has to be proved by positive evidence. If the petitioner is unable to
adduce evidence the only inescapable conclusion to which the Tribunal
can come is that the burden is not discharged and that the election must
stand. The language of section 100(l)(c) is too clear for any speculation
about possibilities.
Quaere : Whether a case in which a nomination is prirna facie
valid and is accepted by the Eeturning Officer without objection or when
the objection is not pressed or proved before him, falls within section
100(l)(e) or section 100(2)(e). Order of Election Tribunal, Allahabad,
in Deo Ghand v. Vashist Narain and Others (6 E.L.R. 138) reversed,
VASHIST NAEAIN SHABMA v. DBV CHAND AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 30.
(S.C)
The result of the election cannot be held to be materially
affected by an improper acceptance of the nomination unless it is proved
that if this nomination had not been accepted the result of the election
would have been substantially different from what it was, i.e., that the
returned candidate would not have been returned, and a different candi-
date would have succeeded at the election. The result should not be
judged by the mere increase or decrease in the total number of votes
secured by the returned candidate but by the fact that the wasted votes
would have been distributed in such a manner between the contesting
candidates as would have brought about the defeat of the returned can-
didate. DEVASHABAN SINHA v. SHBO MAHADEV PEASAD AND OTHERS,
10 E.L.R. 461.
Where the petitioner got 15,511 votes, respondent No. 1, (the re-
turned candidate) got 15,995 votes (that is 484 votes more than the
petitioner) and the respondent No. 2, whose nomination was stated to
have been improperly accepted, got only 510 votes; Held, that the
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 229

result of the election could not be held to have been matarially affected
by the improper acceptance and the election of respondent No. 1 could
not be set aside unless the petitioner could prove that out of the wasted
510 votes, he (the petitioner) would have got at least 484 plus 14, i.e.,
498 votes. DEVASHAEAN SINHA V. SHBO MAHADEV PRASAD AND
OTHEES, 10B.L.E. 461.

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULES.


Non-compliance with rules— When vitiates election—Necessity
of proof that the result of election was materially affected—Burden of
proof—English and Indian Lav)—When result of election is materially
affected. See the cases cited at pp. 126 to 130 under the heading BURDEN
OF PROOF.
——Improper acceptance and non-compliance with Wules—Difference
See DUEGA SHANKAR MEHTA V. THAKTJB RAGHURAJ SINGH AND
OTHERS, 9 B.L.R. 494 (S.C.)

PARTC STATES.
Disqualifications laid down in section 7 of the B. P. Act—
Whether apply to Part G States—Per S. N. VAISH and L. N. MlSHA
(P. LOBO dissenting).—The disqualifications laid down in section 7(d) of
the R. P. Act, 1951, apply to candidates standing for election to Assemblies
of PartC States also. BALCHAND V. LAXMINAEAIN M A T E H 8 B.L.R. 465.
GANGA PEASAD SHASTRI v. PANNA LAL AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.R. 448.

Under section 17 of the Part G States Act, 1951, read with


article 102 (e) of the Constitution what would be a disqualification for a
candidate for being chosen to either House of Parliament under article
102, would be a disqualification to be chosen for the Legislature of a
Part 0 State. The omission in section 8 of the Part G States Act)
1951, of Part II of the R.P. Act, 1951, in which section 7 of the latter
Act occurs, does not lead to the conclusion that the disqualifications
referred to in section 7 do not apply to Part G States. A contract with
the Chief Commissioner of aJPartC Stats would, under section 9 of the
Part C States Act, read witn section 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act,
be a contract with the Central Government and would operate as a
disqualification for election to either House of Parliament under sec-
tion 7(d) and 9 of the R. P. Act, 1951, and it would be a disqualifica-
tion under section 17 of the Part 0 States Act, 1951, for election to the
Legislative Assembly of the State. SATYA DBV BIJSHAHRI V. PADAM
DEV AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.R. 103 (S;C). See also MAHENDBA KTJMAR
p. VlDYAWATI AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 216 (S. C.)
ELD—31
230 ELECTION LAW REPORTS PIGEST

POLICE.

Interference by 'police—When proper—Section 127 of the E. P.


Act only creates a new offence and it is not a substitute for other steps
which can be taken under the ordinary law for maintaining peace and
order, e.g., under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code or arrests. Per
SHOMB—The power of the police in connection with election meetings is
extremely limited and circumscribed. The option of taking any action
against a person for disturbance at an election meeting is laid by the
Legislature on the Chairman, and the police can act only if the Chair-
man requests them to do so. ElKHAB DAS v. ElDlCHAND PALLIWAL
AND OTHERS, 9 B.L.E. 115.

Promulgation of an order under section -144, Criminal Procedure


Code, and arrests of the workers of a candidate do not by themselves
constitute any ground for setting aside an election as these are not
directly covered by any of the grounds mentioned in section 100 of the
Act; nor do they, by themselves, constitute any corrupt or illegal prac-
tice under sections 123, 124 or 125 of the Act. If prohibitory orders
and arrests of workers are made male fide by the police authorities it
may constitute undue influence. RlKHAB DAS V. RlDICHAND PALLIWAL
AND OTHBES, 9 E.L.R. 115.
POLLING.
[See also BALLOT BOXES and BALLOT PAPERS].
Polling—Extension of time without fresh notification—Legality —
Where the scheduled time for commencing and closing of polling was
under orders notified by the Government, 8 a.m., and 6 a.m. respectively,
and, as the polling in some of the booths was started late, the time for
closing the poll was extended up to 7-30 p.m., under fresh orders issued
by the Government on the polling day without any fresh notification in
the Gazette, and the polling was continued till 7-30 p.m. : Held, that
the procedure was contrary to law as the Government had no power
under the Act or the Rules to extend the time beyond that originally
fixed, and such extension was, further, contrary to rule 16 which required
that the hours fixed shall be published bv, notification in the Official
Gazette; but the election cannot be set aside on this ground alone in the
absence of any proof that this illegality had materially affected the result
of the election. P. K. ATRE V. T. R. NAEAVNE AND OTHERS, 1-B.L.R.
355.
There is no provision in the R. P. Act, 1951, or the Rules,
which authorizes the Government to extend the time of polling beyond
that originally fixed. Section 57 which provides for adjournment
of the poll in certain emergencies to another date could not be availed of
to extend the hours of polling on the day originally fixed. An election
POLLING 231

cannot be declared void merely because the polling was started and
closed later than the notified time without a further notification, unless
this irregularity is proved to have materially affected the result of the
election. MoiNTJBDiN B. HARRIS v. B. P. DlVGi, 3 B.L.E. 248.
Commencing polling late—Commencing polling at 8-25 a.m.,
instead of at 8 a.m., as notified, is a contravention of section 56 of the
Act and if the margin of votes by which the successful candidate was
elected as against the petitioner is vory small, this contravention of the
rules may be a sufficient ground for setting aside his election under section
100(2)(c). Dibrugarh N. M. B. 1927 (Hammond 337) relied on.
T. C. BASAPPA v. NAGAPPA AND OTHERS, 3 B.L.R. 197.
Polling started late and not continued for full statutory period—
Where it was found that in several polling booths polling started late and
closed at 5 p.m., instead of continuing for the full statutory period of
8 hours provided by section 56 of the E. P. Act, 1951, that a large
number of votes were not polled, and further, that there was refusal to
record votes of certain registered electors, and that there was a difference
of only 92 votes between the two principal contestants : Held, (i) that,
in the circumstances, the refusal to record votes of certain registered
electors coupled with the non-compliance of the law by starting late and
not continuing for the statutory period must be deemed to have mate-
rially affected the result of the election, and the election should be
declared to be void ; (ii) that when an election is declared void on the
ground that there has been no proper election at all, the petitioner
cannot- be declared duly elected. SUDHANSU SEKHAB GHOSH V.
SATYENDRA NATH BASU AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 73.

The electors have the statutory right to cast their votes and
opportunity must be given according to law to exercise their right of
franchise. Denial of such opportunity is a grave irregularity amounting
to infraction of the rules relating to the election. SUDHANSU SEKHAE
GHOSH V. SATYENDRA NATH BASU AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 73.
Change of time—The mere opening or closing of a poll some
time later than the time fixed is not a ground for setting aside an election
unless it is proved that the result of the election has been materially
affected thereby : Akyab West (Hammond 51), Limerick (1833, P. and K.
373), Drogheda (1874, 2 O'M. and H. 201) relied on. EADHAKBISHNAN
v. MASILAMANI CHETTIAR AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 148.
• Postponing counting of votes—Fixing date for counting before
poll is complete—Legality—Under section 58(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951,
the Eeturning Officer can postpone the counting of votes without explain-
ing the reasons therefor to the candidate. Notice of re-poll may be
232 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

published in such manner as the Ejection Commission directs and it need


not necessarily be published in the Gazette. Rule 44(1) does not mean
that the dates for counting of votes can be appointed only after the poll
is complete. SHANKAB TEIPATHI V. RETUBNING O F F I C E S , MIBZAPUE
AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 315.
Omission to give 8 hours per day—The provision in section 56
of the R. P. Act, 1951, that the total period allotted on any one day for
polling at an election in a constituency shall not be less than 8 hours is
not a merely directory provision and omission to give 8 hours is a non-
compliance of the rules for which the election of the returned candidate
could be declared void under section 100(2)(c) if it has materially affected
the result of the election. KANDASAMI KANDAB V, SUBBAMANIA
GOUNDAE ANDOTHEES, 5 E.L.R. 156.
Duty to record all votes before closing —A Presiding Officer of a
polling station is bound to record the votes of all voters who have entered
the compound of the booth before the hour of closing. He would be
acting illegally in asking them to stand in a queue and preventing those
who stand in the quetfe outside the gate from entering the compound.
BALCHAND v. LAXMINABAIN MATEH, 8 E.L.R. 465.

Providing for special booths for women and larger number of


booths in urban areas alone—Whether discriminatory—Providing for
special booths for women voters in urban areas but not in rural areas
does not amount to illegal discrimination between voters and does not
contravene article 15 of the Constitution. Nor is there any illegal
discrimination in providing for a larger number of booths in urbaiis areas
than in rural areas as proportionately a larger number of electors come
to the polling stations in urban areas to cast votes than in rural areas.
In any event, an election cannot be held invalid on these grounds unless
it is proved that the result of the election has been materially affected
thereby. S E I R A M V. MOHAMMAD TAQI HADI AND OTHKRS, 8
E.L.R. 139.
Preventing candidate from entering booth —Preventing the entry
of a candidate to the polling booth is non-compliance with the rules, but
an election cannot be set aside on this ground unless it is further proved
that the result of the election was materially affected thereby. RlKHAB
DAS v. RIDHICHAND PALLIWAL AND OTHEBS, 9 E.L.R. 115.
POLLING AGENT.
[See also COEBL'PT PRACTICE].
If a polling agent produces a copy of the letter of appointment
to the Presiding Officer and makes a declaration in the manner prescrib-
ed in Eorm 6, he has a right to be admitted to the polling booths before
POLLING AGENT 233

the commencement of the election. The Presiding Officer cannot refuse


admission merely because he had not received any authority or com-
munication from the Beturning Officer in this behalf. If it is established
by the evidence that the petitioners' agents were not allowed access to
the polling booths before the start of the election, then, the consequ-
ences, whatever they are, under the law must follow, even though this
grievance was common to other candidates as well. Under the provi-
sions of section 51 of the Act, however, absence of the polling agents
would not invalidate acts done in their absence if they are otherwise
duly done. MAEUTBAO BHAUBAO AND OTHEES v. GULABBAO DADA-
SAHEB AND OTHEBS, 5 E.L.E. 303.
Letter of appointment must be produced—The letter appointing
polling agents in Eorm VI must be sent to the Eeturning Officer at
least 3 days before the commencement of the poll as laid down in rule 12.
If they are not delivered to the Eeturning Officer within the prescribed
time, so as to give him 72 clear hours to forward them to the Presid-
ing Officers, the Eeturning Officer would be justified in refusing to
receive them. SHIBBAN L A L SAKSBNA V. HABISHANKEB PBASAD AND
OTHEES, 9 B.L.E. 403.

• The mere appointment of a polling agent by a candidate is not


enough to enable the polling agent to gain admission to polling stations.
Notice of such appointment should also be given as prescribed by sec-
tion 46 at least three days before the commencement of the poll to the
Eeturning Officer, and unless a duplicate copy of the letter of appoint-
ment is presented to the Presiding Officer of the polling station and a
declaration is signed before him as prescribed in rule 12, the Presiding
Officer would be justified in refusing to admit him inside the polling
station. D B . K. N. GAIBOLA V. GANGADHAB MAITHANI AND OTHERS
(No. 2), 8B.L.E. 105.
Appointment of government officer as polling agent—Whether
corrupt practice. See CORRUPT PRACTICE.

POLLING OFFICERS.
Appointment of— The Eeturning Officer must appoint polling
officers at least 7 days before the date of poll and communicate the
same to the employees. 'If in any circumstance, he is compelled to make
any deviation from this ordinary procedure, a heavy and onerous duty is
cast upon him to make a proper arrangement under which these officers
might have the full opportunity to. cast their votes yet with expedition,
and notice that such an arrangement has been made should be given so
as to enable them to take the opportunity of casting their votes in postal
234 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

ballots. JYOSTNA CHANDBA AND ANOTHER V. MBHEABALI AND


OTHKBS, 3 E.L.E. 488.
Voting by polling officers—Necessity to make early arrangements
—Omission to afford facility to vote—The petitioner applied to set aside
the election of the respondent on the grounds, inter alia, that a number of
Government servants who were electors of the constituency were em-
ployed on duty on polling stations other than those where they were
ordinarily to cast their votes, and that this was done at a very late
stage, and these electors therefore had no opportunity to cast their
votes in postal ballot papers. A number of voters amounting to about
49 were thus practically dis-enfranchised. It was found that in 47 out
of the 49 cases the voters had not had a proper opportunity to exercise
their right to vote as their orders of employment on polling dates were
made too late, and only a narrow majority of 44 was found on analysis
to stand in favour of the respondent. Held, that, in the circumstances,
the result of the election was materially affected and the election was
therefore void. JTOSTNA CHANDBA AND ANOTHKH V. MBHBABALI AND
OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 488.

-As the decision of a Eeturning Officer accepting or rejecting a


nomination paper is only a summary one, the tribunal has power to allow
the parties to adduce fresh evidence and urge new gronnds and to come
to a decision on the legality of the order of rejection or acceptance upon
all the materials placed before it. The view that the order of the Eeturn-
ing Officer should not be »set aside unless it is perverse is incorrect.
Observations in Prem Nath v. Bam Kishan and Others (1 E.L.E. 271)
dissented from. GUENAM SiNGH AND ANOTHBK V. PAETAP SING-H
AND OTHBBS, 7 E.L.E. 338.

Then is nothing in law to debar a Eeturning Officer from


rejecting a nomination paper on account of a mistake of a substantial
character even though he had failed to notice the defect and draw the
attention of the candidate or his agent to the defect at the time of the
presention of the nomination paper. EAMBSWAK PRASAD SiNGH V
KEISHNA GOPAL DAS AND OTHBES, 4 E.L.E. 112.

RETURNING OFFICER.
See also BALLOT BOXES, BALLOT PAPBBS, ELECTORAL B O L L , and
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES.

Scrutiny of nominations—Enquiry by Beturning Officer—


nature of—The Eeturning Officer's enquiry under s. 36 of the Act being of
a summary nature, the scope of which is limited to his own discretion,
his acceptance or rejection of a nomination paper is open to review by the
POLLING OFFICERS 235

Tribunal which has full power to go behind the decision of the Eeturning
Officer and decide the impropriety of rejection or acceptance and its
consequence on the result of the election. VlJAYA MOHAN REDDY V.
PAG A P U L L A BEDDY AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.B, 414.

-Power to adjourn—Duty to make enquiry—The word "adjourn-


ment" in section 36(5) of the E. P. Act, 1951, means adjournment
to another date, and the section does not prohibit the Eeturning Officer
from giving some time to a candidate to produce a copy of the electoral
roll on the date of scrutiny itself. A Eeturning Officer cannot reject a
nomination on the mere ground that the candidate has not porduced the
electoral roll in which his name is entered. He is bound to make a
summary enquiry and though under section 36(7) the electoral roll is con-
clusive evidence of the candidate's right to stand for election, this does
not mean that other evidence is not admissible to prove the age of the
candidate etc. if a copy of the electoral roll is not available at the time
of the scrutiny. BAI.TNATHPB.ASAD VBBMA V. CHANDBESHWAR NARAIN
PBASAD SINGH AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 88.

——Duty of Returning Officer to make summary enquiry—-A nomin-


tion should not be rejected merely because there are minor discrepancies
between the nomination paper and the electoral roll. In the copy of the
electoral roll produced by a candidate, the name, the serial number and
house number of the proposer tallied with those given in the nomination
paper but the name of the constituency was left blank, and with regard
to the seconder, all the descriptions tallied but the electoral number was
wrongly printed as 729 in the roll while it was shown as 728 in the
nomination paper. The Eeturning Officer, without looking into the elec-
toral roll or making any enquiry, rejected the nomination paper on the
ground that the proposer and seconder were not identifiable: Held, that
the Eeturning Officer acted improperly in rejecting the nomination
paper without making an enquiry as to the identity of the proposer
and seconder. I t was his duty to satisfy himself by looking into the
electoral roll of the constituency (which was before him) and by making
enquiries from the candidate and the proposer and seconder as to how the
mistake in the electoral roll number of the seconder occurred. Thakur
Mohendra Nath Sahi Deo v. Devaki Prasad Sinha (3 Jagat Narain 228)
' and Bamanugraha Narain Singh v. Sarda Prasad Singh (3 Jagat Narain
232) referred to. SURAJ NARATN V. R A M NATH AND OTHERS,
3 E.L.R. 305.

• Power to adduce more evidence before Tribunal—The scope of


the inquiry by the Eeturning Officer at the time of scrutiny of nomina-
tions is of a summary nature and consequently limited and the object of
236 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the Act is to ensure that everything connected with the election proceed
according to the time schedule, postponing all disputes to be raised by
petition after the elections are completed. The Tribunal's enquiry, there-
fore, cannot be limited only to the material that was placed before the
Eeturniug Officer. The petitioner is entitled to explain the descriptions
in the nomination paper by adducing more evidence before the Tribunal.
Shankar v. Returning Officer, Kolaba (l E.L.R. 13) referral to. BAKA-
BAM SUKAEAM KONKANI V. SHANKAR RAO CHINDUJI BBD3E AND
OTHERS, 3 B.L.R. 409.

The rejection of a nomination paper by the Returning Officer can


be supported before the Tribunal on grounds other than those on which
the Returning Officer made the order. HARNAM SINGH V. JWALA
PRASAD AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.R. 332.

Power to review —A Returning Officer has no power to review an


order rejecting a nomination paper which he has made on scrutiny of the
nomination papers and to accept a rejected nomination paper on review.
NATWAB L A L v. BHABTENDBA SINGH AND OTHEES, B.L.R. 408.

Power to allow rectification of defects—The Returning Officer


lias no power to allow rectification of defects in the nomination, whether
they are substantial or unsubstantial, at the time of scrutiny. If the
defects are substantial, the nomination has to be rejected. If not, they
ara immaterial. RATTAN ANMOL SlNQH AND ANOTHER v. ATMA RAM
AND OTHEES, 10 B.L.R. 41. (S.C.j

Duty to record acceptance or rejection, not reasons--Tibs direc-


tion in section 36(8) of the R. P. Act that the endorsement of acceptance
or rejection of a nomination paper should be made on the nomination
papar itself applies only to the first requirement and has no connection
whatsoever with the second requirement, i.e., recording a brief statement
of the reasons for the rejection. BEJAYSINGH V. NARBADA CHARAN
LAL AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.R. 428.

——Whether "Court"—Sanction for prosecution, whether necessary


—See 6 B.L.R. 338, pp. 153-164 supra.

•Whether necessary party to election petition—Costs—See 2 B.L.ii.


315, p. 130 supra.

Whether High Court can issue writ against Returning Officer —


See H I G H COURTS, pp. 187-192.

" Power to allot symbols —Bee pp. 217ff,

r
SCHEDULED CASTES 237

SCHEDULED CASTES.
[See also DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES].

-The description of a candidate as a 'Harijan, Hindu" in the


electoral roll is conclusive evidence to show that he belongs to the
Scheduled Caste, and evidence cannot be admitted in an election petition
to prove that he is a Sikh Harijan and does not therefore belong to a
Scheduled Caste. EATTAN SlNO-H V. DEVINDEB SlNGH AND OTHEBS,
7 E.L.E. 234.
Adding the word reserved' in brackets after the name of the
constituency in the nomination paper of a candidate who stands for the
seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes in the constituency is not a ground
for rejecting his nomination. HAEI DAS V. HlEA SINGH P A L AND
OTHEBS, 4 E.L.E. 466.
' Jatava" is a Scheduled Caste, being included in the caste
Chamar" mentioned in Part X of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)
(Part C States) Order, 1951. BALCHAND V. LAXMINAEAIN MATEH,
8 E.L.E. 465.
A person who is born as a member of a Scheduled Caste does not
cease to be a member of the Scheduled Caste by joining the Mahanubhava
Panth without becoming a sanyasi. Held also: If the nomination of a
candidate for the House of the People has been improperly rejected
and the result of the election has been materially affected thereby,
the election must be declared void even though the candidate has sub-
sequently been returned as a member of the Council of States or has died
after the election. MOBESHWAE PAEASHEAM V. C H A T U E B H U J VITHAL-
DAS JASANI AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 428.

Conversion of a Mahar into a Mahanubhava imports only an


intellectual acceptance of certain ideological tenets and does not alter the
convert's status as a member of a Scheduled Caste, at any rate, so far
as the householder section of the Mahanubhava Panth is concerned.
CHATUEBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI V. MOEESHWAE PAEASHBAM AND
OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 301. (S.C.)
Attestation of declaration—An Additional District and Sessions
Judge is a "magistrate" within the meaning of rule 6 and can attest the
verification of a declaration made under s. 33(3) of the E. P. Act, 1951.
Held also: A defect in the verification required under rule 6 is not a
technical defect not of a substantial nature within the meaning of
section 36(4) of the Act. EAMLAL V. SUJANIEAM AND OTHERS,
2 E.L.E. 27.
ELD—32
238 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

As the word "magistrate" is not defined in the E. P. Act, 1951, I.


or the rules made thereunder, it has to be interpreted in the light of the 1i
definition contained in section 3(32) of the General Clauses Act, and not
in the sense in which that word is used in the Criminal Procedure Code,
and since this definition in the General Clauses Act is not exhaustive (the
words iised in the definition being shall include" and not means") the
word magistrate" in section 33(3) of the R. P. Act must be given its
ordinary dictionary meaning of a civil officer charged with the adminis-
tration of laws." An Additional Sessions Judge is therefore a magistrate
within the meaning of section 33(3) of the R. P. Act, and can validly j
attest a declaration made under that section. A Subordinate Judge who
has been invested with the powers of a Magistrate under section 12 of the
Criminal Procedure Code does not cease to be a magistrate" when he is
appointed as an Additional Sessions Judge. SUJANIRAM v. LAL SHYAM,
SHAH AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.R. 183.
SCHEDULED TRIBES.
If the Tribunal is satisfied that in the name of a particular Tribe
that is adopted or mentioned in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order,
1950, there are included certain castes, groups or communities, it is not
beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hold that the particular caste
community or group comes within the Tribe mentioned in that Order; it
would not amount to amendment of the Constitution Order or rewriting
of it. BAKABAM SUKAEAM KONKANI V. SHANKAE RAO CHINDUJI
BEDSB AND 0 T H E E 9 , 3 B.L.R. 409.
——Gonds and Raj Gonds of Rewa State did not become Kshatriyas
by the Royal Proclamation of the Ruler of the State, as the proclamation
was not a law or regulation but only an act of social reform, and even
if they did become Kshatriyas, they did not thereby lose their status as
Scheduled Tribes. Though change of religion of a member of a Scheduled
Caste would deprive him of his status as a member of the Scheduled
Caste, change of religion of a member of a Scheduled Tribe does not affect
his status as such. M U L A I AND ANOTHER V. L A L DAN BAHADUR
SINGH AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 8.
SECRECY OF VOTING.
—Statements volunteered by voter—Whether admissible in evi-
dence—Though section 94 of the R. P. Act, 1951, prohibits putting
questions to a voter who appears as a witness as to for whem he has
voted at an election, if a voter, waiving this privilege of secrecy,
voluntarily states that he has voted for a certain person, his statement
need not be expunged from the record. BlSWANATH ROY v. TARAKDAS
BANEBJEE AND OTHEBS, 5 E.L.R. 223.
SUPREME COURT 239

Scope of exemption—Section 94 of the E. P. Act must be


strictly construed as it curtails the right of a -witness to state
a fact. The prohibition in the section is only against a statement as to
how a witness or other person has voted at an election. The marginal
note cannot be used to widen the scope of the section. There is no
objection to a witness stating that he belongs to a particular political
party and that party obligations required him not to vote for a person
not chosen by his p a r t y Statements of witnesses that they have not
voted for a particular candidate are admissible in evidence. Such evi-
dence is not excluded by section 94 of the E. P. Act, 1951. A person
who is ostensibly a member of a political party can be asked whether
he belongs to that party. It is only when his political opinions are
confined to his own mind that the question is inadmissible. North
Durham case (3 O'M. & H. 1) and Harwich case (3 O'M. & H. 61) follow-
ed. MANBKLATi AMOLAKCHAND V. THETE GOPAL EAMJI ANDOTHEES,
9 B.L.E. 36.

SIKHS.
As there is no concrete test for determining whether a person
is or is not a Sikh, the qualification for being a Sikh prescribed in the
Sikh Gurdwaras Act, viz., that he should be prepared to give a declaration
that he is a Sikh and believes in the Guru Granth Sahib and the ten
Gurus, and that he has no other religion, may be adopted as the test.
RATTAN SINGH V. DEVINDER SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 234.

SUPREME COURT.
Power to grant special leave to appeal from orders of Election
Tribunal—Article 136 of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court a
plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals
by granting of special leave against any kind of judgment or order made
by a court or Tribunal in any cause or matter, and powers could be
exercised in spite of the specific provisions for appeal contained in the
Constitution or other laws. Neither article 329(b) nor section 105 of the
E. P. Act, 1951, can therefore in any way cut down or affect the over-
riding powers which the Supreme Court can exercise in the matter of
granting special leave to appeal under article 136 against au order of
an Election Tribunal. DURGA SHANKAR MBHTA V. THAKUR BAGHU-
RAJ SINGH AND OTHERS, 9 B.L.E. 494. (S.C.).

The provision contained in section 105 of the E. P. Act, 1951,


that the orders of the Tribunal shall be final and conclusive cannot
abrogate the powers of the Supreme Court under article 136 or of the High
24O ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Court under article 226 of the Constitution. R A J KRUSHNA BOSE V.


BINOD KANUNGO AND OTHERS, 9 B.L.B. 294.

Interference with findings of fact—The Court does not, when


hearing appeals under article 136 sit as a court of further appeal on
facts, and does not interfere with findings given on a consideration of
the evidence, unless they are perverse or based on no evidence. This is
particularly so, when the findings under challenge are those of Election
Tribunals. DINABANDHU SAHIT V. JADUMONI MANGABAJ AND OTHERS,
9 E.L.R. 30.
-Respondent s right to support appeal on grounds found against him
—In an appeal by special leave under article 138 from the decision of a
Tribunal it is not open to the respondent to support the decision of the
Tribunal on grounds which had been found against him by the Tribunal.
VASHIST NARAIN SHARMA v. DBV CHAND AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 30.

VOTING.
—See also BALLOT BOXES, BALLOT PAPERS, P O L L I N G .

Voting—Proportionate representation—The very object of ]


voting by 'single transferable vote" is to ensure that, so far as practic- j
able, no vote should go waste. This is the chief and characteristic merit
of election on proportionate representation" basis, which is the name
given to this method of voting. SOHAN L A L V. ABINASH CHANDER AND
OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 55.
"Votes thrown away"—Votes cannot be rejected as "thrown
away votes" unless the disqualification of the candidate for whom the
votes were given was widely known to the electorate and the votes
were given perversely after such notice. Tayebuddin Ahmed v. Khur-
ram Khan Panee and Others (Sen and Poddar 790) and Moola Singh v.
Mangu Bam and Others (Sen and Poddar 945) referred to. EATTAN
SINGH V. DEVINDER SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 234.
WAIVER.
[See also ESTOPPEL].
Where a Tribunal declared the election of the applicant to be ,
void and the applicant, without taking steps to set aside the order of the [
Tribunal, filed his nomination paper at a fresh election and when he was i
again defeated he filed an application under article 226 against the f
Tribunal's decision : Held, that the applicant had waived his right of j
challenging the decision of the Tribunal by acquiescing in it. Devi Dayal I
v. State of Pepsu (A.I.E. 1953 Pepsu 9) referred to. GANGADHAR V. f
ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VINDHYA PRADESH, AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 183. :
WORDS AND PHRASES 24I

WORDS AND PHRASES.

"Amendment". AUDESH PEATAP SINGH V. B R I J NAEAIN AND


OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 1.
"At all elections". BAM SINGH v. GHASI E A M AND OTHERS,
9 B.L.E. 183.
"At the election". BATTAN ANMOL SINGH V. ATMA EAM
AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 41 (S.C.).
See also oases cited at .pp. 112, 113 supra.
"Attestation".M U L A I AND ANOTHER V. L A L DAN BAHADXJR
SINGH AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 8.

"Authorised for use". H A R I DATT V. MADAN MOHAN AND


OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 25.
"Canvassing". ABDUL R A U F V. GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND
OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 240.
"Certified copy". KANAUJI L A L SHUKLA V. BHAGWAN D I N
AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 1.
"Community". SHIV D U T T AND OTHERS V. BANSIDAS
DHANGAR AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.E. 324.
"Conclusion of the trial". M U K T I NATH E A I V. UMA SHANKER
MISRA, 3 E.L.E. 109.
"Duly nominated".
See oases cited under ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES, pp.
142 ff. supra.
"Election". SUKAR GOPE v. STATE op BIHAR, 1 E.L.B. 68.
N. P. PONNUSWAMI V. EETURNING OFFICER, NAMAK-
KAL (H.C.), 1 E.L.E. 89.
N. P. PONNUSWAMI V. EBTUBNING OFFICER, NAMAKKAL
AND OTHERS (S.C.), 1 E.L.E. 133.
EAM SINGH v. GHASI RAM AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 183.
TIRATH SINGH V. BACHITAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E.
163.
See also cases cited under " H I G H COURTS" pp. 174 £f. supra.
"Employ". ELAYA P I L L A I V. K. PARTHASARATHT AND
OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 20.

"Error apparent on the face of the record". S. KHADER


SHERIFF V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND OTHERS,
7 E.L.E. 471,
242 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

T. C. BASAPPA v. T. NAGAPPA, 10 E.L.R. 14 (S. C).


H A B I VISHNU KAMATH V. AHMED ISHAQUE, 10 E.L.R.
216 (S.C.).
-"False return". MAST R A M V. HARNAM SINGH S E T H I AND
OTHEBS, 7 E.L.R. 301.
"Financial interest". HOREN JONES V. MOHAN SINGH AND
OTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 147.
"Gratification". DAULAT RAM V. MAHARAJA ANAND GHAND
AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 87.
"improper acceptance of nomination".
DuRGA SHANKAB
MEHTA v. THAKTJR RAGHURAJ SINGH AND OTHERS, 9
E.L.R. 494 (S. C).
"in connection with election". RAM SINGH V. GIIASI RAM AND
OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 183.
SHEO NABAYAN VAIDYA V. SARDABMAL, 4 E.L.R. 401.
M. R. MEGANATHAN v. K. T. KOSALRAM, 9 E.L.R. 242.
-"Materially affected".
LAXMIDATTA AND ANOTHER V. MADAN
LAL DHUPAB AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.R. 398.
"May". MAHESH DATTA V. MUBLIDHAR AND OTHERS, 7
E.L.R. 154.
AUDESH PRATAP SINGH V. B B I J N A R A I N , 9 E.L.R. 1.
"Office of profit". HANS R A J JIVRAJ MEHTA V. INDUBHAI
B. AMIN, 1 E.L.R. 171.
CHANDER N A T H v. K. JASWANT SINGH, 3 E.L.R. 147.
YOGRAJ SINGH SHANKAR SINGH PARIHAR V. SITABAM
IIlBACHAND BlRLAAND OTHERS (No. 2.), 3 E.L.R. 439.
KISHEN L A L LAMBOR V. MADAN SINGH, 10 E.L.R. 49.
VINDHYA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY MEMBERS,
In re, 4 E.L.R. 422.
See also other cases cited under "OFFICE OP PROFIT" pp.
179 ff. supra.
-"Prospective candidate". LiNGE GowDA'». SHIVANANJAPPA,
6 E.L.R. 288.
"Relating to candidature". KRISHNAJI BHIMBAO ANTBOLIKAR
v. SHANKER SHANTARAM MORE AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R.
100.
"Service". NYALCHAND VIRCHAND SHETH V. VITHALBHAI
RANCHHODBHAI PATEL AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 451.
WORDS AND PHRASES 243

-"Shall". JAGAN NATH v. JASWANT SINGH AND OTHBBS, 9


E.L.E. 231. (S.C.).
SHAH MOHAMMAD UMAIE V. EAM CHAEAN SINGH AND
OTHEES, 8 E.L.B. 179.
-"Sign", "subscribe". MULAI AND ANOTHER V. L A L DAN
BAHADUE SINGH AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.B. 8.
EATAN SINGH AND ANOTHER, V. PADAM CHAND JAIN
AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 189.
EATTAN ANMOL SINGH V. ATMA EAM AND OTHEBS, 10
E.L.E. 41, (S.C.).
-"Systematic appeal".
SHIV D U T T AND OTHEES V. BANSIDAS
DHANGAR AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.E. 324.
-"Tampering". PEADIPTA KISHOEE DAS V. MOHAMMAD
ATAHAR AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 467. See also 10 E.L.E. 162.
-"Trial". See pp. 118, 120, 122 supra.
-"Void". B R A J NARESH SINGH V. H U K A M S I N G H , 9 E.L.E. 80.
-"Within a week". EOOP CHANDRA SOGANI AND ANOTHER V.
EAWAT MAN SINGH AND OTHERS (NO. 3), 9 E.L.E. 21.
-"Working for a candidate".
JAWAHAE SHANKAR PAGHOLI ».
HIKDAY NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 495.
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO.
Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
T. Prakasam v. U. Krishna Rao and Others, 1 E.L.R. 384.
Yograjsing Shankarsingh Parihar v. Sitaram Hiraehand Birla
and Others, 1 E.L.R. 389.
Or. I, r. 3.
Fida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others. 4 E.L.R. 1.
Or. I, r. 6.
Eida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R. 1.
Or. I,r. 9.
Eida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R. 1.
Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh and Others, 9 E-L.R. 231.
Or. I, rr. 9,13.
Jagajeevandas Shetty v. Sanjeeva Shetty and Others, 3
E.L.R. 359.
Or. I, r. 10.
Eida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others., 4 E.L.R. 1.
Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh and Others, 9 E.L.R. 231.
Or. I, r. 13.
Jagan Nath v, Jaswant Singh and Others, 9 E.L.R. 231.
Or. IV, r. 1.
Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Chandra.-Bhanu Gupta and Others,
6 E.L.R. 123.
Or. VI,r.l7.
Sheo Mahadeo Prasad v. Deva Sharan Sinha and Others,
10 E.L.R. 144.
Or. VI, rr. 14, 15,16.
Debi Prasad v. Mohammed Naseer and Others, 3 E.L.R. 137
Jwala Prasad Misra v. Mahadeo and Others, 3 E.L.R. 473.
Or. VI, r. 15.
Radhey Shyam Sharma v, Chandra Bhanu Gupta and Others,
6 E.L.R. 123.
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 245

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (contd.)

Or. VI, r. 17.


K. T. Kosalram v. M. E. Meganathan and Others, 9 E.L.E. 278.
A. S. Subba Eaj v. Muthiah (No. 2), 1 E.L.E. 290.
Or. IX r. 6.
Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, and Another,
10 E.L.E. 293.
Or. IX, r. 7.
Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, and Another
10 E.L.E. 293.
Eadhey Shyam Sharma v. Chandra Bhanu Gupta and
Others, 6 E.L.E. 123.
Or. IX, r. 8.
Eoop Chandra Sogani and Others v. Eawat Man Singh and
Others (No. 2), 5 E.L.E. 327.
Or. IX, r. 13.
Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, and Another
10 E.L.R. 293.
Or. XII, r. 6.
Shantilal Chaudhary v. Eaghuraj Singh and Others (No. 2),
9 E.L.E. 93.
Or. XVII, r. 2.
Eoop Chandra Sogani and Others, v- Eawat Man Singh and
Others (No. 2) 5 E.L.E. 327.
Or. XVIII, r. 3.
Eoop Chandra Sogani v. Eawat Man Singh and Others.
5 E.L.E. 327.
Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, and Another,
10 E.L.E. 293.
Or. XVIII, r. 2.
Lahri Singh v. Attar Singh and Others, 3 E.L.E. 403.
Constitution of India.
Art. 4.
Sant Singh v. Shamsher Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 203.
Art. 7.
Aslam Khan v. Pazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.E. 341.
ELD—34
246 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Constitution of India (contd.)


Art. 14.
Sumer Singh v. Thakur Gurdat and Others, 7 E.L.E. 171
Sant Singh v. Shamsher Shigh and Others, 7 E.L.B. 203
Maharaj Singh v. Bafcan Amol Singh and Others, 7 E.L.B.
320. Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Election Tribunal, Paizabad,
and Others, 8 E.L.B. 201. Mathai Mathew Manjuran v.
K.O. Abraham, 10 E.L.B. 376.
Art. 15.
Sri Bam v. Mohammad Taqi Hadi and Others. 8 E.L.B. 139.
Arts. 15, 16, 19{l).
Moinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi, 3 E.L.B. 248.
Art. 19(l){a).
Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others v. Lachhi Bam and
Others, 10 E.L.B. 120.
Art. 19(2).
Lachhiram v. Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others,
9 E.L.B. 149.
Arts. 25,39.
Moinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi, 3 E.L.E. 248.
Art. 101.
Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Members. In the
matter of 4 E.L.E. 422.
Art. 101{3).
Maharaja Anand Chand, In re, 5 E.L.B. 197.
Art. 102.
Daulat Bam v. Maharaja Anand Chand and Others, 6 E.L.B.
87. Bholanath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta and Others
(No. 2), 6 E.L.B. 104. Gulabchand Chordia v. Thakur
Narain Singh and Others, 6 E.L.B. 397. Kishenlal Lamror
v. Madan Singh and Others, 10 E.L.E. 49.
Art. 102{e)
Satya Dev Bhushahri v. Padam Dev and Otheis, 10 E.L.B.
103.
Art. 102{l).
Harnam Singh v. Jwala Prasad and Others, 8 E.L.E. 332.
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 247

Constitution of India (contd.)


Art. 102(l){a)
Hansa Jivraj Mehta v. Indtibhai B. Amin and Others,
1 B.L.E. 171.
Krishnappa v. Narayansingh and Others, 7 B.L.E. 294.
Govind Malaviya v. Murli Manohar and Others, 8 E.L.E. 84.
Art. 103.
Maharaja Anand Ohand, In re, 5 E.L.E. 197.
Art. 113.
Mathai Mathew Manjuran v. K. C. Abraham, 10 E.L.E. 378.
Art. 133{1).
Mathai Mathew Manjuranv. K. C. Abraham, 10 E.L.E. 376.
Shantilal Ohaudhary v. Baghuraj Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E.
489.
V. V. Eamaswmi v. Election Tribunal, Tirunelveli, and
Others, 8 E.L.E. 233.
Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Members In the
matter of, 4 E.L.E. 422.
Art. 136.
Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj and Others,
9 E.L.E. 485. Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Eaghuraj
Singh and Others, 9 E.L.B. 494.
Art. 164{4).
Braj Naresh Singh v. Hukam Singh, 9 E.L.E. 80.
Art. 17l{3){d).
Kalika Prasad Singh v. Abdul Hayat Chand and Others
4 E.L.E. 118.
Art. 173.
Beni Madho Eai v. Bhola and Others, 6 E.L.E. 308.
Jawahar Shankar Pacholi v. Hirday Narain Singh and
Others, 6 E.L.E. 495.
Aslam Khan v. Pazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.E. 341.
Arts. 190{3), 193(1).
Saka Venkata Eao v. Election Commission (High Court)
1 E.L.E. 417.
Art. 191.
Daulat Earn v. Maharaja Anand Chand and Others, 6 E.L.E.
87. Bholanath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta and Others,
(No. 2), 6 E.L.E. 104.
Maharaja Anand Chand, In re, 5 E.L.E. 197.
248 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Constitution of India (contd.)


Art. 191 (eonta).
Mahendra Sahu v. Dutia Eaul and Others, 3 B.L.E. 117.
Chander Nath v. Kunwar Jaswant Singh and Others,
3 B.L.E. 147. Shivarama Karanth v. Venkataramana
Gowda and Others, 3 E.L.E. 187. Lahri Singh v. Attar
Singh and Others, 3 B.L.E. 403. Yograjsingh Shankar-
singh Parihar v. Sitaram Hirachand Birla and Others,
(No. 2), 3 E.L.B. 436. Shibban Lai Saksena v. Harishanker
Prasad and Others, 9 E.L.E. 403. Thakur Daoosing v.
Eamkrishna Eathor and Others, 4 E.L.E. 34. Vindhya
Pradesh Legislative Assembly Member. In the matter of,
4 B.L.E. 422. Kishenlal Lamror v. Madan Singh and
Others, 10 E.L.E. 49.
Art. 19l{l).
Beni Madho Eai v. Bhola and Others, 6 E.L.E. 308.
Art. 19l(l){a).
Balbir Singh v. Arjan Singh and Others, 6 E.L.E. 341.
Sahi Earn v. Manphool Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 47.
Isher Singh v. Manjit Inder Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 90.
Faqir Chand v. Pritam Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 119.
Mahesh Datta v. Mtirlidhar and Others, 7 E.L.E. 154.
Sant Singh v. Shamsher Singh and Others, 7 E.L.B. 203.
Maharaj Singh v. Eatan Amol Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E.
320. Kesho Earn v. Hazura Singh and Others, 8 B.L.E.
320. Deshpande, V. D. and Others v. State of Hyderabad and
Others, 10 E.L.E. 203.
Art. 191{1){C).
In re T. Siddalingaiya, Member, Mysore Legislative Assembly
7 E.L.E. 416.
Art. 191(1) (d).
Aslam Khan v. Pazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.E. 341.
Art. 191(2).
Braj Naresh Singh v. Hukam Singh, 9 E.L.E. 80.
Art. 192.
Deshpande, V. D. and Others, v. State of Hyderabad and
Others, 10 E.L.E. 203.
Art. 193.
Aslam Khan v. Pazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.R. 341.
Arts. 226, 227. See HIGH CoUETS, pp. 174-192 supra.
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 249

Constitution of India {contd.)


Art. 330(3).
Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram and
Others, 9 E.L.B. 301.
Art. 245(l).
Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others v. Lachhi Earn and
Others, 10 E.L.E. 120.
Jamna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhiram Eatanlal Jain and
Others, 5 E.L.E. 1. Hamirkha Alarkha v. Eeturning
Officers, Jamnagar City, and Others, 5 E.L.E. 230.
Art. 299.
Sankar Pandia Nadar, A.S.S.8. v. V. V. Eamaswami and
Others, 5 E.L.E. 417.
Art. 299(1).
Chatiirbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram and
Others 9 E.L.E. 301.
Moreshwar Parashram v. Chaturbhuj Yithaldas Jasani and
Others, 7 E.L.E. 428.
Art. 310.
Lahri Singh v. Attar Singh and Others, 3 E.L.E. 403.
Arts. 324, 327. See H I G H COUETS, pp. 174-192 supra.
Art. 324.
Polaki Kotesam and Others v. S. M. Patnaik and Others,
8 E.L.E. 159.
Art. 325.
Moinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi, 3 E.L.E. 248.
Art. 326.
Aslam Khan v. Fazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.E, 341.
Art. 327.
Eamlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission of India and
Others, 7 E.L.E. 364.
Art. 327.
Nagendra Mahto v. The State, 10 E.L.E. 140.
Art. 341.
Bakaram Sukaram Konkani v. Shankar Eao Chinduji Bedse
and Others, 3 E.L.E. 409.
Art. 343(2).
Eamlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission of India and
Others, 7 E.L.E. 364.
250 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Constitution of India (contd.)


Art. 361.
Saka Venkata Eao v. Election Commission (High Court)
1 B.L.E. 417.
List I, Item 72.
Nagendra Mahto v. The State, 10 E.L.E. 140.
List I, Item 93.
Nagendra Mahto v. The State, 10 E.L.E. 140.
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946.
Sec. 4.
V. V. Ramaswami v. Election Tribunal, Tirunelveli, and
Others, 8 E.L.E. 233.
' A. J. Arunachalam v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and Others,
9 E.L.E. 471.
Chiranjit Singh v. Mam Raj and Others, 7 E.L.E. 1.
Evidence Act, 1872.
Sec. 10.
Sri Eam». Mohammad Taqi Hadi and Others, 8 E.L.E. 139.
Sec. 14.
Maneklal Amolakchand v. Thete Gopal Ramji and Others
9 E.L.E. 36.
Sec. 91.
Din Singh and Others v. Kapil Deo and Others, 6E.L.R. 247.
General Clauses Act, 1897.
Sec. 3{33).
Sujaniram v. Lai Shy am Shah and Others, 5 E.L.E. 183.
Government of Part C States Act, 1951.
Prakash Narain v. Jagdish Chandra Joshi and Others,
4 E.L.E. 205.
Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and Others, 10 E.L.E. 103.
Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and Others, 6 E.L.E. 414.
In the matter of Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly.
Members, 4 E.L.E. 422.
Mahendra Kumar v. Vidyawati, 10 E.L.E. 214.
Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lai and Others, 8 E.L.E. 448.
Balchand v. Laxminarain Mateh, 8 E.L.R. 465.
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 251

Indian Contract Act, 1872.


Sec. 29.
; Jwala Prasad Misra v. Mahdeo and Others, 3 E.L.E. 473.
;• Sec. 35.
: :' Pratap Singh v. Nihar Singh and Others, 3 E.L.E. 31.
Sec. 63.
Eama Eeddi v. Chidanandam and Another (No. 2) 3 E.L.E.
i'.' , 42.
k
Sec. 76.
V ' Kanauji Lai Shukla v. Bhagwan Din and Others, 3 E.L.E. 1
v
Limitation Act, 1908.
\. ' Sec. 4. """
, Ganda Singh v. Sampuran Singh and Others, 3 E.L.E. 17.
•t Sec. 22.
n Bankat Lai v. Madan Mohan Mohan and Others, 3 E.L.E.
"[ 375.
jjt Maharaj Singh v. Eatan Amol Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E.
\ 320.
•^ S. Khader Sheriff v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and Others,
7 E.L.E. 471.
Iron and Steel Control Order, 1941.
Prabhudas Eamjibhai Mehta v. Lallubhai Kishordas Maniar
1 E.L.E. 154.
Madhya Bharat Abolition of Zamindaries Act, 1951.
1
Brindaban Prasad Tiwari v. Sita Earn and Others, 5 E.L.E. 48.
Jagdish Singh v. Endra Deolal and Others, 8 E.L.E. 311.
Mahesh Datta v. Murlidhar and Others, 7 E.L.E. 154,
> Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietory Rights Act, 1951.
'!; Thakur Daoosing v. Eamakrishna Eathor and Others,
...^ 4 E.L.E 34. Jagannath v. Pandtirang and Others,
6 E.L.E. 167.
Madhya Pradesh Offices of Profit (Removal of Disqualification
(PartC States) Order, 1951.
Prakash Narain v. Jagdish Chandra Joshi and Others,
4 E.L.E, 205.
Madras Essential Articles Control-and Requisitioning Act, 1949.
A. J. Arunachalam v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and Others,
9 E.L.E. 471.
252 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Madras Foodgrains (Intensive Procurement) Order, 1951.


Sankara Pandia Nadar A.S.S.S. v. V. V. Eamaswami and
Others, 5 E.L.E. 417.
Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, r. 160-B.
Satyanathan, N. v. K. Subramanyan and Others, 10 B.L.B.
311.
Madras Yarn Dealers' Control Order, 1948.
A. J. Arunachalam v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and Others,
9 E.L.E. 471.
Punjab State Legislature (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1952.
Sumer Singh v. Thakur Gurdat and Others. 7 E.L.R 171.
Sant Singh v. Shamsher Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 203.
Maharaj Singh v. Eatan Amol Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E.
320. Balwant Singh and Others v. Devilai and Others,
8 E.L.E. 1.
Representation of the People Act, 1950, sec. 16.
Aslam Khan v. Fazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.E. 341.
Sec. 80(2).
P. N. Balasubrahmanyan v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and
Others, 7 E.L.E. 496.
ss. 22A, 26.
Subrahmanya Bhatt v. Abdul Hameed Khan and Others,
2 E.L.E. 225.
Sec. 25.
Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavda Akbar Dalumiyan
and Others, 4 E.L.E. 499; 4 E.L.E. 500.
P. N. Balasubramaniyam v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and
Others, 7 E.L.E. 496.
Sec. 25(a).
Chinna Malla Eeddi and Others v. The Eevenue Divisional
Officer, Guntur, and Others, 9 E.L.E. 361.
Sec. 25(b).
Earn Singh v. Hazari Lai and Others, 6 E.L.E. 224.
Sec. 28.
Eamlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission of India and
Others, 7 E.L.E. 364.
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 253

R. P. Act, 1950—{oontd.)
Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavda Akbar Dalumiyan
and Others, 4 B.L.E. 499; 4 E.L.E. 500.
Ramakrishna Reddy v. Kamala Devi. 5 E.L.E. 173.
Representation of the People (Preparation of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950.
r. 3.
Laxmidatta and Another v. Madanlal Dhupar and Others,
7 E.L.E. 398.
r. 6.
Kamlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission of India and
Others, 7 E.L.R. 364.
r. 7.
Mathra Das and Others v. Dara Singh and Others, 4 E.L.E.
441.
r. 10.
Gayaprashad v. Krishnachandra Sharma and Others, 10
E.L.E. 6
r. 11.
Chinna Malla Reddi and Others v. The Revenue Divisional
Officer, Guntur, and Others, 9 E.L.E. 361.
r. 14{2).
Chinna Malla Eeddi and Others v. The Eevenue Divisional
Officer, Guntur, and Others, 9 E.L.R. 361.
rr.11, 18.
K. Subrahmanyam v. Abdul Hameed Khan and Others,
9 E.L.R. 432.
r. 18.
Hakikatullah v. Nathu Singh and Others, 6 E.L.R. 10.
r. 19.
A slam Khan v. Faziul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.R. 341.
r. 20.
Hakikatullah v. Nathu Singh and Others, 6 E.L.R. 10.
Ranchhodlal Liladhar Vayedav. Sanjalia Mohanlal Virjibhai
and Others, 4 E.L.R. 493.
Awadhesh Prasad Sinha v. Prabhavathi Gupta and Others,
8 E.L.R. 45.
r. 20(2).
Chinna Malla Reddi and Others v. The Revenue Divisional
Officer, Guntur, and Others, 9 E.L.E. 361,:
ELD—35
254 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. P. (Preparation of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950—(contd.)


Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavda Akbar Dalumiyan
and Others, 4E.L.R. 499.
Eamlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission of India and
Others, 7 E.L.R. 364.
Ramayan Sharan Singh and Another v. Rameshwar Yadav and
Others, 5 E.L.R. 296.
r. 20(3).
Ramakrishna Eeddy v. Kamala Devi, 5 E.L.R. 173.
Ramayan Sharan Singh and Another v. Rameshwar Yadav
and Others, 5 E.L.R. 296.
r. 22.
Gayaprashad v. Krishnachandra Sharma and Others, 10
E.L.R. 6.
Polaki Kotesam and Others v. S. M. Patnaik and Others,
8 E.L.R. 159.
r. 23.
Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavada Akbar Dalumiyan
and Others, 4 E.L.R. 499.
r. 24(1).
Mathra Das and Others v. Dara Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R.
441.
Representation of the People Act, 1951
Sec. 2(e).
P. N. Balasubramanyam v.. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and
Others, 7 E.L.R. 496.
Sec. 2(k).
Ratan Singh and Another v.. Padam Chand Jain and Others,
7 E.L.R. 189.
Sec. 3.
Ram Singh v. Hazari Lai and Others 6 E.L.R. 224.
Sec. S(c).
Ramayan Sharan Singh and Another v. Rameshwar Yadav and i
Others, 5 E.L.R. 296. j
Sec. 6. |
Jawahar Shankar Pacholi v. Hirday Narain Singh and Others
6 E.L.R. 495, 1 E.L.R. 477.
Sec. 7.
Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lai and Others, 8 E.L.R. J
448, 1 E.L.R. 417. \
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 255

R. P. Act, 1951—(conid.)
Sec. 7{b).
Ganda Singh v. Sampuran Singh and Others. 3 E.L.E. 17,
Udainath Singh v. Jagat Bahadur Singh and Others,
3 E.L.E. 26.
Sec. 7{c).
Manmohani Sehgal v. Sucheta Kirpalani, 3 E.L.E. 347.
Sec. 7{d).
See DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES pp. 59-79 supra.
Sec. 7{e).
See DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES •. Office of Profit pp.
79-92 supra.
Sec. 7 (/).
Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavada Akbar Dalmniyan
and Others, 7 E.L.E. 374.
Sec. 8.
Udainath Singh v. Jagat Bahadur Singh and Others. 3 E.L.E.
26.
Sec. 9(2).
Sankara Pandia Nadar, A.S.S.S. v. V. V. Eamaswami and
Others, 5 E.L.E. 417.
Sec. 17.
Joginder Singh v. Eaghbir Singh and Others, 5 E.L.E. 81.
Sec. 18.
S. K. Sambandam v. Surya Eao and Others, 2 E.L.E. 61.
Sec. 18(l){b).
Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. 55.
Kalika Prasad Singh v. Abdul Hayat Chand and Others,
4 E.L.E. 118.
Sec. 19.
K. Subrahmanyam v. Abdul Hameed Khan and Others,
1 E.L.E. 432.
Sec. 25.
Niharendu Dutt Mazuiiidar v. Sudb.ii1 Chandra Bhandari and
' Others, 6 E.L.E. 197.
Sec. 30.
Pida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.E. 1.
Sec. 32.
P. N. Balasubrahmanyan v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and
Others. 7 E.L.E. 496.
256 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. P. Act, 1951—(contd.)
Sec. 33.
See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES.
See. 33(2)
See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES: Proposer and seconder.
Sec. 33(3).
See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES : Election agent.
Sec. 33(5).
See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES: Election roll.
Sec. 33(6). ' _ .
See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES: Electoral roll. !
Sec. 33(7).
Bhairon v. Thakur Ganpat Singh and Others, 6 E.L.E. 409.
Sec. 36.
See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES: QUALIFICATION OF
CANDIDATES.
Sec. 36, 40.
See ELECTION AGENTS.
Sec. 36(2). ~~
Tej Singh v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, and Others, 9 E.L.R.
193.
Bishnu Kumar Singh v. Earn Bilas Sinha and Others
3 E.L.E. 60. Sochet Singh v. Thakar Singh and Others|
(No. 2). 3 E.L.E. 102. Lakhan Lai Mishra v. Tribeni
Kumar and Others, 3 E.L.E. 423.
Sec. 36(2).
Deo Chand and Others v. Vashist Narain and Others,
6 E.L.E. 138.
Sec. 36(2)(d)
S. K. Sambaudam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,
5 E.L.E. 341. f
See. 36(4). \
Jaswant Singh v. Mangal Das and Others, 9 E.L.R. 385 \
Shakti Parshad Shukla v. Balwant Singh and Others *\
4 E-L.E. 301. Narotam Singh v. Des Eaj and Others, 4E.L.R' j
309. Mathra Das and Others v. Dara Singh and Others ? 'j
4 E.L.R. 441. Eanchhodlal Liladhar Vayeda v. Sanjalia |
Mohanlal Virjibhai and Others, 4 E.L.E. 493. Jamuna j
Nandan Prasad Sinha v. Jagdish Narain Singh and Others; |
7 E.L.R. 14. Satish Chander v. Ganga Singh and Others, t
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 257

R. P. Act, 1951 (contd.)


7 B.L.E. 38. Battan Singh v. Devinder Singh and Others,
7 B.L.E. 234. Gurnam Singh and Another v. Partap Singh
and Others, 7 B.L.E. 338. Bhanwarlal Sogani v. Damodar
Lai Vyas and Others, 7 E.L.E. 407. A. K. Subbaraya
Goundar v. Muthusami Goundar and Others, 7 B.L.E.
465. P. N. Balasubrahmanyan v. Election Tribunal,
Vellore, and Others, 7 E.L.E. 496. Earn Singh v. Hazari
Lai and Others, 6 E.L.E. 224. Shiv Dayal v. Teg Earn,
6 E.L.E. 346. Ajayab Singh and Another v. Karnail Singh
and Others, 6 E.L.E. 368. Bishnu Kumar Singh v. Earn
Bilas Sinha and Others, 3 E.L.E. 60. Lallu Chand v.
Tej Singh and Others, 8 E.L.E. 28. Eanohhodlal Liladhar
Vayeda v. Election Tribunal, Ahmedabad, 8 B.L.E. 59.
Kesho Earn v. Hazura Singh and Others, 8 E.L.E. 320.
Eamakrishna Eeddy v. Kamala Devi. 5 E.L.E. 173.
Sec. 36(6).
Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. Sudhir Chandra Bhandari and
Others. 6 E.L.E. 197.
Sec. 36(7).
See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES: SEVERAL NOMINATIONS.
Sec. 37.
See NOMINATION OP CANDIDATES : WITHDRAWAL.
Sec. 38.
Pida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others. 4 E.L.E. 1
Thakur Daoosing v. Eamkrishna Eathor and Others, 4 E.L.E.
34.
Sec. 39(2).
Amin Ahmad v. Nand Lai Sinha, 5 B.L.E. 40.
Sec. 39(4).
Hari Nishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and Others, 5 E.L.E.
248. S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and
Others, 5 E.L.E. 341. .
Sec. 40.
See ELECTION AGENTS.
Sec. 44.
Linge Gowda v. Shivananjappa 6 B.L.E. 288. Shankare
Gowda v. Mariyappa and Another 9 E.L.E. 101.
Sec. 46.
Dr. K. N. Gairola v. Gangadhar Maithani and Others (No. 2).
8 E.L.E. 105.
ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. P. Act, 1951— (contd.)


Sec. 52.
Paida Hussain v. Sheo Bahajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R. 1.
Sec. 53.
Paida Hussain v. Sheo Bahajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.E. 1.
Sec. 54.
Bakaram Sukaram Monakani v. Shankar Rao Chinduji Bedse
and Others, 3 E.L.E. 409.
Sec. 54(2).
Bhan Singh v. Krishna Kant and Another, 4 E.L.E. 212.
Sec. 56.
Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu and Others,
4 E.L.E. 73.
Kandasami Kandar v. Subramania Goundar and Others,
5 E.L.E. 156.
Sec. 56, 57.
P. K. Atre v. Dr. T. E. Naravine and Others, 1 E.L.E. 355-
Sec. 57.
Kandasami Kandar v. Subramania Goundar and Others,
5 E.L.E. 156. Moinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi
3 E.L.E 248.
Sec. 58.
Shankar Tripathi v. Returning Officer, Mirzapur and Others,
2 E.L.R. 315.
Sec. 62.
Jagdish Singh v. Rudra Deolal and Others, 8 E.L.R. 311.
Mathesh Datta v. Murlidhar and Others, 7 E.L.R. 154.
Laxmidatta and Another v. Madanlal Dhupar and Others,
7 E.L.E. 398. Jujhar Singh v. Bhairon Lall and Others,
7 E.L.R. 457. Jyostna Chandra and Another v. Mehrabhali
and Others. 3 E.L.E. 488.
Sec. 63.
Naranjan Singh v. Brish Bhan and Others, 3 E.LE. 179.
Sec. 63(1).
B. R. Ambedkar and Another v. S. A. Dange and Others,
1 E.L.R. 364.
Sec. 70.
Nyalchand Virohand Sheth v. Election Tribunal, Abmedabad,
and Others, 8 E.L.R. 417. 1 E.L.R. 34.
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 259

R.P. Act, 1951— (contd.)


Sec. 76.
S. Khader Sheriff v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and Others,
7 E.L.R. 471.
Sec. 77.
See ELECTION EXPENSES.
Sec. 79.
Salig Ram Jaiswal v. Sheo Kumar Panda and Others,
9 E.L.R. 67. Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kammgo and
Others, 9 E.L.R. 294.
Sec. 79{a).
Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others, 10 E.L.R. 57.
Sec. 80.
See ELECTION PETITION.
Sec. 82.
See ELECTION PETITION: Parties.
Sec. 83.
See ELECTION PETITION : Contents.
Sec. 83(2) and (3).
See ELECTION PETITION : List of Corrupt Practices.
Sec. 84.
See ELECTION PETITION : Reliefs.
Sec. 85.
See ELECTION PETITION : Limitation.
Sec. 86.
See ELECTION TEIBUNAL.
Sec. 88(1).
K. T. Kosalram v. M. R. Meganathan and Others, 9 E.L.R.
278.
Sec. 90.
See ELECTION P E T I T I O N : Amendment, Limitation, Parties
Sec. 92.
See ELECTION PETITION : Amendment of Petition.
Sec. 94.
Murlidhar v. Kadam Singh and Others, 10 E.L.R. 135.
Sec. 94.
Maneklal Amolakchand v. Thete Gopal Ramji and Others,
9 E.L.R. 36.
Biswanath Roy v. Tarakdas Banerjee and Others, 5 E.L.R. 223.
260 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. P. Act, 195l—{co>itd.)
Sec. 97.
Baghtmath Singh v. Kampta Prasad Saxena, 8 E.L.R. 424.
Satya Dev Bushahri v. Ghanshyam and Others, 4 B.L.E.
67.
Jamna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhiram Eatanlal Jain and
Others, 5 B.L.E. 1
Sec. 98.
Faida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others, 4 .B.L.E. 1.
T. G. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Others, 3 B.L.E. 197.
Manmohani Sehgal v. Sucheta Kirpalatii, 3 B.L.E. 347.
Braj Naresh Singh v. Hukam Singh 9 E.L.E. 80. Hanuman
Prasad Misra v. Tara Ohand and Others, 5 E.L.E. 446.
Shivdev Singh v. Dara Singh and Others, 5 E.L.E. 496.
Sec. 98(a).
Mukti Nath Eai v. Unia Shanker Misra and Others, 3 B.L.E.
109. Bankat Lai v. Madan Mohan and Others, 3 E.L.E,
375.
Sec. 99.
See COEBTTPT PRACTICE.
Sec. 100.
B. E. Ambedkar and Another v. S. A. Dange and Others,
1 B.L.E. 364. Sivathanu Pillai v. Nesamony and Others,
1 B.L.E. 312. Padmanabha Menon v. A. M. Thomas and
Others, 1 E.L.E. 404. Prem Nath v. Earn Kishan and
Others, 1 B.L.E. 271. Eamaohandran Nair v. Eama-
ohandra Das and Others, 1 E.L.E. 442. Dr. John
Mathai v. Returning Officer, Kottayam, and Three
Others. 1 B.L.E. 1. N. P. Ponnuswami v. Eeturding
Officer, Namakkal and Others, 1 E.L.E. 89. N. P. Ponnu-
swami v. Eeturning '• Officer, Namakkal, and Others,
(S.C.) 1 B.L.E 133. 1 B.L.E. 461. Jaswant Singh v.
Jagan Nath and Others, 10 E.L.E. 1. Gangadhar
v. Election Tribunal, Vindhya Pradesh and Others,
10 E.L.E. 183. V. K. John v. Vasantha Pai and Others,
& A. Srinivasan v. Vasantha Pai & Others, 10 E.L.E.
345. T. G. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Others, 3 E.L.E.
197. Madan Pal v. Eajdeo Upadhya and Others, '6 E.L.E.
28. Jaswant Singh v. Mangal Das and Others, 9 E.L.R.
385. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Sayed Isak and
Others, 8 E.L.E. 350. Ram Murtbi v. Sumba Sadar and
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 261

R. P. Act, 1951—(cowfe*.)
Others, 2 E.L.B. 330. Brij Naresh Singh v. Hukum
Singh and Others, 2 E.L.E. 266. Vijaya Mohan Beddy
v. Paga Pull a Reddy and Others, 2 B.L.R. 414. Hans
Baj v. Bam Singh and Others, 2 E.L.B, 12. 2 E.L.B. 401.
Sec. 100{l).
Roop Chandra Sogani and Another v. Bawat Man Singh and
Others (No. 3), 9 E.L.B. 21. Salig Bam Jaiswal v. Sheo
Kumar Pande and Others, 9 E.L.R. 67. Sucheta Kripalani
v. S. S. Dulat and Others, 9 E.L.R. 145. Maharaj Singh
v. Ratan Amol Singh and Others, 7 E.L.R. 320. Bhan
Singh v. Krishna Kant and Another, 4 E.L.R. 212.
Sec. 100(l)(a).
Battan Singh v. Devinder Singh and Others, 7 E.L.R. 234.
Dr. K. N. Gairola v. Gangadhar Maithani and Others
(No. 2), 8 E.L.B. 105.
Sec. 100(l){c).
Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chand and Others, 10 E.L.R.
30. Devasharan Sinha v. Sheo Mahodev Prasad and Others,
10 E.L.R. 461. Jagannath v. Pandurang and Others,
4 E.L.R. 167. Desai Basawaraj v. Dasankop Hasansab
and Others, 4 E.L.R. 380. Maneklal Amolakchand v.
Thefce Gopal Bamji and Others : 9 E.L.B. 36. Durga
Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others,
9 E.L.R. 494. Dharam Vir v. Bhala Ram and Others,
7 E.L.R. 64. Battan Singh v. Devinder Singh and Others,
7 E.L.B. 234. Bhanwarlal Sogani v. Damodar Lai Vyas
and Others, 7 E.L.B. 407. Moreshwar Parashram v.
Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani and Others, 7 E.L.B. 428.
Jagdish Singh v. Rudra Deolal and Others, 8 E.L.R. 311.
Chander Nath v. Kunwar Jaswant Singh and Others,
3 E.L.B. 147. Naranjan Singh v. Brisk Bhan and Others,
3 E.L.R. 179. Bakaram Sukaram Konkani v. Shankar Rao
Chinduji Bedse and Others, 3 E.L.R. 409.
Sec. 100{2).
Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat and Others, 9 B.L.B. 145.
M. B. Meganathan v. K. T. Kosalram and Others, 9 E.L.R.
242. Maharan Singh v. Ratan Amol Singh and Others,
7 E.L.R. 320.
ELD—36
262 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. P. Act, 1951— (contd.)


Sec. 100{2){a).
Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others v. Lachhi Earn and
Others, 10 B.L.E. 120. Sardul Singh Caveeshar v.
Hukum Singh and Others, 6 E.L.R. 316. Jawahar
Shankar Pacholi v. Hirday Narain Singh and Others,
6 E.L.E. 495. Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Bashir Husain
Zaidi and Others (No. 2), 8 E.L.E. 300.
Sec. 100{2){c).
Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chand and Others, 10 E.L.E.
30. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad lshaque and Others,
10 E.L.E. 216. Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath
Basu and Otheis, 4 E.L.E. 73. Prakash Narain v. Jagdish
Chandra Joshi and Others, 4 E.L.E. 205. Keshau Prasad
v. Brijraj Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 77. Laxmidatta
and Another v. MadanlaT Dhupar and Others, 7 E.L.E.
398. K. S. Subramanjya Goundar v. Election Tribunal,
Vellore, and Others, 8 E.L.E. 66. Sri Earn v. Mohammad
Taqi Hadi and Others, 8 E.L.E. 139. Abdul Eauf v.
Govind Ballabh Pant and Others, 8 E.L.E. 240. Shanta
Devi Vaidya v. Bashir Husain Zaidi and Others (No. 2),
8 E.L.E. 300. Dnrga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Baghuraj
Singh and Others, 9 E.L.E. 494. Kalicharan Singh»,
Eamaoharitar ' Eai Yadava and Others, 5 E.L.E. 98.
Kandasami Kandar v. Subramania Goundar and Others,
5 E.L.E. 156. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and
Others, 5 E.L.E. 248.
Sec. 100(3)(b).
Sankara Pandia Nadar, A.S.S.S. v. Y. Y. E am as w ami and
Others, 5 E.L.E. 417.
Sec. 701.
John V. K. v. Vasantha Pai and Others & Srinivasan v.
Vasantha Pai and Others, 10 E.L.E. 345.
Sec. 101.
Earn Murtbi v. Sumbar Sadar and Others, 2 E.L.E. 330. Vijaya
Mohan Eeddy v. Paga Pulla Eeddy and Others,2 E.L.E. 414
Sec. 10l{a).
Kali Charan Singh v. Eamacharitar Eai Yadav and Others,
5 E.L.E. 98.
Sardul Singh Oaveeshar v. Hukum Singh and Others,
6 E.L.E 316.
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 263

R. P. Act, 1951—(contd.)
Sec. 10l(b).
Jamuna Prasad Mujhariya and Others v. Lachhi Ram and
Others, 10 E.L.E. 120.
Sec. 102{2){c).
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Zayed Isak and Others,
8 E.L.E. 350.
Sec. 105.
Sivathanu Pillai v. Election Tribunal, Trivandrum, and
Others, 2 E.L.E. 263. Sangram Singh v. Election Tribu-
nal, Kotth, and Others, 10 E.L.E. 293. Hukam Singh
and Another v. Sardul and Others, 6 E.L.R. 162. Tirath
Singh v. Bachitar Singh and Others, 9 E.L.E. 163.
Lakkappa v. Narasimhe Gowda and Others, 9 E.L.E. 201.
T. Nagappa v. Basappa and Others, 9 E.L.E. 216. Eaj
Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo and Others, 9 E.L.E.
294. Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Eaghuraj Singh
and Others, 9 E.L.E. 494. Jamna Prasad Mukhariya v,
Lachhiram Eatanlal Jain .and Others, 5 E.L.E. 1. Sheo
Kumar and Another v. V. G. Oak and Others, 5 E.L.R.
103. Hamirkha Alarkha v. Returning Officer, Jamnagar
City, 5 E.L.R. 230.
Sec. 107.
Braj Natesh Singh v. Hukam Singh, 9 E.L.R. 80. Lakkappa
v. Narasimhe Gowda and Others, 9 E.L.R. 201. T. Nagappa
v. Basappa and Others, 9 E.L.E. 216.
Sec. 110.
Lahri Singh v. Attar Singh and Others, 3 E.L.E. 403. Shiv
Dayal and Others v. Teg Earn and Others, 6 E.L.R. 346.
Marutrao Bhaurao and Others, v. Giilabrao Dadasaheb and
Others, 5 E.L.E. 303.
Sees. 113,119.
Thete Gopal Ramji v. Amolok Chand and Others, 1 E.L.R. 477.
Sec. 117.
ELECTION PETITION: Deposit of Security.
Sec. 122.
Nathulal Mantri and Another v. Vindrawan Prasad Tiwari
and Others, 9 E.L.R. 375.
Sec. 123.
M. Muthiah v. A. S. Subbaraj and Others, 7 E.L.R. 165.
264 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. P. Act, 1951— {contd.)


Sec. 123.
See CORRUPT, PRACTICE pp. 16 to 57 supra.
Sec. 124(1).
Mathai Mathew Manjuran v. K.C. Abraham, 10E.L.E. 376.
Sec. 124,(3).
Sri Earn v. Mohammad Taqi Hadi and Others, 8 E.L.E. 139.
Sec. 124(4).
See CORRUPT PRACTICE 11. False Eeturn of Election
Expenses pp. 26 to 31 supra.
Sec. 124(5).
See CORRUPT PRACTICE 2. Appeal on the ground of religion
etc. 16 to 19 supra.
Sec. 125.
Yograjsingh Shankarsingh Parihar v. Sitaram Hiraehand
Birla and Others (No. 2). 3 E.L.E. 439.
Sec. 125(1).
Nyalchand Virchand Sheth v. Vithalbhai Eanchhodbhai
Patel and Others, 9 E.L.E. 451.
Nyalchand Virchand Sheth v. Election Tribunal, Ahmedabad,
and Others, 8 E.L.E. 417.
Sec. 127.
Bikhab Das v. Eidhiohand Paliwal and Others, 9 E.L.E.
115.
Sec. 128.
Biswanath Eoy v. Tarakdas Banerjee and Others, 5 E.L.E.
223.
Nagendra Mahto v. The State 10 E.L.E, 140.
Sec. 130.
'Bikhab Das v. Eidhiohand Palliwal and Others, 9 E.L.E.
115.
Yograjsingh Shankarsingh Parihar v. Sitaram Hirachand
Birla and Others, (No. 2). 3 E.L.E. 439.
Sec. 131 (l) (b).
Nagendra Mahto v. The State 10 E.L.B. 140.
Sec. 132(3).
Nagendra Mahto v. The State 10 E.LE. 140.
Sec. 136(l)(f).
Nagendra Mahto v. The State 10 E.L.E. 140.
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 265

R. P. Act, 1951—(con**.)
Sec. 140.
Jawahar Shankar Pacholi v. Hirday Narain Singh and Others,
6 E.L.E. 495.
Shivdev Singh v. Dara Singh and Others, 5 E.L.E. 496.
Sec. 148.
Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat and Others, 9 E.L.E. 145.
Sec 143.
Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat and Others, 9 E.L.E. 145.
Manmohani Sehgal v. Suoehta Kirpalani 3 E.L.E. 437.
Eaqir Chand v. Pritam Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 119.
Shivdev Singh v. Dara Singh and Others, 5 E.L.E. 496.
Sec 150.
Amin Ahmad v. Nand Lai Sinha 5 E.L.E. 40.
Deshpande, V.D. and Others v. State of Hyderabad and Others,
10 E.L.E. 203.
Sec. 151.
Amin Ahmad v. Nand Lai Sinha 5 E.L.E. 43.
Sec. 168.
Daulat Earn v. Maharaja Anand Chand and Others, 6 E.L.E-
87.
Sec. 170.
Ham irkha Alarkha v. Returning Officer, Jamnagar City,
5 E.L.E. 230 Sivathanu Piilai v. Election Tribunal.
Trivandrum, and Others, 2 E.L.E. 263. Dr. John Mathai
v. Eetirning Officer, Kottayam, and Three Others, 1 E L.E.
1. Nrisinha Kumar Sinha and Others v. 'Returning Officer,
Burwan Khargram, and Others, 1 E.L.R. 23. Shankar
Bao Eamji and Another v. The State of Madhya Bharat
1 E.L.R. 34. Rudra Pratap Narain Singh v. Bhagwandin
Misra and Others, 1 E.L.E. 60. Sukar Gope v. State of
Bihar. 1 E.L.E. 52. 1 E.L.E. 68. 1 E.L.E. 1. 1 E.L.E.
89.
Representation of the People (Conduct of Eectionsand Election Petitions)
Rules, 1951,
r. 2.
Kda Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.E. 1.
r. 2{d).
Eameshwar Prasad Singh v. Krishna Gopal Das and Others,
4 E.L.E. 112.
266 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951 — (contd.)

r.
Mathra Das and Others v. Dara Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R.
441.
r. 2(2).
Mulai and Another v. Lai Dan Bahadur Singh and Others,
9 E.L.E. 8.
Sahi Earn v. Mauphool Singh and Others, 7 B.L.E. 47.
Dharam Vir v. Bhala Earn and Others, 7 E.L.E. 64.
Eatan Singh and Another v. Padam Ohand Jain and Others
7 E.L.E. 189.
r. 4.
Surat Singh v. Jang Bahadur Singh and Others, 4 E.L.E,
306. Desai Basawaraj v. Dasankop Hasansab and Others,
4 E.L.E. 380.
Tikaram Sharma v. Lalit Bahadur Kharga and Others,
1 E.L.E. 252.
r. 5.
Mohinder Singh v. Mihan Singh and Others, 10 E.L.E. 426.
r. 5.
Bishnu Kumar Singh v. Earn Bilas Singh and Others,
3 E.L.E. 60.
r. 6(2).
Motiram v. Eamchandar Chowdhary and Others, 7 E.L.E.
135. Bhanwarlal Sogani v. Damodar Lai Vyas and Others,
7 E.L.E. 407.
Prem Nath v. Earn Kishan and Others, 1 E.L.E. 271.
r. 6.
Sujaniram v. Lai Shyam Shah and Others, 5 E.L.E. 183.
r. 10.
Mohinder Singh v. Mihan Singh and Others, 10 E.L.E. 426.
Bhanwarlal Sogani v. Damodar Lai Vyas and Others,
7 E.L.E. 407.
r. 11-A.
Isher Singh v. Manjit Inder Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 90.
7 E.L.E. 471.
Gian Chand v. Sriram Bansal and Others, 2 E.L.E. 136.
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 267

R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules 1951 —{contd.)


r. 12.
Shibban Lai Saksena v. Harishanker Prasad and Others,
9 B.L.E. 403. Dr. K. N. Gairola v. Gangadhar Maithani
and Others (No. 2), 8 B.L.E. 105. T. Prakasam v.
U. Krishna Eao and Others (No. 3), 2 E.L.E. 376.
r. 16.
Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu and Others,
4 E.L.E. 73.
r. 16, 17.
P. K. Atre v. Dr. T. E. Naravine and Others, 1 E.L.E. 355.
r. 17(2).
Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu and Others,
4 E.L.E. 73. Eadhakrishnan v. Masilamani Ohettiar and
Others, 4 E.L.E. 148.
r. 18(2).
Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. Sudhir Chandra Bhandari and
Others, 6 E.L.E. 197.
r. 19.
Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. Sudhir Chandra Bhandari anj
Others. 6 E.L.E. 197.
r. 20.
Marutrao Bhaurao and Others v. Gulabrao Dadasaheb and
Others, 5 E.L.E. 303.
r. 21.
Keshau Prasad v. Brijraj Singh and Others. 7 E.L.E. 77.
Eatan Singh and Another v. Padara Chand Jain and Others,
7 E.L.E. 189.
r. 21(1).
Jang Bahadur Singh v. Basant Lai and Others, 8 E.L.E. 429.
r. 21(5).
Eadhakrishnan v. Masilamani Chettiar and Others, 4 E.L.E.
148.
Abdul Eauf v. Govind Ballabh Pant and Others, 8 E.L.E.
240.
r. 22, 47(c).
Seshaiah v. Koti Eeddi and Others, 3 E.L.E. 39. Moinuddin
B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi, 3 E.L.E. 248,
268 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951—(contd.)


r, 23.
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others,
10 B.L.E. 216. Damodar Goswami v. Narnarayan
Goswami and Others, 10 B.L.E. 272.
r. 23.
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Sayed Isak and Others,
8 E.L.E. 350.
r. 23(2).
Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu and Others,
4 B.L.E. 73.
r. 25(1).
Jang Bahadur Singh v. Basant Lai and Others, 8 E.L.E. 429.
r. 28.
Balaiial Das Mohapatra v. Trilakya Nath Prodhan and
Others, 4 B.L.E. 221. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad
Sayed Isak and Others, 8 B.L.E. 350. Damodar Goswami
v. Narnarayanan Goswami and Others, 10 E.L.E. 272.
Hari Datt v. Mad an Mohan and Others, 7 B.L.E. 25.
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and Others, 5 B.L.R.
248. Marutrao Bhanrao and Others v. Gulabrao Dadasaheb
• and Others, 5 B.L.E. 303.
r. 29.
Kalicharan Singh v. Ramacharitar Eai Yadav and Others
5 B.L.R. 98.
r. 32.
Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu and Others,
4 P.L.E. 73.
r. 33.
Eatan Singh and Another v. Padam Chand Jain and Others,
7 E.L.E. 189.
r. 34.
T. Prakasam v. U. Krishna Rao and Others (No. 3), 2 B.L.R.
376.
r. 37.
Sohan Lai Abinash Chander and Others, 4 B.L.E. 55.
r. 37, 38.
Jyostna Chandra and Another v. Mehrabali and Others,
3 E.L.R. 388.
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 269

R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951—{contd.)

r. 44.
Shankar Tripathi v. Beturning Officer, Miraapur, and Others,
2 E.L.E. 315.
r. 46.
T. Prakasam v. U. Krishna Eao and Others (No. 3), 3 E.L.E.
376. E. Swaminafcha Mercondar v. S. Eamalingam
2 E.L.E. 51. Pradipta Kishore Das v. Md. Atahar and
Others, 2 E.L.E. 467.
r. 46(l)(iii).
Shah Umair Sahib v. Eamohar an Singh and Others, 10 E.L.E
162.
r. 46(l)(vi).
Shah Umair Sahib v. Eamoharan Singh and Others, 10 E.L.E.
162.
r. 46(6).
Badhakrishnan v. Masilamani Chettiar and Others, 4 E.L.E.
148.
r. 47.
Naranarayan Goswami v. H. D. Chaudhury and Others
2 E.L.E. 253. Nurul Islam v. Muhammad Bafique and
Others, 2 E.L.E. 70. GovindMalaviya v. Murli Manohar
and Others, 8 E.L.E. 84. Kalicharan Singh v. Bama-
oharitar Eai Yadav and Others, 5 E.L.E. 98.

r.
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others,
10 E.L.E. 216. Damodar Goswami v. Nararayan Goswami
and Others, 10 E.L.E. 272. Eadhakrishnan v. Masila-
mani Chettiar and Others, 4 E.L.E. 148. Balailal Das
Mohapatra v. Trailakya Nath Prodhan and Others,
4 E.L.E. 221. Bari Datt v. Madan Mohan and Others,
7 E.L.E. 25. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and
Others, 5 E.L.E. 248. Marutrao Bhaurao and Others, v.
Gulabrao Dadasaheb and Others, 5 E.L.E. 303. Hari
Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Sayed Ishaque and Others,
8 E.L.E. 350.
r. 47 (l){c), 82, 119.
Gidwani Choithram Pratabrai v. Agnani Thakurdas Chuhar-
mal and Others, 1 E.L.E, 294,
ELD-37
2/0 ELECTION LAW RERORTS DIGEST

R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951—(contd.)


r.49.
Eadhakrishnan v. Masilamani Chettiar and Others, 4 E.L.E.
148.
r. 51.
Pranlal Thakorlal Munshi v. Tndubhai Bhailalbhai Amin and
Others, 1 E.L.E.". 182.
r. 52.
Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu and Others,
4 E.L.E. 73.
Naranarayan Goswami v. H. D. Chaudhury and Others,
2 E.L.E. 253.
r. 58.
Pradipta Kishore Das v. Md. Atahar and Others, 2 E.L.E.
467.
Shah Umair Sahib v. Eamacharan Singh and Others,
10 E.L.E. 162.
rr. 90 to 96.
S. K. Sambandam v. Surya Eao and Others, 2 E.L.E. 61.
r. 91.
S. PL. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,
5 E.L.E. 341.
r. 92 (l)(d).
Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. 55.
r.96.
Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. of).
S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,
5 E.L.E. 341.
r. 97.
Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. 55.
S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,
5 E.L.E. 341.
r. 98.
Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. 55.
S. K. Sambandam v. Eecfcion Tribunal, Madras, and Others,
5 E.L.E. 341.
r.99.
Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. 55.
S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,
5 E.L.E. 341,
INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO

R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951—(contd.)


r. 100.
Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 B.L.R. 55.
S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,
5 E.L.R. 341.
r. 101.
Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E, 55.
S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,
5 E.L.R. 341.
r. 102.
Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.R. 55.
S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,
5 E.L.R, 341.
r. 111.
Shankare Gowda v. Mariyappa and Another, 9 E.L.E. 101.
6 E.L.R. 288. S. Khader Sheriff v. Election Tribunal,
Vellore, and Others, 7 E.L.R. 471. Linge Gowda v.
Shivananjappa 6 E.L.R. 288.
r. 112.
Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others, 10 E.L.R. 57.
r. 117.
Ghasi Ram v. Ram Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R. 124.
Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others, 10 E.L.R. 57.
Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh and Others, 10 E.L.R.
129.
r. 118.
See CORRUPT PRAHCE : Employing more persons, pp. 23-25
supra.
r. 119.
See ELECTION PETITION : Limitation pp. 132 to 140 supra.
Form 26, Parts D and F.
Ram Singh v. Ghasi Ram and Others, 9 E.L.R. 183.
Sch. I Form 5A.
See NOMINATION OP CANDIDATES.
Sch. II.
See NOMINATION OP CANDIDATES.

Sch IV.
Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others, 10 E.L.R. 57*
272 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951— {contd.)


Sch. VI.
Sheonarayan Vaidya v. Sardarmal Lalwani, 4 E.L.E. 401.
Earn Singh v. Ghasi Earn and Others, 9 B.L.E. 183.
Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others, 10 E.L.R. 57.
University of Baroda Act. 1949.
Sees. 10, 63.
Hansa Jivraj Mehta v. Indubhai B. Amin and Others,
1 E.L.E. 171.
U. P. Land Utilization Act, 1948.
Sec. 3.
Bholanath v, Krishna Chandra Bhanu Gupta and Others
(No. 2) 6 E.L.E. 104.
Sec. 104.
Bholanath v. Krishna Chandra Bhanu Gupta and Others,.
6 E.L.E. 105.
U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947.
Sec. 48.
Shibban Lai Saksena v. Harishanker Prasad and Others,
9 E.L.E. 403.
r. 61-A.
Madan Pal v. Eajdeo TJpadhya and Others, 6 E.L.E. 28.
Deo Chand and Others v. Vashist Narain and Others,
6 E.L.E. 138.
r. 6
Beni Madho Eai v. Bhola and Others, 6 E.L.E. 308.
U. P. Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1948.
r. 4-A.
Madan Pal v. Eajdeo Upadhya and Others, 6 E.L.R. 28.
A DIGEST
OF THE

ELECTION LAW REPORTS


VOLS. I TO X.
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED
REFERRED TO ETC.
Abdul Hayat Choudhari v. Zahur Ahmad Choudhari (2 Doabia 10)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 48
Abdul Jabbar v. Azizur Rahman (3 Jagat Narain 215)
—dissented from 7 E.L.R. 165
Abdul Majid v. Sayed Ahmed (1 Doabia 229)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 194 ; 5 E.L.R. 248
Abdul Qadir Siddiqi v. Syed Abdul Hasan (3 Jagat Narain 127)
— ref. 2 E.L.R. 426
Abdul Rahim v. Abu Mahamad (30 Bom. L.R. 774)
—ref, 9 E.L.R. 36
Abdul Rauf v. Govind Ballabh Pant (8 E.L.R. 240)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403
Abdul Razack Sahib v. Hajee Mohammad Ismail (1 Doabia 169)
See Bellary M. R.
Abdul Rouf v. Makhtar Ali (2 E.L.R. 340)
— ref. 6 E.L.R. 138 ; 8 E.L.R. 480 ; 9 E.L.R.; 115
Abdul Wajid v. Sayed Ahmed (Sen and Poddar 610)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 25
Abdul Zabbar Palwan v. Azizur Rehman Mea (A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 425)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 375 *
Aberbrothock (25 Journ 667)
— distinguished 2 E.L.R. 330
Abraham v. Abraham (9 M.I.A. 199)
—ref.g E.L.R. 301
Achbay Lai Singh and Others v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1947 Pat.90)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 139
Agha Mir Ahmad, K. S. v. Mir Mudssir Shah (71 LA. 171)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 162
11 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Agra City case (N.M.U.) (Hammond 9)


—ref. 1 E.L.R. 312
Agra District (N.M.R.) Case (4 Jagat Narain 4)
— ref. 7 E.L.R. 234
Ahamad Thambi Maracayar v. Basava Maracayar (I.L.R. 46 Mad. 123)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 156; 8 E.L.R. 66
Ahmad v. King Emperor (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 27
Ajayab Singh and Another v. Karnail Singh and Others (6 E.L.R. 368)
—affirmed 10 E.L.R. 189
Akyab (Indian Urban), 1928 (Hammond 46)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280, 288 ; 8 E.L.R. 265
Akyab West (Hammond 51)
— relied on 4 E.L.R. 148
Alam Singh v. Gokal Singh (I.L.R. 35 All 484)
— ref. 3 E.L.R. 162
Alcock Ashdown and Co. v. Chief Revenue Authority (50 LA. 227)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480
Aldridge v. Hurst ([1876] 1 C.P.D. 410)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 144
Aligarh District, East (N.M.R.) (Hammond 56)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 432 ; 6 E.L.R. 346
Aligarh District, West (N.M.R.) (Hammond 62)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 432
Ali Muhammad Khan v. Ishaq AH Khan (I.L.R. 54 All. 57 F.B.)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 123
Allah Dad Khan v. Sardar Mohammad Azam (2 Doabia 314)
See Dera Ghazi Khan case
Allah Dad Khan v. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan (1 Doabia 63)
See Ambala and Simla 1937 *
Amazai case, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 1)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121
Ambala and Simla 1937 (Sen and Poddar 6 ; 1 Doabia 63)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 447 ; 5 E.L.R. 173, 199 ; 6 E.L.R. 28 ; 8 E.L.R 66
Ambala Division case (4 Khanna 22)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252 ; 6 E.L.R. 346
Ambala Division case, 1930 (Hammond Jj)
r-ref. 6 E.L.R. 346; 2 E.L.R. 189 ; distinguished 1 E.L.R. 442
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. lii

Ambala North Sikh Rural Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 10,
i Doabia 13)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252, 442 ; 5 E.L.R. 48, 173 ; 6 E.L.R. 346
—relied on 2 E.L.R. 414
Ambala North Sikh Rural Constituency (2 Doabia 290)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 301
Ameer Ali v. Yakub AH Khan (I.L.R. 41 Cal. 347)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247
Ameerunnissa Begum and Others v. Mahboob Begum and Others (A.LR.
1953 S.C. 91) ref. 7 E.L.R. 203.
Amir Ali Khan v. Shamsul Huq (Sen and Poddar 1043)
—relied on 3 E.L.R. 60 ;
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 135
Amirchand v. Raoji (A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 714)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 276; 3 E.L.R. 162, 375
Amir Mohammad Khan v. Atta Mohammad Khan (1 Doabia 98)
See Dera Ghazi Khan North case 1946.
Amir Mohammad Khan v. M. Ata Mohammad (Sen and Poddar 284)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 305
See Dera Ghazi Khan North case 1946
Amritsar and Sialkot General Rural Constituency case (2 Doabia 94)
ref. 9 E.L.R. 101
Amritsar Central (Sikh) case 1937 (1 Doabia 332 ; Sen and Poddar 15)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121, 414; 5 E.L.R. 48, 116, 129, 408; 7 E.L.R. 407
Amritsar City (M), 1924 (Hammond 83)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280, 288
—followed 1 E.L.R. 312
—relied on 2 E.L.R. 163
Amritsar City (2 Hammond E.P. 17)
— ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Amirtsar City case (2 Hammond's E.P. 26)
— ref. 5 E.L.R. 21
Amritsar City case (Sen and Poddar 28)
dissented from 8 E.L.R. 265
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28, 414
Amritsar City Muhammadan Constituency, 1938 (Sen and Poddar 34)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 316 ; 7 E.L.R. 374; 8 E.L.R. 265 ; 9 E.L.R. 101
—relied on 3 E.L.R. 71
IV ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Amritsar South (Sikh) case 1937 (1 Doabia 92 ; Sen and Poddar 58)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121; 6 E.L.R. 316 ; 7 E.L.R. 100
—relied on 7 E.L.R. 457
Ananda Chandra v. Panchilal Sarma (5 Bom. L.R. 691)
— distinguished 2 E.L.R. 109
Anandrao Rege v. Kailash Chandra Giri (1 E.L.R. 211)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 48
Anglo-Indian Constituency, Bengal, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 61)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 103
Anglo-Indian Constituency, Punjab, 1947 (Sen and Poddar 883 ;
1 Doabia 259)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 162 ; 4 E.L.R. 341 ; 5 E.L.R. 48, 81, 129, 173 ;
7 E.L.R. 154, 338, 407
—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 182
—relied on 3 E.L.R. 1
Anglo-Indian (Punjab) case, 1946 (Sen and Poddar 66 ; 1 Doabia 247)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252 ; 2 E.L.R. 121; 3 E.L.R. 305; 4 E.L.R. 309;
5 E.L.R. 48, 129, 173, 408 ; 6 E.L.R. 224, 346, 368 ; 7 E.L.R.
407; 8 E.L.R. 320, 332
—relied on 4 E.L.R. 441
Anglo-Indian (U.P.) case (2 Doabia 106)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 432 ; 4 E.L.R. 341; 5 E.L.R. 81 ; 7 E.L.R. 154
Appaswami Padayachi v. Ethirajulu Naidu (A.I.R. 1926 Mad.1043)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 144
—relied on 1 E.L.R. 373
Apurba Krishna v. Emperor (I.L.R. 35 Cal. 141)
-ref. 5 E.L.R. 173
Arthur v. Commissioners of Sewer (8 Mod. 331)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 361
Ashutosh Sigdar v. Behari Lai (11 C.W.N. i o n )
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 1 ; 8 E.L.R. 179
Ashworth v. McGuirk & Co. Ltd., ([1944] K.B. 1)
—distinguished, 8 E.L.R. 20
Aslam Khan v. Fazlul Haq (4 E.L.R. 341)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 470
Asrar Ahmad v. Nihaluddin and Others (3 E.L.R. 81)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376
Athikesavalu Naidu v. Ekambara Mudaliar (1939, 1 M.L.J, 420)
—followed 3 E.L.R. 42
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. V

Atre, P. K. v. Naravne (i E.L.R. 365)


—relied on 8 E.L.R. 240
—followed 9 E.L.R. 115
Attar Singh v. Thakar Singh (12 C.W.N. 1049)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 467
Attock case (1 Jagat Narain 1; 1 Hammond's E.P. 1)
—followed 3 E.L.R. 347
Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant Co. [1935]
A.C. 532
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 133 ; 8 E.L.R. 159, 350
Attorney-General v. Wilts United Dairies Ltd (1921) (37 E.L.R. 884)
— distinguished 7 E.L.R. 364
Awadhesh Prasad Sinha v. Prabhavathi Gupta and Others (8 E.L.R.45)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480
Azamgarh Case (Hammond 95)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 88 ; 6 E.L.R. 470
Audesh Pratap Singh v. Brij Narain and Others (9 E.L.R. 1)
—relied on 10 E.L.R. 345
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 198
Baba Gurdit Singh's case (1 Doabia 92)
—ref. See Amritsar South (Sikh) case 1937
Baba Khalel Ahmad's case (Sen and Poddar 166)
Babu Chhail Behari Lai Kapoor v. Thakur Moti Singh (2 Jagat Narain
17)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57
Babu Gajendra Chandra Chaudhury and Seven Others v. The Hon'ble
Rai P.C. Datta Bahadur (Hammond 387)
ref. 10 E.L.R. 57
See Benares-cum-Mirzapur Cities
Babu Jagan Nath Prasad v. Raja Maheshwar UayalSeth (2 Doabia 217)
See Sitapur District (East) General Rural Constituency
Babu Jyoti Bhusan v. Babu Shiva Prasad Gupta (A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 205)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341
Babu Lai v. Jagat Narain (A.I.R. 1953 V.P. 51)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 207
Baddrudduja Syed v. Mohammad Khoda Buksh (2 E.L.R. 189)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 309 ; 6 E.L.R/368; 7 E.L.R. 338
Badri Prasad v. Sheo DossDaga (2 Khanna 321)
—distinguished 4 E.L.R. 441
VI ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST
f
Bagaram Tulpude v. State of Bihar (I.L.R. 29 Pat. 401)
—distinguished 10 E.L.R. 272
Badri Prasad v. Sheodas Daga (2 Jagat Narain 146)
See Raipur North case
Bafan Juma v. State (A.I.R. Kutch 91)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341
Bahu Vyankatesh, In re (A.I.R. 1925 Bom. 433)
—followed 6 E.L.R. 388
Baijnath Prasad v. Chandreshwar Narain Prasad Singh and Others
(2 E.L.R. 88)
—ref. 3 E.L.R.147, 375 ; 4 E.L.R. 309; 5 E.L.R. 353
Balailal Das Mohapatra v. Trailakya Nath Prodhan and' Others (4
E L.R. 221)
—ref. 5 E.L.R 248
—considered 7 E.L.R. 25
Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar (I.L.R. 40 Mad. 793)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 293
Balakrishnan v. State of Madras (1952, 1 M.L.J. 514)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 167; 7 E.L.R. 1
Balaraman v. Corporation of Madras (1952, 1 M.L.J. 655)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471
Balasore South case (3 Jagat Narain 93)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 197 ; 9 E.L.R. 324
Balasubramanian P. N. v. C. R. Narasimhan and Others (1 E.L.R. 461)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 309 ; 5 E.L.R. 81, 386; 6 E.L.R. 224,368, 470;
7 E.L.R. 338, 496
Balbir Singh v. Arjan Singh and Others (6 E.L.R. 341)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 90, 119; 10 E.L.R. 49
Balchand v. Laxmi Narain and Others (8 E.L.R. 465)
—relied on 9 E.L.R. 403
Baldwin and Others v. Ellis and Others [1929] 1 K.B. 273
—ref 1 E.L.R. 182, 461; 6 E.L.R. 346
—relied on 7 E.L.R. 338, 496
Ballia case (Hammond 27)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247
— ref. 7 E.L.R. 154
Balwantrao Anantrao Rege v. Kailashchandragiri (1 E.L.R. 211)
•—ref. 10 E.L.R. 450, 461
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. VH

Bama Charan Chakraburty v. Nimai Nandal (A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 114)


—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154
Banarsi Stores v. President of the Indian Republic (A.I.R. 1953 All. 318)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28
Banbury v. Fuller (9 Exch. 111)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 14
Banerji, D. N. v. P. R. Mukherjee (A.I.R. 1953 S.£. 58)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 489 ; 9 E.L.R. 201
Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co., Ltd. v. Labour Appellate
Tribunal (I.L.R. 1953 Mys. 287)
—followed 9 E.L.R. 201
Bank v. Turner (30 L.J. Ch. 379)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 1
Bankat Lai v. Madan Mohan and Others (3 E.L.R. 375)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 309; 6 E.L.R. 470 ; 7 E.L.R. 338
—approved 4 E.L.R. 441
Banwarilal Roy, In re (48 C.W.N. 766)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 53
Bapu Vithal Rajput v. Secretary of State (A.I.R. 1932 Bom. 370;
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183
Barabanki cum Fyzabad General Rural Constituency: Babu Rup
Narain v. K. Rajendra Singh (2 Doabia 347)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341 ; 7 E.L.R. 457
Bareilly City (N.M.U.), 1924 (Hammond 127)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 211; 6 E.L.R. 414
Barindra Kumar Ghose and Others v. Emperor (I.L.R. yj Cal. 467)
- ref. 8 E.L.R. 28
Barlow v. Teal (15 Q.B.D. 403)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68
Barret, T.M. v. African Products Ltd. (A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 261)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 293
Barrow-in-Furness (1886) 4 0 ' M. & H. 78
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 426 ; 9 E.L.R. 242
Basant Singh v. Ratan Singh (1 Dobia 80 ; Sen and Poddar 313)
— distinguished 2 E.L.R. 426
See Ferozepore East (Sikh) case 1946
Basappa v. Nagappa and Others (3 E.L.R. 197)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 216
Viii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Basappa, T.C. v. Nagappa (10 E.L.R. 14)


—ref. 10 E.L.R. 272, 345, 376
—relied on 10 E.L.R. 198, 216
Basavanagoudara Reddi v. Ijari Sirsappa (Election Case No. 3 of 1952)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 374
Basdeo v. John Smidt (I.L.R. 22 All. 55)
—ref. 2 E.L.R, 109 ; 5 E.L.R. 21 ; 9 E.L.R. 403
Bashir Ahmad v. Akhtar Husain Khan (2 Doabia 341; Sen and Poddar
564)
See Moradabad District North-West Muhammdan Rural Constituency
case of 1937
Basti District North-East General Rural Constituency case, 1937 (Sen
and Poddar 106 ; 2 Doabia 355)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 20, 88, 121, 225, 414 ; 3 E.L.R. 305 ; 5 E.L.R. 129,
446 ; 6 E.L.R. 470 ; 7 E.L.R. 301, 407
— applied 5 E.L.R. 341
—relied on 3 E.L.R. 1
Basu Sinha v. Rajandhari Sinha (3 Jagat Narain 80)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 30
Batala Sikh case, 1946 (Sen and Poddar 122; 2 Doabia 263)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252, 271, 442 ; 2 E.L.R. 27, 103, 121, 225, 426 ;
4 E.L.R. 118 ; 5 E.L.R. 173, 446 ; 6 E.L.R. 346 ; 8 E.L.R. 311
—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 182
—relied on 4 2 E.L.R. 414; E.L.R. 441
Batala Sikh 1937 (Sen and Poddar 115)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 116
Batuk v. Surat Municipality (A.I.R. 1953 Bom. 133; 10 E.L.R. 216
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230
Bavalal v. Jivanlal (A.I.R. 1951 Sau. 43)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230
B. B. L. Railway v. District Board (I.L.R. 30 Pat. 287)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68
Begum Wahidul Hasan v. Amajdi Bano Begum (Sen and Poddar 487)
See Lucknow City M.U.W. case 1946
Bsjay Singh v. Narbada Charan Lai and Others (2 E.L.R. 426)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 200; 6 E.L.R. 138,341; 7 E.L.R. 90, 119;
8 E.L.R. 320
—dissented from 7 E.L.R. 14
—followed 7 E.L.R. 203
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. IX

Belfast Borough Western Division case (4 O'M. & H. 105)


—ref. 8 E.L.R. 240
Belfast case (4 O'M. & H. 108)
•:' —ref. 6 E.L.R. 288
1
Belgaum District (N.M.R.) case (2 Jagat Narain 31 ; 2 Hammond E.P
' 45)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52 ; 3 E.L.R. 423 ; 4 E.L.R. 234 ; 5 E.L.R. 446; 6
E.L.R. 414 ; 7 E.L.R. 234
Bellary M. R. (Sen and Poddar 136 ; 1 Doabia 169)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 271; 7 E.L.R. 234 ; 9 E.L.R. 324
—relied on 1 E.L.R. 312
—disapproved 5 E.L.R. 199
—followed 6 E.L.R. 138
Benaras and Mirzapur Districts Mohammadan Rural Constituency case.
1937 (Sen and Poddar 154 ; 2 Doabia 197)
—dissented from 2 E.L.R. 301
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230; 6 E.L.R. 247
—followed 2 E.L.R. 234
—approved 1 E.L.R. 330
Benares~cum-Mirzapur Cities (Sen and Poddar 166)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 274; 5 E.L.R. 173, 199
—relied on 2 E.L.R. 276
Bengal Legislative Council case: Sinha v. B. A. Roy (2 Doabia 368)
—followed 5 E.L.R, 199
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 234
Bengal Marwari Association case (Hammond 157)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 330
B. N. Railway Co. v. Moolji Sicka (A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 815)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 467
Beni Madho Rai v. Bhola and Others (6 E.L.R. 308)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480
Beohor Singh Raghubir Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax (A.I. R.
1948 Nag. 228)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183
Beresford Hope v. Lady Sandhurst ([1889] 23 Q.B.D. 7 9)
—distinguished 5 E.L.R. 199 ; 7 E.L.R. 234
Besant's case (46 I.A. 76)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 499
Betual District case (1 Doabia 211) (sic.)
—ref. 4 E.L.R/309; 7 E.L.R. 338; 8 E.L.R. 332
X ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Beverley (i 0 ' M. & H. 147)


—ref. 3 E.L.R. 71
Beverley (1 O' M. & H. 143)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Bewdley case (3 O' M. & H. 145)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248 ; 10 E.L.R. 376
Bhagalpur case (3 E.L.R. 423)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 234
Bhagalpur North (N.M.R.) 1921 (Hammond 165)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 81
Bhagwan Das's case (4 Jagat Narain 12)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 147
Bhagwati Das v. Thakur Bishambhar Singh (2 Jagat Narain 62) (sic)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 305
Bhaishankar v. The Municipal Corporation of Bombay (I.L.R. 31 Bom.
605
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68, 89
Bhalwal Mohammedan Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 230)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 73; 8 E.L.R. 105
Bhandara cases (4 Khanna 55)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 346
Bhandara case (4 Jagat Narain 22)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252; 2 E.L.R. 414; 4 E.L.R. 309; 7 E.L.R. 338
Bhan Singh v. Krishna Kant and Another (4 E.L.R. 212)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 320
Bhanwarlal Sogani v. Damodar Lai Vyas and Others (7 E.L.R. 407)
—-ref. 9 E.L.R. 21
Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank, Delhi (A.I.R.
1950 S.C. 188; [1950] S.C.R. 459)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 179; 9 E.L.R. 494 ; 10 E.L.R. 376
Bhola Nath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta (3 E.L.R. 288) f
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55; 9 E.L.R. 403
Bibhabati Devi v. Ramendra Narain (A.I.R. 1942 Cal. 498)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 414
Bibhabati Devi v. Ramendra Narain (A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 19)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 220
Bibi Kunda v. Onkar Nath (A.I.R. 1939 Lah. 63)
•—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC XI

Bihar case (Sen and Poddar 746)


—ref. 5 E.L.R. 173
Bihar and Orissa Landholders' Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 129)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 265
Bijoy Singh v. Narbada Charan Lai (2 E.L.R. 426)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55
Bijoy Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Calcutta (35 Bom. L.R. 811)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36
Bhikaji Keshao v. Brijlal Biyani and Others (6 E.L.R. 53)
—reversed 10 EL.R. 357
Bimala Prosad Ray v. State of West Bengal (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 258)
—relied on 8 E.L.R: 179
Birch v. Wigon Corporation [1953] (1 Q.B.D. 136)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 179
Biman Chandra v. Governor, West Bengal (A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 799)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203
Bishanlal v. Kisan Vithoba (A.I.R. 1937 Nag. 108)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21
Bishembardas v. Brijalal (A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 590)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311
Bishnu Kumar Singh v. Ram Bilas Sinha and Others (3 E.L.R. 60)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 135
Deo d. Bishop of Rochester v. Bridges (1 B. & Ad. 847)
— ref. 8 E.L.R. 159
Board of Education v. Rice (1911) A.C. 179
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230
Bobby v. Crosbie (1915) 85 L.J.K.B. 239
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railwaj' Company Ltd. v. Siyaji
Mills Company Ltd. (A.I.R. 1927 All. 514)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 137.
Bombay Central Division (M.R.) 1935 (Hammond 201)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 81; 7 E.L.R. 100
Bombay City case (Hammond 181)
- not followed 1 E.L.R. 384
Bombay City, 1924 case (Hammond 173)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 265, 448
Bombay City North N.M.U. 1924 (Hammond 185)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 197
Xll ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Bombay City South (Hammond 191)


—re}. 8 E.L.R. 105 ; 10 E.L.R. 461
Bombay City (M.U.) i924Mohamedally Allabux v. Jafferbhoy Abdulla-
bhoy Lalji and Others (Hammond 175)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 288, 447
Borough of i Evesham case (3 O'M. & H. 94)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 197
Bowman v. Lewis (11 Otto 22 ; 25 Law Ed. 989)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203
Bradlaugh, Ex parte (3 Q.B.D. 509)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89
Bradely v. Sylvester ([1872] 25 L.T. 459)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 341
Bradshaw v. Foster (5 O'M. & H. 37)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 23
Braja Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Gobinda Pradhana (Sen and
Poddar 82)
—relied on 3 E.L.R. 17 ;
— distinguished 3 E.L.R. 26
Brazee v. Michigan (60 Law Ed. 342)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 471
Breedlove v. Suttles [(1937) 302 U.S. 277]
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Bridgewater case (1 O'M. & H. 116)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 105
Brij Bhukhan Lai v. Moti Lai (4 Khanna 147)
—distinguished 4 E.L.R. 441
Brij Kishore Ram Sarup v. Sheo Charan Lai (A.I.R. 1938 All. 69)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446
Brij Naresh Singh v. Thakur Hukum Singh (2 E.L.R. 266)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 147, 375 ; 4 E.L.R. 167; 5 E.L.R. 129 ; 6 E.L.R.
470 ; 7 E.L.R. 234, 407 ; 9 E.L.R. 21; 10 E.L.R. 1
—followed 5 E.L.R. 248
Brindaban Prasad Tiwari v. Sitaram and Others (5 E.L.R. 48)
—dissented from 7 E.L.R. 154 ; 8 E.L.R. 311
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Broad v. Perkins (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 533
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. Xlii

Brojo Lai Sahu v. Budh Nath Pyari Lai (A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 148)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446
Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 2 H. & C. 722
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 162
Buckman v. Button [(1943) 1 K.B. 405]
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 55
Budhram v. Returning Officer, Bhandara (Miscellaneous Petition No
1779 of 1951, decided on 18th December, 1951)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186
Bulandashahar case (1 Hammond's E.P. 85)
—dissented from 5 E.L.R. 156
Bulandshahar District (East) 1921 (Case No. XVII) : Chaudhuri Amar
Singh v. Pandit Nanak Chand (Hammond 219 ; 1 Jagat Narain 27)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248, 280, 288 ; 5 E.L.R. 446 ; 6 E.L.R. 138 ; 8
E.L.R. 66
—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 442
Bulandshar District M.R. Constituency case 1940 (Sen and Poddar 243)
— ref. 2 E.L.R. 340; 5 E.L.R. 116
Bulandshar East case (2 Doabia 180)
—ref. 8 E.L.R, 105
Burdwan Central General Rural Constituency (Sen and Poddar 249)
— ref. 5 E.L.R. 327
Burdwan North-East General Rural Constituency (Sen and Poddar 251)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 327
Bushell v. Hammond [1904] 73 L.J.K.B. 1005
ref. 9 E.L.R. 36
Butler v. Manchester Sheffield and Lincolnshire Ry. (21 Q.B.D. 207)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 471
Calcutta North Muhammadan Urban Constituency case 1537: Muham-
mad Siddique v. Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin (Sen and Poddar 253;
2 Doabia 322)
—followed 2 E.L.R. 461; 8 E.L.R. 240
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 54; 7 E.L.R. 301
Calcutta North (N.M.U.) 1924 (Hammond 253)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280
Calcutta South case (Hammond 261)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36
Calcutta South case (2 Khanna 98)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252

t
XIV ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Camden (Marquis) v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ([1914] 1 K.B. 641)


—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183
Carter v. Mills (9 C.P. 117)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 496
Caton v. Caton (L.R. 2 H.L. 127)
—distinguished 7 E.L.R. 465
Cawnpore District (N.M.R.) 1931 (Hammond 271)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 81
C. P. Commerce and Industry case (Hammond 282)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36
Chabot v. Lord Morpeth (15 Q.B. 446)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 216
Chairman of the Howrah Municipality v. Khetra Krishna Mitter (I.L.R.
33 Cal. 1290)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 397
Chakkarai Chettiar, In re (A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 96)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203
Champaran North case (2 Khanna 104)
—relied on 2 E.L.R. 70
Champsey Bhara & Co. v. Jivraj Bhallo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.
(44 M.L.J. 766)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471
Chandernath v. Jaswant Singh and Others (3 E.L.R. 147)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 375; 5 E.L.R. 129; 6 E.L.R. 368; 7 E.L.R. 47; 234,
407; 9 E.L.R. 21
—explained 4 E.L.R. 441
—approved 6 E.L.R. 470
Chandra Nath Bagchi v. Nabadwip Chandra Dutt and Others (A.I.R.
1931 Cal. 478
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 397
Charanjitlal Chowdhury v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1951 S.C, <r>
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203
— distinguished 10 E.L.R. 272
Charan Singh's case (2 E.L.R. 276)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403
Chartered Bank of India v. Imperial Bank of India (A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 534)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 197
I
Charu Chandra v. Snigdhendu Prosad and Others (A.I.R. 1948 Cal. 150)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XV

- Chaturbhuj Vithaldas v. Moreshwar Parashram (9 E.L.R. 301 ; [1954]


S.C.R. 817)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 103, 376
Chaudhri Allahdad Khan v. Safi Abdul Hameed Khan (1 Doabia 63)
—-See Ambala and Simla 1937
Chettiar. A. v. Thevar (A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 12; 2 D.L.R. 298 P.C.)
- ref. 9 E.L.R. 375
Chhail Bihari Lall v. Motisingh (Hammond 125)
—See Bareilly City (N.M.U.) 1924
Chhail Behari Lall Kapur v. Shyam Sundar Lall (3 Jagat Narain 59)
ref. 6 E.L.R. 288; 9 E.L.R. 324
Chhotalal Aditram Trivedi v. Rai Mahakore (I.L.R. 41 Bom. 466)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247
Chhota Nagpur Division case (2 Hammond E.P. 99)
— ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Chichester and Wife v. Cobb (14 L.T. 433)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311
Chidambaragauda v. Channappa (A.I.R. 1934 Bom. 329)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154
Chifford and O'Sullivan, In re ([1921] 2 A.C. 570)
—distinguished 10 E.L.R. 216
Chingleput case (Hammond 310)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 105
Chinnappa Reddi v. ThomasuReddi (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 265)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21
Chiraghdin and Another v. Ch. Jehanghir Khan (2 Doabia 144)
—See Okara Muhammadan Constituency case
Chiranjit Lai Chowdhuri v. The Union of India and Others ([1951] S.C.R.
869; A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 171, 203
Chitale R.B.G.K. and Another v. Nandevarao and Another (Ahmeda-
nagar) (3 Jagat Narain 180)
Chittagong case: Haji Badi Ahmad v. Md. Anwarul Azim (Sen and
Poddar 261)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 324
—followed 3 E.L.R. 347
Chocklingam Chetty v. Seethai Achi ([1927] I.L.R, 6 Ran. 29 P.C.)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311
XVI ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Choudhari Amarsingh v. Pandit Nanak Chand (Hammond 219)


—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36
City of Londonderry Election Petition, i860, R.E. (E.E, Digest Vol. 26
275)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 406
Cladow v. Pinnel (1877, 2 C.P.D. 562)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 47
Clay v. Yates (25 L.J. Ex. 237)
—distinguished r E.L.R. 339
Cockermouth case (5 0 ' M. & H. 155)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248
Coconada General Rural Constituency, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 267)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 470
—not followed 2 E.L.R. 20
Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Venkata Narrainappah (8 M.I.A.
529 at 554)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 301
Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan (App. Cas. 417 P.C.)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68, 89; 2 E.L.R. 263; 5 E.L.R. 1; 8 E.L.R. 350
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ekbal & Co. (A.I.R. 1945 Bom. 316)
— ref. 9 E.L.R. 21
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace & Co. (34 Bom.
L.R. 1033)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36
Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 16)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 53; 8 E.L.R. 84
Cooper v. Slade (1858) 6 H.L. Cas. 746
-ref. 8 E.L.R. 139
Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Rameshwar Prasad Varma (A.I.R. 1942 Pat.
452)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 330
Countess of Rothes v. Kirkcalady and Dysart Water Works Commis-
sioners (7 A.C. 694)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 104
Cowper-Essex v. Acton C.B. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 153, 169
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 318
Cox v. Davies (2 Q.B. 202)
—relied on 8 E.L.R. 300
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. XV11

Cox v. Truscott (1905) 21 T.L.R. 319; (1905) 92 L.T. 650


—distinguished and doubted 9 E.L.R. 301
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 42; 7 E.L.R. 428
; Cumberland (Cockermouth Division) case (5 0 ' M. & H. 155)
•i —ref. 6 E.L.R. 288

•; Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 193)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 489.
' Dartmouth case (1845) B. & Arm. 460
•—distinguished 5 E.L.R. 417
Das Gupta P. K. v. C. Das (2 Hammond E. P. 185)
—See Midnapore South case
Dattatraya Trimback Aradhye v. Shamrao Pandurang Legade and
Others (3 Jagat Narain 193)
ref. 3 E.L.R. 403
Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay [1952] S.C.R. 612
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 301
Davies v. Kensington (1874, L.R. 9 C.P. 720)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 12,266; 5 E.L.R. 48
Dawson v. African Consolidated Land and Trading Company (1898)
1 Ch. 6
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 417
Debi Prasad v. Mohammed Nazeer (3 E.L.R. 137)
—relied on 6 E.L.R. 123, 288, 414
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55
—followed 5 E.L.R. 93
—not followed 8 E.L.R. 240
Debi Prasad Sri Krishna Prasad Ltd. v. Secretary of State (A.I.R. 1941
All. 377; I.L.R. 1941 All. 741)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 104; 7 E.L.R. 428; 9 E.L.R. 301
Delanev. Hillcoat (9 B. & C. 310; 109 E.R. 115)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 171; 2 E.L.R. 325; 6 E.L.R. 414 ; 10 E.L.R. 203
Deo Chand and Others v. Vashist Narain and Others (6 E.L.R. 138)
—explained 8 E.L.R. 265
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480
—dissented from 9 E.L.R. 403
—reversed 10 E.L.R. 30
Dera Ghazi Khan case (Sen and Poddar 275; 2 Doabia 314)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 73; 8 E.L.R. 105
•—distinguished 9 E.L.R, 93
iii
XV111 ELECTION LA.W REPORTS DIGEST

Dera Gazi Khan North case, 1946, (Sen and Poddar 284; 1 Doabia 98)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121; 3 E.L.R. 305; 5 E.L.R. 48,327
—distinguished 9 E.L.R. 93
De Silva, E. v. Attorney-General, Ceylon (A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 262)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186
Desai Basawaraj v. Dasankop Hasansab and Others (4 E.L.R. 380)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 461
Desi Chettiar v. Chinnaswami Chettiar [1928] (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 1271;
1928 M.L.J. 162)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 133: 2 E.L.R. 167
Deveshwar Verma v. Deoraj Sethi (Sen and Poddar 504)
—See Lyallpur and Jhang General Constituency case 1938
Devi Dayal v. State of Pepsu (A.I.R. 1953 Pepsu 9)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 183
Devidas v. Nilkantharao (I.L.R. 1936 Nag. 73)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. r
Dharendra Krishna Mukherji v. Nihar Ganguli and Others (A.I.R. 1943
Cal. 266)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 1; 8 E.L.R. 179
Dharwar Urban Bank Ltd. and Another v. Krishnarao Anantrao Konur
(30 Bom. L.R. 203)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36
Dibrugarh N.M.R. (Hammond 337)
—relied on 3 E.L.R. 197
Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps [1899] A.C. 99
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183
Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj (9 E.L.R. 485)
—distinguished 10 E.L.R. 245
—followed 10 E.L.R. 357
Dinesh Chandra v. Rajendra Chandra (A.I.R. 1938 Cal. 324)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311
Din Shah and Others v. Kapil Deo and Others (6 E.L.R. 247)
—ref 10 E.L.R. 450, 461
Dinshaw Shroff v. Income-tax Commissioner (I.L.R. 1943 Bom. 152)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89
Din Singh and Others v. Kapil Deo and Others (6 E.L.R. 247)
—followed 8 E.L.R. 28
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC.

Director of Public Prosecutions v. Lamb [(1941) 2 K.B. 89]


—ref. 4 E.L.R. 55
District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. Mammen Mappillai (I.L.R. 1939
Mad. 708)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89
Ditcher v. Dension ([1857] 11 Moore P.C. 325)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 318
Drougheda case (1 O'M. & H. 256)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 105
Drogheda case (2 O' M. & H. 202)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 73;
—relied on 4 E.L.R. 148
Durga Prasad Mutsaddi Lai v. The Firm Rulia Mai Doogar Mai (A.I.R.
1922 Lah. 100)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 339.
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others (9 E.L.R.
494)
—followed 10 E.L.R. 376, 426
—relied on 10 E.L.R. 345
Durham case (2 0 ' M. & H. 152)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121; 6 EX.R. 197; 8 E.L.R. 240
Dwijendra Narain v. Joges Chandra (A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 600)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154
East Clare case (4 0 ' M. & H. 162)
—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 442
East Cork (6 0 ' M. & H. 318)
— ref. 6 E . L.R. 414
East Cork (6 O'M. & H. 340)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376
East Dorset (6 0 ' M. & H. 22)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 283; 9 E.L.R. 101
East Kerry (6 0 ' M. & H. 85)
-ref. 4 E.L.R. 73
East Nottingaham (6 0 ' M. & H. 292)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 101
Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property ([1952]
S.C.R. 696; A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 319)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. i, 103, 230; 6 E.L.R. 162; 7 E.L.R. 489; 8 E.L.R.
119, 207, 220
—relied on 10 E.L.R. 216
XX ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Ebrahim Saheb v. Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore [1950] 2


M.L.J. 592
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471
Edye v. Robertson (112 U.S. 580)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 364
Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 210;
2 E.L.R. 499)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186; 7 E.L.R. 301; 8 E.L.R. 119, 159, 341, 350;
10 E.L.R. 14, 272
—followed 5 E.L.R. 197
Electric Company Ltd. Province of Bombay (A.I.R. 1947 Bom. 276)
-ref. 6 E.L.R. 53
Elgin and Nairn case (5 O' M. & H. 1)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 283; 7 E.L.R. 301
Eli Vadapalli v. Bayya Suryanarayanamurthi (Sen and Poddar 267)
See Coconada General Rural Constituency, 1937.
Emmens v. Elderton (4 H.L.C. 624)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 188 ; 6 E.L.R. 414
—applied 8 E.L.R. 20
Emmens v. Pottle ([1885] 16 Q.B.D. 358)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376
Emperor v. Ali (5 I.C. 915)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183
Emperor v. Bhawanidas (A.I.R. 1916 All. 299)
—followed 6 E.L.R. 338
Emperor v. Hemendra Prosad Ghosh. (I.L.R. (1939) 2 Cal. 411)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57
Emperor v. Kuchal Pal Singh (A.I.R. 1931 All. 443)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388
Emperor v. Mallappa Tejappa (A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 14)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388
Emperor v. Rachappa (A.I.R. 1936 Bom. 221)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388
Emperor v. Savalaram Kasinath (A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 156)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 173
Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji (A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 156)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57
Emperor v. Sohrai Koeri and Another (A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 550)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 339
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. XXI

Enatulla Basuniav. Jiban Mohan Roy (I.L.R. 41 Cal. 956)


—ref. 5 E.L.R. 327
England v. Inglis [1920] 2 K.B. 636
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 416
Estate and Trust Agencies (1927) Ltd. v. Singapore Improvement Trust
[1937] A.C. 398
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 417.
Evesham ([1880] 3 O'M. & H. 95)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376
Exeter case (6 0 ' M. & H. 228)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 496
Fairchild v. Hughes (258 U.S. 126)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Fakir Mahomed Ramzan v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1936 Bom. 151)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28
Faqir Chand v. Pritam Singh (7 E.L.R. 119)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 320
Faroqui v. Maulvi Mohammad Habib Ullah and Others (2 Doabia 24 ;
Sen and Poddar 202)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 205 ; 341
Farquharson v. Morgan ([1894] 1 Q.B. 552)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21
Farrukhabad case: Sarup Narain v. Raja Durga Narain (3 Jagat
Narain 22)
—followed 3 E.L.R. 347
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28
Fateh Singh v. Suraj Mai (2 Doabia 47)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 197
Feldman, Re (97 L.T. 548)
—distinguished 8 E.L.R. 20
Feni Muhammadad Rural Constituency (Sen and Poddar 310)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 116, 327
Ferozepore Central Mohammadan Constituency, 1946 case (Sen and
Poddar 903)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 265
Ferozepore East (Sikh) case 1946 (1 Doabia 80 ; Sen and Poddar 313)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 162, 211; 2 E.L.R. 121 ; 3 E.L.R. 60 ; 4 E.L.R.
118; 5 E.L.R. 48, 129; 7 E.L.R. 407
— distinguished 2 E.L.R. 426
XX11 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST "

Few, v. C. E. Gibbon (i Doabia 247 ; Sen and Poddar 66)


1
—See Anglo-Indian (Punjab) case
Fida Hussain v. Sheobhajan Singh and Others (4 E.L.R. 1)
-ref. 9 E.L.R. 33
Firm Durga Parshad v. Firm Fuliamal (A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 100)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Firm of Shriram Narayandas (34 Bom. L.R. 236)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 339
Ford v. Newth ([1901] 1 Q.B. 683)
—ref. 3 E.L.R 42
—relied on 5 E.L.R. 417
Forster v. Forster (32 L.J.Q.B. 314)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 361
Gadilingana Gowd, Y. v. H. Sitarama Reddi and Others (Gaz. of India
Extra. Part II, sec. 3, No. 62, 9-3-1953, page 767)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28
Dr. Gairola, K. N. v. Gangadhar Maithani and Others (3 E.L.R. 162)
—followed 5 E.L.R. 116
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403
Gajendra Chandra Chaudhuri and Others v. P.C. Datta (2 Jagat Narain
85 ; Hammond 387)
—See Habibganj South N.M.R. 1924
Galbdoo Kalloo v. S. Rajan and Another (1953 N.L.J. 7)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 34 ; 6 E.L.R. 53
Galway case (1 0 ' M. & H. 307)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 404; 10 E.L.R. 376
Ganesh Krishna v. Nandevrao (3 Jagat Narain 180)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 271; 7 E.L.R. 234; 9 E.L.R. 324
Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lai and Others (8 E.L.R. 448)
—relied on 9 E.L.R. 403
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 465
Gaura Telin v. Shriram Bhoyer and Others (A.I.R. 1926 Nag. 265)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Gauri Shankar Prasad v. Thakur Hanuman Singh (1 Jagat Narain 9)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 60
George Edmund DeSilva v. Attorney-General of Ceylon (A.I.R. 1949
P.C. 261)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

I
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED E T C . XX111
\
Gethard v. Clarke (L.R. 5 C.P. 223)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 461.
Ghasi Ram v. Ram Singh and Others (4 E.L.R. 124)
—explained 7 E.L.R. 320,
—dissented from 6 E.L.R. 414,
—affirmed 9 E.L.R. 183,
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28 ; 9 E.L.R. 115, 242, 403; 10 E.L.R. 57
Gian Chand v. Sriram Bansal and Others (2 E.L.R. 136)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 1, 171; 10 E.L.R. 450
—followed 5 E.L.R. 128,
—distinguished 5 E.L.R. 386
Gidwani Choitahram Partabrai v. Agnani Thakurdas Chuharamal
(1 E.L.R. 194)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 221 ; 7 E.L.R. 25, 189; 10 E.L.R. 272
— dissented from 5 E.L.R. 248,
—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 214 ; 2 E.L.R. 70,
—followed 2 E.L.R. 253,
—relied on 2 E.L.R. 398
Gill, H.H.B. and Another v. The King (A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 128)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 139
Girish Chandra v. Ram Saran (I.L.R. 1929 Cal. 591)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311
Girish Chandra Majhi v. Girish Chandra Maity (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 574)
—relied on 8 E.L.R. 179
Gobardhan Das v. Rao Bahadur Ch. Lai Chand (1 Jagat Narain 57)
— See Rohtak case.
-Gobindjee Madhwajee and Co. Ltd. v. C.J. Smith and Another (A.I.R.
1928 Pat. 568)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28
Gobind Ram v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1942 Sind 62)
—followed 6 E.L.R. 388.
Gokaldas Hirjee v. Zaveri Vallabhadas Valji and Others (2 E.L.R. 234)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 245 ; 5 E.L.R. 129 ; 6 E.L.R. 247
Gokul Chandra Das v. Manager of Baniachong Mozumdari Ward
Estate (A.I.R. 1939 Cal. 720)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480
Gokul Prasad v. Mr. K.M. Dharmadhihari (4 Jagat Narain 32)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247
Golaghat case (Sen and Poddar 10)
—ref, 6 E.L.R. 346
XXIV ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Golaghat (N.M.R.) 1924 : Tara Prasad v. Rai Bahadur Devi Charan


Baruah (Hammond 375)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 432 ; 4 E.L.R. 341
Gold v. Essex C.C. ([1942] 2 K.B. 293)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Golghat case (Hammond 378)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36
Gondia General Rural Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 326; 1
Doabia 206)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 306, 309; 6 E.L.R. 224, 346 ; 7 E.L.R. 135, 338 ;
8 E.L.R. 332,
- relied on 4 E.L.R. 112
—distinguished 4 E.L.R. 441
Goolbai Motabhai Shroff v. Pestonji Cowasji (37 Bom. L.R. 410)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 374 ; 9 E.L.R. 451
Goonesinha v. O.L. De Krester (A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 83)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 1 ; 8 E.L.R. 350
Gopalakrishnan, J.T. v. H.S. Raja Iyengar (A.I.R. 1953 Mys. 8)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 201
Gopalan, A.K. v. State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 88)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 34T; 10 E.L.R. 376
Gopalan Saran v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar (37 Bom. L.R. 817)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36
Gopeshwar Prasad Sahi v. State of Bihar (I.L.R. 30 Pat. 735)
—distinguished 10 E.L.R. 272
Gorakhpur case : Suraj Narain v. Shri Ram Nath (3 E.L.R. 305)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 338, 8 E.L.R. 332
Goree v. Casill (Ann. Cas. 1914 D. 549)
—ref. 5 E.L.R, 156
Gosling v. Veley (16 L.J.Q.B. 201)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 199; 7 E.L.R. 234
Gouri Dutt Ganesh Lai v. Madho Prasad and Others (A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 147)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Govindappa v. Hanumanthappa (A.I.R. 1916 Mad. 745)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154
Govindaswami Pillai v.Ramalingaswamy and Others (A. I.R. 1932 Mad. 321)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52
Govind Prasad Srivatsava and Another v. State of Bhopal (A.I.R. 1952
Bhopal 1)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 207
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXV

Grant v. Overseers of Pagham (1877) 3 C.P. 100


—ref. 8 E.L.R. 139
Great Western Railway v. Bater ([1952] A.C. 1)
-—ref. 8 E.L.R. 84
Great Yarmouth case (5 O'M & H. 176)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 100, 471
Guardians of the Poor of the West Derby Union v. The Metropolitan
Life Assurance Society and Others ([1897] A.C. 647)
—ref. 3 E.L.R.318
Gudiyattam case (E.A. No. 109 of 1952)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311
Gulabchand Chand Chordia v. Thakur Norain Singh and Others
6 E.L.R. 397)
—ref. 10 E.L.R, 49
Gurbaksh Singh v. Baldev Singh (1 Doabia 13)
•—See Ambala North (Sikh) Constituency case
Gurdaspur North (Sikh) Constituency case (1 Doabia 341; 10 E.L.R. 1)
— ref. 10 E.L.R. 376
Gurnam Singh v. Partap Singh (7 E.L.R. 338)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 332
Gyee, U.M. v. Y.B. Tin (A.I.R. 1928 Rang. 245)
— ref. 9 E.L.R. 375
Habibganj case (Hammond 391)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 105
Habibganj South N.M.R. 1924 (Hammond 387)
—relied on 5 E.L.R. 401
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 139
Habib Shah v. Debi Bax Singh (14 I.C. 221)
—relied on 9 E.L.R. 361
Habibur Rahman v. Nawab Sir K.G.M. Faroqui (Sen and Poddar 802)
—see Tipperah North case
Hackney case ([1874] 2 O'M. & H. 77; 31 L.T. 69)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 12, 121, 266; 3 E.L.R. 248; 4 E.L.R. 441;
5 E.L.R. 156, 195; 7 E.L.R. 234; 8 E.L.R. 66
—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 442; 7 E.L.R. 77
—followed 4 E.L.R. 301
Haflzabad Mohammadan Constituency case : Ahmad Khan and Another
v. Raja Mohammad Chowdhry (1 Doabia 265)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280
XXVi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Haggerston case (5 O'M & H. 69)


—ref. 7 E.L.R. 301
Haji Bibiv. H.H. Sir Sultan Mohd. Khan (I.L.R. 32 Bom. 599)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 403
Haji Nasimuddin and Another v. Dandi -Ram Dutta and Others
(1 E.L.R. 412)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 409
—followed 6 E.L.R. 247; 8 E.L.R. 28
Hakikatullah v. Nathu Singh and Others (6 E.L.R. 10)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 470
Haider, S. N. v. Malik (A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 454)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52
Haldar, S. N. v. Malik (Hammond 257)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 171; 2 E.L.R. 325
Hamirkha Alarkha v. Returning Officer, Jamnagar City (East) (A.I.R
1954 Sau. 5 E.L.R. 230.)
—followed 9 E.L.R. 201, 216,
Handandass v. Mohori Bibi (8 I.C. 602)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 339
Hangu Mohammadan Rural Consituency (Sen and Poddar 987)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248
Hansa Jivraj Mehta(Dr.)v. Indubhai B. Amin (1 E.L.R. 171)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28, 397; 7 E.L.R. 374.
—applied 7 E.L.R. 294
—distinguished 3 E.L.R. 187; 4 E.L.R. 466
Hans Raj v. Ram Singh (2 E.L.R. 12)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 1, 8, 136, 414; 3 E.L.R. 147, 305, 375; 4 E.L.R. 466
—dissented from 3 E.L.R. 423
—approved 4 E.L.R. 441
—followed 4 E.L.R. 301; 6 E.L.R. 409; 7 E.L.R. 14,407; 9 E.L.R.
385 ; 10 E.L.R. 1
Hanuman Prasad Misra v. Tara Chand and Others (5 E.L.R. 446)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 104; 7 E.L.R. 428 10 E.L.R. 174, 376
Harford v. Linskey ([1899] J Q-B.D. 852)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52, 68, 89, 461; 4 E.L.R. 234; 7 E.L.R. 496
Hari Baksh v. Babulal (5 Lah. 92)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36 • : <•
Hari Das v. Hira Singh Pal (4 E.L.R. 466)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXvii

Hariram v. Pribhdas (A,I.R. 1945 Sind 98)


— ref. 10 E.L.R. 293
Hariram Onkar v. Mt. Radha (A.I.R. 1943 Nag. 327)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388
Harish Chandra v. Rex (A.I.R. 1949 All. 15)
—'ref. 5 E.L.R. 183
Hari Shanker Bagla v. Kishan Chand Puri (Sen and Poddar 840;
1 Doabia 127)
—See U. P. Chamber of Commerce
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and Others (5 E.L.R. 248)
—not followed 7 E.L.R. 25
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Sayed Isak and Others (8 E.L.R. 350)
—reversed 10 E.L.R. 216
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque (10 E.L.R. 216)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 345, 426
—follmved 10 E.L.R. 272, 293
Harmon v. Park (7 Q.B. 369)
—distinguished 8 E.L.R. 300
Harnandan Prasadv. Kamta Prasad Kakkar (1924 A.L.J. 129)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 84
Harvey v. Facey ([1883] A.C. 552)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 147
Harwich case (3 O'M. & H. 61)
—followed 9 E.L.R. 36
Haverford (L.R. 9 C.P. 7)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 77
Hayat Khan v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1932 Sind 90)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388
Hayes v. Missouri (120 U. S. 68; 39 Law Edn. 578)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203
Hazara Ram's case (Sen and Poddar 395)
—See Hoshiarpur West General Constituency, 1937
Helby v. Mathews ([1895] A.C. 471)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 101
Hemanta Kumari Devi v. Prasanna Kumar Datta (A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 32)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154
Hemendra Nath Roy Choudhury v. Jnanendra Prasanna Jnanendra
Prasanna Bhaduri (A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 732)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 467
XXV1U ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Hem Singh v. Basantilal(A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 93)


—ref. 9 E.L.R. 375
Henrietta Muir Edwards v. Attorney-General of Canada ([1930] A C.
124)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89
Henry v. Galloway (1933) 148 L.T. 453
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203
Hissar North General Constituency (Sen and Poddar 367)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 374
Hissar North (General) Constituency case: Sheokaran Singh and Another
v. Sahib Ram (1 Doabia 297; Sen and Poddar 374)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 71, 280; 7 E.L.R. 100; 9 E.L.R. 242
—followed 7 E.L.R. 165
Holden v. Southwark Corporation ([1921] 1 Ch. D. 550)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 167; 5 E.L.R. 386
Hollinshead v. Hazleton ([1916] 1 A.C. 428)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 417
Horen Jones v. Mohansingh and Others (2 E.L.R. 147)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 104
—dissented from 7 E.L.R. 428
Hoshangabad case (Hammond 407)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 327
Hoshiarpur West General Consstuency 1937; Hazara Ram v. Sardar
Mula Singh (Sen and Poddar 395; 1 Doabia 316)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280, 447; 4 E.L.R. 274; 5 E.L.R. 173; 8 E.L.R. 66
—relied on 2 E.L.R. 276
Hoshiarpur West General Constituency case : Mula Singh v. Mangu
Ram and Others (2 Doabia 268; Sen and Poddar 945)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 352; 3 E.L.R. 197; 4 E.L.R. 205; 5 E.L.R. 446; 7
E.L.R. 234; 8 E.L.R. 105
—approved 3 E.L.R. 423
—followed 5 E.L.R. 199
Hoshiarpur West Muhammadan Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 399;
1 Doabia 267)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248; 7 E.L.R. 301; 9 E.L.R. 242; 10 E.L.R. 461
Howard v. Bodington ([1887] P.D. 203)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 1
Hubli Electric Company Ltd. v. Province of Bombay (A.I.R. 1947 Bom.
276)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 58
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. Xxix

Hukam Sing Sham Singh v. Sardul Singh Kirpal Singh (A.I.R. 1953
Pepsu 133; 6 E.L.R. 162
—ref. 8 E.L R. 207
) —followed 9 E.L.R. 163, 201, 216
"i Hurdutrai v. Official Assignee of Calcutta (52 C.W.N. 343)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 133
Indian Sugar Mills' Association v. Secretary to the Government, U. P.
(A.I.R. 1951 All. 1)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52
—distinguished 10 E.L.R. 272
Insein (2 Hammond E.P. 158)
—ref 3 E.L.R. 197
Insein case, 1923: P.D. Patel v. MaungBa Glay and Maung Kyaw Diu
(Hammond 411)
— ref. 5 E.L.R. 446
Institute of of Patent Agents v. Lockwood ([1894] A.C. 347)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248
Ipswich ([1886] 4 O'M & H. 72)
•—ref. 9 E.L.R. 242
Isher Singh v. Manjit Inder Singh (7 E.L.R. 90)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 119; 8 E.L.R. 320
—dissented from 10 E,L R. 461
Iswari Singh v. Province of Bihar (A.I.R. 1949 Pat. 369)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 173
Islington case (5 O'M. & H. n o )
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121
Islington case (5 O'M. & H. 120)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248; 5 E.L.R, 156; 6 E.L.R. 197; 8 E.L.R. 240
Islington case (5 O'M & H 126)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 66
Ismail Khan v. State (A.I.R. 1951 Assam 106)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 220
J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. v. Emperor ([1947] F.C.R. 141; A.I.R.
1947 F.C. 38)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 339 ; 6 E.L.R. 104 ; 9 E.L.R. 301
Jadumani Behara v. Jadumani Sahu (A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 244)
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 220
Jadumani Mangaraj v. Dinabandhu Sahu and Others (8 E.L.R. 480)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 485
XXX ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Jadunandan Mahtoon v. Mosahib Singh (i Doabia 46)


—See North Gaya (General) Rural Constituency case
Jagadish v. Rudra Deolal (8 E.L.R. 311)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 30
Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 210 ; 9 E.L.R. 231)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 485 ; 10 E.L.R. 144, 376
:
>. . —followed 9 E.L.R. 403; 10 E.L.R. 357
Jagannath v. Pandurang and Others (4 E.L.R. 167)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446; 7 E.L.R. 428 ; 10 E.L.R. 174
Jagannath v. Mt. Puniya (A.I.R. 1952 Madh. B. 51)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230
Jagannath Prasad v. Maheswar Dayal Seth (2 Doabia 217)
—See Sitapur District (East) General Rural Constituency
Jagannath Sharma v. S.C. Gupta and Others (2 E.L.R. 8)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 414 ; 6 E.L.R. 470
Jagat Chandra N. Vohra and Another v. The Province of Bombay and
Others (A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 144)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341
Jagatdar v. Kolte (4 Jagat Narain 22)
—relied on 2 E.L.R. 414
Jagdish Chandra v. Prakash Narain (A.I.R. 1953 V.P. 51)
—followed 9 E.L.R. 163, 201, 216
Jagdish Chandra Joshi v. Prakash Narain and Others (1953 D.L.R.
V.P. 51)
— ref. 8 E.L.R. 207
Jaidev Singh v. Ujagar Singh (Hammond 557)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 499
Jakab Kalak Dana v. Kutch Government (A.I.R. 1951 Kutch 38)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341
Jakatdar, R.B.V.M. v. V.D. Kotle and Others (1 Doabia 218 (sic))
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 401, 309
Mst. Jamma Kunwar v. Kunk Behari and Another (A.I.R. 1937 All.
502)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 162
Jarnna Prasad Mukharia v. Lachhiram Ratanmal Jain and Others
(5 E.L.R. 1 ; A.I.R. 1953 M.B. 197)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 489, 8 E.L.R. 107, 350
—followed 9 E.L.R. 163, 201, 216
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXXi

Janardhan Thakur v. Baldeo Prasad Singh (A.I.R. 1920 Pat. 147)


—not followed 6 E.L.R. 388
Jang Bahadur Singh v. Basant Lai and Others (8 E.L.R. 429)
—re/. 8 E.L.R. 448
Jaswant Singh v. Jagan Nath and Others (2 E.L.R. 12)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 385
Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar ([1949] F.C.R. 595)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 60
Jay Dayal Madan Gopal, In re (I.L.R. 54 All. 846)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446
Jennings and Another v. Kelly [1940] A.C. 206
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 318
Jennings v. Kelly ([1939] 4 All. E.L.R. 464
—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350
Jijibai v. Zabu (30 N.L.R. 18)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 428
Jitendra Nath Gupta and Others v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 99)
-ref. 8 E.L.R. 28
Joginder Singh v. Raghbir Singh and Others (5 E.L.R. 81)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 426
Dr. John Mathai v. Returning Officer, Kottayam (1 E.L.R. 1)
—discussed 1 E.L.R. 23, 52
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230; 6 E.L.R. 186; 8 E.L.R. 159
Jones v. Robson [1901] 1 Q.B. 673
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21; 10 E.L.R. 216
Jones v. Scullord ([1898] 2 Q.B. 565)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Joseph Forster Wilson v. Sir Christopher Furness (6 O'M. & H. 1)
—relied on 10 E.L.R. 129
Joseph Theberge v. Philippe Laudry ([1876-77] 2 A.C. 102)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186
Joy Chand v. Kamalaksha (A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 239)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 1
Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford (5 App. Cas. 214)
—ref. 2 E.L.R. 109; 5 E.L.R. 21
—distinguished 6 E.L.R. 1
Jullundur North Constituency 1946 case (2 Doabia 223; Sen and Poddar
965)
—ref. 4 E.L.R. 67
xxxn ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Jwala Prased Mishra v. Mahadeo and Others (3 E.L.R. 473)


—ref. 4 E.L.R. 34; 6 E.L.R. 1
Jyostna Chandra v. Mehrabali and Others (3 E.L.R. 488)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 461
Kadir Bux Omer Hayat v. Bakt Behari (A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 1768)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446
Kalap Raj v. B. N. Tripathi and Another
—See Basti District N. E. General Constituency
Kalika Prasad v. Hayat Chand (4 E.L.R. 118)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 353
Kalyan Chandra Mohile v. Bishambhar Nath Pandey and Others
(3 E.L.R. 125)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55
Kambar Khan v. Main Ziauddin (Sen and Poddar 716)
—See Razzar Muhammadan Rural Constituency, 1937.
Kanhiya Lai v. Bhagwandas (A.I.R. 1926 All. 30)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388
Kanaiyalal Durllabhram Bhansali v. Popatlal Mulshanker Joshi (1
E.L.R. 244)
ref. 3 E.L.R. 288; 5 E.L.R. 93;
—Mstinguishad 9 E.L.R. 115
Kandan,Textiles Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras (1949) 2 M.L.J. 789)
—relied on 1 E.L.R. 422
Kandasawami Chettar v. Foulkes (A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 396)
—relied on 1 E.L.R. 373
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311
Kangra-cum-Gurdaspur (M.R. 1924) Mohammad Fazal Khan v. Chaud-
huri Ali Akbar (Hammond 437)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 288
followed 1 E.L.R. 311, 341
—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 214
Dr. Kannabhiran v. A.J. Arunachalam and Others (2 E.L.R. 167)
—ref. 3 E.L.R. 447; 5 E.L.R. 446; 6 E.L.R. 104; 7 E.L.R. 1, 171
10 E.L.R. 311, 376
—followed 5 E.L.R. 386
—distinguished 5 E.L.R. 129
—affirmed 9 E.L.R. 471
King v. Lincolnshire Appeal Tribunal; Stubbins, Exparte ([1917]
1 K.B. 1)
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21
TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, E T C . XXX111

C. M. Karale v. B. K. Dalvai and S. N. Angadi (2 JagatNarain 31)


See Belgaum District (N.M.R.)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 30
Karansing v. Kartarsing (A.I.R. 1951 Punjab 170)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 53
Karkare, C D . v. T.L. Shevde (A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 330)
—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203
Karnal South General Constituency case: Pt. Mangat Ram v. Chaudhari
Anant Ram (Sen and Poddar 438; 2 Doabia 80)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 239; 3 E.L.R. 447, 4 E.L.R. 274, 5 E.L.R. 173,
199; 8 E.L.R. 66.
—relied on 8 E.L.R. 265
Karri Sitaramiah v. Venkadem Surrayya [1944] 2 M.L.J. 121
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471
Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 123; [1952]
S.C.R. 435)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203; 8 E.L.R. 139
Kelkar, S. W. v. R. V. Mahajani (1 Doabia 37)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 211
Kensington Division of the Borough of Lambeth (4 0 ' M. & H. 93)
—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471
Ker v. Kennedy [1942] 1 K.B. 409
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 199
Kerrison v. Smith ([1897] 2 Q.B. 445)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 471
Kesab Chandra Patwari v. Gouri Sankar Bhattacharya and Others (2
E.L.R. 215)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414
Kesho Prasad v. Brij Raj Singh and Others (7 E.L.R. yy)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28; 9 E.L.R. 8
^-followed 7 E.L.R. 189
Keshavan v. State of Bombay (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 128)
—ref. 9 E.L.R. 80
Kessowki Issar v. G.I.P. Rly. Co. (I.L.R. 31 Bom. 382 P.C.)
—explained 7 E.L.R. yy
Khairati Ram v. Malawa Ram (A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 266)
—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388
XXXIV ELECTION LAW REPORTS. DIGEST

Khan Bahadur Shah Muhmmad Yahya v. Choudhrv Muhammad Nazirul


Hasan (Sen and Poddar 549)
— See Monghyr North M.R. 1937
Khilumal v. Arjan Das and Others (1 E.L.R. 497)
—explained 3 E.L.R. 74
—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55
Khwaja Hakim Jain v. Moulvi Shaikh Mohomed Husain (Hammond 311)
—ref. 1 E.L.R. 171
Kikabhoy Chandabhoy v. Commissio