Snort Rules: Application

Paul Ritchey, Jacob and Sundstrom, Inc. pritchey@jasi.com

V1.0.0

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Welcome to the class titled ‘Snort Rules: Application’. The purpose of this class is to take the material you learned in the previous section, ‘Snort Rules: Syntax and Keywords’. This section will take those individual keywords, values and syntax to form complete rules. You will also learn how to analyze existing rules piece by piece to determine what the rule is looking for.

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Agenda
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Rule Analysis
Simple Rules ! Difficult Rules ! Advanced Rules
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Writing Rules
Simple Rules ! Difficult Rules ! Advanced Rules
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Tying It All Together
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The first half of this presentation will examine rules of increasing complexity. You will be taught how to analyze an existing rule to determine what it is looking for. This ability is key to understanding how to piece together a complete rule from scratch that matches the signature of an attack. The second half of the presentation will ask you to write rules from scratch of increasing difficulty. The process of creating these rules will be covered in a step by step process. This will show you a possible methodology you can use when creating rules on your own. The very last section will tie together everything you have learned so far, showing you a few of the options available for Snort output. This presentation covers Snort version 1.7. If you are using a newer version of Snort, please remember that new features may have been added or existing features may have been modified after this presentation was assembled.

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Rule Analysis: Simple Rules

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This section will show you how to analyze simple rules, step by step. The analysis skills learned here will be built upon in later sections to analyze rules of increasing difficulty. This will help you later when you will be required to write rules from scratch.

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Rule Analysis: Simple Rules
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Learn to analyze simple rules.
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Signature based on rule header.

Examples taken from snort.org rule set and www.whitehats.com. ! Use logical approach
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Analyze rule header first
• Determine source and destination addresses and ports • Snort uses this section first.

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Analyze rule options next
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In this section you will learn how to analyze simple rules. The rules were chosen because they do not incorporate packet attributes which can make some rules difficult to analyze. These are real life rules, taken directly from the rule set available from the snort.org web site and www.whitehats.com. This means that it’s possible to do further research on the exploits that the rules are designed to detect to fully round out your understanding of rules. This section will start with teaching you how to analyze rules based on a logical approach. The first step is to analyze the rule header. This determines what hosts, ports, protocols and traffic flow must be involved before Snort even starts to examine the rest of the rule – this allows Snort to quickly determine if it should completely analyze the rule against the options section, saving valuable time. Later sections will combine the analysis of the rule header with the options section for more complicated rules.

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Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice
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Background:
Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected machine
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Rule:
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alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice";)

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The first rule we are going to examine is one that looks for attempts at connecting Back Orifice trojans. This particular exploit works by means of a trojan that is somehow installed on the target machine. The trojan can be installed accidentally by end users running executables attached to email messages, downloading the trojan masquerading as a useful utility, etc. Once installed, the trojan opens a port and makes itself available for control from a remote host. Further information on this particular trojan can be obtained any of the major online security web sites. In depth analysis of this trojan is beyond the scope of this course.

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This rule only applies to UDP traffic. the source address is also defined as a variable. will execute the action ‘alert’. named EXTERNAL.) alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice".Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice (cont. 6 . ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 6 For this simple rule. the contents of the signature is completely contained in the rule header. Alert means Snort will write an entry to the alert file and an entry to the logs unless they are overridden by command line options or other means. this is set to !$HOME_NET. In this particular rule. ! Applies only to UDP traffic. If snort the traffic Snort is examining is from another protocol. but must be destined specifically for the port 31337 (otherwise known as ‘eleet’) on the destination machine. The UDP packet can. HOME_NET. this rule will not be tested against them. however. meaning that the source address should be outside of the network address space Snort is monitoring. Typically.) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. The destination address is defined as a variable. This rule. This variable is typically defined at the top of the rules file being used. be originating from any of the possible ports on the source host. when it is triggered. and is set to the addresses Snort is monitoring.

! ! Possibility of false-positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. Since no packet attributes or options are specified. may very well be false-positives. ! Only includes message. although not often. it is seen that the only option being used is the message option. 7 .) ! Examine rule options. This option provides a string that is used to tag alert and log entries. ! High likelihood of false-positives. No packet attributes are examined. This rule is very simple. it is very likely that detects.Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice (cont. making it easier to determine what a log or alert entry represents. Care must be taken when analyzing any available data to validate that the packet was truly a probe for Back Orifice or the master program contacting a Back Orifice client. that happens to be destined for destination port 31337 will trigger this rule. The only thing limiting the rule down to a specific subset of UDP traffic is the destination port. Any traffic. such as streaming audio or video.) alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice". ! 7 Examining the rule options section.

! ! Rule: ! alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 .DeepThroat 3.) 8 The next simple rule we will examine is one that detects Deep Throat trojans.Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat Trojan ! Background Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected host. 8 . Deep Throat is another trojan that can be accidentally installed by users who unknowingly execute attachments or download the software by accident. Once installed.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE .1 Server Active on Network". the trojan opens a port that allows remote hosts to control the infected machine.

) alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 . and to the specific port 6000. it will trigger the rule and will be logged to the alert file and logs with the message specified in the rule options section. Instead of specifying a variable for the source IP address. This rule. If snort the traffic Snort is examining is from another protocol. the contents of the signature is again completely contained in the rule header. The DMZ sites outside of your internal network. Because of this.Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat (cont. when it is triggered. 9 . there are no restrictions. Applies only to UDP traffic.1 Server Active on Network".BACKDOOR SIGNATURE \ DeepThroat 3. If the packet meets all of the above criteria. or outbound from your network to the internet. it would have been just as effective to replace the keyword ‘any’ with !$HOME_NET. the keyword ‘any’ is specified. This rule only applies to UDP traffic. including internal addresses. Snort is typically installed on a machine that resides in a ‘DMZ’. This means that the packet can originate from any possible IP address. ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = internal network 9 For this simple rule. The packet must be destined for the network the variable HOME_NET is set to. Alert means Snort will write an entry to the alert file and an entry to the logs unless they are overridden by command line options or other means. will execute the action ‘alert’. However. Source specified as ‘any’ • ‘Any’ matches all possible IP addresses. I would like take a second to discuss the keyword ‘any’ that was specified for the source address. the packet must originate from a specific port – 2140. this rule will not be tested against them. and sees all traffic in bound from the internet to your network.) ! Examine the rule header: ! ! ! Will ‘alert’ when triggered. Now the rule deviates from the previous example. It does not and should not see your internal traffic.

Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat (cont. Most virus software should be capable of detecting this trojan if properly installed and used regularly. Likelihood of detect being a false-positives. it’s possible that this port combination could be used during the course of a valid connection. Only includes message. Low likelihood of occurrence. 10 ! Possibility of false-positives: ! ! Examining the rule options section. Both ports are ephemeral ports.\ DeepThroat 3. making it easier to determine what a log or alert entry represents.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . and because there are no other criteria for the rule false-positive detects may be made.) ! Examine rule options. This option provides a string that is used to tag alert and log entries. Although unlikely. ! ! No packet attributes are examined. This increases the chances that a detect is a false-positive so care must be taken to fully resolve any detects.1 Server Active on Network". meaning they are out of the reserved range. we again that this rule like the previous example is only specifying the message option. 10 . The only real limiting factors are the source and destination ports. This rule is very simple.) alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 .

Rule Analysis: Complex Rules 11 In this section the rules presented for analysis are a little more complicated than the previous examples. Essentially they provide additional information about packets that are considered hostile beyond source and destination IPs and ports. 11 .

Rule Analysis: Complex Rules ! Learn to analyze complex rules. which can potentially reduce the number of false positives. it’s possible to make rules more accurate. ! Signature also based on rule options. By adding packet attributes (such as TCP flags) to the rule options section.com.whitehats. In these rules. It consists of the rule header and additional information specified in the rule options. Interpretation of the rule option section with different kinds of packet attributes will be introduced here.org rule set and www. Signature based on rule header. 12 .org web site and from the www.snort. ! Examples taken from www. They have been taken from the rule sets available at the www. This section will continue to build on the rule analysis technique that was used in the first section.snort. The example rules used in this section are real world rules.whitehats. ! Use logical approach ! Analyze rule header first ! Analyze rule options next ! • Specifies specific packet attributes • Can increase accuracy – decrease false positives 12 This section concentrates on analyzing more complicated rules – those containing packet attributes in the rule options section.com web site. the signature doesn’t just consist of the contents of the rule header.

NetMetro is another trojan that when installed allows remote control of the infected machine. or downloading the trojan as it masquerades as a useful utility or game.) 13 The rule we are going to examine next is one that detects the NetMetro trojan.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE – NetMetro Incoming Traffic".Complex Rule #1: NetMetro ! Background: Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected machine ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 . 13 . flags:PA. Again. this trojan like any other can be accidentally installed by executing attachments to email messages. Most virus detection software should detect this trojan as long as the signatures are properly maintained.

inclusive.NetMetro Incoming Traffic".) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 . it will not match the rule header information and this rule will not be triggered.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. It specifies that the destination port can be any port except ports 53 through 80. The destination port setting is more interesting. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network.Complex Rule #1: NetMetro (cont. flags:PA. 14 . but may also be set by command line options. If the source port is anything but 5031. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. unless these options are overridden by command line options. The source port the traffic must originate from is port 5031. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 14 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature.

! 15 This rule is the first example of packet attributes being used in the rule options section. the rule will be triggered as soon as the TCP three way handshake is completed and the first packed with a payload is sent inbound to your network. ! No other packet attributes examined. If the port 5031 is used by the person connecting to your telnet server. Other flags. URG and the two reserved bits must NOT be set. additional data possibly beyond what Snort provides may need to be examined. For this particular rule. and the destination port must be outside the specified range. Telnet runs on port 23. flags:PA. FIN.) ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. The attribute being tested is the TCP flags setting. there is a low likelihood of false positives. To rule out the possibility of a detect being a false positive. The false positives are limited because the source port must exactly match 5031. In this case. 15 . The source port 5031 is an ephemeral port. it’s possible this rule may be triggered. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . the TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. outside the range specified by the destination port setting that specifies what ports it cannot be. if an outside user telnets in to a server in your network. ! High likelihood of being false positive. For example. The addition of packet attributes (in this case TCP flags) to the rule options section aids in reducing the possibility of false positives because it helps to narrow the possibility of matches somewhat. meaning that is not a reserved port and available for anyone and any application to use.NetMetro Incoming\ Traffic". although they will happen.Complex Rule #1: NetMetro (cont. such as SYN. No other packet attributes are examined beyond the TCP flag setting.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 .

Scan . This particular scanner can allow an attacker to easily determine what services are available on a host. ! Allows remote detection of available services and OS fingerprinting. For this scanner certain packet attributes are hard coded in the original source code.) 16 The second difficult rule to be examined detects a particular tool used for scanning. It can also allow the rule to be tuned to help eliminate false positives. ack: 0. 16 .Complex Rule #2: Myscan ! Background: Port scanner. and the hacker now has enough information to launch an effective attack. \ flags: S. This allowing an accurate rule to be written that can easily detect scans from this software. ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 .myscan". ttl: >220. increasing the accuracy. Combined with the ability to determine the OS.

The destination port can be anything. it will not match the rule header information and this rule will not be triggered.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 . This means the rule does not care what port is used on the destination host. \ ack: 0. 17 . but may also be set by command line options. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. flags: S. specified by the keyword ‘any’. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. If the source port is anything but 10101. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 17 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. ttl: >220. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file. This variable is set to the IP address range your sensor is to monitor.Scan -myscan".) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. The source port the traffic must originate from is port 10101. unless these options are overridden by command line options.Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET.

The next slide will show you the individual parts that combined together make this happen. flags: S. TCP flags. ttl: >220. acknowledgement number (ack) and the TCP flag settings are examined. there is a low likelihood that the rule will be triggered.) ! Examine the rule options: ! ! ! Time to live value must be greater than 220. must have a value greater than or equal to 220. The second attribute.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 . the packet attributes time to live (ttl).Scan -myscan". the acknowledgement number. but a very high likelihood that if it is triggered that it is NOT a false positive. 18 . For this rule. Acknowledgement number must be zero (0). Low likelihood of occurrence. Low likelihood of being false positive. 18 ! Likelihood of false positives: ! ! In this rule’s option section. TCP flag SYN must be set. time to live. The first attribute that is examined.Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont. \ ack: 0. The last attribute. must be zero (0). There are many key items that lead to this conclusion and show that this rule is a very well written one. must have the SYN flag set.

19 Time To Live ! Acknowledgement Number. Only in a crafted packet will this value ever be used. The first item that helps tune this rule is the specification of a specific port for the source port. All other operating systems use values much less than 220. By specifying a specific value.Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont. The source code for this utility is freely available. the acknowledgement number can never be zero. Most operating systems specify a value much less than 220 when the packet is created. This makes it vulnerable to mutations of the scanning utility. Only one OS uses setting greater than 220. Because the source port is such a high number. meaning the non-reserved ports. Only the Solaris 2.x operating system sets the time to live attribute to a value greater than 220. that source port will be used.101. The last item that contributes to the rule’s tuning is the acknowledgement attribute value.Scan -myscan". ack: 0. it must have made many connections to other machines. However it does depend on the above settings in the crafted packet not to be changed. The rule specifies that this attribute must be set to the value zero (0). Under normal conditions. only source addresses using that specific port might cause a trigger. They are typically used in sequence. and by making a single simple alteration and recompiling it the rule will no longer detect it (although Snort’s scan detection preprocessor should detect it. it is very unlikely – but possible. start at 1024 and go up. Ephemeral ports. 19 .) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ \ (msg: "IDS439 . ttl: >220. flags: S.) ! ! ! ! Source Port ! High into ephemeral ports (non-reserved). ! Rule vulnerable to mutations. but it will not identify the utility being used). All of the above combine to make this a finely tuned rule that will not false positive very often. The second item that helps tune this rule is the time to live value. Cannot normally be set to zero (0). so for a source address to reach 10.

20 . These types of rules also have the lowest likelihood of false positives because of the completeness of the examination of the packets.Rule Analysis: Advanced Rules 20 This section provides analysis of advanced rules – those using more sophisticated packet attributes to examine the packet’s payload. They are also the easiest to avoid triggering by making slight alterations in the application’s source code. These rules are the most difficult to write because they require close analysis of an attack’s signature and of the source code of the attack application if available.

Interpretation of the rule option section with different kinds of packet attributes will be introduced here. By adding packet attributes (such as TCP flags) to the rule options section.com. ! Signature also based on rule options.snort. This section will continue to build on the rule analysis technique that was used in the first section.snort. ! Use logical approach ! Analyze rule header first ! Analyze rule options next ! • Specifies specific packet attributes • Can increase accuracy – decrease false positives 21 This section concentrates on analyzing more complicated rules – those containing packet attributes in the rule options section. it’s possible to make rules more accurate. 21 . They have been taken from the rule sets available at the www.whitehats. In these rules. ! Examples taken from www.org web site and from the www. which can potentially reduce the number of false positives. It consists of the rule header and additional information specified in the rule options. The example rules used in this section are real world rules.whitehats. Signature based on rule header.org rule set and www.Rule Analysis: Advanced Rules ! Learn to analyze difficult rules. the signature doesn’t just consist of the contents of the rule header.com web site.

! Allows instant root access. In this case the exploit is known as the wuftp2600.c exploit which was originally distributed in a broken form. 22 . content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB 4389 D941 B03F CD80|". the attacker is instantly granted root access on a high numbered port that is opened up.) \ \ \ 22 The first advanced rule we will examine is one that exploits a bug in an ftp daemon provided by www. If the exploit is successful. flags: PA.org that is used as a replacement for many native ftp daemons on some flavors of Unix.FTP wuftp260-tf8".Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit ! Background: Exploits a bug in wu-ftp daemon.wu-ftpd. ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 (msg: "IDS458 . as well as coming native in many Linux distributions.

unless these options are overridden by command line options. flags: PA.) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network.FTP wuftp260-tf8". Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file. the packet must be destined for port 21. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. The source port is set to the keyword ‘any’. meaning that the TCP packet can originate from any possible port on the source host. However. but may also be set by command line options. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. Port 21 is a well known reserved port that is used to provide FTP services.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 \ (msg: "IDS458 . 23 . \ content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB \ 43 89D941 B03F CD80|".Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit (cont. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 23 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET.

it’s very likely that it is a positive detect. although possible. 24 . which is denoted by the enclosing pipe (‘|’) symbols. In this example the content that is being searched for is given in hex values. The second attribute specified examines the packet’s payload. ! 24 For this rule.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 \ (msg: "IDS458 . flags: PA. These packets will have the PUSH flag set indicating that data is being sent. is very unlikely to occur during a normal FTP session. Only packets with a payload should be applied against this rule. two packet attributes are examined in order to detect the exploit. The content value. ! Examines payload for specific values. hence this rule’s high level of accuracy. the PUSH and ACK TCP flags must be set. detects will very rarely occur primarily because of the very specific content that is being searched for. ! Low likelihood of being false positive. It’s possible to have other flag settings without the PUSH flag set and still have a payload. For this rule. When detects do occur. \ content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB \ 4389 D941 B03F CD80|".Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit (cont.FTP wuftp260-tf8".) ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. This rule is tuned ever so slightly by the TCP flags attribute. The exploit detected here works by initiating a proper TCP connection. however these are typically other exploits which this rule doesn’t apply to and should have a different rule written to detect them. For this rule. more specifically an anonymous FTP session and initiating a buffer overflow. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. The examination of a packets payload is triggered by specifying the keyword ‘content’. The first attribute is the TCP flag settings.

The ‘cgitest.) \ \ \ 25 The second advanced rule we will examine is a web based exploit.Web cgi cgitest".exe Exploit ! Background: Web exploit. nocase. which limits the possible ramifications of a successful attack that might exist on a Unix or Windows NT machine. flags: AP. ! Allows arbitrary execution of code on server.exe|0d0a|user".Advanced Rule #2: cgitest. The web daemon affected by this vulnerability runs on Windows 95. which is one of the more lethal types of attacks an attacker can use. 25 . content:"cgitest. offset:4. ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 . The exploit works because of a buffer overflow vulnerability.exe’ is a CGI that if it is left installed on a particular web server can allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the web server.

Web cgi cgitest". but may also be set by command line options. flags: AP.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 . If there are web daemons used on your network using alternative ports. the packet must be destined for port 80. content: "cgitest. meaning that the TCP packet can originate from any possible port on the source host. This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET.) \ \ \ ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET.exe Exploit (cont. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. However. Port 80 is one of the most common ports used for web daemons. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 26 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. The source port is set to the keyword ‘any’.exe|0d0a|user". nocase. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file. offset:4. 26 . unless these options are overridden by command line options. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET.Advanced Rule #2: cgitest. the rule should be duplicated for each of the ports being used.

but by ignoring 3 bytes of every packet on a very busy network can quickly add up. two packet attributes are examined in order to detect the exploit. These packets will have the PUSH flag set indicating that data is being sent. This rule tells Snort to start examining the payload 4 bytes in.exe Exploit (cont. ! Examines payload for specific values. and then executing the ‘cgitest. only the ‘offset’ option is used. When detects do occur. To help reduce the overhead of processing that must take place. detects will very rarely occur primarily because of the very specific content that is being searched for. 27 . offset:4. Note the use of the ‘nocase’ option. This may not seem like a lot. flags: AP. it can be tuned by specifying the ‘offset’ and ‘depth’ options.exe|0d0a|user". In this example the content that is being searched for is a combination of two sections of ASCII data and one section of hex values. is very unlikely to occur during a normal web sessions by chance. The second attribute specified examines the packet’s payload. effectively ignoring the first 3 bytes. These options reduce the amount of a packet’s payload that must be inspected by Snort. Only packets with a payload should be applied against this rule.Web cgi cgitest". In this rule. however these are typically other exploits which this rule doesn’t apply to and should have a different rule written to detect them. although possible.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 . This rule is tuned ever so slightly by the TCP flags attribute. For this rule.) \ \ \ ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. The exploit detected here works by initiating a proper TCP connection to a web server. The examination of a packets payload is triggered by specifying the keyword ‘content’. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. and can be interspersed between each other. it’s very likely that it is a positive detect. For this rule. The first attribute is the TCP flag settings. nocase. The content attribute can be a very resource intensive attribute to use. The content value. content: "cgitest. it can appear in any possible combination of upper and lower case letters possible. ! 27 For this rule. the PUSH and ACK TCP flags must be set. It’s possible to have other flag settings without the PUSH flag set and still have a payload. ! Low likelihood of being false positive.ext’ CGI on that server and causing a buffer overflow.Advanced Rule #2: cgitest. This informs Snort that for the ASCII content being searched for. This example shows how ASCII and hex values can be combined to form a payload signature.

A specification for a needed rule will be provided.Writing Rules 28 In this section will demonstrate how to write a few rules from scratch of increasing difficulty. followed by a possible solution. 28 . Keep in mind that for some types of rules there may be several possible answers. all of which may be correct.

Write the rule. The alert message should contain the text ‘Inbound Ping’. The rule should both alert and log.Writing Rules: Simple Rule ! Your boss wants to know about all ICMP echo requests (pings) coming into your network. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule. using the variable HOME_NET to represent your network address space. He would like to have Snort record this packets for future analysis and to see if there are any trends. 29 Your boss is concerned about inbound ICMP echo requests from outside addresses. Write the rule using the variable HOME_NET to represent your network address space. 29 .

Writing Rules: Simple Rule (cont. To do this. 30 . Snort rules always require a port to be specified. We were also told to only record inbound ICMP echo requests. We could have used any value for this field. so specifying the not sign (‘!’) with the HOME_NET variable represents all addresses except those in your network. We were told that the variable HOME_NET would represent our internal network.) ! Possible Answer: alert icmp !$HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg:“Inbound Ping". the rule’s action field must be set to the value ‘alert’. the rule is to both alert and log. but ICMP does not use ports so we used the keyword ‘any’ as a placeholder. and the source address field is set to ‘!$HOME_NET’. Therefore the protocol field is set to ICMP. It is needed only to satisfy the rule parser when Snort reads and process the rules file on startup. it will be ignored by Snort when evaluating a packet against this rule. We also used the ‘itype’ attribute with a value of ‘8’ to limit the rule to only record echo requests – otherwise known as pings. In the rules option section we set the message option to the appropriate value as requested. itype: 8.) 30 According to the specification given on the previous slide.

you decided to write a rule to ignore inbound packets from this scanning box. Also list the command line option that must be included for this rule to be effective. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule. including the satellite office you work at.1. What command line option must also be included? 31 In order to try to keep a step ahead of the hackers. The address space at the satellite office you work at is the Class B 10.168.x. Write a rule that will cause Snort to ignore all inbound TCP packets from the scanning machine.1.Writing Rules: Simple Rule #2 ! Corporate headquarters routinely runs a scan of all IPs owned by the company. 31 .x. 192.1. including satellite offices. corporate headquarters decided to run a periodic scan against all IP addresses the company owns. Tired of filtering through the false positives caused by this routine scanning.

0/16 any ! Snort Command Line: ! Snort –c snortrules -o 32 This is a simple rule to write. 10. you must specify the ‘-o’ option. This causes Snort to process pass rules first.) ! Possible Answer: ! pass tcp 192. In order for this rule to be effective. the keyword ‘any’ was specified.1.0. The source address was set to the specific host from corporate headquarters. The destination address field is set to the proper CIDR notation for the satellite office. so the protocol field in the rule was set to the value ‘TCP’. but also has a special requirement that must not be forgotten.0. To reverse this order. then alert and log rules. indicating that we don’t care what the source port is. it can be any in the entire range possible.0/16. 192.Writing Rules: Simple Rule #2 (cont.1/32 any -> 10. then the pass rules last. the keyword ‘any’. This effectively ignores pass rules. 32 .1.168.168. To ignore packets. You were told this rule should ignore TCP traffic. Snort must be told to process the ‘pass’ rules first. This tells Snort to drop the packet being inspected when the rule is triggered.1. The destination port is set to the same value as the source port. Since the source port can vary. By default Snort processes alert and log rules first.1. the rule’s action field must be set to the value ‘pass’. This can be a useful capability in order to reduce false positives or to ignore traffic from a particular host.1.

1.1. you have decided to log all FTP activity to this server to a separate log file so you can see the full session. you have detected some behavior that just doesn’t seem normal. The source of the possible anomalous behavior is the 10.1.168. Write a rule to log all activity to this server (192.0 class C address space. In order to investigate this matter further. 33 During routine monitoring of your logs on your anonymous FTP server. 33 . Write a Snort rule that will accomplish this. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule.Writing Rules: Difficult Rule ! Odd behavior has been detected on your anonymous FTP server.2) to a single file.

we have specified the ‘session’ option which will record all printable (ASCII) information. Port 21 is the ‘control’ port for FTP sessions where we can record the commands and responses of the user and server.1. For the source IP we specified the class C where the potentially hostile traffic is originating from using CIDR notation. session: printable. 34 . Since the source port can be any of the ephemeral ports.168.1. logto: “anonftp”. This will conveniently log all of the activity to a single file making it easy to review any activity that is recorded. We could have specified the range of ports from 1. we decided to specify the keyword ‘any’. but just in case the traffic is hostile and the attacker tries to use a reserved port we decided to use ‘any’ instead. along with the destination port of 21. We have also redirected the output to the file ‘anonftp’ by using the ‘logto’ option. we specified the ‘log’ action.1.0/24 any -> 192. We don’t really want to have every packet’s header written to the alerts file.2/32 21 (msg: “FTP activity to anonymous FTP server”.) ! Possible Answer: log 10. For the destination address we specified its full IP address in CIDR notation.024 and up.) \ \ 34 For this rule. To record the activity. we really don’t care about having them.Writing Rules: Difficult Rule (cont.

x. The only TCP flag set is the SYN flag. and each packet has the same sequence number. This particular scan use port 53 for both the source and destination ports.1. The scan originates from port 53 to port 53 and has a TCP sequence number of 123456789 for every packet. Write a rule that will both alert and log. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule.168. The packets also include the payload ‘Boo!’ and have only the SYN TCP flag set. The network being monitored is the class C address space of 192. 35 The next rule to write is one for a new fictitious scan that has been seen recently.Writing Rules: Advanced Rule ! A new (fictitious) probe has been detected from a new scanner called ‘pr0b3z’. the PUSH flag is not set. Although there is a payload. 35 . Oddly enough there is a payload of varying length that always contains the string ‘Boo!’ imbedded somewhere.

For the destination addresses we specified our network using standard CIDR notation. the description given to use said that the packets only have the SYN flag set. According to the description this string can appear anywhere in the payload.) 36 For this rule we set the action field to the standard ‘alert’ action. We’ll specify this in the rule using the ‘flags’ attribute and this will indirectly limit the amount of payload processing Snort will have to do because although it is possible to have a payload in a SYN packet it is a rare occurrence. 36 . \ seq: 123456789. From the description we have been given the sequence number is the same for all packets. We used the ‘seq’ packet attribute to specify the sequence number. content: “Boo!”. The content option was used to search packets for a payload that contains the ASCII string ‘Boo!’. and no other flags. These scans can originate anywhere so we have specified the keyword ‘any’ as the source IP. flags: S. Since both the source and destination ports use 53.0/24 53 \ (msg: “Inbound Scan: Pr0b3z”. But.Writing Rules: Advanced Rule (cont.) ! Possible Answer: alert any 53 -> 192. We want this activity to be written to both the alert file and the log file – especially if we later run SnortSnarf on these files which we use during our analysis work. In the rules option section we specified on output message that’s descriptive and will mean something to us when we review the alerts file and log data later. so we can’t specify the ‘offset’ or ‘depth’ options to limit the amount of processing Snort will have to do.1.168. we have set both in the rule to that number.

This last section will what you have learned and tie it all together showing how those rules would be used in real world situations.Tying It All Together 37 You have learned how to write rules and all of the syntax and keywords that go along with it. 37 . Sample Snort output is supplied as well. showing how the detects being monitored for are provided to you when they are detected.

it will write the activity to the alerts file and the log directory and files. and turn on additional options that cannot be specified by command line options.5:80 TCP TTL:46 TOS:0x0 ID:19678 ******A* Seq: 0xE4F00003 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0xC00 38 When using Snort.2 root root 4096 Mar 22 06:58 192. With this option you specify the rules file that you want to use. but the log files can contain additional information the alert files does not if certain options are turned on. Instead. we see that the information it contains is simply the message from the triggered rule and the header information from the packet.2. Examining the alert file. Snort will process the file to build a list of anomalies to detect for alerting and logging. While Snort is running. Snort will issue an error message and exit. After Snort has run for a while and detected anomalous behaviour. you will most often use it along with a rules file which tells Snort what to consider as hostile.168.4:60216 -> 192.3.168.5.Specifying Rules File snort -c snort-lib ls -l /var/log/snort drwx-----.5. if it detects any packets that match any of the rules it will write the activity out to the alert file and to a logging subdirectory in a log file.3. 38 .5 drwx-----. The default directory Snort writes all of its output to is ‘/var/log/snort’.1 root root 2512 Mar 22 06:58 alert cat alert [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 03/21-13:33:51.2. The ‘-c’ command line option is the one you will use to do this.4 -rw------. The content of these files is similar. Snort will not create this directory automatically if it does not exist.2 root root 4096 Mar 22 06:58 1.880120 1. Special Note: This directory must already exist.

Specifying Rules File (cont.5.4:2985 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:9173 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C9B544A Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306314 0 NOP WS: 0 root root root 232 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:12345-2985 232 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:12346-1611 243 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:6969-2701 39 Continuing from the previous slide.168.192.5.5:12345 -> 1. Changing directories to one of the ones listed .5.5.1 root -rw------.5 that used the TCP protocol and has a source port of 12345 and a destination port of 2985.5.275350 192.we see additional files that house all logged activity originating from that IP.) snort -c snort-lib cd 192. The reason this traffic was logged there is because a rule fired that checks for traffic to or from port 12345.4 traffic to destination port 2985. we will examine one of the log subdirectories found in ‘/var/log/snort’.168.5 sent IP 1. the file TCP:12345-2985 represents activity from the host 192.3. For instance.5.168.168.1 root -rw------. 39 . Examining the contents of that file you see that source IP 192.3.1 root cat TCP:12345-2985 [**] Netbus/GabanBus [**] 03/21-13:33:54.2. ls -l total 12 -rw------. A well known trojan named Netbus uses this port.5 .2.168.

/log snort -c snort-lib -l . This is the same as if everything was written to the default directory ‘/var/log/snort’.1 root root root root 4096 Mar 22 08:16 1./log drwx-----.168.3.5 -rw-------.4 4096 Mar 22 08:16 2512 Mar 22 08:16 alerts 40 By default. Remember – the directory you tell Snort to write the alert and logs to must already exist. we have created a log file in the current directory and want the activity recorded there.5. 40 .2 root drwx-----. In this case. You can specify a default directory by using the ‘-l’ option and the name of the directory where you want the information placed.2./log alerts file contains alerts generated by Snort IP subdirectories with logged payloads ls -l . Snort will not create this directory on its own. Snort places the logs and alerts in /var/log/snort.Log Alerts to Directory ./log " " " Output placed in directory .2 root 192. Snort will then record all alerts to an alert file in this directory. as well as creating the logging directories and log files here.

Oracle) Finally. This is only recommended if you are not interested in the payload of packets that trigger rules. This is often done with high traffic volume so as not to bog down Snort with the logging process.g. The log files (or file if you are logging in binary format) are the only place the FULL packet will be written out to including the payload. There are also output plugins available to log packets to a XML formatted file as well as a variety of SQL databases (e. Alternatively. logging can be totally disabled if not desired. 41 . MySQL. PostgreSQL. Depending on other command line options or rules options you use.Logging Options • Default: Full logging to default Snort directory Binary: tcpdump binary output to a single log file None: Disable logging Database: Log packets to SQL database XML: Log packets in portable XML format 41 • • • • The default method of logging is to capture the output generated from Snort detects and store it in the default Snort directory /var/log/snort. you can take any detect that is discovered and log in tcpdump raw output binary format. this will log the traffic that triggered the scan in some kind of human readable format.

followed only by a data/timestamp and source and destination ports and addresses. Windows host via SMB alerts. but write them to the syslog facilities. None will disable alerting all together. followed by a date/timestamp and full packet header information. The fast method writes partial information to the alert file. Full alerting is Snort’s default behaviour. Syslog alerts send messages in a format similar to the fast alerts. Fast alerting does not include the full packet header information. When using this level of alerting. 42 . the message (if any) in the rule is written to the alert file first. Fast alerting on the other hand writes the message (if any) in the rule is again written first. as well as to an XML formatted file. There are also options available to send alerts to a database. The default method is to capture the detect in the file /var/log/snort/alert.Alerting Options • • • • • • • Full: writes alert message and header information to alert file (default) Fast: writes alert message and condensed header to alert file None: disable alerts Syslog: send alert messages to syslog SMB: send WinPopup messages to Windows hosts via ‘smbclient’ Database: Send alerts to SQL database XML: Write alerts in a portable XML format 42 Alerts are an abbreviated format of capturing the detect.

Alert and Logging Differences • • • • • Alerts are all contained in one file Alerts are decoded through transport layer only Logging produces multiple files Logging creates a directory structure by IP numbers Subdirectories contain activity . Alerts exist to let the user know that something has happened and to give that user enough information to decide whether the alert warrants further investigation immediately. and the contents are files named according to the protocol and ports involved.possibly decoded through application layer 43 You may be wondering what the difference between logging and alerting is. The directory name (IP number) indicates the source IP that triggered the logging activity. such as specific exploits or specific hosts. 43 . the alert files exist merely to give the user a single place to monitor for Snort events. It also provides a convenient one stop place to do quick searches for items that may be of interest. Logging will create multiple files under multiple directories based on the IP number of the source host. The actual contents of the files record the payload of the packet(s) involved. Alerts are more abbreviated captures of the detect that can all be found in a single file. Logging and alerting are conceptually different in a few ways. This is a better overview of what is happening on the network versus the more detailed captures for logging. The log files are there to allow follow forensic analysis of events. Logs exist to allow the user to analyse the exact packets that caused an alert in addition to any other packets that are possibly related to the alert event.

The date and timestamp represent the time on the sensor when the detect was made.com>. both the hex representation of the payload and the ASCII printable characters will be displayed. with the exception of the packet payload which can be optionally included in the log files..Alert and Logging Format [**] IDS249 . This essentially labels each detect as it is written to disk. Alert and log records are identical. The next item written is a date and timestamp. Both log and alert messages start with the message text included in the rule..2:25 -> 192.168..168. followed immediately by the packet’s decoded header information which can vary depending on the protocol of the packet. Timestamp Ethernet (optional) DF 192. Hex and ASCII (optional. If the packet payload is included in the logs.200. Relayi ng denied. Optionally following the date and timestamp is the ethernet information.775359 FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF -> FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF type:0x800 len:0x71 Date. the source and destination addresses and ports involved in the detect appear.1.SMTP Relaying Denied [**] Alert/Log Message Text 10/09-02:34:59.1 <blahblahrs@blahblahb l. Next. making it easy to determine why the packet was logged. Packet Payload.7. log file only) 44 This slide shows you the general format of the alert and log files.2:25432 TCP TTL:255 TOS:0x0 ID:24915 *****PA* Seq: 0x30AC5391 Ack: 0x1E3E4A55 Win: 0x2238 Packet Header (varies) 35 35 30 20 35 2E 37 2E 31 20 3C FF FF FF FF 2D FF FF FF FF FF FF 40 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 2E 63 6F 6D 3E 2E 2E 2E 20 52 65 6C 61 79 69 6E 67 20 64 65 6E 69 65 64 0D 0A 550 5. 44 .

Logging/alert Examples • The following rule will be used to test various options to log and alert: \ \ alert tcp any any > 192. Content: "anonymous". We will put this single rule in the rules file name ‘snortrules’ to simplify the logging and alert messages generated. nocase) • Place the above rule in rules file ‘snortrules’. 45 In the next several slides.168. 45 .143.143 network that has the PUSH and ACK flags set and has a content of 'anonymous' in the payload. flags: PA.168. The above rule will be used for most of the detects.0/24 21 (msg: "anonymous FTP attempt". different options will be shown to explain various logging and alerting choices. This rule says that we want to alert if any ftp connection is generated to the 192.

16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 46 In this first example. we notice that there is a file named ‘alert’.143 network using a username of anonymous. Next. 46 .168.143.Alert and Log snort -l logdir -c snortrules In directory logdir you will find a file named alert. in this case since we did not specify the alert level Snort will default to ‘full’. It contains the packet information decoded through the TCP transport layer as can be seen by examining the file. It contains the output that was generated for the detect.143.168.350754 192. We run Snort using our one rule found in ‘snortrules’. we specify that we want to use a default logging directory of logdir. This has to be an existing directory. That triggers a detect and causes Snort to create an entry in the alerts file. what you don't see above is we attempt to ftp to a host on the 192.168. If we examine the contents of logdir directory.15:1536-> 192. [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06.

The filename identifies the protocol (TCP) as well as the source (1526) and destination ports (21) involved in the detect.168.143. we discover a file name TCP:1526-21. If we ‘cd’ into that directory.168.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7c451b73 Ack: 0x7dc44632 win: 0x7d78 TCP options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 47 In the same logdir directory. This is a log directory.143. we discover a subdirectory 192.143.350754 192.15 contains a file: TCP:1536-21 [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06.168.168.168.143.Alert and Log (Cont) The directory logdir contains a subdirectory named: 192.15 that represents the hostile IP that attempted the anonymous ftp access. We find the same message generated in the alert file. 47 .15.143. The subdirectory 192.15:1536 -> 192.

168. Note that the contents of the alert file have not changed from what would normally be recorded.143. which says to decode the application layer.15:1537 -> 192. We follow the same process as before and discover that we have an alert file in logdir which is the same as before. the date/timestamp and the hosts involved. still written in a human readable format.888357 192. It also still contains the full packet header information.143.168.Alert and Log With Decode snort -l logdir -c snortrules -d In directory logdir the file alert has the following contents: [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-12:03:59. 48 .16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:20566 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 48 Now we add the ‘-d’ option to the same command used previously. The alert file still contains the message from the triggered rule.

you will not only see the information contained in the alerts file.143..143. but now the actual payload of the packet at the bottom of the alert.168. 49 . while the right portion contains the ASCII representation. The directory 192.168. The output of the packet’s payload is broken into two parts.Alert and Log With Decode (Cont) The directory logdir contains the subdirectory 192.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:20566 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x94102D52 Ack: 0x94529A7B Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27748803 128108 55 53 45 52 20 61 6E 6F 6E 79 6D 6F 75 73 0D 0A USER anonymous.888357 192.143.168.168.15.15:1537 ->192. 49 If you now look at the log file.15 contains file named: TCP:1537-21 [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-12:03:59. The left portion contains the hex values of the payload.143.

log in binary format. [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06. It also relieves Snort from having to create directories and constantly opening and closing files to write out the information in ASCII format.350754 192. 50 .143. Logging using the binary format is much more efficient than having Snort write out a completely decoded packet in an ASCII format. Instead Snort can open one file and continuously write to that file for the entire duration Snort is running.Alert and Log in Binary snort -l logdir -c snortrules -d -b The directory logdir contains the file alert. If you are deploying Snort on high capacity networks or Snort starts to drop packets.168.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 50 The ‘-b’ option allows you to log the packets to a tcpdump file instead of the normal decoded ASCII files.168. This creates a single binary file instead of creating many subdirectories with files in them that may contain only one packet.15:1536 -> 192.143.

The name has the date of the capture (0428 . 51 . 51 In the logdir directory.log which is a tcpdump raw binary output file of the detect that was captured.log This is a tcpdump binary output of entire packet. This requires less work of Snort to capture and is used when there is a lot of traffic on the network and there is a concern for packets being dropped.Alert and Log in Binary (Cont) In directory logdir we find the following file: snort-0428@1158.April 28th) and the time of the capture (11:58 AM). This can be read either using Snort with the ‘-r’ option or with tcpdump with the ‘-r’ option. we find a file snort-0428@1158.

indicating that the software used to create the dump file collected 144 bytes for each packet collected. That is the tcpdump snapshot length.raw. but this time we use the ‘-r’ switch to tell Snort to read its input from ‘tcpdump.5. 52 .Reading Tcpdump Files snort -vd -r tcpdump. In that case you can pull the data back periodically and run Snort on the retrieved data without using extra CPU cycles on the sensor itself.960269 1..data Initializing Network Interface.168. This is Snort’s way of informing you that it is reading from a file and not from the network interface.2. 03/21-13:33:51.raw.5.168.5:693 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:7570 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C55968F Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306083 0 NOP WS: 0 52 Another useful ability of Snort is the ‘-r’ command line option..5:2307 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:7569 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C857C3C Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306083 0 NOP WS: 0 03/21-13:33:51. This option instructs Snort to read from tcpdump binary files instead of the network interface. or instructed Snort to log in binary. we are using Snort in verbose mode. Readback mode can be especially useful for busy networks where full and constant processing on the sensor itself may not be feasible. This can be done if you've collected data using tcpdump from another sensor or other tcpdump compatible software.3. In the example shown here. This assumes that we have collected ‘tcpdump. snaplen = 144 Entering readback mode. Note the ‘Entering readback mode’.960219 1.4:1398 -> 192.raw..2..data’ earlier and it contains tcpdump binary data..data’ instead of from the network interface. sending the data to the screen. Also. note the ‘snaplen = 144’.4:1399 -> 192.3.

If logging was turned on in Snort.html file containing a summarized list of alerts.Snortsnarf. SnortSnarf creates an index. and you provide the directory the logs are located in.html) • Alert wrap-up html files • Specific source/destination alert html files • Optionally linked to log files for packet inspection • • Located in snort directory contrib subdirectory http://www. The SnortSnarf program is intended to help you view your Snort alerts in an orderly fashion using a web browser. At the top level. 53 .silicondefense.Pl • perl script to take alerts: – Formats Snort alert and log files into html output – Places output in following files for ‘drill down’: • Overall summary of detected alerts (index. SnortSnarf will allow you to drill down to the packet that triggered a specific alert.pl /var/log/snort/alert 53 There are tools available that will help you with the analysis of the alert and log files. One tool that has proven to be popular as well as being very useful is SnortSnarf. and allows you to drill down from the general list of alerts to the specific packet that triggered the alert (providing logging was turned on and the decode option was specified). an html file is created containing each of the same alerts in a single file. At the next level down. This is easier than trying to assess what is happening by looking at the alerts file.com/snortsnarf/ snortsnarf.

It lists the signatures that were detected. click on the summary link which will display a page containing information about the selected alerts. The information displayed can include a sample rule that would detect the traffic. and further explanation of the exploit. For some signatures.775359 on 10/09 Latest alert at 03:00:36 on 10/9 Signature (click for definition) # Alerts # Sources # Destinations Detail link IDS249 . sample packets.SnortSnarf Output Snortsnarf: Snort signatures in snort. To see additional details. 54 . you can click on the signature name and a page displaying information about the signature will be displayed. and the total number of source and destination hosts involved.alert •snort_portscan.alert et al 7 alerts processed.log Earliest alert at 02:34:59. number of times it was triggered. such as the ‘SMTP Relaying Denied’ example shown here.1 (Jim Hoagland and Stuart Staniford) 54 This is a sample index page created by SnortSnarf. This page contains a summarized list of alerts that were triggered during the time period listed.SMTP Relaying Denied 1 1 1 Summary UDP scan 6 1 1 Summary Generated by Snortsnarf v100400. Files included: •snort.

If there were multiple instances of this alert. In this case only one alert of the type ‘SMTP Relaying Denied’ is listed and it involved only one source and destination IP. Clicking on the source IP address will take you to the alerts triggered by that source host for this signature.SMTP Relaying Denied 1 sources 1 destinations Sources triggering this attack signature Source 192.log Earliest such alert at 02:34:59. including all of the hosts that were involved. and the number of destination hosts involved for both of those totals. 55 .2 # Alerts (sig) 1 # Alerts (total) 1 # Dsts (sig) 1 # Dsts (total)) 1 Destinations receiving this attack signature Destinations 192.1 (Jim Hoagland and Stuart Staniford) 55 When clicking on the link from the summarized index page. the grant total of alerts triggered by the host for all alerts.alert •snort_portscan. you arrive at this page.200.Summary of alerts in snort. The chart to the right of the address shows you how many alerts were triggered by that host for this specific alert.2 # Alerts (sig) 1 # Alerts (total) 1 # Srcs (sig) 1 # Srcs (total)) 1 Generated by Snortsnarf v100400.SMTP Relaying Denied 1 alerts on this signature.168. This page lists all of the source and destination hosts involved with the selected alert.alert et al for signature: IDS249 .168.775359 on 10/09 IDS249 . they would all be listed here.775359 on 10/09 Latest such alert at 02:34:59.1. Looking in files: •snort.

192.SMTP Relaying Denied Whois lookup at: ARIN RIPE APNIC Geektools There are 1 distinct destination IPs in the alerts of the type on this page.216 as a source •1 instances of IDS249 .2 in snort.168.SMTP Relaying Denied [**] 56 56 .log Earliest: 02:34:59.alert •snort_portscan.All 1 alerts from 192.alert et al Looking in files: •snort.1.1.775359 on 10/09 1 different signatures are present for 206.181.168.2 DNS lookup at: Amenesi Riherds Princeton [**] IDS249 .216.775359 on 10/09 Latest: 02:34:59.

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