You are on page 1of 7

G.R. No.

143340 June 15, 2001


LAMBERTO T. CHUA, Respondent.

FACTS: Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga
Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia),
daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for
"Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment" with the Regional Trial Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.

Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in
the distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business
convenience, respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of
their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name
of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital
contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as
his counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits would be equally
divided between them. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by
Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a sister of the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy. As
compensation, Jacinto would receive a manager's fee or remuneration of 10% of the
gross profit and Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in addition to her wages
and other remuneration from the business.

Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July 8, 1977, its business
operation went quite and was profitable. Respondent claimed that he could attest to
success of their business because of the volume of orders and deliveries of filled
Shellane cylinder tanks supplied by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. While Jacinto
furnished respondent with the merchandise inventories, balance sheets and net worth
of Shellite from 1977 to 1989, respondent however suspected that the amount
indicated in these documents were understated and undervalued by Jacinto and
Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance.

Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and
particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody,
disposition and management of Shellite without respondent's consent. Despite
respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal,
winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to
comply. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to
her own use and advantage its properties.

On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out the alibis
and reasons to evade respondent's demands, she disbursed out of the partnership funds
the amount of P200,000.00 and partially paid the same to respondent. Petitioner
Lilibeth allegedly informed respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partial
payment of the latter's share in the partnership, with a promise that the former would
make the complete inventory and winding up of the properties of the business
establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly failed to comply with
their duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income of Shellite to
the damage and prejudice of respondent.

On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial
Court in Zamboanga del Norte had jurisdiction over the action. Respondent
opposed the motion to dismiss which later was denied by the trial court.

Hence, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims, contending that
they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests,
damages and attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a cause of action against
them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC
being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As
counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this time on the ground
that the claim for winding up of partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in
partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership assets/properties
should be dismissed and prosecuted against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate
or intestate proceeding. Unfortunately, the same was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the Petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
the Court of Appeals questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss. Also, they also
filed a Motion to Suspend Pre-Trial Conference which was granted.

Meanwhile, the Petition they filed before the Court of Appeals was denied for lack of
merit. Hence, a Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court by the
Petitioners but the same was denied as the Petitioners failed to show a reversible error
on the part of the Court of Appeals.

Because of such, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The
Respondent was able to present their evidence while the Petitioners were not as they
were considered to have waived their right to present evidence for their failure to
attend the scheduled date for reception of evidence despite notice.

On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent.

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, appealing the case to the Court
of Appeals but the same was dismissed as well as the Motion for Reconsideration that
was subsequently filed by the Petitioners.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until
Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written document to show such partnership
between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes
from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the
alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support this argument,
petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his
alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a
deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section
23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is applicable in the instant case so as to render
inadmissible the Respondent’s testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.


The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving
party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and
unexplained account of the transaction.

But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial
evidence, it is necessary that:

1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a

case in prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer

before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves
effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well
entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives
of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify
to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover,
as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to
matters of facts occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been
brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the
simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the
testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between
respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of
respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party
means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right
assigned before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.

We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's testimony lacks

probative value because she was allegedly coerced coerced by respondent, her brother-
in-law, to testify in his favor, Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested
by respondent to testify and that if she were not requested to do so she would not have
testified. We fail to see how we can conclude from this candid admission that
Josephine's testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way categorically say that
she was forced to be a witness of respondent.

Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the
value of her testimony since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the
credibility of witnesses.

Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat respondent's claim
cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a
partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the
testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the
formation of partnership, albeit an informal one.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision
G.R. No. L-25643 June 27, 1968


FACTS: On July 18, 1960 Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold
Storage Co. in Iloilo, together with C.N. Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the annulment of a judgment rendered against the La
Paz Ice Plant by the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Named as defendants were Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor judgment was rendered,
and the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama. The complaint alleged that, because
of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the
receivership of Dineros; that during the pendency of the receivership, Marciano C.
Roque brought an action against the La Paz Ice Plant in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the collection of P150,000, which sum he had supposedly lent to it; that
summons was served not on the receiver but on the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita
Lezama; and that, through the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain
judgment by default against the company. It was claimed that, because the summons
was served on Jose Manuel Lezama instead of on the receiver, the Court of First
Instance of Manila acquired no jurisdiction over the La Paz Ice Plant and that, therefore,
the decision of that court was void.

In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners), while admitting that the
company was placed under receivership, maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama
nevertheless remained president of the La Paz Ice Plant and that as such he had
authority to receive in behalf of the company the court summons in civil case 39827.
They denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest
Roque's claim because they knew it to be a legitimate obligation which the La Paz Ice
Plant had incurred pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors.

Issues having been joined, the case was thereupon heard. At the hearing Dineros asked
the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as "a witness summoned by
the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court." The request was granted over the
objection of the petitioners who invoked the following provision of the Rules of Court:

A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a
wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision cited above is applicable in the instant case as to
render Paquita Lezama to be disqualified to be examined.


This provision deals with two different matters which rest on different grounds of
policy: the disqualification of husband and wife to testify in each other's behalf, as well
as their privilege not to testify against each other. The fundamental theory of the
common law is said to be that relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniary interest,
is the basis of the disqualification.

It is argued that the wife may be so compelled but her testimony would be receivable
only against her. It is even suggested that "each may testify in his or her own behalf,
although the testimony may inure to the benefit of the other spouse, or against his or
her own interest, although the testimony may also militate against the other spouse."

Upon the other hand, it is insisted that compelling Paquita Lezama to testify will
transgress section 20(b) of Rule 130, especially if her testimony will support the
plaintiff's charge.

The complaint charges "fraudulent conspiracy" on the part of the spouses and one
Marciano C. Roque to make it appear that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc.
was indebted to Roque. The wife, Paquita Lezama, is called upon to testify as an adverse
party witness on the basis of her following participation in the alleged fraudulent
scheme: "that it was Paquita Lezama who as Secretary of the company signed the
minutes of the meeting during which Manuel Lezama was allegedly authorized to
negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise as Secretary, made the entry in the
books of the corporation."

Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the
meeting and will be asked questions on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry
in the books of the corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or
beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her
husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated.
Testimony adverse to the wife's own interests would tend to show the existence of
collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc upon their common
defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in
order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely
disparaging to the interests of the husband.

Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule which provides merely that the wife
cannot be examined "for or against her husband without his consent," it is further
argued that "when husband and wife are parties to an action, there is no reason why
either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone," and his
or her testimony could operate only against himself or herself.

Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception to the rule, or even as a
separate doctrine, it would be inapplicable in this case where the main charge is
collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person, and the evident purpose of
examination of the wife is to prove that charge.

Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to examination by

the adverse party as a hostile witness when both spouses are parties to the action,
either the interests of the spouses are separate or separable, or the spouse offered as a
witness is merely a formal or nominal party.
The final point urged upon us is that to prevent one spouse from testifying would
encourage alliance of husband and wife as an instrument of fraud; for then what better
way would there be to prevent discovery than to make a co-conspirator in fraud
immune to the most convenient mode of discovery available to the opposite party? This
argument overlooks the fact that section 6 of Rule 132 is a mere concession, for the
sake of discovery, from the rule which precludes the husband or the wife from
becoming the means of the other's condemnation. The said rule of discovery should
therefore not be expanded in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one's spouse
in a situation where this natural repugnance obtains.

It may not be amiss to state in passing that the respondent Dineros has not
demonstrated that there is no evidence available to him other than the Lezamas'
testimony to prove the charge recited in the complaint.