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DECLARATION OF STATE POLICIES

1) Silverio vs. Republic 537 SCRA 373 (2007)


2) Dept of Health vs, Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. 518 SCRA 240 (2007)
3) Pharmaceutical and health Care Association vs Duque III 535 SCRA 865; G.R. 173034 09 Oct 2007
4) Parreño vs. Commission on Audit 523 SCRA 390 (2007)
5) Orosa vs. Factoran, Jr 224 SCRA 792 (1993)
6) Tano vs. Gov. Salvador P. Socrates G.r. No. 110249 (August 1997)
7) Sales vs. Carreon Jr 515 SCRA 597 (2007)
8) Pamatong vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 161872, (Apr 13, 2004)
9) Chavez vs. Romulo G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

CASE DIGEST:
1) Silverio vs. Republic 537 SCRA 373 (2007) sex reassignment

FACTS:
Petitioner, born in April 4, 1962 with name registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his birth
certificate and sex as "male." . In 2001, being a male transsexual, he underwent sex reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand

Petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. In 2002, he filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8
seeking to have his name changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female” for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

RTC granted the petition. In 2003, the Republic, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason
of sex alteration. The Court of Appeals reversed RTC's decision, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for

RULING:
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.
Under the Civil Code, now amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), there is no sanction of a change of
first name on the ground of sex reassignment. The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of
first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

The court held that the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and statutes must be followed. The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through
the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry

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for that reason. The remedy petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by
the legislature, not by the courts. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Rommel wants to be a bride
Facts: Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his birth
certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fiancé. A year before, Silverio has underwent sex re-
assignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from
“Rommel” to “Mely.” Should the court allow the change of name?

ANSWER: No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the
determination of a person’s sex at the time of birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. It held that Commented [ris3dt1]: Unchangeable, absolute
“while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
There is no special law in the country governing sex reassignment and its effect. This is fatal to
petitioner’s cause.” The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner “will have serious and
wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences,” i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations and substantially affect the public policy in relation to women in
laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code, etc. (GR No. 174689, Silverio v. Republic, October 22, 2007)
Following the doctrine on separation of powers, the Court cannot rule is a case where there is
no law passed by the Legislature. The task of the Court is to interpret the law. Absent such law, the
Court cannot render its decision.
CASE DIGEST:
(2)THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT, USEC. MA. MARGARITA GALON
and USEC. ANTONIO M. LOPEZ, vs. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC., (G.R. No. 169304, March 13, 2007)

FACTS:
In 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued the guideline that only
pharmaceutical products accredited by the Committee shall be allowed to be procured by the DOH and
all other entities under its jurisdiction.

Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through Antonio M. Lopez issued an Invitation for Bids
for the procurement of Penicillin G Benzathine. When the bids were opened, only two companies
participated. Pharmawealth, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and
supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the Philippines, submitted the lower bid
compared to Cathay/YSS Laboratories’ (YSS) bid. Because of the non-accreditation of respondent’s
Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS.

Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc., filed a complaint alleged act of illegally abusing their official positions to make
sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract which act was done in
bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law, praying to
nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. This was the
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by CA, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of immunity from suit can be invoked by petitioner DOH
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RULING:
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition.

As regards the DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated
agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction
and mandamus.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have now
adopted as part of the law of the land

The court ruled that there are acts which are not suits against the State within the rule of immunity of
the State from suit. These are 1) unauthorized acts of government officials or officers, 2) an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, 3) an
action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department who he
violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or
under an assumption of authority which he does not have. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages is permissible.
For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign
immunity and must bear the liability personally.

Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are
unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public
official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
(3) PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEALTH SECRETARY
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III (535 SCRA 865; G.R. 173034 09 Oct 2007)
FACTS:
On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are
not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. The Philippines ratified the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially
parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. The DOH issued RIRR which was
to take effect on July 7, 2006. Herein petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to nullify Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of the “Milk Code,” because it
was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of
said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RIRR of the WHA Resolutions are deemed part of the law of the land which
could be implemented by the DOH

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RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order
No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of
Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
“Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary
international law which are binding on all states. Customary international law is deemed incorporated
into our domestic system. Custom or customary international laws are such general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).
The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other
forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that
advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly
authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-
binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence
state behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions,
although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority
of the member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the
need of a law enacted by the legislature.
On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly
how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory provisions
under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in
the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with
the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code
(4) 2nd LT. SALVADOR PARREÑO represented by his daughter Myrna P. Caintic, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 162224 June 7, 2007

FACTS:
Salvador Parreño served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years and retired on
January 5, 1982 with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant
In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension. He migrated to Hawaii and became a
naturalized American citizen.
In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of
P.D. 1638, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650, which provides that a retiree who loses his
Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon
loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of
the AFP denied the request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension.COA denied
petitioner’s claim for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not COA has jurisdiction over money claims against the government
2) Whether or not Section 27 of P.D. No. 1638, as amended, is constitutional

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RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
On the first issue, the jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government does
not include the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the Supreme
Court and in all Regional Trial Courts. Petitioner’s money claim involved the constitutionality of Section
27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioner’s money claim.

The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether
a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the
statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act
as unconstitutional and void.

On the second issue, the court held that PD 1638, as amended, is constitutional. It does not
impair any vested right or interest of petitioner. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause. In
the same tenor, the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to
reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.

PD 1638 complied with all these. There is a substantial difference between retirees who are
citizens of the Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another
country. The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render personal and military
service necessarily includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have retired from military
service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state.
Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the need
arises.

Hence, provided the petitioner becomes a Filipino, there shall be no legal obstacle to the resumption of
his retirement benefits from the time he complies again with the condition of the law.
(5) OPOSA VS FACTORAN
(6) ALFREDO TANO et al. vs. HON. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN et al G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997
(Right to a balanced and healthful ecology )

FACTS:
In summary, the three ordinances1 by the local government of Palawan were made to ascertain
whether the shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit issued by its Office and the shipment is

1 1.) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa; (AN
ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY
FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES THEREOF)
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covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the matter. It altogether
prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing
method .
Thus, depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of
their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other
marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade. It took away the right of
petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of
Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation
and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business
endeavors
The petitioners content that the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and
unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections
2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners, then2, filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to declare three ordinances as
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the three ordinances are unconstitutional
RULING:
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit.
As to the first set of petitioners, the special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity
amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no
special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct
recourse to the Supreme Court should be allowed.
As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e.,
for a declaration that the Ordinances in question is a nullity for being unconstitutional.
These Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to
the protection and preservation of the environment and are thus novel and of paramount importance.
To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.

2 Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of
Puerto Princesa City ( AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN
ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE
ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYOR'S PERMIT)
3 ) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of P alawan (A
RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE
MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS)

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The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and
social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the
Constitution. Indispensable to decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that "[a]ny
provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local
government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in
favor of the local government unit concerned." evolution refers to the act by which the National
Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific
functions and responsibilities

(7) Sales vs. Carreon Jr 515 SCRA 597 (2007)

8) REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004
FACTS:

Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17,
2003.
The COMELEC declared petitioner who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or not nominated by
a political party or not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to
"equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution by
limiting the number of qualified candidates . He contends that the COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can validly invoke Sec 26 of Art II of the Constitution in disqualifying him
from running for President

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

The provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office" is a subsumed part of Article II
of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." This is not a self-executing
provision. The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office.
Therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
misplaced.

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The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.

(9) FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs.HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE


SECRETARY;ET. AL.,
(G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004)
FACTS:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to
suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR) stressing the need for
a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. Subsequently, the
"Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence was
issued on January 31, 2003, by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) amking as a rule that persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special
permit, certificate of registration or MR) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of
residence.

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public
respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as
Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not THE PNP CHIEF HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE QUESTIONED
GUIDELINES
2. Whether or not the citizens’ right to bear arms is a constitutional right

RULING:
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit.

By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine
Constabulary (PC), therefore, assumed the latter’s licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as
one of PNP’s powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in
accordance with law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chief’s "power to issue detailed implementing
policies and instructions" on such "matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions,
powers and duties" of the PNP. In the same vein, when President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane
to suspend the issuance of PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to perform an assigned duty.
Such act is well within the prerogative of her office. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty.

The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The maintenance of
peace and order1 and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the
State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these
constitutional duties. Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception,

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not the rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere
statutory creation.

CITIZENSHIP
1) Tecson et al v COMELEC G.R. No. 161434 Mar 03, 2001 (en masse Filipinization)
2) In Re: Florencio Mallare 50 SCRA 45 (Doctrine of Implied Election) GRANTED
3) In Re: Ching Bar Matter No. 914 Oct 01, 1999 (CA 625) reasonable time: 3 yrs/DENIED
4) Carlos T. Go, Sr. vs. Luis T. Ramos; vs Jimmy T. Go G.R. No. 167569|| G.R. No. 167570 || G.R.
No. 171946 || Sept 4,2009
5) Mercado vs. Manzano 307 SCRA 543 1999 (Dual Citizenship/Dual Allegiance) Sec 5, Art IV-not
self-executing
6) Valles vs. COMELEC 337 SCRA 543, 2000 –do-
7) Cordora vs COMELEC et al. G.R. No. 176947 Feb 19, 2009
8) Tabasa vs Court of Appeals 500 SCRA 09; August 29, 2006
9) So vs. Republic G. R. No. 170603 January 29 2007 (RA 9139 vs CA 473{June 7,1941})
10) Calilong vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007 (RA 9225)
11) Lopez vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 182701 July 23, 2008 (RA 9225) Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003 Sec 5 (2) to take the oath of allegiance AND execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy
12) Jacot vs. Dal and COMELEC G.R. No. 179848 November 27,2008(RA 9225)
13) Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Ermita, 526 SCRA 353 2007
14) In Re: Benjamin M. Dacanay 540 SCRA 424, 2007 (Req. to Practice of Law)
15) Roseller De Guzman vs. COMELEC et al G.R. No. 180048 June 19 2009 (RA 9225)

SUFFRAGE
1) Akbayan-Youth vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 147066, March 26,2001 DENIED
2) Macalintal vs. COMELEC G.R.No. 157013, July 10, 2003 R.A. 9189 *affidavit of intention to return
3) Loida Nicolas-Lewis et al vs COMELEC G.R. No. 162759 Aug 4, 2008
4) Kabataan Party list vs. COMELEC G.R. no. 189868 Dec 15, 2009 (Extension of Voter Regulatory
Board) GRANTED bec. It is not within the 120-day prohibitory period prior to Election Day
5) Luis A. Asistio vs. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre G.R. No. 191124 April 27, 2010
(Voter-Residency Req)
6) Makil U. Pandaodaya vs. COMELEC et al G.R. No. 79313 Sept 17, 2009 (Domicile vs, Residence

3) IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE 50 SCRA 45


(Doctrine of Implied Election) GRANTED

FACTS:
Ana Mallare was legally married to an alien, thereby giving birth to petitioner Esteban Mallare in 1903. It
has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early
as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect
Philippine citizenship

RULING:
The Supreme Court GRANTED Esteban Mallare’s application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act
would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship
First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of
C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A.
No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling
in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban
Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a
Filipino mother.
His exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship.
Here is a peculiar situation of the petitioner who cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine
citizenship as he is already a Filipino citizen.

3) CASE DIGEST:
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.VICENTE D. CHING BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a
Filipino, was born on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in
Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution dated 1 September
1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the
Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

Ching was born in 1964 governed by the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed
the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines
Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with
the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the
age of majority.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and
an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
majority

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RULING:
The Supreme Court DENIED Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

The Court held that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years
that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect
Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable
and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within
three (3) years from reaching the age of majority, the age of 21.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate
right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. This
golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
CASE DIGEST

12) NESTOR A. JACOT vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized
citizen of the US on 13 December 1989.
He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225( Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act). He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine
Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Bureau of Immigration issued ID recognizing
him as a citizen of the Philippines.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. This was contested by respondent Rogen T. Dal on
May 7, 2007 arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2)
of Republic Act No. 9225,
Jacot was then disqualified from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the
14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal
renouncement of his United States (US) citizenship.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION
ACT OF 2003," SPECIFICALLY SECTION 5(2) AS TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE
PUBLIC OFFICE

RULING:

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The Supreme Court DISMISSED the appeal. The Court finds that petitioner should indeed be
disqualified.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are
already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship.

Further, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

CASE DIGEST:
(15) ROSELLER DE GUZMAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 180048 June 19, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections.
On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification alleging that
petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of
America.
Petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for
dual citizenship under R.A. No. 9225,Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. Upon
approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise
full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election
protest on grounds of irregularities and massive cheating.
He then filed the instant petition for certiorari in regards to his disqualification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor elections for having failed to
renounce his American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.

RULING:
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition.

The petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American
citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14,
2007 elections.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 states:"Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a

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foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic.

Further, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (ART VI)


LAWS
R.A. 7941 (The Party-List System)
R.A. 6735 (An Act Providing for a System of INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
{Approved by Pres. Aquino on 04 Aug 1989})
R.A. 6645 (Special Elections)

CASES
PARTY-LIST
1) Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 147583 26 June 2001)
2) Aklat Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng Lipunan para sa Tao, Inc. vs COMELEC 427 SCRA 712;
2004
3) Partido ng Mangagagawa vs COMELEC 484 SCRA 671; 2006
4) Citizen’s battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) vs. COMELEC G. R. No. 172103 13 Apr 2007
5) Bantay Republic Act/BA-RA 7941 vs COMELEC G. R. No. 177271; 04 May 2007
6) Barangay Assoc for Nat’l Advancement and Transparency(BANAT) vs COMELEC G. R. Nos.
179271 and 179295, 21 Apr 2009 and 08 July 2009
7) Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, G. R. No 190582 Apr 8, 2010
8) Phil Guardians Brotherhood, Inc (PGBI) etc. vs COMELEC G. R. No 190529, 29 Apr 2010

QUALIFICATIONS
9) Representative Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and Jesus L. Vicente G. R. No 187478; Dec 21, 2009

PROHIBITION
10) Dante Liban et al vs. Richard Gordon G. R. No 175352, 15 July 2009

LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS

11) Sema vs COMELEC G. R. No 177597; 16 July 2008


12) Benigno Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo vs COMELEC G. R. No 189793 7April 2010
13) Victorino Aldaba et al vs COMELEC G. R. No 188078 Jan 25, 2010 Population Req.
14) Victorino Aldaba et al vs COMELEC G. R. No 188078 Mar 15, 2010 Contiguous Req.
15) Bagabuyo vs COMELEC G. R. No. 176790 Dec 8, 2008
16) Rodolfo G. Navarro vs. Exec Sec Eduardo Ermita Feb 10,2010

PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES

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17) ANTERO J. POBRE-versus-Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO , A.C. No. 7399
18) TRILLANES IV v Judge Pimentel; G. R. No. 179817 27 June 2008 (parliamentary Privileges) in
nachura
19) SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.) and MARIA FE C. DELA PAZ vs. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS and the SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS JOSE BALAJADIA, JR.
EN BANC G.R. No. 184849 : February 13, 2009
20) Senate of the Phil, et al vs Eduardo Ermita G. R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006 488 SCRA 1
(Legislative Inquiry and Question hour) in nachura
21) Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee 203 SCRA 767 (Investigation should be in aid of
legislation) in nachura
22) Neri v Senate Committees; G. R. No. 180843 25 Mar 2008 549 SCRA 77 and 564 SCRA 152 in
nachura
23) Garcillano v House of Rep Committee on Public Info G. R. Nos. 70338 and 179275 23 Dec 2008
24) Sabio vs Gordon 504 SCRA 704 2006 (Legislative Inq. and On-Going Judicial Proceedings; Do
not Preclude Congressional Hearings)
25) Standard Chartered Bank v Senate Committee on Banks G. R. No. 167173 27 Dec 2007, 241
SCRA 456 (Legislative Inq. and On-Going Judicial Proceedings;i.e. Admin and Criminal Cases)
26) REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M. ROMERO III,
MICHAEL L. ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R. CANLASvs.SENATOR JINGGOY E.
ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT G.R. No. 174105 April 2, 2009 (Legislative Inq. and On-Going Judicial
Proceedings;i.e. Pending Appealed Cases and Special Civil Actions)
27) Ruy Elias Lopez v Senate of the Phil G. R. No. 163556, 8 June 2004 (Joint Congressional
Committee; Canvassing) in nachura
28) Sanchez vs COA 552 SCRA 471, 2008 9Sec 25 {5} Art VI – Power to Transfer Savings
29) ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Purisima, 532 SCRA 251, 2007 (Congressional Oversight;
Legislative Body)

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT
30) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LUISA P. EJERCITO-
ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, and SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, Petitioners,- versus –EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R.
ERMITA
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
31) Roces vs HRET 469 SCRA 484, 205 (HRET Jurisdiction and powers)
32) Representative Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and Jesus L. Vicente G. R. No 187478; Dec 21, 2009 (SAME WITH NO. 9)
33) Electoral Tribunal/Palparan vs HRET G.R. No.189466/ G.R. No. 189506
34) Jun Dueñas Jr, vs HRET G.R. No. 191550, 04 May 2010 (electoral Tribunal; Grave Abuse of
Discretion)

LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL POWERS

35) City of Davao v TRTC Br. XII, Davao City 467 SCRA 280 (PROHIBITION against irrepealable laws)
36) Lacson vs Executive Secretary G.R. No. 128096, 20 Jan 1999 (TITLE OF THE BILL)
37) Barangay Assoc for Nat’l Advancement and Transparency(BANAT) rep. by Salvador Britanico vs
COMELEC G.R. No. 177508 7 Aug 2009 (TITILE OF STATUTES)

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38) ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Ermita 469 SCRA 1 2005 (ORGIGIN OF BILLS, Bicameral
Conference Committee; Delegation of Powers; Ascertainment of acts, Department Secretary
as Agent of Congress
39) Beltran vs Dept of Health 476 SCRA 168, 2005 (Delegation of quasi-Legislative Powers)
40) Southern Cross Cement Corp vs Cement Manufactures Assoc, of the Phil 465 SCRA 532
(Delegation of Powers)
41) Camid vs. office of the President 448 SCRA 711; 2005 (Delegation of Powers)
42) NPC drivers and Mechanics Association (NPCDMA) vs National Power Corp 503 SCRA 138;
2006 (Delegation of Powers)
43) Sema vs COMELEC G. R. No 177597; 16 July 2008
44) Gerochi vs. Dept of Energy (DOE) 527 SCRA 696; 2007 (Delegation of Powers)
45) HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Petitioners, - versus - LA SUERTE CIGAR AND
CIGARETTE FACTORY, TELENGTAN BROTHERS & SONS, INC., Respondents. G.R. No. 166498
June 11, 2009
46) REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES , Petitioner, - versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman
ROMULO L. NERI, Respondents. EN BANC G.R. No. 180046
47) LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS,
in his capacity as City Assessor of Quezon City, Respondents. [G.R. No. 144104. June 29, 2004
48) STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs. RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS
BERHAD, Intervenor) G.R. No. 178158 : December 4, 2009

CASE DIGESTS: Commented [ris3dt2]: Party-list


1. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 147583 26 June 2001)

2. AKLAT-ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG LIPUNAN AT ADHIKAIN PARA SA TAO, INC vs.


(COMELEC) G.R. No. 162203. April 14, 2004
FACTS:
Aklat-Asosasyon Para Sa Kaunlaran Ng Lipunan At Adhikain Para Sa Tao, Inc. (Aklat) has
reorganized itself and taken the necessary steps to make it an organization of, by and for the
marginalized and underrepresented groups of society, particularly the indigenous cultural communities
and the youth.
Aklat asserts that under Section 5 of R.A. 7941, petitions for registration as a party-list
organization may be filed not later than ninety (90) days before the elections. It therefore had until
February 10, 2004 , the ninetieth (90th) day before the elections on May 10, 2004 , within which to file
its petition. Hence, its petition, which was filed on November 20, 2003 , was filed within the allowed
period. COMELEC denies this contention, hence this petition.
ISSUE :
Whether or not AKLAT can re-qualify as a party-list organization
RULING:
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition.
AKLAT failed to substantiate its claim that it represents the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society, rather, it is found to be for business interest or economic lobby group which seeks the
promotion and protection of the book publishing industry

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Under Section 5 of Republic Act No.7941, Registration. Any organized group of persons may
register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations.
The Comelec denied the motion in its questioned Resolution dated February 13, 2004, on three
grounds, namely: 1) the petition was filed beyond the deadline set by the Comelec in Resolution No.
6320 for registration of party-list organizations; 2) the petition was not one for re-qualification as Aklat
was never a registered party-list organization having failed to meet the eight-point guidelines set by the
Court in the Bagong Bayani case; and 3) that its decision not to extend the deadline for registration of
party-list organizations is valid, the Comelec being in the best position to make such a determination

(6) BARANGAY ASSOC FOR NAT’L ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY(BANAT) VS COMELEC G. R. Commented [ris3dt3]: Barangay Assoc for Nat’l Advancement
NOS. 179271 AND 179295, 21 APR 2009 AND 08 JULY 2009 and Transparency(BANAT) vs COMELEC G. R. Nos. 179271 and
179295, 21 Apr 2009 and 08 July 2009
FACTS:
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. On 9 July 2007, the
COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60
proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winnersnot including BANAT.
In determining the additional seats for the “first party”, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first


--------------------- = party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to
additional seats:

Proportion of votes received Additional seats


by the first party
Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4% No additional seat
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may
later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the
party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes
to entitle them to one (1) additional seat. For the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of
party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four
thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes. BANAT only garnered 177,028. Hencem this petition
assails to incvalidate the 2% party-list vote requirement.

ISSUES:
1 ) Whether or not twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling
2) Whether or not it violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation
RULING:
The Supreme Court invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941.

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party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy
reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes.”

In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold
for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of
the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list Commented [ris3dt4]: Sec 5 (2) The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to number of representatives including those under the party list.
party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from
the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats available to Number of seats available to


legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

220 x .20 = 55
.80

CASE DIGEST
7) ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO - versus - COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010

FACTS:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs) Incorporated in 2003. They first applied for registration with the

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COMELEC in 2006 but the application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no
substantial membership base.
Petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
Under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, COMELEC refuses to
accredit Ang Ladlad because of public morals as a party-list organization, hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad can be accredited as a party-list organization on the grounds of public morals

RULING:
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition.
1) Denial of Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941 is incorrect because the enumeration in RA 7941 is not exclusive.
2) Article III, Section 5 provides that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” .Thus, it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
The OSG commented that a person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a
different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a
great divide between thought and action
3) Homosexuality is not criminalized, hence, it is not a statutory violation. As such, we hold that moral
disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts
more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest.
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides “nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of the laws,” courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on
classification.

(8)PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General GEORGE


“FGBF GEORGE” DULDULAO, - versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 190529, April 29,
2010
FACTS:
PGBI was among the party-list organizations delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in
2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections pursuant to the COMELEC en banc issued on
October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions for the May 2010 elections.
Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, provides:
Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
paragraph (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI

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RULING:
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition.
The law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should
therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less
than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these
grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to
garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of
the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. This is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and
applied, under the Court’s authority to state what the law is and as an exception to the application of
the principle of stare decisis.

QUALIFICATIONS
CASE DIGEST:
9)Representative DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL Commented [ris3dt5]: QUALIFICATIONS
TRIBUNAL and JESUS L. VICENTE. G.R. No. 187478 : December 21, 2009
FACTS:
Fernandez filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna
in the May 14, 2007 elections. Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente filed a petition to disqualify
Fernandez alleging that the latter falsely declared under oath his alleged Sta. Rosa residence, among
others

Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Laguna winning by a
margin of 35,000 votes over the nearest candidate. Vicente filed a quo warranto proceedings in this
regard which the HRET favored. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not the HRET had jurisdiction over the case; and
(2) whether or not petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement to be a
Member of the House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987 Constitution

RULING:
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition.

On issue regarding jurisdiction, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17
thereof that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred
upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete.

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On the second issue, Section 6 of Art Vi of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that no person shall
be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Under the law, what is required for the election of governor is residency in the province, not in any
district or municipality, one year before the election. Petitioner's actual, physical presence in Sta. Rosa
for more than a year prior to election day, he has demonstrated that he has substantial ties to Sta. Rosa
and the First District of Laguna for an even longer period than that.

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give
fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to
give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal
niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will

*A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a Member of the House of
Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be
filed by any voter within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.(Rule 17)

CASE DIGEST:
12. SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO versus- COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (April 7, 2010 G.R. No. 189793)
FACTS:
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers
and citizens, seek to nullify as unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9716 which created an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.

The petitioners hinged their petition on Section 5(3) of Art VI, theorizing that, save in the case of a newly
created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation
of a new legislative district in a province

RULING:
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition.

The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court sets aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar

On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and
provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: that each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. The Commented [ris3dt6]: disjunctive

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250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city, the
same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.

In sum, there is no fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of districts in


provinces Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within
the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.

Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the
letter clearly given form in the Constitutional debates
(15) BAGABUYO VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 176970, DECEMBER 8, 2008
Plebiscite not required in legislative apportionment or reapportionment
Former CDO Congressman Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859. The bill eventually became
R.A. No. 9371. It increased CDO’s legislative district from one to two. Rogelio Bagabuyo now seeks to
nullify R.A. No. 9371 on constitutional grounds. He argued that the plebiscite requirement under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay was not complied.
Does R.A. No. 9371 involve the division and conversion of a local government unit? Is a plebiscite
necessary?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The SC ruled that Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite
is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts. R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face,
purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to
Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Commented [ris3dt7]: (4) Within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
“To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and standards provided in this section.
12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative
districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen,
each one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. In terms of services for city residents, this easily
means better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as
against the 500,000 he used to represent.”

What is the difference between “legislative apportionment” and “reapportionment”?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Legislative apportionment is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the
allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district
lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.

Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about
by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision (Article 6 (5))

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What are the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or reapportionment and the division of
a local government unit?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10 expressly
speaks of how local government units may be “created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered.” Its concern is the commencement, the termination, and the modification of local
government units’ corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards
that must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in the local
government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of
income, population and land area are specified as verifiable indicators of viability and capacity to
provide services. The division or merger of existing units must comply with the same requirements
(since a new local government unit will come into being), provided that a division shall not reduce the
income, population, or land area of the unit affected to less than the minimum requirement prescribed
in the Code.

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement
of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry
out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In
contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.
(Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008)

PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES

CASE DIGEST:
17) ANTERO J. POBRE-versus-Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO A.C. No. 7399
FACTS:
The senator's use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the
land was a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts. "I am nauseated. I spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position of Chief Justice if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots. "
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section
11 of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

ISSUE: Whether or not statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity.

RULING:
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition.

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To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good
professional conduct. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the
court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the Court and to maintain the
respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the
higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.
Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.
As to Senator Santiago's unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her
to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary
action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her
own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on
her.
(19)SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
G.R. No. 184849 : February 13, 2009
( Power of Congress to Determine Its Rules)
FACTS:
A Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine National Police (PNP) officers arrived in
Moscow , Russia to attend the 77th General Assembly Session of the International Criminal Police
Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in St. Petersburg from October 6-10, 2008. With the delegation was Gen.
Dela Paz, then comptroller and special disbursing officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however, was to
retire from the PNP on October 9, 2008.
On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow
airport departure area for failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros [approximately
P6,930,000.00] found in his luggage. They were detained in Moscow for questioning. The delegation
were allowed to return to the Philippines but the Russian government confiscated the euros.
Gen. Dela Paz and Mrs dela Paz arrived in Manila with subpoenae issued by respondent
Committee for the investigation it was to conduct on the Moscow.
Petitioners argue that respondent Committee has no jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow
incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13,
Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that respondent Committee
violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest without the required signatures of
the majority of the members of respondent Committee and this cannot be used as the basis of any
investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate has jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter
does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate
Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules)
RULING:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being moot and academic.
Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: Each House shall determine the
rules of its proceedings. this grants full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the
formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally
exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.

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The Court finds that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has acted within the proper sphere
of its authority since the Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations between the Philippines
and Russia in so far as its international obligations are concerned.

(22)NERI VS. SENATE G.R. NO. 180643, MARCH 25, 2008 Commented [ris3dt8]: Neri vs. Senate G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008

Former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the Senate for 11 hours relating to the ZTE-
NBN mess. However, when probed further on what he and the President discussed about the NBN
Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer 3
questions:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project


(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it

Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to Neri, requiring him to
appear and testify on November 20, 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested
the Senate Committees to dispense with Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. In his
letter, Ermita said “that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with China.” Neri did not appear before the Committees. As a result, the Senate
issued an Order citing him in contempt and ordered his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.

Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. The Communications elicited by the 3 Questions are covered by Executive Privilege. The Supreme
Court is convinced that the communications elicited by the questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications
are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can
be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

The Senate contends that the grant of the executive privilege violates the “Right of the people to
information on matters of public concern”. Is the Senate correct?

ANSWER: No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising
their right to information. The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of
legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public information.

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The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There are clear distinctions
between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of
people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production
of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a
subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the
power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an
individual citizen.

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking E.O. 464. Is there
a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?

ANSWER: Yes. The revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

In Senate v. Ermita, the executive privilege should be invoked by the President or through the
Executive Secretary “by order of the President.” Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the
principle of executive privilege, by order of the President?

ANSWER: Yes. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the
requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that “this Office is
constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has
advised Secretary Neri accordingly.” Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is
more than enough compliance.

May the Congress require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with particularity?

ANSWER: No. The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a
matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department. (Senate v. Ermita)

Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri valid?

ANSWER: No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order
suffers from constitutional infirmity. The respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement
laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the “possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry,” along with “the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the
questions relative to and in furtherance thereof.” The SC also find merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent Committees violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry
be in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure.” The respondent Committees’ issuance of
the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did
not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they
curtly dismissed his explanation as “unsatisfactory” and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in
contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention. (Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008)

(24) SABIO VS GORDON 504 SCRA 704 2006


(Legislative Inq. and On-Going Judicial Proceedings; Do not Preclude Congressional Hearings)

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Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry
Former President Cory issued EO No. 1 creating the PCGG. She entrusted upon this body the task of
recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President Marcos and his close
associates. To ensure the PCGG’s unhampered performance of its tasks, Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1
provides that: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence
in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.”

20 years later, the Senate invited PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio to be one of the resource persons in a
Senate investigation. However, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation invoking Section 4 (b) of E.O.
No. 1. May Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 be invoked by Chairman Sabio to justify non-appearance on
legislative investigations?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well
as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress
and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” (Sabio vs.
Gordon, October 17, 2006)

Note: Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.
The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues
being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
prosecution or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative
purpose.
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one
hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law,
actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other
hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to
gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need
to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any
potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of
legislation)

25) STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS G. R. NO. 167173 27 DEC
2007, 241 SCRA 456 (Legislative Inq. and On-Going Judicial Proceedings;i.e. Admin and
Criminal Cases) no full text yet 2009 Bar Exams
2009 Bar Exams
Congressman Nonoy delivered a privilege speech charging the Intercontinental Universal Bank (IUB) with the sale
of unregistered foreign securities, in violation of R.A. 8799. He then filed, and the House of Representatives
unanimously approved, a Resolution directing the House Committee on Good Government (HCGG) to conduct an
inquiry on the matter, in aid of legislation, in order to prevent the recurrence of any similar fraudulent activity.
The HCGG immediately scheduled a hearing and invited the responsible officials of IUB, the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP). On the date set for the hearing, only the SEC Commissioners appeared, prompting Congressman

calesterio®2010/POLIalldigest Page 26 of 34
Nonoy to move for the issuance of the appropriate subpoena ad testificandum to compel the attendance of the
invited resource persons.
The IUB officials filed suit to prohibit HCGG from proceeding with the inquiry and to quash the subpoena, raising
the following arguments:
[a] The subject of the legislative investigation is also the subject of criminal and civil actions pending before the
courts and the prosecutor’s office; thus, the legislative inquiry would preempt judicial action; (3%) and
[b] Compelling the IUB officials, who are also respondents in the criminal and civil cases in court, to testify at the
inquiry would violate their constitutional right against self-incrimination. (3%)
Are the foregoing arguments tenable? Reason.
[c] May the Governor of the BSP validly invoke executive privilege and, thus, refuse to attend the legislative
inquiry? Why or why not? (3%)
Suggested answers:
a) a. No, The legislative inquiry is only in aid of legislation. It is not binding on the criminal or civil aspect of
the case. Thus, the motion to quash the subpoena issued by the legislative body is unavailing. The mere
filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation
b) No, the right against self-incrimination was not violated. The power on inquiry was exercised against the
concerned officials who are the resource persons of the issue. They were not summoned as accused, thus,
there was no violation of their right against self-incrimination.
c) Yes, the BSP Governor may refuse attendance provided he can prove that the President would issue an
order to exclude him form the exercise in the exercise of executive privilege. Otherwise, he may be
compelled to appear before the body.
RULING:

The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely
easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or
an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative
investigation

The power of inquiry––with process to enforce it––is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information––which is not infrequently true––recourse must be
had to others who possess it.

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
(30) PIMENTEL, ET AL. VS. ERMITA, ET AL.
[GR 164978, 13 October 2005]
En Banc, Carpio (J): 14 concur
FACTS:
The Senate and the House of Representatives (“Congress”) commenced their regular session on
26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was
constituted on 25 August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to Arthur C. Yap
(Department of Agriculture, 15 August 2004), Alberto G. Romulo (Department of Foreign Affairs, 23
August 2004), Raul M. Gonzalez (Department of Justice, 23 August 2004), Florencio B. Abad
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(Department of Education, 23 August 2004), Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. (Department of National Defense, 23
August 2004), Rene C. Villa (Department of Agrarian Reform, 23 August 2004), Joseph H. Durano
(Department of Tourism, 23 August 2004), and Michael T. Defensor (Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, 23 August 2004) as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Defensor, et
al., took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. On 8 September 2004, Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. (“Senator Pimentel”), Edgardo J. Angara (“Senator Angara”), Juan Ponce Enrile (“Senator
Enrile”), Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada (“Senator Ejercito-Estrada”), Jinggoy E. Estrada (“Senator Estrada”),
Panfilo M. Lacson (“Senator Lacson”), Alfredo S. Lim (“Senator Lim”), Jamby A.S. Madrigal (“Senator
Madrigal”), and Sergio R. Osmeña, III (“Senator Osmeña”) filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as Senators of the Republic of the
Philippines, to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(“President Arroyo”) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (“Secretary Ermita”). The petition
also sought to prohibit respondents from performing the duties of department secretaries.

ISSUE:
Whether President Arroyo’s appointment of Defensor et al. as acting secretaries was
constitutional, even without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in
session.

RULING:
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to
the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of
a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law,
cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and
confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the
President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice
even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but
practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter
5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in
the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the
government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Pimentel, et al. assert that
Section 17 does not apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution, because it only
applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only
source of law. “Law” refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances,
implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions. Finally, Pimentel, et al., claim that the
issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. They, however, fail to consider
that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title
I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting
appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. In

calesterio®2010/POLIalldigest Page 28 of 34
distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook
writer on constitutional law has observed that "Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to
the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments." The Court find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is
readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to Defensor et al.
immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

CASE DIGEST
33) ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL/PALPARAN VS HRET G.R. NO.189466/ G.R. NO. 189506
FACTS:
Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat and petitioner Jovito S.
Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group who both won a seat in the 2007
elections for the members of the House of Representatives.

Respondents contend that Abayon and Palparan are not qualified and ineligible to sit in the
House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented
Petitioners countered the jurisdiction of HRET, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations,
respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the
2007 elections

RULING:
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petitions.
The members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: “members who shall be elected
from legislative districts” and “those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.” This means that, from the
Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are “elected” into office, not their
parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list
system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast
their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the
need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization. The right
to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all
belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that the
party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list
representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the
resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House

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of Representatives. The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantayparty-list but upheld
its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan

(47) LUNG CENTER VS. QUEZON CITY (GR 144104, 29 JUNE 2004)
En Banc, Callejo Sr. (J): 13 concur
FACTS:
The Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established on 16 January
1981 by virtue of Presidential Decree 1823. It is the registered owner of a parcel of land, particularly
described as Lot RP-3-B-3A-1-B-1, SWO-04-000495, located at Quezon Avenue corner Elliptical Road,
Central District, Quezon City. The lot has an area of 121,463 square meters and is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) 261320 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Erected in the middle of the
aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines. A big space at the ground floor is
being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional
practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their
professional services. Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building along Quezon
Avenue is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and
Elliptical Road, is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical
Orchids and Garden Center. The Lung Center accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders
medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying
patients, the Lung Center receives annual subsidies from the government. On 7 June 1993, both the land
and the hospital building of the Lung Center were assessed for real property taxes in the amount of
P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of Quezon City. Accordingly, Tax Declarations C-021-01226 (16-2518)
and C-021-01231 (15-2518-A) were issued for the land and the hospital building, respectively. On 25
August 1993, the Lung Center filed a Claim for Exemption5 from real property taxes with the City
Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The Lung Center’s request was denied,
and a petition was, thereafter, filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-
LBAA) for the reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. The Lung Cwenter alleged that under
Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the property is exempt from real property taxes. It
averred that a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that the
major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients. The Lung Center contends that it is a
charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from real property taxes. The QC-LBAA rendered judgment
dismissing the petition and holding the Lung Center liable for real property taxes. The QC-LBAA’s
decision was, likewise, affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City
(CBAA) which ruled that the Lung Center was not a charitable institution and that its real properties
were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes; hence, it was not entitled to real
property tax exemption under the constitution and the law. The Lung Center sought relief from the
Court of Appeals, which, on 17 July 2000 (CA-GR SP 57014), rendered judgment affirming the decision of
the CBAA. Undaunted, the Lung Center filed its petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, in the Supreme Court.

ISSUES
[1]: Whether the Lung Center is a charitable institution within the context of Presidential Decree 1823
and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Section 234(b) of Republic Act 7160.
[2]: Whether the real properties of the Lung Center are exempt from real property taxes.

RULING:

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Issue NO. 1 YES. The Lung Center is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements
which should be considered include 1)the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its
constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, the
character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use and occupation of
the properties. Under PD 1823, the Lung Center is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject
to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President of the Philippines
with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. It was organized for the welfare and
benefit of the Filipino people principally to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary
diseases in the Philippines. The raison d’etre for the creation of the Lung Center is stated in the decree.
Further, the purposes for which the Lung Center was created are spelled out in its Articles of
Incorporation, where the medical services of the Lung Center are to be rendered to the public in general
in any and all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without discrimination. After all,
any person, the rich as well as the poor, may fall sick or be injured or wounded and become a subject of
charity. Furthermore, as a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such
and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-
patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money
received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no
money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. The money
received by the Lung Center becomes a part of the trust fund and must be devoted to public trust
purposes and cannot be diverted to private profit or benefit. Under PD 1823, the Lung Center is entitled
to receive donations. The Lung Center does not lose its character as a charitable institution simply
because the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government. Therefore, the fact
that subsidization of part of the cost of furnishing such housing is by the government rather than private
charitable contributions does not dictate the denial of a charitable exemption if the facts otherwise
support such an exemption.
Issue NO. 2. PARTLY NO. Those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not
exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purposes. The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and
exemption is the exception. The effect of an exemption is equivalent to an appropriation. Hence, a claim
for exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to
be mistaken. Under PD 1823, the Lung Center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for
its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. If the intentions were otherwise, the
same should have been among the enumeration of tax exempt privileges under Section 2 thereof. The
exemption must not be so enlarged by construction since the reasonable presumption is that the State
has granted in express terms all it intended to grant at all, and that unless the privilege is limited to the
very terms of the statute the favor would be intended beyond what was meant. The tax exemption
under Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution covers property taxes only.
Consequently, the constitutional provision is implemented by Section 234(b) of Republic Act 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991). Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in order to be entitled
to the exemption, the Lung Center is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a
charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for
charitable purposes. "Exclusive" is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others;
debarred from participation or enjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a manner to exclude; as
enjoying a privilege exclusively." If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not

calesterio®2010/POLIalldigest Page 31 of 34
exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. The words "dominant use" or
"principal use" cannot be substituted for the words "used exclusively" without doing violence to the
Constitutions and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively. What is meant by actual, direct and
exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application
of the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of
the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt
purposes. The Lung Center failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is
actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used
for the treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-
paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen.
Further, a portion of the land is being leased to a private individual for her business enterprise under the
business name "Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center." Indeed, the Lung Center’s evidence shows that it
collected P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991 and P1,679,999.28 for 1992 from the said lessees.
Accordingly, the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital
leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the
land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-
paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

Executive Dept
1. Macalintal vs COMELEC G.R. No. 157013 July 10, 2003
2. Pimentel VS. Joint committee of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-Pres. in the May
10, 2004 G.R. No. 163783 June 22, 2004 (canvass: adjournment of Congress)
3. Brillantes v COMELEC 432 SCRA 269; 2004 (Unofficial Canvass)
4. Legarda v De Castro 542 SCRA 12 2008 (Abandonment of Election Protest)
5. Public Interest Center Inc. vs Elma 494 SCRA 53 (2006) and 516 SCRA 336; 2007 (Holding of Concurrent
Positions
6. Lourdes D. Rubrico et al v Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo et al G.R. No. 183871 18 February 2010 (Pres
Immunity Suit)
7. Isabelita C. Vinuya et al vs, Hon. Executive Secretary et al G.R. No.162230, 28 April 2010 (Executive
Prerogative)
8. Senate of the Phil. Et al v Eduardo Ermita; G.R. No. 169777 20 April 2006; 488 SCRA 1 (EO 484, Executive
Privilege)
9. Neri v Senate Committees; G. R. No. 180843 25 Mar 2008 (Executive Privilege)
10. Akbayan Citizens Action Party vs Aquino 58 SCRA 468, 2008 (Diplomatic Negotiations Privilege; Treaty
Negotiation Confidentiality)
11. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al- versus –EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA et al G.R. No. 164798
October 13, 2005 (Power of Appointment; Constitutionality of Appointment of Acting Secretaries by the
President)
12. Arturo M. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al G.R. no. 191002, et al (Power of Appointment—
Supreme Court Chief Justice)
13. Rufino v. Endriga 496 SCRA 13, 2006 (Sec 16 Art VI- Power of appointment)
14. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs Dir General, NEDA 487 SCRA 623 G.R. No. 167798 19 Apr 2006 Power of Control
(Constitutionality of E.O. No. 420-ID System)
15. Tondo Medical Center Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals 527 SCRA 746 2007 (Power of
Reorganization)
16. Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Phil. Inc (MEWAP) vs. Romulo 628 SCRA 673, 2007
(Power of Reorganization)
17. Anak-Mindanao Party-List Group vs Exec Sec 531 SCRA 583 2007
18. Atty Sylvia Banda et al vs. Eduardo Ermita G.R. No. 166620 20 Apr 2010 (Power of Reorganization; Good
Faith)

calesterio®2010/POLIalldigest Page 32 of 34
19. Pimentel vs. Office of the Exec Sec 462 SCRA 622, 06 July 2005 (Treaty Making Power, Ratification of the
Rome Statute)
20. The Sec of Justice vs. Christopher Koruga G.R. No. 166199 24 April 2009 Power: Deportation of Aliens
21. Constantino Jr. vs Cuisi 472 SCRA 505, 2005 Power to Contract and Guarantee Foreign Loans
22. Gudani vs Senga, 498 SCRA ,2006 (Commander-In-Chief Powers)
23. IBP vs. Zamora; G.R. No. 141284 15 Aug 2000 (Emergency Powers)
24. Lacson vs Perez G.R. No. 147780 10 May 2001(Emergency Powers)
25. Sanlakas vs Exec Secretary G.R. No. 159085 421 SCRA 686 03 Feb 2004 (Emergency Powers)
26. Randolph David vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo et al . G.R. No. 171936 and companion cases
(Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5; Executive Immunity; Emergency Powers)
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Rep of the Phil Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP) 568
SCRA 402 (Power to Conduct Peace Negotiations)

(5) PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES and JOCELYN P. CELESTINO versus-
MAGDANGAL B. ELMA G.R. No. 138965 March 5, 2007

FACTS:
Respondent Magdangal B. Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) on 30 October,1998.Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was
appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC).He accepted the second appointment, but waived
any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional and, therefore, null
and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Elma's concurrent appointments are constitutional

RULING:
The Court denies the respondents motion for reconsideration
It ruled that the concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2,
Commented [ris3dt9]: B. THE CIVIL SERVICE
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. The duties of the CPLC include COMMISSION
giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
departments and agencies and reviewing investigations involving heads of executive departments. Since hold any other office or employment in the
the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are subject to the review of the CPLC, Government or any subdivision, agency or
such appointments would be incompatible. instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
The Court also decreed that the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII of the 1987
Commented [ris3dt10]: Section 13. The President, Vice-
Constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
This ruling does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman practice any other profession, participate in any business, or
when he accepted the second office as CPLC. be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
6) LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO CARBONEL vs. GLORIA government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO conduct of their office.
G.R. No. 183871 : February 18, 2010 The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his
tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
FACTS: Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus
or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.

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On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS) based
in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico. Following a week of relentless
interrogation - conducted alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse and
mental harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan.
Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary
detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct against Capt.
Angelo Cuaresma , et al.
During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez, kept sending text messages to Lourdes
daughter, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing her to beaches and asking her questions about
Karapatan, an alliance of human rights organizations. He failed to make an investigation even after
Lourdes disappearance had been made known to him;
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party.
The CA DISMISSED the instant petition.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the Petition and dropping President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent

RULING:
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED this dismissal.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such.
Also, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if
incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. It would be
inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility as a form of
criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is
beyond the reach of amparo.
The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of
what acts are criminal are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact.
According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility" means the "responsibility of commanders for
crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict."
As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal
liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing
to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on
military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not
yet formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet
to extend concurrence in its ratification.

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While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law
that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.
The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator
of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual.
The petitioners have not provided the CA with the correct addresses of respondents. For this reason, the
Court is unable to ascribe the authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of
Lourdes and the harassment and threats on her daughters to individual respondents. Hence, the
dismissal of the case against them is correct.

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