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Body & Embodiment, Mind & Body

Bodily Dimension in Thinking- History of Body & Thought Relationships in Philosophy (Plato,
Nietzsche, Max Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Foucault)

Body and World- History of Body & Human Subject Relationships in Philosophy (Descartes, Leibniz,
Hume, Kant, Phenomenological Criticism of Kant) (How independent physical nature and experience
are united in our bodily action?

Body, Memory, Metaphor and Movement- Body Memory & Phenomenology, Body Memory &
Cognitive Science

Embodiment and Cognitive Science- Bodies and Persons (Forms of Embodiment), Perception and
Action, Concepts, Imagery-Memory and Reasoning, Language and Communication, Cognitive
Development, Emotion & Consciousness

Handbook of Cognitive Science-An Embodied Approach- Directions for an Embodied Cognitive

Science: Toward an Integrated Approach (Cognitivism in a Blind Alley I Alternative Approaches to
Cognitivism I Post-Cognitivism in the Making: Common Ground and Conceptual Issues I Scaling Up:
Higher Level Cognitive Processes), The Interactive Architecture of Cognition: Conceptual Issues (Is
Embodiment Necessary (Critiques-Fodor, Millikan, The Symbol System Hypothesis, Connectionist
Representation, Agentive Anti-Representationalism-, Interactive Representation-Truth Value, More
Complex Representations, Embodiment in Necessary-, What Kind of Embodiment?), Embodiment and
Explanation (Three Threads I The Separability Thesis I Beyond Flesh-Eating Functionalism I Ada, Adder
and Odder I A Tension Revealed I Parcipant Machinery and Morphological Computation I Quantifying
Embodiment), Can a Swarm Be Embodied (Three Examples of Swarms I Artificial Swarms and Strong
Embodiment I Is a Living Swarm an Embodied Entity?-Mechanistic Embodiment and Living Swarms I
Are Living Swarms Phenomenally Embodied?-), Robotics and Autonomous Agents, CajunBot: A Case
Study in Embodied Cognition (CajunBot and the DARPA Grand Challenge -CajunBot: Hardware, The
“Embodied” Nature of Circumstance-, CajunBot Sensor Systems -LIDAR Laser Sensors, The Spikes and
Z-Drift Problems, Data Integration-, Path Planning, Steering Control, Simulations -Targeted
Simulations, Comprehensive Simulations-, CajunBot Performance and Results), The Dynamics of
Brain-Body-Environment System: A Status Report (Experimental Accomplishments –An Evolutionary
Approach, Evolution of Sensorimotor Behaviour, Evolution of Learning Behaviour, Evolution of
Minimally Cognitive Behaviour-, Theoretical Accomplishment, CTRNN Dynamics-Dynamical Analysis
of Walking, Dynamical Analysis of Food Edibility Learning, Dynamical Analysis of Categorical
Perception-, Outstanding Challenges -Experimental Challenges, Theoretical Challenges, Educational
Challenges-), The Synthetic Approach to Embodied Cognition: A Primer (Basics I Body, Dynamics and
Morphology I Information Self-Structuring I Learning and Development I Case Study 1: Embodied
Categorization I Case Study 2: Application of Embodied Cognition to Prosthetics I The Interaction of
Physical and Information), Animate Vision, Virtual Environments and Neural Codes (Embodied
Intelligence, An Avatar Control System Design –The Operating System Model, Learning in Simple
Concurrent Behaviours, Modelling Task-Directed Eye Movements, Complex Tasks with Sequential
Steps, A Compact Language for Motor Commands, The Advantages of Embodied Cognition),
Perceiving and Acting, Ecological Psychological: Six Principles for an Embodied-Embedded Approach
to Behaviour (Ecological Principle I: Organism-Environment Systems are the Proper Units of Analysis I
Ecological Principle II: Environmental Realities should be Defined at the Ecological Scale I Ecological

Principle III: Behaviour is emergent and Self-Organized I Ecological Principle IV: Perception and Action
are Continuous and Cyclic I Ecological Principle V: Information is Specificational I Ecological Principle
VI: Perception is of Affordances), Seeing What we can do: Insights into vision and action through
observations of natural behaviour? (Methods of assessing Visual Processes in Isolation and in
Concert, Isolating Visual Processes within an Embodied Context, Trade-Offs between Gaze and
Working Memory Use, Bridging the Gap between Laboratory Experiments and Natural Behaviour-
Connecting Vision and Action through Reward-Sensitive Learning Mechanisms-, Future Directions of
Research in Embodied Visual Cognition), Why we don’t mind to be inconsistent (Detecting Attributes,
Spatial Perception, Inconsistent Action, Combining Information, Conscious Perception), A Dynamic
Brain, Neuronal and Cortical Dynamical Mechanisms Underlying Brain Functions (How to Build a
Suitable Neuronal Model for a Psychological Experiment, Calculating the fMRI Signal for an Example
set shifting model, Response times and error rates in an example set shifting task, Summary and Back
to “colour phi”), Dynamic Field Theory as a Framework for Understanding Embodied Cognition
(Dynamical Systems, Dynamic Neural Fields and Peaks as Units of Representation, Interactions
Between Multiple Activation Peaks, Preshape in Dynamic Neural Fields, Categorical Behaviour from
Continuous Representations, Embodying Dynamic Neural Fields on Autonomous Robots), A Lazy
Brain? Embodied Embedded Cognition and Cognitive Neuroscience (Overview, The Computational
Unfeasibility of a Brain in Complete Control, Ignorantly Successful in a User-Friendly Environment,
Generating research questions for Cognitive Neuroscience and Robotics), Embodied Meaning, The
Role of Sensory and Motor Information in Semantic Representation: A Review (Direct Versus Indirect
Engagement, A Brief Review of the Evidence –Behavioural Evidence, Neuroscientific Evidence-),
Embodied Concept Learning (How concepts are learned, Evidence for Embodied Concepts, Learning
Basic Words/Concepts, Learning and Using Abstract and Technical Words and Concepts),
Mathematics, The Ultimate Challenge to Embodiment: Truth and the Grounding of Axiomatic
Systems (Mathematics a Real Challenge to Embodiment, Everyday Embodied Mechanisms for Human
Imagination, Mathematical Abstraction: The Embodiment of Axioms, Sets and Hypersets, Everyday
Abstraction: The Embodiment of Spatial Constraints of Time and Their “Axioms”), Embodiment for
Education (Why Education?, Embodied Mathematics, Embodied Reading, PM and IM and Vocabulary
Acquisition, PM and IM in Science Exposition), Scaling-Up, How did we get from there to here? An
Evolutionary Perspective on Embodied Cognition (Introduction-Animal Cognition: Where we started
from, Human Cognition: Where we ended up, Embodied Cognition: Can it explain where we are
Now?-, Flexibility and Resemblance: Keys to Off-Line Embodiment?-Voluntary Control, Analogy,
Imitation, Future Directions), Thinking with the Body: Towards Hierarchical Scalable Cognition
(Separating Mind and Body, The Phenomenon of Control, Control from Body to Mind, Integration is
Key), On the Grounds of (X)-Grounded Cognition (The Massive Redeployment Hypothesis,
Implications of MRH for X-Grounded Cognition), Emotional and Social Interaction, Understanding
Others: Embodied Social Cognition (An Embodied Approach, Implicit Simulation or Embodied
Practices), Getting to the Heart of Emotions and Consciousness (Descriptive Foundations and
Animation, On the Distinction between Behaviour and Movement, Concepts Emanating from
Movement, Affective Feelings, Dynamic Congruency)

Body, Language and Mind Volume 1 Embodiment- Historical Roots (American Pragmatism, James
Gibson), Body and Mind (Making sense of embodied cognition: Simulation theories of shared neural
mechanisms for sensorimotor and cognitive processes, Phenomenological and experimental
contributions to understanding embodied experience), Body, Language and Culture (The body in

space: Dimensions of embodiment, On the bio-semiotics of embodiment and our human cyborg

How the Body Shapes the Way we Think?- Artificial Intelligence & Robotics, Ubiquitous Computing &
Embodiment, Collective Intelligence

Perspectives on Embodiment- History of Body & Embodiment in Philosophy & Sociology (Foucault &
Bourdieu, Embodied Mind & Phenomenological Approaches, Merleau-Ponty & Embodiment, the
Epoch of the Body: Need and Demand in Kojève and Lacan, the Preservation and Ownership of the

Radical Embodied Cognitive Science- (Hegel, Behe, Chomsky, Fodor), Embodied Cognition & Radical
Embodied Cognition, Theories of Representationalism, Dynamical Stance, Neurophilosophy meets
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Metaphysics of Radical Embodied Cognitive Science

Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension- From Embodiment to
Cognitive Extension, Boundary Disputes, Limits of Embodiment

The Embodied Mind- Cognitive Science and Human Experience- What is Cognitive Science?, What
do we mean by experience?, Varieties of Cognitivism, Varieties of Emergence, Worlds without
grounds, Steps to a Middle way

The Feeling Body-Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind- How the Body Feels in Emotion
Experience, Reappraising Appraisal, Neuro-physio-phenomenology, Feeling Others

The New Science of the Mind- From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology- Expending the
Mind, Non-Cartesian Cognitive Science, The Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, and Extended,
Objections to the Mind Amalgamated, The Mark of the Cognitive, The Problem of Ownership,
Intentionality as Revealing Activity, The Mind Amalgamated

The Body in the Mind- The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason- Mind, Meaning &

Absent Body- Phenomenological Investigations (The Ecstatic Body, The Recessive Body, The Dys-
Appearing Body), Philosophical Consequences (The Immaterial Body, The Threatening Body, To Form
one Body)

Mind from Body: Experience from Neural Structure- Mind in Information Age, Information in the
Age of Mind, Subjective Intelligence & Objective Experience, Structures of Intelligence, Visceral and
Somatic Frames of Mind

Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind- Power of Prediction, Embodying
Prediction, Scaffolding Prediction

The Problem of Embodiment- Marcel’s Theory of the Body as Mystery (Survey of Marcel’s
Philosophy I The Genesis of the Problem in Marcel’s Thought I Methodological Consideration: The
Problem of System I The Theory of the Body-Qua-Mine as Mystery I My Body Qua Mine I The
Meaning of Sentir I My Body as Etre-Au-Monde I My Body as Repere of Existence I The Relation
Between Feeling and Acting I The Meaning of Bodily Acting I The Meaning of Urgefühl), Sartre’s

Ontology of the Body (Sarte’s Ontology I The Theory of the Other I The Ontological Dimension of the
Body I The Body as Being-For-Itself: Facticity I The Body-For-Others I The Third-Ontological Dimension
of the Body I The Apprehension of the Body-For-Itself I The Body as a Centre of Reference I The
Problem of “Ontological Dimension” I The Problem of the Other’s Body-For-Me, and My Body-For-
The-Other), Merleau-Ponty’s Theory of the Body-Proper (The Problem of “Form” I Merleau-Ponty’s
“Phenomenology” I Merleau-Ponty’s Existentialism I The Theory of the Body I The Body-Proper as an
Instrument of “Knowledge” I The Body-Proper as “Sense-Giving I The Corporeal Scheme I The
Intentional Arc I The Body-Proper as Etre-Au-Monde I The Body as Belonging-to the World I The Body
as Being-to the World I The Body as Temporalite-engage I The Body-Proper as Expression I The Body
as Sexual Being I The Body as Expression I Methodological Problems I The Theory of the Body as
Knowledge I First Thesis: The Body is a Latent Knowledge I Second Thesis: The Body is tout etabli I
Third Thesis: The Body as an Ambiguity I The Theory of the Body as Knowledge I First Thesis: The
Body is a Latent Knowledge I Second Thesis: The Body is tout etabli I Third Thesis: The Body as an
Ambiguity I Fourth Thesis: Temporality I The Meaning of Merleau-Ponty’s Existentialism)

Where the Action is-The Embodied Interaction- History of Interaction I Getting in Touch I Social
Computing I “Being-in-the-World”: Embodied Interaction I Foundations I Moving toward Design I
Conclusion and Directions

The Meaning of the Body- The Need for an Aesthetics of Human Meaning I Meaning is More than
Words and Deeper than Concepts I Bodily Meaning and Felt Sense (The Movement of Life I Big Babies
I Since Feeling is First: Emotional Dimensions of Meaning I The Grounding of Meaning in the Qualities
of Life I Feeling Wiiliam James’s “But: The Aesthetics of Reasoning and Logic), Embodied Meaning
and the Sciences of Mind (The Origin of Meaning in Organism-Environment Coupling: A
Nonrepresentational View of Mind I The Corporeal Roots of Symbolic Meaning I The Brain’s Role in
Meaning I From Embodied Meaning to Abstract Thought), Embodied Meaning, Aesthetics and Art
(Art as Exemplar of Meaning-Making I Music and the Flow of Meaning I The Meaning of the Body)

Body Consciousness- Somaesthetics and Care of the Self: The Case of Foucault I The Silent, Limping
Body of Philosophy;: Somatic Attention Deficit in Merleau-Ponty I Somatic Subjectivities and Somatic
Subjugation: Simone de Beauvoir on Gender and Aging I Wittgenstein’s Somaesthetics: Explanation
and Melioration in Philosophy of Mind, Art and Politics I Deeper into the Storm Centre: The Somatic
Philosophy of William James I Redeeming Somatic Reflection: John Dewey’s Philosophy of Body-Mind

The Use of Bodies- The Use of Bodies (The Human Being without Work I Chrensis I Use and Care I The
Use of the World I Use-of-Oneself I Habitual Use I The Animate Instrument and Technology I The
Inappropriable), An Archaeology of Ontology (Ontological Apparatus I Theory of Hypothesis I Toward
a Modal Ontology), Form of Life (Life Divided I A Life Inseparable from Its Forms I Living
Contemplation I Life is a Form Generated by Living I Toward an Ontology of Style I Exile of One Alone
with One Alone I “That’s How we Do It” I Work and Inoperativity I The Myth of Er

Body Images Embodiment as Corporeality- Body Image Intercourse-A Corporeal Dialogue between
Merleau-Ponty and Schiller, Splitting the Subject-The Interval between Immanence and
Transcendence, Morphological Fantasies-Imaginary Schemas, Corporeal Fluidity and Sexual
Difference, The Abject Borders of the Body Image, The Duree of the Techno-Body, Ecart-The Space of
Corporeal Difference, Bodily Imperatives-Toward an Embodied Ethics

The Body Body Problem- Philosophy, Representation and History I Representational Properties and
Mind/Body Identity I The Representational Character of Ideas and the Problem of the External World
I Basic Actions and Basic Concepts I Action, Knowledge and Representation I Outline of a Theory of
Sensational States I Depiction and Description I Freudian Explanations and the Language of the
Unconscious I History and Representation I The Decline and Fall of the Analytical Philosophy I The
Body/Body Problem I Beautiful Science and the Future of Criticism I In Their Own Voice: Philosophical
Writing and Actual Experience

Embodied Mind in Action- Consciousness and Essential Embodiment I : The Basics (Some
Preliminaries I The Nature of Consciousness I Essential Embodiment and the Cartesian Mistakes),
Consciousness and Essential Embodiment II : Types and Structures (Ten Types of Consciousness I
Eight Structures of Consciousness I Affectivity, Egocentricity, Spatiality and Temporality I
Embodiment, Intentionality, Focus and Intensity), Essentially Embodied Agency I: Actions, Causes
and Reasons (Classical Causal Theories of Action and Beyond I Against Davidson 1: Reasons are
Epiphenomenal I Against Davidson 2: Reasons are Insufficient for Action I Against Davidson 3: Actions
without Reasons I Against Davidson 4: Deviant Causal Chains Again), Essentially Embodied Agency II:
Guidance and Trying (Towards a Non-Classical Causal Theory 1 : Active Guidance I Towards a Non-
Classical Causal Theory 2 : Effortless Trying I Is Trying an Epiphenomenal Illusion? No), Essentially
Embodied Agency III: Emotive Causation (Essentially Embodied Agency and the Emotions I What is an
Emotion? I The Intentionality of Desire-Based Emotions I Invasion of the Body Snatchers: Emotional
Self-Control and Emotional Zeroes), The Metaphysics of Agency I: The Problem of Mental Causation
(Some Preliminaries about Causation I The Amazingly Hard Problem I Good Reasons for Efficacy,
Closure, Physicality and Irreducibility I The Causal Exclusion Problems), The Metaphysics of Agency II:
And How to Solve it (From Causal Exclusion to Property Fusion I The Dynamic World I Dynamic
Systems Theory I Strong Metaphysical A Priori Necessity), The Metaphysics of Agency III: Where the
Action Is (Mind-Body Animalism I Dynamic Emergence I Arm-Raising vs. Arm Raising: Trying as
Structuring Causation)

Embodiment Emotion Cognition-The Essential Embodiment Thesis (Consciousness in and through

the Body: Sensorimotor Subjectivity I Five Intrinsic Structures of Sensorimotor Subjectivity I Life as
the Foundation for Sensorimotor Subjectivity I Essentially Embodied Emotions), Essentially
Embodied, Desire-Based Emotions (Cognitive Theories of Emotion I Desire-Based Emotions I
Emotional Intentionality I Affective Framing), Sense of Self, Embodiment and Desire-Based Emotions
(Unified Consciousness and the Sense of Self I Immanent Reflexivity I A Necessarily and Completely
Neurobiologically Embodied, Egocentric Point of View I Embodied Agency and Desire-Based Emotions
I What does it mean to be an Essentially Embodied Self?), The Role of Emotion in Decision and Moral
Evaluation (Egocentric, Caring-Contoured Maps I The “High-Reason” View of Decision-Making and
Moral Evaluation I The Crucial Role of Emotion and Affect I The Frame Problem), Essentially
Embodied, Emotive, Enactive Social Cognition (Concerns about Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory
I Rethinking Social Cognition: “Primary Intersubjectivity” and Affective Framing I Context, Social
Roles and Participatory Sense-Making), Breakdowns in Embodied Emotive Cognition (Schizophrenia,
Psychopathy, Autism)

How the Body Shapes the Mind- Scientific and Phenomenological Investigations of Embodiment (The
Terms of Embodiment I The Case of the Missing Schema I The Earliest Senses of Self and Others I
Pursuing a Phantom I The Body in Gesture), Excursions in Philosophy and Pathology (Prenoetic

Constraints on Perception and Action I Neurons and Neonates: Reflections on the Molyneux Problem
I Complex Structures and Common Dynamics of Self-Awareness I The Interactive Practice of Mind I
Before You Know It)

The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition-Phenomenology and Embodied Cognition I A Ten

Commandments for Ecological Psychology I Extended Cognition I Complex Dynamical Systems and
Embodiment I The Role of the Motor System in Cognitive Functions I Embedded and Situated
Cognition I The Enactive Approach I Music Perception and Embodied Music Cognition I Enactive
Vision I Perception and/for/with/as Action I Bodily Relativity I Embodiment and Language
Comprehension I Embodiment and Language I Linking Words to World I Gesture in Reasoning I The
Embodied Dynamics of Problem Solving I Grounded Mathematical Reasoning I Embodied Interaction,
Coordination and Reasoning in Computer Gameplay I Embodied Cognition and Theory of Mind I The
Embodiment of Culture I Morality in the Body I Body and Emotion I Embodied Emotion Concepts I
Embodiment in the Construction of Emotion Experience and Emotion Understanding I Visual
Experience I First-Order Embodiment, Second-Order Embodiment, Third-Order Embodiment I Acting
for Bodily Awareness I Memory and Action I The Embodiment of Attention in the Perception-Action
Loop I Embodied Remembering I Embodiment, Cognition and the World Wide Web I The
Construction of Group Cognition I Varieties of Group Cognition I Cognition I Revolution, Reform or
Business as Usual?

Embodiment and the Inner Life- Cognition and Consciousness in the Space of Possible Minds- The
post-reflective inner view (The supposed dualism of inner and outer I Introducing the private
language remarks I How philosophers talk I Doing battle with the interlocutor I Philosophical zombies
I The subjectivity of exotic life forms I Thought experiments with peculiar scientists I The subject
adrift in time I The proper silence of first philosophy), Cognition and embodiment (On having no body
I The biological roots of cognition I The sensorimotor loop I Behaviour selection I The human edge I
Founding concepts I Counting and infinity I The space of possible minds), Probing the internal (The
conscious/unconscious distinction I Being on autopilot I Introspective report I Catching ourselves
unawares I The omnipotent psychologist I Novelty and flexibility I Accounting for the conscious
condition), Broadcast and the network (The elements of global workspace theory I Parallel specialist
brain processes I Neural computation I Coalitions of coupled processes I Integration and the
conscious condition I Influence and information I The right connections I The anatomy of a global
workspace), Neurodynamics (From connectivity to behaviour I Dynamics in focus I Wandering among
the attractors I Dynamical complexity I Fireflies of the mind I Evident coherence), The inner life (The
simulation hypothesis I Simulation through a global workspace I Open-ended affordance I Conceptual
blending I Cognitive fluidity and the frame problem I Space, time and memory I Remembering and
reconstructing I Talking to ourselves)

Cognition & Consciousness

The Dynamical Systems Approach to Cognition- Fractal Physiology and Chaos in Medicine, Patterns,
Information and Chaos in Neuronal Systems, The Complex Matters of the Mind, The Lure of Modern
Science — Fractal Thinking, Nonlinear Dynamics in Human Behaviour, Dynamics, Synergetics,
Autonomous Agents, Changing Mind, The Dynamical Systems Approach to Cognition

Cognition, Brain and Consciousness: Introduction to Cognitive Neuroscience- Mind and Brain
(History and Debates), Working Memory – Short & Long Term Memory, Neurons and their

Connections, Brain Measuring Tools, Structure and the Mechanisms of Brain, Vision & Visual
Perception-Its Nature and Content, Hearing and Speech (speech and Auditory System),
Consciousness and Attention (Waking Cognition, Waking, Attention-Perception-Cognition-Learning),
Learning & Memory, Thinking and Problem-Solving, Language, Goal oriented action, Emotion, Social
Cognition: Perceiving the Mental States of Others, Development, The Genes and Molecules of

Consciousness & Cognition- Spectrum Inversion (Functionalism, Frege & Qualia, the Structure of
Belief and Perceptual Representation (Intentionality, Sense-Data Theory, Instantial States & Internal
States), Fregean-Millianism Debate

Consciousness & Subjectivity- Consciousness & Experience (Sensation & Apperception,

Presentational Phenomenology, The Content, Intentionality and Phenomenology of Experience,
Perceptual Acquaintance and Informational Content), Subjectivity and the First Person (Varieties of
Subjectivity, Self Ascription and Self-Awareness, First Person is Not Just a Perspective: Thought,
Reality and the Limits of Interpretation, Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a Perceptual Account of Other
Minds, First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness, The Paradoxes of Subjectivity and the Projective
Structure of Consciousness

Consciousness in Interaction-The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness-
Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction (Pre-reflective Bodily Self-Consciousness,
Extending Conscious Mind, Extended Mind & Perception & Action, Es are good: Cognition as enacted,
embodied, embedded, affective and extended), Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions:
The role of consciousness (Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind, Bodily intentionality
and social affordances in context, Seeing with the hands, My mind”: Reflexive sociality and its
cognitive tools) Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction (From sensation to
consciousness: Suggestions in modern philosophy, Theories of consciousness in early-modern
philosophy, Experience and identity of the self: The emergence of consciousness as a cognitive
concept in the early modern age)

Content & Consciousness- The Language of Mind (The Ontological Problem of Mind, Intentionality,
Evolution in Brain, the Ascription of Content), Consciousness (Introspective Certainty, Mental
Imagery, Thinking and Reason, Actions and Intentions, Language and Understanding)

Content & Consciousness and Perception- The State of Mind (The Mental and the Physical, Content,
perception and concepts), Concepts & Mental Content (Concepts: Representations or Abilities?,
Human Philosophy: Hume on Natural Instincts and Belief Formation, Can Conscious Attention
Restore Uncritical Realism? An Examination of a Neo-Russellian View of Reference, On Peacocke's
Theory of Concepts) Consciousness and the Metaphysics of Mind, Deflationism about Qualia,
Heidegger and AI: Technological Metaphor and Self-Understanding, Causal Exclusion and
Overdetermination, Metaphysical Disjunctivism and the Intentional Theory of Perception, Change
Blindness and Counterfactual Dependence, An Enactive Theory of Phenomenal Intentionality)

Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour?- Neuroscience (The Neuroscience of Movement,

Consciousness of Action as an Embodied Consciousness, Intentions, Actions, and the Self,
Consciousness, Intentionality, and Causality), Philosophy (Where’s the Action? Epiphenomenalism

and the Problem of Free Will, Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions, Phenomenology and the
Feeling of Doing: Wegner on the Conscious Will?)

Locating Consciousness- Naturalism about Subjective Experience, The Limits of Theory,

Consciousness as a Natural Kind (Qualia as Explananda), A Multiple Memory System Framework,
Conscious Perception and Semantic Memory, How do we get there from here?, Martian Pain And
The Problem of Absent Qualia (Supervenience & Epiphenomenalism), Executive" Processing and
Consciousness as Structure, The Moment of Consciousness (Measuring Consciousness)

Mind in Life- Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind- The Enactive Approach (Cognitive
Science and Human Experience, Anatomy and Emergence, Phenomenology and Connection), Life in
Mind (Autopoiesis-The Organization of Living, Life and Mind- The Philosophy of the Organism),
Consciousness in Life (Sensorimotor Subjectivity, Consciousness and Mental Imagery, Temporality
and Living Present, Husserl and Cognitive Science, Emergence and Downward Causation, Empathy
and Enculturation)

Mind : A Brief Introduction- A Dozen Problems in Philosophy of Mind, Materialism & Objections to
Materialism, Consciousness (Consciousness & Mind-Body Problem, Structure of Consciousness &
Neurobiology), Intentionality, Mental Causation, Unconscious and the Explanation of Behaviour,
Perception, The Self

Phenomenal Consciousness- The Nature of Mind, Phenomenal Consciousness-Hard Problem,

Phenomenal Consciousness and the Sufficiency Claim, Experience and the First-Order
Representationalism, Experience and the Explanatory Gap, Experience and Higher-Order

Predictive Brain- At the Origin of the Experience of the Self, The roots of Conscious Awareness,
Consciousness-A Multilevel Framework, Between Conscious Global Workspace & Unconscious Levels,
Does a Hierarchy of Nervous Functions Exist?

Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience and Philosophy of Mind-

Whitehead & Consciousness, Non-human Minds, From Metaphysics to Neuroscience
(Panexperientialism, Quantum Theory & Neuroplasticity, The Evolution of Consciousness, the Carrier
Theory of Causation), Clinical Applications: Consciousness as Process, Consciousness and Causation in
Whitehead’s Phenomenology of Becoming

Reflexive Nature of Consciousness- Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character, the
primacy of phenomenology, Some semantics of “consciousness” (Creature consciousness: transitive
and intransitive, State consciousness, Unconscious Mental States, Self-Consciousness, Phenomenal
Consciousness), A Formula for State Consciousness (Nagel, Access & Phenomenal Consciousness,
Non-conscious Phenomenality), Consciousness and Self-Awareness (Intentionality, Transitivity
Principle), Higher Orderism (Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness), A One-State Alternative,
Representationalism (The Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character), The Nature of
Phenomenal Character (Phenomenal Character as Implicit Self-Awareness, Differences in
Phenomenal Character, Bodily Sensations)

Stream of Consciousness- Introduction (Phenomenal, Phenomenal & Physical, Understanding,

Reality-Appearance & Phenomenal Truths), Unity, Introspection and Awareness (Phenomenal

Background, Awareness, Unity and Introspection), Phenomenal Space (Consciousness, co-
consciousness and space, Non-spatial consciousness, Phenomenal Spaces, S-Thesis reconsidered, V-
Spaces: further issues), Transitivity, Phenomenal Time: Problems and Principles, C.D. Broad and
Husserl, The Overlap Model, Phenomenal Interdependence, The Ramification of Co-consciousness
(Space and Character)

The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness- Interdisciplinary Perspectives- The

Ambiguity of Self-Consciousness: A Preface, The emergence of Self-Awareness as co-awareness in
early child development, Threesome inter-subjectivity in infancy: A contribution to the development
of self-awareness, The Embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to theory-theory of mind?,
From self-recognition to self-consciousness, Self & Identity, Tetraplegia & Self Consciousness

The Experientiality of Narrative-An Enactivist Approach- Cognitive Science: A Thumbnail Sketch,

From Computational Models to Enactivism, Conceptual Thought and Embodiment, Notes for a
Theory of Experientiality, From Experiential Traces to Fictional Consciousnesses (Enacting Narrative
Space, Enacting Characters’ Bodily-Perceptual Experiences, Enacting Qualia through Metaphorical
Language), Fictional Consciousnesses: From Attribution to Enactment (Consciousness-Enactment,
What Is Consciousness-Enactment?, Triggers of Consciousness-Enactment, Mental Simulation as the
Cognitive Basis for Consciousness-Enactment), Fictional Consciousnesses: Self-Narratives and
Intersubjectivity, Embodied Engagements and Their Effects (Embodiment, Virtuality, and Meaning in
Readers’ Reconstruction of Narrative Space)

The Paradox of Self-Consciousness- The Paradox of Self Consciousness (“I” thoughts, Two-types of
First-Person Content), The Form of a Solution (The Functionalist Account of Self Reference, Rejecting
the Classical View of Content), Content, Concepts and Language (Conceptual & Non-conceptual
content: the Richness of perceptual experience, Extending the notion of non-conceptual content: the
Anatomy Principle), The Theory of Non-conceptual Content, The Self of Ecological Optics, Somatic
Proprioception and the Bodily Self, Points of View, Navigation and Spatial Reasoning (From Place
Recognition to a Nonconceptual Point of View: Navigation and Spatial Awareness, Spatial Awareness
and Self-Consciousness, Cognitive Maps and Integrated Representations of the Environment,
Navigation Deploying an Integrated Representations of the Environment over Time, The Notion of a
Nonconceptual Point of View and Primitive Self-Consciousness), Psychological Self-Awareness-Self
and Others, Solving the Paradox of Self-Consciousness

The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness beyond the brain- The Environmental Mind p.111,
Creativity p. 112-6, Automating Creativity (Automated Creativity, Collective Creativity) p. 117-138

Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness- Qualitative Event Realism (What is Consciousness?),

Dualism, Representationalism (The P/T Problem, Differences of Content, Differences of
Representational Type), Transparency (Reasons against Three-Dimensionality of Experiences, The
True Relation between Experience and Representation), Higher Order Theories, Monitoring,
Functionalism (Behaviourism, Homuncular Functionalism, Microfunctionalism, Identity and
Supervenience), Scepticism and the Causes of Qualitative Events, Epiphenomenalism
(Antiepiphenomenalist Intuitions, Self-Stultification), Unified Dualism (Quantum Mechanics),
Patterns as Causes of Qualitative Events (Homogeneity), Panpsychism, The Nontransivity Problem

Wider than the Sky-The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness- The Mind of Man: Completing Darwin’s
Program, Consciousness: The Remembered Present, Elements of the Brain, Neural Darwinism: A
Global Brain Theory, The Mechanisms of Consciousness, Wider Than the Sky: Qualia, Unity, and
Complexity, Consciousness and Causation: The Phenomenal Transform, The Conscious and the
Nonconscious: Automaticity and Attention, Higher-Order Consciousness and Representation, Theory
and the Properties of Consciousness, Identity: The Self, Mortality, and Value, Mind and Body: Some

Complexes and Consciousness- (Objects, Qualities and Complexes), (Quality-instances, Relations and
Collections), (Classes and Existence), (States of Affairs, Mental Acts and Intentionality), (Complex
Objects, Facts and Relational Structure), (Truth, Facts and Bradley’s Paradox), (Mental Acts, Contents
and Beliefs), (Consciousness and Self), (Logical Facts, Laws of Essence and Casual Laws), (Diversity,
Space and the Phenomenology of Time), (Physical Realism, Anti-Realism and Materialism)

Consciousness- The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality, (Consciousness,

Unconsciousness and Intentionality), Searle’s Neo-Cartesian Theory of Consciousness, Consciousness
and Subjectivity, The Anatomy of Consciousness, Between Internalism & Externalism, What is Present
to the Mind?, Thoughts and its Objects, (Belief, Self-Ascription and Ontology)

Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism- Defining
Physicalism (Supervenience & Relation Problem), The Threat of the Subjective (Phenomenal
Knowledge and Acquaintance, Acquaintance and Objectivity), Saving Physicalism (The Ontology of
Subjective Physicalism, Deduction-Necessition and Acquaintance, Assessing Subjective Physicalism)

Ignorance and Imagination-The Epistemic Origin of Problem of Consciousness- The Problem (The
Phenomenal Conception, Three Problems of Experience, the Sceptical Challenge, The Proposal, The
Entailment (A Posteriori Entailment, A Priori Entailment)

Introspection and Consciousness- Skepticism about Introspection (Awareness and Authority:

Skeptical Doubts about Self-Knowledge, Knowledge of Perception), Theories of Introspection
(Phenomenology of Introspection, Epistemology of Introspection, Knowing What I see, Self-
Knowledge Transparency and the Forms of Activity), Constituvism (Self-Intimation and Second-Order
Belief), Introspection and the Nature of Experience (Introspection, Explanation and Perceptual
Experience: Resisting Metaphysical Disjunctivism, Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology,
Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness)

Matter and Consciousness- The Ontological Problem/ Mind-Body Problem(Dualism, Psychological

Behaviourism, Reductive Materialism/Identity Theory, Functionalism, Eliminative Materialism), The
Semantical Problem (Definition by Inner Ostension, Philosophical Behaviourism, The Theoretical
Network Thesis and Folk Psychology, Intentionality and the Propositional Attitudes), The
Epistemological Problem (The Problem of Other Minds, The Problem of Self-Consciousness), The
Methodological Problem (Idealism and Phenomenology, Methodological Behaviourism, The
Cognitive/Computational Approach, Methodological Materialism), Artificial Intelligence (Computers:
Some Elementary Concepts, Programming Intelligence: The Piecemeal Approach), Neuroscience
(Neuroanatomy-The Evolutionary Background, Neurophysiology and Neural Organization,
Neuropsychology, Cognitive Neurobiology, All Again-Computer Models of Parallel Distributed

Processing), Expanding Our Perspective (The Distribution of Intelligence in the Universe, The
Expansion of Introspective Consciousness)

Mechanisms of the Mind- Features of Mind (Theories of Consciousness I Sensation, Perception and
Consciousness I Toward an Heuristic Characterisation of Consciousness I Consciousness and Natural
Selection I Localization of Consciousness Generation I The Status of Consciousness I The Evolutionary
Biology of Perception I Visual Mechanisms and Sight Consciousness I The Memory System and the
Elaboration of Consciousness I Consciousness of an Objective World and Other Forms of Complex
consciousness I Evolution of the Neural Substrate for Elaborated Forms of Consciousness I
Thalamocortical Cortex & Cytoarchitecture I Thinking & Focussing & Understanding & Emotion &
Language I Evolution of Brain, Limbic System, Olfactory System I An Heuristic Model of Consciousness
I AI, Consciousness and Thinking I Stages in Evolution of the Mind

Ten Problems of Consciousness-The Ten Problem (Phenomenal Consciousness Introduced, The

Problem of Ownership, The Problem of Perspectival Subjectivity, The Problem of Mechanism, The
Problem of Phenomenal Causations, The Problem of Super Blindsight, The Problem of Duplicates, The
Problem of the Inverted Spectrum, The Problem of Transparency, The Problem of Felt Location and
Phenomenal Vocabulary, The Problem of the Alien Limb), Why the Problems Run So Deep
(Phenomenal Consciousness, Perspectival Subjectivity, Physicalism & Phenomenal Causation), Can
Anyone Else Feel My Pains? (Phenomenal Objects), The Intentionality of Feelings and Experiences
(Intentional States & Intentional Content, Ownership, Representation of Perceptual Sensations,
Background Feelings), Phenomenal Content, Perpectival Subjectivity, Secondary Qualities, Real
Nature of Phenomenal, Can You Really Imagine What You Think You Can?, Zombies, Inverted
Experience & Earth

The Character of Consciousness- The Problems of Consciousness, The Science of Consciousness

(Neural Correlate of Consciousness, Science for Consciousness),The Metaphysics of Consciousness
(Consciousness and Its Place in Nature, The Two-Dimensional Argument against Materialism,
Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation), Concepts of Consciousness (The Content of
Phenomenal Concepts, The Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief, Phenomenal Concepts and
Explanatory Gap), The Contents of Consciousness (The Representational Character of Experience,
Perception and the Fall from Eden, The Matrix as Metaphysics), Unity of Consciousness (What is the
unity of conscious?)

The Conscious Brain- Theory of Consciousness, Limits of Consciousness, Three Metaphysical

Problems of Consciousness

The Metaphysics of Consciousness- Ontology of Consciousness, How to Become Unconscious, the

Road to Substance Dualism, Panpsychism and Mental Composition, Paralogism, Phenomenal Holism,
Metaphysics of Consciousness without a Phenomenology of Consciousness-Husserl’s Philosophical
Phenomenology, Phenomenal Unity-an Intentionalist Account I Time & Consciousness I Quality,
Thought & Consciousness I Concessionary Dualism and Physicalism I The Representational vs the
Relational View of Visual Experience I Consciousness & Brain

The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness: Primitive Self-
Representation, The Metaphysics of Conscious Subjects, The First Person Concept and its Non-
conceptual Parent, Explaining First Person Phenomena, Descartes Defended, Paralogisms and First

Person Illusions, Perspectival Self-Consciousness, Reflective Self-Consciousness, Interpersonal Self-
Consciousness, Open Conclusion-The Place of Metaphysics

Cybernetics and the Philosophy of Mind- Introduction (The Scientific Side of the Mind-Body
Problem, Proto-science, Traditional Approaches to the Mind-Body Problem, Cybernetic Approach,
Relative Advantages of the Cybernetic Approach) Fundamentals (Historical Background, Entropy and
Information, Communication Theory and Thermodynamics, Feedback & Homeostasis, Cybernetic
Model for Causation, Teleonomic Development, Life & Cybernetics, Evolution & Consciousness &
Feedback, Evolutionary Progress, Cybernetic Model of Learning & Adaptation, Consciousness as a
Form of Adaptation, Informational Characteristics of Basic Detector, Informational Realism, Society,
Language & Reason, Subjectivity, Intentionality, Self-awareness, Immaterial Existence

Dynamic Coordination of Brain from Neurons to Mind- Dynamic Coordination in Brain and Mind,
Cortical Circuits & Cortical Areas, Sequence Coding and Learning, Evolution of Dynamic Coordination
& Comparative Cognition, Coordination in Neocortex at the Microcircuit, Oscillation-supported
information Processing, Hippocampus-Entorhinal-Neocortical Interface, Coordinating Rhythms,
Coordination in Circuits, Neocortical Rhythms, Stimulus-driven Coordination of Cortical Cell
Assembles, Coordination in Brain Systems, Coordination in Sensory Integration, Neural Coordination
& Human Cognition, Coordination in Behaviour & Cognition, Failures of Dynamic Coordination

Conscious Mind: In Search of Fundamental Theory- Foundations [Two Concepts of Mind (What is
consciousness?, The phenomenal and the psychological concepts of mind, The double life of mental
terms, The two mind-body problems, Two concepts of consciousness), Supervenience and
Explanation], The Irreduciblity of Consciousness (Can Consciousness be reductively explained?,
Naturalistic Dualism, The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment (Consciousness and cognition, Paradox
of Phenomenal Judgment, On explaining phenomenal judgments, Content of Phenomenal Beliefs,
The argument from self-knowledge), Toward a theory of consciousness (The coherence Between
Consciousness and Cognition I Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Inverted Qualia, Dancing Qualia I
Consciousness and Information-Some Speculation (Aspects of information, Metaphysics of
information, Is experience ubiquitous?), Applications (Strong Artificial Intelligence, The Interpretation
of Quantum Mechanics))

Arguing about the Mind- Consciousness: What is the problem? (The problem of consciousness I The
puzzle of conscious experience I The Hornswoggle Problem I The incompleteness of objective reality I
Science and the phenomenal), Consciousness: How should it be studied? (Science, publicity and
consciousness I Who’s on first? Heterophenomenology explained I Three facets of consciousness), Is
mind physical? (An Argument for dualism I The case for materialism I What is the soul? I Post-
Physicalism), How is your mind related to your body? How is it related to the world? (Meditations I
Bodily awareness and the self I The extended mind I Overextending the mind?), What is the self?
(Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness I Divided minds and the nature of persons I The self as
a centre of narrative gravity I Against narrative I There is no problem of the self), What can
pathological cases teach us about the mind? (The unbearable likeness of being I Reconceiving
delusion I Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? I Autism and the “theory of mind” debate I
Autism as mind blindness: an elaboration and partial defence I Free will, moral responsibility and
ADHD I Alcohol addiction and responsibility attributions), How can we know whether and what
nonhuman animal think? (How to read minds in behaviour: a suggestion from a philosopher I The

mental lives of nonhuman animals I Can animals empathize? Yes I Can animals empathize? Maybe
not I Apes with language I Behind the ape’s appearance: escaping anthropocentricism in the study of
other minds), Can machines think? (Computing machinery and intelligence I Minds, brains and
programs I The curious case of the Chinese room I Can machines think? I Subcognition and the limits
of Turing test), Is there life on other planets? (The Drake equation I Can SETI succeed? Not likely I The
abundance of life-bearing planets I Response to Sagan I Response to Mayr I The decoding problem:
do we need to search for extra terrestrial intelligence to search for extraterrestrial intelligence?)

Varieties of Consciousness- Cognitive Phenomenology, Conative Phenomenology, The

Phenomenology of Entertaining, Emotional Phenomenology, Moral Phenomenology

Theories of Consciousness- Consciousness and Physicalism (What is Physicalism? I Evidence for

Physicalism I The barrier of Consciousness I The burden of proof I Massaging the values), Themes
from Descartes (Descartes and Virtual Reality I Representational Mind I Inside the Cartesian Theatre I
The Generation Problem I Philosophical Dissolution?), Identity Theories and the Generation Problem
(Non-insane automatism I Connectionism I Sensory Vector Coding I Which vectors are Conscious?),
HOT Theoy I: The Mentalistic Reduction of Consciousness (What is HOT theory? I Conscious states
and subjects I HOT Pathologies I Which HOTs confer consciousness?), HOT Theory II: Animals, Mental
Sophistication and Dispositions (HOT Theory, introspection and concepts I Do animals attribute
mental states? I Consequences for HOT theory I Tests for consciousness I Dispositional HOT Theory),
Self-Representational theories of consciousness (An intermediate HOT-like approach I Transitivity I
Wide instrinsicality and introspection I Conceptually I Pure self-representationalism), Dennett I:
Qualia Eliminated (An Eliminativist Strategy I The Nature of Qualia I Verificationist Arguments),
Dennett II: Consciousness Fictionalized (Instrumentalism, Cognitive Pandemonium I
Phenomenological judgments I Stalin vs. Orwell), Consciousness and Attention (What is attention? I
Experiments with attention I Attention=consciousness I AIR theory and the generation problem),
Representational Theories of Consciousness I (Why representationalism? I Introspection and
consciousness I Phenomenal concepts), Representational Theories of Consciousness II (Dretske on
representation I The case of PTU I Tye on representation I Rogue consciousness and Swampman I
Content and vehicle), Conscious Intentionality and the anti-Cartesian catastrophe (Concepts and
experience I Consciousness as I Externalism vs. Internalism I Intrinsic Intentionality, Narrow Content,
The path to fundamentality), Consciousness, information and panpsychism (Chalmer’s naturalistic
dualism I Organizational invariance I Grades of information I Quantum mechanics and information I
Panpsychism I Objections to Panpsychism), Panpsychism, Aggregation and Combinatorial Infusion
(Deferential Monadic Panpsychism I Problems for DMP I Maximality and Panpsychism I Panpsychism
and emergence I Combinatorial Infusion), Monism and Models (Natural Monism I Newman’s Problem
I Anomalous and pattern monism I Metaphysical realism and neutral monism I Nonstandard models
and consciousness I Some final words)

Impossible Minds-My Neurons, My Consciousness- Who’s afraid of Magnus? (Artificial

Consciousness : The Very Idea! (Why Magnus? I The Consciousness of a Vacuum Cleaner? I Why
Neurons and not Beer Cans? I The Mental World of Magnus I A Basic Guess: Neurons and Thoughts I
A Game of Consequences I Psychological Puzzles I Language: The Human Competitive Edge I
Philosophy or Mathematical Equations?), Neurons and Thought (The Basic Guess I Defining my Own
Consciousness I The Consciousness of Others I The Power of Modelling I The Danger of Inappropriate
Modelling I Why Neurons? I The Mind’s Eye I Learning and Remembering I In a Nutshell I Philosophy

and Consciousness –The New Student and the Engineer I Descartes I Locke I Berkeley I Hume I Kant I
Hegel I William James I Wittgenstein I The End of the Millennium I Enter the Ghost in the Machine I
Penrose-, The Basic Guess in Perspective I What stuff makes me conscious?), Automata and Brains
(Automata Theory: Mathematics Anyone Can Do –The Brain is a State Machine-, The Wheel Machine
I Some Shorthand I Building Machines with Neurons I The Behaviour of Neural Machines I The
Function of Neurons: Learning and Generalisation I Learning or Programming? I A Touch of
Perspective: How we Lost Sight of Consciousness? I Neuroanatomy: The Shape of the Brain I The
Cortex I The Visual System I How Does the Brain create Consciousness? I The Concentric Theory of
Consciousness I The Language of Automata I Automaton does not mean Zombie), The Inner Eye of
Consciousness (Preamble: Engineering the mind of Magnus I Designing an Octopus –Consequence 2:
Inner neuron partitioning-, The Daydreaming Automation –Conscious and Unconscious States-, The
State Structure of Daydreams and Dreams, Learning to be Conscious –Iconic Learning-, Has the
Cartesian Theatre Reopened? I Enter Phenomenology), Who Am I? (The Me in Consciousness I The
“Self” as Others see it I The Psychology of Self I Self, Personality and State Structure I An Image of the
Future –Prediction-, Another Brief Look at Sleep I The Self as Knowing What I can do –The Awareness
of Self I Will and Consciousness I Will and Personality –Will-, Returning to the Self in Philosophy and
Psychology I Kelly’s Personal State Structures I So Who am I? I The Challenge of “Me”), Beginning and
Words (Setting Human Being Apart I Knowing the Names of Things –Representation of Meaning-I
What is an Object? I Associating Names I Where are the Objects? I A Changing World I Concepts and
Logic I More Logic I Verbs I Novelty I Abstractions and Confusions I Theories of Meaning –Gottlob
Frege I Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory of Meaning I Intentionality I Recent Views of “Meaning”- I
Whither the word of God I Imagining the Meaning of Language), Give me a Teddy (Battle at Dawn –
The Piaget Challenge I Chomsky’s Reply I Iconic Representation and the Battle of Royaumont-I “Mah
Mah” I Magnus Utters its First Words –Learning Utterances- I “On Human Communication” –Learning
Language- I The Universality of Languages I An Alternative to Inheritance I The Effectiveness of Iconic
Representation I Generalisation and Apparent Rules I Abstraction and Mastery I Why no Errors? I A
Three Sided Battle –Pinker’s Instrict I Karmiloff-Smith’s Representational Redescription I Magnus,
Pinker and Karnikoff-Smith- I Acquiring Language I What’s New?), Qualia, Instinct and Emotion (A
Philosopher’s Weapon I Qualia I Nagel’s Bat I Dennett’s View on Qualia as a Philosophical Blind Alley I
Colour Vision in People I Iconic Creation of Qualia: An Experiment in Colour –Iconic Transfer of
Qualitative Sensory Properties (Qualia?)- I The Recall of Qualitative Sensory States I More Inner
Sensations: Emotions or Instincts? I Instinct I Emotions I The Emotional Robot I The Importance of the
Private World I Qualia and Emotions as Computational Processes), What’s the Use of Artificial Minds?
(The Human as God I The Historical Robot I The Robot as a Literary Object I The robot as Master of
the Human Race I Sci-Fi Robots I The Human Machine I The Influence of the Computer Scientist –
Sloman’s Design Space I Bundy’s Meta-Level Reasoning I AI and Magnus- I Autonomous Agents and
the Intelligence of an Ant –Brady’s Sensory Concerns I Brooks’ Reactive Robots I Cog, the Philosopher
and Magnus I A Proliferation of Conscious Robots I Philosophers and Neurons I The Awe and the
Mystery I The Challenge of Human Mentation), Magnus 2030 AD: An Interview (Forty Years –the First
Conscious Machine? By Kim Patterson- I Meeting a Conscious Robot)

A Place for Consciousness- Liberal Naturalism (A Place for Consciousness I The Argument against
Physicalism I Physicalist Responses to the Argument against Physicalism I The Boundary Problem for
Experiencing Subjects I On the Possibility of Panexperientialism I On the Probability of
Panexperientialism I Paradoxes for Liberal Naturalism), Facets of Causation (Against Hume I The

Theory of Casual Significance I A Tutorial on Casual Significance I Is Connectivity Entailed by the
Physical? I The Carrier Theory of Causation I The Consciousness Hypothesis)

Cognitive Science & Neuroscience & Neurophilosophy & Neuropsychology

Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science- Foundations (History of Core Themes, The

Representational Theory of Mind, Cognitive Architectures), Aspects of Cognition (Perception, Action,
Human learning and Memory, Reasoning and decision making, Concepts, Language, Emotion,
Consciousness), Research Programs (Cognitive Neuroscience, Evolutionary Psychology, Embodied &
embedded and extended cognition, Animal Cognition)

Neurophilosophy- Some Elementary Neuroscience (The Science of Nervous Systems - A Historical

Sketch, Modern Theory of Neurons (Cellular components of Nervous Systems, How do neurons
work?, Neurotransmitter and Other Neurochemicals), Functional Neuroanatomy (Structure of the
Cortex, Brain), Higher Functions (Brain Mapping), Higher Functions- Neuropsychology & Neurology –
Hemispheric Lateralization, Epistemology & Logical Empiricism, Reduction and the Mind-Body
Problem, Are Mental States are Irreducible to Neurobiological States?, Property Dualism &
Subjective Experience, Intentionality & Intertheoretic Reduction, Functionalist Psychology (Anti-
Reductionism in Functionalism Theories of Mind, Representations and Reduction, The Co-
evolutionary Research Ideology, Information Processing and Sentential Paradigm), Theories of Brain
Function (In Search of Theory, Tensor Network Theory, Parallel Models of Neuronal Computation,
The Neurobiology of an Attentional Operation)

Boundaries of the Mind- The Individual in the Fragile Sciences (Cognition)- Individuals, Psychology
and the Mind, Nativism on Mind, Philosophical Foundation of Individualism (Individualism-
Externalism Debate), Metaphysics Mind and Science-Two Views of Realization, Context Sensitive
Realization, Representation, Computation and Cognitive Science (Locative vs. Taxonomical
Externalism), Thinking Through and Beyond the Body, The Embedded Mind and Cognition, Expanding
Consciousness (Global Externalism and TESEE View), Intentionality & Phenomenology (Inseparability
Thesis, Relationship between Intentionality & Phenomenology, Phenomenal Intentionality), Group
Mind & History, Biology, Social Science (Superorganism Tradition, Collective Psychology, Social
Manifestation Thesis, Group Selection Thesis)

Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement- Data and Theory in
Neuroscience (Localization in the Brain and Other Illusions, Neurophenomenology- An Introduction
for Neurophilosophers), Neural Representation (Moving Beyond Metaphors-Understanding the Mind
for What It is, Brain Time and Phenomenological Time, The Puzzle of Temporal Experience),
Visuomotor Transformation (Grasping and Perceiving Objects, Action-Oriented Representation),
Colour Vision (Cognitive Neuroscience & Colour Perception), Consciousness (Neuro-functional Theory
of Consciousness, Making Consciousness Safe for Neuroscience)

The Corpus and the Cortex- Mindfulness and Being-in-the-World

First-Person Methods: Toward an Empirical Phenomenology of Experience- On Sensing and Sense

(Vision & Seeing, Tact & Touching, Hearing & Listening, Tasting & Smelling), Mundane Experience
(Memory, On Becoming Significant, On Being and Presence, Crises and Suffering as Sources of

Learning, Thinking and Speaking), Ekstatic Knowing & Learning (Problem Solving, Work, Primary
Experiences and Accounts, Reading)

Cognitive Science-An Introduction to the Study of Mind- Introduction-Exploring Inner Space

(Representation, Computation, Interdisciplinary Perspective- Philosophical, Psychological, Cognitive,
Neuroscience, Network, Evolutionary, Linguistic, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics Approaches-,
Categories of Mental Representation), Consciousness & Neuroscience, Consciousness & Artificial
Intelligence, Emergence, Dualism, Monism, Functionalism, Structuralism, Behaviourism,
Psychoanalysis, Mind as Information Processor, Attention, Pattern Recognition & Vision, Memory,
Imagery, Problem Solving, Neuroscience Techniques & Brain Anatomy, Neuroscience & Memory,
Neuroscience & Problem Solving , Neuroscience & Attention, Neuroscience & Visual Pattern
Recognition, Artificial Neural Network, Semantic Network, Connectionist Approach, Neural
Darwinism, Neuroscience & Linguistics, Specific Issues Facing Cognitive Science (Emotions,
Consciousness, Physical Environments, Social Environments, Individual and Cultural Differences)

From Psychology to Neuroscience: A New Reductive Account- Mind-Body Problem, Metaphysics of

Mental Causation, Epistemological Reducibility of Psychology, the Problem of Mental Causation
(Objects, events and properties, typology of possible positions in the philosophy of mind),
Ontological Reductionism (Type Identity, Multiple Realization in Ontological Context, Supervenience,
Psychology & Physics, Casual Arguments & Token Identity, Ontological Reductionism), Psychology &
Neuroscience, Epistemological Reductionism (Multiple Realization in an Epistemological Context,
Epistemological Reductionism, Overcoming Multiple Realization), Reduction & Sub-types, Reduction
of Psychology to Neuroscience, Complete Reductionism, Conservative Reductionism

How Literature Plays with the Brain- The Brain and Aesthetic Experience, How the Brain Learns and
Read the Play of Harmony and Dissonance, The Neuroscience of Hermeneutic Circle, The Temporality
of Reading and the Decentred Brain, The Social Brain and the Paradox of the Alter ego

Neuropsychology & Philosophy of Mind in Process- Micro-genetics & Cognitive Science, Thinking,
Brain & Mind, Microgenesis & Anti-sociality, Moral Values & Knowledge & Embodied Mind, Micro-
genetics of the Self, Neuropsychology of Creativity, Artistic Vision & Brain Hemispheric, Microgenesis
& Psychoanalysis, Self-organizing Ontogenesis, Process & Individuality

Neuroscience & Philosophy- Brain & Mind & Language- Philosophical Foundation of Neuroscience,
Neuroscience & Philosophy, Philosophy as Naive Anthropology, the Conceptual Presuppositions of
Cognitive Neuroscience: A Reply to Critics, the Conceptual Presuppositions of Cognitive
Neuroscience, Putting Consciousness Back in the Brain

Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science- Psychology & Cognitive Science, Epistemological &
Metaphysical Issues, Representation, Realization-Metaphysical & Scientific Perspectives, Realization
& Cognitive Science, Autonomy, Reduction, Multiple Realization, Psychology - Neuroscience
Interaction, Non-Reductive Materialism, Explanatory Gap, Theoretical & Methodological Foundation
of Cognitive Science, Trends Contributing Research Areas, Cognitive Neuroscience Methodology
(Neuro-scientific Theories, Localization & Reduction, Single-Cell Recording, Representation in the
Brain), Computational Neuroscience (Representation (Temporal, Population, Semantics),
Computation, Dynamics, Synthesis, Cognition, Situated Cognition (Environment, Goals, Social

Distribution, Individual Embodiment, Epistemological Reflection, Artificial Intelligence- History &
Foundations and Philosophical Issues

Philosophy of the Brain- The Brain Problem-Mind Problems: Hypothesis of embedment and the
Neuro-philosophical method (Definition of the brain and dilemma of the brain, The Brain Problem,
Hypothesis of embedment, Neurophilosophy as a method for investigation of the brain), Neuro-
epistemological account of the Brain: Epistemic-Empirical Relationship (Spatial Embedment- The
Body and the own body, Temporal Embedment-the own body and Other Bodies, Mental
Embedment- the Brain and the own body, Reflexive Embedment- The own brain and other brains),
Philosophy of the Brain- Empirical Hypothesis of the Brain, Epistemology of the Brain and Ontology of
the Brain (Empirical Hypothesis of the Brain( Dynamic Brain, Event Coding, Embedded Brain),
Epistemology of the Brain (Embedded Epistemology, Epistemology of events and environments, First,
Second and Third Person Epistemology) and Ontology of the Brain (Embedded Ontology, Self-
Reference of the Brain), the Embedded Brain: Mind Problems, Hypothesis of Embedment and
Paradigm Shifts, The Determination of the Brain , The Dilemma of the brain

Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science- Visual Object Recognition, Deductive Reasoning,
Probabilistic Reasoning, Our Native Inferential Tendencies, Epistemic Folkways and Scientific
Epistemology, Observation Reconsidered, Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality- A Reply to
Jerry Fodor, Scientific Discovery, Evidence against Empiricist Accounts of the Origins of Numerical
Knowledge, Troubles with Functionalism, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,
Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation- The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum, How We Know Our
Minds- The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality, The Psychology of Folk Psychology,
Quining Qualia, Neuropsychological Evidence for a Consciousness System, Object Perception,
Ontological Categories Guide Young Children’s Induction’s of Word Meaning, Some elements of
Conceptual Structure, Colour Subjectivism, Critique of Rumelhart and McClellard, The Mental
Representation of the Meaning of Words I Meaning, Other People and the World I Ethics and
Cognitive Science, The Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Judgment, Situations and
Dispositions, Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis, Individualism and Psychology,
The Co-Evolutionary Research Ideology, On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism, Connectionism
and Cognitive Architecture, The Computer Model of the Mind, The Critique of Cognitive Reason

The Search for Mind: A New Foundation for Cognitive Science- Field of Cognitive Science, History of
Cognitive Science, Philosophical Epistemology (Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Mind in Philosophy,
Mind and World- The Problem of Objectivity, Philosophical Epistemology), Psychology (History of
Experimental Psychology, Methodologies in Psychology, Perception, Memory, Mind in Psychology),
Linguistics (Computation & Linguistics /Computational Linguistics, Mind in Linguistics), Neuroscience
(The constituent disciplines of Neuroscience, methodology of Neuroscience, Connectionism (PDP),
Mind in Neuroscience), Artificial Intelligence, Ethnology and Ethnoscience, Symbol Systems & Mind,
Consciousness & Selfhood (Cognitive Views, Consciousness in Philosophy, Development of Selfhood
and minimal requirements for this theory, Cognitive Science and the Search for Mind (A Theory of
Mind, Foundational Consideration)

Minding the Brain-A Guide to Philosophy & Neuroscience- Mind and Brain from Philosophy through
Neuroscience to Neurophilosophy (Philosophy and the Mind, Philosophy of Mind and
Phenomenology I Philosophy and Science Naturalism I Mind, Brain and Science, Psychology and

Neuroscience I Brain and Philosophy-Neurophilosophy), Mind-Brain Problem from Philosophy of
Mind to Philosophy of Brain (Mental Approaches to the Mind-Brain Problem I Physical and Functional
Approaches to the Mind-brain Problem I Non-mental and Non-physical Approaches to the Mind-
brain Problem I Brain-based Approaches to the Mind-brain Problem), Philosophy of Psychology and
Neuroscience From Explanation of Mind to Explanation of Brain (Philosophy of Psychology Personal
versus Sub-personal Levels of Explanation I Philosophy of Psychology Mind and Meaning I Philosophy
of Neuroscience Explanations, Concepts and Observer in Neuroscience I Philosophy of Brain
Characterization of the Brain), Neurophilosophy of Consciousness From Mind to Consciousness
(Arguments against the Reduction of Consciousness to the Brain I Neural Correlates of
Consciousness (NCC), Neural Predispositions of Consciousness (NPC), Conceptual, Phenomenal and
Methodological Issues in the Investigation of Consciousness), Neurophilosophy of Self From
Consciousness to Self (Brain and Self I Brain and Self-Consciousness I Abnormalities of Self and Brain
in Psychiatric Disorders I Brain and Intersubjectivity I Is the Brain a Door Opener?)

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Neuroscience- Explanation, Reduction and Methodology in

Neuroscientific Practice (Molecules, Systems and Behaviour: Another View of Memory Consolidation
I Biological Clocks: Explaining with Models of Mechanisms I Methodology and Reduction in the
Behavioural Neuroscience: Object Exploration as a Case Study I The Science of Research and the
Search for Molecular Mechanisms of Cognitive Functions), Learning and Memory (The Lower Bounds
of Cognition: What do Spinal Cords reveal? I Lessons for Cognitive Science from Neuroergonomics I
Learning Neuroscience and the Return of Behaviourism), Sensation and Perception (fMRI: A Modern
Cerebrascope? The Case of Pain I The Embedded Neuron, the Enactive Field? I The Role of
Neurobiology in differentiating the senses I Enactivism’s Vision: Neurocognitive Basis),
Neurocomputation and Neuroanatomy (Space, Time and Object I Neurocomputational Models:
Theory, Application, Philosophical Consequences I Neuroanatomy and Cosmology), Neuroscience of
Motivation, Decision Making and Neuroethics (The Emerging Theory of Motivation I Inference to the
Best Decision I Emergentism at the Crossroads of Philosophy, Neurotechnology and the
Enhancement Debate I What is Neu in Neuroethics?), Neurophilosophy and Psychiatry
(Confabulations about people and their limbs, present of absent I Delusional Experience I The Case
for Animal Emotions: Modelling Neuropsychiatric Disorders), Neurophilosophy (Levels, Individual
Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology I Neuro-Eudaimonics of Buddhist Lead
Neuroscientists to the Seat of Happiness I The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity)

Philosophical Foundation of Neuroscience- Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical

and Conceptual Roots I The Early Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action of the
Nervous System (Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius-The Origins of the Vernacular Doctrine I Fernel and
Descartes: The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine I The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and its Aftermath I
The Concept of A Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall I Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca,
Frisch and Hitzig I The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sharrington), The Cortex and the
Mind in the Work of Sherrington and his Protegis (Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian
Impact I Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism I John Eccles and the “Liaison Brain” I Wilder Penfield
and the “Highest Brain Mechanism”), The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience (Mereological
Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience- Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Damasio, Frisby, Gregory,
Marr, Johnson-Larid-, Methodological Qualms-Ullman, Blakemore, Zeki, Young, Milner, Scuire and
Kandel, Marr, Frisby, Sperry-, On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to Being, On the
Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity, The Inner, Introspection,

Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect, Privacy or Subjectivity, The Meaning of Psychological
Predicates and How they are Learnt, Of the Mind and its Nature), Human Faculities and
Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis, Preliminaries (Brain-body dualism, The Project, The
Category of the Psychological), Sensation and Perception (Sensation, Perception, Perception as the
causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities, Perception as hypothesis formation:
Helmholtz, Visual Images and the binding problem, Perception as information processing: Mary’s
theory of vision), The Cognitive Powers (Knowledge and its Kinship with Ability I Being able to and
Knowing how to I Possessing Knowledge and Containing Knowledge I Memory I Declarative and non-
declarative memory I Storage , retention and memory traces), The Cognitive Powers (Belief, Thinking,
Imagination and Mental Images, The logical features of mental imagery), Emotion (Affections, The
Emotions: A Preliminary Analytical Survey, Neuroscientists’ Confusion I Analysis of the Emotions),
Volition and Voluntary Movement (Volitions I Libet’s Theory of Voluntary Movement I Taking Stock),
Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis, Intransitive and Transitive
Consciousness (Consciousness and the Brain I Intransitive Consciousness I Transitive Consciousness
and its Forms I Transitive Consciousness: A Partial Analysis), Conscious Experience, Mental States and
Qualia (Extending the Concept of Consciousness I Conscious Experience and Conscious Mental States
I Confusions regarding unconscious belief and unconscious activities of the brain I Qualia I “How it
feels” to have an experience I Of there being something which it is like I The qualitative character of
experience I Thises and Thuses I Of the Communicability and Describability of Qualia), Puzzles about
Consciousness (A Budget of Puzzles I On Reconciling Consciousness of Subjectivity with our
Conception of an Objective Reality I On the Question of how Physical Process can give rise to
Conscious Experience I Of the Evolutionary Value of Consciousness I The Problem of Awareness
Other Minds and Other Animals), Self-Consciousness (Self-Consciousness and the Self I Historical
Stage Setting Descartes, Locke, Hume, James I Current Scientific and Neuroscientific Reflections on
the Nature of Self-Consciousness I The Illusion of a “Self” I The Horizon of Thought , Will and
Affection I Thought and Language I Self-Consciousness), On Method, Reductionism (Ontological and
Explanatory Reductionism I Reduction by Elimination I Are our ordinary psychological concepts
theoretical? I An Everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory? I Eliminating all
that is human I Sawing off the branch on which one sits), Methodological Reflections (Linguistic
Inertia and Conceptual Innovation I The “Poverty of English” Argument I From Nonsense to Sense:
The Power Description of the Results of Commissurotomy I The case of blind-sight: misdescription
and illusory explanation I Philosophy and Neuroscience I What philosophy can and what it cannot do
I Why it matters), Daniel Dennett (Dennett’s Methodology and Presuppositions I The Intentional
Stance I Heterophenomenological Method), John Searle (Philosophy and Science I Searle’s
Philosophy of Mind I The Traditional Mind-Body Problem)

Philosophy and the Brain- Coding and Representation (The Problem I Purpose, direction and history I
What’s in a brain? I Mentality is not separable from the brain I The brain as an agent, Brain programs
I Living and Knowing I Information I The Maintenance of order: DNA I Embryology, adaptation and
evolution I The languages of life and of the brain I Intentionality I Representation and computation in
the brain I The origins of signals in the cortex I Changes in the brain before an intentional action I
Some sites of linguistic activity in the brain), Perceiving (Perception as a search for information I The
senses in the skin and their cortical centres I Taste and smell I Pain and internal sensation I The
senses of posture and balance I Hearing I Vision I The visual cortex I The eye’s search for information I
Some theories of vision), Learning (Memory I Memory as a process of selection I The hippocampus

and memory I Memory and development I Summary of some essential features of memory systems),
Valuing (Wants, needs and values I The hypothalamus I Some examples of regulation I Emotional
responses I Ethics I Social man I Beauty and the brain I Freedom and determination I What am I?),

In Critical Condition Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind- Metaphysics (Review of John
McDowell’s Mind and World I Special Science: Still Autonomous after All These Years (A Reply to
Jaegwon Kim’s “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction)), Concepts (Review of
Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts) I There Are No Recognitional Concepts-Not even RED I
There Are No Recognitional Concepts-Not even RED, Part 2 The Plot Thickens I Do we think in
Mentalese? Remarks on Some Arguments of Peter Carruthers I Review of A, W. Moore’s Points of
View), Cognitive Architecture (Review of Paul Churchland’s The Enigma of Reason, The Seat of the
Soul I Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky’s Solution doesn’t Work I
Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky’s Solution Still doesn’t
Work I there and Back Again: A Review of Annette Karmilloff-Smith’s Beyond Modularity I Review of
Jeff Elman et al. Rethinking Innateness I Review of Steven Milthen’s The Prehistory of the Mind),
Philosophical Darwinism (Review of Richard Dawkin’s Climbing Mount Improbable I Deconstructing
Dennett’s Darwin I In Science Biologically Possible? Comments on Some Arguments of Patricia
Churchland and of Alvin Plantinga, Review of Steven Pinker’s How the Mind Works and Henry
Plotkin’s Evolution in Mind)

Cognitive Phenomenology- Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction I The Case Against Cognitive

Phenomenology I From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the
Perplexed I Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content I On the Phenomenology
of Thought I The Phenomenology of Particularity I Introspection, Phenomenality and the Availability
of Intentional Content I The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology1 I A Frugal View of Cognitive
Phenomenology I On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia I Phenomenal Thought I Disagreement about
Cognitive Phenomenology I Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life I Is There a Phenomenology of
Thought? I The Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking

Philosophy and the Neurosciences- Neurophilosophical Foundations (Philosophy Meets the

Neurosciences I Brain Metaphor and Brain Theory I Neuroanatomical Foundations of Cognition:
Connecting the Neuronal Level with the Study of Higher Brain Areas I Epistemic Issues in Procuring
Evidence about the Brain: The Importance of Research Instruments and Techniques), Language
(Remarks on the Seat of Faculty of Articulate Language, Followed by an Observation of Aphemia I
Recent Work on Aphasia I The Processing of Single Words Studied with Positron Emission
Tomography I Modularity, Domain Specificity and the Development of Language I Linking Cognition
and Brain: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Language), Vision (Brain Mechanisms of Vision I Object
Vision and Spatial Vision: Two Cortical Pathways I Natural Mechanisms of Form and Motion
Processing in the Primate Visual System I Decomposing and Localizing Vision: An Exemplar for
Cognitive Neuroscience), Consciousness (Consciousness and Neuroscience I Functionalism, Dualism
and the Neurocorrelates of Consciousness I The Nature of Pain I Points of View from the Brain’s Eye
View: Subjectivity and Neural Representation), Representation (Representations: From Neural
Systems to Cognitive Systems I The Architecture of Representation I Of Sensory Systems and the
“Aboutness” of Mental States I Brain Matters: A Case against Representations in the Brain),
Reduction (Intertheoretic Reduction: A Neuroscientist’s Field Guide I Explanatory Pluralism and the
Co-evolution of Theories of Science I McCauley’s Demand for a Co-level Competitior)

Externalism & Internalism & Enactivism

Anti-Externalism- On Some Misleading Cases (Externalist Cases & Internalist Theory, Internalist Cases
& Externalist Theory), Mind-Based Externalism and Sensory Content (Against Etiological Semantics,
Non-Etiological Mind-Based Externalism, Qualia and Sensory Content), Language-Based Externalism
and Thought Content (Private Language and Privileged Access I Language, Truth and Inference I
Qualia Empiricism)

Beyond the Brain: Embodied, Situated and Distributed Cognition- Embodied Cognitive Science: a
Research Program (Evolution, Embodiment and the Nature of the Mind I Evolutionary Embodied
Cognitive Science I Artificial Intelligence & Embodiment I Relating Embodied and Situated
Approaches to Cognition), Embodied Cognitive Science: Application (Mental vs. Embodied Models of
Mirrored Self-Recognition: Some Preliminary Consideration), Distributed and Collective Cognition,
Situated Cognition (Situated Cognition- The Extended Mind Thesis and the Subject of Cognition)

Cognitive systems and the Extended Mind- The Thinking Organism (Principles of Demarcation,
Cognitive Systems and Demarcation, Realization and Extended Cognition), Arguments for the
Extended View (Functionalism and Natural Kinds, Developmental Systems Theory and the Scaffolding
of Language, Dynamical Systems Theory, The Experience of Extension and the Extension of
Experience), The Embedded and Embodied Mind (Embedded Cognition and Computation, Embedded
Cognition and Mental Representation, The Embodied View)

Externalism and the Mental- Externalism and Content, What the Internal could be?, The Constitutive
Relation, Externalism and the Inner-Outer Distinction

The Subject’s Point of View- Our Cartesian Mind (Privileged Access and the Mark of the Mental I
Unconscious, Conscious, Bodily I Persons and Mind), Internalism and Externalism (The Internal and
the External, Indiscriminability, Externalism and Privileged Self-Knowledge, Reference and Sense)

The Extended Self : Architecture, Memes and Mind- The Common Bond (Place Identity, Place in
Architectural Theory, Invisible Landscapes, Cultural Relativism, Proxemics, Narratives of the Self, The
Politics of Place), The Body Nucleus (Architecture and the body, The Persisting Point, Theory of
Perception, Tacit-Knowing, Spatial dynamic, Resolving the mind-body problem, Invisible Reality),
Embodied Minds (The enigma of the self, Body mapping as spatial extensions, Peripersonal space,
Identifying with others, The aggregates of experience, Perceptual paradox, Extended cognition, Fields
of Being), Techniques and Human (The Dynamics of techniques, Epiphylogenesis, Debates and
discrepancies, Writing metaphors, Sociality and location), Rethinking Evolution, From genes to
memes (the replicators, The extended phenotype, Units of cultural transmission, Abstract principles,
Problems of definition, Memes and Vehicles, Meta-representation, Niche Construction, Neurological
composition, Beyond reductionism), Types and Taxonomies (The roots of combinativity, Nature as
model, Parts and Wholes, Classifying building types, Implicit and explicit meanings, Global types,
Urban typologies, Linked problem solutions, A question of logic, Self-producing types), Technical
memes and assemblages (Form and content, The technical meme, assemblage theory and the
extended self, Contingent effects, co-evolutionary assemblages, Life as wheels, Symbol of mass
consumption, The greatest public work project, Urban impact), Combinatorial design (culture,
innovation, evolutionary), Recasting the extended self, Appropriating Cyberspace (The topology of

cyberspace, Cyberspace as movement space, Ghosts of Cartesian dualism, Gender inflections, Virtual
selves, Customized automation, Design by artificial selection, Electronic ecologies)

Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science- Foundational Issues in Enaction as a
Paradigm for Cognitive Science-From the Origin of Life to Consciousness and Writing, Enactive Mind
& Social Interaction & Play, Life and Exteriority, Development through Sensorimotor Coordination,
Enaction & Sense-Making & Emotion, Thinking in Movement, Kinaesthesia and the Construction of
Perceptual Objects, Directive Minds-How Dynamics Shapes Cognition, Neuro-dynamics and
Phenomenology in Mutual Enlightenment – The Example of the Epileptic Aura, Language & Enaction,
Enacting Infinity & Transfinite Cardinals, The Ontological Constitution of Cognition and the
Epistemological Constitution of Cognitive Science-Phenomenology & Enaction and Technology,
Embodiment or Envatment? Reflections on the Bodily Basis of Consciousness, Toward a
Phenomenological Psychology of Conscious, Enaction & Imagination & Insight

Externalism- Putting Mind and World Back Together Again- Internalism & Externalism, Cartesianism,
Idealism, The Radical reversal of Idealism, The attack on the inner, Content externalism, The scope
and limits of content externalism, Externalism and first-person authority, Vehicle externalism,
Externalism and consciousness, Externalist axiology, Externalism & Internalism & Idealism

Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology- Externalism in Mind & Epistemology,
What and About What is Internalism, Externally Enhanced Internalism, How to be a Neo-Moorean,
Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism I Entitlement, Opacity and Connection I Content
Externalism, Entitlement and Reasons I What’s wrong with McKinsey-Style Reasoning?, A Priority and
Externalism, The Inference that Leaves Something to Chance, Semantic Externalism and Epistemic
Illusions, Psychological Externalism and the Role of Belief in the Analysis of Knowledge

Mindware- Extended Minds (Epistemic Actions, Classical Externalism vs. Active Externalism, The
Mark of the Cognitive, Integration & Cognitive Systems, Brains & Cognitive Architecture), Enacting
Perceptual Experience (Sensorimotor Chauvinism, Making Sense of Experience, The Best Explanation
Argument, Virtual Representation), Prediction Machines (Sensorimotor Contingency Theory
Revisited, Being Human),

Radical Enactivism- What is Radical Enactivism, Unprincipled Engagements- Emotional Experience,

Expression and Response, Feelings and Objects, Intentionality and emotion, Against Passive
Intellectualism, Emotional experience and Understanding, Embodied expectations and extended
possibilities, From feeling to thinking, The narrative alternative to theory of mind, Narrative practice
and understanding reasons

Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content- Enactivism: The Radical Line (CIC (Content
Involving Cognition), REC (Radical Enactive-Embodied Cognition), CEC (Conservative Enactive-
Embodied Cognition)), Enactivism Less Radical (Other Enactivism, Sensorimotor Enactivism,
Autopoietic Enactivism, The Information- Processing Challenge), The Reach of REC, The Hard Problem
of Content (There is One Blow, Content-What is Good For?, Enactivist Makeovers), CIC’s Retreat
(Falling Back to High Ground, Hyperintellectualism, Minimal Intellectualism, Maximally Minimal
Intellectualism), CIC’s Last Stand (Imaginistic Cognition, Perceptual Science, Phenomenal Cavalry),
Extensive Minds (From Extended to Extensive, Parity-Motivated EMH (Extended Mind Hypothesis),

Complementary-Motivated EMH, Partnering Basic Minds with Scaffolded Minds), Regaining

The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition- Backdrop, Conceptual Foundations (Innateness

and the Situated Mind, Situated Representation I Dynamics, Control and Cognition I Embedded
Rationality I Explanation: Mechanism, Modularity and Situated Cognition I Empirical Developments
(Situated Perception and Sensation in Vision and Other Modalities: A Sensorimotor Approach, Spatial
Cognition: Embodied and Situated, Situated Semantics, Situating Concepts, Is Consciousness
Embodied, Emotion in the Wild- The Situated Perspective on Emotion, The Social Context of
Cognition, Cognition for Culture, Neuroethology-From Morphological Computation to Planning

The Extended Mind- Richard Menary (1988)- The Extended Mind in Focus, The Extended Mind
Extended, The Varieties of Externalism I Meaning, Making and the Mind of the Externalism I
Exograms and Interdisciplinary: History, the Extended Mind and the Civilising Process I Cognitive
Integration and the Extended Mind I In Defence of Extended Functionalism I Consciousness, Broadly
Construed I The Extended Infant: Utterance-Activity and Distributed Cognition I Representation in
Extended Cognitive Systems: Does the Scaffolding of Language Extended the Mind? I The Extended
Mind, the Concept of Belief and Epistemic Credit

The Externalist Challenge- In Defence of Epistemic Externalism (The Challenge of Externalism,

Externalism and Scepticism, Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism Revisited, Conditions on
Cognitive Sanity and the Death of Internalism, Empiricism Externalized, Circularity and Epistemic
Priority), Critiques of Epistemic Externalism (The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism, In
Search of Internalism and Externalism, Inferential Internalism and the Presuppositions of Skeptical
Arguments I Knowledge, Justification and the Cooperative World I The Epistemological Promise of
Externalism I Is Knowledge a Natural Phenomenon I In Defence of Content Externalism (Social
Cartesianism , Existence Proof for a Viable Externalism, Externalism-Epistemic Artefacts and the
Extended Mind, Outing the Mind- A Teleopragmatic Perspective), Critiques of Content Externalism
(Natural Intentionality, Phenomenal Intentionality, On an Argument from Properties of Words to
Broad Content, Reference & Casual Powers & Externalist Intuitions and Unicorns), An Exemplary
Debate about Content (Millikan’s (Un?)Compromised Externalism & Its Comments, Self-Knowledge
(Believing that you Know and Knowing that You Believe, Knowing what you think vs Thinking What
You Know, Do we know how We Know Our own Minds yet?, Social Externalism & Self-Knowledge,
Anti-Individualism and Minimal Self-Knowledge), The Epistemic Significance of Perception (Explaining
Perceptual Entitlement, Externalism and Disjunctivism), An Essay on Intentionality (The Objects of

What Determines Content: The Internalism-Externalism Dispute- Publicity, Externalism and Inner
States I Internalist Constraints on Content Externalism, Intersubjective Externalism, Having a
Concept, Arguments for Externalism, Reference and Defence, External and Internal Aspects in the
Semantics of Names I Externalism, Apriority and Transmission of Warrant, Brown against the
Reduction, Content Externalism and Fregean Sense, Are Object-Dependent Beliefs Explanatorily
Redundant?, Wittgenstein’s Externalism- Context & Self-Knowledge & the Past, Temporal
Externalism- Constitutive Norms and Theories of Vagueness

Extending Ourselves- Epistemic Enhances, Scientific Empiricism, Computational Science, Computer


Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind- Internalism and Externalism, Motivations for Internalism
(Internalism and two thought experiments I Ontological Motivation I Explanatory Motivation I
Epistemic Motivation), Responses to Motivations for Internalism (Responses to ontological
motivation I Responses to explanatory motivations), Motivations for Externalism (Logico-semantic
motivations I Expalantory Motivations I Responses to logica-semantic motivations I Responses to
explanatory motivations), First Person Authority, The Problem and Two Solutions to It (The problem
stated I Abandoning authority? I Burge’s Solution I Davidson, the negative story I Davidson, the
positive story), Responses to Burge and Davidson (Response to Burge I Relational models not
considered my Davidson I Davidson’s theory: comments and criticisms), Towards a Solution (An
impure Davidsonian theory (IDT) I Clarification of the IDT I Objections to the IDT I McKinsey’s
argument), Thoughts, Externalism and Demonstrative Thought (The individuation conditions of
demonstrative thoughts I The object-dependence of demonstrative thought), Evans’ Theory of
Demonstrative Thought (Evans’ “know which” requirement I Comments on Evans’ theory I
Evaluation), An Externalist Theory of Demonstrative Thought (The need for a sortal I Externalist
individuation of demonstrative thought I A way out?), Thoughts which Concern Natural Kinds
(Individuation conditions of natural kind thoughts I The NK-component I The E-component I The
objectual component)


Experimental Phenomenology- Doing Phenomenology, Indians and the Elephant: Phenomena and
the Phenomenological Reductions, The Visual Field: First Phenomenological Excursus, Illusions and
Multistable Phenomena: A Phenomenological Deconstruction, Variations upon Deconstruction
Possibilities and Topography, Expand Variations and Phenomenological Reconstruction, Horizon
Adequacy and Invariance, Projection: Expanding Phenomenology, Interdisciplinary Phenomenology,
Pragmatism and Post-Phenomenology, Material Multistables (Simulation and Embodiment,
Multistability and Cyberspace, Variations on the Camera Obscura, The Seventh Machine: Bow-under-

Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis and the Elements of Everyday Life- The Form of Human
Experience (Interpretation, Embodiment, Memory), The Substance of Human Experience (Others,
Neurosis), The Process of Human Experience (Philosophy)

Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience- Experience and Intentionality, Husserl’s

methodologically solipsistic perspective, Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness, Between Husserl,
Kierkegaard and Aristotle, Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s methodological solipsism, Heidegger on
the nature of significance, Temporality as the source of intelligibility, Heidegger’s theory of time,
Spatiality and human identity, “ Dasein” and the forensic notion of a person

Inner Experience and Neuroscience: Merging Both Perspectives- Developing a Science of Human
Meanings and Consciousness, Lessons Learned from Psychophysics, Psychophysical Methods and
Human Meanings, Describing Characterizing and Understanding Phenomenal Experience, Merging
the Qualitative with the Quantitative-The Roles of Desire and Expectations in Emotions, Second Pain-
A Model for Explaining a Conscious Experience?, Hypnotic and Other Background States of
Consciousness, Using Experiential Paradigms to Extend Science and Help Solve Human Problems

James and Dewey on Belief and Experience-

Phenomenology and Human Experience- Varieties of Human Experience: Contemporary
Phenomenological Approaches (Toward a Phenomenological Reading of Landscape: Bachelard,
Merleau-Ponty, and Zong Bing), The Human Genre: Revisiting Attempts of Classical
Phenomenologists (Heidegger’s Concept of Fore-structure and Textual Interpretation,
Understanding, Historically Effected Consciousness and Phenomenology in Gadamer, Reversibility
and Its Philosophical Implications: A Phenomenological Explication of a Late Concept of Merleau-
Ponty, The Subjective Movement of Body and World: Observations on the Phenomenology and
Metaphysics of Corporeality in the Reflections of Jan Patočka)

Place and Experience- Introduction: the Influence of place, The obscurity of place, The structure of
spatiality I Holism, content and self I Unity, locality and agency I Agency and objectivity I Self and the
space of other I The unity and complexity of place I Place, past and person I the place of philosophy

Predicative Brain- At the Origin of Experience of the Self, The Roots of Conscious Awareness,
Consciousness- A Multilevel Framework, Between Conscious Global Workspace and Unconscious
Levels, Does a Hierarchy of Nerveous Functions Exist?, Movement’s Architectures, The Origin of
Movements, Ecological Rationality-Intuition, Decision and Other Evolution Strategies

Structure of Perceptual Experience- Is the Sense-Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?, Naive

Realist Perspective on Seeing Blurrily, Perceptual Guidance, The Perception of Activity, Auditory
Appearances, Space , Time and Molyneux’s Question

What we Mean By Experience?- The Authority of Experience: Realism, Empiricism and the Problem
of Theory, Cognitive Sciences of Experience, Naturalism and Agency, Experience Recaptured, The
Linguistic Turn and the Ascendancy of Anti-foundationalism

Mental Reality- The Character of Experience, Understanding-Experience, a Note about Dispositional

Mental States, Purely Experiential Content, the Mental and the Non-mental, the Mental and the
Behavioural, Neo-Behaviourism and Reductionism, Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind, Agnostic
Materialism (Monism, Linguistic Argument, Materialism and M&P Monism, Impossibility of an
“Objective Phenomenology”, Panpsychism, The Inescapability of Metaphysics, Equal-Status Monism,
Sensory Spaces I Experience, Explanation and Theoretical Integration I Natural Monism and Agnostic
Monism, The Hard Part of the Mind-Body Problem, Neutral Monism and Agnostic Monism, A
Comment on Eliminativism, Instrumentalism and So On), Materialism, Idealism and Immaterialism
(Mentalism, Strict or Pure Process Idealism, Active Principle Idealism, Stuff Idealism, Immaterialism,
Dualist Options, Frege’s Thesis, The Problem of Mental Dispositions), Mental ( Definition of Mental
Being, Mental Phenomena, The View that All Mental Phenomena are Experiential Phenomena),
Natural Intentionality (E/C Intentionality, The Experienceless I Intentionality and Abstract and
Nonexistent Objects I Experience, Purely Experienced Content and N/C Intentionality, Concepts in
Nature, Intentionality and Experience, Intentionality and Experience), Pain and Pain (Qualitaive
Characters I Functionalism, Naturalism and Realism about Pain), The Weather Watches (What Is it
Like to Be a Weather Watcher?, The Aptitudes of Mental States, The Argument from the Conditions
for Processing the Concept of Space, The Argument from the Nature of Desire, The Argument from
the Phenomenology of Desire), Behaviour (Other-Observability, Neo-neo-behaviorism), The Concept
of Mind, Real Intentionality – Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness (Intentionality, Experience,
Physicalism, Naturalism I Intentionality, Aboutness I The Ubiquity of UNA, Cognitive Experience,
Saving Intentional Realism)

The Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Kantian Perspective- The Content of Perceptual
Experience- Opposing Views (The Content View, Sensory Content vs. Representational Content,
Varieties of Content, Non-conceptual Content, Phenomenology, Perceptual Illusions, Memory,
Demonstrative Identification and Reference, Perceptual Content and Empirical Beliefs, Content and
Normativity), Are the Roots of the Debate Kantian? (Kant and the Myth of the Given, Kant’s Notion of
Experience and the Conceptualism vs Non-conceptualism Debate, Kant, Non-conceptual Content and
Body in Cognition), Kant on Non-conceptual Content-Sensations and Intuitions (Representational
Content Revisited, Nonrepresentation Content, Nonconceptual Content, The Froms of Intuition,
Forms as a priori Intuitions, The Separation Arguments, The Objects of Pure Intuition, The Ambiguity
of Perceiving), Kant on Concepts in Experience (Three Synthesis-Does Apprehension Require
Recognition?, Non-conscious Spontaneity? Schematism and the Transcendental Imagination, the “I
think” of the Transcendental Apperception- The Syntheses and Intuitions-Are Space and Time
“Given” or “Constructed”?, Non-Cognitive Perception), Non-conceptual Content and Transcendental
Idealism (What is Transcendental Idealism and How does it bear on Non-conceptualism?, The
Empirical and the Transcendental, Sensory Content and Cognitive Constraints, The problem of
affection, Space and Time I Empirical Realism, Transcendental Idealism and Non-conceptual Content I
Concepts, Intuitions and Transcendental Idealism I Kant and Naturalism about the Mind (Spinoza and
Hume, Non-conceptualism and Naturalism, McDowell’s Naturalism of the “Second Nature”, Kant’s
“Transcendental Psychology” and Naturalism)

Truth and Experience: Between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics- Truth and Experience-The
Broad Perspective (Experience, Metaphysics and Immanent Transcendence, Being as Diagonal and
the Possibility of Truth: a Reading of Plato’s Theaetetus), Truth and Experience: Responding the
Finitude (Kant’s Slumber and Hegel’s Ontological Gesture, On What is Broken Inside-Hegel on
Finitude, “Subjectivity as Untruth”: Kierkegaard and the Paradoxality of Subjective Truth, Heidegger
and Metaphysics: A Question of the Limit), Phenomenology and Hermeneutics (On the Temporal-
Extension of Moods and Emotions, What was Heidegger’s Experience in Religious Experience,
Experience and the Truth in the Works of Gadamer, Hermeneutical and Phenomenological Aspects of
Experience, Foucault’s Concept of Experience), Phenomenology and Hermeneutics-New Fields
(Between Realism and Idealism- Transcendental Experience and Truth in Husserl’s Phenomenology,
The Contribution of Heidegger’s Philosophy to Geography, Ethnographic Experience, The Experience
of Truth)

William James and the Metaphysics of Experience- James’s Radical Empiricism (A philosophy of pure
experience, metaphysical thesis of pure experience, thesis of pluralistic Panpsychism), From
Psychology to religion: Pure experience and radical empiricism, “The knowing of things together”:
The Formal Break with dualism, Pure Experience & the field Theory, The Field Theory), Religious
Experience, Pluralistic Panpsychism, Superhuman consciousness & the finite God, the Problem of the
Compounding of Consciousness, Varieties of Religious Experience

Berkeley’s Puzzle: What does Experience teach us?- Historical Background, A Straightforward
Solution to Berkeley’s Puzzle, Experiencing Objects as Mind-Independent, the Role of Sensory
Experience in Propositional Knowledge, Experientialism, the Relational View of Experience,

The Contents of Visual Experience- Experiences, the Content View, How Can we Discover the
Contents of Experience?, Properties (Kinds, Visual Experience of Causation), Objects (the Role of
Objects in Visual Experience, Subject and Object in the Contents of Experience, the Strong Content
View Revisited)

The Given-Experience and Its Content- Intentionality, Phenomenology, Consciousness and Content I
A Brentanian Theory of Content, Awareness of Awareness, P.F. Strawson’s Datum I Brentanianism,
Standard Representationalism, Fregean Representationalism I Perception of Physical Objects I
Perception of Physical Objects I Cognitive Phenomenology I Evaluative Phenomenology

Thought, Reference and Experience- Evan’s Frege, Names in Free Logical Truth Theory, Plural Terms:
Another Variety of Reference?, Abandoning Conference?, Evans and the Sense of “ I ” / Information
Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness and Molyneux’s Question I “Another I”: Representing
Conscious States, Perception and Others “ I Space as Objective Experience I Identity, Vagueness and

The Cambridge Core Experience and Its Modes- Experience and its Modes, (Practical Experience,
Historical Experience, Scientific Experience)

The Varieties of Sensory Experience- Uncommon Sense (The Shifting Sensorium I The Sensotype
Hypothesis I Ethnopsychological Aspects of the Terms “Deaf” and “Dumb” I The Sensory Orders of
“Wild Children” I Puzzling over the Senses: From Plato to Marx), The Sensory Construction of Reality
(Sound as Symbolic System: The Kaluli Drum I The Pulse as an Icon in Siddha Medicine I Matters of
Taste in Weyewa I Olfaction and Transition I On Safari: The Visual Politics of a Tourist
Representation), Sensorial Investigations (Sensorial Anthropology I Fusion of the Faculties : A Study
of the Language of the Senses in Hausaland I To Render Visible: Making Sense among Ndembu I The
Ritual of Silent Wishes: Notes on the Moroccan Sensorium I A Taste of India: On the Role of Gustation
in the Hindu Sensorium I The Great Seeing: The Senses in Zinacanteco Ritual Life I Creation by Sound
/ Creation by Light: A Sensory Analysis of Two South American Cosmologies I Conclusion: Sounding
Sensory Profiles)

The Contents of Experience- The puzzle of experience I How to interpret “direct perception” I
Experience and its objects I Scenarios, concepts and perception I The nonconceptual content of
experience I Visual qualia and visual content I The projective theory of sensory content I Sight and
touch I The diversity and unity of action and perception

Sense and Content-Experience and Thought and their Relations- Sensation and the Content of
Experience: A Distinction I The Distinction Applied I Spatial Contents and Constraints (The Basic Case,
The Tightness Constraints) I Observational Concepts I Demonstrative Content 1 (An Evidential
Approach: Constitutive Role I Special Objects, Special Senses or Special References Rules? I
Identificational Basicness) I Demonstrative Content 2 (A Criterion, Evidence and Action I Cognitive
Significance I A Comparison), The Principle of Acquaintance I Between Instrumentalism and Brain-

Subjects of Experience- Substance and selfhood I Mental Causation I Perception I Action I Language,
thought and imagination I Self-knowledge

Conscious Experience-The Problem of Consciousness, Conceptual Foundations (Why is
Consciousness Puzzling? I What would count as Explaining Consciousness? I The Burning House),
Sceptical Accounts (Losing Consciousness, On the Prospects of a Naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal
Consciousness I Towards a Projectivist Account of Conscious Experience), Consciousness and the
Physical World (Consciousness and Space I Time-Gestalt and the Observer I Gaps in Penrose’s
Toilings), The Knowledge Argument (What Mary couldn’t Know: Belief about phenomenal states I A
Limited Defence of Phenomenal Information I The Antipathetic Fallacy and the Boundaries of
Consciousness), Qualia (Qualia: Intrinsic, Relational or What? I On the Persistence of Phenomenology
I Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia), Consciousness and Higher-Order States (Is
Consciousness the Perception of What passes in one’s own mind? I Multiple Drafts and Facts of the
Matter I The Dissociation of Phenomenal States from Apperception), Information-Processing and
Neurobiological Approaches (How is consciousness possible? I Visual Information-Processing and
Phenomenal Consciousness I Faster than Thought: Holism, Homogeneity and Temporal Coding),
Artificial Consciousness (Cog: Steps Towards Consciousness in Robots I Artificial Consciousness)

Perceptual Experience- Manipulating Colour: Pounding an Almond I Perception and the Fall from
Eden I Is there a Perceptual Relation? I Perception without Awareness I Experience and Knowledge I
Active Perception and Perceiving Action: The Shared Circuits Model I Better than Mere Knowledge?
The Function of Sensory Awareness I The Experience of Left and Right I Phenomenal Impressions I On
Being Alienated I Experience without the Head I Beyond Appearances: The Content of Sensation and
Perception I On the Ways Things Appear I Which Properties are Represented in Perception? I
Nonconceptual Content, Richness and Fineness of Grain I

Emotion, Arts & Aesthetic Experience

A Sentimentalist Theory of Mind- Epistemology and Emotion , Belief in Action, The Emotional Unity
of Self, Egoism and Emotion, Empiricism and the Roots of Morality, Mind and Love

Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind- Part 1 (Is Aesthetical Experience Possible?, This is your Brain on
Art, Limits of Aesthetics Empiricism, Philosophy of Perception as a Guide to Aesthetics, Portrait of
the Artist as an Aesthetic Expert), Part 2 (Seeing with Feeling I Physiological Evidence and the
Paradox of Fiction I Believing in Stories

How Literature Plays with the Brain- The Brain and Aesthetic Experience, How the Brain Learns to
Read and the Play of Harmony and Dissonance, The Neuroscience of the Hermeneutic Circle, The
Temporality of Reading and the Decentred Brain, The Social Brain and the Paradox of the Alter Ego

The Arts and the Creation of Mind- The Role of the Arts in Transforming Consciousness, Visions and
Versions of Arts Education, Teaching & Learning Arts , Art Education

The Creative Mind-Myths and Mechanisms- Mystery of Creativity, the Story so Far, Maps of the
Mind, Thinking the Impossible, Concepts of computation, Creative Connections, Unromantic Artists,
Computer-scientists I Chance, Chaos and Randomness I Elite or Everyman? , Of Humans and

Intentionality, Intensionality and Qualia

The Impossible: An Essay on Hyperintensionality- The Possible Worlds Approach,

Hyperintensionality, Hyperintensionality and Its Structure, Impossible Worlds, Constructing Worlds,
The Problem of Bounded Rationality, Epistemic Space, Epistemic Content

The Sources of Intentionality- The Experiential Origins of Intentionality, the Nature of Experiential
Intentionality, The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality, Toward a General Theory of

Towards Non-Being- Semantics for Intentionality (Intentional Operators, Identity, Objects of

Thought, Characterization and Descriptions, In Defence of Non-Being (On What There Isn’t, Fiction,
Mathematical Objects and Worlds, Multiple Denotation), Impossible Worlds and (Other) Non-
Existent Objects (Possibility, Impossibility and Conceivability I Lost in Translation, Phenomenological
Pointing, Poor Non-Existent Objects, Other Issues from the First Edition), Et Cetera (Creating Non-
Existents, Neighbourhood Semantics, Self-Deception, Sein Language, How the Particular Quantifier
Became Existentially Loaded Behind our Backs)

What Mind Can Do?- The Naturalization of Intentionality (What is intentional realism?, Introduction
to informational semantics, Three problems for informational semantics, Information and teleology),
The Casual Role of Intentionality (The computational representational theory of mind (CRTM), Must
an intentional realist be a meaning atomist?, Functionalism and the threat of perception, Explaining
intentional behaviour, Conclusion: a postlude on semantics and psychology)

The Case for Qualia- Philosophical Defences (the Case for Indirect Realism, Illusions and
Hallucinations as Evidence for Sense Data, Experience and Representation, Qualia Realism-Its
Phenomenal Contents and Discontents, The World of Qualia, Subjective Physicalism), Scientific
Defences ( Colour Qualities and the Physical World I Heat, Temperature and Phenomenal Concepts I
A Process-oriented View of Qualia, The Ontological Status of Qualia and Sensations: How They Fit
into the Brain), Attacks (The Churchlands’ War on Qualia, Phenomenal Knowledge without
Experience, A Defence of Qualia in the Strong Sense, How to Believe in Qualia, Transparency and the
Unity of Experience, Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience, From the Looks of
Things: The Explanatory Failure of Representationalism, Why Transparency is Unethical)

Phenomenal Intentionality- The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program I The Access Problem I
Indexical Thought I Phenomenal Presence I Consciousness and Synthesis I Constructing a World for
the Senses I Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality I Phenomenal Intentionality and
the Role of Intentional Objects I Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought I Intellectual Gestalts I
Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content? I Phenomenology and Self-Consciousness

Phenomenal Qualities-Sense Perception and Consciousness- The Ontology of Phenomenal Qualities

(Quality Spaces and Sensory Modalities I Neuro-Cosmology I Phenomenal Qualities I Real
Acquaintance and Physicalism), Perception and Phenomenal Qualities (Moore’s Dilemma I
Projection, Revelation and the Function of Perception, Real Direct Realism), The Kinds and Character
of Phenomenal Qualities (A New Argument for Realism from Perceptual Content, Can we Really see a
Million Colours?, The Nature of Pain and the Appearance/Reality Distinction, The Life of the Mind),

Phenomenal Qualities and Empirical Findings (A Function-Centred Taxonomy of Visual Attention, Can
Sounds be Red?, Technical Issues in Naive Sense-Datum Theory)

Mind & Brain

Mental Processes in the Human Brain- Mental processes in the human brain, From cognitive to
neural model s of working memory, The cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory:
remembering the past and imagining the future, The human amygdala and orbital prefrontal cortex
in behavioural regulation, Beyond the sentence given, The reign of typically in semantic memory I
Morphology, language and the brain: the decompositional substrate for language comprehension,
Modulation of visual processing by attention and emotion-windows on casual interactions between
human brain regions, Levels of processing during non-conscious perception- a critical review of visual
making, Natural correlates of the contents of visual awareness in humans, Function and localization
within rostal prefrontal cortex (area 10), Is there a dysexecutive syndrome? I Shifting and stopping:
fronto-striatal substrates, neurochemical modulations and clinical implications I Should I stay or
should I go? How the human brain manages the trade-off between exploitation and exploration

Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science and Parallel Distributed Processing- What the
Brain’s-Eye View tells the Mind’s-Eye View, The Mind’s-Eye View (Classical Cognitivism, Semantically
Transparent Systems, Functionalism, Situation and Substance, Micro-functionalism, Content and
World, Cognitive Science and Constitutive Claims, Biological Constraint), The Brain’s-Eye View
(Parallel Distributed Processing, the Space between Notes, Information Holism), The Multiplicity of
Mind- A Limited Defence of Classical Cognitivism (Von Neumann Architecture), Structured Thought
(Cognitive Architecture, Systematically Structured Behaviour), Beyond Eliminativism, Levels of
Description of Connectionist Systems, Self-Monitoring Connectionist Systems

Neuronal Man- The Organ of the Soul- from Ancient Egypt to the Belle Epoque (Body and Soul,
Pherenology, the Neuron, Electric Current and Medicinal Substances), Component Parts of the Brain
(Macroscopic View of the Brain, Expansion of the Neocortex, Microcircuits, Wiring), Animal Spirits
(Cerebral Electricity, The Nerve Signal, Oscillators, From one Neuron to Another, The Keys to
Molecule Locks, Psychic Atoms Re-examined), Into Action (From Stimulus to Response), Mental
Objects (The Materiality of Mental Images, From Percept to Concept and Thought, Toward a
Biological Theory of Mental Objects, Assembling the Neurons, Problems of Consciousness, Attention,
The Calculation of Emotion, Seeing Mental Objects, The Substance of the Spirit), The Power of the
Genes (Anatomical Mutations, Heredity and Behaviour, The Simplicity of the Genome and the
Complexity of the Brain, The Automaton Cell, The Embryo System, The Genesis of the Cortex, The
Predestination of the Brain), Epigenesis (Building the Synapse, The Theory of Epigenesis, Hemispheric
Specialization, Cultural Imprint), The Brain-Representation of the World, Anthropogenesis (Genetics
of archaic humans & chimpanzee, The “Phenomenon of Man” Reconsidered)

What is Special about the Human Brain?- The mental gap, The anatomy of the brain, Perception,
Manual skill, Speech and language, Cerebral dominance, Decision-making and planning, Reasoning,
Social cognition

Between Brain and Mind: Models of the Mind & Models in the Mind- Between mind and brain,
Does the mind matter?, Is there a system in the system Ucs.?, Natural history of the mind I Natural,
unnatural and supernatural beliefs I Models of the mind and models in the mind, Myths as models,

The triangular model, Religious fanaticism and ideological genocide, What made Frankenstein’s
creature into a monster? I The preacher, the poet and the psychoanalyst

Beyond the Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Mind- Removing
ourselves from the picture, anthropomorphic animal I Small Brains, Smart Behaviour I The
Implausible Nature of Portia, When do you need a Big Brain?, The Ecology of Psychology,
Metaphorical Mind Fields, There is no such thing as a Naked Brain, World in action, Babies and
Bodies, Wider than Sky

The Brains Representational Power- Building Representations with Neurons and Spikes, Peeling Off
our Conscious Lives, What Neural Network Models can and cannot explain about cognition, Networks
and the problem of Panpsychism, Structure and Function of Brain Systems for Conscious and Non-
conscious Representation I Same Brain, Different States: Waking, Sleeping and Anaesthesia,
Requirements for Conscious Representation, Neural Mechanisms for Conscious Representations,
Levels of Representational Organization, Philosophical and Future Perspectives

Mind & Ontology - Metaphysics & Foundation of Mind

Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind- Making Sense of Emergence, The Layered World- Metaphysical
Considerations, Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues, “Supervenient and Yet Not Deducible”: Is there a
Coherent Concept of Ontological Emergence?, Reasons and the First Person, Taking the Agent’s Point
of View Seriously in Action Explanation I Explanatory Realism, Casual Realism and Explanatory
Exclusions I Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence I Hempel, Explanation,
Metaphysics I Reduction and Reductive Explanation : Is one Possible without the Other? I Can
Supervenience and “Non-Strict” Laws Save Anomalous Monism?, Causation and Mental Causation,
Two Concepts of Realization, Mental Causation and Physicalism I Why there are no laws in the
Special Science: Three Arguments

Personal Agency- The Metaphysics of Mind and Action- Mental Causation, Casual Closure and
Emergent Dualism (Self, Agency and Mental Causation I Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism,
Physical Casual Closure and the Invisibility of Mental Causation, Could Volitions be Epiphenomenal?,
The Self as an Emergent Substance), Persons, Rational Action and Free Will (Event Causation and
Agent Causation, Personal Agency, Substance Causation & Persons and Free Will, Rational Selves and
Freedom of Action, Needs & Facts & Goodness and Truth)

Structure and Metaphysics of Mind How Hylomorphism Solves the Mind-Body Problem- Structure
in the World I Individuals, Properties and Events I Tropes I The Identity Theory of Powers, Competing
Theories of Powers I Structured Individuals and Their Parts, The Problems of Composition, Structured
Activities and Embodiment, Hylomorphic Necessitation and Supervenience, Explanation and Lower-
Level Determination, Physicalism and Other Mind-Body Theories, Hylomorphism and Mind-Body
Problems, Why Hylomorphism

The Mind's Construction Ontology of Mind and Mental Action- Sensory Consciousness (The
Manifest Image of Sensory Consciousness I Occurrence, State, Content and Character I The
Phenomenology and Ontology of Bodily Sensation, Temporal Transparency and Perceptual
Acquaintance, Structural Features of Perceptual Acquaintance, Conscious Contact with Time and the
Continuity of Consciousness, Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Recollection, Introspection and

Knowing what it’s like), Conscious Thinking (The Place of Mental Action in the Metaphysics of Mind,
The Ontology of Conscious Thinking, The Mind uses its own freedom: Suppositional Reasoning and
Self-Critical Reflection I Mental Action, Autonomy and the Perspective of Practical Reason, Intention-
in-Action and the Epistemology of Mind, Reconsidering the Place of Mental Action in the
Metaphysics of Mind, Thinking and Belief)

C. D. Broads Ontology of Mind- Propositions and time, Intentionality and Space in perception,
Memory, Introspection

The Cambridge Core Supervenience and Mind- Events and Supervenience (Causation, nomic
subsumption and the concept of event, Non-casual connections, Events as property exemplifications,
Concepts of Supervenience, Strong and Global Supervenience revisited, Epiphenomenal and
supervenient causation, Supervenience for multiple domains, Supervenience as philosophical
concept, Postscripts on Supervenience), Mind and Mental Causation (Psychophysical Supervenience,
Psychophysical Laws, What is “naturalized epistemology”? I Mechanism, purpose and explanatory
exclusion I The myth of non-reductive materialism I Dretske on how reasons explain behaviour,
Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction, The non-reductivist’s troubles with mental
causation, Postscripts on mental causation)

Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind- Metaphysics and Metaphysical Controversies, The
Kantian approach to the problem, Metaphysical controversies and relevant alternatives, The Kantian
framework (The explicit and implicit argument), the idea of controversy and metaphysics (the limits
of Kant’s theory, Epistemic function), Intuitions, Thought Experiments and Controversies, The
Polemical Character of the Knowledge Arguments (Kripke, Nagel, Jackson), The Antinomies of
Consciousness and their resolutions: Phenomenal concepts, Representationalism and Two-
Dimensional Semantics (Churchland, Jackson, The casual efficacy of conscious qualitative states, The
paradox of phenomenal consciousness, Mind and illusions), A priori knowledge and the explanatory
gap (Jackson: Serious metaphysics and conceptual analysis, Chalmers: Supervenience and scientific
explanations, Block & Stalnaker’s attack: The argument against the epistemic version & The apriority
of reductive explanations and uniqueness & The explanatory gap and two-dimensional semantics),
Personal Identity, Self-Consciousness and Bodily Identity (Strawson’s Individuals, Williams-Personal
identity and individuation, Shoemaker-Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity), From transcendental
arguments to revisionary metaphysics (Wiggins-Relative identity and personhood, Shoemaker-Quasi-
memory and revisionary metaphysics), Neo-Lockeanism, Reductionism and Animalis- The Emergence
of a new debate (Self-identity and Self concern)

Foundations of Mind-Origins of Conceptual Thought- Piaget’s Sensorimotor Infant, Kind’s of

Representation- Seeing and Thinking, Perceptual Meaning Analysis and Image-Schemas: The Infant as
Interpreter, Some Image-Schemas and Their Functions, Some Differences Between Percepts and
Concepts, Some Preverbal Concepts, Conceptual Categories as Induction Machines, Continuity in the
Conceptual System: Acquisition, Breakdown and Reorganization, Recall of the Past, Language
Acquisition (Object Concepts and Words, Preverbal Spatial Concepts and Semantic Primitives, Some
Preverbal Spatial Concepts-The Case of In, On, and Fit together, Bootstrapping Into Syntax with
Image-Schemas), Consciousness (Conscious and Nonconscious Process in Memory & Categorization
& Language Acquisition)

Foundations of Mind-Tyler Burge- Philosophy of Mind 1950-2000

Mind Ontology and Explanation- Ontology (Mind, Structure and Time I Natural Signs I Pains and
Other Secondary Mental Entities I Intrinsic Reference and the New Theory I the Ontology of Emotion
I the Simplicity of Content I the Necessity and Nature of Mental Content), Explanation (Disposition,
Explanation and Behaviour I Behaviourism and the Philosophy of the Act I Parallelism, Interactionism
and Causation I Dispositional Mental States :Chomsky and Freud I Human Action and the Humean
Universe I Behaviourism and Logical Positivism

Origins: On the Genesis of Physic Reality- Rethinking Mind in the Age of the Brain, Axioms,
Prolegomena to a System, Spacing of the Abyss, Deciphering the “Genesis Problem”: On the Origins
of Physic Reality, Mind as Projective Identification, Unconscious Semiotics, Ego and Abyss,

Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind- Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind I
Modes and Mind I Does Ontology Matter? I Basic Ontology I Multiple Realizability and Mental
Causation I The “Supervenience Argument”: Kant’s Challenge to Non-reductive Physicalism, Tropes’
Simplicity and Mental Causation, Zombies from Below, Tropes and Perception

Mind & Meaning

Essays on Reference Language and Mind- Reference and Definite Descriptions, Putting Humpty
Dumpty Together Again, Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions, Speaking of Nothing, Speaker
Reference, Descriptions and Anaphora, The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Destinations, Kripke and
Putnam on Natural Kind Terms

Meaning Mind and Knowledge- Meaning (Rudiments of a Theory of Reference, Substitutional Theory
of Truth, Reference and Semantic Correspondence, How Concepts Hook onto the World), A Type-
Materialist Theory of Experience (In Defence of Type-materialism I Imaginability, Conceivability,
Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem, The Identity Theory), A Representationalist Theory of
Experience (The Paradox of Pain, Locating Qualia: Do they reside in the Brain or in the Body and the
World?, Visual Awareness and Visual Qualia, The Content of Visual Experience), Knowledge (Process
Reliabilism and Cartesian Skepticism, Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief,
Conceivability and Possibility I Concepts, Teleology and Rational Revision)

Meaning Mind and Knowledge Themes from Philosophy of Crispin Wright- Rule Following and the
Normativity of Meaning (Blind Rule-Following, Understanding and Rule-Following I Regularities,
Rules, Meanings, Truth-Conditions and Epistemic Norms I Why meaning intentions are Degenerate),
Knowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings (The Publicity of Meaning and the Interiority of Mind I
Expression, Truth and Reality- Some Variations on Themes from Wright), Truth, Objectivity and
Relativism (Some Remarks about Minimalism I Objectivity, Explanation and Cognitive Shortfall I How
to Formulate Relativism), Warrant, Transmission Failure and Scepticism (When warrant transmits,
Wright on Moore I Moore’s Proof, Liberals and Conservatives- Is There a (Wittgensteinan) Third way?
I Wright Against the Sceptics) Replies of Crispin Wright

Meaning Mind and Matter Philosophical Essays- Translational Semantics, Three Trivial Truth
Theories, What Model-Theoretic Semantics Cannot Do, The Role of Conceptual Role Semantics,
Dual-Aspect Semantics, Davidson & Meaning, Conditions on Understanding Language, Solipsistic

Semantics, A Putnam’s Progress, Mind Matters, More on Making Mind Matter, From Physics to
Physicalism, Mental Causation or Something Near Enough

Reasoning Meaning and Mind- Reasoning (Rationality, Practical Reasoning, Simplicity as a Pragmatic
Criterion for Deciding What Hypotheses to Take Seriously, Pragmatisms and Reasons for Belief),
Analyticity (The Death of Meaning, Doubts About Conceptual Analysis, Analyticity Regained?),
Meaning (Three Levels of Meaning I Language, Thought and Communication, Language Learning,
Meaning and Semantics, (Non-solipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics), Mind (Wide Functionalism,
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience, Immanent and Transcendent Approaches to Meaning and Mind)

Thoughts Papers on Mind Meaning Modality- the Real Distinction between Mind and Body, Is
Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?, Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts I
Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda I Notes on Illusions on Possibility, Beyond Rigdification: The Importance of
Being Really Actual, How in the World?, Mental Causation, Singling out Properties, Wide Causation,
Casual Relevance-Mental & Moral & Epistemic

Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind- Meaning and Understanding, Seeing an Aspect and
Seeing under an Aspect, Wittgenstein on the Role of Experience in Understanding Language, Rule-
Following Revisited, the Private Language Argument One More Time I Rules, Privacy and Physicalism I
Conceiving of Conscious States I Sensation, Introspection and the Phenomenal I Pain: A Philosophical
Borderland, Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology-Methodological Reflections

The Cambridge Core Mind, Language and Meta-philosophy- Pragmatism, Categories and Language I
The Limits of reductionism I Realism, categories and the linguistic turn I The subjectivist principle and
the linguistic turn I Empiricism, extensionalism and reductionism I Mind-body identity, privacy and
categories I Do analysts and metaphysicians disagree? I Incorrigibility as the mark of mental I
Wittgenstein, privileged access and incommunicability I In defence of eliminative materialism I
Cartesian epistemology and changes in ontology I Strawson’s objectivity argument I Verificationism
and transcendental arguments I Indeterminacy of translation and of truth I Dennett on awareness I
Functionalism, machines and incorrigibility

Language of Thought- The Central System as Computational Engine, Jerry Fodor’s Globality Challenge
to the Computational Theory of Mind, What LOT’s Mental States cannot Be: Ruling out Alternative
Conceptions, Mental Symbols, Idiosyncratic Minds Think Alike: Modes of Presentation Reconsidered,
Concepts: A Pragmatist Theory, Solving the Frege Cases

Minds without Meanings- Working Assumptions, Concepts Misconstrued, Contrarian Semantics,

Reference within the Perceptual Circle: Experimental Evidence for Mechanisms of Perceptual
Reference, Reference beyond the Perceptual Circle

Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning: Toward a Social Concept of Mind- Against the philosophic
tradition (Wittgenstein on representations, privileged objects and private language I Private states
and public practices: Wittgenstein and Schutz on intentionality I Wittgenstein, Kant and the
“metaphysics of experience” I Language, learning and the representational theory of mind),
Wittgenstein’s rejection to scientific philosophy, Wittgenstein and the elimination of indeterminacy,
Vygotsky’s social theory of mind

Fodor-Language, Mind and Philosophy- The Fodorian Project I Philosophical and Scientific
Background I The Computational Theory of Mind I Challenges to the Computational Theory of Mind I
Explaining Mental Content I Individualism and Narrow Content I T he Modularity Thesis

Symbols and Embodiment-Debates on Meaning and Cognition- Framing the debate I The limits of
covoriation I Body and symbol in AutoTutor: Conversations that are responsive to the learners’
cognitive and emotional states I Symbolism, embodied cognition and the broader debate I What
brain imaging can tell us about embodied meaning I Grounding language in the brain I Symbols and
embodiment from the perspective of a neutral modeller I Symbol systems and perceptual
representations I Experiential traces and mental simulations in language comprehension I Defining
embodiment in understanding I A Mechanistic model of three facets of meaning I The symbol
grounding problem has been solved, so what’s next? I Language and simulation in conceptual
processing I Levels of embodied meaning: From pointing to counterfactuals I Language
comprehension is both embodied and symbolic I A well grounded education: The role of perception
in science and mathematics I Mending or abandoning cognitivism? I An embodied cognition
perspective on symbols, gesture and grounding instruction I Reflecting on the debate

Other Minds & Intersubjectivity

Mindreading-An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds-

A Cognitive Theory of Pretence, Pieces of Mind- A Theory Third-Person Mindreading, Reading one’s
Own Mind I Objections, Replies and Philosophical Implications

Context as Other Minds- Russell’s Paradox, Objectivism, Relativism, Other minds, Reasoning,
Semiotic, Explanation & Understanding, Early Roots (Socrates/ Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Charles Sander’s
Peirce, Wittgenstein), Modern Strands (Cultural relativism, Early functionalism, Speech-acts, Logical
Presupposition, Modal Logic and possible worlds, Ethnography of Speech, Developmental
Pragmatics, Pragmatics and Machine, Cognitive Psychology, Evolutionary Biology) I Toward an
Integrated Pragmatics of Life, Mind and Language I Categories as Prototypes- The Adaptive Middle
(Linguistic Roots, Prototypes, Philosophical Roots), Semantic Networks and Metaphoric Language,
Grammar and Other Minds: An Evolutionary Perspective, Referential Coherence, Propositional
Modalities, Discourse Coherence, Community as Other Minds-The Pragmatics of Organized Science,
The Adaptive Pragmatics of Self, The Pragmatics of Martial Arts

Others in Mind: Social Origins of Self-Consciousness- Self-Conscious Species, Six Propositions,

Varieties of Self-Reductive Mind States, Mind States in Development, Birth of Self-Consciousness,
Shame and Self-Knowledge, The Roots of Guilt, Giving and Sharing, Origins of Owning and Sharing,
Social Construction of Identity, Moral Space and Self

Subjective Intersubjective Objective-Donald Davidson- Subjective (First Person Authority, Knowing

One’s Own Mind, The Myth of the Subjective, What is Present to the Mind?, Indeterminism and Anti-
Realism, The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self), Intersubjective (Rational Animal, The Second
Person, The Emergence of Thought), Objective (A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,
Afterthoughts, Empirical Content, Epistemology and Truth, Epistemology Externalized, Three
Varieties of Knowledge)

Apprenticeship in Thinking-Cognitive Development in Social Context- Cognitive Development in
sociocultural context (Assumptions about thinking and development I A conceptual framework for
the sociocultual context of the developing mind I The book’s structure and main points), The
individual and the sociocultural context, Conceiving the relationship of the social world and the
individual (Mutuality of individuals and context I Developmental theories of involving mutuality:
Piaget and Vygotsky I Differences in the social world in the theories of Piaget and Vygotsky I Focusing
on both individual and sociocultural contributions I Development as apprenticeship), The cultural
context of cognitive activity (The intuitions of culture I Tools and technologies for individual problem
solving I Valued goals and means in societal traditions), Processes of Guided Participation, Providing
bridges from known to new (Emotional and nonverbal communication I Words as a cultural system
for bridging I Intersubjectivity), Structuring situations and transferring responsibility (Choosing and
structuring children’s activity I Structuring Responsibility in joint problem solving I Transfer of
responsibility for managing activities), Cultural similarities and variations in guided participation
(Universality of guided participation I Cultural variation in what is learned: The goals of development
I Cultural variation in communication with children), Cognitive Development through interaction with
adults and peers, Explanations of cognitive development through social interaction: Vygotsky and
Piaget (Mechanisms of social influence I What phase of childhood is sensitive to social influence? I
Peers versus adults: Equal status versus expertise I Intersubjectivity: Theoretical convergence and
differences), Evidence of learning from guided participation with adults (Language and conceptual
development I Object exploration and construction I Children’s remembering and planning), Peer
interaction and cognitive development (Conflict, relative expertise and status I Shared problem
solving and intersubjectivity I The unique roles of peers), Shared thinking and guided participation:
Conclusion and speculations (Review of the argument I Individual appropriation from shared thinking
I Creativity and guided participation I Sensitivity and challenge in guided participation I Asymmetries
in responsibility for intersubjectivity and learning I Interdependence of children and caregivers in
human development)

Other Minds- Philosophy of Mind (Freud’s Anthropomorphism I Freud’s Permanent Revolution I

Wittgenstein: The Egocentric Predicament I Chomsky: Linguistics and Epistemology I Fodor: The
Boundaries of Inner Space I Armstrong on the Mind I Dennett: Content and Consciousness I Dennett:
Consciousness Dissolved I O’Shaughnessy: The Will I Searle: Why we are not Computers), Ethics and
Political Philosophy (Aristotle on Eudaimonia I Rawls on Justice I Nozick: Libertarianism without
Foundations I Hare: Moral Thinking I Hare: The Foundations of Impartiality I Williams: One Thought
too many I Williams: Resisting Ethical Theory I Schelling: The Price of Life I Schelling: Personal Identity
and Self-Command I Dworkin: Interpretation and the Law I Maclntyre versus the Enlightenment I
Kolakowski: Modernity and the Devil)

Mind & Science

Mind As a Scientific Object- Can Cognitive Science Locate and Provide a Correct Account of the
Mind’s Centre? Progress Toward the Literal (Where are we at Present and How Did we Get There?,
The Relevance of the Philosophy of Psychology to a Science of Psychology?, Mind as a Scientific
Object-A Historical/Philosophical Exploration, The Emergence of Minds in Space and Time, Is the
Mind a Scientific Object of Study? Lessons from History), Is the Study of Mind Continuous with the
Rest of Science? (Psychology as Engineering, Epistemic Dualism I Mind, Brain & Culture, Chalmer’s
Naturalistic Dualism-The Irrelevance of the Mind-Body Problem to Scientific Study of Consciousness,

Emergence and Efficacy), Eliminative Materialism- Sound or Mistaken? (A Particularly Compelling
Refutation of Eliminative Materialism, Commonsense Refutations of Eliminative Materialism, What
does it Take to be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism,
Connectionism and the Propositional Attitudes), Is Mind Just Another Name for the Brain and What
the Brain Does? (All in the Interest of Time-On the Problem of Speed and Cognition, Can there be a
Cognitive Neuroscience of central Cognitive Systems?, The Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory- A
Framework for the Science of Mind?, Gall’s Legacy Revisited-Decomposition and Localization in
Cognitive Neuroscience), Does Evolution Provide a Key to the Scientific Study of Mind? (The
Detachment of Thought, the Mind as an Object of Scientific Study, The Significance of Ape Language
Research, I Object- Mind and Brain as Darwinian Things), Is the Mind a Cultural Entity? (Ignace
Meyerson and Cultural Psychology, Strong Culturalism, the Text of the Mind), Rationality- Cultural or
Natural? (Beyond the Mind-Body Problem I Workshop Rationality, Dogmatism and Models of the
Mind I Is Cognitive Development Equivalent to Scientific Development?, Mind, Brain and the Upper
Paleolithic, Afterword Between Brain and Culture-The Diversity of Mind)

Physicists View of Matter and Mind- Matter in Physics, Evolution and Human, Reductionist
Approaches and its Alternatives, Epistemology & Scientific Truth, Scientific Knowledge & Model
Construction, Description & Complexity & Quantifiability, Paradigms and Scientific Revolutions,
Theory of Relativity, Quantum World and Reality I Entanglement, Measurement and Quantum
Paradoxes I Many Practical Systems and the Classical Limit I Energy, Entropy and emergent Properties
I Complex Systems and Consciousness (Bio-Molecules, the Sub-Slime of Astro-chemistry, The Cell as
the Basic Unit of Life I Specialized Cells for Sight, Insight and Information I Exotic Quantum
Explanations of Consciousness, Addressing the Enigmatic Questions- Self & Personality & Awareness
of Self-)

Philosophy of Mind & Aspects of Mind

Beyond Reductionism Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science- Naturalism

and Reduction in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Science (Varieties of Naturalism, Reduction
and Supervenience, The Demise of Reductionism in Philosophy of Science), Philosophy of Mind and
Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science (Reductionism and Eliminativism Reconsidered, The
Explanatory Gap and Dualism Reconsidered, Nonreductive Physicalism and Mysterianism), Cognitive
Pluralism, Explanation and Metaphysics (Two Forms of Pluralism, The Scope and Plausibility of
Cognitive Pluralist Epistemology, Cognitive Pluralism and Modal Metaphysics, Cognitive Pluralism and

Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind- The Mind-Body Problem After Fifty Years, How to Find the
Neutral Correlate of Consciousness, Embodiment and the Philosophy of Mind, Folk Psychology and
Mental Simulation, Understanding Other Minds from the Inside, Self-Knowledge-the Wittgensteinian
Legacy, Joint Attention and the First-Person , Consciousness as Existence, Setting Things before the
Mind I Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and Consciousness I Experience and Reason in Perception,
Intentionality as the Mark of Mental, Intentionality and Interpretation, Externalism and Norms I
Mind, World and Value I Mind, World and Value I Mind, Knowledge and Reality-Themes from Kant I
The Modality of Freedom I Dualism in Action

Deconstructing the Mind- Deconstructing Mind I Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of
Folk Psychology I What is Folk Psychology? I How do Minds Understand Minds? Mental Simulation vs.
Tacit Theory I Intentionality and Naturalism I Naturalism, Positivism and Pluralism

The Peripheral Mind- Minds and Nerves (A Philosophical Hypothesis, Return of the C. Fibers or
Philosophers’ Lack of Nerve, Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind), Bounds of Mind
(Semantic Externalism, Mind Extended), Mind Embodied (Embodiment and the Peripheral Mind,
Against Action as Constitutive of Mind), Mind and Ethics (Issues in Neuroethics, Concluding Remarks)

The Subject's Point of View- Our Cartesian Mind (Privileged Access and the Mark of the Mental I
Unconscious, Conscious, Bodily I Persons and Minds), Internalism and Externalism (The Internal and
the External I Indiscriminability I Externalism and Privileged Self-Knowledge, Reference and Sense)

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind- Empirical Psychology and philosophical analysis,

Metaphysics and the philosophy of mind I Minds, Bodies and People (Cartesian Dualism, Non-
Cartesianism), Mental States (Behaviourism, Functionalism, Consciousness, Identity Theory, Qualia,
Eliminative Materialism), Mental Content (Externalism, Individuation of Content, Content &
Representation & Casuality, Meta-representation), Sensation and Appearance (Sense-Datum
Theory), Perception (Perceptual Experience & Content, Perception & Causation, Qualia,
Consciousness & Experience), Thought & Language (Modes of mental representation, The “language
of thought” hypothesis), Human Rationality and Artificial Intelligence I Action, Intention and Will
(Intentionality, Intentionality again), Personal Identity and Self-Knowledge (The first person, Persons
and criteria of identity, Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Knowing one’s own mind, Moore’s paradox
and the nature of conscious belief)

The Cambridge Core the Enigma of the Mind- The Enigma of the Mind-Introduction to metaphor
(Toward a physical science of mental-Fiegl and the (re-)construction of the “mind-body problem”,
The apogee of Physicalism-The identity theory and materialism in the Austrian school, The obscure
relationship-Problems and debates surrounding the identity theory, Psychology as alchemy-The
elimination of the mental in the “disappearance theory”, The mind as function-The functionalist
approach to the mind-body problem, The mind as property and as event-The reformist neo-
identityism of Kim and Davidson, The mind as language-The linguistic turn in the mind-body problem,
Speaking in many different ways-The pluralisation of descriptions and explanations in the MBP, The
mind as a mode of subjective experience-An Interpretive model of the features of the mental, The
mind as “subject” and “as being-in-the-world” – Toward a non-mentalistic interpretation of the
mental, The mental as intentional /personal emergence-The psycho-personological perspective of

Introducing Persons- Myself and Others (The Problem of Other Minds (Uniqueness of Consciousness,
Certainty and Meaning)), Immaterial Persons (Dualism: Body and Soul I Identity and the Soul), the
States of Mind (Mind and Behaviour (Philosophical Behaviourism, From Behaviourism to
Functionalism, First-Personal Problems, Errors in Mind)), Mind and Brain (Mind/Brain Identity),
Privacy and Meaning (Meaning and the Mind)), Material Persons (After-life for Materialism,
Boundaries of Persons)

Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind- What is Philosophy of Mind?, The Key Terms, The Key Thinkers,
The Key Texts

Matters of Mind- Visual Experience (Three types of visual experience, Disjunctive Quietism, A Space
of common-factor views, Raw-Feel Theory, Intentional Theory, Sense-Data Theory, Constructing a
Theory), Explaining Qualia (Concepts and Qualia, Dissolving the Problem of Qualia), Content and
Warrant (Semantic and Epistemic Success I Transparent, Private and World-involving contact with the
world I Transparent, Public and World-involving contact with the world I Transparent, Private and
World-distinct contact with the world I Opaque, Public and World-involving contact with the world),
Warrant and Reliability, Zombies and Ghosts, Physicalism and Over-determination

Mind that Abides- Panpsychism in history, Analysis and Science (Realistic Monism-Why Physicalism
entails Panpsychism, Halting the descent into Panpsychism-A Quantum Thermofield Theoretical
Perspective, Mind under matter, The conscious connection-A psycho-physical bridge between brain
and pan-experiential quantum geometry, Can the Panpsychist get around the contribution problem?,
Universal correlates of consciousness I Panpsychism, the Big Bang argument and the dignity of life),
Process Philosophy (Back to Whitehead? Galen Strawson and the rediscovery of Panpsychism I Does
process externalism support Panpsychism? The relational nature of the physical world as a
foundation for the conscious mind I the dynamics of possession- An Introduction to the sociology of
Gabriel Tarde? I Finite Eventism), Metaphysics and Mind (Zero-person and the psyche, “All things
think” Panpsychism and the metaphysics of nature, “Something there?” James and Fechner meet in a
“Pluralistic Universe”, Panpsychic presuppositions of Samkhya metaphysics, The awareness of rock:
East-Asian Understanding and implications, Why has the West failed to embrace Panpsychism? I
Minds, Objects and Relations- Toward a dual-aspect ontology)

Naturalizing the Mind Fred Dretske- The Representational Character of Sense Experience,
Introspection, Qualia, Consciousness, Externalism and Supervenience

Philosophy of Mind- Cartesian Dualism, Descartes’s Legacy (Parallelism, Occasionalism,

Epiphenomenalism), Behaviourism (Other Minds, Philosophical & Psychological Behaviourism), The
Identity Theory (Self-Conscious Thought, Parsimony, Phenomenological Fallacy, Locating Mental
Qualities I Predicates & Properties I Substances, Properties, States and Events), Functionalism (Mind
as Programs, Functionalist Metaphysics, Functionalism & Materialism/ Behaviourism), The
Representational Theory of Mind (Mental Representation, Semantic Engines, Turing Test & Chinese
Room, Thinking as Computing, From Syntax to Semantics, From Taxonomy to Ontology, Layers of
Reality), The Intentional Stance (Minds as Constructs, From Intentional Stance to Design Construct,
From Design Stance to Physical Stance, Kinds of Mind, Consciousness, The Emerging Picture),
Eliminativism (From Instrumentalism to Eliminativism, Theories and Theory Reduction, Ontological
Commitment, Stich’s Argument, Is Eliminativism Self-Refuting?), Consciousness (The Status of Raw
Feels, The Mystery of Consciousness, Qualities of Conscious Experiences, Emergence and
Panpsychism, Representationalism, Consciousness as Higher-Order Representation, Explaining
Consciousness), Non-Reductive Physicalism (From Substance to Properties, Substance Monism &
Property Dualism, Mental Causation-Background Issues, Mental-Physical Supervenience, Causal
Relevance, The Causal Relevance of Mental Properties, The Challenge of Causal Relevance, Higher-
Level Properties), Metaphysics and Mind (The Status of Philosophies of Mind, Metaphysical
Preliminaries, Substances and Properties, Universals, Properties as Particularized Ways, Complex
Objects, Powerful Qualities, Manifestations of Dispositions, Causality and Dispositionality,
Emergence, Levels of Being, Predicates and Properties I Properties, Realism and Anti-Realism), The
Mind’s Place in Nature (Applied Metaphysics, Multiple Realizability, An Alternative Approach, Higher-

Level Properties, Causality and Ceteris Poribus Laws, Levels of Reality vs. Description, Zombies,
Qualities of Conscious Experience, Neutral Monism, Privileged Access, Imagery and Intentionality,
Putting Imagery to Work, Twin-Earth, Intentionality Delivered, Functionalism Adieu, Denouement)

Picturing Mind- The knowing body- Art as an Integrative Process of Cognition, Interrogating
appearance-Being, seeing & Showing, The mutuality of existence-Drawing, emptiness & presence I
Picturing Mind-Writing, Being I The self as open-work-Permeability, incompleteness & revisibility I
Mind, the real & the other I Where we are: Locus of mind-in-the-world I The! the One & the Many:
Mysticism, Art & Poetry I The discontinuum of consciousness: ambiguity, indeterminacy &
multiplicity I A leaving, an unending, A folding, an unfolding I

Predicative Mind- The Territory, The Many Faces of Predication (Dimensions of Predication, Two
kinds of propositions), Tales of Predication (Fregian Predication, Linguistic Predication, Animal
Predication, Interpretative Predication, Perceptual Predication, Pragmatic Predication), Toward an
Explanation, A Hypothesis (Ontogeny, Evolution), Roots (Coregulative Communication, Imperative
Communication, A Sense of Other Minds), Assembly, Implications and Speculations

Presence of Mind- Historical Background, Nothing in Mind (The Meta-Argument for Eliminativism-
Minimal Coherentism-, Changing Our Minds-Connectionism, Information Processing Debate,
Representationalism, Cognitivism-), A Lack of Content (The Tension Between Externalism and
Supervenience, Why Commonsense Psychology is Externalist, The Problem of Content- Casual
Theories of Content, Asymmetric Dependency Theory, The Rejection of Casual Theories-, The
Information-Theoretical Approach), Back Dots and Red Herrings (Biosemantics: The Natural Choice -
Biosemantics and Intentionality-, Defending High Church Biosemantics- Intensional Indeterminacy
Argument-), Seeing without Believing (Nonconceptual Content Introduced –The Virtues of
Nonconceptual Content, The Role of Nonconceptual Content in Conceptual Development, The Failure
of Eliminativist Plan-Domestic Anthropology and the Limits of Propositional Ascription--), Interpreting
Minds (Intensionality Introduced, The Internal Structure of Propositions, Normativity and
Propositional Ascription), Davidson’s Identity Crisis (What Motivates Causalism?- The Neo-
Wittgensteinian Orthodox, The Primary Reason Problem-, The Mysterious Connection Problem and
Anomalous Monism-The Token Identity Theory, Clarifying Davidson’s Understanding of
Supervenience-, The Epiphenomenal Objection, Davidson’s Replies –the Weak Extension Reply, the
Strong Extension Reply-, The Mysterious Connection Reconsidered), The Poisoned Chalice
(Eliminativism, Assessing the Lack of Coherence Charge, The Eliminativist Burden-Minding Our

Reduction in Philosophy of Mind- Reduction in Philosophy of Science, Rethinking Reduction in

Philosophy of Mind (Traditional Approaches to Reduction in Philosophy of Mind [British
Emergentism, Logical Behaviourism and Identity Theory, Multiple Realizability, The Disunity of
Science as a Working Hypothesis, Functionalism, The Dream of Nonreductive Physicalism], Functional
Reduction [The Causal Exclusion Argument and the Functional Model, Kim vs. Nagel, Dissecting the
Functional Model-Functionalization, Realization, Causation-, Functional Reduction as Mechanistic
Explanation, Phenomenal Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap, New Type Physicalism]), A New
Framework for Philosophy of Mind (Explanatory Pluralism for Philosophy of Mind, From Explanatory
Pluralism to Pluralistic Physicalism, Pluralistic Physicalism and Causal Exclusion Worries, Dimensions
of Explanatory Power)

Self and World- The Exclusion Thesis, The Self-Consciousness Argument, The Objectivity Argument
(The Concept Version of the Objectivity Argument, Quasi-Memory, Geometrical Self-Location,The
Intuition Version of the Objectivity Argument, Awareness of the Self “Qua Subject”, Immunity to
Error Through Misidentification, The Incompatibility Objection, Core-Self and Bodily-Self, The
Dispensability Objection), The Unity Argument (Unity and Objectivity, Transcendental Self-
Consciousness, Personal Self-Consciousness), The Identity Argument (The First Concept Version of
the Identity Argument, the Second Concept Version of the Identity Argument, The Problem of
Misconception, The Intuition Version of the Identity Argument, Objection to (D2), The Fifth Response
and (D1), Kant and the Identity Argument, The “Logical” Identity of the “I”), Reductionism
(Reductionism and the Exclusion Thesis, Reductionism and the Objectivity Argument, Reductionism
and the Identity Argument, Reductionism and the Unity of Consciousness)

This is Philosophy of Mind- Meet Your Mind (Aspects of Mind- Thoughts and Experience, Conscious
and Unconscious, Qualia, Sensory Perception, Emotion, Imagery, Will and Action, Self, Propositional
Attitudes-, Philosophical Problems- Mind & Body Problem, Other Problem-), Substance Dualism
(Arguments for Substance Dualism- Leibniz’s Law Arguments, Explanatory Gap Arguments, Modal
Arguments, Mind & Body Interaction as a Problem for Substance Dualism-), Property Dualism ( Qualia
and the Brain, The Inverted Spectrum, The Knowledge Argument, The Explanatory Gap Argument,
Property Dualism & Epiphenomenalism), Idealism, Solipsism and Panpsychism (Solipsism, Idealism,
Panpsychism), Behaviourism and Other Minds (Behaviourism, Qualia Objection, The Philosophical
Problem of Other Minds), Mind as Brain (Mind-Brain Identity Theory, Advantages of Mind-Brain
Identity Theory, Neuroscience), Thinking Machines, Functionalism (The Gist of Functionalism, A Brief
History of Functionalism, Arguments for Functionalism, The Varieties of Functionalism, Arguments
against Functionalism), Mental Causation (The Problem of Mental Causation- causal closure of the
physical, problem for substance dualities, problem for property dualities- Basic Views of Interaction –
Interactionalism, Parallelism, Epiphenomenalism, Reductionism-, Qualia and Epiphenomenalism-
Whether qualia-based epiphenomenalism conflicts with phenomenal self-knowledge, Dennett’s
zimboes-, Anomalous Monism), Eliminative Materialism (Contemporary Eliminative Materialism,
Arguments for Propositional Attitude Eliminative Materialism, Arguments against Propositional
Attitude Eliminative Materialism, Qualia Eliminative Materialism “Quining” Qualia), Perception,
Mental Imagery and Emotion (Perception, Mental Imagery- How similar are mental images to other
mental states?, Is mental imagery the basis for mental states such as thoughts?, To what degree-if
any- is mental imagery genuinely imagistic or picture-like?-, Emotion- What distinguishes emotions
from other mental states?, What distinguishes different emotions from each other?, The difficulties in
giving a unified account of the emotions?-), The Will: Willpower and Freedom, Intentionality and
Mental Representation (Introducing Intentionality, The Inconsistent Triad of Intentionality,
Internalism vs Externalism, Theories of Content Determination- Conceptual role semantics, Casual or
informational theory, Teleological evolutionary theory-), Consciousness and Qualia (Optimism about
Explaining Consciousness, Focusing on Several Different Uses of the Word “Conscious”- Creature
consciousness, Transitive consciousness, State consciousness, Phenomenal consciousness -,
Rosenthal’s Higher Order Thought Theory of Consciousness, First Order Representation Theories of
Consciousness), Is This the End? Personal Identity, the Self, and Life after Death (Problems of
Personal Identity, the Problem of Persistence, Approaches to the Problem of Persistence- The
psychological approach, the somatic or bodily approach-, Life after Death-No-self and afterlife)

Transformations of Mind- “A philosophy that is not a philosophy”, Contrary states, Division of the
soul, Wandering between two worlds, Kant’s aesthetic ideas

Elements of Mind-An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind- Mind (Philosophy of Mind and the
study of mental phenomena I Perspectives and points of view I Perspectives and their objects I The
origin of the concepts of intentionality and intension I Directedness and intentional objects I
Aspectual shape and intentional content I The problem of intentionality I The structure of
intentionality), Body (Interaction between mind and body I Substance, property and event I The
“intelligibility” of mental causation I Physics and Physicalism I The Problem of mental causation for
dualists I The identity theory I Reductionism I Against the identity theory: anti-reductionism I The
problem of mental causation for non-reductive Physicalism I Emergence I Physicalism as the source
of the mind-body problem I What does a solution to the mind-body problem tell us about the mind?),
Consciousness (The conscious and the unconscious I The distinction between the intentional and
qualitative I Qualia I The intentionality of bodily sensation I Strong Intentionalism and weak
Intentionalism I Physicalism, consciousness and Qualia I The explanatory gap I The knowledge
argument examined I Zombies I The prospects for explaining consciousness), Thought (Thoughts and
beliefs I Consciousness and belief I Propositional attitudes I The propositional attitude thesis I De re
and de dicto attitudes I Internalism and Externalism I The argument for Externalism I Demonstrative
Thought I The Prospects for Explaining Thought), Perception (The problem of Perception I The
argument from illusion I Perception as a form of intentionality I The phenomenal character of
perceptual experience I Inverted spectrum , Inverted Earth I Perception as non-conceptual)

The Centred Mind- Propositional Attitudes I Perception, Attention and Consciousness I The Nature of
Working Memory I The Unity of Working Memory I Working Memory in Action I Reasoning, Working
Memory and Attitudes I The Evolution of Reflection

Mental Causation- Davidson, Anomalous Monism and Mental Causation (Thinking Causes I Can
Supervenience and ‘Non-Strict Laws’ save I On Davidson’s Response to the charge of
Epiphenomenalism I Davidson’s thinking causes), Causation and Explanation (Mental Causation:
Sustaining and Dynamic I Metaphysics and Mental Causation I Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory
Practice I Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behaviour I The Union Theory and Anti-
Individualism I Agency and Causal Explanation I The Non-Reductivist’s Troubles with Mental
Causation I Explanation in Biopsychology I Who’s in Charge Here? And Who’s doing all the work? I
Some Content in Narrow I Object-Dependent Thoughts: A Case of Superficial Necessity but Deep
Contingency? I Abilities, Concepts and Externalism)

A Materialist Theory of Mind- A Classification of Theories of Mind I Dualism (Criticism of “Bundle”

Dualism I Criticism of Cartesian Dualism I Difficulties for any Dualist theory), The Attribute Theory I A
Difficulty for any non-Materialist Theory of Mind I Behaviourism (Preliminary I Behaviourism and the
mental concepts I Criticism of Behaviourism), The Central State Theory (Is the theory really
paradoxical? I The theory measured against demands already formulated I A further difficulty
formulated and an answer sketched I Views of Place and Smart I The concept of a mental state I The
concept of a mental state I Distinction between our view and Behaviourism: the nature of
dispositions I The identification of mind and brain I Objections outstanding answered I The nature of
consciousness I The alleged indubitability of consciousness I The alleged indubitability of
consciousness I Unconscious mental processes I Further objections to our theory I Advantages of the

theory), The Will (Purposive activity as activity with a mental cause I Ryle’s Infinite regress I The
nature of purpose activity I The “immediate acts of the will” I Means and ends I Intending and trying I
Desires we do not act from I Wants and wishes I Deliberating and deciding I Mental actions I Belief
and the will I Need all actions be purposive?), The Will (Motives I Pleasure and pain I The emotions),
Knowledge and Inference (Plato’s problem I The nature of non-inferential knowledge I The nature of
inferring I Inferential knowledge I Further considerations about knowledge), Perception and Belief
(Perception as acquiring of belief I The role of the sense-organ I Belief is dispositional, bur perception
is an event I Perception without belief I Perceiving things and perceiving that I Perception and
causality I Unconscious perception I “Small perceptions” I Immediate and mediate perception I The
nature of sense-impressions I Perception and knowledge I The nature of the physical world),
Perception and Behaviour (The manifestation of perception in behaviour I Perception a mere
necessary condition of discriminatory behaviour I What is discriminatory behaviour? I Difference in
perceptions without difference in behaviour I The intentionality of perception I Perceptual illusion),
The Secondary Qualities (The problem of the secondary qualities I A priori objections to identifying
secondary qualities with physical properties I Empirical objections to identifying secondary qualities
with physical properties), Mental Images (Preliminary investigations I The nature of mental images I
Dreams), Bodily Sensations (Tactual and bodily perception I Bodily sensations and bodily feelings I
“Transitive” bodily sensations I Problems about “intransitive” sensations I “Intransitive” sensations
and reactions I “Intransitive” sensations as bodily perceptions I Intensity of sensations and intensity
of reaction I Bodily feelings), Introspection (Recapitulation I Introspection as inner sense: objections I
Introspection and behaviour I Mental states and the mind), Belief and Thought (Belief I Thinking), The
Nature of the Mental with the Physical

Perception & Action

Between Perception and Action- Pragmatic Representation, Perception, Action, Pragmatic Mental
Imagery, Vicarious Perception

Does Perception Have Content- Content Views (Empirical Problems with Anti-Representationalism,
Affordance and the Contents of Perception I Looks, Reasons and Experience), Against Strong Content
(The Problem with the Content View, the Preserve of Thinkers I Disjunctivism, Discrimination and
Categorization), Reconciliatory Views (The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual
Experience, Experiental Content and Naive Realism), Imagistic and Possible-Word Content (Image
Content, What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience?), The Constituents of Perceptual
Content and the Role of Perception (What does vision represent?, Phenomenal Intentionality and
Secondary Qualities, Which Causes of an Experience are also objects of the Experience?)

Emotional Insight- Towards a Perceptual Model, The Perceptual Model, Against the Perceptual
Model, Emotion and Understanding I Emotion, Attention and Virtue

Skillful Coping-Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action- The

Phenomenology of Skills (From Socrates to Expert Systems), Intentionality and Mind (The Perceptual
Noema, Heidegger’s Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality (1933), Todes’s Account
of Nonconceptual Perceptual Knowledge and its Relation to Thought (2001), Overcoming the Myth of
the Mental), Phenomenology and the Human Sciences (Holism and Hermeneutics (1980), The
Primary of Phenomenology over Logical Analysis (2001), From Depth Psychology to Breath
Psychology, What is Moral Maturity?), Embodied Coping and Artificial Intelligence (Making a Mind vs.

Modelling the Brain, Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science (2004), Why Heideggerian AI Failed
and How Fixing it would Require Making it More Heideggerian (2007))

The Possibility of Knowledge- The Possibility of Knowledge, Transcendental Arguments, Perceptual

Knowledge (I): Space, Perceptual Knowledge (II): Concepts, Other Minds, A Priori Knowledge

The Cambridge Core Perception, Knowledge & Belief- Knowledge (Conclusive Reasons, Epistemic
Operators, The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge, Epistemology of Belief, Two Conceptions of
Knowledge - Rational vs. Reliable Belief), Perception and Experience (Simple Seeing, Conscious
Experience, Differences that Make no Difference, The Mind’s Awareness of Itself, What Good is
Consciousness?), Thought and Intentionality (Putting Information to Work, “If you Can’t Make One,
You don’t know How it works”, The Nature of Thought I Norms, History and the Constitution of the
Mental I Minds, Machines and Money-What Really explains behaviour)

Perception and Reason-Perceptual Experiences Provide Reasons (Historical-Epistemological Context,

Belief and Experience-Preliminaries, The Strawson Argument, Refinements-, Experience and Reason-
The Switching Argument, Knowledge by Description, Conceptual Redeployment, Natural Kinds and
Proper Names, Are there Unitary Concepts of Mind-Independent Things?-, Epistemological
Consequences and Criticism-Reliabilism, Classical Functionalism, Classical Coherentism-), The
Rational Role of Perceptual Experiences (Reason Require Conceptual Contents-The Basic Argument,
Possible Counterexamples, Non-Conceptual Experiential Content Is Unmotivated-, The Rational Role
of Perceptual Experiences-Objective Demonstration, Epistemic Openness, Clarifications- The
Epistemological Outlook- Foundationalism and Coherentism, Imagination, Error and Scepticism,
Further Objections-, Developments and Consequences- Non-Demonstrative Perceptual Knowledge,
Russell’s Principle of Acquaintance, Externalism and A priori Knowledge-)

Phenomenology of Perception- Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena, the Body, The
Perceived World, Being-for-itself and Being-in-the-World

Thought in Action- Don’t think, dear; just do and Other-Manifestations of the Just-do-it Principle I
Just-do-it versus Cognition-in-action I What is an Expert? I Does thinking interfere with doing? I
Thinking Fast I Continuous Improvement I You can’t try too hard I Effortless with Effort I The Pleasure
of Movement and the Awareness of the Self I The Aesthetic Experience of Expert Movement I
Intuition, Rationality and Chess Expertise I Sex, Drugs, Rock and Roll and the Meaning of Life

Philosophies of Mind

Panpsychism Contemporary Perspectives- The Logical Place of Panpsychism (Panpsychism and

Panprotopsychism, Emergent Panpsychism), The Varieties of Panpsychistic Ontologies (Mind and
Being, Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism, In Search of Mentons, Land Ho? We are Close to a
Synoptic Understanding of Consciousness), Panpsychism and the Combination Problem (The
Combination Problem of Panpsychism, What combination problem?, Panpsychist Infusion,
Panpsychism and Neutral Monism, The Phenomenal Bounding Solution to the Combination Problem),
Panpsychism and Its Alternatives (Mind Dust, Magic, or a Conceptual Gap Only?, Emergence and
Panpsychism, Neutral Monism and Panpsychism, Dualism and Panpsychism, Idealism and

Emergence in Mind- Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap I
Explanatory, Emergence and Causality: Comments on Crane I Is Non-reductive Physicalism Viable
within a Causal Powers Metaphysic? I Exclusion and Physicalism: Comments on O’Connor and
Churchill I Emergent Causation and Property Causation I Emergence: Laws and Properties: Comments
on Noordhof I The Causal Autonomy: Comments on Menzies and List I Emergence and Downward
Causation I Identity with a Difference: Comments on Macdonald and Macdonald I Can Any Sciences
be Special? I Can Any Sciences be Special? Comments on Papineau I Emergence vs. Reduction in
Chemistry I An Emergentist’s Perspective on the Problem of Free Will I Strong Emergence and
Freedom: Comments on Stephan I Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency


Physicalism, or Something near Enough-Synopsis of the Arguments, Mental Causation and

Consciousness: Our Two Mind-Body Problems (Mental Causation and Consciousness, The
Supervenience/Exclusion Argument, Can we reduce Qualia?, The Two World-Knots), The
Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified and Defended (Non-reductive Physicalism, The
Fundamental Ideas, The Supervenience Argument Refined and Clarified, Is Over-determination an
Option?, The Generalization Argument, Block’s Causal Drainage Argument), The Rejection of
Immaterial Minds: A Causal Argument (Cartesian Dualism and Mental Causation, Causation and the
“Pairing” Problem, Causality and Space, Why not Locate Souls in Space?), Reduction, Reductive
Explanation and Closing the “Gap” (Reduction and Reductive Explanation, Bridge-Law Reduction and
Functional Reduction, Explanatory Ascent and Constraint, Functional Reduction and Reductive
Explanation, Kripkean Identities and Reductive Explanation, Remarks about Block and Stalmaker’s
Proposal), Explanatory Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why they don’t Work (Are There Positive
Arguments for Type Physicalism? Hill’s and McLaughlin’s Explanatory Argument, Do Psychoneural
Identities Explain Psychoneural Correlations?, Block and Stalnaker’s Explanatory Argument, Another
Way of Looking at the Two Explanatory Arguments), Physicalism or Something Near Enough (Taking
Stock, Physicalism at a Crossroads, Reducing Minds, Living with the Mental Residue, Where we are at
Last with the Mind-Body Problem)

Beyond Conceptual Dualism- Problems and Theories: The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary
Philosophical Debate (Explanatory Gap, Dualism and Antireductionism I Problems with Dualism: The
Problem of Mental Causation I Materialism, Functionalism and the Desubstantialization of Mind I
Problems with Functionalism: Consciousness, Mental Causation and Incompleteness I Return to the
Roots of the Desubstantialization of Mind: The Mind-Body Problem in John Locke’s Philosophy I
Diagnosis of the Reasons of a Dilemma: John Searle and Computational Dualism), Biological
Naturalism: A Naturalistic and Non-Reductive Ontology of Consciousness (Identifying the Target: The
Structural Features of Consciousness I Biological Naturalism I Emergent Properties I Mental
Causation: Consciousness and the Creative Structure of the Mind-World Relationship I Reduction and
the Practice of Definition I The Causal Exclusion Dilemma: Terms of the Problem I Biological
Naturalism and Causal Exclusion Dilemma in the Debate between Kim and Searle), Functionalistic
Models of Consciousness: Dennett, Chalmers and the Desubstantialization of Mind (Dennett’s
Eliminative Naturalism: Multiple Drafts Model vs. The Myth of the Cartesian Theatre, The Reasons of
the Phenomenal: Searle vs. Dennett, Chalmers’s Neo-dualism, The Reason for the Unity of the
Natural World: Searle vs. Chalmers, Desubstantialization of Mind, Functionalism and Conceptual
Dualism), Holism and Mental Causation in the Theory of Intentionality (The Logical Structure of

Intentional Representations: Psychological Mode, Representational Content, Direction of Fit and
Condition of Satisfaction, The Casual Self-Referentiality of Perception and Action, Network and
Background: The Holistic and Pragmatic Structure of Mind, The Intersubjective Dimension of
Individual Consciousness and Intentionality: Problems and First Steps toward a Theoretical Account,
Collective Intentionality and Institutional Contexts: Intersubjective Structures of Consciousness,
Searle’s Theory of Intentionality in the View of Contemporary Scientific Research Action, Perception
and the Background Sense of Other), John Searle and Contemporary Neuroscience, Holism, Mental
Causation and the Roots of Subjectivity (Building Block Approach vs. Unified Field Model:
Implications of the Interdependence of Qualitativeness, Subjectivity and Holistic Unity of
Consciousness for Scientific Research I Edelman, Tononi and the Dynamic Core Hypothesis I From
Consciousness to the Self: Some Possible Post-Humean Eliminative Trends I Consciousness as a Space
of Self-Refentiality: Damasio’s Theory and the Role of the Proto-Self in Organism-Environment
Transaction I Subjective Ontology and the Construction of a Sense of the Self: The Interdependence
of Holism, Ontology of Consciousness and Mental Causation)

Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind- A defence of content-internalism and
of a descriptivist theory of concepts I Basic Concepts I The predicative nature of sense-perception I
Uniquely individuating descriptions I Some semantic consequences or our analysis: Tokens versus
types, semantics versus pre-semantics I Modality, intensionality and a posteriori necessity I Cognitive
maps and causal connections: Why the causal story is an important part of the descriptive story I
Conception as knowledge of series of interlocking existence-claims I The problem of de re senses I
Publicity problems and the nature of linguistic communication I Content-externalism and self-
knowledge I Why one’s mental content is fixed by one’s epistemic situation I Jackson and Pettit on
program-causality and content-externalism I Fodor, conceptual atomism and computationalism I
Content-externalism and conceptual atomism I The concept of a symbol I Event-causation and the
root-problem with the Computational Theory of Mind I Fodor’s first argument for conceptual
atomism I Fodor’s second argument for conceptual atomism I Fodor’s third argument for conceptual
atomism I Some arguments for the Symbolic Conception of Thought I A positive argument against the
Symbolic Conception of Thought I Another argument against the Symbolic Conception of Thought:
The concept of non-conceptual content I Propositional structure and the ineliminability of non-
conceptual content I Conceptual content and the structure of the proposition I Peacock on concept-
possession I Semantics versus psychology)

Essays on the Concept of Mind in Early-Modern Philosophy- Consciousness as Spontaneous

Knowledge, Res Cogitans as Res Dubitans, The Mind of God and the Mind of Man- A Puzzle in
Spinoza’s Philosophy of Mind, Idea and Self-Knowledge in Malebranche’s Anti-Cartesian Theory of
Mind, John Locke and the Cambridge Platonists on the Nature of Mind, Dull Souls and Beasts-Two
Anti-Cartesian Polemics in Locke, Berkeley’s Last Word on Spirit, What Kant Could Reid, Metaphysical
Egoism and its Vicissitudes

Mechanical-Mind-Tim Crane- The Mechanical Mind (The Mechanical World Picture, the Mind), The
puzzle of representation (Mental representation, Thought and consciousness, the idea of
representation, Intentionality, Brentano’s thesis, from representation to mind), Understanding
thinkers and their thoughts (The mind-body problem, Understanding other minds, the causal picture
of thoughts, Common-sense psychology, The science of thought: elimination or vindication?, Theory
versus simulation, From representation to computation), Computers and thought (Artificial

Intelligence, Turing Machines, The Chinese room and so on), The mechanisms of thought (Cognition,
computation and functionalism I The language of thought I Syntax and semantics I The argument for
the language of thought I The modularity of mind I Problems for the language of thought I Brainy
computers I Does computation explain representation?), Explaining mental representation
(Reduction and definition, Conceptual and naturalistic definition I Casual theories of mental
representation I The problem of error I Mental representation and success in action I Mental
representation and biological function I Evolution and the mind I Against reduction and definition I
Can representation be reductively explained?), Consciousness and the Mechanical Mind
(Consciousness “what it’s like” and Qualia, Consciousness and Physicalism, The limits of scientific
knowledge, What do the problems of consciousness tell us about the mechanical mind?

Mind and Body- Are we just Machines?, Is there something extra?, Physicalism, Some objections to
Physicalism, Behaviourism, Functionalism, More about thinking, More about feeling

The Representational Theory of Mind- A Functionalist Theory of the Mind (Materialism and
Functionalism, Functionalism and Teleology, Homuncular Functionalism), Representation and
Computation (The Representational Theory of the Mind I The “Language of Thought” Hypothesis I
Intentional Psychology I Avoiding Magical Theories of Mind), Representation, Computation and
Implementation (Theories, Kinds and Levels I The Ecological Level I The Computational Level I
Physical Implementation I Is there a Computational Level?), Marr on Vision; Fodor on the Mind’s
Organization: The Theory in Action (Vision I The Architecture of Vision I The Nature of Visual
Algorithms I A Second Example: The Modularity of Mind), Individualism (Individualism and Content,
Burge on Individualism, Explanation and the Ecological Level I Individualist Intentional Psychology? I
Do you End at your Skin?), Explaining Content (Causal Theories of Content I Kripkean Theories I
Indicator Theories I Teleology I A Modest Proposal I Less Modest Proposal I Function and Content I
Back to the Future: An Empiricist Theory of Content), Eliminativism (The Received View of
Propositional Attitudes I Is Folk Psychology a Degenerating Research Program? I Is Folk Psychology
Parochial? I Is Knowledge Sentential?), Connectionism (An Alternative to Language of Thought? I The
Prima Facie Case for Connectionist Models I Rival or Implementation? I Is Mental Representation
Structured? I Connectionist Mental Representation I Connectionism and the Language of Thought),
Reduction and Anatomy (Anatomy Revisited, Against Autonomy, Reduction and Elimination,
Autonomy and Modularity, Autonomy and Plasticity), Explaining Intelligence (Computation and
Intelligence, Searle’s Chinese Room, The Frame Problem, Problem or Problems?, Why the Frame
Problem is Hard)

Philosophy & Mind

Descartes's Theory of Mind- Cartesian Explanation, Sensation-Ideas as Brain Patterns, Imagination

and Memory, Passions of the Soul, The Will as a Power of Self-Determination, Human Language,
Describing Thought-The Subjective View, Descartes’s Use of the Concept of Substance, Property

Kant's Anatomy of Intelligent Mind- Transcendental Philosophy Psychologized (The Psychological A

Priori, Kant’s Debt to British Empiricism), Kant’s Psychologistic Explication of the Possibility and
Forms of Sensibility (Unity of Sensibility, A Few Understanding of Understanding, Mathematics and
the Unity of Sensibility, Idealism and Realism, Things in Themselves), Kant’s Psychologistic Explication
of the Possibility and Forms of Thought (Concepts in Mind, A Defence of Kant’s Table of Judgments,

The Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories), Kant’s Psychologistic Explication of the Possibility
and Forms of Cognizable Objects (Interpreting the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories,
Transcendental Deduction, A Category-by-Category Elucidation of the Transcendental Synthesis of
Pure-Formal Intuition), Kant’s Psychologistic Explication of the Possibility and Forms of Nature
(Subsuming Reality, Time Out of Mind, Our Place in Nature and Its Place in us)

Kant's Theory of Mind-An Analysis of Paralogisms of Pure Reason- Immateriality, Interaction,

Identity, Immortality, Independence, Ideality

Aspects of Psychologism- Historical Essays (Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence (2006),

Wittgenstein and Intentionality (2010), The Origins of Qualia (2000)), Intentionality (Intentionality as
the Mark of Mental (1998), Intentional Objects (2001), The Intentional Structure of Consciousness
(2003), Intentionalism (2009)), Perception (The Non-conceptual Content of Experience (1992), Is
there a Perceptual Relation? (2006), Is Perception a Propositional Attitude? (2009), The Given
(2012)), Consciousness (Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought (2012), Subjective Facts (2003),
Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts (2005), Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness

Austrian Phenomenology- The Subject Matter of Austrian Phenomenology, The Method of Austrian
Phenomenology, Austrian Phenomenology and Philosophy, Major Figures of Austrian
Phenomenology, Brentano & Husserl on Imagination I Names, Statements and Micro-Functions in
Husserl’s Logical Investigations (Manifestation, Meaning and Reference I Positing Names and Non-
positing States, Inner Perception, Fulfilment of Names and Statements), Marty on Linguistic
Expression and Mind-Functions (Ontological Requirements, Mentalism & Introspectionism), Husserl’s
Elementary Logic- The 1896 Lectures in their Nineteenth Century Context (Logic as Theory of Science,
Concepts, Propositions, Inferences), Meinong on the Objects of Sensation (Brentano and Sensory
Contents, From Physical Phenomena vs. Objects of Sensation, Sensory Objects of Higher Order, The
Nonexistence of Sensory Objects, A Priori Knowledge about Sensory Objects, Comparison with
Stumpf, Comparison with Husserl), Stumpf on Phenomena and Phenomenology, Brentano and
Meinong (Points of Divergence-Theory of Relations, Intensity, Immediate Evidence of Surmise, Feeling
and Desire, Content and Object, Judgments, Presentations, Time-Consciousness, Assumptions, Object
Theory, Value Theory, Phenomena and Consciousness-, Philosophical Affinity), Husserl and Cornelius-
Phenomenology, Psychology and Epistemology (Hans Cornelius, Husserl’s Critique of Attempt at a
Theory of Existential Judgment- Content, Object and Meaning-, Husserl’s Critique of Psychology as an
Experiential Science- The Principle of Thought Economy, Abstraction and General Ideas, The
Experiential Origin of Universally Valid Judgments-, Cornelius’ Reply and Correspondence with
Husserl- Psychology and Epistemology, Correspondence, The Subject Matter of Phenomenology-),
Meinong on Perception and Objectives, Austrian Theories of Judgment, Austrian Theories of
Judgment-Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong and Husserl, The Concept of Casuality in Stumpf’s
Epistemology (Stumpf’s Epistemology, The Concept of Causality in British Empiricism, Inwardly
Perceived Causality, Necessity in Natural Casual Law, The External World and Causality, Causality in
Organic Nature, Psycho-Physical Causality, Psychical Causality)

The Cambridge Core Kant and the Mind- Kant, Functionalism and Cognitive Science I the Resistance
of Materialists, Kant’s theory of Subject (consciousness, unity of experience, mind as representation),
Kant’s conception of awareness and self-awareness, Kant’s theory of apperceptive self-awareness

(Transcendental designation-the referential base of self-awareness, sources of self-awareness,
transcendental and empirical aspects of self), The Mind in Critique of Pure Reason, The first-edition
subjective deduction-the object of “one experience” (Synthesis and Unity, The strange case of Self-
awareness and the Deduction, Kant’s diagnosis of Second Paralogism, The Third Paralogism-Unity
without identity over time, The second-edition subjective deduction-self-representing representation
(Self-representation and Self-awareness), Nature and awareness of the self (Self-awareness and
noumenal mind

John Searle- Philosophy of Mind (Intentionality of Mind and Language, Network and Background in
mental states and language, Rediscovering the mind, Cognitive psychology and the unconscious,
Social Reality, Ontology, Truth-Representation and Epistemology, Speech Act Theory, Taxonomic
Theory, Non-Standard Speech Acts and Speech Activity, Metaphor and fiction

Merleau Ponty's Phenomenology and the Problem of Ideal Objects- Husserl and the Problem of
Ideal Objects, The Problem of Ideal Objects in the Phenomenology of Perception, From Perception to
Language- Relocating the Primordial, Language and Expression in the Middle Period, Intersubjectivity
and the Intermonde, Ideal Objects in the Late Period

Phenomenological Mind- Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science and Phenomenology (An

oversimplified account of the last 100 years, What is phenomenology?, Outline of this book),
Methodologies (Fantasies in the science of consciousness, Phenomenological method, Naturalizing
Phenomenology), Consciousness and Self-Consciousness (Consciousness and pre-reflective Self-
Consciousness, Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness and “what it is like”, Blindsight, Self-consciousness
and reflection), Time (The Default account, A Phenomenology of time-consciousness, The micro-
structure of consciousness and self-consciousness, Time-consciousness and dynamical systems
theory, Is consciousness of a temporal process itself temporally extended?, Historicity), Perception
(Perception holism, The role of others), Intentionality (What is intentionality? I Resemblance,
causation and mental representation I the positive account I Intentionalism I Intentionality and
Consciousness I Phenomenology, externalism and metaphysical realism), the embodied mind
(Robotic & Biologic Bodies, How the body defines the space of experience, The body as experientially
transparent, Embodiment and social cognition), Action and Agency (The phenomenology of agency,
Experimenting with the sense of agency, My actions and yours), How we know others (Theory of
mind debate, Problems with implicit simulation, Empathy and the argument from analogy,
Mentalism and the conceptual problem of other minds, Interaction and narrative), Self and Person
(Neuroscepticism and the no-self doctrine, Various notions of self, Sociality and personality, A
developmental story, Psychologies of the Self)

Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind- The Place of Phenomenology in Philosophy of Mind

(Functionalism and Logical Analysis I Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries I On
the Inescapability of Phenomenology), Self-Awareness and Self-Knowledge (Consciousness with
Reflexive Content, First-Person Knowledge in Phenomenology, Phenomenology and Cortical
Microstimulation), Intentionality (The Immanence Theory of Intentionality, Consciousness of Abstract
Objects), Unities of Consciousness (Husserl and the Logic of Consciousness, Temporal Awareness,
Collective Consciousness), Perception, Sensation and Action (Perceptual Sliences, Attention and
Sensorimotor Intentionality, The Phenomenology of Bodily Awareness)

The Mind and its World- Descrates and Cartesianism (Cartesian Dualism, Mind-Body Relations,
Epistemology, Self-containedness and Exteriorit I Mind, Consciousness, Language I Cartesianism),
Locke and Theory of Ideas (Ideas-some distinctions I Idea, word, object I Ideas and Resemblances,
Primary and Secondary I Resemblance, representation, sensation I Mind and Language), Frege and
Theory of Understanding (Idealism and Realism I Idea, Sense, Meaning I The Theory of Sense, Frege
against ideas), Wittgenstein: Use and Understanding (Understanding as static, Definitions and family
resemblance, Dynamism in the theory of resemblance I Thought, talk and normativity I Naturalism
and Normativity), Behaviourism and Mentalism (Behaviourism, Mentalism, Scientific Psychology and
Folk Psychology, Contemporary Cartesianism), What it is Really Likeq (Ideas, Concepts, Embodiment,
Phenomenology), Twin Earth (Stereotype and essence, Positivism and Realism, Twin Earth and
Exteriority, Embellishments), Internalism and Externalism (Methodological Solipsism, Internalism and
Externalism, The Semantic and Cognitive, Wide and Narrow content, Vat-Brains, Explaining
Behaviour, Self-containedness again, Naturalism and scientism-a sting in the tail?)

Things Seen and Unseen- Merleau-Ponty’s Embodied Philosophy, Merleau-Ponty’s Gestalt

Phenomenology, The Unity of Senses, Depth and Bodily Subject, Eating as Perception, Eating and
Ontology, The Old Ontology (Dominance of Linear Perspective, Science and Observer, The Exclusion
of Mind from Nature, Gestalt Ontology and Human Exceptionalism), Existential Metaphysics,
Transcendence and Transformation, Visual Perception, Sight as Representation, Glancing at the

Husserl and the Logic of Experience- The Meaning of Phenomenology in Husserl’s Logical
Investigations I Authenticity and Apriorism in Husserl’s Logical Investigations I Husserl on the
Principle of Excluded Middle I Mereology, Intentional Contents and Intentional Objects I Syntactical
Acts and Syntactical Objects I Observations on the Activity of Reading I The Phenomenology of
Genesis and the Genesis of Phenomenology I Crisis and Renewal: Husserl’s Kaizo Articles of 1923-24 I
Living in the Moment: Husserl, Derrida and the Logic of the Now I Real Time and Imaginary Time: On
the Husserlian Conception of Temporal Individuation I Transcendental Logic and Transcendental
Reduction: Husserl’s way into Transcendental Phenomenology through the Critique of Science I With
my Hand over my Heart, Looking You Right in the Eyes, I Promise Myself to You.... Some New
Reflections on Derrida’s Interpretation of Husserl

Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science- Historical Background (Brentano and Husserl on
Intentional Objects and Perception I Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship), Basic
Concepts and Theory (Husserl’s theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness I Husserl’s Notion of
Noema I Husserl’s Identification of Meaning and Noema I Husserl’s Theory of Perception I Husserl’s
Perceptual Noema I Husserl’s Account of Our Temporal Awareness I Husserl’s Theory of Pure Ego I
Was Husserl a Realist of an Idealist?), Contemporary Relevance (Husserl on Demonstrative Reference
and Perception I Intending and Referring I Intentionality and Possible Worlds: Husserl and Hintikka),
Recent Parallels (What is Intentional State? I Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research
Strategy in Cognitive Psychology)

Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge- Phenomenological Knowledge (What

RoboMary Knows I So This is What it’s Like I The Knowledge Argument, Diaphahousness ,
Representationalism I Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? I What is this
Thing you call colour), Phenomenal Concepts (What is a Phenomenal Concept? I Phenomenal and

Perceptual Concepts I Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint I Phenomenal Concepts
and Explanatory Gap I Reference and Dancing Qualia I Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts and
the Semantic Premise I Max Black’s Objection to Mind-Body Identity I Grasping Phenomenal

Psychoanalysis & Mind

Origins and Ends of the Mind- Origin and End: Relations between Psychic: Origins and Psychic
Normativity (The missing link between Psychoanalysis and Attachment Theory: Michael Balint’s New
Beginning I Quasi-beliefs and Crazy Beliefs: Subdoxastic States and the “Special Characteristics” of
the Unconscious I Paradoxes of Normativity in Lacanian Psychoanalysis Or: Is Castration Necessary? I
Lacan and Ethics: The Ends of Analysis and the Production of the Subject), Psychoanalysis and
Evolution, Philosophy and the Psychosexual Subject (Love as Ontology: Psychoanalysis against
Philosophy, Psychoanalysis: A Non-Ontology of the Human)

Psychoanalysis and Philosophy of Mind- Psychoanalysis and Philosophy of Mind I Wish-fulfilment

revisited I The significance of consilience: psychoanalysis, attachment, neuroscience and evolution I
Freud’s aesthetics: artists, art and psychoanalysis I Beyond the Philosophy of the (unconscious) mind:
the Freudian cornerstone as scientific theory, a cult and a way of talking I Unconscious knowing:
psychoanalytic evidence in support of a radical epistemic view I In defence of unconscious mentality

Psychoanalysis at the Limit- The Role of Being and Experience: From Freud to Binswanger and
Sullivan I Truth, Mind and Objectivity I Freud and Searle on the Ontology of the Unconscious I
Paranoiac Episteme I From Myth to Metaphysics: Freud and Wittgenstein as Philosophical Thinkers I
The Hermeneutic Versus the Scientific Conception of Psychoanalysis I The Possibility of a Scientific
Psychoanalysis I Incompleteness and Experimental Untestability in Psychoanalysis

Quantum Physics & Mind

Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics- From quantum mechanics to mystery of consciousness

(Two spheres of knowledge, Super intuition, Parallel Universe, Consciousness and quantum
mechanics, Toward theory of consciousness, Quantum mechanics is incomplete without
consciousness, Mystical features of consciousness are compatible with quantum mechanics, Theory
of consciousness from quantum mechanics), Miracles produced by consciousness-(psychic
experience) (Miracles and mysticism in spiritual experience of mankind-historical background,
psychic and parapsychology-), Parallel Worlds and Consciousness- Quantum Reality as Parallel
Classical Worlds (for physicists) (Consciousness and quantum mechanics: From Pauli and Jung to
contemporary authors, Reduction and decoherence in a measurement, “Many-Worlds”
interpretation and separation of alternative), Consciousness in parallel worlds (Parallel worlds -
classical alternatives- as quantum reality, Consciousness classical vision of quantum reality, At the
edge of consciousness, Quantum correlations and telepathy in EEC), Consciousness and life in parallel
worlds: Details for physicists (Representation of alternative sensations by path corridors, Why
alternatives are classical: prerequisite to the existence of life), “Three great problems in physics”
according to Vitaly Ginzburg (Everett’s (many-worlds) interpretation, Extended Everett Concept,
Relations among three problems), Parallel Scenarios and Sphere of Life, Evolution of life: Goal instead
of cause (for physicists), Life in terms of alternative scenarios instead of parallel worlds, Speculations
or further development of the concept, Escaping global crisis and life after death, Summing up the

results, Main points of the Quantum Concept of Life (QCL) I Science, philosophy and religion meet
together in theory of consciousness (From Quantum Mechanics to Consciousness)

Non-Local Universe- Ways of Knowing: A New Epistemology of Science, The Evolution of Mind: The
Symbol-Making Animal I Mind Matters: Mega-Narratives and the Two-Culture War I Mind Matters:
Metaphysics in Quantum Physics I Mind Matters: Poets of a New Reality

Quantum Physics Meets the Philosophy of Mind- Quantum Physics and Philosophy of Mind
(Quantum Mechanics and Intentionality, Quantum Physics and the Fundamentality of the Mental,
Quantum Mechanics and Dualism), Quantum Physics, Consciousness, Agency and Free Will
(Consciousness in the Quantum World: An Indian Perspective I Consciousness, Free Will and
Quantum Brain Biology “The Orch OR Theoy” I Physics, Free Will and Temporality in the Open World I
Quantum Physics, Action and Free Will: How Might Free Will be possible in a Quantum Universe?),
Quantum Stochasticity and (the End of) Neurodeterminism

Quantum Closures and Disclosures- Heidegger and the Quantum Brain (Dasein’s brain, Be-ing holds
sway as Enowning, Heidegger and science, Umezawa’s Quantum Brain Theory, Macroscopic
quantum systems and the problem of presence, Quantum Brain Dynamics (QBD), Quantum
cybernetics, Ontological implications of dual mode-QBD, The dissipative quantum brain as open
system, The beginning, The problem of transcendence, Hameroff and Penrose’s proto-experience,
The role of classical brain, The binding problem, What is presence good for?), Post-Heideggerian
Post-phenomenology and the Quantum Brain (The Post-phenomenology of Hubert Dreyfus-
Quantum being-in-the-world or Background-, The Post-phenomenology of Pauli Pylkko -
Ontotheological thinking, Experience, A conceptual experience, Identity, Holonomic situatedness,
More on aconceptual experience, The problem of how aconceptual understanding is learned,
Symmetry and order, Freedom, Pylkko on “No brain, no Dasein”-, The postphenomenology of Arkady
Plotnisky), Derrida and the Quantum Brain (Of spirit, Of quantum spirit, Self-refentiality and
undecidability in Gödel and Derrida, Gödel’s self-referential undecidable construction, Marks and re-
Marks, Dual mode QBD and Gödel’s theorem, The Derridean type of undecidability, The
transcendental and the plus-present, Derridean infrastructural dynamics, The dynamics of arche-
trace, Differance and its Freudian provenance, Supplementary and the infinite, The Lack in self,
Iterability, The self-erasing trace, physical time and subjective time)

Quantum Leap- Soft Introduction to Quantum Mechanics, Hilbert Space I Human Intelligence, Mind
and Reason I Elements of Quantum Mechanics (Basics of Non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics,
Relativistic Quantum Mechanics and Electrodynamics), Feynman Path Integrals (Path Integrals,
Dynamics of Quantum Fields, Stringy Geometrodynamics, Non-Quantum Applications of Path
Integrals-Cerebellum as Neural Path Integral, Dynamics of Complex Networks-), Quantum Universe
(Quantum Gravity, Quantum Cosmology, Anthropic String Landscape, Top-Down Cosmology,
Cosmology in String Landscape, Brane Cosmology, Hawking’s Brane New World), Quantum
Biophysics in Human Body: Electro-Muscular Stimulation (Basics of Electrical Muscular Stimulation,
EMS Functor, Electrical Stimulation Fields :EMSfields, Stimulated Muscular Contraction Paths EMSpaths,
Anatomical Geometry of the Face and Body Shape: EMSgeom.), Quantum Games and Quantum
Computing (Nash’s Classical Game Theory, Quantum Games, Formal Quantum Games, Quantum
Information and Computing, The Hardware for Quantum Computers), Quantum Mind (Quantum
Theory of Consciousness-Human Mind, Mind/Body Problem, EPR Paradoc and Bell’s Theorem,

Orchestrated Reduction and Penrose Paradox (Orchestrated Reduction and Penrose Paradox,
Physical Science and Consciousness, Quantum Brain, Theory of Mind and Matter, Quantum
Consciousness, Quantum-Like Psychodynamics)


Self-Knowledge for Humans- Homo Philosophicus, The Disparity, Substantial Self-Knowledge, Self-
Knowledge for Philosophers, Reality Check, Psychological Rationalism, Normative Realism,
Predictability Irrational?, Looking Outwards, Self-Knowledge and Inference, Knowing Your Evidence,
Knowing Yourself, Self-Ignorance, The Value of Self-Knowledge

The Phenomenal Self- Mind and Self, Phenomenal Unity, Phenomenal Continuity, Powers and
Subjects, Alternatives, Minds and Mental Representations, Embodiment, Simple Selves, Holism,
Modes of Incapacitation, Objections and Replies, The Topology of the Self, Reductionsim

Absence of Mind- On Human Nature, the Strange History of Altruism, The Freudian Self, Thinking

The Cambridge Core The First Person Perspective and Other Essays- Self-Knowledge (Introspection
and the Self, On knowing one’s own mind, First-person access, Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge),
Qualia (Qualities and Qualia: What’s in the mind?, Qualia and consciousness,
Intrasubjective/Intersubjective), Mental Unity and the Nature of Mind (The first person perspective,
Unity of consciousness and consciousness of unity), The Royce Lectures: Self-Knowledge and “Inner
Sense” (Self-knowledge and “inner sense”, Lecture I: The object perception model I Self-knowledge
and “inner sense”, Lecture II: The broad perceptual model I Self-knowledge and “inner sense”,
Lecture III: The phenomenal character of experience)

Self and World- Self and World (The Exclusion Thesis, The Self-Consciousness Argument), The
Objectivity Argument (The Concept Version of the Objectivity Argument, Quasi-Memory, Geometrical
Self-Location, The Intuition Version of the Objectivity Argument, Awareness of the Self “Qua Subject”
I Immunity to Error Through Misidentification I The Incompatibility Objection I Core Self and Bodily
Self I The Dispensability Objection), The Unity Argument (Unity and Objectivity, Transcendental Self-
Consciousness, Personal Self-Consciousness), The Identity Argument (The First Concept Version of
Identity Argument, The Second Concept Version of the Identity Argument, The Problem of
Misconception, The Intuition Version of the Identity Argument, Objections to (D2), The Fifth Response
and (D1), Kant and the Identity Argument, The “Logical” Identity of the “I”), Reductionism
(Reductionism and the Exclusion Thesis, Reductionism and Objectivity Argument, Reductionism and
Identity Argument, Reductionism and the Unity of Consciousness)

Self Comes to Mind-Antonio Damasio- Starting Over, Awakening (The Self as Wittness, Overcoming a
Misleading Intuition, An Integrated Perspective, A Preview of Main Ideas, Life and Conscious Mind),
From Life Regulation to Biological Value (The Implausibility of Reality, Natural Will, Staying Alive, The
Origins of Homeostasis I Cells, Multicellular Organisms and Engineered Machines I Biological Value,
Biological Value in Whole Organisms, The Success of Our Early Forerunners, Developing Incentives I
Connecting Homeostasis, Value and Consciousness), What’s in a Brain that a Mind can Be?, Making
maps and Making Images (Maps and Images, Cutting Below the Surface, Maps and Minds, The
Neurology of Mind, The Beginnings of Mind, Closer to Making of Mind?), The Body in Mind (The

Topic of the Mind, Body Mapping, From Body to Brain, Representing Quantities and Constructing
Qualities, Primordial Feelings, Mapping Body States and Stimulating Body States, The Source of an
Idea, The Body-Minded Brain), Emotions and Feelings (Situating Emotion and Feeling, Defining
Emotion and Feeling, Triggering and Executing Emotions, The Strange Case of William James, Feelings
of Emotion, How do we Feel an Emotion?, The Timing of Emotions and Feelings, The Varieties of
Emotion, Up and Down the Emotional Range, An Aside on Admiration and Compassion), An
Architecture for Memory (Somehow, Somewhere I The Nature of Memory Records, Dispositions
Came First, Maps Followed I Memory at Work, A Brief Aside on Kinds of Memory, A Possible Solution
to the Problem I More on Convergence-Divergence Zones I The Model at Work I The How and Where
of Perception and Recall), Being Conscious, Consciousness Observed (Defining Consciousness,
Breaking Consciousness Apart, Removing the Self and Keeping a Mind, Completing a Working
Definition, Kinds of Consciousness, Human and Nonhuman Consciousness, What Consciousness is
not, The Freudian Unconscious), Building a Conscious Mind (A Working Hypothesis, Approaching the
Conscious Brain, Previewing the Conscious Mind, The Ingredients of a Conscious Mind, The Protoself,
Constructing the Core Self, The Core Self State, Touring the Brain as it Constructs a Conscious Mind),
The Autobiographical Self (Memory Made Conscious, Constructing the Autobiographical Self, The
Issue of Coordination, The Coordinators, A Possible Role for the Posteromedial Cortices, The PMCs at
Work, Other Considerations on the Posteromedial Cortices, A Closing Note on the Pathologies of
Consciousness), Putting It together (By Way of Summary, The Neurology of Consciousness, The
Anatomical Bottleneck Behind the Conscious Mind, From the Ensemble Work of Large Anatomical
Divisions to the Work of Neurons, When we Feel Our Perceptions, Qualia, Qualia and Self, Unfinished
Business), Long After Consciousness, Living with Consciousness (Why Consciousness Prevailed, Self
and the Issue of Control, An Aside on the Unconscious, A Note on the Genomic Unconscious, The
Feeling of Conscious Will, Educating the Cognitive Unconscious, Brain and Justice, Nature and
Culture, Self comes to Mind, The Consequences of a Reflective Self)

Self-Knowing Agents- The First-Person Reference (Arguments for the No-Reference View of “I”,
Perceptual Modes of First-Person Reference, The Self-Reference Rule, The Agency Account, Agent’s
Awareness and Knowledge of Our Mental Actions), Actions and Self-Knowledge (What are Actions?,
On Knowing One’s Own Actions, Bodily Awareness, Bodily Awareness and Self-Knowledge)

Subjectivity and Selfhood- Self-Awareness and Phenomenal Consciousness (Varieties of Self-

Awareness, Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, A One-Level Account of Consciousness, the
Problem of Infinite Regress), The Concept(s) of Consciousness in Early Phenomenology (Three
Concepts of Consciousness, The Stream of Consciousness, Inner Consciousness and Self-Awareness,
Some Shortcomings), The Structure of Time Consciousness (Subjectivity of Experience, Temporality,
The Internal Object Account, Urbewußtsein and Self-Affection), Reflection and Attention (Natorp’s
Challenge, The Criticism of Reflective Phenomenology, A Hermeneutical Alternative, Pure and Impure
Reflection, Reflection and Alteration, Reflective and Hermeneutical Phenomenology), Consciousness
and Self (Non-egological Challenge, Different Notions of Self, The Narrative Concept of Self, The Self
as an Experiential Dimension, Empirical Implications, A Sense of Self), Self and Other (Expression and
Empathy, Embodied Subjectivity and Internal Otherness, Beyond Empathy, The Transcendence of the
Other, A Multidimensional Approach), Theory of Mind, Autism and Embodiment (Theory of Mind,
Theory-Theory of Self-Awareness, Autism, A Critical Rejoinder)

The Immaterial Self- The Dualist Doctrine, Nihilism and Analytical Behaviourism (The reality of the
mental realm, The nature of analytical reductionism, Analytical behaviourism, The problem of
context-dependence), Analytical Functionalism (The new ontological approach, Complications and
refinements, The knowledge argument, Function without mind, Mind without behavioural function),
The Type-Identity Thesis (Type-identity and the functional-profile theory, The problem of
identification, Lockwood’s hypothesis), Token-Identity and Metaphysical Reductionism (Token-
identity: the prima facie problem, Metaphysical mental reductionism, Why the reductionist’s
position is untenable), Token-Identity and Psychophysical Causation(Dualistic causation: the
traditional objection, The problem of causal pairings, Davidson’s argument, The science-efficacy
argument), The Mental Subject (Can corporeal objects be basic subjects?, Descartes versus Hume,
Filling in a gap, The nature of the self, Non-human animals), Personal Identity, Embodiment and
Freedom (Persons in the ordinary sense, Personal identity, Embodiment, Fredom and agency)

Self and the other-Exploring Subjectivity- The Experiential Self (Conflicting Perspectives on Self I
Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Selfhood I Transparency and Anonymity I Subjectivity or
Selfhood I Self and Diachronic Unity I Pure and Poor I A Multidimensional Account), Empathic
Understanding (Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity I Empathy and Projection I Phenomenology of
Empathy I Empathy and Social Cognition I Subjectivity and Otherness), The Interpersonal Self (The
Self as Social Object I Shame I You, Me and We)

Self, No Self -Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological and Indian Tradition- The Who and
the How of Experience I The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications I Nirvana and Ownerless
Consciousness I Self and Subjectivity: A Middle Way Approach I Self-No-Self? Memory and Reflexive
Awareness I Subjectivity, Selfhood and the use of the Word “I” I “I am of the nature of seeing”:
Phenomenological Reflections on the Indian Notion of Witness-Consciousness I Situating the Elusive
Self of Advaita Vedanta I Enacting the Self: Buddhist and Enactivist Approaches to the Emergence of
the Self I Radical Self-Awareness I Buddhas as Zombies: A Buddhist Reduction of Subjectivity

Structure & Content & Nature of Mind

The Architecture of the Mind- The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind, The Architecture of
Animal Minds, Modules of the Human Mind, Modularity and Flexibility: The First Steps, Creative
Cognition in a Modular Mind, The Cognitive Basis of Science, Distinctively Human Practical Reason

The Innate Mind Structure and Concepts- Architecture (What Developmental Biology can tell us
about Innateness*, Innateness and (Bayesian) Visual Perception, Modularity and Relevance,
Distinctively Human Thinking, Language and the Development of Spatial Reasoning*, The Complexity
of Cognition, Toward a Reasonable Nativism*), Language and concepts (Strong versus Weak
Adaptationism in Cognition and Language, The Innate Endowment for Language, Brass Tacks in
Linguistic Theory, Two Insights about Naming in the Preschool Child*, Number and Natural
Language*), Theory of Mind (Parent-Offspring Conflict and the Development of Social
Understanding*, Reasoning about Intentionality in Preverbal Infants*, What Neurodevelopmental
Disorders can reveal about Cognitive Architecture), Motivation (The Plausibility of Adaptation for
Homicide, Resolving the Debate on Innate Ideas, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the
Moral Mind*, Innateness and Moral Psychology*)

The Cambridge Core The Nature of True Minds- The Legacy of Cartesianism, Supervenience, Mental
Causation, Privileged access, Talk and thought, The nature of true minds

The Hidden Levels of the Mind- Soul, Mind and Body I The Levels of Our Natural Mind I Our Sensory
Level I Our Middle Natural Level I Our Rational Level I Our Rational Level Regenerated I Our Middle
Natural Level Regenerated I Our Sensory Level Regenerated I Swedenborg’s Mind

The Nature of Mind- The Problem of Other Minds (The Problem, Attempted solutions to the
problem, The uniqueness of consciousness, Certainty and meaning), Strong Dualism: Body and Soul
(Developing an argument for dualism, Difficulties for strong dualism, Hume’s bundles, Against the
bundle theory), Identity and the Soul (The concept of identity, Soul identity over time, Soul
individuation at a time, The argument for dualism reconsidered), Rationalism, Empiricism and the
Soul (Rationalism versus Empiricism, Should we be Empiricist?, The empirical evidence for the soul,
Alternative explanations), The Case for Physicalism (Arguments for mind-body identity I
Ramifications, types, tokens and other minds I Difficulties for mind-brain identity I The necessity of
identity), Problems and prospects (Artificial Minds, Free Will, Intentionality, Consciousness), After-life
for Physicalists (Resurrection I Reincarnation I Double difficulties or secondary survival? I Limits of
individual survival), The case for theory-theory (From Cartesian conception to philosophical
functionalism, Theory-theory and its opponents I Developing the theory: theorizing versus innateness
I The problem of other minds revisited)

A Theory of Content-Jerry Fodor- Intentionality (Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation I

Semantics, Wisconsin Style I A Theory of Content-Problem & Theory I Making Mind Matter More I
Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs I Review of Stephen Schiffer’s Remnants of
Meaning), Modularity (Precis of Modularity of Mind I Why should the Mind be Modular?,
Observation Reconsidered I A Reply to Churchland’s “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical

Cognition, Content and A Priori- The Grip of the Given I Radically Naive Realism I Truth in Virtue of
Intentionality, Or, the Return of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction I The Morality of Logic I
Rationalism Regained 1 & 2 & 3

Space & Architecture

Spaces, Worlds and Grammar- Cognitive Links and Domains: Basic Aspects of Mental Space Theory I
Mental Spaces, Constructional Meaning and Pragmatic Ambiguity I Analogical Counterfactuals I Sorry,
I am Not Myself Today: The Metaphor System for Conceptualizing the Self I Subjective Change
Expressions in Japanese and Their Cognitive and Linguistic Bases I Space Accessibility and Mood in
Spanish I Cross-World Continuity and the Polysemy of Adverbial Still I Alternative Grounds in the
Interpretation of Dietic Expressions I Roles and Identificational Copular Sentences I Perspective and
the Representation of Speech and Thought in Narrative Discourse I Mental Spaces and the Grammar
of Conditional Constructions I Conceptual Locations for Reference in American Sign Language)

Conceptual Spaces- Dimensions (The Problem of Modelling Representation I Conceptual Spaces as a

Framework for Representation I Quality Dimensions I Phenomenal and Scientific Interpretations of
Dimensions I Three Sensory Examples: Colour, Sound and Taste I Some Mathematical Notions I How
Dimensions are Identified I Integral and Separable Dimensions I On the Origins of Quality

Dimensions), Symbolic, Conceptual and Subconceptual Representations (An Analogy for the three
kinds of Representations I Symbolic Representations I Subconceptual Representations I Conceptual
Representations I Connections to Neuroscience I Comparisons I The Jungle of Representations),
Properties (Program I Properties in Intentional Semantics I Criticism of the Traditional View of
Properties I Criteria for Natural Regions of Conceptual Spaces I Natural Properties I Reconsidering the
Problems, The Relativism of Conceptual Spaces I Modelling Concepts I The Role of Similarity in
Concept Formalism I Combining Concepts I Learning Concepts I Nonmonotonic Aspects of Concepts I
Concept Dynamics and Nonmonotonic Reasoning I Objects as Special Kinds of Concepts I Four
Geometric Categorization Models I The Shell Space I Experiments), Semantics (What is a semantics? I
Six Tenets of Cognitive Semantics I Analyses of Some Aspects of Lexical Semantics I An Analysis of
Metaphors I The Learnability Questions I Communicating Referents I Can Meanings be in the Head? I
The Semantic Program), Induction (Three Levels of Induction I The Symbolic Level I The Conceptual
Level I The Role of Theoretical Concepts I The Subconceptual Level I Correlations between Domain I
What is Induction?), Computational Aspects (Computational Strategies on the Three Levels I
Conceptual Spaces as Emergent Systems I Smolensky’s Treatment of Connectionism I Not All
Computation is done by Turing Machines I A System for Object Recognition), In Case of Space (What
has been achieved? I Connections among Levels I The Need for a New Methodology)

The Aesthetics of Architecture-Roger Scruton- The Problem of Architecture I Architecture and

Design I Has architecture an essence? I Experiencing architecture I Judging architecture I Freud, Marx
and meaning I The language of architecture I Expression and abstraction I The sense of detail I
Architecture and morality

Architecture and the Brain-A New Knowledge Base from Neuroscience-The Brain Experiences
Architecture I The Sensory Systems I Emotions and Behaviour in Architectural Settings I Perception
and Recognition of Our Environment I Consciousness and Architecture I Methods and Models for
Future Research

The Architecture’s Brain-Neuroscience, Creativity and Architecture- Historical Essays (The Humanist
Brain: Alberti, Vitruvius and Leonardo I The Enlightened Brain: Perrault, Laugier and Le Roy I The
Sensational Brain: Burke, Price and Knight I The Transcendental Brain: Kant and Schopenhauer I The
Animate Brain: Schinkel, Bötticher and Semper I The Empathetic Brain: Vischer, Wölfflin and Göller I
The Gestalt Brain: The Dynamics of the Sensory Field I The Neurological Brain: Hayek, Hebb and
Neutra I The Phenomenal Brain: Merleau-Ponty, Rasmussen and Pallasmaa), Neuroscience and
Architecture (Anatomy: Architecture of Brain I Ambiguity: Architecture of Vision I Metaphor:
Architecture of Embodiment I Hapticity: Architecture of the Senses)

Helsinki-2013-Architecture and Neuroscience- Towards a Neuroscience of Architecture I Should

Architects care about Neuroscience? I (Why) Should Architects care about Neuroscience?

Subjects and Objects-Introduction (The subject matter of this work I Artworks and subjects and
objects I Artworks and artistic complexes I Essentialism and essential elements of artistic complexes I
The format of this book), Preliminary Issues Relevant to Essentialist Abstraction (The Terms abstract
and abstraction I The development of Abstraction in art history I Levels of Abstraction in art I The
different relation of philosophy and art to the question of the limits of Abstraction in art -The general
difference of art and philosophy and the different relation of each to Essentialist Abstraction I
Philosophy and Essentialist art I The non-hierarchical relation of art and philosophy I The

complementary relation of art and philosophy-, Modernism and Essentialist Abstraction –Modernism
and Essentialism and identity and reflexivity-), On Subjects and Objects and Works of Art: General
Considerations and Points of Relevance to Essentialist Abstraction (Singling Something Out, Artistic
Identity and Intentional Actions I Singling Something Out –Creating, selecting and specifying objects I
Artworks and objects I Singling something out determinately I Singling something out indeterminately
I Success and failure in singling something out I Singling out more than one object, but not more than
one art work I Singling something out, the visual arts and the arts in general-, Artworks and
apprehensible objects –Phenomenal and noumenal object, The notion of the identity of an artwork -
The logical and epistemological aspects of an artwork’s identity I The identity of an artwork and
phenomenal and noumenal objects-, The minimal conceptual relation of artist to artwork- No artwork
without identity, Two kinds of required intentional relation of an artist to an artwork –The artist’s
conscious understanding of each kind of relation I Implicit and explicit claims that certain objects are
artworks I Time and intentional relations of an artist to an object meant to be a work of art-,
Artworks, aesthetic objects and intentional actions –Intentional actions and novel artworks-, The
liberal notion of the use of objects and the direct and indirect relation of an object used to make an
artwork -Artworks and the products of accidental actions-, The dependence of artworks on artistic
intentions and cultural contexts -Abstraction, lack of artistic action and publicity-, Artists, Objects and
Some Minimum Conditions of Artistic Identity, The dependence of artworks on pre-existent objects –
The minimum number of pre-existent objects required to make artworks depends on the metaphysics
of personhood I Metaphysics, acts and objects used in producing art-, That an artwork must be
something singled out does not dictate the nature of what is singled out, The history of an object
with which an artwork is meant to be identified, The dependence of an artwork not meant to be
identified with some pre-existent object on the artistic use of some pre-existent object, An artwork
has its particular identity in spite of any degree of similarity that it has to any other object), Artistic
Identity, Subjects and Apprehensible Objects (The dependence of the identity of an artwork on an
apprehensible object –Specification and objects that are meant to be artworks that cannot be
apprehend-, The dependence of knowledge of the identity of an artwork on an apprehensible object I
Relevant apprehension of the apprehensible object on which knowledge of the identity of an artwork
is dependent –Relevant apprehension of an apprehensible artwork I The dependence of an artwork
that is meant to be identified with a non-apprehensible object on an apprehensible object I
Understanding the relation of an apprehensible object on which the identity of an artwork is
dependent to that identity-, The artistic identity of an artwork and its relevance to the ontology,
meaning and value of an artwork I The dependence of the identity and the apprehension of the
identity of an artwork on a public perceptual object –Privacy and publicity and phenomenal objects I
A public perceptual object is necessary but is not sufficient I Apprehensible properties relevant to an
artwork’s identity I No a priori limitations on public perceptual objects I Art-historical objects and
conscious-, Original and subsequent dependence of artworks on objects I Embodied artworks-
Embodiment, identification of artworks and sophisticated notions of artworks I Different kinds of
appreciation of embodied artworks I Ways of producing embodied artworks-, Non-embodied
artworks -Non-embodied artworks and specification I Non-embodied artworks and selection I Non-
embodied artworks and perceptible objects-, Awareness and agency and perceptual objects I
Conceptual idealism and works of art I An artist’s presentation of an object to the artworld as an
artwork), Artworks and Kinds of Objects (Artworks and times and places of apprehending them I An
artist’s identification of the same artwork with apprehensibly different things I An artist’s
identification of a number of works with a number of indistinguishable objects I The equal

identification of an artwork with different objects at the same or different times I An artist’s
identification of an artwork with the same object with which another artwork is meant to be
identified I Temporal and atemporal objects I Artworks and change I Artworks, artifacts and physical
objects), Art and Aesthetics (The distinction between art and the aesthetics I Different sources of
aesthetics experience and the possible heterogeneity of aesthetic experience –Perceptual and
intellectual objects I The possibility of intellectual aesthetic experience of intellectual objects I
Aesthetic experiences, thoughts and feelings I The possible heterogeneity of aesthetic experience-,
Art-historical artworks and kinds of appreciable artistic property –The notion of an artistic property I
Appreciation of an artistic property I The motion of an aesthetic property I Artworks and their
appreciable properties I The intentional direction of events of appreciation I Artworks and judgements
of artistic value I Artistic interest and the possible expansion of the concept of the aesthetic I
Essentialism and the aesthetic-, Factors relevant to the aesthetic value of a work of art –The aesthetic
value of artworks identified with artistically independent objects I Aesthetic value and created
artworks I Aesthetic value and participatory artworks), On Subjects and Objects and Artistic
Complexes: The Material of Essentialism, Subjects and Objects and Artistic Complexes (The concept
of an artistic complex -The notion of original dependence I Derived and acceptably derived objects I
Relevant objects I Appropriate apprehension I Subjects, relevant objects and artistic complexes-, The
nature of an object or objects on which a work of art is relevantly dependent –A single spatio-
temporally continuous perceptual object that can be apprehended in full from a single perceptive I A
single spatio-temporally continuous perceptual object that cannot be apprehended in full from a
single perceptive I A number of spatio-temporally continuous perceptual objects distributed in spatial
proximity I A number of spatio-temporally continuous perceptual objects distributed over distances
from one another I Temporally distributed objects I Possibilities for a plurality of objects on which the
identity of an artwork is dependent I Artworks and tokens of a type-, Artworks and reproduction or
documentation, Kinds of relevant object and their figuring in artistic complexes- A relevant object
with which an artwork is meant to be identified I A relevant object through which an artwork is meant
to be identified I A complex relevant object that has an accept with which an artwork is meant to be
identified and an aspect through which an artwork is meant to be identified I A relevant object
through which and with which an artwork is meant to be identified I Relevant objects and artistic
complexes-), Artistic Complexes and Subjects (Any artwork is related to consciousness –
Consciousness is a necessary condition of the identity of any artwork I Consciousness is a necessary
condition of responding to any artwork-, Consciousness and traditional and Essentialist art, Kinds of
conscious event of interest to Essentialism, Forms of conscious event of interest to Essentialism –Any
event of awareness is either Intentional or non-Intentional I Any event of awareness has or lacks
structure I The structure of Intentional events is reflexive or irreflexive I Areflexive awareness I Any
event of awareness is either monadic or polyadic I First-order awareness I Second-order awareness I
The live fundamental forms of conscious event-, Consciousness and Essentialist Abstraction I
Language, consciousness and Essentialism I Agency I Awareness and agency I Knowing which knowing
that and knowing what –Knowing which I Knowing that I Knowing what-), Artistic Complexes and
Objects (Identity and difference -The primitive concepts of logical sameness and logical difference I
Laws of identity and difference-, Particular identity –Logical identity and particular identity I
Particular identity is unique and singular I Haecceity ia a core logical property I The laws of objects-,
Identity and difference and Essentialism I Logical space I Identity and difference and artistic
complexes –The delimitation of logical space by artworks and things of relevance to them I
Essentialism and the delimitation of logical space-, Artworks, objects and parts I Compositional

relations and works of art –Simple and complex embodied artwork I Simple and complex specified and
non-embodied artworks I Essentialism and compositional relations of objects-, An object either is or is
not dependent on awareness to be the object that it is I Kinds of dependence: identity, dependence
and type dependence –The difference between identity and identity dependence I Actual and possible
awareness of consciousness-dependent objects I The heterogeneity of dependent objects and the
events on which they depend I Possible logical and metaphysical equivalence of dependent objects
and the events on which they depend I The implicit relation of a conscious event to an object
dependent on it-, Identity dependence in general –The implicit relation of an identity-dependent
object to a particular time I The timeless use of “is” I Type-A identity dependence I Type-B identity
dependence I Identity dependence and simplicity and complexity-, Type dependence in general –
Type-A type dependence I Type-B type dependence I Type dependence and simplicity and complexity-,
Singly-dependent objects I Multiply-dependent objects –Homogenous multiply-dependent objects I
Heterogeneous multiply-dependent objects-, Artworks as wholly or partially dependent objects –
Wholly-dependent objects I Partially-dependent objects-, Essentialism and kinds of dependent objects
I Kinds of independent object –Generic independence I Particular independence I Biographical
independence I Universal independence I Necessary independence-, Essentialism and kinds of
independent object), Artistic Complexes and Subjects and Objects (Medium and media –Two notions
of a medium I A medium as a means of effecting artworks I A medium as a means of conveying
artworks I The restrictive notion of a medium I Media and embodied artworks I Media and effecting a
non-embodied artwork that is selected I Language as a medium for effecting artworks I Non-
perceptible events as media for effecting objects meant to be artworks I Documentation and
reproduction as media for conveying artworks I Media and parts of artworks I Relevant objects as
media for conveying artworks I The conceptual linkage of medium and singling something out I
Language as a medium that both effects and conveys the identify of an artwork-, Non-perceptible
events as media for Essentialist Abstraction –Consciousness, ideational objects and comprehension of
identity I Ideational objects and ideational artworks I The mixed media of Essentialism I Possible uses
of consciousness as a medium I Consciousness, art and philosophy I Agency as a medium-, Meaning
and concipients –Meaning and artistic complexes I The concept of a concipient I Essentialism and
meaning-, Kinds and forms of Intentional event and essential elements of artistic complexes –
Perception and conception I Essentialism and forms of awareness I Things that are relevant to the
nature of an Essentialist object-, Cause and effect and change –Change and perceptual objects on
which embodied and specified artworks are dependent I Change and temporal art forms I Artworks
that intentionally incorporate change I Artworks and Cambridge changes I Origination and
termination and works of art-, Artistic complexes and becoming I Indexicals –Indexicals and
awareness I Indexicals and agency I Indexicals and perceptual objects-, Phenomenality and
noumenality I Apprehension and reapprehension I Space and time I Continuity, discontinuity,
recurrence and non-recurrence –Contiguous and noncontigous times I Continuity I Discontinuity I
Artworks and continuity and discontinuity I Recurrence I Non-recurrence I Artworks and recurrence
and non-recurrence-, Aesthetically essential properties), The essential elements of Artistic
Complexes I Identity and Subjects, Objects and Language: Concluding Remarks as a Preamble to an
Essentialist Investigation of the Limits of Abstraction (Preliminary Observations –Abstraction and
subjects I Abstraction and objects : Everything and nothing-, Precis of the principles of Essentialist
Abstarction I Identity and Essentialist Abstraction –The relation of artist and audience to an artwork’s
identity I Identity and essential elements of artistic complexes-, Ideational objects and Essentialist
Abstraction, Comprehension of identity, language and Essentially Abstract artworks –Non-perceptible

events, ideational objects and specification I Specification and perceptual and non-perceptual
ideational objects I Specification and Essentialist Abstraction-, The relation of the identity of an
Essential Abstract artwork to things that are used to effect that identity I Concluding remarks:
Essentialism and its objects –Essentialism and the essential elements of artistic complexes I Additional
Essentialist considerations), Appendices (On the notions of Object, Property, Haecceity and Diversity
–Objects and Properties I Haecceity and Diversity-, Leibniz’s Laws, the Laws of Identity and Difference
and the Identity of Indiscernibles –Leibniz’s Law-A Conceptual Consideration I The Laws of Identity
and Difference I The Identity of Indiscernibles-, Distinction, Discrimination and Distinguishability,
Impossible Objects –Definition of impossible object, I Different views of impossible objects I
Impossible objects and the laws of thought-I I Different views of the relation of impossible object to
consciousness I Impossible objects as Type-A type-dependent objects I Type dependence and
sameness I The relation of impossible objects in events of conceiving of them I Impossible objects
and the laws of thought-II I Saying something and saying something true I Impossible objects, the
laws of objects and Abstraction)

Mind in Architecture- Neuroscience, Embodiment and the Future of Design- Survival through Design
I “Know Thyself” or What Designers can Learn from the Contemporary Biological Sciences I The
Embodied Meaning of Architecture I Body, Mind and Imagination: The Mental Essence of
Architecture I Toward a Neuroscience of the Design Process I Tending to the World I Architecture and
Neuroscience: A Double Helix I Nested Bodies I Embodied Simulation, Aesthetics and Architecture:
An Experimental Aesthetic Approach I From Intuition to Immersion, Architecture and Neuroscience I
Neuroscience for Architecture I Mood and Meaning in Architecture

Brain Landscape-The Coexistence of Neuroscience and Architecture-Three Approaches to

Consciousness I Neuroscience and the Design of Educational Places I Vision and Light in Architectural
Settings I Memorials, Sacred Places and Memory I Memory of Places and Spaces and the Design of
Facilities for the Aging I Systems Neuroscience and Building Systems Applied to Workplace Design I
Methods and Models for Future Research I Environment-Behaviour Studies: A Precursor for
Neuroscience in Design I A Basic Library of Neuroscience I Architecture: History and Practice