Snort Rules: Application

Paul Ritchey, Jacob and Sundstrom, Inc. pritchey@jasi.com

V1.0.0

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Welcome to the class titled ‘Snort Rules: Application’. The purpose of this class is to take the material you learned in the previous section, ‘Snort Rules: Syntax and Keywords’. This section will take those individual keywords, values and syntax to form complete rules. You will also learn how to analyze existing rules piece by piece to determine what the rule is looking for.

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Agenda
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Rule Analysis
Simple Rules ! Difficult Rules ! Advanced Rules
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Writing Rules
Simple Rules ! Difficult Rules ! Advanced Rules
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Tying It All Together
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The first half of this presentation will examine rules of increasing complexity. You will be taught how to analyze an existing rule to determine what it is looking for. This ability is key to understanding how to piece together a complete rule from scratch that matches the signature of an attack. The second half of the presentation will ask you to write rules from scratch of increasing difficulty. The process of creating these rules will be covered in a step by step process. This will show you a possible methodology you can use when creating rules on your own. The very last section will tie together everything you have learned so far, showing you a few of the options available for Snort output. This presentation covers Snort version 1.7. If you are using a newer version of Snort, please remember that new features may have been added or existing features may have been modified after this presentation was assembled.

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Rule Analysis: Simple Rules

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This section will show you how to analyze simple rules, step by step. The analysis skills learned here will be built upon in later sections to analyze rules of increasing difficulty. This will help you later when you will be required to write rules from scratch.

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Rule Analysis: Simple Rules
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Learn to analyze simple rules.
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Signature based on rule header.

Examples taken from snort.org rule set and www.whitehats.com. ! Use logical approach
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Analyze rule header first
• Determine source and destination addresses and ports • Snort uses this section first.

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Analyze rule options next
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In this section you will learn how to analyze simple rules. The rules were chosen because they do not incorporate packet attributes which can make some rules difficult to analyze. These are real life rules, taken directly from the rule set available from the snort.org web site and www.whitehats.com. This means that it’s possible to do further research on the exploits that the rules are designed to detect to fully round out your understanding of rules. This section will start with teaching you how to analyze rules based on a logical approach. The first step is to analyze the rule header. This determines what hosts, ports, protocols and traffic flow must be involved before Snort even starts to examine the rest of the rule – this allows Snort to quickly determine if it should completely analyze the rule against the options section, saving valuable time. Later sections will combine the analysis of the rule header with the options section for more complicated rules.

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Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice
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Background:
Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected machine
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Rule:
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alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice";)

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The first rule we are going to examine is one that looks for attempts at connecting Back Orifice trojans. This particular exploit works by means of a trojan that is somehow installed on the target machine. The trojan can be installed accidentally by end users running executables attached to email messages, downloading the trojan masquerading as a useful utility, etc. Once installed, the trojan opens a port and makes itself available for control from a remote host. Further information on this particular trojan can be obtained any of the major online security web sites. In depth analysis of this trojan is beyond the scope of this course.

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HOME_NET. This rule. In this particular rule.Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice (cont. will execute the action ‘alert’. If snort the traffic Snort is examining is from another protocol. when it is triggered. but must be destined specifically for the port 31337 (otherwise known as ‘eleet’) on the destination machine. named EXTERNAL. the contents of the signature is completely contained in the rule header. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 6 For this simple rule. the source address is also defined as a variable. and is set to the addresses Snort is monitoring.) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. Alert means Snort will write an entry to the alert file and an entry to the logs unless they are overridden by command line options or other means. this rule will not be tested against them. ! Applies only to UDP traffic. 6 . The destination address is defined as a variable. The UDP packet can. meaning that the source address should be outside of the network address space Snort is monitoring. This rule only applies to UDP traffic.) alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice". be originating from any of the possible ports on the source host. This variable is typically defined at the top of the rules file being used. this is set to !$HOME_NET. Typically. however.

Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice (cont. making it easier to determine what a log or alert entry represents. 7 . ! ! Possibility of false-positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. No packet attributes are examined. although not often. ! High likelihood of false-positives. it is very likely that detects. This rule is very simple. that happens to be destined for destination port 31337 will trigger this rule.) ! Examine rule options. it is seen that the only option being used is the message option. ! 7 Examining the rule options section. This option provides a string that is used to tag alert and log entries. such as streaming audio or video. The only thing limiting the rule down to a specific subset of UDP traffic is the destination port. Care must be taken when analyzing any available data to validate that the packet was truly a probe for Back Orifice or the master program contacting a Back Orifice client. Since no packet attributes or options are specified. may very well be false-positives. ! Only includes message.) alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice". Any traffic.

! ! Rule: ! alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 . the trojan opens a port that allows remote hosts to control the infected machine. 8 . Deep Throat is another trojan that can be accidentally installed by users who unknowingly execute attachments or download the software by accident.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE .DeepThroat 3.) 8 The next simple rule we will examine is one that detects Deep Throat trojans.Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat Trojan ! Background Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected host.1 Server Active on Network". Once installed.

and to the specific port 6000. This means that the packet can originate from any possible IP address. when it is triggered. Because of this. If snort the traffic Snort is examining is from another protocol.) ! Examine the rule header: ! ! ! Will ‘alert’ when triggered. This rule.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE \ DeepThroat 3. However. The DMZ sites outside of your internal network.Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat (cont. I would like take a second to discuss the keyword ‘any’ that was specified for the source address. Snort is typically installed on a machine that resides in a ‘DMZ’. This rule only applies to UDP traffic. the keyword ‘any’ is specified. the packet must originate from a specific port – 2140. including internal addresses. it would have been just as effective to replace the keyword ‘any’ with !$HOME_NET. or outbound from your network to the internet. It does not and should not see your internal traffic. the contents of the signature is again completely contained in the rule header. it will trigger the rule and will be logged to the alert file and logs with the message specified in the rule options section. there are no restrictions. ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = internal network 9 For this simple rule. Source specified as ‘any’ • ‘Any’ matches all possible IP addresses.1 Server Active on Network". 9 . Applies only to UDP traffic. If the packet meets all of the above criteria. and sees all traffic in bound from the internet to your network. Now the rule deviates from the previous example. this rule will not be tested against them. will execute the action ‘alert’. Alert means Snort will write an entry to the alert file and an entry to the logs unless they are overridden by command line options or other means.) alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 . Instead of specifying a variable for the source IP address. The packet must be destined for the network the variable HOME_NET is set to.

Although unlikely. Both ports are ephemeral ports. we again that this rule like the previous example is only specifying the message option. ! ! No packet attributes are examined. Only includes message. Low likelihood of occurrence. The only real limiting factors are the source and destination ports. This increases the chances that a detect is a false-positive so care must be taken to fully resolve any detects. 10 .BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . meaning they are out of the reserved range.\ DeepThroat 3. it’s possible that this port combination could be used during the course of a valid connection. making it easier to determine what a log or alert entry represents. Most virus software should be capable of detecting this trojan if properly installed and used regularly.Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat (cont.) ! Examine rule options. Likelihood of detect being a false-positives. This rule is very simple.1 Server Active on Network". and because there are no other criteria for the rule false-positive detects may be made.) alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 . This option provides a string that is used to tag alert and log entries. 10 ! Possibility of false-positives: ! ! Examining the rule options section.

Rule Analysis: Complex Rules 11 In this section the rules presented for analysis are a little more complicated than the previous examples. Essentially they provide additional information about packets that are considered hostile beyond source and destination IPs and ports. 11 .

This section will continue to build on the rule analysis technique that was used in the first section. ! Examples taken from www.snort. ! Use logical approach ! Analyze rule header first ! Analyze rule options next ! • Specifies specific packet attributes • Can increase accuracy – decrease false positives 12 This section concentrates on analyzing more complicated rules – those containing packet attributes in the rule options section. The example rules used in this section are real world rules. In these rules.com web site.com. 12 .Rule Analysis: Complex Rules ! Learn to analyze complex rules.whitehats.whitehats.org web site and from the www. ! Signature also based on rule options. They have been taken from the rule sets available at the www. which can potentially reduce the number of false positives. Signature based on rule header. it’s possible to make rules more accurate.snort. By adding packet attributes (such as TCP flags) to the rule options section. the signature doesn’t just consist of the contents of the rule header. Interpretation of the rule option section with different kinds of packet attributes will be introduced here. It consists of the rule header and additional information specified in the rule options.org rule set and www.

NetMetro is another trojan that when installed allows remote control of the infected machine. this trojan like any other can be accidentally installed by executing attachments to email messages. or downloading the trojan as it masquerades as a useful utility or game. flags:PA.Complex Rule #1: NetMetro ! Background: Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected machine ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 . 13 .) 13 The rule we are going to examine next is one that detects the NetMetro trojan. Again.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE – NetMetro Incoming Traffic". Most virus detection software should detect this trojan as long as the signatures are properly maintained.

but may also be set by command line options. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. ! Applies only to TCP traffic.NetMetro Incoming Traffic".BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET.Complex Rule #1: NetMetro (cont. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. It specifies that the destination port can be any port except ports 53 through 80. 14 . inclusive. The source port the traffic must originate from is port 5031. flags:PA. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 14 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor. unless these options are overridden by command line options. The destination port setting is more interesting. it will not match the rule header information and this rule will not be triggered. If the source port is anything but 5031. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 .) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered.

additional data possibly beyond what Snort provides may need to be examined. The false positives are limited because the source port must exactly match 5031. the rule will be triggered as soon as the TCP three way handshake is completed and the first packed with a payload is sent inbound to your network. No other packet attributes are examined beyond the TCP flag setting.Complex Rule #1: NetMetro (cont. The source port 5031 is an ephemeral port. Telnet runs on port 23. there is a low likelihood of false positives. ! High likelihood of being false positive. FIN.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . meaning that is not a reserved port and available for anyone and any application to use. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. URG and the two reserved bits must NOT be set. flags:PA. To rule out the possibility of a detect being a false positive.) ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 . For this particular rule.NetMetro Incoming\ Traffic". although they will happen. the TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. 15 . Other flags. ! 15 This rule is the first example of packet attributes being used in the rule options section. and the destination port must be outside the specified range. if an outside user telnets in to a server in your network. If the port 5031 is used by the person connecting to your telnet server. such as SYN. The attribute being tested is the TCP flags setting. outside the range specified by the destination port setting that specifies what ports it cannot be. For example. The addition of packet attributes (in this case TCP flags) to the rule options section aids in reducing the possibility of false positives because it helps to narrow the possibility of matches somewhat. ! No other packet attributes examined. it’s possible this rule may be triggered. In this case.

increasing the accuracy. ack: 0. It can also allow the rule to be tuned to help eliminate false positives. and the hacker now has enough information to launch an effective attack.) 16 The second difficult rule to be examined detects a particular tool used for scanning.myscan". ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 . ! Allows remote detection of available services and OS fingerprinting.Scan . ttl: >220. For this scanner certain packet attributes are hard coded in the original source code. Combined with the ability to determine the OS. This allowing an accurate rule to be written that can easily detect scans from this software. 16 . This particular scanner can allow an attacker to easily determine what services are available on a host.Complex Rule #2: Myscan ! Background: Port scanner. \ flags: S.

The source port the traffic must originate from is port 10101. flags: S.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 .Scan -myscan". ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 17 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. specified by the keyword ‘any’. 17 . The destination port can be anything. ttl: >220. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET. This variable is set to the IP address range your sensor is to monitor. it will not match the rule header information and this rule will not be triggered. but may also be set by command line options.) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. unless these options are overridden by command line options. If the source port is anything but 10101.Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont. This means the rule does not care what port is used on the destination host. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. \ ack: 0. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature.

TCP flag SYN must be set. time to live. there is a low likelihood that the rule will be triggered. Low likelihood of being false positive.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 . The next slide will show you the individual parts that combined together make this happen. The first attribute that is examined. 18 . For this rule. must be zero (0).Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont. There are many key items that lead to this conclusion and show that this rule is a very well written one.) ! Examine the rule options: ! ! ! Time to live value must be greater than 220. the acknowledgement number. Acknowledgement number must be zero (0). acknowledgement number (ack) and the TCP flag settings are examined. TCP flags. must have the SYN flag set. ttl: >220. \ ack: 0. The second attribute. Low likelihood of occurrence. flags: S. the packet attributes time to live (ttl). but a very high likelihood that if it is triggered that it is NOT a false positive. The last attribute. must have a value greater than or equal to 220. 18 ! Likelihood of false positives: ! ! In this rule’s option section.Scan -myscan".

and by making a single simple alteration and recompiling it the rule will no longer detect it (although Snort’s scan detection preprocessor should detect it. The second item that helps tune this rule is the time to live value. Only the Solaris 2. 19 Time To Live ! Acknowledgement Number. but it will not identify the utility being used). start at 1024 and go up. the acknowledgement number can never be zero. By specifying a specific value.101. Cannot normally be set to zero (0). All of the above combine to make this a finely tuned rule that will not false positive very often. so for a source address to reach 10. it is very unlikely – but possible. They are typically used in sequence. flags: S. This makes it vulnerable to mutations of the scanning utility. ! Rule vulnerable to mutations. The first item that helps tune this rule is the specification of a specific port for the source port. The last item that contributes to the rule’s tuning is the acknowledgement attribute value. Because the source port is such a high number. All other operating systems use values much less than 220. Only one OS uses setting greater than 220. that source port will be used. only source addresses using that specific port might cause a trigger. The source code for this utility is freely available. Only in a crafted packet will this value ever be used.x operating system sets the time to live attribute to a value greater than 220. The rule specifies that this attribute must be set to the value zero (0). meaning the non-reserved ports. However it does depend on the above settings in the crafted packet not to be changed. Under normal conditions.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ \ (msg: "IDS439 . ttl: >220.) ! ! ! ! Source Port ! High into ephemeral ports (non-reserved). ack: 0.Scan -myscan". it must have made many connections to other machines. Ephemeral ports.Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont. 19 . Most operating systems specify a value much less than 220 when the packet is created.

These rules are the most difficult to write because they require close analysis of an attack’s signature and of the source code of the attack application if available. They are also the easiest to avoid triggering by making slight alterations in the application’s source code.Rule Analysis: Advanced Rules 20 This section provides analysis of advanced rules – those using more sophisticated packet attributes to examine the packet’s payload. These types of rules also have the lowest likelihood of false positives because of the completeness of the examination of the packets. 20 .

In these rules. ! Use logical approach ! Analyze rule header first ! Analyze rule options next ! • Specifies specific packet attributes • Can increase accuracy – decrease false positives 21 This section concentrates on analyzing more complicated rules – those containing packet attributes in the rule options section. it’s possible to make rules more accurate. The example rules used in this section are real world rules.whitehats.org rule set and www.com.com web site. which can potentially reduce the number of false positives. the signature doesn’t just consist of the contents of the rule header. By adding packet attributes (such as TCP flags) to the rule options section. Signature based on rule header. Interpretation of the rule option section with different kinds of packet attributes will be introduced here. 21 . It consists of the rule header and additional information specified in the rule options.whitehats.snort.Rule Analysis: Advanced Rules ! Learn to analyze difficult rules.snort. They have been taken from the rule sets available at the www. ! Examples taken from www. This section will continue to build on the rule analysis technique that was used in the first section.org web site and from the www. ! Signature also based on rule options.

In this case the exploit is known as the wuftp2600.c exploit which was originally distributed in a broken form. ! Allows instant root access.Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit ! Background: Exploits a bug in wu-ftp daemon.org that is used as a replacement for many native ftp daemons on some flavors of Unix.FTP wuftp260-tf8". the attacker is instantly granted root access on a high numbered port that is opened up. flags: PA. content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB 4389 D941 B03F CD80|". If the exploit is successful. as well as coming native in many Linux distributions.) \ \ \ 22 The first advanced rule we will examine is one that exploits a bug in an ftp daemon provided by www. ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 (msg: "IDS458 .wu-ftpd. 22 .

The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. The source port is set to the keyword ‘any’.) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. meaning that the TCP packet can originate from any possible port on the source host. However.Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit (cont. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET. unless these options are overridden by command line options. flags: PA.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 \ (msg: "IDS458 . ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 23 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. but may also be set by command line options. the packet must be destined for port 21. This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor. \ content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB \ 43 89D941 B03F CD80|".FTP wuftp260-tf8". It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file. 23 . In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. Port 21 is a well known reserved port that is used to provide FTP services.

! Low likelihood of being false positive. detects will very rarely occur primarily because of the very specific content that is being searched for. For this rule. more specifically an anonymous FTP session and initiating a buffer overflow. The exploit detected here works by initiating a proper TCP connection. is very unlikely to occur during a normal FTP session. hence this rule’s high level of accuracy. It’s possible to have other flag settings without the PUSH flag set and still have a payload. ! 24 For this rule.Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit (cont. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. In this example the content that is being searched for is given in hex values. This rule is tuned ever so slightly by the TCP flags attribute. 24 . the PUSH and ACK TCP flags must be set. \ content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB \ 4389 D941 B03F CD80|". The first attribute is the TCP flag settings.FTP wuftp260-tf8". flags: PA. When detects do occur. however these are typically other exploits which this rule doesn’t apply to and should have a different rule written to detect them. it’s very likely that it is a positive detect. Only packets with a payload should be applied against this rule. The second attribute specified examines the packet’s payload. The examination of a packets payload is triggered by specifying the keyword ‘content’. These packets will have the PUSH flag set indicating that data is being sent. For this rule. ! Examines payload for specific values. which is denoted by the enclosing pipe (‘|’) symbols.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 \ (msg: "IDS458 .) ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. two packet attributes are examined in order to detect the exploit. The content value. although possible.

! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 .Advanced Rule #2: cgitest. offset:4. The web daemon affected by this vulnerability runs on Windows 95.exe Exploit ! Background: Web exploit. which limits the possible ramifications of a successful attack that might exist on a Unix or Windows NT machine.Web cgi cgitest".exe|0d0a|user". 25 .exe’ is a CGI that if it is left installed on a particular web server can allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the web server. nocase.) \ \ \ 25 The second advanced rule we will examine is a web based exploit. content:"cgitest. flags: AP. The exploit works because of a buffer overflow vulnerability. The ‘cgitest. which is one of the more lethal types of attacks an attacker can use. ! Allows arbitrary execution of code on server.

This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor. offset:4. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. unless these options are overridden by command line options. flags: AP.exe|0d0a|user". If there are web daemons used on your network using alternative ports. but may also be set by command line options. content: "cgitest. meaning that the TCP packet can originate from any possible port on the source host.exe Exploit (cont.) \ \ \ ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. the packet must be destined for port 80. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 . In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. Port 80 is one of the most common ports used for web daemons. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature.Web cgi cgitest". The source port is set to the keyword ‘any’. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. nocase. However. the rule should be duplicated for each of the ports being used. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 26 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file.Advanced Rule #2: cgitest. 26 .

To help reduce the overhead of processing that must take place. effectively ignoring the first 3 bytes. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. offset:4. nocase. 27 . The second attribute specified examines the packet’s payload. It’s possible to have other flag settings without the PUSH flag set and still have a payload. The exploit detected here works by initiating a proper TCP connection to a web server. When detects do occur. Note the use of the ‘nocase’ option. This rule is tuned ever so slightly by the TCP flags attribute. and then executing the ‘cgitest. This example shows how ASCII and hex values can be combined to form a payload signature.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 .) \ \ \ ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. although possible. content: "cgitest. it can appear in any possible combination of upper and lower case letters possible. The first attribute is the TCP flag settings. ! Examines payload for specific values. detects will very rarely occur primarily because of the very specific content that is being searched for. two packet attributes are examined in order to detect the exploit. only the ‘offset’ option is used. flags: AP. These packets will have the PUSH flag set indicating that data is being sent. it can be tuned by specifying the ‘offset’ and ‘depth’ options. For this rule. the PUSH and ACK TCP flags must be set. but by ignoring 3 bytes of every packet on a very busy network can quickly add up. This informs Snort that for the ASCII content being searched for. The examination of a packets payload is triggered by specifying the keyword ‘content’. ! 27 For this rule. This may not seem like a lot. In this example the content that is being searched for is a combination of two sections of ASCII data and one section of hex values. For this rule. In this rule. ! Low likelihood of being false positive. This rule tells Snort to start examining the payload 4 bytes in. it’s very likely that it is a positive detect. Only packets with a payload should be applied against this rule. and can be interspersed between each other. is very unlikely to occur during a normal web sessions by chance.Web cgi cgitest". The content value.Advanced Rule #2: cgitest. The content attribute can be a very resource intensive attribute to use. These options reduce the amount of a packet’s payload that must be inspected by Snort.ext’ CGI on that server and causing a buffer overflow. however these are typically other exploits which this rule doesn’t apply to and should have a different rule written to detect them.exe Exploit (cont.exe|0d0a|user".

all of which may be correct. Keep in mind that for some types of rules there may be several possible answers. followed by a possible solution. A specification for a needed rule will be provided. 28 .Writing Rules 28 In this section will demonstrate how to write a few rules from scratch of increasing difficulty.

Write the rule. 29 Your boss is concerned about inbound ICMP echo requests from outside addresses. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule. using the variable HOME_NET to represent your network address space. The rule should both alert and log.Writing Rules: Simple Rule ! Your boss wants to know about all ICMP echo requests (pings) coming into your network. The alert message should contain the text ‘Inbound Ping’. 29 . He would like to have Snort record this packets for future analysis and to see if there are any trends. Write the rule using the variable HOME_NET to represent your network address space.

30 .) 30 According to the specification given on the previous slide. We also used the ‘itype’ attribute with a value of ‘8’ to limit the rule to only record echo requests – otherwise known as pings. It is needed only to satisfy the rule parser when Snort reads and process the rules file on startup. and the source address field is set to ‘!$HOME_NET’. We could have used any value for this field. Therefore the protocol field is set to ICMP. the rule is to both alert and log. but ICMP does not use ports so we used the keyword ‘any’ as a placeholder. To do this. We were also told to only record inbound ICMP echo requests. so specifying the not sign (‘!’) with the HOME_NET variable represents all addresses except those in your network. We were told that the variable HOME_NET would represent our internal network. itype: 8. Snort rules always require a port to be specified. it will be ignored by Snort when evaluating a packet against this rule. In the rules option section we set the message option to the appropriate value as requested.Writing Rules: Simple Rule (cont. the rule’s action field must be set to the value ‘alert’.) ! Possible Answer: alert icmp !$HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg:“Inbound Ping".

corporate headquarters decided to run a periodic scan against all IP addresses the company owns.1. Also list the command line option that must be included for this rule to be effective. Write a rule that will cause Snort to ignore all inbound TCP packets from the scanning machine. you decided to write a rule to ignore inbound packets from this scanning box. 192. The address space at the satellite office you work at is the Class B 10.168.1.x. What command line option must also be included? 31 In order to try to keep a step ahead of the hackers. including satellite offices. Tired of filtering through the false positives caused by this routine scanning. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule.x. including the satellite office you work at. 31 .1.Writing Rules: Simple Rule #2 ! Corporate headquarters routinely runs a scan of all IPs owned by the company.

so the protocol field in the rule was set to the value ‘TCP’. the rule’s action field must be set to the value ‘pass’. To ignore packets. In order for this rule to be effective. 10.) ! Possible Answer: ! pass tcp 192. the keyword ‘any’ was specified.1. the keyword ‘any’. By default Snort processes alert and log rules first. To reverse this order. This tells Snort to drop the packet being inspected when the rule is triggered.1/32 any -> 10. but also has a special requirement that must not be forgotten.0/16.168. then alert and log rules. This effectively ignores pass rules. The destination address field is set to the proper CIDR notation for the satellite office. This causes Snort to process pass rules first. This can be a useful capability in order to reduce false positives or to ignore traffic from a particular host. You were told this rule should ignore TCP traffic. you must specify the ‘-o’ option. Since the source port can vary.1.1.168. 192.0. it can be any in the entire range possible. The source address was set to the specific host from corporate headquarters. Snort must be told to process the ‘pass’ rules first. 32 . then the pass rules last.1.1. indicating that we don’t care what the source port is. The destination port is set to the same value as the source port.0/16 any ! Snort Command Line: ! Snort –c snortrules -o 32 This is a simple rule to write.0.Writing Rules: Simple Rule #2 (cont.

33 . you have decided to log all FTP activity to this server to a separate log file so you can see the full session. In order to investigate this matter further. Write a Snort rule that will accomplish this.Writing Rules: Difficult Rule ! Odd behavior has been detected on your anonymous FTP server. 33 During routine monitoring of your logs on your anonymous FTP server.2) to a single file. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule. Write a rule to log all activity to this server (192. you have detected some behavior that just doesn’t seem normal.0 class C address space.1.1.168. The source of the possible anomalous behavior is the 10.1.

along with the destination port of 21.0/24 any -> 192. we specified the ‘log’ action. but just in case the traffic is hostile and the attacker tries to use a reserved port we decided to use ‘any’ instead. This will conveniently log all of the activity to a single file making it easy to review any activity that is recorded. We have also redirected the output to the file ‘anonftp’ by using the ‘logto’ option.) \ \ 34 For this rule. We don’t really want to have every packet’s header written to the alerts file.2/32 21 (msg: “FTP activity to anonymous FTP server”.024 and up. session: printable. we really don’t care about having them. 34 . For the source IP we specified the class C where the potentially hostile traffic is originating from using CIDR notation.Writing Rules: Difficult Rule (cont. logto: “anonftp”. To record the activity. Since the source port can be any of the ephemeral ports. Port 21 is the ‘control’ port for FTP sessions where we can record the commands and responses of the user and server.) ! Possible Answer: log 10. we have specified the ‘session’ option which will record all printable (ASCII) information. we decided to specify the keyword ‘any’.168.1. For the destination address we specified its full IP address in CIDR notation.1.1. We could have specified the range of ports from 1.

Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule.x. The scan originates from port 53 to port 53 and has a TCP sequence number of 123456789 for every packet.1. Write a rule that will both alert and log. The network being monitored is the class C address space of 192. Although there is a payload.Writing Rules: Advanced Rule ! A new (fictitious) probe has been detected from a new scanner called ‘pr0b3z’. 35 . The packets also include the payload ‘Boo!’ and have only the SYN TCP flag set. Oddly enough there is a payload of varying length that always contains the string ‘Boo!’ imbedded somewhere.168. The only TCP flag set is the SYN flag. 35 The next rule to write is one for a new fictitious scan that has been seen recently. This particular scan use port 53 for both the source and destination ports. and each packet has the same sequence number. the PUSH flag is not set.

) ! Possible Answer: alert any 53 -> 192. content: “Boo!”.168. \ seq: 123456789. But. so we can’t specify the ‘offset’ or ‘depth’ options to limit the amount of processing Snort will have to do. flags: S. the description given to use said that the packets only have the SYN flag set.) 36 For this rule we set the action field to the standard ‘alert’ action. For the destination addresses we specified our network using standard CIDR notation. These scans can originate anywhere so we have specified the keyword ‘any’ as the source IP.Writing Rules: Advanced Rule (cont. Since both the source and destination ports use 53. We want this activity to be written to both the alert file and the log file – especially if we later run SnortSnarf on these files which we use during our analysis work. we have set both in the rule to that number. We used the ‘seq’ packet attribute to specify the sequence number.0/24 53 \ (msg: “Inbound Scan: Pr0b3z”. We’ll specify this in the rule using the ‘flags’ attribute and this will indirectly limit the amount of payload processing Snort will have to do because although it is possible to have a payload in a SYN packet it is a rare occurrence.1. According to the description this string can appear anywhere in the payload. 36 . The content option was used to search packets for a payload that contains the ASCII string ‘Boo!’. From the description we have been given the sequence number is the same for all packets. and no other flags. In the rules option section we specified on output message that’s descriptive and will mean something to us when we review the alerts file and log data later.

Sample Snort output is supplied as well. This last section will what you have learned and tie it all together showing how those rules would be used in real world situations. showing how the detects being monitored for are provided to you when they are detected. 37 .Tying It All Together 37 You have learned how to write rules and all of the syntax and keywords that go along with it.

if it detects any packets that match any of the rules it will write the activity out to the alert file and to a logging subdirectory in a log file.2. While Snort is running.5 drwx-----. The ‘-c’ command line option is the one you will use to do this. Instead. Special Note: This directory must already exist.3. Snort will not create this directory automatically if it does not exist.5:80 TCP TTL:46 TOS:0x0 ID:19678 ******A* Seq: 0xE4F00003 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0xC00 38 When using Snort.2 root root 4096 Mar 22 06:58 1. we see that the information it contains is simply the message from the triggered rule and the header information from the packet.1 root root 2512 Mar 22 06:58 alert cat alert [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 03/21-13:33:51. it will write the activity to the alerts file and the log directory and files.4 -rw------. but the log files can contain additional information the alert files does not if certain options are turned on.168.3.880120 1. and turn on additional options that cannot be specified by command line options.168. Snort will process the file to build a list of anomalies to detect for alerting and logging. The default directory Snort writes all of its output to is ‘/var/log/snort’.2.4:60216 -> 192. you will most often use it along with a rules file which tells Snort what to consider as hostile. With this option you specify the rules file that you want to use.2 root root 4096 Mar 22 06:58 192. The content of these files is similar. Examining the alert file.5.Specifying Rules File snort -c snort-lib ls -l /var/log/snort drwx-----. Snort will issue an error message and exit. 38 .5. After Snort has run for a while and detected anomalous behaviour.

3.168.168.5.4 traffic to destination port 2985.) snort -c snort-lib cd 192.5:12345 -> 1. 39 .5.2.1 root -rw------. the file TCP:12345-2985 represents activity from the host 192.168.275350 192. Changing directories to one of the ones listed .3.2.5 sent IP 1.5. The reason this traffic was logged there is because a rule fired that checks for traffic to or from port 12345.192.168. ls -l total 12 -rw------.we see additional files that house all logged activity originating from that IP.1 root cat TCP:12345-2985 [**] Netbus/GabanBus [**] 03/21-13:33:54.Specifying Rules File (cont.1 root -rw------.168.5. Examining the contents of that file you see that source IP 192.4:2985 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:9173 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C9B544A Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306314 0 NOP WS: 0 root root root 232 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:12345-2985 232 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:12346-1611 243 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:6969-2701 39 Continuing from the previous slide. A well known trojan named Netbus uses this port.5 . For instance. we will examine one of the log subdirectories found in ‘/var/log/snort’.5.5.5 that used the TCP protocol and has a source port of 12345 and a destination port of 2985.

5.3. we have created a log file in the current directory and want the activity recorded there. 40 ./log drwx-----. Snort will then record all alerts to an alert file in this directory.2. Remember – the directory you tell Snort to write the alert and logs to must already exist. This is the same as if everything was written to the default directory ‘/var/log/snort’. Snort places the logs and alerts in /var/log/snort.4 4096 Mar 22 08:16 2512 Mar 22 08:16 alerts 40 By default. Snort will not create this directory on its own.5 -rw-------. You can specify a default directory by using the ‘-l’ option and the name of the directory where you want the information placed.Log Alerts to Directory .1 root root root root 4096 Mar 22 08:16 1.2 root 192. as well as creating the logging directories and log files here.2 root drwx-----./log " " " Output placed in directory ./log snort -c snort-lib -l . In this case./log alerts file contains alerts generated by Snort IP subdirectories with logged payloads ls -l .168.

you can take any detect that is discovered and log in tcpdump raw output binary format. Oracle) Finally. This is often done with high traffic volume so as not to bog down Snort with the logging process. MySQL.g. this will log the traffic that triggered the scan in some kind of human readable format.Logging Options • Default: Full logging to default Snort directory Binary: tcpdump binary output to a single log file None: Disable logging Database: Log packets to SQL database XML: Log packets in portable XML format 41 • • • • The default method of logging is to capture the output generated from Snort detects and store it in the default Snort directory /var/log/snort. logging can be totally disabled if not desired. Depending on other command line options or rules options you use. This is only recommended if you are not interested in the payload of packets that trigger rules. There are also output plugins available to log packets to a XML formatted file as well as a variety of SQL databases (e. Alternatively. The log files (or file if you are logging in binary format) are the only place the FULL packet will be written out to including the payload. PostgreSQL. 41 .

Alerting Options • • • • • • • Full: writes alert message and header information to alert file (default) Fast: writes alert message and condensed header to alert file None: disable alerts Syslog: send alert messages to syslog SMB: send WinPopup messages to Windows hosts via ‘smbclient’ Database: Send alerts to SQL database XML: Write alerts in a portable XML format 42 Alerts are an abbreviated format of capturing the detect. There are also options available to send alerts to a database. When using this level of alerting. followed only by a data/timestamp and source and destination ports and addresses. 42 . as well as to an XML formatted file. The fast method writes partial information to the alert file. Full alerting is Snort’s default behaviour. The default method is to capture the detect in the file /var/log/snort/alert. followed by a date/timestamp and full packet header information. Windows host via SMB alerts. the message (if any) in the rule is written to the alert file first. Syslog alerts send messages in a format similar to the fast alerts. Fast alerting does not include the full packet header information. Fast alerting on the other hand writes the message (if any) in the rule is again written first. but write them to the syslog facilities. None will disable alerting all together.

Logging and alerting are conceptually different in a few ways. and the contents are files named according to the protocol and ports involved. The actual contents of the files record the payload of the packet(s) involved. The directory name (IP number) indicates the source IP that triggered the logging activity.Alert and Logging Differences • • • • • Alerts are all contained in one file Alerts are decoded through transport layer only Logging produces multiple files Logging creates a directory structure by IP numbers Subdirectories contain activity .possibly decoded through application layer 43 You may be wondering what the difference between logging and alerting is. Logging will create multiple files under multiple directories based on the IP number of the source host. The log files are there to allow follow forensic analysis of events. Alerts are more abbreviated captures of the detect that can all be found in a single file. the alert files exist merely to give the user a single place to monitor for Snort events. This is a better overview of what is happening on the network versus the more detailed captures for logging. Alerts exist to let the user know that something has happened and to give that user enough information to decide whether the alert warrants further investigation immediately. Logs exist to allow the user to analyse the exact packets that caused an alert in addition to any other packets that are possibly related to the alert event. such as specific exploits or specific hosts. It also provides a convenient one stop place to do quick searches for items that may be of interest. 43 .

168. log file only) 44 This slide shows you the general format of the alert and log files..7. The next item written is a date and timestamp. followed immediately by the packet’s decoded header information which can vary depending on the protocol of the packet. This essentially labels each detect as it is written to disk. Both log and alert messages start with the message text included in the rule. If the packet payload is included in the logs. the source and destination addresses and ports involved in the detect appear. with the exception of the packet payload which can be optionally included in the log files.2:25432 TCP TTL:255 TOS:0x0 ID:24915 *****PA* Seq: 0x30AC5391 Ack: 0x1E3E4A55 Win: 0x2238 Packet Header (varies) 35 35 30 20 35 2E 37 2E 31 20 3C FF FF FF FF 2D FF FF FF FF FF FF 40 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 2E 63 6F 6D 3E 2E 2E 2E 20 52 65 6C 61 79 69 6E 67 20 64 65 6E 69 65 64 0D 0A 550 5. making it easy to determine why the packet was logged.Alert and Logging Format [**] IDS249 . Next.1. Packet Payload.com>.775359 FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF -> FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF type:0x800 len:0x71 Date. Relayi ng denied. 44 .. The date and timestamp represent the time on the sensor when the detect was made.2:25 -> 192. Timestamp Ethernet (optional) DF 192. Optionally following the date and timestamp is the ethernet information.1 <blahblahrs@blahblahb l.168.SMTP Relaying Denied [**] Alert/Log Message Text 10/09-02:34:59. both the hex representation of the payload and the ASCII printable characters will be displayed. Alert and log records are identical.200. Hex and ASCII (optional..

45 .168. 45 In the next several slides.143 network that has the PUSH and ACK flags set and has a content of 'anonymous' in the payload. different options will be shown to explain various logging and alerting choices. We will put this single rule in the rules file name ‘snortrules’ to simplify the logging and alert messages generated.Logging/alert Examples • The following rule will be used to test various options to log and alert: \ \ alert tcp any any > 192.168. Content: "anonymous".143. nocase) • Place the above rule in rules file ‘snortrules’. The above rule will be used for most of the detects. This rule says that we want to alert if any ftp connection is generated to the 192. flags: PA.0/24 21 (msg: "anonymous FTP attempt".

168. we specify that we want to use a default logging directory of logdir. we notice that there is a file named ‘alert’. [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06. We run Snort using our one rule found in ‘snortrules’.143 network using a username of anonymous.350754 192. If we examine the contents of logdir directory. what you don't see above is we attempt to ftp to a host on the 192. Next.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 46 In this first example.143.143.Alert and Log snort -l logdir -c snortrules In directory logdir you will find a file named alert. That triggers a detect and causes Snort to create an entry in the alerts file. 46 .15:1536-> 192.168. It contains the output that was generated for the detect. in this case since we did not specify the alert level Snort will default to ‘full’.168. This has to be an existing directory. It contains the packet information decoded through the TCP transport layer as can be seen by examining the file.

The subdirectory 192.143.168.168.168.143.15. The filename identifies the protocol (TCP) as well as the source (1526) and destination ports (21) involved in the detect.168.Alert and Log (Cont) The directory logdir contains a subdirectory named: 192. If we ‘cd’ into that directory.350754 192.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7c451b73 Ack: 0x7dc44632 win: 0x7d78 TCP options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 47 In the same logdir directory.15:1536 -> 192. This is a log directory. 47 . we discover a subdirectory 192.15 that represents the hostile IP that attempted the anonymous ftp access. We find the same message generated in the alert file.15 contains a file: TCP:1536-21 [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06.143.143. we discover a file name TCP:1526-21.168.143.

It also still contains the full packet header information. still written in a human readable format.143. the date/timestamp and the hosts involved. Note that the contents of the alert file have not changed from what would normally be recorded. We follow the same process as before and discover that we have an alert file in logdir which is the same as before.15:1537 -> 192.143.Alert and Log With Decode snort -l logdir -c snortrules -d In directory logdir the file alert has the following contents: [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-12:03:59. which says to decode the application layer. 48 .888357 192.168.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:20566 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 48 Now we add the ‘-d’ option to the same command used previously. The alert file still contains the message from the triggered rule.168.

16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:20566 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x94102D52 Ack: 0x94529A7B Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27748803 128108 55 53 45 52 20 61 6E 6F 6E 79 6D 6F 75 73 0D 0A USER anonymous.15. 49 .888357 192. 49 If you now look at the log file.15 contains file named: TCP:1537-21 [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-12:03:59.168. but now the actual payload of the packet at the bottom of the alert.168.168.143.Alert and Log With Decode (Cont) The directory logdir contains the subdirectory 192.168. you will not only see the information contained in the alerts file.15:1537 ->192..143. The output of the packet’s payload is broken into two parts. The left portion contains the hex values of the payload.143.143. while the right portion contains the ASCII representation. The directory 192.

15:1536 -> 192. If you are deploying Snort on high capacity networks or Snort starts to drop packets. log in binary format.143. It also relieves Snort from having to create directories and constantly opening and closing files to write out the information in ASCII format.Alert and Log in Binary snort -l logdir -c snortrules -d -b The directory logdir contains the file alert.350754 192.143.168. This creates a single binary file instead of creating many subdirectories with files in them that may contain only one packet. Instead Snort can open one file and continuously write to that file for the entire duration Snort is running.168.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 50 The ‘-b’ option allows you to log the packets to a tcpdump file instead of the normal decoded ASCII files. [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06. Logging using the binary format is much more efficient than having Snort write out a completely decoded packet in an ASCII format. 50 .

This requires less work of Snort to capture and is used when there is a lot of traffic on the network and there is a concern for packets being dropped.Alert and Log in Binary (Cont) In directory logdir we find the following file: snort-0428@1158. 51 .log This is a tcpdump binary output of entire packet. we find a file snort-0428@1158. This can be read either using Snort with the ‘-r’ option or with tcpdump with the ‘-r’ option. The name has the date of the capture (0428 . 51 In the logdir directory.April 28th) and the time of the capture (11:58 AM).log which is a tcpdump raw binary output file of the detect that was captured.

960219 1.raw.2. but this time we use the ‘-r’ switch to tell Snort to read its input from ‘tcpdump.. Note the ‘Entering readback mode’.data Initializing Network Interface. snaplen = 144 Entering readback mode.168.5:2307 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:7569 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C857C3C Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306083 0 NOP WS: 0 03/21-13:33:51. This can be done if you've collected data using tcpdump from another sensor or other tcpdump compatible software.4:1398 -> 192.5:693 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:7570 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C55968F Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306083 0 NOP WS: 0 52 Another useful ability of Snort is the ‘-r’ command line option. This assumes that we have collected ‘tcpdump.raw.5.. sending the data to the screen.2. In that case you can pull the data back periodically and run Snort on the retrieved data without using extra CPU cycles on the sensor itself.data’ earlier and it contains tcpdump binary data.3.3. This option instructs Snort to read from tcpdump binary files instead of the network interface. we are using Snort in verbose mode.data’ instead of from the network interface.4:1399 -> 192. Readback mode can be especially useful for busy networks where full and constant processing on the sensor itself may not be feasible.raw. That is the tcpdump snapshot length. note the ‘snaplen = 144’. indicating that the software used to create the dump file collected 144 bytes for each packet collected.168. 52 . Also. or instructed Snort to log in binary..Reading Tcpdump Files snort -vd -r tcpdump.960269 1. In the example shown here.. 03/21-13:33:51. This is Snort’s way of informing you that it is reading from a file and not from the network interface.5..

html) • Alert wrap-up html files • Specific source/destination alert html files • Optionally linked to log files for packet inspection • • Located in snort directory contrib subdirectory http://www.silicondefense.Pl • perl script to take alerts: – Formats Snort alert and log files into html output – Places output in following files for ‘drill down’: • Overall summary of detected alerts (index. This is easier than trying to assess what is happening by looking at the alerts file.pl /var/log/snort/alert 53 There are tools available that will help you with the analysis of the alert and log files. 53 . At the top level.Snortsnarf.html file containing a summarized list of alerts. SnortSnarf will allow you to drill down to the packet that triggered a specific alert. and you provide the directory the logs are located in. an html file is created containing each of the same alerts in a single file. One tool that has proven to be popular as well as being very useful is SnortSnarf. At the next level down. The SnortSnarf program is intended to help you view your Snort alerts in an orderly fashion using a web browser. SnortSnarf creates an index.com/snortsnarf/ snortsnarf. If logging was turned on in Snort. and allows you to drill down from the general list of alerts to the specific packet that triggered the alert (providing logging was turned on and the decode option was specified).

The information displayed can include a sample rule that would detect the traffic. sample packets. Files included: •snort.alert •snort_portscan. and further explanation of the exploit. click on the summary link which will display a page containing information about the selected alerts. and the total number of source and destination hosts involved.775359 on 10/09 Latest alert at 03:00:36 on 10/9 Signature (click for definition) # Alerts # Sources # Destinations Detail link IDS249 . you can click on the signature name and a page displaying information about the signature will be displayed. For some signatures.SnortSnarf Output Snortsnarf: Snort signatures in snort.log Earliest alert at 02:34:59. such as the ‘SMTP Relaying Denied’ example shown here. It lists the signatures that were detected. number of times it was triggered.alert et al 7 alerts processed. To see additional details. This page contains a summarized list of alerts that were triggered during the time period listed. 54 .1 (Jim Hoagland and Stuart Staniford) 54 This is a sample index page created by SnortSnarf.SMTP Relaying Denied 1 1 1 Summary UDP scan 6 1 1 Summary Generated by Snortsnarf v100400.

the grant total of alerts triggered by the host for all alerts.1. Clicking on the source IP address will take you to the alerts triggered by that source host for this signature. they would all be listed here.log Earliest such alert at 02:34:59.168.200. and the number of destination hosts involved for both of those totals.2 # Alerts (sig) 1 # Alerts (total) 1 # Dsts (sig) 1 # Dsts (total)) 1 Destinations receiving this attack signature Destinations 192.1 (Jim Hoagland and Stuart Staniford) 55 When clicking on the link from the summarized index page. you arrive at this page. In this case only one alert of the type ‘SMTP Relaying Denied’ is listed and it involved only one source and destination IP. Looking in files: •snort. including all of the hosts that were involved. This page lists all of the source and destination hosts involved with the selected alert.SMTP Relaying Denied 1 alerts on this signature.SMTP Relaying Denied 1 sources 1 destinations Sources triggering this attack signature Source 192. The chart to the right of the address shows you how many alerts were triggered by that host for this specific alert.168.775359 on 10/09 Latest such alert at 02:34:59. If there were multiple instances of this alert.alert et al for signature: IDS249 .2 # Alerts (sig) 1 # Alerts (total) 1 # Srcs (sig) 1 # Srcs (total)) 1 Generated by Snortsnarf v100400.alert •snort_portscan. 55 .775359 on 10/09 IDS249 .Summary of alerts in snort.

775359 on 10/09 1 different signatures are present for 206.775359 on 10/09 Latest: 02:34:59.All 1 alerts from 192.SMTP Relaying Denied Whois lookup at: ARIN RIPE APNIC Geektools There are 1 distinct destination IPs in the alerts of the type on this page.log Earliest: 02:34:59.1.216.216 as a source •1 instances of IDS249 .1.alert et al Looking in files: •snort. 192.SMTP Relaying Denied [**] 56 56 .2 DNS lookup at: Amenesi Riherds Princeton [**] IDS249 .181.168.2 in snort.alert •snort_portscan.168.