NO. 7.

EVIDENCE (APRIL 24, 2019) raise before the SC, that as far as
determination of facts it is final and
R130
executory.
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.
 There is no qualifications to become a
 Corpuz vs People April 29, 2014 (Estafa
witness, as long as the witness can
Case)
perceive and perceiving, can make known
 P vs Monroyo June 28, 2017 (Acts of
their perception to others, may be
Lasciviousness)
witness;
 Orsos vs P Nov 2017

Q: Can a blind be a witness to a rape case?

Q: If a crime committed is in violation of
A child at tender age be a witness? Is the
RA 7610, can you still be charge for acts of
word of a child be considered as gospel
lasciviousness under the RPC?
truth? Or when a woman was raped,
A: Whichever has the higher penalty,
should we believe that the woman was
pursuant to the case of Monroyo. But in
indeed ravished?
lieu of RA 7610, there is no more acts of
A: There is a Cross-examination to tell the
lasciviousness (deemed absorbed).
truth. As far as the witness is concerned,
anyone can be a witness as long as he can
Q: How does the court treat the testimony
perceive and perceiving, can make known
of a child witness?
their perception to others. Kahit na bulag
A: P vs Caoili (EB) Aug 8, 2017;
ka, may pang-amoy ka naman at pandinig.

P vs Balcueva July 1, 2015

Q: Who has the tasked to assess the
- Rape of a female over 12 yrs old, by
credibility of a witness?
her father. Being the father is
A: It is the trial court that has the initial
considered as aggravating
time to observe the credibility of the
circumstance due to moral
witness. On cross, direct, re-direct, re-
ascendancy, notwithstanding of
cross. It must be given with respect and
such, the penalty would be the same,
finality.
Reclusion Perpetua without
qualification for parole.
GR: SC takes cognizance of the case on
purely question of law under R45.
P vs Colentava Feb. 9, 2015
EGR: In writ of kalikan cases when mixed
- Relative to the rule of a child witness;
question of fact and law can be raise.
that child witness’ testimony is
EEGR: When there is a conflict between
considered as gospel truth; even in
the trial court findings and appellate
the Rules of court, it is given
court, the SC will review the case. or in
credence
Admin tribunal, the findings of the LA is
- Child witness: (1) nakatalikod; (2)
diff from the findings of NLRC on appeal,
must be aided by DSWD; or (3) with
the SC may review the same and will
his father or nearest kin;
disregard that only question of law may

Page 1 of 93
P vs Magbitang (EB) June 14, 2016
- A child maybe a competent witness
unless the trial court determine
upon proper showing that the child’s
mental maturity is such as to render
him incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which is to be examine
and of relating the facts truthfully.
Q: What if there is a finding submitted to
the court that the 10-yr old witness is
mentally ill. Allegedly, she was mentally
abused by her 2 grandfather. If you were
the counsel for the accused, what will be
your defense?
A: P vs Kulantiba; P vs Magbitang:
Questioning the credibility of the witness,
at the age of 10, pang 4yrs old lang yung
isip.
- Pwedeng i- discredit yung testimony
nung child witness.
Q: Can a child request that counsel for the
accused go outside the court?
A: Yes. Because he might be intimidated
to the counsel.
Q: Can the judge assess the credibility of
the witness?
A: Yes.
Q: The testimony of public officer, which
has the presumption of regularity;
between presumptions of regularity
versus presumption of innocence, which
will prevail?
A: Presumption of innocence. Because it is
a consti right of the accused.
Q: How do you classify a police blotter
testify and presented in court by the desk
officer who recorded in the police blotter
what transpired in the certain event
recorded. Can you give it a presumption
of regularity?
A: No. because it is merely hearsay, the
desk officer has no personal knowledge.
At most, it is considered as corroborative.
In rape cases the accused can be
convicted even w/o the testimony of the
medical officer but solely based on the
testimony of the rape victim. Medical
certificate is merely corroborative.
Q: When can you invoke a sweetheart
defense theory?
A:
Q: Is identification through police line-up
admissible as evidence?
A: The Courts should have adopted the
totality of circumstances test: (P vs
Pepino, Jan 12, 2016; citing the case of P vs
Teehankee)
(1) The witness’ opportunity to view
the criminal at the time of the
crime;
(2) The witness degree of attention at
that time;
(3) The accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; or
(4) The level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the
time of the identification;
(5) The length of time between the
crime and identification;
(6) The suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
If the abovementioned requisites
are all present, the identification made
by the witness during the police line-up
can be admitted in evidence.
Page 2 of 93
An ill motive in rape cases is inconsequential, as
long as there is affirmative or credible declaration
from the rape victim. Ill motive cannot be given
consideration in identification.
In criminal cases, the no 1 req to
win the case is the positive identification.
Once it was already identified, 50% ay
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or
pwede na manalo.
insanity of adverse party.
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity.
Q: What if the witness is presently
confined in the national mental health in
mandaluyong, can he be considered as
credible witness?
A: You can file a motion in court to
disqualify the witness. Those, whose
mental condition at the time of
examination is incapable of intelligently
making known their perception to others.
Mental maturity is such that capable of
making known your perception to others.
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.
 The husband cannot testify against his
wife and the wife cannot testify against
her husband. Except a case filed by one
against the other.
Ex.
The wife of the City mayor of Iriga City
went to the NBI and issued a press
release that her husband is the number 1
killer in the bicol region, author of several
holdups, etc. Etong si wife ay binubugbog
kasi nagseselos sa mga bodyguard, etc.
The wife filed a case against him. Would
the testimony of the wife admissible?
It would not be admissible because of the
personal knowledge is considered as
marital privileged communication.
 Dead man’s statute
 It is prohibited because once a person
died, his mouth is forever close, he could
no longer defend himself;
 Whatever agreed upon bet parties, and
the other party dies prior to that, you
could no longer question the same.
Garcia vs Robles vda De Caparas April 17,
2013 (Deptals)
- Dead man’s statute, if one party to
the allege transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or
under mental disability, the other
party is not entitled to undue
advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction.
Ex:
Q: Flora is the owner of the farm
being tilled by Eugenio as the agricultural
lessee under agricultural lease
agreement. Before flora passed away,
she appointed her niece Amanda as her
Attorney in fact, when Eugenio passed
away, he was succeeded by his children
Modesta, Crispina and Pedro. Amanda
and Pedro entered into Agricultural
Lease Hold Contract installing and
recognizing the latter as the lone
Page 3 of 93
 agricultural lessee and cultivator of the
land. When Pedro passed away, his wife
Dominga took over as Agri Lessee, the
sisters of Pedro filed a complaint for the
nullification of leasehold and restoration
of right as Agri lessees against Pedro’s
surviving Spouse. The only evidence
presented was Amanda’s declaration and
their affidavit that Pedro was forcedly
represented Flora and to her that he is
the actual cultivator of the land and that
when she confronted him about this, and
the alleged alternate parties between
the sisters, Pedro allegedly told her that
he and his 2 sisters had an understanding
about it, and he did not have the
intention of depriving them of their
cultivator rights. There was no other
evidence other than such verbal
declaration which prove existence of
such agreement, no written
memorandum of such agreement exist,
no proof that they actually cultivated the
land, no receipt evidencing payment of
the land owner’s share or other
documentary evidence put on record. Is
the affidavit of Amanda stating what
Pedro told her during his lifetime is
admissible as evidence? (Deptals)
A: NO. Dead man’s Statute.
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication.
 Husband and wife
 Atty and client
 Doctor and Patient
 Minister or the penitent
 Imam
 Katipunan para hindi makalimutan.
Confession sa pari ni Gregorio de Jesus,
tapos inabi ng pari sa mga kastila na
nagaalsa ang mga Filipino.
Sec. 25. Parental and Filial Privilege
 Anak, except, if there is a case against the
other.
 Doctor and patient, pag napatay yung
patient; reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide. Art 365 RPC
Q: When does trial begins?
A: Starts during pre-trial. Because any
admission made during the pre-trial, no need
to prove it during the trial.
Sec. 26. Admission of a party.
 An admission against interest is the best
evidence which afford greatest certainty
of the facts and dispute since no man
would declare against himself, unless
such declaration is true;
 Kaya may Miranda Rights;
G.R. No. 216491, August 23, 2017 THE
HEIRS OF PETER DONTON, THROUGH THEIR LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVE, FELIPE G. CAPULONG,
Petitioners, v. DUANE STIER AND EMILY MAGGAY,
Respondents.
Ex.
Q: A court sheriff was charged
administratively in the court of admin for
soliciting which is prohibited under the
canon of court personnel. However,
upon receiving the notice to comment,
he ignored the same and no longer
report for work. Is it equivalent to
admission?
Page 4 of 93
 A: Noces de Leon vs Florendo (AM No. P-
15-3393). Admission by silence if he
failed to answer.
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible.
 In criminal negligence cases, nabangga
yung bus and asking assistance from the
bus owner. Cannot be considered as
offer of compromise of admission of guilt
because that is crim negligence under
Art. 365 of RPC; cannot considered
against the offeror. However, in some
cases, it is considered as implied
admission.
 During JDR, Mediation; even murder now
pwede ng mag mediate. Frustrated Php
75,000.00, Attempted Php 50,000.00,
Murder Php 100,000.00;
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party.
 Will it affect other party? No, unless
there is conspiracy;
Napoles vs SB
- The testimony given by benhurluy
considered as admission by third-
party.
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent.
Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator.
- Pagka yung kaconspirator ay umamin
na pwede na yung gamitin against
sayo, exception to the rule na
admission by 3rd party. Kasi may
personal knowledge. Kaya merong
state witness program (less guilty)
Reyes vs OMB
Q: Can the declaration of the whistle
blower in the PDAF be given probative
value during the PI w/o violating the res
inter alios acta rule in Sec. 28 R130?
A: Yes. Neither can the Napoles siblings
discount the testimony of the whistle
blower in viol of res inter alios acta rule.
"An exception to the res inter alios acta
rule is an admission made by a
conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. This provision states
that the act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy,
and during its existence, may be giver, in
evidence against the co-conspirator after
the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. Thus,
in order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his
or her co-conspirators, it is necessary
that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by
evidence other than the admission itself;
(b) the admission relates to the common
object; and (c) it has been made while
the declarant was engaged in carrying
out the conspiracy."
The provision of Sec. 28 in rel to sec. 30
does not apply to conspirator. If the
conspirator admitted, it can be use
against the co-conspirator.
Secs. 31. Admission by privies.
32. Admission by silence.
33. Confession.
31.
Page 5 of 93
  Case re the execution of the will. Yung
tinanong ng court yung witness kung
nakita daw ba niya yung testator kung
pinirmahan yung will by mere looking at
his left side, kasi daw may kurtina. As
long as nakita nung witness na
pumipirma ang testator, still considered
as valid and considered him as credible
witness.
 In drafting a will under electronc
evidence rule, would it be valid if it
merely captured by the camera,
videorecorder, etc. Valid.
32.
Noces-de leon vs Florendo Case
- Failure to answer, deemed
admission by silence.
Remedy if the accused was convicted
because he was tried in absentia:
- The accused needs to surrender
within the 15-day period, before the
decision becomes final and
executory;
- Conviction by silence pag hindi
sumurrender within that period;
Q: Is the presence of the accused
required during pre-trial in crim case, compared
to R18?
A: NO. Under the revised guidelines of
continuous trial, the presence of the
accused no longer needed. Because the
pre-trial, in order to be the governing law
during trial must be signed by the
accused and counsel.
33.
If made with assistance of counsel =
admissible
If made w/o the assistance of counsel =
inadmissible, fruit of poisonous tree.
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence.
Q: If you are a murderer or shabu seller,
you are acquitted from a case and here
comes another same case. Can the same
be considered as similar act as evidence?
A: NO.
Sec. 35. Unaccepted Offer.
Unaccepted offer is an offer in writing to
pay a particular sum of money or to
deliver a written instrument or to deliver
a specific personal property is rejected
without valid cause equivalent to actual
production and tender of the money
instrument or property.
Q: If you offer a compromise. Can it be
used against you?
A: Yes. Walang matinong tao na mag
ooffer na aregluhin kung hindi siya guilty.
Sec. 36. Testimony confined to be personal
knowledge. (VIP)
Q: What is required in order that a
person cannot be objected to?
A: He must have personal knowledge
Q: Newspaper Clippings, is it considered
as hearsay?
A: Yes. In so far as the rules of evidence is
concerned.
Page 6 of 93
Estrada vs Arroyo Case
- The SC used as an admission on the
part of the president as he could no
longer perform her duty as chief
executive, the clippings or album of
Sen. Angara as evidence. (Paiba iba
ang decision).
Q: Can the certificate issue by the DENR
that indeed the Title was existing, is
enough?. P vs Galenga Jan 23, 2017
A: No. If the witness who identifies the
ecrt was not the one who prepared it,
considered as hearsay. It must be the one
who signed the certificate. As to the
existence of the certification is
concerned, it is admissible, but as to the
contents of the certification, it is
considered as hearsay.
Doctrine of Independently Relevant
Statement
- It is the evidence as to the making of
the statement which is not
secondary but primary, for the
statement itself, may constitute a
fact and issue or is circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such
fact. Esineli vs P, citing Republic vs
Heirs of Alejadia Senior (2002)
Sec. 37. Dying declaration.
Q: Is it admissible as evidence the dying
declaration of the victim, identifying the
person killed him? How about you are a
police officer and at the time the witness
is about to die sinasabi niya kung sino ang
pumatay sa kaniya, then after 10 mins,
namatay siya, then, kinuha yung thumb
na may dugo tapos idiniin doon sa
statement nung victim. But there was a
statement that the victim ay
nagpefacebook. Would it be considered
as a dying declaration (mejo Malabo
kwneto)? P vs Palanas June 17, 2015
A: Yes. It is considered as dying
declaration as well as res gestae.
Q: How about if the person is about to
die, make a statement as to the person
who shoot him but later on survives,
would it be considered as dying
declaration?
A: Yes. Because there’s no person an
magbibiro sa kaniyang buhay.
Requisites for a dying declaration to be
considered as exception to the hearsay
rule:
(a) The declaration must concern of the
surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death;
(b) At the time the declaration made,
the declarant is conscious of his
impending death;
(c) Declarant must be competent as a
witness;
(d) Declaration is offered in criminal
case in murder, homicide, parricide,
where declarant is a victim.
- Dying declaration sa criminal case
lang ginagamit.
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest.
Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree.
Sec. 41. Common reputation.
Page 7 of 93
 First violator of civil code, prohibiting
marriages between first cousins, Manuel
Quezon. Ang mga ayala, pinag aasawa
ang mga mag pipinsan.
Sec. 42. Part of Res Gestae.
P vs Palanas June 17, 2015 (Murder Case)
Res Gestae
- A hearsay which is an exception to
the hearsay rule;
- Refers to the circumstances, facts
and declaration that draw out of the
main fact, and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous
and contemporaneous with the main
fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation or publication.
- Almost similar with dying
declaration;
In order to be exempted from hearsay
evidence, it must possess the ff:
(a) The principal act or res gestae, is a
starling occurrence;
(b) Statements were made before the
declarant have time to contrive or
devise;
(c) Statement must concern the
occurrence in question and its
immediately appending
circumstances.
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business.
Q: Is there s difference between the
delivery receipt and official receipt? Which is
admissible?
A; Official Receipt, evidence as to
payment. There is really a delivery.
Q: Is the ticket and the duplicate of a bus
ticket considered as original?
A: Yes.
Q: If the entry in the course of business is
voluminous, is it sufficient to merely
present a certificate or bring the
douements to the court?
A: Mere certificate is sufficient, provided
that it is authenticated.
Sec. 44. Entries in official records.
Q: In the case of Cudia vs Sup of the PMA.
Is a high grade as certified by the
registrar can be used as an evidence in
your favour due to the admin case of
dishonesty. Can it be a defense on your
part?
A: No.
Q: What is the presumption of the
entries in the official record made by the
public officer in the government?
A: P vs Laba Jan 28, 2013 (Viol. of 9165),
the SC affirmed the conviction of the
accused. the testimony of the chemical
analyst and the forensic chemist re the
recovered prohibited drug, enjoys
presumption of regularity in the
preparation.
Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like.
Sec. 46. Learned treaties
- Considered as judicial notice. There
is no harm in presenting the same
before the court, admissible as
evidence.
Page 8 of 93
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition of a former
proceedings.
Ambrey vs Tsourous July 5, 2016
Requisites in order that a testimony in a
former proceeding be admitted in the new
proceedings:
(a) The witness is dead or unable to
testify;
(b) Testimony or deposition is given in a
former case, judicial or
administrative between the same
parties, or closed representing the
same interest;
(c) Former case involve the same
subject as that in the present case,
although in different causes of
action;
(d) The issue testified to by the witness
in the former trial is the same issue
involve in the present case;
(e) The adverse party had the
opportunity to examine in the
former case.
Q: If you will utilize the witness used in
one case and will utilize in the new case
involving the same parties, the same
issue, but diff causes of action. Is there a
need that the witness should still testify
in the new case?
A: No. Ask for the certified copy of the
TSN in a former proceeding. File a motion
to admit and ask for the stipulation to the
opposing counsel that the witness
testified in the previous case involving
the same parties, and ask to mark the
same as exhibit.
Sec. 48. General Rule. (Opinion)
GR: Opinions are considered as hearsay.
EGR: If you are an expert witness.
Q: If an expert witness presented in
court, what should you do if you want to discredit
the witness?
A: Ask the presentor the qualification of
the witness because the presentor will
ask a stipulation to you, whether the
opposing counsel will admit that the
witness is an expert. Never admit.
Q: How do you qualify a witness as an
expert?
A: Ask the educational background, years
of experience, the cases that he attended
to, is it similar to one he will be testifying.
Q: What is the weight of the testimony of
an expert witness?
A: It has only persuasive effect, because
the court will take its own evaluation.
Q: If a fingerprint expert will be
introduce, the case is for perjury or
falsification of document, when do you
get an expert witness?
A: Before the NBI, ask for subpoena
duces tecum ad testifecandum, and
CIDG. But still, it is not conclusive. The
court needs to issue and independent
findings.
Tortuna vs Gregorio Jan 17, 2018
Burguilla vs CA 1987
Q: Is the medical certificate in rape cases
is it necessary? Do you need introduce
med cert as evidence?
A: NO. The testimony of the victim is
enough to convict the accused in criminal
Page 9 of 93
 cases. Except, if the same is a gang rape.
(Magi dela Riva Case: Gang Rape)
- Expert witness is similar to amicus
curae.
- If the witness is not an expert
witness, you always object.
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness.
Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses.
- Inadmissible in evidence; see
exception enumerated in the
section.
- It can be objected too, because it is
considered hearsay.
- The opinion of a witness for which
proper basis is given may be received
an evidence regarding as an
exception to the rule, the identity;
you testify as an eye witness because
you witness the same (Ex. Execution
of a will).
- Mental sanity of a person: either of
the parents may testify that your
child is of sound mind.
Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally
admissible; exceptions.
- You can prove that the accused has a
good or bad moral character.
- De Lima vs Guerero, re the witnesses
presented in congress, now they are
discrediting the witnesses presented
in the RTC of muntinlupa. They
should file exclusion, not
discrediting. The court may be given
probative value to the testimony of
such witnesses.
Q: For example, yung accused ay
previously charged of an estafa, but was
acquitted. Then another case of estafa
was charged against him. During the trial
of the existing estafa case, pupwede mo
bang sabhin sa court na para i-prove
yung good or bad moral character nung
accused as witness?
A: As far as the court is concerned, it is
permitted. But if you were the counsel of
the accused, you should not permit the
same, the introduction, because it has
not probative value whether he has bad
or good moral character. The required
evidence in criminal case is not the
character, but proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
NOTE: Kwento re CTA hearing.
Q: Is second MR is considered as prohibited
pleading?
A: Yes. Under R52, Sec. 2, Exception, if in the
interest of substantial justice.
NO. 8. EVIDENCE (MAY 15, 2019)
R133
Cases in the Phils.:
(a) Criminal – has the highest quantum,
proof beyond reasonable doubt; any
doubt shall be resolve in favour of the
accused and against the state; reason:
the State is too powerful compared to an
accused; The accused has 27 rights,
compared to the State, has only 1 right,
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Page 10 of 93
(b) Civil – preponderance of evidence; if
preponderate in favour of the plaintiff,
then it shall resolve in favour of the
plaintiff; Preponderance is more than
prima facie evidence; in between.
(c) Administrative – substantial evidence;
Ang Tibay vs CIR; Substantial Evidence =
social justice = those who have less in life
must have more in law; Cudia vs Sup of
Military Academy.
- Labor Cases, is only substantial.
Merks Fil Inc. vs Apestus Feb 18,
2015; Ayungo vs Bimpko Ship Mgt
Corp Feb 26, 2014; INC ship Mgt vs
Morales Feb 2015.
- Extrajudicial Confession, not
sufficient ground for conviction,
EXCEPT, if you are assisted by a
counsel at the time you extra
judicially confess of the crime
committed, exception to the
EXCEPTION is admission in a media
interview.
- Circumstantial Evidence, there
should be more than 1 circumstance.
Q: Can a criminal case prove through
circumstantial evidence?
A: Yes. Provided there must be more
than 1 circumstance.
P vs Magbitang June 14, 2016; P vs
Juan Dasan June 14, 2016;
- Absent direct evidence against the
accused in criminal case, it can be
proven through circumstantial
evidence;
Candelaria vs P Dec. 8, 2014 (Q.
Theft); Atienza vs P Feb 12, 2014
(Murder); P vs Lamsen Feb 2013;
R131
Sec. 1. Burden of proof.
- The burden of proof, in criminal
cases, does not shift. Except, when
the accused invoked self-defense,
then the burden of proof shifts now
to the accused, he will be the one to
first present evidence, to prove that
it is justifiable. Because, under the
justifying circumstance, the person is
not criminally as well as civilly liable.
If you invoke exempting
circumstance, you may be exempt
from criminal liability, but you are
not exempt from civil liability;
- In civil cases, burden of proof does
not shift; the only instance is that,
kapay sumagot pa yung respondent
na may utang siya pero bayad na,
dpat ang finile ay motion to dismiss
on the ground of extinction of civil
liability.
Q: A disqualification case was filed
against Sen. Poe Llmansares on the
ground of the admission that she is a
foundling, hence, disqualified to run
as pres of the Rep of the Phils. As her
Fil citizenship is doublful, in this kind
of case, who has the burden of
proof? Does it Shift? March 8, 2016
Poe Llamnsares vs Comelec
A: It does not shift. The complainant
has to prove that she has no origin
and that disqualified. She is
presumed to be a Fil. Cit considering
that she was found within the Phils.
Page 11 of 93
 Q: In a collection suit, who has the
burden of proof that the defendant
is not yet paid of his indebtedness?
A: It is the Plaintiff.
Q: What if there is a ground for
motion to dismiss but failed to do so,
what should you do? (mentioned
above)
A: Considered as affirmative
defense. It has to be incorporated in
the answer and you can file a motion
for preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defense, as if you filed a
motion to dismiss.
Ligon vs RTC of Makati Feb 26, 2014
Sec. 2. Conclusive Presumptions. (MEMORIZE)
Sec. 3. Disputable Presumptions.
- Pwedeng pabulaanan; Except, the
accused is presumed innocent until
proven guilty.
- Read and analyze;
Q: What is the natural presumption of a
person signed the document?
A: Incarnation Construction Industrial
Corp vs Phoenix Ready Mix Dev’t Corp.
The presumption is, that you read and
fully understood that document,
UNLESS, sinabi mo na no read no write ka
(so disputable).
Q: Between presumption of the
regularity in the performance of the
official duty and the constitutional
provision of presumption of innocence,
which prevail?
A: The constitutional presumption. The
essence of Sec. 21, R.A No. 9165.
Sec. 4. No presumption of legitimacy or
illegitimacy.
- Amended already by the family code.
- If a person was born out of wedlock,
considered illegitimate.
- 2 status of a person in the family
code: (1) Legitimate and (2)
Illegitimate.
R132 (Presentation of Evidence)
Summary:
(a) Direct
(b) Cross
(c) Re-direct
(d) Re-cross
- After the defense rests it case,
tatanungin ng judge kung
magpepresent pa ng rebuttal yung
plaintiff. Kapag oo, then there will be
sue rebuttal. After the plaintiff or
people rested its case (when? Formal
offer of documentary evidence).
Upon the revised guidelines of
continuous trial in criminal cases,
took effect on Feb 2017, the Formal
Offer of Documentary exhibit shall
be made orally.
Then the defense will be asked if he
wanted to file a demurrer to
evidence. If the motion to file D. Evid
was denied (is MR allowed? Yes. Can
you orally argued your MR w/o
putting in writing and ask the court
to rule on your moral MR? Yes, in the
case of Enrile vs P), he will be given
trial date when to present the
evidence, if granted, he has 10 non-
Page 12 of 93
 extendible days period to file D.
Evidence.
Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court.
Sec. 2. Proceedings to be recorded.
- Upon the effectivity of the 1964
Rules of Court, all courts in the Phils
are considered as court of record,
prior to that, not all courts are court
of record.
GR: All proceedings in court are
recorded.
EGR: if you will manifest, off the
record your honor. You can secure
copy of TSN.
Sec. 3. Rights and obligations of the witness.
(MEMORIZE)
- Witness is constitutionally protected
while he is in the witness stand;
- If you are on cross, you treated the
witness as tickling puppy;
(1)
(2) a matter of discretion by the court;
- if you feel that the Judge is asking
question more than clarificatory, you can
object the same.
The cross, direct, redirect and re-cross by
a witness before the trial court, should
be given respect and treated with
finality. P vs Dionaldo July 23, 2015, P vs
Jalyarte April 2, 2015, Pyansa vs P;
Q: What if there is a slight variation in the
testimony of the witness, would it affect its
credibility?
A: No. P vs Nelmidac Sept 11, 2012. It
would still be clarify or corrected through
redirect, or clarificatory by the court.
Sec. 4. Order in the examination of an individual.
Sec. 5
Sec. 6
Sec. 7
Sec. 8
Sec. 9. Recalling witness.
- It is a matter of discretion. You may
recall the witness if there something
to be clarified.
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions.
- Leading, answerable by yes/no. you
suggest an answer; allowed only on
preliminary and cross-examination
(questions are always leading)
- Misleading, it was not stated by the
witness, you put an answer in the
mouth of the witness.
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness.
- If it is your witness, you cannot a
question which will
incriminate/impeach your witness;
you put him on the witness stand in
your own favour, not of your
opponent.
Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of
inconsistent statements.
Q: How do you confront the witness?
A: By laying the answer on the first
question and reading another
answer on another question, but
Page 13 of 93
 interrelated to the first question. the counsel is asking questions
Therefore, you will now ask the regarding the document.
witness which is which.
Sec. 19.
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of the witness.
Classes of documents:
Sec. 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. (A) Public
- All documents emanating from
- Sensitive cases like, child abuse, viol government agencies, including
against women. The witness if you GOCC.
are a child, you are facing the judge, (B) Private
not the audience. - Are documents duly notarized.
Sec. 20.
Q: Can a child witness testify through
videocamera, away from the people Sec. 21
around? - Ancient document, one which is 30
A: Yes. yrs or older.

Sec. 16. When witness may refer to Sec. 22

memorandum.
How the genuineness of handwriting can
- For purposes of identification, you be prove:
can ask the court w/ leave to (a) By the person himself;
approach the witness and show the (b) Witnesses – who witness the
documents for purposes of handwriting.
identification and confront the (c) Expert
witness.

Sec. 17. Sec. 23

- Assuming that there are 5pages in
the contract, and 2 of the 5 pages
were not admitted as evidence. The
remainder may be presented and
admitted as evidence.
Sec. 18.
Sec. 24
- If the written document showed to
the witness, the latter can examine
those documents. You can object if
Sec. 25
- All documents emanate from gov’t
agencies have the presumption of
regularity.
- TCT need not marked as certified
true copy, blue copy emanating from
RD are considered as repository as
original.
- Documents emanating from PSA, BIR

Page 14 of 93

Q: In attesting the original copy of
the TCT, do you need to present the
RD or his authorize rep?
A: No. Government record
considered as valid and enjoys
presumption of regularity.
Sec. 26
- Those documents voluminous in
character. Ex. Records from the COA
- Mere certification from government
officer will be enough.
- It must be translated in the official
language;
- Official language: Fil and English
- Translator must be from the DFA, if it
will be used as evidence he must be
from the SC, EXCEPTION, in the
absence of any translator, any
accredited translator can do,
provided there must be with prior
leave of court and shall be recorded
to the office of the court
administrator.
Sec. 34 (MEMORIZE; VIP)

Sec. 27 - Evidence not formally offered has no

probative value, shall have no
consideration;
- If the document was pre-marked but
Sec. 28 not formally offered, cannot be
consider by the court and has no
- A certification would be enough. probative value;
- Oral: Before the witness testify.
Sec. 29 (MEMORIZE) Written: after the prosecution rests
its case.
Sec. 30
Sec. 35
- Must be commissioned notary
public. Sec. 36

Sec. 31 - Amended by the revised guidelines

- The witness must put to the witness Sec. 37

stand the person caused the
alteration and he should explain the - You manifest to the court;
reason for such.
Sec. 38
Sec. 32
- Shall be made immediately after the
Sec. 33 objection.

Sec. 39

Page 15 of 93

Sec. 40
- You made a manifestation attaching
the documents.
- Read Judicial Affidavit Rule.
RULE 130
Sec 20
Corpuz vs People
Witnesses; Settled is the rule that in
assessing the credibility of witnesses, the
Supreme Court gives great respect to the
evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the witness
stand, an opportunity denied the appellate
courts, which merely rely on the records of the
case.—Anent the credibility of the prosecution’s
sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner,
the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that
in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court
gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial
court for it had the unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and their
deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity
denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on
the records of the case. The assessment by the
trial court is even conclusive and binding if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence,
especially when such finding is affirmed by the
CA. Truth is established not by the number of
witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies,
for in determining the value and credibility of
evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not
numbered.
People vs Monroyo
Remedial Law; Evidence; Credibility of
Witnesses; Factual Findings; The factual findings
of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
the rape victim, are accorded great weight and
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.—As
in the Acts of Lasciviousness cases, the Court
defers to the findings of fact of the trial court, as
affirmed by the CA. Jurisprudentially settled is the
principle that if a victim’s testimony is
straightforward, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things,
unflawed by any material or significant
inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility and
the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
thereof. Putting more emphasis, the factual
findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great
weight and respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, as in this case.
Orsos vs People
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; The
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
domain best left to the trial court judge because
of his unique opportunity to observe the
deportment and demeanor of a witness on the
stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts;
and when his findings have been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals (CA), these are generally binding
and conclusive upon the Supreme Court (SC).—
At the outset, it bears to emphasize the
recognized rule in this jurisdiction that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
domain best left to the trial court judge because
of his unique opportunity to observe the
deportment and demeanor of a witness on the
stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts;
and when his findings have been affirmed by the
CA, these are generally binding and conclusive
Page 16 of 93
upon this Court. While there are recognized
exceptions to the rule, the Court found no
substantial reason to overturn the identical
conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on
the matter of AAA’s credibility.
CHILD WITNESS
People vs Caoili (en banc) August 8 2017
People vs Balcueva
Witnesses; Child Witnesses; A young girl
would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as
serious as rape at the hands of her very own
father, allow the examination of her private part,
and subject herself to the stigma and
embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was
other than a fervent desire to seek justice.—As
correctly ruled, AAA’s clear, categorical, and
unwavering testimony reveals that she was
indeed raped by Balcueva, her own father. Suffice
it to say that Balcueva’s flimsy defense of denial
and alibicannot prevail over AAA’s positive and
categorical testimony and identification of him as
the perpetrator of the crime. Verily, a young girl
would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as
serious as rape at the hands of her very own
father, allow the examination of her private part,
and subject herself to the stigma and
embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was
other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence,
there is no plausible reason why AAA would
testify against her own father, imputing to him
the grave crime of rape, if this crime did not
happen.
People vs Colentava
Witnesses; Child Witness; The Supreme
Court (SC) has been consistent in giving credence
to testimonies of child victims especially in
sensitive cases of rape.—It is noteworthy that
“AAA” was a minor at the time she was raped.
The Court has been consistent in giving credence
to testimonies of child victims especially in
sensitive cases of rape. In People v. Garcia, 681
SCRA 465 (2012), it was held that: Testimonies of
child victims are normally given full weight and
credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a
minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has
in fact been committed. When the offended
party is of tender age and immature, courts are
inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she
testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young
girl’s revelation that she had been raped, coupled
with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and willingness to undergo public
trial where she could be compelled to give out
the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be
so easily dismissed as mere concoction.
The Supreme Court (SC) has
ruled that a young girl’s revelation that she had
been raped cannot be easily labeled as a mere
concoction.—The Court has ruled that a young
girl’s revelation that she had been raped cannot
be easily labeled as a mere concoction. In People
v. Melivo, 253 SCRA 347 (1996), it was held that:
It takes much more for a sixteen-year-old lass to
fabricate a story of rape, have her private parts
examined, subject herself to the indignity of a
public trial and endure a lifetime of ridicule. Even
when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain
amount of psychological depravity for a young
Page 17 of 93
woman to concoct a story which would put her
own father for the most of his remaining life to
jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to
a lifetime of shame.
People vs Magbitang
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Child
Witnesses Rule; Under the Rules of Court, a child
may be a competent witness, unless the trial
court determines upon proper showing that the
child’s mental maturity is such as to render him
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which he is to be examined and of relating the
facts truthfully.—Under the Rules of Court, a
child may be a competent witness, unless the trial
court determines upon proper showing that the
child’s mental maturity is such as to render him
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which he is to be examined and of relating the
facts truthfully. The testimony of the child of
sound mind with the capacity to perceive and
make known the perception can be believed in
the absence of any showing of an improper
motive to testify. Once it is established that the
child fully understands the character and nature
of an oath, the testimony is given full credence.
In the case of CCC, the Defense did not
persuasively discredit his worthiness and
competence as a witness. As such, the Court
considers the reliance by the trial court on his
recollection fully justified.
People vs Pepino
Witnesses; Out-of-Court Identification;
Totality of Circumstances Test; In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted
the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the
witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the
time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.—
In People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995),
the Court explained the procedure for out-of-
court identification and the test to determine the
admissibility of such identifications in this
manner: Out-of-court identification is conducted
by the police in various ways. It is done thru show
ups where the suspect alone is brought face to
face with the witness for identification. It is done
thru mug shots where photographs are shown to
the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done
thru lineups where a witness identifies the
suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and
relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following
factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view
the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the identification; (5) the length
of time between the crime and the identification;
and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure. Applying the totality-of-
circumstances test, we find Edward’s out-of-
court identification to be reliable and thus
admissible. To recall, when the three individuals
entered Edward’s office, they initially pretended
to be customers, and even asked about the
products that were for sale. The three had told
Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino
“pulled out a gun” instead. After Pepino’s
Page 18 of 93
companion had taken the money from the
cashier’s box, the malefactors handcuffed
Edward and forced him to go down to the parked
car. From this sequence of events, there was thus
ample opportunity for Edward — before and
after the gun had been pointed at him — to view
the faces of the three persons who entered his
office. In addition, Edward stated that Pepino had
talked to him “[a]t least once a day” during the
four days that he was detained.
Rule 130
Sec. 23
Garcia vs Robles Vda Caparas
Remedial Law; Evidence; Dead Man’s
Statute; If one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or
other mental disabilities, the other party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction.—DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96,
which was filed in 1996 or long after Pedro’s
death in 1984, has no leg to stand on other than
Amanda’s declaration in her July 10, 1996
Affidavit that Pedro falsely represented to
Makapugay and to her that he is the actual
cultivator of the land, and that when she
confronted him about this and the alleged
alternate farming scheme between him and
petitioners, Pedro allegedly told her that “he and
his two sisters had an understanding about it and
he did not have the intention of depriving them
of their cultivatory rights.” Petitioners have no
other evidence, other than such verbal
declaration, which proves the existence of such
arrangement. No written memorandum of such
agreement exists, nor have they shown that they
actually cultivated the land even if only for one
cropping. No receipt evidencing payment to the
landowners of the latter’s share, or any other
documentary evidence, has been put forward.
What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to
consider and realize is that Amanda’s declaration
in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged
admission and recognition of the alternate
farming scheme is inadmissible for being a
violation of the Dead Man’s Statute, which
provides that “[i]f one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other
party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction.” Thus, since Pedro is
deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which
pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the
1996 “Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa” which she
as assignor entered into with petitioners, and
which is now the subject matter of the present
case and claim against Pedro’s surviving spouse
and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such
declaration cannot be admitted and used against
the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by
reason of her being unable to contradict or
disprove such declaration as a result of her
husband-declarant Pedro’s prior death.
Rule 130
Sec. 26
Heirs of Donton vs Maggay
Admission Against Interest; An admission
against interest is the best evidence which
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute since no man would declare anything
against himself unless such declaration is true.—
Be that as it may, the Court, however, differs
from the findings of the courts a quowith respect
to Stier’s citizenship. More than the Certification
issued by the BOI, which clearly states that Stier
is an American citizen, the records contain other
documents validating the information. For
Page 19 of 93
instance, in paragraph 1 of respondents’ Answer
with Counterclaim, they admitted paragraphs 1,
2, and 3 of the Complaint insofar as their personal
circumstances are concerned, and paragraph 2 of
the Complaint states: “2. Defendant DUANE
STIER is of legal age, married, an American citizen,
a non-resident alien with postal address at Blk. 5,
Lot 27, A, B, Phase 1, St. Michael Home Subd.,
Binangonan, Rizal. x x x” (Emphases supplied)
Similarly, one of the attachments to the
Manifestation filed by respondents before the
RTC is an Affidavit executed by Stier himself,
stating: “I, DUANE STIER, of legal age,
married, American citizen. x x x” (Emphasis
supplied) The foregoing statements made by
Stier are admissions against interestand are
therefore binding upon him. An admission
against interest is the best evidence which
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute since no man would declare anything
against himself unless such declaration is true.
Thus, an admission against interest binds the
person who makes the same, and absent any
showing that this was made through palpable
mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset
it, especially so in this case where respondents
failed to present even one piece of evidence in
their defense. Hence, the courts a quo erred in
ruling that Stier’s American citizenship was not
established in this case, effectively rendering the
sale of the subject property as to him void ab
initio, in light of the clear proscription under
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution against
foreigners acquiring real property in the
Philippines, to wit: Section 7. Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.
Rule 130
Sec. 32
Noces De Leon vs Florendo
Remedial Law; Evidence; Admissions; For
his failure to file comment, he is deemed to have
impliedly admitted the charges against him.—
Unfortunately, instead of facing the charges
against him, Florendo chose to ignore the
accusations against him by no longer reporting
for work. Indeed, for his failure to file comment,
he is deemed to have impliedly admitted the
charges against him. Moreover, records show
that this is not the first offense committed by
Florendo. On February 12, 2009, he was found
guilty of dishonesty in A.M. No. P-07-2304 and
fined by this Court. He was likewise found guilty
of dishonesty and corruption in A.M. No. P-12-
3077 and was suspended for six (6) months per
this Court’s Decision dated July 4, 2012.
Rule 130
Sec. 28
Napoles vs Sandiganbayan
Rule 130
Sec. 30
Reyes vs Ombudsman
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount
the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on
their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule
under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence, which states that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, unless the admission is by a
conspirator under the parameters of Section 30
of the same Rule.223 To be sure, the foregoing
rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence
which should not be rigidly applied in the course
of preliminary investigation proceedings.
In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the
Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence,
Page 20 of 93
which would otherwise be inadmissible under
technical rules on evidence, during the
preliminary investigation "as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the
224
hearsay." This is because "such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of
225
parties." Applying the same logic, and with the
similar observation that there lies substantial
basis for crediting the testimonies of the
whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed
by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res
inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as
case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on
evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has
jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a
preliminary investigation,"226 as in this case.
Rule 130
Sec 36
Republic vs Galeno
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay
Evidence Rule; Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, has no probative value unless
the proponent can show that the evidence falls
within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule.—The contents of the certifications are
hearsay because respondent’s sole witness and
attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was
incompetent to testify on the veracity of their
contents, as she did not prepare any of the
certifications nor was she a public officer of the
concerned government agencies. Notably, while
it is true that the public prosecutor who
represented petitioner interposed no objection
to the admission of the foregoing evidence in the
proceedings in the court below, it should be
borne in mind that “hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, has no probative value unless
the proponent can show that the evidence falls
within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule,” which do not, however, obtain in this case.
Verily, while respondent’s documentary evidence
may have been admitted due to the opposing
party’s lack of objection, it does not, however,
mean that they should be accorded any probative
weight.
Espineli vs People
Same; Same; Hearsay Evidence Rule;
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force
depends in whole or in part on the competency
and credibility of some persons other than the
witness by whom it is sought to produce.—
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force
depends in whole or in part on the competency
and credibility of some persons other than the
witness by whom it is sought to produce.
However, while the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person
given for the purpose of establishing the truth of
the fact asserted in the statement is clearly
hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement on the record is merely to
establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor
of such statement, was made. Regardless of the
truth or falsity of a statement, when what is
relevant is the fact that such statement has been
made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the
statement may be shown. As a matter of fact,
evidence as to the making of the statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself
may constitute a fact in issue or is
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
such a fact. This is known as the doctrine of
independently relevant statements.
Same; Same; Independently
Relevant Statements; The testimony of National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent Segunial is in
the nature of an independently relevant
statement where what is relevant is the fact that
Page 21 of 93
Reyes made such statement and the truth and
falsity thereof is immaterial.—The testimony of
NBI Agent Segunial that while he was
investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him
that he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling
Sotero “Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si
Berbon” and that he saw the two (petitioner and
Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an
armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car,
cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is
considering that NBI Agent Segunial’s testimony
was not presented to prove the truth of such
statement but only for the purpose of
establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes
executed a sworn statement containing such
narration of facts. This is clear from the offer of
the witness’ oral testimony. Moreover, NBI Agent
Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is
incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of
Reyes’ statement. Verily then, what the
prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact
that Reyes made such narration of facts in his
sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the
truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent
Segunial is in the nature of an independently
relevant statement where what is relevant is the
fact that Reyes made such statement and the
truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a
case, the statement of the witness is admissible
as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.
The hearsay evidence rule as provided under
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to
personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.—A
witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force
depends in whole or in part on the competency
and credibility of some persons other than the
witness by whom it is sought to produce.
However, while the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person
given for the purpose of establishing the truth of
the fact asserted in the statement is clearly
hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement on the record is merely to
establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor
of such statement, was made. Regardless of the
truth or falsity of a statement, when what is
relevant is the fact that such statement has been
made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the
statement may be shown. As a matter of fact,
evidence as to the making of the statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself
may constitute a fact in issue or is
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
such a fact. ( Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga,
Sr )
Rule 130
Sec. 37 and Sec. 42
People vs Palanas
Remedial Law; Evidence; Dying
Declaration; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Conditions
for a dying declaration to constitute an exception
to the hearsay evidence rule.—For a dying
declaration to constitute an exception to the
hearsay evidence rule, four (4) conditions must
concur: (a) the declaration must concern the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration was made, the declarant is conscious
of his impending death; (c) the declarant was
competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration
is offered in a criminal case for Homicide,
Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the
victim. On the other hand, a statement to be
deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus,
Page 22 of 93
constitute another exception to the rule on
hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of
the following requisites: (a) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Because the
declaration was made in extremity, when the
party is at the point of death and when every
motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful considerations to
speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation
so solemn and awful as creating an obligation
equal to that which is imposed by an oath
administered in court.—In the case at bar, SPO2
Borre’s statements constitute a dying
declaration, given that they pertained to the
cause and circumstances of his death and taking
into consideration the number and severity of his
wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he
uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own
death was already imminent. This declaration is
considered evidence of the highest order and is
entitled to utmost credence since no person
aware of his impending death would make a
careless and false accusation. Verily, because the
declaration was made in extremity, when the
party is at the point of death and when every
motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful considerations to
speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation
so solemn and awful as creating an obligation
equal to that which is imposed by an oath
administered in court.
Same; Same; Res Gestae; The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration,
or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.—In the same vein, SPO2
Borre’s statements may likewise be deemed to
form part of the res gestae. “Res gestae refers to
the circumstances, facts, and declarations that
grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate
its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act,
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact
or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as
a part of the transaction itself, and also whether
it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose
to manufacture testimony.” In this case, SPO2
Borre’s statements refer to a startling
occurrence, i.e., him being shot by Palanas and
his companion. While on his way to the hospital,
SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the
identification of his assailants. Hence, his
utterance was made in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely,
such statement is relevant because it identified
Palanas as one of the authors of the crime.
Therefore, the killing of SPO2 Borre, perpetrated
by Palanas, is adequately proven by the
prosecution.
Ejercito vs Macapagal-Arroyo
Ocampo vs Enriquez
Rule 130
Sec. 44
People vs Laba
Page 23 of 93
 Remedial Law; Evidence; Entries Made in
Official Records; Under Section 44 of Rule 130,
Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records
made in the performance of official duty are
prima facie evidence of the facts they
state.―Neither will the non-presentation in
court of Police Senior Inspector Ebuen, the
forensic chemist who conducted the laboratory
examination on the confiscated substance,
operate to acquit appellant. The matter of
presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is
not for the court to decide. It has the discretion
as to how to present its case and it has the right
to choose whom it wishes to present as
witnesses. Besides, corpus delicti has nothing to
do with the testimony of the chemical analyst,
and the report of an official forensic chemist
regarding a recovered prohibited drug enjoys the
presumption of regularity in its preparation.
Corollarily, under Sec. 44 of Rule 130, Revised
Rules of Court, entries in official records made in
the performance of official duty are prima
facieevidence of the facts they state.
RULE 130
Sec. 47
Ambray vs Tsourous
Testimony at a Former Proceeding;
Hearsay Evidence Rule; The reasons for the
admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial
or proceeding are the necessity for the testimony
and its trustworthiness.—Notably, the
admissibility of Estela’s former testimony in the
present case finds basis in Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence or the “rule on former
testimony” which provides: Section
47. Testimony or deposition at a former
proceeding.— The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to
cross-examine him. Case law holds that for the
said rule to apply, the following requisites must
be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to
testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given
in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or
those representing the same interests; (c) the
former case involved the same subject as that in
the present case, although on different causes of
action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in
the former trial is the same issue involved in the
present case; and (e) the adverse party had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the
former case. The reasons for the admissibility of
testimony taken at a former trial or proceeding
are the necessity for the testimony and its
trustworthiness. However, before the former
testimony can be introduced in evidence, the
proponent must first lay the proper predicate
therefor, i.e., the party must establish the basis
for the admission of testimony in the realm of
admissible evidence.
RULE 130
Sec. 49
Tortona et al vs Gregorio et al
Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; Rule 130,
Section 49 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
specifies that courts may admit the testimonies
of expert witnesses or of individuals possessing
“special knowledge, skill, experience or
training.”—Rule 130, Section 49 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence specifies that courts may
admit the testimonies of expert witnesses or of
individuals possessing “special knowledge, skill,
experience or training”: Section 49. Opinion of
expert witness.—The opinion of a witness on a
Page 24 of 93
matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he is shown to
possess, may be received in evidence.
Testimonies of expert witnesses are not
absolutely binding on courts. However, courts
exercise a wide latitude of discretion in giving
weight to expert testimonies, taking into
consideration the factual circumstances of the
case.
Opinions; An opinion bereft of factual
basis merits no probative value.—Opinions, when
admissible, must have proper factual basis. They
must be supported by facts or circumstances
from which they draw logical inferences. An
opinion bereft of factual basis merits no
probative value. People v. Malejana, 476 SCRA
610 (2006), stated the following regarding expert
opinions: The probative force of the testimony of
an expert does not lie in a mere statement of the
theory or opinion of the expert, but rather in the
aid that he can render to the courts in showing
the facts which serve as a basis for his criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of his
conclusion is founded.
Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; In the case
of an expert witness, he or she must be shown to
possess knowledge, skill, experience, or training
on the subject matter of his or her testimony. On
the other hand, an ordinary witness may give an
opinion on matters which are within his or her
knowledge or with which he or she has sufficient
familiarity.—The witness rendering an opinion
must be credible, in addition to possessing all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
specified in the Revised Rules on Evidence. In the
case of an expert witness, he or she must be
shown to possess knowledge, skill, experience, or
training on the subject matter of his or her
testimony. On the other hand, an ordinary
witness may give an opinion on matters which are
within his or her knowledge or with which he or
she has sufficient familiarity. The testimony, too,
must be credible in itself. In Borguilla v. Court of
Appeals, 147 SCRA 9 (1987), this Court said:
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, it must be
credible in itself — such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.
We have no test of the truth of human testimony,
except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous
and is outside of judicial cognizance.
The credibility of an expert witness does
not inhere in his or her person. Rather, he or she
must be shown to possess knowledge, skill,
experience, or training on the subject matter of
his or her testimony.—The credibility of an expert
witness does not inhere in his or her person.
Rather, he or she must be shown to possess
knowledge, skill, experience, or training on the
subject matter of his or her testimony. In First
Nationwide Assurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
318 SCRA 589 (1999), where the identity of the
vehicle in question was in issue, this Court
considered these factors in assessing the
credibility of the expert witness.
Borguilla vs CA
Evidence; Evaluation of testimony is the
primary task of courts where there are conflicting
versions.—In cases such as the one now before
Us where there are directly conflicting versions of
the incident object of the accusation, the Court in
its search for the truth perforce has to look for
some facts or circumstances which can be used
as valuable aids in evaluating the probability or
improbability of a testimony.
Criteria for believing evidence.—
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, it must be
credible in itself—such as the common
Page 25 of 93
experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.
We have no test of the truth of human testimony,
except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous
and is outside of judicial cognizance.
Motive as a means of ascertaining the
truth necessary where identity of accused in
question or doubtfuL—Although it is the general
rule that the presence of motive is the killing of a
person is not indispensable to a conviction
especially where the identity of the assailant is
duly established by other competent evidence or
is not disputed, nonetheless the absence of such
motive is important in ascertaining the truth as
between two (2) antagonistic theories or versions
of the killing.
In case of rape, no need for presenting
medico legal certification, because the testimony
of the sole witness - the victim herself - is enough
to convict the accused in rape cases. Unless, it is
a gang rape, (People vs Jamie Jose - Maggie De la
Riva Case)
RULE 133
Sec. 4
People vs Magbitang
Circumstantial Evidence; Circumstantial
evidence is not necessarily weaker in persuasive
quality than direct evidence.—In this connection,
it is worth reminding that circumstantial evidence
is not necessarily weaker in persuasive quality
than direct evidence. As the Court said in People
v. Villaflores, 669 SCRA 365 (2012): We have
often conceded the difficulty of proving the
commission of rape when only the victim is left to
testify on the circumstances of its commission.
The difficulty heightens and complicates when
the crime is rape with homicide, because there
may usually be no living witnesses if the rape
victim is herself killed. Yet, the situation is not
always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of
Court also allows circumstantial evidence to
establish the commission of the crime as well as
the identity of the culprit. Direct evidence proves
a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or
inferences being drawn on the part of the fact
finder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence
indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the
factfinder must draw an inference or reason from
circumstantial evidence. To be clear, then,
circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when
to insist on direct testimony would ultimately
lead to setting a felon free. The Rules of
Court makes no distinction between direct
evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances
from which the existence of a fact may be
inferred; hence, no greater degree of certainty is
required when the evidence is circumstantial
than when it is direct. In either case, the trier of
fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused. Nor has the
quantity of circumstances sufficient to convict an
accused been fixed as to be reduced into some
definite standard to be followed in every
instance. Thus, the Court said in People v.
Modesto: The standard postulated by this Court
in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence is
well set out in the following passage
from People v. Ludday: “No general rule can be
laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial
evidence which in any case will suffice. All the
circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.”
People vs Oandasan
Page 26 of 93
 Same; Aggravating Circumstances;
Treachery; The fact that the shooting of the three
(3) victims had occurred in quick succession fully
called for a finding of the attendance of treachery
in the attacks against all the victims.—Although
the CA and the RTC correctly concluded that the
accused had been directly responsible for the
shooting of Tamanu and Paleg, we are perplexed
why both lower courts only characterized the
killing of Tamanu and the near-killing of Paleg as
homicide and frustrated homicide while
characterizing the killing of Montegrico as
murder because of the attendance of treachery.
The distinctions were unwarranted. The fact that
the shooting of the three victims had occurred in
quick succession fully called for a finding of the
attendance of treachery in the attacks
against all the victims. Montegrico, Tamanu and
Paleg were drinking together outside their
bunkhouse prior to the shooting when the
accused suddenly appeared from the rear of the
dump truck, walked towards their table and shot
Montegrico without any warning. That first shot
was quickly followed by more shots. In that
situation, none of the three victims was aware of
the imminent deadly assault by the accused, for
they were just enjoying their drinks outside their
bunkhouse. They were unarmed, and did not
expect to be shot, when the accused came and
shot them.
The attack was mounted with treachery
because the two (2) conditions in order for this
circumstance to be appreciated concurred,
namely: (a) that the means, methods and forms
of execution employed gave the person attacked
no opportunity to defend themselves or to
retaliate; and (b) that such means, methods and
forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without
danger to his person.—The attack was mounted
with treachery because the two conditions in
order for this circumstance to be appreciated
concurred, namely: (a) that the means, methods
and forms of execution employed gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or to retaliate; and (b) that such
means, methods and forms of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the
accused without danger to his person. The
essence of treachery lay in the attack that came
without warning, and was swift, deliberate and
unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victims no chance to resist, or
retaliate, or escape, thereby ensuring the
accomplishment of the deadly design without risk
to the aggressor, and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victims.
Treachery as an aggravating or attendant
circumstance must be established beyond
reasonable doubt.—Treachery as an aggravating
or attendant circumstance must be established
beyond reasonable doubt. This quantum is hardly
achieved if there is no testimony showing how
the accused actually commenced the assault
against the victim. But to absolutely require such
testimony in all cases would cause some murders
committed without eyewitnesses to go
unpunished by the law. To avoid that most
undesirable situation, the Rules of Court permits
a resort not only to direct evidence but also to
circumstantial evidence. Indeed, the proof
competent to achieve the quantum is not
confined to direct evidence from an eyewitness,
who may be unavailable. Circumstantial evidence
can just as efficiently and competently achieve
the quantum. The Rules of Court nowhere
expresses a preference for direct evidence of a
fact to evidence of circumstances from which the
existence of a fact may be properly inferred.
The Rules of Court has not also required a greater
degree of certainty when the evidence is
circumstantial than when it is direct, for, in either
case, the trier of fact must still be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
Page 27 of 93
accused.The quantity of circumstances sufficient
to convict an accused has not been fixed as to be
reduced into some definite standard to be
followed in every instance.
Candelaria vs People
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial
Evidence; Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.—Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an
accused only if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person; the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at the
same time, inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary thereto,
a conviction based on circumstantial evidence
must exclude each and every hypothesis
consistent with innocence.
Flight; While it is true that flight per se is
not synonymous with guilt,unexplained flight
nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the existence
of a guilty conscience,especially when taken
together with all the other circumstantial
evidence attendant in this case.—Threading
these circumstances together, the Court
perceives a congruent picture that the crime of
Qualified Theft had been committed and that
Candelaria had perpetrated the same. To be sure,
this determination is not sullied by the fact that
Candelaria’s companion, Romano, had died
before he could testify as to the truth of his
allegation that the former had threatened him
with a balisong on August 23, 2006. It is a gaping
hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was
admittedly placed under Candelaria’s custody
and remains unaccounted for. Candelaria did not
proffer any persuasive reason to explain the loss
of said goods and merely banked on a general
denial, which, as case law holds, is an inherently
weak defense due to the ease by which it can be
concocted. With these, and, moreover, the tell-
tale fact that Candelaria has not returned or
reported back to work at Unioil since the
incident, the Court draws no other reasonable
inference other than that which points to his
guilt. Verily, while it is true that flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt, unexplained flight
nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the existence
of a guilty conscience, especially when taken
together with all the other circumstantial
evidence attendant in this case. Thus, all things
considered, Candelaria’s conviction for the crime
of Qualified Theft stands.
Atienza vs People
Circumstantial Evidence; The test to
determine whether or not the circumstantial
evidence on record is sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of circumstances duly
proven must be consistent with each other and
that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the accused’s guilt and
inconsistent with his innocence.—Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the main fact in issue
may be inferred based on reason and common
experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
Page 28 of 93
facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential
that the circumstantial evidence presented must
constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to
a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the
guilty person. Stated differently, the test to
determine whether or not the circumstantial
evidence on record is sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of circumstances duly
proven must be consistent with each other and
that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the accused’s guilt and
inconsistent with his innocence.
People vs Lamsen
Circumstantial Evidence; Elements of;
Words and Phrases; Circumstantial evidence is
defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a
fact in issue through an inference which the fact-
finder draws from the evidence established.—
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that
evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue
through an inference which the fact-finder draws
from the evidence established. It is sufficient for
conviction if: [a] there is more than one (1)
circumstance; [b] the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken
chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The
test to determine whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to
convict the accused is that the series of
circumstances duly proved must be consistent
with each other and that each and every
circumstance must be consistent with the
accused’s guilt and inconsistent with the
accused’s innocence.
RULE 133
Sec. 5
Ang Tibay vs CIR
TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.—The Court of Industrial
Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No.
103 requires it to act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem
just and equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations
may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it
can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character.
There are cardinal primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
1. The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U.
S., 304 U. S. 1, -58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed.
1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall
Page 29 of 93
be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play."
2. Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in
Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80
Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court
in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to
adduce evidence, without the corresponding
duty on the part of the board to consider it, is
vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the
person or persons to whom the evidence is
presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration."
3. "While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This
principle emanates from the more fundamental
principle that the genius of constitutional
government is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant
and a limitation upon power.
4. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion (City of
Manila vs.Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated
November 29, 1937, XXXVI 0. G. 1335), but the
evidence must be "substantial." (Washington,
Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648,
650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) "Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian
Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board,
4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations
Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13,
15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.)
* * * The statute provides that 'the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity
shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of
this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of
technical rules so that the mere admission of
matter which would be deemed incompetent in
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct.
563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227
U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed.
431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry.
Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law.
ed. 1016; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United
States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74
Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go
so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroboratborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated
Edison Co. v.National Labor Relations Board, 59 S.
Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
5. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence pre-sented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S.
Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed
to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty
actively to see that the law is enforced, and for
Page 30 of 93
that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing
itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed
for the purpose of investigating and determining
the facts in any given case, but their report and
decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of
Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or
agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of
inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace
or any public official in any part of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation,
and may delegate to such board or public official
such powers and functions as the said Court of
Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but
such delegation shall not affect the exercise of
the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section
10, ibid.)
6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of
its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may
be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally impossible for the titular heads of the
Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide
all controversies coming before them. In the
United States the difficulty is solved with the
enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final
decision, with right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such
statutory authority.
7. The Court of Industrial Relations should,
in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
Cudia vs Superintendent of PMA
SC:We have been consistent in
reminding that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings
and hearings similar to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice; that
the proceedings may be summary; that cross-
examination is not an essential part of the
investigation or hearing;and that the required
proof in a student disciplinary action, which is an
administrative case, is neither proof beyond
reasonable doubt nor preponderance of
evidence but only substantial evidence or “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Maersk-Filipinas vs A Vestruz
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals;
Petition for Review on Certiorari; Considering
that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter (LA)
and the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), on the one hand, and the Court of
Appeals (CA), on the other hand, are
contradictory, the general rule that only legal
issues may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
does not apply, and the Supreme Court (SC)
retains the authority to pass upon the evidence
presented and draw conclusions therefrom.—
Generally, a reexamination of factual findings
cannot be done by the Court acting on a petition
for review on certiorari because the Court is not
a trier of facts but reviews only questions of law.
Thus, in petitions for review on certiorari, only
questions of law may generally be put into issue.
This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions.
In this case, considering that the factual findings
of the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and the
Page 31 of 93
CA, on the other hand, are contradictory, the
general rule that only legal issues may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45
of the Rules of Court does not apply, and the
Court retains the authority to pass upon the
evidence presented and draw conclusions
therefrom.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment;
Burden of Proof; It is well-settled that the burden
of proving that the termination of an employee
was for a just or authorized cause lies with the
employer.—It is well-settled that the burden of
proving that the termination of an employee was
for a just or authorized cause lies with the
employer. If the employer fails to meet this
burden, the conclusion would be that the
dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. In
order to discharge this burden, the employer
must present substantial evidence, which is
defined as that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion, and not based
on mere surmises or conjectures.
Ayungo vs BEAMKO Corp
Labor Law; Evidence; Substantial
Evidence; In labor disputes, grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) when, inter alia, its
findings and the conclusions reached thereby are
not supported by substantial evidence.—In labor
disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings
and the conclusions reached thereby are not
supported by substantial evidence. This
requirement is clearly expressed in Section 5,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides
that “[i]n cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.”
INC ShipMgt vs Morales
Substantial Evidence; In labor cases, as in
other administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to
support a conclusion is required.—In labor cases,
as in other administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient
to support a conclusion is required. To note,
considering that substantial evidence is an
evidentiary threshold, the Court, on exceptional
cases, may assess the factual determinations
made by the NLRC in a particular case. In Career
Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna, 686
SCRA 676 (2012), the Court expressed the
following view: Accordingly, we do not reexamine
conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the
NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise
in its specialized field. Nor do we substitute our
“own judgment for that of the tribunal in
determining where the weight of evidence lies or
what evidence is credible.” The factual findings of
the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally
conclusive on this Court. Nevertheless, there are
exceptional cases where we, in the exercise of
our discretionary appellate jurisdiction may be
urged to look into factual issues raised in a Rule
45 petition. For instance, when the
petitioner persuasively alleges that there is
insufficient or insubstantial evidence on
record to support the factual findings of the
tribunal or court a quo, as Section 5, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court states in express terms that in
cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established only if
supported by substantial evidence. (Emphases
supplied; citations omitted) The evident conflict
Page 32 of 93
between the NLRC’s and CA’s factual findings
as shown in the records of this case prompts the
Court to sift through their respective factual
determinations if only to determine if the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in reaching
its disposition, keeping in mind that the latter’s
assessment should only meet the threshold of
substantial evidence.
RULE 131
Section 1
(Poe-Llamanzares vs Comelec 2016) Poe is
considered as a Filipino citizen
The Court made two important rulings on
this particular point. First, that Mr. Fornier, the
petitioner in the COMELEC case to deny Mr. Poe’s
CoC, had the burden to prove that Mr. Poe
committed material misrepresentation. Second,
even assuming that the petitioner therein was
able to make out a prima facie case of material
misrepresentation, the evidence on Mister Poe’s
side preponderated in favor of the conclusion
that he did not make any material
misrepresentation. Thus, the COMELEC was
correct in saying that there was no basis to grant
Fornier’s Section 78 petition. Mr. Poe, We said,
did not have to conclusively establish his natural-
born citizenship; preponderance of evidence was
sufficient to prove his right to be a candidate for
President.
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence defines burden of proof as “the duty
of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim” “by the
amount of evidence required by law.” When it
comes to a Section 78 proceeding, it is the
petitioner who has the burden of establishing
material misrepresentation in a CoC.79
Since the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial
body, the petitioner must establish his case of
material misrepresentation by substantial
evidence.80
Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Burden of proof never shifts.81 It is the burden of
evidence that shifts.82 Hence, in a Section 78
proceeding, if the petitioner comes up with
a prima facie case of material misrepresentation,
the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.
In this case, respondents had the burden to
establish the following: (1) falsity of the
representations made by petitioner with regard
to her citizenship and residence; and (2) intent to
deceive or mislead the electorate.
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a
party to prove the truth of his claim or defense,
or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence
required by law. The private respondents had not
presented even an iota of proof to show that Sen.
Poe was not born to Filipino parents. Thus, it was
grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to
conclude that Sen. Poe was not a natural-born
Filipino and had deliberately misrepresented
such fact.
To shift the burden of proof to foundlings
like, Sen. Poe, to prove the citizenship of their
parents who had abandoned them is as
preposterous as rubbing salt on an open bleeding
wound; it adds insult to injury. The State cannot
allow such unconscionable interpretation of our
laws. Instead, the judiciary, as the instrumentality
of the State in its role of parens patriae, must
ensure that the abandoned children, the
foundlings, those who were forced into an
unfavorable position are duly protected.
Ligon vs RTC Br 56 Makati
RULE 131
Sec 3
Page 33 of 93
 Encarnacion Construction vs Phoenix
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions;
Case law states that the natural presumption is
that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and
consequences.—In this case, there is no proof
that ECIC was disadvantaged or utterly
inexperienced in dealing with Phoenix. There
were likewise no allegations and proof that its
representative (and owner/proprietor) Ramon
Encarnacion (Encarnacion) was uneducated, or
under duress or force when he signed the
Agreement on its behalf. In fact, Encarnacion is
presumably an astute businessman who signed
the Agreement with full knowledge of its import.
Case law states that the natural presumption is
that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and
consequences. This presumption has not been
debunked.
(Presumption is that you have read and fully
understood the document unless you dispute no
read no write)
presumption of regularity in performance of
service vs presumption of innocence as
constitutional right - constitutional presumption
of innocence will prevail - Applying in sec 21 of RA
9165 chain of custody - as am.- 3 witness rule -
during inventory marked w/ duly elected public
officer of the place rep of DOJ, media rep, = even
little deviation will result in the acquittal of the
accused = case dismissible
RULE 132
People vs Dionaldo
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses;
Well-settled is the rule that the question of
credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial
court to determine.—Well-settled is the rule that
the question of credibility of witnesses is
primarily for the trial court to determine. Its
assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight, and it is conclusive and
binding unless shown to be tainted with
arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence has
not been considered. Absent any showing that
the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight which would affect the result of the case,
or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment
of the credibility of witnesses deserves high
respect by the appellate court.
People vs Hallarte
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals;
Time and again, the Supreme Court has held that
factual findings of the trial court, especially on
the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great
weight and respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal.—Time and again, the Court has held that
factual findings of the trial court, especially on
the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great
weight and respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions
such as where there exists a fact or circumstance
of weight and influence which has been ignored
or misconstrued, or where the trial court has
acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts.
Fianza vs People
Remedial Law; Evidence; Credibility of
Witnesses; In almost all cases of sexual abuse, the
credibility of the victim’s testimony is crucial in
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where
only the persons involved can testify as to its
occurrence.—It is not hard to imagine 11-year-
old AAA being intimidated and cowed into silence
and submission by her neighbor, a full grown
Page 34 of 93
adult male old enough to be her parent, with
threat of humiliation, should she not give in to his
dastardly desires. She is still a child not capable of
fully understanding or knowing the import of her
actions. Verily, in almost all cases of sexual abuse,
the credibility of the victim’s testimony is crucial
in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where
only the persons involved can testify as to its
occurrence. Hence, the Court accords a high
degree of respect to the assessment of the trial
court which is in the best position to observe the
declarations and demeanor of the witnesses, and
evaluate their credibility, even more so when the
same is affirmed by the CA, as in this case.
If there is slight variation in the testimonies of the
witness, will it affect his credibility? NO. If there
is slight variation, it could still be corrected to re-
direct or clarificatory questions.
People vs Nelmida
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure;
Appeals; When the issues revolve on matters of
credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings, are accorded high
respect, if not conclusive effect.—Time and
again, this Court held that when the issues
revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the
findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of
the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions anchored on said findings,
are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
effect. This is so because the trial court has the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and is in the best position to discern
whether they are telling the truth. Moreover,
credibility, to state what is axiomatic, is the sole
province of the trial court. In the absence of any
clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that would have affected
the result of the case, the trial court's findings on
the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be
disturbed on appeal.
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Slight
variations in the testimony of a witness as to
minor details or collateral matters do not affect
his or her credibility as these variations are in fact
indicative of truth and show that the witness was
not coached to fabricate or dissemble.—It is
axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony
of a witness as to minor details or collateral
matters do not affect his or her credibility as
these variations are in fact indicative of truth and
show that the witness was not coached to
fabricate or dissemble. An inconsistency, which
has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is
not a ground to reverse a conviction.
People vs. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174, June 22,
1992
Facts: Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were
suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila.
A surveillance team was dispatched to the
place. As narrated by Patrolmen Mercado and
Juan in trial, they saw two men looking from side
to side, and one holding his abdomen, they
approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two
tried to run away but were unable to escape
because the other lawmen had surrounded
them.
The suspects were then searched. One of
them, the accused-appellant, was found with a
Page 35 of 93
.38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six
live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later
identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife
secreted in his front right pants pocket. The
weapons were taken from them.
An information was filed against
accused-appellant for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 for having in his possession a
firearm without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the
proper authorities.
Danganan was also presented as a
witness for the prosecution. He identified the
subject weapon as among the articles stolen from
him during the robbery in his. He pointed
Mengote as one of the robbers. Mengote claims
that the weapon was “planted” on him at the
time of his arrest.
The gun, together with the live bullets
and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and
C and admitted over the objection of the defense.
As previously stated, the weapon was the
principal evidence that led to Mengote's
conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief
that the revolver should not have been admitted
in evidence because of its illegal seizure as no
warrant therefor having been previously
obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an
incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of
Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also
effected without a warrant. The defense also
contends that the testimony regarding the
alleged robbery in Danganan's house was
irrelevant and should also have been disregarded
by the trial court.
The Solicitor General maintains that the arrest
and search of Mengote and the seizure of the
revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113,
Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as
follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant
when lawful. — A peace officer
or private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; xxx
Issue: Whether or not the arrest, search and
seizure was lawful.
Ruling: Par. (a) requires that the person be
arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to
commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the
arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in
the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused-appellant was merely
"looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen,” according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense
that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted
by Mengote in their presence.
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the
setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It
might have been different if Mengote bad been
Page 36 of 93
apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place
where he had no reason to be, like a darkened
alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was
arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a
crowded street shortly after alighting from a
passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not
skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear
light of day. There was nothing clandestine about
his being on that street at that busy hour in the
blaze of the noonday sun.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less
stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at
the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in
fact just been committed and that the arresting
officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that Mengote had committed it. All
they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet
to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what
offense, if at all, had been committed and neither
were they aware of the participation therein of
the accused-appellant. It was only later, after
Danganan had appeared at the Police
headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in
his house and of Mengote's supposed
involvement therein.
As for the illegal possession of the firearm found
on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered
this only after he had been searched and the
investigation conducted later revealed that he
was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess
it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no
knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone
the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully
carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the
robbery of Danganan's house.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised
by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here
make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration.
Without the evidence of the firearm taken from
him at the time of his illegal arrest, the
prosecution has lost its most important exhibit
and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence
against Mengote (which is based on the said
firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered
released immediately unless he is validly
detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts of the case:
On October 22, 1975,
complainant Atty. Tito Pintor
and his client Manuel Montebon
in complainant's residence
discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for
direct assault which they filed
with the Office of the City Fiscal
of Cebu against Leonardo
Laconico. After they had decided
on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone
call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico
telephoned appellant, who is a
Page 37 of 93
 lawyer, to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of
the direct assault case. Appellant
went to the office of Laconico
where he was briefed about the
problem.
When complainant called up,
Laconico requested appellant to
secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a 3. that the extension telephone which was
telephone extension so as to
hear personally the proposed
conditions for the settlement.
Twenty minutes later,
complainant called up again to
ask Laconico if he was agreeable
to the conditions. Laconico
answered 'Yes'. Complainant
then told Laconico to wait for
instructions on where to deliver
the money.
Appellant executed on the
following day an affidavit stating
that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct
assault. Since appellant listened
to the telephone conversation
without complainant's consent,
complainant charged appellant
and Laconico with violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
RTC: found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of
violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The
two were each sentenced to one (1) year
imprisonment with costs.
CA: On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, holding that the communication between
the complainant and accused Laconico was
1. private in nature and, therefore, covered
by Rep. Act No. 4200;
2. that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge
and consent of the complainant; and
used by the petitioner to overhear the
telephone conversation between
complainant and Laconico is covered in
the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act
No. 4200.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
(a) whether or not the telephone
conversation between the complainant and
accused Laconico was private in nature;
(b) whether or not an extension
telephone is covered by the term "device or
arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200;
(c) whether or not the petitioner had
authority to listen or overhear said telephone
conversation and
(d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is
ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed
in favor of the petitioner.
HELD:
We rule for the petitioner.
1. There is no question that the telephone
conversation between complainant Atty.
Page 38 of 93
 Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was
"private" in the sense that the words
uttered were made between one person
and another as distinguished from words
between a speaker and a public. It is also
undisputed that only one of the parties
gave the petitioner the authority to listen
to and overhear the caller's message
with the use of an extension telephone
line.
2. The main issue in the resolution of this
petition, however, revolves around the
meaning of the phrase "any other device
or arrangement." The law refers to a
"tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a
"device or arrangement" for the purpose
of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There
must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap or
the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.
Hence, the phrase
"device or arrangement" in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200,
although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be
construed to comprehend
instruments of the same or
similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which
would be tantamount to tapping
the main line of a telephone.
3. Whether or not listening over a
telephone party line would be
punishable was discussed on the floor of
the Senate. Yet, when the bill was
finalized into a statute, no mention was
made of telephones in the enumeration
of devices "commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone
or walkie talkie or tape recorder or
however otherwise described." The
omission was not a mere oversight.
Telephone party lines were intentionally
deleted from the provisions of the Act.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal
statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at
bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is
included in the phrase "device or arrangement",
the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension telephone
We are of the view that an extension telephone
is not among such devices or arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200,
otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR
ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as
Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to compel respondent
Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of
Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027 pursuant to police power
delegated to local government units, to promote
Page 39 of 93
the order, safety, health, morals and general
welfare of the society.
Sections 1 and 3 of said ordinance states
that:
SECTION1. For the purpose of
promoting sound urban planning and
ensuring health, public safety, and
general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its
adjoining areas, the land use of [those]
portions of land bounded by the Pasig
River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in
the east, Beata St. in the south,
Palumpong St. in the southwest, and
Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR
Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de
Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River
in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in
the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta.
Ana bounded by the Pasig River,
Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F.
Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified
from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of
industries and other businesses, the
operation of which are no longer
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are
hereby given a period of six (6) months
from the date of effectivity of this
Ordinance within which to cease and
desist from the operation of businesses
which are hereby in consequence,
disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area
described therein from industrial to commercial
and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within
six months from the date of effectivity of the
ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the
area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of
the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department
of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in
which they agreed that "the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil
companies agreed to perform the following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the
objectives stated above, the OIL
COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this
MOU, undertake a program to scale
down the Pandacan Terminals which
shall include, among others, the
immediate removal/decommissioning
process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks
starting with the LPG spheres and the
commencing of works for the creation of
safety buffer and green zones
surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. xxx
Section 2. – Consistent with the
scale-down program mentioned above,
the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint
operations and management, including
the operation of common, integrated
and/or shared facilities, consistent with
international and domestic technical,
safety, environmental and economic
considerations and standards.
Consequently, the joint operations of the
OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan
Terminals shall be limited to the common
Page 40 of 93
 and integrated areas/facilities. A
separate agreement covering the
commercial and operational terms and
conditions of the joint operations, shall
be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3. - The development
and maintenance of the safety and green
buffer zones mentioned therein, which
shall be taken from the properties of the
OIL COMPANIES and not from the
surrounding communities, shall be the
sole responsibility of the OIL
COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other
hand, committed to do the following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall
endorse to the City Council this MOU for
its appropriate action with the view of
implementing the spirit and intent
thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and
the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit
and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL
COMPANIES to continuously operate in
compliance with legal requirements,
within the limited area resulting from the
joint operations and the scale down
program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City
Mayor shall monitor the OIL
COMPANIES’ compliance with the
provisions of this MOU.
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA
and the national government shall
protect the safety buffer and green
zones and shall exert all efforts at
preventing future occupation or
encroachment into these areas by illegal
settlers and other unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in
Resolution.7 In the same resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective
only for a period of six months. Thereafter, the
Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending
the validity of Resolution for another three (3)
months, and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue
special business permits to the oil companies.
Contentions:
Petitioners contend that respondent has the
mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2)
of the Local Government Code (RA 7160),13 to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027
has been superseded by the MOU and the
resolutions.14 However, he also confusingly
argues that the ordinance and MOU are not
inconsistent with each other and that the latter
has not amended the former. He insists that the
ordinance remains valid and in full force and
effect and that the MOU did not in any way
prevent him from enforcing and implementing it.
He maintains that the MOU should be considered
as a mere guideline for its full implementation.
Hence, this original action for mandamus
praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.
ISSUE:
WON respondent has the mandatory
legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
Page 41 of 93
RULING:
YES.
The Local Government Code imposes upon
respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city.” One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In
Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., 202 SCRA 779 (1991), we
stated the reason for this: These officers cannot
refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the
duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in
all cases to question the constitutionality of
statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon
them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government
from the highest to the lowest are creatures of
the law and are bound to obey it.
No reason exists to delay the implementation of
a protective measure designed to protect the
residents of Manila from the catastrophic
devastation that will surely occur in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of
the City of Manila, is directed to immediately
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 160795 - June 27, 2008
CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA
TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and TERESITA
CUASO, respondent.
FACTS
Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the
Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 located at
Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City,
which is managed by petitioner Corinthian
Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). Frank and
Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is
adjacent to the Tanjangcos’ lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house, a
relocation survey was necessary. Before, during
and after the construction of the said house,
Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections
in order to determine compliance with the
approved plans pursuant to their Manual of Rules
and Regulations. Unfortunately, after the Cuasos
constructed their house, their perimeter fence
encroached on the Tanjangcos’ lot.
No amicable settlement was reached between
the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that
the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the
latter failed and refused, prompting the
Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit. Eventually,
the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint against
Corinthian. The Cuasos alleged that had
Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its
duty, they would not have been involved in a
boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the
Tanjangcos. The Cuasos were ordered to pay
Page 42 of 93
monthly rentals. It, however, ruled that the
Cuasos were builders in good faith, and gave the
Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos the
option to buy the encroaching portion of the
land. In the event that the Cuasos were unable
and unwilling to purchase the said portion, the
perimeter wall should be demolished at the
latter’s expense.
The Tanjangcos filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the RTC denied.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, all the parties
appealed to the CA.
In the meantime, the Cuasos prayed for the
issuance of TRO to enjoin the demolition of the
perimeter fence. However, the Supreme Court
denied the Cuasos' application for lack of merit.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision.
It held that the Cuasos acted in bad faith. On the
third-party complaints, Corinthian, the
contractor, and Engr. De Dios were all found
negligent in performing their respective duties.
The Tanjangcos stand by the ruling of the CA. The
Tanjangcos contend that a court can take judicial
notice of the general increase in the rentals of
real estate, as in this case, where the CA
considered the value of their lot in the "posh-and-
swank" Corinthian Gardens Subdivision and the
fact that they were deprived of it for almost two
decades.
Only Corinthian filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. The Cuasos filed a failure to contest the CA decision before
Comment/Manifestation praying that they be
allowed to adopt Corinthian’s Motion for
Reconsideration. However, the CA denied
Corinthian’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence,
Corinthian filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not a TRO to enjoin the
execution of the RTC’s decision must be
granted
2. Whether or not the Corinthian is guilty
for negligence
3. Whether or not rent was due the
Tanjangcos based on judicial notice only
RULING
1. No. The TRO should not be granted. The
denial was based on sound legal
principles. It is axiomatic that to be
entitled to the injunctive writ, one must
show that there exists a right to be
protected which is directly threatened by
the act sought to be enjoined.
Furthermore, there must be a showing
that the invasion of the right is material
and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable,
and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to issue
in order to prevent serious damage.
In the Cuasos’ case, their right to
injunctive relief had not been clearly and
unmistakably demonstrated. They failed
to show proof that there is material and
substantial invasion of their right to
warrant the issuance of an injunctive
writ. It bears stressing that the Cuasos
failed to appeal the ruling of the CA. This
this Court was fatal to their cause. It had
the effect of an admission that they
indeed acted in bad faith, as they
accepted the CA ruling.
Page 43 of 93
2. Corinthian is guilty for negligence. The
test to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in
committing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinary person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
It is clear that Corinthian failed to
exercise the requisite diligence in
insuring that the Cuasos abide by its
Manual of Rules and Regulations,
thereby resulting in the encroachment
on the Tanjangcos’ property. By its
Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is
reasonable to assume that Corinthian, in
the approval of building plans, and in the
conduct of periodic inspections of on-
going construction projects within the
subdivision, is responsible in insuring
compliance with the approved plans,
inclusive of the construction of
perimeter walls, which in this case is the
subject of dispute between the
Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. Corinthian's
imprimatur on the construction of the
Cuasos' perimeter wall over the property
of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos
that everything was in order.
3. No. The reasonable amount of rent may
not be determined by judicial notice but
by supporting evidence, such as (1) the
realty assessment of the land, (2) the
increase in realty taxes, and (3) the
prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity. A
court cannot take judicial notice of
a factual matter in controversy.
The court may take judicial notice of
matters of public knowledge, or which
are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.
Before taking such judicial notice, the
court must “allow the parties to be heard
thereon.” Hence, there can be no judicial
notice on the rental value of the
premises in question without supporting
evidence.
Salcedo-Ortanez v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110662. August 4, 1994
FACTS:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed
before the Quezon City RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages, on the
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity against petitioner
Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez. Among the exhibits
offered by private respondent were three (3)
cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between the petitioner and
unidentified persons. Teresita submitted her
Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of
evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of
private respondent’s offered evidence. Petitioner
filed her motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the RTC, prompting petitioner to file a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
to assail the admission of evidence of the
aforementioned cassette tapes. These tape
recordings were made and obtained when
private respondent allowed his friends from the
military to wiretap his home telephone.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition
because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible
per se. They and any other variant thereof can be
admitted in evidence for certain purposes,
depending on how they are presented and
Page 44 of 93
offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them
in the interest of truth and fairness and the even
handed administration of justice; and (2) A
petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate
to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence
adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is
interlocutory; neither does it impinge on
jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be
questioned in the appeal from the judgment on
the merits and not through the special civil action
of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously
that it exists, cannot be more than an error of
law, properly correctible by appeal and not by
certiorari. Petitioner then filed the present
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the recordings of the
telephone conversations are admissible
in evidence.
2. Whether or not the remedy of certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
properly availed of by the petitioner in
the Court of Appeals.
using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise
described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken
word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained, obtained
or secured by any person in violation of
the preceding sections of this Act shall
not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties
to the telephone conversations allowed
the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

HELD:
2. No. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to
generally not available to challenge an
Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
interlocutory order of a trial court. The
Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
proper remedy in such cases is an
Communication, and for other purposes”
ordinary appeal from an adverse
expressly makes such tape recordings
judgment, incorporating in said appeal
inadmissible in evidence thus:
the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order.
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person,
not being authorized by all the parties to However, where the assailed
any private communication or spoken interlocutory order is patently erroneous
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by and the remedy of appeal would not

Page 45 of 93
 afford adequate and expeditious relief,
the Court may allow certiorari as a mode
of redress.
17. SPOUSES LATIP vs. CHUA 1 of 3 SPOUSES
LATIP vs. CHUA G.R. No. 177809. October 16,
2009. Facts: Rosalie is the owner of Roferxane
Building, a commercial building, located in
Parañaque City. Rosalie filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer plus damages against
petitioners, Spouses Latip. Rosalie attached to
the complaint a contract of lease over two
cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as
lessor, and by Spouses Latip. A year after the
commencement of the lease and with Spouses
Latip already occupying the leased cubicles,
Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a
letter demanding payment of back rentals and
should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased
cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed
Rosalie’s demand, she instituted the aforesaid
complaint. Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie’s claims.
They averred that the lease of the two (2)
cubicles had already been paid in full as
evidenced by the three receipts in Rosalie’s
handwriting, showing payment to of the total
amount of P2,570,000.00. They asseverated that
sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for
sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in
Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of
goods during the Christmas season, they readily
accepted Rosalie’s offer to purchase lease rights
in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under
construction at the time. According to Spouses
Latip, the immediate payment of ₱2,570,000.00
would be used to finish construction of the
building giving them first priority in the
occupation of the finished cubicles. Spouses Latip
averred that the contract of lease they signed had
been novated by their purchase of lease rights of
the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to
receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel
and the subsequent filing of a complaint against
them. MeTC: ruled in favor of Rosalie. RTC:
reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses
Latip. The trial court did not give credence to the
contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized
and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete.
CA: reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision
of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of
lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand
and not notarized, remained a complete and valid
contract.On the issue of whether the amount of
P2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of
goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this
common practice in the area of 17. SPOUSES
LATIP vs. CHUA 2 of 3 Baclaran, especially around
the Redemptorist Church. According to the
appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered
by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders
at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill
money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls
thereat. Issue: Whether or not the judicial notice
was proper Ruling: No. The doctrine of judicial
notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution; care must be
taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative. Generally
speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be
well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful
or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The principal guide in determining what facts
may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial
notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety. To say that
a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely
another way of saying that the usual form of
Page 46 of 93
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of
the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is
because the court assumes that the matter is so
notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial
notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the
judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a
fact, not generally or professionally known, the
basis of his action. Moreover, a judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to a reasonable
dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court;
or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts
take judicial notice, may be matters coming to
the knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which
are universally known, and which may be found
in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided,
they are such of universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded
as forming part of the common knowledge of
every person. As the common knowledge of man
ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular
facts have been judicially noticed as 17. SPOUSES
LATIP vs. CHUA 3 of 3 being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on
the existence or non-existence of a fact of which
the court has no constructive knowledge. The
Court note that the RTC specifically ruled that
Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced
no evidence to prove her claim that the said
amount simply constituted the payment of
goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached
an annex to her petition for review before the CA,
containing a joint declaration under oath by other
stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid
goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this
score, the Court emphasize that the reason why
the rules on evidence provide for matters that
need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically
on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking
of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter
so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by
the parties. However, in this case, the requisite of
notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching
documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of
the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the
CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be
proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court— What need not
be proved.
People v. Aminnudin
163 SCRA 402, July 6, 1988
Facts:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June
25,1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 in Iloilo City. The PC officers who
were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters
for investigation. The two bundles of suspect
articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination.
When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act was filed against him. Later, the information
was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who
had also been arrested with him that same
evening and likewise investigated. Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently,
the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge
against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of
the arresting officers absolving her after a
Page 47 of 93
"thorough investigation." The motion was but carried only two watches at the time,
granted, and trial proceeded only against the traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending
accused-appellant, who was eventually P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other
convicted. According to the prosecution, the PC expenses. The trial court also rejected his
officers had earlier received a tip from one of allegations of maltreatment, observing that he
their informers that the accused appellant was on had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained
board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was by him.
carrying marijuana. He was identified by name.
Issue: Whether or not the marijuana found in the
Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the
bag of the accused admissible in evidence?
evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as
he descended from the gangplank after the Held:
informer had pointed to him. They detained him
No. The present case presented no such
and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was
urgency. The police agents had enough time to
found to contain three kilos of what were later
secure a warrant to arrest and search the accused
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic
but did not do so. In addition to this, the arrest
examiner, who testified that she condueted
did not fall into any of the exceptions of a valid
microscopic, cheihical and chromatographic tests
warrantless arrest because the accused-
on them. On the basis of this finding, the
appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,c
corresponding charge was then filed against
ommitting a crime nor was it shown that he was
Aminnudin.
about to do so or that he had just done so. The
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the constitutional presumption is that the accused is
marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was presumed innocent even if his defense is weak as
his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and long as the prosecution is not strong enough to
two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was convict him.
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
Without the evidence of the marijuana
His bag was confiscated without a search
allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be
manhandled to force him to admit he was
admitted, and should never have been
carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting
considered by the trial court for the simple fact is
him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms
that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the
even as he parried the blows while he was still
fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes'
handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know
felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident
what marijuana looked like and that his business
of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant
was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.
of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come
He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged
under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of
to have been carrying was not properly identified
Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also
and could have been any of several bundles kept
illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
in the stock room of the PC headquarters.
inadmissible.
The trial court was unconvinced, noting
from its own examination of the accused that he
claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches

Page 48 of 93
 People vs. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 182348. November 20, 2008.
VELASCO, JR., J.
Facts:
The facts, according to the prosecution, showed
that in the morning of October 20, 2002, an
informant tipped off the Drug Enforcement Unit
of the Marikina Police Station that wanted drug
pusher Wifredo Loilo alias “Boy Bicol” was at his
nipa hut hideout in San Mateo, Rizal. A team was
organized to arrest Boy Bicol. Once there, they
saw Boy Bicol by a table talking with accused-
appellant. They shouted “Boy Bicol sumuko ka na
may warrant of arrest ka. (Surrender yourself Boy
Bicol you have a warrant of arrest.)” Upon
hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them in a
shootout and was fatally shot. Accused-appellant
was seen holding a shotgun through a window.
He dropped his shotgun when a police officer
pointed his firearm at him. The team entered the
nipa hut and apprehended accused-appellant.
They saw a plastic bag of suspected shabu, a
digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia,
ammunition, and magazines lying on the table.
PO1 Calanoga, Jr. put the markings “CVDC,” the
initials of accused-appellant, on the bag
containing the seized drug. Accused-appellant
was subsequently arrested. The substance seized
from the hideout was sent to the Philippine
National Police crime laboratory for examination
and tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. He was thus separately
indicted for violation of RA 9165 and for illegal
possession of firearm.
The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition but
convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs.
The CA sustained accused-appellant’s conviction.
It pointed out that accused-appellant was
positively identified by prosecution witnesses,
rendering his uncorroborated denial and
allegation of frame-up weak. As to accused-
appellant’s alleged illegal arrest, the CA held that
he is deemed to have waived his objection when
he entered his plea, applied for bail, and actively
participated in the trial without questioning such
arrest.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.
Ruling:
No. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
was effected under Sec. 5(a), arrest of a suspect
in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless
arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
Since accused-appellant was not in possession of
the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol’s nipa hut, his
subsequent arrest was also invalid. His arrest,
independent of the buy-bust operation targeting
Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he was not
proved to be committing any offense.
Moreover, there can be no constructive
possession in this case. There is no question that
accused-appellant was not the owner of the nipa
hut that was subject of the buy-bust operation.
He did not have dominion or control over the
nipa hut. Neither was accused-appellant a tenant
or occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not disputed
by the prosecution. The target of the operation
was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely a
guest of Boy Bicol.
Page 49 of 93
 JESUS CUENCO vs. TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS
COMPLEX, INCORPORATED AND MATIAS B.
AZNAR III
G.R. No. 174154, October 17, 2008
J. NACHURA
Facts:
This case is s a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner leased from respondents
for a period of two (2) years, the Talisay Tourist
Sports Complex, to be operated as a cockpit. The
lease was extended for another four (4) years.
Upon expiration of the contract,
respondent company conducted a public bidding
for the lease of the property. Petitioner
participated in the bidding. The lease was
eventually awarded to another bidder, Mr. Rex
Cuaqui Salud. Thereafter, petitioner wrote four
(4) demand letters to respondents.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for sum
of money, damages and attorney’s fees. The RTC
issued a Pre-trial Order. The RTC issued an Order
admitting the exhibits of petitioner, consisting of
the contract of lease and the four (4) demand
letters. The same court formally admitting the
respondents’ following exhibits: the lease
contract, inventory of the leased property,
inventory of the sports complex, ocular
inspection report and various receipts mostly in
the name of Southwestern University incurred in
different months of 1998. The RTC rendered a
Decision in favor of petitioner. The CA rendered
a Decision reversing and setting aside the
decision of the RTC. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a judicial admission
is conclusive and binding upon a party making the
admission.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled in the
affirmative. Petitioner questions the CA’s finding
that there was damage caused the premises
while the lease was still in force. Such finding
could only have been based on alleged inventory
of the property conducted by the respondents.
Petitioner takes exception to this evidence
because of the earlier judicial admission made by
respondents’ counsel that no inventory was
conducted and, accordingly, any evidence
adduced by the respondents contrary to or
inconsistent with the judicial admission should be
rejected.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. – An
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by a showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
A party may make judicial
admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the
trial, by verbal or written manifestations or
stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial
proceeding.30 The stipulation of facts at the pre-
trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The
veracity of judicial admissions require no further
proof and may be controverted only upon a clear
showing that the admissions were made through
palpable mistake or that no admissions were
made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the
pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are
binding and conclusive upon them.
Respondents did not deny the
admission made by their counsel, neither did
they claim that the same was made through
palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts
is incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the
Page 50 of 93
courts. The pre-trial forms part of the
proceedings and matters dealt therein may not
be brushed aside in the process of decision-
making. Otherwise, the real essence of
compulsory pre-trial would be rendered
inconsequential and worthless.31 Furthermore,
an act performed by counsel within the scope of
a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an
act of the client which renders respondents in
estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission
or representation is conclusive upon the person
making it and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.32
Thus, respondents are bound by the
admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial.
The petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
RTC is hereby REINSTATED with modifications.
PEOPLE vs LAGUIO, JR.
G.R. No. 128587
March 16, 2007
Garcia, J.:
FACTS:
On May 16, 1996, police operatives of
the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime
of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) headed by Captain Margallo
arrested Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a
certain Arellano for unlawful possession of
metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
During the investigation of the three, they
identified the source of the drug to be Redentor
Teck alias Frank and Joseph Junio. An entrapment
was planned and the three were made to call
their source and pretend to order another supply
of shabu. Frank and Junio was arrested while they
were about to hand over another bag of shabu.
The two did not disclose their source of shabu but
admitted that they were working as talent
manager and gymnast instructor under Glamour
Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang.
They also disclosed the next scheduled delivery of
shabu and that their employer Wang could be
found at the Maria Orosa Apartment.
The police officers then proceeded to
Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same
under surveillance. During such, Wang came out
of the apartment and walked towards a parked
BMW car but nearing the car, he was approached
by the team of Captain Margallo. They introduced
themselves to Wang as police officers, asked his
name and upon hearing that he was Lawrence
Wang, they immediately frisked him and asked
him to open the back compartment of the car.
They found an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm
automatic Back-up pistol loaded with
ammunitions inside Wang’s front pocket. Upon
the search in the car, they found 32 transparent
bags containing white substance likely to be
shabu and an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm pistol
with magazine. Then and there, Wang was
arrested and the latter resisted said warrantless
arrest and search.
Three Information were filed against
Lawrence Wang concerning Violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Violation of Comelec Gun Ban. On
December 6, 1996, the prosecution rested its
case only in so far as the charge for the Violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon motion,
accused Wang was granted 25 days from said
date within which to file his intended Demurrer
to Evidence. Hence, on January 9, 1997, Wang
filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence praying
for his acquittal for lack of a valid arrest and
search warrants and the inadmissibility of the
Page 51 of 93
prosecution’s evidence against him. Considering
that the prosecution has not yet filed its
Opposition to the demurrer, Wang filed an
Amplification to his Demurrer of Evidence. Then,
the prosecution filed its Opposition alleging that
the warrantless search was legal as an incident to
the lawful arrest.
Herein respondent judge Hon. Perfecto
Laguio, Jr. granted Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence
acquitting him of all the charges for lack of
evidence. On pure questions of law, petitioner
People of the Philippines has directly come to the
Supreme Court via an Appeal by Certiorari under
Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2(c) of the
Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the
Resolution granting said Demurrer to Evidence
and acquitting accused Wang. A resolution was
issued by the Court requiring the respondents to
comment thereon within 10 days from notice.
Thereafter, the People was required to file a
Reply. The Court resolved to give due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the prosecution may
appeal the trial court’s resolution
granting Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence
and acquitting him of all charges without
violation of the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy.
2. Whether or not there was a lawful arrest,
search and seizure by the police
operatives despite the absence of a
warrant of arrest and/or a search
warrant.
RULING:
1. The dismissal order consequent to a
Demurrer to Evidence is not subject
to appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
raising a pure question of law. Said
judgment of acquittal may only be
assailed in a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
under reasonable conditions which
would thereby not result to double
jeopardy.
Any appeal from a judgment of acquittal
necessarily puts the accused in double
jeopardy. In effect, Section 2 of Rule 122 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure disallows appeal by
the People from judgments of acquittal. An order
granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a
resolution of the case on the merits, and it
amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further
prosecution of the accused after an acquittal
would violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy.
To this general rule, however, the Court
has previously made some exceptions as
presented in the case Galman vs Sandiganbayan
and People vs Uy, there is no double jeopardy
when the prosecution is denied due process of
law, or when the trial court commits grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the case by granting
the accused’s Demurrer to Evidence.
A judgment of acquittal in a criminal case
may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear
showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
Page 52 of 93
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment
void. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of
the Philippines filed with the Court in the present
case is an appeal by way of an appeal by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a
pure question of law, which is different from a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For filing the
wrong remedy, the herein petition is outrightly
dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the
assailed dismissal order of the trial court by
appeal without violating the private respondent’s
right against double jeopardy. The instant
petition will nevertheless fail on the merits as to
the second issue.
2. There was no basis in favor of a lawful
arrest and the alleged incidental
search. Hence, all pieces of evidence
acquired are inadmissible as
evidence.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New
Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a
person without a warrant: (a) when in his
presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense (in flagrante
delicto); (b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it, and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while
being transferred from one confinement to
another. None of these circumstances were
present when the accused was arrested hence
there can be no search incident to a lawful arrest.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused
caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of
Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
In the case at bar, Wang was
not committing any visible offense
nor acting in a suspicious behavior
that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. The accused
was merely walking to the parked
car when the police officers arrested
and frisked him and searched his
car. The accused was not
committing any overt act indicative
of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the
arresting officers.
The unlicensed pistol that
the accused had in his pocket was
bantam and slim in size that it would
not give an outward indication of a
concealed gun. Likewise, the
contraband items found in the car
were not in plain view as the 32 bags
of shabu were in the trunk
compartment, and the Daewoo
handgun was underneath the
driver’s seat of the car. The police
officers had no information or
knowledge that the accused was
carrying or possessing an unlicensed
gun and that banned articles were
inside the car or that the accused
had placed them there.
Page 53 of 93
 The presented circumstances also do not
sufficiently establish the existence of probable
cause based on personal knowledge as required
in paragraph (b) of Section 5. It is on the ground
that Wang was arrested mainly on the
information that he was an employer of Frank
and Junio who was previously arrested but had
not disclosed Wang as their source of the illegal
drugs. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does
not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly
made by the trial court, is that the warrantless
arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless
search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise
unlawful.
Petition is DENIED. (Private Respondent was
ACQUITTED.)
(Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings
Corporation) Distinction between the two
remedies/actions, Appeal and Certiorari:
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a
remedy designed for the
correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. Where the error is not
one of jurisdiction, but of an
error of law or fact -- a mistake
of judgment -- appeal is the
remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over
an appeal, the CA exercises its
appellate jurisdiction and power
of review. Over a certiorari, the
higher court uses its original
jurisdiction in accordance with
its power of control and
supervision over the
proceedings of lower courts. An
appeal is thus a continuation of
the original suit, while a petition
for certiorari is an original and
independent action that was not
part of the trial that had resulted
in the rendition of the judgment
or order complained of. The
parties to an appeal are the
original parties to the action. In
contrast, the parties to a petition
for certiorari are the aggrieved
party (who thereby becomes the
petitioner) against the lower
court or quasi-judicial agency,
and the prevailing parties (the
public and the private
respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only
judgments or final orders and
those that the Rules of Court so
declared are appealable. Since
the issue is jurisdiction, an
original action for certiorari may
be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower
court prior to an appeal from the
judgment; or where there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy.
As to the Period of
Filing. Ordinary appeals should
be filed within fifteen days from
the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a
record on appeal is required, the
appellant must file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty days from the said
notice of judgment or final
order. A petition for review
Page 54 of 93
 should be filed and served within
fifteen days from the notice of
denial of the decision, or of the
petitioners timely filed motion
for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal
by certiorari, the petition should
be filed also within fifteen days
from the notice of judgment or
final order, or of the denial of the
petitioners motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition
for certiorari should be filed not
later than sixty days from the
notice of judgment, order, or
resolution. If a motion for new
trial or motion for
reconsideration was timely filed,
the period shall be counted from
the denial of the motion.
Case Title: Republic of the Philippines V Herminio Roque
et. al
Facts:
Private respondents filed a Petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the
constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372
otherwise known as the "Human Security Act of 2007, :
(a) Section 3, for being void for vagueness; (b) Section
7,for violating the right to privacy of communication and
due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent
relationships; (c)Section 18, for violating due process, the
prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder,Ruling
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well
as for contradicting Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended; (d) Section 26, for violating the right to
travel; and (e) Section 27, for violating the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, averring
that certain petitions (SC petitions) raising the issue of RA
9372’s constitutionality have been lodged before the
Court. The Court promulgated its Decision in the
Southern Hemisphere cases and thereby dismissed the SC
petitions.
Petitioners filed the subject motion to
dismiss, contending that private respondents failed to
satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they
averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already
been upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere
cases.
The RTC issued an Order which denied the subject motion
to dismiss, finding that the Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents’
petition for declaratory relief was properly filed.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was,
however, denied by the RTC. The RTC observed that
private respondents have personal and substantial
interests in the case and that it would be illogical to await
the adverse consequences of the aforesaid law’s
implementation considering that the case is of paramount
impact to the Filipino people.
Issue
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the subject motion to dismiss
and whether private respondents maintain that the
requirements for declaratory relief have been satisfied
and that the Court has yet to resolve the constitutionality
of RA 9372, negating any grave abuse of discretion on the
RTC’s part.
It is well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be
qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to
constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
Page 55 of 93
to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation oflooms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts
law. In this relation, case law states that not every errorindicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided
in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of lawthat the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The degreedeclaration.
of gravity, as above-described, must be met.
A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory
Applying these principles, the Court observes that whilerelief would show that they have failed to demonstrate
no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the parthow they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to
of the RTC when it found that the Court did not pass uponsustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement
the constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southernof the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed
Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its jurisdictionfrom the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere
when it ruled that private respondents’ petition had metcases, private respondents only assert general interests
all the requisites for an action for declaratory relief.as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the
Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismissgovernment could prospectively commit if the
was altogether improper. enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled.
As their petition would disclose, private respondents’ fear
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an
of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain
action for declaratory relief:
government officials which were addressed to the
first , the subject matter of the controversy must be ageneral public. They, however, failed to show how these
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , thegovernmental action geared towards the implementation
terms of said documents and the validity thereof areof RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no
doubtful and require judicial construction; third , thereparticular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held
must have been no breach of the documents in question;in Southern Hemisphere:
fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or
“Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have
the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose
become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court
interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for
has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory
judicial determination; and sixth , adequate relief is not
actions characterized by "double contingency," where
available through other means or other forms of action or
both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and
proceeding.
the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that antheorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.”
actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC
one exists in this case.
petitions in the Southern Hemisphere cases on the basis
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existingof, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicialthe ripening seeds of one), the RTC should have dismissed
determination, not one that is conjectural or merelyprivate respondents’ petition for declaratory relief all the
anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it issame.
meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed
It is well to note that private respondents also lack the
with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception
required locus standi to mount their constitutional
before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper,
challenge against the implementation of the above-
animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that
stated provisions of RA 9372 since they have not shown

Page 56 of 93
any direct and personal interest in the case. While it hasPilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell)
been previously held that transcendental public(collectively, the oil companies) and the Republic
importance dispenses with the requirement that theof the Philippines, represented by the
petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger ofDepartment of Energy (DOE), filed their
suffering direct and personal injury, it must be stressedrespective motions for leave to intervene and for
that cases involving the constitutionality of penalreconsideration of the decision.
legislation belong to an altogether different genus of
In an earlier decision (2007 case),
constitutional litigation.
petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief,Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon,
neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand isin an original petition for mandamus under Rule
ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel
on the above-discussed allegations in privaterespondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., to enforce
respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative andOrdinance No. 8027. This ordinance was enacted
merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripeby the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila and is
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had aapproved by respondent Mayor. The said
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Thisordinance reclassified the area described therein
private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case atfrom industrial to commercial and directed the
bar. owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under the reclassification to cease and desist
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it
from operating their businesses within six
irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability
months. Among the businesses situated in the
of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to
area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the
the private respondents exists in the first place.
oil companies.In the said decision, the Supreme
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifthCourt ruled that respondent had the ministerial
requisites for an action for declaratory relief, as well asduty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
the irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents’enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
petition for declaratory relief should have beengovernance of the city including the subject
dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to the same, it Ordinance.
cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its
In the present case (2008 case), the oil
discretion.
companies and DOE sought to intervene and filed
motions for reconsideration in intervention. The
oil companies called the attention of the
Social Justice Society vs Jose Atienza
Supreme Court to the fact that Chevron had filed
G.R. No. 156052
a complaint against respondent and the City of
February 13, 2008; J. Corona
Manila in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with
Facts: application for writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction.
After promulgating an earlier decision on
Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of
March 7, 2007, Chevron Philippines Inc.
Manila also attacking the validity of Ordinance
(Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and
No. 8027. Thereafter, the city council of Manila

Page 57 of 93
enacted Ordinance No. 8119 or the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of 2006. Aggrieved anew, Chevron
and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila,
asking for the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119.
The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron,
enjoining the City of Manila and respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8119. Hence, this case.
Issues:
Procedural:
a. Whether or not movants-intervenors
should be allowed to intervene
b. Whether or not the injunctive writs (writ
of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction issued
by RTC of Manila) are impediments to the
execution of our March 7, 2007
Substantive:
c. WON the rule on judicial admission is
applicable in the case
Ruling:
a. Whether or not movants-intervenors
should be allowed to intervene in this
case
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that movant-
intervenors have the right to intervene for the
interest of justice. Under Rule 19 (sec 1 and 2) of
the ROC, Intervention is a remedy by which a
third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable
him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or
interest which may be affected by such
proceedings. Thus, the following are the
requisites for intervention of a non-party:
(1) Legal interest in the matter in
controversy; or in the success of
either of the parties; or against
both parties; or person is so
situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof;
(2) Intervention will not unduly
delay or prejudice the
adjudication of rights of
original parties;
(3) Intervenors rights may not be
fully protected in a
separate
proceeding[51] and
(4) The motion to intervene may
be filed at any time
before rendition of
judgment by the trial
court.
For both the oil companies and DOE,
the last requirement is definitely
absent. As a rule, intervention is allowed
before rendition of judgment as Section
2, Rule 19 expressly provides. The Court,
however, has recognized exceptions to
Section 2, Rule 19 in the interest of
substantial justice. The rule on
intervention, like all other rules of
procedure, is intended to make the
powers of the Court fully and completely
available for justice. It is aimed to
facilitate a comprehensive adjudication
of rival claims overriding technicalities on
the timeliness of the filing thereof. Since
the oil companies have a direct and
immediate interest in the
implementation of Ordinance No. 8027,
they have the right to intervene.
Page 58 of 93
 b. Whether or not the injunctive writs are
impediment for the enforcement of the
subject ordinance.
No. The Supreme Court ruled that under
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the
grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction are as follows:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the
relief demanded, and the whole or part
of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the
act or acts complained of, or in requiring
the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or
nonperformance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant;
or
c. That a party, court, agency or a person
is doing, threatening, or is attempting to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
There are two requisites for the issuance
of a preliminary injunction: (1) the right to be
protected exists prima facie and (2) the acts
sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.
It must be proven that the violation sought to be
prevented will cause an irreparable injustice.The
act sought to be restrained here was the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027. It is a
settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the
presumption of validity and, as such, cannot be
restrained by injunction. The Court, in resolving
whether or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction should be
issued, is guided by the following
requirements: (1) a clear legal right of the
complainant; (2) a violation of that right; and (3)
a permanent and urgent necessity for the Writ to
prevent serious damage. Courts will not
invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears
that it is unconstitutional. There is no such
showing here. Therefore, the injunctive writs
issued in the Manila RTCs order had no leg to
stand on.
c. Whether or not the rule on judicial
admission is applicable in the case
No. In this case, the oil companies assert
that respondent judicially admitted that
Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance
No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where
Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 8027) They contend that such admission
worked as an estoppel against the respondent.
Respondent countered that this
stipulation simply meant that Petron was
recognizing the validity and legality of Ordinance
No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of
said ordinances constitutionality, opting instead
to question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119.
The Supreme Court ruled that the rule on
judicial admissions does not apply in the instant
case. Under Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, An admission, verbal or written, made by
a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. While it is true that a party
making a judicial admission cannot subsequently
take a position contrary to or inconsistent with
what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not
Page 59 of 93
applicable here. Respondent made the
statements regarding the ordinances in civil case
nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not the
same as this case before us. To constitute a
judicial admission, the admission must be made
in the same case in which it is offered.Hence,
respondent is not estopped from claiming that
Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance
No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies
which should be considered estopped. They rely
on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119
superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same
time, also impugn its (8119s) validity. The
Supreme Court frown on the adoption of
inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at
clever positioning under one or the other on the
basis of what appears advantageous at the
moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or
contrary positions regarding the validity of a
statute or ordinance. As to the constitutionality
of the ordinances, the Supreme Court ruled that
both ordinances are constitutional and as such,
the respondent Mayor of Manila is compelled by
mandamus to enforce the same.
Decision:
The Supreme Court granted the motion of the
intervenor-movants, as represented by the
Department of Energy, to intervene. The RTC of
Manila is ordered to dismiss the consolidated
cases. The respondent city Mayor of Manila is
ordered to enforce the ordinances.
Alfelor vs. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987, March 31,
2006
Doctrine:
A party who judicially admits a fact
cannot later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of
evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission
also removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy. Consequently, an admission made in
the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission and are conclusive as to
such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored,
whether objection is interposed by the party or
not.
Facts:
The children and heirs of the late spouses
Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for
Partition. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita
Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria
Katrina, who claimed to be the surviving spouse
of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the
deceased Alfelor Spouses.
Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for
Intervention alleging that she has legal interest in
the matter of litigation for partition, she being
the surviving spouse and primary compulsory
heir of Jose. Josefina attached to said motion her
Complaint-in-Intervention wherein she alleged
that the second marriage to Teresita was void ab
initio for having been contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina
further alleged that Joshua and Maria Katrina
were not her husband’s children. Josefina
attached to her pleading a copy of the marriage
contract which indicated that she and Jose were
married.
Teresita testified that she and Jose were
married. While she did not know Josefina
personally, she knew that her husband had been
previously married to Josefina and that the two
did not live together as husband and wife. She
knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s
relatives consented to her (Teresita’s) marriage
with Jose because there had been no news of
Page 60 of 93
Josefina for almost ten years.
Judge denied the motion and dismissed
intervenor’s complaint, ruling that respondent
was not able to prove her claim. The trial court
pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear
to testify in court to substantiate her claim.
Moreover, no witness was presented to identify
the marriage contract as to the existence of an
original copy of the document or any public
officer who had custody thereof. Teresita and her
children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the
legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose,
considering that the latter referred to them as his
children in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
among others.
Josefina filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. CA reversed
the ruling of the trial court. It held that Teresita
had already admitted (both verbally and in
writing) that Josefina had been married to the
deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no
longer requires proof. Consequently, there was
no need to prove and establish the fact that
Josefa was married to the decedent.
Issues:
1. Was there need to prove the existence of
Josefina's marriage to Jose?
2. Should Josefina be allowed to intervene in the
action for partition?
Held:
1. No. The fact of the matter is that Teresita
Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein,
admitted the existence of the first marriage in
their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC.
Teresita admitted several times that she knew
that her late husband had been previously
married to another. This admission constitutes a
“deliberate, clear and unequivocal” statement;
made as it was in the course of judicial
proceedings, such statement qualifies as a
judicial admission. A party who judicially admits a
fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of
evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission
also removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy. Consequently, an admission made
in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive
as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored,
whether objection is interposed by the party or
not. The allegations, statements or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against
the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a
position contrary of or inconsistent with what
was pleaded.
2. Yes. Intervention shall be allowed when a
person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in
litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the
parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4)
or when he is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or disposition of
property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof.
Considering this admission of Teresita,
petitioners’ mother, the Court rules that
respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently
established her right to intervene in the partition
case. She has shown that she has legal interest in
the matter in litigation.
Page 61 of 93
 JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011]
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish
Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his
mother Elsie who got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also
submitted documents which include (a)
petitioner’s certificate of live birth;
petitioner’s baptismalcertificate; (c) petitioner’s
college diploma, showing that he graduated from
Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree
in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation
from the same school; (e) Certificate of
Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of
several articles from different newspapers about
petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special
Appearance and Comment manifesting that the
petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him. Meanwhile,
Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear
the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in
form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus
filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that
DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the
RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed
to establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the
case of Herrera v. Albanamely, a prima
facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between
the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for
Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new
hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that
ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for
filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet
taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He
then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus,
it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four
significant aspects of a traditional paternity
(b)
action had been met and held that DNA testing
should not be allowedwhen the petitioner has
failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether aprima facie showing is necessary
before a court can issue a DNA testing order
HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack
ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA
testing since no evidence has, as yet, been
presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The
statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four
significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has
been widely misunderstood and misapplied in
this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the
parties have presented their respective evidence.
They are matters of evidence that cannot be
determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish
Page 62 of 93
filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is
herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by
a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in
the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely
provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA
testing. It states that the appropriate court may,
at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person, who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing
and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following: (a) A biological sample exists that is
relevant to the case;(b) The biologicalsample: (i)
was not previously subjected to the type of DNA
testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The
DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the court
may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule
shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of
a prior court order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement agencies, before a suit
or proceeding is commenced. This does not
mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be
issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing,
the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the
DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good
cause” for the holding of the test. In these states,
a court order for blood testing is considered a
“search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in
ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable
cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause.
Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing
must be made before a court can constitutionally
order compulsory blood testing in paternity
cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary
matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in
which paternity is contested and a party to the
action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood
test, a show cause hearing must be held in which
the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing The same condition precedent
should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect
the putative father from mere harassment suits.
Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA
testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.”
PEOPLE vs. ABETONG
G.R. No. 209785 - June 4, 2014
Third Division
*Spoiler: Acquitted*
Facts:
On August 22, 2003, the PNP received
information that a certain alias "Cano," later
Page 63 of 93
identified as accused-appellant, was selling drugs
in his house.
Upon arrival at the target area, PO3 Perez and the
asset were ushered in by Abetong and once
inside, PO3 Perez saw three persons allegedly
engaged in a pot session. After receiving the
plastic sachet, PO3 Perez introduced himself as a
police officer and signaled his back-up to effect
the arrest of the four individuals.
From their arrest until the items seized were
transmitted to the PNP Crime Lab., the pieces of
evidence were allegedly under PO3 Perez’s
custody. In his testimony, PO3 Perez stated that
he kept the items inside the evidence locker in
the Drug Enforcement Unit Office, to which only
Inspector Lorilla has a key.
On August 25, 2013, PO3 Perez brought the
sachet containing crystalline substance and the
tooter to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing.
The items were received by Inspector Augustina
Ompoy, the Forensic Chemical Officer who then
performed the necessary examinations on the
items recovered and later testified for the
prosecution.
In his defense, Abetong declared being at
home, a male person entered the open door and
held him. When Abetong asked what his fault
was, the man answered to just go with him.
Abetong was not informed of the cause of his
arrest; no drugs were presented to him. He knew
of the charge – Violation of Section 5, R.A. 9165 –
only during arraignment in court.
The RTC rendered a decision convicting him of
the crime charged which the CA affirmed.
In upholding the RTC conviction, the CA
ratiocinated that the prosecution’s evidence was
sufficient to afford the court a reliable assurance
that the evidence presented is one and the same
as those confiscated from accused-appellant.
Abetong argued that his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt. He maintained that,
assuming without conceding the validity of the
buy-bust operation, the prosecution failed to
sufficiently prove that the integrity of the
evidence was preserved. Abetong hinged his
appeal on the fact that Inspector Lorilla, who had
the only key to the evidence locker, did not testify
during trial.
Issue
1. Whether or not the prosecution was able
to establish an unbroken chain
of custody over the drug evidence; and
2. Whether or not presumption of
regularity was establish.
Ruling
1. The Court held that prosecution failed to
establish an unbroken chain of custody over the
drug evidence.
Sec. 21 of RA 9165 requires that: (1) The
apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the
accused; and (2) Within twenty-four (24) hours
Page 64 of 93
upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs
shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic
Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination.
While it is true that in the case of People vs Musa,
the SC stated that “Since the perfect chain is
almost always impossible to obtain, non-
compliance with Sec. 21 of RA 9165, as stated in
the IRR, does not, without more, automatically
render the seizure of the dangerous drug void,
and evidence is admissible as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team.”
However, in this case, the prosecution failed to
establish an unbroken chain of custody over the
drug evidence.
The chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness’ possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
In the case at bar, the failure of Inspector Lorilla
to testify is fatal to the prosecution’s case for
during the three-day interval, Inspector Lorilla
constructively acquired custody over the seized
items. As the lone key holder and consequentially
a link in the chain, Inspector Lorilla’s testimony
became indispensable in proving the guilt of
Abetong beyond reasonable doubt. Only he could
have testified that no one else obtained the key
from him for purposes of removing the items
from their receptacle. While the delay in itself is
not fatal to the prosecution’s case as it may be
excused based on a justifiable ground, it exposes
the items seized to a higher probability of being
handled by even more personnel and,
consequently, to a higher risk of tampering or
alteration.
2. The presumption of regularity has been
overturned.
A perusal of the Information filed against
Abetong and Inspector Ompoy’s chemistry report
reveals a glaring inconsistency in this case. The
Information charges Abetong of selling 0.02 gram
of methamphetamine hydrochloride. However,
Inspector Ompoy testified that the specimen
weighs 0.04 gram.
For sure, this discrepancy in the weight of the
substance is fatal to the case of the
prosecution. It automatically casts doubt as to
the identity of the item seized and of the one
tested as it erases any assurance that the
evidence being offered is indeed the same as the
one recovered during the buy-bust operation.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. Accused-
appellant Marlon Abetong y Endrano is hereby
ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.
Page 65 of 93

COMMONWEALTH VS. MICHAEL SERGE
(SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA)
586 Pa. 671 (2006)
FACTS:
In 2001, Appellant shot his wife, Jennifer
Serge (Victim), three times, killing her inside their
home in Scott Township, Lackawanna County.
Appellant was arrested that morning and charged
with one count of first-degree murder and one
count of third-degree murder.
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a
Motion in limine, seeking to present the
prosecution's theory of the fatal shooting
through a CGA based on both forensic and
physical evidence. The trial court grated the same
provided that certain evidentiary foundations
were established at trial. It required the
Commonwealth to authenticate the animation as
both a fair and accurate depiction of expert
reconstructive testimony and exclude any
inflammatory features that may cause unfair
prejudice. To safeguard against potential
prejudice, the trial court required the pre-trial
disclosure of the CGA.
At his jury trial, Appellant alleged that he
had acted in self-defense as his wife attacked him
with a knife. He further asserted that he should
be acquitted on the grounds of justifiable self-
defense. Alternatively, Appellant argued that his
extreme intoxication at the time of the shooting
rendered him incapable of formulating the
specific intent to kill.
The Commonwealth countered that the
killing was intentional, and that Appellant, a
former Lieutenant of Detectives with the
Scranton Police Department, "used his decades
of experience as a police officer to tamper with
the crime scene to stage a self-defense setting."
In particular, the Commonwealth asserted that
Appellant had moved his wife's body and
strategically positioned her near a knife that he
had placed on the floor, as depicted in the CGA.
During its case-in-chief, the
Commonwealth presented a CGA as
demonstrative evidence to illustrate the expert
opinions of its forensic pathologist, Gary W. Ross,
M.D. (Dr. Ross), and crime scene
reconstructionist, Trooper Brad R. Beach
(Trooper Beach). The CGA showed the theory of
the Commonwealth based upon the forensic and
physical evidence, of how Appellant shot his wife
first in the lower back and then through the heart
as she knelt on the living room floor of their
home. More importantly, the animation showed
the location of Appellant and his wife within the
living room, the positioning of their bodies, and
the sequence, path, trajectory, and impact sites
of the bullets fired from the handgun.
The trial court thoroughly instructed the
jury of the purely demonstrative nature of the
CGA both before the animation was presented
and during the jury charge prior to deliberation.
In particular, the court noted that the CGA was a
demonstrative exhibit, not substantive evidence,
and it was being offered solely as an illustration
of the Commonwealth's version of the events as
recreated by Dr. Ross and Trooper Beach. Finally,
the court informed the jury that they should not
confuse art with reality and should not view the
CGA as a definitive recreation of the actual
incident.
In 2002, the jury found Appellant guilty
of first-degree murder and the trial court
immediately sentenced him to life imprisonment.
The same was affirmed by the Superior Court.
Page 66 of 93
 In 2004, the Supreme Court granted
allowance of appeal limited solely to the issue of
whether the admission of the CGA depicting the
Commonwealth's theory of the case was proper.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Computer Generated
Animation depicting the Commonwealth’s
Theory is admissible.
HELD: Yes.
A CGA should be deemed admissible as
demonstrative evidence if it: (1) is properly
authenticated pursuant to as a fair and accurate
representation of the evidence it purports to
portray; (2) is relevant; and (3) has a probative
value that is not outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice pursuant. In addition, the courts
must address the additional dangers and benefits
this particular type of demonstrative evidence
presents as compared with more traditional
demonstrative evidence.
The computer-generated demonstrative
evidence must be relevant and authenticated by
testimony that (a) the witness has personal
knowledge of the exhibit's subject matter and (b)
the exhibit is accurate. To lay a proper foundation
for computer-generated visual evidence, the
proponent must first establish through witness
testimony the accuracy of the exhibit's portrayal
of the substantive information in question.
Accordingly, the Commonwealth presented the
testimony of multiple individuals including the
Matzkanin (Director of Forensic Animations),Dr.
Ross (Forensic Pathologist), Trooper Beach
(Crime Scene Reconstructionist) et.al.,. They
testified physical evidence and the
measurements taken at the crime scene, both of
which were used in creating the CGA. Further, the
creator of the CGA testified that the CGA was a
graphical presentation of another expert's
opinion. Thus, the CGA is properly authenticated.
Because the CGA was properly
authenticated, we must turn to the second prong
of the three-part test, which involves a question
of its relevancy. The CGA was relevant because it
clearly, concisely, and accurately depicted the
Commonwealth's theory of the case and aided
the jury in the comprehension of the collective
testimonies of the witnesses without use of
extraneous graphics or information.
Accordingly, we must turn to the third
and final prong, prejudice. It is within this prong
that a CGA has the potential danger due to the
visual nature of the presentation. In the present
case, the content of the CGA was neither
inflammatory nor unfairly prejudicial. Any
prejudice derived from viewing the CGA resulted
not from the on-screen depiction of the
Commonwealth's theory, but rather was inherent
to the reprehensible act of murder. The possible
unnecessary and prejudicial aspects of a CGA
were not present. In particular, the CGA did not
include: (1) sounds; (2) facial expressions; (3)
evocative or even life-like movements; (4)
transition between the scenes to suggest a story
line or add a subconscious prejudicial effect; or
(5) evidence of injury such as blood or other
wounds. Instead, much like a two-dimensional
hand drawing of bullet trajectories, the CGA
merely highlighted the trajectory of the three
bullets fired, concluding from ballistics and blood
splatter that the body had been moved after the
victim died as part of Appellant's attempt to stage
his self-defense. The CGA was devoid of drama so
as to prevent the jury from improperly relying on
an emotional basis. The major difference
between a traditional chart or drawing of bullet
trajectories and the instant presentation lays in
Page 67 of 93
the three-dimensional nature that enabled the
Commonwealth experts to present their exact
theory and the underlying mathematics used in
formulating its case. In particular, the ability to
rotate the view allowed the Commonwealth's
experts to explain the exact path of the bullets
and show why the evidence suggested that it
was not a killing in self-defense. As such, it was a
clearly relevant and helpful tool for an expert to
present an informed opinion to the jury.
CONCLUSION
In a question of first impression in this
Commonwealth, we hold that a CGA is potentially
admissible as demonstrative evidence, as long as
the animation is properly authenticated, it is
relevant, and its probative value outweighs the
danger of unfair prejudice or confusion.
Therefore, because in the instant matter: (1) the
Commonwealth satisfied all of the foundational
requirements for admitting the CGA as
demonstrative evidence; (2) the CGA was
relevant evidence that enabled the
Commonwealth experts to illustrate their
opinions and educate the jury on the forensic and
physical data; and (3) the alleged prejudicial
effect of the CGA does not outweigh its
relevance, we conclude that the admission of this
evidence was proper. Hence, the admission of a
CGA depicting the theory of the Commonwealth
in this case was proper. Accordingly, we affirm
the decision of the Superior Court.
Celestino Marturillas vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 163217; April 18, 2006
FIRST DIVISION; PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
FACTS:
On the night of November 4, 1998, in the
vicinity of Barangay Gatungan Bunawan District,
Davao City, the victim herein, Artemio
Pantinople, a former barangay kagawad of the
said place was shot to death.
The incident was witnessed by Lito
Santos who had heard a gunshot and had noticed
smoke and fire coming from the muzzle of a big
gun, from a distance of about 10 meters.
According to Lito, he saw Artemio clasping his
chest and staggering backwards to the direction
of Lito’s house, and had shouted “Tabangi ko Pre,
gipusil ko ni kapitan,” meaning “Help me, Pre, I
was shot by the captain.” Shortly after the same,
Artemio’s wife, Ernita came towards the direction
of the incident, saw his husband sprawled on the
ground and upon seeing the same, she went
histerical, jumping and shouting, “Kapitan, ngano
nimo gipatay ang akong bana? meaning“Captain,
why did you killed my husband?”
According to Ernita, when the incident
happened, she was at home and had heard a
gunshot followed by a shout “Help me Pre, I was
shot by the captain.” Then, Ernita immediately
pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw
appellant-accused Celestino Marturillas,
Barangay Captain of Gatungan, wearing a black
jacket and camouflage pants, carrying with him a
long firearm, running towards the direction of the
back portion of Lito’s house. From there,
appellant-accused allegedly crossed the street
and disappeared.
According to the testimonies of the
witnesses, the place of the incident was well-
Page 68 of 93
illuminated due to the full moon and the two
fluorescent lamps in the store of Lito. The
description of Artemio’s wife of the clothing worn
by the man who shot his husband was the same
clothes worn by the herein accused as testified by
another witness.
After the police were informed that
Celestino Marturillas was the one responsible for
the shooting, the police officers then proceeded
to the house of Marturillas and informed him that
he was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. The
police invited him to go with them to the police
station and also to bring his M-14 rifle.
Marturillas did not say anything and went with
the police with his gun which he surrendered to
the officers. Marturillas was detained the whole
night in the Bunawan Police Station and was
transferred to Tibungco Police Station the
following morning.
Upon autopsy of Artemio’s cadaver, the
postmortem findings stated that the cause of
death was a gunshot in the chest. During the
investigation of the crime scene, an empty shell
fired from a carbine rifle was recovered.
However, said evidence was only indorsed by the
police the following morning of the incident. At
the same time, the Station Commander of the
Police Station made a written request to PNP
Crime Laboratory requesting that a paraffin test
be conducted on Marturillas and that a ballistics
examination be made on the M-14 rifle which he
surrendered to Bunawan Police. Hence, on the
morning of November 5, Celestino Marturillas
was subjected to paraffin testing which results
found that he was negative for powder nitrates.
The Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory testified that the said result indicates
that Marturillas never fired a weapon at any time
between 7:30 p.m. of November 4 until the next
day.
On defense, petitioner Marturillas
presented an alibi that he only learned of the
shooting incident two hours later through the
information personally relayed to him by the
Barangay Kagawads. He asserted that he was
awakened from his sleep by the latter and he
then immediately instructed them to assembled
the SCAA (Special Civilian Armed [Auxiliary]).
Thereafter, he and the Kagawads proceeded to
the crime scene but was not able to render any
assistance because the widow and relatives of
the deceased were already belligerent and
hostile with him.
Based on the Affidavits filed, the
Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on
November 5, 1998 finding sufficient evidence to
indict Appellant for the crime of Homicide and
not Murder as alleged in Private Complainants’
Affidavit Complaint. Thus, Marturillas was
charged with the crime of Homicide. After the
appropriate court procedures, the RTC found
Marturillas guilty of the charge. When the case
was appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC with modifications as to the
awards of actual damages.
The Court of Appeals held that
Marturillas was positively identified as the one
running away from the crime scene immediately
after the gunshot. This fact, together with the
declaration of the victim himself that he had been
shot by the captain, clearly established the
latter’s complicity in the crime. The Court also
rejected his defenses of denial and alibi as the
same cannot prevail the positive testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses found to be more
credible. Thus, petitioner Marturillas filed an
Appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside
the decision and resolution of the CA. He
questioned the inherent weakness of evidence
presented by the prosecution against him and
Page 69 of 93
assailed the plausibility of the allegation that the competent to testify as a witness. Hence,
victim had uttered, “Tabangi ko pre, gipusil ko ni Artemio’s dying declaration was not only
kapitan”, which was considered as his dying admissible in evidence as an exception to the
declaration or as part of res gestae; and there hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling
should have been no finding of guilt because of piece of evidence as the Court held that “a dying
the negative results of the paraffin test. declaration made by the victim immediately prior
to his death constitutes evidence of the highest
order as to the cause of his death and of the
ISSUE: Whether or not the pieces of evidence identity of the assailant.”
presented by the prosecution were credible and
sufficient to indict Marturillas of the crime of The victim’s declaration may also be
Homicide. considered as part of res gestae under Section 42
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which states that
“statements made by a person while a startling
RULING:
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the
The Court ruled in the affirmative and
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
held the Petition as unmeritorious. The Court
as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
held that the totality of the evidence presented
accompanying an equivocal act material to the
by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
conviction of petitioner.
received as part of the res gestae.” Simplified, Res
gestae refers to statements made by the
As to the uttered words by the victim, it
participants or the victims of, or the spectators
was considered as a valid dying declaration under
to, a crime immediately before, during, or after
Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
its commission. These statements are
which states that “the declaration of a dying
spontaneous reactions or utterances inspired by
person, made under the consciousness of
the excitement of the occasion, without any
impending death, may be received in any case
opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false
wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
statement. Artemio’s declaration complied with
evidence of the cause and surrounding
the requisites to be deemed part of res gestae
circumstances of such death.” Artemio’s uttered
which are: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
words satisfied the requisites for a dying
startling occurrence; 2) the statements were
declaration to be admissible as evidence which
made before the declarant had time to contrive
are : 1) it must refer to the cause and
or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the
circumstances surrounding the declarant’s
occurrence in question and its immediately
death; 2) it must be made under the
attending circumstances.
consciousness of an impending death; 3) it must
be made freely and voluntarily without coercion
As to the results of the paraffin test, while
or suggestions of improper influence; 4) it must
they were negative, that fact alone did not ipso
be offered in a criminal case, in which the death
facto prove that the accused was innocent. Time
of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) it
and time again, the Court has held that a negative
should have been made by a declarant
paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a

Page 70 of 93
person has not fired a gun. In other words, it is
possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for
nitrates, as when culprits wear gloves, wash their
hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. It
is also pronounced in a similar case that the
paraffin test is extremely unreliable and it is not
conclusive as to an accused’s complicity in the
crime committed. Hence, the negative paraffin
test result are considered to be of lesser probative
value.
The prosecution was also able to
establish motive on the part of petitioner on the
ground that prior to the shooting, Artemio was
trying to close a real estate transaction which
petitioner tried to block, hence the same showed
petitioner’s antagonism towards the victim.
Clearly, with these evidence presented,
petitioner’s guilt was established beyond
reasonable doubt. To be sure, conviction in a
criminal case does not require a degree of proof
that, excluding the possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof that produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition
is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED, subject to the
modification in the award of damages set forth
here. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 188608 . February 9, 2011
PEOPLE vs. RONALDO MORALES
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Acting on a tip from an informant that
there is rampant selling of illegal drugs in
Antipolo Street, Barangay Mauway,
Mandaluyong City, the Chief of the Metro South
Narcotics Office in Taguig ordered a buy-bust
operation against appellants. The team, headed
by SPO2 Dante Rebolado (SP02 Rebolado), was
composed of five (5) to six (6) members. PO1
Alano was the designated poseur-buyer while
PO1 Buenafe acted as back-up.5 Two (2) pieces of
₱100.00 peso bills were prepared, along with 23
cut-out money-sized papers or "boodle money."
6
The initials "WAA" were marked on the two (2)
₱100.00 peso bills.7
The team proceeded to 338 Antipolo Street. PO1
Buenafe positioned himself inside a vehicle,
which was parked five (5) meters away from the
target house.8 PO1 Alano and the informant was
approached by a man who identified himself as
Roding, and the latter invited them to go inside
the house where they were met by Ronnie. The
informant then ordered one (1) kilo of marijuana
from Ronnie for ₱3,000.00. Ronnie ordered
Roding to get the money from PO1 Alano while
he went inside a room. A few seconds later,
Ronnie went out of the room and handed PO1
Alano a green transparent plastic bag containing
two (2) brown folded envelopes, the contents of
which are bricks of dried marijuana. Immediately
after verifying the contents as marijuana, PO1
Alano introduced himself as a police officer and
arrested Ronnie.9 Roding was able to go out of
the house but he was later on arrested by PO1
Buenafe, who responded to the scene when he
noticed a commotion outside the target house.10
The boodle money was seized from Roding.
Appellants were brought to the South Metro
Narcotics District Office in Fort Bonifacio.11
While at the police station, PO1 Alano placed his
initials on each of the brown envelopes
containing the marijuana before bringing it to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory.12 Police Senior Inspector Grace
Eustaquio examined the specimens brought to
Page 71 of 93
her and she prepared Physical Sciences Report buyer which revealed material details of the buy-
No. D-2350-98 confirming that the specimens bust operations. Hence, this petition.
were found positive for marijuana.
Appellants maintain their innocence and allege
The defense belied the allegations that there was that the police officers failed to establish the
a buy-bust operation conducted wherein they chain of custody of the marijuana, considering
were caught red-handed selling marijuana. that PO1 Alano categorically admitted that the
According to Roding, a tricycle driver, testified marijuana was only marked at their office. On the
that he went to Calbayog Street in Mandaluyong other hand, the Office of the Solicitor-General
City to see his niece, who happens to be his supports their conviction.
tricycle operator, because he wanted to get
money to buy spare parts for his tricycle. While ISSUE:
he was waiting for his niece to arrive, he went to
the store of Ronnie to buy cigarettes. Suddenly, a WON the police officers failed to
group of men who introduced themselves as establish the chain of custody of the marijuana.
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) operatives
arrived and asked for Ronnie. Ronnie came RULING:
forward and was handcuffed. Roding was also
NO.
invited to go with the NARCOM operatives for
In People v. Resurreccion, this Court
questioning. When Roding refused, he was
reiterates that failure to immediately mark seized
forced to board a vehicle and was brought along
drugs will not automatically impair the integrity
to Fort Bonifacio. While inside the vehicle, Roding
of chain of custody as long as the integrity and
was forced to admit that he was with Ronnie
the evidentiary value of the seized items have
selling prohibited drugs. Ronnie narrated that,
been preserved, as these would be utilized in the
while he was manning his store, three (3) cars
determination of the guilt or innocence of the
stopped in front of the store and around seven
accused.31
(7) NARCOM operatives alighted from the cars.
Ronnie was then frisked and arrested. Some of
PO1 Alano accounted for the crucial links
the NARCOM operatives searched his house. It
in the chain of custody of the marijuana. It can be
was then at that moment when Roding came by
recalled that the green plastic bag containing
his store to buy cigarettes. Roding was likewise
marijuana placed inside two (2) envelopes was
arrested.
handed to him by Ronnie. After arresting
appellants, PO1 Alano and the rest of the
The RTC held that the prosecution clearly
NARCOM operatives immediately brought
established that there was a lawful buy-bust
appellants and the seized marijuana to Fort
operation conducted by operatives of NARCOM
Bonifacio.32 Upon reaching the camp, PO1 Alano
and the appellants were lawfully arrested upon
placed his initials on each envelope and turned
the consummation of the sale transaction of
them over to P/Supt. Pepito Dumantay (P/Supt.
marijuana. On appeal, the CA rendered judgment
Dumantay). Together with PO1 Buenafe and
affirming with modification the RTC's decision by
P/Supt Dumantay, PO1 Alano brought the
giving weight to the testimony of the poseur-
marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.33 The

Page 72 of 93
forensic chemist examined the very same
specimen brought to her, and in her findings, she
confirmed it to be positive for marijuana.
The prosecution indeed sufficiently
proved that that the chain of custody of the
marijuana was never broken from the time PO1
Alano received the marijuana from Ronnie up to
the moment it was presented in court as
evidence. Hence, the prosecution has proven
beyond reasonable doubt that appellants were
caught in flagrante delicto selling marijuana.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 26
September 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02844 finding appellants
Ronaldo Morales y Flores (Ronnie) and Rodolfo
Flores y Mangyan (Roding) GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in
Criminal Case No. MC-98-746-D-H, for violation
of Section 4, Article II in relation to Section 21,
Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
is AFFIRMED.
CAPISTRANO OBEDENCIO, JR. vs. JUDGE JOAQUIN
M. MURILLO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH
26, MEDINA, MISAMIS ORIENTAL.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1753. February 5, 2004.
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 03-1652-RTJ)
QUISUMBING, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness governs the examination of child
witnesses who are victims of, accused of, or
witnesses to a crime. In the absence or incapacity
of the parents to be the guardian, Section 5 (a) of
said rule provides that the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem to promote the best interests
of the child.
FACTS:
Complainant Capistrano Obedencio, Jr.,
charged respondent Judge Joaquin M. Murillo,
Presiding Judge of the RTC of Medina, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 26, of unjustly dismissing
Criminal Case No. 1401-M (2000) for rape,
entitled People v. Dexter Z. Acenas.
Complainant averred that on May 3, 2000,
he and his wife assisted their 14-year-old
daughter, Licel Acenas Obedencio, in filing a
criminal complaint for rape allegedly committed
upon her when she was 11 years old by her uncle,
Dexter Z. Acenas. After the preliminary
investigation, which the accused did not attend,
the case was filed in respondent judge’s sala. On
May 25, 2001, following Licels abduction from
their house, complainant sought to secure from
the court a copy of the warrant of arrest issued
against the accused. To his great surprise,
respondent judge told him that the case had
been dismissed three days earlier on May 22,
2001. According to respondent judge, Licel
Obedencio had come to court, accompanied by
her maternal grandparents and Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Emmanuel Hallazgo. There she was
presented to affirm her affidavit of desistance.
Complainant claims that the dismissal was
marred by serious irregularities. He specifically
lamented the absence of any subpoena or notice
of hearing from the court to him, his wife, or their
counsel. He believes that since Prosecutor
Hallazgo, Licels maternal grandparents, and the
accused are relatives, this fact contributed to the
unjust dismissal of the case.
Respondent judge stated that he heard
Criminal Case No. 1401-M (2000) on May 22,
2001, upon the request of Prosecutor Hallazgo
who was prosecuting the case. During the
hearing, Prosecutor Hallazgo presented an
affidavit of desistance executed by Licel. Then,
Page 73 of 93
Licel took the witness stand and was asked on
matters contained in her affidavit. She recanted
the allegations in her affidavit-complaint and
denied having been molested by her uncle,
Dexter. She explained that her mother forced her
to file the rape charge because of family
inheritance problems. Respondent judge asserts
that, with the filing of the affidavit of desistance,
the court had no other recourse but to dismiss
the case.
The Office of the Court Administrator found
respondent judge liable for ignorance of the law
for unjustly dismissing Criminal Case No. 1401-M
(2000). OCA recommended that respondent
judge be reprimanded with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense would
be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE:
WON the affidavit of desistance executed
without the concurrence of Licel’s parents bears
credence which would result for the dismissal of
the rape case.
RULING:
NO. Article 220(6) of the Family Code
gives to complainant and his wife the right and
duty to represent Licel in all matters affecting her
interest. Thus, they were entitled to be notified
and to attend every hearing on the case. As a
judge, respondent is duty-bound to acquaint
himself with the cases pending before him. He
should have known that Licel filed the criminal
complaint with the assistance of her parents, who
are her natural guardians. It was incumbent upon
respondent judge to inquire into the reason
behind their nonappearance before the court
instead of simply relying on the bare explanation
of the defense counsel that he and his client
could not find Licels parents. Respondent judge
ought to remember that the accused, Dexter
Acenas, is the maternal uncle of the victim. That
Licel came to court with her maternal
grandparents, and not her parents, on the day
she was examined to affirm her affidavit of
desistance, should have alerted respondent
judge to be more circumspect. Being still a minor,
Licel cannot fully comprehend for herself the
impact and legal consequence of the affidavit of
desistance. Given her tender age, the probability
is that Licel succumbed to illicit influence and
undue pressure on her to desist from pursuing
her complaint.
Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a
minor, on May 22, 2001, when she was presented
before respondent’s sala to affirm the execution
of her affidavit of desistance. Thus the affidavit
should have been executed with the concurrence
of her parents. Licel could not validly give consent
to an affidavit of desistance, for a minor is
incompetent to execute such an instrument. At
the very least, herein respondent should have
appointed a guardian ad litem for Licel, to protect
her welfare and interest, instead of hastily
dismissing the rape case.
The Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness, which took effect on December 15,
2000, governs the examination of child witnesses
who are victims of, accused of, or witnesses to a
crime. In the absence or incapacity of the parents
to be the guardian, Section 5 (a) of said rule
provides that the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem to promote the best interests
of the child. This rule was already in effect when
respondent judge dismissed the rape case on
May 22, 2001.
Respondent is reminded that a judge is the
visible representation of the law and, more
Page 74 of 93
important, of justice. A judge owes it to the public
to be knowledgeable, for ignorance of the law is
the mainspring of injustice. A judge must know
the laws and apply them properly in all good
faith. Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires a judge to be faithful to the law
and to maintain professional competence. He
should conduct the functions and perform the
duties of his office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of
arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction
of law. Where the law transgressed is simple and
elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the respondent Judge Joaquin
M. Murillo, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Medina, Misamis Oriental, Branch 26, is
found LIABLE for gross ignorance of the law in
connection with the unjust dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 1401-M (2000). He is ORDERED to pay
the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) and
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the
performance of his judicial duties and
functions. He is further warned sternly that a
repetition of the same or similar offense would
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
TITLE: Ang v. CA 618 SCRA 592 April 20, 2010
FACTS: After receiving from the accused Rustan
via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture
of a naked woman with her face superimposed
on the figure, Complainant filed an action against
said accused for violation of the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act or
Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.
The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the
message, was 0921-8084768, one of the
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he
copied the picture of her face from a shot he took
when they were in Baguio in 2003. The accused
said to have boasted that it would be easy for him
to create similarly scandalous pictures of her and
threatened to spread the picture he sent through
the internet.
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the
violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter
rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision.
The CA denied Rustan’s motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25,
2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC properly admitted
in evidence the obscene picture presented in the
case?
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the
decision of the CA.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to
Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic
signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-
SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the
admissibility of the obscene picture for the first
time before the Supreme Court. The objection is
too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the
time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for
objection.
Page 75 of 93
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the
present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-
judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the
prosecution has proved each and every element
of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
A.M. No. CA-05-20-P September 9, 2005
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-
MAGTOLIS, COURT OF APPEALS, Complainant,*
vs.
CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts:
Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in
Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H
before the RTC of Pasig City. On appeal, the case
was assigned to the Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423.
Lagua, who was then detained at the Bureau of
Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City,
filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding the
petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a
Resolution on October 9, 2003, directing him to
post a ₱200,000.00 bond.
Lagua’s bond was approved in a Resolution dated
November 6, 2003, where the appellate court
also directed the issuance of an order of release
in favor of Lagua. The resolution was then
brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of
Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M. Pattugalan-
Madarang, for promulgation.
Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed the
respondent’s unusual interest in the Lagua case.
The respondent had apparently been making
inquiries whether the appellate court had already
directed the issuance of an order of release in the
said case. Atty. Madarang then directed the
typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, and to
notify the mailing section that there were orders
requiring personal service. At around 4:00 p.m.,
the respondent then went to Atty. Madarang’s
office and assisted in arranging and stapling the
papers for release. He brought the said
resolutions and other papers himself to the
Mailing Section.
Respondent went to the National Penitentiary to
serve the resolution and order of release in the
Lagua case. The respondent left the prison
compound at around 2:30 p.m.
In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a
telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor,
who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative. It was
about 2:00 p.m. The caller asked her how much
more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s
provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty.
Madarang that they had sought the help of a
certain Rhodora Valdez of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig, where the criminal case
originated, but were told that they still had a
balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty.
Madarang through the respondent. Atty.
Madarang then called the said court and asked to
speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Lagua’s
relative.
Through her telephone inquiries, by disguising
herself as a relative of the accused-appellant, she
learned that Rhodora Valdez was the incumbent
Process Server of RTC, Branch 163, Pasig City,
from which the original case against accused-
appellant Lagua originated.
She coordinated with Ms. Cecil Secarro, the
Acting Chief of the Mailing Section, and she was
able to obtain the mobile phone number of Salud
from Ms. Secarro and started texting him. She
represented herself as Arlyn, Lagua’s relative.
Page 76 of 93
Several days later, Salud accompanied by Ms.
Secarro, came to my office to apologize. But
before he could even say a word, he broke down
in [wails]. In between his loud cries, he uttered,
"Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga
anak.
Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her
office. When confronted, the respondent denied
extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release,
or in any other case. He, however, admitted
serving the copies of resolution and order of
release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art
Baluran.
Justice Magtolis lodged the complaint against the
respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003,
containing, among others, the following
allegations:
The delivery of resolutions/orders to
unauthorized persons and "complete strangers"
who promised to "take care thereof" ("siya na
raw ang bahala") constitutes not only neglect of
duty but also conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Staying for the whole day
within the vicinity of the National Bilibid Prisons
to the point of failing to fulfill his other duties for
the day constitutes inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official
duties. On the other hand, the use of her name
and that of their Division Clerk of Court to illegally
solicit financial or material benefit from parties
with pending cases before this Court is illegal per
se.
In his counter-affidavit, the respondent
vehemently denied the charges. He never
demanded money from Lagua’s relative; his
name had been used by someone and was, thus,
a mere victim of the circumstances. Moreover,
the fact that he immediately released the CA
order in question was clear proof that he had no
financial interest in the transaction.
The Findings of the Investigating Officer
In her Report dated January 21, 2005, Atty.
Longalong found that the respondent was guilty
as charged, and made the following
recommendation:
In view of all the foregoing, there is substantial
evidence to hold respondent liable for the
offenses charged. He is liable for inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of his official
duties and for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service when he admittedly served
the copies of the resolution and order of release
in the Lagua case intended for detained appellant
and his counsel on Mr. Baluran whom he
admitted to have met only on that day, against
the rules and normal office procedure on
personal service. His long stay in the Bureau of
Prisons also caused the delay in the service of
other court processes assigned to him for service
on that day. He is also liable for having financial
or material interest in an official transaction
considering his undue interest in the service of
the order of release and actual release of Lagua
to the point of staying almost the whole day in
the Bureau of Prisons and the aborted "deal" as
can be concluded from the phone call of Melissa
Melchor to Atty. Madarang and subsequent
exchange of text messages with Atty. Madarang
disguising as Lagua’s relative. …
The respondent now claims that the admission of
the text messages as evidence against him
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not the admission of the text
messages as evidence constitutes a violation of
respondent’s right to privacy.
Ruling:
The respondent admitted that he was the sender
of the first three text messages in Atty.
Madarang’s cellphone: "bkit, C rhodora to"; "CNO
KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO"; and
"SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI."
The respondent’s claim that the admission of the
text messages as evidence against him
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is
unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
"ephemeral electronic communication" under
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, and "shall be proven by the testimony
of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof." Any question as to
the admissibility of such messages is now moot
and academic, as the respondent himself, as well
as his counsel, already admitted that he was the
sender of the first three messages on Atty.
Madarang’s cell phone.
Page 77 of 93
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent
case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that
case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct,
considered text messages addressed to the
complainant asking for a million pesos in
exchange for a favorable decision in a case
pending before the CA. The Court had the
occasion to state:
… The text messages were properly admitted by
the Committee since the same are now covered
by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to
telephone conversations, text messages … and
other electronic forms of communication the
evidence of which is not recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules],
"Ephemeral electronic communications shall be
proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or who has personal knowledge
thereof … ." In this case, complainant who was
the recipient of the said messages and therefore
had personal knowledge thereof testified on their
contents and import. Respondent herself
admitted that the cellphone number reflected in
complainant’s cellphone from which the
messages originated was hers. Moreover, any
doubt respondent may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been laid
to rest when she and her counsel signed and
attested to the veracity of the text messages
between her and complainant. It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. We have no doubt as to the probative
value of the text messages as evidence in
determining the guilt or lack thereof of
respondent in this case.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent
Cielito M. Salud is found GUILTY of inefficiency
and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for a
period of One (1) Year and Six (6) Months,
effective immediately. He is further DIRECTED to
inform the Court as to the date of his receipt of
this Decision to determine when his suspension
shall have taken effect.
Reynaldo De Villa vs. The Director of the New
Bilibid Prisons
G.R. No. 158802. November 17, 2004
J. Ynares-Santiago
Facts:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his
son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-
fold relief: First, that respondent Director of
Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of
petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that
petitioner be granted a new trial. These reliefs
are sought on the basis of purportedly
exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples
allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child
born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment dated Feb 1, 2001, the
Court found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen
Mendoza, his niece by affinity. As summarized in
the Court’s decision, Aileen Mendoza charged
petitioner Reynaldo de Villa with rape in an
information dated January 9, 1995, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. When arraigned
on January 26, 1995, petitioner entered a plea of
not guilty.
During the trial, the prosecution
established that sometime in the third week of
April 1994, at about 10:00 in the morning, Aileen
Mendoza woke up in her family’s rented room in
Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on
top of her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten
months. She was unable to shout for help
because petitioner covered her mouth with a
pillow and threatened to kill her. Aileen could not
do anything but cry. Petitioner succeeded in
inserting his penis inside her vagina. After making
thrusting motions with his body, petitioner
ejaculated. This encounter allegedly resulted in
Aileen’s pregnancy, which was noticed by her
mother, Leonila Mendoza, sometime in
November 1994. When confronted by her
mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped
her. Aileen’s parents then brought her to the
Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a criminal
complaint against petitioner.
Page 78 of 93
 The doctor who examined Aileen
confirmed that she was eight months pregnant
and found in her hymen healed lacerations at the
5:00 and 8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994,
Aileen gave birth to a baby girl whom she named
Leahlyn Mendoza.
In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at
the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67
years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him
incapable of having an erection. He further
averred that Aileen’s family had been holding a
grudge against him, which accounted for the
criminal charges. Finally, he interposed the
defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the
incident, he was in his hometown of San Luis,
Batangas.
The trial court found the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape and sentenced him to death, to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000,
pay the costs, and support the child. On
automatic review, the court found that the date
of birth of Aileen’s child was medically consistent
with the time of the rape. Hence, the court
affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modifications sentencing the petitioner with
reclusion perpetua
Three years after the promulgation of the
decision, there was a question of Reynaldo de
Villa’s guilt or innocence. Petitioner-relator in this
case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He
alleges that during the trial of the case, he was
unaware that there was a scientific test that could
determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the
father of the victim’s child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-
relator was only informed during the pendency of
the automatic review of petitioner’s case that
DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity.
This information was apparently furnished by the
Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death
Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel
for petitioner.
Thus, petitioner’s brief in People v. de
Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test and
DNA test in order to determine the paternity of
the child allegedly conceived as a result of the
rape and the relief was implicitly denied.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once
more prayed that DNA tests be conducted and it
was denied with finality in a Resolution.
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by
these challenges, for having been informed that
DNA tests required a sample that could be
extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked
Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa
and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask
Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup and used as
a sample. Petitioner-relator then gathered
samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa. Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to
conduct DNA testing on the sample given by
Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the
grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given
by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the
donors of the samples, save for the sample given
by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to
the DNA Analysis Laboratory.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory
rendered a preliminary report and showed that
Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the
children whose samples were tested, due to the
absence of a match between the pertinent
genetic markers.
Hence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus.
Issue: Whether or not the DNA result is a valid
basis for a petition for habeas corpus and motion
for new trial.
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus
has long been a haven of relief for those seeking
liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom
of movement. Very broadly, the writ applies to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which a person has been deprived of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any person has
been withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Issuance of the writ necessitates that a person be
illegally deprived of his liberty. In the celebrated
case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, the Court stated
Page 79 of 93
that [a]ny restraint which will preclude freedom
of action is sufficient.
The most basic criterion for the issuance
of the writ, therefore, is that the individual
seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his
freedom of movement or placed under some
form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is
restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. In the recent case of
Feria v. CA, it was held that review of judgment of
conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus only in a very specific
instances, such as when, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding:
(a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person;
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as
such sentence is void as to such excess.
In this instance, petitioner invokes the
writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of
conviction, without, however, providing a legal
ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine,
petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a
constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of
the court imposing the sentence, or that an
excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of
habeas corpus in order to seek the review of
findings of fact long passed upon with finality.
This relief is far outside the scope of habeas
corpus proceedings. The Court stated the general
rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of
error, and should not be thus used.
Be that as it may, it appears that the
petitioner once more relies upon erroneous legal
grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion for
new trial. A motion for new trial, under the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available
only for a limited period of time, and for very
limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for
new trial may be filed at any time before a
judgment of conviction becomes final, that is,
within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or
notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore,
a motion for new trial is no longer an available
remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the
grounds for a new trial:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall
grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been
discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his
plea on the basis of purportedly newly-
discovered evidence, i.e., the DNA test
subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding
petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as
a result of the rape. The decision sought to be
reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus has long attained finality, and
entry of judgment was made as far back as
January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an
examination of the evidence presented by the
petitioner, the Court do not find that the DNA
evidence falls within the statutory or
jurisprudential definition of newly- discovered
evidence.
A motion for new trial based on newly-
discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met:
(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) that said evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trail even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and
(d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if
admitted, it would probably change the
judgment.
In this instance, although the DNA
evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the
trial, the Court nonetheless find that it does not
Page 80 of 93
meet the criteria for newly-discovered evidence
that would merit a new trial. Such evidence
disproving paternity could have been discovered
and produced at trial with the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was
“unaware” of the existence of DNA testing until
the trial was concluded carries no weight with
this court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of
DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the
part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner’s
counsel. In either instance, however, this
negligence is binding upon petitioner.
The petition is dismissed.
People vs Enojas
G.R. No. 204894. March 10, 2014
FACTS:
The defendant, taxi driver Enojas, whose
parking suspiciously in front of a glass shop, was
approached by two policemen PO2 Gregorio and
PO2 Pangilinan while patrolling the vicinity.
Enojas provided the police with identification
that the officers suspected to be fake. The
officers then asked Enojas to accompany them to
the police station for further questioning. Enojas
agreed and left his taxi behind.
On the way to the police station, the
officers stopped at a 7-11 to use the restroom.
Officer Pangilinan who went into the store, saw
and apprehended two robbers, one of the
robbers was killed, while one of whom shot and
killed officer Pangilinan. The other officer got out
of the car upon hearing the gunshots. Returning
to the police car, he found that Enojas had fled
the scene. Suspecting that accused Enojas, the
taxi driver who fled, was involved in the
attempted robbery, they searched the
abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that
Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torres
instructed PO3 Cambi to monitor its incoming
messages and communicated with the other
suspects. The police then conducted an
entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest
of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently,
the police were also able to capture accused
Enojas and Gomez.
The prosecution presented the
transcripts of the mobile phone text messages
between Enojas and some of his co-accused.
Manifesting in open court that they did not want
to adduce any evidence or testify in the case, the
accused opted to instead file a trial memorandum
for their defense. They pointed out that they
were entitled to an acquittal since they were all
illegally arrested and since the evidence of the
text messages were inadmissible, not having
been properly identified.
The RTC rendered judgment, finding all
the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident
premeditation and use of armed men with the
special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms. Upon review, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed in
toto the conviction of the accused. The CA,
however, found the absence of evident
premeditation since the prosecution failed to
prove that the several accused planned the crime
before committing it.
The accused appealed from the CA to the
Supreme Court. The defense points out that the
prosecution failed to present direct evidence that
the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni
took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the evidence of text messages
were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone
is sufficient to attain a conviction.
HELD:
1. No. The RTC admitted them in
conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution
applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved
by the testimony of a person who was a party to
the same or has personal knowledge of them.
Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas,
Page 81 of 93
exchanged text messages with the other accused
in order to identify and entrap them. As the
recipient of those messages sent from and to the
mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them.
2. Yes. The prosecution could prove their
liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the
evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It has been held that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Here the totality of the
circumstantial evidence the prosecution
presented sufficiently provides basis for the
conviction of all the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANIEL ALCOBER
G.R. No. 192941. November 13, 2013
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed with modification the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Carigara,
Leyte finding accused-appellant Daniel Alcober
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape.
On July 20, 1999, at around 2:00 a.m., AAA was in
their house in Tunga, Leyte. Her mother was
away, selling bananas in Carigara, while her
younger siblings were upstairs, sleeping. At that
time, AAA was in second year high school and was
thirteen years old. After working on her school
assignment, AAA cooked rice downstairs in the
kitchen. While she was busy cooking rice, she did
not notice the arrival of accused-appellant, who
suddenly embraced her from her back. She
identified accused-appellant as the person who
embraced her since she immediately turned
around and the place was illuminated by a
kerosene lamp. AAA resisted and was able to
release herself from accused-appellant’s hold.
Accused-appellant unsheathed the long bolo,
locally called a sundang, from the scabbard on his
waist and ordered her to go upstairs. Poking the
sundang at AAA’s stomach, he then ordered AAA
to take off her shorts, and told her he will kill her,
her siblings and her mother if she does not do as
she was told.
AAA complied with accused-appellant’s orders.
When she was lying on the floor, already
undressed, accused-appellant placed the
sundang beside her on her left side. He took off
his shirt and shorts and went on top of her. AAA
did not shout since accused-appellant threatened
to kill them all if she did. He held her hair with his
right hand and touched her private parts with his
left hand. He then "poked" his penis into her
vagina and made a push and pull movement. AAA
felt pain. Accused-appellant kissed her and said
"Ah, you’re still a virgin." When accused-
appellant was done, he stood and said "If you will
tell this to anybody, I will kill you."
AAA did not tell her mother about the incident as
she was afraid accused-appellant will execute his
threat to kill them all. The sexual advances were
thereafter repeated every time AAA’s mother
sold bananas on Wednesdays and Sundays.
On January 8, 2001, accused-appellant ordered
AAA to pack and go with him to Tabontabon,
Leyte, threatening once more to kill her siblings if
she does not comply. In Tabontabon, accused-
appellant once again forced AAA to have sex with
him. The following day, AAA’s mother,
accompanied by police officers of Tunga, Leyte,
arrived, searching for AAA and the accused-
appellant. AAA was finally able to talk to her
mother, which led to AAA’s filing a complaint for
rape against accused-appellant. Accused-
appellant was arrested a few days later on
January 11, 2001.
Dr. Gariando requested a vaginal smear in the
course of his physical examination of AAA. Dr.
Gariando testified that the specimen secured
from AAA at around 2:00 p.m. of January 10, 2001
was positive for the presence of spermatozoa.
Medical Technologist II Alicia Adizas, confirmed
the finding of Dr. Gariando.
AAA testified that she was 13 years old at the
time the accused committed the crime of rape
against her. BBB, the mother of AAA, testified
that AAA was 13 years old on July 20, 1999.
Page 82 of 93
Accused-appellant categorically admitted that he
had sex with his 13-year old stepdaughter on
October 20, 1999.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-
appellant guilty of the crime of rape and
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of
rape. The trial court imposed the death penalty
upon accused-appellant on the basis of the fifth
paragraph, number 1, of Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision with several
modifications as to the penalty, from death to
reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate
court, although it is undisputed that accused-
appellant is the common-law spouse of the
victim’s mother, the records are bereft of
independent evidence to prove that AAA is a
minor, apart from the testimonies of AAA and her
mother. Accused-appellant appeals to this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in
finding that the records are bereft of
independent evidence to prove that AAA is a
minor, apart from the testimonies of AAA and her
mother.
Ruling:
Yes. In People v. Pruna, the Court established the
guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance:
x x x3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic
document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s
mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify
on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact
age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the
victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.x x x
In the case at bar, no birth or baptismal certificate
or school record showing the date of birth of AAA
was presented.
Pursuant to number 4 of the guidelines, however,
in the absence of the foregoing documents
(certificate of live birth or authentic document),
the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused. In the case at bar, AAA testified that she
was 13 years old on July 20, 1999 and that her
birthday was in February. Accused-appellant,
who insists that the incident occurred on October
20, 1999, expressly and clearly admitted that AAA
was still 13 years old on that date, which was
three months later.
Several more questions were propounded to
accused-appellant to ascertain that he was aware
of AAA’s minority at the time of the sexual
intercourse, and accused-appellant’s answers
plainly showed that he was fully cognizant of this
fact.
Furthermore, BBB categorically testified that AAA
was 13 years old at the time material to this case.
To be sure, there is no disparity between the
evidence for the prosecution and the defense on
the point that the accused had carnal knowledge
of AAA when she was only 13 years old. Taking
into account that the minority of the victim and
accused-appellant’s being the common-law
spouse of the victim’s mother, this Court finds it
proper to appreciate this qualifying circumstance
under the fifth paragraph, item number 1, Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
The proper penalty for qualified rape is reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346
which prohibited the imposition of the death
penalty. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,
the Court modify the amount of exemplary
damages for qualified rape by increasing the
same from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00) following established
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed with modifications the
finding of the Regional Trial Court finding
accused-appellant Daniel Alcober guilty beyond
Page 83 of 93
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is further
MODIFIED.
People v. Joel Yatar
G.R. 150224 May 05, 2004
Facts: Kathylyn Uba, the victim, was a 17 year old
girl living with her grandmother, Isabel Dawang in
Liwan west, Rizal, Kalinga.
Joel Yatar, the appellant, was the husband of the
victim’s aunt, Luz Yatar. The couple lived for a
time inside Isabel Dawang’s house along with the
victim. However, the two separated due to
frequent quarrels. Luz went away and the
appellant moved back to his parent’s house a few
hundred meters away.
On June 30, 1998 at 8:30am, Kathylyn and her
cousin Judilyn were talking on the ground floor of
the two storey house of Isabel Dawang. The topic
of their conversation was the letter sent by Luz
Yatar to her estranged husband. By 9am, Isabel,
Judilyn and her husband left for their farm in
Nagbitayan. The victim was left alone though she
did mention that she might go to Tuegegarao
later.
Later at 10 am, two witnesses saw the appellant
near the backside kitchen of Isabel Dawang’s
house. When confronted as to why he was
lingering there, the appellant told them he was
just getting some firewood for his mother.
On her way home around 12:30pm, Judilyn saw
the appellant descend from the second floor of
the said house. When he got down, the appellant
ran towards the back of the house. Still later, he
also saw the appellant pacing to and from the
house. She further recounts that the appellant
was wearing a collared white shirt and black
pants. She did not find the situation odd as the
appellant used to live in the said house.
By 1:30 pm, Judilyn again saw the appellant,
wearing different clothes, this time, a black shirt
and blue pants.
Night came and Isabel Dawang came back to her
house. It was dark and foreboding. When she
entered inside, she noticed that Kathylyn did not
do some of her chores. She went up the ladder
and saw the door bounded by rope. She thought
it a bit odd and somewhat ominous, coming
home at night without any light in sight. Still she
went down again, to fetch a knife to cut the rope
that tightly binds the door. When she climbed
back up, she cut the rope and entered the room.
She groped in the darkness as her eyes slowly
adjusted to what little light moon gave out. She
stumbled into something cold and soft. What she
found in that room scarred her for the rest of her
remaining days. Inside, was her granddaughter,
cold, dead nothing to cover her but darkness. She
went out and cried for help. When help came, all
discovered the gruesome end of Kathylyn. She
was naked and bathing in a pool of blood. Her
guts spilled out from a gaping wound in her
stomach.
At 9pm of the same day, as the police were
investigating the crime scene, they found the
victim’s clothes and a dirty white shirt stained
with blood a few meters away from the house.
The police took the appellant in their custody
who denied any involvement in the victim’s
death. On July 3, 1998, appellant escaped from
the police but was eventually captured. He was
later arraigned in which he pleaded not guilty.
The appellant was convicted in the Regional trial
court and was sentenced to death. Due to the
death penalty sentence, the case was
automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Issue: Was the guilt of the accused proven
beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling: Yes. The evidence both physical and
circumstantial evidence presented by the
Page 84 of 93
prosecution was sufficient enough to warrant a 4. A Witness also saw appellant wearing a a
conviction even without an eye witness who saw dirty white shirt descending from the
the accused commit the crime. second floor of the house were the victim
was found
5. Sperm was found on the victim.
The sperm found on the victim’s vagina was 6. The sperm and blood sample from the
found to be identical to the DNA found in the appellant had matching DNA.
blood sample of appellant. DNA being molecules 7. Appellant tried to escape.
containing genetic code are unique for each
person. Furthermore, the DNA found in a
Circumstantial evidence, to warrant a conviction
person’s saliva, blood, sperm, sweat, bone, hair
must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
shaft, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue and rectal
and reasonable conclusion that the accused to
cells are the same and do not change within a
the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the
person’s lifetime. As such, this DNA print or
crime. As such, these three requisites must
identification technology is uniquely effective in
concur:
resolving crimes as it links the accused, the crime
scene and the crime.

1. There is more than 1 circumstance.

2. Facts on which inferences were derived
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
are proven.
courts should consider, the following factors:
3. The combination of all the circumstances
how the samples were collected, how they were
is such to produce a conviction beyond
handled, the possibility of contamination of the
reasonable doubt.
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
When taken together, the circumstantial
conducted the tests.
evidence along with the physical evidence of
identical DNA found on the Sperm and blood
sample from the accused, his guilt is proven
In the given case, the prosecution introduced an
beyond reasonable doubt.
expert witness who testified that the sperm and
blood samples have identical DNA, linking the
accused to the crime.
PEDRO GRAVADOR vs EUTIQUIO MAMIGO, THE
DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OF BAYAWAN-STA.
Apart from the physical evidence presented, the SCHOOL DISTRICT,
trial court took into consideration of the following THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF
circumstantial evidence: NEGROS ORIENTAL, THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
SCHOOLS and THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,
(all sued in their official and personal capacities)
1. witness accounts of the presence of the
appellant in the place where the victim G.R. No. L-24989 July 21, 1967; CASTRO, J.:
was found.
2. Appellant was seen at the back of the Facts:
house wearing a dirty white shirt.
Petitioner Pedro Gravador was the
3. Judilyn saw appellant at 12:30 pm
principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School
wearing the said white shirt while at
Negros Oriental when he was advised by the then
1:30pm of the same day, she saw him
Superintendent of Schools of his separation from
again wearing a black shirt in the said
the service on the ground that he had reached
house.

Page 85 of 93
the compulsory retirement age of 65. Petitioner
wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting
his forced retirement on the ground that the date
of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but
December 11, 1901. Attached to his letter was
the affidavit, executed on July 26, 1962, of Lazaro
Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes both of Amlan
Negros Oriental, in which these two affiants
declared that they knew that the petitioner "was
born on December 11, 1901, in the Municipality
of Amlan. He filed this suit for quo
warranto, mandamus and damages in the Court
of First Instance of Negros Oriental. The trial
court granted the petition and as such, the
petitioner was reinstated. The respondents
appealed but appellate affirmed. Hence, this
case.
Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court correctly
ruled in appreciating the provision on pedigree
under the Rules on Evidence
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the
controversy on the petitioner's date of birth
arose as a result of the conflicting records of the
Division of Schools of Negros Oriental. On the one
hand the pre-war records show his date of birth
to be November 26, 1897. These records consist
of two Insular Teachers Cards and one
Employee's Record Card. On the other hand, the
post-war records, consisting of an Elementary
Teacher's Report Card,an Employee's Record
Card, and an Employee's Record of
Qualifications state that the petitioner was born
on Dec. 11, 1901. The problem is aggravated by
two uncontroverted facts, namely, that the
records of the church where the petitioner was
baptized were destroyed by fire, and that the
municipal civil register contains no record. of the
petitioner's birth
The Supreme Court ruled that the lower
court correctly relied upon the post-war records,
for three cogent reasons.First, as Moran states,
although a person can have no personal
knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify
as to his age as he had learned it from his parents
and relatives and his testimony in such case is an
assertion of a family tradition.Second, the import
of the declaration of the petitioner's brother,
contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral
case way back in 1924, to the effect that the
petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be
ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased
relative, this statement is at once a declaration
regarding pedigree within the intendment and
meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as
the date of birth of the petitioner not only by
evidence of family tradition but also by the
declaration ante litem motam of a deceased
relative.Third, the patties are agreed that the
petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was
born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on June
10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner
then could not have been born earlier than
Constantino.
The Supreme Court granted the petition.
A.M. No. CA-05-18-P. April 12, 2005.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-80-CA-P)
ZALDY NUEZ, complainant, vs. ELVIRA CRUZ-
APAO, respondent.
DOCTRINE Evidence; Ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony
of a person who was a party to the same or who
has personal knowledge thereof; Court has no
doubt as to the probative value of the text
messages as evidence in determining the guilt or
lack thereof of respondent
CASE : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER .Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct.
FACTS:
The complaint arose out of respondent
ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO solicitation of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez
(Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and
favorable decision of the latter’s pending case in
the CA, the crew of the tv network accompanied
him to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Commission–Special Projects Group (PAOCC-
SPG) in Malacañang where he filed a complaint
for extortion7against respondent.
Note : FYI . need not be written, thank you.
An entrapment operation by elements
of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF) on 28 September 2004 at the
Page 86 of 93
 Jollibee Restaurant, 2nd Floor, Times Plaza
Bldg., corner Taft and United Nations Avenue,
Manila,8 the place where the supposed hand-
over of the money was going to take place.
Respondent’s apprehension by agents
of the PAOCTF in the course of the entrapment
operation prompted then CA Presiding Justice
(PJ) Cancio C. Garcia to issue Office Order
which created an ad-hoc investigating
committee which was specifically tasked to
conduct a thorough and exhaustive
investigation of respondent’s case and to
recommend the proper administrative
sanctions against her as the evidence may
warrant.11
In accordance with the Order, the
Committee conducted an investigation of the
case and issued a Resolution12 dated 18
October 2004 where it concluded that a prima
facie case of Dishonesty and Serious
Misconduct against respondent existed.
The Committee thus recommended
respondent’s preventive suspension for ninety
(90) days pending formal investigation of the
charges against her.13
On 28 January 2005, the Committee
submitted a Report14 to the new CA Presiding
Justice Romeo A. Brawner with its
recommendation that respondent be
dismissed from service.
Based on the hearings conducted and
the evidence received by the Committee, the
antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant’s case referred to above
had been pending with the CA for more than
two years.15 Complainant filed an illegal
dismissal case against PAGCOR before the
Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC
ordered complainant’s reinstatement but a
writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order was issued by the CA in favor
of PAG-COR, thus complainant was not
reinstated to his former job pending
adjudication of the case.16
Desiring an expeditious decision of his case,
complainant sought the assistance of respondent
sometime in July 2004 after learning of the
latter’s employment with the CA. During their
first telephone conversation17 and thereafter
through a series of messages they
exchanged via SMS,complainant informed
respondent of the particulars of his pending case.
Allegedly, complainant thought that respondent
would be able to advise him on how to achieve an
early resolution of his case.
However, a week after their first telephone
conversation, respondent allegedly told
complainant that a favorable and speedy decision
of his case was attainable but the person who was
to draft the decision was in return asking for One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).19
Complainant expostulated that he did not
have that kind of money since he had been
jobless for a long time, to which respondent
replied, “Eh, ganoon talaga ang lakaran dito, eh.
Kung wala kang pera, pasensiya
20
na.” Complainant then tried to ask for a
reduction of the amount but respondent held
firm asserting that the price had been set, not by
her but by the person who was going to make the
decision.21 Respondent even admonished
complainant with the words “Wala tayo sa
palengke iho!”22when the latter bargained for a
lower amount.23
On 24 September 2004, complainant and
respondent met for the first time in person at the
2nd Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg.,28 the
place where the entrapment operation was later
conducted. Respondent also explained that the
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
guaranteed a favorable decision only in the CA
but did not extend to the Supreme Court should
the case be appealed later.31
When respondent was asked where the
money will go, she claimed that it will go to a male
researcher whose name she refused to divulge.
The researcher was allegedly a lawyer in the CA
Fifth (5th) Division where complainant case was
pending.32 She also claimed that she will not get
any part of the money unless the researcher
decides to give her some.33
Complainant tried once again to bargain for a
lower amount during the meeting but
respondent asserted that the amount was fixed.
Nuez and Siringan arrived at past noon and
seated themselves at the table beside the one
occupied by the two (2) agents, Banay and
Villena. Complainant had with him an unsealed
long brown envelope containing ten (10) bundles
of marked money
Page 87 of 93
and paper money which was to be given to
respondent.
Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m.46 She
appeared very nervous and suspicious during the
meeting.47Ironically, she repeatedly said that
complainant might entrap her, precisely like
those that were shown on Imbestigador.48 She
thus refused to receive the money then and
there. What she proposed was for complainant
and Siringan to travel with her in a taxi and drop
her off at the CA where she would receive the
money.49
Complainant, respondent and Siringan
negotiated for almost one hour.53 Complainant
and Siringan bargained for a lower price but
respondent refused to accede.
Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and
found positive for ultra-violet powder that was
previously dusted on the money.57 She was later
detained at the WPD Headquarters.
HELD:
Complainant was able to prove by his testimony
in conjunction with the text messages from
respondent duly presented before the
Committee that the latter asked for One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a
favorable decision of the former’s pending case
with the CA. The text messages were properly
admitted by the Committee since the same are
now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence65 which provides:
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to
telephone conversations, text messages . . . and
other electronic forms of communication the
evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence, “Ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the
same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . .
.” In this case, complainant who was the recipient
of said messages and therefore had personal
knowledge thereof testified on their contents
and import. Respondent herself admitted that
the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s
cellphone from which the messages originated
was hers.66 Moreover, any doubt respondent
may have had as to the admissibility of the text
messages had been laid to rest when she and her
counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the
text messages between her and complainant.67 It
is also well to remember that in administrative
cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied.68 We have no doubt as to
the probative value of the text messages as
evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof
of respondent in this case.
When she was asked if she had sent the text
messages contained in complainant’s cellphone
and which reflected her cellphone number,
respondent admitted those that were not
incriminating but claimed she did not remember
those that clearly showed she was transacting
with complainant.
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R.
TIJING
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and
ANGELITA DIAMANTE
G.R. No. 125901. March 8, 2001]
Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have
six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr.,
who was born on April 27, 1989. Petitioner
Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of
private respondent Angelita Diamante.
According to Bienvenida, Angelita
went to her house to fetch her for an
urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was
on her way to do some marketing, she
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She
also left her four-month old son,
Edgardo, Jr., under her care. When Bienvenida
returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo,
Jr., were gone. She was told that her
employer went out for a stroll and was
told to come back later. She returned to
Angelita's house after three days, only to discover
that Angelita had moved to another place.
Bienvenida and her husband looked for
their missing son in other places. However,
despite their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.
Four years later, the spouses read in the tabloid about
the death of the common-law husband of the private
Page 88 of 93
respondent. Thus, they went to Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Nevertheless, private respondent refused to return the boy
, as the latter claimed that the he is not Edgardo , Jr. but her
own son. named John Thomas Lopez. Thus, the spouse
filed their petition for Habeas Corpus.
To substantiate their petition, petitioners
presented two witnesses. One is Benjamin Lopez,
who claimed that his brother is sterile and that
the latter even admitted to him that John Thomas
Lopez was only an adopted son. The spouses
Tijing also requested the Clinic where their son
was born to be their witness.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court
concluded that since Angelita and her common-
law husband could not have children, the alleged
birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.
The trial court also held that the minor and
Bienvenida showed strong facial
similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person who is the natural child of
petitioners. The petition for Habeas Corpus was
grabted and Angelita Diamante is ordered to
immediately release from her personal custody
minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over
and/or surrender his person to Edgardo A. Tijing
and Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately.
Nevertheless, upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence
this petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the
proper remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr.,
and John Thomas Lopez are one and
the same person and is the son of
petitioners and whether DNA
testing is necessary in this case?
Ruling:
Yes, The writ of habeas corpus is proper to
regain custody of said child.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child
even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be
said that in custody cases involving minors,
the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying
rationale for the availability of the writ as a
remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the
purpose of determining the right of custody
over a child. It must be stressed too that
in habeas corpus proceedings, the question
of identity is relevant and material, subject to
the usual presumptions including those as to
identity of the person.
In this case, the minors identity is crucial in
determining the propriety of the writ
sought. Thus, it must be resolved first
whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by
Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor
named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita
insists to be her offspring.
It is not the function of the Supreme Court to
examine and evaluate the probative value of
all evidence presented to the concerned
tribunal which formed the basis of its
impugned decision, resolution or order. But
since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals
contradict those of the trial court, they may
scrutinize the evidence on the record to
determine which findings should be
preferred as more conformable to the
evidentiary facts.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case
reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John
Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,
Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
In their decision it is added that the Courts
should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence in future as it
would be useful to all concerned in the
prompt resolution of parentage and identity
issues. Though it is not necessary in this case
to resort to DNA testing as the evidence
presented is already sufficient.
National Power Corporation v. Codilla, Jr.
520 SCRA 412, April 3, 2007
Page 89 of 93
Facts:
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel
of foreign registry owned and operated by private
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly
bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge
209 which was then moored at the Cebu
International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996,
petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint
for damages against private respondent Bangpai
Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on
petitioner’s power barges. Thereafter, petitioner
filed an Amended Complaint impleading herein
private respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as
additional defendant, contending that the latter
is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co. Wallem
Shipping, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss which was
subsequently denied by public respondent Judge.
Bangpai Shipping Co. likewise filed a Motion to
Dismiss which was also denied by public
respondent Judge.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during
the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of
evidence before the lower court consisting of
Exhibits “A” to “V” together with the sub-marked
portions thereof. Consequently, private
respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem
Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to
petitioner’s formal offer of evidence.
Subsequently, public respondent judge issued
the assailed order denying the admission and
excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits
“A,” “C,” “D,” “E,” “H” and its sub-markings, “I,”
“J” and its sub-markings, “K,” “L,” “M” and its sub-
markings, “N” and its sub-markings, “O,” “P” and
its sub-markings, “Q” and its sub-markings, “R”
and “S” and its sub-markings. According to the
Court: The record shows that the plaintiff has
been given every opportunity to present the
originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the
documents it offered. It never produced the
originals.
Upon denial of petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Court of Appeals
maintaining that public respondent Judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying the admission
of its Exhibits “A,” “C,” “D,” “E,” “H” and its sub-
markings, “I,” “J” and its sub-markings, “K,” “L,”
“M” and its sub-markings, “N” and its sub-
markings, “O,” “P” and its sub-markings, “Q” and
its submarkings, “R” and “S” and its sub-markings.
Thereafter, the appellate court issued a Decision
dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant
petition.
Issue: Whether or not photocopies are electronic
documents as contemplated in R.R. No. 8792 or
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on
Electronic Evidence?
Held:
No. An “electronic document” refers to
information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other models of written
expression, described or however represented,
by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved
and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. It includes digitally
signed documents and any printout, readable by
sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic
document.
The rules use the word “information” to
define an electronic document received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. This would
suggest that an electronic document is relevant
only in terms of the information contained
therein, similar to any other document which is
presented in evidence as proof of its contents.
However, what differentiates an electronic
document from a paper-based document is the
manner by which the information is processed;
clearly, the information contained in an
electronic document is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in
the photocopies submitted by petitioner will
reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as
the signatures of the persons who purportedly
signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. By no stretch of the
Page 90 of 93
imagination can a person’s signature affixed
manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence,
the argument of petitioner that since these paper
printouts were produced through an electronic
process, then these photocopies are electronic
documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not
preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having
thus declared that the offered photocopies are
not tantamount to electronic documents, it is
consequential that the same may not be
considered as the functional equivalent of their
original as decreed in the law.
People of the Philippines vs. Rufino
Umanito G.R. No. 172607 April 16, 2009 DNA
Evidence, Disputable presumption
OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS:
The instant case involved a charge of rape. The
accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape. The alleged 1989 rape of the private
complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy
and the birth of a child hereinafter identified as
“BBB.”
In view of that fact, as well as the defense of alibi
raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering
whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB.
With the advance in genetics and the availability
of new technology, it can now be determined
with reasonable certainty whether appellant is
the father of AAA’s child.
The DNA test result shall be simultaneously
disclosed to the parties in Court. The [NBI] is,
therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties
in advance the DNA test results. The [NBI] is
further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of
the DNA profiles and all results or other
information obtained from DNA testing and is
hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until
such time as the accused has been acquitted or
served his sentence.
The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood
stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB],
and Umanito, to determine whether or not
Umanito is the biological father of [BBB], showed
that there is a Complete Match in allof the 15 loci
tested between the alleles of Umanito and [BBB];
That based on the above findings, there is
a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito
is the biological father of BBB.
The defense admitted that if the value of the
Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there
shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether Umanito is the biological father of
[BBB].
RULING:
Court resolved, for the very first time, to
apply the then recently promulgated New Rules
on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules). The DNA testing
has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as
testified to by AAA, Umanito had fathered the
child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine
months after the day she said she was raped by
Umanito.
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted
andovercome by other evidence (Rule 131,
Section 3).
The disputable presumption that was established
as a result of the DNA testing was not
contradicted and overcome by other evidence
considering that the accused did not object to the
admission of the results of the DNA testing
(Exhibits “A” and “B” inclusive of sub-markings)
nor presented evidence to rebut the same.
By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is
deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC
and the Courtof Appeals finding him guilty of the
crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
Page 91 of 93
indemnification of the private complainant in the
sum of P50,000.00.
Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA
testing conforms with the conclusions of the
lower courts, and that no cause is presented for
us to deviate from the penalties imposed below,
the Court sees no reason to deny Umanito s
Motion to Withdraw Appeal.The instant case is
now CLOSED and TERMINATED.
51. G.R. No. 127745. April 22, 2003.*
FELICITO G. SANSON vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
Same; Testimonial Evidence; Hearsay
Rule; Exception; Dead Man’s Statute; The Dead
Man’s Statute renders incompetent certain
persons from testifying.—As for the
administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s
Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule
renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their
assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted. x x x The rule is exclusive and cannot
be construed to extend its scope by implication
so as to disqualify persons not mentioned
therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in
the above enumeration are not prohibited from
testifying as to a conversation or transaction
between the deceased and a third person, if he
took no active part therein. x x x
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What the Dead
Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of
testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose
before the death of the deceased.—In any event,
what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the
admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim
which arose before the death of the deceased.
The incompetency is confined to the giving of
testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson
and Celedonia are supported by checks-
documentary evidence, their claims can be
prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
On February 7, 1990, herein petitioner-appellant
Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as
creditor, filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City a petition, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 4497, for the settlement of the
estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the deceased) who
died on January 10, 1990. Sanson claimed that
the deceased was indebted to him in the amount
of P603,000.00 and to his sister Celedonia
Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of
P360,000.00.
Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr.
and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later
filed separate claims against the estate, alleging
that the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and
P150,000.00, respectively.
By Order of February 12, 1991, Branch 28 of the
Iloilo RTC to which the petition was raffled,
appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the
deceased, as administratrix of his estate,
following which she was issued letters of
administration.
During the hearing of the claims against the
estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola,
wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified
on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over
the objection of the administratrix who invoked
Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
otherwise known as the Dead Man’s Statute.
Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister
Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction
with the deceased which is evidenced by six
checks issued by him before his death; before the
deceased died, Celedonia tried to enforce
settlement of the checks from his (the
deceased’s) son Jeny who told her that his father
would settle them once he got well but he never
did; and after the death of the deceased,
Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for
payment but were dishonored due to the closure
of his account.
The administratrix, denying having any
knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the claims, nevertheless
alleged that if they ever existed, they had been
paid and extinguished, are usurious and illegal
and are, in any event, barred by prescription. And
she objected to the admission of the checks and
Page 92 of 93
check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are
the claimants upon the ground that the witnesses commonly family members or relatives of the
who testified thereon are disqualified under the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due
Dead Man’s Statute. to their apparent interest as a result of their
relationship to the parties, there would be a
Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits
dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In
identified by Jade, the administratrix asserted
any event, as will be discussed later,
that they are inadmissible because Jade is the
independently of the testimony of Jade, the
daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and wife of
claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on
claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is
the basis of their documentary evidence—the
covered by the above-said rule on
checks.
disqualification.
In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute
Issue:
proscribes is the admission
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose
NOT HOLDING THAT CLAIMANT[S’] EVIDENCE OF before the death of the deceased. The
THE CLAIM IS INCOMPETENT UNDER THE DEAD incompetency is confined to the giving of
MAN’S STATUTE, AND INADMISSIBLE testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson
and Celedonia are supported by checks-
HELD:
documentary evidence, their claims can be
The administratrix counters that the due prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
execution and authenticity of the checks-exhibits
WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996
of the Montinolas were not duly proven since
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
Jade did not categorically state that she saw the
ASIDE and another rendered ordering the
filling up and signing of the checks by the
intestate estate of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy,
deceased, hence, her testimony is self-serving;
through Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, to pay:
besides, as Jade had identical and unitary interest
with her husband and mother-in-law, her 1. 1)Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of
testimony was a circumvention of the Dead P603,500.00;
Man’s Statute.
2. 2)Celedonia S. Saquin, the amount of
As for the administratrix’s invocation of the Dead P315,000.00;33
Man’s Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The
3. 3)Angeles Montinola, the amount of
rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2)
P150,000.00; and
their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted. 4. 4)Eduardo Montinola, Jr., the amount of
P50,000.00. representing unsettled
xxx
checks issued by the deceased.
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to
extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify
persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses
who are not included in the above enumeration
are not prohibited from testifying as to a
conversation or transaction between the
deceased and a third person, if he took no active
part therein.

xxx

Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an

assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is
being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to
the transaction. In transactions similar to those

Page 93 of 93