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Aparri v.s.

Court of Appeals


On January 15, 1960, the Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) approved resolution no. 13 (series of 1960), which appointed Appari as a general
manager of the said company which will take effect on January 16, 1960. However on March 15, 1962, the
same Board of Directors approved resolution no. 24 (series of 1962) which states that the Chairman of the
Board has transmitted to the Board of Directors the desire of the office of the Philippines to fix the term of
Aparri, the general manager up to the closing time of the office on March 31, 1962 in accordance with
paragraph 2, section 8 of R.A. 1160:

Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. — The Board of Directors shall have the following powers
and duties:

2) To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager …, subject to the recommendation of the Office of
Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines, …. The Board, by a majority vote
of all members, may, for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and with the
approval of the President of the Philippines, suspend and/or remove the General Manager and/or the Assistant
General Manager (p. 46, rec., emphasis supplied).


Whether or not Resolution no. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of the petitioner without cause.


The court ruled that resolution no. 24 which approved by the Board of Directors and pursuant to the desire of
the office of the President legally fixed the term of Appari. The word term in legal sense means the definite
period of time that an officer may hold an office. The statue is undeniably clear. Resolution no. 24 speaks of no
removal but an expiration of the term of Appari. When the language of the statue is plain, clear, and free from
ambiguity, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

2. Flores vs. Orilon, 223 sav. 568 

Gamboa v CA
Martin, J. | November 28, 1975 | Who Must Prosecute Criminal Actions | Petition to review on certiorari
Petitioners: Jose Gamboa and Units Optical Supply Company
Respondents: CA and Benjamin Lu Hayco
SUMMARY: Petitioners filed 124 complaints of estafa against respondent. 75 of them were formally charged.
He filed a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction, averring that all the indictments with regard to the 75 estafa informations were mere
components of only one crime,
since the same were onlu impelled by a single criminal resolution or intent. CA directed the fiscal to consolidate
all the informations in one. The
Court said that no CA, you’re wrong. The crime of estafa is not a continuing offense beause the abstractions
and the accompanying deposits
thereof in the personal accounts of private respondent cannot be similarly viewed as "continuous crime".
DOCTRINE: The term "continuing" must be understood in the sense similar to that of "transitory" and is only
intended as a factor in determining
the proper venue or jurisdiction for that matter of the criminal action pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court because "a person
charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is part committed
1. Respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco was an employee of petitioner
Units Optical Supply Company. Petitioner company filed 124
complaints of estafa were filed against him, 75 of which were
formally charged after the preliminary investigation. The common
charges only differ in dates and amounts complained of.
2. A civil action for accounting was also filed against him, this time
by the owner. Lu CHiong Son alleged that respondent initiated taking
over the business while the former was confined in a hospital.
Through fraud, deceit and machinations, Hayco duped him into
affixing signature and thumbmark in a general power of attorney that
caused the closing of Son’s accounts in a bank. Respondent
transferred accounts into his own name with the same bank whew.
3. Respondent commenced petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction pendent lite, claiming that the filing, prosecutuion and trial
of the 75 estafa cases is oppressive, whimsical and capricious and
without or in excess of jurisdiction of City Fiscal and the City Court
Judges of Manila. He asserts that all the indictments with regard
to the 75 estafa informations were mere components of only one
crime, since the same were onlu impelled by a single criminal
resolution or intent.
4. Trial Court dismissed petition ruling that the series of withdrawals
were not a result of one criminal impulse.
5. CA reversed RTC, directing respondent city Fiscal to cause the
dismissal of 75 criminal cases and to consolidate in one information
all the charges contained in the 75 informations.
WON the accusations contained in the 75 informations against
respondent constitute a single crime of estafa - NO
1. The daily abstractions from and diversions of private respondent of
the deposits made by the customers of the optical supply company
from October 2, 1972 to December 30, 1972, excluding Saturdays
and Sundays, cannot be considered as proceeding from a single
criminal act within the meaning of Article 481. There must be 75
charges of estafa against respondent.
2. Apart from the crimes defined and punished under Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code is the "delito continuado" or "continuous crime".
This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a
single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division.

Article 48 of our Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No.

4000, that "(w)hen a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period."
In order that it may exist, there should be "plurality of acts
performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal
provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent
and purpose, which means that two or more violations of the
same penal provision are united in one and the same intent
leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim."
So long as the act or acts complained of resulted from a single
criminal impulse it is usually held to constitute a single offense to be
punished with the penalty corresponding to the most serious crime,
imposed in its maximum period. The test is not whether one of the
two offenses is an essential element of the other. "to apply the
first half of Article 48, ... there must be singularity of criminal
act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law."
4. In the case at bar, each day of conversion constitutes a single act
with an independent existence and criminal intent of its own. All the
conversions are not the product of a consolidated or united
criminal resolution, because each conversion is a complete act by
itself. Specifically, the abstractions and the accompanying
deposits thereof in the personal accounts of private respondent
cannot be similarly viewed as "continuous crime". There could be
as many acts of misappropriation as there are times the private
respondent abstracted and/or diverted the deposits to his own
personal use and benefit. The ruling holds true when the acts of
misappropriation were committed on two different occasions.
5. The characterization or description of estafa as a continuing
offense cannot be validly seized upon by private respondent as basis
for its inference that the acts of abstraction in question constitute but
a single continuing crime of estafa. The sole import of this
characterization is that the necessary elements of estafa may
separately take place in different territorial jurisdictions until the
crime itself is consummated. This is so, because "a person charged
with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where
the offense is part committed”. The moment, however, that the
elements of the crime have completely concurred or transpired, then
an individual crime of estafa has occurred or has been consummated.
The term "continuing" here must be understood in the sense
similar to that of "transitory" and is only intended as a factor in
determining the proper venue or jurisdiction for that matter of
the criminal action pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court. In transitory or continuing offense in which some acts
material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation
occur in one province and some in another, the court of either
province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the other.
Triste v. Leyte State College Board of Trustees, 192 SCRA 326 PASCUAL, KXY
Facts: For two (2) years, Petitioner discharged her duties and functions as vice-president of the college.
However, from the time when Magdalena S. Remo retired as President of the college, there was a total revamp
in the composition of the Board of Trustees. Dr. Purificacion M. Flores was designated officer-in-charge and
later appointed as the new College President. Anticipating moves to replace her as vice-president, petitioner
submitted to the Board of Trustees a position paper, asserting that the Board could not appoint a vice-president
because the position was not vacant, the vice-president's term was not co-terminous with that of the
recommending president who had retired, and the incumbent was not replaceable at the pleasure of the Board.
In fact, she stated therein that she is qualified for the college presidency. Petitioner’s apprehension were proved
right by later development. She received a letter from President Flores assigning her to another position.
Alleging that the appointment of Dr. Crescencia V. Chan-Gonzaga to the position of vice-president in effect
eased her out of said position. She contended that her constitutional and legal rights to security of tenure had
been violated. She alleged therein that since her ouster as vice-president, she had been demoted to the
position of Director of Research and that the 20% salary increase granted to all academic personnel of
government schools was not given to her because under the plantilla approved by the Office of Budget and
Management, her salary was reduced by one step since she was no longer the college vice-president. She
argued that she was terminated and stripped of her rank and status without legal cause and due process.
Private respondent Dr. Gonzaga and public respondent Dr. Flores contend that petitioner was merely
"designated" and not "appointed" to the college vice-presidency. They aver that petitioner's "designation" to said
position was "purely an internal arrangement which does not require the approval or confirmation by the Civil
Service Commission." 19 They maintain that petitioner's term of office being co-terminous with that of the
retired college president, petitioner may not complain that she was illegally dismissed from the vice-presidency.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was merely designated or permanently appointed
Held: While in a line of cases, the term “APPOINT” applied to the nomination or designation of an individual.
Common usage, however oftentimes puts a distinction in such that “APPOINTMENT” connotes permanency,
while “DESIGNATION” implies temporariness.
A public officer to another position may mean to vest him with additional duties while he perform the functions of
his permanent office; or in some cases, a public officer may be “designated” to a position in an acting capacity
However in this case, The court ruled that the laws contemplate of a duly appointed vice president. As such,
petitioner could be removed only for justifiable reason and such and after she was accorded due process.
Executive Order No. 17 was issued by the President on May 28, 1986 "to obviate unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving officials and employees, particularly in the career civil service“
Section 1 thereof provides that separation or replacement of officers and employees shall be made "only for
justifiable reasons". For its purposes, a state college is considered a ministry.
"SEC. 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/replacement of personnel:
1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the
Ministry Head concerned;
3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service."
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is GRANTED and the IMMEDIATE REINSTATEMENT of petitioner
with backwages to the position of vice-president of the Leyte State College is hereby ordered.

3. Maleniza vs. COA, 179 SOV . 408 

4. Paredes vs. Acting Chairman, 116 SOV. 176 

5. GSIS vs. esc, 245 SCRA 179 

Mancenido vs. CA, 330 SCRA 419
Case Digest: People vs Jalosjos




The victim of rape in this case was a minor below twelve (12) years of age, who herself narrated the
shameful details of the dastardly act against her virtue. The victim was peddled for commercial sex by her own
guardian whom she treated as a foster father. Because the complainantwas a willing victim, the acts of rape
were preceded by several acts of lasciviousness on distinctlyseparate occasions..The accused was then
CongressmanRomeo Jalosjoswho, inspite of his having been charged and convicted by the trial court for
statutory rape, was stillre-elected to his congressional office. On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for
the crime ofstatutory rape and twelve (12) for acts of lasciviousness, were filed against accused-appellant

The victim, Maria Rosilyn, grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care of
SimplicioDelantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old homosexual whose
ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and accepting boarders at his house.He,
however, was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.

Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of one of their boarders. They went tothe Pasay City Police
where she executed a sworn statement against SimplicioDelantar. Rosilynwas thereafter taken to the custody
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted an investigation, which eventually led to thefiling of criminal charges against accused-appellant He
was also convicted on six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.









The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC Makati with modification of penalty.


THEREOF NOT AN ABSOLUTERULE OF LAW; CASE AT BAR. The contention is without merit. Falsus in
unofalsus inomnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in modernjurisprudence.Trier of
facts are notbound to believe all that any witness has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and
reject other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to be thetruth . . .
Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars,the jury are not
required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but may credit suchportions as they deem worthy
of belief.


transcript ofstenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact firm and consistent on the fact of rape
andlascivious conduct committed on her by accused-appellant. She answered in clear, simple andnatural words
customary of children of her age.


COURT; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.Contrary to thecontentions of accused-appellant, the records reveal
that Rosilyn positively and unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the courtroom. Such identification
during the trial cannot be
diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accused-appellant as her abuser based
on the name she heard from the person to whom she was introduced and on the name she saw and read in
accused-appellant's office.


settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be provedby the presentation of her birth
certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have
been considered by the trial court because said birthcertificate has already been ordered cancelled and
expunged from the records by the Regional TrialCourt of Manila, Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-
81893, dated April 11, 1997. Even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and
ample proof of the complainant's age in the records. Rosilyn's Baptismal Certificate can likewise serve as
proofof her age. In People v. Liban, we ruled that the birth certificate, or in lieu thereof.


Campuhan, we explained that thephrase, "the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of
consummating thesexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.Theinevitable contact between
accused-appellant's penis, and at the very least, the labia of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she
felt pain inside her vagina when the "idiniin" part ofaccused-appellant's sex ritual was performed.

. STATUTORY RAPE; ELEMENTS; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — At the time of commission of the
crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape was penalizedunder Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which
amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:When and how rape is committed. — Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a womanunder any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force
or intimidation; 2. When the woman isdeprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is
under twelve years of age or is demented

In Re: Raul Gonzales, 160 SOV. 711

6. Echece vs. CA. 198 SOV. 577 

Jocom vs. Regalado, 201 SOV. 73

Cuevas et al. v. Bacal, [G.R. No. 139382. December 6, 2000]

This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive service officers (CESOs). More
specifically, it concerns the “appointment” of respondent Josefina G. Bacal, who holds the rank of CESO III, to
the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office, which has a CES Rank Level I, and her
subsequent transfer, made without her consent, to the Office of the Regional Director of the PAO because of
the appointment of Atty. Carina Demaisip to the position of Chief Public Defender (formerly Chief Public
Attorney). Atty. Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto ruled in her favor by the Court of Appeals. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari.

 (1) Bacal is entitled of security of tenure considering that she belongs to Career Service;
 (2) security of tenure in the Career Executive Service is acquired with respect to the position or to the rank
the officer is holding;
 (3) CESOs may be shifted from one position to another without violating their security of tenure;
 (4) Bacal’s unconsented transfer from Acting Chief Public Attorney to Regional Director constitutes a
 (1) No. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of
tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend
on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not
have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an
exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate
eligibles. Here, Atty. Bacal has a rank of CESO III “appointed” to a position of CESO I. The appointment
extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
 (2) Security of tenure in the career executive service is acquired with respect to rank and not to position.The
guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the particular positions to which
they may be appointed a concept which is applicable only to first and second-level employees in the civil
service but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President. Here, respondent did not acquire
security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to the higher position of Chief Public Attorney
since she was not subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that position
as required by the rules of the CES Board.
 (3) Yes. Members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred from one position to
another and from one department, bureau or office to another;provided that such reassignment or transfer is
made in the interest of public service and involves no reduction in rank or salary; provided, further, that no
member shall be reassigned or transferred oftener than every two years. If a CESO is assigned to a CES
position with a higher salary grade than that of his CES rank, he is allowed to receive the salary of the CES
position. Should he be assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade, he shall
continue to be paid the salary attached to his CES rank. Here, there is a valid transfer of Atty. Bacal to the
Regional Office as it was made in the interest of public service and she is still compensated according to her
CES rank.
 (4) No. Respondent’s appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was merely temporary and that,
consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of Regional Director of the same office, which
corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a demotion, much less a violation of the security of
tenure guarantee of the Constitution. The rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of
tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed – not merely assigned – to a particular station. Such a rule
does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to
periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency.


MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 155336
November 25, 2004
FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided
for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of
these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide additional
source of funding for said staffing modification.

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.

In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital
Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments
be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and file
employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversedthe recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and
upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that
such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?
HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM
are disallowed.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall
establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed
considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.

This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or
conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.

2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and
other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM
are unauthorized and irregular

In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the
compensation and position classification system of the national government.

In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the
compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations
of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the
compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.

(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation
structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of
Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBM’s function is merely to ensure
that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that
PPC’s compensation system “conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” )
3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be
sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is
consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National
Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement
of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation
and position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of
legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of
positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped
from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity

4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.

Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of
constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence and
fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other
bodies including the CHR. Thus:

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police commission.
Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and planning

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the
class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise,
expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.

Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal
autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the
freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and
dispatch its needs may require from time to time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is
understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman,
which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable
by membership.

We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the
CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and
implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional
Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of
offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the
grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary
Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to
formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the
compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of
the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly
known as the Compensation Standardization Law.

5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522
“that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits
authorized under compensation standardization laws.”26

Malonzo vs. 311 sav. 224

Hipolito vs. 195 SCAA 6

Civil Service Commission vs. Jose Lucas
On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the Agricultural Information Division,
Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity), filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint
against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for misconduct.
Based on the description of the petitioner, while she was standing before a mirror, near the office door of Jose
Lucas, she noticed a chair at her right side which Mr. Lucas sit at that very instant. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas bent
to reach for his shoe, and at that moment she felt Mr. Lucas hand touching her thigh and running down his palm
up to her ankle. She was shocked and suddenly faced Mr. Lucas and admonished him not to do it again or she
will kick him. But Mr. Lucas touched her again and so she hit him. A verbal exchange then ensued; she was
thrown out of the door, and was told never to enter the office again.
On June 8, 1992, the Board of Personnel Inquiry of DA issued a summons requiring the respondent to answer
the complaint. According to Lucas, he did not touch the thigh of the complainant and what happened was that
he accidentally brushed complainant’s leg while reaching for his shoe.
After a formal investigation, respondent was found guilty of simple misconduct with a penalty of suspension for
1 month and 1 day.
In due time, respondent brought his case to the Civil Service Commission. Thereafter, the CSC issued a
resolution finding the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposing on him a penalty of dismissal from
the service. Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.
Then, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA set aside the resolution of the CSC and reinstated
the resolution of BOPI of DA. The CA further assailed that the respondent was not given due process as he was
not informed of the modification of the charge against him, the distinctions of simple and grave misconduct. He
only came to know of the changes when he received the notice of the resolution dismissing him from service.
1. WON respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on
a charge of simple misconduct.
2. WON the act complained of constitutes grave misconduct.

1. The SC sustained the ruling of the CA that the basic requirement of due process is that a person must be
duly informed of the charges against him, and that a person cannot be convicted of a crime which he
was not charged. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.
2. Under the circumstances, the act of the respondent is not constitutive of grave misconduct, in the
absence of proof that respondent was maliciously motivated. It has also been noted that the respondent
has been in the service for 20 years and this is his first offense.

By: rgl


Garcia vs Executive Secretary GR No 101273 03 July 1992

11WednesdayMar 2015

Posted by Rachel Chan in Case Digests, Constitutional Law I

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Facts: Executive Order no 475 imposed an additional duty of 9% on crude oil and oil products while Executive
Order 478 imposed a special duty on crude oil and oil products. Petitioners claimed that both EOs are
unconstitutional because all revenue measures must originate from the House of Representatives and the Tariff
and Customs Code authorized the president to increase the tariff duties only to protect local industries but not
to raise additional revenue for the government.
Issue: Whether or not the tariff rates imposed are valid?
Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The assailed Executive Orders are valid. Congress may by law
authorize the president to fit tariff rates and other duties within specified limits. The issuance of these EOs
authorized by Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. There is nothing in the law that suggests
that the authority may only be exercised to protect local industries. Custom duties may be designated to
achieve more than one policy objective the protection of local industries and to raise revenue for the