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Paul Ritchey, Jacob and Sundstrom, Inc. email@example.com
Welcome to the class titled ‘Snort Rules: Application’. The purpose of this class is to take the material you learned in the previous section, ‘Snort Rules: Syntax and Keywords’. This section will take those individual keywords, values and syntax to form complete rules. You will also learn how to analyze existing rules piece by piece to determine what the rule is looking for.
Simple Rules ! Difficult Rules ! Advanced Rules
Simple Rules ! Difficult Rules ! Advanced Rules
Tying It All Together
The first half of this presentation will examine rules of increasing complexity. You will be taught how to analyze an existing rule to determine what it is looking for. This ability is key to understanding how to piece together a complete rule from scratch that matches the signature of an attack. The second half of the presentation will ask you to write rules from scratch of increasing difficulty. The process of creating these rules will be covered in a step by step process. This will show you a possible methodology you can use when creating rules on your own. The very last section will tie together everything you have learned so far, showing you a few of the options available for Snort output. This presentation covers Snort version 1.7. If you are using a newer version of Snort, please remember that new features may have been added or existing features may have been modified after this presentation was assembled.
Rule Analysis: Simple Rules
This section will show you how to analyze simple rules, step by step. The analysis skills learned here will be built upon in later sections to analyze rules of increasing difficulty. This will help you later when you will be required to write rules from scratch.
Rule Analysis: Simple Rules
Learn to analyze simple rules.
Signature based on rule header.
Examples taken from snort.org rule set and www.whitehats.com. ! Use logical approach
Analyze rule header first
• Determine source and destination addresses and ports • Snort uses this section first.
Analyze rule options next
In this section you will learn how to analyze simple rules. The rules were chosen because they do not incorporate packet attributes which can make some rules difficult to analyze. These are real life rules, taken directly from the rule set available from the snort.org web site and www.whitehats.com. This means that it’s possible to do further research on the exploits that the rules are designed to detect to fully round out your understanding of rules. This section will start with teaching you how to analyze rules based on a logical approach. The first step is to analyze the rule header. This determines what hosts, ports, protocols and traffic flow must be involved before Snort even starts to examine the rest of the rule – this allows Snort to quickly determine if it should completely analyze the rule against the options section, saving valuable time. Later sections will combine the analysis of the rule header with the options section for more complicated rules.
Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice
Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected machine
alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice";)
The first rule we are going to examine is one that looks for attempts at connecting Back Orifice trojans. This particular exploit works by means of a trojan that is somehow installed on the target machine. The trojan can be installed accidentally by end users running executables attached to email messages, downloading the trojan masquerading as a useful utility, etc. Once installed, the trojan opens a port and makes itself available for control from a remote host. Further information on this particular trojan can be obtained any of the major online security web sites. In depth analysis of this trojan is beyond the scope of this course.
6 . this rule will not be tested against them. HOME_NET. and is set to the addresses Snort is monitoring. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 6 For this simple rule. but must be destined specifically for the port 31337 (otherwise known as ‘eleet’) on the destination machine. meaning that the source address should be outside of the network address space Snort is monitoring. The destination address is defined as a variable.Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice (cont. ! Applies only to UDP traffic. the contents of the signature is completely contained in the rule header. The UDP packet can.) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered.) alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice". this is set to !$HOME_NET. will execute the action ‘alert’. when it is triggered. the source address is also defined as a variable. Alert means Snort will write an entry to the alert file and an entry to the logs unless they are overridden by command line options or other means. This rule. however. named EXTERNAL. Typically. be originating from any of the possible ports on the source host. If snort the traffic Snort is examining is from another protocol. In this particular rule. This rule only applies to UDP traffic. This variable is typically defined at the top of the rules file being used.
This option provides a string that is used to tag alert and log entries. it is seen that the only option being used is the message option. that happens to be destined for destination port 31337 will trigger this rule. ! High likelihood of false-positives. ! Only includes message.Simple Rule #1: Back Orifice (cont. 7 .) alert UDP $EXTERNAL any -> $INTERNAL 31337 \ (msg: "IDS188/trojan-probe-back-orifice". making it easier to determine what a log or alert entry represents. although not often. ! ! Possibility of false-positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. The only thing limiting the rule down to a specific subset of UDP traffic is the destination port. This rule is very simple. such as streaming audio or video. may very well be false-positives.) ! Examine rule options. Since no packet attributes or options are specified. ! 7 Examining the rule options section. Care must be taken when analyzing any available data to validate that the packet was truly a probe for Back Orifice or the master program contacting a Back Orifice client. No packet attributes are examined. Any traffic. it is very likely that detects.
1 Server Active on Network". Deep Throat is another trojan that can be accidentally installed by users who unknowingly execute attachments or download the software by accident.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . the trojan opens a port that allows remote hosts to control the infected machine.Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat Trojan ! Background Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected host. 8 . ! ! Rule: ! alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 .) 8 The next simple rule we will examine is one that detects Deep Throat trojans. Once installed.DeepThroat 3.
BACKDOOR SIGNATURE \ DeepThroat 3. it will trigger the rule and will be logged to the alert file and logs with the message specified in the rule options section. will execute the action ‘alert’. If snort the traffic Snort is examining is from another protocol. the contents of the signature is again completely contained in the rule header. there are no restrictions.Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat (cont. the packet must originate from a specific port – 2140. This rule. This rule only applies to UDP traffic.1 Server Active on Network". Snort is typically installed on a machine that resides in a ‘DMZ’. 9 .) alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 . This means that the packet can originate from any possible IP address. It does not and should not see your internal traffic. Applies only to UDP traffic.) ! Examine the rule header: ! ! ! Will ‘alert’ when triggered. Now the rule deviates from the previous example. the keyword ‘any’ is specified. this rule will not be tested against them. and sees all traffic in bound from the internet to your network. when it is triggered. it would have been just as effective to replace the keyword ‘any’ with !$HOME_NET. Alert means Snort will write an entry to the alert file and an entry to the logs unless they are overridden by command line options or other means. The DMZ sites outside of your internal network. including internal addresses. If the packet meets all of the above criteria. and to the specific port 6000. ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = internal network 9 For this simple rule. Instead of specifying a variable for the source IP address. I would like take a second to discuss the keyword ‘any’ that was specified for the source address. The packet must be destined for the network the variable HOME_NET is set to. However. or outbound from your network to the internet. Because of this. Source specified as ‘any’ • ‘Any’ matches all possible IP addresses.
! ! No packet attributes are examined. 10 . making it easier to determine what a log or alert entry represents. Most virus software should be capable of detecting this trojan if properly installed and used regularly.) ! Examine rule options. Likelihood of detect being a false-positives. Although unlikely.) alert udp any 2140 -> $HOME_NET 60000 \ (msg:"IDS106 . This increases the chances that a detect is a false-positive so care must be taken to fully resolve any detects. Only includes message. Both ports are ephemeral ports. and because there are no other criteria for the rule false-positive detects may be made. it’s possible that this port combination could be used during the course of a valid connection. The only real limiting factors are the source and destination ports. This rule is very simple. we again that this rule like the previous example is only specifying the message option.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE .\ DeepThroat 3. 10 ! Possibility of false-positives: ! ! Examining the rule options section.Simple Rule #2: Deep Throat (cont. Low likelihood of occurrence. This option provides a string that is used to tag alert and log entries.1 Server Active on Network". meaning they are out of the reserved range.
11 .Rule Analysis: Complex Rules 11 In this section the rules presented for analysis are a little more complicated than the previous examples. Essentially they provide additional information about packets that are considered hostile beyond source and destination IPs and ports.
org rule set and www.org web site and from the www. Interpretation of the rule option section with different kinds of packet attributes will be introduced here. In these rules. They have been taken from the rule sets available at the www.com web site.Rule Analysis: Complex Rules ! Learn to analyze complex rules. it’s possible to make rules more accurate.whitehats. It consists of the rule header and additional information specified in the rule options.snort. ! Signature also based on rule options.snort.com. ! Use logical approach ! Analyze rule header first ! Analyze rule options next ! • Specifies specific packet attributes • Can increase accuracy – decrease false positives 12 This section concentrates on analyzing more complicated rules – those containing packet attributes in the rule options section. Signature based on rule header. By adding packet attributes (such as TCP flags) to the rule options section. the signature doesn’t just consist of the contents of the rule header. ! Examples taken from www. 12 . which can potentially reduce the number of false positives.whitehats. The example rules used in this section are real world rules. This section will continue to build on the rule analysis technique that was used in the first section.
flags:PA. Most virus detection software should detect this trojan as long as the signatures are properly maintained.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE – NetMetro Incoming Traffic". Again. NetMetro is another trojan that when installed allows remote control of the infected machine.) 13 The rule we are going to examine next is one that detects the NetMetro trojan.Complex Rule #1: NetMetro ! Background: Trojan ! Allows remote control of infected machine ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 . 13 . this trojan like any other can be accidentally installed by executing attachments to email messages. or downloading the trojan as it masquerades as a useful utility or game.
unless these options are overridden by command line options. This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 14 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. The destination port setting is more interesting. It specifies that the destination port can be any port except ports 53 through 80. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. flags:PA. but may also be set by command line options. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. it will not match the rule header information and this rule will not be triggered. The source port the traffic must originate from is port 5031.NetMetro Incoming Traffic". 14 .) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. If the source port is anything but 5031. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 .Complex Rule #1: NetMetro (cont. inclusive.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET.
For this particular rule. although they will happen. Other flags. For example. The addition of packet attributes (in this case TCP flags) to the rule options section aids in reducing the possibility of false positives because it helps to narrow the possibility of matches somewhat. and the destination port must be outside the specified range. it’s possible this rule may be triggered. To rule out the possibility of a detect being a false positive. such as SYN. ! 15 This rule is the first example of packet attributes being used in the rule options section. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. the rule will be triggered as soon as the TCP three way handshake is completed and the first packed with a payload is sent inbound to your network.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 5031 -> $HOME_NET !53:80 \ (msg:"IDS79 . 15 . URG and the two reserved bits must NOT be set. If the port 5031 is used by the person connecting to your telnet server.) ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. the TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. FIN. ! High likelihood of being false positive. flags:PA. The attribute being tested is the TCP flags setting.Complex Rule #1: NetMetro (cont. there is a low likelihood of false positives. The source port 5031 is an ephemeral port. if an outside user telnets in to a server in your network.BACKDOOR SIGNATURE . outside the range specified by the destination port setting that specifies what ports it cannot be. No other packet attributes are examined beyond the TCP flag setting. The false positives are limited because the source port must exactly match 5031. meaning that is not a reserved port and available for anyone and any application to use. ! No other packet attributes examined. In this case.NetMetro Incoming\ Traffic". Telnet runs on port 23. additional data possibly beyond what Snort provides may need to be examined.
ttl: >220. It can also allow the rule to be tuned to help eliminate false positives. This particular scanner can allow an attacker to easily determine what services are available on a host. 16 . ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 . \ flags: S. and the hacker now has enough information to launch an effective attack. ! Allows remote detection of available services and OS fingerprinting.) 16 The second difficult rule to be examined detects a particular tool used for scanning. This allowing an accurate rule to be written that can easily detect scans from this software.myscan".Scan . Combined with the ability to determine the OS. For this scanner certain packet attributes are hard coded in the original source code. ack: 0.Complex Rule #2: Myscan ! Background: Port scanner. increasing the accuracy.
specified by the keyword ‘any’. it will not match the rule header information and this rule will not be triggered. If the source port is anything but 10101. ttl: >220. The source port the traffic must originate from is port 10101.Scan -myscan". The destination port can be anything. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET.) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. This variable is set to the IP address range your sensor is to monitor. unless these options are overridden by command line options. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. flags: S. 17 . The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file.Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 17 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. This means the rule does not care what port is used on the destination host. but may also be set by command line options. \ ack: 0.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 . which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET.
TCP flag SYN must be set. flags: S. TCP flags. there is a low likelihood that the rule will be triggered. the acknowledgement number. must have a value greater than or equal to 220.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg: "IDS439 . 18 ! Likelihood of false positives: ! ! In this rule’s option section. The second attribute. The first attribute that is examined. The next slide will show you the individual parts that combined together make this happen. the packet attributes time to live (ttl).) ! Examine the rule options: ! ! ! Time to live value must be greater than 220. acknowledgement number (ack) and the TCP flag settings are examined. For this rule. Low likelihood of being false positive. Low likelihood of occurrence. but a very high likelihood that if it is triggered that it is NOT a false positive. ttl: >220. must have the SYN flag set. must be zero (0). There are many key items that lead to this conclusion and show that this rule is a very well written one. Acknowledgement number must be zero (0). The last attribute. 18 . time to live. \ ack: 0.Scan -myscan".Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont.
However it does depend on the above settings in the crafted packet not to be changed.Scan -myscan". ttl: >220. All of the above combine to make this a finely tuned rule that will not false positive very often. it is very unlikely – but possible.101. 19 . They are typically used in sequence. All other operating systems use values much less than 220. Most operating systems specify a value much less than 220 when the packet is created. Cannot normally be set to zero (0). Only the Solaris 2. This makes it vulnerable to mutations of the scanning utility. ack: 0. 19 Time To Live ! Acknowledgement Number. but it will not identify the utility being used). so for a source address to reach 10. Only in a crafted packet will this value ever be used. meaning the non-reserved ports. The source code for this utility is freely available. ! Rule vulnerable to mutations. only source addresses using that specific port might cause a trigger. that source port will be used. start at 1024 and go up. Under normal conditions.Complex Rule #2: Myscan (cont. flags: S. The rule specifies that this attribute must be set to the value zero (0). it must have made many connections to other machines. and by making a single simple alteration and recompiling it the rule will no longer detect it (although Snort’s scan detection preprocessor should detect it. The first item that helps tune this rule is the specification of a specific port for the source port.) ! ! ! ! Source Port ! High into ephemeral ports (non-reserved). The last item that contributes to the rule’s tuning is the acknowledgement attribute value.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 10101 -> $HOME_NET any \ \ (msg: "IDS439 .x operating system sets the time to live attribute to a value greater than 220. Only one OS uses setting greater than 220. The second item that helps tune this rule is the time to live value. Ephemeral ports. By specifying a specific value. the acknowledgement number can never be zero. Because the source port is such a high number.
They are also the easiest to avoid triggering by making slight alterations in the application’s source code. These rules are the most difficult to write because they require close analysis of an attack’s signature and of the source code of the attack application if available. These types of rules also have the lowest likelihood of false positives because of the completeness of the examination of the packets.Rule Analysis: Advanced Rules 20 This section provides analysis of advanced rules – those using more sophisticated packet attributes to examine the packet’s payload. 20 .
The example rules used in this section are real world rules. ! Examples taken from www. Signature based on rule header. Interpretation of the rule option section with different kinds of packet attributes will be introduced here.org web site and from the www. ! Use logical approach ! Analyze rule header first ! Analyze rule options next ! • Specifies specific packet attributes • Can increase accuracy – decrease false positives 21 This section concentrates on analyzing more complicated rules – those containing packet attributes in the rule options section.whitehats.com.com web site. By adding packet attributes (such as TCP flags) to the rule options section. This section will continue to build on the rule analysis technique that was used in the first section. 21 .whitehats.snort. In these rules. ! Signature also based on rule options. which can potentially reduce the number of false positives.snort. They have been taken from the rule sets available at the www. it’s possible to make rules more accurate. the signature doesn’t just consist of the contents of the rule header. It consists of the rule header and additional information specified in the rule options.org rule set and www.Rule Analysis: Advanced Rules ! Learn to analyze difficult rules.
flags: PA. as well as coming native in many Linux distributions. ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 (msg: "IDS458 .org that is used as a replacement for many native ftp daemons on some flavors of Unix. the attacker is instantly granted root access on a high numbered port that is opened up. 22 .wu-ftpd.Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit ! Background: Exploits a bug in wu-ftp daemon. In this case the exploit is known as the wuftp2600.FTP wuftp260-tf8". ! Allows instant root access. content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB 4389 D941 B03F CD80|".c exploit which was originally distributed in a broken form. If the exploit is successful.) \ \ \ 22 The first advanced rule we will examine is one that exploits a bug in an ftp daemon provided by www.
The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET. However. \ content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB \ 43 89D941 B03F CD80|". It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. the packet must be destined for port 21. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. meaning that the TCP packet can originate from any possible port on the source host. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 23 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. unless these options are overridden by command line options. 23 . This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor. but may also be set by command line options.) ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered.FTP wuftp260-tf8". Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file. The source port is set to the keyword ‘any’. Port 21 is a well known reserved port that is used to provide FTP services.Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit (cont.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 \ (msg: "IDS458 . ! Applies only to TCP traffic. flags: PA.
This rule is tuned ever so slightly by the TCP flags attribute. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. ! 24 For this rule. The first attribute is the TCP flag settings. The content value.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 21 \ (msg: "IDS458 . however these are typically other exploits which this rule doesn’t apply to and should have a different rule written to detect them. hence this rule’s high level of accuracy. two packet attributes are examined in order to detect the exploit. detects will very rarely occur primarily because of the very specific content that is being searched for. The exploit detected here works by initiating a proper TCP connection.FTP wuftp260-tf8". is very unlikely to occur during a normal FTP session. In this example the content that is being searched for is given in hex values. Only packets with a payload should be applied against this rule. which is denoted by the enclosing pipe (‘|’) symbols. although possible. ! Examines payload for specific values. flags: PA. These packets will have the PUSH flag set indicating that data is being sent. ! Low likelihood of being false positive. the PUSH and ACK TCP flags must be set. For this rule. 24 . The examination of a packets payload is triggered by specifying the keyword ‘content’. When detects do occur. it’s very likely that it is a positive detect. For this rule. It’s possible to have other flag settings without the PUSH flag set and still have a payload. more specifically an anonymous FTP session and initiating a buffer overflow.Advanced Rule #1: Wu-FTP Exploit (cont. \ content: "|31C0 31DB 31C9 B046 CD80 31C0 31DB \ 4389 D941 B03F CD80|".) ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. The second attribute specified examines the packet’s payload.
exe|0d0a|user". ! Allows arbitrary execution of code on server.Advanced Rule #2: cgitest. 25 . The ‘cgitest. The web daemon affected by this vulnerability runs on Windows 95. The exploit works because of a buffer overflow vulnerability. which limits the possible ramifications of a successful attack that might exist on a Unix or Windows NT machine. ! ! Rule: ! alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 .exe Exploit ! Background: Web exploit. content:"cgitest.) \ \ \ 25 The second advanced rule we will examine is a web based exploit. offset:4. which is one of the more lethal types of attacks an attacker can use. nocase. flags: AP.Web cgi cgitest".exe’ is a CGI that if it is left installed on a particular web server can allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the web server.
offset:4. It also only applies to TCP traffic that meets the criteria of the rest of the signature. nocase. This variable is set to the IP addresses your sensor is to monitor.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 .Web cgi cgitest".exe|0d0a|user". meaning that the TCP packet can originate from any possible port on the source host. flags: AP. the rule should be duplicated for each of the ports being used. If there are web daemons used on your network using alternative ports. ! Source defined by variable ! • $EXTERNAL_NET = !$HOME_NET ! Destination defined by variable • $HOME_NET = your network 26 This rule when triggered will alert – meaning it will create an entry in the alerts file and create a log file. but may also be set by command line options. The source port is set to the keyword ‘any’. In most cases EXTERNAL_NET is set to !$HOME_NET. The destination address is specified by the variable HOME_NET. ! Applies only to TCP traffic. The source address is specified by the variable EXTERNAL_NET.Advanced Rule #2: cgitest. which means that the source address can be any IP address except the IPs belonging to your network. unless these options are overridden by command line options. However.exe Exploit (cont. 26 . the packet must be destined for port 80. Both of these variables are typically defined at the top of a rules file. Port 80 is one of the most common ports used for web daemons. content: "cgitest.) \ \ \ ! Examine the rule header: Will ‘alert’ when triggered.
This may not seem like a lot. ! 27 For this rule.exe|0d0a|user".exe Exploit (cont. Only packets with a payload should be applied against this rule. Note the use of the ‘nocase’ option. For this rule. offset:4. although possible. The exploit detected here works by initiating a proper TCP connection to a web server. In this rule. only the ‘offset’ option is used. The first attribute is the TCP flag settings. content: "cgitest. To help reduce the overhead of processing that must take place. ! ! Likelihood of false positives: Low likelihood of occurrence. is very unlikely to occur during a normal web sessions by chance. The content value.ext’ CGI on that server and causing a buffer overflow. it’s very likely that it is a positive detect. In this example the content that is being searched for is a combination of two sections of ASCII data and one section of hex values. and then executing the ‘cgitest. For this rule. it can appear in any possible combination of upper and lower case letters possible. flags: AP. This rule is tuned ever so slightly by the TCP flags attribute.Web cgi cgitest". ! Examines payload for specific values. It’s possible to have other flag settings without the PUSH flag set and still have a payload. effectively ignoring the first 3 bytes. it can be tuned by specifying the ‘offset’ and ‘depth’ options. This rule tells Snort to start examining the payload 4 bytes in. The second attribute specified examines the packet’s payload. ! Low likelihood of being false positive. 27 . two packet attributes are examined in order to detect the exploit. but by ignoring 3 bytes of every packet on a very busy network can quickly add up.) \ \ \ ! Examine the rule options: TCP flags PUSH and ACK must be set. When detects do occur. detects will very rarely occur primarily because of the very specific content that is being searched for. the PUSH and ACK TCP flags must be set. This informs Snort that for the ASCII content being searched for. however these are typically other exploits which this rule doesn’t apply to and should have a different rule written to detect them. These packets will have the PUSH flag set indicating that data is being sent. These options reduce the amount of a packet’s payload that must be inspected by Snort. The content attribute can be a very resource intensive attribute to use. This example shows how ASCII and hex values can be combined to form a payload signature. and can be interspersed between each other. The examination of a packets payload is triggered by specifying the keyword ‘content’. nocase.Advanced Rule #2: cgitest.) alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"IDS265 .
28 . all of which may be correct. Keep in mind that for some types of rules there may be several possible answers.Writing Rules 28 In this section will demonstrate how to write a few rules from scratch of increasing difficulty. A specification for a needed rule will be provided. followed by a possible solution.
using the variable HOME_NET to represent your network address space. 29 . He would like to have Snort record this packets for future analysis and to see if there are any trends. The rule should both alert and log. 29 Your boss is concerned about inbound ICMP echo requests from outside addresses.Writing Rules: Simple Rule ! Your boss wants to know about all ICMP echo requests (pings) coming into your network. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule. The alert message should contain the text ‘Inbound Ping’. Write the rule using the variable HOME_NET to represent your network address space. Write the rule.
We were told that the variable HOME_NET would represent our internal network. Snort rules always require a port to be specified. and the source address field is set to ‘!$HOME_NET’. the rule is to both alert and log. We were also told to only record inbound ICMP echo requests. the rule’s action field must be set to the value ‘alert’. It is needed only to satisfy the rule parser when Snort reads and process the rules file on startup.) ! Possible Answer: alert icmp !$HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any \ (msg:“Inbound Ping". it will be ignored by Snort when evaluating a packet against this rule. To do this. In the rules option section we set the message option to the appropriate value as requested. so specifying the not sign (‘!’) with the HOME_NET variable represents all addresses except those in your network. We could have used any value for this field. 30 . itype: 8. Therefore the protocol field is set to ICMP. but ICMP does not use ports so we used the keyword ‘any’ as a placeholder.Writing Rules: Simple Rule (cont.) 30 According to the specification given on the previous slide. We also used the ‘itype’ attribute with a value of ‘8’ to limit the rule to only record echo requests – otherwise known as pings.
168. What command line option must also be included? 31 In order to try to keep a step ahead of the hackers.Writing Rules: Simple Rule #2 ! Corporate headquarters routinely runs a scan of all IPs owned by the company. including satellite offices. including the satellite office you work at. Also list the command line option that must be included for this rule to be effective. you decided to write a rule to ignore inbound packets from this scanning box.1.1.x. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule. Tired of filtering through the false positives caused by this routine scanning. 31 . The address space at the satellite office you work at is the Class B 10. Write a rule that will cause Snort to ignore all inbound TCP packets from the scanning machine. 192. corporate headquarters decided to run a periodic scan against all IP addresses the company owns.1.x.
168. Snort must be told to process the ‘pass’ rules first.) ! Possible Answer: ! pass tcp 192. then the pass rules last. 32 . the rule’s action field must be set to the value ‘pass’. then alert and log rules. The source address was set to the specific host from corporate headquarters. The destination port is set to the same value as the source port.1. To ignore packets. This causes Snort to process pass rules first. This tells Snort to drop the packet being inspected when the rule is triggered.Writing Rules: Simple Rule #2 (cont. the keyword ‘any’ was specified.168. This effectively ignores pass rules. indicating that we don’t care what the source port is.0/16.0. The destination address field is set to the proper CIDR notation for the satellite office.1. 10. so the protocol field in the rule was set to the value ‘TCP’. but also has a special requirement that must not be forgotten.0/16 any ! Snort Command Line: ! Snort –c snortrules -o 32 This is a simple rule to write. you must specify the ‘-o’ option. it can be any in the entire range possible. Since the source port can vary. the keyword ‘any’.1/32 any -> 10.1.0. To reverse this order.1. 192.1. You were told this rule should ignore TCP traffic. In order for this rule to be effective. This can be a useful capability in order to reduce false positives or to ignore traffic from a particular host. By default Snort processes alert and log rules first.
1. In order to investigate this matter further. 33 .2) to a single file. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule.168. you have decided to log all FTP activity to this server to a separate log file so you can see the full session. 33 During routine monitoring of your logs on your anonymous FTP server. Write a rule to log all activity to this server (192.0 class C address space. you have detected some behavior that just doesn’t seem normal. Write a Snort rule that will accomplish this.1. The source of the possible anomalous behavior is the 10.Writing Rules: Difficult Rule ! Odd behavior has been detected on your anonymous FTP server.1.
Writing Rules: Difficult Rule (cont. For the destination address we specified its full IP address in CIDR notation. we have specified the ‘session’ option which will record all printable (ASCII) information.1. we decided to specify the keyword ‘any’. but just in case the traffic is hostile and the attacker tries to use a reserved port we decided to use ‘any’ instead. For the source IP we specified the class C where the potentially hostile traffic is originating from using CIDR notation. logto: “anonftp”.) \ \ 34 For this rule.1. Since the source port can be any of the ephemeral ports.024 and up.) ! Possible Answer: log 10. We have also redirected the output to the file ‘anonftp’ by using the ‘logto’ option.2/32 21 (msg: “FTP activity to anonymous FTP server”. This will conveniently log all of the activity to a single file making it easy to review any activity that is recorded.0/24 any -> 192. We could have specified the range of ports from 1. 34 . we specified the ‘log’ action. To record the activity.1.168. session: printable. Port 21 is the ‘control’ port for FTP sessions where we can record the commands and responses of the user and server. we really don’t care about having them. along with the destination port of 21. We don’t really want to have every packet’s header written to the alerts file.
The only TCP flag set is the SYN flag. Although there is a payload. The packets also include the payload ‘Boo!’ and have only the SYN TCP flag set. 35 The next rule to write is one for a new fictitious scan that has been seen recently.1.x. Write a rule that will both alert and log. 35 .168. and each packet has the same sequence number. Oddly enough there is a payload of varying length that always contains the string ‘Boo!’ imbedded somewhere. Please briefly pause this presentation now and resume it when you have written the rule. the PUSH flag is not set. The network being monitored is the class C address space of 192. This particular scan use port 53 for both the source and destination ports.Writing Rules: Advanced Rule ! A new (fictitious) probe has been detected from a new scanner called ‘pr0b3z’. The scan originates from port 53 to port 53 and has a TCP sequence number of 123456789 for every packet.
But. content: “Boo!”. In the rules option section we specified on output message that’s descriptive and will mean something to us when we review the alerts file and log data later. Since both the source and destination ports use 53.Writing Rules: Advanced Rule (cont. For the destination addresses we specified our network using standard CIDR notation. We used the ‘seq’ packet attribute to specify the sequence number. we have set both in the rule to that number.168. These scans can originate anywhere so we have specified the keyword ‘any’ as the source IP. According to the description this string can appear anywhere in the payload.) ! Possible Answer: alert any 53 -> 192. We want this activity to be written to both the alert file and the log file – especially if we later run SnortSnarf on these files which we use during our analysis work.) 36 For this rule we set the action field to the standard ‘alert’ action. so we can’t specify the ‘offset’ or ‘depth’ options to limit the amount of processing Snort will have to do. From the description we have been given the sequence number is the same for all packets. 36 . We’ll specify this in the rule using the ‘flags’ attribute and this will indirectly limit the amount of payload processing Snort will have to do because although it is possible to have a payload in a SYN packet it is a rare occurrence. flags: S.1. \ seq: 123456789. and no other flags. the description given to use said that the packets only have the SYN flag set. The content option was used to search packets for a payload that contains the ASCII string ‘Boo!’.0/24 53 \ (msg: “Inbound Scan: Pr0b3z”.
This last section will what you have learned and tie it all together showing how those rules would be used in real world situations.Tying It All Together 37 You have learned how to write rules and all of the syntax and keywords that go along with it. Sample Snort output is supplied as well. 37 . showing how the detects being monitored for are provided to you when they are detected.
3.168. Instead. Snort will issue an error message and exit.5 drwx-----.2.2. and turn on additional options that cannot be specified by command line options.4:60216 -> 192.2 root root 4096 Mar 22 06:58 192.5:80 TCP TTL:46 TOS:0x0 ID:19678 ******A* Seq: 0xE4F00003 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0xC00 38 When using Snort.5. Special Note: This directory must already exist.168. After Snort has run for a while and detected anomalous behaviour. The default directory Snort writes all of its output to is ‘/var/log/snort’. 38 .2 root root 4096 Mar 22 06:58 1. if it detects any packets that match any of the rules it will write the activity out to the alert file and to a logging subdirectory in a log file. we see that the information it contains is simply the message from the triggered rule and the header information from the packet.880120 1. With this option you specify the rules file that you want to use. Snort will not create this directory automatically if it does not exist. it will write the activity to the alerts file and the log directory and files.5.3. The content of these files is similar. Snort will process the file to build a list of anomalies to detect for alerting and logging. but the log files can contain additional information the alert files does not if certain options are turned on. While Snort is running.Specifying Rules File snort -c snort-lib ls -l /var/log/snort drwx-----. The ‘-c’ command line option is the one you will use to do this.1 root root 2512 Mar 22 06:58 alert cat alert [**] NMAP TCP ping! [**] 03/21-13:33:51. you will most often use it along with a rules file which tells Snort what to consider as hostile. Examining the alert file.4 -rw------.
5.168.5.Specifying Rules File (cont.1 root cat TCP:12345-2985 [**] Netbus/GabanBus [**] 03/21-13:33:54.5 sent IP 1.1 root -rw------.4 traffic to destination port 2985.5 .2. A well known trojan named Netbus uses this port.168.5 that used the TCP protocol and has a source port of 12345 and a destination port of 2985.5.we see additional files that house all logged activity originating from that IP. Examining the contents of that file you see that source IP 192.168.4:2985 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:9173 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C9B544A Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306314 0 NOP WS: 0 root root root 232 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:12345-2985 232 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:12346-1611 243 Mar 22 06:58 TCP:6969-2701 39 Continuing from the previous slide.) snort -c snort-lib cd 192. the file TCP:12345-2985 represents activity from the host 126.96.36.199:12345 -> 1.1 root -rw------.192.5. For instance. Changing directories to one of the ones listed .2.5. The reason this traffic was logged there is because a rule fired that checks for traffic to or from port 12345. ls -l total 12 -rw------. we will examine one of the log subdirectories found in ‘/var/log/snort’.3. 39 .168.3.275350 192.
1 root root root root 4096 Mar 22 08:16 1.5 -rw-------. Snort will not create this directory on its own. 40 . as well as creating the logging directories and log files here.2. This is the same as if everything was written to the default directory ‘/var/log/snort’. Snort will then record all alerts to an alert file in this directory. we have created a log file in the current directory and want the activity recorded there.2 root drwx-----. Remember – the directory you tell Snort to write the alert and logs to must already exist.2 root 192.3. Snort places the logs and alerts in /var/log/snort./log drwx-----./log snort -c snort-lib -l .168.4 4096 Mar 22 08:16 2512 Mar 22 08:16 alerts 40 By default. You can specify a default directory by using the ‘-l’ option and the name of the directory where you want the information placed.5.Log Alerts to Directory . In this case./log " " " Output placed in directory ./log alerts file contains alerts generated by Snort IP subdirectories with logged payloads ls -l .
logging can be totally disabled if not desired. There are also output plugins available to log packets to a XML formatted file as well as a variety of SQL databases (e. 41 .g. The log files (or file if you are logging in binary format) are the only place the FULL packet will be written out to including the payload. MySQL. This is only recommended if you are not interested in the payload of packets that trigger rules. Depending on other command line options or rules options you use. Oracle) Finally. you can take any detect that is discovered and log in tcpdump raw output binary format. PostgreSQL.Logging Options • Default: Full logging to default Snort directory Binary: tcpdump binary output to a single log file None: Disable logging Database: Log packets to SQL database XML: Log packets in portable XML format 41 • • • • The default method of logging is to capture the output generated from Snort detects and store it in the default Snort directory /var/log/snort. This is often done with high traffic volume so as not to bog down Snort with the logging process. this will log the traffic that triggered the scan in some kind of human readable format. Alternatively.
followed by a date/timestamp and full packet header information. Full alerting is Snort’s default behaviour. as well as to an XML formatted file. When using this level of alerting. followed only by a data/timestamp and source and destination ports and addresses. The fast method writes partial information to the alert file. Fast alerting does not include the full packet header information. There are also options available to send alerts to a database. the message (if any) in the rule is written to the alert file first. 42 . Fast alerting on the other hand writes the message (if any) in the rule is again written first. None will disable alerting all together. Syslog alerts send messages in a format similar to the fast alerts. The default method is to capture the detect in the file /var/log/snort/alert. Windows host via SMB alerts. but write them to the syslog facilities.Alerting Options • • • • • • • Full: writes alert message and header information to alert file (default) Fast: writes alert message and condensed header to alert file None: disable alerts Syslog: send alert messages to syslog SMB: send WinPopup messages to Windows hosts via ‘smbclient’ Database: Send alerts to SQL database XML: Write alerts in a portable XML format 42 Alerts are an abbreviated format of capturing the detect.
such as specific exploits or specific hosts. Logging and alerting are conceptually different in a few ways. Alerts exist to let the user know that something has happened and to give that user enough information to decide whether the alert warrants further investigation immediately. The log files are there to allow follow forensic analysis of events.Alert and Logging Differences • • • • • Alerts are all contained in one file Alerts are decoded through transport layer only Logging produces multiple files Logging creates a directory structure by IP numbers Subdirectories contain activity . It also provides a convenient one stop place to do quick searches for items that may be of interest. 43 . the alert files exist merely to give the user a single place to monitor for Snort events.possibly decoded through application layer 43 You may be wondering what the difference between logging and alerting is. Logging will create multiple files under multiple directories based on the IP number of the source host. This is a better overview of what is happening on the network versus the more detailed captures for logging. Logs exist to allow the user to analyse the exact packets that caused an alert in addition to any other packets that are possibly related to the alert event. The directory name (IP number) indicates the source IP that triggered the logging activity. Alerts are more abbreviated captures of the detect that can all be found in a single file. The actual contents of the files record the payload of the packet(s) involved. and the contents are files named according to the protocol and ports involved.
If the packet payload is included in the logs.SMTP Relaying Denied [**] Alert/Log Message Text 10/09-02:34:59. The date and timestamp represent the time on the sensor when the detect was made.com>.775359 FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF -> FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF type:0x800 len:0x71 Date.. Alert and log records are identical.Alert and Logging Format [**] IDS249 . Both log and alert messages start with the message text included in the rule.1 <blahblahrs@blahblahb l..2:25432 TCP TTL:255 TOS:0x0 ID:24915 *****PA* Seq: 0x30AC5391 Ack: 0x1E3E4A55 Win: 0x2238 Packet Header (varies) 35 35 30 20 35 2E 37 2E 31 20 3C FF FF FF FF 2D FF FF FF FF FF FF 40 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 2E 63 6F 6D 3E 2E 2E 2E 20 52 65 6C 61 79 69 6E 67 20 64 65 6E 69 65 64 0D 0A 550 5. with the exception of the packet payload which can be optionally included in the log files. Relayi ng denied. log file only) 44 This slide shows you the general format of the alert and log files. the source and destination addresses and ports involved in the detect appear. The next item written is a date and timestamp. both the hex representation of the payload and the ASCII printable characters will be displayed. Packet Payload. This essentially labels each detect as it is written to disk.200. followed immediately by the packet’s decoded header information which can vary depending on the protocol of the packet. 44 .168. Optionally following the date and timestamp is the ethernet information. Timestamp Ethernet (optional) DF 192.. making it easy to determine why the packet was logged.1.7.168. Next.2:25 -> 192. Hex and ASCII (optional.
143 network that has the PUSH and ACK flags set and has a content of 'anonymous' in the payload. flags: PA. 45 In the next several slides. nocase) • Place the above rule in rules file ‘snortrules’. The above rule will be used for most of the detects.168.168.0/24 21 (msg: "anonymous FTP attempt".143. This rule says that we want to alert if any ftp connection is generated to the 192. 45 . We will put this single rule in the rules file name ‘snortrules’ to simplify the logging and alert messages generated. Content: "anonymous".Logging/alert Examples • The following rule will be used to test various options to log and alert: \ \ alert tcp any any > 192. different options will be shown to explain various logging and alerting choices.
143. we specify that we want to use a default logging directory of logdir. what you don't see above is we attempt to ftp to a host on the 192.350754 192.168. This has to be an existing directory. Next. It contains the output that was generated for the detect. We run Snort using our one rule found in ‘snortrules’. That triggers a detect and causes Snort to create an entry in the alerts file.Alert and Log snort -l logdir -c snortrules In directory logdir you will find a file named alert. we notice that there is a file named ‘alert’.15:1536-> 192.168.168. [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06. in this case since we did not specify the alert level Snort will default to ‘full’. If we examine the contents of logdir directory. It contains the packet information decoded through the TCP transport layer as can be seen by examining the file. 46 .16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 46 In this first example.143 network using a username of anonymous.143.
We find the same message generated in the alert file. If we ‘cd’ into that directory.15 that represents the hostile IP that attempted the anonymous ftp access.143.Alert and Log (Cont) The directory logdir contains a subdirectory named: 192.143.143. 47 . The filename identifies the protocol (TCP) as well as the source (1526) and destination ports (21) involved in the detect.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7c451b73 Ack: 0x7dc44632 win: 0x7d78 TCP options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 47 In the same logdir directory.143. The subdirectory 192.15:1536 -> 192.168.15 contains a file: TCP:1536-21 [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06.15. we discover a subdirectory 192.350754 192. This is a log directory.168. we discover a file name TCP:1526-188.8.131.52.168.
168. still written in a human readable format. We follow the same process as before and discover that we have an alert file in logdir which is the same as before.888357 192. the date/timestamp and the hosts involved. which says to decode the application layer. Note that the contents of the alert file have not changed from what would normally be recorded.143. 48 . It also still contains the full packet header information.143. The alert file still contains the message from the triggered rule.Alert and Log With Decode snort -l logdir -c snortrules -d In directory logdir the file alert has the following contents: [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-12:03:59.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:20566 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 48 Now we add the ‘-d’ option to the same command used previously.168.15:1537 -> 192.
143. but now the actual payload of the packet at the bottom of the alert. The output of the packet’s payload is broken into two parts.168.143.Alert and Log With Decode (Cont) The directory logdir contains the subdirectory 192.888357 192.143.168..15:1537 ->192.15 contains file named: TCP:1537-21 [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-12:03:59.168. you will not only see the information contained in the alerts file.168. The left portion contains the hex values of the payload. while the right portion contains the ASCII representation. 49 .143.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:20566 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x94102D52 Ack: 0x94529A7B Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27748803 128108 55 53 45 52 20 61 6E 6F 6E 79 6D 6F 75 73 0D 0A USER anonymous. 49 If you now look at the log file.15. The directory 192.
50 .15:1536 -> 192.16:21 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x10 ID:18558 DF *****PA* Seq: 0x7C451B73 Ack: 0x7DC44632 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => NOP NOP TS: 27713449 92831 50 The ‘-b’ option allows you to log the packets to a tcpdump file instead of the normal decoded ASCII files. log in binary format.168. Logging using the binary format is much more efficient than having Snort write out a completely decoded packet in an ASCII format.168. Instead Snort can open one file and continuously write to that file for the entire duration Snort is running.143. It also relieves Snort from having to create directories and constantly opening and closing files to write out the information in ASCII format. [**] Anonymous FTP attempt [**] 04/28-11:58:06.143.Alert and Log in Binary snort -l logdir -c snortrules -d -b The directory logdir contains the file alert. This creates a single binary file instead of creating many subdirectories with files in them that may contain only one packet.350754 192. If you are deploying Snort on high capacity networks or Snort starts to drop packets.
log which is a tcpdump raw binary output file of the detect that was captured. This requires less work of Snort to capture and is used when there is a lot of traffic on the network and there is a concern for packets being dropped.log This is a tcpdump binary output of entire packet. 51 .April 28th) and the time of the capture (11:58 AM). The name has the date of the capture (0428 .Alert and Log in Binary (Cont) In directory logdir we find the following file: snort-0428@1158. we find a file snort-0428@1158. 51 In the logdir directory. This can be read either using Snort with the ‘-r’ option or with tcpdump with the ‘-r’ option.
3. Also. or instructed Snort to log in binary. indicating that the software used to create the dump file collected 144 bytes for each packet collected.raw.data Initializing Network Interface. This option instructs Snort to read from tcpdump binary files instead of the network interface..data’ earlier and it contains tcpdump binary data.raw.5..data’ instead of from the network interface. note the ‘snaplen = 144’.960269 1.4:1398 -> 192.168. sending the data to the screen.5:2307 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:7569 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C857C3C Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306083 0 NOP WS: 0 03/21-13:33:51.960219 1. but this time we use the ‘-r’ switch to tell Snort to read its input from ‘tcpdump..raw. 52 ..Reading Tcpdump Files snort -vd -r tcpdump. This assumes that we have collected ‘tcpdump. snaplen = 144 Entering readback mode. This can be done if you've collected data using tcpdump from another sensor or other tcpdump compatible software.3.4:1399 -> 192. In that case you can pull the data back periodically and run Snort on the retrieved data without using extra CPU cycles on the sensor itself. In the example shown here. 03/21-13:33:51.5:693 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:7570 DF **S***** Seq: 0x9C55968F Ack: 0x0 Win: 0x7D78 TCP Options => MSS: 1460 SackOK TS: 9306083 0 NOP WS: 0 52 Another useful ability of Snort is the ‘-r’ command line option. This is Snort’s way of informing you that it is reading from a file and not from the network interface. we are using Snort in verbose mode. That is the tcpdump snapshot length. Readback mode can be especially useful for busy networks where full and constant processing on the sensor itself may not be feasible. Note the ‘Entering readback mode’.168.5.2..2.
pl /var/log/snort/alert 53 There are tools available that will help you with the analysis of the alert and log files. SnortSnarf will allow you to drill down to the packet that triggered a specific alert. At the next level down.com/snortsnarf/ snortsnarf.Snortsnarf. The SnortSnarf program is intended to help you view your Snort alerts in an orderly fashion using a web browser. and allows you to drill down from the general list of alerts to the specific packet that triggered the alert (providing logging was turned on and the decode option was specified). 53 . an html file is created containing each of the same alerts in a single file. At the top level.html) • Alert wrap-up html files • Specific source/destination alert html files • Optionally linked to log files for packet inspection • • Located in snort directory contrib subdirectory http://www.html file containing a summarized list of alerts. and you provide the directory the logs are located in. One tool that has proven to be popular as well as being very useful is SnortSnarf. SnortSnarf creates an index.silicondefense. This is easier than trying to assess what is happening by looking at the alerts file.Pl • perl script to take alerts: – Formats Snort alert and log files into html output – Places output in following files for ‘drill down’: • Overall summary of detected alerts (index. If logging was turned on in Snort.
and further explanation of the exploit.SnortSnarf Output Snortsnarf: Snort signatures in snort.1 (Jim Hoagland and Stuart Staniford) 54 This is a sample index page created by SnortSnarf. you can click on the signature name and a page displaying information about the signature will be displayed.alert et al 7 alerts processed.log Earliest alert at 02:34:59. This page contains a summarized list of alerts that were triggered during the time period listed. It lists the signatures that were detected. sample packets. 54 . number of times it was triggered. The information displayed can include a sample rule that would detect the traffic.775359 on 10/09 Latest alert at 03:00:36 on 10/9 Signature (click for definition) # Alerts # Sources # Destinations Detail link IDS249 .alert •snort_portscan. click on the summary link which will display a page containing information about the selected alerts. For some signatures. Files included: •snort.SMTP Relaying Denied 1 1 1 Summary UDP scan 6 1 1 Summary Generated by Snortsnarf v100400. and the total number of source and destination hosts involved. To see additional details. such as the ‘SMTP Relaying Denied’ example shown here.
In this case only one alert of the type ‘SMTP Relaying Denied’ is listed and it involved only one source and destination IP. The chart to the right of the address shows you how many alerts were triggered by that host for this specific alert.168.2 # Alerts (sig) 1 # Alerts (total) 1 # Dsts (sig) 1 # Dsts (total)) 1 Destinations receiving this attack signature Destinations 192.Summary of alerts in snort.775359 on 10/09 IDS249 . they would all be listed here. 55 . Clicking on the source IP address will take you to the alerts triggered by that source host for this signature.alert et al for signature: IDS249 .SMTP Relaying Denied 1 sources 1 destinations Sources triggering this attack signature Source 192. you arrive at this page. If there were multiple instances of this alert. including all of the hosts that were involved.1 (Jim Hoagland and Stuart Staniford) 55 When clicking on the link from the summarized index page. Looking in files: •snort.2 # Alerts (sig) 1 # Alerts (total) 1 # Srcs (sig) 1 # Srcs (total)) 1 Generated by Snortsnarf v100400.alert •snort_portscan.log Earliest such alert at 02:34:59.1. the grant total of alerts triggered by the host for all alerts. This page lists all of the source and destination hosts involved with the selected alert. and the number of destination hosts involved for both of those totals.775359 on 10/09 Latest such alert at 02:34:59.200.SMTP Relaying Denied 1 alerts on this signature.168.
SMTP Relaying Denied Whois lookup at: ARIN RIPE APNIC Geektools There are 1 distinct destination IPs in the alerts of the type on this page.216.1.2 in snort.1.2 DNS lookup at: Amenesi Riherds Princeton [**] IDS249 .168.775359 on 10/09 Latest: 02:34:59.SMTP Relaying Denied [**] 56 56 .775359 on 10/09 1 different signatures are present for 206.168.216 as a source •1 instances of IDS249 .alert et al Looking in files: •snort.181. 192.log Earliest: 02:34:59.alert •snort_portscan.All 1 alerts from 192.
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