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GILCHRIST v.

CUDDY where the profits of the injured person are derived from his contractual relations
with a large and indefinite number of individuals, thus reducing him to the necessity
FACTS: of proving
Cuddy, was the owner of the "Zigomar;" that Gilchrist was the owner of a
cinematograph theater in Iloilo; that in accordance with the terms of the contract Courts usually grant an injunction where the profits of the injured person are
entered into between Cuddy and Gilchrist the former leased to the latter the derived from his contractual relations with a large and indefinite number of
"Zigomar" for exhibition in his (Gilchrist's) theater for the week beginning May 26, individuals, thus reducing him to the necessity of proving in an action against the
1913; and that Cuddy willfully violated his contract in order that he might accept tort feasor that the latter is responsible in each case for the broken contract, or else
the appellants' offer of P350 for the film for the same obliging him to institute individual suits against each contracting party, and so
exposing him to a multiplicity of suit
ISSUE/S & RULING:
DAYWALT v. RECOLETOS
Did the appellants know that they were inducing Cuddy to violate his contract
with a third party when they induced him to accept the P350? FACTS:

Espejo admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film He received a Teodorica Endencia, an unmarried woman, resident in the Province of Mindoro,
letter from his agents in Manila dated April 26, assuring him that he could not get executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo. W. Daywalt,
the film for about six weeks. The arrangements between Cuddy and the appellants .a tract of land situated in the barrio of Mangarin
for the exhibition of the film by the latter on the 26th of May were perfected after
April 26, so that the six weeks would include and extend beyond May 26. The A decree recognizing the right ,of Teodorica as owner was entered but the Torrens
appellants must necessarily have known at the time they made their offer to Cuddy certificate was not issued until later. The parties, however, met immediately upon
that the latter had booked or contracted the film for six weeks from April 26. the entering of this decree and made a new contract with a view to carrying their
Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that the appellants knowingly induced Cuddy original agreement into effect – deed of conveyance
to violate his contract with another person. But there is no specific finding that the
appellants knew the identity of the other party, So we must assume that they did The second contract was not immediately carried into effect for the reason that the
not know that Gilchrist was the person who had contracted for the film Torrens certificate was not yet obtainable and in fact said certificate was not issued
until the period of performance contemplated in the contract had expired. the
Were the appellants likewise liable for interfering with the contract between parties entered into still another agreement, superseding the old, by which
Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of one of the Teodorica Endencia agreed, upon receiving the Torrens title to the land in question,
contracting parties? to deliver the same to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Manila, to be forwarded
to the Crocker National Bank in San Francisco
The appellants claim that they had a right to do what they did. The ground upon
which the appellants base this contention is, that there was no valid and binding The Torrens certificate was in time issued to Teodorica Endencia, but in the course
contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist and that, therefore, they had a right to of the proceedings relative to the registration of the land, it was f ound by official
compete with Gilchrist for the lease of the film, the right to compete being a survey that the area of the tract inclosed in the boundaries stated in the contract
justification for their acts was about 1,248 hectares instead of 452 hectares as stated in the contract. In view
of this development Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the whole
the mere right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally inducing tract to the purchaser, asserting that she never intended to sell so large an amount
Cuddy to take away the appellee's contractual rights. of land and that she had been misinformed as to its area

It is said that the ground on which the liability of a third party for interfering with a led to litigation in which Daywalt finally succeeded, upon appeal to the Supreme
contract between others rests, is that the interference was malicious Court, in obtaining a decree for specific performance; and Teodorica Endencia was
ordered to convey the entire tract of land to Daywalt pursuant to the contract
In the case at bar the only motive f or the interf erence with the Gilchrist-Cuddy
contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting The defendant, La Corporación de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious corporation,
the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does with its domicile in the city of Manila. Said corporation was formerly the owner of
not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing a large tract of land, known as the San Jose Estate. The same corporation was at this
its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the above authorities, that they were liable time also the owner of another estate on the same island immediately adjacent to
to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved from such the land which Teoderica Endencia had sold to Geo. W. Daywalt; and for many years
liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the the Recoletos Fathers had maintained large herds of cattle on the farms referred to
original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film
Father Sanz was fully aware of the existence of the contract of 1902 by which
The liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual Teodorica Endencia agreed to sell her land to the plaintiff as well as of the later
obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his important developments connected with the history of that contract and the
contract with Gilchrist contract - substituted successively for it

Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission. causes When the defendant corporation sold the San Jose Estate, it was necessary to bring
damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the the cattle off of that property; and, in the first half of 1909, some 2,368 head were
damage so done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition removed to the estate of the corporation immediately adjacent to the property
precedent to the liability of a tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person which the plaintiff had purchased from Teodorica Endencia. As Teodorica still
to whom he causes damage retained possession of said property Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with
her whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the def endant corporation were
As a rule, injunctions are denied to those who have an adequate remedy at law. pastured upon said land during a period extending from June 1, 1909, to May 1,
Where the choice is between the ordinary and the extraordinary processes of law, 1914
and the former are sufficient, the rule will not permit the use of the latter. If the
injury is irreparable, the ordinary process is inadequate Damages on the ground that said corporation, for its own selfish purposes,
unlawfully induced Teodorica Endencia to refrain from the performance of her
Gilchrist was facing the Immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the contract f or the sale of the land in question and to withhold delivery to the plaintiff
fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had of the Torrens title, and further, maliciously and without reasonable cause,
counted upon as his feature film. It is quite apparent that to estimate with any maintained her in her defense to the action of specific performance which was
degree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an finally decided in favor of the plaintiff in this court. The cause of action here stated
event would be quite difficult if not impossible is based on a liability derived from the wrongful interference of the defendant in
the performance of the contract between the plaintiff and Teodorica Endencia
In this extremity, the appellee applied for and was granted, as we have indicated, a
mandatory injunction against Cuddy requiring him to deliver the Zigomar to In 1911, it appears, the plaintiff, as the owner of the land which he had bought from
Gilchrist, and a preliminary injunction against the appellants restraining them from Teodorica Endencia entered into a contract (Exhibit C) with S. B. Wakefield, of San
exhibiting that film in their theater during the week he (Gilchrist) had a right to Francisco, for the sale and disposal of said lands to a sugar growing and milling
exhibit it enterprise, the successful launching of which depended on the ability of Daywalt to
get possession of the land and the Torrens certificate of title. In order to accomplish that it has made itself coparticipant in the breach of the contract, can in no event
this end, the plaintiff returned to the Philippine Islands, communicated his exceed hers
arrangement to the defendant, and made repeated efforts to secure the registered
title for delivery in compliance with said agreement with Wakefield The most that can be said with reference to the conduct of Teodorica Endencia is
that she refused to carry out a contract for the sale of certain land and resisted to
ISSUE/S & RULING: the last an action for specific performance in court. The result was that the plaintiff
was prevented during a period of several years from exerting that control over the
whether a person who is not a party to a contract for the sale of land makes himself property which he was entitled to exert and was meanwhile unable to dispose of
liable for damages ,to the vendee, beyond the value of the use and occupation, by the property advantageously
colluding with the vendor and maintaining him in the effort to resist an action for
specific performance

To our mind a fair conclusion on this feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga
and his associates believed in good faith that the contract could not be enf orced
and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into effect. Any advice
or assistance which they may have given was, therefore, prompted by no mean or
improper motive. It is not, in our opinion, to be denied that Teodorica would have
surrendered the documents of title and given possession of the land but for the
influence and promptings of members of the defendant corporation. But we do not
credit the idea that they were in any degree influenced to the giving of such advice
by the desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle upon
the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff

attorney for the plaintiff maintains that, by interfering in the performance of the
contract in question and obstructing the plaintiff in his efforts to secure the
certificate of title to the land, the defendant corporation made itself a co-
participant with Teodorica Endencia in the breach of said contract, also failed
contract w/ wakefield

it was held that the right of action for maliciously procuring a breach of contract is
not confined to contracts f or personal services, but extends to contracts in general

Malice in some form is generally supposed to be an essential ingredient in cases


of interf erence with contract relations. But upon the authorities it is enough if the
wrongdoer, having knowledge of the existence of the contract relation, in bad faith
sets about to break it. up. Whether his motive is to benefit himself or gratify his
spite by working mischief to the employer is immaterial. Malice in the sense of ill-
will or spite is not essential

Upon the question as to what constitutes legal justification, a good illustration was
put in the leading case. If a party enters into contract to go for another upon a
journey to a remote and unhealthful climate, and a third person, with a bona fide
purpose of benefiting the one who is under contract to go, dissuades him from the
step, no action will lie.. But if the advice is not disinterested and the persuasion is
used for "the indirect purpose of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the
plaintiff," the intermedler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract broken

Translated into terms applicable to the case at bar, the decision in Gilchrist vs.
Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep., 542), indicates that the def endant corporation, having notice
of the sale of the land in question to Daywalt, might have been enjoined by the
latter from using the property for grazing its cattle thereon. That the defendant
corporation is also liable in this action for the damage resulting to the plaintiff from
the wrongful use and occupation of the property has also been already determined.
But it will be observed that in order to sustain this liability it is not necessary to
resort to any subtle exegesis relative to the liability of a stranger to a contract for
unlawful interference in the performance thereof. It is enough that defendant used
the property with notice that the plaintiff had a prior and better right

Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or omission,
characterized by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for
the damage so done. Ignoring so much of this article as relates to liability f or
negligence, we take the rule to be that a person is liable for damage done to another
by any culpable act; and by "culpable act" we mean any act which is blameworthy
when judged by accepted legal standards. The idea thus expressed is undoubtedly
broad enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts
likely to be developed in any society

Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a contract may
incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade performance, there is one
proposition upon which all must agree. This is, that the stranger cannot become
more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than
the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger liable for damages
in excess of those that could be recovered against the immediate party to the
contract would lead to results at once grotesque and unjust

In the case at bar, as Teodorica Endencia was the party directly bound by the
contract, it is obvious that the liability of the defendant corporation, even admitting