OUTER SPACE

WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND SECURITY

AlExEi ARbATOv AND vlAdimiR dvORkin, EDITORS

OUTER SPACE

OUTER SPACE WEAPONS. AND SECURITY AlExEi ARbATOv AND vlAdimiR dvORkin. DIPLOMACY. EDITORS .

Military. Outer space--Strategic aspects. English Outer space : weapons. its staff.ceip.) -.882--dc22 2010033067 Cover design and composition by Design Army Printed by United Book Press . N. Aeronautics. MD 21211-4370 1-800-537-5487 or 1-410-516-6956 Fax: 1-410-516-6998 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kosmos. Title. the views represented here are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment.. diplomacy and security / Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin. ISBN 978-0-87003-250-9 (pbk. All rights reserved. Arbatov.© 2010 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2.C.ISBN 978-0-87003-251-6 (cloth) 1. contact Carnegie’s distributor: Hopkins Fulfillment Service PO Box 50370. or its trustees. 20036 202-483-7600. p.W. editors. cm. 3. D. III. Vladimir. II. Space weapons. Dvorkin. To order. Washington. UG1520.K6713 2010 358’. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment. Fax: 202-483-1840 www. Aleksei Georgievich. I.org The Carnegie Endowment does not take institutional positions on public policy issues. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Avenue. Baltimore.

Contents vii Foreword ix Preface xv Acknowledgments xvii Abbreviations and Acronyms xxi Introduction Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin Part 1: Civilian And Military Activities In Outer Space 2 Features of the outer space environment Petr Topychkanov 16 the Peaceful and Military Development of space: A Historical Perspective Valery Babintsev 30 space Weapons Programs Vladimir Dvorkin Part 2: Negotiations and Legal Regulations Governing Outer Space 48 non-Weaponization of outer space: Lessons From Negotiations Viktor Mizin 68 Codes of Conduct for outer space Sergey Oznobishchev 78 Preventing an arms race in space Alexei Arbatov 103 Conclusion 111 Index 117 Contributors 119 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .

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the military. But. What is the possibility of a space arms race and who would win it? What are the codes of conduct for operating in outer space? Who controls the skies beyond Earth’s limits? Can disagreements be resolved peacefully? Several recent attempts to develop legal barriers to a space race have failed. military. and Security. Their use of space information systems for military purposes could create a tipping FOREWORd vii . Diplomacy. its potential for militarization makes cooperation between nations an urgent global priority. If outer space should fill with weapons—including highly survivable space systems and information transmission systems used for military purposes—the risk of accidents. India. While space has not transformed—yet—into a new field for armed conflict. and Pakistan—quickly develop expertise. the authors argue. an agreement on a framework governing space—which lacks borders—must be reached. In Outer Space: Weapons. The potential risks increase as nations with growing political. and command system mal- functions becomes substantial.FOREWORd In the fifty years since the United States and Russia raced to launch the first weapons into outer space. commercial. editors Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin—along with other Russian researchers from the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program—explore the strategic implications of space weapons from the Russian point of view. and eco- nomic ambitions—notably China. and scientific development of space has advanced at a rapid pace. false alarms.

military. and create an irreversible crisis for the entire nonproliferation regime. If countries fail to find areas of cooperation. and technological development expands the realm of activity in outer space. countries may need to adopt partial solutions and find ways to closely monitor compliance. As the globalization of economic. the evolving relationship between the United States and Russia. Mathews President Carnegie Endowment for International Peace viii FOREWORd . Rather than banning weapons outright. Jessica T. Nations will need to be transparent about their goals and the terms covered by formal and informal disar- mament agreements to provide a successful framework for negotiations.point that would make reversing an arms race impossible. and the fac- tors that motivate nations to engage in peaceful negotiations. the authors argue that diplomatic solutions can prevent another space race. this volume provides a compelling road map on how to avoid future conflicts in a critical arena. political. By taking a close look at the mixed history of disarmament talks. the growing threat of a space arms race and the prospects of conflict in space would inevitably lead to nuclear and missile proliferation. This path is avoidable.

In chapter two. It provides an overview of the various types of spacecraft and their operation. This edited volume—produced as part of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Non- proliferation Program—assesses prospects for preventing the militarization of space.PREFACE The special nature of space as a sphere of civilian and military activity is drawing increasing interest as more countries develop and enhance their space programs. By analyzing fifty years of space system development. “The Peaceful and Military Development of Space: A Histori- cal Perspective. and past and present space weapons programs. and explains the relation- ship between satellite capabilities and the orbits in which they are placed. in the air.” independent expert Valery Babintsev examines the history of space exploration from the launch of the first Soviet satellite in 1957 to the PREFACE ix . examines the specific nature of outer space. “Features of the Outer Space Environment. Chapter one. Ensuring those programs are used to achieve peaceful ends is a growing source of concern for the international community. It also provides a comparative analysis of the operational use of armed forces on land. the authors determine that nations must heed the lessons of previous disarmament negotiations.” by Petr Topych- kanov. and seek areas of cooperation both formally and informally. recognize the changing balance of power in space. and in space. efforts to establish an international legal framework to guide space development. at sea.

as well as the increasing use of space-based information systems and technology. and assesses the latent technological links between missile defense and antisatellite systems as well as the development prospects for space-based missile defense systems and space-to-Earth strike weapons. but through politically binding voluntary codes of conduct in outer space. and presents a system- atized categorization of various space weapons that could be the subject of future treaties and verification procedures. and continuing with the discussions on space-based missile defenses at talks between the United States and the USSR..S. Arbatov also evaluates the evolution of arms control measures and methods for monitoring compliance. and Chinese systems for destroying satellites.” Sergey Oznobishchev explores informal means of preventing the militarization of space—not through full-scale treaties. The chapter analyzes the technical characteristics of the various space launchers and manned and unmanned spacecraft.present. He analyzes the legal. “Non-Weaponization of Outer Space: Lessons From Negotiations. military. Chapter four.S. and technical difficulties involved in defining the treaty’s subject matter―along with the possibilities for monitoring compliance. It also assesses the outlook for the future development of civilian and military space systems. and launching strikes from space against targets on Earth.” by Viktor Mizin. USSR/Russian. In chapter three. drawing on examples from previous arms control talks. penetrating missile defenses. “Space Weapons Programs. He also examines the development of Soviet asymmetrical measures in response to the U. reviews current U.” Vladimir Dvorkin takes a close look at the development of U. beginning with the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Codes of conduct could help create political barriers to the militarization of space and create favorable conditions for subsequent formal negotiations and agreements.” Alexei Arbatov looks at the prospects for future treaties on banning or limiting space weap- ons. These talks centered on nuclear and space weapons and the draft agreements made in the 1980s on the prohibition of weapons in space. He examines the latest initiatives. Finally. In chapter five. “Preventing an Arms Race in Space. including negotiations on stra- tegic arms reductions. He examines how each side’s position has evolved and how the groundwork already laid on developing legal provisions and norms could be used in future negotiations. in chapter six. research and development projects in the space weapons field.S. x PREFACE . Strategic Defense Initiative pro- gram in the 1980s. “Codes of Conduct for Outer Space. focusing on the Russian-Chinese draft presented at the Disarmament Conference in 2008. provides a historical overview and analysis of the efforts to create a legal framework for the military use of space. strategic.

data exchange. the diplomatic process inevitably ends in deadlock. provisions on exceptions to the rules. which include detailed agreements on all issues. as well as gradual progression in disarma- ment and control measures. The potential militarization or weaponization of space could become the biggest threat to its peaceful use and to the devel- opment of international cooperation. INF. Sixth. Fifth. without going into the technical details of definitions. the arms race may become impossible to reverse. great strides have been made in the military. an analysis of the half century of space system development makes it possible to identify two main models for the legal regulation of space activity. The creation and use of weapons in military operations in space and from space is more costly than using forces and weapons deployed on land. One is based on the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space and includes comprehen- sive bans on general classes of weapons and activities. ranging from partial measures to ones that are increasingly broad in scope. rapidly deployable spacecraft and boosters. and scientific development of outer space. One possible approach is to reach agreement on a framework or code of conduct in outer space. Second. and in the air. commercial. over the last half century. First. which would create the political conditions for a rapid transition to full-fledged and legally binding treaties on banning or limiting space weapons. PREFACE xi . but it has not yet been transformed into a new field for potential armed conflict. but if weapons development goes beyond a certain threshold. The existence of military space programs in Russia and China could be an incentive to begin serious negotia- tions in this area. verification. The other model is based on the ABM. recent international attempts to erect legal barriers to an arms race in space have been unsuccessful. Third. Only strategic interests can motivate the United States to undertake serious talks and accept limitations on its own weapons. especially given the variety of space weapons and the difficulty of verifying their numbers. at sea. The resulting deadlock has led the expert community to look for alternative solutions. previous negotiations on nuclear and space weapons have shown that if one country maintains complete secrecy of its military-technical programs and closes off its decisions to any critical analysis while trying to use nego- tiations for its own political and propaganda ends. SALT I. development of space information systems will continue in two direc- tions: the development of highly survivable space systems comprising small (light). and mutually agreed-upon understandings. Fourth.The authors draw a number of conclusions. and the development of information transmission systems. and START I treaties. the last decade has shown that Washington is disinclined to engage in disarmament negotiations on the basis of goodwill and noble goals alone.

and later be extended to other countries. the United States will need to transition its policy from the first to the second model. command system malfunctions. Despite its superiority in space. the world is experiencing security problems that cannot be resolved unilaterally. India. the growing threat of a space arms race and the prospect of conflicts in space would inevitably lead to vertical and horizontal nuclear and missile proliferation. there would be a substantial danger of accidents. The initial treaty could have a limited validity period (ten years with the possibility of extension). Compliance could be monitored using the technical means of verification of the parties. if outer space.Soviet proposals at multilateral forums and bilateral talks with the United States in the 1980s as well as Russian initiatives over the last decade (includ- ing joint initiatives with other countries) were based on the first model. Rather than simply ban- ning deployment. were to become filled with weapons. the differing stages of development of various technical programs and projects. It would therefore have the most to lose. In the long term. which lacks national borders. preferably in combination with cooperation and transparency measures. and preferably China. and possibly Iran. the United States is also the country that depends most on the security of satellite support systems for its military and civilian activi- ties. the difficulties involved in defining the subject matter of treaties and implementing verification measures. Seventh. the technological overlap between the vari- ous types of systems. and in its first stage could include the United States. In this era of globalization. taking into account the immense complexity and many facets of the issues. and others to balance it. and create an irreversible crisis for the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime. false alarms. Pakistan. There is an urgent need for cooperation among the major powers and all responsible countries to resolve these issues as they seek to combat the xii PREFACE . Brazil. and so on. an indirect solution to the problem could be to reach an initial agreement prohibiting tests of antisatellite systems and space-based missile defense systems that result in the destruction of a targeted satellite or ballistic missile and its components during flight. especially through the use of military force. and Japan. To achieve results in this area. The ability to agree on definitions of what exactly treaties will cover and to draw up realistic and reliable verification and transparency measures will play a huge role in the success of any practical negotiations. the United States possesses clear technical superiority in space at the moment. Russia. but an arms race in space could lead China. these diplomatic initiatives brought Moscow some political and propaganda dividends but did not lead to con- crete results in the form of legally binding treaties. Set against Washington’s unconstructive line. and the great asymmetry in the geostrategic situations and military policies of different countries. Furthermore. Russia.

implement effective measures to address climate change and environmental issues. This book underscores the importance of such cooperation in a new and expanding realm. and take action to ensure energy and food security. verify compliance at major stages of the disarmament process. prevent international terrorism. PREFACE xiii . carry out multilateral peacekeeping operations.proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

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ACknOWlEdgmEnTS The authors would like to express their gratitude to the Carnegie Corporation of New York. the John D. the United States. They are also grateful to the researchers and support staff of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington) and the Carnegie Moscow Center for their intellectual contributions and assistance. and proposals to the political circles. They address their analyses. We are especially grateful to all the Russian specialists from the Russian Acad- emy of Sciences. criticisms. and informed citizens of Russia. like the Nonproliferation Program as a whole. for reviewing the book. member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. MacArthur Foundation. and the Starr Foundation for their support of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonprolifera- tion Program. and the media who took part in a series of seminars and conferences held in 2008 as part of this project. full responsibility for the opinions expressed herein rests only with the Russian specialists who authored its contents. and other influential countries in preventing the potential weaponization of space. ACknOWlEdgmEnTS xv . scientific and civil centers. pro- ceeded under the auspices of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Their feedback was invaluable. government agencies. Sagdeyev. Although the present work. Our special gratitude goes to Renad Z. academic communities. and Catherine T.

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Produc- tion.S. and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction CFE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty CWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development.AbbREviATiOnS And ACROnymS ABM Treaty Treaty between the USSR and the U. Stockpiling. and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction ECM Electronic countermeasure equipment FOBS Fractional Orbital Bombardment System GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System AbbREviATiOnS And ACROnymS xvii . on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems AES Artificial Earth satellite ASAT Antisatellite system BMD Ballistic missile defense BTWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. Production.

S.S. on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (1972) SALT II Treaty between the USSR and the U.S. on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (1991) START II Treaty between the Russian Federation and the U. on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (1979) SBL Space-based laser weapons SDI Strategic Defense Initiative (U.S. on the Fur- ther Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (1993) TMO Theater of military operations UN United Nations WMD Weapons of mass destruction xviii AbbREviATiOnS And ACROnymS .S.ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile ICOC International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation INF Treaty Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (referred to as the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missile Treaty in Russian) MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NTMV National Technical Means of Verification PPW Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space R&D Research and development SALT I Interim Agreement between the USSR and the U.) SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile SMF Strategic missile forces SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty START I Treaty between the USSR and the U.

Russian historian (1841–1911) .“Henceforth.” Vasily Klyuchevsky. armies will be needed only to provide someone to die under the laboratory missiles in accordance with the laws of chemistry. battle will be done with chemistry textbooks and laboratories rather than armies.

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with Britain and Germany also engaged in their development. and 22 to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Certain newly industrialized nations (India. Canada. Argentina. Japan. the problems and prospects of preventing the proliferation of space weapons. At least 40 of these countries rely to one degree or another on programs that utilize space to provide information support for their weapons systems. and Egypt) are also steadily becoming more involved. At present. with around 425 of these belonging to the United States. Pakistan. 96 to Russia. Germany. China. India has second- generation space-based remote Earth-sensing technologies that also allow it to conduct image reconnaissance. Britain. with France. and the prohibition of the use of force in and from space are not new issues.inTROdUCTiOn ALExEI ARBATOV AND VLADIMIR DVORKIN The militarization of outer space. Belgium. the Netherlands. while over 20 countries possess the scientific and industrial potential to develop and produce space technology and launch spacecraft using their own or leased carriers. the number inTROdUCTiOn xxi .1 By 2015. Russia and the United States are the leaders. and Japan have the means for pro- viding space-based information support. including image reconnaissance. the near-Earth space environment is home to around 780 actively operating spacecraft. but at lower resolutions. The United States. and Spain each playing an active role. There is even evidence that the United Arab Emirates has hired various firms to develop its own military spacecraft. France. but they are more relevant than ever. China. More than 125 countries are currently involved in various space activities. Russia.

the United States.of satellite constellations will grow by more than 400 spacecraft. especially as most transactions already depend on satellite communications and relay systems. dual-purpose. More than 150 satellites in deployed constellations in space in either operational or standby mode provide information support. The precedent was set during the Cold War. when the USSR and the United States actively developed and deployed weapons in space. Outer space first turned into a transit zone and military test site as early as the 1950s: first for nuclear testing. Also of note is the gradual development of multi-satellite space systems that comprise hundreds of small. which contribute information support. Satellite systems are also crucial in supporting financial and economic activi- ties in this era of globalization. and 55 percent are in highly elliptical or geostationary orbits. Aside from those used in military systems. Yet xxii inTROdUCTiOn . To move into the realm of space would naturally continue the way the use of force has expanded the course nations have followed over millennia as their geopolitical configurations realign and regular breakthroughs in science and technology are made. it is about 20 times larger than that of Russia). and the rapid pace of scientific and tech- nological progress threaten to turn space—with its growing military and civilian significance—into a new arena for arms races. 20 percent are in intermediate orbit. then for the flight trajectories of ballistic missiles.2 The security of military. and civilian satellite systems has now become a vital component of overall national security for nearly every developed nation. which are particularly counterproductive. this course also presents growing threats to international security and enormous material costs. growing political and military differences among leading powers and alliances. Earth-monitoring satellites play an important role in warning people about natural disasters and other emergen- cies. given the unprecedented global economic crisis and its potential long-term consequences. to sea. which has made substantially greater investment in its military space program than all other space nations combined (at commercial rates of exchange. and its NATO allies all have military spacecraft. On the whole. The developed nations are becoming all but inca- pable of conducting military operations without their space capabilities. Greater conflict in international relations. While Russia. to air. However. about 40 percent of the total spacecraft in orbit are active military satellites. Space systems now represent an integral part of the combat potential of the leading nations’ armed forces. which may be deployed in any class of orbit. the overwhelming majority of the military satellites belong to the United States. About 25 percent of these spacecraft are concentrated in low orbit. lightweight spacecraft capable of completing dual-purpose missions. and finally. and finally for their interception by anti-ballistic missile systems. War has evolved from land.

Humanity faces a crucial decision: it can treat space as an arena for arms races and armed conflict. or make it a sphere for peaceful international cooperation. including in the way it approaches the use of outer space. vol. 1 (Moscow: Voennyi Parad. Notes 1 Voennoy-Promyshlennyi kompleks: Entsiklopediya [Military-Industrial Complex Encyclope- dia]. a multipolar international system. and the suppression of international terrorism and its support- ers among irresponsible regimes requires unprecedented cooperation in the civi- lized global community. The choice will likely be made in the coming decade. 2005).large-scale militarization of outer space has not really begun. and global interdependence began to develop. The opportunity soon emerged to break the historical cycle of arms races and military conflicts spread- ing to ever-higher levels of technological innovation and newer spheres of human activity. inTROdUCTiOn xxiii . energy and food security. With the end of the Cold War. 2 Ibid. the campaign against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). intensive glo- balization. in the sense of deploying weapons to use in or from space. Resolving the potentially catastrophic problems of climate change.

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PART 1 CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE .

01 FEATURES OF ThE OUTER SPACE EnviROnmEnT PETR TOPyChkAnOv .

commonly also known as near. outer.OUTER SPACE Outer space is understood as everything beyond the Earth’s atmosphere. nations are free to gather intelligence and conduct other activities from outer space. Outer space may be subdivided into near-Earth. The Greek word “cosmos” is synonymous with the astronomic defini- tion of the concept of universe. interstellar dust from meteors. solar wind. and gravity and weightlessness. Spain. high-energy particles. which states that outer space “is not subject to national appropriation” by claims of sovereignty. it cannot be studied or utilized without first understanding its features and properties. interplanetary. these recom- mendations have not yet been formalized in international law. something they cannot do in the atmosphere above the territories of other countries.1 As outer space is a unique environment. including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. However.3 Outer space is characterized by its extreme vacuum and the presence of ultra- violet radiation. and the other planets. The boundary between the atmosphere and outer space should lie at altitudes of 100 kilometers above sea level. and larger meteorites. The only official proclamation on such matters is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. and interstellar (meta-galactic) space.2 Consequently. PETR TOPyChkAnOv 3 . Other important features of outer space to be considered include the magnetic fields of the Sun. and open space. the exis- tence of radiation belts (high-energy particles that have been captured and cor- ralled by magnetic fields). the Earth. as recommended by the International Aeronautical Federation at its 1960 conference in Barcelona.

the planets. the field of view will be smaller. ORbiTS And SATElliTES Most human activity in outer space occurs in “near space. At lower altitudes. but the satellite will be able to track a single strip all the way around the Earth.000 kilometers at apogee (the point in the orbit that is farthest from the center of the Earth). and other celestial bodies. • orbital altitude (Hp – perigee. Within this region. which extends to a radius of around 930. navigation. obviously. with the orbital period of the satellite matching the 4 FEATURES OF ThE OUTER SPACE EnviROnmEnT . The primary orbital parameters are: • inclination i – the angle between the orbital plane and the equator.5 Each orbit offers its own advantages for carrying out these varied tasks. In analyzing human activity in outer space.4 giving a clue to the main uses of outer space: detection and observation of objects on the Earth’s surface. the minimum distance between the satellite and the Earth. it is vital to understand the orbital parameters of the spacecraft as they pass through the gravitational fields of the Earth. and how effective it will be in carrying out its mission. communications. in the atmosphere.e. Sometimes.e. at sea. the overriding consideration for spacecraft flight is the Earth’s gravitational pull. • orbital period T – the time it takes for a satellite to complete one orbit. The advantage of an equatorial orbit at the altitude mentioned above is that it will be geosynchronous.” Fewer than four percent of all the spacecraft ever deployed have left the Earth’s gravitational field. i.. axis. below ground. Ha – apogee.Near-Earth space is dominated by Earth’s gravity field. the term “near space” is applied only to the radius of the Moon’s orbit around the Earth. A satellite pass- ing over the surface of the Earth in equatorial orbit will continually “view” exactly the same track of ground. elliptical. and quasi-circular orbits. and in space. and meteorol- ogy and scientific research. stationary. sun-synchronous.000 kilometers.. • eccentricity e – the ratio of the distance between the orbit’s foci and the major. The orbital parameters are of primary importance in determining the main requirements a spacecraft must meet.– the maximum distance to Earth). The orbits considered most practical for carrying out the principal spacecraft missions are the equatorial.000 kilometers at perigee (the point in the orbit closest to the center of the Earth) to 406. which stretches from 363. i. polar. Equatorial orbits are defined as those in which the angle of inclination between the orbital plane and the Earth’s equatorial plane is close to zero. with the Earth’s gravitational field play- ing the role of a perturbing force. the gravitational influences of the Sun and other planets begin to dominate. and control. or real. Beyond the gravitational reach of the Earth.

and hyperbolic. a spacecraft must develop the necessary velocity. and 4. Inclined orbits are more convenient for observing objects on the surface of the Earth. In circular orbits.09 seconds. the altitude of any orbital point above the Earth is about the same.” Polar orbits permit full coverage of the Earth’s surface. Isosynchronous Passes over the same ground track (projection of satellite’s orbit on the Earth’s surface) on a daily basis. elliptical.Earth’s period of rotation of 23 hours. Parabolic and hyperbolic orbits enable the spacecraft to escape the Earth’s field of gravity. including the polar regions. A single satellite has a field of view of 30–34% of the surface of the Earth. For example. a satellite in polar orbit passing at an altitude of 600 kilometers above sea level can cover the surface of the Earth completely in twelve hours.809 km. Ensures that the spacecraft passes sequentially along every Polar region of the Earth.900 km. H = 35. Elliptical 0<e<1 Sun-synchronous Characterized by a constant angle between the orbital plane and the direction of the sun. A satellite moving along this orbit is constantly stationed on the illuminated side of the Earth. Such orbits are usually used by telecommunication satellites and missile warning systems. i = 97–110°. inclination i = 90°. as the greater the orbital inclination relative to the equator.7 Orbits are also divided by shape into circular. or over seven revolutions. for orbits where H = 300–5. 56 minutes. the broader the strip of ground that the satellite can “see. Table 1 shows the most fre- quently used orbits. Satellites with an orbital plane inclined between 97° and 110° relative to the equator are said to be in sun-synchronous orbit. parabolic. as they pass over the Earth’s poles. while elliptical orbits are substantially closer to the Earth at perigee than they are at apogee. primarily through the thrust produced by its engines during the boost PETR TOPyChkAnOv 5 .6 Table 1. These orbits are primarily used for space reconnaissance. allowing the satellite to remain fixed above the same point on the Earth (known as a geosta- tionary orbit). In order to achieve its assigned orbit. Classification of Main Orbits TyPE OF ORbiT FEATURES Circular Equal apogee Ha and perigee Hp altitudes. Quasi-isosynchronous Passes over the same ground track (projection of satellite’s orbit on the Earth’s surface) every n days. Orbits inclined 90° relative to the equator are called polar orbits. Geostationary i = 0.

2 3. 9 A vivid example of the manner in which debris can appear in space was provided by the Chinese antisatellite weapons test on January 11. including items that have detached from spacecraft and launch vehicles.9 km/s. min. and its orbital parameters must be maintained through periodic adjustments to its trajectory using its engines. As a result of such tests. At a velocity of 10.000 3.851 objects in near- Earth space as of October 1.0 km/s. there were 12. and physical/spatial characteristics (Table 3). 2008. spacecraft enter hyperbolic orbits. Wright. to achieve elliptical orbit.11 Seven percent of these (900 objects) were functioning spacecraft. Gronlund. At an even greater velocity. but less than 11. km vElOCiTy.phase of its flight. AlTiTUdE. 21. 35. Characteristics of Main Near-Earth Orbits ORbiTAl ORbiTAl ORbiTAl mAx.2 (24 h) 42.000 7. L. and L.8 km/s in order to enter a cir- cular orbit 160 kilometers above sea level (see more about orbital altitudes below).S. the number of objects registered in the catalog of the U. it is subjected to a series of disturbance forces. the spacecraft can achieve parabolic orbit.000 3.6 94.436. Space Surveillance Network has dramatically grown. During insertion of a spacecraft into orbit and subsequently during its flight. a spacecraft needs to reach a greater velocity. PERCEnTAgE OF TOTAl AREA 500 7. km/S PERiOd. as well as damaged or decom- missioned spacecraft remaining in orbit. 8 Circular and elliptical orbits are often preferred for space missions because they allow the spacecraft to engage in a stable and long-term exchange of information with the Earth. Grego. producing some 2. 2005).4 104.0 36. Table 2.9 6. 2007: a 960-kilogram Fengyun-1C weather satellite was destroyed by a Chinese mid-range missile at an altitude of 864 kilometers above the Earth.9 718.8 20. Space debris consists of artificial objects. with the remainder being space junk: non-functioning 6 FEATURES OF ThE OUTER SPACE EnviROnmEnT .6 1. A spacecraft must maintain a velocity of at least 7.0 Source: D.500 particles of debris. 22. Two other negative technological factors that affect the operation of spacecraft must be added to the orbital factors listed above: space debris and radio inter- ference. EARTh COvERAgE.10 According to the Space Surveillance Network. called the second cosmic velocity.3 (12 h) 38. field of view along the surface of the Earth (see Table 2). Each altitude is characterized by its own orbital velocity. The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts & Science.1 1. orbital period.

the Moon.000 km/h in low PETR TOPyChkAnOv 7 . 300. There is no longer any effect from the Earth’s radiation belt. This range has three equilibrium points in the Earth-Moon system of coordinates. and the Sun has only a weak net effect on the spacecraft. Borchev. Solar winds increase further. The Earth’s radiation belt (lower boundary at 200–300 kilometers) partially reflects radio waves. Low radiation level. orbits Solar winds increase.000–930. The kinetic energy of a ten-centimeter object traveling at 30.500 kilometers).000 The gravitational pull of the Earth continues to weaken. Medium-Earth 1.000 The gravity of the Earth.000–300. while that of the Moon and the Sun increases.000 kilometers. satellites. 500–1.786 kilometers. Solar winds increase (with particle speeds ranging from 300–600 km/s during solar lulls up to 2.500 Gas diffusion makes a smaller impact on the spacecraft (almost none at 1. where these effects sharply decrease.000 kilometers from the center of its mass). reaching a peak at an altitude of 20. 2005).000 The force of Earth’s gravitational perturbation weakens.500–5. but the spacecraft does encounter the composite disturbance forces of the Earth. 5. 450.000–40.000 kilome- ters. Physical and Spatial Characteristics of Earth Orbits TyPE OF diSTAnCE FROm PhySiCAl-SPATiAl FACTORS AFFECTing A ORbiT ThE SURFACE OF SPACECRAFT ThE EARTh (km) Low-Earth 100–500 The spacecraft is slowed by the diffusion of light gases orbits in the atmosphere. O voennoy kosmonavtike [On Military Cosmonautics] (Moscow: SIP RIA.000–450. A. High-level radioactivity poses a danger to the spacecraft and its crew (in case of manned flights). and debris fragments (40 percent).and high-Earth orbits) have been cataloged. Geostationary orbit ends at an altitude of 35. and two points in the Earth-Moon-Sun sys- tem (libration points). Source: M. although spacecraft can be damaged by even smaller objects. spent orbital stages. and Sun.Table 3. No radiation belts are present.000 The spacecraft encounters a strong disturbance force from the Moon (its gravitational pull reaches out 65. objects associated with mission programs (53 percent). The influ- ence of the Earth’s outer radiation belt grows.000 The effects of the Earth’s inner radiation belt escalate orbits until the spacecraft reaches an altitude of 3. Moon. 34–35.12 Only objects ten centimeters in radius (in low earth orbit) or greater (in medium. High-Earth 40.000 km/s during solar flares).

km Low-Earth orbits (circular) 100–1. Passive defensive equipment (such as shields or other devices) serve to protect spacecraft only from the smallest objects.500 Telecommunications Imaging Navigation Radio intelligence Meteorology Medium-Earth orbits 19. “Satellites and Antisatellites: The Limits of the Possible.000 Navigation Missile warning systems Radio intelligence Telecommunications Sources: A. managing ed. 9. 190–196. semi-synchronous) Imaging Telecommunications Geostationary orbit 35. The saturation of orbits with satellites operating in either the same band or in adjacent bands leads to radio interfer- ence and radio signal overlap. 48–67.000 Navigation (circular. D.org. has helped to define the technical aspects of how the military uses orbits (Table 4). Space Security (Waterloo: spacesecurity. Operational Military Use of Orbits ORbiTS diSTAnCE FROm USE (ChARACTERiSTiCS) ThE SURFACE OF ThE EARTh. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment. B. 2001).786 Missile warning systems Radio intelligence Telecommunications High-Earth orbits (elliptical) 450. no. 4 (Spring 1986).orbit is equivalent to that of a 35-ton truck driving at 190 km/h. J. Table 4..000–20. West.000–930. The choice of orbit has been determined by whatever conditions favor the effective 8 FEATURES OF ThE OUTER SPACE EnviROnmEnT . 2008). The above data show that the current level of technological development has allowed the military to actively use any orbit for conducting its missions. first and foremost in the USSR/Russia and the United States.13 The specific nature of orbits and dynamics of space-program development. B.” International Security 10. Another equipment-source factor negatively affecting satellite performance is radio interference. Carte. Watts.

while this task is much simpler for countries like the United States and France.17 The spacecraft occupying these orbits are specialized according to the most active fields of space PETR TOPyChkAnOv 9 . into geostationary orbit. 52° west longitude). 5° north latitude. where the U. it would need to add 11 km/s to change its inclination angle by 90°. To place a satellite in geostationary orbit from the Baikonur Space Center in Kazakhstan. The angle of inclination for the primary orbit must not be less than the geographic latitude of the launch location. for example. would require more energy than it does from Cape Canaveral.S. while that of the second is 692 tons.14 Hence.S. can place 20 percent more payload into geostationary orbit than can a similar vehicle launched from Russia’s Baikonur Space Center (46° north latitude. Russia needs to use more powerful launch vehicles to reach that orbit. For this reason. while a spacecraft would only have to increase its acceleration by 4 km/s in order to change from an orbit of 400 kilometers to one of 36. respectively. 63° east longitude). 10 percent into high-altitude elliptical orbits or interplanetary trajectories. for example. Russian spacecraft must execute complicated maneuvers with significant orbital adjustments in order to deploy into geostationary orbit. and 6 percent into medium orbit. so the geographic latitude of the carrier’s launch site will limit the choice of orbits that can be used for placing a payload in orbit. 36 percent into low orbit. 48 percent have been deployed into geosta- tionary orbit. heavy Angara space vehicle).9-ton loads.16 The following data describe human activity in “near space” in the most general terms: of 900 operating spacecraft.and 4. the military uses low and medium orbits for imaging. inclined orbits—including polar ones—as well as high- altitude elliptical orbits provide a more accessible option for Russia.8. The laws of space dynamics state that the plane of a near-Earth orbit (as well as the plane of a ballistic missile’s trajectory) will always pass through the center of the Earth. While equatorial orbits—including geostationary ones—offer a fully accessible and attractive option for the United States (the majority of its territory rests between 25° and 49° north latitude).000 kilometers. approaches to outer space utili- zation illustrates the importance of geography in the process of orbit selection. while deploying missile attack and nuclear detonation warning systems in geostationary and high-Earth orbits. which can place 4. Kennedy Space Center is located.15 A vehicle launched from France’s Kourou Space Center (French Guiana. the Euro- pean Ariane 4 and the Russian Proton-K. A comparison between the Russian and U. differ substantially in weight: the launch weight of the first vehicle is 470 tons.completion of these missions. Thus. Thus. Alteration of the orbital inclination requires far more complex and energy-intensive maneuvers to achieve than alteration of orbital altitude or shape. which territory stretches between 41° and 81° north latitude. Consequently. This factor becomes even more significant when the spacecraft reaches orbit onboard a launch vehicle originating from Russia’s north- ern space center at Plesetsk (which is why the country spent many years creating the special.

During the Cold War. factors. and smaller still for space systems. Table 5. It may encompass land. less than 100 of the approximately 1. plans for creating a European Rapid Reaction Force call for only 60. Thus. and space (sometimes air and outer space are combined into aerospace). navigation (medium orbits). Strategic Air Command 10 FEATURES OF ThE OUTER SPACE EnviROnmEnT .000 people (30 percent) being scheduled for deployment in combat as needed. sea. sur- face.18 OUTER SPACE AS A SPhERE OF miliTARy OPERATiOnS A sphere of military operations is defined as the environment.20 How each of these spheres of military operations can be used for conducting specific military missions can be seen from comparative evaluation of a number of parameters (Table 5). and missile warning systems (high-altitude elliptical and geostationary orbits). sea. 2 – of low value for military operations. As Table 5 shows. the United States kept about 50 to 60 percent of its strategic sea-based missile forces on combat alert.S.activity: telecommunications and meteorology (geostationary and low orbits). and conditions that must be taken into consideration for the successful application of force or execution of a particular military mission. underground.500 heavy and medium strategic bombers in the U.19 Spheres of military operations would include a country’s own armed forces. air. 3 – of high value for military operations. smaller for air. and air object imaging (low orbits). PAylOAd EFFECT miliTARy FORCE & lOgiSTiCAl nESS PORTiOn OF lOCAl OPERATiOnS RESOURCE SUPPORT OF TOTAl TERRAin USE mASS Ground 3 3 2–3 3 4 Sea 3 2 3–4 4 3 Air 2 4 2 2 2 Space 1 1 1 1 1 Note: Figures indicate the following: 1 – of lowest value for military operations. thus. 4 – of highest value for military operations.000 of a total force of 200. the amount of forces and resources that could be involved in military missions at any particular time is greatest for ground and naval forces. as well as allied and hostile forces and their equipment. 70 of the approximately 100 Russian spacecraft perform purely military or military and civilian missions. hypothetical military actions utilizing the four spheres of military operations vary sharply across certain key parameters. most spacecraft are deployed on either military or dual- use missions. rather than among the other three. with the greatest disparity existing between space operations and the traditional spheres. For example. At the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. Comparative Evaluation of Certain Parameters of Spheres of Military Operations SPhERE OF SPECiFiC AmOUnT OF COvERT. At the same time. including the informational environment within areas of military activity and other zones of significance.

could be maintained on air patrol at any one time. or to strike surface targets). and so on). ground forces require less support. However. Since spacecraft orbit the Earth as the Earth rotates on its axis. and other resources and materials onboard. due to the pre- dictability of their orbital position. especially those placed in high orbits or orbits at reduced angles of inclination. spare parts. munitions. While the field of view of Earth increases at higher orbits and the so-called “absence factor” declines. Spacecraft now carry their own fuel supply for orbital maneuvering. In terms of the ratio of mission-critical payload weight to total weight. the energy intensity (and expense) associated with delivering payloads to and from orbit are high. Spacecraft have the least favorable ratio of mission-critical pay- load to total weight (as noted above. the distance to the target is correspondingly greater. and the weight and size restrictions on the spacecraft are severe. their payloads may make up only about two to three percent of total weight deployed in low orbit and less than one percent PETR TOPyChkAnOv 11 . which would require that the United States increase its current orbital payload capabili- ties by a factor of five to ten. ground forces are typi- cally less covert. A spacecraft’s reliance on the “rear” is reduced to receiv- ing commands from its control center and transmitting information to users. any single location on Earth will be beyond the reach of a low-orbit spacecraft most of the time (see Table 2). Yet another characteristic traditionally seen as vital to the effectiveness of force and resource utilization is the extent of operational covertness. The navy (especially the submarine arm) enjoys the greatest degree of covertness. meaning that both the time and the potential energy required to hit a tar- get increase (this relates to directed-energy weapons). for example. By contrast. the extreme difficulty of concealing them. provisions. Independent American scientists have calculated that in order to intercept a single Iranian liquid fueled ballistic missile. it is by no means always possible to distinguish military satellites from civilian ones. the launch of an orbital spacecraft (except for manned space stations) requires no additional supplies (such as fuel and lubrication materials.600 of its Brilliant Pebbles space interceptors in 300-kilometer orbits with a total mass of 2. navy ships place highest (and on the whole have the fewest limitations). This ratio is less favorable for the military equipment of ground forces. and even less for air forces. and the navy less still. and air forces are even less so (with the exception of helicopters and stealth aircraft). where the laws of space dynamics strictly dictate how spacecraft can be used (to intercept interconti- nental ballistic missiles [ICBMs]. the United States would need some 1. As noted above. especially as few countries are able to monitor outer space and identify space objects. it requires much less logistical and administrative support than the forces and resources used in other spheres of military operations. The fewest resources at any particular time were available for missions in space.21 Another significant distinction is that once a spacecraft has entered orbit. and the openness of space to radar and electro-optical surveillance. Air forces require the greatest degree of support. It is much easier to detect spacecraft in space. their own sources of power.000 tons.

control. as well as the facili- ties for the launch. Only the largest countries can deploy complex space systems for military missions. and disadvantages (Table 6). the critical factors for spacecraft are the gravitational and radiation fields of the Earth and other celestial bodies. This ratio means that space activity is extremely expensive: it costs around 20.000 kilometers.000 to 450. affecting naval forces to a much lesser degree.in high orbit).000 kilometers. Compared to other spheres of military operations. as well as for ballistic missiles and ballistic missile defenses (BMD) that are not based in space. even less so (except for helicopters). at present only military/logistic. in the case of complex spy satellites)—as well as the cost of operating and using the spacecraft (or a spacecraft constellation). Terrain and other surface features have always played an enormous—at times decisive—role in military operations. and support of spacecraft. Still.22 and it becomes obvious that military access to outer space is available only to those countries that can provide substantial long-term financing. The unique characteristics of this “space terrain” demand a unique approach for spacecraft operation and application. These factors in their traditional form have absolutely no effect on spacecraft (except for the presence of cloud cover. each featuring its own set of objectives. advantages. Add to this the cost of the spacecraft itself—which varies between 15 and 20 million USD for a mini-satellite and goes up to 100 million USD for a typical civilian one (or even billions of dollars. where weather conditions play the deciding role.000 USD (in 1990s prices) to place one kilogram of payload into low orbit. The latter includes an area of outer space that would range from 300. Current systems provide support for the following types of missions in space: 12 FEATURES OF ThE OUTER SPACE EnviROnmEnT . and scientific missions are being planned. Clearly. and the precessional braking that low-orbital objects experience. commercial. the use of outer space currently is confined mostly to near-space. This is why up to the present time spacecraft have been pri- marily engaged in providing the armed forces with information support for pursu- ing activities within the three traditional spheres of military operations. space imposes the greatest number of limitations. The military operations sphere is composed of such features as theater or region of military operations and operational zones (the terms “sphere” and “theater” of military operations are sometimes used interchangeably). Thus. This sector is still unexplored and undeveloped as part of the sphere of military operations. Some experts divide outer space into two potential theaters of military operations (TMO): near-Earth and near-lunar. which makes it more difficult to obtain photographic intelligence). in addition to the influence of equipment-related factors. and aviation. terrain has the greatest impact on ground troops and forces. due to the degree of difficulty associated with the development and use of outer space.23 The near-Earth TMO may be divided into three zones of operation. The first TMO—near-Earth—includes near-Earth space from an altitude of 100 to 40. As previously noted. located both on land and at sea.

40.” Bol- shaya Kosmicheskaya Entsiklopediya. “Kosmos i natsionalnaya bezopasnost [Space and National Security]. topo. of a geostationary time required for operation 40. communi. http://kosmos. and meteorology). launching space. need for striking ground tar.• overview of military and strategic situation. A. Duration of a Higher energy zone of 20. combat orbit. • implementation of global systems of interference-safe communication and mili- tary command. lower maneu. low of spacecraft to level of emissions maintain constant during information Earth surveillance warfare Middle 2.claw. craft.000 communications. Zones of Operation in a Potential Near-Earth TMO ZOnE OF AlTiTUdE ACTUAl nATURE AdvAnTAgES OF diSAdvAnTAgES OPERATiOn RAngE. Minimum energy Relatively high zone of 2.html. • observation of compliance with international treaties and agreements on reduc- tions in arms and forces. • observation of the use of nuclear weapons and environmental conditions in combat areas. PETR TOPyChkAnOv 13 . spacecraft required to reach their ligence support to survey the Earth surface targets (30%) Sources: M. potential non- control. and early warning of war prepara- tions and the initiation of military operations. highly efficient vering. Borchev. relaying.000– Navigation. expenditure for energy expendi- operation navigation.000 reconnaissance spacecraft’s orbit expenditure operation (10%) increases at higher to launch altitudes. relatively ing. possibility spacecraft. ground-based highly effective in systems. meteorology for surveying Earth. longer Far zone of 20.000– MWS. O voennoy kosmonavtike [On Military Cosmonautics] (Moscow: SIP RIA. OF miSSiOnS (AS ZOnE OF ZOnE km A PERCEnTAgE OF All miliTARy miSSiOnS) Near 100– Reconnaissance. high susceptibility (60%) relative ease of to detection and detecting missiles interception by and spacecraft. vering cost.000 cations. topographic and geodetic surveying. and • observation of the results of strikes against strategic objects and targets. cartography. a large number gets from space. 2005). ture for maneu- graphical survey.ru/shared/231. Table 6. navigation. fewer beam weapons geophysical intel. • information support for armed forces (reconnaissance.

“Kosmicheskiye apparaty” [Space Vehicles].htm. Oborona. 12. Kuryer. 3 “Legal Aspects of Reconnaissance in Airspace and Outer Space. for example. T. Watts. the Safety of Space Objects With Nuclear Power Sources on Board and Problems Relating to Their Collision With Space Debris (New York: United Nations. no.” Nats. “Verny Sputnik.. 1982). Meshcheryakov. 19. http://search. “Kosmichesky perekhvat udalsya: Amerika beret na pritsel okolozemnoe prostranstvo” [“The Pursuit of Outer Space Has Succeeded: America Puts Near-Earth Outer Space in Its Sights”]. 39. no. West.S. 40–41. V. ed.” Articles II. 9 UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. S. Bubnov and L. E. 2008). 4 B. Wright. 10 UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 11 V. The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts & Sciences. Space Security (Waterloo: spacesecurity. 2002). 16 Ibid. 15. United Nations Trea- ties and Principles on Outer Space (New York: United Nations. Bratya-Slavyane. Grego. Kelso. Voyen. 2008). P. Department of Defense. 8–9. L.. 5 A. 6 I. 6 (June 1961). articles written by the Russian minister of defense between 2001 and 2007: S. American Style: The Creation of an Aerospace Defense System Is the Only Way to Contain Aggression from Space].ru/forces/2008-02-29/1_perehvat. 273 (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology. Defense Technical Information Center. 7. 50. 15 D. Kamanin. December 2006). no. 1964).” Orbital Debris Quart. 1996). “Vooruzhenniye Sily Rossii i ee geopoliticheskiye prioritety” [Russia’s Armed Forces and Their Geoplitical Priorities]. Belyakov. 6–7. D.” Columbia Law Review 61. Rossiya v Glob. Technical Report on Space Debris: Text of the Report Adopted by the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (New York: United Nations.ng. 2001). 12 “Satellite Box Score. Myasnikov.org. and L. “Battlespace. Obitaemye Kosmicheskiye Stantsii [Manned Space Sta- tions] (Moscow: Voyenizdat. “Sezon okhoty’ po-amerikanski: sozdaniye sistemy VKO edinstvenny sposob sderzhivaniya agressii iz kosmosa” [Hunting Season. 7. National Research on Space Debris.” Postnote. in Sovetskaya voennaya entsiklopedia [The Soviet Military Encyclopedia]. but this results in a corresponding loss of momentum from the Earth’s rotation.com/columns/v04n07. 2005). 382–387. ed. M. Khantseverov. http://www. and F. as well as interviews with Russian Air Force chief Anatoly Kornukov published between 1998 and 2002: O. Palagin. 1. 4. 1 (January–February 2004). 1999).Notes 1 Kosmonavtika: Entsiklopediya [Cosmonautics: Encyclopedia] (Moscow: Sov. 1985). 7 (28) (July 2008). 18 A.astronaut.html.078–1. 14 FEATURES OF ThE OUTER SPACE EnviROnmEnT .” Encyclopædia Britannica Online.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/b/00680. 19 See. 7 I. 38–51. 8 Bhupendra Jasani. N. 2008). February 29–March 6. http://nvo. Obozreniye. no. Ivanov. 2008. 49 (265) (December 17–23. 13 J. 2 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.. 14 The inclination angle may be greater.celestrak. 2. including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. “Military Use of Space. http://www. Falichev. eb/article-208385. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment.086. Nezavisimoye Voyen. “Space Exploration. no. Entsiklopedia. “Basics of the Geostationary Orbit. which adds to the launch vehicle’s total energy.” http:// www. issue 4 (October 2008). IV.” Satellite Times (May 1998). R. Politike. News 12. Outer Space—A New Dimension of the Arms Race (London: SIPRI. 79–80.dtic. N.. vol.ru/bookcase/books/kamanin5/ text/010. 20 U.html.-Prom. 17 Ibid. B. Borisov. Gronlund. 1. V mire kosmonavtiki [In the World of Cosmonautics] (Nizhny Novgorod: Russkiy Kupets.

60–61. XXXVII–XXXVIII. 39–41. 2003). A. PETR TOPyChkAnOv 15 . 2008).21 Boost-Phase Intercept System for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues (College Park: American Physical Society Study Group. Steinbruner. O voennoy kosmonavtike [On Military Cosmonautics] (Moscow: SIP RIA. Borchev. Gallagher and J. 2005). 22 N. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security (Cam- bridge: American Academy of Arts & Sciences. D. 23 M.

02 ThE PEACEFUl And miliTARy dEvElOPmEnT OF SPACE A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE vAlERy bAbinTSEv .

Tikhonravov. and • obtain data on the upper layers of the atmosphere and test the systems required for high-altitude capsules (release. descent. This project (known as VR-190) was intended to perform the following missions: • study the effects of weightlessness on humans in a pressurized cabin during the brief free flight.EARly STAgES Practical space activity is said to have begun on October 4. 1957. an event preceded by many years of research by teams of scientists and engineers headed by Sergey P. landing. stabilization. with the Soviet Union’s launch of the world’s first artificial earth satellite from its Baikonur Space Center. • study the behavior of the capsule’s center of mass and the movement of the capsule around its center of mass upon separation from the launch vehicle. Tikhonravov assembled a group of Rocket Propulsion Research Institute experts to develop the design of a manned high-altitude rocket-propelled vehicle (carrying a capsule with two cosmonauts) for conduct- ing upper-atmosphere research. vAlERy bAbinTSEv 17 . It was decided that the project would be based on the use of a single-stage liquid-fuel rocket capable of reaching an altitude of 200 kilometers in vertical flight. Korolev and Mikhail K. Back in early 1945. and so on).

1958. 1958. by a second satellite placed into a higher orbit. The U. The world’s first manned spacecraft. and an explosive bolt separation system. During the test phase of this ICBM. who 18 ThE PEACEFUl And miliTARy dEvElOPmEnT OF SPACE . 1959. Cosmonaut Gherman Titov followed on August 6 in Vostok-2. with 1964 seeing the inception of multiple-man crews in space flight. with Yuri Gagarin aboard. space program was headed by Wernher von Braun. and • a system for stabilizing capsules in extra-atmospheric flight using low- thrust jets. 1961. It must be noted that the first steps of Soviet and U. On January 2. space exploration began with the launch of the Explorer-1 satellite on Febru- ary 1. a retrorocket for soft landings.S. It also had more sophisticated onboard equipment and carried a test animal. was launched on May 15. The uncompromising rivalry between the USSR and the United States made outer space development an exceptionally fast-paced affair. which had a launch weight of 280 tons. the Soviet Union decided to build the R-7 ICBM based on the rocket packet configuration proposed by Tikhonravov. Nine spacecraft were suc- cessfully sent to the Moon between 1966 and 1970. In 1953. and a non-ejection pressurized cabin equipped with a life support system.000 kilometers above the surface of the Moon. It was used to support a program of near-earth space exploration that was considered ambitious for the time. space exploration were accompanied by a considerable number of fatalities and accidents during launch. An interplanetary craft launched on October 4. he had demonstrated the feasibility of achiev- ing the first cosmic velocity and launching artificial earth satellites (AES) using the rocket technology under development in the country at the time. Tikhonravov and his team began developing the idea for a rocket design in 1947. Four more manned craft were launched between 1962 and 1963.S. The first very simple satellite was followed on November 3. Vostok-1. an improved R-7 launch vehicle placed an interplanetary craft on a lunar flight path. was launched on April 12. preparations were already under way to use it as a spacecraft launch vehicle. and stayed in orbit for 691 days.000 to 6. U. passing within some 5. with two of them making soft landings on the surface. circled the Moon and transmitted a television signal to earth with images of its back side.S. weighing 1. 1959.The VR-190 project offered some revolutionary innovations that have since been incorporated into modern satellites: • a parachute system for descent. The third AES.327 kilograms. It remained in orbit for 160 days (the first AES stayed in orbit for 92 days). By the late 1940s and the early 1950s. 1957. • an electric contact probe for timing the ignition of the soft-landing engine. Another launch on September 14 landed a spacecraft on the surface of the Moon for the first time.

which in 1965 used a French-made Diamant-1 vehicle to launch the country’s A-1 spacecraft.S. with Neil Armstrong and Edwin (Buzz) Aldrin becoming the first humans ever to walk on its surface. navigation. successes prompted other countries to accelerate their own space programs. relay.S. television broadcasting. and whose crowning achievement came with the production. This flight marked the inception of the inter- national programs that developed successfully over the last quarter of the twenti- eth century. If the margin of error for AES orbital launches in 1957–1958 was measured in dozens of kilometers. Upon coming to the United States. vehicles launched the first British Ariel-1 spacecraft (1962). These countries also began to develop their own launch vehicles. and the transition to high-speed data lines. and images of Saturn in 1980 from some 1. Launch vehicle and spacecraft control system capabilities also improved substan- tially.before 1945 had been one of the leading missile technology specialists in Ger- many. vAlERy bAbinTSEv 19 . when U. This achievement was made possible thanks to the Saturn launch vehicle developed under the lead- ership of von Braun for the Apollo program in 1964–1967. by the mid-1960s control system precision was already high enough that a spacecraft launched to the Moon could land within just five kilometers of its designated touch-down spot. government made strenuous efforts to lead the space race and occa- sionally succeeded: in 1964.S. The first Soviet and U. the first Canadian Alouette-1 spacecraft (1962). launch. The U. U. the Atlas launch vehicle placed into orbit the Mercury spacecraft manned by John Glenn. A new stage in space development was achieved with the Apollo-Soyuz test flight project. Its greatest success came in 1969. astronauts landed on the Moon in the Apollo-11 spacecraft. The immense scientific and technical problem of maneuvering for rendezvous and docking were resolved in 1967 with the automatic docking of two unmanned artificial earth satellites (Kosmos-186 and Kosmos-188). Later. 1962. images of Mars were suc- cessfully transmitted to earth as early as 1965 over distances exceeding 200 million kilometers. the final phase of which entailed launching and docking the Soyuz and Apollo spacecraft in orbit in July 1975. which was used to launch the Explorer-1. the United States placed the first spacecraft into geo- stationary orbit. and orbital assembly of the International Space Station. France also developed the Ariane family of launch vehicles that are some of the most cost-effective to date. which quickly led to the establishment of the first orbital station (USSR) and the optimization of the flight procedures necessary for sending spacecraft to the Moon that culminated in humans setting foot on its surface (United States).S. The greatest success in this field was achieved by France. Due to the progress made in space communications. On February 20. and the first Italian San Marco spacecraft (1964).5 billion kilometers away. he used the Redstone ballistic missile as the basis for creating the Jupiter-C launch vehicle.

There has also been a qualitative shift in the way manned missions are conducted. metallurgy of high-strength and heat-resistant materials and the chemistry of propellants. One of the first experiments in space was devoted to earth photography. first launched in April 1981. military hardware—and so on without satellite navigation systems. which demonstrated just how much information space observation can offer for the discovery and rational utilization of natural resources. the orbiter was nonetheless unquestionably a major stride forward in the exploration of space. The broad use of new mathematical approaches and the introduction of advanced computers helped to solve such complex problems as the design of spacecraft orbits and their control in flight. and plasma technologies. space technology was the cre- ation of a reusable aerodynamic orbiter (the Space Shuttle). Systems were 20 ThE PEACEFUl And miliTARy dEvElOPmEnT OF SPACE . For example. which in turn spawned the new scientific discipline of space flight dynamics.S. SCiEnCE. powerful liquid-fuel rocket engines were developed. but has also become increasingly profitable with time. It is difficult to imagine modern forms of transportation—cargo ships. SPACE. Grappling with the problems that arose during preparation for and execution of space flights also led to intense progress in celestial and theoretical mechan- ics. Satellite constellations can be monitored and controlled from a single location on earth through the use of relay systems. and it thus was unable to meet the original economic performance expecta- tions. as well as mea- surement. An important milestone was the transition from launching individual spacecraft to the establishment of multiple-satellite systems in space to perform a wide variety of missions (including missions for socioeconomic and scientific purposes) and to the integration of the space industries of a number of countries. as well as for the socioeconomic sector. in order to allow launch vehicles to reach the speeds necessary for space. This form of communications has proven to be not only the most reliable. civil aviation. theo- ries of heat transfer and the strength of materials. vacuum. Although not all of the potential of its multi-use capability was ever fully real- ized. The development of these launch vehicles and liquid-fuel rocket engines advanced knowledge about thermo-. The 1980s and 1990s saw examples of humans living and working in weightless environments for periods of greater than one year. hydro-. Commercial satellite communica- tions systems cover almost every country on earth and allow for immediate two- way telephone communications with any party. And nATiOnAl ECOnOmiES The developments in astronautics proved highly beneficial for other scientific fields. and gas dynamics. Soviet cosmonauts first demonstrated the feasibility of functioning outside a space- craft in the 1960s and 1970s.A major achievement in the development of U.

and photographic and optical electronic scanning of the earth’s surface. including the side not visible from earth. The unmanned spacecraft sent to other planets have essentially been little more than robots controlled by radio command from earth. Orbital equipment provides a unique ability to globally monitor environmental con- ditions on earth and the state of its natural resources. shape. and clarified the finer details of its shape and mag- netic field. The engineering required to complete various space research missions―from the launch of artificial earth satellites. and operation of highly complex space systems have also made major contributions to the development of advanced technology. environmental monitor- ing. The design. the study of which also broadened the knowledge of the interaction between the earth and the charged particles emanating from the sun. and readings in other bands of the spectrum with a high degree of periodic- ity. and orbit of the Moon. Artificial satellites have been useful in obtaining more precise data about the mass. solar storms. Automated space probes have yielded additional information on the shape and gravitational field of the earth. and meteor showers. The masses of Venus and Mars were more accurately estimated through the observation of spacecraft flight path behavior. vAlERy bAbinTSEv 21 . Space imagery has proven effective in observing crop development. espe- cially those that apply to large regions. Space exploration requires the fabrication of complex automated machines that can meet the strict limits imposed by launch vehicle payload carrying capacity and conditions in outer space.successfully developed for natural resource research. and this has led to the rapid development of both automation and microelectronics. Nearly every country in the world nowadays relies on weather data obtained from space. and the Lunokhod-1 and Lunokhod-2 rovers were deployed on the surface. These weather satellites form the basis for real-time weather forecasts. Earth satellites together with atmospheric rocket probes have helped to collect detailed data on near-Earth space. detecting plant diseases. and measuring soil factors and water conditions. that radiation belts were discovered. production. and the need to develop reliable systems capable of performing such tasks has advanced our understanding of complex technical systems. to the launch of interplanetary spacecraft and manned vehicles and stations also yielded a wealth of priceless information about our solar system. at resolutions considerably superior to those producible with ground equipment. Orbital geodesic surveys are especially important for natural resource mapping. The advancement of space technology has made it possible to establish space- based meteorological service systems that can provide images of the earth’s cloud cover. for example. Interplanetary space flights do much to increase our understanding of the nature of many planetary phenomena. such as solar winds. Spacecraft sent to the moon transmitted back images of the Moon’s surface. It was with the help of the first artificial satellites. Samples were taken of the lunar soil.

The first experimental reconnais- 22 ThE PEACEFUl And miliTARy dEvElOPmEnT OF SPACE . and enhanced environmental monitor- ing of land and sea. as well as orbital complexes for radio and electronic intelligence. near-Earth space had been filled with tens of thousands of man-made objects. This pollution results mainly from the imperfect launch technologies still in use today. Over ten satellites of this type were launched in the succeeding two years. as well as for communications. space communications systems. and navigation. and the lower atmosphere. however. brings about ecological problems just as it monitors them. oceans. the ratio- nal utilization of the Earth’s natural resources. In 1966–1976. espe- cially since the beginning of widespread Internet availability. SPACE And miliTARy ACTiviTiES The development of astronautics in countries around the world has been closely associated with national defense. Efforts toward the creation of a space-based missile early-warning system were also initiated at that time. polluting our land. The equipment used in space has played a defining role in the establishment of unified information technology for maintaining global telecommunications. By the beginning of the twenty-first century. and first used them for conducting photographic and radio reconnaissance.Space activity. radar intelligence. with four experimental satellites launched in 1972–1976. ushered in a new stage of military activities in space. There will soon be a pollution challenge in near-Earth space to add to the already acute problem of environmental pollution on Earth. the Internet will continue to develop the use of high-speed broadband space-based communications channels. In the future. alignment. This is not coincidental: the equipment required to deliver spacecraft to orbit was based on military rockets manufactured by defense contractors under order by the armed forces. The development and use of space systems in the United States began at the same time and proceeded along similar lines. including spacecraft and frag- ments of such. which naturally conceived of satellites in terms of pursuing military goals. The Soviet Union’s 1961 launch of the Zenit-2 photo-reconnaissance satellite. and geodesic survey support. improved photo-reconnaissance spacecraft of this same Zenit series. geodesic survey support. after which the first orbital complex entered service. meteorological observation. The acceleration of activity in space places increasing stress on the environment. the first spacecraft to be exclusively devoted to military missions. These ends will require the introduction of manned spacecraft capable of not only near-Earth orbital flight but also of flights to other planets. entered service. navigation. Such problems present a unique platform for joint efforts between scientists and engineers around the world. Manned spaceflight is a crucial tool for the further development of science.

the Ferret spacecraft was used for electronic intelligence. and weather support systems also continued to improve rapidly. During this same period. During the 1960s. the Skor and Syncom satellites were developed for com- munications. The subsequent transi- tion to a new generation of orbital systems and complexes that had significantly longer service lives and improved on-board equipment and data delivery systems represented a qualitative leap forward in the military use of orbital systems. 1959. and the Tiros satellite was launched to collect weather information. which used a large antenna to intercept European radio communications. navigation. The first large-scale practical use of orbital systems in vAlERy bAbinTSEv 23 . The Rhyolite satellite. and the first satellites appeared from such countries as Britain and Canada. The deployment of permanent satellite systems and complexes in orbital constel- lations to achieve a variety of purposes improved information support for the activi- ties of the armed forces. Figure 1. Discovery-1. The Almaz military orbital space station assembly shop In the 1970s the more sophisticated LASP series of reconnaissance spacecraft. Orbital communication. Particular importance was attached to space-based missile launch early-warning systems and Earth-based nuclear detonation detection systems. the Samos series of space- craft was used to carry out imagery intelligence. was launched on February 28. due to the short service life of satellites orbiting at lower altitudes. the total number of satellite constellations continued to remain low. Notwithstanding the numerous orbital systems that were introduced at the time. capable of greater surveillance detail and having a wide visibility field. This series of spacecraft was used to develop the equipment and techniques needed for con- ducting reconnaissance from orbit. and the scope of the tasks performed by orbital systems expanded considerably.sance satellite. a communications system was also deployed in geosta- tionary orbit. was placed into geostationary orbit for the first time. were devel- oped and introduced into service. as did missile attack early warning systems.

assessments of enemy target damage. Over the course of this conflict. Of predominant importance in obtaining intelligence from space were the capa- bilities of the United States. and meteoro- logical support. which became something of a testing ground for new types of weapons and military equipment. and geodesic surveys. when coalition forces relied on orbital resources throughout the operation. the space command was primarily responsible for intel- ligence and communications.” Space systems were even more extensively used throughout the operations in the former Yugoslavia for planning missile strikes and bombing runs. which helped to identify nearly all of the enemy’s ground force emplacements. According to publicly accessible sources. the satellite constellation during the war comprised 50 to 59 military spacecraft having a variety of mission goals. such as investigating the possibility of using data from the space-based IMEWS ballistic missile launch early-warning system to improve the tactical effectiveness of the Patriot missile defense systems. The coalition command made extensive use of satellite communications systems to establish contact with units down to the tactical level. and meteorological support. navigational. missile elements and units. These naturally included orbital systems. geodesic survey. which by the start of combat operations had deployed a constellation of 29 satellites. The space-based navigation system was considered particularly important. topological. The early deployment of the satellite constellation made these capabilities available. The great importance of military orbital systems to coalition operations in the Persian Gulf conflict stimulated the development of new techniques for their tac- tical application in combat. were developed for the orbital reconnaissance systems. and took full advantage of the NAVSTAR global positioning system’s navigation field to improve the accuracy of aircraft attacks at night and to make flight corrections in the trajectories of cruise and air-launched missiles. Experts have called the Persian Gulf War “the first space war of our era. performing damage assessment. as well as missile launch early-warning satellites.support of combat operations came during the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf. new tactical applications. Weather reports based on data from orbit were used to prepare and modify aircraft flight plans. using various military and commercial surveillance satellites and communications. and other militarily or economically important targets with a high degree of confidence. 24 ThE PEACEFUl And miliTARy dEvElOPmEnT OF SPACE . and providing topological. 28 satellites in the NAVSTAR system. navigation and meteoro- logical spacecraft. An impressive amount of satellite data was used during the 2003 Iraq war. and a large number of commercial communications and remote Earth-sensing satellites. as the information it provided allowed precision-guided weapons to be used around the clock and under all weather conditions. aircraft bases. During combat operations.

The Air Force would coordinate its bombing mis- sions to make sure that the Global Positioning System satellites were optimally situated above the battlefield. In addition.S. Integrated space. The concept of joint temporally and spatially coordinated operations using reconnaissance and combat aircraft and vAlERy bAbinTSEv 25 . and land reconnaissance and targeting system The United States began preparing for the use of its orbital resources long before the invasion. Recent research and the experience gained from military conflicts. The U. air.Figure 2. Air Force Space Command to assign well-prepared specialists to traditional joint command posts. have enabled the United States to lay the foundation for integrated inter-services reconnaissance and weapons systems. thus enabling the U. to obtain weather and target imaging data. Space Command experts kept the staffs of the various branches of the armed forces informed about current capabilities and other possibilities for integrating both military and commercial orbital systems into combat operations. The Department of Defense attached particular impor- tance to training highly qualified military experts who could efficiently accom- plish the operational goals of combat military support.S. in particular. and to make use of satellite communication channels. Space Command was most fully represented by the Combined Air and Space Operations Center at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. which was responsible for the timely coordination of space systems during the planning and execution of military operations.

with each capable of independent operation in accordance with the particular tactical situation. or Iridium satel- lite personal communications networks became widely used for communication among mobile units and even between individual servicemen and their com- manders or with each other. but effective algorithm. nearly all (some 600) of the combat aircraft taking part in the operation were outfitted with precision-guided weapons. NATO created a special unit within its Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to address the use of space sys- tems. Inmarsat. Combat operations in Iraq also underscored the tremen- dous role satellite communications capabilities (utilizing military communications networks and numerous commercial systems) have to play in troop command and control during both the lead-up to and the execution of combat operations. During the conflict in Yugosla- via in 1999. there were only 98 general-purpose tactical aircraft with this ability. revealing target locations in real time.space-based reconnaissance satellites integrated into a single system (Fig. above all with the use of the NAVSTAR system for targeting precision-guided weapons (some data suggest that up to 95 percent of all weapons used in 2003 were of that type. Satellite telephones based on the civilian Globalstar. compared to 7 percent in 1991). thus implementing the “seek and destroy” mission. The target data obtained are then transmitted to troop and weapon command points and/or directly to air strike forces. in order to coordinate its diversified reconnaissance activities and to make optimum use of the information received. 26 ThE PEACEFUl And miliTARy dEvElOPmEnT OF SPACE . which simultaneously under- take additional reconnaissance and attack efforts. This transition to satellite guidance systems resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of aircraft capable of firing precision-guided weapons against ground tar- gets. Orbital surveillance systems (electronic and optical-electronic) scan areas of interest at high rates of view and deliver the collected data quickly. all-weather surveillance from orbit. Diversified systems operate under a rather simple. as well as its capability for providing continuous. in 2003. One is the tactical versatility of the aviation and space components. Space-based navigation systems played a significant role in the second Iraq war. Another is the combat stability of the system due to its multi-level nature. In 1991. Analyses of the use of space systems in local conflicts has definitively confirmed both the need for and the high effectiveness of using so-called space support teams established at different levels of command. dispatching some two dozen mobile field teams to the battlefield to provide air and sea force commanders with satellite information at the tactical level. Such integrated systems have a number of distinguishing features. 2) represents a qualitatively new stage in the development of warfare. Even more significant for the coalition forces was the widespread use of global positioning system data.

military space systems must provide information to the armed forces from orbit in support of their operations. which can be deployed in any class of orbit. productivity. • lower (absolute) cost of orbital deployment. 20 percent in interme- diate orbit. and other NATO countries all have their own military space- craft. the United States. and • greater survivability of spacecraft due to their greater numbers.000 USD per kilogram to manufacture large military spacecraft. which has a mili- tary space program budget that is considerably larger than those of all the other “space-capable” nations combined (about 20 times greater than that of Russia). The technical basis for the above would be the development of small (light) space- craft and launch vehicles. the strategic nature of the tasks they perform. it costs between 88. and other factors. As noted above. rapidity of deployment. Experts cite the following advantages in the use of small spacecraft: • lower costs and shorter development and manufacturing time frames. a transition to a new stage of scientific and tech- nical development characterized by significant electronics miniaturization. that is. and eventually to the individual soldier.000 dollars per kilo- gram for small spacecraft. about 40 percent of all current satellites are active military spacecraft. At the moment. survivability.1 The establishment and deployment of large-scale constellations in near-Earth space. and the introduction of combat-capable space systems may all be seen as preconditions for space to become a new arena for armed conflict. • fewer limitations on the numbers of spacecraft deployed. and 55 percent in high elliptical or geostationary orbit. and • dissemination of information from space through to the lowest levels in the chain of command. periodicity. On the whole. The space systems that will carry out this mission are to be developed along two interrelated directions: • development of space systems according to wartime requirements for reso- lution. Although Russia.000 and 220. About 25 percent of the spacecraft are concentrated in low orbits. but this cost can be reduced to 17. the emergence of space- based systems that are capable of actively engaging individual targets (either destroying or neutralizing them). There are over 150 operational or orbital reserve spacecraft that make up informa- tion-support constellations.The Russian army has also gained a certain amount of positive experience from using space support units to provide pre-strategic and tactical support in combat training exercises. the overwhelming majority belongs to the United States. vAlERy bAbinTSEv 27 .

plus an additional 70 hours after getting the launch order. and fre- quency of launches. These small spacecraft systems would be created and deployed primarily to accomplish tactical goals. In the United States. the United States will pursue the development not only of individual weap- ons systems of various special types. such as providing communications within the theaters of military operations. and carrying out individual experiments. navigation. The ability to transmit information from orbit through to the lowest levels of the chain of command and down to the individual soldier was not possible before the end of the twentieth century. when the first compact intelligent devices appeared and changed the nature of modern warfare. this also makes it possible to launch inexpensive small spacecraft rapidly in times of crisis. inasmuch as the potential that the commercial space industry represents is more effectively utilized by developing small spacecraft systems. • improved stability that comes from using a “distributive” architecture for the orbits of small spacecraft. it still takes seven to eight days to prepare a mobile Taurus vehicle for launch. Under this plan. increased numbers of small spacecraft manufactured. Although light carriers. which launches from an aircraft. including small spacecraft. but also of combat gear that must neces- sarily include support technologies for command (communications). observing movements of enemy forces.Other major advantages of the use of small spacecraft systems include: • greater flexibility that comes from being able to distribute functions that are cur- rently being performed by a single traditional spacecraft among several small satellites. It currently takes up to 60 days to prepare the carrier rockets for launching military satellites into orbit. the use of small spacecraft for military purposes has already entered the practical application phase. • accelerated rate of introduction of the latest technology owing to shortened production time. such as the Pegasus and Taurus class. The United States has been actively developing and using launch vehicles that accelerate the time for putting spacecraft into orbit. the main goal of which is to improve the combat capabilities of the individual soldier. has better time characteristics. in which the loss of one or several satellites of the constellation presents less of an impediment to the pursuit of military goals. and it would be possible to utilize individual elements or even entire systems that have been created for commercial purposes. with the small SSU spacecraft developed for its Naval Ocean Surveillance System satellite program and the MB small space- craft used during the crisis in the Balkans in 1999. and the display of information. receiving data relat- ing to damage assessment. The Pegasus-xL booster. require the least amount of time to deploy. which could be supplemented in the future with 28 ThE PEACEFUl And miliTARy dEvElOPmEnT OF SPACE . • greater reliance on commercial systems. the United States has been implementing a Soldier Modernization Plan. deter- mined only by the speed at which the aircraft reaches the release point. Since 1993.

Their mission objectives would include protection of friendly satellites. the technology also appeared for wag- ing information warfare and non-lethal attacks on humans. The growing importance of space for achieving basic military aims in the twenty- first century may lead to the development and deployment of space-based military systems able to participate in military operations. In the future. A detailed analysis of the problems this involves is presented in the following chapter. vol. and camouflage. provision of unimpeded access to space. systems based on these technologies could be mounted on spacecraft and deliver mass attacks against selected regions. denial of access to space for use by a potential enemy. and disruption of satellite systems. 1. and may culminate in the use of space combat systems to attack ground targets. 2005) vAlERy bAbinTSEv 29 . This would enhance the individual soldier’s ability to carry out combat missions under any conditions and increase his autonomy exponentially as a result. (Moscow: Voennyi Parad. On the eve of the twenty-first century. personal protection. elimination of land-based command centers.weapons control. Note 1 See Voennoy-Promyshlennyi kompleks: Entsiklopediya [The Military-Industrial Complex Encyclopedia].

03 SPACE WEAPOnS PROgRAmS vlAdimiR dvORkin .

Active development of such weapons was begun in the USSR and the United States in the first half of the 1960s. aircraft. air- based. in particular. They can be assigned strike missions against missiles. including a buildup of strategic offensive arms that could desta- bilize the global political and military environment. strike systems using various basing modes and designed against spacecraft and targets in different other environments. or tar- gets on the Earth’s surface or at sea. vlAdimiR dvORkin 31 . A description of space weapons development (foremost in the United States and Russia) fol- lows below. air-based. If activated and pur- sued. and super-high-frequency and kinetic weapons). they could in the foreseeable future trigger both symmetric and asymmetric countermeasures. or sea-based. and conventional munitions delivered to or from orbit. Their development and deployment remains in various stages of implementation. directed energy weapons. and the two nations’ plans were initially similar in content in many ways and focused on establishing land-based. and they can be space-based. In general. space weapons may be classified into three categories: kinetic energy weapons. strategic and tactical antimissile defense systems.The missions and major phases of development of military and dual-use orbital support systems were described in detail in the preceding chapter. and various penetration aids against these defenses. and space-based antisatellite systems armed with various types of weapons (including lasers. satellites. land-based.

000 kilometers. but this never happened. using kinetic kill systems. which had been approved as early as the late 1970s. Experts managed to convince the Soviet leadership that the orbital deployment and testing of such military space systems would trigger a disproportionate military response in outer space by the United States that would be extremely disadvantageous to the USSR. with tests beginning in October of that year. All of the main elements of this complex were built by 1967. The system was intended for destroying especially important hardened spacecraft. and the orbital station was never built. President Ronald Reagan officially announced the pro- gram on March 23. and it was commissioned for military service under the designation IS-M in 1978. especially as Ronald Reagan immediately underscored the complex- ity of the work and his country’s inability to complete it within the century. It did not threaten to diminish the nuclear deterrence potential of the Soviet Union in the near term. Strategic Defense Initia- tive. were related to the creation of the Kaskad and Skif antisatellite orbital stations armed with both missile and laser weapons. This was probably due to political and military reasons rather than techno- logical or financial ones.USSR/RUSSiA ASymmETRiC RESPOnSES The Soviet Union embarked on its IS (satellite interceptor) program in the 1960s. the USSR vowed not to deploy any weapon in space so long as “other countries refrained from deploying any type of antisatellite weapon in space. As the overwhelming majority of all U. with 25 percent of them against real targets. The complex was later mod- ernized and its intercept altitude increased. More than 20 full-scale experiments were conducted in all. secret and public information on nearly all of the developments in this field became available to Moscow well before then.S. The IS complex was accepted for experimental operation in February 1973. and antimissile defense penetration aids had already been conducted with varying degrees of intensity for some 20 years. Although U. based in low orbits. antimissile defenses. However. 32 SPACE WEAPOnS PROgRAmS .3 Development of the Kontakt airborne missile system continued until the early 1990s.” 2 The IS-MU system remained in service until 1993.S. 1982. when President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree ordering its withdrawal. 1983. and Soviet work on space weapons.S. The system’s last test was conducted on June 18. the announcement of this program had a mostly political effect and hindered the nuclear weapons limitation and reduction talks. It was capable of destroying spacecraft at altitudes ranging from 250 to 1. The Soviet Union resumed tests of this antisatellite system (under the designation IS-MU) in April 1980. This system was meant to be carried by the MiG-31 fighter interceptor to destroy spacecraft orbiting at altitudes of up to 600 kilometers. 1968. the testing of the deployed weapons was never completed. due to funding cuts. The largest projects.1 In August 1983. The antisatellite missiles were to be flight- tested in 1985–1986. The first intercept mission was suc- cessfully accomplished on November 1. Work on space weapons in the Soviet Union was accelerated in the early 1980s in response to the launching of the U.

vlAdimiR dvORkin 33 . The number of ballistic missile submarines in the sea was also increased. In 1985.and sea-launched ballistic missiles has continued uninterrupted since the 1960s. This was a function not only of the total number of missiles available in service. the USSR made provisions to increase its total number of launchers from 1. Soviet pilot projects were structured along both symmetrical and asymmetrical lines. has been to saturate its information capabilities and firepower by launching the greatest possible number of missiles. missiles. this work focused primarily on the creation of an effective complex for penetrating BMD systems featuring light. but also of the survivability of the launch- ers and missiles under various strike scenarios. Before the emergence of the Star Wars program. At the same time. Work on penetrating land-based BMD systems with land. intermediate.200 mobile Topol ICBM and Kuryer (small-ICBM) launchers by 2005. It also examined the option of deploying up to 1.In addition. which are less constrained by weight and size limitations than sea-launched missiles and thus are able to use some of their power to carry additional means for protection and BMD system penetration. D-20. the USSR began to develop road. The guiding principle behind BMD defense penetration.S. although this had less to do with countering BMD defenses than it did with the fact that the performance characteristics of many of the vessels prevented their large-scale deployment on combat patrol. and formalized as the SK-1000.398 to nearly 1.S. and heavy false targets. and SP-2000 programs. In preparation for the worst-case scenario. the Soviets focused primarily on developing land-based ICBMs. and high-ranking military authorities immediately began lobbying for its proposals. as well as active signal jamming stations. competent Soviet scientists came to the conclusion rather quickly that the cost of the Star Wars program and of potential Soviet coun- termeasures were not comparable. In order to ensure adequate missile survivability against the steadily improving pre- cision of U. leading to a new generation of ICBMs with enhanced capabilities. which still holds true today. To improve the survivability of missiles in flight. Star Wars program.4 U. the Soviet Union repeatedly undertook to improve the struc- tural hardness of its launch silos. Once this became ineffective. Nevertheless.700 units.S. a set of measures was planned that would increase the total number of launchers and improve their survivability. plans to create orbital weapon systems added new impetus to Soviet efforts to develop asymmetrical methods for overcoming space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. and included a potential deploy- ment of Soviet combat spacecraft and land-based ICBMs. Soviet strategic missile force options were elaborated for the event of a full-scale BMD system deployment by the United States.and rail-mobile missile systems for its Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) even before the U. the announcement of the SDI program proved a powerful incen- tive for the Soviet Union’s influential military-industrial complex.

including the disintegration of the versatile Soviet design corporations and a severe shortage of funds.S. especially those based on asymmetric measures. and as early as 1962 had produced antisatellite interceptors with nuclear warheads on the Nike-Zeus and Thor missiles that were operationally deployed on Johnston Island. BMD system at all levels. There are many reasons why Russia will be unable to implement such large-scale symmetrical and asymmetrical projects in the foreseeable future. some of these projects. This line of research eventually culminated in Russia’s development of the Topol-M land-based and Bulava sea-based missile systems.S.The mobile Topol missile complexes and rail-based mobile missile systems that were initially deployed in the latter half of the 1980s improved the SMF’s surviv- ability in the event of a counterstrike and increased the ability to saturate the likely U. accelerating and releas- ing the warhead glider. thus also improving their surviv- ability. guidance systems. if the United States chooses to deploy antisatellite weapons. After completion of the first stage burn. the second stage would “break apart” into several independent missiles. the missile would appear to nose-dive toward the ground. Development to this end was pursued using two of the most powerful. which was considered justified. The United States introduced two such antisatellite systems (ASAT) between 1972 and 1974. system’s anticipated orbital BMD assets using kinetic and laser weapons that had been developed to destroy missiles dur- ing their boost acceleration. leading to additional saturation of the BMD defenses. which would fly to the target in the upper atmosphere. This intriguing line of work ended at the project design stage and was not pursued further.000 kilometers. That said. this was not felt to be enough: the means were also needed to overcome the U. ThE UniTEd STATES—TOWARd SUPERiORiTy in OUTER SPACE The United States began developing antisatellite systems in 1957. Upon completion of the boost portion of the flight. Another fruitful line of pursuit involved the development of an ICBM re-entry glider to avoid the classically problematic passive phase of the flight at apogee altitudes of over 1. so-called modular types of ground-based ICBMs (the R-36M and the UR-100H UTTH – SS-18 and SS-19). where the missile and its warheads at separation are most vulnerable to orbital BMD. 34 SPACE WEAPOnS PROgRAmS . and BMD penetration aids. The project design documents indicate that the second stages of these missiles were composed of bundles of several missiles. This was accomplished by using part of the energy capacity of the missile at the expense of its payload. each with its own re-entry vehicles. However. Other work focused on considerably reducing the altitude and duration of the boost portion of the flight of solid-fuel missiles. might be resumed despite the heavy burden they place on the national budget. when they were withdrawn from operational status and mothballed.

within the framework of its ASAT program. antisatellite projects have now reached the experimental proto- type development stage. which was developed within the framework of the SDI program on the basis of the modernized. Although this never happened. For example. Various development prototypes have already undergone flight tests. and the system was mothballed. However. because it is a successor to the EKV-PLV anti-ballistic missile system currently being tested. it seems likely that in reality the interceptor’s high-speed encounter with its target would involve such a large amount of kinetic energy that no sheet could ever be capable of preventing the scattering of the enormous number of fragments produced.6 It would be quite feasible to deploy a ground-based ASAT equipped with such interceptors. including the land-. thus preventing the resulting debris (fragments of both the satellite and the interceptor) from spread- ing. the United States placed most of its chips on the development of a land-based ASAT. This decision did not mean that the United States had completely rejected the idea of developing ASAT. this ASAT underwent flight tests against real space targets. flight tests have been conducted on the KEAsat space interceptor. air-. It was esti- mated that the system would allow the United States to destroy between three and five spacecraft in low-Earth orbits of under 1.S. it already had a draft plan for an “environmentally clean” Kinetic Energy Antisatellite (KEAsat) interceptor that supposedly eliminated fragmentation. Its altitude. The first ten military KEAsat systems were due to start operation in June 1998.In 1977. According to development plans. Work on this system was terminated in 1988 for a number of technical and political reasons.000 kilometers within 24–36 hours. In 1984–1985. small-sized Brilliant Pebbles interceptor.7 The Rockwell International Corporation won a contract to develop a land-based antisatellite demonstration system in 1990. would supposedly be able to destroy all near-Earth military satellites within a week. with two live intercepts of decommissioned U. This time. in the form of a mobile tractor-trailer vlAdimiR dvORkin 35 . the United States did collect and preserve the criti- cal technological assets that had been developed. however. and sea-based components of the system.S. It is estimated that the system could be made mission-capable again within a matter of months.000 kilometers. Initial plans for this system called for seven test flights. By 1991. A number of U. 5 ASATs equipped with such interceptors. these interceptors would carry a Teflon sheet with a surface area of 113 m2 that would unfurl shortly before impact with the target and “envelop” the spacecraft in the sheet. It has been said that the KEAsat system could be built very quickly should President Obama decide to deploy it. the United States began devel- opment on a new-generation antisatellite system designed to destroy satellites with its miniature homing vehicle fired from an F-15 aircraft into a vertical trajectory on a SRAM-Altair booster. satellites and five close flybys of orbiting spacecraft. was limited to 1. A new stage of work on ASAT began in 1989.

Given the appro- priate political will.8 The United States has also continued to develop a space-based laser weapon system (SBL) based on an orbital antimissile and antisatellite platform to destroy targets at ranges of 1. the entire space-based laser weapon system program was returned to the stage of technological development. which are capable of disabling satellites very expeditiously. During the initial stage. and so on. and beam control. plans then called for forming two batteries of 48 launchers each. enough to outfit a single battery. Its adaptive optics made it possible to develop the technology of compensat- ing for the distortion to the laser beam as it passes through the atmosphere.and intermedi- ate-orbit satellites. With a number of questions remaining inadequately addressed. tracking. These experiments demonstrated the theoretical feasibility of the United States’ using SBLs to create a system for detection.S. the manage- ment team of the SBL program was dismissed. Aside from using them as a component of the BMD system. these types of ASAT missiles. and all the work in this field was transferred to a newly created administrator named Laser Technologies. between 60 and 79 anti- satellite missiles were to have been deployed. and consisted of two laser pulses fired directly at an MSTI-3 satellite. which became an integral part of the program for developing an airborne laser weapon system.000 kilometers. U. Another possible ASAT component would be the use of one or two terrestrial laser weapon systems based on the existing antisatellite MIRACLE (Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser) (which has been incorporated into the laser test facility at the U. despite some progress in the SBL program. guidance. Two space experiments conducted in 1990 demonstrated the high precision with which the laser beam could acquire and stably track its target for extended peri- ods.complex with a three-stage booster rocket and an interceptor similar in design to the Brilliant Pebbles interceptor.S.9 At the same time. replenishing the SBL’s complex laser components in orbit. and would also be able to cause a total loss of sensitivity in early-warning and Earth-surveillance satellites in any orbit (including geostation- ary) by directly overexposing their photoreceptors. as well as against aircraft targeted over distances of several hundred to several thousand kilometers. could be deployed quite easily. experts continue to view such SBLs as potential weapons for use against ballistic missiles at any range by tar- geting them during their boost phase (at altitudes of 10 kilometers or higher). The first successful live tests of the laser were performed in the United States in October 1997.000 to 3. Army’s White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico) to functionally dis- able the most vital information-gathering satellites. It thus appears likely that none of the scientific research and experimen- 36 SPACE WEAPOnS PROgRAmS . the United States is also considering using SBLs as a potential weapon against low. key problems remained with delivering the full-scale laser weapon into orbit. Subsequent assessment indi- cated that this laser produces enough energy to disable solar panels or damage the optical electronic equipment of satellites orbiting at altitudes of between 400 and 700 kilometers.

• a multiple-use space maneuvering vehicle (SMV). • the airborne laser antisatellite and antimissile system. According to the originally published plans. the United States successfully completed a scheduled series of preliminary flight tests on a low-power laser installation. megawatt-class combat laser. However. and ground tests on a flight-ready. nothing has been written about such tests in the public press since. but for the foreseeable future it is unlikely to progress further. at least for the foreseeable future.S. • the Army’s ground-based mobile system developed under the KEAsat program. and • the ground-based MIRACLE antisatellite laser complex used to functionally dis- able the most vital information-gathering satellites. as well as low-Earth-orbit satellites. The Strategic Boost Glide Vehicle project was designed to deliver sudden and precise strikes against strategically important targets located in the heart of the enemy’s defenses. this device was to have had its first flight tests by 2002. The Boe- ing Company has spent a number of years under contract with the U. The logical continuation of such work was the reusable SMV program. The following are at the stage of exploratory research and experimentation: • Space-Earth systems. This system was designed as part of the theater BMD to attack ballistic missiles immediately after launch. Work on space-based laser weapon systems that feature antisatellite and antimis- sile orbital platforms has progressed from the research and development stage to the technological development stage. In August 2007. • orbital electronic countermeasure equipment. the first realistic engineering designs of such a weapon did not appear until 1987.10 The following antisatellite systems are currently at the most advanced stages of design development and ground and flight testing: • the AEGIS Mk7 modified sea-based missile defense (antisatellite) system using STANDARD-3 (SM-3) missiles and Boeing guided kinetic warheads. The foremost project currently under active development is an airborne laser weapon system that features an antimissile and antisatellite system. especially mobile missile launchers and surface ships.tal studies conducted on this project will move beyond the “technological” stage. Although the United States first began developing systems that could destroy ground objects from space concurrently with the appearance of the very first sat- ellites. Air Force vlAdimiR dvORkin 37 . and • orbital inspection technologies.

working on this vehicle. the U. orbital control. its relatively small payload of around 500 kilograms is currently considered a serious limitation. it is worth noting that under present conditions.S. or even hypersonic strike gliders armed with armor-piercing warheads for striking terrestrial hard targets. especially if based near the borders of the potential opponent. in particular the size of its payload. the first launch of the SMV AirLaunch system could take place within the next few years. small guided missiles. air-. inspection or elimination of space objects.85-scale SMV called the x-40 was produced to help developers design and operate the vehicle. The United States attaches great importance to the role of counter-information weapons in carrying out radio-electronic warfare in and from space. the U. It would be possible to quickly deliver the SMV into orbit at various inclinations by using a Boeing-747 as a flying launch platform.13 However. or sea-based system. Experts predict that. Indirect evi- dence of this comes from its current efforts to protect U.12 To launch the standard model of the SMV. it was disclosed that the U. Notwithstanding published reports about the development of spacecraft that could destroy targets in the heart of an enemy’s territory. The importance of these activities may also explain the data that have appeared about recent electronic countermeasures development work. Air Force has decided to continue to refine the design of the SMV project.S. the operational and strategic need for such systems remains highly doubtful.S.11 The SMV was originally intended as a vehicle that would be capable of carrying out nearly any of the mission types associated with military operations in or from space. in light of the existing shortcomings and limitations of the SMV. In 1998. However. Boeing has proposed initially using the three-stage solid-fuel rockets from its AirLaunch program. which has been designed to operate in orbits from parking to geostationary in pursuit of a number of military goals. there are limitations on payload weight. During a series of Senate hearings. The main concern is that such an orbital or fractionally orbital weapon would not perform more effectively than an equivalent land-. The first successful tests of an x-40A were conducted at New Mexico’s Holloman Air Force Base in August 1998. which was to use terrestrial active jamming stations to destroy or disable foreign satellites. should the project win final approval. 38 SPACE WEAPOnS PROgRAmS . and analysis of threats and anomalies affecting the U.S. For example. and the mission costs are generally high. with a new role focusing on assessment of system vulnerability and survivability. and observation and transport of general-purpose aircraft. a 0. space-based systems from electronic warfare. telecommunications infrastructure. including the rapid launch of lightweight satellites. telecommunications system’s National Coordinating Center was transformed into the National Telecommunications and Information Exchange in January 2000. Air Force in 2004 had created the 76th space control squadron. its flight test program ended in July 2001. The laws of orbital dynamics preclude stationing systems permanently in orbit above or within striking range of their targets (except for those in geostationary orbits).S.

as well as multi-cell antennas with diameters of up to 200 meters and enhancement factors of up to 100 dB. especially within the framework of the Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space (ANGELS) program. which the U. and Earth-to-space radio communications could probably be service-ready in the near future. According to experts at the U. the Lockheed Martin Corporation won a contract from the U. but that can also be used to inspect and attack a potential enemy’s satellites. By the beginning of the 1970s. Designs for 15-. the United States had already deployed in orbit a nine-meter parabolic mirror antenna designed for a top working frequency of 8. Development is progressing on space-based adjustable phased-array antennas. Development work continues on a mirror antenna of 55 meters in diameter and 320 kilograms in weight. or disable the enemy’s missile attack early warning satellites. 30-. The technology for building large antennas with apertures measured in hundreds of meters could be developed over the next few years. single-component mirror antennas with gain factors of up to 50 dB. Space-based electronic warfare systems to disrupt space-to-Earth. vlAdimiR dvORkin 39 . Large-area antennas are the key to increasing the energy potential of onboard space-based electronic warfare systems. space-to- space. and 100- meter parabolic mirror antennas with frequencies up to 12-18 GHz have also been developed. The results of this dual-purpose program are applicable both to electronic war- fare and space defense. A space-based anti-communications satellite electronic war- fare system could include up to two to four electronic warfare satellites operating in stationary orbits and equipped with four to eight interference transmitters. Depart- ment of Defense began financing in 2005. spacecraft. This program involves the develop- ment of autonomous micro-spacecraft designed to safeguard and inspect U. For the future.S.S.S.Extensive work has also been carried out in the field of orbital inspection tech- nologies. could be built in the near future. The Rhyolite spacecraft was equipped with a specially developed 15-meter antenna (which had a top work- ing frequency of 9 GHz).25 GHz. An experimental inspection micro-spacecraft was to be launched into geosta- tionary orbit in 2009. In standby mode. Based on avail- able data. The development of electronic warfare capabilities focuses in particular on programs for developing high-power orbital radio frequency transmitters that can either destroy or disable the electronic equipment of com- bat control and space-based communications systems.S. the real technological groundwork has already been laid for using existing radio technology to develop space-based electronic warfare equipment. they could have a service life of several years. autonomous micro-spacecraft built with ANGELS technology could be equipped either with radio transmitters for creating radio interference or with paint-spraying equipment that blocks the optical equipment of other spacecraft. In 2005. Center for Defense Information. Air Force’s research laboratory to develop an autonomous micro-spacecraft for the ANGELS inspection program.

The United States is the indisputable leader. The location of these reserved airspace zones confirms that they were related to the detected ballistic missile launch. a Chinese Fengyun-1-3 spacecraft was destroyed. and that this had been a test of an antisatellite weapon. aside from the fact that certain zones of Chinese airspace had been reserved in advance and closed to aviation. STRATEgiC COnCEPTS And nATiOnAl inTERESTS The United States. 2007. with a correlation noted between the time of its destruction and the launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile from China’s xichang Satellite Launch Center. It is noteworthy that there had been no information publicly available to indicate that China had been preparing either to launch a ballistic missile from its xichang Satellite Launch Center. and • the broad integration of information technologies into promising weapon sys- tems for all levels of military operations. China conducted its first successful antisatellite weapons test in 2007.14 The satellite was destroyed at an altitude of 864 kilometers over central China. with its diverse arsenal of advanced space technologies and the accu- mulated scientific and technical experience to build and potentially place various types of sea-based and land-based (stationary and mobile) antisatellite systems into service sometime after 2010. and China are all capable of employing their current potential for space militarization in the foreseeable future. national space policy. The “United States Space Command Vision for 2020. suggesting that the destruction of the satellite had been associated with the firing of the ballistic mis- sile. The deployment of such weapons has been doctrinally anticipated and justified in the fundamental concepts of U. According to media reports. or to test elements of its antisatellite weapons. This 954-kilogram. and its fragments identified on January 11–12. and until the time of its destruction was a component of China’s weather observation system. and sea forces. it can be concluded that China has the scientific and tech- nological foundation to conduct military operations in space and is continuing to develop this expertise. 1999. defined the key areas of activity as: • the development of approaches and methods for the full control of space.ChinA’S AnTiSATElliTE dEbUT After three earlier failures. serially produced satellite was launched from China’s Taiyuan Launch Center (otherwise known as the Wuzhai Space and Missile Test Center) on May 10. In light of the above.15 40 SPACE WEAPOnS PROgRAmS . Russia.” for example. • the search for new approaches and methods for waging global warfare (includ- ing the potential capability to bring force to bear from space against any region on Earth) and full functional integration between military space forces and land. air.S.

17 On August 31. especially nuclear- armed missiles.16 which as a whole outlined a comprehensive program for U.S. dominance in space. control space.S. In January 2001. • technical development and production similarities between BMD and ASAT systems. As the U. during crises. edge in this area. and. if directed.S. global strategic and tactical warning systems. and • to develop plans and options to ensure freedom of action in space. all of these missions may be considered support vlAdimiR dvORkin 41 . orbital systems. and at any level of conflict.S. 1996. and utilize space systems. and • to attack any ground. space policy. the militarization of space and development of BMD systems is impelled by: • the potential for future proliferation of nuclear weapons. enhance forces. deny such freedom of action to adversaries. while at the same time identifying three potential mission goals for such weapons: • to protect existing U. • to develop and deploy the orbital assets necessary to maintain the U. • to provide space capabilities to support continuous.S. National Space Policy) of September 14.S.18 The new policy defined the responsibilities and duties of the Department of Defense as follows: • to support and enhance defense and intelligence needs and operations in peacetime.Specific steps in this direction were laid out in a report published in January 2001 by the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Manage- ment and Organization (the Rumsfeld Commission). or air targets from space. and identified the main principles and goals of the new U. and continue the upgrade of defense and intelligence capabilities. sea. President Bush authorized a new National Space Policy that superseded the Presidential Decision Directive NSC-49/NSTC-8 (U. • a steady trend toward the blurring of the boundaries between the military and civilian use of space. • to provide support for capabilities in space. With the exception of the latter. 2006. leadership sees it. and • declining Russian activity in space and increasing space activity by nations that are openly or potentially hostile to the United States. the Congressionally authorized Commission on Space strongly recommended that the United States retain the option of deploying weapons in space. • to interfere with enemy use of space and space systems. as well as multi-layered and integrated missile defenses.

the United States really has behaved arrogantly and neglected its own obligations (for example. As stressed in Natsionalnaya oborona [National Defense]. and resembles pro- paganda about the U. Russian military analysts often take the militaristic declarations and projects of their U. however. from the 1960s through the 1980s the USSR was implementing plans for the militarization of space that were at least as extensive if not more so than those of the United States. and the collapse of the USSR. It should be said. The militarization of space has been no exception. such appeals and intentions should be scrutinized as critically as the peace-loving declarations that Washington has presented as its official line. and has been occurring independently of ideological disagreements.S. However.S. that the U. and its allies (first and foremost NATO) has been directed unequivocally at securing strategic and military dominance over Russia and other nations and degrading their nuclear deterrence potential. as well as on weaponry and military operations. Deprived of its once-powerful enemy and enjoying a military budget larger than that of any other nation. since the end of the Cold War. the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. For this reason. counterparts uncritically. analysis published today in Russia often suffers from being one-sided.S. yet by contrast they remained shrouded in great secrecy and therefore did not appear to contra- dict the public “peace-loving policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. political system is one of the most open in the world. official information about these plans (not to mention the true strategic and operational concepts of the Russian Federation) is not much more freely available today than in the days of the Soviet Union. However. At the same time. That said. current Russian military space programs are unquestionably inferior to those of the United States in scale and technical sophis- tication. Nevertheless. these requirements did not go as far as the above-cited recommendations of the Congressional Commission calling for the deployment of weapons in space. the Moscow Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship.” In light of financial constraints and organizational and technical problems fac- ing the military-industrial complex. threat rather than an analytical study. the goal of securing freedom of action in space and denying such freedom to adversaries can be met only by implementing some of the programs described above to destroy or disable the spacecraft of other nations. which provided for a partnership approach to such areas as BMD). one of the principal publications on the subject and a mouthpiece of the Russian military-industrial complex: “The policy of the U.” 19 Official U. As is evident from the historical overview of space weapons development presented above. provid- ing a great deal of information on military concepts and operational plans.activities for military systems in space. signed by the presidents of Russia and the United States in 2002.S.S. the 42 SPACE WEAPOnS PROgRAmS . threat from space. military command publications have undoubtedly served as fertile ground for additional concerns about the U. this has been a consistent trend rather than just a tactical tendency.S.

although it does plan to actively increase its resources in space. Moscow sees the deployment of a space component of the antimissile defense system as a serious threat that could potentially degrade Russia’s nuclear deterrence. and other military powers. Russia has been less reliant on constellations of satellites for the operations of its general-purpose forces. space support for long-range conventional strikes.S. Presently Russia is concerned about U. Allegedly. the United States must have more of an interest than any other nation in protecting its satellite systems. subsequently. For the time being. Over the more distant future. This would explain the fact that the United States has limited itself to conducting individual experiments and tests in the 1980s and over the current decade. and scientific assets in space belong to the United States.United States has spent lavishly on the latest projects and experiments relating to space weapons and various types of information systems. even if the priorities differ. but in light of its relatively limited nuclear deterrence potential is worried more about the United States’ near-term projects for a multi- layered BMD system. allowing its military space command to make the kind of hawkish declarations that would never have been permitted during the Cold War years. even though it is far ahead of other powers in terms of both the development and variety of its space weapon programs. it could end up the loser should other nations deploy their own ASAT systems. The PRC clearly has interests in this area that coincide with those of Russia. this decision was based on a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis of a large- scale antisatellite weapons race with Russia. Washington has deactivated its previous satellite defense systems. which is greatly and increasingly dependent on the operation of various satellites for its strategic and general-purpose armed forces. China is probably less concerned about the new U. There is no question that the greatest military. other potential space nations. this is significantly less of a factor for Russia. By virtue of the intrinsic vulnerability of spacecraft (which have predictable orbits and weak passive defenses. the PRC. However. and which are difficult to cam- ouflage) and the much greater reliance of the United States on orbital systems to support its strategic nuclear forces and general-purpose forces. general-purpose capabilities. Thus. and never did initiate extensive military deployment of the new space weapon systems. relying instead on the “secondary antisatellite potential” of its strategic-. and this interest must also be defensive rather than offensive in nature. and tactical-class BMD systems (such as the Ground- Based Interceptor and the Standard Missile component of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System). China. vlAdimiR dvORkin 43 . and. operational-. even by the Reagan administration in the context of its SDI program. commercial.S. includ- ing the satellite intercept test it carried out in 2008.

perhaps. Accordingly.S. administration’s approach in this area. 44 SPACE WEAPOnS PROgRAmS .S. • ASAT systems are viewed as a means for actively defending U. It cannot be ruled out that. spacecraft (including space-based BMD systems) from the sub-orbital and orbital antisat- ellite systems of other nations. antisatellite systems are being developed as a means of deterring the deployment of such systems by Russia and China in the distant future. and • in a worst-case scenario. including. specialists have stressed that The United States has made the greatest investment in space assets and is sub- stantially dependent on them for conducting global military operations. • the United States is uncertain that the prohibition of antisatellite systems could be reliably controlled.S. the new administration will be forced to seriously reconsider some U. even as the United States agrees to deprive itself of such systems.S. This makes it even more essential that there be a policy of energetic efforts to prevent the militarization of outer space.… A ban on space weapons would disproportionately benefit the United States. The potential vulnerability of these assets to relatively unsophisticated attacks presents a more significant threat than any other danger in space. the military use of space. coupled with a financial crisis on a scale unprecedented since the late 1920s. and further believes that the closed nature of military policy in Russia (and even more so in the PRC) makes it likely that such weap- ons systems will be developed and tested secretly.This means that in the future both Russia and China will likely have an interest in developing antisatellite systems as an asymmetrical response to new U. policies. some influential U. BMD systems and general-purpose forces capabilities. It would be logical to ask why the United States has spent the current decade resisting any serious negotiations on banning antisatellite systems by treaty (while at the same time developing and testing some of these very systems itself). which therefore has every reason to establish and maintain exacting standards of verification. foreign policy failures and dif- ficulties. rather than taking the initiative in this area. even if a large-scale arms race involving space weap- ons were to occur. the United States expects its military superiority in space to remain overwhelming. Much now depends upon the new U. as a result of major U. The answer involves several possibilities (that at least apply to the thinking of the Bush administration): • the United States fears that a restriction or prohibition of ASAT systems would complicate its development of space-based BMD systems because these sys- tems share significant technologies and components. 20 Such expectations are certain to be countered by both the traditional iner- tia of existing ASAT development programs and the powerful influence of military-industrial corporations. • U.S.S.S.

March 1998.A. 10 Space News 18 no. eds. no. (Moscow: Izd. Entsiklopediya I vek: Oruzhiye i tekhnologii Rossii [Twenty-First Century Encyclopedia: Weaponry and Technology of Rus- sia. 1992). Arbatov and V. no. Nuclear Proliferation: New Technologies. 1992. 9 (260) (2004) (based on materials from Space Daily.S.com and http://www. 17 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (Moscow. Podvig. “United States Space Com- mand Vision for 2020. as used by Pavel Podvig in his June 12. the U. Cherkas. Oborona. Dvorkin.Carnegie Moscow Center (Moscow: ROSSPEN. General. 35 (2007) 10/IX: 8. 2001). “Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s: A Research Note.com websites. 16 Novosti Kosmonavtiki 14. 12 Ibid. Space. sea. Zarubezhniye kosmicheskiye kom- pleksy i sistemy [Foreign Space Complexes and Systems].S. See also: P. 2008). 1992). 7 Molchanov. 1995). Reconsidering the Rules of Space Security (American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 5 (1999): 39. Notes 1 B. com. M. Molchanov.S. 2006. See also: Molchanov. no. 5 Aviation Week and Space Technology 134. no. no.spacedaily. 1 (Summer 2008): 118–138. Weapons and Treaties. 9 Informatsionniye materialy po kompleksnomu eksperimentu MO SShA RME/LACE (USA-51). (Moscow: MO RF. Pechati. 19 Nats. 3 “Kosmicheskiye sredstva vooruzheniya” [Space Weapons]. no.. report. provodimye v ramkakh programmy SOI [Informational Materials on the Multifactor Experi- ment of the U.” Krasnaya Zvezda (March 5–11. Gallagher and J. vlAdimiR dvORkin 45 . 15 Howell M. A. 2 S. 4 From material in Vitaly Katayev’s archives. 3.F. dom “Oruzhiye i tekhnologii. [S. 18 “U. 1 (216) (2001). Sovremenniye politiko-pravoviye problemy voyenno-kosmicheskoy deyatel- nosti i osnovy metodologii ikh issledovaniya [The Modern Political and Legal Problems of Military and Space Operations and the Methodological Bases of Their Study].S. Tarasenko. 5 (2007) 5/II: 16. MoD RME/LACE (USA-51).1]. and space targets. “The Militarization of Space and Space Weapons.” 2002). Steinbruner. Novosti Kosmonavtiki. 14 Based on materials from http://www. 80.” in Long Range Plan (Executive Summary). IX/III (1991).” in Nuclear Prolifera- tion: New Technologies. Military Aspects of Soviet Cosmonautics (Moscow: TOO Nikol. Estes III. 13 Ibid. Department of Defense. Space News 18.” International Security 33. Carried Out Within the Framework of the SDI Program] (NPO Energiya. and others). V. no. 11 Aviation Week & Space Technology (June 11. P. no. 2001). air. U. 6 Novosti Kosmonavtiki. 8 These assessments were made by a team of experts that included the author. 7 (28) (July 2008): 41. 196–228.spacelauncher. 2009) 196–228.with the goal of drafting and implementing comprehensive treaties that pro- hibit launching weapons into orbit that could be used to attack land. National Space Policy. Nuclear Proliferation: New Technologies. Commander in Chief. Novosti kosmonavtiki. 2008). 20 N. Agenstvo Ros. 1 (216) (2001) 196–228. V.

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PART 2 NEGOTIATIONS AND LEGAL REGULATIONS GOVERNING OUTER SPACE .

04 nOn-WEAPOniZATiOn OF OUTER SPACE: LESSONS FROM NEGOTIATIONS vikTOR miZin .

In the aftermath of the successful launch of the first satellite in 1957.3 As early as the very first round of disarmament negotiations of the last century.2 The logic of this approach is obvious: Russia needs to maintain strategic parity and strives to pre- vent the United States from gaining a unilateral strategic advantage. quest for military superiority by continuing to develop new types of military space assets in the strictest secrecy while pursuing politi- cal and diplomatic efforts in favor of the “peaceful use of outer space. However. both at international forums and in the context of bilateral relations. continues to follow this line.S.S.1 Russia. while currently pursuing the goal of countering U. both sides began to recognize the potentially destabilizing nature of space weapons and tried to avoid anything that would spur the position- ing of weapons systems in space. which was what Soviet experts believed the United States sought. 4 This was especially true with respect to vikTOR miZin 49 .” Moscow consistently supported the non-weaponization of outer space and advanced numerous initiatives. as the legal successor of the USSR. the Soviet leader- ship strove to offset a potential U. plans to deploy BMD systems and components.” Within the frame- work of the campaign for “general and complete disarmament. the Soviet leadership applied the unique tactic of linking progress at the “space talks” to limits on defensive and offensive strategic weapons. advocating inter- national legal recognition of outer space as an area free of any type of weaponry. as well as space-based antisatellite weapons. while at the same time trying to avoid a new and costly arms race.

the treaty did not ban military activities in space per se. Still. the United States accepted the Soviet approach. Based on the principles of the UN Charter. space activities are to be carried out in accordance with international law. whose deployment in outer space would be fraught with unpredictable military and strategic consequences and the possibility of hor- rific technological accidents. the first step toward actual nuclear disarmament.S. In particular. appealing to all nations to refrain from placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction into orbit around the Earth.” 7 Ultimately. signed on January 27. 1967. Moreover. and promoting international cooperation and understanding (Article III). The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1884 in October 1963. the Soviet version of the document covered all outer space. Under Article I of this international legal document. while the U. Ultimately. the Treaty proclaims outer space as “the province of all mankind” and guarantees the important principle that “outer space … is not subject to national appropriation.6 The international community adopted the superpowers’ finalized draft as United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2222.8 Under this agreement. in the interests of maintaining international peace and security. in Moscow. as it did in other environments. should have been based entirely on national efforts. That document declared that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out “for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind. the document was based on the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. according to the Soviets. Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies). the new treaty’s verification process.S. although it intro- duced a number of restrictions. all test detona- tions of nuclear weapons and all other types of nuclear explosions are prohibited.-Soviet “thaw” that followed the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. However. the treaty did not prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in space.nuclear weapons. In many respects. ThE iniTiAl AgREEmEnTS On OUTER SPACE The Limited Test Ban Treaty.” and thus all nations are to be guaranteed free and equal access to all areas of space.-Soviet draft treaty. which was proposed by the USSR and unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1963.-Soviet cooperation that emerged at the time facili- tated finalization of the Treaty on Outer Space (officially named the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. draft applied only to celestial bodies. Washington. nations party to the treaty agree not 50 nOn-WEAPOniZATiOn OF OUTER SPACE .5 This document served as the framework for consensus on a joint U. the tentative U. and London.S.S. Interestingly enough. was co-authored by the Soviet Union during the U.

13 In 1972. the ABM Treaty would also indirectly ban space-based ASAT systems (although this relationship does not work in reverse—an ASAT weapon of any bas- ing mode would not necessarily be a component of BMD by definition). testing. tightening export controls on critical technologies. and regulating the global market of commercial space launches. or land-based tac- tical antimissiles are created. have actually ratified the treaty.to launch any objects into space bearing nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction. none of which have space programs of any significance. This meant that the ban would for the first time apply to all other space-based weap- ons.S.12 The problem of preventing the weaponization of space has turned out to be con- nected to efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of missiles and missile tech- nologies. navigation. vikTOR miZin 51 . The treaty also requires that consultations be held in the event that the activities or experiments in space planned by one state potentially interfere with the peaceful exploration and use of outer space by other states (Article Ix). This overlapping may be seen in the U. which not only laid the foundation for the limitation and reduction of strategic and other nuclear weapons for the next 30 years and served as the cornerstone of the philosophy and practice of strategic stability. efforts to modify the Nike Zeus anti-ballistic missile for satellite-attacking modes. As space-based BMD systems simultaneously have considerable antisatellite capabilities. the superpowers continued their attempts to develop new types of non-nuclear space weapons that could be used against targets in space. However. and no weapons testing or military maneuvers of any kind are to be conducted on these celestial bodies (Article IV).11 A certain synergy has emerged as orbital strike weapons could be developed while BMD systems. the United States and the USSR concluded the historic Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). and early warning of missile launches.9 After the 1967 Treaty was concluded. Under the agreement. 1979. The Treaty on Outer Space was further developed with the drafting of the Agree- ment Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of December 18. and provides for the possibility of inspections (Article xII).14 but it did not specify that these limitations applied only to nuclear weapons. Consequently. although no weapons were ever actually deployed in space.10 By the early 1970s. it has not yet gained any serious political or legal force. but also represented an important international legal barrier to space militarization. only a few countries. air defenses. communications. the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes by all nations party to the treaty. The ABM Treaty prohibited the development. no military bases are to be established there. which imposed a full-scale prohibition of military activities on the Moon or in lunar orbit. both superpowers had expanded their military support activities in space in such areas as satellite reconnaissance. and deployment of BMD systems and space-based BMD components (Article V).

The United States expressed serious concerns about antisatellite system tests conducted by the Soviet Union.S.S. early warning. ASAT tests. Article Ix).18 For the duration of the talks. the two sides suspended testing of their respective systems.S. or BMD radars.-Soviet political rela- tions (1978–1979). first by the 1979 SALT II Treaty (Point 1. and was confirmed in the conclusions of a special Senate commission chaired by Senator Sam Nunn.The 1972 Treaty contained a number of indirect limitations on military activities in space. By the mid-1970s. COnSUlTATiOnS On AnTiSATElliTE SySTEmS In light of this new mutual understanding on strategic stability and the role of satellite support sys- tems. headed on the Soviet side by Ambassador-at-Large of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Lev Mendelevich and on the U. 52 nOn-WEAPOniZATiOn OF OUTER SPACE . three rounds of bilateral consultations on antisatellite issues were initiated by the Carter administration. were held without particular success and amounted to a mere recitation of the differing positions by the two parties.19 With each side express- ing concern primarily about the other’s antisatellite program. the negotiators still reviewed possible restrictions on such programs. the Soviet Union (in the 1960s and 1970s) conducted a series of tests of its co-orbital anti- satellite system and deployed several silo-based launchers for its IS system at its Baikonur site in 1972. BMD launchers.” and to use them to verify compliance. missile attacks. This represented the first official legal codification of military activities in orbit associated with support operations (reconnaissance. In the appendix to the treaty. then the USSR voiced its anxiety over U. the United States had discontinued the development of its direct ascent ASAT and suspended the 505 system (based on the Nike-Zeus missile) and the 437 system (based on the Thor missile). It became a roadblock to the implementation of President Reagan’s SDI program.16 The United States followed suit by starting an airborne ASAT program (see chapter 3 for details). The negotiations between the two delegations. Meanwhile.15 The ABM Treaty also obligated both parties “not to interfere with the national technical means of verification [NTMV] of the other Party.17 During the subsequent period of relative improvement of U. The United States was induced to begin developing antisatellite weapons in part as a response to the threat of the partially orbital missiles deployed by the USSR in 1969 that were eventually banned. then by START I. the development of space weapons—particularly antisatellite components— was considered a destabilizing factor. the famous Agreed Statement “D” banned the deployment in space and other environments of “BMD systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for BMD interceptor missiles. and so on). side by Ambassador Robert Buchheim.” This interpretation of the key provision prevailed in the United States following a series of intense debates in the early 1980s.

However. In 1983.-Soviet relations that followed the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. spacecraft assigned to attack ground targets on Earth or. objected to imposing an unconditional and universal ban on any hostile action against the spacecraft of other parties. direct broadcast satellites). the United States and the USSR were unable to reach accord on the subject of the future treaty or on the nature of its prohibitions.22 and the United States and the USSR con- tinued testing their antisatellite systems well into the 1980s. or merely any interference with their normal functioning (the differences between the two sides are outlined in Table 7. This did not mean that Moscow intended to decommission the IS-MU system that had already been deployed. Agreement could not be reached on what exactly the future treaty would prohibit: direct physical action against enemy satellites.21 The Reagan administration demonstrated no interest in the legally binding restrictions on antisatellite system development. as the Soviet delegation implied. for example.20 This course was favored because it was much easier to verifiably restrict the Soviet system based on the experience of SALT I and SALT II. these consultations never resumed. consultations in cases NTMV. even for testing purposes. Moscow made a unilateral commitment not to deploy any new ASAT systems in space. Subject of the treaty Open-ended agreement to One-year moratorium on ASAT prohibit all types of ASAT testing to provide time to draft an and the testing of such agreement on the prohibition of systems in the two countries ASAT testing and deployment. vikTOR miZin 53 . The Soviets also objected to impos- ing an unconditional ban on countermeasures against satellites belonging to third nations. SDI program.The United States followed a two-pronged approach of developing antisatellite systems while impeding their deployment by others. point- ing out that certain situations may require that orbital threats be neutralized (for example.S. in line with its efforts to counteract the U. with systems for verification Prohibitions and Prohibition of certain “hostile Prohibition of all attacks against restrictions activities” against American any satellites and Soviet spacecraft Verification method NTMV. Differences in Positions between the United States and USSR in 1978–1979 TOPiC USSR U.S.) Table 7. so long as other nations would assume the same obligation. The Soviet delegation. The Soviet Union continued to comply with this morato- rium even after the United States carried out a real-target test of its SRAM-Altair airborne antisatellite system in 1985. by the end of the talks.S. on-site inspections of dispute As a result of the serious deterioration in U.

the USSR applied its policy of preventing an arms race in outer space by obstruct- ing the Strategic Defense Initiative program announced by President Reagan on March 23. In a statement on Janu- ary 29. and international secu- rity to introduce an element of realism into this assessment24 were drowned in a chorus of alarm from interest groups.S.S.S. and the system was decommissioned. 54 nOn-WEAPOniZATiOn OF OUTER SPACE . Russian President Yeltsin reaffirmed Russia’s readiness to eliminate existing antisatellite systems on a basis of reciprocity with the United States. the USSR advanced a series of treaty proposals to prohibit the creation or use of weapons of any type in space. The IS-MU antisatellite complex was removed from testing and combat duty in 1993. the United States was creating the means to deliver a bolt-from-the-blue strike from space first and foremost at targets like Moscow and the Kremlin.23 The senile leaders of the Communist Party’s Politburo. including some in the academic commu- nity. In this political atmosphere. under the guise of providing defense capabilities. and to draft a treaty imposing a comprehensive ban on weapons intended specifically for satellite attacks. the Soviet military and political leadership still viewed it as an extremely dangerous bid for strategic superiority.S. space research. 1983 (which would violate provisions of the ABM Treaty by developing and testing elements of a space-based antimissile defense system).The U. which exaggerated the U. and that in fact. As was the case with the U. and in the 1980s it began presenting them regularly for discussion both at the United Nations and at meetings of specialized international organizations (such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the Conference on Disar- mament in Geneva). While skeptical about the SDI program’s ability to intercept all of the warheads launched in a counterstrike. ignorant in technological or military matters. fell under the sway of a massive PR campaign promoted by the Soviet military- industrial complex. the Kremlin leadership became so frightened that it was prepared to make much greater concessions in negotiations with the United States than the strategic situation actually required (it appears that the same dynamic is taking place in Russia now in connection with U. plans to deploy elements of its BMD system in Europe). SOviET iniTiATivES AT inTERnATiOnAl FORUmS In the 1980s. Congress terminated the ASAT program at the end of the 1980s in the friendlier atmosphere that resulted from the end of the Cold War and the conclu- sion of several major arms control treaties at the time. The Soviet leaders were assured that SDI was something like the “Star Wars” weapon system (rather than an actual R&D program). Efforts by professional experts in physics. space threat. deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. mainly with the goal of obtaining crush funding for a host of military programs involving asymmetrical response measures (see chapter 3 for details). 1992.

if a country at its own discretion identified any space object in “orbit around the Earth” as a weapons carrier. Under the draft. as well as from Earth against objects in outer space. that country would essentially be allowed to destroy the object without recourse to consultation or to accepted international legal criteria (Article III). or the development of these systems using new physical principles.S. Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov sent a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General proposing the creation of a World Space Organization to regu- late the supply of peaceful missile technology and provide equal access to the international space launch market. Many of the provisions in the draft. The provision in the draft that prohibited the use of manned spacecraft for military missions (Article II. and so on.S.In 1981.29 Unfortunately. in orbit as components of either manned or unmanned systems. Space Shuttle.-Soviet consultations on ASAT. particle-beam. At the same time. diplomats under the pretext that it would be difficult to provide a precise definition for the term “space weap- ons.S. 1981. it did not prohibit either the testing and possession of land-based and airborne antisatellite systems (Article I.28 In an effort to preclude the arms race in outer space and to foreclose any channel for its weaponization. first launched into orbit on April 12. Point 4).S. for example. the USSR clarified its proposal by indicating the specific areas in which the use of force should be prohibited and the categories of space weapons that should be covered by these bans: the Soviet proposal would have banned the use of force in outer space and from space against Earth.” 31 In 1987. In 1986. nuclear. required additional clarification. prohibited ASAT testing outright and included an appeal to eliminate systems of this type that were already in existence (Article II. delegations to the Conference on Disarmament from the German vikTOR miZin 55 . the USSR proposed the potential prohibition and elimination of “space-strike weapons” and all other land-. Moscow began regularly submitting resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly condemning an arms race in outer space. Point 5) was a rather transpar- ent Soviet attempt (first tried during the ASAT consultations) to restrict the military use of the U. Point 1 of the draft). For example. although the 1981 version did leave room for some divergence in interpretation. whether conventional. side. laser. The more comprehensive 1983 version. It clarified its position that nations must not place or deploy space-strike weapons of any kind. however. air-. the USSR introduced its initiative for a treaty prohibiting the deployment of weapons of any type in space25 and submitted the draft treaty to prohibit the use of force in outer space and from space against Earth. or sea-based systems designed to destroy targets in space. this proposal was essentially rejected by the U.27 nor did it prohibit intercepting orbital devices not intended for peaceful purposes. in which some of the criticisms of the provisions in the previous Soviet draft were addressed. In 1984.30 These proposals were also systematically rejected by U.26 The phraseology of these documents incorporated some of the results achieved at previous U.

the USSR expressed its support for creating an international inspection agency to monitor the launch of all objects into space and their associated launchers. experts believe. This led to its unwillingness to impose any bans on new types of space weapons. considering the existing legal regime. and finally against its SDI program. but also a kind of active measure designed to lure the USSR into an exhausting competition that it was destined to lose. believing that it could outdo the United States in creating military space systems. following a French proposal to create an International Satellite Monitoring Agency. as a number of U. Many of the Soviet initiatives were indeed loaded with anti-U.S. it is nonetheless quite clear that SDI was really not only a grandiose new technological project to revamp the U. its Space Shuttle. primarily aimed at turning public opinion against its ASAT tests. However. developed and submitted the main provisions of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Antisatellite Weapons and on Ways to Ensure the Immunity of Space Objects. both manned (such as the Almaz station) and unmanned (the IS-MU antisatellite complex). but would also circumvent a substantial part of contem- porary international law. with the support of Soviet experts. The SDI program not only seriously influenced the mentality of the new team of Soviet leaders that had come to power in the mid-1980s. by the 1980s it had become apparent that the USSR would not be able to compete effectively with the United States in the more advanced stages of the arms race that required not only enormous financial expenditures.S. In the opinion of the United States and its allies. However. they did promote a more profound conceptual- 56 nOn-WEAPOniZATiOn OF OUTER SPACE . but. slant. propaganda and revealed an anti-U.S.34 It was further claimed that they were not only superfluous.35 nEgOTiATiOnS On nUClEAR And SPACE ARmS The Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations of the late 1980s became an important closed forum for deliberating the non-weaponization of space. while carefully avoiding any mention of secret Soviet plans.S. the USSR made a new pro- posal to establish an International Space Monitoring Agency that was to become an integral part of an International Verification Agency in the future. Although they failed to achieve tan- gible progress on space weapons.Democratic Republic and Mongolia. also contributed to the economic collapse of the USSR.32 At the Con- ference on Disarmament that same year. all these ideas were essentially blocked by the United States. but also radi- cally new ways of organizing production to adopt regular and flexible innovations. including those based on new physical principles.33 The Soviet Union expressed its willingness to consider using Soviet missiles to launch the agency’s satellites under mutually acceptable terms. Although there are serious doubts on this point. armed forces. The Soviet leadership of the 1960s and 1970s felt a certain degree of con- fidence. the draft multilateral treaties on the non- use of force in space were clearly a form of propaganda. In 1989.

argument that SDI was not a subject of the negotiations. testing. At the same time. and its position evolved noticeably throughout the course of the talks. as well as other assets capable of destroying targets in space. accord- ing to which the treaty did not prohibit the testing of BMD components in space. or on Earth. although at a certain point after 1989 the Soviet delegation did allow the possibility that a number of tests and associated experiments not prohibited by the ABM Treaty could be conducted in space. proposing instead to completely prohibit the development. and prototypes of space-based BMD systems. or in space. Soviet diplomacy was following a rather flexible tactical line. but also the associated scientific research and tech- nological development and testing. once the USSR and the United States had reached agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms and on the elimination of Soviet and U. while suggesting that experts from both countries coordinate a list of equipment to be prohibited for launch into space during such tests. in the atmosphere. The Soviet negotia- tors focused their greatest efforts on denying the United States the freedom to conduct R&D of space-based BMD components. at research facilities. in the atmosphere. however. Moscow continued to oppose the U.ization of the ideology of the military use of space. and it further proposed to destroy the already existing ASAT systems. Between 1983 and 1984. The Soviet delegation affirmed the obligation of each country to open its laboratories to monitoring and an agreed-upon prohibition on testing of all mock-ups. The so-called package of proposals that the Soviet side presented at the Reyk- javik summit in 1986 anticipated that.S. criticizing any attempts at diluting this agree- ment. in particular under the guise of conducting research on national missile attack early warning and air defense systems. and deployment of any space-based weapons that could be used to strike objects on Earth. experimental models.37 In 1985. especially in light of the growing opposition to SDI both within the United States and among its NATO allies. This new approach created certain public relations problems for Washington. At the same time. including inspectors’ access to the relevant laboratories. and manu- facturing plants). intermediate-range missiles.S. the USSR proposed prohibiting not only the development and deployment of space-strike capabilities. The Soviet delegation placed its main emphasis on criticizing the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty advocated in 1985 by the United States. testing.36 The Soviet Union persistently used the nuclear and space arms negotiations to advocate the inviolability of the ABM Treaty in its original 1972 form. they would bilaterally abandon the development.S. accusations that the Soviet Union had long been pursuing its own determined and secret R&D efforts in this field. and deployment of any antimissile or antisatellite systems.S. leadership to take a different tack vikTOR miZin 57 . the Soviet delegation was forced to ward off U. test ranges. The Soviet Union declared its willing- ness to set up a very strict system of monitoring. This forced the U. Moscow agreed in 1987 that BMD research could be conducted in laboratories on Earth (for example.

the United States was pushing to draft an agreement on “certain measures promoting the cooperative transition to a regime with a greater emphasis on defense” (it should be noted that. and Medvedev came to adopt this idea as well). It was further agreed that the right of each side to determine its own course of action after the non-withdrawal term expired did not mean that a party could automatically withdraw from the ABM Treaty without explaining the nature of the threat against the “supreme interests” of that state (in keeping with Article xV of the ABM Treaty). the Soviet side proposed including the “Washington formula” in the text of a separate agreement on the observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed term. For its part. the two sides did agree to the requirement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time and to begin intensive discussions on strategic stability three years before that term was to end.by offering Moscow a superficially simpler way to achieve its goals. However. This was a unique kind of trap—after all. while for the USSR it was the space disarmament group. It was politically important for Moscow that the ABM Treaty be observed in its original 1972 form. a non-withdrawal agreement could not strip the parties of their ability to renounce the treaty if it came into conflict with the goal of averting a threat to the “supreme interests” of the state. Thereafter. the leadership first of the Soviet Union. Besides. as conditions changed. It also wanted the formula included in a protocol to the treaty on verification measures and the predictability of the strategic situ- ation’s development. 58 nOn-WEAPOniZATiOn OF OUTER SPACE . the two sides were never able to draft a com- mon text in light of the obvious ambiguity surrounding the issue of preventing withdrawal from the ABM Treaty at all costs. In late 1988. the spirit and letter of the ABM Treaty required such an explanation in any case (both before and after the expiration of a potential non-withdrawal agreement). devel- opment. The only issue was the credibility of the explanation. The two sides even had different names at the nuclear and space arms talks for the space discussion forum: the United States referred to it as the defense and space group. a party had the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty only under “extraordinary circumstances” that threatened the “supreme interests” of the state (Article xV). Nevertheless. Putin. rather than concluding a detailed agreement on which types of operations with orbital systems would be allowed or prohibited. the work focused on reaching consensus on the wording of the protocol. the two sides could agree to continue to abide by the ABM Treaty for a specific period of time. and testing of the systems and components authorized by the Treaty. This all went to show that the diplomats had gotten tangled up in their own legal constructions: after all. with rights to conduct research. at the December 1987 summit in Washington. It suggested that. which was a subjective and political matter rather than a legal one. then of Russia under presidents Yeltsin.

The American and Soviet sides were able to better understand the national characteristics of the research and development that produced these systems and components. or was merely bluffing to complicate the fate of the SDI program. especially considering the traditional opaqueness of everything involving Soviet defense (see chapter 3 for more details). a brief description of scheduled tests. It was anticipated that the protocol would establish the procedures for performing onsite inspections of BMD test facilities (to ensure that no systems prohibited by the treaty were to be launched into space). these negotiations led to an unprecedented level of openness in the most delicate areas of military technological activity.Although the work of the defense and space group in Geneva involved long. modernization. especially if conducted on a random or irregular basis. the Soviet delegation decided that visits to BMD research laboratories would make no practical sense. and an explanation of how this work and these tests met the limitations established by the ABM Treaty. and replacement of BMD systems and components. and discussed the definitions and authorized parameters of the space-based sen- sors that the United States was seeking to freely develop and deploy and even to endow with BMD radar capabilities. it neverthe- less helped to clarify a number of important concepts. making what had appeared impossible (such as transparency and vikTOR miZin 59 . and that the data exchanged should include a brief description of the work being con- ducted. and holding briefings on ongoing operations. On the other hand. In contrast to its previous proposal to open the laboratories. roadblocks could still have been thrown up by taking advantage of complexities in definition and interpretation. It was further proposed that the two sides should agree on a list of the BMD com- ponents that would be prohibited from being launched into space. conducting expert exchanges. subsequent experience has shown that negotiations can gain tremendous momentum in the presence of the mutual political will to reach agreement. The two sides also intended to exchange lists of the facilities carrying out research and testing on BMD com- ponents. which naturally raises questions as to whether the Soviet Union was genuinely committed. In light of what is now known about the vast range of R&D in the USSR at the time aimed at an asymmetrical response to weapons systems attacking in or from space. an indication of the places where this work was conducted. deployment. it hardly seems real- istic to expect that degree of transparency. For example. testing. Even if the United States had shown a willingness to reach practical agreements. On the whole. a brief description of the work scheduled to be done in the near future. The delegations reviewed procedures in great detail for exchanging data relat- ing to research and development. beginning at the moment such work is accessible to monitoring by national technical means of verification (NTMV). drawn-out exchanges over the meanings or interpretations of terms.” as well as for “mock-ups” and “prototypes” of such components. precise defini- tions were developed for such terms as BMD “components” and “subcomponents.

even for testing purposes. and when the entire military and strategic bal- ance changed drastically in the 1990s. forgo space-strike capabilities.S. 1983 The USSR unilaterally promises not to deploy antisatellite weapons in space. failed to utilize this unique window of opportunity. 60 nOn-WEAPOniZATiOn OF OUTER SPACE . as long as the other side refrains from such activity. and deployment The Soviet terms “space weapons” and of all space-based weapons that can strike “space-strike weapons” are quite flawed targets on the ground. or prohibited. testing. in the air. dogmatically obsessed at the time with the idea of a space-based BMD system. conducting research permitted by the ABM Steps should be taken to exclude the Treaty. and the 1991 Treaty Between the USSR and the U. The weaponization of space reappeared as a subject for negotiations only some 20 years later. whether systems that already exist and are still in the based in space or using other types of testing phase must be destroyed by both the mobile basing. including antisatellite weapons. this item was dropped for good. or in outer and incorrect. Washington. the antisatellite deployment of BMD components. Table 8. tion. The USSR has already tested and possibility of the arms race expanding deployed an antisatellite system and has a into outer space and both sides should BMD system set up around Moscow. testing. At the same time. 1983–1984 The development. American and Soviet Positions at the 1983–1988 Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations USSR U. as the intended research does not ment of space-strike weapons should be provide for the development. The United States is prepared to discuss the problems of strategic defense. The positions taken by the Soviet Union and the United States during the 1983–1988 negotiations on nuclear and space arms are compared in Table 8.verification) suddenly attainable. 1985 The development (including research and The SDI program is not subject to negotia- technological activity). on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I). and deploy. the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This is what happened with the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. including the operational BMD system that the Soviet Union has deployed around Moscow. The United States is space should be completely prohibited. that fall under the ABM United States and the USSR. Treaty ban. testing.S. together with some other issues that had remained unresolved since the late 1980s.

). They must also agree to ban the placement of arms in space. on land.S. pilot models. weapons. Reykjavik Meeting. This ban must cover the development of these weapons. electromagnetic rail guns. in the ocean. contracts. They must also abide by the authentic interpretation of the ABM Treaty. They must agree to ban space weapons that are only intended for offense: antisatellite systems using any bas- ing mode (with the elimination of the existing types of ASATs) and space-to-Earth class weapons that are capable of striking targets in space. and in the air from space. both inside and outside laboratories. particle-beam components outside these laboratories. including targeted scientific research work. particularly in ment to laboratories. to conduct space tests. as well as in countries involved in the development of space systems under U. opening the corre- sponding laboratories for inspection in both the United States and the USSR. 1986 The two sides must agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for fifteen years. September 1986 Agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years. and prototypes of space-based BMD systems. They must also agree to prohibit the testing and construction of mock-ups. November 1985 The two sides should open their laboratories for verification purposes. They must employ NTMV and onsite inspections. especially in space. The two sides must limit their space-based The two sides must retain their right antimissile weapons research and develop. vikTOR miZin 61 . They must also agree regard to systems based on new physical not to conduct tests of space-based BMD principles (laser weapons. etc.

these talks must take into account research that has already been completed and the situation that has developed by that time as a result of the elimination of strategic offensive arms. and manufacturing plants. At the same time. but this activity must be limited limit research to laboratories and links to laboratories.S. into space in the course of this research. agreement on the list of equipment that with heavy bombers and cruise missiles would be prohibited from being launched remaining untouched. the two sides must hold negotiations on the entire range of issues involving BMD systems and their links to strategic offensive arms. This applies to scientific the second stage to the USSR’s accep- research activities conducted at institutes.and land-based ballistic missiles. Within three to five years of the ten-year period’s expiration date. tance of the U. 1987 The USSR agrees to conduct of BMD The United States rejects proposals to research. offensive arms: the elimination of only Experts from the two sides must still reach sea. It also fails to cover full-scale space testing of traditional BMD components and contains no restrictions on the development or testing of BMD systems based on new physical principles and that are capable of replacing traditional BMD components. Only their deployment is banned. including those conducted in space. 62 nOn-WEAPOniZATiOn OF OUTER SPACE . April 1987 The United States proposes extending the deadline for the 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive arms from five to seven years and reducing the ABM Treaty non- withdrawal period from ten to seven years. nor “experimental” operations. February 7. position on strategic test ranges. 1987 The United States maintains that the ABM Treaty restricts neither research activities.

The two sides must enhance strategic stability safeguards by developing a “predictability package” that includes mutual laboratory visits. After 1994. mutual monitoring of space-based antimissile system testing. May 1987 The commitment by the two sides not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying antimissile systems extends through 1994. and annual exchanges of data on program activity. The December 1987 Washington Summit Meeting The two sides are obliged not to withdraw from the treaty for an agreed period of time. each will have the right to determine its own future course of action. then the withdrawal of one side from the ABM Treaty would release the other from the obligation of abiding by the Strategic Offensive Arms Reductions Treaty. It further binds them to con- tinue negotiations on antisatellite systems and space-to-Earth class weapons. and the term of its validity should depend on execution of the strategic offensive arms Treaty. which states that the two sides agree not to use their right to withdraw from the treaty for ten years and to refrain from placing certain space-based equipment in outer space. unless they reach some other agreement before then. at the end of this time. on Certain Measures to Strengthen the ABM Treaty Regime and Prevent an Arms Race in Space. both sides agree to engage in intensive discus- sions on strategic stability. If the sides fail to reach agreement on all BMD- related matters within two to three years before the Agreement is to expire. Three years before this term expires.S. unless the two sides agree otherwise. July 1987 (and again in December 1989) The USSR submits the draft Agreement between the USSR and the U. each side would have the right to stop abiding by the Treaty’s terms and begin deploying its BMD systems. vikTOR miZin 63 . The agreement should come into effect only after a 50 percent strategic offensive arms reduction agreement has taken effect.

were invited to visit U. With the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 26. American and Soviet diplomats reached an understanding at a Sep- tember 1989 meeting in Wyoming to abandon the Soviet linkage between the defense and space agreement and the strategic arms reduction agreement. January 1988 The USSR maintains that the commitment The United States submits the draft to comply with the ABM Treaty “as signed in Defense and Space Treaty on certain mea- 1972” implied the illegitimacy of the treaty’s sures promoting a cooperative transition “broad interpretation. from the Treaty without a threat to the meaning optical electronic and other “supreme interests” of the state (Article xV). there was a pause in U.38 After the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed in 1987. Bush administration in Washington. A curious episode occurred that same year: on October 5. Strategic arms negotiations resumed again only in the summer of 1989. 1988. proposals on a non-nuclear BMD system. meanwhile. including the fundamental and re-submits its draft Defense and obligations concerning the Treaty and its Space Treaty from January 22. as well as BMD tracking and guidance equipment (submit- ted for the second time in December 1989). Soviet repre- sentatives later officially clarified that this did not mean that Moscow had agreed to these proposals. laboratories involved in SDI work.S.-Soviet relations on nuclear and space weapons caused by the advent of the George H. the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station. It also after the expiration of the non-withdrawal submits a proposal to agree to allow the period did not signify the ability to withdraw testing of “information sensors” in space. Ultimately. surveillance equipment. The United States adheres to the “broad ington formula” in a separate ABM Treaty interpretation” of the Washington formula agreement. 1991.S. non-withdrawal period. The USSR further proposes that all agreements concern- ing verification of compliance with this agreement and predictability measures (in particular. which had been built in violation of the ABM Treaty. the negotiations on space that had been pursued since March 1985 came to an end. At the same time. The May-June 1988 Moscow Summit Meeting September-November 1988 The USSR proposes including the “Wash. W. the right to the deployment of a future anti-ballistic “to determine one’s own course of action” missile strategic defense system. and their rapid pace allowed for the signing of START I by 1991.S.” In addition. Soviet experts. Mikhail Gorbachev stunned his own diplomats at the Geneva negotiations by announcing that he was ready to discuss new U. which made it possible to conclude the work on START I. 64 nOn-WEAPOniZATiOn OF OUTER SPACE . 1991. the exchange of research program information) be included in a joint protocol to this agreement.

which provided for the launch of at least 1. 2000. proposal to deploy a so-called “Global Protection Against Limited Strikes” system. 1992. it may prove useful should any serious negotiations on preventing an arms race in space begin in the foreseeable future.000 ground-based interceptors of the GBI type. from the “Golden Age” of disarmament and arms control of the 1960s through the 1990s.39 In their joint statement of June 17.S.” However.ru/visit-lavrova. and for Disarmament: A Collection of Documents and Materials] (Moscow: Politizdat. however. Notes 1 Andrei Andreevich Gromyko. za razoruzheniye: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov [The USSR’s Battle Against the Nuclear Threat and the Arms Race. the presidents of the United States and Rus- sia agreed that their nations “should work together with allies and other interested states in developing a concept” of a global system “as part of an overall strategy against the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Yeltsin stressed that Moscow believed in unconditional compliance with all of the provisions of the treaty. including those related to various space-based anti- missile and antisatellite weapons..geneva. 3 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Adopted by Decree of the President of the Rus- sian Federation on April 21. explaining that the Russian leader had only meant cooperation on the development of joint missile attack early warn- ing systems and data exchange. http://www. The Russian representatives were subsequently forced to essentially disavow Yeltsin’s declaration on the possibility of conducting joint work on the basis of a “re-orientated” SDI program. while presenting a Sino-Russian draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space. after the collapse of the USSR.mid. Strategic Defense Initiative and the use of high technology developed by the Russian defense sector.html.” perhaps based on a “reoriented version of the U.ru/politics/2000-04-22/5_doktrina. ed. 2008.ng.000 small “Brilliant Pebbles” interceptor satellites and hundreds of SBIRS tracking satellites in orbit and called for the deployment of around 1. 1992.On January 31. the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects. the international community inherited a significant number of building blocks that could be used to draft potential future agreements to ban deploying weapons in space. There was also no accord reached on the basis of the Russian “Global Protection System” initiative.S. gonki vooruzheniyi.html. Russian President Boris Yeltsin proposed the creation of “a global system to protect the world community. which he made on February 12. Borba SSSR protiv yadernoy ugrozy. 1987).” When asked whether this meant that Russia was renouncing the 1972 ABM Treaty. in the early 1990s the United States and the USSR were unable to reach a compromise based on a U.41 This diverse collection of ideas and proposals has remained untapped for any bilateral or multilateral legally binding documents to the present day. vikTOR miZin 65 . http://www. 2 See Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s speech at the Conference on Disarmament.40 Thus.

state.” [Current Problems with the Progressive Development of International Law on Outer Space] Rossiyskiy Yezhegodnik Mezhdunarodnogo Prava [The Russian Yearbook of International Law] (Saint Petersburg: Rossiya-Neva. 98th Congress. J. Johnson. 42. Countermeasures and Arms Control (Washington: OTA.gov/cs/issues/space-aeronautics. 12 P. 2002. 1985). 16 P. Red Star in Orbit (New York: Random House. 21 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. GPO. l.1244 (October 17. Bezopasnost: rossiyskiy vybor [Security: The Russian Choice] (Moscow. Antisatellite Weapons. Hayes. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII). Politics. Mezhdunarodno-pravovye problemy predotvrascheniya razmescheniya oru- zhiya v kosmose [International Legal Problems Concerning the Prohibition of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space] (Moscow.globalsecurity. as well as a brief synopsis of the history of how agreement on the Treaty was reached. 1963.4 Raymond L.” International Security.S. A. Kosmos i mezhdunarodnoye pravo [Outer Space and International Law] (Moscow: MGIMO. S. no. 22 Report to the Congress on U. 95-96. 1. 11 White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Oberg. Mezhdunarodnoye kosmicheskoe pravo [International Space Law] (Moscow: MGIMO. (London: Taylor and Francis. 1986). 5 “Vopros o vseobschem i polnom razoruzheniyi” [The Question of Universal.html#1. 9 Kosmos i pravo.” Berkeley Technology Law Journal. Gennady P. 1989). and the Strategic Defense Initiative (Berkeley: Univ.I. 2003). State Department website at http:www.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/space1.S. “Non-Proliferation and Free Access to Space: The Dual-Use Dilemma of the Outer Space Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime. vol. http:// www. Zhukov. Pravovye problemy poleta cheloveka v kosmos [The Legal Problems Connected with Man’s Flight into Outer Space] (Moscow. 1981). S. March 31.” Arms Control Today (Decem- ber 1983): 2. “Approaches to an ASAT Treaty. United States Military Space into the Twenty-First Century. 5 (Winter 1980–1981): 25–40. Strategic Defense and Antisatellite Weapons Hear- ing. 14 See: A. 1987). Soviet Military Strategy in Space (London: Jane’s Publishing Company Limited.S.org/wmd/world/russia/r-36o. Policy on ASAT Arms Control. A Shield in Space? Technologies. December 13. 2002). 19 U. Office of Technology Assessment. B. 1999). Congress. 6 See Kosmos i pravo [Space and Law] (Moscow: IGPAN. A/RES/1884 (XVIII) A/PV. 9. which appears on a U. Garthoff. Sept. Vereshchetin. 1985). 162. “Banning the Bomb in Outer Space. of California Press. Bhupendra Jasani. Total Disarma- ment]. 1977). 1984). 217. 20 Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues (National Academy Press.htm. [S. for National Security Studies. no. no. L. A. 1984) 149. 1984 (Washington: U. 18 W. 8 See Kosmos i pravo. 17 See http://www. V. 66 nOn-WEAPOniZATiOn OF OUTER SPACE . ed. Lakeoff and H. 2 (Spring 1994).” in Space Weapons: The Arms Control Dilemma. 1963). 7 United Nations General Assembly. 85. 2nd session (Washington: U. 13 B.]. 10 N. Piradov.]. “Déjà-vu: The ASAT Debate in Historical Context. Slocombe. 23 See the eighth chapter in the study: Kosmicheskoye oruzhiye: dilemmy bezopasnosti [Space Weapons: Security Dilemmas] (Moscow: Mir. Hurewitz. Occasional paper. USAF Inst.ostp. Yakovenko. US National Space Policy. Deistvuiuschiye mezhdunarodnye soglasheniya i predotvrascheniye razmescheniya oruzhiya v kosmicheskom prostranstve [Outer Space and Law: International Agreements in Force and the Prohibition of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space] (CD/1780. 456–468.S. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. Stares. 1984). 1986). 182–184. Mezh- dunarodnoye sotrudnichestvo v kosmose (pravovye voprosy) [International Cooperation in Space (Legal Issues)] (Moscow. GPO. York. Arbatov.S. May 2006). 191. 1999). 15 S. [S. “Aktualnye problemy progressivnogo razvitiya mezhdunarodnogo kosmicheskogo prava. 1980). 1985).

Document A/36/192. Oznobishchev. no. 1981. Novoye vremya (special issue. Illusions. Piradov.acronym. 8 (1992). 41 A. Oznobishchev. A. Sagdeyev and A. S. 1989.” New York Times.” Space Policy (May 1988): 112–114. 35 T. April 7. vikTOR miZin 67 . 40 V. no. eds. Knopf. August 26. Arms Control in Space: Workshop Pro- ceedings. Moskvin and S. “SOI: Opasnosti. 1984.” Defending Deterrence: Managing the ABM Treaty Regime into the 21st Century. 1988). 1989).39. Strategic Defense Policies in Retrospect. “Limitations and Allowances for Space-Based Weapons. 33 Conference on Disarmament Document CD/OS/WP. 36 See: S. “Rossiya-SShA: Realno li voyenno-kosmicheskoye sotrudnichestvo?” [Russia-USA: Is Military and Outer-Space Cooperation Realistic?].htm. “Lies and Rigged ‘Star Wars’ Test Fooled the Kremlin.S. CD/476. 134–151. Rogov. Document A/39/243b. CD/274. 1987).org. 25 United Nations General Assembly. “Creating a World Space Organization. Doty. 1982. June 1992). August 2. 1984. 26 United Nations General Assembly. (Wash- ington: Pergamon-Brassey’s.S. 1–2 (1989) 165. Otnosheniya. the accusations referred to the alleged Soviet plans to give antimis- sile warfare capabilities to the country’s S-300 (SA-10) and S-300B (SA-12) air defense systems. 31 “Russian and China Introduce a Draft Treaty on Space Weapons. 66 (September 2002).uk/dd/dd66/66nr07. Chayes and P. 32 Conference on Disarmament Document CD/777. R. Alternatives]. Talbott. March 20. http://www. Velikhov. 28 United Nations General Assembly.” Science and Global Security 1. 34 Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings.24 E. Weiner. August 18. Kokoshin. The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and Nuclear Peace (New York: Alfred A. 37 More specifically. and Congress. no. and several of its experimental land-based lasers. its Okno optical-electronic space surveillance system in Nurek (Tajikistan). Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunar. 1983. illyuzii. Mizin. July 31.” Implications of Strategic Defense Deployments for US-Russian Rela- tions (Washington: Stimson Center. and S. 38 “Visit to Sary Shagan and Kyshtym.” Disarmament Diplomacy. September 27. 39 B. 1987. OTA-BP-ISC-28. 1984. 27 U. 30 Arms Control in Space: Workshop Proceedings. 27. Congress. 29 A. May 1984. August 20. “Swings in the Soviet and U. alternativy” [SDI: Dan- gers. Office of Technology Assessment. Document A/38/194. Carter.

05 COdES OF COndUCT FOR OUTER SPACE SERgEy OZnObiShChEv .

Bush administration did all it could to avoid finalizing any formal security agree- ments with Russia. particularly in the field of space activity—a field in which the United States had traditionally maintained a free hand and where it felt itself to be technologically and economically superior. the world community has developed much of the diplomatic and legal foundation for preventing an arms race in space and ensuring the security of civilian and military spacecraft and activities there. However. the George W. It included only a general appeal “to contrib- ute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the preven- tion of an arms race in outer space.Since the beginning of the space age. Recent international efforts to erect new legal barriers to an arms race in space have been feeble and unsuccessful. the lengthy discussions that eventually produced United Nations General Assembly Resolution 57 of 2002 on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space resulted in provisions containing too many compromises and attached little responsibility to the parties involved. In the end.S. Despite its stated goal of establishing relations based on partnership. the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects for SERgEy OZnObiShChEv 69 . Aside from the negative U.” 1 Russia introduced the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weap- ons in Outer Space. international diplomacy has failed to build on these accom- plishments during the past decade. attitude. Russia’s continuing difficult relations with the West have also contributed to this failure.

one of which involved attempt- ing to reach less formal agreements. accounting and counting rules. 1967). it did represent another step forward in this field.UN discussion in 2008.” 2 then the same phrase was applied to “any kinds of weapon” 3 in the new version. a 40-year-old document (January 27. the various versions of codes of conduct might be brought to the forefront as politically binding documents unencumbered by complex definitions.” According to Perino. This treaty contained only one restrictive article—Article II. It is worth considering these drafts in greater detail. including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Instead. experts are discussing several versions of such codes introduced at both the national and international levels using the terminology of documents cir- culating at official levels. which is a word-for-word match for the phraseology of Article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. if such full-scale negotiations ever do begin.” White House press secretary Dana Perino stated that “the United States opposes the development of legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit access to or use of space. and methods of verification and data exchange. However. then for objective reasons (reviewed in detail in the previous chapters). above all the United States. they are likely to be protracted and arduous. However. 70 COdES OF COndUCT FOR OUTER SPACE . The discussions and gradual coordination of principles needed to adopt such a code of conduct would bring about necessary but voluntary restrictions. such as a code of conduct or an opera- tional framework for work in outer space. based on the acknowledgment that a full-scale agreement would be unattainable given the prevailing conditions. while broad- ening support for the fundamental principles of using outer space exclusively for peaceful or military-support purposes. such an agreement would be impossible to verify. Presently. but with more general and indirect limitations that would make them palatable to leading Western nations. Although the Russian draft failed to achieve a breakthrough in the international legal principles preventing an arms race in space. As an interim solution. The new administration in Washington could potentially lead to a more favorable consideration of the issues surrounding the non-militarization of space. The United States immediately rejected any possibility of concluding a treaty on the “placement of weapons in outer space. the adminis- tration advocated preventing an arms race in space by “continuing the dialogue to enhance transparency and increase trust among the interested parties. install such weapons on celestial bodies. if the Treaty of that time had presented the require- ment “not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weap- ons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.” 4 The emerging deadlock over ways to create a legal foundation for the non- weaponization of space motivated the world’s experts to seek out alternative approaches and methods for achieving this goal.

However. Another relevant precedent is the highly detailed European Code of Conduct in Coastal Zones.5 Its provisions are mostly declarative in nature and not supported by any binding obligations on the member states. also stopped providing information about its vehicle launches. excessive. although both countries continued to submit notification on strategic missile launches in accordance with START I. U. approved in April 1999 by the authorized committee of the Council of Europe. a document of this type does establish certain regulations for the development and export of missiles and missile technologies. This development is telling: only 34 nations joined the Missile Technology Con- trol Regime adopted in 1987. In the absence of a reliable regional and global security system. primarily because its restrictions were perceived as unverifiable. A similar objective is in fact being pursued by those who favor drafting codes of conduct for outer space. policy. adopted in November 2002 in The Hague. opting instead to wait for the Center to open. such as the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. and establishes a framework for signatories to register their space launches and report these to other member states. Washington refused to present any information about its booster launches. a significant number of nations would prefer to have the freedom to develop and use missile technology themselves. poses a serious problem for the code. At its core are a set of basic rec- ommendations for the future development of national legislation and international legal documents that address the comprehensive management of coastal activity. As the center was never operational.COdES OF COndUCT AS inTERnATiOnAl lEgAl REgUlATiOnS When concluding a formal agreement would be overly complex. it is common global practice to draft codes of conduct. which always strives for the utmost freedom of action in space. Still. Citing the missile launch notifica- tion requirement adopted in the 2002 joint Declaration on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Noti- fications of Missile Launches. SERgEy OZnObiShChEv 71 . and calls for reductions in the national stockpiles of such missiles.S. Russia. which until then had been observing this provision of the code. In 2008. The new code contains declarations of the need to prevent and restrain missile proliferation and of the importance of reinforcing disarmament and nonprolifera- tion mechanisms and increasing the transparency of missile programs. There are now more than 120 nations party to this code. the United States never presented any data at all. or politically difficult. It consists of fifteen chapters describing the main problems associated with the use and preservation of coastal areas.

it could hardly be expected that nations during an armed conflict would abide by bans on interfering with such systems as GLONASS. None- theless. a number of similar drafts are cur- rently being discussed within the expert community and even in official circles.dRAFTing COdES FOR SPACE The history of negotiations on space weapons over previous decades (including antisatellite and space-based BMD systems) reveals the enormous complexity of trying to impose treaty-based legal restrictions on space systems. In light of the dissolution of the ABM Treaty due to the United States’ unilateral withdrawal in 2002 and the subsequent stall in negotiations on nuclear weapons reductions. and finally it should indicate the types of weapons that could be deployed in space or fired from Earth against spacecraft. these proposals went much farther than did those of the foreign experts participating in the Stimson Center project. As later became clear. Several versions of a possible COC now enjoy reasonably broad support throughout the world. NAVSTAR. Another potential objective for the COC might be to impose certain limits on the provocative deployment of destabilizing surveillance and reconnaissance systems in space. which are the primary systems supporting precision-guided weapons. the political environment for such negotiations has become even less favorable. In explaining the logic behind this formulation of the COC. deployment. Prohibitions of this kind should be in effect during times of peace and war. and use of any weapons systems designed with this purpose in mind. The Russian experts suggested that the COC should ban any activities aimed at either destroying or reducing the stable operation of systems in space and should restrict the creation. Vladimir Dvorkin. during which the Russian participants gradually formed a common position and a set of proposals for what the COC should con- tain. At the same time. should leading nations adopt the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (COC). the COC should primarily focus on identify- ing the objects of space systems whose working capacity can be disturbed by outside intrusion. In the opinion of the Russian experts. or with the functions of other military or dual-use support systems. the authors of this particular COC draft avoided any descriptive definitions of the subject. As the scope of legal limitations has been disputed. Stimson Center. The Russian proposals also include expanded suggestions for these definitions. deployment. and Sergey Oznobishchev) took direct part in developing one version under the auspices of the Henry L. and 72 COdES OF COndUCT FOR OUTER SPACE . the Russian side pointed out that in theory this document should have banned the testing. focusing instead on the rights and responsibilities of space-capable nations. this could help increase the level of national responsibility in this area and create the conditions that would favor drafting more binding and formal agreements in the future. Several of the authors of this book (Alexei Arbatov. It should then determine the ways in which these objects could be affected and the methods that could be used. and Galileo.

Another approach would be to voluntarily agree to prohibit certain weapons systems or development stages (for example. The long- term goals could include the prohibition of weapons systems designed to destroy objects in space from Earth. it need not contain strict definitions. described above. The Russian experts felt that the COC should provide an opportunity for the parties to refrain SERgEy OZnObiShChEv 73 . testing).use of all destruction facilities that are aimed at objects of space systems and all means that impede their functioning. so the COC could potentially appeal to nations to refrain from test- ing strategic BMD systems that could target spacecraft. or to target spacecraft. testing. It must be stressed that verification of compliance with these terms using national technical means would be tremendously difficult. and other weapons (except for nuclear weapons. there have been no formal limitations on the development and deployment of these systems. Since the U. involves making a declaration of rather general principles that would evoke no objections and would be acceptable to most par- ties. The Russian experts underscored the special role played by strategic BMD systems. but rather to allow the nations to declare their intention to keep within certain developmental limits and to refrain from pursuing certain kinds of activity. precise restrictions and verification procedures. such as the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. and use of weapons that could either destroy or interfere with terrestrial spacecraft control and communication systems. For that reason. respectively). In this. kinetic. electromagnetic. production. the COC would only be able to call for restraint by the nations in developing. or sanctions for violating its terms. The goal of the COC should not be to prohibit outright. pre- ferred by Western colleagues. The restrictions could be much stricter on weapons systems deployed in space to attack other objects in space or on Earth. dangerously close spacecraft flybys. deployment. and use of these systems. Inasmuch as the COC is essen- tially a statement of intentions based on voluntary accord between nations. which unquestion- ably have antisatellite potential. and so on). This includes laser. it would be similar to other documents of this kind. and using these weapons systems. The parties could also declare their intention to agree on the characteristics of stability and on actions that could destabilize the situation in space (a sudden buildup of particular sat- ellite constellations. The experts also mentioned the problem of banning the development. testing. The COC could contain an appeal that nations refrain from the development. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. There is currently a wide variety of weapons systems with such capabilities that are either available for use or presently under- going testing. One of these. which are already prohibited from being launched into space or tested by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and by the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.S. particle-beam. The COC could be developed conceptually in several ways. testing.

France. went much further.C. where military programs and their financing are transpar- ent. including the military space programs of all of the participating countries. while the final responsibility calls for the establishment of “consultative pro- cedures” to resolve questions relating to compliance with the COC. and consult with other space-faring states regarding activities of concern in space. The model COC concludes with nine “responsibilities for space-faring states. and the United States. or monitoring. D. limitation. evidence of violations could be convincingly confirmed or refuted only in the presence of precise specifications of what is subject to prohibition. so long as their viola- tions remain hidden from the view of the world community. attempt to minimize space debris. and military agencies and the military-industrial complex are monitored by independent government and civilian groups. such a responsibility would imply refraining from testing antisatellite systems that would result in the destruction of target satel- lites. As the authors of this draft saw it. abide by the “rules of safe space operation” (not yet propounded in law). Only a few of the Russian proposals were incorporated into the model COC of October 2007 that resulted from the joint efforts by non-governmental organiza- tions from Canada. Without these. Although this provision may be subject to rather loose interpretation. it established the grounds for “the right of consultation” mentioned above. authoritarian lead- ers could feel free to breach any code they might sign. Perhaps the most positive contribution the COC could make would be for it to establish the political preconditions needed for a rapid transition to negotiations on legally binding trea- ties on prevention of space weapons developments. Even then. Another important responsibility was to refrain from creating interference harmful to objects in space. Russia. The model COC is most specific in its declaration of the responsibility of nations to strive to minimize the amount of space debris resulting from their activities. It recognizes certain rights of space-faring nations. as the document was the product of a compromise aimed at gaining the approval of the leading nations at an official level. Most of the model COC consists of acknowledgments typical of such interna- tional documents.6 It could not have been otherwise. A commitment to the COC as a joint declaration of intent carries more weight in democratic nations. including the right to self-defense under the UN Charter. such as the importance of a number of currently existing prin- ciples and acts for the peaceful use of outer space. This means that a precondition for adopting such documents as the COC must be a considerable degree of transparency in the associated areas. Japan. The draft developed by the Eisenhower Institute in Washington.” including the responsibility to respect the rights of other space-faring nations.7 Its proposed Framework for Space Security should probably be classified 74 COdES OF COndUCT FOR OUTER SPACE .from developing weapons systems in space by voluntarily refusing to either test or deploy such weaponry.

the Frame- work proposed establishing a jointly sponsored Coordinated Space Awareness Center capable of detecting. Therefore. The proposals in the Framework are thus more specific. Unlike the model COC. The viability of a COC was boosted considerably by the Council of the European Union at the end of 2008 in its proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activi- ties. the prin- ciples contained in this draft document are also rather general: there are no outright restrictions on the development. safety and integrity of space objects in orbit. The appearance of this European Union draft represents the first indication to date that this type of document is now moving from the discus- sion stage to the practical. As may be seen from the provisions cited above. Under the document’s general principles.” or the need for countries to “take all the appropriate measures and cooperate in good faith to prevent harmful interference in outer space activities.as a voluntary agreement rather than a treaty. the damage or destruction of outer space objects. this draft is also plagued by the same political problems as noted above and represents something of an interim link between codes and treaties. Its goal is to coordinate the actions of governments that recognize the need to adopt certain norms for strengthening the security of all participants in space activity. signatories shall “resolve to share” information annually on “national space policies and strategies. such as freedom of access to outer space while “fully respecting the security. tracking. the participating states would resolve to abide by a certain set of prin- ciples on the use of outer space. the document enjoins its signa- tories to “refrain from any intentional action which will or might bring about.” 9 In the section dedicated to space operations. it proposes a ban on the deployment and testing of weapons components for space-based missile defense systems. as these would be “indistinguishable from a destructive space-based weapon. testing. although for understandable reasons its definitions remain rather general and the details of its verification measures largely undeveloped. and identifying man-made objects in orbit around the Earth. including basic objectives for secu- rity and defense related activities. or deployment of any weapons systems that target space objects or can be used from space against other objects in space or on Earth. In addition.” 8 In order to create and strengthen trust-building measures in this area.” To meet these objectives. which promulgated a number of important principles intended to enhance progress toward averting an arms race in space. the Council of the European Union has declared its support for the enclosed Code of Conduct. directly or indirectly. the Framework presents an entire list of basic definitions for the purposes of the document. SERgEy OZnObiShChEv 75 . It proposes a specific set of obligations that each party to the agreement must accept. key among which is an agreement to refrain from testing destructive antisatellite weapons in space and deploying any space-based antisatellite systems.” 10 In its cover letter. nor does it contain any definitions of its main tenets and terms.

the necessary restrictions would come into play and consensus on a num- ber of basic principles relating to the peaceful use of space would increase. not the United States. this would mark a step toward a broader consensus among a number of leading countries (including the chief American allies) about the importance of preventing such a race. In the course of discussing and gradually achieving compromise on principles for a COC. should relieve nations of their responsibility to develop stricter legal restrictions to ensure by treaty that space is used only for peaceful purposes. its statements suggest that the United States has decided in favor of the political and legal approach to safeguarding activities in space.S. Barack Obama promised to “restore U. In his election campaign. Nonetheless.The potential signatories would be the members of the European Union. and verifiable treaties in this vital field. this would also set the stage for this ini- tiative to move on to the global arena.-Russian relations and the decline in the mutual trust needed to achieve progress. if adopted. A truly constructive approach could eventually result in practical. some serious obstacles will have to be overcome before agreements could be concluded. vklyuchaya Lunu i drugie nebesnye tela” [An Agreement on the Principles of the Actions of Governments in Regard to the Study and Use of Outer Space. 2 “Dogovor o printsipakh deyatelnosti gosudarstv po issledovaniyu i ispolzovaniyu kosmi- cheskogo prostranstva.S. Notes 1 “Predotvrashchenie gonki vooruzheniy v kosmicheskom prostranstve” [Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space]. None of this. A/RES/57/57. However. there are also some grounds for optimism in the change of administration in the United States. and transparency measures. even if only in words. one of which is the recent deterioration in U. which in turn would put pressure on Washington to adopt such restrictions. which has pro- vided the first hints of a shift in Washington’s position. leadership on space issues. policy. So far. the main source of concern today in terms of the threat of an arms race in space. verifica- tion options. if this promise should become active U. however.S. legally binding. and the resolution of numerous other complex issues. What lies ahead is a serious discussion of the advantages and shortcomings of the various draft treaties and codes. where its provisions could potentially be expanded with new restrictions. identification of areas of agreement. including a worldwide ban on weapons to interfere with sat- ellites and a ban on testing antisatellite weapons. who had enthusiasti- cally supported Obama’s candidacy. which would facilitate subsequent progress toward a legally binding agreement.” 11 This statement quite possibly reflects the input of Susan Eisenhower and her colleagues.” For the first time the United States would adopt a “code of conduct for space-faring nations. Aside from the initiative by the European Union. Should the Euro- pean nations adopt the proposed code. 76 COdES OF COndUCT FOR OUTER SPACE .

” http://www.consilium. 10 Ibid. 7 “Framework of Space Security: An Alternative to the Weaponization of Space. “Annex II. Rejects Treaty on the Non-Deployment of Arms in Space].org/pub.mid.” See: “International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17175. Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies]. Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities” (Brussels. January 21.” http://www.S.pdf.europa. http://www. http://register. http://www.ru/news/2008/02/12/reject. eisenhowerinstitute. 9 Council of the European Union. 6 “Model Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations.com/issues/defense.un. 4 “SSHA otvergli dogovor o nerazmeshchenii oruzhiya v kosmose” [U. 2007.org/russian/docu- men/convents/hague. http://lenta. 1967. and to provide annual information on “the number and generic class of ballistic missiles launched during the preceding year. 2008). 5 The Code also includes provisions proclaiming the nations’ agreement on the need to make annual declarations outlining their ballistic missile policies and single-use space launch vehicle programs. 3 “Dogovor o predotvrascheniyi razmescheniya oruzhiya v kosmicheskom prostranstve. 8 Ibid. 11 “Preventing Arms Race in Outer Space: Barack Obama and Joe Biden on Defense Issues. primeneniya sily ili ugrozy siloj v otnosheniyi kosmicheskikh objektov: Proekt” [An Agree- ment on the Prohibition of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force in Relation to Objects in Space: A Project].barackobama. 1997): 625–630.dot. December 3.pdf. http://www.cfm?ID=575. en08.ru/ns-dvbr. SERgEy OZnObiShChEv 77 .nsf/8329e2a 2d0f85bdd43256a1700419682/432569d800226387c32573ee002c0db8?OpenDocument.” A/57/724.” released by the Stimson Center.stimson. October 24. Deystvuyuscheye mezh- dunarodnoye pravo 3 (Moscow: MNIMP Publishing House.org/themes/international/fos/framework.

06 PREvEnTing An ARmS RACE in SPACE AlExEi ARbATOv .

It is also quite telling that no new disarmament agreements have taken legal effect since 1994 (START I). The remaining treaties and agreements have not been signed. the current political. Despite the Cold War ending two decades ago. from the United States’ failure to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to its decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty at the begin- ning of the current decade. military/strategic.The enormous complexity of banning or limiting weapons in space through legal means is evident from the experience of negotiations conducted to prohibit such weaponry. for a number of reasons. and legal environment for such negotiations and agreements is even less favorable. or have been ratified but remain unsupported by a system of counting rules and verification and therefore have not come into effect (Table 9). the near total dismantlement of the system of international disarmament treaties. or have been signed but not rati- fied. the status of which is highly unclear. has adversely affected the environment for negotia- tions. First. with the exception of the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). AlExEi ARbATOv 79 .

in Outer Space and Under Water verification measures Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 1967 In effect. Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 1994 2009 (START I) Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on Further 1993 Has not come into effect Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1996 Has not come into effect (not ratified by the U. 1972 The U. not provided with a Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass verification system Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty) Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Limita. provided with sphere.Table 9. provided with ate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) verification measures. Collapse of the Nuclear Disarmament System dOCUmEnT yEAR STATUS SignEd Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmo. 1963 In effect. provided with tion of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (also verification measures known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty) TTBT) Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on Under. not provided with a in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. 1979 Has not come into effect tion of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on Intermedi. 1987 Implemented. verification system insufficient Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of 1971 In effect. 1976 In effect. and some other countries) The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty — The negotiations that began in 1993 are in a deadlock . including verification system the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (The Outer Space Treaty) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 In effect.S.S. Rus- sia considers withdrawing Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the 1991/ Expired on December 5. withdrew from the tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) Treaty in 2002 Interim Agreement Between the USSR and the USA 1972 Expired in 1977 on Certain Measures with Respect to Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I) Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Limita. 1974 In effect. provided with ground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes verification measures Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Limita.

and Iraq. the new U. And it cannot be ruled out that the antisatellite weapons devel- AlExEi ARbATOv 81 . independent—factor in deterring an aggressor from using its armed forces…. or under the pretext that such weapon systems would be impossible to prohibit or limit.S. in some cases.2 Although Russia has not been named as a potential foe. for their part.3 Only a minority of Russian experts questions these ideas. As Russian military experts have written. Prompt Global Strike strategy employs conven- tionally armed strategic delivery vehicles (Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles) against enemy targets. further complicate matters by seeking to create instruments of war in space. “Considering the growing dependence of modern armed forces effective- ness on the space component…. Rus- sia’s official military and political leadership and expert community have. Absorbing the recent experiences of Yugoslavia. which would hardly be possible without reliance on space-based support systems. which are general in nature. primarily the United States. orbital information networks and other types of support (non-weapon) systems are becoming the most important and irreplaceable component of modern conven- tional warfare. Moscow does not believe that such expensive conventionally armed delivery vehicles are to be used solely against rogue nations. Framework Agreement Between the Russian Federa. either with the blatant goal of securing military superiority. making them inevitable targets for attack. is not in full effect: does not have counting rules and verifica- tion measures Note: The table does include nuclear-free zone treaties. The threat and actual use of antisatellite systems against the enemy could be viewed as an additional—and. At the same time.4 This concept of repelling aerospace attacks clearly prioritizes striking at the most vulnerable link of such a threat (spacecraft). Afghanistan. 1997 Has not come into effect tion and the USA on the Reduction of Strategic Arms (START III) Agreement Between Russia and the USA on the 1997 Has not come into effect Delimitation of Strategic and Non-Strategic BMD Treaty Between Russia and the USA on the Strategic 2002 Remains in effect until Offensive Reductions (SORT) December 31. Key: Treaties still In effect Treaties that never entered into effect Treaties likely to expire or become void The military space programs of certain nations. 2012. countered with a new military doctrine that focuses on repelling aerospace attacks. relying on antisatellite systems to execute the attacks.1 As an example.

sat- ellite interception experiment of 2008 have confirmed yet again. establishing military bases or conducting military tests and maneuvers on celestial bodies or in orbit around them. as did the largely positive response the draft received from most of the conference participants. During that same year. Following the U. although it perhaps did not resolve all of the many issues. compounding the difficulties of successful negotiations. and deployment of antisatellite weapons in space. conducting hostile actions or using force on celestial bodies or in orbit around them. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002. a new Russian-Chinese draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) was presented at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. or placing them in orbit around these bodies. The crisis provided an outlet for all the latent griev- ances. as the Chinese antisatellite system test of 2007 and the U. and.S. Although these positive precon- ditions are critical to establishing a favorable environment for future negotiations. The subject of the non-militarization and non-weaponization of space remains just as relevant today. and animosity that the two nations had built up against each other over the preceding two decades as a consequence of the growing number of problems that remain unresolved but are masked by cosmetic declarations of partnership and cooperation. they by no means eliminate the need for a thorough study of all of the aspects involved. there have been no restrictions on the development. The law also tacitly allows for anti-BMD systems and weapons. these prohibitions are not yet supported by a system of verification and monitoring.oped for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation could become the ‘bridle’ that greatly restrains implementation of those ambitious plans by the American and NATO ‘cowboys. in the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict in the South Caucasus.S. mistrust. as 82 PREvEnTing An ARmS R ACE in SPACE .-Russian relations has also recently increased. testing. installing them on celestial bodies. testing. it at least affirmed the urgent nature of the problem. with improved political relations between the leading powers and renewed serious disarmament negotiations—particularly on nuclear arms—space will inevitably return to the disarmament agenda. and deliberately deploying debris in orbits in order to disrupt the normal operation of spacecraft (provisions of the 1977 Convention).’” 5 Tension in U.S. The law does not currently prohibit the placement of any weapons in space that are not weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless. nor is there any prohibition on the develop- ment. PROPOSAlS FOR UnivERSAl AgREEmEnTS Although contemporary space law prohibits placing nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruc- tion in orbit around the Earth. The following are also prohibited: testing nuclear weapons in outer space. or deployment of space-based BMD systems or their components. which is just as critical to the prospects of the negotiations.

2002. the distinction was drawn between two types of space objects: objects that are designed to execute launches and remain under national jurisdiction. In enhancement of common legal prac- tice. Subsequently. including bilateral agreements and existing legal regimes. or placed in outer space by any other means. and the staging of applied military space experiments of any type. the term “weapon in outer space” is defined as “any device placed in outer space. The Russian interpretation of international space law accepts the standard boundary between the atmosphere and space as being 100–110 kilometers above sea level. or leaving orbit around any celestial body towards this celestial body. The draft PPWT was submitted to the Conference with a research mandate in 2008 in hopes that if the reviews were favorable the appropriate committee would initiate discussions on the draft.well as active and passive satellite defenses. and that nations are entitled to explore and use outer space freely for peaceful purposes.” At the same time. which has been AlExEi ARbATOv 83 . or on any celestial body. 2008. the use of force or the threat of force against objects in space. and objects that have been accelerated to the first (orbital) or second (escape) cosmic velocities to enter space. with the latter falling under the jurisdiction of international space law. The preamble of the document reaffirms that the role of outer space has been expanding steadily. The first suggestion that a universal agreement should be achieved to prohibit deployment of any weapons in outer space. It notes the positive influence exerted by existing agreements on arms control and disarmament in outer space.6 This issue had already been under discussion at the Conference for over five years. except the Earth. In 2004–2005. the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China presented a joint draft of the PPWT at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. the term “outer space object” was further defined as “any device designed to function in outer space which is launched into an orbit around any celestial body. except those involving hostile environmental modification techniques.” This definition is not a new one. and is a fea- ture of the laws of a number of nations. or moving from any celestial body towards another celestial body. For the purposes of the Treaty. 2001. Specifically. or located in orbit around any celestial body. and a moratorium on the deployment of weapons in outer space until conclusion of such an agreement was made by the Russian foreign minister at the 56th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 24. based on any physical principle. laser) and radio electronic countermea- sures. the development and deployment in space of optical electronic (for example. a working paper entitled “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space. On February 12. Russia and China provided the Conference with materials about the rules of international law that regulate military activity in outer space. Article I defines the term “outer space” as “the space above the Earth in excess of 100 km above sea level. the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” was submitted to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on June 27.

the States Parties shall implement agreed confidence- building measures on a voluntary basis.” It stipulates that a weapon will be considered to have been deployed in outer space if it orbits the Earth at least once. or the threat of such actions. binding document to control weap- ons in outer space. actions aimed at destroying them. or follows a section of this orbit before leaving it. Germany. along with the relevant argumentation (Article VII). announced that it intends to play a constructive part in discussing the draft. The Russian-Chinese PPWT initiative was generally well received by the inter- national community (with the notable exception of the United States). not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects. not to install such weapons on celestial bodies and not to place such weapons in outer space in any other manner. but do not enter Earth’s orbit. the interested parties are to consult with each other with the goal of settling the matter through negotiation and cooperation. Germany. the States Parties should fail to come to an agreement after such consul- tations. The terms “use of force” and “threat of force” are defined as “any hostile actions against objects in space. unless agreed otherwise” (Article VI). the dispute can be referred by the interested State Party to the executive organization of the PPWT. in particular. 84 PREvEnTing An ARmS R ACE in SPACE . or to eliminate population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or inflict damage on them. and that it favors adopting a new. or is permanently stationed somewhere in outer space.specially produced or converted to destroy.” Verification of compliance with the Treaty must be addressed in an additional protocol. If. “the States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons. inter alia. on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere. like the other members of the European Union.” According to Article II of the draft PPWT. and not to assist or induce other States. This excludes various classes of ballistic missiles that transit through outer space to carry out their military missions (including satellite interception). including the Charter of the United Nations and the Outer Space Treaty. The draft indicates that “with a view to promoting confidence in compli- ance with the provisions of the Treaty and ensuring transparency and confidence- building in outer space activities. including. If a dispute does arise. believes that the prime objective has now become to discuss and adopt the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activity as a way to improve security in this sphere. groups of States or international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty. however. temporarily or permanently disrupting their normal functioning or deliberately changing their orbit parameters.” Article IV of the draft PPWT declares: “Nothing in this Treaty may be interpreted as impeding the exercise by the States Parties of their right to explore and use outer space for peaceful purposes in accordance with international law. damaging them. An executive organization of the PPWT will be created specifically as a mechanism to be used for resolving disputes that arise from the application or interpretation of its provisions. damage or disrupt the normal func- tioning of objects in outer space.

verification capabilities (which usually apply to space weapons based on Earth) are absolutely key in determining what may or may not be prohibited or restricted during the first stage of the negotiations. This marks a significant departure from the unrealistic but comprehensive Soviet stance of the 1980s. It is also interesting that this treaty covers only weapons that have been deployed in space and excludes Earth-to-space systems.S. Instead. as did the Netherlands. AlExEi ARbATOv 85 . high-tech war. the United States is interested only in discussing specific transparency and confidence-building issues that could help resolve individual problems linked to the use of space. In practical terms. apparently because China and possibly Russia have been develop- ing land-based antisatellite systems as an asymmetrical response to a potential U. Romania. which is theoreti- cally capable of degrading their nuclear deterrence potential.S. strategic BMD program. as was the case with the negotiations on SALT I and SALT II during the 1970s. space-based BMD system. if ever. In the interim. It is obvious that this coincidence of interests stems from their concern over the U. The highly advanced technical systems that the draft covers relate to strategic weapons and systems that are essentially only available to a few nations.Moreover. along with Kazakhstan and the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Speaking on behalf of the Group of 21. high-precision conventional weapons that could be used in a new. Another characteristic feature of the Treaty is that problems relating to verification (the most difficult but also most critical issue for military space systems) have been bypassed by referring to a supplementary protocol and voluntary confidence- building measures. which might emerge only in the more distant future. The negative stance that Washington took on the Russian-Chinese draft can be explained by its unwillingness to allow its hands to be tied with respect to the development of its military space program. The multilateral format of the participants for the proposed draft also raises seri- ous doubts.S. The new Russian-Chinese initiative reaffirmed the bilateral approach that the two powers took on this strategic issue. it could hardly become a basis for practical negotiations.7 Syria supported the draft. it addresses only the BMD and ASAT space systems and space-to-Earth weap- ons. Although this discriminatory approach may be quite understandable from a military standpoint. Germany feels that the political conditions are not yet right to adopt a full-scale treaty prohibiting weapons in space (the COC was developed under the auspices of the European Union and then was to be submitted to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament). which are developing most rapidly and could begin service within the foreseeable future. and several other nations favoring pro- ceeding with its elaboration. systems in space that provide informational support for both BMD and the massive numbers of long-range. There are probably also plans to target the U.

The supporting argu- ment was that BMD was a morally justifiable system designed to defend people against offensive nuclear arms. Sec- retary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in Glassboro in 1967 that the sides begin the arms limitation process by mutually renouncing antimissile defense. U. On the whole. Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). There have been historical precedents for this. and the stakes. Outer space is a fundamentally new arena for a potential arms race or armed conflict. and expensive. It would therefore hardly be reasonable to expect any practical negotiations to result from this multilateral approach (based on the model of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Devel- opment. and their technologies—hidden in a thick veil of secrecy—are exceptionally complex.or at the very most a trilateral format (Russia–the United States–the PRC) would seem more logical. but for political propaganda rather than practical disarmament. The methods required for monitoring and verification would be extremely difficult to execute. But once Washington shifts its stance to a more constructive one and practical negotiations are held on the non-militarization of space that include the cardinal problem of verification. It is appropriate to remember that when. Thus began the long journey through successes and failures that remains unfinished and to which no end is yet in sight. A bi. prolonged. he was flatly turned down. at least at the initial stage. Production. there could be many surprises and complications in store for Russia and China along the way. it will be a complex. ESTAbliShing ThE SUbjECT OF nEgOTiATiOn Experience from the initiatives and negotiations conducted on this issue over many years has first and foremost confirmed the fact that opinions in diplomatic and expert circles on the 86 PREvEnTing An ARmS R ACE in SPACE . are extremely high. all-encompassing treaty.S.while the issues involved are particularly sensitive. It should be emphasized that the problem of space non-militarization will most likely be impossible to resolve through a single. multi- functional. This was not entirely futile. after two decades of heated polemics at all international forums. especially while the official U. if space disarmament and arms limitations talks ever do begin in a practical format. or the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. both from a military standpoint and in scientific and commercial terms.S. Therefore. the new Russia-China initiative achieved some positive results. and multi-stage process that probably is comparable more to negotiations over the strategic arms reduction and limitation agreement than the CWC or BTWC. such as the experience with the debates in the United Nations on universal and complete nuclear disarmament that in the 1960s were transformed into negotiations on specific BMD systems and strategic ballistic missiles under SALT I. position remained obstinate. Pro- duction and Stockpiling of Bacteriological [Biological] and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC). These weapon systems are all still early in development.

AlExEi ARbATOv 87 . SDI program (Table 10). as well as attack munitions that have been created and tested for striking space objects. Consequently. In other words. subject of legal regulation itself are highly ambiguous and are based upon differing interpretations. and that operate from space objects (objects that have competed at least one full revolution of a near-Earth orbit—for now. Anti-ship object system based tal ballistic aircraft and anti- BMD missiles defense submarine weapons Air-based Antisatellite Airborne Heavy Anti. space-strike system BMD space-strike strike weapons weapons weapons Object in Sub-orbital anti. Proposals by the USSR on the Universal Prohibition of Space-Strike Weapons (early 1970s) lAUnChER TARgET lOCATiOn lOCATiOn Space object Object in Ground-based Air-based Sea-based space Space object Space-based Space. discussion does not address other celestial bodies or their orbits). the main and fundamental objective—determining the subjects of negotiation—remains far from resolved. Space-to. Table 10. listic missiles. defense submarine tion and control sea-based weapons system cruise missiles Note: The gray text designates the types of space-strike weapons that were to be prohibited under the Soviet proposals of the mid-1980s. It was this broad interpretation of “space strike weapons” that the Soviet Union used as the subject of legal prohibition dur- ing the treaty negotiations of the early and mid-1980s in its campaign against the U. Experts have more or less accepted the view that space weapons or space arms are attack munitions that have been created and tested for striking any target. Anti. Space.S. A simpler and less-strict definition of space weapons calls them attack munitions that are themselves orbital objects or that are intended to destroy space objects. Space-sea antisatellite based to-Earth air space. space armaments were identified either by their target location or by the location of their own deployment. x-ray laser Fractional space satellite system BBM orbital missiles Ground-based Antisatellite Ground. Anti. Anti-ship object complex based BMD bombers aircraft and anti- on F-15 aircraft defense submarine and “air-space” weapons SRAM-Altair missiles Sea-based Aegis-Standard Sea-based Submarine. Intercontinen. aircraft and anti- combat informa. Anti-ship object multifunctional BMD launched bal.

S. but not missiles carrying conventional warheads. and trajec- tories that overlap between ballistic missiles. then space weapons could have also included all intermediate-range and inter- continental ballistic missiles and all antimissile defense systems with an intercep- tion altitude of more than 100 kilometers. banned FOBS. it is not considered a space weapon from a formal legal standpoint and would not be considered a space object upon entering orbit. which deliver nuclear weapons (or other types of WMD). orbital altitudes. As the FOBS was not designed to make a complete orbit of the Earth. but that does not complete a single full revolution in a near-Earth orbit. treaties. an orbital bomber still at the design stage that would descend from orbit to attack surface targets. which scanned only the directions from which missile attacks were anticipated: the north. Although in this sense it could be compared to any other ICBM or SLBM. the distinctions between two different weapons classes—strategic missiles and space-to-Earth space-strike weapons—are based not on the techni- cal differences between them. and BMEWS [Ballistic Missile Early Warning System] sup- port systems) may allow dual application and use.The most important nuance here is the clearly defined distinction between the terms “space object” and “object in space. consensus on even this point does not do much to alleviate the complexity of the situation. and east. created by the USSR using heavy ICBMs. START I. A similar situation is coalescing around the U. For this reason. In other words. Point 18). anti-ballistic missiles. However. ASAT. which was designed to attack targets not by following a typical ballistic trajectory. A striking example of just how vague these distinctions can be is the so-called fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS). was prohibited by START I (Article V. If this distinction had not been made. the technical specifications of attack systems and the various weapon deployment systems (first and foremost. These were created by some nations a long time ago and remain the subject of other negotiations. Falcon system. and proposed agreements. and satellites. as well as BMD. it was intended to attack the United States from the southern azimuths not covered by the radar of the missile early-warning systems. The difficulty is that there is a great range of velocities. which expired in December 2009. This ICBM. a system could theoretically be created and tested in partial orbit around the Earth and would not fall under START I or any other exist- ing definitions of space weapons. in which case the very same system would function as a space object and be considered a space weapon.S. but by the extra half-hour one spends in near-Earth orbit. BMD and ASAT strike systems. 88 PREvEnTing An ARmS R ACE in SPACE . after it enters orbit there is technically nothing to prevent this missile from com- pleting a single revolution or even several revolutions around the Earth before re- entering to strike its target. but by entering near-Earth orbit and making a partial orbit pass over the Antarctic Circle before re-entering and striking its target in U. territory.” The latter refers to any object that has been either placed in space or travels through space. For this reason. west.

On the other hand. the battle tank. or 12 months after the excavation begins. a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of con- crete for the silo has been completed. Paragraph 1. while others are still at a fairly early stage of technical development. and the multiple roles they represent in the defensive planning of the various nations) and in terms of verification (which will be discussed in further detail below). if these could be resolved and the system tested in partial Earth orbit. then it. Battle tanks are tracked armored fighting vehicles which weigh at least 16. In addition. signed in 1990. Paragraph 6. with a high level of self-protection…. describes one of the main subjects of agree- ment as follows: “for the purpose of counting a deployed ICBM and its associated launcher. as: “a self-propelled armored fighting vehicle capable of heavy firepower.” Success at previous disarmament negotiations has always come from having a set of specifically identified (or mutually understood) technical characteristics and mutually agreed-upon class and type definitions for these weapons systems. primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun neces- sary to engage armored and other targets. On one hand. C). the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. By way of analogy. d). rather than by their specific technical characteristics. and a mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility … or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility” (Article III. imagine the dif- ficulty of implementing disarmament measures if the subject has been identified as “any sea-based weapon or weapon for striking targets at sea.Although this project faces serious technical and financial issues. In addition. too. up to now the greatest achievement of strategic arms reduction and limitation efforts. would fall outside all current definitions of space weapons and accordingly not be covered by any treaty. Space weapons are currently defined in terms of the environment in which they are deployed and/or the environment in which their targets are located. Another document of historic importance.5 metric tons unladen weight and which are armored with a 360-degree traverse gun of at least 75 millimeters caliber. whichever occurs earlier. it is exceedingly difficult to identify a subject for the prohibition or limitation negotia- tions. at this very early stage of space weapon technical development. The START I Treaty of 1991. defines one of the most important subjects of agreement. in that some were created in the past and have since been either mothballed or unilater- ally eliminated. after which banning would be tremendously difficult both strategically (due to their variety and asymmetrical nature. any wheeled armored fighting vehicles entering into service which meet all the other criteria stated above shall also be deemed battle tanks” (Article II. For a number of reasons. with high cross-country mobility. AlExEi ARbATOv 89 . some of which are quite objective. a particular paradox arises in connection with space weapons. this is cause for hope that the new weapons would be banned before being tested or deployed. no definitions of this nature exist for space weapons.

potentially. the PRC. Antisatellite Ground. Intercontinen. A significant number of satellites of various design and manned spacecraft either are being deployed or will soon be deployed in these orbits. and antimissile 90 PREvEnTing An ARmS R ACE in SPACE . communications. weather forecasting. Space-to-Earth Space-to-air Space-sea object antisatellite based BMD space-strike space-strike space-strike system weapons weapons weapons Object in Sub-orbital anti.000 kilometers or beyond. and fails to address what. this simplifies matters by sidestepping the compli- cated issue of differentiating them from existing BMD systems (both strategic and theater) and ICBMs and intermediate-range missiles used as antisatellite weap- ons. submarine tion and control sea-based weapons system cruise missiles Note: The gray text designates the types of space-strike weapons that are subject to prohibition under the 2008 Russian-Chinese draft treaty. on the other hand it ignores the Earth-to-space class of antisatellite system that the USSR and the United States have already created and tested.The 2008 Russian-Chinese draft does quite clearly contain a narrower interpreta- tion of the term “space weapons” that excludes ground-based (as well as sea- based and air-based) systems. defense and anti- combat informa. The 2008 Russian-Chinese Draft lAUnChER TARgET lOCATiOn lOCATiOn Space object Object in Ground-based Air-based Sea-based space Space Space-based Space. from a military standpoint. listic missiles. primarily those in orbit. On one hand. and. Anti-aircraft Anti-ship object multifunctional BMD launched bal. these systems may pose the greatest threat to satel- lites orbiting at up to 1. Anti-aircraft Anti-ship based system based BMD tal ballistic defense and anti- object missiles submarine weapons Air-based Antisatellite Airborne Heavy Anti-aircraft Anti-ship object complex based BMD bombers defense and anti- on F-15 aircraft submarine and “air-space” weapons SRAM-Altair missiles Sea-based Aegis-Standard Sea-based Submarine. x-ray laser Fractional space satellite system BBM orbital missiles Ground. Table 11. Russia and other nations (Table 11). including satellites engaged in optical-electronic and radio-electronic intelligence. will soon become the most attractive antisatellite systems that are now being developed by the United States. For the foreseeable future. but covers only space-based systems.

beam. dam- age or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space. or air into the appropriate orbit for the intercept. or super-high-frequency weapons. will also to a lesser extent pose a threat to satellites in high orbit. on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere. the 2008 draft Treaty does not appear to be a very effective mechanism. as is also true of any potential air-based. it would simply leave ASAT out altogether. or otherwise station themselves near their targets in advance (“space mines”).” This raises the following questions: what does “specially produced or converted” mean? How and based on which characteristics will this capability be defined? Would this agreement prohibit a shuttle that. as well as satellites in highly elliptical orbit with perigees that pass over the Antarctic (and which are used for communications and missile early warning. Spacecraft can be destroyed with conventional (explosive). which has been specially produced or converted to destroy.” which. among other things). GLONASS. In peacetime a nation would not deliberately create interference to disrupt the normal functioning of the spacecraft of another nation. In the first version. However. and interference can be created using EW (Electronic Warfare) sources or laser. and removes satellites from orbit? Even less clear is the implica- tion of the terms “components of the biosphere” and their “elimination” and “dam- age. It now also appears likely that antisatellite/ antimissile defense weapon platforms (if these do ever appear) and space-to- Earth platforms will orbit at these same altitude ranges. also captures. this document identifies as being “any device placed in outer space. as noted above. missile early warning and navigation (GPS.defense (SBIR-LOW). including geosynchronous and semi-geosynchronous orbit for communications. repairs. these satellites could within the foreseeable future also become vulnerable to sys- tems that either launch their ASAT from the ground. damage from shooting down obsolescent satellites. in addition to its other missions. Considering the verification difficulties of even its second version. Aside from these gaps. the 2008 draft PPWT is also ambiguous in its definition of “weapons in space. kinetic (direct impact). These ASAT systems. based on any physical principle. During times of war. which are capable of intercepting targets at altitudes of up to 1. damage or disrupt the normal func- tioning of objects in outer space. or dam- age from causing them to re-enter the atmosphere and sink in the ocean? There are just as many ambiguities associated with the phrase “to destroy.” Would this mean. depending on their particular characteristics and the environment in which they operate. for example. and sea-based laser systems that would be able to destroy or damage satellites in high orbits with reasonable effectiveness. sea. x-ray. how- AlExEi ARbATOv 91 . the damage to the ozone layer that every space launch causes. or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or inflict damage on them. or laser weapons. nuclear. and Galileo).” The normal func- tioning of spacecraft can be disrupted in many different ways. ground-.000 kilometers.

or be capable of striking ballistic missile boosters from longer distance up as they depart the atmosphere or missile warheads in space at close range. satellites. capable not only of attacking aircraft. For example. Whether the phrase “disrupt the normal functioning” would apply to illuminating satellites from the ground or from space by laser or radar (for example. but also of detecting. However. These would include. rapidly transmitting vast quantities of informa- tion. Theoreti- cally. The antisatellite effectiveness of a space-based laser is a function of its distance from the target. could hardly be expected to hold. or of terrestrial spacecraft control or space information collection and relay centers. and no international treaty or agree- ment restricts their development. electromagnetic. considering the diversity of laser types and the properties of the different environments through which their beam passes (outer space or the atmosphere). laser. and. Especially difficult to prohibit are the weapons systems based on energy beam technologies (primarily lasers). prohibitions against interfering with such systems as GLONASS. NAVSTAR. say. probing. or use of weapons systems designed to attack or disrupt the functioning of the ground components of satellite information and 92 PREvEnTing An ARmS R ACE in SPACE . This is especially true as many types of weapons are as a rule multipurpose in nature.ever. targeting other weapons systems. and identifying objects on the Earth’s surface. kinetic. testing. and other such weapons. for identification purposes) is also unclear. even if the motivation for creating such systems is only to discourage other nations from creating or using them. deployment. the mutual interest in preventing uncontrolled escalation of conflict should increase the probability of agreeing not to attack the ballistic missile launch early warning satellites of the other nation (similar to agreements existing between some nations not to attack the other’s nuclear power plants). However. as weapons platforms and their potential targets both follow and can change their orbital trajectories. dual purpose. Theoretically. eventually. laser effectiveness could be restricted. a laser may lack destructive potential in a dense atmosphere. concluding an agreement to prohibit them would still be extremely difficult. which the enemy would utilize for its main high-precision weapons support. or use. nor could nations at war be expected not to try to disrupt the functioning of other orbital support systems of a military. where range is largely a function of techni- cal characteristics and the prohibition against their extra-national basing has been quite reliable in keeping strategic systems separate from intermediate-range and tactical weapons in a number of agreements. it would be extremely difficult to reach agreement on this restriction. testing. This represents yet another practical differ- ence from. or in space. it would be extremely difficult to translate the technical performance characteristics of such weapons into actual restrictions on combat capabilities. and their components in flight. or commercial nature. for example. beam. ballistic missiles. but in outer space could turn out to be an effective weapon against distant satellites. or Galileo. To prohibit the development. nuclear arms limitation. under water. However.

As mutual trust has grown and progress continued toward more radical disarmament mea- sures. type. The point of intercept of a satellite can be programmed many days or even weeks in advance. spacecraft do not present mass targets and are not accompanied by decoys and other means of penetrating ballistic missile defenses. satellites travel in predictable orbits that can be tracked in advance. depending on class. fractional orbital bombardment missiles. missions of this nature could be carried out using almost any conventional or nuclear offensive weapon system.000 kilometers orbit. There are. targets for the BMD system also pass through the very same space environ- ment where most of the spacecraft with apogees of up to 1. but are also very fragile (especially the solar panels. including offensive ballistic missiles of various types. which greatly simplifies the task of targeting them. it is true. SPECiFiCS OF vERiFiCATiOn in SPACE Verification of agreement perfor- mance is the most important and inviolable condition for practical disarmament. or systems based on new physical principles. as opposed to disarmament initiatives for political or propaganda purposes. and so on. Many arms that are designed for other purposes may also have a secondary poten- tial for attacking space objects.000 kilometers. preparing delivery vehicles and satellites to quickly replace lost satellites. At the same time. unlike bal- listic missiles. and trajectory configuration. but in other respects do present easier targets for interception. and manned or unmanned spacecraft.control systems would be nearly impossible. technical capabilities for verification must not be seen as an absolute imperative. first and foremost through the use of space reconnaissance satellites. communications antennas. deploying dormant reserve satellites “on standby” in orbit. radio electronic warfare technology. After all. Most importantly. It was only through the emergence of the national technical means of verification. respectively). while the flight time of ballistic missiles might range from seven to 30 minutes. The most complicated example of this type of overlap would be strategic BMD systems of any basing mode that possess an inherent antisatellite potential at orbital altitudes of up to approximately 1. and optical electronic sensors). Aside from missiles intercepted during the early boost or final reentry portions of the trajectory. the national technical means of verification have been complemented by AlExEi ARbATOv 93 . Satellites in these orbits move somewhat faster than missile final stages or warheads (around 8 and 5–7 km/s. that the first SALT I agreements could be concluded in 1972. a number of ways to enhance the survivability of these space systems: increasing protection of both spacecraft and ground centers from various types of physical attack by implementing operational and engineering measures. Finally. such measures often require consider- able outlays of resources and time. ensuring redundancy for the most vital spacecraft. However. Spacecraft as a rule are not only larger than missiles or warheads.

has not been fully implemented due to its lack of verification systems and counting rules for the nuclear warheads subject to limitation. It is most difficult to prohibit or restrict space weapons during the deployment stage or military service time. although the latter was never provided with a system of verification. It is entirely possible that dialectical progress could be made in space weapons dis- armament and verification. it would be naïve to expect any breakthroughs during the early stages. verification efforts have concentrated on the deployment and military service life stage of the weapon systems life cycle (as with the ABM Treaty. is not addressed in any of the treaties except the CWC and the BTWC. but it was unsupported by any verification measures. In addition. The ABM Treaty does prohibit “development” of several kinds of BMD systems but the parties were never able to agree on a definition for this term. the development of such verification systems and methods in and of itself might be seen as creating a kind of antisatellite weapon or as a military operation. The development stage. a problem that was exacerbated during the U. since each treaty offered more complicated monitoring and verification measures than the previous one. as was the case with the 2008 draft PPWT.-USSR debates over the SDI program in the early 1980s. but to a much lesser degree (in the CFE Treaty. the period between the beginning of development of a weapons system and its testing stage. which strictly controls missile tests. and even more difficult to prove that they fall under the subject matter of the Treaty without inspecting them in orbit or returning them to Earth (and this with the proviso that the treaty actually does define the prohibited technical character- istics for these systems.measures of transparency. dangerous. that is. especially in light of the novelty and unique character of the subject of negotiation. This would also affect the future use of mini-satellites to inspect spacecraft in any orbit. rather than simply referring to their deployment environ- ments or possible target locations). The 1967 Treaty on Outer Space was also at this stage (in terms of the non-deployment of WMD). The 1990 CFE Treaty. they were not covered at all. confidence-building. and the CTBT. for example. The verification measures contained in these disarmament treaties also cover the testing stages of the weapons sys- tems. the CFE Treaty.S. SALT I. unac- ceptable to nations in light of the classified nature of their military and com- mercial programs. and the 19 96 CTBT were unprec- edented in this respect. In most of the previous and existing disarmament treaties. The opposite also holds true: the 2002 SORT. most likely. It would be extremely difficult to use the national technical means of verification to identify banned armed satellites from among the 700 or so spacecraft that are currently deployed in various orbits. and. however. as well as onsite inspections. and cooperation verification. and other measures. the INF Treaty.) The only exceptions are START I. START I. To perform such onsite inspections in space or return a satellite to Earth is frequently technically impossible. and the CWC Treaty). 94 PREvEnTing An ARmS R ACE in SPACE . especially if this relates to their deployment in space. the 1992 CWC. the 1994 START I. which focuses entirely on testing. permanent onsite monitoring.

but to prohibit them would intrude into the overall ground-based infrastructure of the space command-control systems—an unrealistic prospect. However. should suspicions arise. In addition. when the U. which are the most likely to appear in the foreseeable future (but which are not addressed by the Russian-Chinese draft). the interceptor missiles of these systems are small enough that they can be stored at any military airfield storage facility. but for now they appear unrealistic. More attainable would be numerical limitations for such systems. if an agreement can be reached on their technical characteristics and deployment locations using methods borrowed from the INF Treaty and START I. It would not actually be that difficult to prohibit or limit systems such as those deployed by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s (and missiles like the one experimentally tested by China in 2007).-USSR negotiations on space weapons touched upon the prohibition of space-based BMD systems. The picture is also ambiguous with respect to ground-. or sea-based missile systems currently being upgraded. measures to enhance verification. would be extremely difficult due to their differing technical characteristics and dual use capabilities as antimissile and antisatellite weapon systems (Table 12). To prohibit or restrict the deployment of airborne laser systems currently under development. such pre-launch inspection methods might become a way to verify the non-weaponization of space. and sea-based space weapons. as both jets are considered dual-purpose systems and serve in the air forces of the two nations in large numbers. particularly in respect to the 2008 Russian-Chinese draft. possibly including the right of the parties to conduct onsite inspection of the air force bases of the other side on short notice. it was recognized at the time that such onsite verification methods were too intrusive and difficult to implement in prac- tice. However. AlExEi ARbATOv 95 . although this would require extensive transparency and agreement on functional distinctions among aircraft and missile types. as disarmament measures become more radical and nations begin to step back from military confrontation. air-. Special guidance and navigation systems for these ASATs naturally exist. an issue that was addressed in the late 1980s. verification for such airborne systems as the F-15 SRAM-Altair deployed by the United States in the 1980s or the ASAT system developed by the Soviets for basing on MiG-31 interceptor jets would be extremely difficult to implement. In time.Considerations of military and commercial secrecy also reduce the likelihood that nations might in the foreseeable future implement mutual pre-launch verification procedures at launch facilities. and individual sites allowed for ASAT deployment.S.

Ability to Verify Space Weapons at Various Stages of Their Service Life TyPE OF RESEARCh TESTS WiTh TESTS WiThOUT dEPlOymEnT ARmAmEnT ACTiviTiES dESTRUCTiOn dESTRUCTiOn in miliTARy OF TARgET OF TARgET SERviCE Kinetic impact systems: Space object 1 3 1 1 Object in space 1 3 2 3 Ground-based 1 3 2 3 Air-based 1 3 2 2 Sea-based 1 3 2 2 Directed-energy 1 3 1 1 weapons Note: 1 – impossible to verify. with all proposals relating to the non-militarization and non-weaponization of space relegated to the role of political and propagandistic démarche rather than true disarmament initiatives.Table 12. the most advanced of all the space powers. However. such negotiations might become a practical undertaking for nations seeking to resuscitate the entire system and process of disarmament. the fact that space weapons have very specific points of deployment and target loca- tions allows their development to be tangibly limited by restricting full-scale tests. in which case (considering past experience with previously proposed initiatives) a totally new approach will be needed to defining the subject. particularly on the part of the United States. should the U. At the same time. 2 – limited verification possible. PROSPECTS FOR limiTing And PROhibiTing SPACE ARmS Until now.S. military space policy. the most important distinction between space weapons. and methods for legally regulating the military/strategic relations between the space-capable powers in this field today and in the future. Should the Obama administration initiate a review of U. the absence of goodwill among nations. format. especially those based in orbit. This is also largely true of the Russian-Chinese 2008 draft PPWT. and all other types of arms that have previously been the subject of disarmament agreements. is that they are extremely difficult (if not impossible) either to prohibit or to restrict once they have been deployed. then a “window of opportunity” might open to hold practical negotiations. has precluded holding even preliminary practical negotiations on this problem. position change and the goodwill of other nations con- tinue. 96 PREvEnTing An ARmS R ACE in SPACE . 3 verifiable Thus.S.

The former would be of benefit to the United States. Space-to-Earth Space-to-air Space-sea antisatellite based BMD space-strike space-strike space-strike system weapons weapons weapons Object in Sub-orbital X-ray laser Fractional — — space antisatellite BBM orbital missiles system Ground-based Antisatellite Ground. space-to-Earth. START I embodied a compromise between reducing heavy ICBMs and limiting mobile land-based Soviet missiles on the one hand. for example. an obvious way to balance the practical interests of the parties in space would be to include a prohibition or strict limitation of antisatellite systems in exchange for limitations on the development of space-based BMD systems (meaning strike systems. It should be remembered that it was not the peaceful aspirations of the powers that served as the practical foundation for the strategic arms treaties. the treaty would use the technological overlap between BMD and ASAT (which complicates the prohibition of one without prohibiting the other) to advance measures that would either limit or prohibit them together (Table 13). based in space). interest in limiting Soviet multiple-warhead missiles and a corresponding Soviet desire to restrict U. to discard the positions that the USSR had held in the 1980s and that were reflected in the recent Russian and Chinese proposal in Geneva.S. as does the potential for verification of the agreement. Intercontinen. it would be advisable. Noble-sounding appeals to prevent the militarization of space will hardly be adequate grounds for future talks. rather. Specifically. while the USSR had an interest in limiting BMD systems. The Reduction and Prohibition of Antisatellite and Space-Based BMD Systems lAuncher tArget locAtion locAtion Space object Object in Ground-based Air-based Sea-based space Space object Space-based Space. the latter of benefit to Russia and the PRC. cruise missiles.S. SALT I. or interceptors. Anti-aircraft Anti-ship object system based BMD tal ballistic defense and anti- missiles submarine weapons Alexei ArbAtov 97 . strategic sea-based and air-based forces on the other. The basis for SALT II was a U. in contrast to 20 years ago. By the same logic. at least for the initial stage. only became possible because the United States had an interest in halting the buildup of Soviet ballistic missiles. efforts should not be directed at instituting a sweeping prohibition of all Earth-to-space. and reducing or limiting the superior U. In finding an approach to the subject of these negotiations. the technical properties of which remain vague. table 13. it was the asymmetry of the military balance between parties. and space-to-space systems. Under such a format. the subject of negotiations should be narrowed and.S.

Air-based Antisatellite Airborne Heavy Anti-aircraft Anti-ship object complex BMD bombers defense and anti- based on F-15 submarine aircraft and weapons “air-space” SRAM-Altair missiles Sea-based Aegis. The ability to clearly define the subject of the agreement and to develop realistic and reliable transparency and verification measures is crucial to the success of any practical negotiations. might become a subject for agreement in the more distant future (ten to fifteen years). preferably in conjunc- tion with cooperative measures and well-defined transparency. For example. but this would be difficult to achieve. Sea-based Submarine. antisatellite defenses are the most advanced. focusing on tests involving the actual destruction of either target satellites or ballistic missiles and their elements at flight trajectories— the kind of tests conducted by the USSR between 1960 and the 1980s. Still more is this true of space-to-Earth systems. new ones are either under development or are dual-use systems. ASAT prohibition cannot be verified in outer space through realistically achievable methods. and to consider the various initiatives being advanced by independent experts from various countries. while space-based BMD systems. Instead of prohibiting deployment. Considering the differ- ent interpretations of the subjects of negotiation. and it is likely that only China has experimental systems on Earth (which may explain why the 2008 joint Russian-Chinese draft referred only to space systems). a single agreement could hardly be possible. 98 PREvEnTing An ARmS R ACE in SPACE . the prospects for which remain rather vague. It is also important to determine the proper sequence for the stages of negotiation. defense and anti- multifunc. Russia and the United States have either mothballed or withdrawn their old systems. As noted above. submarine tional combat sea-based weapons information cruise missiles and control system Note: The gray text designates the types of space-strike weapons that would be covered by a restriction (imposed through the prohibition of testing them against real targets in space) proposed by the authors of this monograph. Today. It would be useful for Moscow and Washington to remember their experiences in the 1970s and 1980s. the parties could resolve this problem indi- rectly by initially agreeing to prohibit testing of antisatellite and space-strike BMD systems. and by China in 2007. Verification of this agreement could be based on the NTMV of the respective parties. Anti-aircraft Anti-ship object Standard BMD launched bal. by the United States in 1980. The preferred goal would be to prohibit all ASAT deployment regardless of basing mode. listic missiles.

with emphasis on NTMV in conjunction with mini- mal transparency and cooperative measures. This treaty could initially include the United States. and. and monitoring satellites. AlExEi ARbATOv 99 . communication. with the option of extending. • retarding the development of space-based BMD systems. navigation. • the prevention of experiments that result in “space junk” that threatens the spacecraft of all nations. considering its inter- est in the greatest possible limitation of ASAT. it should also contain an article on the right of the parties to withdraw from the treaty should an extraordinary event jeopardize the “supreme interests” of either party. the PRC. Russia (and the PRC. • its early inclusion of the PRC (and. with sufficient infor- mation presented so as to remove all suspicion of secret ASAT experiments of the type the United States conducted in 2008 when it intercepted a satellite. other powers) in the new stage of the strategic weapons limitation process. This would be less than the amount of time expected for the initial deployment of technically feasible space-based BMD systems. particularly their strike components. thereafter.the existing format for notifying other parties of all missile launches should be confirmed and expanded to further include all actions or experiments that have a destructive effect on objects in space. This would serve as an additional deterrent to the United States. Russia. but also provide the potential of membership for any other country in the future. The initial treaty could be limited to ten years. Similar to any other such treaty. A permanent joint commission should be created (potentially combined with the existent Joint Data Exchange Center) for verification and dispute resolution. • relative ease of verification. and • retarding the development of ASAT systems capable of attacking vital early warning. should it agree) could issue a unilateral statement saying that the creation of either a space-based BMD system or a space-to-Earth system by the United States would constitute one such extraordinary event. if it could be reliably verified. preferably. The advantages of such a treaty include: • the prevention of the development and improvement of the most advanced class of space arms—antisatellite weapons—regardless of the physical prin- ciples involved and their basing mode. The approach speeds should be regulated for peacetime satellite docking operations conducted only upon notification of and supervision by the other party or parties. The elimination of obsolescent satellites that threaten to fall to Earth should be conducted under the supervision of the other party or parties.

non–space-based BMD systems. it could be followed by other 100 PREvEnTing An ARmS R ACE in SPACE . without their prior testing for the guar- anteed capability to destroy satellites. shuttle spacecraft. SLBMs. with a guaranteed ability to destroy satellites by nuclear detonation (disabling all spacecraft within range. • nations are unable to engage in the development of antisatellite capabilities to asymmetrically respond to the development of new systems for conventional military operations. primarily in geostationary orbits. However. • nations may still maintain their antisatellite potential (without tests on targets). backed by space information systems. had they failed first to pass through those natural stages of disarmament. can be made toward space non-weaponization. should they ever appear. some fairly substantial. further- more. including the use of long-range. If a first step. fractional orbital missiles (after the expiration of START I). and technical constraints (including the specific nature of the space environment). and transparency measures that START I implemented 20 years later. Due to military. and remove spacecraft that have outlived their service time or require repairs. it should nonetheless be emphasized that the advantages of the proposed option appear to outweigh its shortcomings. political. the parties would never have achieved the unprecedented across-the-board reductions. the tangibility of the technical and military parameters of the subject matter. In recognizing these problems. and other still-hypothetical technologies. including: • nations may still conduct indirect testing and deploy antisatellite systems during the testing and deployment of other. • nations may still create space-to-Earth class strike weapons. including those based on the use of fractional orbital missiles. as were the 1972 Interim SALT I Agreement and SALT II in 1979. in light of its mutual strategic acceptability to the parties. • nations may still secretly rehearse low-intensity antisatellite operations using manned and unmanned satellites to approach. and the verifiability of compliance by the parties. high-precision weapons. capture. including verifiable prohibition of any testing of ASAT or space BMD systems.The proposed treaty is not without shortcomings. this option appears to be relatively achievable as a practical first step in preventing the militarization of space. including that nation’s own). and IRBMs (for China). the proposed treaty must be partial and selective. • nations may still secretly deploy “space mines” in times of peace or a prewar period. • nations may still secretly test directed-energy (laser or beam) weapons and radio-electronic devices intended to disrupt satellite operations without physi- cally destroying them. and • nations are unable to directly counteract hypothetical space-to-Earth class sys- tems. however small. restrictions. using ICBMs.

and negotiations on their prohibition can therefore be postponed. leading to fundamental and irreparable degradation of its overall military potential. these should be considered a topic of the more distant future. potentially. there would be other ways to minimize such threats. the conclusion of conventional long-range. The same principle applies to working out details of the interception of ballistic missiles by space-based BMD systems. In reality. especially if instead of a demonstrative act the aggressor launches a fast and coordinated attack on its target’s entire orbital con- stellation. the main argument in favor of the proposed treaty is the absence of any realistic alternatives to prohibiting ASAT and space-based BMD by prohibiting their full-scale testing. asymmetrical countermeasures to the future space- based BMD systems under discussion here can be executed by other means. and efforts to alter the military and politi- cal environment as a whole (including a decision by NATO not to expand further east. An ability to develop antisatellite potential indirectly through related military tech- nologies. and would be unlikely to succeed under the 2008 Russian-Chinese draft.8 One way or another. the outcome of which would be uncertain. such tests could never pro- vide a nation with confidence in its ability to destroy many missiles and warheads in flight. The issue of antisatellite systems being used to help repel a so-called aerospace attack is also extremely complex. It appears that this would not be implementable under prior proposals by the USSR. Nations could rely instead on other military counter- measures. their prospects and characteristics are still unclear. As for space- to-Earth strike systems. The deepening global financial and economic crisis cast doubt on the prospects for an expensive and intricately complex strategic BMD system. AlExEi ARbATOv 101 . will not provide the self-confidence needed for a real armed conflict. Finally. The threat to Russia itself and the proposed means to combat it both appear quite far-fetched. which would be pivotal for military planning. responsible powers will hardly be likely to take the step of deploying such expensive weapon systems. and the peaceful settlement of the problem of Taiwan). as was the case with the limitation of strategic nuclear arms. Moreover. armed conflicts. which will gradually be trans- formed into an arena for arms races and. which are being rehearsed with- out orbital deployment or testing of weapon platforms. Without full-scale testing. as with space-based BMD systems. such as legal agreements or coun- termeasures instead of getting dragged into an expensive arms race. This applies still more to space-to-Earth systems. high-precision arms limitation agreements. the only alternative is that there will be no legal restrictions on the weaponization of outer space. other disarmament treaties. especially its space-based version.broader and more intrusive verification measures.

no.] 2008). in Nuclear Proliferation: New Technologies. 42. 8 V. 4. Kaliadine and A. July 2008. “Chto takoye vozdushno-kosmicheskaya oborona?” [What Is Aerospace Defense?]. 28–42. Smirnov. [S. compiled and edited by A. Dvorkin. V. 4 V. Arbatov and V. 7 (28). “Kosmos v voprosakh vooruzhyonnoi borby” [Outer Space and Armed Struggle]. Weapons and Treaties. 2007. 3 S. 6 See G. Dvorkin. 102 PREvEnTing An ARmS R ACE in SPACE . 2009) 109–118. eds. and V. Gallagher and J.I. Grinko and V. “Kosmos v voprosakh vooruzhyonnoi borby” [Outer Space and Armed Struggle].” Russia: Arms Control. 7 The group includes nonaligned and neutral nations of various political leanings. Nats. Zhukov. Grinko. Obozreniye. 2 See E. Sukhanov. A. Steinbruner. Disarmament and International Security: IMEMO Supplement to the Russian Edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2008. V. Nezavisimoye voyen. “Russian-Chinese Initiative for the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space. Arbatov (Moscow. Myasnikov. oborona. 40–54. 2009). (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center/ ROSSPEN. “Kontrsilovoi potentsial vysokotochnogo oruzhiya” [The Countervail- ing Potential of High-Precision Weapons]. Dvorkin. “Chto takoye vozdushno-kosmicheskaya oborona?” [What Is Aerospace Defense?].Notes 1 See N. Smirnov. Sukhanov. March 3. 5 S. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security (American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

and by extension the most difficult to regulate. A study of the problems involved in preventing the militarization of outer space. It is precisely such a scientific analysis that this book aims to provide. applying traditional approaches to newly created instruments of war or rules on disarmament and non-use of force to outer space has produced meager results. space will prove the most difficult to develop. By virtue of its novelty and unique characteristics as a field of military activity. But they have had access to outer space for only half a century. AlExEi ARbATOv And vlAdimiR dvORkin 103 . based on previous attempts to create a viable international legal framework and of both past and present space weapons programs. corporations. yields several conclusions and recommendations. politics. Thus far. strategic and political space research remains an area of interest for a relatively narrow group of experts and pales in comparison to the major intellectual schools and historical studies devoted to the art of war on land.COnClUSiOn ALExEI ARBATOV AND VLADIMIR DVORKIN Humans have spent over a century mastering aviation and millennia securing the land and seas. or pressure groups. or the use of naval and air power in foreign and military policies. making it the newest arena for human endeavor. Space is a unique physical environment that with the advent of the age of global- ization in international economics. With physical properties that dif- fer qualitatively from those of traditional human environments. free from the gloss of propaganda campaigns or lobbying efforts by agencies. and the technological military devel- opment of nations creates a demand for a professionally honest and objective analysis of military/space issues.

and others. SECOnd Since the end of the 1950s. Britain. these features and others have ensured that. The development of astronautical engineering has provided a powerful impetus to the progress of science and technology. In spite of predictions in the 1950s and 1960s. navigation.S. remote Earth sensing. or in the air. Italy. the spacecraft is unable to linger over a single location on the ground (unless it is in geostationary orbit). the transition to new-generation space sys- tems with substantially longer active service lives and more advanced onboard equipment and systems for delivering collected data initiated a dramatic expan- sion in the use of space capabilities to pursue military objectives. outer space development has progressed at an exceptionally rapid pace. This in turn means that a spacecraft’s ability to remain in contact with the ground is restricted. and cosmic and earth sciences would all be inconceivable. followed by India. it has still not been transformed into a new arena for armed conflict. although this program did initiate progress along a broad front of military and technological development. Brazil. information. spacecraft are inherently vulnerable. Ultimately. which is of particular importance for deliver- ing strikes in both directions. and scientific development of outer space over the past half century. The two powers had alternating success within the framework of this rivalry. Without space systems. As the Earth rotates on its axis as a spacecraft orbits it. SDI program of the 1980s realized. nor were the hopes and fears surrounding the U. and Japan. meteorology. commercial. the sweeping military space programs and their related strategic concepts that the United States ambitiously developed during this decade have still not resulted in the deployment of weapons for military operations in and from space. Canada. The dual nature of space development between its use for peaceful and military ends entails both collaboration and rivalry between the space powers. Space systems initially found their broadest practical application in new types of wars that relied 104 COnClUSiOn . weapon-carrying battle platforms have not yet been deployed in orbit. primarily due to the intense rivalry between the USSR and the United States over the military use of outer space. and found broad application in the socioeconomic. For all of their significance. The enormous energy requirements and high costs of placing a single payload into orbit impose strict weight constraints as well. China. and were eventually joined by other nations: France.FiRST The unique characteristics of outer space as a physical environment are of prime consideration in identifying both the opportunities and the limits that must be overcome for its use. and to the enor- mous role that space achievements quickly acquired as a source of national pres- tige. Germany. despite the intensive military. at sea. commercial. As the last century came to a close. and environmental fields. As they move in orbits that are both predictable and accessible to radio-electronic and optical tracking beyond the protection of the Earth’s atmosphere. modern achievements in telecommunications. It is far more costly to develop and use weapons in military operations in and from space than forces and weapons deployed on land.

the Soviet asymmetrical response focused on space-based and other antisatellite systems. and Iraq in 2003. Beginning with the Desert Storm cam- paign of 1991. and sea-based anti- missile systems using kinetic or laser attack components. eventually to the individual soldier.S. weaponization) of space may become the greatest threat to the peaceful use of this environment and the development of international cooperation in space. BMD coun- termeasures involving offensive strategic arms. While the United States emphasized targeting Soviet nuclear deterrence forces with its space-. This phase of space weapons development began to deescalate in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR.S. which had flight paths that transited space. U. third The militarization of space through deployment in orbit of military and dual-use satellites has already been under way for half a century. air-. these new methods and capabilities were then demonstrated at increasing scale in military operations in Yugoslavia in 1999. Until 1963. Although weapons have been tested in orbit. to be more precise. Although Russia scaled back most of its work at various stages of research and development. The first will be to create highly survivable and rapidly deployable space systems that rely on light spacecraft and boosters with significantly miniatur- ized electronics. high-precision weapons attacks.on space control and information support systems for conducting massive long- range. In terms of actual implementation. nuclear weapons were also tested in space. This new phase in the militarization (or. The United States and the Soviet Union commenced work on space weapons as early as the first half of the 1960s. Strategic Defense Initiative and the corresponding Soviet response. and the development of its own ground-based BMD systems. The weapons themselves (in other words. The space-based information capabilities of the future will develop in two inter- related directions. they have never actually been deployed as permanent objects in space. the second will involve transmitting satellite information down to the lowest possible level of the command chain. the attack components) appeared in space much earlier. land-. The increasingly military role of outer space and scientific and technological progress makes space an ever more attractive environment both for developing weapons systems in space and for using force in and from space. work in the 1960s–1980s was confined to running a few series of experiments in space and commissioning a few antisatellite systems in limited numbers and for relatively short-term service. space weap- ons programs began to expand once again at the beginning of this decade when SDI was revived at a new level and widened—this time to focus on the missile threat Alexei ArbAtov And vlAdimir dvorkin 105 . such work was accelerated after the launch of the U. For a broad spectrum of space weaponry projects in the early 1980s. with the launches of the first ballistic missiles. Afghanistan in 2001.

The present situation provides additional time to advance initiatives on limiting some of the more destabilizing military space programs. The weapons had questionable military usefulness. implicitly. and deployment of anti- ballistic missile systems and their space-based elements. Russia still retains its potential to develop and deploy space weapons. or measures of verification. The same common interest served as the foundation for the 1967 Treaty prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons in space. the methodology of prohibition.-Soviet dialogue on antisatellite weap- ons systems showed. However. the ABM Treaty played an important part in banning the development.from so-called “rogue” nations (and. That treaty avoided any detailed definitions of the subject matter. While it was still valid (1972–2002).S. Fourth The rapid development of military space technology over the past half- century was paralleled by an accumulation of a considerable amount of nego- tiating experience and a body of legal documents for dealing with this problem. China). As the experience of the 1978–1979 U. It should be remembered that the 1963 Treaty was signed at a time when both parties had an interest in halting nuclear tests in space that led to damage of their global radio-electronic systems. As the experience of the past decade has shown. Its foundation rests on the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space. Only its strategic interests in prohibiting or limiting opposing weapons systems will moti- vate the United States to engage in serious talks and accept limitations on its own weapons in exchange. At the same time. In 2008. the arms race might become irreversible. Washington is not inclined to participate in disarmament negotiations based on good intentions alone. if the development of weapons should proceed beyond a certain threshold. The existence of military space programs in Russia (and China) could be an incentive to begin serious negotiations in this area. but the possibility of loss of control over them or of malfunction or catastrophe leading to unpredict- able consequences posed an obvious and significant threat. which remain at various stages of develop- ment today as a fallback for symmetrical and asymmetrical countermeasures. This does not mean. Outer space will play a growing part in human activ- ity as technological progress improves the capacity to create a variety of space weapons. especially given the variety of space weapons and the difficulty of their limitation and verification. testing. that the problem is simply going to resolve itself. however. the onset of an unprecedented financial and economic crisis and the change of administration in Washington have again delayed implementation of these ambitious American ideas. it was pointless to try to find a simple solution to the 106 conclusion . subsequent efforts to apply the same all-encompassing approach to the development of various non-nuclear space weapons that promise significant military advantages while avoiding the enormous costs and risks have been unsuccessful.

especially in light of the increasing opposition to SDI both within the United States and among its NATO allies. and by the United States to use the negotiations as cover to buy time to complete testing of its own system. More fruitful was the experience of the space group that attended the nuclear and space weapons negotiations. testing. which was modeled on the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space by expanding its prohibition of WMD to include “any weapons.” AlExEi ARbATOv And vlAdimiR dvORkin 107 . The experience of previous negotiations on nuclear and space weapons also indi- cates that if one side maintains complete secrecy about its military technical pro- grams while trying to use negotiations for its own political and propaganda ends. also did not facilitate an agreement. or on the ground. The work of the defense and space group in Geneva helped to clarify the meaning of a number of crucial terms and review the procedures for onsite inspection and data exchange relating to research. as well as other space-based capabilities using traditional or other physical principles to attack targets in space. The enormous complexity and multifaceted nature of the problem. including opening its laboratories to inspection. development. preventing “space-strike weapons. The same is also true of the Russian–Chinese draft Treaty submit- ted to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in the spring of 2008.problem because of the deep technical asymmetry between the weapons sys- tems under discussion. this created quite a few difficulties for Washington. SDI program. The opportunity to achieve mutually advantageous concessions will thus be lost. compounded by the United States’ negative posture. In 1983–1984. has proven too great for this sweeping. In propaganda terms. and deployment of antimissile and antisatellite systems.S. deployment. in the atmosphere. the diplomatic process will inevitably result in deadlock. They had not actually been intended to reach an agreement but to put up political resistance and spread propaganda against the U. FiFTh Attempts in recent years at the international level to put legal provisions in place to establish barriers to an arms race in space have been unsuccessful. and mod- ernization of BMD systems and components by the two sides. one- off approach. Moscow sought to curtail the freedom the United States enjoyed in working on space-based BMD system components. This old regulatory legal framework could prove useful during future negotiations. The Soviet Union declared its willingness to establish very strict verification procedures.” and prohibiting the use of force in and from space against the Earth were unsuc- cessful. The so-called package proposal that the Soviet side offered at the 1986 Reykjavik Summit provided that the USSR and the United States would mutually forgo the development. testing. if they take place. Efforts by the Soviet Union to selectively prohibit or allow certain antisatellite capabilities or actions. Subsequent Soviet initiatives at international forums that proposed prohibiting the placement of “any types of weapons” in space.

One model is based on the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space and includes comprehensive bans on certain types of weapons 108 COnClUSiOn . even this approach has its problems. Commitment to a code as a com- pilation of declarations of intent means much more in democratic nations. compelling evidence of such violations could be confirmed or refuted only if there are precise definitions for what is subject to these bans. Such initiatives stem from the idea that reaching agreement on the principles of a code of conduct would not only introduce the necessary voluntary restrictions but also expand agreement over the fundamental principles of outer space being used solely for peaceful or military support purposes. SixTh An analysis of the half century of development of military and techni- cal space systems and the principles of their use as well as the experience of talks and agreements makes it possible to tentatively identify two main models for the legal regulation of space activity. interim solutions could include using codes that are politically binding without being weighed down by complex definitions. Even then. these efforts include the Council of the European Union’s draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. with all of the ensuing political consequences (as in the case of the United States with The Hague Code). This idea was based on the existing (though imperfect) International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. These attributes are inherent in legally binding treaties that strictly regulate the conduct of all parties regardless of their system of government. These new draft proposals include the Model Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations. At the official interna- tional level. they must do so openly. meanwhile. and verification. record-keeping and counting rules. can sign any codes they want and remain free to breach them for as long as the violations remain hidden from the world community. where military programs and financing are transparent. However. and methods of verification data exchange. drawn up by the Eisenhower Institute. While progress on legally binding treaties has stalled. The greatest potential contribution of such a code of conduct in space would be to create the political conditions needed for negotiations on full-fledged and legally binding treaties to ban or limit space weapons.S. restric- tions. presidential campaign when Barack Obama backed a code of conduct that included a global ban on the use of weapons against satellites and prohibited antisatellite weapons tests. released by the Stimson Center. and where military agencies and the military-industrial complexes are monitored by independent parliaments and civil society groups. The heads of authoritarian nations. If democratic countries fail to abide by the codes. The international expert community also applied political pressure during the 2008 U. adopted in November 2002 in The Hague. and the draft Framework of Space Security. One of these ideas involved efforts to reach agreement on a code of conduct in outer space that would be less formal than a treaty.The resulting deadlock has compelled the international expert community to seek alternative solutions.

the United States must transition from the first model to the second. The initial treaty could be in effect for a limited period (ten years. and the difficulties involved in defining the subject matter and verifica- tion measures for the treaties. and includes detailed agreements on all issues. and accepted understandings. its first phase could include the United States. provisions on exceptions to the rules. preferably combined with measures of cooperation and transparency. and China. Alexei ArbAtov And vlAdimir dvorkin 109 . Russia. the differing stages of development of the various technical programs and projects. an indirect solution to the problem might be to reach a pre- liminary agreement to prohibit testing of antisatellite systems and space-based missile defense systems capable of destroying a targeted satellite or ballistic missile and its components in flight. the technological overlap between the various types of systems. with the possibility of an extension). Rather than simply prohib- iting deployment. The practical basis for the treaties on strategic arms was not to peacefully resolve issues but to balance the military interests of the parties. data exchange. The ability to agree on definitions of the subject of the treaties and to draw up realistic and reliable verification and transparency measures will be extremely important for any practical negotiations to succeed. Compliance could be verified by using the national technical means of verification of the parties. verification. without going into technical details of definitions of the subject of the agreement. taking into account the immense complexity and many fac- ets of the issues. SALT I.and activities. INF. the practical interests of the parties in space could be easily balanced by prohibiting or greatly restricting antisatellite weapons in exchange for a refusal to develop space BMD systems in other words. To achieve results in this area. these diplomatic initiatives brought Moscow some political and propaganda dividends but did not lead to concrete results in the form of legally binding treaties. as well as a gradual progression in disarma- ment and verification measures. the technological overlap of BMD and ASAT systems that complicates the prohibition of one without the other would encourage measures that either limit or prohibit both. By the same logic. and the latter would serve the interests of Russia and the PRC. after which it could be extended to include other nations. Soviet proposals at multilateral forums and bilateral talks with the United States in the 1980s as well as Russian initiatives from this decade (including joint initia- tives with other countries) have been based on the first model. and START I treaties. space-based strike systems (interceptors). The other model that also closely relates to space issues is based on the ABM. Using this treaty format. ranging from partial steps to measures increas- ingly broad and deep in scope. as well as the great asymmetry in the geostrategic situations and military policies of the parties. Set against Wash- ington’s unconstructive policy. The former would serve the interests of the United States.

Brazil. Russia. the par- ties would have never attained the unprecedented across-the-board reductions. Pakistan. There is an urgent need for cooperation among the major powers and all responsible countries to resolve these issues as they seek to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. and take action to ensure energy and food security. as was true of the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement and the 1979 SALT II Treaty. the growing threat of a space arms race. carry out multilateral peacekeeping operations. Furthermore. SEvEnTh Although the United States possesses economic and technical supe- riority in space at the moment. it would inevitably involve other countries. In the long term. and especially of space conflicts. restrictions. as well as an irreversible crisis for the entire nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime. the next step could well be to begin work on legally binding treaties to guarantee that space will be used only in the interests of peace and common security. if outer space. and transparency measures that the INF Treaty and START I imple- mented 20 years later. implement effective measures to address climate change and environ- mental issues. and Japan. will inevitably lead to vertical and horizontal nuclear and missile prolif- eration. This is what happened with nuclear weapons and missile technology. While the United States enjoyed an initial monopoly or superiority. were to become filled with weapons. without national borders or natural shelters. and others. In this era of globalization. later joined by Iran.” A first step on this road would be the rapid approval of a code of conduct for nations’ activities in space. as it is the country that relies most on the security of satellite support systems for its military and civilian activities. As Napoleon once said. The same dynamic demands urgent work in drafting international agreements to prevent the militarization of outer space. should an arms race ever begin. 110 COnClUSiOn . “Politics is just common sense applied to important matters. the greatest danger would come from accidents. beginning with China. verify compliance at major stages of the disarmament process. The United States would also have the most to lose. and command system malfunctions. it now sees their proliferation as the greatest threat to its security. India. the world is experiencing new security problems that cannot be resolved unilaterally. prevent international terrorism. false alarms. Had they failed to pass through these natural phases of disarmament.Military and political considerations as well as technical and physical circum- stances demand that the treaty option proposed above be partial and selective. especially through the use of military force.

Edwin (“Buzz”). 86–93 future trends. 93–96 Armstrong. 72. 52–54 legacy of. 43–44. 90–91 negotiations and. 6. 22 altitude. See artificial earth satellites (AES) weaponization Agreement Governing the Activities of States on collapse of nuclear disarmament system.” 11 Ariel-1. 3 Alouette-1. 19 Air Force. 19 Washington summit on. 19 U. 52–54 as model for future treaties. 79–86 non-weaponization. 37–38 Atlas launch vehicle. 18. 109 of USSR/Russia. 94 non-weaponization and. 50–52 verification and. 6 autonomous micro-spacecraft. 57–65 A-1 spacecraft.S. 51–52 Apollo-11. 39 antennas. 58 Ariane launch vehicles. 39 Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating anti-missile defense systems. large area. 34–37. 37–38 atmosphere Aldrin. 19 AEGIS Mk7 anti-satellite system. 82–83 Apollo-Soyuz project. 19 AirLaunch program (Boeing). See also non- AES. prevention of.S. 79. 90–91 ABM Treaty (1972) disarmament proposals and. 79–86 negotiations and. U.. 104 SMV development and. 43–44. 9. 19 “absence factor. 109–110 universal agreement proposals. See anti-satellite systems (ASAT) autonomous micro-spacecraft. 31–32 Local Space (ANGELS) program. 19 boundary of. 40.indEx A of China. 85. 19 scope of. 25 ASAT. 106 of U.S. artificial earth satellites (AES). 93–96 verification and. 39 antisatellite systems (ASAT) indEx 111 . 85. Neil. 110 altitude. 51 disarmament proposals. 39 astronautical engineering. 79–101. 19 pollution of. 96–101 agreements globalization and. 37 arms race. 19. 49. 32. withdrawal from. 90–91 definitions in. 52–54. 21 Air Force Space Command. 80–81 the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979). 43–45.

90–92 weaponization Earth-based systems of. 10–11 elliptical orbits. 11 BTWC. 6. 34 debris. 88–89 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT. 23 112 indEx . 3 Braun. 76 Cold War era Eisenhower Institute.. 69 Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1963). 28 Warning Systems and Notifications of Carter. 105 U. Wernher von. 17–18 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty launch requirements and. 20–22 history of. 71 Eisenhower. 9 Combined Air and Space Operations Center. 18–19 costs. 90. 94 Boeing Company. 43–44. 41–42 China Diamant-1 launch vehicle. defined. 79. 33. 57. George W. 33–34 Destruction (CWC). 18–19 Security Space Management and Organization report. See also BMD Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. 52 Missile Launches (2002). 23 covertness.. George H. 54. See arms race. 4 as international legal regulations. defined. 36–37 Bacteriological [Biological] and Toxin space-based. 42–44 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development.S. U. xxi Council of the European Union. 90–91 disarmament. 59–60 ballistic missile defense (BMD). Jimmy. early space activity.. 41 European Code of Conduct in Coastal Zones (1999). See Convention on the Prohibition CWC. 12. 41. 108 images of. 19. E 72–76. 19 antisatellite weapon systems. 71 Commission to Assess United States National Explorer-1. 44. 82–87. Weapons and on their Destruction 87. 95. 84–85 early-warning systems. 11–12. 9 (1999).S. See missile early-warning Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities systems proposal (EU).b Conference on Disarmament from the German Baikonur Space Center Democratic Republic and Mongolia.. See space debris Bush. Fengyun-1-3 spacecraft. 27. 98 Discovery-1. 86. 97–98 (BTWC). 23 for the Exchange of Data from Early carrier rockets. 39. 31 85. directed energy weapons. xxi dual-purpose systems. 39 Defense Department. 108 Britain. 95 circular orbits. W. 19 information support capability. 94 Ferret spacecraft. missiles and. 35 space weapons programs. 41 F Commonwealth of Independent States. 50 C Declaration on the Establishment of a Joint Center Canada. 52 d Bulava missile system. 3–5. 9 Commission on Space (US). 43–44. 40. Production. 25 equatorial orbits. 4–5. 49. Stockpiling and Use BMD systems of Chemical Weapons and on their Cold War era buildup. 75–76. 69–76 gravity field. 19. 91–92. 33–34 EKV-PLV anti-ballistic missile system.S. U. 51–52. prevention of. Production Development. 31–45 electronic miniaturization. 40 1996). 108 BMD system buildup. 71 Center for Defense Information. Stockpiling and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Use of Chemical Weapons and on [Biological] and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) their Destruction (BTWC) Buchheim. Rumsfeld Commission recommendations on. 23 future negotiations. 75. 72–76. non- disarmament proposals of. systems Production. 41 Production and Stockpiling of SBLs and. 5–6. 5–6 Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (COC). 108 Earth codes of conduct. Susan. 64 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Bush. 37–38 cosmos. 86. 69–70 eccentricity. 85 Falcon system. See Convention on the Prohibition of the of the Development. of spacecraft. 94 partnership approach to. 27 Britain. 74–75. 55–56 early space activity. 109–110 docking technology. early space activity. 60. Robert. 7–8 drafting of.

88 k Framework for Space Security. 26 early space activity. 64 explanation of. 4–5 intelligence gathering and. 3 military operations. 22 science and. 27–28 of Earth. 71. 73. 18–20 information technology. 74–75. use of. 85 Geneva Conference on Disarmament (2008). 95 International Aeronautical Federation. 105 Jupiter-C launch vehicle. 53–54 SBL programs and. 23 l USSR/Russia and. 26 ISMU system. 72. 64 scientific discoveries and. 21 Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963). 31. 59–60 MiG-31 fighter interceptor. xxi laser weapons system (SBL). 37 missile early-warning systems indEx 113 . John. 17 Geneva Conference on Disarmament (2002). 52 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF. 19 LASP spacecraft. 21 near-lunar space and. 20 h Lockheed Martin Corporation. 12 Japan. 18–19 GLOSNASS system. 21 i m inclination. 90 Mendelevich. 95. xxi miniaturization. 56. 18 Kontakt airborne missile system. 108 Lunokhod-1 rovers. 21 spacecraft and. Alexei. 23 McNamara. 26 precision-guided weapons. 73. 22 Inmarsat network. 57.fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS). 26 telecommunication satellites and. 26 orbits and. 26 Mars intelligence gathering images of. 7–8 USSR vs. 24. 108 history of. defined. 56 near-Earth space and. 9 geostationary orbits Krasnoyarsk radar station. 85 Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite (KEAsat). xxiii launch vehicles global positioning systems. 21 hyperbolic orbits. 72 rocket engines and. 9 land-based ICBMs. 38 j terrain and. 24–25 outer space as sphere of. 1987) meteorological service systems. xxii International Verification Agency. Mikhail. 72 Korolev. 9 space probes and. 36. 107 Kosygin. 32 seek and destroy missions. 86 intermediate-range missiles. 39 Henry L. 108 Kaskad anti-satellite orbital station. 33–34 Germany. 32. 19 Persian Gulf War and. Sergey P. 32 Galileo system. 19 space support teams. xxi early space activity. 19 MIRACLE (Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser). 24–26 AirLaunch program and. 3–5. Lev. 26. 84–85. 32. 27 Missile Proliferation (2002). 21 gravity field small spacecraft systems and. 23–25 NAVSTAR system and. 106 liquid-fuel rocket engines. 32 France.S. 37–38 Globalstar network. 19 information support capability. 32 Gagarin. Stimson Center. 36–37. 26 Italy. U. 83. 23–24 scientific discoveries and. 37 g kinetic energy weapons. 4 manned spaceflight India. 10–13 Iridium network. 12–13 interplanetary space flights. 23 globalization. 36–37 IS (satellite interceptor) program. 110. 8–9 orbital systems and combat. 110 satellites negotiations and. 27. 22–29 International Space Station. 50. 12 Iraq War (2003) orbital systems and combat. 103. Yuri. 20 Gorbachev. 54. 82–83 Kourou Space Center.. 19. See also space weapons programs International Code of Conduct against Ballistic comparative costs of. 10–12. xxi Kazakhstan. 92 Glenn. 5–6 Lunokhod-2 rovers. 109. Robert. See weather as model for future treaties. 35.

72 “Possible Elements for a Future International near space. 42–43 claims of sovereignty and. 24. 5–6 SALT I/II Treaties. 105. 21 Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations. 28 pollution. the Threat or Use of Force non-weaponization. non-weaponization and. 93–95. 21 “rogue” nations. 24 polar. 50–51. 109 37–38 scope of. 23–24 natural resources. 24. 73 Relationship (2002). 53 56–65. 23. Ronald. 32. 42 parabolic orbits. See USSR/Russia circular. 17 orbital altitude. 105 Proton-K. 26 Persian Gulf War. 4–10 scientific discoveries and. 26. 22 NAVSTAR system. 21 Outer Space Treaty (1967) Moscow Declaration on the New Strategic ban on nuclear weapons. 36 satellites and. 19–20 R-7 ICBM. 96. 73. 56–57 radio-electronic warfare. Nikolai. 4–10 Rumsfeld Commission. defined. 4 Romania. 5 Naval Ocean Surveillance System (US). perceived threat of. 60–64 Prompt Global Strike program. 7 Russian Federation. 54–56 NTMV. research and development. 9 equatorial. 81–82 nuclear weapons and. orbital geodesic surveys of. 28 59. 55 elliptical. 106.” 83 agreements on. 5–6 Ryzhkov. 52–53. 6. Dana. 4–5. 52–54 Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (UN). 5 Missile Technology Control Regime (1987). 5–6 IMEWS system. 9 S hyperbolic. Barack. Sam. U. 23 radio interference. 72 anti-satellite consultations and.. 4–10 space-based. 49. 24 national technical means of verification (NTMV). 18–19 properties of. Reagan. Pegasus carriers. 51 Space. 52. 8–9 Samos spacecraft. 35–36 orbital geodesic surveys. 39 O rocket engines. 49. 109. 49–65 Against Outer Space Objects. 51 satellites and. 85 the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Nike-Zeus missiles. 56–65. 21 polar orbits. 69 chronology of negotiations. 3 Multiple-use Space Maneuvering Vehicle (SMV). 18 orbits. 110 P National Defense report (Russian Federation). 52 Reykjavik summit (1986). 28 National Telecommunications and Information People’s Republic of China. 57 Rhyolite satellites. 73. 4–10 human landings on. 38–39 nuclear detonation detection systems. 23 114 indEx . 8 nuclear weapons. 70 NATO. of atmosphere. 38 Perino. 97. See national technical means of verification R (NTMV) radiation belts. 76. FOBS and. 26. 108 Rocket Propulsion Research Institute. 49–51. 98–99 Pegasus-xL booster. 22–23 sun-synchronous. 70 verification capabilities and. 3–4 non-weaponization and. 57. 5–6 National Space Policy (US). 50–52 precision-guided weapons. 108 as military sphere. 49–51. 19 Nunn. 4 Rockwell International Corporation.S. 34. 88 parabolic. 5 laser weapons systems and. See also arms race. 94 n Napoleon. 3–4 Faring Nations. 41 Patriot missile defense systems. 41 characteristics of. 105–106 orbital period. 4. xxi–xxii Legal Agreement on the Prevention of Netherlands. 59 prevention of reusable aerodynamic orbiters. 20 Obama. 110 military operations and. 100. legacy of. Earth-based. 10–13 Moon orbits and. on politics. 9 USSR/Russia initiatives. 71 outer space Model Code of Conduct for Responsible Space. 85 orbital stations. See China Exchange. 5–6.

69 as model for future treaties. Syria. 94–95 future trends. 34 orbital parameters for. 19 prohibition of WMDs. 28–29 T space activity. 6 features of. 71 United Arab Emirates. 31–45 as universal agreement proposal.S. 20. 18 numbers of. 39 Thor missiles. 44. 69–76 announcement of. 23 manned. 26. 23 Tiros satellites. 93 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile space debris Systems. 110 Resolution 1884. 104 costs of. 59–60. 40–45 Space Objects (1987). ballistic missiles and. Saturn. 17–29. 104 submarines. 29 Taurus carriers. 19 BMD Treaty and. 17–18 intelligence gathering and. 10–11 anti-satellite weapon systems. See also anti-satellite systems (ASAT) legacy of. 20–22 geostationary orbits of. 85 37–38 Soldier Modernization Plan (US). 4–5 threat of “rogue” nations and. 90–93 space flight dynamics. 105–106 navigation systems and. 40 verification capabilities. U. 31–45 indEx 115 . Mikhail K. 109. 37–39 Treaty on the Prohibition of Anti-Satellite Weapons U. 31. See Strategic Defense Initiative United States (SDI) absence of goodwill. space activity and.San Marco spacecraft. 21 negotiations and. 5 Skor satellites.. 4–5. and. 26. 33. 107–108 space weapons programs. 94 USSR treaty proposals. 12 Soviet monitoring of laboratories. 28 history of. 43. 100–101 Resolution 57 (2002). xxii–xxiii telecommunication satellites history of military operations. 23 spacecraft.S. 6–8 in Outer Space (PPWT draft. 50 negotiations and. 23 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe small spacecraft systems. 38 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT. 22 Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons measurement of. 54–55 Star Wars program. 1990). 52 satellites. 94 science. 52–54. 5–6 Space. 23. 19 2002). 31–34. 82–86 China and. 12–13 autonomous micro-spacecraft. 95 START I Treaty (1994) U codes of conduct and. 43–45. 4 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe radio interference and. 20. 11–12. 34–37. 4–10 Strategic Missile Forces (SMF). xxi–xxii Topol-M missile system. 94 small spacecraft. 32 sun-synchronous orbits. 33–34 telecommunication. 50 verification and. 4–5. 2008) spacecraft and. See BMD Treaty (1972) atmospheric pollution and. 101 space probes. See Outer Space Treaty (1967) vulnerability of. 18–20. 88 United Nations legacy of. 96 Space Shuttle.S. 40 future trends. 55–56 SRAM-Altair system. 64 Resolution 2222.. 37 52–54 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) codes of conduct and. 20–22. 32–33 Cold War era weapons and. Strategic Boost Glide Vehicle project. 8 (CFE. xxi FOBS and. 27–28 (NATO). 6. 22–29 commercial. 38 administrative support and. See also specific programs Taiyuan Launch Center. 79. 20 full-scale testing and. 26 U. 95. 89. 6–8. 26 SMV (Multiple-use tSpace Maneuvering Vehicle). 64–65 equatorial orbits of. 53. Gherman. 11 theaters of military operations (TMO). 27 Tikhonravov. 96 Strategic Air Command. 22 in the Exploration and Use of Outer velocity and. 27–28 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States space debris and. 34 Skif anti-satellite orbital station.-Soviet relations and. See also specific spacecraft military operations and. 22 Titov. 56–57 orbits and. 20 science and. 34–45 and on Ways to Ensure the Immunity of USSR/Russia and. 34 costs of.

36–37 seek and destroy missions. 43–44. xxi Yeltsin. 109–110 information support capability. 54. 42–43. 31–34. 22 post–Cold War space weapons development. 9–10 photo-reconnaissance satellites. combat alert missiles. 32. 52–54. 9 Persian Gulf War and. 24–25 NATO support teams and. 19 outer space utilization and. 18–20 xichang Satellite Launch Center. 58–59. 26 moon landings. 91 weather satellites Iraq invasion and. 21 Tiros satellite. 82–87. 6–8 USSR/Russia anti-satellite weapon systems. 21 verification capabilities international agency for. 58 weapons in space. 27 space weapons programs. 69–76 Cold War era weapons and. former Iraq invasion and. 105–106 space program budgets. 18 VR-190 project. 49. 54–65 orbital stations and. 22–23 Zenit-2 photo-reconnaissance satellite. 107 early space activity. xxii space weapons programs and. 25–26 Yugoslavia. 85. 31. 105–106 SBL programs and. 93–96 service life stages and. 109–110 global positioning systems. 52. 90–92. 24 outer space utilization and. 25 Persian Gulf War and. 79 x-40A (SMV). 96 treaty negotiations and. 90–91 codes of conduct and. 34–45 United States Space Surveillance Network. 22 post-Cold War space weapons development. 23 116 indEx . 28–29 space program funding. 24–26 y information support capability. 40 future negotiations. Boris. defined. 65 inter-armed forces systems. 32. 24 technology of. 5–6 Venus. 40–45 v velocity. 18 Vostok-2. 56 prevention of arms race and. 31–45 disarmament proposals and. 17–19 future negotiations. xxi non-weaponization and. 23–24 Z photo-reconnaissance satellites. 27 space support teams. 38 early space activity. 19 orbital systems and combat. 26 small spacecraft systems. 27. 10–11 x CTBT and. 85–86 Vostok-1. 17–18 W Washington summit on ABM Treaty (1987). 27–28 Soldier Modernization Plan.

viktor mizin is a leading researcher at the Center for the Study of War and Peace at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. sergey oznobishchev is the director of the Institute of Strategic Assess- ments and a professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Rela- tions of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.contributors Alexei Arbatov is a senior scholar and chair of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. vladimir dvorkin is principal researcher at the Center for International Security at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and International Relations and former director of the Defense Ministry’s Central Research Institute in Moscow. He is also head of the Center for International Security at the Institute for International Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. contributors 117 . valery babintsev is an independent expert. Petr topychkanov is a research associate at the Institute of Asian and African Studies at Moscow State University and coordinator of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program.

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Fites Vanessa Ruiz Chas W. The Endowment—currently pioneering the first global think tank—has operations in China. Mathews. Russia. its work is non- partisan and dedicated to achieving practical results. President Paul Balaran. Executive Vice President and Secretary Thomas Carothers. nonprofit organiza- tion dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States. Vice President for Studies Douglas H. Annan Zanny Minton Beddoes Bill Bradley Sunil Bharti Mittal Gregory Craig Catherine James Paglia William H. Vice President for Studies George Perkovich. Jr. Fineberg J. Gaither Shirley M. the Middle East.cArnegie endowment For internAtionAl PeAce The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private. Tilghman William W. Vice President for Studies board of trustees Richard Giordano. Tavitian James C. These five locations include the centers of world governance and the places whose political evolution and international policies will most determine the near-term possibilities for international peace and economic advance. Lewis. and the United States.. Europe. Chairman Linda Mason Stephen R. Stapleton Roy Donald V. Paal. Freeman. Vice Chairman Jessica T. Founded in 1910. Jr. Mathews Kofi A. officers Jessica T. Vice President for Studies Marwan Muasher. Donaldson W. Taylor Reveley III Harvey V. Aso O. George .

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Alexei Arbatov is a senior scholar and chair of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center and head of the Center for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. tech- nical. vladimir dvorkin is principal researcher at the Center for International Security at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and International Relations and former director of the Defense Ministry’s Central Research Institute in Moscow. military.The world faces numerous security concerns—from nuclear proliferation to terrorism to climate change—that cannot be resolved by one nation alone. And unilateral military force will not defeat transnational threats. and legal problems confronting negotiators attempting to prevent—or at least control—the weaponization of space. the book details the political. leading Russian experts analyze the space weapons programs of world powers. Diplomacy. In Outer Space: Weapons. one issue requires urgent attention that is “out of this world”: the militarization of space. In this era of global challenges. As countries try to avoid a catastrophic new arms race in space. and Security. .

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