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SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 172602. September 3, 2007.]

HENRY T. GO , petitioner, vs . THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN


and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN , respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration led by petitioner of the Decision
dated April 13, 2007.
Petitioner, a private individual, stands charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019, the clear terms of which punishes public o cers who, on
behalf of the government, enter into contracts or transactions manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government, whether or not the public o cer pro ted or will
profit thereby. ISTECA

The rst element of the crime is that the accused must be a public o cer who
enters into a contract on behalf of the government. The philosophy behind this is that
the public o cer is duty bound to see to it that the interest of the government is duly
protected. Thus, should the contract or transaction entered into by such public o cer
is manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government's interests, the public
o cer is held liable for violation of Section 3 (g), whether or not this public o cer
profited or will profit thereby .
In Luciano v. Estrella , 1 Justice J.B.L. Reyes opines that the act treated in Section
3 (g) partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as
de ned by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or
not the provision has been violated. An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice
or criminal intent is completely immaterial. 2 Section 3 (g), however, applies restrictively
only to public o cers entering into a contract on behalf of the government manifestly
or grossly disadvantageous to the government. HIDCTA

The pronouncement in Luciano v. Estrella 3 is instructive:


Second, herein respondent municipal o cials were charged with violation
of Republic Act 3019 under its Section 3(g), or speci cally, for having entered, on
behalf of the government, into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government. It is not at all di cult to see that to
determine the culpability of the accused under such provision, it need only be
established that the accused is a public o cer; that he entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and that such a contract is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to that government. In other words, the act treated
thereunder partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum; . . .ECaHSI

In Luciano v. Estrella, the private persons who were charged with "conspiring and
confederating together" with the accused public o cers to have unlawfully and
feloniously, on behalf of the municipal government of Makati, Rizal, entered into a
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contract or transaction with the JEP Enterprises, were also charged with violation of
Section 4 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, for knowingly inducing or causing the above-
mentioned public o cials and o cers to enter into the aforementioned contract or
transaction.
These private individuals were acquitted for insu ciency of evidence, which
simply means that the criminal liability of the public o cers for violation of Section 3
(g) is separate and distinct from the liability of private persons under Section 4 (b) of
Republic Act No. 3019. In other words, notwithstanding the allegation of conspiracy to
violate Section 3 (g), the liability of private individuals who participated in the
transaction must be established under the appropriate provision which is Section 4 (b),
for knowingly inducing or causing the public o cers to commit Section 3 (g) where
criminal intent must necessarily be proved . This is in clear recognition that
Section 3 (g), a malum prohibitum, specifically applies to public officers only. ISHaTA

The information in this case, reads:


The undersigned Graft Investigation and Prosecution O cer II, O ce of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, accuses VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR. and HENRY
T. GO with violation of Sec. 3(g), R.A. No. 3019 committed as follows: TcSHaD

On or about November 26, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent


thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing
the offense in relation to his o ce and taking advantage of the
same, in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and
President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO) , did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter
into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) ,
after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo
Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under
Republic Act 6957 as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing
that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event that
the latter defaults speci cally Article IV, Section 4.04 © in relation to Article
I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA which term is more bene cial to PIATCO
and in violation of the BOT law, and manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines .
CONTRARY TO LAW.

From a cursory reading of the Information, it indubitably shows that all the
elements enumerated for the violation of Section 3 (g) relate to the public o cer ,
not to the private individual, for as have been emphasized, Section 3 (g) is a
crime that can only be committed by public officers .
This brings to the fore the overstated point that Section 3 (g), by its clear terms,
can only be committed by public o cers, for if it were otherwise, then the law itself
would have clearly provided for it. Notably, even certain paragraphs of Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019 provide for its application to private individuals, but not Section
3 (g), thus:

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SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or bene t referred to
in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public o cer the
employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely
release of the con dential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this
section shall, together with the offending public o cer, be punished under
Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disquali ed, in
the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the
Government. AaCEDS

It is clear that sub-paragraph (g) is not included in the quoted portion of Section
3. There are indeed offenses punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special
laws where the mere allegation of conspiracy will su ce in order to validly charge the
persons who connived in the commission of the offense. In Section 3 (g), however, and
other penal provisions, which can only be committed by a certain class of persons, an
allegation of conspiracy to indict those which are clearly not within its purview, is
deficient, as shown in Luciano v. Estrella where the public o cers were convicted under
Section 3 (g) and yet the private parties therein were acquitted inspite of the allegation
of conspiracy in the Information.
In voting to grant the motion for reconsideration, I am not saying that petitioner
is innocent or that he can no longer be prosecuted if indeed he is liable for any crime
relating to his acts that led to the signing of the ARCA. As emphasized in my Dissenting
Opinion dated April 13, 2007, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides for the
prohibition on private individuals, thus: ETIDaH

SEC. 4. Prohibition on private individuals. — (a) It shall be unlawful for


any person having family or close personal relation with any public o cial to
capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or
pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction,
application, request or contract with the government, in which such public o cial
has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or a nity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal
relation" shall include close personal relationship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which
assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause
any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof. DTISaH

It is well-settled that penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and
liberally for the accused, so much so that the scope of a penal statute cannot be
extended by good intention or by implication. The Information lumping petitioner with a
public o cial for conspiracy to violate Section 3 (g), is totally in rm. Section 3 (g) can
only be violated by a public o cer. The acts for which private persons can be charged
together with the public o cials are enumerated in the last paragraph of Section 3 and
Section 4, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 3019. If warranted, petitioner Go
should be charged for violation of Section 4 (b) in relation to Section 3 (g) .
In my Dissent to the Decision dated April 13, 2007, reference was made to
Articles 210 (Direct Bribery) and 212 (Corruption of Public O cials ) of the Revised
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Penal Code. In Direct Bribery, the public o cer agrees to perform an act either
constituting or not constituting a crime, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present received by such o cer. Only the public o cer may be charged under and be
held liable for Direct Bribery under Article 210, while the person who conspired with the
public o cer, who made the promise, offer or gave the gifts or presents, may be
indicted only under Article 212 for Corruption of Public O cials, regardless of any
allegation of conspiracy. DHacTC

Another concrete example is Campomanes v. People . 4 Petitioner Campomanes,


a private individual, was charged with conspiring with a public o cer who failed to
render account for public funds disbursed punishable under Article 218 of the Revised
Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2)
he must be an accountable o cer for public funds or property; (3) the offender is
required by law to render accounts to the Commission on Audit; and (4) fails to render
an account for a period of two months.
The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Campomanes is not a public o cer and
applied Article 222 in relation to Article 218. Article 222 also involves failure to render
an account not by a public o cer, but by a private individual who has charge of any
national, provincial or municipal funds, revenues or property. Notwithstanding the
charge of conspiracy , petitioner Campomanes was made to answer not to Article
218, which pertains only to public officers, but to Article 222. DCIAST

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED and the Decision


dated April 13, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092 dated December 6, 2005 denying
petitioner's Motion to Quash and its March 24, 2006 Resolution denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case No. 28092 in so far as petitioner Henry T. Go is
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, J., votes to deny the Motion for Reconsideration. Please see my
dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, Jr., JJ., join the dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions
AZCUNA , J., concurring :

Petitioner moves for reconsideration of the Decision of this Court holding that he
can be liable under Sec. 3 (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on an
allegation that he was in conspiracy with a public official.
The Decision relies on Domingo v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. No. 149175, October 25,
2005, 474 SCRA 203. DTSaIc

In that case, the First Division of the Court ruled that a private individual may be
liable for conspiracy with a public official under Sec. 3 (h) of Republic Act 3019.
I agree that there is no difference between Sec. 3 (h) and Sec. 3 (g) in this
respect. If a private individual can be charged for conspiracy with a public o cial in
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Sec. 3 (h) — directly or indirectly having a nancial or pecuniary interest in any contract,
business or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
o cial capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having an interest, so can a private individual be charged with conspiracy with a public
o cial under Sec. 3 (g) for entering into a contract under terms and conditions
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. IDAEHT

Petitioner, however, rightly claims that in the Domingo case, the information
alleged sufficient specifics as to what constituted the conspiracy, namely, by acting as
a dummy for the public official and allowing his business to be used by him.
Normally, an allegation of conspiracy is su cient, leaving the details to be
established by the evidence at the trial. HDTSCc

There is, however, a need to distinguish the instance, as in this case, where the
conspiracy is an element of the offense itself and not merely a circumstance that
increases the penalty. For the only way a private individual can be liable under Sec. 3 (g)
is if he acted in conspiracy with the public o cial. Where the conspiracy is constitutive
of the offense, it should be alleged with more speci cs than where it merely increases
the penalty to that of the most guilty. Otherwise, there would be a failure to accord the
accused his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense of which he
stands charged.
The allegation in this case against petitioner simply stated that he acted "in
conspiracy with" the accused public official. I find this insufficient. EACTSH

Finally, all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused.


In light of the foregoing, I am of the view that the motion for reconsideration
should be granted. acADIT

GARCIA , J., concurring :

I vote to grant the subject motion for reconsideration as I join the earlier
Dissenting Opinion of Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago contra the majority
opinion dated April 13, 2007 penned by Mr. Justice (now ret.) Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
Justice Santiago's dissent is correct or at least defensible. Section 3 (g) of the
Anti-Graft Law (RA 3019) which punishes the act of entering, on behalf of the
government, into a contract or transaction grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government may, as the dissent stressed, be committed only by public o cers. As
may be gathered from settled jurisprudence, 1 the rst element of the crime of violating
Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019 is that the accused is a public o cer, irresistibly implying that
only a public o cer can be adjudged guilty for the offense, implying, in turn, that a
private individual cannot be held liable under Sec. 3 (g), applying the conspiracy
principle. There can be no denying that there are certain offenses which are limited to or
can be committed only by a certain class of persons, meaning only they can be
successfully prosecuted and punished for acts punishable as such offense. Section 3
(g) of RA 3019, where only one authorized to sign and conclude government contracts
may be proceeded against, as only he can enter into contract on behalf of the
government, is such offense. Mention may also be made of felonies punishable under
Articles 204 to 207 of the Revised Penal Code and falling under the category of
"Malfeasance and Misfeasance in O ce ," which only judges, in the exercise of judicial
functions, can be held liable of. EHCcIT

The notion of a private individual being held liable for violation of Sec. 3 (g) under
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the conspiracy theory has practically nothing to commend itself. Sec. 3 (g)
presupposes that the offender is duly authorized to enter into a contract on behalf of
the government, which means that he is a public o cer since only a public o cer can
possess such an authority. Now, then, it is legally impossible for a private person to
agree with one so authorized to enter into a contract manifestly unfavorable to the
government and then decide, in concert with the public o cer, to commit the unlawful
act. Let it be stressed that conspiracy, as a criminal law concept, contemplates of two
or more persons coming to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and
deciding to commit it. Theoretically, then, for conspiracy to exist, each malefactor must
independently have the legal capability to commit the unlawful act. For, if one is
incapable, how can he possibly agree and decide to commit it? Needless to state,
petitioner Go, even if he wanted to, could not have entered into a binding transaction for
and in behalf of the government, be it favorable or unfavorable to the latter.
The conclusion negating the conspiracy scenario under Sec. 3 (g) becomes all
the more compelling if we consider Sec. 3 (g) side by side with the preceding Sec. 3 (e).
Section 3 (e) punishes the act of causing undue injury to any party or giving such party
undue bene ts thru evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable
negligence. By case law, one of the elements to be proven in order to constitute a
violation of Sec. 3 (e) is that the accused is a public o cer or a private person charged
in conspiracy with the former. 2 The conspiracy angle under Sec. 3 (e) is not present in
the enumeration of the essential elements of the crime penalized under Sec. 3 (g). 3 The
absence must have some legal and logical basis. What comes immediately to mind is
what is adverted to earlier, i.e., that a private person cannot plausibly agree with a public
o cer to enter into a contract manifestly disadvantageous to the government and then
act on that agreement by concluding/signing one. Surely, the private person cannot, for
want of authority, agree in the first place to execute/sign a government contract. cHECAS

If at all then, a private individual, if charged in conspiracy with a public o cer, can
be prosecuted and convicted under Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019. But such private individual
cannot plausibly be charged either directly or in conspiracy with a public o cer, and be
convicted for violation of Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019.
There is no dispute in this case that petitioner/movant Henry T. Go is not a public
o cer. As such, he cannot be lumped with then DOTC Secretary Vicente Rivera in the
information for violation of Sec. 3 (g). The remedy of the government prosecutors
against petitioner lies elsewhere, that is, to charge him, if warranted, under the proper
provision/s of the Anti-Graft Law or the Revised Penal Code, which is precisely Justice
Santiago's belabored point. cISDHE

Hence, my vote to GRANT petitioner's motion for reconsideration.


Respectfully submitted.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., dissenting :

This refers to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners.


On April 13, 2007, the Court rendered its Decision in this case dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari and a rming in toto the Resolution dated December 6, 2005 of
t he Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go, which denied petitioner Go's Motion to Quash and
t h e Sandiganbayan Resolution dated March 24, 2006 which denied petitioner Go's
Motion for Reconsideration. 1

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Petitioner Go contends that the Court misconstrued the pronouncements in
Luciano v. Estrella , 2 Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan , 3 Domingo v. Sandiganbayan , 4 and
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan . 5 He also contends that a mere allegation of conspiracy is
not enough to hold him, a private person, equally liable with the public o cer for
violation of Section 3 (g) since the actual recital of facts constituting the conspiracy
must be made explicit in the Information in order to meet the fundamental right of an
accused to be fully informed of the charge against him. aAHSEC

Go's contentions are without merit.


The cases of Luciano, Singian, Jr., Domingo and Marcos were properly applied by
the Court. CIaDTE

In Luciano, certain municipal public o cers and private individuals were charged
with violation of Sections 3 (g) and 4 (b) of the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in
connection with a contract involving tra c de ectors. The Court held therein that "[t]he
act treated thereunder (referring to Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019) partakes the nature
o f malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as de ned by law, not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been
violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for
which R.A. No. 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public
o cers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which
may lead thereto."
I n Singian, certain o cers of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Singian, a
private individual, were charged with violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019
in connection with alleged behest loan accommodations extended by PNB to
Integrated Shoe, Inc. Even though one of the elements of the offense under Section 3
(g) is that the accused is a public o cer, this case illustrates that private persons,
when conspiring with public o cers , may be indicted and, if found guilty, held
liable for violation of Section 3 (g). TADaCH

I n Domingo, Jaime Domingo, the Municipal Mayor of San Manuel, Isabela, and
Diosdado Garcia, a private individual, were charged with Section 3 (h) of R.A. No. 3019
as it appears that the latter was used as a dummy to cover up the business transaction
of the Mayor with the municipality. While one of the elements of the offense under
Section 3 (h) is that the accused is a public o cer, like Section 3 (g), Garcia, a private
individual was held equally liable with the Municipal Mayor, pursuant to Section 9(a) of
R.A. No. 3019.
I n Marcos, then First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, as Chairman of the Philippine
General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI) and Jose P. Dans, Vice-Chairman of the Light
Rail Transport Authority (LRTA), were charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No.
3019 in connection with a lease agreement entered into by LRTA with PGHFI. When
Dans was acquitted, Marcos led a Motion for Reconsideration. The Court granted her
motion, nding that since she signed the lease agreement as a private person, not as a
public o cer, she cannot be convicted under Section 3 (g). It is this particular
statement that petitioner is hanging on to for the reconsideration of the Court's
Decision in the present petition. However, in its subsequent declaration in Marcos, the
Court ruled: HICSTa

Neither can petitioner be considered as in conspiracy with Jose P. Dans,


Jr., who has been found without any criminal liability for signing the same Lease
Agreement. Absent any conspiracy of petitioner with Dans, the act of the latter
cannot be viewed as an act of the former. Petitioner is only answerable for her
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own individual act. Consequently, petitioner not having signed Exhibit "B" as a
public o cer, there is neither legal nor factual basis for her conviction under
Section 3(g) of Rep. Act 3019. 6

The aforesaid declaration of the Court — that Marcos's acquittal was based on
the nding that she signed the lease agreement as a private person, not a public o cer
— should be taken in the context of the above-quoted paragraph. TCacIE

In other words, considering that Dans was acquitted, there could not be
conspiracy between him and Marcos; and in the absence of conspiracy, Marcos could
not be convicted for her individual act of signing the Lease Agreement as a private
person.
The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision
to advance one's case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no
speci c portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision
must be considered in its entirety . 7 ECaTDc

In addition to the foregoing cases are Meneses v. People 8 a n d Froilan v.


Sandiganbayan. 9 In Meneses, the Court did not concede to the argument that private
persons cannot be convicted of violation of Section 3 (e) and (j) of R.A. No. 3019, its
application being limited only to public o cers. The Court stated that Section 1 of the
law makes clear the legislative intention to make the application of the statute extend
both to public officers and private persons, thus:
The policy of the Philippine government, in line with the principle that a
public o ce is a public trust is to repress certain acts of public o cers and
private persons alike which constitute graft and corrupt practices or which may
lead thereto. 1 0 EHSADc

The Court held that "having conspired and confederated with the accused public
o cers, in the perpetration of acts designed towards the obtention of pecuniary
bene ts or advantage, in violation of law, they [referring to the private person] must be
deemed to have consented to and adopted as their own, the offense of said public
officers, in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all." 1 1
I n Froilan, petitioner Froilan, a private individual, was charged with three public
o cers in connection with the procurement of laboratory chemicals for the Bohol
Agricultural College, a government educational institution. While one of the issues
raised was whether a private individual can be held liable under Section 3 (g) of R.A. No.
3019, the Court never delved on the issue and, instead, it acquitted the accused in the
absence of another element of the offense — that the contract or transaction is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Indubitably, it shows that even a
private individual may be charged and held accountable under Section 3 (g), when he is
charged in conspiracy with public officers or employees. EDISaA

In all these cases, the Court had consistently held that private individuals, when
conspiring with public o cers , may be found guilty of offenses under Section 3,
even though one of the elements of the offense is that the accused is a public officer.
On the alleged inadequacy of the allegation of conspiracy in the Information, the
Court in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan 1 2 elucidated on how conspiracy as the mode of
committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, applying People v.
Quitlong, 1 3 viz: cEAHSC

Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement


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concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information
must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or
that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an
agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an
allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired"
or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy,' must aptly
appear in the information in the form of de nitive acts constituting
conspira cy. In ne, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of
purpose or the community of design among the accused must be
conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its
derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting
the conspiracy . Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the
information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a
matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it . In establishing conspiracy when
properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by
direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused. 1 4
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx

The Information in this case su ciently states the facts which petitioner Go is
charged with, thus: TEacSA

[T]he accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., . . . in conspiracy with accused


HENRY T. GO , . . . did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously entered
into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project
for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo
Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III
under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law)
providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in
the event of the latter's default speci cally Article IV, Section 4.04 (c)
in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA which terms are more
bene cial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT Law and manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines . (Emphasis supplied).

It bears stressing that the allegation of conspiracy in the information


must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to
prove it . A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative
of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of
sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. 1 5 A statement of this evidence
is not necessary in the information. 1 6
In view of the foregoing, I vote to deny the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner and maintain the Decision dated April 13, 2007. aSTAHD

Footnotes
1. G.R. No. L-31622, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 769.
2. People v. Quijada, G.R. Nos. 115008-09, July 24, 1996, 259 SCRA 191, 228.
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3. Supra note 1 at 780.
4. G.R. No. 161950, December 19, 2006.
GARCIA, J., concurring:
1. Ingco v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. No. 112584, May 23, 1997, 272 SCRA 563; Morales v.
People, G.R. No. 144047, July 26, 2002, 385 SCRA 259; Duterte v. Sandiganbayan , G.R.
No. 130191, April 27, 1998, 289 SCRA 721 and Marcos v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. No.
126995, October 6, 1998, 297 SCRA 95.
2. Sistoza v. Desierto , G.R. No. 144784, September 3, 2002, 388 SCRA 307; General Bank &
Trust Co. v. Ombudsman , 324 SCRA 113; Garcia v. Ombudsman , 325 SCRA 667; Medina
v. Sandiganbayan, 218 745.
3. Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and other cases listed in supra note 1.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., dissenting:
1. Rollo, p. 403.
2. 145 Phil. 454 (1970).
3. G.R. Nos. 160577-94, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 348.

4 G.R. No. 149175, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 203.


5. 357 Phil. 762 (1998).
6. Id. at 789.
7. Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals , 401 Phil. 776,
800 (2000); Valderrama v. National Labor Relations Commission , 326 Phil. 477, 484
(1996); Policarpio v. Philippine Veterans Board and Associated Insurance & Surety Co.,
Inc., 106 Phil. 125, 131 (1959).
8. G.R. Nos. L-71651 and L-71728, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 303.
9. 385 Phil. 32 (2000).
10. Meneses v. People, supra note 8, at 315.
11. Id. at 316.
12. 427 Phil. 820 (2002).

13. 354 Phil. 372 (1998).


14. Id. at 390.
15. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan , supra note 11, at 862, citing People v. Paguntalan , G.R. No.
116272, March 27, 1995, 242 SCRA 753, 780; People v. Reyes, 316 Phil. 1 (1995); People
v. Nacional, G.R. Nos. 111294-95, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 122, 130.
16. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, id.

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