Snort Rules: Application

Paul Ritchey, Jacob and Sundstrom, Inc. pritchey@jasi.com

V1.0.0

1

Welcome to the class titled ‘Snort Rules: Application’. The purpose of this class is to take the material you learned in the previous section, ‘Snort Rules: Syntax and Keywords’. This section will take those individual keywords, values and syntax to form complete rules. You will also learn how to analyze existing rules piece by piece to determine what the rule is looking for.

1

Agenda
!

Rule Analysis
Simple Rules ! Difficult Rules ! Advanced Rules
!

!

Writing Rules
Simple Rules ! Difficult Rules ! Advanced Rules
!

!

Tying It All Together
2

The first half of this presentation will examine rules of increasing complexity. You will be taught how to analyze an existing rule to determine what it is looking for. This ability is key to understanding how to piece together a complete rule from scratch that matches the signature of an attack. The second half of the presentation will ask you to write rules from scratch of increasing difficulty. The process of creating these rules will be covered in a step by step process. This will show you a possible methodology you can use when creating rules on your own. The very last section will tie together everything you have learned so far, showing you a few of the options available for Snort output. This presentation covers Snort version 1.7. If you are using a newer version of Snort, please remember that new features may have been added or existing features may have been modified after this presentation was assembled.

2

Rule Analysis: Simple Rules

3

This section will show you how to analyze simple rules, step by step. The analysis skills learned here will be built upon in later sections to analyze rules of increasing difficulty. This will help you later when you will be required to write rules from scratch.

3

Rule Analysis: Simple Rules
! !

Learn to analyze simple rules.
!

Signature based on rule header.

Examples taken from snort.org rule set and www.whitehats.com. ! Use logical approach
!

Analyze rule header first
• Determine source and destination addresses and ports • Snort uses this section first.

!

Analyze rule options next
4

In this section you will learn how to analyze simple rules. The rules were chosen because they do not incorporate packet attributes which can make some rules difficult to analyze. These are real life rules, taken directly from the rule set available from the snort.org web site and www.whitehats.com. This means that it’s possible to do further research on the exploits that the rules are designed to detect to fully round out your understanding of rules. This section will start with teaching you how to analyze rules based on a logical approach. The first step is to analyze the rule header. This determines what hosts, ports, protocols and traffic flow must be involved before Snort even starts to examine the rest of the rule – this allows Snort to quickly determine if it should completely analyze the rule against the options section, saving valuable time. Later sections will combine the analysis of the rule header with the options section for more complicated rules.

4

Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice
!

Background:
Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected machine
!

!

Rule:
!

alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice";)

5

The first rule we are going to examine is one that looks for attempts at connecting Back Orifice trojans. This particular exploit works by means of a trojan that is somehow installed on the target machine. The trojan can be installed accidentally by end users running executables attached to email messages, downloading the trojan masquerading as a useful utility, etc. Once installed, the trojan opens a port and makes itself available for control from a remote host. Further information on this particular trojan can be obtained any of the major online security web sites. In depth analysis of this trojan is beyond the scope of this course.

5

be originating from any of the possible ports on the source host. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 6 For this simple rule. Alert means Snort will write an entry to the alert file and an entry to the logs unless they are overridden by command line options or other means. The destination address is defined as a variable. named EXTERNAL. the contents of the signature is completely contained in the rule header. when it is triggered. but must be destined specifically for the port 31337 (otherwise known as ‘eleet’) on the destination machine.) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. If snort the traffic Snort is examining is from another protocol. This rule only applies to UDP traffic. ! Applies only to UDP traffic. will execute the action ‘alert’. meaning that the source address should be outside of the network address space Snort is monitoring.) alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice". this rule will not be tested against them. and is set to the addresses Snort is monitoring. This rule. this is set to !$HOME_NET. 6 . Typically. In this particular rule. This variable is typically defined at the top of the rules file being used. however. HOME_NET. the source address is also defined as a variable.Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice (cont. The UDP packet can.

may very well be false-positives. 7 . that happens to be destined for destination port 31337 will trigger this rule. No packet attributes are examined. This rule is very simple.Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice (cont. it is seen that the only option being used is the message option. it is very likely that detects. ! ! Possibility of false-positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. This option provides a string that is used to tag alert and log entries. Any traffic. such as streaming audio or video. ! High likelihood of false-positives. making it easier to determine what a log or alert entry represents. Care must be taken when analyzing any available data to validate that the packet was truly a probe for Back Orifice or the master program contacting a Back Orifice client. The only thing limiting the rule down to a specific subset of UDP traffic is the destination port.) ! Examine rule options. ! 7 Examining the rule options section. although not often. Since no packet attributes or options are specified. ! Only includes message.) alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice".

) 8 The next simple rule we will examine is one that detects Deep Throat trojans.1 Server Active on Network". Deep Throat is another trojan that can be accidentally installed by users who unknowingly execute attachments or download the software by accident. the trojan opens a port that allows remote hosts to control the infected machine.DeepThroat 3.Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat Trojan ! Background Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected host.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . ! ! Rule: ! alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 . 8 . Once installed.

9 . It does not and should not see your internal traffic. Alert means Snort will write an entry to the alert file and an entry to the logs unless they are overridden by command line options or other means. will execute the action ‘alert’.1 Server Active on Network". This means that the packet can originate from any possible IP address. there are no restrictions. it will trigger the rule and will be logged to the alert file and logs with the message specified in the rule options section. Now the rule deviates from the previous example. The packet must be destined for the network the variable HOME_NET is set to. this rule will not be tested against them. the contents of the signature is again completely contained in the rule header.) alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 . Snort is typically installed on a machine that resides in a ‘DMZ’. Instead of specifying a variable for the source IP address. Because of this. or outbound from your network to the internet. The DMZ sites outside of your internal network. when it is triggered. Applies only to UDP traffic. including internal addresses. If snort the traffic Snort is examining is from another protocol. and sees all traffic in bound from the internet to your network.) ! Examine the rule header: ! ! ! Will ‘alert’ when triggered. However.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE \ DeepThroat 3. it would have been just as effective to replace the keyword ‘any’ with !$HOME_NET. ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = internal network 9 For this simple rule.Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat (cont. Source specified as ‘any’ • ‘Any’ matches all possible IP addresses. If the packet meets all of the above criteria. the keyword ‘any’ is specified. This rule. the packet must originate from a specific port – 2140. This rule only applies to UDP traffic. and to the specific port 6000. I would like take a second to discuss the keyword ‘any’ that was specified for the source address.

1 Server Active on Network". 10 . Both ports are ephemeral ports.\ DeepThroat 3.) alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 . This increases the chances that a detect is a false-positive so care must be taken to fully resolve any detects. making it easier to determine what a log or alert entry represents. This rule is very simple. Low likelihood of occurrence.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . 10 ! Possibility of false-positives: ! ! Examining the rule options section. meaning they are out of the reserved range. Although unlikely. we again that this rule like the previous example is only specifying the message option. ! ! No packet attributes are examined. Likelihood of detect being a false-positives. Only includes message. it’s possible that this port combination could be used during the course of a valid connection. Most virus software should be capable of detecting this trojan if properly installed and used regularly.) ! Examine rule options. This option provides a string that is used to tag alert and log entries. The only real limiting factors are the source and destination ports.Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat (cont. and because there are no other criteria for the rule false-positive detects may be made.

Essentially they provide additional information about packets that are considered hostile beyond source and destination IPs and ports. 11 .Rule Analysis: Complex Rules 11 In this section the rules presented for analysis are a little more complicated than the previous examples.

This section will continue to build on the rule analysis technique that was used in the first section. It consists of the rule header and additional information specified in the rule options. ! Examples taken from www.snort. Interpretation of the rule option section with different kinds of packet attributes will be introduced here. the signature doesn’t just consist of the contents of the rule header. 12 . ! Use logical approach ! Analyze rule header first ! Analyze rule options next ! • Specifies specific packet attributes • Can increase accuracy – decrease false positives 12 This section concentrates on analyzing more complicated rules – those containing packet attributes in the rule options section.snort. The example rules used in this section are real world rules.org rule set and www.com.Rule Analysis: Complex Rules ! Learn to analyze complex rules. By adding packet attributes (such as TCP flags) to the rule options section.whitehats. They have been taken from the rule sets available at the www. it’s possible to make rules more accurate.com web site. which can potentially reduce the number of false positives.org web site and from the www. In these rules. ! Signature also based on rule options.whitehats. Signature based on rule header.

13 .) 13 The rule we are going to examine next is one that detects the NetMetro trojan. flags:PA.Complex Rule #1: NetMetro ! Background: Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected machine ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 . Most virus detection software should detect this trojan as long as the signatures are properly maintained. NetMetro is another trojan that when installed allows remote control of the infected machine.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE – NetMetro Incoming Traffic". Again. or downloading the trojan as it masquerades as a useful utility or game. this trojan like any other can be accidentally installed by executing attachments to email messages.

If the source port is anything but 5031.Complex Rule #1: NetMetro (cont.) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. inclusive. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. 14 . but may also be set by command line options.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE .) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 .NetMetro Incoming Traffic". unless these options are overridden by command line options. The source port the traffic must originate from is port 5031. flags:PA. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. it will not match the rule header information and this rule will not be triggered. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 14 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file. It specifies that the destination port can be any port except ports 53 through 80. The destination port setting is more interesting.

15 . The addition of packet attributes (in this case TCP flags) to the rule options section aids in reducing the possibility of false positives because it helps to narrow the possibility of matches somewhat. although they will happen. the TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. outside the range specified by the destination port setting that specifies what ports it cannot be. In this case. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. ! No other packet attributes examined. ! High likelihood of being false positive.NetMetro Incoming\ Traffic".Complex Rule #1: NetMetro (cont. and the destination port must be outside the specified range. Other flags. The false positives are limited because the source port must exactly match 5031. If the port 5031 is used by the person connecting to your telnet server. To rule out the possibility of a detect being a false positive.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . additional data possibly beyond what Snort provides may need to be examined. it’s possible this rule may be triggered.) ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. No other packet attributes are examined beyond the TCP flag setting. For this particular rule. the rule will be triggered as soon as the TCP three way handshake is completed and the first packed with a payload is sent inbound to your network. For example. ! 15 This rule is the first example of packet attributes being used in the rule options section. such as SYN. The source port 5031 is an ephemeral port. if an outside user telnets in to a server in your network.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 . meaning that is not a reserved port and available for anyone and any application to use. there is a low likelihood of false positives. The attribute being tested is the TCP flags setting. URG and the two reserved bits must NOT be set. Telnet runs on port 23. flags:PA. FIN.

! Allows remote detection of available services and OS fingerprinting. ttl: >220. ack: 0. 16 . It can also allow the rule to be tuned to help eliminate false positives.myscan".Scan . ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 . Combined with the ability to determine the OS. This allowing an accurate rule to be written that can easily detect scans from this software. This particular scanner can allow an attacker to easily determine what services are available on a host. and the hacker now has enough information to launch an effective attack. increasing the accuracy. \ flags: S.) 16 The second difficult rule to be examined detects a particular tool used for scanning.Complex Rule #2: Myscan ! Background: Port scanner. For this scanner certain packet attributes are hard coded in the original source code.

This variable is set to the IP address range your sensor is to monitor. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. The destination port can be anything. flags: S. \ ack: 0. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 17 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. it will not match the rule header information and this rule will not be triggered. specified by the keyword ‘any’. The source port the traffic must originate from is port 10101.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 . ttl: >220. 17 .) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. unless these options are overridden by command line options. This means the rule does not care what port is used on the destination host.Scan -myscan".Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET. If the source port is anything but 10101. but may also be set by command line options. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file.

The last attribute. Low likelihood of occurrence.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 . The next slide will show you the individual parts that combined together make this happen. the packet attributes time to live (ttl). must have a value greater than or equal to 220. For this rule. but a very high likelihood that if it is triggered that it is NOT a false positive. TCP flags. The first attribute that is examined. ttl: >220. time to live. flags: S.) ! Examine the rule options: ! ! ! Time to live value must be greater than 220. 18 . must have the SYN flag set. there is a low likelihood that the rule will be triggered. TCP flag SYN must be set. Acknowledgement number must be zero (0). \ ack: 0. the acknowledgement number. Low likelihood of being false positive. The second attribute. must be zero (0).Scan -myscan".Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont. acknowledgement number (ack) and the TCP flag settings are examined. 18 ! Likelihood of false positives: ! ! In this rule’s option section. There are many key items that lead to this conclusion and show that this rule is a very well written one.

! Rule vulnerable to mutations.101. Under normal conditions. but it will not identify the utility being used).) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ \ (msg: "IDS439 . Cannot normally be set to zero (0). meaning the non-reserved ports.Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont. However it does depend on the above settings in the crafted packet not to be changed. it must have made many connections to other machines. The source code for this utility is freely available. only source addresses using that specific port might cause a trigger. ttl: >220. Ephemeral ports. ack: 0. 19 Time To Live ! Acknowledgement Number. The last item that contributes to the rule’s tuning is the acknowledgement attribute value. 19 . The rule specifies that this attribute must be set to the value zero (0). This makes it vulnerable to mutations of the scanning utility. that source port will be used.) ! ! ! ! Source Port ! High into ephemeral ports (non-reserved). the acknowledgement number can never be zero. They are typically used in sequence. Most operating systems specify a value much less than 220 when the packet is created. it is very unlikely – but possible. All of the above combine to make this a finely tuned rule that will not false positive very often. The second item that helps tune this rule is the time to live value. Only the Solaris 2. The first item that helps tune this rule is the specification of a specific port for the source port. Only one OS uses setting greater than 220. By specifying a specific value.x operating system sets the time to live attribute to a value greater than 220. and by making a single simple alteration and recompiling it the rule will no longer detect it (although Snort’s scan detection preprocessor should detect it.Scan -myscan". so for a source address to reach 10. Because the source port is such a high number. start at 1024 and go up. All other operating systems use values much less than 220. Only in a crafted packet will this value ever be used. flags: S.

They are also the easiest to avoid triggering by making slight alterations in the application’s source code.Rule Analysis: Advanced Rules 20 This section provides analysis of advanced rules – those using more sophisticated packet attributes to examine the packet’s payload. 20 . These types of rules also have the lowest likelihood of false positives because of the completeness of the examination of the packets. These rules are the most difficult to write because they require close analysis of an attack’s signature and of the source code of the attack application if available.

By adding packet attributes (such as TCP flags) to the rule options section. In these rules.snort. 21 .whitehats. it’s possible to make rules more accurate.org rule set and www.Rule Analysis: Advanced Rules ! Learn to analyze difficult rules.whitehats. The example rules used in this section are real world rules. ! Signature also based on rule options.com web site. ! Examples taken from www. Interpretation of the rule option section with different kinds of packet attributes will be introduced here. This section will continue to build on the rule analysis technique that was used in the first section. ! Use logical approach ! Analyze rule header first ! Analyze rule options next ! • Specifies specific packet attributes • Can increase accuracy – decrease false positives 21 This section concentrates on analyzing more complicated rules – those containing packet attributes in the rule options section.snort. Signature based on rule header. They have been taken from the rule sets available at the www. It consists of the rule header and additional information specified in the rule options.com. which can potentially reduce the number of false positives. the signature doesn’t just consist of the contents of the rule header.org web site and from the www.

FTP wuftp260-tf8".) \ \ \ 22 The first advanced rule we will examine is one that exploits a bug in an ftp daemon provided by www. In this case the exploit is known as the wuftp2600. content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB 4389 D941 B03F CD80|".Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit ! Background: Exploits a bug in wu-ftp daemon. flags: PA. as well as coming native in many Linux distributions. 22 . the attacker is instantly granted root access on a high numbered port that is opened up.c exploit which was originally distributed in a broken form. ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 (msg: "IDS458 .org that is used as a replacement for many native ftp daemons on some flavors of Unix. If the exploit is successful. ! Allows instant root access.wu-ftpd.

Port 21 is a well known reserved port that is used to provide FTP services.) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. the packet must be destined for port 21. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature.Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit (cont. flags: PA. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. meaning that the TCP packet can originate from any possible port on the source host. This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 23 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. unless these options are overridden by command line options. \ content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB \ 43 89D941 B03F CD80|". The source port is set to the keyword ‘any’. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 \ (msg: "IDS458 . However. but may also be set by command line options.FTP wuftp260-tf8". 23 .

24 . which is denoted by the enclosing pipe (‘|’) symbols. however these are typically other exploits which this rule doesn’t apply to and should have a different rule written to detect them. This rule is tuned ever so slightly by the TCP flags attribute. it’s very likely that it is a positive detect. more specifically an anonymous FTP session and initiating a buffer overflow. the PUSH and ACK TCP flags must be set. These packets will have the PUSH flag set indicating that data is being sent. It’s possible to have other flag settings without the PUSH flag set and still have a payload. For this rule. When detects do occur. two packet attributes are examined in order to detect the exploit.FTP wuftp260-tf8". ! Low likelihood of being false positive. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 \ (msg: "IDS458 . The examination of a packets payload is triggered by specifying the keyword ‘content’. The second attribute specified examines the packet’s payload. In this example the content that is being searched for is given in hex values.Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit (cont. The first attribute is the TCP flag settings. ! Examines payload for specific values. is very unlikely to occur during a normal FTP session.) ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. hence this rule’s high level of accuracy. \ content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB \ 4389 D941 B03F CD80|". detects will very rarely occur primarily because of the very specific content that is being searched for. ! 24 For this rule. although possible. Only packets with a payload should be applied against this rule. The content value. flags: PA. For this rule. The exploit detected here works by initiating a proper TCP connection.

nocase.) \ \ \ 25 The second advanced rule we will examine is a web based exploit. The exploit works because of a buffer overflow vulnerability. ! Allows arbitrary execution of code on server.exe|0d0a|user". which is one of the more lethal types of attacks an attacker can use.Web cgi cgitest".Advanced Rule #2: cgitest.exe’ is a CGI that if it is left installed on a particular web server can allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the web server.exe Exploit ! Background: Web exploit. content:"cgitest. which limits the possible ramifications of a successful attack that might exist on a Unix or Windows NT machine. flags: AP. The ‘cgitest. 25 . The web daemon affected by this vulnerability runs on Windows 95. ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 . offset:4.

! Applies only to TCP traffic. meaning that the TCP packet can originate from any possible port on the source host. the packet must be destined for port 80. nocase. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. flags: AP.Web cgi cgitest". This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor.exe|0d0a|user". but may also be set by command line options. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. offset:4. The source port is set to the keyword ‘any’. 26 . Port 80 is one of the most common ports used for web daemons. content: "cgitest. If there are web daemons used on your network using alternative ports.exe Exploit (cont.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 . The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 26 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. However. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file.Advanced Rule #2: cgitest. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. the rule should be duplicated for each of the ports being used.) \ \ \ ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. unless these options are overridden by command line options.

nocase.Advanced Rule #2: cgitest. For this rule. Only packets with a payload should be applied against this rule. and can be interspersed between each other. but by ignoring 3 bytes of every packet on a very busy network can quickly add up. two packet attributes are examined in order to detect the exploit. It’s possible to have other flag settings without the PUSH flag set and still have a payload.ext’ CGI on that server and causing a buffer overflow. detects will very rarely occur primarily because of the very specific content that is being searched for. This rule tells Snort to start examining the payload 4 bytes in. content: "cgitest. When detects do occur. This example shows how ASCII and hex values can be combined to form a payload signature. For this rule.exe|0d0a|user". offset:4. This informs Snort that for the ASCII content being searched for. only the ‘offset’ option is used.Web cgi cgitest". the PUSH and ACK TCP flags must be set.exe Exploit (cont. The content attribute can be a very resource intensive attribute to use. effectively ignoring the first 3 bytes. The examination of a packets payload is triggered by specifying the keyword ‘content’. ! 27 For this rule. These packets will have the PUSH flag set indicating that data is being sent. it can be tuned by specifying the ‘offset’ and ‘depth’ options. Note the use of the ‘nocase’ option. In this rule. The first attribute is the TCP flag settings.) \ \ \ ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. however these are typically other exploits which this rule doesn’t apply to and should have a different rule written to detect them. is very unlikely to occur during a normal web sessions by chance. To help reduce the overhead of processing that must take place. and then executing the ‘cgitest. The second attribute specified examines the packet’s payload. These options reduce the amount of a packet’s payload that must be inspected by Snort. although possible.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 . This may not seem like a lot. it can appear in any possible combination of upper and lower case letters possible. 27 . flags: AP. The content value. This rule is tuned ever so slightly by the TCP flags attribute. In this example the content that is being searched for is a combination of two sections of ASCII data and one section of hex values. The exploit detected here works by initiating a proper TCP connection to a web server. ! Examines payload for specific values. ! Low likelihood of being false positive. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. it’s very likely that it is a positive detect.

Keep in mind that for some types of rules there may be several possible answers.Writing Rules 28 In this section will demonstrate how to write a few rules from scratch of increasing difficulty. A specification for a needed rule will be provided. all of which may be correct. followed by a possible solution. 28 .

Writing Rules: Simple Rule ! Your boss wants to know about all ICMP echo requests (pings) coming into your network. 29 . The alert message should contain the text ‘Inbound Ping’. He would like to have Snort record this packets for future analysis and to see if there are any trends. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule. using the variable HOME_NET to represent your network address space. Write the rule. 29 Your boss is concerned about inbound ICMP echo requests from outside addresses. The rule should both alert and log. Write the rule using the variable HOME_NET to represent your network address space.

We were told that the variable HOME_NET would represent our internal network. Snort rules always require a port to be specified. In the rules option section we set the message option to the appropriate value as requested. We could have used any value for this field.) 30 According to the specification given on the previous slide.Writing Rules: Simple Rule (cont. itype: 8. so specifying the not sign (‘!’) with the HOME_NET variable represents all addresses except those in your network. it will be ignored by Snort when evaluating a packet against this rule. 30 . Therefore the protocol field is set to ICMP. We were also told to only record inbound ICMP echo requests. and the source address field is set to ‘!$HOME_NET’.) ! Possible Answer: alert icmp !$HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg:“Inbound Ping". We also used the ‘itype’ attribute with a value of ‘8’ to limit the rule to only record echo requests – otherwise known as pings. It is needed only to satisfy the rule parser when Snort reads and process the rules file on startup. the rule is to both alert and log. but ICMP does not use ports so we used the keyword ‘any’ as a placeholder. To do this. the rule’s action field must be set to the value ‘alert’.

Write a rule that will cause Snort to ignore all inbound TCP packets from the scanning machine.x. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule. including the satellite office you work at. Also list the command line option that must be included for this rule to be effective. 192.1. you decided to write a rule to ignore inbound packets from this scanning box. corporate headquarters decided to run a periodic scan against all IP addresses the company owns. The address space at the satellite office you work at is the Class B 10.168. What command line option must also be included? 31 In order to try to keep a step ahead of the hackers. Tired of filtering through the false positives caused by this routine scanning. including satellite offices. 31 .1.1.x.Writing Rules: Simple Rule #2 ! Corporate headquarters routinely runs a scan of all IPs owned by the company.

1/32 any -> 10. but also has a special requirement that must not be forgotten. Since the source port can vary. This causes Snort to process pass rules first.0/16 any ! Snort Command Line: ! Snort –c snortrules -o 32 This is a simple rule to write. 32 .1.1.0/16.) ! Possible Answer: ! pass tcp 192. the rule’s action field must be set to the value ‘pass’.1. This effectively ignores pass rules.0.Writing Rules: Simple Rule #2 (cont.1. To reverse this order. This tells Snort to drop the packet being inspected when the rule is triggered. it can be any in the entire range possible. 10.1. the keyword ‘any’. then alert and log rules. so the protocol field in the rule was set to the value ‘TCP’. In order for this rule to be effective.168. then the pass rules last. Snort must be told to process the ‘pass’ rules first. This can be a useful capability in order to reduce false positives or to ignore traffic from a particular host. the keyword ‘any’ was specified. 192. By default Snort processes alert and log rules first.168. indicating that we don’t care what the source port is. you must specify the ‘-o’ option.0. The source address was set to the specific host from corporate headquarters. You were told this rule should ignore TCP traffic. The destination port is set to the same value as the source port. To ignore packets. The destination address field is set to the proper CIDR notation for the satellite office.

0 class C address space. In order to investigate this matter further. Write a rule to log all activity to this server (192.1. you have detected some behavior that just doesn’t seem normal.Writing Rules: Difficult Rule ! Odd behavior has been detected on your anonymous FTP server. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule.168.2) to a single file. Write a Snort rule that will accomplish this. The source of the possible anomalous behavior is the 10.1. 33 . you have decided to log all FTP activity to this server to a separate log file so you can see the full session.1. 33 During routine monitoring of your logs on your anonymous FTP server.

) ! Possible Answer: log 10.) \ \ 34 For this rule. but just in case the traffic is hostile and the attacker tries to use a reserved port we decided to use ‘any’ instead.0/24 any -> 192.1. we decided to specify the keyword ‘any’. we have specified the ‘session’ option which will record all printable (ASCII) information.Writing Rules: Difficult Rule (cont. This will conveniently log all of the activity to a single file making it easy to review any activity that is recorded. we specified the ‘log’ action. session: printable. along with the destination port of 21. For the destination address we specified its full IP address in CIDR notation. logto: “anonftp”.2/32 21 (msg: “FTP activity to anonymous FTP server”. Port 21 is the ‘control’ port for FTP sessions where we can record the commands and responses of the user and server. we really don’t care about having them. We don’t really want to have every packet’s header written to the alerts file.1. For the source IP we specified the class C where the potentially hostile traffic is originating from using CIDR notation.168. We have also redirected the output to the file ‘anonftp’ by using the ‘logto’ option. Since the source port can be any of the ephemeral ports. To record the activity. We could have specified the range of ports from 1.024 and up. 34 .1.

35 . The only TCP flag set is the SYN flag. Write a rule that will both alert and log. Although there is a payload. The packets also include the payload ‘Boo!’ and have only the SYN TCP flag set. This particular scan use port 53 for both the source and destination ports.x. The scan originates from port 53 to port 53 and has a TCP sequence number of 123456789 for every packet. the PUSH flag is not set. and each packet has the same sequence number.Writing Rules: Advanced Rule ! A new (fictitious) probe has been detected from a new scanner called ‘pr0b3z’.1. Oddly enough there is a payload of varying length that always contains the string ‘Boo!’ imbedded somewhere. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule. The network being monitored is the class C address space of 192.168. 35 The next rule to write is one for a new fictitious scan that has been seen recently.

In the rules option section we specified on output message that’s descriptive and will mean something to us when we review the alerts file and log data later. flags: S. These scans can originate anywhere so we have specified the keyword ‘any’ as the source IP. We want this activity to be written to both the alert file and the log file – especially if we later run SnortSnarf on these files which we use during our analysis work.168. The content option was used to search packets for a payload that contains the ASCII string ‘Boo!’. According to the description this string can appear anywhere in the payload. we have set both in the rule to that number. But. \ seq: 123456789. Since both the source and destination ports use 53. and no other flags.0/24 53 \ (msg: “Inbound Scan: Pr0b3z”. the description given to use said that the packets only have the SYN flag set. We used the ‘seq’ packet attribute to specify the sequence number. For the destination addresses we specified our network using standard CIDR notation. so we can’t specify the ‘offset’ or ‘depth’ options to limit the amount of processing Snort will have to do. 36 . We’ll specify this in the rule using the ‘flags’ attribute and this will indirectly limit the amount of payload processing Snort will have to do because although it is possible to have a payload in a SYN packet it is a rare occurrence.) ! Possible Answer: alert any 53 -> 192.) 36 For this rule we set the action field to the standard ‘alert’ action.Writing Rules: Advanced Rule (cont. content: “Boo!”.1. From the description we have been given the sequence number is the same for all packets.

This last section will what you have learned and tie it all together showing how those rules would be used in real world situations. showing how the detects being monitored for are provided to you when they are detected. Sample Snort output is supplied as well. 37 .Tying It All Together 37 You have learned how to write rules and all of the syntax and keywords that go along with it.

we see that the information it contains is simply the message from the triggered rule and the header information from the packet. Snort will not create this directory automatically if it does not exist. After Snort has run for a while and detected anomalous behaviour.168. While Snort is running.880120 1. The content of these files is similar.2 root root 4096 Mar 22 06:58 192.4 -rw------.2.3.1 root root 2512 Mar 22 06:58 alert cat alert [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 03/21-13:33:51. Instead.168. Special Note: This directory must already exist. Examining the alert file. With this option you specify the rules file that you want to use.Specifying Rules File snort -c snort-lib ls -l /var/log/snort drwx-----. Snort will issue an error message and exit.4:60216 -> 192.2. it will write the activity to the alerts file and the log directory and files.3.5. you will most often use it along with a rules file which tells Snort what to consider as hostile. 38 . Snort will process the file to build a list of anomalies to detect for alerting and logging.5:80 TCP TTL:46 TOS:0x0 ID:19678 ******A* Seq: 0xE4F00003 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0xC00 38 When using Snort.5 drwx-----. The default directory Snort writes all of its output to is ‘/var/log/snort’.5. The ‘-c’ command line option is the one you will use to do this. if it detects any packets that match any of the rules it will write the activity out to the alert file and to a logging subdirectory in a log file. and turn on additional options that cannot be specified by command line options.2 root root 4096 Mar 22 06:58 1. but the log files can contain additional information the alert files does not if certain options are turned on.

168.4:2985 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:9173 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C9B544A Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306314 0 NOP WS: 0 root root root 232 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:12345-2985 232 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:12346-1611 243 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:6969-2701 39 Continuing from the previous slide.5 sent IP 1.168.168.2. ls -l total 12 -rw------.1 root -rw------.5.5 that used the TCP protocol and has a source port of 12345 and a destination port of 2985. 39 .3.2. Examining the contents of that file you see that source IP 192.) snort -c snort-lib cd 192.5.1 root -rw------.275350 192.5.Specifying Rules File (cont. Changing directories to one of the ones listed .192. For instance. we will examine one of the log subdirectories found in ‘/var/log/snort’.5.168.5 .5.5.1 root cat TCP:12345-2985 [**] Netbus/GabanBus [**] 03/21-13:33:54. The reason this traffic was logged there is because a rule fired that checks for traffic to or from port 12345. the file TCP:12345-2985 represents activity from the host 192.we see additional files that house all logged activity originating from that IP.4 traffic to destination port 2985. A well known trojan named Netbus uses this port.3.5:12345 -> 1.168.

Snort places the logs and alerts in /var/log/snort.1 root root root root 4096 Mar 22 08:16 1. You can specify a default directory by using the ‘-l’ option and the name of the directory where you want the information placed./log snort -c snort-lib -l .4 4096 Mar 22 08:16 2512 Mar 22 08:16 alerts 40 By default.2 root 192.168. This is the same as if everything was written to the default directory ‘/var/log/snort’. 40 ./log drwx-----. Remember – the directory you tell Snort to write the alert and logs to must already exist.2.5 -rw-------.Log Alerts to Directory .3. Snort will not create this directory on its own./log " " " Output placed in directory .2 root drwx-----. as well as creating the logging directories and log files here. In this case. we have created a log file in the current directory and want the activity recorded there.5./log alerts file contains alerts generated by Snort IP subdirectories with logged payloads ls -l . Snort will then record all alerts to an alert file in this directory.

41 . logging can be totally disabled if not desired. Alternatively. Depending on other command line options or rules options you use. you can take any detect that is discovered and log in tcpdump raw output binary format. This is often done with high traffic volume so as not to bog down Snort with the logging process. The log files (or file if you are logging in binary format) are the only place the FULL packet will be written out to including the payload. MySQL. Oracle) Finally. There are also output plugins available to log packets to a XML formatted file as well as a variety of SQL databases (e.g. This is only recommended if you are not interested in the payload of packets that trigger rules.Logging Options • Default: Full logging to default Snort directory Binary: tcpdump binary output to a single log file None: Disable logging Database: Log packets to SQL database XML: Log packets in portable XML format 41 • • • • The default method of logging is to capture the output generated from Snort detects and store it in the default Snort directory /var/log/snort. this will log the traffic that triggered the scan in some kind of human readable format. PostgreSQL.

There are also options available to send alerts to a database. the message (if any) in the rule is written to the alert file first. followed by a date/timestamp and full packet header information. The fast method writes partial information to the alert file. The default method is to capture the detect in the file /var/log/snort/alert. followed only by a data/timestamp and source and destination ports and addresses. 42 . None will disable alerting all together. When using this level of alerting. Syslog alerts send messages in a format similar to the fast alerts. Full alerting is Snort’s default behaviour. Fast alerting does not include the full packet header information. Windows host via SMB alerts. Fast alerting on the other hand writes the message (if any) in the rule is again written first.Alerting Options • • • • • • • Full: writes alert message and header information to alert file (default) Fast: writes alert message and condensed header to alert file None: disable alerts Syslog: send alert messages to syslog SMB: send WinPopup messages to Windows hosts via ‘smbclient’ Database: Send alerts to SQL database XML: Write alerts in a portable XML format 42 Alerts are an abbreviated format of capturing the detect. as well as to an XML formatted file. but write them to the syslog facilities.

It also provides a convenient one stop place to do quick searches for items that may be of interest. Alerts exist to let the user know that something has happened and to give that user enough information to decide whether the alert warrants further investigation immediately. the alert files exist merely to give the user a single place to monitor for Snort events. This is a better overview of what is happening on the network versus the more detailed captures for logging. such as specific exploits or specific hosts. 43 . Logs exist to allow the user to analyse the exact packets that caused an alert in addition to any other packets that are possibly related to the alert event. The log files are there to allow follow forensic analysis of events. Logging and alerting are conceptually different in a few ways.possibly decoded through application layer 43 You may be wondering what the difference between logging and alerting is. The directory name (IP number) indicates the source IP that triggered the logging activity. and the contents are files named according to the protocol and ports involved.Alert and Logging Differences • • • • • Alerts are all contained in one file Alerts are decoded through transport layer only Logging produces multiple files Logging creates a directory structure by IP numbers Subdirectories contain activity . Alerts are more abbreviated captures of the detect that can all be found in a single file. The actual contents of the files record the payload of the packet(s) involved. Logging will create multiple files under multiple directories based on the IP number of the source host.

168.. with the exception of the packet payload which can be optionally included in the log files. followed immediately by the packet’s decoded header information which can vary depending on the protocol of the packet.1. The date and timestamp represent the time on the sensor when the detect was made.200. Alert and log records are identical. Hex and ASCII (optional.Alert and Logging Format [**] IDS249 .. Next. both the hex representation of the payload and the ASCII printable characters will be displayed.1 <blahblahrs@blahblahb l. Optionally following the date and timestamp is the ethernet information.. Relayi ng denied.2:25 -> 192.com>. This essentially labels each detect as it is written to disk.7. The next item written is a date and timestamp. Both log and alert messages start with the message text included in the rule.SMTP Relaying Denied [**] Alert/Log Message Text 10/09-02:34:59. Packet Payload. making it easy to determine why the packet was logged. 44 . log file only) 44 This slide shows you the general format of the alert and log files. Timestamp Ethernet (optional) DF 192.775359 FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF -> FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF type:0x800 len:0x71 Date.2:25432 TCP TTL:255 TOS:0x0 ID:24915 *****PA* Seq: 0x30AC5391 Ack: 0x1E3E4A55 Win: 0x2238 Packet Header (varies) 35 35 30 20 35 2E 37 2E 31 20 3C FF FF FF FF 2D FF FF FF FF FF FF 40 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 2E 63 6F 6D 3E 2E 2E 2E 20 52 65 6C 61 79 69 6E 67 20 64 65 6E 69 65 64 0D 0A 550 5.168. If the packet payload is included in the logs. the source and destination addresses and ports involved in the detect appear.

45 In the next several slides. Content: "anonymous". The above rule will be used for most of the detects. different options will be shown to explain various logging and alerting choices. nocase) • Place the above rule in rules file ‘snortrules’.143 network that has the PUSH and ACK flags set and has a content of 'anonymous' in the payload.168. flags: PA. This rule says that we want to alert if any ftp connection is generated to the 192. We will put this single rule in the rules file name ‘snortrules’ to simplify the logging and alert messages generated.143.0/24 21 (msg: "anonymous FTP attempt". 45 .Logging/alert Examples • The following rule will be used to test various options to log and alert: \ \ alert tcp any any > 192.168.

15:1536-> 192. It contains the packet information decoded through the TCP transport layer as can be seen by examining the file. Next. we notice that there is a file named ‘alert’.168.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 46 In this first example.168. If we examine the contents of logdir directory.168. we specify that we want to use a default logging directory of logdir. That triggers a detect and causes Snort to create an entry in the alerts file. [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06.350754 192. We run Snort using our one rule found in ‘snortrules’. in this case since we did not specify the alert level Snort will default to ‘full’. 46 .143.Alert and Log snort -l logdir -c snortrules In directory logdir you will find a file named alert.143 network using a username of anonymous.143. what you don't see above is we attempt to ftp to a host on the 192. It contains the output that was generated for the detect. This has to be an existing directory.

15:1536 -> 192.15 that represents the hostile IP that attempted the anonymous ftp access.143. The filename identifies the protocol (TCP) as well as the source (1526) and destination ports (21) involved in the detect. The subdirectory 192. we discover a file name TCP:1526-21.15 contains a file: TCP:1536-21 [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06.168.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7c451b73 Ack: 0x7dc44632 win: 0x7d78 TCP options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 47 In the same logdir directory.143. we discover a subdirectory 192.143. We find the same message generated in the alert file.15.143.168.143.168. 47 . If we ‘cd’ into that directory.Alert and Log (Cont) The directory logdir contains a subdirectory named: 192.350754 192. This is a log directory.168.168.

168. the date/timestamp and the hosts involved.143.Alert and Log With Decode snort -l logdir -c snortrules -d In directory logdir the file alert has the following contents: [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-12:03:59.168. still written in a human readable format. Note that the contents of the alert file have not changed from what would normally be recorded.143. We follow the same process as before and discover that we have an alert file in logdir which is the same as before.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:20566 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 48 Now we add the ‘-d’ option to the same command used previously. which says to decode the application layer. The alert file still contains the message from the triggered rule.15:1537 -> 192. 48 . It also still contains the full packet header information.888357 192.

15 contains file named: TCP:1537-21 [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-12:03:59.15:1537 ->192.143. The output of the packet’s payload is broken into two parts. but now the actual payload of the packet at the bottom of the alert.888357 192. The left portion contains the hex values of the payload.15. you will not only see the information contained in the alerts file. 49 If you now look at the log file.168.143.Alert and Log With Decode (Cont) The directory logdir contains the subdirectory 192.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:20566 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x94102D52 Ack: 0x94529A7B Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27748803 128108 55 53 45 52 20 61 6E 6F 6E 79 6D 6F 75 73 0D 0A USER anonymous.143. while the right portion contains the ASCII representation.168..143.168.168. 49 . The directory 192.

15:1536 -> 192.143. If you are deploying Snort on high capacity networks or Snort starts to drop packets.350754 192. It also relieves Snort from having to create directories and constantly opening and closing files to write out the information in ASCII format.168.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 50 The ‘-b’ option allows you to log the packets to a tcpdump file instead of the normal decoded ASCII files.Alert and Log in Binary snort -l logdir -c snortrules -d -b The directory logdir contains the file alert. Logging using the binary format is much more efficient than having Snort write out a completely decoded packet in an ASCII format.143.168. log in binary format. Instead Snort can open one file and continuously write to that file for the entire duration Snort is running. [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06. This creates a single binary file instead of creating many subdirectories with files in them that may contain only one packet. 50 .

we find a file snort-0428@1158.Alert and Log in Binary (Cont) In directory logdir we find the following file: snort-0428@1158.April 28th) and the time of the capture (11:58 AM).log This is a tcpdump binary output of entire packet. This can be read either using Snort with the ‘-r’ option or with tcpdump with the ‘-r’ option. The name has the date of the capture (0428 . This requires less work of Snort to capture and is used when there is a lot of traffic on the network and there is a concern for packets being dropped. 51 In the logdir directory. 51 .log which is a tcpdump raw binary output file of the detect that was captured.

indicating that the software used to create the dump file collected 144 bytes for each packet collected.5:693 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:7570 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C55968F Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306083 0 NOP WS: 0 52 Another useful ability of Snort is the ‘-r’ command line option. This option instructs Snort to read from tcpdump binary files instead of the network interface.. This is Snort’s way of informing you that it is reading from a file and not from the network interface. snaplen = 144 Entering readback mode.168.2.3. 52 .raw.5. In the example shown here. This assumes that we have collected ‘tcpdump.5:2307 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:7569 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C857C3C Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306083 0 NOP WS: 0 03/21-13:33:51.5. 03/21-13:33:51.Reading Tcpdump Files snort -vd -r tcpdump.data’ instead of from the network interface.2. Note the ‘Entering readback mode’. but this time we use the ‘-r’ switch to tell Snort to read its input from ‘tcpdump. Also.. In that case you can pull the data back periodically and run Snort on the retrieved data without using extra CPU cycles on the sensor itself. or instructed Snort to log in binary.data’ earlier and it contains tcpdump binary data.raw. Readback mode can be especially useful for busy networks where full and constant processing on the sensor itself may not be feasible. note the ‘snaplen = 144’....raw.168.960269 1.4:1398 -> 192. That is the tcpdump snapshot length. sending the data to the screen. This can be done if you've collected data using tcpdump from another sensor or other tcpdump compatible software.data Initializing Network Interface.4:1399 -> 192. we are using Snort in verbose mode.960219 1.3.

This is easier than trying to assess what is happening by looking at the alerts file. At the top level.Snortsnarf. One tool that has proven to be popular as well as being very useful is SnortSnarf. 53 .silicondefense.html file containing a summarized list of alerts.pl /var/log/snort/alert 53 There are tools available that will help you with the analysis of the alert and log files. SnortSnarf will allow you to drill down to the packet that triggered a specific alert. At the next level down.Pl • perl script to take alerts: – Formats Snort alert and log files into html output – Places output in following files for ‘drill down’: • Overall summary of detected alerts (index. If logging was turned on in Snort. and allows you to drill down from the general list of alerts to the specific packet that triggered the alert (providing logging was turned on and the decode option was specified). SnortSnarf creates an index. The SnortSnarf program is intended to help you view your Snort alerts in an orderly fashion using a web browser.com/snortsnarf/ snortsnarf.html) • Alert wrap-up html files • Specific source/destination alert html files • Optionally linked to log files for packet inspection • • Located in snort directory contrib subdirectory http://www. an html file is created containing each of the same alerts in a single file. and you provide the directory the logs are located in.

1 (Jim Hoagland and Stuart Staniford) 54 This is a sample index page created by SnortSnarf. Files included: •snort.alert et al 7 alerts processed.SnortSnarf Output Snortsnarf: Snort signatures in snort.log Earliest alert at 02:34:59. sample packets. click on the summary link which will display a page containing information about the selected alerts. and the total number of source and destination hosts involved.SMTP Relaying Denied 1 1 1 Summary UDP scan 6 1 1 Summary Generated by Snortsnarf v100400. It lists the signatures that were detected. such as the ‘SMTP Relaying Denied’ example shown here. you can click on the signature name and a page displaying information about the signature will be displayed. The information displayed can include a sample rule that would detect the traffic. number of times it was triggered. To see additional details. This page contains a summarized list of alerts that were triggered during the time period listed. and further explanation of the exploit.775359 on 10/09 Latest alert at 03:00:36 on 10/9 Signature (click for definition) # Alerts # Sources # Destinations Detail link IDS249 . For some signatures. 54 .alert •snort_portscan.

including all of the hosts that were involved.SMTP Relaying Denied 1 sources 1 destinations Sources triggering this attack signature Source 192.Summary of alerts in snort. This page lists all of the source and destination hosts involved with the selected alert.200.1 (Jim Hoagland and Stuart Staniford) 55 When clicking on the link from the summarized index page.1. Clicking on the source IP address will take you to the alerts triggered by that source host for this signature. In this case only one alert of the type ‘SMTP Relaying Denied’ is listed and it involved only one source and destination IP.SMTP Relaying Denied 1 alerts on this signature.168. The chart to the right of the address shows you how many alerts were triggered by that host for this specific alert.775359 on 10/09 IDS249 .168.alert •snort_portscan. If there were multiple instances of this alert.2 # Alerts (sig) 1 # Alerts (total) 1 # Srcs (sig) 1 # Srcs (total)) 1 Generated by Snortsnarf v100400.log Earliest such alert at 02:34:59. Looking in files: •snort. you arrive at this page.775359 on 10/09 Latest such alert at 02:34:59.2 # Alerts (sig) 1 # Alerts (total) 1 # Dsts (sig) 1 # Dsts (total)) 1 Destinations receiving this attack signature Destinations 192.alert et al for signature: IDS249 . 55 . they would all be listed here. and the number of destination hosts involved for both of those totals. the grant total of alerts triggered by the host for all alerts.

2 DNS lookup at: Amenesi Riherds Princeton [**] IDS249 .1.alert •snort_portscan.168.1.216.2 in snort.216 as a source •1 instances of IDS249 .168.SMTP Relaying Denied Whois lookup at: ARIN RIPE APNIC Geektools There are 1 distinct destination IPs in the alerts of the type on this page.All 1 alerts from 192.log Earliest: 02:34:59.775359 on 10/09 Latest: 02:34:59. 192.775359 on 10/09 1 different signatures are present for 206.SMTP Relaying Denied [**] 56 56 .alert et al Looking in files: •snort.181.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful