DOCKET NO. COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF COCIAL SERVICES on behalf of F-28901-08/10B ELENA SVENSON, Petitioners, ORDER TO SHOW -againstCAUSE WITH TRO MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Respondent. Hon. Paula Hepner _____________________________________________________ Upon the annexed affidavit of Michael Krichevsky, duly sworn to on the 2010, and the papers annexed hereto, day of August,

LET the petitioner(s) or petitioners’ attorney(s), show cause before this Court at the Courthouse located at 330 Jay Street, Brooklyn, New York, on the day of August, 2010,

at 9:30 o'clock in the forenoon of that day, why an order pursuant to CPLR 6301 should not be made and entered: 1. To DECLAR that support order against respondent dated February 3, 2010 by magistrate John Fasone of Kings County Family Court is VOID on the grounds that it was obtained by actual fraud, fraud upon the court, perjury, misconduct, misrepresentation, witnesstempering, obstruction of justice and in absence of due process, as well as mistake of fact pursuant to CPLR 5241, and immediately order a new hearing in accordance with CPLR and Constitution. 2. As an alternative, to stay this order and income execution pending appeal and enter temporary support order of $315.90 per month based on Respondent’s current income from unemployment insurance benefits of $430 per week. IT APPEARING that a cause of action exists in favor of the respondent and that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damages will result unless the petitioners are restrained

before a hearing can be had; and it is, ORDERED, that pending the hearing of this application, the Petitioner(s) be and hereby is enjoined and restrained from engaging in the conduct complained of in the annexed moving papers. SUFFICIENT REASON APPEARING THEREFOR, let personal service of a copy of this Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraining Order, together with a copy of the papers upon which it was granted, upon the attorney(s) for the Petitioner(s) by office delivery pursuant to CPLR 2103(b)(3) on or before the ____ day of __________ 2010, be deemed good and sufficient service. ENTER ____________________________


MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 1. I am the Respondent in the action herein. 2. I reside at 4221 Atlantic Ave, Brooklyn, New York. 3. On 2.03.10 I was ordered to pay Petitioner $31,599.42 in arrears, petitioner’s attorney fees, about $700 per month for parties’ child health plan to pay to my employer in addition to $2045 in monthly child support while getting gross income of $4000 per month and respondent’s employer received income execution notice demanding $3067.50 payment for child support per month (Exhibit A). 4. This order would be impossible to comply with because after taxes respondent would have $3694 per month in disposable income (see copies of pay stabs in Exhibit B). If he tries to deduct from that amount $3067.50 plus $700 for child health care it would be more (3067.50 + $700 = 3767.50) than $3694 of respondent’s disposable income, not to mention that respondent has basic human needs too and no more than 65% would be

possible legally to deduct pursuant to Consumer Credit Protection Act Limitations on Withholdings for Support (15 U.S.C. 1673 (b)) 5. Temporary child support order was $627 per month calculated by magistrate John Fasone based on respondent’s $4000 per month gross income (Exhibit C).

Petitioner and her attorneys, Yoram Nakhimovsky, Michael Biancanello, and Yonatan Levoritz, in the name of the parties’ child welfare in concert engaged in malicious prosecution terrorizing respondent “as hired hit men.”


It started in 2008 with petitioner, at the advice of her attorney, Yoram Nakhimovsky, stealing respondent’s personal records, files, documents and electronic backup media, not to mention her attempts to provoke violence by, inter alia, looting respondent’s apartment on 4336 Manhattan Avenue in Brooklyn. Attached, as Exhibit D is witness affidavit.


It continued with Family Offence Petition falsely reporting family offence, child abuse and request for child support and ex parte order of protection on October 27, 2008. Petitioner falsified facts in her petition and during hearing, this petition was withdrawn before the court had any opportunity to rule, (Exhibit E).

9. By the end of the day after petitioner obtained this order of protection, she brought parties’ child at respondent’s place of work. They were so afraid of respondent that they started badmouthing respondent and harassing his employer, Harlan Wittenstein, Esq., by demanding that he fires respondent.

Next, Mr. Levoritz and petitioner committed fraud upon the court by filing fraudulent financial disclosure affidavits (Exhibit F) with the court. For example, in her


family offence petition (Exhibit E) she stated that due to Mr. Krichevky’s offence she and the child “temporary living in apartment her parents own” at 2620 Ocean Parkway in Brooklyn. She intentionally did not inform the court that her parents are decedents and she owns this apartment so that she could “show the court how miserable they are and how atrocious Mr. Krichevsky is”. To be consistent in her statements she and her attorney Mr. Levoritz intentionally and consistently with her prior statement did not list her 2620 Ocean Parkway cooperative apartment as “Other real estate owned” under II. ASSETS: e) of post-father financial disclosure affidavit, and lists parties 120 Oceana condominium as “Residence owned” under d) (Exhibit F). During child support hearing, she admitted that she does not live there, but collects $2825 in rent. She kept perjuring herself by continuing falsely testifying in court “She and child live in her parent’s apartment” rentfree. 11. She succeeded in her attempt to confuse the court and court wrote in Findings of Fact:” Court finds petitioner’s testimony does the court with respect to her other testimony regarding her present financial circumstances – i.e. that she presently resides in her parents’ apartment rent free and receives cash support from her sister in Germany.” 12. Testifying in Court that she is getting cash support from her sister in Germany is another perjury as her sister, Larissa Gaber, is on public assistance there.

Her attorney Mr. Levoritz obstructed justice through witness tampering by making her sister not to appear in court on January 6, 2010 after she was served with subpoena (Exhibit G).



In post-father financial affidavit, petitioner and her attorney state that with ZIRO assets her income is $2850 per month while expenses are over $4000. This fact was pointed out to magistrate John Fasone, but he “looked the other way”.

15. Mr. Levoritz and petitioner spoiled evidence by destroying and/or concealing (it is unknown which) unfavorable to them evidence. Petitioner and her attorney did not deny the fact that these documents were stolen from respondent by Svenson. (Exhibit H)

I am not surprised that 2003 income tax return was presented in 2009 to court “as latest income tax return” conveniently showing over $180,000 in income over respondent’s attorney objection that it is inadmissible. Respondent was prejudiced by not been able to present his current income tax information as well as to file his income tax returns on time.


This is how Mr. Levoritz used evidence spoilage to take advantage over Mr. Krichevsky during hearing and manipulated court’s opinion “that Mr. Krichevsky must be punished for atrocious conducts”:

Q. Why do you owe the IRS roughly 250 to $300,000? A. In 2001 it was --

THE COURT: She didn't file her taxes, counsel? MR. LEVORITZ: No, Your Honor, not at all. Fact, she was a dependent on the respondent's taxes. THE COURT: You have a document you want to offer that explains all this? MR. LEVORITZ: No. There is no one document that explains all this, your


Honor. There are many documents, and different places, and different time periods. But she was a dependent back in 2001, 2002, 2003, four and five of the respondent. And he was filling taxes on her behalf, which is one of the things that we would have gotten to in discovery, but never got there. 18.

Mr. Levoritz thought that all evidence was destroyed by stating: “Fact, she was a dependent on the respondent’s taxes…” It turns out that some evidence survived and points out to the fact contrary to Mr. Levoritz statement that her client did not file taxes in 2001 and was dependent on Mr. Krichevsky’s tax return. In fact, she did file her personal 2001 income tax form 1040A, but spent all her money and failed to pay tax when it was due. Attached as Exhibit I, copy of statement dated November 8, 2010 that she owes to IRS only $132,082.60 contrary to magnitude of their allegation of $ 250,000 - $300.000. This document was produced in Supreme Court action by petitioner’s attorney Mr. Biancanello to respondent’s attorney when it was convenient to them and in favor of Petitioner. By having two sets of “evidence and facts” for two different lawyers perjuriously stating different facts in different actions supported by different evidence, all of them committing abstraction of justice.

Here is another dirty lawyer’s trick: Q. Have you produced copies of your mortgage applications, as requested in this proceeding? A. No. THE COURT: Requested by who and when? MR. LEVORITZ: Requested by me on August 10, 2009, Your Honor.


MR. SINGER: Objection. (Inaudible) have been served. THE COURT: I'm sorry? MR. LEVORITZ: He objected to every single item I requested,bank statements, credit cards -MR. SINGER: For five years, Your Honor. What is this, for the entire history of the relationship?

19. Mr. Levoritz knew that I would not have a copy of my mortgage applications, bank statements, etc. from 2004. This is done to harass respondent and “to show the court how evasive Mr. Krichevsky is”. However, Mr. Levoritz did not ask 2009 “mortgage in default” notices from banks.

If respondent had a chance to file his 2006 income tax return, it would show $52,547 in income (Exhibit J) in contrast to 2005 income of $154,000. Then, based on the last income tax return that order of support would be at least 3 times smaller, and petitioner’s lawyer knew this.


Mr. Levoritz perjuriously testified (breaking the unsworn witness rule), inter alia, that respondent misreporting his income to court. He testified that respondent while reporting his income of $4000 a month is actually paying $10,000 in mortgage payments. He knew it was perjury because while these hearings were going on there were two foreclosure lawsuits pending in Kings County Supreme Court against respondent, one of which was also against petitioner, and Mr. Levoritz had copies of summonses (Exhibit K). Her lawyer, Michael Biancanello, who was handling her Supreme Court defense


action, was in possession of all documents as well.

Finally, Respondent presents blackmail note written in 2008 by Petitioner Svenson to Mr. Krichevsky (Exhibit L). It written in Russian with numerous grammar errors. I, Michael Krichevsky, under penalty of perjury certify that I translated this note to the best of my knowledge and ability: “I went to see lawyers and they told me that you doing money laundering. Three lawyers told me not to sell apartment (meaning parties condo). My parents supported me. (Next sentence I did not understand). We cannot stand each other. You want to kill me. I told every body that you want to kill me. All my friends know how you were waving your hands in front of my nose. I asked Elena for a copy of accountant contract, but she would not give it to me. I paid for everything.” This note sounds kind of “psychiatric”, but in the whole context of her malicious prosecution and verbal threats to report me to FBI and IRS shows her witness character.

23. There is also mistake of fact made during this proceeding. Respondent was paying $627 in temporary child support though SCU (Exhibit M) which was never accounted for in Final order of support.

Due to continuous harassment of respondent through 7 different law suits in different courts of Brooklyn , more than one year of malicious prosecution that caused a great deal of stress respondent’s work performance degraded. Inflicted emotional distress, numerous personal meetings with his lawyer and court appearances burned him out and prevented from working 60 - 80 hours per week as he used to before 2008. In the end, his employer got fed up and laid him off.


25. Now, respondent is receiving unemployment insurance benefits in the amount of $430 weekly. (Exhibit N) 26. Child Support Collection Unit rubs me off my benefits and takes 65%. I am left with $174.38 per week which is below federally set self support reserve of $14,620 and poverty income level of $10,830 ($174 x 52 weeks = $9,048). 27. This money is not enough to fulfill my basic human needs, not to mention to pay for car insurance, gasoline, utilities, etc.

I survive only with support of my friends, which cannot last forever.

29. If this situation continues I will loose my car and with it ability to find a job.

On May 3, 2010, respondent served petitioner with petition to modify his child support amount due to the fact that respondent lost his job.

31. Respondent informed petitioner that he is now collecting unemployment insurance benefits. 32. Petitioner appeared in court on May 13, 2010 alone and requested adjournment till August 12, 2010 “due to her attorney been booked”.

On May 19, 2010, respondent filed petition for custody and first appearance was set on June 14, 2010. All of a sudden, her lawyer Mr. Levoritz became available and appeared on this day, June 18 and June 30, 2010.


While been so busy, Mr. Levoritz fail to answer my petitions for modification and custody, and instead served me with petition for violating the court order for not paying ordered child support, even though petitioner notified respondent that he is unemployed.


On June 28, 2010 after custody hearing, which was adjourned till October 4, respondent’s attorney, Mr. Levoritz, approached respondent and “made him an offer he can not refuse”. The offer was: petitioner withdraws his custody petition in exchange for not sending me to jail, and arrears will be converted into money judgment. Rule of Professional conduct 3.4 - FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL states that a lawyer shall not: (e) present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.

This is just one of many other rules of professional conduct broken by “team plays” of Mr. Levoritz and Magistrate John Fasone.

WHEREFORE, respondent respectfully moves this Court to sign the annexed temporary restraining order, grant any relief in paragraphs 1 or 2 of OSC so that the status quo can be preserved until the parties have their day in court, and for such other and further relief as Interest of Justice for Pro Se respondent and this Court seems just and proper.

X________________________________ MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY

Sworn to before me this ___ day of July, 2010 _________________________



-againstMICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Respondent -----------------------------------------------------------------

___________________________________________________ JUDICIAL NOTICE, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WITH TRO ___________________________________________________

The documents herein are hereby certified pursuant to 25 NYCRR 130-1.1-A By: ________________________________

AGNOWLEGMENT OF IN-HAND SERVICE: In-Hand Service of the within document is hereby acknowledged on this _____ day of ________ 2010, at _________ am/pm

FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS _____________________________________________________ KINGS COUNTY SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT OF KINGS DOCKET NO. COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF COCIAL SERVICES on behalf of F-28901-08/10 ELENA SVENSON, Petitioners, JUDICIAL NOTICE -againstMICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Respondent. _____________________________________________________ Hon. Paula Hepner

COMES NOW, Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se, (Hereinafter “Respondent”)hereby respectfully moves this Court to take JUDICIAL NOTICE: The Courts have long held that Pro Se pleadings are to be read liberally and if there is relief available that they have failed to request, the Courts should be lenient and the Pro Se litigant should be afforded that available relief. Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1983) Reversed and Remanded which held: “[26] ‘a court should be particularly careful to ensure proper notice to a pro se litigant.’ Herron v. Beck, 693 F.2d at 127. See also Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1129 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding district court abused its discretion…failing to afford to a pro se civil rights litigant…” “[37] The pleadings of pro se litigants…subject to less stringent rules. ‘…, however inartfully drafted, must be held to less rigorous standards than…by lawyers.’ Woodall v. Foti, 651 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1981); see Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1981).” F.D.I.C. v. Hillcrest Assoc., 66 F.3d 566 (2d Cir. 1995) “reiterating general rule and outlining exception for pro se litigants…” “We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and construe them liberally.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) We give a "liberal" reading to pro se filings because those litigants lack formal legal training. See GJR Invs., 132 F.3d at 1369 ("Courts do and should show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the


benefit of a legal education."). In Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 09/17/2003) the Court held: “The law does not entertain the legal fiction that every individual has achieved a state of legal omniscience; … there is no presumption that all of the citizens actually know all of the law all of the time. Practically speaking, citizens must educate themselves about the law” See West Covina, 525 U.S. at 241, 119 S. Ct. at 682 (noting that an individual "can turn to these public sources to learn about the remedial procedures available to him"); id. at 242, 119 S. Ct. at 682 (noting that a citizen "could not reasonably be expected to educate himself about the procedures available to protect his interests"); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108, 105 S. Ct. 1785, 1799-1800 (1985)” Mr. Krichevsky, representing himself, invokes the doctrine of staire decisis and the United States Supreme Court’s Rulings and Rulings of other Appellate and Civil Courts concerning Pro Se pleadings and requests this Honorable Court take Judicial Notice: “Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers.” Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233 "Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers, which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment." Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938) "Where a plaintiff pleads pro se in a suit for protection of civil rights, the Court should endeavor to construe Plaintiff's Pleadings without regard to technicalities." Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, 151 F.2d. 240, Third Circuit Court of Appeals “Pro Se parties have the right to Appeal, and submit their briefs on appeal even though they may be inartfully drawn”, see Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d


354 (5th Cir. 1998). “Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigant’s consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result.” U. S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Moreover, “the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.” Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1971). The history of bias and prejudice against pro se litigants within the Courts is long. Stephen Elias who had been with Nolo Press, the nation’s leading publisher of self-help law books, back in 1997, in an article Bias Against Pro Per Litigants… stated: “From the moment they first contact the court system, most people who want to represent themselves, without a lawyer, encounter tremendous resistance. Within the closed universe of the courts, this bias is as pernicious as that based on race, ethnic origins or sex.” “People who cannot afford a lawyer are a rebuke to the organized bar’s monopoly…, because that monopoly is morally—if not legally—justified…the ABA has admitted that 100 million Americans can’t afford lawyers.” "... the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the constitution and laws." Elmore v. McCammon (1986) 640 F. Supp. 905

"We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2D 774 (CA2 1944)." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519. JUDICIAL NOTICE IN REGARD TO RESPONDENT’S CASE NEW YORK CPLR Rule 4514. Impeachment of witness by prior inconsistent statement: “In addition to impeachment in the manner permitted by common law, any party may introduce proof that any witness has made a prior statement inconsistent with his testimony if the statement was made in a writing subscribed by him or was made under oath. In this case,


Petitioner’s statement on Family Offence Petition and two financial disclosure affidavits, as well as her testimony during hearing are inconsistent and misleading:

On post-father disclosure affidavit petitioner claims zero cash and income of $2825 per month versus $4245 expense per month.


During hearing she testified that in 2009 she borrowed $10,000 from her sister, Larissa Gaber to pay her lawyers, and paid $5000 each to her attorneys Levoritz and Biancanello, while omitting the fact that before them she paid attorney Yoram Nakhimovsky who worked on her three different lawsuits against respondent for about six month.

Respondent served petitioner’s sister, Larissa Gaber, with witness subpoena. No excuse and/or notice was given to respondent by adverse party regarding unavailability of her for trial – missing witness charge and ground for MISTRIAL.

Petitioner’s attorney made the following statement on Page 70 (Exhibit A) line 2-7 of October 8, 2009 hearing: “Your Honor, unfortunately, in certain communities it does happen where nonlawyers actually own law firms, and it’s a lawyer that’s used as a front”. This is defamatory and racially discriminatory statement designed to influence bias and prejudice of court against respondent and the ground for MISTRIAL.

Hearing was forced before discovery completed, while motion was pending and respondent did not get his chance to depose petitioner. Violation of due process law, Constitution and ground for MISTRIAL


Supreme Court Decisions on Void Orders - Rulings made in violation of Due Process are void. A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections. The validity of a judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398. See also Restatements, Judgments ' 4(b). Prather v Lloyd, 86 Idaho 45, 382 P2d 910. The limitations inherent in the requirements of due process and equal protection of the law extend to judicial as well as political branches of government, so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228. A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded a valid adjudication, but may be entirely disregarded, or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. ... It is not entitled to enforcement ... All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. 30A Am Jur Judgments '' 44, 45. It is a fundamental doctrine of law that a party to be affected by a personal judgment must have his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 US 277, 29 L Ed 629, 6 S Ct 1194. Every person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard in a court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests, before he is affected by any judicial decision on the question. Earle v McVeigh, 91 US 503, 23 L Ed 398.

CONCLUSION Respondent is invoking his Rights and Immunities guaranteed him by both the State of


New York Constitution and The Constitution of The United States of America, and respectfully moves the Court to take Judicial Notice of staire decisis when ruling on respondent’s pro se pleadings. Respectfully submitted, this day of August, 2010, Brooklyn, New York

-------------------------------------------------Michel Krichevsky, PRO SE.


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