Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |1
Republic of the Philippines warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE,
PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA
TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY
AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON
OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR,
JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs.
Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that
would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To
be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with
the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season
and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and
excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen
quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same
question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority
Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by
Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a
Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information
signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State
Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant
City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to
and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail,
none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed
on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being,
or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the
statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no
complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally determined
the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for
hearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a
consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which
had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-
accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said
return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandezcharged
murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged
murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of
rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the
complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means
for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48,

Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound
crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with
which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after
which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and
the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours
from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and
P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued
without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional
liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues
raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to
Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in
Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in
the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion
cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with
common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his
written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of
rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion
which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all
other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to
its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning
Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In
the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical
bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here
persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact
that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the
1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No.
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |2
942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by
enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that
"(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter
(Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon
which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most
serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In
thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same
recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory
that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be
interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes
committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of
the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the
consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real
thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is
made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why
Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If
murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes
were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely:
(1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000
and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon
the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years
of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would
have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would
be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose
of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more
severe than that which would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished separately. In the words of
Rodriguez Navarro:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso
de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75
del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente
en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71
(later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article
48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son
aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho
constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de
ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena
correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado
maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma
de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este
limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado.
(Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in
said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the
graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not
exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged
were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our
Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of
said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses,
there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing
that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in
its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose
than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the
penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for
this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two
or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is
deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru
separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the
penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |3
grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each
offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which is that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not
here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper
time. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other
questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to
the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the
petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing
that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that
indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court
said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said
defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said
offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned
amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and
robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge
cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of
P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in
dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment,
said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist
in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that
rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion
thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context
of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined
and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or
preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint
against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau

of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing
of the questioned information. 14There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to
law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is
charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the
preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's
arrest without first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by
examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of
Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is
not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being
sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that
the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was
raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to
personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely
because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period
within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or
could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome
the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and
necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging
only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now
be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from
which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking
the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The
original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct
course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted
to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence
against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying
to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the
information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis
that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper
choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a
motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |4
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has
founded the present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is
charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the
prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against
him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have
been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions
was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an
assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever
to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify
every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify
by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through
the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of
four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the
trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or
deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It
makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing
no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's
recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for
the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It
is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been
recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof
the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court
of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful
or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just
outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the
petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present
petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds
would only compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now
decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too
strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of
proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only
if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court
of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will
give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process
and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of
the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive
of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to
 Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |5

that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants
of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No.
90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon
of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the
strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that
quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is
regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of
country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to
whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of
their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly
senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news
these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but
by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an
ongoing rebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the
crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is
disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery.
There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the
penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered
as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect
such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what
is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for
promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and
the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion
only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of
right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent
Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by
said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this
Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112235. November 29, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELIAS LOVEDIORO y
CASTRO, Defendant-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Ricafat Law Office for Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ESSENTIALLY A CRIME OF MASSES INVOLVING
CROWD ACTION. — The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public
uprising against the government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of
masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within
predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that
other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself
because they acquire a political character.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRIMES COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE OF POLITICAL END,
ABSORBED. — Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act,
however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion,
which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime
committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive
of the act should be conclusively demonstrated. It is not enough that the overt acts
of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of
the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does
not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc.,
were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it
has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and
would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion. If no political motive is established and
proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion.
In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself,
suffice.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF; BURDEN IN PROVING
POLITICAL MOTIVE IN CRIMES COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION LIES
WITH THE ACCUSED. — The burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the
defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better than any individual
knows. As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |6
impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in
the information. It must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; NOT ESTABLISHED WHERE KILLING WAS NOT
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. — It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire
extrajudicial confession did appellant ever mention that he was a member of the New
People’s Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would suggest
that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose.
Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not
contain any mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of
SPO3 Lucilo. Even prosecution eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in
his sworn statement of October 19, 1992. In any case, appellant’s claim regarding the
political color attending the commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its
viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. Against appellant’s attempts
to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on record
leaves the impression that appellant’s bare allegations of membership in the NPA was
conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial
notice that in many NPA infested areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to
the furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of
mitigating the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes
perpetrated by common criminals. In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence
pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that
the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE CREDIBLE
WITNESS IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. — It is of no moment that a single
eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, scaled his fate, for it is settled that the testimony of one
witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. Against appellant’s claims that
he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free
from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; MOTIVE; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT PRECLUDE
CONVICTION. — Neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant.
Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction, there
being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified appellant as the
perpetrator of the felony.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; BOLSTERED BY ABSENCE OF GRUDGE
AGAINST ACCUSED. — In the case at bench, the strength of the prosecution’s case
was furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant’s admission in open court that he
and the eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against each other.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; MANIFEST BY THE
SUDDEN AND WITHOUT WARNING ATTACK ON THE VICTIM. — Treachery was
adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was sudden,
and without warning of any kind.

9. ID.; MURDER; PENALTY. — The killing having been qualified by treachery, the
crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence
of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all the accessories provided
by law.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the
Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45
caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman’s right ear and fired. The
man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot the
fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter’s gun, the
man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled. 1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta,
a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim
and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the
deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant’s father was his first
cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a
resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on
the face, the chest, and other parts of the body. 2 On autopsy, the municipal health
officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic shock. 3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on November
6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of
the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case No. 5931
before RTC, Branch 1, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present
unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police
Station inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his death, to the
damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |7
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24,
1993 states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused
ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy
with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to
pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline
Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil
indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said widow the sum of
Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing
actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on
the part of the said accused.
With costs against the accused.
SO-ORDERED.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial
court decision finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness, Nestor Armenta,
as supporting his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion,
not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified
him as a member of the New People’s Army. Additionally, he contends that because
the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends," 4 (said
killing) should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134
and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal shot
but merely acted as look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have
been charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion
under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore
have been meted only the penalty of prision mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the
Solicitor General avers that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as
rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent
for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends." 5 Moreover,
the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant were to be convicted of rebellion,
and even if the trial court had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a
rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as appellant contends,
but reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6968, the Coup D’etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty
imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in a rebellion.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not
rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act. No. 6968,
rebellion is committed in the following manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives. 6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the
government. 7 By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or
multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within
predetermined bounds. 8 One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is
that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself
because they acquire a political character. This peculiarity was underscored in the
case of People v. Hernandez, 9 thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the
Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, then it
becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of
the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave,
assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a
lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is
rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or
not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act
should be conclusively demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense,
motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows.
Thus, in People v. Gempes, 10 this court stressed that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused’s) knowledge and since
moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to
state, which they could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the
deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of
rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |8
the crimes. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does
not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc.,
were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it
has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and
would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion. 11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a
common crime-alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty-
could benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political crimes.
Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v. Amin, 12 where the prosecution
sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829, 13 for
allegedly harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the
senator’s knowledge that Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held,
against the prosecution’s contention, that rebellion and violation of P.D. 1829 could
be tried separately 14 (on the principle that rebellion is based on the Revised Penal
Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator was being
charged, though punishable under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of
rebellion being motivated by, and related to the acts for which he was charged in
Enrile v. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling
in favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No.
1829 cannot prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion had already been
filed and in fact decided, the Court said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that
the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes
but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense. 15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in Enrile v. Amin
further underscored that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[I]intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with
rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is
a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the
act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion,
then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being
punished separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused
should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion,
motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the
furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v. Ompad, Jr., 16 to the
instant case is striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA recruits identified the
accused Ompad, alias "Commander Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having

led three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military
informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman,
Ompad was merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because
political motive was neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a
political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the
information. 17 It must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. In People v.
Paz and Tica we held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or
defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The
lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being
an informer, and his suspicion that he was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate
to established that the motivation for the killing was political, considering appellant’s
obvious interest in testifying to that effect. 18
Similarly, in People v. Buco, 19 the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to
established that the reason for the killing of their victim was to further or carry out
rebellion. The evidence adduced by the defense therein simply showed that appellant
Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas Calma, alias "Commander Sol" to kill municipal
mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise showed that Calma was
induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on account of private
differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court attributed no political
motive for the killing, though committed by known members of the Hukbalahap
movement. 20
People v. Dasig 21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the
Court held that "the act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a
person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of a rebellion." In Dasig the Court however noted that the accused, who
was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also
executed an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA
"sparrow unit," a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in
agreement. The Solicitor General’s brief in Dasig which this Court favorably quoted,
noted that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People’s Army with the
objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. 22
By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case at
bench. He states that accused-appellant’s belated claims to membership in the NPA
were not only in substantial but also self serving, 23 an averment to which, given a
thorough review of the circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Criminal Law II Session 1 Page |9
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA clearly overcame
the burden of proving motive or intent. It was shown that the political motivation for
the killing of the victim was the fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the
PC. The perpetrators even left a letter card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a
warning to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in the case at bar
where the evidence for the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and
denials not substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the killing of
victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo. 24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial
confession to having participated in the killing of Lucilo as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Q: What was that incident if any, please narrate?
A: July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male person a
certain alias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched me
and told me to go with them, so I asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun
and same he stopped/call a passenger jeepney and told me board on said jeepney.
(sic)
Q: Please continue.
A.. Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we alighted on said
jeep, so we walk towards Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining,
when the rain stopped we continue walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)
Q: When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q.7 you used the road near
the bakery where did you proceed?
A: I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue walking, at
more less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my companion told us as to quote in Bicol
dialect to wit: ‘AMO NA YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS’ (This is the place towards the
poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead of a small store, my three (3) companion
continue walking towards poblacion, later on a policeman sporting whit T-shirt a
khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said policeman is nearly approaching
me, ALWIN shot the said policeman infront of the small store, when the said
policeman fell on the asphalted road, ALWIN took the service firearm of the said
policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2) companions
commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill wherein there is a small
bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the handgun that was handed to me by them at
Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)
Q: Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?
A: I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it radio, that he is

JESUS LUCILO. (sic)
Q: What is your participation in the ground?
A: Look-out sir.
Q: I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)
A: No more sir.25cralaw:red
It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant
ever mention that he was a member of the New People’s Army. A thorough reading
of the same reveals nothing which would suggest that the killing in which he was a
participant was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the information filed
against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any mention or
allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo. 26 Even
prosecution eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn
statement of October 19, 1992. 27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant’s membership in the NPA
surfaced almost merely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely
picked up and followed through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta’s testimony on
cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly,
however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint
appellant as an NPA member. 28 The logical result, of course, was that the trial court
did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial court, after all, had
the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness’ testimony while upholding the
rest of it. 29 While disbelieving the portion of Armenta’s testimony on appellant’s
alleged membership in the NPA, the trial court correctly gave credence to his
unflawed narration about how the crime was committed. 30 Such narration is even
corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of the gunwielder, by
the testimony of the appellant himself.
In any case, appellant’s claim regarding the political color attending the commission
of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and
unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon the prodding of alias Alwin and alias
Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the organization’s goals. 31 He claimed that
his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had offended our organization," 32
without, however, specifying what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had
been a member of the NPA for five months before the shooting incident. 33
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant’s contentions are couched in
terms so general and non-specific 34 that they offer no explanation as to what
contribution the killing would have made towards the achievement of the NPA’s
subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was never alleged to be an
informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA.. Against
appellant’s attempts to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the
C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 10
evidence on record leaves the impression that appellant’s bare allegations of
membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable
upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas, crimes have been
all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of
political color for the purpose of mitigating the imposable penalty when in fact they
are no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis v.
Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or
irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or belittled.
Their activities, the killings and acts of destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate,
unfortunately continue unabated despite the best efforts that the Government
authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the insurrectionist groups of the
right or the left no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The need
for more stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid. 35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the
killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted
appellant of the crime of murder. 36 It is of no moment that a single eyewitness,
Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled that the testimony of one witness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. 37 Against appellant’s claims that he
acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free from
any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused. 38
Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or
absence of motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction, there being a
reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified appellant as the perpetrator
of the felony. 39 In the case at bench, the strength of the prosecution’s case was
furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant’s admission in open court that he and the
eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against each other. 40
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by
appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been
qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial
court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetuatogether with all the
accessories provide by law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court’s decision dated September 14,
1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL alias
"TAPOL", Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution2 dated
June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in G.R. CR No. 26418, which set aside the
November 15, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17,
Kidapawan City, Cotabato.
Petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" were
charged with the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).4 The Information dated May 3, 1990 reads:
The undersigned accuses EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO
MARFIL Alias "TAPOL" of the crime of Violation of Domicile, committed as follows:
That at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1989, at Sitio New Lantawan,
Barangay Greenhills, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Cotabato,
Philippines, the above-named accused EDIGARDO GEROCHE, being a Barangay
Captain and the rest being CAFGUs, hence, persons inauthority, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with garand rifles, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without proper judicial order, entered
the house of ROBERTO MALLO by forcibly breaking the door of said house against
the will of the occupants thereof, search the effects of the house without the previous
consent of the owner and then mauled one of the occupant BARILIANO LIMBAG
inflicting injuries to the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 11
During the arraignment on November5, 1990, all the petitioners pleaded not
guilty.6 Thereafter, trial ensued.
Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around 10:00 o’clock
in the evening of May 14, 1989 inside the house which he already bought from
Roberto Mallo. He roused from sleep when petitioners, who were not armed with
search warrant, suddenly entered the house by destroying the main door. The
petitioners mauled him, striking with a garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They
looked for firearms but instead found and took away his airgun. Roberto Limbag,
Baleriano’s nephew who was living with him, witnessed the whole incident and
corroborated his testimony.
Aside from presenting SPO4 Felomino Calfoforo, the Subpoena and Warrant Officer of
President Roxas Police Station who testified on the police blotter, Dr. Antonio Cabrera
also took the witness stand for the prosecution. Essentially, he affirmed the medical
certificate that he issued. His findings indicated that Baleriano suffered hematoma on
the left side of the nose, back portion of the body at the level of the hip region, and
back portion at the right side of the scapular region as well as abrasion on the right
side of the breast and left side of the body at the axilliary region.7 Dr. Cabrera opined
that the injuries inflicted would heal from seven to ten days. 8 For the defense,
petitioners denied the crime charged, declaring in unison that they were in their
respective houses the entire evening of May 14, 1989. They alleged, however, that
the night before, on May 13, 1989, they conducted a roving footpatrol, together with
other barangay officials, due to the rampant cattle rustling in the area. At the time,
they recovered a stolen carabao owned by a certain Francisco Pongasi9 from three
unidentified persons who managed to escape.
On November 15, 2001, the trial court found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC.
They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor
maximum, that is, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. According to
the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is
an essential element of Article 128 of the RPC. It held:
The prosecution who has that onus probandifailed to prove one of the essential
elements of the crime; on the issue of whether or not all the accused were public
officers; while it is true that accused were named CVO’s and the other as a barangay
captain and that even if the same were admitted by them during their testimony in
open court, such an admission is not enough to prove that they were public officers;
it is for the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence other than that of
the testimony of witnesses that they werein fact public officers; there exist a doubt of
whether or not all the accused were in fact and in truth public officers; doubts should
be ruled in favorof the accused; that on this lone and essential element the crime
charged as violation of domicile is ruled out; that degree of moral certainty of the
crime charged was not established and proved by convincing evidence of guilt beyond

reasonable doubt; x x x.10 Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which, on
November 18, 2005, set aside the trial court’s judgment. While it agreed with both
parties that petitioners should not be convictedfor Less Serious Physical Injuries, the
CA still ruled that they are guilty of Violation of Domicile considering their judicial
admissions that they were barangay captain (in the case of Geroche) and part of the
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (in the case of Garde and Marfil). The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and the
evidence on hand, the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered
finding the accused-petitioners GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing
them to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months, One (1) Day of arresto mayor
maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1) Day of prision [correccional] minimum with
the accessory penalty of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
professionor calling pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition. They argue
that there is double jeopardy since the trial court already acquitted them of Violation
of Domicile and such judgment, being now final and executory, is res judicata.
Petitioners insist that their appeal before the CA is limited to their conviction for the
crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries, focusing their arguments and defense for
acquittal from said crime, and that the CA violated their constitutional right to due
process when it convicted them for Violation of Domicile.
We deny.
An appeal in a criminal case opensthe entire case for review on any question
including one not raised by the parties.12 When an accused appeals from the
sentence of the trial court,he or she waives the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court,
which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate.13 An
appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.14 The appellate court may, and generally does,look into
the entire records to ensure that no fact of weight or substance has been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court.15
Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less
Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke
the prohibition on doublejeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to
correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment. Petitioners could not have
been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by finding
C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 12
them guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information instead of Less
Serious Physical Injuries.
The Court adopts the findings of factand conclusions of law of the CA. In their
testimony before the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither
Geroche denied that hewas a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they
were CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are considered as public
officers/employees.16
As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article
128 of the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccionalin its medium and maximum
periods (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation
of Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or effects not constituting
evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the
offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were
sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.
In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law17 requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate
sentence. The maximum term of the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code.1âwphi1 Yet the penalty prescribed by Article 128 of the RPC is composed of
only two, not three, periods. In which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the
division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period
of each of the three portions. Applying the provision, the minimum, medium and
maximum periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 128 are:
Minimum – 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days
Medium – 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
Maximum – 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years
Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period
or from 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of
the provisions of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code that if there are no other
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that
prescribed by Article 128 is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
 C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 13

The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the
Court hereby sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four ( 4) years,
nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and
Resolution dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 26418
finding petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias
"Tapol" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Domicile, penalized under
Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that
should be imposed is an indeterminate sentence from two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and
ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202692 November 12, 2014
EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the
December 28, 2011 Decision1and July 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. The assailed issuances affirmed the decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 12, in Criminal Case Nos. 09-270107-08
which, in turn, affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Manila
adjudging petitioner Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco) guilty of drunk driving and resisting
arrest.4
The factual backdrop:
On July 20, 2006, separate Informations, one for Violation of Section 56(f) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 41365 and another, for Violation of Article 151 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC)6 were filed against petitioner Sydeco with the MeTC in Manila and
eventually raffled to Branch 14 of that court. The accusatory portions of the
interrelated informations, docketed as Crim. Case No. 052527-CN for the first offense
and Crim. Case No. 052528-CN for the second, respectively read:
1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
being then the driver and owner of a car, did then and there willfully and unlawfully,
drive, manage and operate the same along Roxas Blvd. cor. Quirino Avenue, Malate,
in said city, while under the influence of liquor, in violation of Section 56(f) of
Republic Act 4136.
Contrary to law.
C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 14
2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully and unlawfully resist and disobey P/INSP Manuel Aguilar,
SPO2 Virgilio Paulino, SPO4 Efren Bodino and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, bonafide
member of the Philippine National Police, Malate Police Station-9, duly qualified and
appointed, and while in the actual performance of their official duties as such police
officers, by then and there resisting, shoving and pushing, the hands of said officers
while the latter was placing him under arrest for violation of Article 151 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Contrary to law.
By Order of September 19, 2006, the MeTC classified the cases as falling under, thus
to be governed by, the Rule on Summary Procedure.
When arraigned, petitioner, as accused, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
During the trial of the two consolidated cases, the prosecution presented in evidence
the oral testimonies of SPO4 Efren Bodino (Bodino),7 PO2 Emanuelle Parungao8 and
Ms. Laura Delos Santos,9 plus the documents each identified while in the witness box,
among which was Exh. "A", with sub-markings, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest10executed
by SPO2 Bodino and two other police officers. The defense’s witnesses, on the other
hand, consisted of Sydeco himself, his wife, Mildred, and Joenilo Pano.
The prosecution’s version of the incident, as summarized in and/or as may be
deduced from, the CA decision now on appeal is as follows:
On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3
Benedict Cruz III and another officer were manning a checkpoint established along
Roxas Boulevard corner Quirino Ave., Malate, Manila when, from about twenty (20)
meters away, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick up with plate number
XAE-988. Petitioner was behind the wheel. The team members, all inuniform, flagged
the vehicle down and asked the petitioner to alightfrom the vehicle so he could take a
rest at the police station situated nearby,before he resumes driving.11 Petitioner, who
the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and insisted he
could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, petitioner started talking rudely to the
policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "P…g ina mo, bakit mo ako
hinuhuli." Atthat remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to petitioner that his
team had seen him swerving and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to
arrestpetitioner who put up resistance. Despite petitioner’s efforts to parry the hold
on him, the police eventually succeeded in subduing him who was then brought to
the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to be positive of alcoholic
breath per the Medical Certificate issuedby that hospital, marked as Exh. "F".
Petitioner was then turned over to the Malate Police Station for

disposition.12 Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed tobe a victim in the incident in
question, adding in this regard that he has in fact filed criminal charges for physical
injuries, robbery and arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. In his Counter-
Affidavit13 and his Complaint-Affidavit14 appended thereto, petitioner averred that, in
the early morning of June 12, 2006, he together with Joenilo Pano and Josie
Villanueva, cook and waitress, respectively, in his restaurant located along Macapagal
Ave., Pasay City, were on the way home from on board his pick-up when signaled to
stop by police officers at the area immediately referred to above. Their flashlights
trained on the inside of the vehicle and its occupants, the policemen then asked the
petitioner to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle search, a
directive he refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead, he
opened the vehicle window, uttering, "plain view lang boss, plain view lang."
Obviously irked by this remark, one of the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar, as it turnedout,
then told the petitioner that he was drunk, pointing to three cases of empty beer
bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner’s explanation about being sober and that
the empty bottles adverted to came from his restaurant was ignored as P/Insp.
Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth and poked a gun at his head,
at the same time blurting, "P…g ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito marami ka
pang sinasabi." The officers then pulled the petitioner out of the driver’s seat and
pushed him into the police mobile car, whereupon he, petitioner, asked his
companions to call up his wife. The policemen then brought petitioner to the Ospital
ng Maynila where they succeeded in securing a medical certificate under the
signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting petitioner as positive of alcoholic
breath, although he refused to be examined and no alcohol breath examination was
conducted. He was thereafter detained from 3:00 a.m.of June 12, 2006 and released
in the afternoon of June 13, 2006. Before his release, however, he was allowed to
undergo actual medical examination where the resulting medical certificate indicated
that he has sustained physical injuries but negative for alcohol breath. Ten days later,
petitioner filed his Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp. Aguilar and the
other police officers.
Petitioner also stated in his counter-affidavit that, under Sec. 29 of R.A. 4136, or the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not to place the erring driver under arrest, but to confiscate his driver’s
license.
On June 26, 2009, the MeTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having established the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction of the offenses charges is
hereby pronounced. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:
1. Pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No.
052527-CN; and
C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 15
2. Suffer imprisonment of straight penalty of three (3) months and pay a
fine of two hundred fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.
For lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to certify to the Land Transportation Office the
result of this case, stating further the data required under Section 5815 of Republic
Act 4136.
Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main submissions that the MeTC
erred in: 1) according credit to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating,
although the records custodian of Ospital ng Maynila was presented to testify thereon
instead of the issuing physician, and 2) upholding the veracity of the joint affidavit of
arrest of P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Efren Bodino, and PO3 Benedict Cruz III,
considering that only SPO4 Bodino appeared in court to testify.
By Decision16 dated February 22, 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner, addressing the first issue thus raised in the appeal in the following wise:
Dr. Balucating’s failure to testify relative to petitioner’s alcoholic breath, as indicatedin
the medical certificate, is not fatal as such testimony would only serve to corroborate
the testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino, noting thatunder the Rules of
Court,17 observations of the police officers regarding the petitioner’s behavior would
suffice to support the conclusion of the latter’s drunken state on the day he was
apprehended.18
Apropos the second issue, the RTC pointed out that the prosecution has the
discretion as to how many witnesses it needs to present before the trial court, the
positive testimony of a single credible witness as to the guilt of the accused being
reasonable enough to warrant a conviction. The RTC cited established
jurisprudence19 enunciating the rule that preponderance is not necessarily with the
greatest number as "[W]itnesses are to be weighed, not numbered." Following the
denial by the RTC of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the CA on a
petition for review, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. By a Decision
dated December 28, 2011, as would be reiterated in a Resolution of July 18, 2012,
the appellatecourt affirmed that of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 22, 2010
of the RTC, Manila, Branch 12, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition on the following stated issues:

I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties by the police officers; and
II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate issued by Dr.
Harvey Balucating, in the absence of his testimony before the Court.
The petition is meritorious.
Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at times, to the trial court’s
findings of fact does hold sway when, as here, it appears in the record that facts and
circumstancesof weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied in a case under appeal.20 Corollary, it is basic that an appeal in criminal
prosecutions throws the whole case wide open for review, inclusive of the matter of
credibility and appreciation of evidence.21` Peace officers and traffic enforcers,like
other public officials and employees are bound to discharge their duties with
prudence, caution and attention, which careful men usually exercise in the
management of their own affairs.22
In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during
the period material appearednot to have performed their duties as required by law, or
at least fell short of the norm expected of peace officers. They spotted the
petitioner’s purported swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to stop which he
obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the driver’s license orissue any
ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required under the particular
premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136, which specifically provides:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. – Law enforcement and peace officers
of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for
any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic
rules and regulations x x x confiscate the license ofthe driver concerned and issue a
receipt prescribed and issuedby the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver
to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the
time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be
extended, and shall become invalid thereafter.x x x (Emphasis added.) Instead of
requiring the vehicle’s occupants to answer one or two routinary questions out of
respectto what the Court has, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals,23 adverted to as the
motorists’ right of "free passage without [intrusive] interruption," P/Insp. Aguilar, et
al. engaged petitioner in what appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when
utterances were made doubtless not to their liking, they ordered the latter to step out
of the vehicle, concluding after seeing three (3) empty cases of beer at the trunk of
the vehicle that petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol. Then petitioner
went on with his "plain view search" line. The remark apparently pissed the police
officers off no end as one of them immediately lashed at petitioner and his
companions as "mga lasing" (drunk) and to get out of the vehicle, an incongruous
C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 16
response to an otherwise reasonable plea. Defense witness, Joenilo Pano, graphically
described this particular event in his sinumpaang salaysay, as follows:
x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga pulis, nag flash light sa
loob ng sasakyan at sa aming mga mukha.
x x x isang pulis ang nag-utos sa aminna kami ay magsi-baba at buksan ang pintuan
ng nasabing sasakyan.
x x x dahil doon sinabi ni Kuya sa mga pulis, na hindi pwede iyon at pinigilan niya ako
at ang aking kasama kong waitress na bumaba.
x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulisang salitang "PLAIN VIEW LANG BOSS, PLAIN VIEW
LANG" pero iyon ayhindi nila pinansin. Sa halip as isang pulis ang nagsabi na "MGA
LASING KAYO HETO MAY CASE PA KAYO NG BEER".
x x x habang nagpapaliwanag si Kuya, isang pulis ang biglang kumuha ng susi ng
sasakyan habang ang isang pulis ang biglang sumuntok sa bibig ni Kuya, nagbunot
ng baril at tinutukan sa ulo si Kuya.
x x x dahil doon ay nagmakaawa ako na wag barilin si Kuya subalit ako rin ay
tinutukan ng baril. x x x na matapos suntukin si Kuya aypinagtulungan siya ng mga
pulis na ilabas sa sasakyan at nang mailabas siyaay pinagtulakan siya ng mga pulis sa
gilid ng kalsada habang hawak ang kanilang baril.24
Pano’s above account ironicallyfinds in a way collaboration from the arresting officers
themselves who admitted that they originally had no intention to search the vehicle in
question nor subject its occupants to a body search. The officers wrote in their
aforementioned joint affidavit:
xxxx
That we arrested the suspect, Edmund Sydeco y Siozon x x x for violation of RA 4136
(Driving under the influence of liquor), and violation of Article 151 of the RPC
(Resisting Arrest) x x x committed on or about 3:30A.M., June 11, 2006 along x x x
Malate, Manila. x x x He began to raise his voice and converse with us rudely without
considering that we are in uniform, on duty and performing our job. P/INSP Manuel
Aguilar pointed out that we saw him swerving and driving under the influence of
liquor that was why we are inviting him to our police station in which our intention
was to make him rest for a moment before he continue to drive. x x x (Emphasis
added.)
In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be
precise, petitioner has not committed any crime or suspected of having committed

one. "Swerving," as ordinarily understood,refers to a movement wherein a vehicle
shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or
movement.25 The act may become punishable when there is a sign indicating that
swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature ofreckless driving, a
concept defined under RA 4136, as:
SECTION 48. Reckless Driving. – Noperson shall operate a motor vehicle on any
highway recklessly or without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic,
grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and the
conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the
safetyor rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to
the highway.
Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of
reckless driving. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be
something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a
willful and wantondisregard of the consequences is required.26 Nothing in the records
indicate that the area was a "no swerving or overtaking zone." Moreover, the
swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets
are usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb
and property to third persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped the
petitioner’s car, they did not issue any ticket for swerving as required under Section
29 of RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the petitioner and his
companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that the petitioner was then
drunk mainly because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle. On re-
direct examination, SPO4 Bodino testified:
Q: On that particular date, time and place … what exactly prompted you to arrest the
accused (sic) the charged in for Viol. of Section 56(f) of R.A. 4136?
A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoynamin na amoy alak siya at yung sasakyan ay
hindi maganda ang takbo.
Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that you spotted the vehicle
of the accused swerving, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q. Is that also the reason why you apprehended him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you approached the vehicle of the
accused?
C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 17
A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, "Bakit daw siya pinahihinto?"
xxxx
Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness?
A: He refused to ride with usgoing to the hospital, Your Honor.
x x x x27
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-
off between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the
latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by
his insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly
be considered as resisting a lawful order.28 He may have sounded boorish or spoken
crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress
that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an
overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to
avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop.
The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art.
151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the
offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.29
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons
in authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely
petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches30 to be
conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience
let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often
been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality
of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to
assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.31 Moreover, there
is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen
to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and
body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the
occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and
frisk" action. As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only reason why they asked
petitioner to get out of the vehicle was not because he has committed a crime, but
because of their intention toinvite him to Station 9 so he could rest before he
resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the apprehending officers, in an
act indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle
and, in the process of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the face.
None of the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioner’s allegation
aboutbeing physically hurt before being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be
tested for intoxication. What the policemen claimed was that it took the three (3) of

them to subdue the fifty-five year old petitioner. Both actions were done in excess of
their authority granted under RA 4136. They relied on the medical certificate issued
by Dr. Balucating attesting that petitioner showed no physical injuries. The medical
certificate was in fact challenged not only because the petitioner insisted at every
turn that he was not examined, but also because Dr. Balucating failed to testify as to
its content. Ms. Delos Santos, the medical record custodian ofthe Ospital ng Maynila,
testified, but only to attest that the hospital has a record of the certificate. The trial
court, in its decision, merely stated:
At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were not testified upon by
the doctor who issued it.1âwphi1Instead, the Records Custodian of the Ospital ng
Maynila was presented by the Prosecution to testify on the said documents.
However, although the doctor who examined the accused was unable to testify to
affirm the contents of the Medical Certificate he issued (re: that he was found to have
an alcoholic breath), this court finds that the observation of herein private
complainants as to the accused’s behavior and condition after the incident was
sufficient.
Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:
The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence
regarding x x x x
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person Under Section 15 of the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, "at the trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the
direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same." 32
In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical
certificate Dr. Balucating issued on June 12, 2006 as to petitioner’s intoxicated state,
as the former was not able to testify as to its contents, but on the testimony of
SPO4Bodino, on the assumption that he and his fellow police officers were acting in
the regular performance of their duties. It cannot be emphasized enough that
smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are differing concepts.
Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty whether a
person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving
under the influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of course changed with the
approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586)
which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA),33 a term defined
under its Sec. 3(e) as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood
alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer test
reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the [DOH], the NAPOLCOM]
and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private
motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC
C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 18
[blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said
driver isdriving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the prism of RA 10586,
petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for
this obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone
conclusively, for reaching during the period material the threshold level of intoxication
set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. Under Art. 22 of the
RPC,34penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar asthey are favorable to the
accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily,
even by force of Art. 22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone,
petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of
alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.
Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its Resolution35 of
November 21, 2006 found, on the strength of another physical examination from the
same Ospital ng Maynila conducted by Dr. Devega on the petitioner on the same
day,June 12, but later hour, probable cause for slight physical injuries against P/Insp.
Aguilar et al. That finding to be sure tends to indicate that the police indeed man
handled the petitioner and belied, or at least cancelled out, the purported Dr.
Balucating’s finding as to petitioner’s true state.
The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after the unfortunate
incident, lost no time incommencing the appropriate criminal charges against the
police officers and Dr. Balucating, whomhe accused of issuing Exh. "F" even without
examining him. The element of immediacy in the filing lends credence to petitioner’s
profession of innocence, particularly of the charge of disobeying lawful order or
resisting arrest. Certainly not to be overlooked is the fact that petitioner,in so filing
his complaint, could not have possibly been inspired by improper motive, the police
officers being complete strangers to him and vice versa. Withal, unless he had a
legitimate grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that petitioner would expose
himself to harm’s way by filing a harassment criminal suit against policemen.
Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason.36 It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account.37 Given
the deviation of the police officers from the standard and usual procedure in dealing
with traffic violation by perceived drivers under the influence of alcoholand executing
an arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the trial court and the CA on
the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. As
stressed in People v. Ambrosio,38 the presumption of regularity is merely just that, a
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the
evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone
cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overcome
by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. In the present
case, the absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving
coupled with the forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle
argues against or at least cast doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and
resisting arrest.
 C r i m i n a l L a w I I S e s s i o n 1 P a g e | 19

In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of
innocence or at least infavor of the milderform of criminal liability. This is as it should
be. For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of proving the guiltof an
accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence and
noton the weakness of the defense.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASI:OE. Petitioner is hereby acquitted of the crimes charged in Criminal Case No.
052527-CN and Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.

No pronouncement as to costs.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice