[A.C. No. 6486.
September 22, 2004] From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that
EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G.
DANTES, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one
requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of law is
regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has good moral
character, and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in
accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is
not only a condition precedent[1] to the practice of law, but an unending
requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found
guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.[2]
In an Affidavit-Complaint[3] dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her
husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality, abandonment,
and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD
Case No. 01-851.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent
purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other,
and had illegitimate children with them. From the time respondents illicit affairs
started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus
forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their childrens
needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a
violation of his lawyers oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role
model to the community.
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued
an Order[4] requiring respondent to submit his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer[5] on November 19, 2001. Though
admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of their
children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate
eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their
Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent
claimed that when complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted that
she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were
residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment.
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he
could afford and provided for their needs. He even bought two lots in
Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate
financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him
to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the
complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and
documentary,[6] to support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.
on January 19, 1979, complainant and respondent were married [7] and lived
with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth
year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and sell
business and relied on dole-outs from the respondents mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and
Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980,[8] October 14, 1981[9] and August
11, 1983,[10] respectively. Complainant narrated that their relationship was
marred by frequent quarrels because of respondents extra-marital
affairs.[11] Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her mother in
Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent had failed to provide
adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a
domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent
to live separately, complainant asseverated that she was just compelled to work
abroad to support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she
learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then
bluntly told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he
preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth
certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave,[12] all surnamed Dantes,
and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour [13] to prove the fact that
respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two
different women. Letters of complainants legitimate children likewise support
the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.[14]
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived
his right to cross-examine complainant, after he failed to appear during the
scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however, submitted
his Comment/Opposition to the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with
Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the Records of the
Proceedings[15] on August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt
Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondents motion was denied
because it was filed after the complainant had already presented her
evidence.[16] Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence
on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a
prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline.Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.
In respondents Position Paper,[17] he reiterated the allegations in
his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the resolution of the
complaint for support with alimonypendente lite[18] filed against him by the
complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,[19] the
instant administrative case should be dismissed for lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar
Confidant its Report[20] and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case
No. 01-851.[21] The IBP recommended that the respondent be suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been
defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community.[22] To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree[23] or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency.[24]
In Barrientos vs. Daarol,[25] we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer
of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the
practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals,
those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but
should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of
good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three
ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public
image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth:
to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[26]
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain
their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. [27] They may be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[28]
Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two
different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant
constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate
sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity
and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting
moral standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.[29]
In Toledo vs. Toledo,[30] we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful
wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise,
in Obusan vs. Obusan,[31] we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming
carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,[32] that moral delinquency
which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community
as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. [33] Where a lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed.[34] However, in the present case, the
seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a
member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant
Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the
Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner
described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his
answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not
disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with
the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his
office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent
part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia
Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down
to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she"
(complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the
respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he
covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her
to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the
floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her
family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had
sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her
hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the
sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster
parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family.
She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that
afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the
house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and
gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n.,
hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard
by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because
of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the
respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was
alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for
him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of
influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt
Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n.,
hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the
complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that
after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil
Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office
of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative
case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the
complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their
clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents,
but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited
himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before
she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual
intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the
second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place
before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual
intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his
house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her
when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents'
intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask
permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my
common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by
the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia,
explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could
not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx xxx xxx
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of
the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under
circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are
convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but
repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after
the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of
the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned
cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The
respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long
after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the
spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows
that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship
with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could
not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of
age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2,
1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence
and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he could not
fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so
that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of
his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated
him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he
is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was
17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist
him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed
a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of
good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court
permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first
Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented
himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an
adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive,
knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage
still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar
examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he
 would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year
or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then
permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason
of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the
same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent
disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for
membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the
office of a lawyer.
xxx xxx xxx
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due
hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from
his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other
misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he
appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately
alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good
moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time
maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of
Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe
to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render
judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office
as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense
that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said
complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and
that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128
of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for
additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to
receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of
which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked
leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the
same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been
proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That
no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent
when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is
not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law
wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met
respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She
and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by
the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines)
at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur
(t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24)
as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him
she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to
stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26).
Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk
about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to
Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as
'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry
him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister
Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go
with her because she and respondent 'had already a good
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and
went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent
was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for
her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her
legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named
Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in
1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29).
Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact,
she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court
Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later
date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16,
1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the
complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and
his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when
she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the
time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for
her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted
Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by
her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house,
who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the
other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he
and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife;
that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she
confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines)
was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away,
because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join
her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told
 Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never
to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to
Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with
him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as
he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband
(Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was
already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live
with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide'
from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman'
(Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because
he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the
fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he
was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor
General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit
perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the
bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8,
March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1)
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit
relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts
on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed
gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after
he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the
truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations,
being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that
the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent,
through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on
April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral
argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly
filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual
relations with the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore
him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with
Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant
Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married
woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment
notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent
has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that
the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among
those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a
lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is
not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy
members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper
administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory
authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the
power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a
fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958
ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that
the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may
provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted
doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of
creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of
the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for
other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from
our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private
and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for
the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted,
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not
specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an
attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional
or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of
this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds.
Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the
moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before
complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual
intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared
— and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking
her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of
the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant
was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy
over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed:
"He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood,
Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering
her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral
ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him."
Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant
reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction
for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has,
by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a
member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute
sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the
ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the
following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of
Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney
and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule
prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an
attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice
of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance
of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly
bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of
the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so
would be — as the Solicitor General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment
from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous
relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do
not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in
effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to
the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and
character degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if
he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not
controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of
decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the
prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the
respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in
that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of
propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his
admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse
for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to
extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the
complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more
revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means
he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then
free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married
woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's
niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct
therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal
profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to
possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his
authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and
perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally
charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence
adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient
ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to
the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion,
whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders
differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent.
— If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied
with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme
Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme
Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same
within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules
requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense
charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment.
Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient
grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The
Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent
he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of
himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention
is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his
moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and
not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran
observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good
moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or
from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held
by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the
standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to
persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely
enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
[1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v.
Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v.
Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral
character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous
life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to
have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral
character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now
as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein
respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against
respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross
Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula]
seek the legal advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her
collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand
Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the concerned
parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato,
Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway
Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After
the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step
out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and
embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met
respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize
the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent
offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way,
complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just
got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after
corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was
almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face
and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant
even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and
immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing
him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to
get back the case folder from him. The communications transpired was
recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:
Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to refer it withwas living
At 5:33:46 pm
replied by respondent - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"
at 6:16:11 pm (Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)
sent by complainant - I feel bad. I can’t expect that u will take advan
at 6:17:59 pm the situation.
Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you
Sent by complainant have relationship with her.
At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by respondent - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking advantage of the sit
At 6:32:43 pm put it rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri"
sorry. Its not taking advantage of the situation,
rightly it is an expression of feeling)
Follow up message - I’m s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I c
by respondent my sincerity" (I’m so sorry. I’ll not do it again. W
at 6:42:25 pm see me so I can show you my sincerity)
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to
complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I don’t know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im
realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I don’t know what to do so you may forgive me.
I’m really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was
received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. I’m really sri. Pls. Nxt ime
bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really sorry. Please next time behave na ko),
which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.2
In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to
the complainant; that he met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6
March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which
complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and
Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant
rode with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the
former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and
Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street
teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts
imputed to him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal
case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent
pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal
name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married to
a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their
marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant
other with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered
lawyer
to discuss respondent’s fees and it was respondent who always paid for their
bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on
26 July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa
submitted his Report and Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of
the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March
2006, approving and adopting, with modification, the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the
behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a lawyer
when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.5
The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts
that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with
respondent’s actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms
of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal
society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high
degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs
with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I – x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral
character is a continuing condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in
good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite
condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we
emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is
no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only
the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and
gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing
less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as
officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. 8 We
explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must
not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain
their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.10
In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person
really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four
ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public
image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.12
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.
In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She
offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her
right face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and
she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek
and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek
towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No
intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done.
Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except
saying "sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona
Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following
events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met … I fetched her I should say, somewhere along
the corner of Edsa and Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting
each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and
Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so
I said … she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like
that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to
Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed
about her case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be
okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red
wine. After that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said … it’s about
9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, let’s go. So when I said let’s go
so I stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she
followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told me just
drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the last
meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt
Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She
offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand, I ...
should I say tilted her face towards me and when she’s already facing me I
lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night. She went down the
car, that’s it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said let’s go because I have an appointment.
So we went out, we went inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she
said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down , before she opened
the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the
use of my left hand, pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again softly
on the lips and that’s it. x x x.14 (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity
which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced
may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such
conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for
such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be
immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly
immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he
abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne
him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved
that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a
married woman. This court declared that respondent failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondent’s act of engaging in illicit relationships with
two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant
constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition of appropriate
sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and
exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent,
a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as
chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said
college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under
the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he
abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman into
marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract
marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and
then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch
pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage
and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children,
for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such,
"there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married
woman and left complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years.
We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession," warranting respondent’s disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife
was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of
respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the
Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated
marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to
maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is expected of
members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.26
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on
the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of
greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning the
head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful.
However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be
considered grossly immoral.
Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of
his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him,
deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must
establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by
the Court of its disciplinary power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not
he who denies, must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof
lies on the party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit,
non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit.31 In
the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof
required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the
same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right
after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the
respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately
extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The
exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this
out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several
people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney
route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he
could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he
could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not
grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a
lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of a number of
factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must
consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the
public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the
profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.34 Disciplinary
proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring
those who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and
reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 35 While it is
discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem
proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by
the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the
bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to
his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for
the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral
character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a
lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly
show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious
character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer
to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is
meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the
commission of the offense should also be considered. 36
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of
a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty
to the court or the client.37 In the Matter of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was
publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her
blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct
which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this
is respondent’s first offense, reprimand would suffice.
We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to
be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to
come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct.
However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial,
and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto
Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent
is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with
his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be
imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.

EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO, Adm. Case No. 6589
Complainant, versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR.,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
December 19, 2005
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated 02
October 1997,[1] Epifania Q. Bantolo charged Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. of
violating the lawyers oath and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for
having (i) wittingly or willingly performed, promoted, or sued any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, and or giving aid or consent to the same; (ii) delayed the
just execution of the suit without legal or justifiable cause and employing illegal
means and unlawful force to do so; (iii) blatantly showed disrespect to the
Regional Trial Court by disobeying its lawful orders; and (iv) for employing
unlawful and illegal means to attain his ends.
According to complainant, respondent is the lawyer and one of the defendants
in a case involving a parcel of land in Valderrama, Antique. [2] The case was
decided in favor of the complainant and her co-plaintiffs, and thereafter, a writ of
execution was issued, by virtue of which, defendants were ejected from the
property. However, respondents, with his co-defendants subsequently entered
the disputed property and harvested the palay planted therein. [3] Plaintiffs were
prompted to move for defendants to be declared in contempt of court because
of their open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court,
which were abetted by the acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon who is an officer of
the court.[4]On 25 January 1991, the trial court declared Atty. Castillon and his
co-defendants guilty of indirect contempt of court, with the penalty of one month
imprisonment and fine.[5] Subsequently, on 26 July 1994, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the modification that instead of
imprisonment, defendants were ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.[6]
In his Answer to Complaint dated 02 March 1998, respondent denied
complainants allegations and claimed that said complaint was a form of
harassment.[7] Hearings were thereafter scheduled but were cancelled and
reset due to the unavailability of the complainant. Finally, on 09 December
1998, a hearing for the reception of complainants evidence was
conducted.[8] While notices were subsequently sent to respondent setting the
case for reception of his evidence, no such hearing pushed through due to
respondents failure to inform the IBP of his new office address. Thus,
respondent was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence.[9]
In the Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 17 March 2004, the
investigating commissioner, Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, found that
complainant failed to prove that respondents actions, with respect to his
unsuccessful defense of the case were not within the bounds of the law.
Moreover, that respondent lost his case in the trial court does not necessarily
support the charge of willingly promoting or ruing any groundless, false or
unlawful suit or giving aid, or consenting to the same, [10] he added. Thus,
according to the IBP, the only remaining issue to be resolved is respondents
liability, if any, for his contumacious acts, as found by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals.[11]
Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the appellate court with
respect to respondents contumacious acts as final and conclusive, it was found
that respondent committed an act which constitutes a breach of his sworn
promise to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities. Furthermore, the Report noted respondents attempts to thwart the
instant disbarment proceedings, to wit: i) attempt to mislead the Commission on
Bar Discipline by representing that the proceedings relative to the contempt
charges against him are still pending when in fact they had already been
terminated; ii) placing too much emphasis on the alleged lack of personality of
the complainant to file the disbarment complaint; and iii) failure to notify the
Commission of his change of address.[12]
Finding however, that the penalty of disbarment would be reasonable under the
circumstances, the Commission recommended instead the penalty of
suspension for one month.[13] As explained in the Report:
A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that the
basis of the act for which the court found to be contumacious is
a claim of ownership over the subject property, and thus arose
from an emotional attachment to the property which they had
possessed prior to their dispossession as a consequence of the
decision in Civil Case No. 1345. Respondents subsequent acts,
however, including those which were found to be
contumacious, as well as his actuations in the instant case,
merit disciplinary sanctions, for which is recommended that
respondent be suspended for one (1) month.[14]
On 30 July 2004, the IBP passed a resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO, XVI-2004-376
CBD Case No. 510
Epifania Q. Bantolo vs.
Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent
has been found by both the Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of
execution and for attempting to mislead the Commission into
believing that the contempt charge is still pending by submitting
an Order of the trial court which pertains to a second contempt
charge, Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) month.
The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken.
Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and
this deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may
subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary
sanctions as well.[15] Such is the situation in the instant case. We need not delve
into the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the
contempt case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyers
commission of the contumacious acts have been shown and proven, and
eventually punished by the lower courts.
A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he
owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of his client he must ensure
that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that
he is an instrument of truth and justice. More importantly, as an officer of the
court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice,
graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the
integrity of the courts[16] and to show respect to its processes. Thus, any act on
his part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the
administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct calling for the
exercise of disciplinary action against him.[17]
Respondents defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen display of
disrespect of the very system which he has sworn to support. Likewise, his
various attempts to delay and address issues inconsequential to the disbarment
proceedings had necessarily caused delay, and even threatened to obstruct the
investigation being conducted by the IBP.
Nevertheless, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not proper in the
instant case. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer
from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers when the evidence calls for it, it will
also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.[18] In the case of respondent, the Court finds that a months suspension
from the practice of law will provide him with enough time to purge himself of his
misconduct and will give him the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the
virtuous path of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon is found GUILTY of
gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) month with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon notice of
this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondents record as an
attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5161 April 14, 2004
ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant
Isidra Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with
presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise
against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of
profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the
canons of legal and judicial ethics.
The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante
and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria;
Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and
Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit:
a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
containing an area of 43,908 square meters more or less, and covered
at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite;
b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an
area of 16,073 square meters, more or less, and covered at that time
by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an
area of 22,131 square meters, more or less and covered at that time by
TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship
with her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was
lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or
immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise
against, the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-
law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that
they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and
Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented
that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the
title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was
later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already
made to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise
against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when
he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas
contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the
Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in
favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or
falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel
Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated by
Felicisima and Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial
Reconstitution of the Original Copy and Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT
No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Cavite, filed by complainant’s sisters Marcelina and
Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the respondent made gross
misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that
Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late
spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining
a new title in their names. With the reconstituted title, and with the
express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were
able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited
from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment
was even received pending the reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false
misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he
requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full
 payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution
would be released within a month when he knew that it would be
impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case
only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even
used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an
employee.
In his Comment,2 the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and
asserts that he did not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the
co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law.
Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and
Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither
can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated
17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of
the document. All the while he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had
already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever complainant’s signature
was affixed on that document, it was done in good faith.
The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et.
al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false
testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were the only
children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on
him because such was a clear oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to
Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his wife. His conformity
through his signature was pro-forma because the property was a paraphernal
property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his alleged gross and false
misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would be released by the end
of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk
of Court, Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually
uncontested and granted by courts.
Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in
bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil
Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus
Damages"; and a criminal case for Estafa and Falsification of Public
Documents.
In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly
made by her mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in
view of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden death in
1967; and partition of the properties in total disregard of their father was morally
reprehensible, since the latter was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of
the siblings were still minors including respondent’s wife herself; (3) on 5
February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter of
Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of a toka. She further
states that the respondent was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he
admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses.
On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision. 3
On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues
presented by both parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the
respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended
that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.4
In its Resolution No. XV-2003-3335 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of
the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juan’s report, but reduced
the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years.
We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and
conclusion of culpability. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he
is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of
the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his
sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the
hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus:
LAWYER'S OATH
I, ……………… , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money
or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate
themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow,
but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By
swearing the lawyer’s oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law,
as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice. 6 This oath
is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
...
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
…
 Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
...
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system.
When the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he
made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent
miserably failed.
The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are the children of
Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the
exclusion of their other siblings.7 There was concealment of the fact that there
were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the
respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to complainant’s
sister, he knew of his wife’s siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant
stayed with them while she was in the Philippines.8 Yet, the respondent
presented that document to the Register of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to
effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his
sister-in-law Miriam.
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted 9 regarding the
falsification of complainant’s signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement10 dated 17
March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the
complainant of her right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed
complainant’s name in that document.11 Such act of counterfeiting the
complainant’s signature to make it appear that the complainant had participated
in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of a public
document.12
Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and
against committing falsification, he presented13 such document to the Registry
of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife. 14 He
himself, therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified
document to the damage of the complainant and her other co-heirs.15 Notably,
he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal
documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.16
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which
are contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a
lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold
the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional
Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon
that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for law and legal processes.17 For a lawyer is the servant of the
law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the
administration of law and the dispensation of justice.18 As such, he should make
himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.19 He should not, therefore,
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.20 He makes
himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act
or conduct.21
Respondent’s argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-
law Marcelina of the other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution
of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not deserve credence in
view of the following circumstances: First, the petition clearly names only
Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six siblings who
were heirs of the unpartitioned lot.22 Second, during the hearing of said case
when the respondent asked Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters
other than Felicisima, the latter said none. The transcript of that hearing reads:
ATTY. TORRES:
Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased
Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita Reynante?
WITNESS:
A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.
Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?
A None, sir.23
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false
testimony24 in court, and he never corrected the same despite full knowledge of
the true facts and circumstances of the case. 25 Moreover, in knowingly offering
in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false
testimony.26
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall "not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice."27 This Rule was clearly and openly
violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that
she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony
in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the
court called upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself,
he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part
that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct
and justifies disciplinary action against him.28
It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he
offered in evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and
notarized by him. During the hearing of this administrative case, Marcelina
admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title was in her possession
was false, as she was never in possession of the title 29 and would not,
therefore, know that the same was lost.
Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong,
the respondent requested the release of 50% of the remaining balance for the
sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was
assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title
for Lot 1605 would be released within the month.30 Respondent’s information
was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or
almost a year after he sent the letter.31 Such act, therefore, shows lack of
candor and honesty on the part of the respondent.
Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring
intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct
for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring
lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings,
which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable
men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 While the
assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our
sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be
controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar.33
Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an
erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence
calls for it.34 Verily, given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this
case, we find that respondent’s gross misconduct calls for the severance of his
privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty
recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S.
Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as
Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering
him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which
shall forthwith record it in the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of
the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate
copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial
agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 932 June 21, 1940
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General
against the respondent Roque Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice
and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him.
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his
wife Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on
contracting a second marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who
was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental
Negros. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the
latter that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and
asked him to bring his wife on the afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939.
This was done and the respondent right then and there prepared the document
Exhibit A in which it was stipulated, among other things, that the contracting
parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the
same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have
against the party so marrying. After the execution and acknowledgment of
Exhibit A by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands and
assured them that they were single and as such could contract another and
subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?"
Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and, pointing to his diploma hanging
on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid."
Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939,
contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to
show that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as
the evidence on this point is not clear and the same is not material in the
resolution of the present case, we do not find it necessary to make any express
finding as to whether the full amount or any portion thereof was paid or, as
contended by the respondent, the service were rendered free of charge.
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense
that he had the idea that seven years separation of husband and wife would
entitle either of them to contract a second marriage and for that reason
prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said document he
realized that he had made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for
the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and signed
the deed of cancellation Exhibit A.
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the
spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the
respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as
a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital
foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation
and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which
justifies disbarment from the practice of law. The admission of a lawyer to the
practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the
privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to
society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the
law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of
a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege
should be declared terminated. In the present case, respondent was either
ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving
the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and
this is the opinion of some members of the court. The majority, however, have
inclined to follow the recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero
Rodas, in view of the circumstances stated in the report of said investigator and
the fact that immediately after discovering his mistakes, respondent endeavored
to correct it by making the parties sign another document cancelling the
previous one.
The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
G.R. No. 105909 June 28, 1994
MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, and PHILIPPINE
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondents.
Felix E. Mendiola for petitioner.
Makalintal, Barot, Torres & Ibarra for respondent Philippine Petroleum
Corporation.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner questions and seeks the nullification of the resolution of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 27504 dated March 31, 1992, dismissing
the petition for having been filed by a private counsel, as well as its succeeding
resolution dated June 9, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 1
The records show that on March 17, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Tanay,
Rizal, Branch 80, rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 057-T in favor of plaintiff,
now herein petitioner Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, against defendant, now herein
private respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC, for short), ordering
therein defendant to pay said plaintiff (1) the amount of P5,301,385.00
representing the tax on business due from the defendant under Section 9(A) of
Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of said municipality for the period from 1979 to
1983, inclusive, plus such amount of tax as may accrue until final determination
of the case; (2) storage permit fee in the amount of P3,321,730.00 due from the
defendant under Section 10, paragraph Z(13)
(b-1-c) of the same municipal tax ordinance for the period from 1975 to 1986,
inclusive, plus the amount of said fee that may accrue until final determination
of the case; (3) mayor's permit fee due from the defendant under Section 10,
paragraph (P) (2) of said municipal tax ordinance from 1975 to 1984, inclusive,
in the amount of P12,120.00, plus such amount of the same fee as may accrue
until final determination of the case; (4) sanitary inspection fee in the amount of
P1,010.00 for the period from 1975 to 1984, plus the amount of this fee that
may accrue until final determination of the case; and (5) the costs of suit. 2
On June 3, 1991, in G.R. No. 90776 this Court affirmed the aforesaid judgment,
with the modification that business taxes accruing prior to 1976 are not to be
paid by PPC because the same have prescribed, and that storage fees are not
also to be paid by PPC since the storage tanks are owned by PPC and not by
the municipality and, therefore, cannot be the bases of a charge for service by
the municipality.3 This judgment became final and executory on July 13, 1991
and the records were remanded to the trial court for execution.
On October 14, 1991, in connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty.
Felix E. Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of plaintiff municipality with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal* for the examination of
defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to
1991 for the purpose of computing the tax on business imposed under the Local
Tax Code, as amended. On October 21, 1991, defendant corporation filed a
manifestation to the effect that on October 18, 1991, Pililla Mayor Nicomedes
Patenia received from it the sum of P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the
above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court, as evidence by the release
and quitclaim documents executed by said mayor. Accordingly, on October 31,
1991 the court below issued an order denying plaintiff municipality's motion for
examination and execution of judgment on the ground that the judgment in
question had already been satisfied.4
Thereafter, on November 21, 1991 Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's aforesaid order of October 31, 1991, claiming that
the total liability of defendant corporation to plaintiff municipality amounted to
P24,176,599.00, while the amount involved in the release and quitclaim
executed by Mayor Patenia was only P12,718,692; and that the said mayor
could not waive the balance which represents the taxes due under the judgment
to the municipality and over which judgment the law firm of Atty. Mendiola had
registered two liens for alleged consultancy services of 25% and attorneys' fees
of 25% which, when quantified and added, amount to more than P12 million.
On January 28,1992, the trial court denied the aforesaid motion for
reconsideration.5
On February 18, 1992, Atty. Mendiola, again ostensibly in behalf of herein
petitioner municipality, filed a petition for certiorari with us, which petition we
referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and was docketed therein
as CA-G.R. SP No. 27504.6 On March 2, 1992, respondent PPC filed a motion
questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority to represent petitioner
municipality.7 Consequently, on March 31, 1992 respondent Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of
law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by
the Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal
officer.8Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution of June 9, 1992.9
Petitioner is once again before us with the following assignment of errors:
1. It is an error for the Court of Appeals to consider private
respondent's new issue raised for the first time on appeal, as it
could no longer be considered on appeal, because it was never
been (sic) raised in the court below.
2. It is an error for the Court of Appeals in dismissing (sic) the
instant petition with alternative remedy of filing similar petition
as it is a departure from established jurisprudence.
3. It is an error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the filing of
the instant petition by the private counsel is in violation of law
and jurisprudence.10
We find the present petition devoid of merit.
The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority
to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. The
matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled
in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,11 and reiterated in Province of Cebu
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,12 where we ruled that private attorneys
cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and
provincial subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall
represent the province and any municipality or municipal district
thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original
jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where
the municipality or municipal district in question is a party
adverse to the provincial government or to some other
municipality or municipal district in the same province. When
the interests of a provincial government and of any political
division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on
behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any
municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a
special attorney may be employed by its council.13
Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264,
the Local Autonomy Law,14 only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney
can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is
mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent
it.15
For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was
disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on
record.16 In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on
appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of
law.
The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to include
situations wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be
sustained. The fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal
justification for employing the services of private counsel. Unlike a practicing
lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse to
perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his
oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the
municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting
provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and
prosecute its case in court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised
Administrative Code.17
It is also significant that the lack of authority of herein counsel,
Atty. Mendiola, was even raised by the municipality itself in its comment and
opposition to said counsel's motion for execution of his lien, which was filed with
the court a quo by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of
said municipality.18
The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the
first time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality is
untenable. The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of
the proceedings. In the cases hereinbefore cited, 19 the issue of lack of authority
of private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised for the first time in
the proceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for services rendered in the
particular case, after the decision in that case had become final and executory
and/or had been duly executed.
Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty.
Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have been revoked
by the municipality when the latter, through the municipal mayor and without
said counsel's participation, entered into a compromise agreement with herein
private respondent with regard to the execution of the judgment in its favor and
thereafter filed personally with the court below two pleadings
entitled and constitutive of a "Satisfaction of Judgment" and a "Release and
Quitclaim".20
A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is
considered to have impliedly dismissed his lawyer. Herein counsel cannot
pretend to be authorized to continue representing the municipality since the
latter is entitled to dispense with his services at any time. Both at common law
and under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a client may dismiss his
lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings, and there is nothing
to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own
litigation.21
The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the
intervention of his lawyer.22 Even the lawyers' right to fees from their clients may
not be invoked by the lawyers themselves as a ground for disapproving or
holding in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement. The lawyers
concerned can enforce their rights in the proper court in an appropriate
proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court, but said rights may not be
used to prevent the approval of the compromise agreement.23
The apprehension of herein counsel that it is impossible that the municipality
will file a similar petition, considering that the mayor who controls its legislative
body will not take the initiative, is not only conjectural but without factual basis.
Contrary to his pretensions, there is presently a manifestation and motion
pending with the trial court filed by the aforesaid municipal mayor for the
withdrawal of the "Satisfaction of Judgment" and the "Release and
Quitclaim"24 previously filed in the case therein as earlier mentioned.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be signed by the

party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which
should not be a post office box.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same
was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this
Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report
to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary
action. (5a)